N.B. This is a single case.

I opted to divide it into two in order to show how the Supreme Court dealt first
with the procedural aspect of the case which eventually led to their ruling on the substantive aspect.
Concentrate on the procedural aspect as it is here where the Court discoursed upon a constitutionally
mandated function of the Judiciary.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS
G.R. nos. 176951, 177499, 178056, 21 December 2009
608 SCRA 637

CASE: Procedure regarding tie-votes in the Court en banc. (Procedural Law)

Velasco Jr., J.:

FACTS:

In 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court granted the petitions and declared the
cityhood laws unconstitutional. The Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the
petitions and nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being violative of the
Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article X and the equal protection clause.

Thereafter, respondents in the case moved to reconsider. However, a divided Court

denied their motion on 31 March 2009.

A second motion for reconsideration by a respondent was filed. By a vote of 6-6,

the Court dismissed their motion on 28 April 2009 for lack of merit and absence
of a majority vote.

On 14 May 2009, a motion to amend the 28 April Resolution was filed by the
respondents.

On 2 June 2009, the Court issued a resolution declaring the May 14, 2009 motion
adverted to as expunged in light of the entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009.
Immediately, LGUs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2,
2009.

In view of this incident, the Court observed the following:

1) the initial motion to reconsider the November 18, 2008 Decision raised new and
substantial issues, inclusive of the matter of the correctness of the factual premises
upon which the said decision was predicated;
(2) the May 14, 2009 motion which mainly argued that a tie vote is inadequate to
declare a law unconstitutional remains unresolved;

(3) Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, all cases involving the constitutionality
of a law shall be heard by the Court en banc and decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the required vote set forth in the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII
is limited only to the initial vote on the petition or also to the subsequent voting
on the motion for reconsideration.

HELD:

Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, as couched, exacts a majority vote in the determination of a case
involving the constitutionality of a statute, without distinguishing whether such
determination is made on the main petition or thereafter on a motion for
reconsideration. This is as it should be, for, to borrow from the late Justice Ricardo
J. Francisco: x x x [E]ven assuming x x x that the constitutional requirement on the
concurrence of the majority was initially reached in the x x x ponencia, the same is
inconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a motion for reconsideration.
As to the required votes, All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law shall be heard by the Supreme Court
en banc, x x x shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon. (Emphasis added.) Webster defines majority as a number greater than half
of a total.[13] In plain language, this means 50% plus one.

In Lambino v. Commission on Elections, Justice, now Chief Justice, Puno, in a

separate opinion, expressed the view that a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a
majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value.

The respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009.

is GRANTED by the Court through a vote of 6-4.

Likewise, the respondents 14 May 2009 motion to consider the second motion for
reconsideration of the 18 November 2008 Decision as unresolved is GRANTED.
Thus, the second motion for reconsideration is also GRANTED.
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. nos. 176951, 177499, 178056, 21 December 2009
608 SCRA 637

CASE: Petitions to declare Cityhood Laws Unconstitutional and for Violation of

Equal Protection Clause. (Substantive Law)

Velasco Jr., J.:

FACTS:

During the 11th Congress, 57 cityhood bills were filed before the House of
Representatives. 33 out of these 57 bills, became laws. The remaining 24 were not
acted upon.

RA 9009 (formerly Senate Bill 2157, signed 30 June 2001) amended Sec. 450 of the
1991 Local Government Code (LGC) this amendment increased the average
annual locally generated income requirement from PhP 20 million to PhP 100
million to qualify a municipality to be converted into a city.

After RA 9009 took effect, the Lower House of the 12th Congress adopted a
Resolution that sought to exempt the 24 municipalities not acted upon by the
previous Congress. The 12th Congress ended without action on that said resolution.

The 13th Congress once again re-adopted the said resolution and forwarded it to the
Senate for approval. The latter however failed to approve it.

Sen. Pimentel, Jr. said that passing such resolution would allow a wholesale
exemption from the income requirement required under RA 9009. Thus, he
suggested that the House file individual bills that pave the way for municipalities to
become cities then forward them to the Senate for proper action. 16 municipalities
heeded the senators advice and filed individual cityhood bills. Common to these
16 bills was a provision exempting the municipality from the PhP 100 million
income requirement.

Both Houses of Congress approved the individual cityhood bills, and eventually
lapsed into a law. Each cityhood law, directed COMELEC to conduct plebiscite
within 30 days for its approval to determine whether the voters approve of the
conversion.

Petitioners seeks to declare the cityhood laws unconstitutional for violation of Sec.
10, Art X of the 1987 Constitution, as well as the equal protection clause.

ISSUE/S:

WHETHER OR NOT, the cityhood bills are unconstitutional on the following

grounds:
a.) violation of Sec. 10, Art X of the 1987 Constitution.
b.) violation of the equal-protection clause.

HELD:

In 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court granted the petitions and declared the
cityhood laws unconstitutional. The Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the
petitions and nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being violative of the
Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article X and the equal protection clause.

However, after granting the respondents second motion for reconsideration, the
Court is disposed to reconsider.

NO. The following cityhood laws do not violate Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987
Constitution. This provision states: No province, city, municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected. While the Constitution speaks of the Local Government
Code, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let
alone the LGC of 1991 Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter,
Congress can, via either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject
enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be
embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to
ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity. Petitioners contention that
Congress must follow the criteria set in the LGC and not in any other law is illogical
and does not persuade the Court. Furthermore, it can be inferred from the Senate
deliberations on S.B. 2157 (now RA 9009), that the meant to (1) exempt the pending
cityhood bills from the PhP 100 million income requirement; and (2) insofar as
cityhood bills are concerned, RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect.
NO. The following cityhood laws does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. The equal protection clause prohibits undue favor as well as hostile
discrimination. Hence, a law need not operate with equal force on all persons or
things to be conformable with Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution.1 Petitioners cannot
invoke this clause of the Constitution precisely because no deprivation of property
results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws.

In view of the foregoing, the court ABANDONS and SETS ASIDE the Decision of
18 November 2008.

PETITIONS DISMISSED.

1
Sec. 1, Art. III No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.