journal of Semitic Studies XXXV/2 Autumn 1990

SIBAWAIHI'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH'

ACCORDING TO Z A J j A j I :
A NEW INTERPRETATION

M. Y. SULEIMAN
EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY

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I. Introduction
It is generally agreed that the 'parts of speech' premise is one of
the most important elements in the Arabic linguistic tradition.
In the West, this premise has been recently studied by Weiss
(1976), Versteegh (1977) and Owens (1988), to mention but a
few. Weiss (ibid. p. 23), for example, points out that the
most fundamental classification of words recognized by the medieval
Arab grammarians is the well-known three-fold classification into
noun ('ism), verb (fi'l) and particle (harf). Said to have been first
enunciated in Islam by none other than the Caliph 'All, this classifica-
tion has remained to the present day a leading principle of Arabic
grammar and is regularly set forth in the opening pages of grammar
books still used in the Muslim East. Even the Wright-Caspari
grammar, taken still to be the classic Arabic grammar in English,
treats the three classes of words as 'parts of speech' ...'
The chief objective of this paper is to explore the status of
Slbawaihi's premise concerning the 'parts of speech' in Arabic,
as outlined at the beginning of his celebrated Kitdb, in the light
of the interpretation given to it by Zajjajl (d. 337 AH) in his
slim but influential work al-'Jddh ft 'Hal al-nabw. More specifi-
cally, our chief objective here is to investigate whether what we
have elected to call 'premise' at this early stage in the paper is,
in the final analysis, a hypothesis, theorem, definition, law,
postulate or axiom.
It might seem a little strange, at this early stage in the
1
Owens (1988, p. 125) agrees with the main thrust of this assertion:
'One of the best known precepts of Arabic grammar is the tri-partite
division of words into nouns ('asma'), verbs ('af-at) and particles (hurtij).
2
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 SlBAWAIHI'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH'

argument, to refer to such notions as 'theorem', 'postulate' and

'axiom', in the context of Arabic grammar, in view of the fact
that these notions are commonly associated with the Greek
mathematical sciences, particularly Euclidean geometry, in anti-
quity, and not with any of the disciplines that are commonly
and more directly linked with the Greek linguistic tradition. It
will, however, become clear that the notions mentioned in the
preceding paragraph specify a perspective which, in our view,
will enable us to reach a better understanding of ZajjajI's views
concerning Slbawaihi's premise as well as the intrinsic nature
and status of this premise as found in Slbawaihi's Kitdb.

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This paper has three further subsidiary objectives. Firstly, it
postulates the existence of a link between Classical Euclidean
geometry and the Arabic linguistic tradition, particularly as
developed by Arabic grammarians who came after Slbawaihi
and his immediate followers. To the best of our knowledge,
the existence of such a link has never been previously put
forward in the literature. As such, this paper may be construed
as providing fresh evidence in support of the less than
monolithic trend championed by Versteegh (1977) in more
recent times which posits a relationship, of one kind or
another, between Arabic linguistic thinking and the Greek
intellectual tradition. In dealing with this issue, Versteegh
{ibid.) emphasizes the contribution made by logic, Greek
empiricist medicine and the Greek as well as the Greek-based
Syriac grammatical traditions which obtained in the lands
conquered by the Arabs, as three seminal sources that had
decisively informed, albeit in varying degrees and in different
domains, the Arabic linguistic tradition. In his treatment of the
'parts of speech' in Arabic, Versteegh emphasizes the role
played by, especially, the Greek and Syriac grammatical tradi-
tions as factors in moulding the thinking of the early Arabic
grammarians concerning this phenomenon in their language.
Adopting or supporting the above trend does not, however,
imply a rejection of the alternative trend which posits a
relationship between the Islamic religious sciences and the
Arabic linguistic tradition. That the Islamic religious sciences
have exercised a crucial role in the formulation and develop-
ment of the Arabic linguistic tradition is a matter beyond
dispute, as has been painstakingly shown by Kopf (1956) and
Carter (1972). In our view, it is not inconsistent to claim that
both the Greek intellectual tradition and the Muslim religious
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 SIBAWAIHI'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH'

sciences had served as sources, in one form or another, for the

development of aspects of the Arabic linguistic tradition,
although differences of opinion may, understandably, arise
with regard to the extent of their respective contribution in
particular instances. Any polarization of views concerning the
issue under consideration here would not, in our opinion, do
justice to the variety of positions adopted by the Arabic
grammarians during the first few centuries of Arabic scholar-
ship.
The second subsidiary objective of this paper is to show that
the notion 'ilia in the Arabic linguistic tradition (see Suleiman,
1988) applies within a restricted domain. More specifically, the

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scope of this notion is not envisaged to include such premises
as the 'parts of speech' in Slbawaihi's model, owing to its status
as an initial statement (see below) in the theoretical/descriptive
edifice which constitutes what we have called, for the lack of a
better term, the Arabic linguistic tradition.
Thirdly, this paper purports to show the modernity of the
linguistic thinking of the Arabs, as reflected in the views
advocated by Zajjajl concerning Slbawaihi's 'parts of speech'
premise. Although Zajjajl refers to induction (istiqrd*) as one of
the methods employed by the Arabic grammarians, it is,
nevertheless, evident from the status of the 'parts of speech'
premise as an initial principle that induction is not the sole
procedure in Arabic linguistic thinking. This conclusion
applies directly to Slbawaihi's linguistic model, although it is
nowhere explicitly articulated in the Kitdb. The implication
of this conclusion is to deny the existence of a unique
and exclusive relationship between induction and empiricism,
as well as between the application of the former method
in linguistic description and the status of being scientific,
whatever that may be.

2. Parts of Speech in the Kitdb.

Sibawaihi opens his Kitdb with the famous statement in which
he specifies the 'parts of speech' in Arabic. In this section, we
shall first give Slbawaihi's specification almost in its entirety,
and, then, establish its salient features in order to set the scene
for the discussion in section 3 below. Sibawaihi states (I, 5):
Words in Arabic consist of noun, verb and particle which means
something not designated by a noun or a verb. The noun may be
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 SlBAWAlHI'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH'
exemplified by rajulun (man), farasun (mare) and ha'itun (wall). As for
the verb, it designates conjugations taken from the form of verbal
nouns, and constructed to refer to a past state, a future state ... and a
continuing state of affairs that has not been terminated. The con-
struction of the perfect verb may be exemplified by dhahaba (he
went), sami'a (he heard), makutha (he stayed) [illustrating the
patterns ja'ala, fa'ila and ja'ula respectively] and humida
(He was praised [illustrating the passive pattern fu'ila]. As for the
construction of what has not yet taken place, this may be exemplified
by the imperative, such as idhhab (go!), uqtul (kil\\) and idrib (hit!)
[illustrating the patterns ifal, uful and ifil respectively]. It may also
be exemplified by the indicative imperfect with a future meaning,
such nsyaqtu/u (he will M\W),yadhhabu (he will go),yadribu (he will hit)

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[illustrating the active patterns yafulu, jafalu and yafilu respecti-
vely] ; yuqtalu (he will be killed) and yudrabu (he will be hit)
[illustrating the passive pattern yufalu]. The same applies to the
construction of that which has not been terminated and which is still
in existence if you are making a statement.... As for that part of
speech which designates a meaning not designated by a noun or a
verb, this may be exemplified by tbumma (then), saw/a (futurity), the
wdw of oath or swearing, the prepositional prefix //- as well as other
prepositions.

A close examination of this reveals the following salient

features of Slbawaihi's premise. Firstly, Slbawaihi relies on a
mixture of elements in the delimitation of the three word-
classes he establishes in Arabic. Thus, he invokes what is
essentially a notional or conceptual consideration in delimiting
the 'particle'. Furthermore, this is carried out in a manner
which suggests that both the 'noun' and the 'verb' are
susceptible to notional delimitation, as is evident from the
'negative mode' adopted by Slbawaihi in delimiting the par-
ticle, although no such delimitation is given in the Kitdb. In
delimiting the verb, Slbawaihi also advances what is essentially
a morphological, or morphosyntactic, consideration, as is clear
from his reference to the states of the verb and the types of
conjugations subsumed under it. It may be worth pointing out
in passing here that the preceding suggestions for delimiting
'parts of speech' in Arabic agree, in principle, with the well-
known practice of the classical grammarians of Greece and
Rome. As such, Slbawaihi's position is open to the same sort of
criticisms that have been levelled by modern linguists against

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 SIBAWAIHI'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH'

the classical Western linguistic tradition (see Palmer, 1971;

Crystal, 1971).2
Secondly, Slbawaihi's procedure for delimiting 'parts of
speech' in Arabic employs exemplification as a means for fixing
the meanings of the three word classes it establishes. This is
most clearly reflected in the specification of the noun which, in
the Kitdb, is neither notionally nor morpho-syntactically defi-
ned, although these two modes of delimiting it are, in prin-
ciple, available to Slbawaihi.3
Thirdly, Slbawaihi offers no empirical evidence or 'rational

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2
In his study of'parts of speech' in Arabic, Weiss (1976) observes that
the Arabic grammarians employed two different methods which he calls the
descriptive method and the rational method. According to him {ibid., p. 23),
the descriptive method 'placed the emphasis on observed features {'alamat,
khasa'is) of the parts of speech, features noted as a result of an inductive
{istiqra'i) examination of specimens, mostly literary, of "pure" Arabic, i.e.
the kalam al-Arab.' He characterizes the rational method as follows {ibid.,
p. 24): 'The term rational indicates that the method is non-empirical and
non-investigative; it relies rather upon categories arising from pure reflec-
tion which form a logically complete set, i.e. which admit of no further
categories.' Broadly speaking, the descriptive method is an intrinsically
linguistic one, while the rational method is a conceptually or notionally
orientated one.
3
In dealing with word classes in Arabic, Owens (1988, p. 125) observes
that the 'very first grammarians (e.g. Slbawaihi) simply assumed these
divisions and illustrated them with examples without specifying the charac-
teristics of each. Among later grammarians ... considerable attention was
given to identifying the defining properties of each class. In justifying this
classification Arabic grammarians drew on arguments from all levels of
analysis phonological, morphological and semantic' Owens {ibid.,
p. 128) also points out that 'in searching for formal and semantic parame-
ters for classifying words [the Arabic grammarians] had to find characteris-
tics which were unique only to the members of that class'. He goes on to
argue that, when considered against this restriction, the criteria provided by
the Arabic grammarians for defining word classes do not fully succeed in
achieving their objective. To illustrate this conclusion, he gives {ibid.,
p. 129) two general contexts in which the criteria fail:
(a) 'while the criteria work in the clear cases, there are on the other hand
sub-classes of items they do not work for, as the Arabic grammarians were
well aware. For example, the "verb" habbadhd (how nice) lacks all the
morphological characteristics of verbs. There are nouns which cannot occur
with the definite article and the indefinite -n (the pronouns) ...'; and
(b) 'there are criteria which succeed only in distinguishing one of the three
classes against one of the other two, but not against both. For instance, not
only nouns, but also particles (e.g. definite article) have a non-temporal
meaning, and like verbs, particles do not refer to individuals ...'.
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 SIBAWAIHI'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH'

proof,4 to support the validity of his premise which sets out the
'parts of speech' in Arabic. More specifically, Slbawaihi omits
to give any empirical or rational support in favour of his claim
that 'parts of speech' in Arabic are three only, and not, say, two
or four. The significance of this feature, as well as that of the
previous one, will become clear later in this paper.

3. Parts of Speech in Slbawaihi: Zajjdji's Interpretation

We have mentioned at the beginning of section 1 that ZajjajI's
views concerning Slbawaihi's 'parts of speech' premise in
Arabic are set out in his 'Iddh. Zajjajl begins the first chapter of

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this work by indicating that the grammarians are fully agreed
on Slbawaihi's tripartite division of Arabic speech into noun,
verb and particle. This is followed by a discussion in the form
of a debate between two parties of scholars: those who accept
Slbawaihi's premise versus those who question its 'truth' or
'validity'. We shall call these two groups, for the lack of better
terms, the 'proponents' and the 'opponents', respectively.
Considering what Zajjajl says about the full agreement
{'ijmd') of the grammarians on Slbawaihi's premise, the 'op-
ponents' are either a fictional group of grammarians {nahwiyyuri)
or a group of non-grammarians, most probably scholastic
theologians. Be that as it may, what matters here is the nature
of the arguments advanced by each party of scholars. In the
debate under consideration here, Zajjajl belongs to the first
group, i.e. the 'proponents'.
The 'opponents' commence the debate by pointing out that
Slbawaihi offers no conclusive evidence or compelling argu-
ment in support of his 'parts of speech' premise. Slbawaihi,
they argue, merely states his tripartite classification of words,
providing examples of the word classes recognized therein:
'Slbawaihi exemplified each part of speech, but did not
associate these parts with any conclusive evidence or argument
which demonstrates that speech consists of three parts only ...
or that it does not divide into four, five or more parts' {'tddh,
41). By unquestioningly accepting Slbawaihi's premise, so
charge the 'opponents', the 'proponents' replace reliance on
empirical evidence or 'rational proof in grammatical investiga-

4
The term 'proof is used in this paper in a loose sense and not in the
technical sense.
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 SIBAWAIHI'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH1

tion by the force of 'argument from authority', thus subverting

the nature of nahw as an empirical and rational discipline.
In responding to the charges put forward by the 'op-
ponents', Zajjajl, in his capacity as a self-appointed spokesman
for the 'proponents', advances a variety of counter-arguments.
He approaches his first counter-argument indirectly by
mentioning two types of human knowledge which he later
employs as a frame of reference for dealing with the status of
Slbawaihi's parts of speech' premise. Zajjajl states that certain
things are known intuitively {bi badihati al-'aqli) without the
intervention of proof or recourse to external evidential support

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bi ghayri burhdnin wa-ld dalllin (p. 42). The following are
examples of such items of human knowledge according to
Zajjajl. Human beings 'intuitively know' that the same body in
the physical world cannot be both motionless and in a state of
motion at one and the same time. Similarly, human beings
'intuitively know' that the same object cannot be in two
different places at one and the same time. Using a modern
formulation, knowledge of this type may be said to be intrinsi-
cally characterized by 'intellectual self-evidence'. Furthermore,
each such item of human knowledge may be regarded as a
'given', and, therefore, it may be used as a basis for securing
further knowledge about problematical and inaccessible pheno-
mena : bihdyustadallu 'aid al-musbkali al-mulbasi wa-al-ghdmidi al-
khafiyyi.
Intellectual self-evidence may also be predicated of other
types of human knowledge, not because they are immediately
knowable or acceptable by the participants in the field or fields
of knowledge concerned, but because whatever means are
employed in unravelling such knowledge are characterized by
clarity and accessibility as well as by being generally agreed
upon and easily understood: wa mina al-'ashyd'i mdju'rafu bi al-
dald'ili al-wddihati al-qaribati al-muttafaqi 'alaihd allati Id tashkulu
'aid 'ahadin hattd taqiima maqdma mdju'rafu badihatan bi ghayri
istidldlin (p. 42). Such items of human knowledge may be
regarded as 'givens' and, therefore, used as initial statements in
their relevant disciplines.
ZajjajI's intention behind mentioning these two types of
human knowledge is clear: he wishes to assert that Slbawaihi's
premise concerning 'parts of speech' in Arabic is characterized
by intellectual self-evidence, of the one type or the other, and,
therefore, it must be treated as a 'given' within the framework
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 SlBAWAIHI'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH'

of Sibawaihi's model which constitutes the very heart of Arabic

grammar (nahw). As such, the acceptance of Sibawaihi's premise
by the 'disciples' cannot, contrary to what the 'opposition'
assert, be solely said to rely on the force of 'argument from
authority' or on the acceptance of a convention {taqlid). In fact,
it is said by Zajjajl to rely on 'study' {bahtti) and 'reflection'

The reference to 'study' and 'reflection' by Zajjajl is signifi-

cant. It gives an indication of ZajjajI's view concerning the
nature of Sibawaihi's premise, namely, that it imparts informa-
tion which belongs to the second type of human knowledge

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outlined above. This conclusion on the part of Zajjajl is also
evident from the fact that he goes on to show, by means of a
'rational argument', that Arabic speech consists of precisely the
three types of word-class recognized by Sibawaihi in his
premise, and that the existence of a further 'part' is a priori
ruled out. Although ZajjajI's argument is not sufficiently clear
in parts, we shall, nevertheless, state it here in order to give the
reader a full picture of the issue in hand (p. 42):
[Since in normal communication by means of speech] the addressee
{mukhdtab), the addressor {mukhdtib), that about which things are
reported {mukhbar 'anha) and that which is reported {mukhbar bihi) are.
objects and accidents {'asmd'un wd 'a'rddun) represented in the utte-
rance by their names ('asmd*), it follows that the report (kbabar) is
different from that which is reported/to which the report is relayed
{mukhbar) and that about which things are reported {mukhbar 'anhu),
the latter being subsumed under the noun {ism). The report {kbabar)
as well as whatever is derived from it or contains its semantic force is
a verb ifi't). ... It is inevitable that there should be a bond {ribdf)
between them: this is the particle {harf). As a fourth type of meaning
is not possible, a fourth part of speech is a priori ruled out. This is
what Sibawaihi means by saying that words consists of noun, verb,
and particle {wa-hadhd ma'nd qawli Sibawaihi al-kalimu ismun wafi'lun
waharfun).

The purpose of ZajjajI's argument is patently obvious: it is

to unpack the intellectually self-evident element in Sibawaihi's
assertion that Arabic speech consists of noun, verb and particle.
Clarity, however, cannot be attributed to the content of this
argument, with the result that it cannot be said to be either
easily understandable or immediately acceptable. Consequently,
Zajjajl may be criticized for having failed to satisfy the criteria
which he himself set for the type of arguments which can be
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 SlBAWAlHl'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH'

adduced to evince the intellectually self-evident component in

the second type of human knowledge which he recognizes.
This, however, does not drastically alter the conclusion that
SIbawaihi's 'parts of speech' is seen by Zajjajl as imparting
information which falls within the scope of the second type of
intellectually self-evident knowledge.
Zajjajl offers two further counter-arguments in defence of
the 'proponents' in their acceptance of SIbawaihi's premise.
Although these two counter-arguments are not, strictly spea-
king, central to the position of the 'proponents', we shall state
them here for the sake of completeness and because they give
us an indication of the range of arguments and mode of

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argumentation employed by the Arab grammarians in their
discipline.
The first subsidiary counter-argument belongs to the variety
of arguments which invoke the weight of authority as a
consideration in supporting the positions that the arguments in
question are supposed to promote or defend. Basically, this
boils down to saying that 'pedigree' is not an irrelevant
consideration in accepting a certain premise or position. Thus
it is not unreasonable to accept a certain premise, in a given
field, on the grounds that it was promulgated or expounded by
(a) scholar(s) who is/are recognized as (an) undisputed leader(s)
in his/their field(s) of investigation, although the premise
concerned, for one reason or another, might not have been
fully tested. In the light of this exposition, we may interpret
Zajjajl's reference to the presumed role of'AIT b. Abl Talib in
enunciating the 'parts of speech' premise as an attempt on the
part of this grammarian to bolster SIbawaihi's position, by
invoking the authority which flows from 'All's status in Muslim
life and, more importantly, the Arabic linguistic sciences. In
other words, ZajjajI's reference to 'All as the originator of the
'parts of speech' premise may be viewed as an attempt to claim
that this premise has a 'respectable pedigree', thus conferring
upon it a degree of respectability or, even, legitimacy.
The second counter-argument has two elements. On the one
hand, it throws down the gauntlet to the 'opponents' by
inviting them to show that Arabic speech contains linguistic
entities which cannot be subsumed under the different parts of
speech recognized by Slbawaihi. In other words, the first
element boils down to saying that the onus is on the
'opponents' to falsify SIbawaihi's premise - a task which
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 SIBAWAIM'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH'

Zajjajl declares to be impossible. On the other hand, the

counter-argument under consideration here erects what might
be called a 'protective belt' around Slbawaihi's premise, decla-
ring, in an almost legalistic manner, that the mere occurrence
of doubt does not in itself constitute sufficient grounds for
rejecting that which has long been held to be true {al-shukiiku Id
tadfa'u al-haqd'iqd). Consequently, the 'proponents' are seen by
Zajjajl to be justified in holding to Slbawaihi's premise and in
dismissing the thesis of the 'opponents' because it does not
amount to anything more solid than unwarranted doubt.
Having defended the position of the 'proponents' against the
criticisms directed towards them by the 'opponents', Zajjajl,

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who might not be speaking on behalf of the disciples at this
stage in the 'Iddh, turns his attention to what he regards as an
important feature of Slbawaihi's premise, namely its linguistic
universality. According to Zajjajl, the universality of Slbawai-
hi's premise follows from its property of being an intellectually
self-evident principle. It is also borne out by the evidence
drawn from languages other than Arabic Clddh: p. 45):
We have considered the applicability of [Slbawaihi's premise] in
languages other than Arabic and found that these languages adhere
to it. The speech produced by their speakers entirely subdivides into
noun, verb and particle, and it hardly contains a fourth type of
meaning (ma'nan).
Although Zajjajl gives no indication of the languages which
he investigated, and although the last part of the last sentence
in the above quotation is not as categorical as the first part of
the same sentence in favour of the universality thesis, there is
no doubt that Zajjajl regards this thesis as a characteristic
feature of Slbawaihi's premise. The significance of this feature
will become clear later in this paper.

4. The Status of Slbawaihi's Premise

The chief properties of Slbawaihi's premise according to Zajjajl
are its intellectual self-evidence and its universality, although,
with respect to the latter property, Slbawaihi restricts himself
to Arabic speech only in the Kitab. One important consequence
readily follows from the intellectual self-evidence of Slbawaihi's
premise, namely that it lacks any 'logical source' or 'origin' in
the sense that it cannot be shown to be derived from any prior

254
 SIBAWAIHI'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH'

set of observational statements. Another property of Sibawai-

hi's premise which has been mentioned in section 2 above is its
reliance on exemplification as a chief procedure in fixing the
meanings of the parts of speech it recognizes.
Let us now consider the status of Sibawaihi's premise against
this background, i.e. whether it is a hypothesis, theorem,
definition, law, axiom or postulate. In this connection, the
following conclusions may be offered:

(a) Sibawaihi's premise cannot be regarded as a hypothesis in

the technical sense because of its intellectual self-evidence. It, is

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therefore, not open to empirical refutation by confronting it
with counter examples from the field of phenomena which lie
within its scope, i.e. Arabic speech. By the same token,
Sibawaihi's premise cannot be regarded as a law in its relevant
domain of discourse, for the simple reason that all laws remain
in principle hypothetical in nature, regardless of their degree of
certainty, logical or otherwise.

(b) Sibawaihi's premise cannot be regarded as a theorem in the

logical sense because of its status as an initial statement in
Sibawaihi's grammatical model. Witness the fact that Slbawaihi
begins his Kitdb with this premise. Put differently, because
Sibawaihi's premise cannot be shown to be deductively inferred
from another logically prior statement, or set of statements, in
its relevant domain, this premise cannot be regarded as a
theorem.

(c) Sibawaihi's premise cannot be regarded as a definition

proper because it does not fully and precisely spell out the
meanings of the terms it contains. Rather, it largely relies on
notional considerations and on exemplification (section 2 or
above) in fixing the meanings of the terms concerned. This
explains the reason why we have previously referred to Siba-
waihi's attempt to fix the meanings of the terms 'noun', 'verb'
and 'particle' as delimitation and not definition. The fact that
Slbawaihi does not properly define his parts of speech, but
treats them as more or less primitive notions, is highly signifi-
cant because it fully accords with ZajjajI's view of Sibawaihi's
premise as an intellectually self-evident statement or a 'given'.

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 SlBAWAIHl'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH'

(d) By a process of elimination, SIbawaihi's premise must be

regarded as either an axiom or a postulate, in the Classical
Euclidean understanding of these two terms.5 However, owing
to the fact that axioms and postulates are thought to have
certain features in common within the framework mentioned in
the preceding sentence, we shall first outline their common
properties, and the implications which follow from them, in the
light of what Proclus says about axioms and postulates in his A
Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's Elements (1970).
Proclus {ibid., p. 140) states that it is a 'common character of
axioms and postulates alike that they do not require proof or

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geometrical evidence but are taken as known and used as
starting points for what follows'. The following consequences
follow from this characterization of axioms and definitions:

(i) axioms and postulates, by virtue of being 'known', are

not open to empirical refutation;
(ii) Axioms and postulates have no 'logical source' or 'ori-
gin' in the sense outlined at the beginning of this section,
owing to their properties of being both 'known' and 'initial'
statements;
(iii) the terms which axioms and postulates contain must, by
implication, be viewed as primitive terms; and
(iv) owing to their 'givenness', primacy and the primitive
status of the terms they contain, axioms and postulates perform
an important function in their relevant disciplines, namely, they
preclude the occurrence of infinite regress in the chain of
reasoning in the discipline concerned. As Blanche points out in
his discussion of Euclidean geometry (1962, p. 1): 'If demonstra-
tion is to be a finite procedure, it must be based on some given
initial proposition ...'.

Now, a brief comparison of the properties of SIbawaihi's

premise as established at the beginning of. this section
with the characterization of axioms and postulates as given by
Proclus including the implications which follow from them,
reveals that SIbawaihi's premise largely answers the understan-
ding of axioms and postulates in Euclidean geometry.

5
Examples of 'axiom' and 'postulate' will be given later in this section.

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 SIBAWAIHI'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH'

(e) Despite their similarities, however, axioms and postulates

are different types of statement which cannot be easily and
straightforwardly distinguished from each other.6 In order
to establish whether Slbawaihi's premise is an axiom or a
postulate, we shall first outline the difference between these
two types of statement by reference to Proclus' Commentary.
According to Proclus, the difference between axiom and postu-
late may be characterized in the following three ways:

(i) '...axioms take for granted things that are immediately

evident to our knowledge and easily grasped by our untaught
understandings, whereas in a postulate we ask leave to assume

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something that can easily be brought about or devised, not
requiring any labour of thought for its acceptance nor any
complex construction' (p. 140);
(ii) '... a postulate prescribes that we construct or provide
some simple or easily grasped object for the exhibition of a
character, while an axiom asserts some inherent attribute that is
known to one's auditors such as that fire is hot, or some
other quite evident truth about which we say that they who are
in doubt lack sense organs or must be prodded to use them. So
a postulate has the same character as an axiom but differs
from it in the manner described. For each of them is an
undemonstrable starting-point, one in one way, the other in the
other' (p. 142); and,
(iii) 'Aristotle ... maintains that a postulate is demonstrable
and, even though not accepted by the learner, can still be
taken as a starting point, whereas the axiom is as such
indemonstrable and everyone would be disposed to accept it,
even though some might dispute it for the sake of argument'
(p. 143).

Broadly speaking, the above characterizations of the diffe-

rence between axiom and postulate fall into two groups. On
the one hand, the first two characterizations regard the diffe-
rence between axiom and postulate as more a matter of
degree than of kind; axioms are immediately acceptable, while
postulates may require some form of exposition to reveal their

6
Witness the fact that whereas 'all right angles are equal to one another'
is regarded as an axiom by some scholars, it is regarded as a postulate by
others.

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 SIBAWAIHI'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH'

intellectual self-evidence, which property is not in dispute. On

the other hand, the third characterization treats the difference
between axiom and postulate as more a matter of kind than of
degree; an axiom requires no demonstration while a postulate
does. Although it is not our intention to deal with the
difference between axiom and postulate any further here, it is
perhaps worth pointing out that this difference relates to the
fact that axioms tend to be of a general nature, while postulates
are invariably tied to a particular discipline. Thus, in Euclid's
Elements 'Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to
one another' is an axiom, while 'a circle may be described from
any centre, at any distance from that centre' is a postulate.7

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Let us now deal with ZajjajI's view of the status of Slbawai-
hi's premise in the light of what has been said so far under
point (e). Slbawaihi's premise is characterized by the following
important feature under ZajjajI's interpretation. Although it is
marked by intellectual self-evidence, some sort of exposition is
still required to evince this property (see section 3 above).
This is clear from the fact that Zajjajl views the information
imparted by this premise as belonging to the second type of
human knowledge which he establishes in his 'Jddh. It is also
clear from the fact that Zajjajl deems it necessary to offer a
'demonstration' of the 'truth' of Slbawaihi's premise by means
of some kind of 'rational proof.
Now, if we consider this property of Slbawaihi's premise in
terms of what has been said above vis-a-vis the difference
between axiom and postulate, it becomes evident that the
premise in question assumes, under ZajjajI's interpretation, the
character of a postulate, and not an axiom.

5. Final Comments
To say that Slbawaihi's premise, under ZajjajI's interpretation,
is a postulate, in no way implies that Slbawaihi's grammatical
model is regarded as a postulational system by Zajjajl or that it
can be established as such in terms of its essential nature. It
takes more, much more, than the mere presence of one or two
postulates in a grammatical model for the model in question to
begin to be considered as a postulational or axiomatic system

7
See The Elements of Euclid (1933) for the axioms and postulates on pp. 5
and 6 respectively.

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 SIBAWAIHI'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH'
8
proper. The paradigm example of an axiomatic system in
Greek learning is Euclidean geometry. Judged against this
yardstick, Sibawaihi's grammatical model cannot be legitima-
tely regarded as a postulational system. It is also worth
pointing out here that the establishment of Sibawaihi's premise
as a postulate, both under ZajjajI's interpretation and in terms
of its essential nature, in no way implies that Slbawaihi thought
of his premise as a postulate and/or intended it to be under-
stood in this capacity by other scholars. This, however, does
not mean that one cannot legitimately ask the question as to
whether Sibawaihi's premise is, by virtue of its intrinsic nature,
a postulate. As a matter of fact, this paper addresses this very

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issue in an attempt to offer a reasoned analysis of it.
However, what is of significance in this connection is the
following. If we accept the conclusion that Sibawaihi's 'parts of
speech' premise, both as viewed by Zajjajl and in terms of its
essential character in the Kitdb, is a postulate, and if, in
addition, we take into consideration the fact that the Arabic
grammarians, particularly during ZajjajI's time, were working
in a milieu in which the Greek sciences, including mathematics
and its daughter discipline geometry, had been making their
presence increasingly felt via translations and commentaries, (if
we accept these two points), then it does not seem to be
unreasonable to posit the existence of a link, whether direct or
indirect, between the Arabic linguistic tradition and classical,
Euclidean geometry. One may go even further and put forward
the conjecture that ZajjajI's linguistic thinking seems to have
been informed, in one way or another, by classical geometry.
Although we have no direct material evidence to substantiate
these two claims, particularly the second one, they nevertheless
strike us as cogent and plausible.
Taking cognizance of the fact that the preceding chain of
arguments is crucially based on the validity of the claim that
Sibawaihi's premise lacks a 'logical source' i.e. contains an
'untraceable element' in the Popperian sense it may be
necessary to point out, in anticipation of two obvious lines of
counter-argument, that the validity of the claim concerned
cannot be seriously challenged by either or both of the follo-
wing two conditions:

8
For this point the reader may refer to Blanche (1962).
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 SlBAWAIHl'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH'

(i) Slbawaihi's premise is largely based on both the Greek

and Greek-inspired Syriac grammatical traditions. As such,
Slbawaihi's premise has a historical source. Consequently, the
question as to whether or not this premise has a 'logical source'
does not arise within the context of Slbawaihi's grammatical
model; and/or
(ii) Slbawaihi's premise is inductively based.
With respect to the first contention, the case for the over-
whelming material dependence of Slbawaihi's premise on the
Western Classical linguistic approach is yet to be fully and
convincingly made. It is our view that some of the evidence
found in the large number of studies which set out to support

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this case is, at best, 'circumstantial', and, in certain instances,
can be re-interpreted in a manner which weakens this case.
However, that Slbawaihi may, in one way or another, have
been informed by the Greek and Latin linguistic tradition is
not an unwarranted suggestion. In other words, while we do
not wish to deny that Slbawaihi may have been informed by
the Greek and Latin grammatical tradition, we cannot accept
the contention that Slbawaihi's premise is so overwhelmingly
based on this tradition that it can be said to have a historical
source. Consequently, it is not illegitimate to ask whether
Slbawaihi's premise has a logical source within the grammatical
framework proposed by Slbawaihi in his Kitdb. We may go
further here and say that even if Slbawaihi's premise had a
historical source, it would still be legitimate to ask whether this
premise has a logical source, albeit that the investigation in this
instance would be shifted from examining whether or not
Slbawaihi's premise has a 'logical source' to the presence or
absence of such a source for the 'historical source' which
underlies Slbawaihi's premise.
The second contention may be easily disposed of by pointing
out that the Kitdb cannot be legitimately said to be able to
sustain the view that Slbawaihi's premise was inductively
derived, in the technical sense of the term 'induction', from
observations recording the occurrence of 'relevant' features in
Arabic speech phenomena. In saying this, however, we do not
wish to claim that observation played no part in the setting up
of Slbawaihi's premise (considering the nature of scientific
inquiry, such a claim would be totally absurd). This boils down
to saying that, while observation played a part in the setting up
of Slbawaihi's premise, this premise cannot be said to be
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 SIBAWAIHI'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH'

inductively based on, or derived from, observations of Arabic

speech phenomena. Consequently, we must reject the validity
of the second contention above as an argument against our
view that Slbawaihi's premise lacks a 'logical source'.
The recognition that Slbawaihi's premise cannot be legitima-
tely said to be inductively derived from a limited but well-
circumscribed set of prior observational statements is an impor-
tant result of this study. This is so because it serves as a basis
for showing the modernity of Slbawaihi's views from the
standpoint of what Pateman (1987) calls the philosophy of
linguistics, i.e. the underlying epistemological, ontological
and methodological considerations which underpin the pro-

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nouncements of modern linguists concerning the nature and
scope of their discipline.
In his introduction to New Horizons in Linguistics (2), Lyons
(1987) deals with the fundamental question 'What is Linguis-
tics?'. He observes that modern linguistics has performed an
almost complete turn about in its interpretation of the pair of
terms 'science' and 'scientific', shedding its earlier strong
inductive predilections in favour of a decidedly deductive
outlook. He writes (ibid., p. 2):
Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, when linguistics came to
be established as an independent discipline in an increasing number
of universities in several parts of the world, it was dominated bv
what may be called the inductive view of science
Against this view, one may argue that certain theoretical assump-
tions, however inchoate and inexplicit, must of necessity accompany
the selection and description of the data: that not only description
but even observation is to a greater or lesser degree 'theory laden'.
... If this is so ... there is no reason why these assumptions and
expectations should not be given full theoretical recognition from
the outset and used in the construction of a theory ... we may refer
to this alternative view of the nature of scientific theory the deductive
(or hypothetico-deductive) view.
He further adds (p. 3):
The inductive approach is no longer as strongly represented in the
standard textbooks of linguistics as it used to be. From about the
mid-1960s the deductive approach has been gaining ground. ... by
now, however, it is all but universally accepted ... that the purely
inductive view is untenable.
We have quoted Lyons at length here because the extent and
implications of the shift from an inductive to a deductive view

261
 SlBAWAIHI'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH"

of the philosophy of linguistics has not been fully appreciated

in the field of Arabic linguistics, particularly among modern
Arab linguists. Witness the fact that Hassan (1982), who is
generally and deservedly regarded as one of the leading linguists
in the Arab world, still defines 'science' and 'scientific', in the
framework of modern linguistics, in terms of induction. More
importantly, however, Hassan uses this formulation as a
springboard to show that Arabic grammar is 'inductivist' and,
by virtue of its coincidence with modern linguistics on this
level, is characterized by modernity. In terms of Hassan's
approach, Slbawaihi's premise would not be regarded as a
'scientific' principle within the framework of Arabic grammar.

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However, if we base ourselves on Lyons, and if, in addition,
we concentrate on the property of Slbawaihi's premise as a
statement which lacks a 'logical source', then it more or less
readily follows that Slbawaihi's premise can be easily defended
against the charge of being unscientific from the inductivist
view point. We can go even further here and state that, by
virtue of its deductivist or hypothetico-deductivist orientation,
Slbawaihi's premise emerges as a thoroughly modern principle
in terms of its underlying epistemological foundations.
The recognition of Slbawaihi's premise as a postulate
more particularly as a self-evident statement or 'given'
adequately explains why this premise is ultimately excluded from
the scope of the notion 'ilia (cause) in Arabic linguistic thinking,
as is obvious in the 'Iddh. It stands to reason that a grammatical
proposition which is characterized by intellectual self-evidence
does not require any 'ilia to account for the occurrence of what
it asserts in Arabic speech phenomena. Thus while it would be
illegitimate to ask why Arabic speech subdivides into noun,
verb and,particle, it would be both acceptable and valid to ask
why inna and its 'sisters' require a subject in the accusative and
a predicate in the nominative as, for example, in 'inna Zaidan-
qa'imun (Zaid is indeed standing). The usual answer that inna
and its 'sisters' resemble a transitive verb whose object has
preceded its subject as, for example, in darabani 'akhuka (your
brother hit me) is said to constitute the 'ilia of the morpho-
syntactic peculiarity of the 'case' markings assumed by the
subject of 'inna and its predicate.
Finally, the universality of Slbawaihi's premise, under Zajja-
jfs interpretation, must be viewed in terms of the status of this
premise as a postulate. Considering what we have said towards
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 SIBAWAIHI'S 'PARTS OF SPEECH'

the end of the previous section, about the restriction of

postulates to particular disciplines, it is worth pointing out the
obvious here, namely, that the universality of Slbawaihi's
premise is linguistic in nature. In other words, the view that
Slbawaihi's premise is universal boils down to saying that it
is capable' of applying to all human languages adequately.
Whether this is the case or not does not concern us here.

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