................................................................................

................................................................................3
........................................................................................3
............................................................................5
................................................................................6

................................................................................7
........................................................................7
................................................................................9

..........................................................13
..........................................................................13
......................................................................16
..................................................17
..............................................................18

......................................................................................20
................................................................21
....................................................................................................25
............................................................................................26

WTO

lose-lose

1
http://w2kdmz1.moea.gov.tw/user/news/detail-1.asp?kind=&id=2464

()

6,528

2006511
71.7728.23

()

9295
2

()

()

LPG

2
14 1
2006 1 155
3
2

()

(
)

99%

() OECD

(/)

()

2003 12 30
2004 41.24

2003 OECD

4

()

(conscious parallelism)

(Cartel)
(concerted practice)(Tacit
Collusion)

(credible threat)

(interdependence)

20

()
()

()

()

()

()

()

()

4
( 093102 )

()

()

()

931014

14650

()

Ethly case 1984

FTC

(Dupont)

()

5
093102

650 http://www.cpctmtd.com.tw

(converge)

()

Stigler(1964)6

6
George Stigler 1964 (Journal of Political Economy,
44-61) A Theory of Oligopoly
3 (1)

10


()

10

()

()

()

(2)(3)
3 (
) 1970

7
093102

11


()

12


Harrington (2005) 8(collusive markers)

(1)

(2)(3)
(4)(5)

Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M., Luke M. Froeb, John Geweke, and Christopher

T.Taylor (2005) 9A Variance Screen for Collusion,

Block, Michael K.,

Frederick C. Nold, and Joseph G. Sidak(1981) The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust
Enforcement,

( 91 8 92 1 )

8
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Detecting Cartels, Johns Hopkins University, July 2005.
9
Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M., Luke M. Froeb, John Geweke, and Christopher T.Taylor, A Variance
Screen for Collusion, FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 275, March 2005.

13


W. Bentley MacLeod198510A Theory of Conscious Parallelism

Deneckere and Kovenock (1992)

11

Borensitein Shepard (1996)4373

(panel data)

Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982)

12

MacLeod (1985)

13

10
MacLeod, W.Bentley (1985), A Theory of Conscious Parallelism, European Economic
Review,27:25-44
11
13 1
2005 1 6061
12
13 1 2005 1
96
13
13 1 2005 1
99

14


Harrington and Chen200414

(random walk)

14
Harrington, Joseph E. Jr. and Joe Chen, Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and
Endogenous Buyer Detection, Johns Hopkins University, April 2004 (International Journal of
Industrial Organization, forthcoming)

15


2002 2004 20

15
16

15
70% 30%
16

16

(conscious parallelism)17

91
4 93 9 ()

91 4 92 4
91 8 92 1
95 92 0.2

91 4 93 9
( 93 10 95 2 )

17
Macleod (1985), A Theory of Conscious Parallelism,
European Economic Review, Vol. 27, pp.25-44.

17
 91 4 93 9

H()L()
1(H,H)=2(H,H)1(L,H)=2(H,L)1(H,L)=
2(L,H)1(L,L)=2(L,L)

1(L,H)1(H,H)1(L,L)1(H,L)a
bcd
2
H L
(b,b) (d,a)
H
1
(a,d) (c,c)
L

18
 Player1
Player2 Player1
HPlayer2 H
L Player2 H Plaer1
H() Player2 L Plaer1
H L

1
H L
2 2
H L L
1 1 1

H H L L

(b,b) (d,a) (c,c) (c,c)

backward induction subgame perfect equilibrium Player1

HPlayer2 H Player3
H

19


20


95 92

90.12.08.00 15.617 14.517 11.9227

15.617 14.517 11.9227 *

90.11.17.00 16.617 15.517 12.4227

16.617 15.517 12.4227 *

90.06.29.23 16.917 15.817 12.7227

90.06.30.00

16.917 15.817 12.7227

1 91.06.01.00 15.617 14.517 11.9227

15.617 14.517 11.4227

2 91.08.20.00 16.617 15.517 12.4227

(
16.417 15.317 12.3227 )

3 91.09.27.00 17.017 15.917 13.0227

16.817 15.717 12.9227 ()

4 91.10.26.00 17.417 16.717 14.0227

17.217 16.517 13.9227 ()

5 91.12.28.00 17.717 17.017 14.2227

17.517 16.817 14.1227 ()

6 92.01.09.00 18.217 17.517 14.4227

18.017 17.317 14.3227 ()

7 92.01.16.00

17.517 16.817 14.1227

21
8 92.02.22.00 19.017 18.317 15.1227

*
(
19.017 18.317 15.1227 )

9 92.04.04.00 18.017 17.317 14.6227

18.017 17.317 14.6227 () *

10 92.04.14.22 17.217 16.517 14.0227 15

14
22
17.217 16.517 14.0627

11 92.07.08.00 17.217 16.517 13.0227

17.217 16.517 12.8227 ()

12 92.08.09.00 18.217 17.517 13.6227

18.217 17.517 13.6227 () *

13 92.09.20.00 17.717 17.017 13.4227

17.717 17.017 13.4227 () *

14 92.11.01.00 17.217 16.517 13.2227

17.217 16.517 13.2227 () *

15 92.12.17.00 17.717 17.017 13.5227

17.717 17.017 13.5227 () *

16 93.01.07.00 18.217 17.517 13.7227

18.217 15.517 13.7227 () *

17 93.01.16.00 19.017 18.317 14.5227 1

(
19.017 18.317 14.5227 ) *

18 93.3.25.00 19.617 18.917 15.1227

()

22
19 93.03.26.00

19.617 18.917 15.1227

20 93.07.16.00 20.017 19.317 15.6227 15 19

16
15 20
(
20.017 19.317 15.6227 ) *

21 93.09.22.00 20.617 19.917 16.6227 0.7

0.6
20.617 19.917 16.6227 *

93.12.30.22 20.317 19.617 16.6227

93.12.30.00

20.317 19.617 16.6227

94.03.10 (17 ) 21.317 20.617 17.6227

20.317 20.617 17.6227

94.08.02.18 22.817 22.117 19.1227

94.08.31.17

25.217 24.517 21.1227

94.10.24.10

22.017 21.317 20.1227

94.10.24.12 22.017 21.317 19.1227

95.02.14.12 23.017 22.317 20.1227

23
 95.02.14.17

23.017 22.317 20.1227

(NT$)

0.3332 ()

24
 ( 2006/05/27)

663 26.3%

153 6.1%

114 4.5%

95 3.8%

84 3.3%

81 3.2%

68 2.7%

49 1.9%

29 1.2%

26 1.0%

25 1.0%

12 0.5%

12 0.5%

12 0.5%

1096 43.5%

2519 100.0%

25


18

1.

I.

II.

III.

IV.

2.

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

3.

18
http://www.ftc.gov.tw/

26


19

1.

2.

3.

19
http://www.moeaboe.gov.tw/laws/oil/l_oil_01.asp?group=g

27