TKE IDEOLOGY AND LOGIC OF SCIENTISM

by

DAVID JAMES HARDING

M.A., U n i v e r s i t y of S a s k a t c h e w a n J S a s k a t o o n , 1965

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR TKE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

i n the D e p a r t m e n t

of

P o l i t i c a l Science, Sociology and Anthropology

@ DAVID JADES HARDING, 1 9 7 0

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

JANUARY, 1 9 7 0
 APPROVAL

Nnmc: David James liarding

Dagraa: Doctor of Philosophy .

T i t l e of Dissartntion: Tho Ideology and Logic of Scionrism

-
Examining Committee :

>

(G
Senior Supervisor

1.'

' (F.B. ~klinge)

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i . Examining Committee

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jfr6wn)
- 1
r

~xarninidgCommit tee

L,

($fc;'*'~aniEi%i
Examining Commit tee

Department of Sociology
University of California
Santa Barbara,aCalifornia
 - iii -
,

Abstract

The assumption t h a t science i s exclusive of ideology i s presently funda-

mental t o m o s t research and teaching i n t h e s o c i a l sciences. An evaluation of

t h i s assumption c o n s t i t u t e s t h e proper study of t h i s thesis. An examination of

t h e ~ r o b l e mof ideology, t h a t is, t h e way a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l arrangement of s c i -

ence predisposes us t o deal with p a r t i c u l a r "paradigms", which a r e assoc i a t e d with

p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l consequences, exposes t h e r h e t o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r of

t h i s assumption. Furthermore, it i s shown t h a t an erroneous understanding of t h e

philosophy of t h e physical sciences complements t h e r h e t o r i c a l separation of s c i -

ence f'rom ideology. Once s c i e n t i f i c " f a c t s " , "theoryt', etc. a r e demystified and

s i t u a t e d w i t h i n t h e h i s t o r i c a l development of p a r t i c u l a r paradigms, t h e relevance

of t h e problem of ideology f o r a l l science i s recognized.

On t h e b a s i s of t h e above argument, t h e implications of t h e problem of

ideology f o r problems of logic i n t h e s o c i a l sciences a r e discussed. An examina-

t i o n of formal t h e o r i e s of logic shows t h a t they function t o r e i n f o r c e t h e rhe-

t o r i c a l s e p a r a t i o n of science from ideology, and, a s such, t o obscure t h e ide-

o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n of d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s of knowledge. Eecause formal approaches

t o l o g i c a b s t r a c t both method and theory from t h e context and consequences of par-

t i c u l a r forms of knowledge, they cannot account f o r t h e implications of t h e problem

of ideology f o r logic. Once we replace formal, idealized approaches t o logic with

a pragmatic working logic which has t h e t a s k of assessing arguments rooted i n ongo-

ing inquiry and subject mattcr, we can undertake inquiry which accounts f o r t h e

problem of ideology.
 F i n a l l y it i s argued t h a t a r e i f i c a t i o n of lawuage underlies t h e formal,

idealized approaches t o logic. When language i s s i t u a t e d i n human praxis and t h e

meaning of knowledge i s approached i n terms of t h i s , t h e dichotomies between ob-

j e c t i v e and subjective, theory and p r a c t i c e , f a c t and value which a r e implied by

t h e r h e t o r i c a l separation of science from ideology a r e exposed a s o n t o l o g i c a l a

p r i o r i e s which impede ongoing inquiry i n t o human behavior and experience. The

s t r u c t u r e and function of t h e u n i v e r s i t y i s then examined t o determine t h e r o o t s

and consequences of these dichotomies. It i s argued t h a t they complement t h e

function of t h e u n i v e r s i t y within t h e p o l i t i c a l economy of s t a t e capitalism. It

i s f u r t h e r argued t h a t a schizoid praxis c h a r a c t e r i z e s academia and t h a t t h i s i s

f'undamental t o t h e development of what i s c a l l e d t h e i d e o l o g y d looffic of scien-

a m . Wthemnore, because academics teach and research i n terms of t h e s e dichot-

omies, they a r e unable t o concepti~alizet h e s t r u c t u r a l problems of our s o c i e t y or

t h e i r own place within them. The p o s s i b i l i t y of reforming t h e u n i v e r s i t y t o be-

come c e n t e r s of such pragmatic inquiry while t h e s t r u c t u r e s of s t a t e capitalism

e x i s t i s ,rejected.

The study deals c r i t i c a l l y with t h e ideas of K. Marx, F. Engels, K. Mann-

heim, I.L. ~ o r o w i t z : J. Schumpeter, G. Bergmann, T. Kuhn, I. Berlin, A. Rapoport,

H. Marcuse, C.W. Mills, J - P S a r t r e , M. Weber, J. Bronowski, E. Durkheim, K. Popper,

S. Toulmin, F. Kaufmann, P. Winch, E. Sapir, B. Wharf, G.H. Mead, A. Bentley, J.

Dewey, R.D. Laing, T. Veblen, P. Goodman, M. Lerner, J. Porter, J. Galbraith and

others.
 Table of Contents

Tne Inchworm and The Hoptoad ........................................ i

Examining Committee ...................................................... ii

Abstract ...........e.............................................iii
In5rodu~tion

SECTION ONE: THE PROBIXM OF IDEOLOGY,

Chapter One: Ideology a s False an1 t Ideas:

----
Marx and Engels ........-.................................7
Ideology and t h e Division of Labour: .................... 7
Ideology and Epistemology: ..............................
Ideology and Revolution: ................................ 18

Footnotes: .............................................. 23

Chapter Two: Ideology a s a General and Total Problem:

Mannheim .............................................. 26

The Sociology of Knowledge ............................... 2.7

Distinctions Within t h e Sociology of Knowledge .......... 31

ManWeimls Evaluative Epistemology ...................... 35

On Mannheimls Contradictions ............................ 40
Footnotes ............................................... 46
Chapter Three:

The Personification of Ideology ......................... 50

 Sociologism A s Ideology ............................... 55

On Horowitzts Contradictions .......................... 59

Footnotes ............................................. 70

Chapter Four: Ideology a s Pre-Analysis: Schumpeter .................. 73

......................... 74
Schumpeter's C r i t i q u e of Marx

................................
.
Schumpeterls Obscurity 78

Schumpeter s Scientism ................................ 81

Footnotes .......................................... 86

Chapter Five: Ideology a s Disguised Values: Bergmann ................ 88

The Logical Analysis of Ideology ...................... 88/

Logic as Ideology ..................................... 95

Footnotes ............................................. 98

. Chapter Six:
7-
Ideology and t h e Natural Sciences: Kuhn ............... 100

.................
The Mystification o f S c i e n t i f i c Rules 101

The Need For Epistemological Reform ................... 105

................
The Character of S c i e n t i s t i c Education 110

The Rationalization of Scientism ...................... 113

Paradigms and t h e Problem of Ideology ................. 117

Footnotes ..............................................123
Chapter Seven: Ideology a s Articulated P o l i t i c a l ConClict:
Berlin ................................................ 126

Ideological Models .................................... 127

 .. vii .

.............
P o l i t i c a l Conflict and Ideological Models 132

Footnotes ............................................. 135

Chapter Eight: Ideology a s a Struggle Between c l a s s e s of

Problems: Rapoport ................................... 137

Ideological Struggle and t h e Problem of

Ideology ..............................................
.
137

............................
I n t e l l e c t u a l s and Ideology 142

Footnotes ............................................. 146

Chapter Nine: ..........

The T o t a l i t a r i a n i z a t i o n of Ideology: Marcuse 148

Ideology and Advanced Industrialisrn ................... 149

The Ideology of Descriptiveness ....................... 151

......................
S t r u c t u r a l Analysis and Ideology 154

Footnotes .......................................... 157

Chapter Ten: The End of t h e End-of-Ideology: ............
C.W. Mllls 158

The Rise and F a l l of Ideology ......................... 158

Mills1 Typology of Ideology ........................... 162

Footnotes .............................................167
Chapter Eleven: ............................170
Ideology a s Praxis: S a r t r e

Existentialism a s Ideology ............................ 170

Vulgar Marxism and PosStivisrn ......................... 174

...................................
S a r t r e ' s Pragmatism 183

Ideology a s a Project ................................. 186

Footnotes ........................................... 199

 .v i i i .
I

..
SECTION TWO: THE PROBLEM OF LOGIC

Chapter Twelve: A Neutral Logic: Weber ......................... 194

Dichotomies and- Contradictions ................. 194

................... 198
I n t e r p r e t a t i v e Understanding

I d e a l Types and Ideology....................... 202

The Value-Free Doctrine and t h e

University ..................................... 206

Social Policy and Ideology ..................... 212

Doctrine Becomes Dogma ......................... 217

Academic and Pragmatic Logic I n

Weber .......................................... 220

Bootnotes ...................................... 227

Chapter Thirteen: A Humanist Logic: Bronowski .................... 234

The Context of Science ......................... 234

The Habit of Truth ............................. 236

...............
The Myth of t h e " I s " and "ought" 238

Footnotes ...................................... 243

Chapter Fourteen: An Authoritarian Logic : Durkheim ............... 246

The Study of Social Facts as Ideology .......... 246

Logical Rules a s Ideological Rules:

1 .Rules
of Observation ....................... 248
2 .
Rules f o r Distinguishing t h e Normal
and Pathological ........................... 255
...................
3 .Rules f o r C l a s s i f i c a t i o n 259
4 .Rules f o r Explanation ...................... 261
.
5 Rules f o r Establishing Proof ............... 267

Scientism and Authoritarianism ................. 269

 Footnotes ........................................ 272

Chapter F i f t e e n : A Polemical Logic: Popper .......................... 277

Formal and Pragmatic C r i t i c i s l n ..................... 277

Anti-Naturalist Historicism:
1 .Methods i n t h e S o c i a l and Natural
Sciences .......................................279
2 .E s s e n t i a l i s m versus Nominalism ................. 281
Pro-Naturalist Historicism: The Problem of
Historical Prediction .............................. 282

.........
C r i t i c i s m s of Anti-Naturalist Historicism: 286

2 .Popperls ~olitics
......................
1 .Scientism and H i s t o r i c i s m
..............................
286
289
3 .A P r i o r i Arguments and Scientism............... 291

..........
C r i t i c i s m s of Pro-Naturalist Historicism: 294
1 .Laws. Trends and Causes ........................
2 .Hypothetico-Deductive Models and
294

Individualism .................................. 301

3 .O b j e c t i v i t y and
Knowledge ......................................
t h e S ~ i o l o g yof
305

Footnotes .......................................... 309

Chapter Sixteen: Logic a s Argument: Toulmin ......................... 318

s
S c i e n t i f i c Discovery: Toulminl Rejection
of Scientism. ....................................... 318

S c i e n t i f i c Laws: A Pragmatic View of

Explanation ........................................ 323

S c i e n t i f i c ~ h e o r i e s : Demystif ying t h e Notion

of Cause ........................................... 327

Determinism: The Myth of Scientism .................. 329

Logic a s Argument:
1 .The J u s t i f i c a t o r y Task of Logic ................ 331
 2 .The
Layout of Arguments ........................ 332
3 .The .............
F a l l a c i e s of S y l l o g i s t i c Logic 336
4 .
Substantial Arguments and Ideology ............. 341
.
5 Formal Logic and t h e S c i e n t i s t i c Myth
of Determinism .................................. 345
6 .
Idealized and Working Logic .................... 347
7 .Comparative Epistemological Analysis ........... 351

Footnotes .......................................... 353

Chapter Seventeen: A Rule-Centered Logic: Kaufmann .................... 359

Matters of Fact and Matters of Meaning ............. 359

Reforming Traditional Logic: KauAnannls
" ~ a s l cRules....................................... 364

Kaufmannl s Sc ientism............................... 367

The Unity of Method ................................ 369

Values a s Analytlc Statements ...................... 372

Issues i n t h e Social Sciences ...................... 373

1 .The Natural and ................
Social Sciences 373
2
3
.
Behaviorism and
.
Social Facts
..................
Introspection
................................... 375
376
.
4 Social Laws
.
5 Objectivity and
.....................................
.....
378

.
6 Value Problems
.
7 Economic Theory
.................................
t h e Sociology of Knowledge

....................
and Science
380
383
387

The Dilemma of Kaufmann~sMethodology .............. 388

Footnotes .......................................... 393

Chapter Eighteen: A Schizoid Logic: Winch ............................ 398

The S p l i t Between Thought and Reality .............. 398

Sociologlcal and Epistemological Rules ............. 400

The Disunity of Method and Scientism ............... 402

 Idealized and Working Logic ......................... 406

Academic Reductionism and Schizoid Logic ............ 410

Footnotes ........................................... 414

Chapter Nineteen: Language and Logic: Mead ............................418

The Heuristic Character of Language ................. 420

Science and Linguistics ............................. 424

Reified Linguistics ................................. 429

Language and Pragmatic Logic:

1
2
.Behaviorism and Epistemology
.Formal Logic and Ongoing Activity
....................
............... 433
435
3 . ......
The Generalized Other and S c i e n t i f i c Rules
4
5
.
.
The Social F i e l d of Science
Ideology and Language
.....................
...........................
438
440
445

Footnotes ........................................... 446

Chapter Twenty: Ideology and Inquiry: Dewey .......................... 452

Formal and Pragmatic Logic .......................... 454

The Dichotomies of Scientism:

.
1 Objective and Subjective ........................ 459
2 .Theory and P r a c t i c e
.
3 Fact and Value
.............................
.................................. 463

4 .
Ideology and Inquiry ............................ 470
494

Footnotes ........................................... 496

SECTION THREE: THE PROBLEM OF EDUCATION_

Chapter Twenty-one: The University and t h e Ideology and Logic of

Scientism ........................................... 506

Studying t h e Obvious:
1 .The Boundaries of Academia ...................... 509
 2 .The Schizoid Praxis of Academia .................. 513
3 .The Tautology of Milieux and Structure ........... 518
4 .The Business-Like Control of t h e University ...... 524
Academic Freedom a s Repressive Tolerance ............. 527

Structure a s Function: The P o l i t i c a l Economy of

t h e University....................................... 530

Myths About t h e University........................... 537

Radical and Conservative Critiques of t h e

University ........................................... 5'43

...............
P o l i t i c s and Logic i n t h e Multiversity 549

Pragmatic Inquiry and Social Change .................. 559

Footnotes ...........................................565
Bibliography ..............................................................576
 - kiii -

Acknowledgements

Though t h e conception of problems, t h e approach and t h e writing of t h i s

study i s a r e f l e c t i o n of my own praxis, t h i s study was a cooperative project. I

t h e r e f o r e want t o thank t h e t h e s i s committee, Frank Collenge, Gary Rush, Fred

Brown, and, a t an e a r l i e r stage, T.B. Bottomore, f o r t h e i r assistance. I want

t o mention t h a t rapping with Fred Brown m a farm outside Vancouver, e s p e c i a l l y

about pragmatism and p o l i t i c s , helped me t o i n t e g r a t e my i n c l i n a t i o n s and under-

t a k e t h e study.

I n p a r t i c u l a r , I want t o mention those with whom I: have l i v e d who helped

me wlth t h i s study. Bob Ludl3w, Sandi Hackler, Arthur Milner, Nora Thorson, Ron

Davis, John Braun and Colin Condit a l l made suggestions about my d r a f t s which have

helped me f a c e and begin t o solve my problems wlth language and communication.

Fiona K a r l s t e d t , who typed t h e t h e s i s and suggested and made corrections, should be

considered a co-author. Without labour t h a t makes writing i n t e l l i g i b l e and share-

a b l e , t h e r e can be no knowledge. To destroy t h e mystique around science and ensure

t h a t knowledge (along with other s o c i a l and economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s ) become humanized

we must begin t o challenge t h e academic ego, most o f t e n expressed a s male chauvinism,

t h a t complements a l i e n a t e d and e x p l o i t a t i v e i n t e l l e c t u a l work.

Since t h i s study has r o o t s i n my past, it i s a l s o worth mentioning those who

have e s p e c i a l l y influenced my thinking. Duncan Blewett of Regina Campus, Dan Sydiaha

of Saskatoon Campus, Hube Wilson of Princeton University and Fred Brown of Simon

Fraser University have a l l helped t o ruptllre my thinking a t a t h e when I was ready

 - xiv -

t o expand my perspective on t h e s o c i a l sciences.

I want t o dedicate t h e study t o Reece Hardirg who w i l l be f i v e i n September.

He kept asking me when I would be f i n i s h e d "your phesis", and I always wondered

whether t h e time spent on it would, i n any small way, r e l a t e t o t h e making of t h e

s o c i a l - s c i e n t i f i c revolution required i f he and h i s f r i e n d s a r e t o be a b l e t o look

t o t h e i r flxture without t h e f e a r s and hopelessness t h a t my generation generates.

I f it does not then ny tlme would have been b e t t e r spent wlth Reece.

F i n a l l y I want t o thank t+ members of t h e I.W.W., No. 620, Vancouver,

B.C. f o r l e t t i n g us use t h e i r (and our) o f f i c e f o r typing t h i s t h e s i s .

 The fnchworm and The Hoptoad

In bureaucratic social science -

of which
abstracted empiricism i s the most suitable '

t o o l and grand theory the accompanying lack

of theory - the whole social science endeav-
or has been pinned down t o the services of
prevailing authorities. -C. Wrighe Mills.

The inchworm procedures a r e chaotic and hebe-

phrenic. They lead t o piecemeal assemblies of
material. They win scant respect. The hoptoad
methods admit no limitations, s e t up new con-
ceptualizations f a r a f i e l d , and before long
they have concatenated t h e i r subempires into
major systems. The r e s u l t is not hebeplwenic,
but paranoid, - Gardner Murphy.
 - xvi -

ERRATA

The Inchworm and the Hoptoad i s (xv) not (i),

Pages 316 and 377 have been omitted in numbering.

There a r e two pages numbered 359 and they have

been designated Itat' and l l b t t . The s a m e applies to
page 521.

- ---

G. B. Rush
Senior Supervisor
 ,

Introduction

An introduction should provide t h e reader with i n s i g h t s born from r e f l e c t -

ing on one's study as it i s taking shape. Though an author must be sure of t h e s e t

of problems, i n any study, he or she cannot be c e r t a i n where t h a t study w i l l lead.

An introduction should provide t h e reader with t h e perspective on t h e study t h a t

t h e author develops a s he or she i s consolidating t h e argument. (1)

Proper Study

This t h e s i s has, a s i t s "proper study", t h e concern with how ideology and

s o c i a l science can or cannot be c l e a r l y distinguished. A study of a v a r i e t y of

approaches t o t h e "problem of ideology" l e d t o t h e conclusion t h a t ideology and

science cannot be t r e a t e d exclusively.

The same question i s then studied from a second stance. If ideology and

science canngt be c l e a r l y distinguished, then t h e r e l a t i o n s between t h e o r i e s o f

logic used i n t h e s o c i a l sciences and ideology a r e open t o study. Several impor-

t a n t t h e o r i e s of logic a r e studied from t h i s perspective and t h e conser-rative

function of formal, academic l o g i c s i s contrasted with t h e more r a d i c a l function

o f pragmatic logic. The d i f f e r i n g characters of s o c i a l s c i e ? x e s t h a t u t i l i z e t h e

contrasting logics a r e described and a l l versions of t h e value-free d o c t r i n e c r i t -

ized. Most important it i s argued t h a t only a pragmatic approach t o logic i s a b l e

t o account f o r t h e problem ideology presents f o r t h e s o c i a l sciences.

This i s only a capsule of t h e study. A t t h i s point, it i s v i t a l t o know

Something about i t s development. Studies i n t h r e e areas t h e sociology of

knowledge, t h e philosophy of science, and t h e sociology and philosophy of education -
were undertaken t o attempt t o c l a r i f y how best t o approach t h e problem of ideology

and t h e s o c i a l sciences. This led t o an accumulation and s c a t t e r i n g of relevant

ideas, sub-problems and hunches, but t o a skeleton of an argument t h a t could

take them i n t o account. The f i r s t a r e a of study made me s k e p t i c a l of a s o l e l y

academic d e s c r i p t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c ideas. The s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l relevance and

function of ideas has always concerned me and I began t o apply t h i s a n a l y s i s t o

s o c i a l science i t s e l f . The second a r e a of study convinced me t h a t even an academic

approach t o specialized problems i n t h e philosophy of science and logic was highly

questionable. Formal l o g i c s seemed t o lack a footing i n human praxis; and yet

functioned t o mystify knowledge i n t h e s o c i a l sciences t h a t d i d have such a basis.

The t h i r d a r e a of study convinced me t h a t it was i n a study of t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s

i n educational i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t I would l o c a t e ( s i t u a t e ) t h e processes ( u s e s of

a u t h o r i t y i n teaching and research, uses of language, e t c . ) t h a t would explain how

and why such a n academic and f a l s i f i e d treatment of knowledge occurs. Though I

have not developed t h i s matter i n depth i n t h i s study, it a f f e c t e d t h e conceptu-

a l i z a t i o n of t h e t h e s i s profoundly.

Obviously, t h e development of t h e l i n e of thought was not a s neat a s t h e

above o u t l i n e suggests. It took time t o even begin t o r e a l i z e t h a t these t h r e e

areas of study were relevant t o t h e problem a t hand. And with study i n t h e s e a r e a s ,

the "problem" i t s e l f was transformed. Such i s t h e " d i a l e c t i c " of inquiry. ( 2 )

It i s worth commenting on t h e o r i g i n of t h e problem. My i n t e r e s t s i n t h e

social sciences have always had an i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r i a n , even " t r a n s d i s c i p l i n a r i a n " ,

character t o them. My formal education has included problems i n p o l i t i c a l science

(%A. ), psychology (B.A. Honours and M.A. ) and sociology (B. A. and Ph. D. 1. More
 \

i m p o r t a n t , my ongoing independent and committed s t u d i e s have included, among o t h e r

t h i n g s , t h e f i e l d s of economic h i s t o r y , s o c i a l t h e o r y and philosophy. This range

of s t u d y , and t h e p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e t h a t complements i t , has f o r c e d me t o " t r a n s -

d i s c i p l i n a r i a n " q u e s t i o n s which I found were r e d u c i b l e t o t h e problem of " i d e o l o g y

and t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s " . T h i s i n q u i r y i s t h e n r o o t e d i n y e a r s of thought and

s t u d y and s e r v e s a s a n important j u n c t i o n i n my i n t e l l e c t u a l work. The o r i e n t a -

t i o n developed h e r e w i l l d e f i n i t e l y a f f e c t a l l my f u t u r e s o c i a l r e s e a r c h .

Method

As I s a i d , t h e t h r e e a r e a s of s t u d y d i d n o t provide a method of o r g a n i z a t i o n

for the thesis. While r e f l e c t i n g on problems encountered i n my M a s t e r ' s T h e s i s ( 31,

I r e a l i z e d t h a t what a p p e a r s t o be a n uneconomical method was r e q u i r e d t o enhance

my l e a r n i n g a t t h i s s t a g e i n my s t u d i e s of ideology and l o g i c . A more c o n c i s e

s t a t e m e n t of t h e problem and development of t h e argument was p o s s i b l e , b u t it

would s u f f e r from t h e t r a p p i n g s of what M i l l s c a l l e d "grand t h e h r y " ( 4 ) . My M.A.

s u f f e r e d from what M i l l s c a l l e d " a b s t r a c t empiricism" ( t o o much d a t a , t o o l i t t l e

c r i t i c a l t h o u g h t ) and t h e r e was n o t h i n g t o be gained from going t o t h e o t h e r

extreme.

My method i s t h e r e f o r e d i a l o g i c a l . I have s e l e c t e d c e r t a i n a u t h o r s

s t r a t e g i c a l l y and o u t l i n e d and c r i t i c a l l y e v a l u a t e d t h e i r i d e a s a s a b a s i s f o r

developing my own argument. Agreement w i t h a n a u t h o r was not a c r i t e r i a f o r

selection. I have d e a l t w i t h each a u t h o r i n d e p t h and n o t skipped over p o i n t s

even i f t h e y a r e s i m i l a r t o ones w i t h which I had a l r e a d y d e a l t . The a l t e r n a t i v e

t o t h i s s o - c a l l e d redundancy would have been a f o r m a l i z e d and ec1ectl.c argument,

combining p o i n t s from s e v e r a l theorists t o make my own p o i n t . Such a n approach

 I

would not only f a i l t o do j u s t i c e t o t h e arguments and t o expose t h e i r s h o r t -

comings i n depth, it would a l s o c o n t r a d i c t t h e main emphasis of t h e t h e s i s .

Taking " i d e a s " from a number of sources t o h e l p develop my own argument would,

i n e f f e c t , a b s t r a c t t h e s e i d e a s out of t h e i r o r i g i n a l , c o n t e x t , d i s s o c i a t e them

from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e author and i n t h e process my own argument would t a k e

on a r e i f i e d c h a r a c t e r . For my t h e s i s t o be a l i v e , it must grow out of a dialogue

with t h e r e a l arguments of o t h e r humans; not with "straw men".

I have t h u s s a c r i f i c e d economy f o r c r i t i c i s m . I have attempted t o make

t h e argument a s thorough a s p o s s i b l e without s p e c i f y i n g o r g e n e r a l i z i n g t h e

problem t o o much. For example, I have d e l i b e r a t e l y excluded a study of t h e i m -

p l i c a t i o n s of psychoanalysis f o r t h e study of ideology and l o g i c and of questions

of method derived from phenomenology. Both t h e s e f i e l d s a r e r e l e v a n t t o t h e broad

c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of t h i s t h e s i s , and, i n my opinion, a study of them would r e i n f o r c e

t h e g e n e r a l approach taken. I have had t o d e a l with many problems s i n c e "ideology

and t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s " i s a n almost e n d l e s s a r e a of study, but I have t r i e d t o

i n t e g r a t e t h e study i n terms of c e r t a i n themes ( e . g . , t h e q u e s t i o n of " f a c t and

value" ) and my d i a l o g i c a l , c r i t i c a l method.

Organization

C e r t a i n c h a p t e r s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , c a r r y t h e argument. I n Section I , t h e

f i r s t f i v e c h a p t e r s develop my approach t o t h e problem of ideology. It r e l i e s

heavily on a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which s t r e s s e s t h e l a t e n t pragmatism of Marx and

EngelIs approach. Chapter Six, "ideology i n t h e Natural s c i e n c e s " , plays a p i v o t a l

i
r o l e i n broadening t h e bounds of t h e study. Many p o i n t s r a i s e d i n t h a t c h a p t e r a r e
 b

The following chapters i n S e c t i o n I do two things. F i r s t , they r e l a t e

t h e approach taken t o ideology t o p o l i t i c a l matters and thus provide c l u e s about

how s c i e n t i f i c and s o c i a l processes (e.g. , changes) i n t e r r e l a t e . Second, t h e y

e x p l a i n why academia has f a i l e d t o g e n e r a l l y a r t i c u l a t e t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s .

The f i r s t s e c t i o n concludes by d i s c u s s i n g S a r t r e a s one of t h e few t h e o r i s t s

who has developed a n understanding of knowledge which accounts f o r ideology.

S e c t i o n I1 i s both a d e m y s t i f i c a t i o n of t h e o r i e s of l o g i c t h a t do not

account f o r t h e problem of ideology and a development of a n approach t o l o g i c

t h a t does. The s i x t e e n t h chapter, on Toulmin, i s t h e " t u r n i n g point" i n t h i s

process, and hence has an added importance. Chapter Nineteen s e t s out t h e more

s i g n i f i c a n t i d e a s of t h e t h e s i s , but it depends t o o much on t h e whole development

of t h e argument t o stand by i t s e l f . Chapter Twenty attempts t o sum up t h e type

of l o g i c which i s a b l e t o e x p l i c i t l y account f o r t h e interdependence of ideology

and l o g i c vis-a-vis t h e f u n c t i o n of s c i e n c e i n society.

S e c t i o n 111 (Chapter ~wenty-One) i s only a b r i e f o u t l i n e of t h e implica-

t i o n s of t h e t h e s i s f o r education. I have only r a i s e d two a s p e c t s of t h i s

question: t h e way s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s i n education u n d e r l i e t h e mystified and r e -

i f i e d view of science ( " s c i e n t i s m " ) which ignores t h e r e l a t i o n s of ideology and

l o g i c ; and t h e implications of t h e "student r e v o l t " (and t h e i a r g e r s o c i a l move-

ment of which it i s a p a r t ) f o r our approach t o knowledge i n t h e s o c i a l sciences.

It i s f i t t i n g t h a t a t h e s i s t h a t s t r e s s e s "praxis" and a pragmatic under-

standing of knowledge should conclude by r e f e r r i n g t o t h e c o n f l i c t i n g s o c i a l r e -

l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t u n d e r l i e t h e problems s t u d i e d i n t h e t h e s i s i t s e l f .
 ,
Footnotes

I
This introduction was drafted a f t e r Chapter Eighteen. I n a sense, t h e t h e s i s
was "down-hill" from t h a t point and it was t h e b e s t place from which t o r e f l e c t
c r i t i c a l l y on t h e study.

2 ~ i s tv i t a l t o understand how a study i s transformed a s it progresses o r know-

ledge tends t o become mystified. See C.W. M i l l s : On I n t e l l e c t u a l Craftsmanship,
i n The S o c i o l o ~ ~ i c Imagination.
al New York, Oxford University Press (1959); and
Two S t y l e s of Social Science Research, i n I. L. Horowitz (ed. ): Power P o l i t i c s
and People. New York, Ballantine (1963).

3 ~ Harding:
. An Empirical C l a r i f i c a t i o n of Motivational Variables Amonq
Saskatchewan People of Indian Ancestrg. Saskatoon, University of Saskatchewan
( 1964

4 ~ . ~ M. i l l s : The Sociological Imagination, Chapter Two.

 chapte$ One

Ideology a s F a l s e and E l i t I s t Ideas: Marx and Engels

Though t h e term "ideology" was used before them1, it was Karl Marx and

Frederick Engels who developed t h e f i r s t t h e o r y of ideology. Their theory

about t h e r e l a t i o n s between i d e a s , c l a s s s t r u c t u r e , power and r e v o l u t i o n a r o s e

I

from t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s of Feuerbach and t h e young Hegelians of t h e i r time.

Though it was developed over one hundred years ago, it remains an important

b a s i s f o r any s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e problem of ideology.

It i s necessary t o o u t l i n e t h e t h e o r y I n depth s i n c e it i s not widely

discussed a t present. The excessive use of t h e word "ideologyn today i s not

i n d i c a t i v e of a n i n t e l l i g e n t use of t h e term. It has t a k e n on such a broad

meaning t h a t t h e ordinary use - u s u a l l y l o o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d with a p o l i t i c a l

programme and s t r a t e g y - i s of l i t t l e value. Nor do t h e p o l i t i c s of a person

seem t o r e l a t e much t o a n i n t e l l i g e n t , l e t alone i n t e l l i g i b l e , use of t h e term.

People i n North America o f t e n use t h e term a s it became d i s t o r t e d during t h e

Cold War period. During t h a t period it came t o be a s s o c i a t e d with an i r r a t i o n a l

anti-communism. A l l theory_ of ideology was l o s t . One r e s u l t of t h i s a n t i -

t h e o r e t i c a l i s m i s t h a t today p o l i t i c a l l e f t i s t s o f t e n use t h e term i n a sec-

t a r i a n way, i.e., t o r e f e r t o t h e i r own position. We s h a l l s e e a s we proceed

I

JI \ t h a t t h e t h e o r y of Marx and Engels provides us with a f a r d i f f e r e n t meaning; one

having r a m i f i c a t i o n s f o r both method and t h e o r y i n t h e s o c i a l sciences.

Ideology and t h e Division of Labour

A general t h e o r y of consciousness u n d e r l i e s Marx and Engels' t h e o r y of

ideology. I n t h e i r words:

" ~ o n s c i o u s n e s scan never be anything e l s e than conscious existence, and

t h e existence of men i s t h e i r a c t u a l life-process. I f i n a l l ideology
men and t h e i r circumstances appear upside down a s i n a camera obscura,
t h i s phenomenon a r i s e s just a s much from t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l life-process
a s t h e inversion of objects on t h e r e t i n a does from t h e i r life-process
.. .113

To c l a r i f y what they meant, they continued:

hat is t o say, we do not s e t out from what men say, imagine, conceive,
nor from men a s narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, i n order t o
a r r i v e a t men i n t h e flesh. We s e t out from r e a l , a c t i v e men, and on
t h e b a s i s of t h e i r r e a l life-process we demonstrate t h e development of
t h e ideological r e f l e x e s and echoes of t h i s life-pr,ocess. The phantoms
formed i n t h e human b r a i n a r e a l s o , n e c e s s a r i l y , sublimates of t h e i r
m a t e r i a l life-process, which i s empirically v e r i f i a b l e and bound t o
m a t e r i a l premises. Morality, r e l i g i o n , metaphysics, a l l t h e r e s t of
ideology and t h e i r corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer
r e t a i n t h e semblance of independence. They have no h i s t o r y , no develop-
ment; but men, developing t h e i r m a t e r i a l production and t h e i r m a t e r i a l
intercourse, a l t e r , along with t h i s t h e i r r e a l existence, t h e i r thinking
and t h e products of t h e i r thinking. L I T -
ness,butonsciousness by l i f e . "4

Without discussing what they meant by "empirically v e r i f i a b l e " and "material

premises" we cannot be sure what form of consciousness Marx and Engels would c a l l

ideological. This shows t h e i n t r i c a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p between so-called epistemological

questions and s o c i a l theory t h a t I w i l l be discussing throughout t h i s t h e s i s .

Lefebvre, one of t h e few contemporary s o c i o l o g i s t s t o deal with t h e notion of

ideology i n Marxism, can help us understand Marx and Engelst statements. He de-

scribed t h e i r approach t o consciousness by c o n t r a s t i n g it with an opposite approach.

ithe her we s t a r t from consciousness; i n which case we f a i l t o account f o r

r e a l l i f e . O r we s t a r t from r e a l l i f e ; then we come up against t h i s
ideological consciousness t h a t has no r e a l i t y , and must account f o r it.
H i s t o r i c a l materialism puts an end t o t h e speculation which s t a r t s from
consciousness, from representat ions, and hence from i l l u s i o n s ...
"5

To understand t h e difference between t h e s e approaches, we need t o consider

how Marx and Engelst theory of h i s t o r y Shaped t h e i r theory of ideology. Their main
 L
point was t h a t the d i v u i o n of labour made human consciousness i d e o l o e a-l I
L 1 -
because with it theory became abstracted from practice. The

" ~ i v i s i o nof labour only becomes t r u l y such from the moment when a
division of material and mental labour appears. From t h i s moment
onwards consciousness c a n r e a l l y f l a t t e r i t s e l f t h a t it i s some-
thing other than consciousness of existing practice, t h a t it i s
r e a l l y conceiving something without conceiving something real;
from now on consciousness is i n a position t o emancipate i t s e l f
from t h e world and t o proceed t o t h e formation of "pure" theory,
theology, philosophy, e t h i c s , e t ~ . " ~

This division of labour led t o t h e development of i l l u s i o n s among the

mass of people.

"The division of labour, which we saw above a s one of the chief forces
of h i s t o r y up till now, manifests i t s e l f a l s o i n t h e ~ u l i p g. l g ~ h a s . ~ g s I
t h e d i v i s i ~ - o f mental and_t_exial ~ab_o-ur, so t h a t inside t h i s c l a s s
one p a r t appears-as t h e t h i i i e r s of t h e - g l s s s ( i t s active, conceptive
ideologists, who make t h e perfecting of t h e i l l u s i o n of t h e c l a s s
about i t s e l f t h e i r chief source of livelihood), while t h e others1 a t -
t i t u d e t o these ideas and i l l u s i o n s i s more passive and receptive,
because they a r e i n r e a l i t y t h e a c t i v e members of t h i s c l a s s and have
l e s s time t o make up i l l u s i o n s and ideas about themselves. "7

From t h i s they concluded:

"The ideas of t h e ruling c l a s s a r e i n every epoch t h e ruling ideas:

i.e. t h e c l a s s , which i s t h e r u l i n g material force of society, i s a t ' \

t h e same time i t s ruling i n t e l l e c t u a l force. The c l a s s which has t h e

means of material production a t i t s disposal, has control a t t h e same
time over t h e means of mental production, so t h a t thereby, generally
speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production
a r e subject t o it. The r u l l n g ideas a r e nothing more than t h e ideal
expression of t h e dominant material r e l a t i o n s h i p s , t h e qominant mate-
x i a l relationships grasped a s ideas; hence of t h e relationships which
make t h e one c l a s s the r u l i n g one, therefore the ideas of i t s domi-
nance ... ( t h e r e f o r e ) t h e ruling c l a s s r u l e a l s o a s thinkers, a s
producers of ideas, and regulate t h e production and d i s t r i b u t i o n of
t h e ideas of t h e i r age: thus t h e i r ideas a r e t h e ruling ideas of t h e
epoch. II 8

Phis i s a complicated theory where t h e term "ideology" has a f a r d i f f e r e n t

meaning than i s common today. Lefebvre outlined the r e l a t i o n of t h e division

of labour t o ideology a s follows.

 "So f a r a s t h e development o f ideologies i s concerned, t h e most important
\ d i v i s i o n i s t h a t between physical and i n t e l l e c t u a l labor, between crea-
t i v e a c t i o n ( o p e r a t i o n s upon t h i n g s with t h e a i d of t o o l s and machines)
and a c t i o n on human beings by means of non-material instruments, t h e
,,
primary and most important of which i s language. "9

According t o t h i s theory, t h e organization of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s within t h e d i v i s i o n

"
of labour of capitalism separates t h e c r e a t i o n ' o f ideas from t h e mass of people.

Yet t h e s e ideas represent t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e " r u l i n g c l a s s " and pervade t h e

2,
3 'K?
whole s o c i e t y due t o t h e c o n t r o l they have over "mental production", e.g., educa-

From t h i s comes ideology, o r f a l s e ideas t h a t do not r e f l e c t t h e experience

'
so R 9
!
<

-
of t h d mass of t h e people.
7--
Ideas come t o be t r e a t e d a s abstractions. I n Marx and

Engels words:

"Once t h e r u l i n g ideas have been separated from t h e r u l i n g individuals

and, above a l l , from t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s which r e s u l t from a given stage
of t h e mode of production, and i n t h i s way t h e conclusion has been
reached t h a t h i s t o r y i s always under t h e sway of ideas, it is very
easy t o a b s t r a c t from t h e s e various ideas ' t h e i d e a 1 ...
a s t h e domi-
nant f o r c e I n h i s t o r y ...".lo
v'
Ideology i s t h u s created through a r e i f i c a t i o n l 1 of ideas. According t o
!I' Marx and Engels t h i s occurs through " t h r e e t r i c k s " . F i r s t "one must s e p a r a t e t h e

ideas of those r u l i n g f o r empirical reasons, under empirical conditions and a s

empirical individuals, from t h e s e a c t u a l r u l e r s , and t h u s recognize t h e r u l e of

ideas o r i l l u s i o n s i n history". Ideas become a b s t r a c t e d from t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l

o r i g i n s and s o c i a l functions i n t h i s way. Second "one must bring an order i n t o

t h i s r u l e of ideas, prove a mystical connection among t h e successive r u l i n g

iaeas ..." Thus a l o g i c i s imposed on t h e s e "ideas1' t h a t have become abstracted

from t h e i r o r i g i n and function. Third " t h e mystical appearance ... i s changed

illto a ... s e r i e s of persons ... i n t o t h e I t h i n k e r s 1 , t h e lphilosophersl, t h e

J I d e o l o g i s t s l who again a r e understood a s t h e manufacturers of h i s t o r y ... 11 12

Those t h a t impose a l o g i c onto t h e ideas t h a t a r e a b s t r a c t e d from t h e i r o r i g i n

 and function come t o bc sccn as the creators of the ideas.

Here i s the key t o t h e i r theory of ideology. tIdeology i s the a b s t r a c t i o n

of ideas from t h e i r origin and function; t h e i r formalization and t h e i r dissemina-

t ion a s 1t r u e ideas through t h e s o c i a l i z a t i o n and educational i n s t i t u t i o n s .fl

This theory does not imply t h a t ideologies a r e f a l s e i n the sense t h a t they have

no r e a l i t y . The problem of ideology f o r Marx and Engels i s not the t r u t h or I?

--
falsehood of ideas per se, but t h e r e l a t i o n of theory t o practice or of mental

t o physical work.

Lefebvre outlined s i x c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s he saw i n t h i s theory of ideology

which can help us understand t h i s point. According t o h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of

Marx and Engels, ideologies present us with "... a fragmentary, partial reality

.. .'I Though they d i s t o r t r e a l i t y"...'they culminate i n systems ( t h e o r e t i c a l ,

C . ,

philosophical, p o l i t i c a l , j u r i d i c a l ) ..." Consequently, they a r e both "...

t'
L,
'5 'general, speculative, abstract ..." and "... representative of determinate,
limited, special i n t e r e s t s . " Thus "... ideologies a r e not altogether false. "
"...mixed up
Because they a r e rooted i n r e a l i t y , s c i e n t i f i c i n s i g h t s a r e often

ideological thinking." They d i f f e r from science i n t h a t they "... make room

f o r non-scientif i c abstractions ..."I3

Another way t o specify Marx and Engels' concept of ideology i s t o discuss

t h e way ideology a f f e c t s the r e l a t i o n s between human praxis and consciousness.

Lefebvre comments t h a t "Ideologies a r e ... ignorant of the exact nature of t h e i r

r e l a t i o n s with praxis - do not r e a l l y understand t h e i r own conditions and pre-

suppositions, nor the a c t u a l consequences t o which they a r e leading. 111 4

Ideologies do have "conditions", i.e., they a r e r e l a t e d t o human praxis, but

t h i s relationship i s not a r t i c u l a t e d within a system of ideas which i s ideological.

The s o c i a l function of t h e ideology i s not a n object of study within a system

of ideas which i s ideological, but instead t h e "ideas" a r e t r e a t e d i n a b s t r a c t .

Lefebvre f u r t h e r simplified Marx and Ene;elsl theory of t h e function of

ideologies. He wrote t h a t " ~ d e o l o g i e smediate between praxis and conscious-

J
ness ( i. e. , language ). They a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y f a l s e ideas though t h e i r

a b s t r a c t nature leads t o a d i s t o r t e d view of praxis. r1t i s t h e formalization

f l i m i t e d ideas and t h e i r dissemination a s a b s t r a c t , general t r u t h s then t h a t

\
\ '
l e a d s t o ideology. \, :1

1
Could it be t h a t t h e ideas of Marx and Engels have themselves been ab- ,,<bt

s t r a c t e d and disseminated by t h e same means they describe? What is now being

c a l l e d "vulgar marxisml' could be t h e r e s u l t of p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s i n communist

c o u n t r i e s doing j u s t t h i s . The s i m p l i s t i c and d i s t o r t e d images of Marx and

Engels i n c a p i t a l i s t countries could a l s o r e s u l t f'rom t h e p o l i t i c a l e l t k s

t h e r e doing much t h e same thing. I n t h e former case, t h e ideas a r e t r e a t e d

p o s i t i v e l y and i n t h e l a t t e r they a r e t r e a t e d negatively, but i n both they a r e

treated abstractly. I n t h i s way, according t o t h e very process they have de-

scribed, t h e ideas of Marx and Engels may have become a marxian ideology. Some

of those who i d e n t i f y with t h e ideas of Marx and Engels may themselves t r e a t t h e

"ideas" i n a n ideological, r a t h e r t h a n h i s t o r i c a l manner. C l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h e

- -p-.
\ ---
problem of ideology t h u s may a i d us t o understand t h e uses of p o l i t i c a l ideas a t

t h e present time.

Marx and Engels1 theory of ideology, of course, requires a s p e c i f i c t e s t i n g .

One would need t o study ( i )t h e dominant ideas of t h e time, h i s t o r i c a l l y ( ii) t h e

l o g i c s t h a t systematize these dominant ideas and ( i i i )t h e method of dissemination.

I n a d d i t i o n t o looking a t t h e philosophies of science of today, t h i s would involve

 I

a study of t h e mass media and educational i n s t i t u t i o n s . Later, when I discuss

t h e o r i e s of knowledge i n t h e s o c i a l sciences, I w i l l be t e s t i n g t h e kinds of

r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t Marx and Engels hypothesized.

Ideology and Epistemology

Marx and Engels recognized t h e need f o r such s p e c i f i c studies.

" ~ m ~ i r i c observation
al must i n each s e p a r a t e instance bring out empirically,
and without any m y s t i f i c a t i o n and speculation, t h e connection of t h e s o c i a l
and p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e with production. The s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e and t h e
S t a t e a r e c o n t i n u a l l y evolving out of t h e l i f e - p r o c e s s of d e f i n i t e individ-
u a l s , but of individuals, not a s they may appear i n t h e i r own o r other
people's imagination, but a s they r e a l l y a r e ; i.e. a s they a r e e f f e c t i v e ,
produce m a t e r i a l l y , and a r e a c t i v e under d e f i n i t e m a t e r i a l l i m i t s , pre-
suppositions and conditions independent of t h e i r wil.1. "16

The ideas people hold of themselves have t o be t r e a t e d with skepticism. This i s '

one t h i n g t h a t follows f r h Marx and Engelst theory of ideology. Not from people's
J
ideas, but from t h e i r actions, w i l l we f i n d out about t h e nature of people's ex-

perience. This a n t i - i d e o l o ~ i c a l epistemology i s t h e foundation of Marx and Engelst

approach t o s o c i a l theory.

About t h e i r epistemological premises, they wrote: "The premises from which

we begin a r e not a r b i t r a r y ones, not dogmas, but r e a l premises (from) which ab-

s t r a c t i o n can only be made i n t h e h a g i n a t ion. 'I7 Their premises a r e not b u i l t

from a b s t r a c t t h e o r i e s of ideas, a s i s so t y p i c a l among modern philosphers; i n

f a c t , epistemology p e r s e i s not considered problematic. According t o them, t h e

c r u c i a l t h i n g i s t o recognize t h a t we use our imagination t o a b s t r a c t knowledge,

and t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e knowledge i s dependent not on t h e a b s t r a c t i o n s p e r s e

but on t h e r e l a t i o n of our a b s t r a c t i o n s t o t h e p r a c t i c a l l i v e s of people. In their

his method of approach i s not devoid of premises. It s t a r t s out from

 t h e r e a l premises and does not abandon them f o r a moment. I t s premises
a r e men, not i n any f a n t a s t i c i s o l a t i o n or abstract d e f i n i t i o n , but i n
t h e i r actual, empirically perceptible process of development under
d e f l n i t e conditions. A s soon a s t h i s a c t i v e life-process i s descrlbed,
h i s t o r y ceases t o be a c o l l e c t i o n of dead f a c t s a s it i s with the em-
p i r i c i s t s (themselves s t i l l a b s t r a c t ) , or an imagined a c t i v i t y of
imagined subjects, a s with t h e i d e a l i s t s . "I8

Those who l i v e i n i s o l a t i o n from t h e p r a c t i c a l l i v e s of t h e mass of people

( e. g. , academics ) and who, by Marx and Engels d e f i n i t i o n would be c a l l e d "ide-

ologists", of'ten lack t h i s kind of understanding. Rather than r e l a t i n g knowledge

t o t h e p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s of people, they develop a b s t r a c t r a t i o n a l e s f o r t h e i r

knowledge. They make up new ideas t h a t a r e used t o argue t h a t t h e i r ideas a r e

valid or true. This abstracting of epistemology i n t o t h e realm of theory i s

rooted i n a f a i l u r e t o consider t h e s o c i a l r o l e of language. Ideologists a r e

J
not s e l f - c r i t i c a l of t h e i r uses of language, but t r e a t language a s i f it existed

i n a realm autonomous from s o c i a l interaction.

Marx and Engels1 handling of t h e problem of ideology, and t h e i r r e l a t e d

epistemology, was r e l a t e d t o t h e i r understanding of t h e s o c i a l nature of language.

I

Sounding l i k e George Herbert Mead, who m o t e about language some eighty years

l a t e r , they m o t e :

"Language i s a s old a s consciousness, language i s p r a c t i c a l consciousness,

a s it e x i s t s f o r other men, and f o r t h a t reason i s r e a l l y beginning t o
e x i s t f o r me personally a s well; f o r language, l i k e consciousness, only
a r i s e s from t h e need, t h e necessity, of intercourse with other men.11~9

Lefebvre commented on Mal?x and Engels1 awareness of the r e l a t i o n of

language t o ideology. To him, Marx and Engelsl theory of ideology It... tries to

s l t u a t e language within praxis."20 And, i n doing so, it exposes t h e d i s t o r t i o n s '

of theory t h a t i s abstracted from practice. As Lefebvre said of Marx and Engelst

discussion of language and ideology:

" l n analyzing language ... we must i s o l a t e i t s formal character but we

must never separate it from i t s other aspects -
content, development,
history, s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , praxis, "21
 L

Those who f a i l t o see t h a t language, including i n t e l l e c t u a l language, a r i s e s

from s o c i a l intercourse, and who t r e a t ideas a s though they were individually

created, can e a s i l y deceive themselves with abstract theories of knowledge.

I w i l l r e t u r n t o t h i s point throughout t h e thesis.

We could say t h a t knowledge and ideology a r e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by Marx

and Engels i n terms of how t h e use of t h e o r e t i c a l language r e l a t e s t o practice.

fideology r e s u l t s when t h e o r e t i c a l language i s developed without specifying i t s

I
Irelation t o t h e changing p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s of people. Knowledge (e.g., science)
V

d +F' '--
r e s u l t s when t h e o r e t i c a l language i s used t o a i d us t o understand; and, a s we
4-
.
s h a l l see, charxe these p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s . d
This d i s t i n c t i o n i s best described by outlining Marx and Engelst c r i t i c i s m

of Feuerbachls use of ideas. It i s h i s tendency t o deal a b s t r a c t l y with s o c i a l

f a c t s t h a t a r e themselves t h e r e s u l t of human a c t i v i t y within c e r t a i n s o c i a l

r e l a t i o n s , r a t h e r than t o work t o change these s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , t h a t Marx and

Engels c r i t i c i z e d . They wrote t h a t Feuerbach

"... only i n t e r p r e t s the e x i s t i n g sensuous world, has only t h e r e l a t i o n

of a t h e o r i s t t o it, while i n r e a l i t y f o r t h e p r a c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t , J
i.e., t h e communist, it i s a question of revolutionizing the existing
world, of p r a c t i c a l l y attacking and changing e x i s t i n g things. "22

O r , f u r t h e r c r i t i c i z i n g him, they wrote:

" ~ does
e not see how the sensuous world around him i s , not a thing given
d i r e c t from a l l e t e r n i t y , ever t h e same, but t h e product of i n d u s t r y 4
and of t h e s t a t e of society; and, indeed, i n t h e sense t h a t it i s an
h i s t o r i c a l product, t h e r e s u l t of the a c t i v i t y of a whole successioq of
generations, each standing on t h e shoulders of t h e preceding one, de-
veloping i t s industry and i t s intercourse, modifying i t s s o c l a l organ-
i z a t i o n accordirg t o the changed needs.I123

Here Marx and Engels made it c l e a r t h a t they did not consider t h e c r e a t i o n

I/
of knowledge t o be an academic endeavour. Interpreting observations made i n and

Of a society, i n i t s e l f , does not c o n s t i t u t e understanding. Instead t h e r e must

be a c t i v i t y t o a l t e r t h e h i s t o r i c a l conditions t h a t underlie t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s J

T-
and t h e observations made of them. Theory i s rooted i n problems within t h e

a c t i c a l a f f a i r s of people. Theory is rooted i n t h e d i v i s i o n between physical

mental labour. Theory must be put back i n t o p r a c t l c e t o be of any value.

As an example of t h i s , Marx and Engels discussed t h e existence of r e l i -

gious theory i n Germany during t h e i r time. They wrote t h a t t o understand these

r e l i g i o u s ideas "... i s only a question of explaining t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l t a l k from

t h e a c t u a l e x i s t i n g conditions." But they went f u r t h e r than t h i s . This explana-

t i o n i n i t s e l f w i l l "solve", i. e., change, nothing.

"The r e a l , p r a c t i c a l d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e s e phrases, t h e removal of these

notions from t h e consciousness of men, w i l l , a s we have already s a i d , be
a f f e c t e d by a l t e r e d circumstances, not by t h e o r e t i c a l deductions. "24

Here we see Marx and Engelsl pragmatic view of $deas. Theory i s seen a s

a p r a c t i c a l tool. I f theory i s seen otherwise, say, i n a b s t r a c t from p r a c t i c e ,

then t h e t h e o r i s t s forget t h a t "...f o r t h e mass of men, i.e., the proletariat,

t h e s e t h e o r e t i c a l notions do not e x i s t and hence $0 not require t o be dissolved

... ltZ5 Marx and Engels a r e saying t h a t t h e o r i s t s , by using t h e i r imagination,

t u r n problems a r i s i n g from t h e p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s of people i n t o theory f o r c l a r i -

fication. If they ever forget t h i s and come t o believe t h a t t h e i r "ideas" e x i s t

among t h e masses of people, they w i l l not recognize t h a t changing t h e p r a c t i c a l

conditions out of which t h e i n l t i a l problem came c o n s t i t u t e s t h e r e a l solution.

I d e o l o g i s t s a r e those who work within e l i t i s t i n s t i t u t i o n s - have r e i f i e d problems,

methods and t h e o r i e s and a r e looking f o r "solutions" i n t h e a b s t r a c t l i n g u i s t i c

system within which they a r e thinking.

Marx and Engels were c l e a r l y d i s c r e d i t i n g t h e "academic" approach t o t r u t h .

"Ideology" comes from an academic development of theory. Such an academic develop-

 I

ment of theory, then, a s now, i s centered i n t h e universities. And it was not

limited, then, nor today, t o the s o c i a l sciences. The natural sciences a r e

often thought t o be dealing with a b s t r a c t , trans-human f a c t s a s i f "... nature's

s e c r e t s were being disclosed only t o the eye of the physicist and chemist ...I1

(which i s what Marx and Engels accuse Feuerbach of implying). Showing a simi-

l a r i t y with Thomas Kuhnls approach t o natural science, which w i l l be studied

l a t e r , Marx and Engels asked:

"...but where would natural science be without industry and commerce?

Even t h i s 'pure' natural science i s provided with an aim, a s with i t s
material, only through trade and industry, through the sensuous activ-
i t y of men. "26

The mystification of "Science" t h a t i s so widespread today was a l s o

occurring during t h e time of Marx and Engels. But they recognized t h a t without

technology, and more importantly, t h e "aims" or purposes f o r which technology i s

used, t h e r e i s no science. That i s not t o say t h a t s c i e n t i f i c theory a r i s i n g

from t h e problems and techniques of a period cannot a f f e c t t h e e x i s t i n g technology.

It is r a t h e r t o put science and technology i n t o perspective and not t o t r e a t science

i n a trans-human manner. Since it i s humans who a r e t r e a t i n g science i n a "trans-

human" way, the s c i e n t i s t i c view of ideas i s absurd. What Marx and Engels s a i d of

r e l i g i o n a l s o applies t o t h e mystified concepts of science above.

Marx and Engels saw a l l sciences a s ultimately rooted i n the "sensuous

a c t i v i t y " of people and they discredited any abstracting of ideas from t h i s source.

Solutions i n a l l science a r e t o be found by a l t e r i n g t h e circumstances or conditions

from which the problems of s o c i a l and natural science a r i s e . The e r r o r of t h e aca-

demic or ideologist i s t h a t he relapses 'I.. . i n t o idealism a t the very point where

the communist m a t e r i a l i s t sees the necessity, and a t the same time the condition,

Of a transformation both of industry and of the s o c i a l structure."27 They make

 >
ideas i n t o things, and being unaware of t h e i r own place within t h e s o c i a l s t r u c -

t u r e , they confuse t h e i r academic handling of ideas with t h e p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s

of people. They a r e then caught within a n i s o l a t e d language system; within a n

"ivory tower".

Ideology and Revolution

The above discussion shows how Marx and Engels1 theory of ideology r e l a t e d
\
.
t

r" <-
t o t h e i r understanding of t h e s o c i a l nature of language and t h e p r a c t i c a l r o o t s

of knowledge. Their epistemology was not an academic, but a pragmatic theory of

knowledge. This r e l a t e d t o t h e i r theory of revolution, f o r , according t o t h e i r

view of ideas, important t h e o r e t i c a l problems r e f l e c t contradictions i n s o c i a l

conditions. The r e l a t i o n between t h e i r pragmatic epistemology and t h e i r theory

of r e v o l u t i o n was shown when they wrote t h a t t h e i r approach "...does not explain

p r a c t i c e from t h e idea but explains t h e formation of ideas from m a t e r i a l p r a c t i c e ;

and accordingly it comes t o t h e conclusion t h a t a l l forms of consciousness and

products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental c r i t i c i s m ... but only by

t h e p r a c t i c a l overthrow of t h e a c t u a l s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s which gave r i s e t o t h i s

i d e a l i s t i c humbug ..." From t h i s they concluded "... t h a t not c r i t i c i s m but

revolution i s t h e driving f o r c e of h i ~ t o r y . " ~ 9

A r e a l s o l u t i o n t o a problem t h a t i s rooted i n human a c t i v i t y within par-

t i c u l a r s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , and has been c l a r i f i e d by theory, i s thus "... a prac-

t i c a l movement, a revolution ..."30 t h a t w i l l a l t e r conditions s o a s t o f r e e

humans t o a c t i n new ways. The equation of a " p r a c t i c a l movement" and "revolution"

shows how Marx and Engelst theory of ideology, i.e., of how ideas a r e r e i f i e d , was

t h e c o r o l l a r y of t h e i r theory of how revolutionary ideas r e l a t e t o s o c i a l change.

 I

I d e o l o ~ i c a lideas function t o just i f y e x l s t i w conditions whereas revolut ionarg

ideas can function t o help change t h e s e conditions.

On t h e b a s i s of t h e b approach t o consciousness, labour, language and

, i d e a s , Marx and Engels concluded t h a t en he existence of revolutionary ideas i n

a p a r t i c u l a r period presupposes t h e existence of a revolutionary c l a s s ...1131

For revolutionary ideas t o develop t h e r e must be a s o c i a l grouping t h a t has come

t o s e e a c o l l e c t i v e o r common problem and d e s i r e s t o a l t e r t h e s o c i a l conditions.

T e o p l e i n t h i s s o c i a l grouping must break out of "individualism1' whereby they de-

i
Ie p t
f i n e d t h e i r problems a s personal and s p e c i a l and/or accepted t h e ideological ideas

served t o j u s t i f y t h e s t a t e of a f f a i r s t h a t they experienced. According t o

Marx and Engels, once revolutionary ideas developed it was proof that people had

come t o understand "... conditions which were previously abandoned t o chance and
had won an independent existence over a g a i n s t t h e separate individuals j u s t because

of t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n a s individuals ... and through t h e i r separation had become a

bond a l i e n t o them."32

Ideology t h u s functions t o fragment individuals so they do not understand

how t h e i r personal problems r e l a t e t o p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . A s long a s

people a r e fragmented or individualized, t h e r e is no change of a l t e r i n g s o c i a l re-

l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t c r e a t e problems f o r people. A s Marx and Engels put it "... only

by t h e a c t i o n of individuals in again subjecting t h e s e material powers t o them-

s e l v e s and abolishine; t h e d i v i s i o n of labour ... only i n community with o t h e r s has

each individual t h e means of c u l t i v a t i n g h i s g i f t s i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s ; only i n t h e

c bmmunity, t h e r e f ore i s personal freedom possible. "33

We have thus come t h e f u l l c i r c l e . The d i v i s i o n of labour was what under-

l a y t h e separation of mental from m a t e r i a l production. This separation and t h e

c o n t r o l of t h e " r u l i n g c l a s s " over both mental and material production was what
 I

allowed ldeology t o develop. Now w e see t h a t ideology i s what functions t o keep

t h e mass of people from understanding how many of t h e i r personal problems a r e

rooted i n t h e d i v i s i o n of labour and i t s c o n t r o l by a r u l i n g group. Ideology,

t h e way Marx and Engels handled t h e problem, i s thus r e l a t e d t o "alienation".

Though they were not using t h e term i n t h e i r discussion of ideology, t h e idea of

a l i e n a t i o n developed i n Marxts e a r l i e r writings was implied when Marx and Engels

wrote "... within t h e d i v i s i o n of labour s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s t a k e on an inde-

pendent existence, t h e r e appears a d i v i s i o n w i t h i n t h e l i f e of each individual,

i n so f a r a s it i s personal and i n so f a r a s it i s determined by some branch of

labour and t h e conditions pertaining t o it. "34

This "independent existence" of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s which a r e not i n t h e

c o n t r o l of t h e mass of people i s what a l i e n a t e s people according t o Marx and

Engelst theory. But they were not reducing people t o t h e s e s o c i a l relationships.

When they wrote "we do not mean it t o be understood from t h i s t h a t , f o r example,

t h e r e n t i e r , t h e c a p i t a l i s t , etc. cease t o be persons; but t h e i r personality i s

/I
!
conditioned and determined by i t d e f i n i t e c l a s s r e l a t i o n s h i p s . . . ' I they
~ ~ are

explicitly anti-reduction is ti^^^ i n t h e i r approach. This i s important t o note

since many have tended t o use Marx and Engelst ideas about ideology i n a reduc-

t i o n i s t i c way. We s h a l l r e t u r n t o t h i s point when we show t h e s i m i l a r i t y between

Marx and Engels and Jean Paul Sartre.

Ideology t h u s functions t o maintain alienation. And, according t o t h i s

theory, s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , including t h e S t a t e and law, which a r e a l i e n a t i n g

because they have "...won a n existence independent of t h e individuals ..." become

"... a power which i n t h e l a s t r e s o r t can only be broken by a revolution. "37 Marx

and Engelst main conclusion a f t e r t h e i r handling of t h e problem of Ideology i s t h a t

 I

'I... t o a s s e r t themselves, a s i n d i v i d u a l s , t h e y ( p e o p l e ) must overthrow t h e

S t a t e . 11 38

The above d i s c u s s i o n shows how Marx and Engels s l t u a t e d knowledge i n

human p r a x i s and t h e r e f o r e had t o u l t i m a t e l y d e a l with t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of

i d e a s and t h e q u a l i t y of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Their t h e s i s r e l a t i n g ideology

t o a l i e n a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a n o r i g i n a l one i n t h e s o - c a l l e d sociology of know-

ledge. Their argument t h a t s o c i a l science r e l a t e s t o r e v o l u t i o n i s a much

neglected t h e s i s - one of major concern i n t h i s study. It would have been

s u p e r f i c i a l t o d i s c u s s Marx and Engelsl handling of t h e problem of ideology

without having discussed how it r e l a t e d t o t h e s e o t h e r questions. Otherwise we

would be t a k i n g t h e i r i d e a s about ideology out of t h e l a r g e r context w i t h i n which

t h e y were o r i g i n a l l y given meaning. This .is what i s t y p i c a l l y done, e s p e c i a l l y

a s academia becomes over-specialized with d i s c i p l i n e s and s u b - d i s c i p l i n e s , a l l

w i t h t h e i r s p e c i a l languages, i.e., t h i s s p e c i a l i z e d p r a x i s i s one main reason

why it i s s o r a r e f o r t h e problem of ideology and o t h e r g e n e r a l problems of t h e

s o c i a l s c i e n c e s t o be given s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n today.

What can we conclude from t h i s d i s c u s s i o n of Marx and Engelsl handling of

t h e problem of i d e o l o g y ? ? 3 i r s t it i s v i t a l t o s e e t h a t they began with a prag-

matic view of ideas and saw theory not a s truth-seeking i n a b s t r a c t from t h e

p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s of people but a s a means t o c l a r i f y how s o c i a l conditions a f f e c t

u s and t o provide c l u e s about how t o change them t o b e t t e r t h e s i t u a t i o n of humans.

-
'?)second t h e y saw ideology functioning t o fragment people s o t h a t t h e i r problems
'. /
w i t h i n t h e S o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s could not be understood commonly. Third t h e y

argued t h a t it was t h e e l i t i s t c o n t r o l over t h e production of ideas t h a t allowed

t h i s t o happen. From t h i s it i s Clear t h a t a s o c i a l theory, c r i t i c a l of t h e

 c a p i t a l i s t d i v i s i o n of labour, includ& mental labour,39 underlies a l l e l s e .

Their s p e c i f i c t h e o r i e s , including t h a t about ideology, have meaning only a s a

p a r t of a n o v e r a l l c r i t i c i s m of c a p i t a l i s t society. Marx and Engels did not

s t a r t with t h i s o v e r a l l c r i t i c i s m and then deduce t h e s p e c i a l theories. Their

handling of t h e s p e c i f i c problems, l i k e t h e problem of ideology, was a r e s u l t

of c o n t i n u a l l y "shuttling"40 between macro h i s t o r i c a l concerns aqd macro prob-

lems rooted i n s p e c i f i c s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s of t h e time.

This theory provides a n excellent beginning f o r our study of ideology

and science. I n i t s comprehensiveness and i t s ramifications, it opens up

questions which we must now confront. It i s a c l a s s i c c r i t i q u e of academic

knowledge and because it places language and knowledge within a s o c i o l o g i ~ a l

dimension it provides us with a foundation f o r a broad c r i t i c a l examination of

dominant epistemologioal ideas.

This theory a l s o c l a r i f i e s t h e problem of ideology and helps counter t h e

confusion t h a t i s common about t h e term. A s one author s a i d "1t i s an irony of

I t h e h i s t o r y of lideologyl t h a t it probably began a s a l a b e l f o r t h e s c i e n t i f i c

a l t e r n a t i v e t o metaphysical speculation, and ended a s t h e l a b e l f o r t h e meta-

/ physical a l t e r n a t i v e t o science. "41 Marx and Engelsl theory shows t h e usefulness

of r e t u r n i n g t o t h e o r i g i n a l meaning of t h e term and c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e problem of

ideology a s a s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c concern.

The interdependence of a l l aspects of Marx and Engelsl s o c i a l theory, in-

cluding t h e problem of ideology, epistemology, etc., r a i s e s a s p e c i f i c problem

with which we must deal before proceeding.

i Since "ideologyu was a term used t o

describe f a l s e ideas, what i s t o s t o p people from t r e a t i n g a l l of t h e ideas of

Marx and Engels, including t h e i r ideas about ideology, a s ideological? A dif-

f e r e n t s o c i a l theory, emphasizing d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and based on a

 I

d i f f e r e n t epistemology, could, t h e o r e t i c a l l y , conclude t h i s . This problem

a r i s i n g from our above d i s c u s s i o n l e a d s u s t o consider Karl Mannheim's handling

of t h e problem of ideology.

Footnotes

l ~ h French
e philosopher Destutt de Tracy used t h e term i n 1801 I t . .
f o r broad s c i e n t i f i c i d e a s and ideals."
a s a synonym
I. L. Horowitz: Philosophy, Science and
.
t h e Sociology of Knowledge. S p r i n g f i e l d , Charles C. Thomas ( 1 9 6 1 ) ~ p. 79.

2 ~ .Marx and F. Engels: The German I d e o l o a . New York, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Publishers

( 1947)

31bld., p. 14.

41bid., p. 14-15.

5% Lefebvre: The Sociology of Marx. New York, Random House ( 19681, p. 65.

6Marx and Engels, op. c i t . , p. 20.

9Lef ebvre, op. tit., P. 67.

' O ~ a r x and Engels, op. c i t . , p. 42.

111 w i l l be using t h i s term throughout t h e t h e s i s . It r e f e r s t o t h e tendency t o

a t t r i b u t e a f i x e d , a b s t r a c t q u a l i t y t o ideas; and t o " t h i n g i f y " a n idea; o r t a k e
it out of i t s h i s t o r i c a l and s o c i a l context.

l 3 l e f e b v r e , op. c i t . , p. 69-72.

l 6 ~ a r xand Engels, op. c i t . , p. 13.

181bid., p. 15. Here wc see Marx and Engels using the term "abstract empiricists"
t h a t C.W. M-111s made c e n t r a l t o h i s c r i t i c a l sociology.

2 8 ~ h eterm "pragmatic1' i s c e n t r a l t o t h i s t h e s i s . A simplistic d e f i n i t i o n of the

word would d i s t r a c t from t h e argument of t h e t h e s i s since pragmatism gains i t s
meaning only i n t h e context of a comparison with and c r i t i c i s m of formal approaches
t o knowledge. One thing should be c l e a r r however. I am using t h e term both t o
describe approaches t o knowledge which emphasize t h e hwnan praxis out of which
ideas gain meaning, and i n t h e more technical way t o describe t h e pragmatic theory
of logic. Chapter Twenty w i l l specify t h e more technical use of the term.

3 6 ~ h i st h e s i s s h a l l wage a consistent c r i t i q u e against reductionism i n t h e s o c i a l

sciences. Such reductionism, or the tendency t o t r y t o reduce explanations of
human behavior t o specialized d i s c i p l i n e s ( e. g. , physiologism, p s y c h ~ l ~ g i ~ m ,
So~iologism,etc. ) r e s u l t s from the growiw formalization and specialization of
academic (e.g., ideological) approaches t o knowledge. It i s rooted i n the one-
dimensional praxis of academics teaching and researching within one-dimensional
i n s t i t u t i o n s . MY discussion of Marcuse (Chapter Nine) w i l l elaborate on t h i s
matter.
39Marx and Engelst theory of ideology i s c o n s i s t e n t with t h e so-called "new
working c l a s s " t h e o r i e s of today i n t h a t it focusses on t h e ideological r o l e
of mental labour i n education. It remains debatable whether or not Marx and
Engels were aware of t h e p o t e n t i a l productive r o l e of mental labour i n advanced
capitalism.

4 0 ~ . ~M. i l l s used t h i s term t o depict t h e need t o avoid both grand theory and
a b s t r a c t empiricism. M i l l s a c c r e d i t s Marx with t h i s a b i l i t y i n h i s book The
Marxists, New York, Dell (1962), p. 10-12.

4 1 ~ .Williamson: Ideology and t h e Problem of Knowledge. Edmonton, mimeographed,

undated, p. 9.
 ,

Chapter Two

Ideology a s a General and Total Problem: Mannheim

Karl Mannheimts handling of t h e problem of ideology discards some and

r e l i e s on other f e a t u r e s of Marx and Engelst approach. The f e a t u r e s t h a t a r e

accepted were generalized i n t o a p o s i t i o n t h a t tended t o be absolutized and,

consequently, it i s of questionable value. S t i l l Mannheimls discussion i n t r o -

duces us t o a dilemma t h a t c l a r i f i e s our discussion of ideology. The dilemma

a r i s e s from h i s turning t h e theory of ideology i n t o problems i n t h e sociology

of knowledge.

Mannheim accredlted Marxism with b a s i c i n s i g h t s i n t o t h e nature of

ideology. He showed t h i s when he wrote t h a t "... t h e beginnings of t h e concep-

t i o n of ideology which marks t h e theory of u s e f u l myths may be t r a c e d l a r g e l y

t o Marxism."' But Mannheim was a l s o quick t o c r i t i c i z e "the Marxian" notion of

ideology. He t h u s continued t h a t Marxism "... does not, however, bring every

attempt a t a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of h i s t o r y i n t o t h i s category but only those t o

which it is i n o p p o ~ i t i o n . " ~Both h i s indebtedness and h i s basic divergence

from Marx's concept of ideology ( h e ignores Engels1 c o n t r i b u t i o n ) were shown

by t h e statement t h a t ---I - -.-

-\'
"The sociology of knowledge a c t u a l l y emerged with Marx, whose profoundly
suggestive anercus went t o t h e h e a r t of t h e matter. However, i n h i s
work, t h e sociology of knowledge i s s t i l l indistinguishable from t h e
iI
unmasking of ideologies s i n c e f o r him s-strata and c l a s s e s were
, t h e b e a r e r s of Ideologies. Furthermore, although t h e theory of ideology
appeared within t h e framework of a given i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of h i s t o r y , it
was not a s yet c o n s i s t e n t l y thought out. "3

These statements can be taken a t f a c e value only a t t h e r i s k of ignoring

a c e n t r a l i s s u e f o r t h e problem of ideology. Mannheim's broad category of "the

Marxian" theory of ideology ignored t h e p o s s i b i l i t y mentioned e a r l i e r t h a t Marx

and Engelst theory of ideology was i t s e l f r e i f i e d by t h e s o c i a l process t h a t

they claimed created ideology. Mannheim d i d not ignore t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y completely

s i n c e he d i d w r i t e

"...it could e a s i l y be shown t h a t those who t h i n k i n s o c i a l i s t and com-

munist terms d i s c e r n t h e ideological elements only i n t h e thinking of
t h e i r opponents ... A s s o c i o l o g i s t s t h e r e i s no reason why we should
not apply t o Marxism t h e perceptions which it i t s e l f has produced, and
point out from case t o case i t s ideological ~ h a r a c t e r . " ~

S t i l l he d i d not c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h between Marx and Engelst theory of ideology,

a s p a r t of a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l theory and a r e l a t e d epistemology, and t h e p o l i t i c a l

and e l i t i s t use of t h e ideas about ideology i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o t h a t s o c i a l theory

and epistemology. I n f a c t , it can be argued t h a t Mannhsim abstracted t h e theory of

ideology, and, i n a n academic fashion, c r e a t e d a general problem without consider-

ing t h e important r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e s e ideas t o other ideas within Marx and Engels1

work. What a r e pseudo-problems, sometimes c a l l e d t h e problems of s o c i o l o g i c a l

s ~ b j e c t i v i t y ,may
~ have been t h e r e s u l t .

The Sociology of Knowledge

With t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y i n mind l e t us look a t Mannheimls handling of t h e

problem of ideology. As already s t a t e d , t h e key t o t h e a n a l y s i s was h i s transform-

ing of t h e theory of ideology i n t o problems i n t h e sociology of knowledge. A

r e j e c t i o n of t h e treatment of ideas, i.e., ideas, a s absolutes and t h e r e l a t e d

l i n k i n g of a l l ideas t o s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l conditions, i s what underlay t h i s t r a n s i -

tion. Mannhelm t h u s wrote t h a t "AS long a s one does not c a l l h i s otm p o s i t i o n i n t o

question but regards it a s absolute, while i n t e r p r e t i n g h i s opponent's ideas a s a

function of t h k l d o c i a l p o s i t i o n they occupy, t h e decisive s t e p has not been

.
.--.
 taken. 11 6

What Mannheim c a l l e d "ideological d i s t o r t i o n " r e s u l t s from a b s o l u t i z i n g

ideas. He argued t h a t "we have a case of ideological d i s t o r t i o n ... when we

t r y t o resolve c o n f l i c t s and a n x i e t i e s by having recourse t o absolutes, according

t o which it i s no longer possible t o live."7 (my emphasis) .The reason why it i s

"0 longer possible t o l i v e " by c e r t a i n ideas i s because they a r e "inappropriate"

31 t o t h e s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l conditions i n existence. "Viewed from t h i s standpoint,

knowledge i s d i s t o r t e d and ideological when it f a i l s t o t a k e account of t h e new

r e a l i t i e s applying t o a s i t u a t i o n , and when it attempts t o conceal them by think-

ing of them i n categories which a r e inappropriate. "* M a t we mean by "new

r e a l i t i e s " and "appropriate categoriest' i s , of course, t h e crux of t h e matter.

The problem of ideology i s p a r t l y rooted i n c o n f l i c t s about what c a t e g o r i e s r e -

. +

f l e e t r e a l i t y t h e best.
-\

Because of t h e tendency t o a b s o l u t i z e ideas - including Marx and Engels1

4, I

ideas about ideology - Mannheim made h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between "th'e study of

ideologyu and " t h e sociology of knowledge". The former "... has made i t s t a s k

t o unmask t h e more o r l e s s conscious deceptions and disguises of human i n t e r e s t

groups, p a r t i c u l a r l y those of p o l i t i c a l parties. " The l a t t e r "... i s concerned

-+A*---
s-7uw*- ?&&&* L%".-m."akw .%.--%-\-- --
not so much with d i s t o r t i o n s due t o a d e l i b e r a t e e f f o r t t o deceive a s with t h e
->-, -'m."--z
&%+ '- - -- - -&.&- -----
varying ways i n which objects present themselves t o t h e subject according t o t h e
--&-a- *
%-A$iPxl*l>ir l i s - s e P m =-*

1 differences i n social setting.^^ Mannheim t h e n argued t h a t we should "... leave

t o t h e theory of Ideology only t h e f i r s t forms of t h e ' i n c o r r e c t ' o r untrue, while
~ ? - " ' ~''
-I one-sidedness of Dn-,
\
which i s not due t o more or l e s s conscious i n t e n t ,

w i l l be separated from e theory of ideology and t r e a t e d a s t h e proper subject-

-'-$ ___z_ ,
matter of t h e sociology of knowledge. "I0 This d i s t i n c t i o n i s t h e b a s i s of
 I

Mannheim's handling of t h e problem of ideology. When we remember t h a t Marx

and Engels d i d & suggest t h a t ideology was a d e l i b e r a t e f a l s i f y i n g of events,

but r e s u l t e d from t h e d i v i s i o n of mental and physical labour and t h e functioning

of dominant ideas t o maintain t h e a l i e n a t i o n of t h e mass of people, it seems t h a t

Mannheim may be creating, r a t h e r t h a n c l a r i f y i n g , a problem. Since Marx and

Engelst theory of ideology d i d include a consideration of problems t h a t Mannheim

c l a s s i f i e d under t h e sociology of knowledge, h i s d i s t i n c t i o n comes i n t o question.

Mannheim turned t h e problem of ideology i n t o a general and t o t a l academic

problem. A l l ideas a r e r e l a t e d t o socio-historic conditions and i f older ones

cease t o apply t o new circumstances, but a r e s t i l l perpetuated, they d i s t o r t

realities. Thus Mannheim wrote t h a t h he attempt t o escape ideological and

utopian d i s t o r t i o n s i s , i n t h e l a s t a n a l y s i s , a quest f o r r e a l i t y . " What i s

meant by "quest f o r r e a l i t y " i s what i s v i t a l , and i s not a simple matter. But

4

it i s c l e a r t h a t it i s not a question t h a t i s "solved" academically. Mannheim

s t a t e d what he meant by t h i s statement when he wrote t h a t ideological (and

utopian) a n a l y s i s

'I... can be used t o combat t h e tendency on our i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e t o

separate thought from t h e world of r e a l i t y , t o conceal r e a l i t y , o r t o
exceed i t s limits. Thought should contain n e i t h e r l e s s nor more t h a n
t h e r e a l i t y i n whose medium it operates."ll

This i s a confusing StateXnent, though it r a i s e s a relevant problem. The

confusion i s based on an academic r a t h e r than a pragmatic understanding of language

and thought. For Mannheim thought must be linked with " r e a l i t y " . From t h i s it

follows t h a t "thought" can p o t e n t i a l l y be separated from " r e a l i t y " . The f a c t t h a t

t h e concept of "ideology" (and f o r Mannheim t h e concept of "utopia" a s w e l l ) s i p

n i f i e s a problem f o r thought a t a l l suggests t h a t thought and r e a l i t y sometimes do

and sometimes don't r e l a t e . A s he wrote " ~ 0 t hconcepts contain t h e imperative

 I

t h a t every idea must be t e s t e d by i t s congruence with reality."12

But t h i s concern with t h e r e l a t i o n of thought and r e a l i t y i s not the

fundamental issue. F i r s t of a l l it i s simply stupid t o t r e a t " r e a l i t y " and

"thought" a s separate since language and thought a r e the key media within

which humans exist. The separation of thought and r e a l i t y i s more a symptom

of Mannheimls f a l s e epistemological ideas than of a useful understanding of

ideology.

What i s needed is a specific statement of what f o r m of thought makes

sense of what aspects of human r e a l i t y . Mannheim did recognize t h a t "... our

1
conception of r e a l i t y i t s e l f has been revised and called i n t o question"13 by

growing awareness of t h e problem of ideology; but by s p l i t t i n g "thought1' and

" r e a l i t y " he got caught i n a vicious c i r c l e about t h e "congruence" of t h e two.

A person t r a i n e d o r oriented t o using ideas academically, i.e., who looks f o r

"solutions" within language per se, can go on endlessly t r y i n g t o make (words

about) " r e a l i t y " and (words about) "thought" f i t together nicely.

Marx and Engelsl handling of t h e problem of ideology considered t h i s

question. They argued f o r a r e l a t i o n of thought o r consciousness and praxis

( t h i s is a b e t t e r term than " r e a l i t y " ) t h a t would replace t h e "ideology" t h a t

was being produced i n a b s t r a c t from t h e l i v i n g experiences of the mass of people.

This was t o be done with the a i d of "knowledge" of t h e i r common problems within

t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s of e a r l y capitalism. Marx and Engels argued t h a t t h e sep-

a r a t i o n of theory and practice, which made theory into ideology and practice i n t o

alienation, had t o be overcome by changing the s o c i a l relationships - includiw

those between " t h e o r i s t s " and the mass of people - t h a t underlay t h i s s p l i t .

Mannheim a l s o thought t h a t the r e l a t i o n of theory and practice was a

\ c e n t r a l question. Thus he wrote t h a t

 I

" ~ d e o l o g i e sa r e t h e s i t u a t i o n a l l y transcendent ideas which never succeed

de f a c t o i n t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r projected contents. Though they of-
t e n become t h e good-intentioned motives f or t h e subjective conduct of
t h e individual, when they a r e a c t u a l l y embodied i n p r a c t i c e t h e i r mean-
ings a r e most frequently d i s t o r t e d . "14

From t h i s we can conclude t h a t f o r Mandleim t h e meaniw of ideas i n

p r a c t i c e w i l l determins whether r e a l i t y i s being d i s t o r t e d or not. I f t h i s is

s p e c i f i e d , a s I w i l l attempt t o do a s I continue, I do not disagree. Unfortu-

n a t e l y t h i s t r a i n of thought was not fvllowed through by Mannlleim.

Distinctions Within t h e Sociology of Knowledge

Mamdleim attempted t o f u r t h e r c l a r i f y t h e problem of ideology by making

s e v e r a l other d i s t i n c t i o n s . Let us look a t them, one by one, t o see whether it

c o n s t i t u t e s a r e a l c l a r i f i c a t i o n or i s a lengthy but c i r c u l a r a n a l y s i s back t o

h i s o r i g i n a l dilemma. The d i s t i n c t i o n s I s h a l l look a t a r e those between t h e

"particular/total", ' t s p e c i f i c / g e ~ e r a l ' tand "non-evaluative/evaluative" concep-

t i o n s of ideology. Clarifying what he meant by these d i s t i n c t i o n s w i l l show us

how and why MamP~eimt u r n s t h e s p e c i f i c theory of ideology i n t o a general academic

problem. It w i l l a l s o serve t o f u r t h e r our c r i t i c a l evaluation of t h i s approach

t o t h e problem of ideology.

For Mannheim h he p a r t i c u l a r conception of ideology i s implied when ...

we a r e s k e p t i c a l of t h e ideas and representations advanced by our opponents."l5

By comparison t h e tota_l conception r e f e r s t o "...t h e ideology of an age or of a

concrete s o c i a l group, e.g. of a class. "16 I n both cases It.. . t h e ideas expressed

by t h e subject a r e .., regarded a s functions of h i s existence ... (and a r e ) not

taken a t t h e i r face value". This i s t h e i r s i m i l a r i t y . Their difference l i e s i n

c a l l i n g i n t o question of It. .. t h e opponent s t o t a l ~ e l t a n s c 1 l a u u . n ~when

"~~ the t o t a l

conception of ideology i s being used. While t h e p a r t i c u l a r conception tends tr~wards

 1

" t h e purely psychological" i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of ideas t h e t o t a l conception

touches upon "... t h e t h e o r e t i c a l or noological l e v e l ... not merely t h e

content but a l s o t h e form ... even t h e conceptual framework of a mode of
18
thought a s a function of t h e l i f e s i t u a t i o n of a thinker."

Showing and recognizing a s i m i l a r i t y with Marx, Mannheim concluded

that "... a n a n a l y s i s of t h e correspondence between t h e s i t u a t i o n t o be known

and t h e forms of knowledge"19 c o n s t i t u t e s a higher form of a n a l y s i s t h a n t h a t

focussing on t h e psychology of i n t e r e s t s . According t o t h i s approach, t h e

individual i s not seen a s " t h e bearer'' of a n ideology, but r a t h e r

"... t h e individual can only be considered a s t h e bearer of a n ideology a s

long as we deal with t h a t conception of ideology which, by d e f i n i t i o n , i s
d i r e c t e d more t o detached contents t h a n t o t h e whole s t r u c t u r e of thought,
uncovering f a l s e ways of thought and exposing l i e s . A s soon a s t h e t o t a l
conception of ideology i s used, we attempt t o reconstruct t h e wbole out-
look of a s o c i a l group, and n e i t h e r t h e concrete individuals nor t h e
a b s t r a c t sum of them can l e g i t i m a t e l y be considered a s bearers of t h i s
ideological thought-system a s a whole. 11 20

This d i s t i n c t i o n is c e r t a i n l y j u s t i f i e d , though s t i l l confusing. An

i n d i v i d u a l & "the bearer" of a n ideology i n t h a t he o r she has experienced

events i n such a way t h a t a s p e c i f i c "ideology" develops. But i f by "bearer"

we imply "cause" o r anything l i k e t h a t we c o n t r a d i c t everything known about

t h e s o c i a l i z a t i o n of language and thought. Marx and Engels themselves b u i l t

t h e i r theory of ideology on a n understanding of t h e s o c i a l character of language

a ~ thought.
d Since Mannheim implied t h a t " t h e Marxian" treatment of ideology

lacked t h i s understanding and j u s t i f i e d h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between p a r t i c u l a r and

t o t a l concepts of ideology on t h i s b a s i s , we a g a i n conclude t h a t he f a i l e d t o

d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e o r i g i n a l theory and t h e r e i f i c a t i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l

theory of ideology.

According t o Mannheim, t h e s h i f t from t h e p a r t i c u l a r t o t h e t o t a l view

of ideology occurred through t h r e e stages i n t h e h i s t o r y of ideas. First

t h e r e was t h e contribution of c r i t i c a l philosophy. I n Mannheimls words:

" ~ h i l o s o p h yplayed a p a r t i n t h e process, but not philosophy i n t h e

narrow sense ( a s it i s usually conceived) a s a d i s c i p l i n e divorced
from t h e a c t u a l context of living. I t s r o l e was r a t h e r t h a t of t h e
ultimate and fundamental i n t e r p r e t e r of t h e f l u x i n t h e contemporary
world. "21

This philosophy succeeded i n e s t a b l i s h i n g new perspectives of t h e world.

Then, " ~ f t e rt h e objective ontological u n i t y of t h e world had been demolished

..." with t h e a i d of philosophy " t h e perceiving s u b j e c t " became important.

/Jp,f 1.5

Thus philosophies of consciousness began t o develop and these became a founda-

t i o n f o r t h e theory of ideology.

" ~ e n c e f o r t ht h e world a s "world" e x i s t s only with reference t o t h e

knowing mind, and t h e mental a c t i v i t y of t h e subject determines t h e
form i n which t h e world appears. This c o n s t i t u t e s i n f a c t t h e em-
bryonic t o t a l conception of ideology, though it is, a s y e t , devoid
of i t s h i s t o r i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l implications. "22

Second t h e r e was t h e development of h i s t o r i c a l perspective and i t s

i n t e g r a t i o n with t h e new awareness of t h e perceiving subject. The subject ' . s

placed within a h i s t o r i c a l context. This development, t h a t i s , t h e awareness

of "... t h e h i s t o r i c a l l y changing nature of mind was discovered not so much by

philosophy a s by t h e penetration of p o l i t i c a l i n s i g h t i n t o t h e everyday l i f e

of t h e time. "23

The t h i r d and t o Mannheim t h e most important s t e p was awareness of t h e

r e l a t i o n between s o c i a l c l a s s e s and i n t e l l e c t u a l forms. This provided a more

s p e c i f i c hypothesis from which t o study how t h e perceiving subject and h i s t o r i c a l

Setting interrelated. Once t h i s transformation from t h e p a r t i c u l a r and psycho-

l o g i c a l t o t h e t o t a l and h i s t o r i c a l understanding of ideology occurred:

 h he p a r t i c u l a r conception of ideology merges with t h e t o t a l . This
becomes apparent t o t h e observer i n t h e following manner: previously,
one's adversary, a s t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a c e r t a i n p o l i t i c a l - s o c i a l
p o s i t ion, was accused of conscious o r unconscious f a l s i f i c a t i o n . Now,
however, t h e c r i t i q u e i s more thoroughgoing i n t h a t , having d i s c r e d i t e d
t h e t o t a l s t r u c t u r e of h i s consciousness, we consider him no longer
capable of thinking c o r r e c t l y . "24

A t t h i s point, t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between a "specific" and a "general"

a p p l i c a t i o n of ideological a n a l y s i s entered Mannheimls study. For t h i s d i s -

tinction "...t h e decisive question i s whether t h e thought of a l l groups

(including our own) o r only t h a t of our adversaries is recognized a s s o c i a l l y

determined. "25 Nannheim argued t h a t g ideas a r e s o c i a l l y determined. After

combining t h e t o t a l and t h e general d e f i n i t i o n s of ideology, he concluded t h a t

'I... t h e general form of t h e t o t a l conception of ideology is being used by t h e

a n a l y s t when he has t h e courage t o subject not j u s t t h e adversary's point of

view but a l l points of view, including h i s own, t o t h e ideological analysis."26

On t h e b a s i s of t h i s , Mannheim developed a f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n . A specific

-
and p a r t i c u l a r or t o t a l a p p l i c a t i o n of ideological a n a l y s i s i n i t s e l f i s insuf-

f i c i e n t a s a sociological a n a l y s i s s i n c e it remains a p a r t of t h e " i n t e l l e c t u a l

armament of a party". A s Mannheim wrote " I n attempting t o expose t h e views of

another, one i s forced t o make one's own view appear i n f a l l i b l e and absolute,

which i s a procedure a l t o g e t h e r t o be avoided i f one i s making a s p e c i f i c a l l y

non-evaluative i n ~ e s t i g a t i o n . ~ ~his
7 non-evaluative o r sociological approach

i s contrasted with t h e "evaluative" and, f o r Mannheim, was characterized by "a

d e f i n i t e epistemology1'.

We saw how Marx and Engels accepted a n epistemology which r e l a t e d t o both

t h e i r s o c i a l theory and theory of ideology. Mannheim a l s o proposed an e p i s t e -

mology t o complement h i s " t o t a l and general", i. e. , "non-evaluative" application

of ideological analysis. He saw two p o s s i b i l i t i e s which he c a l l e d "relativism1'

 and "relationalism", and he argued f o r t h e l a t t e r . H i s conclusion was t h a t

"...r e l a t i v i s m combines t h i s h i s t o r i c a l - s o c i o l o g i c a l i n s i g h t with an o l d e r

theory of knowledge'which was a s yet unaware of t h e i n t e r p l a y between condi-

t i o n s of existence and modes of thought."** I n h i s view, r e l a t i v i s m owed

"... i t s existence t o t h e discrepancy between t h i s newly-won i n s i g h t i n t o t h e

a c t u a l processes of thought and a theory of knowledge which has not y e t taken

account of t h i s new insight. 1129

Instead of relativism, which r e j e c t s epistemological questions about

t r u t h and tends t o s e e a l l ideas a s equally worthwhile o r worthless, Mannheim

argued
1
"...t h a t it i s not epistemology i n any absolute sense but r a t h e r a
J; c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l l y t r a n s i t o r y type of epistemology which i s i n c o n f l i c t with

It~ is unclear what

t h e type of thought oriented t o t h e s o c i a l s i t ~ a t i o n . " ~

Mannheim meant by t h e statement "... i n c o n f l i c t with t h e type of thought o r i -

ented t o t h e s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n " but it could r e f e r t o t h e need f o r people t o

understand r e l a t i o n s h i p s between immediate s o c i a l experience and l a r g e r s o c i a l

s t r u c t u r e s i f they a r e t o g a i n r e a l knowledge. If t h i s was t h e case, t h e n we

s e e a c o n t i n u i t y from Marx and Engels1 thought t o t h a t of Mannheimls; a c o n t i -

n u i t y t h a t continues i n t h e work of C.W. Mills and Herbert Marcuse i n our time.31

Mannheimls Evaluative Epistemology

The main conclusion t h a t Mannheim derived from t h e s e t h r e e d i s t i n c t i o n s

and h i s idea of t h e sociology of knowledge a s a non-evaluative study of i d e o l o ~ y

was t h a t a new epistemology was required f o r t h e s o c i a l sciences. He wrote

"... epistemology i s a s intimately enmeshed i n t h e s o c i a l process a s i s t h e

t o t a l i t y of our thinking, and it w i l l make progress t o t h e extent t h a t it can

master t h e complications a r i s i n g out of t h e changing s t r u c t u r e of thought. 1132

 He then hinted a t t h e nature of t h e nkw epistemology. "A modern theory of

knowledge which takes account of t h e r e l a t i o n a l a s d i s t i n c t from t h e merely

/
Y'
r e l a t i v e character of a l l h i s t o r i c a l knowledge must s t a r t with t h e assumption

t h a t t h e r e a r e spheres of thought i n which it i s impossible t o conceive of

absolute t r u t h e x i s t i n g independently of t h e values and p o s i t i o n of t h e subject

and unrelated t o t h e s o c i a l context. "33 The "spheres of thought" of which Mann-

heim was thinking were not made clear. And i f h i s statement about "absolute

t r u t h e x i s t i n g independently" i s taken l i t e r a l l y I would argue t h a t no sphere

of thought can avoid t h e e f f e c t s of ideology.

It is noteworthy t h a t when t h i s new epistemology i s applied t o s p e c i f i c

problems then t h e study of ideology becomes evaluative i n a new way, i.e., a

non-sectarian way. The s o c i o l o g i s t needs t o evaluate how h i s o r her ideas about

ideology r e l a t e t o a s o c i a l p o s i t i o n and t h e values learned i n t h a t position.

Mannheim t h u s ended up advocating a n evaluative, o r what we might c a l l a self-

c r i t i c a l , study of ideologies. This is where h i s general and t o t a l a p p l i c a t i o n

of ideological a n a l y s i s led. The r e l a t i o n s h i p of "epistemology" and " t h e soci-

ology of knowledge" was t h e b a s i s of t h i s study of ideologies. Making t h i s q u i t e

e x p l i c i t , he wrote "our point i s not, t h e r e f ore, t h a t t h e sociology of knowledge

w i l l , by i t s very nature, supplant epistemological and noological inquiry, but

r a t h e r t h a t it has made c e r t a i n discoveries which have more than a mere f a c t u a l

relevance, and which cannot be adequately d e a l t with u n t i l some of t h e conceptions

and prejudices of contemporary epistemology have been revised. "34 1t is q u i t e

fl

c l e a r t h a t epistemology i s t o remain a s e p a r a t e " d i s c i p l i n e " and t h i s , a s we

Proceed, w i l l be our main reason f o r r e j e c t i n g Mannheimls handling of t h e problem

of ideology.
 I

This, i n summary, 3s Mannheimls main contribution t o t h e problem of

ideology. H i s d i s t i n c t i o n s begin t o c l a r i f y t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n of epistemology

and t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e person within h i s t o r i c a l conditions. But, i n t h e process,

t h e meaning of t h e term "ideology" may have been so generalized and t o t a l i z e d

t h a t it no longer makes any useful discriminations between d i f f e r e n t forms of

b

ideas. Let us look c r i t i c a l l y a t Mannheimls approach t o t h e study of ideology

t o s e e j u s t how u s e f u l it is.

4
I want t o make it q u i t e c l e a r t h a t I have no disagreement with Mannhelmls

c r i t i c i s m of ideological a n a l y s i s t h a t assumes t h e existence of absolutes. There

i s nothing worth preserving i n a s e c t a r i a n a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e theory of ideology

and t h e r e is everything t o g a i n from basic s e l f - c r i t i c i s m about t h e problem of

ideology within t h e s o c i a l sciences. Thus Mannheim's d i s t i n c t i o n s do help us

make important i s s u e s e x p l i c i t t h a t might otherwise be ignored o r neglected.

The d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e non-evaluative and evaluative concepti0.n~of ideology

f o r c e s us away from a narrow, projecting35 fomn of thought towards self-conscious-

ness of our presuppositions and t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o our time and place i n s o c i e t y

and history.

Mannheimls argument t h a t a l l i n t e l l e c t u a l positions a r e b u i l t upon a n

I
ontology, and t h a t it i s b e t t e r t o evaluate t h i s foundation than ignore it,

challenges us t o develop new l e v e l s and forms of consciousness and knowledge.

It IS on t h e b a s i s of t h i s argument t h a t Mannheim advocates h i s "evaluative

epistemology", i.e., a theory of knowledge which t a k e s i n t o account t h e r e l a t i o n -

ships between a t h i n k e r ' s s o c i a l p o s i t i o n and h i s o r her ideas. We must l e a r n

t o confront our ontological presuppositions, not pretend they a r e non-existent

and t h a t we observe " r e a l i t y " with a detached o b j e c t i v i t y , Doing t h e l a t t e r

 ,
simply allows "ideological d i s t o r t i o n " t o have a more pervasive e f f e c t on our

thought. O r , i n Mannheiml s words:

h he danger i n presuppositions does not l i e merely i n t h e f a c t t h a t

they e x i s t or t h a t they a r e p r i o r t o empirical knowledge. It l i e s
r a t h e r i n the f a c t t h a t an ontology handed down through t r a d i t i o n
obstructs new developments, especially i n t h e basic modes of think-
ing, and a s long a s the p a r t i c u l a r i t y of t h e conventional t h e o r e t i c a l
framework remains unquestioned we w i l l remain i n t h e t o i l s of a s t a t i c
mode of thought which i s inadequate t o our present stage of h i s t o r i c a l
and i n t e l l e c t u a l development.1136

Though t h e need t o develop new l e v e l s and forms of self-consciousness

is undisputable, I remain ambivalent about t h e value of Mannheimls approach t o

t h e problem of ideology. While it i s c l e a r t h a t so-called "abstract empiricismI137

i s an impossibility, it seems f r u i t l e s s t o t r y t o resolve the problem a t a n

academic l e v e l of analysis (e.g., ontological, metaphysical) a s Mannheim did.

This simply leads t o another philosophical and technical language f o r t h e

academic. It does not evaluate why a form of ideas e x i s t s f o r a c e r t a i n social

group. It i s because of t h i s t h a t I remain skeptical of Mannheimls statement

t h a t "A c l e a r and e x p l i c i t avowal of t h e implicit metaphysical presuppositions

which underlie and make possible empirical knowledge w i l l do more f o r t h e c l a r i -

f i c a t i o n and advancement of research than a verbal denial of the existence of

these presuppositions accompanied by t h e i r s u r r e p t i t i o u s admission through t h e

back door. tt 38

Separating our language i n t o "the empirical" and "the metaphysical" may

show sophistication, even imagination, but it does not break us out of t h e

dilemma with which Mannheimls d i s t i n c t i o n s present us. I am not r e j e c t i n g

Mannheim's plea f o r a more conscious evaluation of ideology. It i s r a t h e r t h a t

I think an epistemological orientation, which he has, i s the wrong one t o the

problem.
 I am i n f u l l agreement with Mannheimls statement t h a t

"we s h a l l be forced eventually t o assume an evaluative position. The t r a n -

s i t i o n t o an evaluative point of view i s necessitated from t h e very begin-
ning by t h e f a c t t h a t h i s t o r y a s h i s t o r y i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e unless c e r t a i n
of i t s aspects a r e emphasized i n c o n t r a s t t o others. "39

But t h i s does not necessarily mean t h a t we need t o debate, academically, our

various "metaphysics". To do t h i s i s symptomatic of t h e d i v i s i o n of "mental

production", i n Marx and Engelst words, from t h e p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s of t h e mass

of people. It i s t h e tendency within t h e ivory towers of academics who have t h e

Jtime t o c r e a t e , ad infiniturn, new problems out of t h e c r i t i c a l analyses of old

4 ones. Mannheim tended towards t h i s i n some places, though he had t h e opposite

and more f r u i t f u l i n c l i n a t i o n , a s well.

The f a c t t h a t Mannheim concluded t h a t we need a new epistemology shows

t h e predominance of t h e academic s t r a i n within h i s thought. Though he disclaimed

t h e search f o r "ultimate t r u t h " on t h e b a s i s of h i s discussion of t h e problem of

/ideology, h i s very language suggests a clinging t o t h e notion. When Mannheim de-

scribed t h e non-evaluative approach t o ideological analysis, he s t a t e d t h a t t h e

sociologist

"... w i l l no longer be inclined t o r a i s e t h e questlon a s t o which of t h e

contending p a r t i e s has t h e t r u t h on i t s s i d e , but r a t h e r he w i l l d i r e c t
h i s a t t e n t i o n t o discovering t h e approximate t r u t h a s it emerges i n t h e
course of h i s t o r i c a l development out of t h e complex s o c i a l process. The
modern i n v e s t i g a t o r can answer i f he i s accused 9f evading t h e problem
of what i s t r u t h , t h a t t h e i n d i r e c t approach t o t r u t h through s o c i a l
h i s t o r y w i l l i n t h e end be more f r u i t f u l than a d i r e c t l o g i c a l a t t a c k . "O'

It i s c l e a r t h a t he s t i l l saw " t r u t h " , whether approximate or not, a s something

a r i s i n g from an academic description of s o c i a l history.

When Mannheim wrote "Knowledge a r i s i n g out of our experience i n a c t u a l l i f e

s i t u a t i o n s , though not absolute, i s knowledge none t h e less,"41 you can sense h i s

own ambiguity ahout t h e question o f ultimate truth. He i s too apologetic f o r

 I

r e j e c t i n g t h e idea of ultimate t r u t h t o have obtained a q u a l i t a t i v e l y new

understanding of what c o n s t i t u t e s t h e v a l i d i t y of one idea over a n other.

S t i l l , on t h e b a s i s of h i s statement, he could have d e a l t d i f f e r e n t l y with

t h e problem of ideology and t h e r e l a t e d problem of epistemology. Throughout

h i s study, i n f a c t , t h e r e a r e statements t h a t could have served a s a b a s i s f o r

an a l t e r n a t i v e .

On Mannhelml s Contradictions

Instead of concluding t h a t academics i n t h e s o c i a l sciences need a n

evaluative epistemology, we could conclude t h a t a l l persons with i n t e l l e c t u a l

s k i l l s must i n e v i t a b l y face choices about how t h e i r knowledge w i l l be used.

This would u l t i m a t e l y include choices about what problems were t o be one's

priority. Such would be a d i f f e r e n t conclusion than Mannheim's, though it would

not n e c e s s a r i l y contradict h i s underlying t h e s i s . Actually, it would help avoid

a n a b s t r a c t i n g of t h e implications of t h e problem of ideology within t h e ivory

tower of academics.

Mannheim saw t h e need f o r t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l t o make judgments, but he did

not mean t h e same t h i n g t h a t I have s t r e s s e d . For example, he wrote "... t h e

more aware one becomes of t h e presuppositions underlying h i s thinking, i n t h e

i n t e r e s t of t r u l y empirical research, t h e more it i s apparent t h a t t h i s empirical

procedure ( i n t h e s o c i a l sciences, a t l e a s t ) can be c a r r i e d on only on t h e b a s i s

of c e r t a i n meta-empirical, ontological, and metaphysical judgments, and t h e expec-

t a t i o n s and hypothesis t h a t follow from them. t~~~ Here he showed both i n s i g h t

i n t o t h e ramifications of t h e problem of ideology and h i s i n a b i l i t y t o understand

how t h e i s o l a t i o n of academic i n s t i t u t i o n s and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n of academic languages

 I

helps c r e a t e and perpetuate ideologies t h a t " d i s t o r t " t h e s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s

of t h e s o c i e t y a t large.

A t one point, Mannheim approaches t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e perspective on

ideologies. It i s when he recognizes t h e possible r e l a t i o n between human

freedom and c r i t i c a l knowledge. I w i l l quote him a t length s i n c e t h i s r e -

l a t i o n i s v i t a l t o my own thesis.

r hose who f e a r t h a t a n increased knowledge of t h e determining f a c t o r s

which e n t e r i n t o t h e formation of t h e i r decisions w i l l t h r e a t e n t h e i r
"freedom" may r e s t i n peace. Actually it i s t h e one who i s ignorant
of t h e s i g n i f i c a n t determining f a c t o r s and who a c t s under t h e immedi-
a t e pressure of determinants unknown t o him who i s l e a s t f r e e and most
thoroughly predetermined i n h i s conduct. Whenever we become aware of
a determinant which has dominated us, we remove it from t h e realm of
unconscious motivation i n t o t h a t of t h e c o n t r o l l a b l e , calculable, and
o b j e c t i f i e d . Choice and decision a r e thereby not eliminated; on t h e
contrary, motives which previously dominated us became subject t o our
domination; we a r e more and more thrown back upon our t r u e s e l f and,
whereas formerly we were t h e s e r v a n t s of n e c e s s i t y , we now f i n d it
possible t o u n i t e consciously with f o r c e s with which we a r e i n
thorough agreement. "43

It i s argued t h a t choice can be enhanced by an understanding of t h e

workings of ideology. But a s long a s t h i s "understanding" i s kept within t h e

academic realm and a person looks f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n only academically, a n end-

l e s s dilemma - what can r i g h t l y be c a l l e d a pseudo-problem - remains. If t h e r e

i s no absolute t r u t h and i f ideology, a s Mannheim defines i t , a f f e c t s us a l l ,

t h e n it i s impossible t o ever "solve" t h e problems of knowledge i n theory. It

i s possible t o go on and on c r e a t i n g a n a l y s i s a f t e r a n a l y s i s about t h e dilemma,

but t o what end? I s n ' t t h e important question t o f i n d out t h e consequences of

various forms of ideas f o r t h e mass of people? Shouldn't judgment and choice be

used i n t h i s way? Asking these questions i t s e l f shows how human choice i s u l t i -

mately relevant f o r s o c i a l science.

 Mannheim i s perplexed by t h e dilemma of r e l a t i v e versus a b s o l u t e t r u t h .

His confusion i s t y p i c a l of a l l who have t a k e n s e r i o u s l y t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of

having a b s t r a c t and a b s o l u t e t r u t h s only t o f i n d out t h a t t h e i r thought has

something t o do with t h e i r e x i s t e n c e , i.e., a p a r t i c u l a r kind of experience

w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i o - h i s t o r i c position. Regardless of Mannheimts apparent

r e j e c t i o n of a r e l a t i v i s t i c epistemology i n f a v o r of a so-called " r e l a t i o n a l "

one, h i s language i n d i c a t e s t h a t he i s caught i n t h i s dilemma.

E a r l y i n h i s study he asked "What we a r e concerned with h e r e i s t h e

elemental p e r p l e x i t y of our time, which can be epitomized i n t h e symptomatic

q u e s t i o n 'How is it p o s s i b l e f o r man t o continue t o t h i n k and l i v e i n a time

when t h e problems of ideology and u t o p i a a r e being r a d i c a l l y r a i s e d and thought

through i n a l l t h e i r implications? "44 My r e p l y would be t h a t "man" wontt have

any major t r o u b l e continuing t o t h i n k and l i v e though academics may become con-

fused by t h i n k i n g t h r o w h a l l t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e problem of ideology f o r

t h e i r a b s t r a c t views of knowledge. Since Mannheim argued t h a t our awareness of

t h e problem of ideology i s based i n i n s i g h t s i n t o " t h e perceiving s u b j e c t " , i n

a growing " h i s t o r i c a l perspective" and a growing awareness t h a t d i f f e r e n t and

changing s o c i a l groupings have d i f f e r i n g idea systems, it i s s t r a n g e t h a t he

t u r n e d t h i s problem i n t o a perplexing i n t e l l e c t u a l dilemma. He saw t h e develop-

ment of t h e problem i n t h e p a s t , but was unable t o p r o j e c t i t s development i n t o

t h e future. H i s academic o r i e n t a t i o n t o t h e problem made it impossible f o r him

t o s i t u a t e problems of knowledge l i n k e d t o t h e new awareness of ideology i n t h e

changing s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s of h i s time.

Out of t h i s dilemma, many pseudo-problems have developed. One i n t e r e s t i n g

t h i n g i s how Marx and Engels avoided them t h o w h not ignoring t h e problem of

 R

- 43 -
I

ideology i t s e l f . It i s my contention t h a t it was t h e i r praglnatic epistemology

t h a t kept them from these pseudo-problems. It i s a l s o my contention t h a t

Mannheimls generalized and t o t a l i z e d use of t h e concept "ideology1', whereby

-
a l l ideas became ideological, r e s u l t e d from h i s own c l i n g i n g t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y

of academic, a b s t r a c t t r u t h . Only if t h e r e i s an i n i t i a l b e l i e f i n t r u t h ner ,

se, i.e., t r u t h i n a b s t r a c t from t h e p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s of t h e mass of people,

i s t h e r e a reason t o be perplexed about t h e t o t a l and general e f f e c t s , i.e.,

" d i s t o r t i o n " of ideology. Only i f "ideology1' i s contrasted with "science" i n

a b s t r a c t and t h e problem of ideology misconceptualized i s t h e r e a reason f o r

such confusion a s Mannheim experienced. The f a c t t h a t "ideology" is seen a s

" d i s t o r t i o n " i t s e l f shows t h a t t h e r e i s a b e l i e f i n t r u e ideas. Primarily,

Mannheim was r i g h t t o emphasize t h e meaning of ideas i n p r a c t i c e ; i n f a c t , t h i s

form of evaluation i s t h e way t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of ideas needs t o be shown.

Though Mannheim r e f e r r e d t o t h i s " r e l a t i o n a l " approach and saw i t s v a l i d i t y , he

was s t i l l caught i n t h e search f o r t r u t h i n t h e realm of theory.

I n one place i n h i s study, Mannheim shows t h e way out of t h i s dilemma.

After discussing t h e use of t h e term "ideology" by Napoleon, he wrote "...

common speech o f t e n contains more philosophy and is of g r e a t e r s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r

t h e f u r t h e r statement of problems t h a n academic disputes which tend t o become

s t e r i l e because they f a i l t o t a k e cognizance of t h e world outside t h e academic

walls. "45 My sympathy with t h i s anti-academlc o r i e n t a t i o n t o t h e problem of

ideology i s already c l e a r but I am not s u r e t h a t Mannheim r e j e c t e d such an

o r i e n t a t i o n himself. He was i n t e r e s t e d i n "philosophy" and i n "the f u r t h e r

statement of problems", not i n t r e a t i n g ideas a s a p a r t of t h e p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s

of people, and it i s t h i s very approach t h a t leads t o t h e s t e r i l i t y of academia.

 I

The important point i s t h a t were t h e problem of ideology t o be con-

s i s t e n t l y tackled i n terms of a n anti-academic o r i e n t a t i o n , i.e., i n terms of

t h e p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s of people ( w i t h i n which "common speech" occurs) we would

avoid abstractine; epistemology, ontology, metaphysics o r whatever i n t o academic

languages and problems (i.e., pseudo-problems). Rather, we would recognize a l l

v a r i a t i o n s of t h e value-free doctrine (e.g., a b s t r a c t empiricism) a s untenable

and would begin t o d e l i b e r a t e l y make judgments about t h e kind of consequences

o r ends we wish t o see follow from t h e c r e a t i o n of ideas. Our i n t e l l e c t u a l work

and t h e events of t h e time would t h e n be i n a constant r e l a t i o n s h i p . Instead of

c r e a t i n g more and more ideology, i n Marx and Engels1 sense of t h e term, we would

work toward an i n t e g r a t i o n of theory and t h e p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s of people - fully

aware t h a t t h e r e a r e p o l i t i c a l implications once people have ideas t h a t c l a r i f y

r a t h e r t h a n mystify t h e r e l a t i o n of personal problems and t h e type of s o c i a l

r e l a t i o n s t h a t dominate t h e s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e i n existence.

Mannheim recognized t h a t with t h e i n s i g h t i n t o t h e problem of ideology

t h e r e has developed "... a new kind of thinking i n which theory could not be

separated from t h e p r a c t i c e nor from t h e i n t e n t . "46 This i s a c r u c i a l insight.

But, by h i s use of t h e term " c o l l e c t i v e u n c o n s c i ~ u s "t ~

o ~describe t h e a l i e n a t i n g

( h e t a l k e d of t h e "obscuring") e f f e c t s of ideology, he a l s o showed t h a t he was

w i l l i n g t o remain aloof from t h e t a s k of developing t h i s form of thought. Once

t h e d i v i s i o n of mental and physical labour is seen a s basic t o t h e s e p a r a t i o n of

theory from p r a c t i c e and i n t e n t , and t h e system of a u t h o r i t y t h a t maintains t h i s

d i v i s i o n of labour i s understood, t h e t a s k of developing r a d i c a l l y new forms of

-
thought becomes more than an f n t e r p r e t e r /of t h e world can handle.
1
Before concluding t h i s d i s i u s s i o n of Mannheim, it i s important t o note
/
1
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t h a t hc d i d not consider h i s study t o be a s o l u t i o n t o t h e problem of ideology.

This adds f u r t h e r support t o my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . When he was discussing t h e

existence of a n "ontology" i n a l l thought systems, he wrote

h his unavoidable i m p l i c i t ontology which i s a t t h e b a s i s of our a c t i o n s ,

even when we do not want t o believe it, i s not something which i s a r r i v e d
a t by romantic yearning and which we impose upon r e a l i t y a t w i l l . It
marks t h e horizon within which l i e s our world of r e a l i t y and which cannot
be disposed of by simply l a b e l l i n g it ideology. A t t h i s point we see a
glimmer of a "solution" t o our problem even though nowhere e l s e i n t h i s
book do we attempt t o o f f e r one.1148

Here Mannheim implies a skepticism of t h e t o t a l , general and evaluative

view of ideology around which he b u i l t h i s study. I n other words, it i s pos-

s i b l e t h a t he began t o recognize t h a t , a s we have argued, such a use of t h e

term "ideology" had no l a s t i n g value. Language, thought and idea systems a r e

p a r t of t h e human condition s o it i s not u s e f u l t o consider ideas per s e a s

d i s t o r t i o n s of r e a l i t y . Though Mannheim t r i e d not t o do t h i s , h i s commitment

t o a n academic view of epistemology made it impossible f o r him t o develop a

theory of v a l i d ideas t h a t could be u s e f u l t o t h e mass of people. To do t h i s ,

we would need t o ask: ( i ) what ideas have what f u n c t i o n and what e f f e c t s on

our l i v e s ? ; and ( i i )how does t h e method of c r e a t i n g and disseminating ideas

a f f e c t t h e s e consequences? A s a hypothetical example of t h i s form of question:

what ideas, r e l a t e d t o what form of praxis, have l i b e r a t i n g e f f e c t s and which

have a l i e n a t i n g e f f e c t s f o r humans?

There i s f u r t h e r evidence t h a t Mannheim did not consider h i s study a

d e f i n i t i v e one on t h e problem of ideology. I n a l e t t e r about t h e work under

consideration, he s t a t e d t h a t "... we should not conceal inconsistencies ...

(when) our whole thought system i n i t s various p a r t s leads t o inconsistencies."

When he wrote t h a t he inconsistencies i n our whole outlook, which i n my pre-

s e n t a t i o n become more v i s i b l e ...I1, he even suggested t h a t h i s "study" could be

 - 46 -
I

taken a s an example of t h e f a l l a c i e s of "our whole ( r e a d "academic") thought

.
system11 49

A s p a r t of t h e i r theory of ideology, Marx and Engels had t o hypothesize

about t h e kinds of questions l i s t e d above and they went beyond a n awareness of

t h e shortcomings of academic knowledge. They studied t h e r e l a t i o n s between

consciousness and praxis, and were thoroughly sociological. They did not

separate theory from practice, a s Mannheim did, and complain about t h e weak-

nesses of r e i f i e d ideas. That i s what makes t h e i r handling of t h e problem of

ideology more inclusive, and it i s what allowed them t o avoid any a b s t r a c t

\i pseudo-problems about epistemology. It was Mannhelmls separation of Marx and

i
Engelst theory of ideology from t h e i r s o c i a l theory and r e l a t e d pragmatic

epistemology, without even analyzing t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e s e ideas,

t h a t l e d him i n t o t h e dead-end t h a t i s i n e v i t a b l e i f t h e sociology of knowledge

i s made i n t o a n academic problem.

Footnotes

.
K
' Mannheim: I d e o l o ~ gand Utopia. New York, Harcourt , Brace and World ( 1936 1,
P- 139.

5 ~ h eterm "sociological s u b j e c t i v i t y " has been given c o n t r a s t i n g meanings.

Bergmann, who i s c r i t i c i z e d i n Chapter Five, argues t h a t such subject i v i t y, which
he a t t r i b u t e s t o Mannheim, r e s u l t s when "...one f a i l s t o distinguish between value
Judgments and statements of f a c t ...I1 (G. Bergmann: Ideology, i n Readings i n t h e
Philosophy of Science. May Brodbeck (ed. ). New York, Macmlllan (19681, p. 131.
 ,
jlchapters Nine and Ten w i l l deal with t h e l a t t e r two authors i n d e t a i l .

32~annheim, loc. c i t .

351 use t h e psychoanalytical term "projection" purposefully because any com-

prehensive study of ideology would have t o analyze t h e d i f f e r e n t modes of
thought where a n awareness of t h e mediating r o l e of ideology between p r a x i s
and consciousness ( i. e., language) does and does not e x i s t . I n t h e l a t t e r
case, because consciousness would be more a b s t r a c t e d from praxis, t h e r e would
t e n d t o be a projecting mode of thought.

3 7 ~ h i sterm r e f e r s t o an i n v e s t i g a t i o n where a person thinks he a c t s a s a

detached and "objective" observer and records s o c i a l f a c t s t h a t a r e thought
t o have a nature independent of him o r her.

38~annheitn, op. c i t . , p. 90.

391bid., pp. 93-4.

4 0 ~ b i d . p. 84.

41~bid., p. 86.

4 2 ~ b i d . , p. 89.

&31bid., pp. 189-90.

47Mannheim argued t h a t here i s I m p l i c i t i n t h e word lideologyl t h e i n s i g h t

t h a t i n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s t h e c o l l e c t i v e unconscious of c e r t a i n groups obscures
t h e r e a l c o n d i t i o n of s o c i e t y both t o i t s e l f and t o others and thereby s t a b i l i z e s
it." Ibid., p. 40.

48~annheim, op. c i t . , p. 88 ( f o o t n o t e ) .

4 9 ~ . ~Wolff:
. The Sociology of Knowledge and Sociological Theory, i n G.
Llewellyn ( ed. ): S~.rmosiurnon S o c i o l o ~ l c a lTheory. New York, Harper and Row
(1959) P. 571.
 ,
Chapter Three

The Rhetorical Separation of Ideology and Science

The extensiveness of my examination of Karl Mannheimls thought r e f l e c t s

my respect f o r h i s discussion of t h e problem of ideology. Though d i f f e r i n g

from him on t h e question of epistemology, and concluding t h a t h i s handling of

t h e problem tended t o c r e a t e pseudo-problems, h i s study remains a c l a s s i c i n

t h e area. He dissected t h e problem of ideology i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s and thus ex-

posed some ramifications, a s well a s dead-ends. It was h i s commitment t o d e a l

with both t h e s e matters t h a t allows others t o avoid t h e p i t f a l l s of s o c i o l o g i c a l

subjectivism.

It i s now necessary t o c o n t r a s t Mannheimls i n t e l l e c t u a l treatment of t h e

problem of ideology with t h e widespread r h e t o r i c a l approach t o t h e problem. It

i s necessary t o do t h i s a t t h i s point i n t h e study because t h e c o n t r a s t i s fun-

damental t o t h i s t h e s i s . Since t h e time of Marx, Engels and Mannheim, t h e

r h e t o r i c a l s e p a r a t i o n of "ideology" and " s o c i a l sciencet1has dominated academic

languages. It was necessary t o begin with Marx, Engels and Mannheim t o expose,

by comparison, t h e ignorance which underlies t h e present scientisml which t o t a l l y

ignores t h e problem of ideology.

The r h e t o r i c a l approach t o t h e problem of ideology can be exposed with a

sampling of t h e v a s t amount of l i t e r a t u r e t h a t assumes, u n c r i t i c a l l y , t h a t

" s o c i a l science'' and "ideology" a r e e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t . We w i l l see from t h i s

sampling t h a t t h e only way t o "prove" t h i s assumption i s by burning Mannheimls

book and purging a l l those who have c r i t i c a l ideas i n t h e society. A one-

dimensional, t o t a l i t a r i a n s o c i e t y could enforce a standardization of ideas (e.g.,

 I

ideology) and lead t o t h e b e l i e f t h a t those ideas a r e purely s c i e n t i f i c , but

o b j e c t i v e l y t h e ideology would s t i l l e x i s t . This idea shows t h e absurdity of

t h e position.

" ~ d e o l o g y "and " s o c i a l science" can be defined i n such a way t h a t they

appear t o be completely d i s t i n c t , but t h e problem of ideology w i l l be ignored.

Such i s t h e danger of allowing verbal i n t e l l i g e n c e t o develop without i n t e l l e c -

t u a l commitment and judgment. Such verbal i n t e l l i g e n c e without t h e commitment

t o c r i t i c a l l y evaluate ideas i s what underlies t h e view, common i n academia,

t h a t "ideology" r e s u l t s from t h e i n s i s t a n c e t h a t knowledge of s o c i e t y must a c t

a s a n instrument f o r s o c i a l change. This view of ideology s e e s any s i g n of

passion, commitment o r activism i n a person a s a d i s t o r t i n g influence on t h e

s c i e n t i f i c search f o r t r u t h . We a r e already beginning t o see how meaningless

t h i s combination of words ( " s c i e n t i f i c search f o r t r u t h " ) i s without a d e t a i l e d

a n a l y s i s of ideology.

The P e r s o n i f i c a t i o n of Ideology

Thinking along t h e s e l i n e s , Ries wrote t h a t "... science sees values a s

facts.112 The implication of t h i s i s t h a t " f a c t s " a r e a b s t r a c t descriptions,

uncontaminated by commitments o r judgments , and t h a t "values" a r e ideological.

According t o t h i s view, t h e . " s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t 1 ' stands back and observes and

s t u d i e s those with values, but cannot support ideologies i n any way i f he o r

she i s t o remain a s c i e n t i s t .

I n Chapter Twelve I w i l l show how t h i s "value-free" view of s o c i a l

science, t h e so-called value-free doctrine, i s r a t i o n a l i z e d by a n oversimpli-

f i c a t i o n of Max Weberls work. For now l e t me expand on t h e way t h e r h e t o r i c a l

approach t o t h e problem of ideology i s rationalized. F i r s t , i n t h i s view,

 I

" s o c i a l science" i s stereotyped a s "policy-related", but b a s i c a l l y detached

from p o l i t i c a l decision-making. Social s c i e n t i s t s a r e seen a s tlexpcrts" who

provide informed opinion without making value judgments. Ries s t a t e d t h a t

s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s inform decision-makers without providiny a framework of

values and he implied t h a t t h i s means they a r e value-free.3

This double-talk i s f u r t h e r exposed a s soon a s one recognizes t h a t t h e

problems t h a t many s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s research a r e established within t h e "frame-

work of values" of p o l i t i c a l decision-makers. Furthermore, t h e " p o s i t ion" is

exposed a s r h e t o r i c ( a s o p h i s t i c a t e d and convincing mis-use of words) when

Mannheimls q u e s t i o m about t h e r e l a t i o n of a t h i n k e r and h i s o r her s o c i a l

p o s i t i o n a r e taken seriously. The very notion of "policy-relatedt1 research,

which r e l a t e s t o t h e separation or' "pure" and "applied" r e s e a r ~ h ,cloaks

~ over

these relationships. One could say t h a t t h e s e terms a r e "ideological d i s t o r -

t i o n s " of t h e s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s of research today.

The second reason why a s e r i o u s handling of t h e problem of ideology has

not occurred i n contemporary North American academia r e l a t e s t o t h e almost t o t a l

i n t e g r a t i o n of s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s i n t o t h e dominant ideology. Their functional

i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o t h e dominant s o c i e t y a s so-called "experts" i s complemented by

t h i s i d e o l o g i c a l integration. Social science i s increasingly used t o a i d

p o l i t i c a l and i n d u s t r i a l dec ision-making5 and t h e r e f ore a r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n t o

cloak t h e p o l i t i c a l ideology t h a t helps e s t a b l i s h academic problems and determine

t h e uses of s t u d i e s i s required. Ries' r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n i s c a l l e d "... t h e 'self-

observation of society." H e wrote:

"The self-observation of s o c i e t y i n t h e form of a policy-related s o c i a l

science i s a necessity under t h e present conditions of s o c i a l organization.
This is even more t r u e of t h e democratically organized i n d u s t r i a l s t a t e
t h a n t h e t o t a l i t a r i a n . Without a dominating ideology, t h e democratic
s t a t e r e q u i r e s information about i t s e l f a s a means of s o c i a l c o n t ~ o l . " ~
 I

Ries i s quuite c o r r e c t t h a t t h e domimnt s o c i a l science is used f o r

" s o c i a l control". But t h e use of t h e words "democratic" and " t o t a l i t a r i a n " ,

with t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r connotations i n t h i s s o c i e t y , allowed him t o ignore t h e

problem of ideology. Nevertheless, we must a c c r e d i t Ries with a s o p h i s t i c a t e d

use of words. When he wrote t h a t our s o c i e t y i s "without a dominating ideology"

-
Ries seemed t o be n e u t r a l on a basic issue. He n e i t h e r supported t h e dominant

ideas on t h i s continent nor did he c r i t i c a l l y analyze t h e i r ideological function.

The r e s u l t of t h i s ambiguity was not a hypothesis f o r f u r t h e r study, but t h e

implication, not t h e argument, t h a t t h e s c i e n t i s t i s f r e e of t h e influence of

ideology. With t h e growing i n t e g r a t i o n of s o c i a l science i n t o t h e s o c i e t y and

i t s use f o r s o c i a l c o n t r o l , t h e r e has developed a n end-of-ideology posture which

has made t h e ideological b a s i s of t h a t research most diff'icult t o discern.

There i s a l s o a t h i r d way t h a t t h e problem of ideology i s ignored. It

i s by c r e a t i n g a stereotype of " t h e i d e o l o g i s t " which makes t h e well i n t e g r a t e d

s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t appear l i k e a calm, cool and c o l l e c t e d scholar. Ries was doing

j u s t t h i s when he depicted such s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s with t h e statement "... t h e r e

have been men who have refused t o play t h e r o l e of Messiah even though t h e demand

upon them was great.IT7 He continued t h i s d e p i c t i o n by comparing "the i d e o l o g i s t "

t o t h e "maker of graven images".

"1n t h e end t h e i d e o l o g i s t and t h e maker of graven images want t h e same

thing. The i d e o l o g i s t c a r e s only t h a t h i s ideas have some a c t i v e ex-
pression i n t h e l i f e of man and society. The image maker c a r e s only
t h a t h i s images have some bodily expression i n t h e wood t h a t he carves.
The image maker, unlike t h e a r t i s t , has no respect f o r t h e m a t e r i a l i n
which he carves. It makes no d i f f e r e n c e t o him what t h e q u a l i t y of t h e
wood may be, o r whether he shapes wood, b r a s s o r stone, so long a s t h e
image stands a p a r t from him and he can bow down t o it. The i d e o l o g i s t
i n t h e end c a r e s n e i t h e r f o r t h e men nor t h e s o c i e t y which i s t o serve
a s t h e bodily expression of h i s idea. Men may be crushed and s o c i e t y
t o r n asunder so long a s t h i s gives evidence of being e f f e c t e d by t h e
f o r c e of a n idea. Both image maker and i d e o l o g i s t seek deliverance by
 giving t h e a u t h o r i t y of a t h i n g t o i t s l i k e n e s s , t h e one through t h e
image of God, t h e other through t h e image of man. The one carves i n
wood, t h e o t h e r carves h i s fellow man. "8

Again we must give Ries c r e d i t a s a r h e t o r i c i a n though none a s a c l a r i f i e r

of t h e problem of ideology. H i s b a s i c e r r o r was t o personify t h e problem of

ideology i n t o "the i d e o l o g i s t " and thereby avoid t h e needed consideration of how

t h e p o s i t i o n of a person i n s o c i e t y a f f e c t s t h e system of ideas he o r she holds.

He f u r t h e r e r r s by r e i f y i n g "the idea" of t h e i d e o l o g i s t , i.e., giving it some

trans-human and t r a n s - s o c i a l r e a l i t y . I n a sense t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s a double

reification. H i s above analogy shows h i s own mechanism. Human beings a r e not

l i k e wood, t h a t can be acted. on by "an idea" t h e way a t o o l can shape a sculpture.

And furthermore ideas and ideologies do not operate outside of human praxis a s

Ries implied. The e f f e c t of t r a d i t i o n a l o r new and c r i t i c a l ideas must be under-

stood i n terms of t h e r o l e they play within any s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . To do

otherwise i s t o give "ideas" a c o n s p i r a t o r i a l nature; a n existence over and

above humans. Such n e c e s s i t a t e s t h e c r e a t i o n of a c o n s p i r a t o r i a l agent; hence,

t h e c r e a t i o n of " t h e ideologist" by Ries.

The i r o n i c t h i n g i s t h a t judged i n terms of t h e problem of ideology, Ries

becomes a n i d e o l o g i s t of t h e s o r t he i s stereotyping. That is t h e r i s k one t a k e s

when dealing f l i p p a n t l y with s e r i o u s matters. I w i l l r i s k applying Mannheimls

" p a r t i c u l a r " o r psychological concept of ideology t o Ries by speculating t h a t

t h e "publish o r perish" c u l t may be more important t o him than s e r i o u s i n t e l -

l e c t u a l work.

A very s i m p l i s t i c view of t h e r e l a t i o n of theory and p r a c t i c e and thought

and a c t i o n i s i m p l i c i t i n Riesa thinking. H e showed t h i s when he wrote t h a t

"... s o c i a l science no longer claims t o d e l i v e r man from t h e s a l i e n t

predicament of h i s existence, namely t h a t he does not f i t i n t o h i s
 I

. own environment. I f t h e s o l u t i o n t o t h a t problem i s t o come i n human

h i s t o r y , then t h e s o l u t i o n w i l l have t o come from some other agency
than s o c i a l science. "9

On t h e one hand t h e r e i s s u b t l e arrogance i n t h i s statement about t h e relevance

of " s o c i a l science", a s presently c o n s t i t u t e d , t o p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s , i.e. , " t h e

predicaments" of people. When did t h e s o c i a l sciences clalm t o " d e l i v e r man .. .I1

anyway? On t h e other hand t h e r e i s a n ignorance about t h e v i t a l e f f e c t s of t h e

presently c o n s t i t u t e d s o c i a l sciences on t h e p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s of t h e mass of

people. And it is important t o note t h a t they a r e e f f e c t s on, i , e . , out of t h e

c o n t r o l of, t h e mass of people. The dominant uses of t h e s o c i a l sciences do not

a i d people i n developing i n s i g h t s i n t o t h e i r common problems. Furthermore, though

meaning something d i f f e r e n t from Ries, I would agree t h a t people do not " f i t into"

t h e environment. By t h i s I mean t h a t t h e present s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s c r e a t e immense

c o n f l i c t s f o r us a l l . The i n t e r e s t i n g t h i n g i s how s o c i a l science helps f i t

people i n t o , o r a d j u s t people t o , t h e s e conflictf'ul s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s .

Were s o c i a l science t o be committed t o aiding people understand t h e i r

predicaments, r a t h e r t h a n doing "policy-related" research f o r t h e decision-makers

of t h e dominant i n s t i t u t i o n s , it would not mean t h a t s o c i a l science i n i t s e l f would

d e l i v e r anyone from t h e i r problems. Such i s t o confuse "ideas", academically con-

ceived, with people using ideas t o develop s o c i a l a l t e r n a t i v e s . It would, however,

mean t h a t t h e mass of people would have a v a i l a b l e a vocabulary1' t h a t allowed them

t o experiment t o change t h e conditions t h a t a f f e c t them.

Ries made a major e r r o r when he wrote

"If s o c i a l science moves beyond ideology, it may make us conscious of t h e

images and t h e f a l s e a u t h o r i t i e s i n t h e h i s t o r y of man. There i s always
hope, of course, t h a t t h i s consciousness of s o c i e t y w i l l make a difference.
But what difference it s h a l l make and how it s h a l l make it we cannot our-
s e l v e s say. The objective i n t e r p r e t i v e study of s o c i e t y may e n t e r t a i n t h e
hope of l i b e r a t i n g man from some of h i s idols. But it i s a hope and not a
promise. "11
 I

F i r s t l y he again showed h i s naivete and/or ignorance by suggesting t h c pos-

s i b i l i t y t h a t s o c i a l science can move beyond ideology. Unless he wants t o

argue t h a t t h e r e a r e absolutely t r u e ideas, which is unarguable, he has no

case whatsoever. The question i s not how t o go beyond ideology, but choosing

which ideological o r i e n t a t i o n one w i l l work within. Secondly Ries introduced

t h e words "objective i n t e r p r e t i v e study" without c l a r i f y i n g what t h i s means &I

terms of t h e problem of ideology. Without' doing t h i s these words have only a

r h e t o r i c a l meaning. Thirdly and l a s t l y Ries t a l k e d of ideas having a " l i b e r -

a t i n g " e f f e c t by exposing man's idols. This could mean what Marx and Engels

meant, i.e., making knowledge relevant t o t h e mass of people, o r what Mannheim

meant when he saw t h e need t o make i n t e l l e c t u a l judgments f u l l y aware of t h e

dangers of ideological d i s t o r t i o n . R i e s l f a i l u r e t o deal with t h e problem of

ideology and h i s 2 p r i o r i and s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g separation of "ideology" and

" s o c i a l science" makes it c l e a r t h i s was not what he meant.

J u s t what d i d Ries mean? I agree t h a t t h e l i b e r a t i n g e f f e c t of ideas

'I... i s a hope and not a promise." But without acknowledging t h e relevance of

t h e problem of ideology t h e chances of t h i s happening a r e decreased. There i s

a cynicism i n Riesl words t h a t i s t y p i c a l of those who use words i n a b s t r a c t

from t h e p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s of t h e mass of people.

Sociologism a s Ideology

There i s another way t h a t t h e problem of ideology i s ignored. It i s a

more s o p h i s t i c a t e d r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , but nevertheless a r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . It

combines a s u p e r f i c i a l ayareness of problems i n t h e philosophy of s o c i a l science

with s o c i o l o g i c a l jargon. Underneath t h i s t h e r e s t i l l remains t h e r i g i d dichotomy

between " s o c i a l science" and "ideology" which i s untenable once t h e problem of

ideology i s confronted.

MacRae, i n a n a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d The Crisis of ~ o c i o l o g i~r o, n~i ~

cally

expresses t h e kind of thinking t h a t r e f l e c t s t h e deep c r i s i s i n contemporary

s o c i a l science. Since we have already looked a t Marx and Engels1 theory of

ideology, it i s useful t o quote MacRaels impressions of Marx1s ideas. Making

a n analogy between r e l i g i o n and marxism, s i m i l a r t o Riesl analogy between image-

maker and i d e o l o g i s t , MacRae wrote:

"contrary t o popular b e l i e f , Marx was not a s o c i o l o g i s t , nor has Marxism

contributed much beyond ideology t o t h e content of sociology which could
not have been b e t t e r derived from other writers. Such a n opinion i s , of
course, unpopular. A s t h e 20th century l o s e s f a i t h i n Marxism so i s t h e
l o s s f e l t and expressed by such desperate expedients a s t r y i n g t o i d e n t i -
fy Marxism with sociology. One i s reminded of t h e anguished s h i f t s of
some 19th century w r i t e r s a s they abandoned C h r i s t i a n i t y and t r i e d t o
r e c o n c i l e t h e i r vanishing f a i t h with a science they d i d not understand."l3

If one does not c r i t i c a l l y examine t h e assumptions i n t h i s statement and

expose how t h e power of c e r t a i n words (e.g., f a i t h ) and t h e phraseology cloak over

s e r i o u s problems, t h e statement can be convincing. This i s t h e danger when read-

ing those who can manipulate language s k i l f u l l y . For example, saying "...Marx
was not a s o c i o l o g i s t ..." implies, without s t a t i n g it e x p l i c i t l y , that there

a r e some pure s o c i o l o g i c a l methods and t h e o r i e s t h a t serve a s a n unchanging

standard f o r our knowledge of society. We saw with Mannheim and w i l l s e e i n

g r e a t e r d e t a i l l a t e r with Thomas Kuhn how no such absolute c r i t e r i a f o r knowledge

of any form can e x i s t . Also, t h e statement t h a t Marxism d i d n ' t c o n t r i b u t e "...

much beyond ideology t o t h e content of sociology ...I1 shows a t o t a l misunderstand-

ing of t h e problem of ideology. "Ideology" i s & added t o content. Ideology

u n d e r l i e s t h e s e l e c t i o n of problems, t h e approach t o study, and t h e consequences

of such studying. It i s an o r i e n t a t i o n t o study. MacRaels statement a l s o implies,

again without being e x p l i c i t , t h a t t h e r e i s some proper content f o r sociology.

 I

The word "ideology" i s c l e a r l y being used without any adequate meaning.

No d i s t i n c t i o n is made between Marx and Engelst theory of ideology and

t h e abstracting of these ideas i n t o a marxian ideology. (We saw with Mannheim

how t h i s can lead t o pseudo-problems.) Hence, t h e r e i s no p o s s i b i l i t y of begin-

ning t o explain how t h i s process occurred. Related t o t h i s f a i l u r e i s MacRaels

own u n c r i t i c a l acceptance of a p o l i t i c a l ideology, rooted i n i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l -

i s m , which i s what underlies t h e rampant sociologism i n these societies. This

p o l i t i c a l ideology i s revealed by h i s statements about marxism. The statement

"AS t h e 20th century loses f a i t h i n Marxism ..." i s more a projection of t h e

cynicism of those i n i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l i s t nations who once accepted a messianic

view of marxian ideas14 than of an accurate statement about t h e influence of

marxian ideas throughout t h e world. I do not want t o debate whether t h i s i n f l u -

ence i s growing or not, but I r e j e c t a s nonsense t h a t the 20th century has " l o s t

f a i t h " i n marxian ideas. Many variations of marxian ideas have developed i n in-

d u s t r i a l and non-industrial, c a p i t a l i s t and s o c i a l i s t countries, and t h e marxian

o r i e n t a t i o n i s strong on a world-wide scale. Marxian ideas have increasingly

been developed within North America since t h e middle 1960's.

MacRaets statement r e f l e c t s the cynicism of those who have found t h a t

human problems a r e not solved by t h e b e l i e f i n ideas which a r e t r e a t e d a s abso-

lutes. Marx and Engels never implied t h i s i n t h e i r work, so MacRae has c l e a r l y

f a i l e d t o understand t h e i r theory of ideology or t o even begin t o come t o g r i p s

with t h e problems involved.

This i s a n important point. The way i n which academl.cally trained s o c i a l

s c i e n t i s t s have viewed marxian ideas r e f l e c t s t h e i r own p o l i t i c a l Ideology.

 - 58 -
I

Their view of marxian ideas i s l i k e Mannheimls " p a r t i c u l a r " and what I would

c a l l a "sectarian" a p p l i c a t i o n of ideological analysis. Their own ideas a r e

assumed t o be absolutes, yet a r e not made e x p l i c i t , and ideas t h a t deviate

from them a r e stereotyped a s "ideologytt. This s u b t l e and s o p h i s t i c a t e d form

of sectarianism i s one reason why t h e problem of ideology i s not p r e s e n t l y

debated w i t h i n academic sociology o r t h e o t h e r s o c i a l sciences.

Since t h e problem of ideology is not s e r i o u s l y considered, l e t alone

r a i s e d , it i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t MacRae draws a n analogy between r e l i g i o n and

marxism. Those who deviate from MacRaels p o l i t i c a l ideology base t h e i r ideas

on "faith". According t o MacRae, they a r e desperately t r y i n g t o i d e n t i f y

marxism with t r u e sociology. What is not considered i s t h e analogy between

contemporary sociology and r e l i g i o n ; o r , how academics always i d e n t i f y t h e i r

sociologism with science. When "science" i t s e l f i s r e i f i e d , i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d

i n t o a n orthodoxy, and l o s e s basic s e l f - c r i t i c i s m , i. e. , insight i n t o t h e prob-

lem of ideology, it is being t r e a t e d r e l i g i o u s l y . I am not disputing t h e f a c t

t h a t marxian ideas a r e o f t e n t r e a t e d i n t h i s manner (though MacRaels o r i e n t a t i o n

could never explain how o r why t h i s has happened). I a m disputing MacRaels

implication t h a t t h i s tendency i s exclusive t o marxian ideas.

It i s more accurate t o say t h a t c o n f l i c t i n g ideas about s o c i e t y e x i s t and

t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r o r i e n t a t i o n , with i t s own ideological foundation, i s p r e s e n t l y

a s s o c i a t e d with academic sociology, while t h e other i s associated with marxism.

Because he had a s e c t a r i a n s e t of b e l i e f s , MacRae was unable t o s e e t h i s and t o

discuss t h e problem of ideology and t h e philosophy of s o c i a l science i n t e l l i g e n t l y .

One statement i n MacBaels paper rnif~hthave been t h e s t a r t of such a discus-

sion: "... by a science we mean a loose s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n of people who s h a r e a

 - 59 -
I

common i n t e r e s t i n knowledge about and understanding of observable phenomena

i n a given a r e a , who communicate t h e i r observations and thoughts, judge these

by shared c r i t e r i a s , and obtain t h e i r r e s u l t s by a d i v e r s i t y of common methods

... "15 But what does t h i s statement mean? Without c l a r i f y i n g s e v e r a l questions

a r i s i n g from t h i s statement, it has no significance. I ask MacRae: What form

does t h e s c i e n t i f i c " s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n " take?; how d i d it evolve h i s t o r i c a l l y

and what a r e i t s t r e n d s and contradictions?; what i s t h e nature (e.g., Ideolo-

gy? ) of t h e "common i n t e r e s t " of t h e s c i e n t i s t s w i t h i n i t ? ; what do they mean

by "understand"?; what a r e t h e i r assumptions about "phenomena"?; what " c r i t e r i a " ,

including values, do they "share"? And, most important, what a r e t h e r e l a t i o n s

between t h e h i s t o r y and form of s c i e n t i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e way t h e scien-

t i s t s view knowledge, and t h e uses t o which t h e i r r e s u l t s a r e put?

These questions a r e not even r a i s e d , so MacRae's discussion of "the c r i s i s

of sociology" lacks any substance about t h e problems of c r e a t i n g knowledge about

society. H i s reference t o philosophical and ideological i s s u e s i n t h e s o c i a l

sciences was not i n d i c a t i v e of a commitment t o follow them through. This would

have demanded a reconsideration of h i s s e c t a r i a n view of sociology, but it appears

t h a t t h e function of r a i s i n g i s s u e s i n a s u p e r f i c i a l manner, a s MacRae did, was

t o cloak over t h i s lack of s e l f - c r i t i c i s m with academic language.

On Horowitzls Contradictions

A l l t h e s e four e r r o r s o r ways of neglecting t h e problem of Ideology a r e

combined with g r e a t fluency i n Horowitzl s discussion of ideology. l6 It i s of

value t o look i n depth a t t h i s discussion s i n c e it r e v e a l s t h e contradictions

t h a t run through a l l attempts t o s p l i t " s ~ c i a lscience" and "ideology".

 I

I n a manner c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of academic s o c i o l o g i s t s , Horowitz s t a r t e d /

h i s discussion by making t h i s s p l i t . He wrote t h a t t h e r e a l value of ideology

"...t o t h e sociology of knowledge begins when ideology i s d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from

other forms of knowledge, i. e. s c i e n t i f i c , poetic, religious. " l 7 Rather than
;1 5
accepting t h i s statement u n c r i t i c a l l y , we must ask i f t h e r e i s any b a s i s f o r

t h i s differentiation.

Horowitzls d e f i n i t i o n of ideology i t s e l f suggests t h e r e i s not. He

continued "1n s h o r t , ideology expresses t h a t point i n s o c i a l knowledge a t which

i n t e r e s t s connect up t o a p i c t u r e of reality."18 Can anyone deny t h a t science,

whether n a t u r a l o r s o c i a l , has d e f i n i t e i n t e r e s t s ? The way i n which science i s

v'
J' i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d e s t a b l i s h e s i t s "teleology". There can be d i f f e r i n g aims f o r

science, depending on i t s i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d form, and t h i s f u r t h e r shows t h a t

science i t s e l f "connects" with i n t e r e s t s . That i s why t h e r e i s a problem of

ideology t h a t cannot be handled when we s p l i t up t h e words "science" and

" ideologyu.
Later i n h i s discussion, Horowitz implied t h a t science does have i n t e r e s t s .

He made it q u i t e e x p l i c i t t h a t he saw t h e r o l e of "...logic a s s a t i s f y i n g t h e

f u n c t i o n a l needs of a s o c i a l system."19 If l o g i c i s orientec? t o t h e "needs" o r

i n t e r e s t s of a s o c i e t y then, according t o Horowitzt s own l o g i c , "science" i t s e l f

becomes ideological. Since h i s d e f i n i t i o n of "ideology" excludes t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y

h i s argument i s shown t o be absurd.

The above statement i s , however, a deviation from Horowitz's main orienta-

tion. He c o n t i n u a l l y separated "science" and "ideology" by arguing t h a t science,

l i k e r e l i g i o n , i s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e u n i v e r s a l v a l i d a t i o n of Its knowledge; and,

furthermore, t h a t i t s findings, unlike those of an ideology, can be separated

from t h e person. I n h i s words:

 "1n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o ideology, science and r e l i g i o n s t r i v e f o r a
universal v a l i d a t i o n of t h e i r claims ...
And universal validation,
f o r science derived through experience and f o r r e l i g i o n derived
through revelation, must be capable of being made separate from t h e
personality of t h e knower. It i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s which marks ideology
a s d i s t i n c t , s i n c e it can never be divorced from t h e personality, i.e.
t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e knower, o r from t h e c o l l e c t i v e c l a s s a u t h o r i t y
which supports an ideology. " 20

The t r o u b l e with t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s t h a t it does not account f o r t h e

i s s u e already r a i s e d , i.e., t h e i n t e r e s t s of science and t h e problem of ideology

t h a t t h i s implies. Furthermore, t h e analogy between "science" and " r e l i g i o n "

implies t h a t s c i e n t i f i c ideas a r e t r u e o r f a l s e i n a b s t r a c t from t h e i n s t i t u -

t i o n s and technology i n which they a r e rooted. Talking of ideas being inde-

pendent of "the personality of t h e knower" is u s e f u l a s long a s we don't f o r g e t

L
t h a t a s o c i a l arrangement, including t h e recruitment and t r a i n i n g of s c i e n t i s t s ,

i s fundamental t o t h e i r shareable c r i t e r i a . This s o c i a l arrangement must e x i s t

f o r them t o "agree" independent of t h e personality. Different s o c i a l arrange-

ments of s c i e n t i s t s , with d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l functions, would have c o n t r a s t i n g

c r i t e r i a determining t h e relevance of c e r t a i n problems. The very c l a s s of

problems21 w i l l d i f f e r . This again r a i s e s t h e problem of ideology since t h e

r e l a t i o n s between a c l a s s of problems and t h e function of science helps e s t a b l i s h

t h e ideological o r i e n t a t i o n of a group of academics.

Horowitz's recourse t o "universals" d i s t o r t s t h e reason why it i s s a i d

t h a t knowledge must be independent of any s i n g l e person. That i s why he g e t s

caught i n pseudo-problems s i m i l a r t o those of Mannheim, though we s h a l l s e e t h a t

he d i d not understand what Mannheim was saying.

On t h e b a s i s of h i s ( f a l s e ) d i s t i n c t i o n between science and ideology,

Horowitz wrote:

"There a r e no grounds f o r viewing a n ideology a s a v a s t continuum infusing

 a l l forms and s t y l e s of knowledge. It i s furthermore unwarranted t o de-
c l a r e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e o b j e c t i v e functioning of a n ideological system
i n v a l i d on t h e grounds t h a t t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r too has a n ideology. Since
a n ideology has defined l i m i t s , t h e r e a l question of a n a l y s i s s h i f t s from
how one can "escape" h i s ideology, t o a comparative a n a l y s i s of ideologi-
c a l systems i n t h e f i r s t instance, and a comparison of ideologies with
o t h e r forms of knowledge i n t h e second instance.

I n t h e above statement, t h e word ideology o r a v a r i a t i o n of it i s used seven

times. Yet t h e term lacks any u s e f u l meaning. We agree t h a t ideology i s not

some d i s t o r t i n g influence on a l l forms of'knowledge. Such a use of t h e term i s

t o o much l i k e t h e conspiracy theory; and, l i k e t h e conspiracy theory, t h i s view

assumes t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s some "pure1', untainted r e a l i t y . If ideology i s given

t h i s d i s t o r t i n g connotation, t h e n we w i l l never grasp t h e r>elations between t h e

s o c i a l arrangement of science, t h e c l a s s of problems considered relevant, and

t h e s o c i a l f u n c t i o n o r consequences of knowledge t h a t follows from t h e s e r e l a -

t ions.

If one's handling of t h e problem of ideology t a k e s these r e l a t i o n s i n t o

account, a person can avoid t h e vicious c i r c d e about whether t h e "ideology" of

t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r d i s t o r t s h i s study of ideologies. And t o say t h a t what i s

needed i s a "comparative a n a l y s i s of ideological systems" followed by "a com-

parison of ideologies with other forms of knowledge" i s not t h e way t o g e t out

of t h i s dilemma. A t a l l l e v e l s of h i s thought, Horowitz p e r s i s t s i n f a l s e l y

s p l i t t i n g "science1' and "ideology" and a view of both t h a t is meaningless once

t h e s o c i a l arrangement of science i s understood.

Horowitz's e r r o r s a r e rooted i n h i s notion of "ideas" i n t h e s o c i a l

sciences. When he wrote t h a t "Durkheim c o r r e c t l y i n s i s t e d upon t r e a t i n g s o c i a l

f a c t s a s t h i m s , a s s o c i a l events i n themselves d i s t i n c t from t h e consclously

formed r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of them i n t h e mind1I23 he, l i k e Durkheim, r e i f i e d ideas.

Ideas a r e given an existence over and above t h e r o l e and consequence of thought

 1

i n human a f f a i r s . I n one place, Horowitz showed t h i s tendency c l e a r l y .

.. it should
".systems be mentioned t h a t n e i t h e r s c i e n t i f i c laws nor r e l i g i o u s
vanish with each change i n t h e s t r u c t u r e of p o l i t y economy.
or
This i s not t o say t h a t they a r e unaffected by such changes, but they
a r e a f f e c t e d i n terms of a c c e l e r a t i o n and retardation. Ideology, on
t h e other hand, which a l s o claims universal t r u t h , i s d i r e c t l y subject
t o obsolescence through h i s t o r i c a l change."24

The matter of t h e nafure of s c i e n t i f i c laws w i l l have t o await a d e t a i l e d

discussion below.25 For now, we can r e j e c t any s t a t i c or mechanistic view of

such laws. When Horowitz s a i d t h a t such laws don't vanish with s o c i a l change,

but a r e "accelerated and retarded" he seemed t o hold such a view. When he used

t h e phrase "universal t r u t h " he d e f i n i t e l y had such a view.

Horowitz had not even considered t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t views of science

themselves change with changes in s o c i e t y and history. He ignored t h e implica-

t i o n s of h i s own statement about "logic s a t i s f y i n g t h e functional needs o f a

s o c i a l system". His dichotomy between "science" and "ideologyt' i s maintained

absolutely. I n Mannheim's terms, Horowitzls work r e f l e c t s a p a r t i c u l a r , un-

c r i t i c a l form of ideology.

Horowitz discussed Mannheim b r i e f l y aEd h i s discussion shows t h a t he

f a i l e d t o grasp t h e problem of ideology t h a t Mannheim outlined. Horowitz

claimed t h a t Mannheim equated ideology with d i s t o r t i o n , and he r i g h t l y concluded

t h a t such a view was of no value. Assuming t h a t Mannheim's t o t a l conception of

ideology meant f a l s e consciousness or t o t a l d i s t o r t i o n , Horowitz wrote "once a

more modest approach t o t h e l i m i t s of ideology i s taken, we need not make t h e

equation of ' t o t a l ideology' t o ' t o t a l d i s t o r t i o n s ' - an equation whose use i n

s o c i a l science i s dubious on empirical a s well a s l o g i c a l grounds. 1,26

But Mannheim c l a r i f i e d t h a t he was not making t h i s equation. To Mannheim

t h e " t o t a l " conception of ideology r e f e r r e d t o t h e bringing i n t o question of not

j u s t t h e d e t a i l s but of t h e point of view being expressed. When t h i s " t o t a l "

 concept was generalized and a l l points of view ( n o t only t h a t of an adversary)

were c r i t i c a l l y scrutinized, Mannheim argued t h a t t h e sociology of knowledge

was being practiced. The matter of ideological d i s t o r t i o n has t o be separated

from t h e matter of ideological a n a l y s i s i n Mannheimls thought. I n one place,

Mannheim equated Ideological d i s t o r t i o n with t r y i n g 'I... t o resolve c o n f l i c t s

and a n x i e t i e s by having recourse t o absolutes, according t o which it i s no

longer possible t o live. 1'27 Though it is unclear j u s t how Mannheim would have

evaluated t h i s idea of ideological d i s t o r t i o n , it i s abundantly c l e a r t h a t such

d i s t o r t i o n i s not i d e n t i f i e d with t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a t o t a l ideological analy-

sis.

To Mannheim, ideology oriented a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l grouping t o t h e l a r g e r

s o c i a l r e a l i t y in a p a r t i c u l a r way. The ideas held may or may not be d i s t o r t i n g .

It depends on whether they a r e understood i n r e l a t i o n ( h i s " r e l a t i o n a l " epistemo-

logy) t o t h e p r a c t i c a l conditions within a c e r t a i n s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l s e t t i n g .

Though I have already concluded t h a t Mannheim did not handle t h i s problem ade-

quately, due t o h i s academic view of epistemology, Horowitzls i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of

him i s c l e a r l y mistaken.

Horowitz i n t e r p r e t e d Mannheimls work i n terms of t h e r e l a t i v i s t i c cate-

/ g o r l e s t h a t Mannhe3.m himself rejected. To equate a t o t a l ideological a n a l y s i s

with t o t a l d i s t o r t i o n i s t o v a l i d a t e or i n v a l i d a t e ideas i n a b s t r a c t from prac-

t i c a l affairs. Those who do t h i s e a s i l y s l i p i n t o r e l a t i v i s t i c thinking. If

you do not evaluate ideas i n terms of t h e i r consequences, you begin t o t h i n k of

ideas a s t r u e or f a l s e p e r se. I f you become aware of t h e problem of ideology,

even i n a minor way, but s t i l l hold t h i s a b s t r a c t view of knowledge, r e l a t i v i s m

appears t o be t h e problem. As I ' v e already s t a t e d , f o r r e l a t i v i s m t o be a prob-

lem t h e r e has t o be some b e l i e f i n absolutes. Horowitzls t a l k of "universal

 validation" f o r both science and r e l i k i o n i s t h e o t h e r s i d e of t h e c o i n of

h i s f a l s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Mannheim.

Horowitzls f a l s e handling of t h e problem of ideology a l s o led him t o

a m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Marx and Engelsf view of ideology. Showing t h i s , he

wrote t h a t "...Marx seems t o i d e n t i f y t h e counter-ideology of t h e p r o l e t a r i a t

with general s c i e n t i f i c t r u t h . Which is t o say t h a t Marx i d e n t i f i e s what i s

s o c i a l l y exploited with what is s c i e n t i f i c a l l y correct. "28 his conclusion

showed Horowitzls t o t a l i n a b i l i t y t o c r i t i c a l l y evaluate, l e t alone understand,

Marx and Engelst pragmatic view of ideas. Instead of s t a r t i n g with t h e i r theory

of ideology and i t s r e l a t i o n t o a s o c i a l theory and r e l a t e d epistemology, and

t h e n c r i t i c a l l y evaluating t h i s , Horowitz imposed h i s own view of " s c i e n t i f i c

t r u t h " on t h e i r ideas. From t h i s he concluded something t h a t does not follow

from Marx1s thought a t a l l . Marx d i d not accept a n a b s t r a c t notion of s c i e n t i f i c

t r u t h , i n f a c t , would have c a l l e d t h a t ' t i d e o l o g i c a l l ~ ,s o nothing Horowitz wrote

a c c u r a t e l y described h i s thinking.

Horowitz created other pseudo-problems on t h e b a s i s of h i s f a l s e s p l i t -

t i n g of "science" and ltideology". He c r e a t e d t h e notion of " s c i e n t i f i c ideology"

which he equated with marxian and s o c i a l i s t ideas and t h e n r e j e c t e d it. F i r s t he

wrote t h a t "TO speak of a ' s c i e n t i f i c ideology1 i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n f a c t a s well

a s logic." Later he continued t h a t "The dogma of t h e u n i t y of theory and p r a c t i c e ,

upon which such a ' s c i e n t i f i c ideology1 r e s t s , assumes a s t r u e what has t o be

proved i n every s i t u a t i o n , i.e. t h a t useful s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s r e q u i r e a correspond-

ing t h e o r e t i c a l system. " 2 9

The attempt t o r e l a t e theory and p r a c t i c e , which i s t y p i c a l of a l l forms

I
*-
of science, can d e f i n i t e l y be made a "dogma". But i f t h i s happens, t h e development
 I

w i l l ble abandoned. Pract ic n be crudely "explained" by a reductionism t o

t h e c a t e g o r i e s of a n a b s t r a c t theory o r p r a c t i c e can be made i n t e l l i g i b l e by

a d i a l e c t i c awareness of t h e e f f e c t s of h i s t o r i c a l and s o c i a l forces. The

former i s a u n i t y of theory and p r a c t i c e only i n s t y l e whereas t h e l a t t e r i s

one i n both form and content.30 It i s because of t h i s t h a t no r e a l i n t e g r a -

t i o n of theory and p r a c t i c e i s possible i f a dogmatic approach dominates.

Horowitz d i d not s p e c i f y what he meant by proving t r u e " i n every s i t u a -

t i o n " o r having "a corresponding t h e o r e t i c a l system" f o r u s e f u l s o c i a l a c t i v i -

ties. Nor was he c l e a r w h a t he meant when he wrote t h a t t h e c r i t e r i a of

s c i e n t i f i c ideologies "... a r e not c r i t e r i a n e c e s s a r i l y shared by a mature

sociology. "31 H i s c o n t r a s t between " s c i e n t i f i c ideologies" and a "mature

sociology'' was, therefore, without any foundation.

When Horowitz wrote t h a t "... t h e promotion of a c t i o n r e q u i r e s appeals

t o non-verifiable moral postulates"32 we have a c l u e about h i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n

of " s c i e n t i f i c ideology" and "mature sociology". The l a t t e r does not r e l a t e

thought and a c t i o n whereas t h e former does. There a r e two problems with t h i s .

F i r s t it is highly academic t o t r e a t h m n a c t i o n s a s "non-verifiable moral

postulates". Turning human a c t i o n s i n t o academic jargon a t t r i b u t e s g r e a t e r

r e a l i t y t o academia t h a n t o t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e mass of people. It i s crude

reductionism t o impose concepts l i k e " v e r i f i c a t i o n " and "postulate" onto human

actions. Rather t h a n using language t o c l a r i f y t h e meaning of human behavior,

it t y p i f i e s t h e s e c t a r i a n a t t i t u d e of those i s o l a t e d i n t h e ivory towers of t h e

world.

Secondly without a thorough discuss i o n of " v e r i f i c a t ion", which would

include consideration of t h e r e l a t i o n s of theory and p r a c t i c e , means and ends,

and f a c t s and values, Horowitz's statement has no meaning. It i s noteworthy t h a t

 L

C.W, Mills, whom Horowltz seems t o adrnjre, discussed t h e h i s t o r i c a l nature of

models of v e r i f i c a t i o n i n a book edited by Horowitz himself.33 Once a person

recognizes t h a t v e r i f i c a t i o n methods change over history, an abstract scientism

U
i s no l o w e r possible. Since Horowitz's dichotomy between "science" and "ide-

ology", on which a l l of h i s other d i s t i n c t i o n s r e s t , f a i l e d t o take t h i s f a c t

i n t o account, I can only conclude t h a t he was more interested i n publishing

M i l l s than i n studying him.

One possible consequence of t h e f a i l u r e t o consider t h e problem of ide-

ology i s a sectarian a t t i t u d e t h a t i s cloaked by s c i e n t i f i c rhetoric. This i s

what happened t o Horowitz. Having no insights i n t o how t h e social arrangements

of science e s t a b l i s h t h e relevance of a c l a s s of problems, with p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l

functions, he saw t h e s c i e n t i s t a s an impartial, detached man. Thus he wrote

$hat "Those who place a supreme value on science w i l l judge t h a t ideology best

which advocates high decision-making r o l e s f o r s c i e n t i s t s . "34 We have seen how

ideas and methods of v e r i f i c a t i o n were abstracted out of t h e i r s o c i a l and h i s t o r -

i c a l context by Horowitz. The " s c i e n t i s t " himself i s a l s o given a t r a n ~ - ~ ~ ~ i a l

nature by him. I ask Horowitz: What kind of decisions w i l l they make?; what

s o c i a l arrangement w i l l enable them t o have t h i s r o l e i n decision-making?; and

what a r e t h e consequences f o r the mass of people i n and outside of the country?

O r , i n sum, what ideological orientation underlies t h e decision-making r o l e of

s c i e n t i s t s t h a t he is advocating? S c i e n t i s t s a r e c e r t a i n l y not self-f inancing,

self-determing humans who e s t a b l i s h t h e problem-areas they work on and t h e uses

put t o t h e i r findings. They are s o c i a l animals and t h e i r r o l e a s decision-makers

would need t o be analyzed a s such.

Horowitz t r e a t s "science" as many t r e a t religion. H i s constant compari-

son between the two i s revealing. As t h e archetype "god" was thought t o "know"
 L

a more fundamental r e a l i t y , now the archetype " s c i e n t i s t " i s a t t r i b u t e d t h i s

quality. Thus Horowitz asks: "1n t h i s struggle between a S t a t e ideology and

utopian counter-ideologies what i s the place of the ! r a t i o n a l 1 man?"35 And

h i s conclusion: "The r o l e of t h e s c i e n t i s t ... i s t o distinguish empirical

from ideological claims, not t o adopt a messianic a t t i t u d e toward t h e former

and a missionary a t t i t u d e toward saving us from t h e l a t t e ~ . " 3 ~

Nothing i s solved by t h i s appeal t o "reason1' and "sciencet1. Horowitz

has not even s t a r t e d t o consider t h e problem of ideology i n i t s many ramifica-

tions. Rather he assumed t h a t "science" and " s c i e n t i s t s " a r e above t h e ide-

ological struggles of the world. It i s indisputable t h a t t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n -

ships within which s c i e n t i s t s operate have d e f i n i t e connect ions with t h e uses

I
of power i n society. The way s c i e n t i s t s see themselves usually does not take

these relationships i n t o account, and theref ore t h e i r own consciousness can be

considered narrowly ideological. Their s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and r e l a t i v e i s o l a t i o n

from t h e l i v e s of t h e mass of people, however, does not a l t e r t h e f a c t t h a t they

a r e i n a r e l a t i o n s h i p with t h e s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e and serve a p a r t i c u l a r function

within it. Until t h i s function i s analyzed, t h e problem of ideology i n t h e

sciences has not been tackled.

I f Horowitz has c r i t i c a l l y evaluated t h e meaning of "science", he would

have had t o conclude t h a t s c i e n t i f i c knowledge and ideology a r e not a t a l l mu-

t u a l l y exclusive. And, though he did not build h i s discussion upon t h i s aware-

ness, Horowitz seemed t o know of t h e f a i l u r e of h i s approach. I n one place, he

showed t h a t h i s own dichotomy was false. He thus wrote t h a t

h his approach c a r r i e s no implication t h a t science p e r se makes men

incapable of decisive action. It is t o say t h a t t h e aims of science
can and a r e embodied by c e r t a i n ideologies i n which t h e ultimate value
is s o c i a l abundance. "37
 Though saying t h i s , h i s approach f a i l e d t o analyze "the aims of science".

Horowitzls approach d i d not show, i n terms of t h e s o c i a l arrangement of science,

why science i s o r i s n ' t used f o r " s o c i a l abundance". To have done t h i s would

have forced him out of h i s narrow scientism.

Horowitz began h i s discussion with a dichotomy between "science" and

"ideology". A s he proceeded, he combined t h e terms i n t o " s c i e n t i f i c ideologies"

and r e j e c t e d h i s own creation. He t h e n concluded h i s discussion by s t a t i n g t h a t

t h e aims of science " a r e embodied by c e r t a i n ideologies". H i s f a l s e beginning

forced him t o a self-contradictory position. There i s c l e a r l y no value i n a

discussion of ideology which i s i t s e l f based on a narrow scientism. The l o g i c a l

c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n horowitz Is argument c o n s t i t u t e a f orm of evidence f o r my own.

Horowitz d i d w r i t e t h a t ideologies a r e "... a response t o t h e d i v i s i o n

of men i n economy, and no l e s s , a consequence of p o l i t i c a l concentration of

power i n e l i t e s . 1 ' 3 ~ This i s amazingly c l o s e t o Marx and Engels theory of ide-

ology, though Horowitz seemed unaware of t h i s . H i s f a i l u r e was t o not s e e t h a t

t h e aims of science, which a r e not s t a t i c , a r e a l s o a response t o " d i v i s i o n of

men" and t h e existence of " p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s " . But t h e m y s t i f i c a t i o n of science,

i t s e l f a r e s u l t of t h e way science functions i n t h i s society, was t o o s t r o n g f o r

Horowit z.

From t h i s a n a l y s i s we can only conclude t h a t Horowitz used t h e c r i t i c i s m s

of scientism developed by C.W. M i l l s s o l e l y i n a r h e t o r i c a l manner. Horowitz

became well versed i n t h e c r i t i c a l s o c i o l o g i c a l language developed by M i l l s , but

lacked t h e c r i t i c a l awareness t h a t went with it. One t h i n g t h a t those s k i l l e d

i n r h e t o r i c r i s k i s self-contradiction. We saw how Horowitzls own logic in-

v a l i d a t e d h i s own arguments.

I n t h e book under consideration, Horowitz argued f o r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n

 I

between science and ideology. This i s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t underlies t h e value-

f r e e doctrine with i t s s i m p l i s t i c and confusing r h e t o r i c . I n another place,

Horowitz attacked t h e value-free doctrine. He wrote t h a t "... t h e tenacious

c l i n g i n g t o t h e 'value-freet d o c t r i n e and t o t h e Ifunctionall method i s a con-

sequence of t h e s a l e s values of a n i h i l i s t i c posture i n a c t u a l research under-

t a k i n g ~ . " ~I n~ t h i s a r t i c l e , he a l s o wrote of empiricism being "... not simply

a s o c i o l o g i c a l methodology, but a s o c i a l ideology. 11 40

I s t h i s t h e same "empiricism" t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e s "the r a t i o n a l man of

mature sociology"? Horowitz e i t h e r enjoyed exposing h i s contradictions o r had

gone beyond them and developed a more stunning perspective. E i t h e r of t h e s e

p o s s i b i l i t i e s supports my own t h e s i s . One might say t h a t Horowitzts statement

that "... empiricism a s a s o c i o l o g i c a l ideology leads t o gamesmanship and pseudo-

I n t e l l e c t u a l o n e - ~ p m a n s h i p "has
~ ~ been proven not only by our c r i t i c i s m but i n

h i s own practice.

Footnotes

l ~ h eterm "scientism" w i l l be used throughout t h i s study. Hayek has used t h e term

t o depict t h e dogmatic methodological naturalism o r r e l i a n c e on oversimplified
n a t u r a l science ideas i n a l l f i e l d s o f science ( t h e s e terms a r e explained i n
Chapter F i f t e e n ) t h a t i s widespread today (F.A. von Hayek: The Counter Revolution
of Science. New York, Free. Press ( 1952) ). Rather t h a n giving t h e term such a
s p e c i f i c philosophical meaning, i n t h i s t h e s i s , "scientism" r e f e r s t o t h e wide-
spread "ideology o f science", i. e. , t h e s c i e n t i f i c metaphysics (myths) t h a t a r e
being disseminated throughout t h e c u l t u r e , including t h e u n i v e r s i t i e s .

2~ayrnondE. Ries: Social Science and Ideology, i n Social Research, Vol. 32, No. 2
(1964), pp. 234-43. I read t h i s a r t i c l e i n 1964 when I f i r s t became concerned
about t h e way ideological problems were being neglected by academics. Reading
t h i s a r t i c l e unknowingly c o n s t i t u t e d t h e beginning of t h i s t h e s i s . It l e d me t o
w r i t e two papers on ideology and science (J. Harding: Action Research, Social
Change and Ideology i n t h e Social Sciences. Saskatchewan Psychologist, May ( 1 9 6 6 ) ;
J. Harding: P r e r e q u i s i t e s of an Integrated Social Sc ience. Canadj an A l t e r n a t i v e s ,
Regina, Vol. 1, No. 2 ( 1966 1 1.
 I

3"1t does no good t o say t h a t t h i s problem of value l i e s Ioutside1 of s c i e n c e

and i s 'properly1 t h e t a s k of t h e policy-maker, because, u n l e s s we understand
how our policy-makers a c t u a l l y make t h e i r d e c i s i o n s , we a r e simply c h i l d r e n a t
t h e mercy of unconscious and i r r e s p o n s i b l e drives. The s u b t l e problem of under-
standing t h e b a s i s of policy-making may be t h e most important problem t h e 'be-
h a v i o r a l sciences1 f a c e i n t h e coming decades. " Churchman, quoted by Fred
Brown: Behavioral Science: A Reappraisal. Burnaby, Simon F r a s e r University,
mimeographed ( 1969 ) , p. 26.

&see Bronowskils c r i t i c i s m of t h i s s e p a r a t i o n i n Chapter Thirteen.

50ne good study of t h i s i n t e g r a t i o n i s Loren B a r i t z : The Servants of Power.

New York, John Wiley and Sons (1960).

'O~he monopoly t h a t some people have on a s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c vocabulary r e f l e c t s

t h e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of power throughout our society. Without concepts (words and
i d e a s ) t o express r e l a t i o n s h i p s between personal problems and l a r g e r s o c i a l
s t r u c t u r e s , people cannot begin t o break through t h e i r powerlessness.

1 2 ~ .MacRae:
~. The Crisis of Sociology, i n J.H. Plumb ( ed. ) : Crisis i n t h e
Humanities. Penguin.

l 4 more
~ d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s point occurs i n Chapter Ten.

'5Mac~ae, op. c i t . , p. 129.

l61. L. Horowitz: Philosophy, Science and t h e Sociology of Knowledge. Spring-

f i e l d , Charles C. Thomas (1961), Chapter 7.

I91bid., p. 86. I w i l l argue i n t h e second s e c t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s t h a t a l l

approaches t o l o g i c serve c e r t a i n ends, i.e.. r e l a t e t o c e r t a i n s o c i a l and human
consequences.

2 1 ~ h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between ideology and s c i e n t i f i c c l a s s e s of problems i s

discussed i n Chapter Eight.
22Horowitz, loc.

231bid. , p. 81. My c r i t i c i s m of Durkheimfs theory of s o c i a l f a c t s i s i n Chapter

Fourteen.

2 4 ~ b i d . , p. 86.

2 5 ~ e eChapter Sixteen i n p a r t ic u l a r but a l s o Chapter Six.

2 6 ~ o r o w i t z , op. c i t e a p. 82.

2 7 ~ .Mannheim: I d e o l o ~ vand Utopia, p. 96.

2 9 ~ b i d . , pp. 88-9.

3 0 ~ h i sd i f f e r e n c e i s c r i t i c a l i n t h i s study. Marcuse emphasized t h e d i f f e r e n c e

when he s t r e s s e d c r i t i c a l o r negative reason. For another approach t o t h e same
question s e e C. Levi-Strauss: The Savape Mind. University of Chicago ( 1966) a
Chapter 9.

~ ~ . Methodological Consequences of t h e Sociology of Knowledge, i n

3 3 ~ Mills:
I.L. Horowitz ( ed. ): Power. P o l i t i c s and Peoole. New York, B a l l a n t i n e (,1963),
pp. 453-68.

34~orowitz: P h i l o s o ~ h y , Science and t h e Sociology of Knowledge, i b i d . , p. 88.

391.1,. Horowitz: Establishment Sociology: The Value of Being Value-Free, in

Inquiry. Oslo, Norway, U n i v e r s i t e t s f o r l a g e t , Vol. 1, No. 6, p. 135.
 Chapter Four

Ideology a s Pre-Analysis: Schumpeter

An understanding of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e problem of ideology

and t h e s o c i a l arrangement of science is r a r e i n a time of academic s p e c i a l -

ization. Concentrating on t h e i r so-called " f i e l d s " and d i s i n t e r e s t e d i n

g e n e r a l i n t e l l e c t u a l problems, most academics don't ever r e a l i z e t h a t t h e

c l a s s of problems with which t h e y d e a l have something t o db with t h e s o c i a l

o r g a n i z a t i o n (e.g., f u n c t i o n ) of t h e t y p e of knowledge developed. A few begin

t o consider t h e problem of ideology, but, a s we saw i n Chapter Three, t h e y

never break from a narrow scientism. I n d i f f e r e n t ways, Ries, MacRae and

Horowitz a l l f a i l e d t o handle t h e problem a s a n i n t e l l e c t u a l problem. Instead

t h e y used t h e word "ideology" t o debunk t h e p o s i t i o n with which t h e y disagreed.

Even so, t h e s e authors a r e not t y p i c a l of s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s on t h i s continent.

Most s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s a r e so i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e ideology of s c i e n t i s m and i t s

i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements t h a t t h e y don't even begin t o use t h e words t h a t r e -

f l e c t t h e problem of ideology.

It is common f o r academic economists t o have t h i s narrowness. When we

f i n d a n exception t o t h i s , it warrants s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n . Unlike most economists

of h i s time, Joseph Schumpeter acknowledged t h a t t h e r e was a problem of ideology

and undertook a n evaluation of it i n h i s f i e l d of s t u d y . l H i s e v a l u a t i o n , though

l i m i t e d by h i s r e l i a n c e on a v e r s i o n of t h e value-free d o c t r i n e , introduces u s t o

problems a r i s i n g from t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s of l o g i c and ideology. We touched on

t h i s matter when discussing Horowitz. A c r i t i c a l examination of Schumpeter can

 I

urther our consideration of t h i s question.

Schumpeterls Critique of Marx

Schumpeter accredited Marx with developing t h e modern theory o f ideology

and generally he t r e a t e d t h e term i n a similar manner. Of Marx he said "Marx

realized t h a t men's ideas or system of ideas a r e not, a s historiography i s s t i l l

prone t o assume u n c r i t i c a l l y , the prime movers of t h e h i s t o r i c a l process, but

form a lsuperstructurel on more fundamental f a c t o r s ..."2

Schumpeter, however, disagreed with Marx's theory of ideology i n t h r e e

s p e c l f i c ways. F i r s t , he argued t h a t Marx "... was completely blind t o t h e ide-

ological elements present i n h i s own ..."t h ~ u g h t . ~Second, he disagreed with

t h e position he a t t r i b u t e d t o Marx t h a t a l l ideology is "reducible ... t o those

i n t e r e s t s of t h e dominant class."4 According t o what Schumpeter called t h e

"principle of ideological interpretation", only t w o points need t o be stressed

about ideology. He wrote "... t h a t ideologies a r e superstructures erected on,

,and produced by, the r e a l i t i e s of the objective s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e below them; and

t h a t they tend t o r e f l e c t these r e a l i t i e s i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y biased manner. 11 5

Ideology, according t o Schumpeter, was not necessarily reducible t o "purely

economic terms", which was how he characterized Marx1s use of the term.

H i s f i r s t point i s a c t u a l l y unclear. Saying t h a t t h e r e i s an "ideological

element" i n Marxls thought does not deal with some basic considerations. For

example, is s o c i a l c r i t i c i s m a s biased a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o the study of society a s

a r e l i a n c e on ideas and categories t h a t a r e apologetic f o r a s o c i a l system? Or,

t o put t h i s another way: what orientations (e.g., methodologies), i f any, would

d i f f e r e n t i a t e between biased and non-biased o r l e s s biased ideas about society?

 I

I n not dealing with these kinds of questions, t h e kind Mannheim tackled, Schumpcter

increased t h e confusion about t h e problem of ideology. Academics a r e accustomed

t o debunking what they stereotype a s "Marxls ideology" without dealing with t h e

problem of ideology i n an i n t e l l e c t u a l , non-pejorative manner. This u n c r i t i c a l

approach has c l e a r l y a f f e c t e d Schumpeter.

His second point d e p i c t s a view of ideology t h a t i s s i m i l a r t o t h a t de-

veloped by Mannheim. Mannheim, a s we saw, a l s o used t h e term ideology i n a gen-

e r a l and a t o t a l way. Schumpeter, however, did not show t h e depth of awareness

t h a t was developed by Mannheimls h i s t o r i c a n a l y s i s of t h e growth i n awareness

about ideological a f f e c t s on knowledge. For example, h i s use of language was

mechanistic, and t h i s suggests a lack of an adequate theory of t h e interdependence

of ideas and s o c i a l structure. When Schwnpeter wrote about ideas being 'I... erect-

ed on ... produced by ... ( t h e ) s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e below them" he showed t h i s mecha-

nism. We have already seen t h a t Xarx held a dynamic, not a r e d u c t i o n i s t i c , theory

of these r e l a t i o n s h i p s ; a theory t h a t showed how ideology mediates between praxis

and consciousness. Schwnpeter s b e l i e f t h a t Marx was an economic r e d u c t i o n i s t i s

based more on p r o j e c t i o n than on understanding.

Schwnpeterls t h i r d point i s more u s e f u l f o r our inquiry. He refused, on

l o g i c a l grounds, t o equate ideology with d i s t o r t i o n and thus argued t h a t

"... ideologies a r e not l i e s . It must be added t h a t statements of f a c t

t h a t e n t e r i n t o them a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y erroneous. The temptation i s
g r e a t t o a v a i l oneself of t h e opportunity t o dispose a t one s t r o k e of a
whole body of propositions one does not l i k e , by t h e simple device of
c a l l i n g it a n ideology. This device i s no doubt very e f f e c t i v e a s e f -
f e c t i v e a s a r e a t t a c k s upon a n opponentls personal motives. But l o g i c a l -
l y it i s inadmissible. As pointed out already, explanation, however
c o r r e c t , of t h e reasons why a man says what he says t e l l s us nothing
about whether it i s t r u e or f a l s e . " 6

Though I do not accept t h e view of logic which i s implied i n t h i s statement

I do accept t h e point t h a t i n t e l l e c t u a l c r i t i c i s m i s needed t o show t h e worth o r

f a l s i t y of any s e t of ideas. Stereotyping a s e t of ideas a s "ideulogy", U S ~ I ~ /

t h e term pejoratively, proves nothing. A s an example, n e i t h e r t h e end-of-

1
ideology proponents nor t h e so-called "vulgar mar xi st^",^ both of whom do t h i s

with s e t s of ideas with which they disagree, provide us with t h e needed c l a r i -

f i c a t i o n of t h e problem of ideology.

Schumpeterls view of logic i s shown by h i s treatment of "facts1' and

"values". When he s a i d t h a t "tampering with f a c t s or with r u l e s of procedure"

and "passing11value judgments were, besides "ideology1', two "other dangers" t o

economic a n a l y s i s , he showed a basic confusion about t h e problem of ideology.

What values a r e i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t i n d i f f e r e n t forms of knowledge? What

values a r e i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t i n d i f f e r e n t r u l e s of procedure? These ques-

t i o n s cannot be c l a r i f i e d independent of a consideration of t h e problem of

ideology. By separating "ideology" from " f a c t s and values" and these from

"values", r a t h e r than analyzing t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s , * Schumpeter was, i n e f f e c t ,

refusing t o consider t h e problem of ideology.

Schumpeter did say t h a t "... value judgments o f t e n r e v e a l ... ideology" 9

but he maintained a c l e a r separation of f a c t from value. This was shown

by h i s statement t h a t "...it i s possible t o pass value judgments upon i r r e -

proachably established f a c t s and t h e r e l a t i o n s between them, and it i s possible

t o refrain from passing any value judgments upon f a c t s t h a t a r e seen i n an ide-

o l o g i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t l i g h t . "lo There a r e no "irreproachably established f a c t s "

independent of a c l a s s of problems. And a c l a s s of problems obtains i t s shareable

meaning from t h e s o c i a l arrangement and function of science. Nor a r e "value

judgments" something you Pass on facts. This view of values assumes t h a t an

individual s c i e n t i s t discovers f a c t s and then decides how t o apply them. Rather

 - 77 -
I

than t h i s , t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s within which a s c i e n t i s t a c t s give an oricn-

t a t i o n t o h i s o r her work. The "values" a r e already implied i n the c l a s s of

problems, not added t o t h e r e s u l t s obtained. Clearly, Schumpeter f a i l e d t o

understand t h e implications of Marx's theory of ideology, which he generally

accepted f o r h i s own view of science. I f ideas form a "superstructure", then

it i s useless t o separate "facts" f r o m a consideration of how ideas function

within a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l system.

Schwnpeter accepted a formalistic, not a pragmatic concept of logic.

This formalism was shown when, discussing Adam Smith, he wrote "... we a r e not
s o much interested in- he ... argued f o r us a s we a r e i n u he argued and

what t o o l s of analysis he used in doing so. "11 This statement r e f l e c t s Schum-

p e t e r ' s r e i f i e d view of t h e s c i e n t i f i c process. The "rules of procedure" of

science were t r e a t e d a b s t r a c t l y and not r e l a t e d t o t h e pervasive e f f e c t of ide-

ologies i n a s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l setting. Schumpeterls discussion implied

t h a t science i s equivalent t o technique, and t h a t technique i s i n t h e possession

of s c i e n t i s t s . This i s t h e c i r c u l a r kind of argument t h a t he was making. Eco-

nomic analysts, f o r example, have t h e t a s k of picking out It... a s best ( t h e y )

can such a n a l y t i c a l performance from t h e common run of verbalizations of t h e

humors of t h e time, t h a t a r e unconnected with any e f f o r t t o improve our concep-

t u a l apparatus, and hence without i n t e r e s t t o us.1112 The implication of t h i s

i s t h a t some know what "conceptual apparatus" i s correct and others do not.

I ask: correct f o r what? Schumpeter did not take t h i s question serious-

ly. He never put h i s ideas about "truth" o r "objectivity" i n t o any well defined

context. He therefore implied there i s an objective knowledge p e r se; t h a t ideas

can be correct inthemselves. He did not place ideas, including ideas about

t r u t h , i n t o a s o c i a l context even though the theory of ideology he accepted

 I

suggested t h a t ideas always function within and gain t h e i r meaning from such

a context.

Schumpeter did not analyze the "conceptual apparatus" of science from

a sociological stance. It was described, b r i e f l y , but a description of s o -

c a l l e d " r u l e s of procedure" without a sociological basis too e a s i l y leads t o

a r e i f i e d view o f methodology. I n only one place did Schumpeter show t h i s

awareness. Speaking of t h e "advances" i n t h e techniques of economic analysis,

he wrote t h a t "...our a b i l i t y t o speak of progress ... i s obviously due t o t h e

f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s a widely accepted standard, confined, of course, t o a group

of professionals, t h a t enables us t o array d i f f e r e n t theories ...Ill3 I agree,

a s f a r a s he goes, but understanding t h e conditions t h a t allow professionals t o

l e a r n these standards remains a more fundamental problem than a description of

t h e standards. And Schumpeter, l i k e Horowitz, f a i l e d t o take up t h i s matter.

His discussion ended just where it should have began.

Schumpeter 1 s Obscurity

Having argued t h a t ideology, value judgments and "tampering with facts"14

a l l d i s t o r t economic theorx, Schumpeter went on t o discuss the s c i e n t i f i c process

i n t h e more specialized f i e l d of economic analysis. He began by making a dis-

t i n c t i o n between "analysis" and "preanalysis". I n h i s words "... analytic e f f o r t

i s of necessity preceded by a preanalytical cognitive a c t t h a t supplies t h e raw

material f o r t h e analytic effect."15 This preanalytical process he called

"vision". This i s a revealing word since it tends t o mystify a process t h a t

should be scrutinized closely i f the problem o f ideology i s t o be c l a r i f i e d .

l t ~ i s i o n becomes
" an all-embracing term f o r a l l hypothetical innovations a s a

f i e l d of study changes.
 According t o Schumpeter, a n a l y t i c e f f o r t begins with t h e verbalizing of

"vision". From t h i s comes conceptualization which Schumpeter saw a s "... elements

taking t h e i r places with names attached t o them t h a t f a c i l i t a t e recognition and

manipulation."16 Again we s e e a mechanistic language t h a t suggests a lack of

understanding of t h e process of analysis. According t o t h i s l i n e of thought,

"names" a r e put on "elements" t o become "concepts". Such a s i m p l i s t i c view of

s c i e n t i f i c a n a l y s i s r e s u l t s f r o m t h e equation of a s p e c i a l i z e d c l a s s of problems,

and t h e knowledge obtained, with i n s i g h t i n t o R e a l i t y or Truth. When academic

narrowness i s t y p i c a l , it i s r a r e t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p s between problems, methods and

t h e o r i e s a r e understood. Such ignorance i s o f t e n transformed i n t o metaphysical

and mechanical t h e o r i e s of knowledge.

Schumpeterls scheme i s highly r a t i o n a l . After "naming of elements1', new

f a c t s a r e assembled; new r e l a t i o n s and concepts a r e added; and, ultimately, a

" s c i e n t i f i c model" i s produced.17 I have no doubt t h a t t h i s simple scheme had

some personal meaning f o r Schumpeter, and arose t o h e l p r a t i o n a l i z e h i s own

t h e o r e t i c a l work. Though n e a t , it f a i l e d t o draw out t h e r e a l i s s u e s involved i n

understanding how p a r t i c u l a r problems, methods and t h e o r i e s develop, or why they

become synthesized i n t o d i f f e r e n t f o r m s ( s o - c a l l e d models) f o r d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i s t s .

Most important, h i s approach f a i l e d t o consider why some problems (e.g., t h e prob-

lem of ideology) a r e n ' t conceptualized by c e r t a i n groups of s c i e n t i s t s , nor any

language developed t o allow t h i s t o even begin t o happen. Schumpeter c e r t a i n l y

recognized a problem when he brought t h e term "vision" i n t o h i s vocabulary. But

adding a term t o a discussion does not c o n s t i t u t e c l a r i f i c a t i o n or understanding.

Schmpeter shows us t h a t rationalism can be used t o cloak over basic confusion.

i
After o u t l i n i n g t h i s r a t i o n a l scheme, Schumpeter returned t o a discussion
 I

but does not greatly a f f e c t t h e r u l e s v f procedure. One statement allows me t o

point out Schumpeterls basic f a l l a c y , so I w i l l quote him a t length.

Summarizing h i s position, Schumpeter s t a t e d t h a t

h his i s indeed a primitive but not, I think, misleading statement of t h e

process by which we grind out what we c a l l s c i e n t i f i c propositions. Now
it should be perfectly c l e a r t h a t t h e r e i s a wide gate f o r ideology t o
enter i n t o t h i s process. I n f a c t , it enters on t h e very ground f l o o r ,
i n t o t h e preanalytic cognitive a c t of which we have been speaking.
Analytic work begins with material provided by o u r vision of things* and
t h i s v i s i o n i s ideological almost by definition. It embodies t h e picture
of things a s we see them, ana wherever t h e r e i s any possible motive f o r
wishing t o see them i n a given r a t h e r than another l i g h t , t h e way i n which
we see things can hardly be distinguished from t h e way i n which we wish t o
see them. The more honest and naive o u r v i s i o n i s , t h e more dangerous i s
it t o t h e eventual emergence of anything f o r which general v a l i d i t y can be
claimed. The inference f o r t h e s o c i a l sciences i s obvious, and it i s not
even t r u e t h a t he who hates a s o c i a l system w i l l f o r m an objectively more
correct v i s i o n of it than he who loves it. For love d i s t o r t s indeed, but
hate d i s t o r t s s t i l l more. Our only comfort i s i n t h e f a c t t h a t there i s a
l a r g e number of phenomena t h a t f a i l t o a f f e c t our emotions one way or t h e
other, and t h a t therefore look t o one man very much a s they do another. But
we a l s o observe t h a t t h e r u l e s of procedure t h a t we apply i n our a n a l y t i c
work a r e almost a s much exempt from ideological influence a s v i s i o n i s sub-
ject t o it. Passionate allegiance and passionate hatred may indeed tamper
with these rules. I n themselves these r u l e s , many of which, moreover, a r e
imposed upon us by t h e s c i e n t i f i c practice i n f i e l d s t h a t a r e l i t t l e o r not
a t a l l affected by ideology, a r e p r e t t y ef-fective i n showing up misuse. And
what i s equally important, they tend t o crush out ideologically conditioned
e r r o r from t h e visions from which we s t a r t . It i s t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r v i r t u e ,
and they do so automatically and irrespective of t h e desires o f t h e research
worker. The new f a c t s he i s bound t o accumulate impose themselves upon h i s
schema. The new concepts and r e l a t i o n s , which somebody e l s e w i l l formulate
i f he does not, must v e r i f y h i s ideologies o r e l s e destroy them. And if t h i s
process i s allowed t o work i t s e l f out completely, it w i l l indeed not protect
us from t h e emergence of new ideologies. but it w i l l c l e a r i n the end t h e
e x i s t i n g ones from error. "18

This position i s "indeed primitive", but it i s also misleading. Giving

"rules" t h e t a s k of weeding out ideological influences i n knowledge i s tautological.

Since a s e t of r u l e s may be useful f o r one c l a s s of problems, but not another, r e l y -

ing on them a s your absolute c r i t e r i a increases t h e probability t h a t some p r ~o ''~ e m s

w i l l be ignored. And t h i s i s a c t u a l l y how ideology a f f e c t s the s o c i a l sciences.

While, metaphorically, Schumpeter i s correct t h a t "ideology enters on the ground

 I

floor" of science, he i s mistaken t o t r e a t " r u l e s " a s pure techniques. The very

methods used by a group of s c i e n t i s t s r e l a t e t o t h e c l a s s of problems t o which

they give p r i o r i t y . The "rules" themselves a r e operating a t a "preanaly-bic"

l e v e l of consciousness. When I discuss Kuhnts a n a l y s i s of n a t u r a l science i n

Chapter Five, t h e importance of t h i s point f o r t h e problem of ideology w i l l be

clarified.

Schumpeterls Scientism

F a i l i n g t o analyze t h e sociological c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and function of these

r u l e s , Schwnpeter perpetuated t h e dogma t h a t some ideas, i n themselves, a r e

objective and t h a t others a r e not. Even a s s o p h i s t i c a t e d a t h e o r i s t a s he was

not unaffected by scientism. This "scientism" i s o f t e n d i f f i c u l t t o l o c a t e , a s

t h e following statement shows.

"AS soon a s we have r e a l i z e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of ideological b i a s , it i s not

d i f f i c u l t t o l o c a t e it. A l l we have t o do
procedure.
...i s t o scrutinize scientific
It s t a r t s from t h e perception of a s e t of r e l a t e d phenomena
which we wish t o analyze and ends up -
f o r t h e time being -
with a scien-
t i f l c model i n which these phenomena a r e conceptualized and t h e r e l a t i o n s
between them e x p l i c i t l y formulated, e i t h e r a s assumptions or a s proposi-
t i o n s (theorems). This primitive way of putting it may not s a t i s f y t h e
logician, but it i s a l l we need f o r our hunt f o r ideological bias."lg

This f o r m a l i s t i c approach t o science r e f l e c t s an ignorance of t h e r e l a t i o n s

between methods, ways t o t h e o r i z e and t h e c l a s s of problems which has relevance

because of t h e s o c i a l arrangement of science. Rather than hunting down ideological

b i a s , Schumpeterts approach ensures t h a t an orthodoxy - a closed system of problems,

methods and t h e o r i e s - will be protected from fundamental c r i t i c i s m . Schumpeter simply

f a i l e d t o r a i s e t h e problem of ideology. He s k i r t e d around t h e important issues by

using t h e words "ideology", " f a c t " , "value" and " r u l e s " without giving them meaning,

even i n terms of h i s own theory of knowledge. Actually, h i s "theory of knowledge''

amounted t o a s p l i t t i n g up of these terms so it appeared t h a t they were unrelated.

Yet h i s own a n a l y s i s forced him t o draw t h e s e words c l o s e r and c l o s e r together t o

t h e point of undercutting h i s o r i g i n a l position.

Ultimately one's theory of knowledge must be a r t i c u l a t e d i n r e l a t i o n t o

one's time and place i n s o c i e t y and h i s t o r y i f t h e problem of ideology i s t o be

d e a l t with i n any basic way. Schumpeter f a i l e d t o do t h i s . H i s main e r r o r was t o

not see t h a t h i s treatment of science a s technique, and h i s view of ideology a s a l l

e l s e , r e l a t e d t o t h e nature and uses of knowledge i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s .

Only i n t h i s context can we begin t o make sense of h i s statement t h a t "Science i s

technique and t h e more it develops t h e more completely does it pass out of t h e

range of comprehension not only of t h e public but, minus h i s own chosen s p e c i a l t y ,

of t h e research worker himself. "20

Schumpeter J u d ~ e d t h e fragmentation of research and t h e specialized nature

of academic knowledge t o be progressive. But he assumed it t o be good r a t h e r than

evaluating t h e consequences of t h i s s o c i a l arrangement of science. He admitted

t h a t one consequence was an i n a b i l i t y of s p e c i a l i z e d researchers t o understand

each other. It follows from t h i s t h a t they would have trouble understanding how

t h e i r s p e c i a l i z e d findings add up, i.e., what t h e o v e r a l l s o c i a l e f f e c t s would be.

We can Lmagine other ways t o s o c i a l l y arrange science t o allow t h e s o c i a l conse-

quences t o be evaluated as p a r t of t h e subject matter. Schumpeter was too com-

mitted t o s c i e n t i s t i c assumptions t o s e e t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y .

Schumpeter was not dogmatic i n h i s scientism since he did not begin h i s

discussion with m ~ t u a l l yexclusive r e a l i t i e s , one of " f a c t " and another of

"value". This tendency was, however, shown when he s t a t e d t h a t he was It.. .

speaking of science which i s technique t h a t t u r n s out t h e r e s u l t s which, tovether

-
with (my emphasis) value judgments o r preferences, produce recommendations, e i t h e r
individual ones o r systems of them - such a s ... mercantilism, l i b e r a l i s m and

SO on. "21 Secing t h e development of p o l i t i c a l and economic ideologies a s pref-

e r e n t i a l applications of value-free f a c t s i s t h e height of academic absurdity.

It r e s u l t s from a formal and a h i s t o r i c a l view of knowledge. Later, when I

discuss Max Weber's r o l e i n c r e a t i n g t h e value-free doctrine, 5, s h a l l show how

t h e tendency t o separate value from f a c t i s not only i n t e l l e c t u a l l y naive, but

s o c i a l l y destructive.

Though t h i s tendency i s present i n Schumpeterts work, he did recognize

an interdependence between ideology and s c i e n t i f i c analysis. His overlapping

definitions of "vision", which was basic t o h i s view of t h e s c i e n t i f i c process,

and "ideology" forced t h i s recognition. He d i d not, however, recognize t h i s

interdependence i n terms of t h e sociology of knowledge. His formal o r i e n t a t i o n

made t h i s impossible and l e d him t o consider ideology t o be a necessary evil.

Thus he wrote "...though we proceed slowly because of our ideologies, we might

not proceed a t a l l without them. "22

Schumpeter's formal approach l e d him t o separate "investigation" from

"evaluation". Hence he wrote

"...i n i t s e l f s c i e n t i f i c performance does not r e q u i r e us t o d i v e r t our-

s e l v e s of' our value judgments or t o renounce t h e c a l l i n g of an advocate
of some p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t . To i n v e s t i g a t e f a c t s or t o develop t o o l s
f o r doing so i s one thing; t o evaluate them from some moral or c u l t u r a l
standpoint i s , i n logic, another thing, and t h e two need not c o n f l i c t . lI23

This separation of i n v e s t i g a t i n g and evaluating f a c t s i s t h e f a l l a c y of a l l t h e o r i e s

t h a t do not hegin with a c l e a r understanding of t h e problem of ideology. "~acts"

a r e t r e a t e d a s things t o be discovered, r a t h e r than a s human c r e a t i o n s a r i s i n g from

a p a r t i c u l a r function of science. The l a t t e r i s not t h e same a s saying t h a t t h e

human "mind" c r e a t e s " f a c t s " a t What I am saying i s t h a t we a r e a species

t h a t l i v e s within c e r t a i n dimensions; t h a t has a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p , 1. e. ,

t h e s o c i a l arrangement of human labour, technology and science, with t h e material
 I

environment, and t h a t we c r e a t e f a c t s accordingly.

Once "facts" a r e seen i n terms of hunlan and s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s , t h e sug-

g e s t i o n t h a t investigating f a c t s i s purely a technical matter, while evaluating

them i s a moral matter, becomes absurd. Our academic languages, which a r e s t i l l

b u i l t upon t h i s kind of d u a l i t y (e.g., t e c h n i c a l versus moral) keep us from un-

derstanding t h e v i t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e s o c i a l organization of science

and t h e way a c l a s s of problems, c e r t a i n r e l a t e d methods and t h e o r i e s i n t e r r e l a t e .

As science becomes more and more consequential f o r humanity our very survival

depends on thinlclng and a c t i n g i n terms of t h e s e relationships.

Furthermore, Schumpeter made "logic" a f i n a l a r b i t e r f o r questions of

f a c t ( "technique" ) and value ("morals" ). But of what kind of l o g i c was he speak-

ing? Logics a r e a l s o c r e a t i o n s of human beings. Unfortunately, it has become a n

academic "fad" t o have a logic t o r a t i o n a l i z e t h e dominant approaches i n t h e s o c i a l

sciences. This j u s t enhances our i n a b i l i t y t o understand t h e problem of ideology

a t i t s roots. Until we recognize t h a t t h e r e i s no absolute "Logic" on which we

can r e l y , t h a t t h e r e is no " ~ o g i c "t h a t w i l l make our i n t e l l e c t u a l decisions f o r

us, we w i l l not l e a r n t o maximize judgment i n our s c i e n t i f i c work. This judgment,

i f maximized, would involve choosing problems and methods t h a t r e l a t e t o t h e s o c i a l

ends, i. e., consequences, we desire.

Schumpeterls discussion was f a r removed from t h i s goal. H i s discussion did

attempt t o r e l a t e ideology t o a n a l y s i s , but t h e problem of ideology was not drawn

out because of h i s d u a l i s t i c thinking. Were he t o have tackled problems of l o g i c

s e r i o u s l y , and taken h i s recognition of Marxls theory of ideology a s t e p f u r t h e r

t o a sociology of knowledce study of t h e l o g i c s t h a t lead us t o dichotomize value

and f a c t , he would have had t o encounter t h e problem of ideology.

 - 85 -
!

It would be u n f a i r t o not a c c r e d i t Schumpeter with some "vision" regard-

ing t h i s problem. Though h i s analysis of f a c t and value i s unsound, within h i s

a n a l y s i s t h e r e a r e statements t h a t could be considered "preanalytic", t h a t i s ,

which could have l e d t o a more thorough discussion. One good example i s h i s

statement t h a t

"There i s more comfort i n t h e observation t h a t no economic analysis l a s t s

forever and t h a t , with a likelihood t h a t approximates c e r t a i n t y , we
eventually grow out of each. This follows not only from t h e fact ( m y
emphasis) t h a t s o c i a l p a t t e r n s change and hence every economic a n a l y s i s
i s bound t o wither, but a l s o from t h e r e l a t i o n t h a t ideology bears t o t h e
p r e - s c i e n t i f i c cognition which we have c a l l e d vision."25

Only i n t h i s one place did Schwnpeter recognize t h a t " s o c i a l patterns1' and

t h e form of a n a l y s i s r e l a t e , I f Schwnpeter had s e r i o u s l y questioned why economic

analyses change, and had seen t h a t changes i n s c i e n t i f i c "rules" a r e a p a r t of

l a r g e r ideological changes, he might have abandoned h i s adherence t o a version of

t h e value-free doctrine. If Schwnpeter had applied h i s above statement t o h i s own

handling of t h e problem of ideology he would have recognized h i s contradictory

position. Like Horowitz, or anyone t h a t t r e a t s ideas academically, Schwnpeter

admitted changes i n systems of thought a t one point, while absolutizing t h e " r u l e s "

of one system of thought a t another point i n h i s discussion.

Schwnpeterls self-contradictory p o s i t i o n was shown when he wrote t h a t

"Since t h e source of ideology i s o u r pre and e x t r a - s c i e n t i f i c v i s i o n of t h e economic

process and of what i s - causally or t e l e o l i g i c a l l y - important i n it and s i n c e

normally t h i s v i s i o n i s then subjected t o s c i e n t i f i c treatment, it i s being e i t h e r

v e r i f i e d or destroyed by analysis and i n e i t h e r case should vanish qua ideology. 11 26

On t h e one hand, he admitted t h a t economic analyses change. On t h e other hand, he

admitted t h a t "ideology" I s t h e beginning of any p a r t i c u l a r economic analysis. If

t h i s is s o then t h e problem of ideology can never be solved by r e l y i n g on any par-

 - 86 -
L

t i c u l a r method of economic analysis. Schumpeter cannot have it both ways, though

he t r i e d . One main reason why it i s so d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e problem of ideology t o

be understood i s t h a t specialized academics a r e oft;en more competent c r e a t i n g

new words t o avoid evaluating t h e i r assumptions t h a n using language t o move

c l a r i f i c a t i o n t o a new level.

Footnotes

' ~ o s e p h A. Schwnpeter: Is t h e History of Economics a History of Ideology?, i n

D. Braybrooke (ed. ): P h i l o s o ~ h l c a lProblems of t h e Social Sciences. New York,
Macmillan ( 1966 1, pp. 108-18.

bid., p. 110.

%bid.

4~chwnpeter, op. c i t . , p. 111.

%bid.

%bid.

7 ~ . ~Mills
. used t h e term "vulgar marxism" t o describe t h e "empty and i r r e l e v a n t
rhetoricic"t h a t remains when p o l i t i c a l ideas become "simply myth or folklore" .
C.W. M i l l s : The Marxists, op. c i t . , p. 17.

* ~ h e s ewords a r e themselves inadequate f o r analyzing t h e problem of ideology. The

f a c t t h a t I have w r i t t e n of t h e " i n t e r r e l a t i o n s " of f a c t and value, though I r e j e c t
t h e dichotomy, shows t h e inadequacy of our language.

g~chumpeter, op. c i t . , p. 112.

11bid.

"lbid., p. 113.

14'1~amperingwith f a c t s " might be q u i t e necessary f o r d e v e l o p i x a new c l a s s of

problems! This w i l l become c l e a r i n Chapter Six when we c r i t i c i z e t h e a b s t r a c t
notion of f a c t s .
15~ci~umpeter,
op. c i t . a p. 116.

1611Suchscholars a s Joseph Schumpeter, Weberts g r e a t e s t successor i n t h e r o l e of

economic s o c i o l o g i s t , have delineated t h e concept (Weberls i d e a l t y p e ) more pre-
c i s e l y under t h e new term 'model'. And on t h i s b a s i s new lmodels' have become an
enormous stock-in-trade among s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s . I' (H. S t u a r t Hughes: Conscious-
ness and Societg. New York, Random ( 1958), p. 314. ) When I discuss Weberls work
i n Chapter Twelve, I w i l l show how t h i s more precise formulation of t h e " i d e a l
type" r e f l e c t s a vulgarization of Weberls insight.

17~chumpeter, op. c i t . , pp. 117-18.

1 8 ~ o s e p hA. Schumpeter: Science and Ideology, i n R. V. Clemence ( ed. ) : Essays

of Joseph Schumpeter. Cambridge, Addison-Wesley Press (1951), p. 272.

2 3 pragmatic
~ o r i e n t a t i o n and an i d e a l i s t one a r e o f t e n confused by those who
understand " f a c t s " from a vulgar m a t e r i a l i s t or a b s t r a c t empiricist perspective.
To h e l p c l a r i f y t h i s a c r i t i q u e of idealism from a pragmatic stance is included
i n Chapters Seventeen and Eighteen.

24~chumpeter, op. c i t . , p. 281.

 L

Chapter Five

Ideology as Disguised Values: Bergmann

Our discussion of Joseph Schwnpeter may not have made it c l e a r how a

c r i t i c a l examination of t h e o r i e s of logic r e l a t e s t o t h e problem of ideology.

It i s necessary t o e s t a b l i s h t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p of logic and ideology f o r our

c r i t i q u e of scientism t o be thorough. I w i l l do t h i s by evaluating a paper by

Bergmann1 which discussed "ideology and l o g i c t t i n a way fundamentally d i f f e r e n t

than my approach. The comparison w i l l hopefully serve t o c l a r i f y t h i s matter

more than would a d i r e c t a r t i c u l a t i o n of my own position.

The Logical Analysis of Ideology

Bergmann accepted t h e value-free doctrine without q u a l i f i c a t i o n and devel-

oped h i s d e f i n i t i o n s of "facts", "value", "logic1' and "ideologytt within t h i s frame-

work. His claim was t o have done "...a l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s of t h e notion of ideology."2

We s h a l l see, however, t h a t he made t h e same e r r o r s t h a t a l l who begin t h e i r a n a l y s i s

with a value-fact s p l i t make.

Here i s how Bergmann defined " f a c t " and "value":

"A statement of f a c t says something about t h e object or objects it mentions;

and, depending only on t h e properties of t h e s e objects, it i s e i t h e r t r u e
or f a l s e . A value judgment i s misunderstood i f it i s taken t o a s c r i b e a
property t o t h e object, a c t or s i t u a t i o n it mentions i n t h e same sense i n
which a statement of f a c t i s such an a s c r i p t i o n ; it i s , t h e r e f o r e , l i t e r a l l y
n e i t h e r t r u e or false."3

What one means by "... says something about ... t h e properties of these o b j e c t s ..."
i s , of course, t h e crux of t h e problem of logic. And, a s I s h a l l argue i n Chapter

Nineteen, t h e c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h i s requires a sociological understanding of language.

On t h e b a s i s of these d e f i n i t i o n s , Bergmann developed t h e following definition

of " ideology1'.
he motive power of a value judgment i s often g r e a t l y increased when
it appears within t h e r a t i o n a l e of those who hold it not under i t s
proper l o g i c a l f l a g a s a value judgment but i n t h e disguise of a
statement of f a c t . A statement of t h i s kind, t h a t i s , a value judg-
ment disguised a s , or mistaken f o r , a statement of fact. I s h a l l c a l l
a n J i d e o l o g i c a l statement1. A r a t i o n a l e o r an important p a r t of a
r a t i o n a l e t h a t contains i n l o g i c a l l y c r u c i a l places ideological s t a t e -
ments I s h a l l c a l l an " i d e ~ l o g y " . " ~

From t h i s s e t of deductions, Bergmann concluded t h a t man i s an "ideological

animal". I n h i s words: "...up t o t h i s point i n h i s history, his rationales

were more often than not ideologies and because, whether we l i k e it or not, t h e

motive power of h i s standards i s , a t l e a s t sometimes, g r e a t l y increased i f they

take t h e fomn of an ideology."5 There i s nothing t o be gained from saying t h a t

"man" is a n ideological animal. While mental and physical labour i s r i g i d l y

divided, and knowledge is mystified, "ideology" w i l l a f f e c t a l l humans - academics

included. For example, Bergmannls own concepts a r e ideological. Seeing t r u t h a s

t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of " f a c t s " , and a l l e l s e a s disguising values with statements of

f a c t s , ignores t h e f a c t t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l arrangement of science pre-

determines t h a t a c e r t a i n c l a s s of problems and f a c t s with c e r t a i n human conse-

quences takes p r i o r i t y . Bergmannls formalism not only kept him from studying

t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s ; it a l s o r e f l e c t s t h e ideology within mainstream academia t h a t

t r e a t s f a c t s i n such a way t h a t t h e s o c i a l function of knowledge w i l l & be under-

stood.

Though Bergmann d i d not conclude t h a t man was a " l o g i c a l animal", he t r e a t e d

logic a s though it were more fundamental than ideology. Much a s Schmpeter tended

t o r e i f y t h e " s c i e n t i f i c processt1, Bergmann tended t o r e i f y "logic". He did not

even o b t a i n t h e i n s i g h t of Horowitz t h a t logic I t s e l f serves t h e ideological needs

of a s o c i a l system.
 I

Here i s how Bergmann viewed logic. F i r s t of a l l , " l o g i c n , L e . , h i s

logic, transcends both the sociological and epistemological approaches t o

knowledge. Arguing h i s position, Bergmann wrote:

" ~ i k et h e problem of epistemological subjectivity, though f o r d i f f e r e n t

reasons, t h e problem of sociological s u b j e c t i v i t y i s , I submit, a
pseudo-problem. There appears t o be a problem only a s long a s one
f a i l s t o distinguish between value judgments and statements of f a c t ,
t r e a t i n g some of the former l i k e statements of perceptual e r r o r o r ,
more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , l i k e systematic delusions due t o one's s o c i a l
circumstances. 11 6

The s o c i 0 1 0 g i ~ a land epistemological approaches t o knowledge a r e "subjective"

because they f a i l t o make a l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between "fact" and "value". In

Bergmannl s words:

"... t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between f a c t and value, which explains t h i s notorious

s u b j e c t i v i t y , i s a s c l e a r and unproblematic a s those between a physical
object, a percept, and an illusion. Moreover - and t h i s i s the c r u c i a l
point - a l l these d i s t i n c t i o n s a r e matters of l o g i c a l , not of sociological,
analysis, j u s t a s they a r e systematically p r i o r t o and independent of a l l
sociological considerations. " 7

Here we see t h e argument t h a t l o g i c a l considerations a r e primary t o sociological

ones i n understanding the problem of ideology. Since t h i s argument i s o f t h e

more sophisticated ones used t o j u s t i f y t h e value-free doctrine and scientism it

requires a detailed criticism.

Ideological orientations a r i s e out of t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , the types of

language and consciousness and t h e r e l a t e d forms of knowledge of a time and place

i n history. Reducing t h e problem of ideology t o t h e formal r e l a t i o n s of " f a c t "

and "value" tends t o ignore the implications of t h i s . This reduction can make t h e

problem of ideology appear t o be a l o g i c a l matter since no h i s t o r i c a l content i s

u t i l i z e d i n t h i s formal kind of analysis. Because he t r i e d t o make an undefined

"logicn t h e absolute anchor f o r h i s argument and f a i l e d t o s i t u a t e h i s idea of

"logicH i n h i s t o r y , we can say t h a t Bergmannls own values were disguised a s s t a t e -

 I

ments of f a c t . I r o n i c a l l y , t h i s was Bergmann's own d e f i n i t i o n of "iaeology".

There i s a c i r c u l a r i t y i n Bergmannls argument. The f ornial manipulation

of d e f i n i t i o n s i s a weak beginning f o r any argument. According t o Bergmann,

h i s position "... i s not a n ideology ... (and i t ) beholds t h e t r u t h without

ideological distortion."* But saying t h i s does not prove it, nor does t h e

manipulation of d e f i n i t i o n s ensure t h a t h i s " l o g i c " deserved t h e transcendental

s t a t u s it was given. Once Bergmannls idea of l o g i c and of "ideology" i s examined

from t h e s t a n c e of t h e problem of ideology, t h i s so-called l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s of

ideology i s shown t o be both meaningless and i d e o l o g i c a l i n t h e more profound

sense of t h a t term.

Bergmannts "logic" r e f l e c t e d t h e p o s i t i v i s t i c - a n a l y t i c a l t r a d i t i o n i n

philosophy. The dichotomizing of " o b j e c t i v e " and "subjective" i s b a s i c t o t h i s

tradition. I n h i s words

" ~ b j e c t i v i s mt a k e s i t s i n s p i r a t i o n from t h e n a t u r a l sciences and t h e

e m p i r i c i s t philosophies of t h e l a s t century. Subjectivism stands i n
t h e t r a d i t i o n of Hegelian idealism, which i s history-centered, could
not accept t h e " p o s i t i v i s t i c 1 ' d i s t i n c t i o n between f a c t and value, and
even d e n i e s t h a t t h e r e i s any such t h i n g a s o b j e c t i v e self-contained
t r u t h i n t h e sense i n which a l l n o n i d e a l i s t i c philosophers, r e a l i s t
and p o s i t i v i s t a l i k e , i n s i s t t h a t t h e r e is such t r u t h . Mannheim a s
a n i n d i v i d u a l c e r t a i n l y stems from Hegel; so, by t h e way, does Dewey,
who i n many r e s p e c t s holds s t r u c t u r a l l y very s i m i l a r view^."^

I w i l l not t a k e up t h e d e t a i l e d debate over l o g i c u n t i l l a t e r . My purpose

i n t h i s s e c t i o n of t h e t h e s i s is t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e problem of ideology i s

fundamental f o r t h e s o c i a l sciences. I n doing t h i s , I am showing both t h e super-

f i c i a l i t y of t h e s c i e n t i s t i c view of ideology and t h e ideology t h a t complements

scientism. It is noteworthy, however, t h a t Bergmann c l a s s i f i e d Mannheim and Dewey

i n t h e same i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a d i t i o n . This t h e s i s is based on a s i m i l a r assumption,

though I hold a p o s i t i v e , not negative view of t h e s e a u t h o r s ' contributions.

 I

Bergmam c?ld not base h i s argument on a c r i t i c a l discussion of philo-

sophical issues i n t h e s o c i a l sciences, nor on an analysis of t h e h i s t o r y of

philosophies of knowledge. And h i s formal, contentless discussion was t h e

b a s i s of h i s downfall. This was shown, unquestionably, by h i s d e f i n i t i o n of

ideology a s t h a t with which he, a s one i n t h e p o s i t i v i s t - a n a l y t i c a l t r a d i t i o n ,

disagreed. As he wrote "1f I am t o be c o n s i s t e n t , I must c a l l ideology every

r a t i o n a l e , no matter how e x p l i c i t and a r t i c u l a t e on t h e fact-value issues and

other fundamental questions, t h a t a s s i m i l a t e s f a c t s and values t o each other

i n a way i n which t h e t r a d i t i o n i n which I stand i n s i s t s t h a t t h i s cannot be

done."1 I f t h e r e was any doubt about t h e c i r c u l a r i t y of Bergmannls position,

t h i s statement should d i s p e l it. C h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a l l t h e o r i s t s who f a i l t o

understand t h e mediational e f f e c t of ideology, even on t h e most specialized

a r e a s of knowledge, Bergmannls argument proves t o be no argument a t a l l .

Bergmannls idea of "ideology" only applied t o other t r a d i t i o n s than t h e

one with which he agreed. I n admitting t h i s , we see how Bergmannls a b s t r a c t

commitment t o "logictt helped undermine h i s own argument. I n h i s paper, he made

h i s formal manipulation of d e f i n i t i o n s e x p l i c i t i n a n attempt t o be i n t e r n a l l y

consistent. To t h e formal l o g i c i a n , i n t e r n a l consistency i n language forms i s

paramount.ll Such does not c o n s t i t u t e a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h e problem of ideol-

ogy, however. It i s more accurate t o c a l l what Bergmann did "word games" than

analysis.

Bergmannys notion of " t r u t h " r e l i e d on t h e formal manipulation of

d e f i n i t i o n s o r word games. Discussing Mannheim he wrote

I f Mannheimls "...
proposition t h a t every r a t i o n a l e i s an ideology i s
i t s e l f objectively t r u e , how can we know of it? I f it i s not, why
should we pay any a t t e n t i o n t o i t ? And what, i n p a r t i c u l a r , i s t h e
value of a s o c i a l science thus construed?"12
 I

It i s a d i s t o r t i o n of Mannheimls case t o reduce it t o t h e maxim t h a t "every

r a t i o n a l e i s an ideology". We already saw t h a t Mannheimls main concern was

with understanding ideas i n t h e i r socio-historic context with t h e a i d of a

r e l a t i o n a l epistemology. Bergmann's misreading of Mannheim r e l a t e d t o h i s

academic, r a t h e r than pragmatic, view of truth. We have now seen i n several

cases how t h i s misreading complements a f a i l u r e t o confront t h e problem of

ideology a s a problem.

Bergmann imposed h i s own concept of " o b j e c t i v i t y " onto Mannheimls

thesis. This was done much l i k e Horowitz imposed h i s view of science onto

Marxls work. Mannheimls point was t h a t t h e t r a d i t i o n a l , platonic13 notion of

t r u t h needed t o be replaced because epistemology i t s e l f had a socio-historic

basis. Mannheim did not succeed i n t h i s t a s k but Bergmann ignored t h e problem.

He u t i l i z e d t h e t r a d i t i o n a l view of o b j e c t i v i t y t o c r i t i c i z e Mannheimls argument

without ever considering t h e c r i t i q u e of t h i s notion of o b j e c t i v i t y t h a t was

implied by Mannheimls argument.

This p r o j e c t i o n by Bergmann exemplified how ideology presently operates

i n t h e s o c i a l sciences. Bergrnannls c r i t i c i s m of Mannheim did not mean t h a t two

c o n t r a s t i n g perspectives were being evaluated. Instead of t h i s , one (Mannheimls)

was being reduced t o another ( ~ e r g m a n n ' s ) . Bergmannls o r i e n t a t i o n was too nar-

row and formal f o r him t o be aware t h a t Mannheim had d e a l t with t h i s very problem,

i. e., t h e problem of perspectives.

Bergmann admitted t h e v a l i d i t y of a s o c i o l o g i c a l treatment of knowledge

only a t one point i n h i s discussion. And again h i s a b s t r a c t commitment t o

" l o g i c a l analysis" helped t o expose t h e contradictions and weaknesses i n h i s

6 method. F i r s t he wrote t h a t It... I believe t h a t t h e r e a r e causes t h a t make some

&
 - 94 -
L

sociological f a c t o r s enter, a s they probably do, ... they a r e l i k e l y not t h e

whole s t o r y ...ltl' Though he wrote t h i s , i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o h i s e a r l i e r

statement t h a t logic "... i s p r i o r t o and independent of ..."sociology i n

analyzing f a c t and value, he did not undertake any serious study of t h e

sociology of knowledge.

Instead of t r y i n g t o c l a r i f y t h e questions implied i n h i s own statements,

Bergmann concluded t h a t " o b j e c t i v i s t s " a r e " n e u t r a l experts and c r i t i c s " , while

" s u b j e c t i v i s t s " have a "desire f o r s o c i a l leadershipV.l5 He did not discuss

what were t h e sociological "causes" of t r u t h . Instead, he implied, without

argumentation, t h a t t h e s o c i a l s t a t u s of so-called o b j e c t i v i s t s allows them t o

see the truth. Without a thorough a n a l y s i s of t h e s o c i a l i z a t i o n of i n t e l l e c t u a l s

within t h e so-called " o b j e c t i v i s t " and " s u b j e c t i v i s t " t r a d i t i o n s , and a considera-

t i o n of t h e usefulness and function of t h e s e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s themselves, no such

conclusion i s j u s t i f i e d . Though Bergmann d i d f i n a l l y admit t h a t t h e sociology of

knowledge i s relevant t o questions of l o g i c , h i s adherence t o a formal theory of

l o g i c made it impossible f o r him t o do t h e necessary follow-up analysis.

Bergmannls commitment t o t h e value-free doctrine was t o t a l . After barely

touching on t h e problem of ideology, a t i t s r o o t s , he s h i f t e d t o a more a b s t r a c t

discussion t o b u i l d new c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s and d e f i n i t i o n s t o shore up h i s case.

Thus t h e terms "philosophical ideologies" and " s c i e n t i f i c ideologies" were added

t o h i s already f a l t e r i n g discussion.

Combining t h e terms "science" and "ideology" contradicted a l l t h a t Bergmann

had argued t o t h i s point. We already saw how Schumpeter's contradictions led him

t o do a s i m i l a r thing. Originally, a s a r e s u l t of t h e assumed s p l i t between " f a c t "

and "value", l o g i c was seen a s fundamental t o ideology. A l l of Bergmann's l a t e r

 I

points depended on t h e v a l i d i t y of t h i s assumption. Yet, a f t e r admittine t h e

relevance of t h e sociology of knowledge, he moved t o a l e v e l of a b s t r a c t i o n

which allowed him t o deal with some of t h e implications of t h e problem of ide-

ology without h a v i n g t o reconsider h i s e a r l i e r points and r e l a t e d b e l i e f s .

Bergmann ended h i s discussion where it should have begun. Discussing

" s c i e n t i f i c ideologies", he admitted t h a t

"... t h e laws proposed and even t h e v a r i a b l e s entering them may well be

0-
determined, a t l e a s t i n p a r t and e i t h e r ~ c o n s c i o u s l yor unconsciously,
by t h e values of t h e author. P r a c t i c a l l y t h i s i s , I believe, one of
t h e most important mechanisms by which s c i e n t i f i c ideologies e s t a b l i s h
themselves a s s o c i a l science, sometimes dangerously and with disastrous
consequences, a s i n t h e case of Marxism, which - l e t us be just -
brought home t o us t h e relevance of t h e economic v a r i a b l e s a s it had
never been brought home t o us before.'116

F i n a l l y , Bergmann admitted t h a t values do e n t e r i n t o statements of f a c t . Finally,

Bergmann reached t h e consciousness with which Schumpeterts inadequate a n a l y s i s

began. Though, l i k e Schwnpeter, he argued t h a t "value judgments a s such a r e not

ideological"'7 and thus t r i e d t o maintain a r i g i d dichotomy between values and

f a c t s , h i s own notion of " s c i e n t i f i c ideologies" showed t h a t t h i s dichotomy was

untenable. H i s c r e a t i o n of t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , a s with Horowitz's use of t h e

same terms, r e f l e c t e d h i s recognition of t h e problem of ideology and h i s r e f u s a l

t o consider t h e implications of i 6 f o r h i s own formal logic.

Logic a s Ideology

How a r e we t o understand Bergmannls contradictory handling of t h e r e l a t i o n

of l o g i c and ideology? For one thing, it shows how t h e academic use of language

can cloak over a self-contradictory position. It a l s o shows how language has t o

deal with an i n t e l l e c t u a l problem i n an inclusive manner, a t a l l relevant l e v e l s ,

i f it i s t o c l a r i f y t h e problem f o r us. Over-specialization i n academia operates

 ,

against such uses of language and a c t u a l l y helps maintain an ignorance about

t h e problem of ideology.

A philosopher with so-called o b j e c t i v i s t assumptions has much t o reconsider

when he or she comes face t o face with t h e problem of ideology. Bergmann's paper

shows t h e d i r e consequences of t h e over-specialized "knowledge" and languages

t h a t function within t h e ivory towers of t h i s society. With a fragmentation of

knowledge, which i t s e l f has r o o t s i n a s o c i e t y t h a t fragments people, comes t h e

fragmentation of thought. Problems t h a t a r e o f t e n shown t o be pseudo-problems

when a more inclusive and integrated perspective i s used g e t "conceptualized" i n

a narrow way when s p e c i a l i z a t i o n dominates. What passes a s conceptualization

often proves t o be a play on a b s t r a c t d e f i n i t i o n s .

Bergmann's ideas about logic, ideology and t h e h i s t o r y of philosophy were

I n t e r r e l a t e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r manner. When h i s own discussion tended t o undermine

h i s own assumptions, new, a b s t r a c t categories were invented. The contradictions

were t h u s cloaked over. Bergmannls own commitments were r e l a t e d t o t h i s i n f l e x i -

bility. Early i n h i s paper he wrote

"Wherever ( a philosopher) s t a r t s ,
few fundamental questions which,
stand* though not necessarily t o
n o t h i m has changed and n o t h i m ,
he w i l l... soon a r r i v e a t those r a t h e r
once firmly grasped, help us t o under-
answer, a l l others. I n t h i s respect
I hope, ever w i l l (my emphasis)."18

Then, near t h e end of t h e paper, he wrote "I would say then, t h a t by t h e standards

of c l a s s i c a l nineteenth-century l i b e r a l i s m , which, freed from some h i s t o r i c a l dross,

happen t o be my own, t h e idea of an ideology-free s o c i e t y is a consummation devoutly

t o be desired, i f f o r no other reason than t h a t humanity, t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e , and t h e

courage it takes t o bear l i f e without t h e support of ideological i l l u s i o n . t t 19

Together these statements show t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s between Bergmannls view

of l o g i c and h i s a n ideological orientation. He implied t h a t philosophers deal

 I

with unchanging questions and t h a t l i b e r a l i s m seeks an end-of-ideology. He a l s o

believed t h a t h i s l o g i c was unchangine; (e.g., t r a n s - h i s t o r i c a l ) and t h a t h i s

l i b e r a l values were factual. When he ended h i s paper by saing t h a t "...we may

increase our chances ( o f an ideology-free s o c i e t y ) i f we can l e a r n t o stand by

our values without clutching t o an ideology."20 t h i s o r i e n t a t i o n was c a r r i e d t o

i t s l o g i c a l absurdity. a act" and "value" were s t i l l s p l i t ; and t o suggest t h a t

h i s own l i b e r a l values were not r e l a t e d t o any ideology, he a l s o kept "values"

and "ideology" separated. This a r b i t r a r y manipulation of words has nothing what-

soever i n common with analysis.

The way Bergrnannls formal logic and l i b e r a l values i n t e r r e l a t e i s t h e core

of t h e ideology t h a t dominates science i n t h i s society. This i n t r i c a t e system of

ideas i s what I have c a l l e d scientism. The f a c t t h a t a n end-of-ideology r h e t o r i c

and formal, contradictory manipulations of d e f i n i t i o n s a r e used t o cloak t h e ide-

ology of scientism does not confirm t h e value-free doctrine. Rather than t h i s , it

makes scientism a n example of a very crude and i n a r t i c u l a t e d ideology.

When Bergmann spoke of freeing l i b e r a l values from "some h i s t o r i c a l drosst1

he showed t h e c r u d i t y of t h i s academic manipulation of language. There a r e no

" l i b e r a l values" i n a b s t r a c t from t h e function of them within a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l

system a t any p a r t i c u l a r time.21 Treating ideas i n t h i s manner i s i t s e l f a r e s u l t

of t h e way i n which "mental production" i s s o c i a l l y organized. Bergmannls approach

i s exceptionally c l o s e t o t h e model t h a t Marx and Engels developed t o c h a r a c t e r i z e

t h e c r e a t i o n of ideology. He wanted t o give " l i b e r a l values" a p u r i t y , untainted by

historical realities. He wanted t o t r e a t h i s values a s absolutes and t o analyze

those of others a s ideologies. H i 5 l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s of ideology turned out t o be an

expression of logic as ideology.

 I

My criticism of Bergmann leads me t o make t w o added points t h a t a r e basic:

t o t h i s study. One& about t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between specialized types and forms

of knowledge and an inadequate handling of t h e problem of ideology. Could it be

t h a t our methods of r e c r u i t i n g and t r a i n i n g professional academics and s c i e n t i s t s

no longer serve, but i n f a c t r e t a r d , t h e growth of relevant knowledge? This leads

me t o ask how we should determine what forms and types of knowledge a r e relevant. 22

The l a t t e r point, which I w i l l discuss when I analyze S a r t r e l s approach t o ideology,

i s about t h e c e n t r a l i t y of choice or of i n t e l l e c t u a l judgment t o a l l science. I

have already touched on t h i s in my discussion of Mannheim. We choose assumptions

according t o t h e i r value i n dealing with c e r t a i n i n t e l l e c t u a l problems. The c l a s s

of problems with which we a r e dealing w i l l a f f e c t what these assumptions w i l l be.

I f we a r e unable t o see t h e r o l e of choice and judgment i n science, i f we a r e t i e d

t o a n orthodoxy, inquiry w i l l be retarded. Since what I have c a l l e d "word games"

a r e widespread where t h e r e i s verbal i n t e l l i g e n c e without a s e l f - c r i t i c a l perspec-

t i v e , r e a l inquiry i s often non-existent i n academia. The value-free doctrine, i n

a l l i t s v a r i a t i o n s , undercuts t h e a b i l i t y t o make i n t e l l e c t u a l judgments because it

d i s t o r t s our understanding of t h e d i a l e c t i c s of human knowledge. I w i l l now expand

on t h i s point by discussing t h e problem of ideology i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e n a t u r a l

sciences.

Footnotes

l ~ u s t a vB e r m n n : Ideology, i n May Brodbeck (ed. 1: Readinm i n t h e Philosophy of

t h e Social Sciences. New York, Macmillan (1968), pp. 123-38.

2 ~ b i d . , p. 124.

j ~ b i d . , p. 125.

lL1bid., p. 129.
' l ~ h e tendency t o reduce " l o g i c N t o t h e question of i n t e r n a l consistency i s
c r i t i c i z e d i n Chapter Sixteen.

12Bergmann, op. c i t . , p. 132.

13~oulminhas argued t h a t contemporary examples of platonic or " p l a t o n i s t " views

of t r u t h a r e those which attempt t o 'I., . employ mathematic models i n a l l specula-
tions ... " and which a t t r i b u t e an independent existence t o such "mathematical

e n t i t i e s " , much a s Plato did t o h i s "forms". Stephen Toulmin: The Uses of

Argument. Cambridge University Press ( 19641, p. 182.

"Bergmann, op. c i t . , p. 133.

2 1 ~w i l l d e a l with t h i s question i n d e t a i l i n Chapter Ten.

220ne approach t o t h i s question i s suggested by t h e following statement: "...

human cravings a r e not only inescapable p a r t s of t h e datum with which s o c i a l science
works, but ... they d i c t a t e t h e d i r e c t i o n of emphasis of s o c i a l science a s man's
working t o o l f o r continually rebuilding h i s cultwle." Robert S. Lynd: Knowled~te
For What? Princeton University Press ( 1 9 3 9 ) ~ p. 200.
 ,
Chapter Six

Ideology and t h e Natural Sciences: Kuhn

To t h i s point i n my analysis, I have argued t w o things. F i r s t , I have

t r i e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t ideology c o n s t i t u t e s a fundamental problem f o r the s o c i a l

sciences. Second, I have c r i t i c i z e d a l l approaches t o t h e question of ideology

t h a t f a i l t o t r e a t it a s such. I have argued t h a t regardless of t h e sophistica-

t i o n with which these l a t t e r approaches a r e presented any approach t h a t tends t o

o r does a b s t r a c t "methods" , "rules", "logic" - however "science" i s characterized

- f a i l s t o recognize important relationships between t h e function of science, t h e

c l a s s of problems with which it deals, and t h e s o c i a l and human consequences t h a t

result.

Much o f t h i s inadequate thinking o r what I have called "scientism" r e s u l t s

from a stereotyped extrapolation of natural science rationales. To deal with t h e

f a l s e handling o f t h e problem o f ideology it i s therefore necessary t o discuss

issues i n t h e natural sciences a t some length. A recent and widely discussed book

by Kuhn1 provides us with a useful perspective f o r t h i s task. We s h a l l see, as we

proceed, t h a t once natural science i s de-mystif ied, r i t i s easier t o grasp the i m -

plications of t h e problem of ideology f o r our understanding of s o c i a l science.

Thomas Kuhn only used t h e term "ideology" twice i n h i s study. Referring

t o t h e widespread b e l i e f t h a t s o c i a l sciences have f a i l e d t o progress a s much a s

natural sciences, he asked "what changes i n technique o r rnethod o r ideology would

enable it ( a s o c i a l science d i s c i p l i n e ) t o do so?"2 It i s significant t h a t t h i s

question occurred i n the concluding chapter of t h i s h i s t o r i c a l study of natural

 I

science. Because of t h i s , no r e a l evaluation of t h e problem of ideology i n

t h e n a t u r a l sciences was possible f o r Kuhn. It i s c l e a r , however, t h a t Kuhn

saw a function f o r ideology i n science. Early i n h i s study, he wrote t h a t

he depreciation of h i s t o r i c a l f a c t i s deeply, and probably functionally,

ingrained i n t h e Ideology of t h e s c i e n t i f i c profession ..."3 To evaluate t h i s

proposition, we need t o t r a c e through Kuhnls a n a l y s i s of "paradigms", h i s d i s -

cussion of epistemology, and h i s ideas about education i n t h e n a t u r a l sciences

On t h e basis of t h i s , I w i l l indicate why and how t h e sociology of knowledge i s

relevant t o t h e n a t u r a l sciences. Furthermore, by discussing Kuhn's f a i l u r e t o

see t h i s relevance, I w i l l show how t h e problem of ideology i s c e n t r a l t o

f i e l d s of knowledge.

The Mystification of S c i e n t i f i c Rules

Kuhn's main point was t h a t "paradigms" a r e more fundamental t o n a t u r a l

science than s p e c i f i c s c i e n t i f i c r u l e s or methods. A paradigm i s a "... strong

network of commitments - conceptual, t h e o r e t i c a l , instrumental and methodological

.. .l14 I n many places, Kuhn used t h e term interchangeably with "world view". This

network of commitments i s more important t o t h e workings of science than any ab-

s t r a c t i o n s of t h e kind Schumpeter made about " s c i e n t i f i c method". "A paradigm i s

a c r i t e r i a f o r choosing problems ... "5 and, according t o Kuhn, "... t h e reception

of a new problem o f t e n n e c e s s i t a t e s a r e d e f i n i t i o n of t h e corresponding sclencel'6

including i t s methods.

S c i e n t i f i c "rules" a r e often non-existent i n t h e sense t h a t philosophers

of science o f t e n r e f e r t o them. When research i n a c l a s s of problems i s progres-

sing "normally", r a t h e r than paradigms themselves being debated, " r u l e s " a r e often

not even a r t i c u l a t e d . A s Kuhn wrote

 1

"one i s a t l i b e r t y t o suppose t h a t somewhere along t h e way t h e s c i e n t i s t

has i n t u i t i v e l y abstracted r u l e s of t h e game f o r himself, but t h e r e i s
l i t t l e reason t o believe it. Though many s c i e n t i s t s t a l k e a s i l y and
well about t h e p a r t i c u l a r individual hypotheses t h a t underlie a concrete
piece of current research, they a r e l i t t l e b e t t e r than laymen a t charac-
t e r i z i n g t h e established bases of t h e i r f i e l d , i t s legitimate problems
and methods. I f they have learned such a b s t r a c t i o n s a t a l l , they show
it mainly through t h e i r a b i l i t y t o do successful research."7

These "rules" a r e o f t e n mystified a s though a researcher deduced or in-

duced a l l h i s i n s i g h t s according t o them. Rather than t h i s occurring, Kuhn

argued t h a t

"Normal science i s a highly determined a c t i v i t y , but it need not be

e n t i r e l y determined by rules. That i s why, a t t h e s t a r t of t h i s essay,
I introduced shared paradigms r a t h e r than shared r u l e s , assumptions and
points of view a s t h e source of coherence f o r normal research t r a d i t i o n s .
Rules, I suggest, derive from paradigms, but paradigms can guide research
even i n t h e absence of rules. "8

Kuhn went f u r t h e r than t h i s and argued t h a t methodological debates a r e not about

t h e adequacy of "rules" per s e but r e f l e c t a n underlying debate about t h e r e l e -

vance of paradigms.

"Normal science can proceed without r u l e s only so long a s t h e relevant

s c i e n t i f i c community accepts without question t h e p a r t i c u l a r problem-
s o l u t i o n s already achieved. Rules should t h e r e f o r e become important
and t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c unconcern about 'them should vanish whenever
paradigms or models a r e f e l t t o be insecure.'9

A t present, when debates about methods i n t h e s o c i a l sciences a r e increasing, we

should be deciding what underlying paradigms, or pre-paradigm hypotheses, a r e i n

conflict. A h i s t o r i c a l study of t h e s o c i a l sciences, not t h e t y p i c a l technique-

oriented debate, i s what w i l l provide us with t h i s understanding.

Rather than speaking of " t h e s c i e n t i f i c method", Kuhn talked of "... t h e

r u l e s of t h e game. "lo H i s view of methods i n science s t r e s s e d t h e commitments of

t h e s c i e n t i s t s who work within a paradigm of problems. According t o Kuhn, t h e s e

a r e usually p r a c t i c a l commitments "... t o preferred types of i n ~ t r u m e n t a l i t ~ " ~ ~

and, according t o him, It... t h e endurance of instrumental commitments ... a s much

a s laws and theory, provide s c i e n t i s t s k i t h the r u l e s of the game."12

I f r u l e s a r e not seen i n t h i s pragmatic way, then " t h e s c i e n t i f i c method"

comes t o be t r e a t e d metaphysically, The r u l e s , i f abstracted from t h e i r use,

come t o be seen a s i n t r i n s i c a l l y t r u e or false. Much f a l s e debate r e s u l t s from

t h i s error. Much "philosophy of science" i s rooted i n t h i s error. A l s o , when

r u l e s a r e t r e a t e d i n t h i s abstracted way, it i s easy t o ignore t h e r u l e of what

Kuhn called "quasi-metaphysical commitments1', or what I might c a l l ideological

commitments, among natural s c i e n t i s t s .

Ignorance about these p r a c t i c a l and ideological commitments of s c i e n t i s t s

complements t h e metaphysical treatment of s c i e n t i f i c "rules". They a r e then

thought of a s Rules, unrelated t o a s c i e n t i f i c paradigm and t h e instrtgnents t h a t

a r e relevant t o problems t h a t have grown out of it. This error occurs because

philosophers of science and those who extrapolate "rulest' from other f i e l d s of

study often t r y t o r a t i o n a l i z e our understanding of research methods when no such

r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n i s possible. A s Kuhn wrote: A group o f s c i e n t i s t s 'I. .. can ...

agree i n t h e i r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a paradigm without agreeing on, o r even attempting

t o produce, a f u l l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of it." He continued t h a t t h e

"... lack of a standard i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r o f an agreed reduction t o r u l e s w i l l not

prevent a paradigm from guiding research. "'3

Rules, therefore, cannot be understood i n a b s t r a c t from a specific paradigm.

If and when they a r e a r t i c u l a t e d , they serve a function within the network of com-

mitments and problems t h a t constitute a paradigm. And it i s not necessarily a

progressive function. For example, Kuhn s t a t e d t h a t h here must a l s o be r u l e s

t h a t l i m i t both t h e nature of acceptable solutions and the steps by which they a r e

t o be obtained."14 I n view of t h i s , it i s possible f o r "rules" t o keep a f i e l d of

study from expanding i n t o new problem areas. If and when new problems a r e raised,
 ,
and i f t h e paradigm of commitments cannot be made relevant t o them, what Kuhn

c a l l e d a " c r i s i s " occurs. Such a c r i s i s demands "...t h e blurring o f a para-

digm and t h e consequent loosening of t h e r u l e s f o r normal research."l5 What

has come t o be t r e a t e d a s normal research within a paradigm therefore "...

often suppresses fundamental novelties because they a r e necessarily subversive

o f i t s basic commitments. "I6

Rules can, therefore, function t o j u s t i f y an orthodoxy t h a t i s r e s i s t i n g

a needed r e d e f i n i t i o n o f problems i n a f i e l d o f study. The "subversive" r o l e

of "fundamental novelties" e x i s t s i n natural science a s i n a l l areas of know-

ledge. A n emphasis on "rules" i s a major way t h a t an ensuing c r i s i s i n a

s c i e n t i f i c paradigm i s ignored.

Kuhn argued t h a t t h e "... p r o l i f e r a t i o n of versions of a theory is a

very symptom of c r i s i s . " l 7 Rather than allowing schisms t o develop among d i f -

f e r e n t t h e o r e t i c a l orientations i n t h e s o c i a l sciences, it i s more v i t a l t o

understand why and how t h e v a r i a t i o n of ideas r e f l e c t s a more basic c r i s i s i n

a paradigm. If K u h n l s analysis o f paradigms and r u l e s applies t o t h e s o c i a l

sciences, then "methodological hobby-horsing"18 w i l l not get t o t h e r o o t of t h e

matter.

Kuhnls main point was about "... t h e insufficiency of methodological

directives, by themselves, t o d i c t a t e a unique substantive conclusion t o many

s o r t s of s c i e n t i f i c questions. "I9 This analysis shows the necessity t o see how

a network of commitments t o a c l a s s of problems and r e l a t e d methods undergoes

change a s new problems become relevant. And it i s necessary t o understand why

new problems become relevant. S h i f t s and c c n f l i c t s within i n s t i t u t i o n s would be

one thing t o study. The important point f o r our discussion of ideology i s t h a t a s

problems change, commitments change. O r , it i s possible t h a t a s commitments (e.g.,

values) change, problems change. The ordering of the change i s not t h e relevant

issue here. What i s important i s the conclusion t h a t no " s c i e n t i f i c model" ex-

i s t s i n any s t a t i c way.

The Need f o r Epistemological Reform

Though t h e implications o f Kuhnts perspective on r u l e s a r e revolutionary,

he f a i l e d t o fundamentally question the t r a d i t i o n a l epistemology which complements

t h e r e i f i e d view o f " s c i e n t i f i c method". A fundamental revision of epistemology

would bring t h e idea of t r u t h into t h e realm of experience, acknowledging t h a t

humans can choose t h e values - with values seen both a s commitments t o , and a s

t h e consequences o f , doing things i n c e r t a i n ways - f o r which they want t h e i r

knowledge created.

Though h i s concept of epistemology remained narrow, Kuhn did recognize t h e

need f o r a change. He wrote t h a t "None of these crisis-promoting subjects has yet

produced a viable a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e t r a d i t i o n a l epistemological paradigm, but

they do begin t o suggest what some o f t h e paradigmts c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w i l l be."20

Furthermore, he asked:

"Are t h e o r i e s simply man-made i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of given data? The episte-

mological viewpoint t h a t has most often guided Western philosophy f o r
t h r e e centuries d i c t a t e s an immediate and unequivocal, Yes! I n t h e
absence of a-developed a l t e r n a t i v e , I f i n d it impossible t o relinquish
e n t i r e l y t h a t viewpoint. Yet it no longer functions effectively, and
t h e attempts t o make it do so through t h e introduction of a neutral
language of observations now seem t o me hopeless."21

Kuhn c l e a r l y rejected t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a "neutral language" o r value-free

logic. Our discussion of Bergmann already showed t h e s u p e r f i c i a l i t y of t h i s view

of logic. Even with t h i s insight, Kuhn did not develop a r e a l a l t e r n a t i v e ; a l -

though some of h i s ideas did pave t h e way f o r t h i s . For example, Kuhn showed t h a t
 I

paradi~rnsserve a p r a m a t i c f ~ m c t i o nf e r research, r a t h e r than being t r u e o r

f a l s e p e r se. I n h i s words

" ~ i t h o u tcommitment t o a paradigm t h e r e could be no normal science.

Furthermore, t h a t commitment must extend t o areas and t o degrees of
precision f o r which t h e r e is no f u l l precedent."22

And Kuhn c o r r e c t l y called t h i s a tautolo~zicalfunction. Once t h e commitments

t o a paradigm a r e made, then c e r t a i n problems, methods and theories have mean-

ing t o a s c i e n t i s t . The language of a paradigm gives a focus t o research, and,

a s such, has a s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g function.

I n themselves, tautologies do not present a problem f o r science. It is

when a paradigm comes into question and t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of problems, methods

and t h e o r i e s can be seen, t h a t t h i s problem a r i s e s . As Kuhn said " ~ r o mwithin

a new theory of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge, they (anomalies) may instead seem very

much l i k e tautologies, statements of s i t u a t i o n s t h a t could not conceivably have

been otherwise."23 Only when t h e r e i s a search f o r absolute knowledge do tau-

tologies become a problemper se. Only i f t h e f'undamental r o l e of paradigms t o

science i s ignored and some abstract idea o f t r u t h i s accepted, do tautologies

appear problematic.

These i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of problem, method and theory form the "logic" of a

paradigm. Speaking of those It.. . committed t o Newton's theory ...'I, Kuhn remark-

ed t h a t t h e "... second law o f motion ... behaves ... very much l i k e a purely
l o g i c a l statement t h a t no amount of observations could refute. "24 his i s an

example of how a paradlgm - including s p e c i f i c r e s u l t s and general hypotheses -

forms a worldview with i t s own logic. And, more important, t h i s shows why

s c i e n t i s t s cannot r e l y on formal logic a s the f i n a l a r b i t e r of truth.

Only those who a r e looking f o r "a

logic'' f a i l t o recognize how the
 I

p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of a c l a s s of problems, methods and t h e o r i e s con-

s t i t u t e "2 logic". They use 2 logic t h a t i s i n t e r r e l a t e d with a s e t of f a c t s

and theory t o v a l i d a t e t h a t very s e t of f a c t s and theory. This i s understand-

a b l e since t h e person i s f ; h i n k i w within t h e paradigm, but t h a t does not mean

t h a t t h e logic of t h e paradigm can be used t o prove t h a t t h e f a c t s or theory

a r e t r u e i n some metaphysical way. This f a l s e conclusion is rooted i n an

academic approach t o epistemology. Looking f o r t r u t h i n n w r a l and i n theoyy,

r a t h e r than seeing t h a t t h e so-called "rules" function a s a p a r t of "the game",

many academics t r y t o anchor t h e i r knowledge on a system t h a t i s i t s e l f a rep-

r e s e n t a t i o n of t h a t knowledge. This i s how formal logic functions tautologi-

c a l l y and, a s we saw i n Chapter Five, ideologically. F a i l i n g t o see t h a t f a c t s

and theory a r e a p a r t of a paradigm and of an ideology, these academics g e t

caught i n endless diiemmas.

Kuhnis t h e s i s implied a c r i t i c i s m of notions of t r a d i t i o n a l epistemology.

For example, he 'wrote t h a t t h e 'I.. . d i s t i n c t i o n between discovery and invention

o r between f a c t and theory w i l l , however, immediately prove t o be exceedingly

artificial. lt25 K u h n questioned t h e common s p l i t between f a c t s a s discovere4 and

theory a s invented because it assumes t h a t t h e r e can be n e u t r a l ( i . e . , non-para-

digrn) observations of "nature" or " r e a l i t y " . This was t h e main assumption t h a t

Kuhn's study rejected.

Rejection of t h i s dichotomy demands a new concept of " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n "

t h a t i s not rooted i n t r a d i t i o n a l epistemology. Once t h e primacy of paradigms

i s acknowledged, it i s not possible t o t a l k of a sub,iective person observing an

objective r e a l i t y , with " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " a s t h e link. Referring t o t h e way t h a t

new paradigms, with new commitments, a r e developed, Kuhn wrote "NO ordinary sense
 I

of t h e term s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s f i t s these flashes of I n t u i t i o n through which a

new paradigm i s born."26 S c i e n t i f i c interpretations a r e c l e a r l y not r a t i o n a l ,

l o g i c a l deductions made according t o some trans-social c r i t e r i a , though many

think of science i n t h i s way.

A change i s a l s o required i n our notion o f "verification". About t h i s

Kuhn wrote "Verification is l i k e natural selection; it picks out t h e most viable

among t h e a c t u a l a l t e r n a t i v e s i n a p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n ( my emphasis 1. 27

Viable i n terms of what? Viable i n terms of t h e commitments of a s c i e n t i s t t o

a paradigm? It i s important t o note t h a t t h e " p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n " ,

e.g., t h e way science functions within a society, w i l l a f f e c t t h e method of veri-

f i c a t i o n and interpretation. Here we see where Kuhn's thought begins t o overlap

with t h e sociology of knowledge.

Verification and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a r e not made on t h e basis of a b s t r a c t

principles. They stem f r o m t h e operations used by a s c i e n t i s t within a particu-

l a r h i s t o r i c a l situation. Kuhn suggested t h a t "perhaps immediate experience

should be s e t a s i d e a s f l u i d , and we should discuss instead t h e concrete opera-

t i o n s and measurements t h a t t h e s c i e n t i s t performs i n t h e l a b ~ r a t o r y . " ~This

~

would require a n analysis of t h e research techniques i n use, which means much

more than a description of them. The s o c i a l function of science a t a p a r t i c u l a r

time w i l l enhance t h e development of some techniques over others. Another way of

s t a t i n g t h i s i s t h a t the "aims of science", rooted i n t h e organization of science,

a f f e c t t h e methods o r t o o l s of verification. '

This means t h a t technology and i t s uses need t o be included i n any com-

prehensive study of epistemology. And t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of science and tech-

nology were mentioned by Kuhn. He wrote t h a t "Because the c r a f t s a r e one r e a d i l y

 I

accessible source of f a c t s t h a t could not have been casually discovered,

technology has often played a v i t a l r o l e i n the emergence of new sciences."29

Later i n h i s book he made t h i s point:

"AS i n manufacture so i n science -

retooling i s an extravagance t o
be reserved f o r t h e occasion t h a t demands it. The significance of
c r i s e s i s t h e indication they provide t h a t an occasion f o r retool-
ing has arrived. "3'

This i s more than an analogy. Technology and i t s uses shape t h e

function o f science and t h e c l a s s o f problems with which it deals. And since

t h e uses of technology r e l a t e t o t h e system of p o l i t i c a l and economic power,

t h e system of power i n society can a f f e c t t h e very core of t h e s c i e n t i f i c

method. I f t h e r e i s no a b s t r a c t method of v e r i f i c a t i o n , i f v e r i f i c a t i o n comes

from a s e t of operations, and i f these operations r e l a t e t o the dominant uses

of technology, then a l l abstracted notions of s c i e n t i f i c method must be r e j e c t -

ed. I n Kuhnrs study t h e de-mystification of scientism was t o t a l .

Kuhn exposed concretely and h i s t o r i c a l l y t h e r h e t o r i c t h a t often passes

i n academia a s "philosophy of science". The implications of h i s insights a r e

threefold. F i r s t , we can conclude t h a t t h e scientism of today not only lacks

understanding of t h e process by which science develops, but impedes t h i s .

Scientism impedes t h e development of knowledge about how problems, methods and

theories i n t e r r e l a t e within a paradigm. It r e t a r d s t h e development of a h i s t o r -

i c a l and s e l f - c r i t i c a l consciousness about science. Kuhn saw t h a t t h e superfi-

c i a l , p o s i t i v i s t i c orientation t o science l i m i t s t h e consciousness of s c i e n t i s t s .

He wrote "1f p o s i t i v i s t i c r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e range o f a theory's legitimate

a p p l i c a b i l i t y a r e taken l i t e r a l l y , the mechanisms t h a t t e l l the s c i e n t i f i c com-

munity what problems may lead t o fundamental change must cease t o f ~ n c t i o n . " 3 ~

It follows f r o m t h i s t h a t s c i e n t i s t s have t o be conscious of the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s

 ,
and t h e logic of the paradigm wlthlra which they work; f u l l y aware t h a t pin?

beyond t i d y t h e o r e t i c a l positions sometimes becomes basic t o s c i e n t i f i c pro-

gress.

Secondly, we can conclude t h a t a l l notions of "ob jectlvityfl t h a t r e s u l t

f r o m scientism need t o be rejected. Kuhn saw t h i s when he s t a t e d t h a t we need

IT... an inversion of our normal view o f t h e r e l a t i o n s between s c i e n t i f i c

a c t i v i t y and t h e community t h a t practices it. We must learn t o recognize
a s causes what have ordinarily been taken t o be effects. I f we can do
t h a t , t h e phrases ' s c i e n t i f i c progress 1 and even Iscientif i c o b j e c t i v i t y 1
may come t o seem i n part redundant. "32

This inversion follows from Kuhnls h i s t o r i c a l paradigm analysis of natural

science. Once t h e logic of a paradigm i s recognized a s being primary t o any

specif i c method o r r u l e , t h e meaning of "objectivet' can only be seen in terms

of t h e e f f e c t s produced by c e r t a i n operations. Once science i s understood a s

paradigm development and paradigm change, t h e r e is no place f o r t h e notion of

"objective causes" p e r se. Objective r e s u l t s a r e always dependent w o n c e r t a i n

operations and t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t i s r e l a t e d t o them with a p a r t i c u l a r

paradigm. And, a s we argued above, these operations and paradigms develop with-

i n a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l context. It i s worth noting the s i m i l a r i t y

between Mannheim's r e l a t i o n a l epistemology and Kuhnls paradigm view of science.

Both emphasize the need t o see f a c t s and theories i n terms of o r i n r e l a t i o n t o

t h e l a r g e r world-view of t h e person.

The Character o f Scient i s t i c Education

A t h i r d point follows from Kuhnls analysis. We c l e a r l y need t o ask

questions about the education approaches t h a t reinforce the f a l l a c i e s of

scientism, and t o consider approaches t h a t could provide a more accurate and

and s e l f - c r i t i c a l perspective of science. Kuhn had a c l u e when he wrote

that

"... t h e view of science-as-cumulation i s entangled with a dominant

epistemology t h a t takes knowledge t o be a construction placed d i -
r e c t l y upon raw sense data by t h e mind. (There i s ) ...
strong
support provided f o r t h e same historiographic schema by t h e
techniques of e f f e c t i v e science pedagogy."33

A f a l s e epistemology i s taught i n science courses and t h i s underlies and

shores up t h e scientism of today. This point deserves s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n .

Once scientism i s exposed and t h e way i s cleared t o deal d i r e c t l y with t h e

problem of ideology, t h e need f o r a c r i t i c a l study of educational approaches

becomes more apparent. It i s i n t h e dominant "education" t h a t t h e r h e t o r i c of

sc i e n t i s m i s taught.

Kuhn saw both t h e form and t h e content of science textbooks a s being

responsible f o r t h i s scientism. On t h e f i r s t page of h i s study, he r e f e r r e d

to "... t h e u n h i s t o r i c a l stereotype ( of science ) drawn from science texts. "

He explained t h i s f u r t h e r by writing t h a t

hose t e x t s have, f o r example o f t e n seemed t o imply t h a t t h e content

of science i s uniquely exemplified by t h e observations, laws, and
t h e o r i e s described i n t h e i r pages. Almost a s regularly, t h e same
books have been read a s saying t h a t s c i e n t i f i c methods a r e simply
t h e ones i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e manipulative techniques used i n gathering
textbook data, together with t h e l o g i c a l operations employed when re-
la6ing those data t o t h e textbook's t h e o r e t i c a l generalizations. The
r e s u l t has been a concept of science with profound implications about
i t s nature and d e ~ e l o p m e n t . " 3 ~

Later i n h i s study he reaffirmed t h i s : "More than any o t h e r s i n g l e aspect of

science, t h a t pedagogic form ( t h e textbook) has determined our image of t h e

nature of science and of t h e r o l e of discovery and invention i n i t s advance."35

The u n h i s t o r i c a l character of science textbooks gives t h e student a f a l s e

view of science. The r o l e of paradigms and paradigm change i s not understood

when it i s believed t h a t 'I... science has reached i t s present s t a t e by a

s e r i e s of individual discoveries and inventions t h a t , when gathered t o -

gether, c o n s t i t u t e the modern body of technical knowledge."36 Therefore,

Kuhn concluded t h a t "~extbooksthus begin by truncating the s c i e n t i s t ' s

sense of h i s d i s c i p l i n e ' s h i s t o r y and then proceed t o supply a s u b s t i t u t e

f o r what they have eliminated.'137 Scientism r e s u l t s not only from an igno-

rance of t h e problem of ideology but from an ignorance of t h e h i s t o r y of

science i t s e l f .

S c i e n t i s t s a r e trained t o think i n a r e s t r i c t e d manner by t h i s un-

h i s t o r i c a l education. Kuhn went a s f a r a s t o say "Of course, it i s a narrow

and r i g i d education, probably more so than any other except perhaps i n ortho-

dox theology.t138 But, according t o him, t h i s "narrow and rigid" t r a i n i n g o f

professional s c i e n t i s t s had a paradoxical function. On t h e one hand, hat

element of a r b i t r a r i n e s s does not ... indicate t h a t any s c i e n t i f i c group could

p r a c t i c e i t s t r a d e without some s e t of received beliefs. "39 On t h e other hand,

"That prof essionalization leads ... t o a n immense r e s t r i c t i o n of the s c i e n t i s t s

v i s i o n and t o a considerable resistance t o paradigm change. 11 40

Kuhn is ambiguous about t h e e f f e c t s of t h i s narrow and r i g i d education.

I am not. It i s a r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n f o r ignorance t o argue t h a t s c i e n t i s t s must

have narrow b e l i e f s t o do research work. And t h i s argument f a i l s t o consider

t h e e f f e c t s o f such research-through-ignorance. Kuhn s t a t e d "Because he t h e r e

joins men who learned t h e bases of t h e i r f i e l d from t h e same concrete models,

h i s subsequent practice w i l l seldom evoke overt disagreement about fundamen-

t a l s . "41 Not aware of t h e fundamental issues, t h e s c i e n t i s t s cannot be aware

of t h e way t h e c l a s s of problems with which they deal r e l a t e t o t h e function

and consequences of science f o r t h e people of a society o r beyond. A scien-

t i s t i c education thus t r a i n s irresponsibility. 42

I f education functions t o consolidate b e l i e f s f o r a group of s c i e n t i s t s

it w i l l not make them aware of t h e paradigm within which they think and i n terms

of what they do research. This i s a main reason why specialized s c i e n t i s t s re-

main ignorant of t h e problem of ideology. Their "education" t o a paradigm gives

them a tautological, not a c r i t i c a l , mentality. They do not s c r u t i n i z e t h e as-

sumptions and b e l i e f s t h a t a r e i n t e r r e l a t e d with t h e i r s c i e n t i f i c work. Most

of a l l they do not consider t h e e f f e c t s of t h e i r research.

Though Kuhn recognized t h i s detrimental function of a r i g i d science edu-

cation, he did not consider t h e possible a l t e r n a t i v e s t o present education nor

what t h e consequences of such a l t e r n a t i v e s might be. Even though h i s paradigm

analysis i s a v i t a l contribution t o t h e c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the problem of ideology

he did not consider t h e implications of t h i s f o r education i n t h e sciences.

The Rationalization of Sc ientism

Some of Kuhnls statements show a tendency t o mystify science, though h i s

general analysis i s i n opposition t o t h i s tendency. Referring t o t h e s p e c i a l i -

zation of t h e sciences, Kuhn wrote " ~ l t h o u g hit has become customary, and i s

surely proper, t o deplore t h e widening gulf t h a t separates the professional

s c i e n t i s t from h i s colleagues i n other f i e l d s , t o o l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n i s paid t o

t h e e s s e n t i a l relationship between t h a t gulf and t h e mechanisms i n t r i n s i c t o

s c i e n t i f i c advance. "lC3 We should be wary o f t h e phrase "mechanisms i n t r i n s i c t o

s c i e n t i f i c advance". Kuhn was probably r e f e r r i n g t o t h e way anomalies i n a para-

digm lead t o a c r i s i s and a change i n paradigms, but abstracting t h i s cr~ncrete

h i s t o r i c a l process i n t o "intrinsic, mechanisms" t o n e a s i l y leads back t o a

s c i e n t i s t i c ideology. It can lead t o academic studles i n t o t h e nature of

these " i n t r i n s i c mechanisms". There a r e n l t any such mechanisms nor a r e t h e r e

" e s s e n t i a l relationships". A h i s t o r i c a l analysis of science of t h e kind Kuhn

undertook has i t s value because it forces us t o think of science without these

metaphysically-toned terms.

Kuhnls view of knowledge tended t o s t a y academic. This was shown by

h i s statement t h a t "BY ensuring t h a t t h e paradigm w i l l not be t o o e a s i l y sur-

rendered, r e s i s t a n c e guarantees t h a t s c i e n t i s t s w i l l not be l i g h t l y d i s t r a c t e d

and t h a t t h e anomalies t h a t lead t o paradigm change w i l l penetrate existing

knowledge t o t h e core."44 Here Kuhn was s t r e s s i n g how t h e narrow and r i g i d

education, which underlies scientism, can a i d t h e development of knowledge.

He believed t h a t ignorance can function t o conserve knowledge, although he would

not have put it i n these terms. Surely t h e r e i s a way t o r e s i s t changing a para-

digm when i t s s c i e n t i f i c value s t i l l e x i s t s without having a s c i e n t i s t i c ideology.

Kuhn a c t u a l l y ignored t h i s question by r e f e r r i n g t o "the core" of knowledge.

Although he stressed t h e r e l a t i v i t y of knowledge, i.e., how s c i e n t i f i c f a c t s re-

l a t e t o a p a r t i c u l a r paradigm, he continued t r e a t i n g knowledge a s something i n

itself. There was a tendency i n Kuhnls analysis t o a b s t r a c t t h e notion of "para-

digm" out of i t s h i s t o r i c a l and human context and by doing t h i s t o r e v e r t t o

pseudo-problems about science. Once t h e primacy of paradigms (worldviews) i s

recognized, the v i t a l problem i s not i n any sense epistemologlcal. It i s r a t h e r

t o determine what t h e consequences of a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l organization and type

of research a r e f o r human beings.

So a s not t o do an i n j u s t i c e t o Kuhn, it should be mentioned t h a t he a l s o

had an anti-epistemological s t r a i n i n h i s thought. His skepticism about t h e

development of a "pure" s c i e n t i f i c language i s one example. He conunented t h a t

"No current attempt t o achieve t h a t end has yet come close t o a generally
applicable language of pure percepts. And those attempts t h a t come
c l o s e s t share one c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t h a t strongly reinforces several of
t h i s e s s a y ' s main theses. From t h e s t a r t they presuppose a paradigm,
taken e i t h e r from a current s c i e n t i f i c theory or from some f r a c t i o n of
everyday discourse, and they then t r y t o eliminate from it a l l non-
l o g i c a l and non-perceptual t e r m ~ . " ~ 5

K u h n recognized t h a t i n a period of normal science a s c i e n t i f i c paradigm has a

t a u t o l o g i c a l character. It uses i t s own l o g i c t o define what i s not logical.

And it I s because of t h i s t h a t t h e search f o r an "objective" language of

-Science Is f r u i t l e s s .
When Kuhn wrote t h a t " S c i e n t i s t s do not see something a s something e l s e ;

instead they simply see i t r t 4 6 he could have m e y t two things. This ambiguity

allows us t o again show why Kuhn could not c a r r y h i s own a n a l y s i s through t o

understand t h e problem of ideology. E i t h e r he meant t h a t t h e s c i e n t i s t , i n

c o n t r a s t with t h e non-scientist, sees t h e t r u t h ; o r he meant t h a t t h e s c i e n t i s t

s e e s t h e r e s u l t s of t h e operations he or she i s carrying out. As operations and

paradigms change, so do perceptions. The l a t t e r view is t h e one t h a t complements

Kuhnls own analysis. The s c i e n t i s t i s never i n t e r p r e t i n g something a s something

else. This idea comes from a f a l s e epistemology. He or she i s evaluating what

he or she i s doing and i n t e r p r e t i n g it i n terms of t h e paradigm t o which he o r

she i s t r a i n e d and committed. Any suggestion of a "pure percept" is pure f i c t i o n .

Some statements made by Kuhn, however, suggest t h a t he tended towards t h e

opposite meaning. It i s Kuhnls m y s t i f i c a t i o n of "nature" t h a t leads me t o con-

clude t h i s . I n one place he s a i d "... it i s hard t o make nature f i t a paradigm

..."and a l i t t l e f u r t h e r on he talked of how s c i e n t i s t s had "... t o beat nature

i n t o l i n e ... I n another place he wrote of how " ~ a t u r ei t s e l f must f i r s t
!lQ7
 L

undermine professional s e c w l t y by making p r i o r achievcmenta seem problematic. 11 48

This l a s t statement i s an irresponsible use of metaphor since it gives "nature"

a metaphysical character which, be d e f i n i t i o n , can never be known by science.

If it c a n ' t be known, then t h e r e i s no point; i n f a c t , there i s no way of

speaking o f "nature" a s Kuhn did. The pragmatic character o f science and a

mystification of "nature" a r e thoroughly incompatable.

Kuhn held t o t h i s concept of knowledge because he f a i l e d t o consider

t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s between t h e s o c i a l function o f science i n a p a r t i c u l a r

society and t h e r i s e and f a l l of paradigms. He put "science" on a pedestal

even though h i s study showed t h a t such a view was h i s t o r i c a l l y unfounded. Thus

we g e t Kuhn saying t h a t "... part of our d i f f i c u l t y i n seelng t h e profound d i f -

ferences between science and technology r e l a t e s t o t h e f a c t t h a t progress i s a n

obvious a t t r i b u t e of both f i e l d ~ . " ~ 9Kuhnts f a i l u r e t o carry through h i s own

thought l e d him t o gloss over v i t a l sociological and p o l i t i c a l questions by using

t h e terms "progress1', "nature", and sometimes "science" i n a r h e t o r i c a l fashion.

The separation of science and technology need not r e f l e c t an underlying

scientism. It does i f "science" i s given a trans-social meaning a s "pure" know-

ledge. The d i s t i n c t i o n between so-called "pure" and "applied" knowledge, which

is presently widespread, tends t o do t h i s . And Kuhn gave natural science a r o l e ,

a "pure" r o l e , not d i r e c t l y of " s o c i a l importance". I n h i s words

"unlike t h e engineer, and many doctors, and most theologians, t h e scien-

t i s t need not choose problems because they urgently need solution and
without regard f o r t h e t o o l s a v a i l a b l e t o solve them. I n t h i s respect,
a l s o , t h e contrast between natural s c i e n t i s t s and many s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s
proves instructive. The l a t t e r often tend, a s t h e former almost never
do, t o defend t h e i r choice of a research problem -
e.g., t h e e f f e c t s of
r a c i a l discrimination o r the causes o f t h e business cycle -
chiefly i n
terms of the s o c i a l importance of achieving a s o l ~ t i o n . " 5 ~

The d i s t i n c t i o n between pure and applied science becomes a red herring i n

 L

terms o f ICuhnls own study. Any paradigm within which a s c i e n t i s t works w i l l

provide p r a c t i c a l applications i n some cases and not i n others. But t h i s i s

not the fundamental issue. The important question i s how one paradigm of

problems, methods and theories r e l a t e s t o a c e r t a i n f o r m of p r a c t i c a l appli-

cation, with s p e c i f i c consequences. And, following from t h i s , how might a

d i f f e r e n t paradigm of problems, methods and theories lead t o a d i f f e r e n t s e t

of e f f e c t s f o r t h e people i n a society. Once t h e problem of ideology i s ac-

knowledged, these s o r t s of questions become problematic.

/'

Paradigms and t h e Problem o f Ideology

So we r e t u r n t o t h e problem of ideology. To deal with it, I do not have

t o r e j e c t Kuhn's orientation, but only t o carry it through i n i t s ramifications.

When Kuhn wrote about " s c i e n t i f i c revolutions", he was beginning t o do t h i s .

There a r e several things t o emphasize about h i s discussion. F i r s t , Kuhn saw

t h a t t h e h i s t o r i c a l context affected t h e nature of science.51 Second, he saw

s c i e n t i f i c theory a s having a fluzction, not a s being t r u e o r false.52 And, t h i r d ,

. . ,

he did not accept science a s an accumulation o f facts. He thus said "... t h e

case f o r cumulative development of science's problems and standards i s even harder

t o make than t h e case f o r cumulation of theories."53

On t h e b a s i s of h i s h i s t o r i c a l and pragmatic study of natural science,

Kuhn became aware o f issues t h a t a r e relevant t o our own study. He r e a l i z e d t h a t

a change i n paradigms also implied a change i n t h e models of verification. He

s t a t e d t h i s c l e a r l y when he wrote t h a t

" ~ u paradigms
t d i f f e r i n more than substance, f o r they a r e directed not
only t o nature but a l s o back upon t h e science t h a t produced them. They
a r e t h e source of t h e methods, problem-field, and standards of solution
accepted by any mature s c i e n t i f i c community a t any given time. As a
 r e s u l t , the reception of a new paradigm often necessitates a
r e d e f i n i t i o n of the corresponding science. Some o l d problems
may be relegated t o another science o r declared e n t i r e l y "un-
s c i e n t i f i c " . Others t h a t were previously non-existent o r t r i v -
i a l may, with a new paradigm, become t h e very archetypes of
s i g n i f i c a n t s c i e n t i f i c achievement. And a s t h e problems change,
s o , often, does t h e standard t h a t distinguishes a r e a l scien-
t i f i c solution from a mere metaphysical speculation, word game,
o r mathematical play. "54

He a l s o realized t h a t there can be no "objective" o r "neutral" scien-

t i f i c language. He made t h i s e x p l i c i t when he wrote " I f , a s I have already

urged, t h e r e can be no s c i e n t i f i c a l l y or empirically neutral system of language

o r concepts, then t h e proposed construction of a l t e r n a t i v e t e s t s and theories

must proceed from within one o r another paradigm-based tradition."55 A further

r e a l i z a t i o n was t h a t paradigm change or scient2fic revolutions do not occur by

some trans-paradigm logic. Kuhn thus wrote "Just because it i s a t r a n s i t i o n

between incommensurables , t h e t r a n s i t ion between competing paradigms cannot be

made a s t e p a t a time, forced by logic and neutral experience ... it must occur

a l l a t once (though not necessarily i n a n i n s t a n t ) or not a t a l l . ,I 56

The conclusion t h a t followed from these points was t h a t he competition

between paradigms i s not the s o r t of b a t t l e t h a t can be resolved by proofs. !I 57

This i s t h e case because

"when paradigms enter, a s they must, i n t o a debate about paradigm choice,

t h e i r choice i s necessarily c i r c u l a r . Each group uses i t s own paradigm
t o argue i n t h a t paradigm's defense. 11 58

Now, consider t h e following statement about ideology. "(ideologies) ... a r e

impervious t o evidence not because t h e i r proponents do not adduce any i n support

o f t h e i r position, but because t h e conclusions argued from t h e evidence r e s t upon

an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which, i f consistently maintained, can be guaranteed i n advance

t o cover any f a c t which the observer might bring back from the sociological study

of the contingent w o r 1 d . 1 ' ~ ~The s i m i l a r i t y between Huncirnanls statement and Kuhnls

 I

i s remarkable. Both an analysis of paradigms and ideologies shows t h e in-

a b i l i t y of resolving c o n f l i c t s between perspectives by reference t o academic

criteria.

There i s a l s o a s i m i l a r i t y between Kuhnls conclusion and t h a t of Mann-

helm a f t e r he discussed t h e problem of ideology i n t h e s o c i a l sciences. Let

us r e t r a c e Kuhnls argument so t h a t t h i s s i m i l a r i t y i s e x p l i c i t . According t o

him, each group of s c i e n t i s t s "receives b e l i e f s " about a paradigm which moti-

v a t e them t o undertake common research on common problems. When a paradigm i s

i n c r i s i s , t h e so-called "rules" of t h e paradigm do not function t o determine

t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e o r e t i c a l disputes. Instead, a new c l a s s of problems and

commitments i s developed t o replace t h e old. And, according t o Kuhn, t h i s

change i n paradigms does not occur through l o g i c a l o r r a t i o n a l processes. On

/'
t h i s point, Kuhn quoted Max Planck who s t a t e d t h a t "... a new s c i e n t i f i c t r u t h
does not triumph by convincing i t s opponents and making them see t h e l i g h t , but

r a t h e r because i t s opponents eventually d i e , and a new generation grows up t h a t

i s f a m i l i a r with

With t h e dying of t h e older s c i e n t i s t s , a pedagogic-based s e t of b e l i e f s

a l s o dies. We can conclude from t h i s t h a t paradigm change requires a new so-

c i a l i z a t i o n or education, so we s t i l l have t o ask why t h e change occurred. It

i s not because of a b s t r a c t evidence, s i n c e t h e r e is no such thing. We a r e again

forced t o an a n a l y s i s of t h e changing s o c i a l function of science f o r a clue. This

conclusion i s v i t a l f o r our view of both n a t u r a l and s o c i a l science. Proofs a r e

themselves r e l a t i v e t o paradigms, t h e r e f o r e , proofs cannot resolve paradigm con-

flicts. What then does? Saying t h a t s c i e n t i s t s with older commitments t o a para-

digm d i e and a r e replaced with young s c i e n t i s t s with new commitments does not

answer t h i s question. The question leads us r i g h t back t o t h e problem of ideology.

Kuhn led us back t o Mannheim and then t o Marx and Engels.

A t t h e beginning of h i s discussion of paradigm change, Kuhn asked the

quest ion:

"why should a change of paradigms be c a l l e d a revolution? I n the face

of t h e vast and e s s e n t i a l differenzes between p o l i t i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c
development, what parallelism can j u s t i f y t h e metaphor t h a t finds rev-
olution i n both?"61

He answered h i s question with t h e statement:

-\ >

" ~ o l i t i c a lrevolutions a r e inaugurated by a growing sense, often r e s t r i c t -

ed t o a segment of the p o l i t i c a l community, t h a t exist ing i n s t i t u t i o n s
have ceased adequately t o meet t h e problems posed by a n environment t h a t
they have i n part created. I n much t h e same way, s c i e n t i f i c revolutions
a r e inaugurated by a growing sense, again often r e s t r i c t e d t o a narrow
subdivision of the s c i e n t i f i c community, t h a t an existing paradigm has
ceased t o function adequately i n the exploration of an aspect of nature
t o which t h a t paradigm i t s e l f had previously led the way. " 6 2

The analogy i s useful, but, i n it, we again see Kuhn's tendency t b mystify

"nature". The " s c i e n t i f i c community" does not "explore nature" detached from

t h e h i s t o r i c a l and p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s a s Kuhn implied. Science and i t s changing

paradigms a r e inextricably rooted i n these very r e a l i t i e s , What Kuhn called

" p o l i t i c a l " o r ' t s c i e n t i f i c " revolutions a r e separable only when we r e f l e c t on

history. The a c t u a l events t h a t lead t o new ideologies, paradigms and i n s t i t u -

t i o n s a r e not separable along these l i n e s when you a r e l i v i n g through them. And

anyone who t r i e s t o t r e a t them a s two d i s t i n c t r e a l i t i e s w i l l end up accepting

t h e s c i e n t i s t i c ideology. To avoid t h i s , it i s c r u c i a l f o r us t o ask how t h e

p o l i t i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t e r r e l a t e i n our society. F o r example,

how do t h e p o l i t i c a l orientations i n our society a f f e c t t h e development of scien-

t i f i c paradigms?

Not asking these kinds of questions implies t h a t "nature" i s studied by

s c i e n t i s t s who a r e detached from and unaffected by the i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements

within which they work. It accredits t h e " s c i e n t i f i c community" with an

autonomy t h a t contradicts what we know about t h e i r t r a i n i n g i n and commitments

t o a p a r t i c u l a r paradigm. A more accurate understanding of the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s

of science and p o l i t i c s develops once t h e p o l i t i c a l nature of education is

analyzed. Kuhn himself stressed t h e function of education i n developing shared

b e l i e f s within a dominant paradigm. He simply f a i l e d t o analyze t h e p o l i t i c a l

aspect of those b e l i e f s and t h e p o l i t i c a l consequences of a dominant paradigm.

His mystification of "nature" i s a symptom o f a study finished too soon.

When t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s o f science and p o l i t i c s a r e recognized. we a l s o

recognize t h e r o l e of choice i n science. Once a l l a b s t r a c t notions of science

have been rejected, then we see the need t c con\sciously decide t o work within a

c l a s s o f problems t h a t r e l a t e t o c e r t a i n human ends which a r e valued more than

those associated with another c l a s s of problems. Though f a i l i n g t o recognize

t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of science and p o l i t i c s , Kuhn did s t r e s s t h e r o l e of choice

i n science. I n one place, he wrote he very existence of science depends upon

vesting t h e power t o choose between paradigms i n t h e members of a special kind

o f community. lr63 I n another place, he wrote

"... since no paradigm ever solves a l l t h e problems it defines and

paradigms leave a l l t h e same problems unsolved, para-
since no t w o
digm debates always involve the question: Which problems i s it
more significant t o have solved? Like t h e issue of competing
standards, t h a t question of values can be answered only i n terms
of c r i t e r i a t h a t l i e outside of normal science altogether, and it
i s t h a t recourse t o external c r i t e r i a t h a t most obviously makes
paradigm debates revolutionary. "64

And, i n a t h i r d place, he wrote

" ~ o e sit r e a l l y help t o imagine t h a t there i s some one f u l l , objec-

t i v e , t r u e account o f nature and t h a t t h e proper measure of scien-
t i f i c achievement I s the extent t o which it brings us closer t o
t h a t ultimate goal? I f we can learn t o s u b s t i t u t e evolution-from-
what-we-do-know f o r evolution-toward-what-we-wish-to-know, a number
of vexing problems may vanish i n t h e process."65
 I

A l l t h e s e statements show t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e problem of

paradigms and t h e problem of ideology. Why does a p a r t i c u l a r s c i e n t i f i c

community choose one paradigm over another? A study of t h e s t r u c t u r e and

f u n c t i o n of education - including both r e s e a r c h and teaching - would c e r -

t a i n l y h e l p answer t h i s . Why a r e some s c i e n t i f i c problems considered more

s i g n i f i c a n t t h a n others? A study of t h e i d e o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n of educa-

t i o n would h e l p answer t h i s . How a r e s c i e n c e ' s p r i o r i t i e s established. A

study of r e s e a r c h i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e i r l i n k s with t h e p o l i t i c a l economy

would h e l p answer t h i s . These questions l i e a t t h e h e a r t of t h e problem of

ideology. And Kuhnts h i s t o r i c a l approach, though not including a p o l i t i c a l

a n a l y s i s of s c i e n t i f i c paradigms and education,, was moving i n t h e i r d i r e c t i o n .

Though t h e r e was not a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of h i s use of t h e term "ideology", he

c l e a r l y recognized some r e l a t i o n s h i p between s c i e n t i f i c paradigms and ideology.

A t t h e beginning of h i s study, Kuhn asked "...what changes i n technique

o r method o r ideology would enable ..."t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s t o progress. Al-

though he d i d not t r y t o answer t h i s question, h i s own study provides important

clues. Fundamental reforms i n t h e educational system seem necessary t o undercut

t h e ideology of scientism. A mystified view of s c i e n t i f i c r u l e s and f a c t s needs

t o be replaced by a n approach t o s c i e n c e which considers questions of ends and

consequences. But t h e s e changes cannot occur w i t h i n s o c i a l s c i e n c e without t h e

S o c i a l arrangement of science a l s o changing. I f we a r e t o avoid t h e dogmas and

conservatism of a l l forms of scientism, we must t h e n look a t t h e p o l i t i c a l a s p e c t s

of t h e problem of ideology.
 Footnotes

l ~ h o m a sS. Kuhn: The S t r u c t u r e of S c i e n t i f i c Revolutions. Chicago,

U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago Fress ( 1 9 6 2 ) .

9 ~ b i d . , p. 47.

11bid., p. 40.

l11bid.

121bid., p. 41.

131bid. J p. 44.

141bid., p. 38.

'%bid., p. 84.

161bid., p. 5.

171bid., p. 71.

18c.w. M i l l s used t h i s term.

301bid,, p. 76. Kuhn did not consider why Hretoolingtloccurs a t c e r t a i n times
and not a t others. When one looks a t t h e function of t h e market place i n t o o l -
ing contemporary science and a t t h e values of t h a t market place (e.g., p r o f i t ) ,
we see how t h e s o c i a l arrangement of science makes ideology a perennial problem.

4 2 ~W.. Mills waged a continuous c r i t i q u e of t h e "bureaucratic s o c i a l science"

t h a t he witnessed developiw i n t h e U,S. One of h i s major concerns was with
t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s t r a i n e d i n such an orientation.
Kuhnls a n a l y s i s confirms Mills' own t h a t i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s presently
s t r u c t u r e d i n t o t h e s o c i a l arrangement of science.

4 5 ~ b i d . , p. 126. Kuhn, l i k e Mannheim, v a c i l l a t e d between an old and a new

approach t o science. Many of h i s i n s i g h t s may have a r i s e n because of t h i s
marginality.
511bid., p. 75. Here, i n discussing advances s i n c e greek science, Kuhn warned
of t h e dangers of ignoring " a l l h i s t o r i c a l context".

5%. G. Runciman: Sociological Evidence and P o l i t i c a l Theory, i n - May Brodbeck

( ed. ) , op. cit. , p. 562.

6 3 ~ b i d . , p. 166. I n Chapter Thirteen, I w i l l argue that c e r t a i n values a r e

implied by t h e makeup of s c i e n t i f i c communities.
 Chapter Seven

Ideology a s A r t i c u l a t e d P o l i t i c a l Conflict: Berlin

It was necessary t o demystify " t h e n a t u r a l sciences1' e a r l y i n t h i s

study, s i n c e much of t h e confusion about ideology and epistemology i n t h e

s o c i a l sciences r e s u l t s from a n erroneous e x t r a p o l a t i o n of n a t u r a l science

rationales. On t h e b a s i s of Kuhnts study, I concluded t h a t ideology i s

problematic i n t h e n a t u r a l a s well a s t h e s o c i a l sciences. His h i s t o r i c a l

a n a l y s i s of n a t u r a l science showed t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of s c i e n t i f i c problems,

methods and t h e o r i e s and suggested t h a t t h e s e "paradigmsn could be r e l a t e d t o

t h e h i s t o r i c a l and s o c i a l circumstances w i t h i n which t h e s y n t h e s i s occurred.

This does not mean t h a t t h e consequences of knowledge developed from a par-

t i c u l a r paradigm can be reduced t o a n a n a l y s i s of t h e h i s t o r i c a l and s o c i a l

conditions. Such a mechanistic approach t o t h e problem of ideology would be

a s f r u i t l e s s a s ignoring t h e problem I t s e l f .

These same conclusions apply t o t h e range of d i s c i p l i n e s t h a t make up

t h e s o c i a l sciences. It i s understandable t h a t t h e more h i s t o r i c a l and philo-

s o p h i c a l a d i s c i p l i n e t h e more i n c l u s i v e i t s range of study and t h e r e f o r e t h e

more l i k e l y t h a t t h e r e w i l l be a n awareness of t h e s e questions. For example,

one would not expect a b e h a v i o r a l i s t i c - o r i e n t e d " p o l i t i c a l ~ c i e n t i s t "t o~ be

a s aware of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s underlying t h e problem of ideology a s a p o l i t i c a l

philosopher. I n a d d i t i o n , one would expect t h e r e t o be more consciousness about

t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s underlying t h e problem of ideology a t a time when p o l l t i c a l

 I

It i s important t o recognize t h a t t h e r e a r e conditions whlch influence

t h e r e l a t i v e presence o r absence of t h e modes of study t h a t l e a d t o a n aware-

ness of t h e problem of ideology. To s p e c i f y t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s , we need t o d i s -

cuss t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between "science" and " p o l i t i c s " i n some depth. We have

only begun t o suggest how t h e p o l i t i c a l makeup of a s o c i e t y , t h e s o c i a l arrange-

ment of s c i e n c e and t h e c h a r a c t e r of s o c i a l s c i e n c e a r e i n t e r r e l a t e d . A discus-

s i o n of t h e r e l a t i o n s of ideology and science by t h e p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t I s a i a h

2
Berlin provides a b a s i s f o r t h i s understanding.

I d e o l o g i c a l Models

B e r l i n was f o r t h r i g h t i n h i s r e j e c t i o n of lscientism. He wrote t h a t

"The b a s i c c a t e g o r i e s ... ( o f our thought) a r e not m a t t e r s of induction and

h y p o t h e s i s f t 3 and, furthermore, t h a t questions about t h e s e basic c a t e g o r i e s It.. .

a r e not answered by e i t h e r empirical o b s e r v a t i o n o r formal deduction. "4 Instead

of a n a b s t r a c t , a - h i s t o r i c a l and a - s o c i a l approach t o science, B e r l i n recognized

t h a t t h e r e a r e " i d e o l o g i c a l foundationstt t o a l l L'orms of knowledge. H i s way of

r a i s i n g t h e problem of ideology was unique. He argued t h a t

'I... i f p o l f t i c a l theory i s t o be converted i n t o a n a p p l i e d s c i e n c e , what

i s needed is a s i n g l e dominant model -
l i k e t h e d o c t o r ' s model of a
h e a l t h y body - accepted by t h e whole, o r g r e a t e r p a r t , of t h e s o c i e t y i n
quest ion. The model w i l l be i t s i d e o l o g i c a l foundation. "5

Though overly metaphoric6 B e r l i n ' s approach t o t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of science

and ideology pinpointed c r u c i a l questions. For i n s t a n c e , he was suggesting t h a t

"basic c a t e g o r i e s v of thought a r e rooted i n i d e o l o g i c a l models and t h a t t h e s e

models g i v e d i r e c t i v e s t o empirical study&a imply t h e values by which any f a c t s

organized through such a study o b t a i n t h e i r meaning. According t o B e r l i n , value

and f a c t a r e synthesized i n t h e b a s i c c u l , ~ ~ ~ o rof
i e st h e i d e o l o g i c a l model.

Perhaps more important i s t h e dialectic w l u t i o n between f a c t and value suggested

by B e r l i n ' s scheme. The i d e o l o g i c a l modd provides standards which a f f e c t t h e

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of any observations made, iitty, of p o l i t i c a l events. Conditions

can be judged by t h e i r congruency with t h o ideological model. -_ _ _ of

_The - emphasis - 1

"applied science" i s on t h e constant eval~luLlonof a c t u a l

_ _ I _
- - - -----
_ I I
- - -. -
o l o g i c a l model i s never transcended by thi;: inquiry.
-
This understanding of s c i e n c e and idcology fundamentally challenges t h e

s c i e n t i s t i c views of " t r u t h " and " r e a l i t y " . B e r l i n ' s a n a l y s i s , l i k e Kuhnls, was

based upon t h e idea of "paradigms" i n science. This approach provided him with

a n awareness of t h e r e l a t i o n s of "valuet1 and "fad+," t h a t a l l versions of t h e

value-free d o c t r i n e f a i l t o develop. Referring t o t r a d i t i o n a l s c i e n t i s t s , B e r l i n

wrote t h a t

"... what t h e y conceive t o be t h e s t r u c t u r e of thought o r r e a l i t y ... can

be shown t o be dominated by one o r mor8e models o r paradigms: mechanistic,
organic, a e s t h e t i c , l o g i c a l , m y s t i c a l , shaped by t h e s t r o n n e s t i n f l u e n c e
of t h e day (my emphasis) - r e l i g i o u s , s c i e n t i f i c , metaphysical o r a r t i s t i c .
This model o r paradigm determines t h e content a s well a s t h e form of b e l i e f s
and behavior. "7

If i d e o l o g i c a l models a r e "... shaped by t h e s t r o n g e s t i n f l u e n c e of t h e day . .."

t h e n t h e r e i s no point t r e a t i n g them a s academic a h i s t o r i c models. But t h e

problem remains: how do we understand t h e h i s t o r i c a l development of i d e o l o g i c a l

models?
-
About t h i s B e r l i n wrote "The model i t s e l f may be regarded a s t h e product

of h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r s : t h e s o c i a l (and psychological) consequences of t h e develop-

ment of productive f o r c e s , a s Marx t a u g h t , o r t h e e f f e c t s i n t h e minds of i n d i v i d u a l s

of purely psychological process which Freud and h i s d i s c i p l e s have i n v e s t i g a t e d . "*

B e r l i n ' s argument accounted f o r more l e v e l s of problems t h a n t h a t of
t h e form and t h e content of knowledge i s always r e l a t e d t o a model which i s i t s e l f

a "product of h i s t o r i c a l factors". He pinpointed Marx and Freud a s t h e o r i s t s who

provided us with profound hypotheses about t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between h i s t o r y and

t h e s e "basic categories 11 9 .
A person accustomed ( i . e . , s o c i a l i z e d ) t o an a b s t r a c t and academic view of

ideas may not be convinced by B e r l i n ' s logic. Such a person might say t h a t Marx's

o r Freud's ideas about t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of ideology and science a r e themselves ide-

ological. And, using t h e term "ideology", a s we have been using it, t h a t i s , of

course, c o r r e c t . But t h i s does not lead t o t h e conclusion t h a t t h e t h e o r i e s of

Freud and Marx regarding t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of experience, ideologies and s o c i a l

s t r u c t u r e a r e no b e t t e r nor no worse than t h e value-free doctrine which denies i t s

own ideology. Because they have studied t h e problem of ideology d i r e c t l y , t h e

hypotheses and approaches developed have more v a l i d i t y . The problem of ideology

simply cannot be handled by those who accept t h e value-free doctrine. It is no

more than a "word game", therefore, t o respond t o B e r l i n ' s argument with r e l a t i v -

i s t i c thought.

A serious question i s r a i s e d by Berlin" statements. What r e l a t i o n s h i p

between theory and p r a c t i c e w i l l help e s t a b l i s h t h e v a l i d i t y of one "ideological

model" or paradigm10 over another? B e r l i n had a d i a l e c t i c o r i e n t a t i o n t o t h i s

question. He wrote t h a t "The h i s t o r y of thought and c u l t u r e i s , a s Hegel showed

with g r e a t b r i l l i a n c e , a changing p a t t e r n of g r e a t l i b e r a t i n g ideas which i n e v i t a b l y

t u r n i n t o suffocating s t r a i t jackets, and so s t i m u l a t e t h e i r own d e s t r u c t i o n by new

emancipating, and a t t h e same time enslaving conceptions. "11 This perspective i s

important since it forces us t o make a v i t a l d i s t i n c t i o n when we evaluate ideologies.

Ideas have r o o t s i n h i s t o r i c a l conditions, but a l s o have p a r t i c u l a r e f f e c t s depend-

 ,
ing on the contemporary conditions withln which they a r e being reproduced and

disseminated. The e f f e c t s o r consequences of ideologies, therefore, need t o

be s p e c i f i c a l l y analyzed within p a r t i c u l a r s e t t i n g s , i.e., they cannot be re-

jected o r accepted s o l e l y i n terms of t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l roots.

Berlin's h i s t o r i c a l treatment of paradigms i s thoroughly incompatible

with t h e value-free doctrine. He discredited t h a t doctrine when he wrote

"...t h e r e i s no human a c t i v i t y without some kind o f general outlook:

skepticism, cynicism, r e f u s a l t o dabble i n a b s t r a c t issues o r t o
question values, hard boiled opportunism, contempt f o r theorizing,
a l l t h e v a r i e t i e s of nihilism, a r e of course, themselves metaphysical
and e t h i c a l positions, committal a t t i t u d e s . Whatever e l s e t h e exis-
t e n t i a l i s t s have taught us, they have made t h i s f a c t plain. The idea
of a completely Wertfrei theory ( o r model) o f human action ( a s con-
t r a s t e d , say, with animal behavior) r e s t s on a naive misconception of
what o b j e c t i v i t y or n e u t r a l i t y i n t h e s o c i a l s t u d i e s must be.

This awareness of t h e r o l e of "committal a t t i t u d e s " i n a l l forms of knowledge has

several implications. F i r s t l y , it demands a r e j e c t i o n of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l view of

objectivity. We have already seen why we cannot t r e a t ideas a s objective, g e r se.

There a r e no ideas wr. Rather, ideas a r e t o o l s of analysis; a means t o under-

stand how d i f f e r e n t forms of consciousness o r behavior function within a human

situation. The use of a language system and o f the methods used t o v a l i d a t e argu-

ments within it does not, i n i t s e l f , prove an "idea" t o be valid. The language

system within which ideas a r e created and evaluated and t h i s includes both t h e

general l i n g u i s t i c s rooted i n c u l t u r e and specialized l i n g u i s t i c s l i k e those of

s c i e n t i f i c d i s c i p l i n e s has t o be c r i t i c a l l y evaluated i t s e l f . Such would begin

t o provide an understanding of how logics, sciences, and ideologies r e l a t e . It

would a perspective on knowledge t h a t scientisln cannot give us.

We cannot show the v a l i d i t y of an idea p e r se. Nor can we show t h e v a l i d i t y

of an idea only by "its" application. Because a totalitarian ideology i s perpetu-

 ,
atcd and pervasive i n a society, and i s being "applied" thoroughly withln t h e

i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e ideas of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m a r e not validated. Rather, we need

t o evaluate and judge t h e consequences, i n p r a c t i c e , of t h e dissemination of

t h e ideology. To do t h i s we would need t o understand t h e conditions t h a t give

r i s e t o t h e ideology and i t s impact, but t h e present existence of t h e ideology

could not be explained away by such an analysis. The process of judging t h e

present consequences of an ideology remains c e n t r a l t o any thorough evaluation

of ideas. We a r e , therefore, committed t o have ends; what some might want t o

c a l l "value c r i t e r i a " , which a r e used t o help us evaluate t h e p r a c t i c a l s t a t e

of a f f a i r s . Without these so-called "value c r i t e r i a " , our ideas may go on

adapting t o changing p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s and no c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s of t h e r o l e of

ideology w i l l be possible. Without judgment, t h e r e i s no understanding.

B e r l i n suggested t h i s when he compared t h e need f o r a model of physical

h e a l t h with t h e need f o r a "model of ends" (my term) f o r evaluating s o c i a l and

h i s t o r i c a l systems. He made t h i s point e x p l i c i t when he wrote h heir (Marx of

Bentham, Tolstoy of Marx) c r i t i c i s m s r e l a t e t o t h e adequacy of t h e categories i n

terms of which we discuss men's ends, d u t i e s or i n t e r e s t s , t h e permanent frame-

work i n terms of which, not about which, ordinary empirical disagreements can

a r i s e . " I 3 Whether or not they a r e e x p l i c i t i n a s c i e n t i f i c theory, ends a r e a l -

ways being implied. And they a r e not necessarily "empirical", i. e. , reflected

within t h e present s i t u a t i o n . Ends a r e not observables. An evaluation of t h e

past and of t h e f u t u r e w i l l help e s t a b l i s h t h e ends implied i n any argument.

Disagreements over t h e nature and meaning of a present s e t of circumstances shows

us t h i s .

Furthermore, t o t h e extent t h a t t h e theory i s associated with a p r a c t i c a l

r e a l i t y (e.g., a technological r e a l i t y ) t h e ends can be evaluated more d i r e c t l y .

 - 132 -
I

I f t h e consequences o r ends a r e not a r t i c u l a t e d , and t h e a s s o c i a t l o n between

a theory and, say, t h e uses of technology, a r e not understood, t h e i d e o l o g i c a l

foundation of t h e theory w i 1 3 , go unnoticed. Our ignorance of such i d c o l u g i c a l

foundations of a l l theory, however, does not show value-freedom o r value r e l a -

t ivity. It simply shows ignorance.

P o l i t i c a l C o n f l i c t and I d e o l o g i c a l Models

This debate over ends i s lacking w i t h i n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t a r e c r e a t i n g

t h e ideology of t h e value-free doctrine. Basic i n t e l l e c t u a l c r i t i c i s m i s lacking

i n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of higher education i n our s o c i e t y and t h e r e a r e reasons f o r

this. A debate over ends develops when c o n f l i c t i n i n s t i t u t i o n s develops t o a

point where t h e dominant ideology ( e . g . , value-free s c i e n t i s m ) i s being demysti-

fled. This occurs when t h e meaning of people's l i f e s t y l e s no longer complement

t h e ideology and t h e h a b l t s a s s o c i a t e d with i t , and a need a r i s e s f o r a new a r t i c -

u l a t i o n of ideas. There is t h u s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between a n i n t e l l e c t u a l treatment

of t h e problem of ideology and s o c i a l , i n s t i t u t i o n a l and personal c o n f l i c t . As

one author has s a i d "When c o n f l i c t does not e x i s t , o r when contending i n t e r e s t s

a r e not d i r e c t l y l a i d b a r e , t h e n t h e r e i s no e x i s t e n t i a l b a s i s f o r ideology. 11 14

B e r l i n argued a s i m i l a r point when he s t a t e d t h a t p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y a r i s e s

i n a s o c i e t y "where ends collide1'.15 If d i s s e n t , opposition o r r e s i s t a n c e t o a

dominant ideology and i n s t i t u t i o n s i s not t o l e r a t e d , and i f d i s s e n t e r s a r e r e -

pressed e f f e c t i v e l y , t h i s debate of ends w i l l not occur. P o l i t i c a l theory cannot

evolve u n l e s s t h e r e i s a r e a l pluralism o r fundamental p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s i n a

society. A s B e r l i n s a l d " ~ i ~ monism

i d i s compatible with philosophical a n a l y s l s

only i n theory (my emphasis). The p l i g h t of philosophy under despotism i n our

 I

times provides cunclusive curar.ei;e evldence f o l > this t h e s i s . "IG

As we s h a l l see i n Chapter Nine, B e r l i n ' s statement i s s i m i l a r t o Iferbert

Marcuse's t h e s i s about ideology i n i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s . The important point i s

how p o l i t i c a l philosophy, a s one way t o a r t i c u l a t e t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of ideolo-

g i e s and science, a r i s e s out of t h e condition of p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t . Where such

c o n f l i c t does not e x i s t , has not yet been a r t i c u l a t e d , or has been e f f e c t i v e l y

repressed, what passes a s philosophy i s o f t e n r e a l l y crude ( i .e . , u n a r t i c u l a t e d )

ideology. For t h e r e t o be an i n t e l l e c t u a l treatment of t h e problem of ideology,

t h e dominant ideology and i n s t i t u t i o n s must themselves be i n question. Since

"... t o t h i n k i s t o generalize (and) t o generalize i s t o cornpare"17 t h e r e must

be an ideological c o n f l i c t within a s o c i e t y f o r t h e r e t o be awareness of t h e

problem of ideology i t s e l f .

It i s necessary t o d i s t i n g u i s h thinking from a r h e t o r i c a l use of language

i f we a r e t o understand what B e r l i n meant. The "arguments" of scientism a r e

r h e t o r i c a l because Ideological c o n f l i c t s i n theory a r e not r e l a t e d t o ideological

conflic'cs i n practice. Ideologlcal c o n f l i c t s a r e n ' t even acknowledged by scien-

t-ism, so t h i s l e v e l i f inquiry i s impossible f o r it. Unless c o n f l i c t s i n theory

and c o n f l i c t s i n p r a c t i c e a r e r e l a t e d , t h e f u l l ramifications of t h e problem of

ideology cannot be understood.

B e r l i n ' s thought allows us t o a r t i c u l a t e t h e problem of ideology even

though he did not develop it i n t h i s depth. B e r l i n d i d admit t h a t our categories

by which we organize experience - which included t h e e f f e c t s of imagination and

language - a r e themselves a r e s u l t of our experience. A d i a l e c t i c approach t o

t h e problem of ideology i s , t h e r e f o r e , required. A s well, B e r l i n helps us t o

organize, r e l a t e and order t h e varAiousproblems and l e v e l s of thought t h a t a r e

relevant t o a thorough jnquiry o f t h e problem of ideology. For example, h i s

 2

thought allowed us t o see t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n of science and ideology i n terms of

t h e a r t i c u l a t i c m of s o c i a l c o n f l i c t s within p o l i t i c a l theory. He a l s o helped us

recognize t h a t no form o r amount of academic analysis w i l l , of i t s e l f , ever

c l a r i f y t h e problem of ideology.

B e r l i n ' s main conclusion was " I f we examine t h e models, paradigms, con-

ceptual s t r u c t u r e s t h a t govern various outlooks whether consciously or n o t , and

compare t h e various concepts and categories involved with respect, f o r example,

t o t h e i r i n t e r n a l consistency o r t h e i r explanatory force, then what we a r e en-

gaged upon i s not psychology or sociology o r logic o r epistemology, but moral o r

18
s o c i a l or p o l i t i c a l theory, or a l l of t h e s e a t once. " Scientism has attempted

t o s p l i t "science" from s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l theory, but t h i s has proven t o be

impossible. Rather than science and ideology being separated a s scientisrn sug-

g e s t s , scientism i t s e l f r e f l e c t s a t o t a l i t a r i a n - l i k e c o n t r o l of science and t h e

consequent lack of awareness of t h e problem of ideology. Marx and Engels1 term

" f a l s e consciousness" a p p l i e s t o scientism because it remains ignorant of t h e

s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l foundations of t h e problems, methods and t h e o r i e s with which

it deals. Those who t h i n k within t h e premises of t h e value-free doctrine a l s o

l i v e and a c t within a narrow s o c i a l existence. They remain ignorant of how t h e i r

s o c i a l p o s i t i o n r e l a t e s t o t h e s o c i a l function of s c i e m e , and how t h e problems,

methods and t h e o r i e s they deal with r e l a t e t o t h e ideological foundations of t h e

dominant i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t underlie t h e i r s o c i a l position. I f by i n t e l l e c t u a l

inquiry, we mean using language t o c r e a t e models t h a t r e f l e c t t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n -

ships of our immediate experience, which can include i n t e l l - e c t u a l work, and t h e

l a r g e r s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y , we see t h a t much t h a t passes f o r i n t e l l e c t u a l

work i n academia i s a c t u a l l y a r h e t o r i c a l j u s t i f l c a t i o n f o r t h e ideological founda-

t i o n s of t h e dominant society.
 Footnotes
d

l ~ o ar discussion and c r i t i c i s m of t h i s o r i e n t a t i o n , see James C. Charlesworth

( ed. ) : m e Limits of Behavioralism i n P o l i t i c a l Science. Philadelphia, AAPSS
(1962).

'Isaiah Berlin: Does P o l i t i c a l Theory S t i l l Exist?, i n P. L a s l e t t and W. G.

Runciman (eds. ): Philosophy, P o l i t i c s and Society, Oxford, B a s i l Blackwell
(1962) , pp. 1-33.

6 ~ h emetaphor from medical science is u s e f u l a but i f t h e questions it implies

( e. g., sociology of knowledge questions) a r e obscured by an abstracted discussion
of "models" (e.g., t h e i r v e r i f i c a t i o n , e t c . ) t h e value of it w i l l be l o s t . Since
B e r l i n ' s d i s c u s s i o n tended t o be more metaphoric than substantive, it i s possible
f o r t h e implications of h i s approach t o be ignored.

9~ s p e c i f i c study of hypotheses about ideology and science rooted i n freudian

and marxian s o c i a l t h e o r i e s would help c l a r i f y t h e problem of ideology and logic
i n t h e s o c i a l sciences. Rather than doing t h i s i n t h i s t h e s i s , I have r e l i e d on
a c r i t i c a l examination of t h e ideology of scientism which ignores these very prob-
lems.

'!There may be some confusion of terms here. I am using "ideological model" and
"paradigm" almost a s synonyms. There is a n "ideological foundation" t o a l l science
hence applied science can be considered t o r e l y on an "ideological model". A
"paradigm" r e f e r s t o t h e c l a s s of problems, methods and t h e o r i e s t h a t develop out
o f t h e i d e o l o g i c a l model.

' b e r l ~ n , op. c i t . , p. 19.

I%. Alan Haber: The End of Ideology a s Ideology. Our Generation. Vol. 4,
No. 3, p. 61.
 I

Chapter Eight

Ideology a s a Struggle Between Classes of Problems: Rapoport

We a r e now ready t o tackle t h e r e l a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t t o t h e

problem of ideology more directly. B e r l i n ' s discussion of the r o l e of paradigms

and what he c a l l e d committal a t t i t u d e s i n a l l thought generalized Kuhnts points

t o t h e s o c i a l sciences and c l a r i f i e d how ideology operates within a l l science.

I have therefore developed t h e basic question i n t h i s section and am now ready

t o develop relevant themes i n more depth.

I w i l l begin my discussion by asking how t h e ideological foundations of

science express themselves. O r , t o undercut any tendency t o t r e a t t h i s question

metaphysically, I w i l l reword it: What i s the r e l a t i o n between theory and prac-

t i c e t h a t enables us t o study t h e ideological foundations of science? For example,

a r e s c i e n t i f i c problem, methods and theories simply cloaking over c e r t a i n vested

i n t e r e s t s i n society? I f t h i s i s too crude, a s it is, do p o l i t i c a l and economic

e l i t e s determine what a r e t h e "legitimate" and u s e f i l areas of research which

s c i e n t i s t s t h e n develop? Though t h i s may not be done i n any conspiratorial way,

t h e r e i s a strong argument f o r r e l a t i n g ideology and science i n t h l s manner.

Military and marketing research a r e t h e most obvious examples.

Ideological Struggle and t h e Problem of Ideology

These questions, however, do not r a i s e the v i t a l relationship. To outline

t h e way ideology i s expressed i n science, I t u r n t o a paper by Anatol Rapoport.

I n t h a t paper, Rapoport wrote t h a t

 "An ideology is e s s e n t i a l l y a perspective i n which ' r e a l i t i e s v a r e
defined. A s long a s the perspective remains i n t a c t , so do the re-
a l i t i e s , and the problems a r i s i n g i n t h e context of the r e a l i t i e s
remain relevant. An ideological struggle i s e s s e n t i a l l y a n attempt
t o change a perspective and t h e resistance t o such an attempt.'Thus
a n ideological struggle is not an attempt t o 'solve a problemt, but
an attempt t o bring one or another c l a s s of problems i n t o focus."3

When t h e relevance and consequences o f studying a c e r t a i n c l a s s of problems .is

i t s e l f not being studied, you do not have a n ideological struggle. But you do

have a n ideology, i.e. , "a perspective i n which I r e a l i t i e s t a r e defined", even

i f it i s a r t i c u l a t e d a s a s c i e n t i f i c orthodoxy. And t h i s is t h e case regardless

of t h e sophistication with which it is presented. It i s when you have c r i t i c a ' l ,

fundamental thought which s t r i v e s t o e s t a b l i s h a new c l a s s of problems, with new

consequences f o r humans, t h a t the ideological struggle begins.

I n Kuhnts or Berlin's terms, an ideological struggle would be an attempt

t o overthrow a paradigm. This does not happen i n a s o c i a l o r p o l i t i c a l vacuum,

though a n academic treatment of ideas w i l l always lead t o t h i s misunderstanding.

I n s t i t u t i o n a l and s o c i a l c o n f l i c t s shape t h e nature of any ideological struggle.

It i s when people begin t o c r i t i c i z e t h e s o c i a l system within which a t r a d i t i o n a l

c l a s s of problems functioned t h a t t h e attempt t o redefine subject matters accel-

e r a t e s t o t h e point of ideological struggle.

When a n ideological struggle is occurring, t h e nature of "evidence" i t s e l f

becomes problematic. Both K u h n and B e r l i n touched on t h i s question, but Rapoport

made it c e n t r a l t o h i s discussion. Writing of Marxist-Leninist ideology, he said

" ~ d h e r e n c et o a t h e s i s with a self-predictive component i s not merely a

cognitive a c t ; it i s a p o l i t i c a l a c t . That i s t o say, evidence f o r o r
against such a t h e s i s i s not the only b a s i s f o r accepting o r r e j e c t i n g
it. Another important basis i s one's Preference f o r the consequences
(my emphasis) of the t r u t h o r t h e falsehood of t h e t h e s i s i n question. 11 4

Here Rapoport was pointing out t h a t f o r those with a pragmatic orientation t o

knowledge the consequences of an i n t e l l e c t u a l position a r e considered t o be

evidence f o r o r against t h a t position. His own statement, however, showed t h a t

be believed i n an academic view of evidence. When he wrote t h a t "evidence f o r

o r against such a t h e s i s i s not t h e only basis f o r accepting o r r e j e c t i n g it" o r

r e f e r r e d t o "the consequences of t h e t r u t h o r falsehood of t h e t h e s i s " , he was

separating t r u t h and evidence off from t h e s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l context of a .

thesis. But t h e notion of "evidence" or "truth" a s being autonomous from these

contexts is i t s e l f ideological. It is t h e academic orientation t o knowledge,

rooted i n a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l arrangement of science, t h a t leads people t o think

t h a t t h e t r u t h or evidence of a t h e s i s can be shown independent of its conse-

quenc e s . 3

The pragmatic approach t o knowledge abandons academic c r i t e r i a of v a l i d i t y

because, once knowledge is placed i n a human context, t h e question of revolution-

a r y change, and a c l a s s o f problems associated with t h i s , i t s e l f becomes a matter

f o r inquiry. And t h i s problem has implications f o r our view of knowledge. Evi-

dence i s no longer taken i n an a b s t r a c t way, but i s r e l a t e d t o t h e a b i l i t y t o

change s o c i a l conditions i n terms of s t r a t e g i e s t h a t a r i s e from c e r t a i n i n t e l l e c -

t u a l analyses. The evaluation of t h i s t r a n s l a t i o n of theory back i n t o practice

i s never a clear-cut process. A s f o r any c l a s s of problems, there reinains the

t a s k o f describing what has happened and i s happening and explaining why, though

t h i s evaluation w i l l take a p a r t i c u l a r form. It i s not a mechanistic o r formalistic

matter. And t h e t a s k o f evaluation can never be allowed t o come i n t o t h e control

of a n e l i t e - neither a p o l i t i c a l o r economic e l i t e nor a s c l e n t i f ic e l i t e which

has taken over p o l i t i c a l and economic functions i n a society. Evidence must con-

t i n u a l l y come from the p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s of people - hence the social relations i n

 ,
and around science w i l l have t o be dcmocratic.

To understand t h e v i t a l relationships between ideology and science, it

is necessary t o see how academic c r i t e r i a a r e i n t e r r e l a t e d with t h e e l i t i s t

makeup of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s within which teaching and research i s undertaken.

These academic c r i t e r i a w i l l function u n t i l these i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e replaced by

democratic ones. It is a l s o necessary t o r e j e c t t h e widespread assumptions

about which s o c i a l relationships a r e r e a l and which a r e not. The s o c i a l r e l a -

tionships t h a t a r e perceived and studied by an academic with l i b e r a l values, f o r

example, w i l l be q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from those perceived and studied by a revolution-

a r y with s o c i a l i s t values. Yet both s e t s of s o c i a l relationships have a r e a l i t y .

It is a mistake t o debate which a r e r e a l and which a r e not. Once we r e j e c t t r a -

d i t i o n a l epistemology, we must consistently u t i l i z e a d i a l e c t i c understanding of

r e a l i t y and study t h e r e l a t i o n s between problems, methods and theories i n terms

of t h e s o c i a l arrangement of science.

This does not mean t h a t both s e t s of s o c i a l relationships a r e equally

"true". Seen from t h e assumptions of one perspective, problems from another w i l l

seem unreal, untrue, even strange and u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . The question i s which s e t

of assumptions, i f we t r e a t t h e perceived and studied s o c i a l relationships a s as-

sumptions, i s most inclusive. For instance, which i s a b l e t o account f o r the

o t h e r ' s positiorf i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , r a t h e r than r h e t o r i c a l l y , and t o be self-correct-

ing.

Rapoport touched on t h i s question when he wrote t h a t an It.. . appreciation

of r e a l i t y depends not only on r e l a t i n g ideas t o observable events but a l s o on the

events which one s e l e c t s t o observe."5 Neither t h e reasons f o r , nor the s i g n i f i -

cance of s o c i a l events is a t a l l obvious. Establishing relationships between and

 I

among s o c i a l events, with the a i d o f a s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l analysis, is what

does t h i s . Some forms of s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l analysis a r e more inclusive and

s e l f - c r i t i c a l than others. I n addition, t h e r e i s a l s o a passive and a c t i v e mode

of evaluation. Academics often evaluate i n a passive manner, attempting t o be

"descriptive" and nothing more. We have seen how impossible t h i s i s . Descrip-

t i o n , no matter how sophisticated, always r e l i e s on p a r t i c u l a r categories which

have a n ideological foundation. Some more a c t i v i s t i n t e l l e c t u a l s a f f e c t events

as p a r t of evaluating them. They r e l a t e t o t h e events r a t h e r than attempting t o

i n t e r p r e t them i n a detached manner.

A n a c t i v i s t approach is not necessarily more inclusive and s e l f - c r i t i c a l ,

though t h e r e i s t h i s tendency. And, it should be c l e a r t h a t t h i s a c t i v i s t o r

s t r a t e g i c approach t o evaluation i s not exclusively t h e way o f s o c i a l i s t s . Many

s o c i a l i s t academics t r e a t ideas i n a r e i f ied manner. Conversely, l i b e r a l theo-

r i s t s a r e o f t e n engaged i n a c t i v e t h e o r i z i k , using research techniques t h a t a r e

v i t a l t o t h e market place. It is how and why ( i . e . , t o what end) t h i s a c t i v e

theorizing occurs, not t h e f a c t of activeness Eer se, t h a t w i l l fundamentally

d i s t i n g u i s h t h e d i f f e r e n t ideological f oundations t o science.

The evaluation of t h e consequences of these ideology-science systems, i n

4

terms of chosen ends, i s what w i l l t e s t t h e i r validity. Since t h e ends a r e chosen

t h e r e can be no ultimate validity. These choices of ends cannot be made i n an

a b s t r a c t , academic manner. Our ideas about "choice", "freedom" and "reason" a l l

w i l l need revamping once t h e problem of ideology i s recognized and c l a r i f i e d . For

example, a n i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c understanding of choice, freedom and reason i s inade-

quate once t h e language systems we use a r e analyzed i n relationship t o our s o c i a l

experiences. An analysis of language w i l l help us understand how and why we choose

 I

c e r t a i n ends and values f o r our i n t e l l e c t u a l work. I w i l l return t o t h i s

question i n Chapter Nineteen.

I n t e l l e c t u a l s and Ideology

Rapoport wrote of how commitment t o c e r t a i n ends i s c e n t r a l t o an i n t e l -

l e c t u a l l s work. His understanding of t h i s , however, was limited by i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c

assumptions. He wrote, f o r example, t h a t "... t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l t h i r s t s f o r iclka-

t i o n a l experience ...7 He continued t h a t

is need i s transformed i n t o an ethos, a c r i t e r i a i n judging t h e q u a l i t y

of t h e l i f e around him. I n s h o r t , t h e individual need of t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l
becomes an ideological commitment. "8 1

These " c r i t e r i a i n judging t h e q u a l i t y of l i f e " a r e t h e ends t h a t a f f e c t t h e i n t e l -

l e c t u a l ' s work. But t o think they a r i s e from t h e individual i n t e l l e c t u a l l s need

f o r " i d e a t i o n a l experience" i s t o f o r g e t t h a t t h e c l a s s of problems t o which an

i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t r a i n e d and with which he o r she works already implies ends. It

a l s o ignores t h e f a c t t h a t a c l a s s of problems i s t h e r e s u l t of a broad s o c i a l ,

not s t r i c t l y psychological, s e t of ideological forces.

Rapoportls handling of t h e problem of ideology a s a s t r u g g l e between d i f -

f e r e n t c l a s s e s of problems r e l a t e d p o l i t i c a l processes i n a s o c i e t y t o t h e c r e a t i o n

of s c i e n t i f i c theory. This broadens our inquiry beyond t h e recognition t h a t t h e r e

a r e ideological foundations t o a l l forms of science f o r it shows t h e relevance of

t h e study of s o c i a l change t o t h e study of science and ideology. Rapoportls under-

standing of t h e source of ideological s t r u g g l e was, however, narrowed by h i s indi-

v i d u a l i s t i c assumptions. When he wrote t h a t "ideological revolutions a r e i n s t i g a t e d

by i n t e l l e c t u a l s " 9 he showed h i s f a i l u r e t o analyze t h e i n t e l l i g e n s i a sociologically.

The changing r o l e s of i n t e l l e c t u a l s within changing s t r u c t u r e s , with changing func-

t i o n s , needs t o be analyzed s p e c i f i c a l l y before any sound ideas about t h e roots of

ideological struggles can be developed.

Rapoport jumped too quickly f r o m h i s analogy between paradigm changes i n

the natural sciences t o h i s notion o f ideological struggles over classes of prob-

lems i n t h e social sciences. I n not analyzing why ideologies come into c o n f l i c t

during c e r t a i n periods, he actually f a i l e d t o develop an adequate d e f i n i t i o n of

t h e intellectual. Yet, when he said that "My d e f i n i t i o n would i d e n t i f y only a

f r a c t i o n of academics ( o r professionals) a s intellectuals"1 he was implying t h a t

such an analysis was needed.

I n t h e past few years t h e r e has been a growing ideological struggle i n

North America. But it i s not exclusive t o i n t e l l e c t u a l s , no matter how they a r e *

defined. It may be more accurate t o speak of an ideological struggle, rooted i n

wide p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t , creating a new i n t e l l i g e n t s i a t h a t r e f l e c t s and r e f i n e s

t h e ideas of a s o c i a l movement, than t o speak of " i n t e l l e c t u a l s " s t a t i c l y . I say

t h i s because academics and other professionals within t h e established s t r u c t u r e

tend t o r e a c t t o a challenge t o those structures r a t h e r than undertake an i n t e l -

l e c t u a l analysis of the underlying conflicts. This f o r m of analysis might give

us clues about t h e r o o t s of ideology and t h e c r e a t i o n o f i n t e l l e c t u a l groupings

of various orientations. This i s not, however, how Rapoport proceeded. "Instead

of undertaking an analysis of t h e creation of i n t e l l e c t u a l groupings and ideologies

he jumped f r o m h i s individualistic approach t o a view o f i n t e l l e c t u a l s a s a "class"

i n themselves. According t o t h i s s u p e r f i c i a l concept o f llhlasstr ( a s a l o t of in-

t e l l e c t u a l s ) when the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a develops a new commitment t o t r ~ t h ,i.e., a

commitment t o deal with a new c l a s s o f problems t h a t have been ignored by t h e

established academia, it comes into c o n f l i c t with authority. I n Rapoportls words

"Only i f t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l ' s commitment t o t r u t h i s t o t a l and, moreover,

coupled with values othcr than ( f a c t u a l l y ) demonstrable t r u t h , does
 t h e d i a l e c t i c opposition between the i n t e l l e c t u a l ' s ideological commit-
ment and t h e dynamics of power manifest i t s e l f i n f u l l , awesome force.
I n t h i s context, t h e c l a s s i n t e r e s t of t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l s reveals i t s e l f
and, with it, t h e t h r e a t s against which i n t e l l e c t u a l s ought t o mobilize. 1111

I f t h e ideological s t r u g g l e of i n t e l l e c t u a l s is seen i n t h e context of p o l i t i c a l

c o n f l i c t , a s B e r l i n ' s a n a l y s i s suggested, and "the i n t e l l e c t u a l " i s not a b s t r a c t -

ed from t h i s process, then I have no disagreements.

*
But Rapoport did not mean

this. I n maintaining h i s academic view of t r u t h by r e f e r r i n g t o a " t o t a l commit-

ment t o t r u t h " , he was unable t o s i t u a t e t h e i n t e l l i g e n s i a and understand t h e i r

c r i t e r i a f o r t r u t h , i n t h e s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l process. Furthermore, it i s d i f -

f i c u l t t o see whether Kuhnls a n a l y s i s , which Rapoport footnoted, l2 had any con-

ceptual e f f e c t on him. Speaking of a " t o t a l commitment t o t r u t h " i s symptomatic

of a n a b s t r a c t epistemology and showed an ignorance of t h e problem of paradigm

change and of ideology.

Where does t h e i n t e l l i g e n s i a come from? What makes them a homogeneous

grouping? What ends, values and commitments underlie t h e i r orientation? What

4 ,

p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s r e l a t e t o t h e c r e a t i o n and/or a r t i c u l a t i o n of t h e i r ideas?

Why do ideological s t r u g g l e s sometimes separate some i n t e l l e c t u a l s from others?

If t h e s e questions a r e l e f t unanswered, t h e "conclusion" t h a t i n t e l l e c t u a l s a r e a

c l a s s i s without any basis. I have already r e f e r r e d t o t h e d i s t o r t i n g e f f e c t s of

knowledge which i s over-specialized and fragmented. Rapoportls e r r o r s a r e a r e s u l t

of t h i s very process. He combined t h e concept of "class", used a b s t r a c t l y , with

h i s more developed concept of "ideology", and ended up with an empty synthesis.

Rapoport organized r e l a t i o n s h i p s - f o r example t h a t of t h e i n t e l l i g e n s i a

with p o l i t i c a l movements - t h a t were implied by t h e problem of ideology i n an er-

roneous manner. For example, he wrote

"we do not know t h e extent of t h e impact which t h e p o l i t i c a l awakening of

 I

the American i n t e l l e c t u a l w i l l make, nor t h e p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e s which

w i l l r e s u l t from it, nor t h e i r extent on the world scale. It appears,
however, t h a t a c l a s s struggle of an e n t i r e l y new kind i s shaping up. "I3

Here Rapoport assumed t h a t t h e "awakening of t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l " i s fundamental t o

t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s i n North America. He saw p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e s r e s u l t i n g

-
from t h i s awakening. On the basis of t h e kinds of questions asked above, I would

tend t o reverse t h i s order. I n t e l l e c t u a l s a r e not a s t a t i c s o c i a l grouping t h a t

"awakens". They a r e groupings of people located i n and around educational i n s t i -

t u t i o n s who have learned t o use language t o a r t i c u l a t e s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s . Their

use of language and the s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s they focus on w i l l be affected by t h e i r

position within s o c i a l relations. When p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t develops, d i f f e r e n t

o r i e n t a t i o n s w i l l develop within t h e i n t e l l i g e n s i a . They do not remain a homo-

geneous grouping when ideological struggle develops throughoudthe society.

Rapoportts suggestion t h a t a "class struggle'' develops between t h e i n t e l l i g e n s i a

and authority does not describe the separation of t h e i n t e l l i g e n s i a along broad

c l a s s , r a c i a l o r generational lines. And it c o n f l i c t s with h i s own admission t h a t

by " i n t e l l e c t u a l " he does not include a l l professional academics. Rapoport simply

f a i l e d t o analyze t h e system of authority and how it intertwines with academia and

reinforces c e r t a i n ideological orientations while c o n f l i c t i n g with others. Rapoport

presented a f a l s e image of t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l a s a rebel against authority. Since he

f a i l e d t o describe t h e authority system, i n i t s ramifications, h i s conclusions a r e

more mystifications of t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l than i n t e l l e c t u a l positions.

A comprehensive analysis f o r understanding the p o l i t i c a l r o l e of established

4

i n t e l l e c t u a l s would include t h e changing s t r u c t u r e and function of education; the

growth of t h e r a d i c a l s o c i a l movement on t h i s continent; i t s relationship t o broad

p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s with internatlonay roots and consequences; and the r e l a t i o n s h i p

of t h e s e t o each other. One c e n t r a l question would be an analysis of t h e c r e a t i o n

of ideology within t h e dominant system of education. Because of Rapoport's mysti-

f i c a t i o n of " t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l " , he did not undertake, l e t alone recognize, t h i s

a n a l y s i s of education and ideology. H i s important i n s i g h t t h a t ideological strug-

g l e s a r e over c l a s s e s of problems, with d i f f e r e n t relevancies, would be u s e f u l i n

such a n a n a l y s i s since today's s t r u g g l e over o r i e n t a t i o n s t o education, subject

matters, and s o c i a l t h e o r i e s i n u n i v e r s i t i e s i s t h e concrete expression of an ide-

o l o g i c a l struggle. Rapoport, however, seemed t o see t h i s ideological s t r u g g l e

a r i s i n g from individuals, separate from t h e s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s of t h e

i n s t i t u t i o n s within which they work.

-
Combining t h e i n s i g h t s of B e r l i n and Rapoport, we have t h e necessary per-

s p e c t i v e on t h e problem of ideology t o attempt t o summarize it. B e r l i n pointed

out t h a t paradigm change within p o l i t i c a l theory r e s u l t e d from p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t .

Rapoport pointed out t h a t ideological s t r u g g l e s a r e attempts t o change paradigms,

o r c l a s s e s of problems. The implication is t h a t science and ideology i n t e r r e l a t e

through p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t and t h e expression of t h a t i n t h e r i s e and f a l l of

c l a s s e s of problems.

Footnotes

'see B a r i t z , op. c i t .

2 ~ n a t o Rapoport:
l Have The I n t e l l e c t u a l s A Class I n t e r e s t ? Montreal, Our Genera-
-
t i o n , Vol. 5, No. l, pp. 31-49.
 6 ~ o - c a l l e d"academic marxism" has been growing i n the universities since t h e
decline of cold war anti-communism. Once t h e s o c i a l i s t rhetoric of t h i s "marxism"
i s shed it proves t o be based i n t h e s c i e n t i s t i c ideology as much a s a r e l i b e r a l
academics.
 I

Chapter Nine

The T o t a l i t a r i a n i z a t i o n of Ideology: Marcuse

We now have t h e problem and some of t h e implications of t h e problem of

ideology c l a r i f i e d . To do t h i s , we have had t o expose positions t h a t t o t a l l y

Ignore t h e problem, those t h a t handle it s u p e r f i c i a l l y , and those t h a t come t o

g r i p s with t h e v i t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s , p o l i t i c s , ideology,

language and science, which underlie t h e problem of ideology.

Three t h e o r i s t s , Herbert Marcuse, C. Wright M i l l s and Jean Paul S a r t r e , a l l

begin t h e i r a n a l y s i s from a n understanding of t h e problem of ideology. Though d i s -

t i n c t i n t h e i r languages and i n t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r conclusions, they a r e a l l bound

by one concern: how a r e we t o develop forms of knowledge t h a t t a k e t h e problem of

ideology i n t o account? Since a l l forms of knowledge a r e i n t e r r e l a t e d with c e r t a i n

s o c i a l functions and s o c i a l and human consequences, taking these i n t e r r e l a t i o n s i n t o

account e x p l i c i t l y would allow a q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t kind of knowledge t o develop.

What forces operate t o hinder or enhance such a goal? Since t h e function and conse-

quence of knowledge a f f e c t s t h e form it takes, a new function needs t o be developed.

What a r e t h e s o c i a l implications of knowledge t h a t lacks t h i s awareness of t h e prob-

lem of ideology, and what might they be i f a form of knowledge accounting f o r it

existed?

These kinds of questions were implied i n t h e work of Marcuse, Mills and S a r t r e .

Each was concerned with exposing t h e ideological b a s i s of today's dominant forms of

knowledge and with c r e a t i n g a new form of science t h a t e x p l i c i t l y accounted f o r t h e

matter of ideology. It is i n t h i s sense t h a t a l l were o r a r e waging an ideological

struggle against the dominant forms of knowledge i n western i n d u s t r i a l societies.

Ideology and Advanced Industrialism

How did Marcuse handle the problem of ideology? His major t h e s i s i n t h e realm

o r s o c i a l theory was t h a t a t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m of "repressive tolerance" i s increasing

in advanced i n d u s t r i a l societies. Accoraing t o t h i s argument, t h e human a l i e n a t i o n

2
which is rooted i n e a r l i e r i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n is no longer subjectively experienced,

but "... has become e n t i r e l y objective. " According t o Marcuse, i n advanced industri-

alism "... t h e subject i s swallowed up by i t s alienated existence. lt3 Since "ideolog-

i c a l indictment" of t h i s advanced a l i e n a t i o n i s d i f f i c u l t due t o t h e t o t a l i t a r i a n

nature of t h e society, some confuse t h e new s t a t e of a f f a i r s with an "end of ideology".

Marcusets r e p l y t o t h i s is

"This absorption of ideology i n t o r e a l i t y does not, however, s i g n i f y t h e fend

of ideologyf. On t h e contrary, i n a s p e c i f i c sense, advanced i n d u s t r i a l cul-
t u r e i s more ideological than i t s predecessor, inasmuch a s today t h e ideology
is i n t h e process of production i t s e l f ."lC

Marcuse was arguing t h a t ideology i s no longer a r i s i n g haphazardly, but is now

being reproduced d e l i b e r a t e l y t o attempt t o r a t i o n a l i z e s o c i a l contradictions ration-

ally. The e f f e c t s of t h i s ideology a r e more pervasive and t h e means whereby it i s

developed a r e more sophisticated than f o r past r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s f o r vested i n t e r e s t s .

Being more pervasive, t h e ideology is l e s s discernable. Ideology - a combination of

half-truths and d i s t o r t i o n s , of unconsciously held and deliberately perpetuated be-

liefs - functions t o cloak f a l l a c i e s and prevent c r i t i c i s m s of t h e s o c i a l system.

Marcuse c l e a r l y believed t h a t t h i s i s t h e case more than when Karl Marx lived and

f i r s t used t h e term i n t h i s way.

Marcusefs argument c l e a r l y went beyond t h a t of Marx. Marcuse argued t h a t aware-

ness of t h e ideological nature of i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y has i t s e l f been integrated i n t o

 I

t h e ideology of our society. The pseudo-theories of t h e end-of-ideology theo-

r i s t s r e f l e c t t h i s thorough i n t e g r a t i o n of much of t h e i n t e l l i g e n t s i a i n t o t h e

dominant society. Not only a r e many i n t e l l e c t u a l s serving t h e dominant s o c i a l

groups through research, they a r e a l s o serving them by debunking a l l c r i t i c a l

ideas with t h e i r end-of -ideology pretenses.

Marcuse wrote t h a t

"... t h e debunking of an old ideology becomes p a r t of a new ideology. Not

only t h e i l l u s i o n s a r e debunked but a l s o t h e t r u t h i n those i l l u s i o n s . "5

Labelling s o c i a l t h e o r i e s t h a t were and/or a r e c r i t i c a l of e a r l y i n d u s t r i a l

s o c i e t i e s a s being t o t a l l y ideological, i.e., d i s t o r t i n g , f a i l s t o discriminate

between c r i t i c i s m s t h a t a r e s t i l l relevant and those t h a t have l o s t t h e i r v a l i d -

ity. Such debunking of t h e kind those t h a t make a r h e t o r i c a l separation between

science and ideology do of marxism does not help c l a r i f y t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l prob-

lems involved i n making such discriminations. Here Marcuse has helped show how

ignorance of t h e problem of ideology and t h e crude perpetuation of ideology re-

late.

Treating h i s t o r i c a l ideas t h a t imply c r i t i c i s m s of t h e present s o c i a l system

a s though they were t o t a l ideological d i s t o r t i o n s of s o c i a l r e a l i t y makes it e a s i e r

t o t r e a t t h e new h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n , and t h e ideas t h a t dominate i t , a s objective.

Treating c r i t i c a l ideas a s being t o t a l l y erroneous makes it e a s i e r t o convince people

t h a t t h e predominate s e t of ideas a r e accurate. Furthermore, severing t h e h i s t o r i c a l

connections between c r i t i c a l ideas from t h e past and those i n t h e present makes it

more d i f f i c u l t t o know how ideas a r e ideological. Instead of linking ideas t o a

c l a s s of problems and r e l a t e d s o c i a l consequences and evaluatirg t h e d i s t o r t i n g

e f f e c t of them i n t h i s context, t h e rupturing of t h e present from t h e past leads

people t o t r e a t ideas a s being t r u e or f a l s e per s. When t h i s i s done, it i s

 - 151 -
L

d i f f i c u l t t o know how ideas a r e ideological and what t h e ideology i s .

Like Mannheim, Marcuse gave t h e term "ideology" a general and t o t a l mean-

ing. There i s no end-of-ideology; t h e r e i s r a t h e r a change i n ideology. And t h e

new ideology gains c r e d i b i l i t y by stereotyping past s e t s of c r i t i c a l ideas i n t o t a l .

Marcuse sometimes saw t h e creation of ideology a s t h e s t r a t e g y f o r justifying t h e

dominant s e t o f b e l i e f s , not by focussing on those b e l i e f s p e r s e o r i n t h e i r his-

t o r i c a l context, but by making them credible without providing any d i r e c t evidence.

Present ideologies gain t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y by debunking past ideologies, not by a r -

gument or uses of reason. Our study has shown t h a t t h i s i s t h e method by which t h e

s c i e n t i s t i c ideology has gained c r e d i b i l i t y .

The Ideology of Descriptiveness

The sophisticated methods f o r creating ideology today have changed the char-

a c t e r , though not t h e function of ideology. According t o Marcuse, t h i s new character

of ideology r e l a t e s t o t h e p o s i t i v i s t i c nature of t h e dominant s o c i a l science. In

h i s words

"...t h e descriptive analysis of t h e f a c t s blocks t h e apprehension of f a c t s

and becomes an element o f t h e ideology t h a t sustains t h e f a c t s . Proclaiming
t h e e x i s t i n g s o c i a l r e a l i t y a s i t s own nomn, t h i s sociology f o r t i f i e s i n
t h e individuals t h e ' f a i t h l e s s f a i t h 1 i n t h e r e a l i t y whose victims they are:
!Nothing remains of ideology but t h e recognition of t h a t which is - model of
a behavior which submits t o the overwhelming power of t h e established s t a t e
of a f f a i r s 1 . " 6

To understand t h i s , we have t o understand how Marcuse viewed facts. To him

"facts" were never obvious nor rooted i n t h e common sense appearance of things.

Rather, it takes so-called "negative thought", c r i t i c a l and comparative reason, t o

discover t h e relationships, both h i s t o r i c a l and physical, t h a t give observations

meaning. Marcuse accepted Marx1s statement t h a t " ~ lscience

l would be superfluous,
 I

i f t h e appearance, t h e form, and the nature of things were wholly identical. " 7

The c u l t of description and f a c t u a l i t y f a i l s t o understand the meaning of f a c t s

o r t h e c r e a t i v e r o l e o f the human i n developing them. We have already discussed

how human choice, f o r example, the determination of significance, underlies t h e

c r e a t i o n of facts. Marcuse's notion of d i a l e c t i c a l reason or t h e negating of t h e

appearance o f things t o understand t h e essence - e.g., t h e contingencies - of

things i s i n sharp contrast t o analytic or p o s i t i v i s t notions of reason. 8

To understand Marcuse's view of f a c t s , it i s necessary t o understand t h e

Ideological r o l e t h a t Marcuse a t t r i b u t e d t o p o s i t i v i s t i c s o c i a l science. Posi-

tivism, a s a s e t of methods and rationales, provides t h e dominant society with

t o o l s f o r describing i t s e l f . It emphasizes t h e description of s o c i a l forms and

appearances, not t h e explanation of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s and therefore tends t o es-

t a b l i s h a body of knowledge t h a t reinforces t h e ideology t h a t j u s t i f i e s t h e domi-

nant forms of t h e society. As such it helps re-create t h e ideology of the society.

To understand Marcusels use of t h e term ideology we have t o approach words

i n a paradoxical manner and not i n terms of r e l i a b l e and consistent definitions.

I n t e r n a l consistency, a s we s h a l l see i n Chapter Sixteen, i s often a formal cover

f o r an ideological controversy. The term "fact" i s a case i n point. I n claiming

t h a t what passes a s a "fact" within p o s i t i v i s t i c s o c i a l science i s not a f a c t a t

a l l , Marcuse gave t h e word "fact" d i f f e r e n t meanings. He was r e a l l y arguing t h a t

i n f a i l i n g t o understand meanings i n r e l a t i o n t o underlying ideological orientations

we a r e understanding nothing. Failing t o do t h i s leads our thought t o be r e i f i e d t o

those objects and t h e dominant view of them t h a t advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s em-

phasize. Like Berlin, Marcuse i s saying t h a t only by contrasting f a c t s within

ideologies can we come t o understand t h e meanings o f facts. I f we lack comparative

thought, we lack r e a l thought.

 I

He approached t h e term "ideology" i n a s i m i l a r paradoxical way. Arguing

t h a t t h e t r u e t a s k of philosophy i s t o negate, and t h a t present philosophy does

not do t h i s , Marcuse wrote

"... philosophy c o n t r a d i c t s and p r o j e c t s

i n thought only. It i s ideology,
and t h i s ideological character i s t h e very f a t e of philosophy which no
s c i e n t i s m and positivism can overcome. "9

From t h i s we can s e e t h a t f o r Marcuse a philosophy which challenges what he c a l l e d

t h e "ideological empiricism"1 of t h e dominant s o c i a l science would i t s e l f be an

Ideology. Ideology was c l e a r l y not given a derogatory meaning by Marcuse. The

c h a r a c t e r and function of ideology, not t h e existence o r non-existence of ideology,

is what was v i t a l f o r him. The t'one-dimensional" ideology of advanced i n d u s t r i a l

s o c i e t i e s functions t o l e v e l out thought and behavior. It i s a t o t a l i t a r i a n ide-

ology. C r i t i c a l Philosophy, a s a counter ideology, can serve t o expose t h i s tend-

ency.

For Marcuse, ideology i s both t h e debunker of past ideology and t h e exposure

of t h e function of t h i s present debunking. The problem of ideology t h e r e f o r e must

be approached d i a l e c t i c a l l y and i n a h i s t o r i c a l ccntext. Treated i n a l o g i c a l ,

formal way, Marcuse's use of t h e term "ideology" seems nonsensical. However, when

t h e use is r e l a t e d t o h i s c r i t i c a l s o c i a l theory, it takes on a meaningful d e f i n i t i o n .

Perhaps t h e simple d i s t i n c t i o n Mannheim made between "utopia" and "ideology1' would

+
have avoided confusion over Marcuse's use of t h e term. For example, when Marcuse

wrote t h a t philosophy's It... ideological e f f o r t may be t r u l y therapeutic - t o show

r e a l i t y a s t h a t which it r e a l l y i s , and t o show t h a t which t h i s r e a l i t y prevents

from being (my emphasis)."ll Mannheimls notion of "utopia" seems t o apply. Mannheim

spoke of utopia a s a f u t u r i s t i c perspective, whereas t o him ideology was a j u s t i f i c a -

t i o n of t h e present s t a t e of a f f a i r s . That which cannot be because of t h e present

 I

s o c i a l system, but which i s s t r i v e n f o r , could be c a l l e d utopia, and philosophyls

t a s k t o reveal t h i s p o t e n t i a l i n t h e present.

Marcuse's phrase " t o show r e a l i t y a s t h a t which it t r u l y is" makes it c l e a r

t h a t he was not a r e l a t i v i s t . Though h i s use of "ideology" ( c a l l i n g both apologies

f o r , and past and present c r i t i c i s m s of t h e s o c i a l system ideologies) tended towards

r e l a t i v i s m , Marcuse c l e a r l y did b e l i e v e t h a t some ideas a r e more v a l i d than others.

It i s by analyzing t h e character and f u n c t i o n of a n ideology t h a t t h e b e t t e r ideas

w i l l be determined. Marcusels study amounted t o a r e j e c t i o n of l i b e r a l , p o s i t i v -

I
i s t i c ideas a s having a t o t a l i t a r i a n f'unction i n a n advanced i n d u s t r i a l s e t t i n g .

E
S t r u c t u r a l Analysis and Ideology

It follows from Marcuse's discussion t h a t new ideologies develop with new

forms of knowledge, i n new s o c i a l contexts. New functions and s t r u c t u r e s of knowledge

demand new ideological bases. I n c l a r i f y i n g t h e problem of ideology, our t a s k i s t o

draw out t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s and, i n t h e process, t o t r y t o bring more of t h e relevant

r e l a t i o n s h i p s between science and ideology i n t o t h e realm o f s e l f - c r i t i c i s m . To do

t h i s , and t h i s follows from Kuhnls t h e s i s a s well a s Marcusels, a new, more i n c l u s i v e

"paradigm" o r ideology i s required.

This i s not a vicious c i r c l e , a s I have s a i d already. It i s only seen a s such

i f a person goes on thinking within a s p e c i f i c ideology-science scheme which ignores

t h e problem of ideology. O f course, it w i l l be incomprehensible t o those who t h i n k

they a r e value-free o r objective, since they a r e unable t o be s e l f - c r i t i c a l and come

t o recognize t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e i r own academic work and t h e s o c i a l conse-

quences of t h e p a r t i c u l a r s t r u c t u r e and f u n c t i o n of knowledge within which they do t h a t

work.

Marcuse's handling o f t h e problem of ideology advances our discussion, s i n c e

he showed how ignorance about t h e problem r e s u l t s from t h e character of t h e new

ideologies of advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s . Awareness of present ideology i s

retarded by concentrating on t h e debunking of a stereotyped version of past ide-

ologies. Positivism a i d s i n t h i s t a s k by equating t h e description of t h e present /

s t a t e of a f f a i r s with being objective. This d e s c r i p t i v e mentality o b l i t e r a t e s t h e

c r i t i c a l theory which is required i f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between events, s t r u c t u r e s ,

*6
power and ideas a r e ever t o be understood. These r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e what underlie

t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l problem of ideology and they a r e what Marcuse attempted t o expose.

Marcuse's method of exposing t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s , however, remained super-

ficial. Though he implied t h a t ideology functioned within s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s , he

did not do a s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s of ideology. His t h e s i s on t h e one-dimensional

s o c i e t y was based more on an ideological a n a l y s i s of ideology, t h a t i s , t h e counter

posing of one s e t of ideas (e.g., d i a l e c t i c i d e a s ) against another s e t (e. g. , ana-

l y t i c i d e a s ) , than on an a n a l y s i s t h a t s i t u a t e d ideas within a s t r u c t u r a l s e t t i n g .

Marcuse can r i g h t l y be c r i t i c i z e d f o r being academic, r a t h e r than h i s t o r i c a l , i n

h i s criticism.

Because Marcuse's c r i t i c i s m s tended t o be academic, h i s own study had a one-

dimensionality. I n only- d t h e t o t a l i t a r i a n character and function of ide-

ology, Marcuse can be accused of having h i s own form of positivism. P o l i t i c a l con-

f l i c t s since t h e publishing of One-Dimensional Man i n 1964 have established an ide-

ological s t r u g g l e on t h i s continent and Marcuse's somewhat f a t a l i s t i c handling of

t h e end-of-ideology ideology appears s u p e r f i c i a l i n retrospect. His f a i l u r e t o do

a s t r u c t u r a l analysis of ideology led him t o formalize t h e dominant myths of t h i s

s o c i e t y and t o f a l s e l y a t t r i b u t e an h i s t o r i c a l autonomy t o them.

A recent review of Marcuse's philosophy makes these same c r i t i c i s m s .

 ,
"The tznifyine: idea i n Marcuse's l a t e work i s precisely t h e notion of One-
Dimensionality, which c o l r e c t s h i s statements reporting t h e disappearance
of c o n f l i c t i n t h e monochrome c u l t u r e of t h e machine. The amities mentioned
e a r l i e r a r e amalgamated i n Hegelian fashion: they a r e equal manifestations
of t h e Lack of Conflict which j u s t i f i e s t h e book's t i t l e . The p r o l e t a r i a t
f r a t e r n i z e s with t h e bourgeoisie, philosophy has no quarrel with t h e world,
t h e works of Shakespeare a r e sold i n t h e drugstore. But t h e mergers of these
once opposed universes a r e not s t r u c t u r a l l y connected i n t h e book. Their d i f -
f e r e n t i a t e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e t t i n g s become i r r e l e v a n t : each i s just an expres- d
s i o n of t h e merging common t o them all."12

When t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e t t i n g s within which ideologies function become i r r e l e v a n t

t o s o c i a l c r i t i c i s m t h e r e is a tendency t o reduce s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s t o t h e "basic

categorf es" of t h e dominant ideology. No h i s t o r i c a l perspective nor s c i e n t i f i c

understanding of t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s i s possible i f they a r e not studied i n a

d i a l e c t i c way. D i a l e c t i c reason without d i a l e c t i c research becomes a s academic and

formal a s a n a l y t i c reason with or without p o s i t i v i s t i c research.

Marcuse f a i l e d t o d i s t i n g u i s h "... between productive a c t i v i t y and t h e ide-

o l o g i c a l a c t i v i t i e s surrounding it. "13 H i s a n a l y s i s of t h e ideology of advanced

i n d u s t r i a l i s m was more a c r i t i c i s m of t h e dominant ideas than of t h e workings of t h e

society. Since t h e problem of ideology i s not rooted s o l e l y i n t h e c r i t i c i s m of ideas

but i n r e l a t i n g t h e s o c i a l arrangement of science t o t h e character and consequences

of science, Marcuse Is approach t o ideology demands basic c r i t i c i s m .

Marcuse's philosophy stood i n opposition t o t h e dominant ideology of t h i s

society. A s such, it had t h e seeds of t h e ideological s t r u g g l e t h a t has since devel-

oped. I n a sense, h i s academic c r i t i c i s m s of dominant ideas preceded t h e more prag-

matic and a c t i v i s t c r i t i c i s m of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s t h a t a r e now occurring within North

America. Cohen was c o r r e c t when he s a i d t h a t student r a d i c a l s , who were i n i t i a l l y

influenced by Marcuse, now "... a c t i n order t o negate t h e r e a l i t y he described, even

i f t h a t e n t a i l s negating h i s theory a t t h e same time."14

 Footnotes
**

b e r b e r t Marcuse: One-Dimensional Man. Boston, Beacon Press (1964).

2 ~remainst debatable whether Marcusels approach c o n s t i t u t e s a r e j e c t i o n of marxian

c l a s s a n a l y s i s and c l a s s struggle. Arguing t h a t a l i e n a t i o n i s no longer s u b j e c t i v e l y
experienced implies such a r e j e c t i o n since it denies t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of revolutionary
consciousness developing a s people r e l a t e t h e i r a l i e n a t i o n t o t h e contradictions i n
s o c i a l and economic structures. Whether or not one accepts t h e marxian view of c l a s s
s t r u g g l e , Marcuse's argument i t s e l f seems one-dimensional. For an approach t o aliena-
t i o n based on r a d i c a l psychiatry, and not ignoring t h e d i a l e c t i c s of s u b j e c t i v i t y , s e e
R.D. Laing: The Divided Self. Penguin ( 1960).

7 ~ .Selsam and H. Martel ( eds. ) : Reader I n Marxist Philosoph~. New York,

I n t e r n a t i o n a l Publishers ( 1963), p. 138.

' ~ a r c u s e l s notion of d i a l e c t i c reason accounts f o r t h e problem of ideology and

emphasizes a form of knowledge not based on t h e f a l s e d i s t i n c t i o n s of scientism. As
Marcuse wrote " ~ i a l e c t i c a lthought i n v a l i d a t e s t h e a p r i o r i opposition of value and
f a c t by understanding a l l f a c t s a s stages of a s i n g l e process -a process i n which
subject and object a r e so joined t h a t t r u t h can be determined only within t h e sub-
ject-object t o t a l i t y . " Reason and Revolution. Boston, Beacon ( 19601, p. v i i i .

9Marcuse: One-Dimensf onal Man, op. c i t . , p. 199.

1 2 ~ e r r yCohen: The Philosophy of Marcuse. New Left Review, No. 57, Sept.-Oct. 1969,
p. 42.
 Chapter Ten

The End of t h e End-of-Ideology: C.W. Mills

I n C. Wright M i l l s ' work, we f i n d a f u r t h e r c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h e

problem of ideology. Mills was d i r e c t l y concerned with t h e functioning of ideas

a s ideologies w i t h i n a s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . He, unlike Marcuse, was aware of t h e need

t o do a s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s of ideologies. I n h i s words:

" ~ u s ta s t h e basic o u t l i n e of t h e p o l i t i c a l and economic s t r u c t u r e i s

teased out from t h e l e g a l and d o c t r i n a l verbiage, so a r e t h e ideologies
of t h e regime explained i n terms of t h e composition and developmental
t r e n d s of t h e s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e and i t s various s t r a t a . Ideologies and
s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e a r e seen conjointly, which i s t h e only way t o see
e i t h e r i n accurate and t e l l i n g focus. For i n some s i t u a t i o n s nothing
t h a t i s s a i d can be taken a t i t s f a c e value, and it is more important
t o know meanings than t o t e s t f o r t r u t h . Indeed, t h e way t o p o l i t i c a l
r e a l i t y i s through ideological analysis. "l

For Mills, ideological a n a l y s i s was e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e s o c i a l sciences. The

meaning of ideas t o those who believe them i s more v i t a l than an a b s t r a c t search f o r

t h e t r u t h of ideas. Undertaking t h i s form of a n a l y s i s i s what makes s o c i a l sciences

aware of t h e implications of t h e problem of ideology f o r i t s e l f . And, a s I have argued

before, it i s t h e lack of such analysis t h a t allows scientism t o develop. Ideological

a n a l y s i s i s needed t o make us aware of t h e way t h e c l a s s of problems with which science

d e a l s i n t e r r e l a t e with t h e s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e and t h e s c i e n t i s t s 1 place i n it.

The Rise and F a l l of Ideology

Mills suggested some s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s between ideology and s o c i a l s t r u c -

ture. He claimed t h a t It... ideologies usually a r i s e a s a response t o an e f f e c t i v e

debunking of power.lt2 This claim r e l a t e d t o M i l l s 1 general d e f i n i t i o n of ideology a s

 I

" p o l i t i c a l r h e t o r i c " which j u s t l f i c s "... c e r t a i n i n s t i t u t i o n s and p r a c t i c e s , demand-

ing and expecting other^."^ There has c l e a r l y been an increase i n t h e p o l i t i c a l

r h e t o r i c about t h e need f o r law and order and t h e need f o r revolution, s i n c e t h e

m i l i t a n t student and black movements have developed, and t h e war and opposition t o

t h e war i n Vietnam has escalated. Are we t o conclude t h a t these movements a r e "ef-

f e c t i v e l y debunking power" and t h e r e i s t h e r e f o r e t h e need f o r more and more ideology

t o t r y t o j u s t i f y t h e p o l i c i e s and e f f e c t s of t h a t power system? This i s what M i l l s t

argument would Imply.

Mills' a n a l y s i s of t h e "end-of-ideology" proponents gives us f u r t h e r i n s i g h t

i n t o h i s handling of t h e problem of ideology. About t h e end-of-ideology M i l l s wrote

" P r a c t i t i o n e r s of t h e no-more-ideology school do of course smuggle i n general

ideas under t h e guise of reportage, by i n t e l l e c t u a l gossip, and by t h e i r se-
l e c t i o n of t h e notions they handle. Ultimately, t h e end-of-ideology i s based
upon a disillusionment with any r e a l commitment t o socialism i n any recogniz-
a b l e form. That is t h e only "ideology" t h a t has r e a l l y ended f o r t h e s e writers.
But with i t s ending, all ideology, they t h i n k , has ended. That ideology they
t a l k about; t h e i r own ideological assumptions, they do not. "4

Here he was claiming t h a t an ideology e x i s t s behind t h e facade of o b j e c t i v i t y presented

by t h e s e t h e o r i s t s . Our discussion has already shown t h e s u p e r f i c i a l i t y of any such

end-of-ideology r a t i o n a l e . But Mills had a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , perhaps even an explana-

t i o n , f o r t h i s pretense of an end-of-ideology.

On t h i s matter, Mills wrote t h a t "1f t h e phrase lend-of-ideology! has any

meaning a t a l l , it p e r t a i n s t o s e l f - s e l e c t e d c i r c l e s of i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n t h e r i c h e r

countries. It i s I n f a c t only t h e i r s e l f image." He then continued t h a t

"... t h e end-of-ideology i s of course i t s e l f an ideology -

a fragmentary one,
t o be sure, and perhaps more a mood. ( I t ) i s i n r e a l i t y t h e ideology of an
ending: t h e ending of p o l i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n i t s e l f a s public f a c t . "5

We s e e here a common theme between M i l l s and Marcuse. Marcuse1s overriding concern

was with t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of c r i t i c a l philosophy i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s .

 - 160 -
I

H i s work was an attempt t o make up f o r t h i s deficiency. Mills spoke of t h e end-of-

ideology proponents a s apologists f o r t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s , f o r t h e end t o " p o l i t i c a l

r e f l e c t i o n " , i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l and r i c h e r s o c i e t i e s . Marcuse a l s o spoke of " t h e

debunking of a n old ideology becoming p a r t of a new one". Mills made t h i s same gen-

e r a l point by saying t h a t "...t h e end-of-ideology is very l a r g e l y a mechanical - not

a c r e a t i v e response - t o t h e ideology of Stalinism."6 The difference between Marcuse

and Mills l i e s i n Mills t r e a t i n g t h e end-of-ideologists a s a h i s t o r i c a l fad, while

Marcuse tended t o over-react with a t o t a l theory of s o c i a l c o n t r o l and s o c i a l i n t e -

gration. M i l l s saw t h e end of t h e fad, while Marcuse was unprepared.

Mlllsl argument t h a t ideology develops a s power is debunked can be r e l a t e d t o

h i s c a l l i n g t h e end-of-ideology p o s i t i o n a "mood". When t h e position was being devel-

oped, most notably by Daniel ~ e 1 1 t,h~e r e was f a r more ideological homogeneity i n t h e

United S t a t e s than e x i s t s a t present. A simple r h e t o r i c , r a t h e r than an inclusive

ideology, was then s u f f i c i e n t t o l e g i t i m a t i z e t h e dominant s o c i e t y and i t s uses of

power. A s p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i f i e d , t h e end-of-ideology rhetoric

was quickly replaced by more e x p l i c i t j u s t i f i c a t i o n s and c r i t i c i s m s of dominant in-

stitutions. Among i n t e l l e c t u a l c i r c l e s , t h i s i s a l s o beginning t o occur. Radical

(e.g., s o c i a l i s t ) , l i b e r a l and conservative p o s i t i o n s , each combining c r i t i c i s m s and/

or j u s t i f i c a t i o n s of dominant i n s t i t u t i o n s i n p a r t i c u l a r ways, have a l l become more

e x p l i c i t a s p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t has increased.

M i l l s foresaw t h i s f a s t decline of t h e end-of-ideology rhetoric. I n 1960,

he wrote t h a t h he end-of-ideology i s on t h e way out because it stands f o r t h e r e f u s a l

t o work out an e x p l i c i t p o l i t i c a l philosophy. "8 As an "ideology of p o l i t i c a l compla-

cency" it could not serve t h e i n t e r e s t s of power groups i n a s o c i e t y increasingly

r i f e with c o ~ l i c t 9.
 I

We can see from t h i s how Mills used t h e concept of "ideologyt'. He saw a l l

s o c i a l thought, including s o c l a l science, a s having a n ideological foundation.

Though t h e end-of-ideology proponents probably took t h e i r self-image q u i t e serious-

l y , and may have believed they were above p a r t i s a n p o l i t i c s , Mills pointed out t h a t

"It i s a kindergarten f a c t t h a t any p o l i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n t h a t i s of possible public

significance is ideological: i n i t s terms, p o l i c i e s , i n s t i t u t i o n s , men of power a r e

c r i t i c i z e d o r approved."10 Certainly, t h e claim by many academics t h a t t h e United

S t a t e s i s beyond ideology has served t o l e g i t i m i z e t h e "men of power" and t h e poli-

c i e s t h a t they have others c a r r y out.

The way Mills r e l a t e d "ideology" and " p o l i t i c a l philosophy" needs some

clarification. Often he used t h e term ideology t o debunk ideas, a s when he wrote

of The Professional I d e o l o m of Social ~ a t h o 1 o g i S t s . l ' I n t h a t paper, he used t h e

term t o depict t h e f a i l u r e of much of American sociology t o l i n k t h e i r " c r i t i c i s m

of milieux" with a c r i t i c i s m of t h e s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e i t s e l f . A professional myopia

kept many s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s from seeing t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and, according t o Mills,

t h i s made t h e i r conclusions ideological. Not dealing with structural-milieux r e l a -

t i o n s h i p s , t h e " s o c i a l problems" of t h e s o c i e t y were seen a s i s o l a t e d phenomenon and

t h e s o c i e t y a s a whole remained unchallenged, l e t alone u n i n t e l l i g i b l e .

I n other places, Mills linked t h e term "ideology" t o t h e a c t u a l study of

t h e s e s t r u c t u r a l questions. He equated " s t r u c t u r a l questions and basic ideology 11 12

with both being seen a s fundamental t o a n explanatory, i . e . , h i s t o r i c a l sociology.

What Mills c a l l e d "basic ideology" thus took on a p o s i t i v e connotation: t h e term

ideology was not associated with d i s t o r t i n g t h e nature of s o c i a l relationships. Here,

a s with Marcuse, we see two d i f f e r e n t uses of t h e term. One use i s attached t o a

p o s i t i o n t h a t i s considered t o be f a l l a c i o u s . The other use i s attached t o t h e

c r i t i c i s m of t h a t position.

This ambiguity i n both Marcusels and Mills' use of t h e term ideology i s in-

d i c a t i v e of t h e i r f a i l u r e t o deal e x p l i c i t l y , i . e . , conceptually, with t h e problem

of ideology. Their work implies t h e problem of ideology, but they never e s t a b l i s h -

ed t h e problem, a s a problem, around which other questions could f a l l i n t o place.

Neither made t h e e r r o r of looking f o r a b s t r a c t t r u t h , and hence f o r t h e a b o l i t i o n

of ideology. Both made d i s t i n c t i o n s between v a l i d and d i s t o r t i q ideas about soci-

ety. And both saw p o l i t i c a l or c r i t i c a l philosophy a s c e n t r a l t o t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n .

But both f a i l e d t o put these i n s i g h t s together. Otherwise, t h e i r use of "ideology"

would have drawn out t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t , i n t e l l e c t u a l

c l a s s e s of problems, and t h e s o c i a l consequences of dealing with one c l a s s over an-

other.

Mills1 Typology of Ideology

Mills d i d not accomplish t h i s t a s k , but he did c r e a t e a typology t h a t can

point us i n t h e needed direction. He used t h i s typology of " p o l i t i c a l philosophy"

t o expose t h e s u p e r f i c i a l i t y of t h e end-of-ideology t h e o r i s t s . Since t h e p o s i t i o n

of t h e s e t h e o r i s t s runs through a l l t h e s u p e r f i c i a l approaches t o t h e problem of ide-

ology, it i s worth discussing Mills1 c r i t i c i s m s i n depth.

I n h i s l a s t book, The Marxists, Mills defined a p o l i t i c a l philosophy a s having

four aspects. He wrote

-
" ~ i r s tof a l l , a p o l i t i c a l philosophy i s i t s e l f a s o c i a l r e a l i t y ; it I s an
ideolopz i n terms of which c e r t a i n institutions and p r a c t i c e s a r e j u s t i f i e d
and others attacked; it provides t h e phrases i n which demands a r e r a i s e d ,
c r i t i c i s m s made, exhortat ions delivered, proclamations formulated and, a t
times , p o l l c i e s determined.
-
Second, it i s an e t h i c , an a r t i c u l a t i o n of Ideals which on various l e v e l s
 of g e n e r a l i t y and s o p h i s t i c a t i o n i s used i n Judging men, events and
movements, and a s goals and guidelines f o r a s p i r a t i o n s and p o l i c i e s .
-
Third, a p o l i t i c a l philosophy designates afcencies of a c t i o n , of t h e
means of reform, revolution, or conservation. 1t' contains s t r a t e g i e s
and programs t h a t embody both ends and means. It designates, i n s h o r t ,
t h e h i s t o r i c a l l e v e r s by which ideas a r e t o be won o r maintained a f t e r
they have been won.
Fourth, it contains t h e o r i e s of man, s o c i e t y and h i s t o r y , or a t l e a s t
assumptions about how s o c i e t y i s made up and how it works; about what
i s held t o be i t s most important elements and how these elements a r e
t y p i c a l l y r e l a t e d ; i t s major points of c o n f l i c t and how these con-
f l i c t s a r e resolved. It suggests t h e methods of study appropriate t o
i t s theories. From t h e s e t h e o r i e s and with t h e s e methods, expectations
a r e derived. " I 3

Then, applying t h i s typology t o t h e end-of-ideology t h e o r i s t s , Mills concluded f o u r

things. F i r s t , t h e i r ideology was used t o l e g i t i m i z e t h e s t a t u s quo. Second, i t s

theory of s o c i e t y is shallow because of a "fetishism of empiricism"14 which narrows

i t s study t o t h a t of s p e c i f i c milieux. Third, t h e problem of an agency of s o c i a l

change i s not even posed a s an i n t e l l e c t u a l problem. And f o u r t h , t h e end-of-ideology

proponents deny t h e very relevance of i d e a l s ; c a l l i n g a l l indications of idealism

( n o t used a s i n "philosophical idealism") "utopian", t h e term being used i n a pejo-

r a t i v e way.

On a l l four counts t h e end-of-ideology proponents lack sophistication.

Mills' c r i t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e typology doomed t h e end-of-ideology p o s i t i o n t o

be f o r g o t t e n within i n t e l l e c t u a l history. I n ignorning t h e very problem of ideology,

t h e end-of-ideology p o s i t i o n has no i n t e l l e c t u a l defense against t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l and

p o l i t i c a l c r i t i c i s m s t h a t a r e being l e v e l l e d a g a i n s t it on t h i s continent. When under

a t t a c k , t h e end-of-ideology pretense becomes reduced t o pure rhetoric.

One has t o ask why t h e r e i s no p o l i t i c a l philosophy t o help j u s t i f y t h e power

groups i n our society. What, i f anything, does t h i s have t o do with t h e very nature

of t h e power? M i l l s gave us a c l u e t o t h i s question when he wrote t h a t " ~ d e o l o g y ,

a s t h e public f a c e of a p o l i t i c a l philosophy, very o f t e n becomes simply myth o r folk-

 I

l o r e ; very often too, even a minimum of ideology withers away: a l l that i s l e f t

B
i s an empty and i r r e l e v a n t rhetoric."15 The end-of-ideology rhetoric i s a l l that

i s l e f t of l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l philosophy a t a time when capitalism has become s t a t e

capitalism and has l o s t a l l pretense of being l i b e r a l . The r o l e of t h e United

S t a t e s i n t h e world, e s p e c i a l l y i n Vietnam, has peeled away t h e l i b e r a l r h e t o r i c ,

and, a s t h i s has occurred, t h e academic apologists f o r t h e dominant society have

a l s o been exposed. They have been shown t o have no "basic ideology" o r p o l i t i c a l

philosophy. Their j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r t h e dominant i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e without h i s t o r -

i c a l substance. But more important, t h e i r "... doctrine i t s e l f has become banalized

and, i n t h e process, emptied of much of i t s moral f o r c e and i n t e l l e c t u a l cogency. 11 16

One author has w r i t t e n t h a t " ~ i b e r a l i s mi n t h i s country is dead and t h e end-

of-ideology i s i t s legacy. 1117 This is c o n s i s t e n t with M i l l s r argument. With t h e

s h i f t i n s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s t h a t have l e d t o t h e i m p e r i a l i s t character of t h e United

S t a t e s any past c r e d i b i l i t y f o r l i b e r a l r a t i o n a l e s i n t h e society has been l o s t .

This i s why l i b e r a l academics constantly t r e a t l i b e r a l values i n a b s t r a c t from s o c i a l

realities. Having no s o c i a l r e a l i t y under s t a t e capitalism become imperialism, l i b -

eralism must be made i n t o a n a b s t r a c t , unexamined r h e t o r i c . This a b s t r a c t analysis

shows how t h e ideology of scientism functions t o cloak over t h e s o c i a l contradictions

of s t a t e capitalism and, a s such, plays a n ideological r o l e f o r t h e power groups of

t h e society.

What i s it t h a t gives c e r t a i n ideas a "moral force" and " i n t e l l e c t u a l

cogencyu? This question w i l l not occur t o those who t r e a t ideas academically; who

a b s t r a c t academic languages from t h e t a s k of c r i t i c a l l y evaluating s o c i a l and his-

t o r i c a l events. It w i l l not occur t o those whose function i s t o perpetuate myths

t h a t j u s t i f y t h e dominant society. It w i l l not occur t o those who have more commit-

 - 165 -
I

ment t o corporate i n s t i t u t i o n s than t o the t a s k of inclusive, c r i t i c a l , i n t e l l e c t u a l

work. O r , t o take us f u l l c i r c l e , those who deny the existence of t h e problem of

ideology w i l l be l e f t with naked ideology once t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l foundations on

which t h e i r rhetoric r e s t s begin t o crumble.

The end-of-ideology proponents pre-determine t h e i r own i n t e l l e c t u a l suicide.

They r e l y on s t a b i l i t y i n t h e dominant i n s t i t u t i o n s t o maintain t h e i r self-image and

rhetoric. When t h a t s t a b i l i t y i s gone, a s i t increasingly i s i n North American uni-

v e r s i t i e s , the end-of-ideology l i b e r a l s a r e unable t o t r e a t t h e c o n f l i c t i n an in-

t e l l e c t u a l manner. Not having done t h e i r homework, they tend t o i r r a t i o n a l i t y when

peeled o f t h e i r self-image. A s M i l l s stated

"With d i s t a s t e , they r e t r e a t from a l l "ideology"; they a r e uninterested i n

l a r g e r "theory", and they neither possess nor even t r y t o designate agen-
c i e s of action. They become i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e "pragmatic1' and t h e "piece-
meal1'. Facts may be acknowledged, but only i n a scattered way; they a r e
not connected with each other o r with l a r g e r theories and c e r t a i n l y not
with d e f i n i t e programs. "I8

Millst typology raised another relevant point. After arguing t h a t a f e -

tishism with empiricism makes it impossible t o develop adequate theories of society,

and t h a t such a lack focusses on t h e symptoms r a t h e r than the roots of s o c i a l prob-

lems, M i l l s concluded "Thus p o l i t i c a l bias masquerades a s epistemological excel-

lence."lg Here a r e l a t i o n s h i p between p o l i t i c a l philosophy and theories of knowledge

was being suggested. From t h i s , we can i n f e r t h a t theories of knowledge a r e them-

selves ideological. Marcuse already suggested such a relationship when he r e l a t e d

one-dimensional ideology and p o s i t i v i s t i c s o c i a l science. I n our e a r l i e r discussions

we saw how academic epistemologies function t o cloak t h e problem of ideology, and, a s

such, have a crude ideological nature.

The search f o r these relationships i s c e n t r a l t o t h e problem of ideology

i n t h e s o c i a l sciences. I n t h e second section, I w i l l undertake a detailed ide-

ological a n a l y s i s of epistemological theories. Mills succeeded i n bringing t h e

r e l a t i o n s h i p out by showing how t h e end-of-ideology position r e l a t e d t o a narrow

and a b s t r a c t epistemology and t o a s u p e r f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l philosophy t h a t served

t o j u s t i f y t h e power s t r u c t u r e i n t h e United States.

Mills, own study of Karl Mannheimts work made him f u l l y aware of t h i s

question. About Mannheim he wrote

"Mannheimls " t o t a l , absolute, and universal" type of "ideology" i n which

s o c i a l p o s i t i o n bears upon " t h e s t r u c t u r e of consciousness i n i t s to-
t a l i t y " , Including form a s well a s content, may be i n t e r p r e t e d t o mean
t h i s s o c i a l - h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i v i z a t i o n of a model of t r u t h , or t h e in-
fluence of a " s o c i a l position" upon "choice" of one model a s over
a g a i n s t another. Mannheimls remarks do not c o n t r a d i c t t h i s more e x p l i c i t
and a n a l y t i c statement. "20

M i l l s suggested a r e l a t i o n s h i p between "models of t r u t h " o r " v e r i f i c a t o r y models",

a s M i l l s c a l l e d them elsewhere, and one's s o c i a l experience and position. Though

not recognized by those with narrow academic commitments, t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p has a

general v a l i d i t y because i t i s through it t h a t we can t a c k l e t h e many problems t h a t

t h e problem of ideology exposes. Therefore, dealing with t h e problem of ideology

has a pragmatic function i n s o c i a l science research. It opens up new problems,

otherwise ignored. It allows new i n t e l l e c t u a l content, with a c r i t i c a l p o l i t i c a l

function, t o be developed. It i s , a t one l e v e l , a n attempt t o change t h e c l a s s of

problems with which s o c i a l science deals. It is, t h e r e f o r e , an ideological matter

t o r a i s e t h e problem of ideology.

Because of h i s awareness of t h e relevance of t h e problem of ideology, Mills

recognized t h e value of Marx1s work. About Marx he wrote "NO oAe who does not come

t o g r i p s with t h e ideas of marxisrn can be an adequate s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t ; no one who

believes t h a t marxism contains t h e l a s t word can be one either.lt21 You w i l l r e c a l l

MacRaels stereotyped handling of Marx i n Chapter ~ h r e e . His

~ ~ e r r o r was i n believing
 I

h i s own sociological jargon and f a i l i n g t o c r i t i c a l l y analyze what he meant by

"science" and "ideology". Once evaluated, h i s meanings proved t o be contradic-

t o r y and s u p e r f i c i a l . MacRae f a i l e d t o come t o g r i p s with t h e ideas of marxism.

But those who t r e a t marxism r e l i g i o u s l y a r e a l s o unable t o come t o g r i p s

with t h e problem of ideology, br t o s e e how Marx and Engels helped t o c l a r i f y it

themselves. It i s equally f a l l a c i o u s t o stereotype Marxls thought from t h e l e f t

or the right. And some i n t e r e s t i n g s i m i l a r i t i e s e x i s t i n t h e way both forms of

stereotyping a r e done. The p o l i t i c s may be d i f f e r e n t , but t h e academic approach

t o ideas i s not. Therefore, r a i s i n g t h e problem of ideology implies an ideolog-

i c a l s t r u g g l e against both t h e end-of-ideology l i b e r a l academics and t h e vulgar

marxists. To show why t h i s is t h e case I w i l l t u r n t o a discussion of S a r t r e ,

Footnotes

'c.w. M i l l s : The Nazi Behemoth, i n I.L. Horowitz (ed. ): Power, P o l i t i c s and

People. New York, Ballantine ( 19631 , p. 176.

2 ~ . ~Mills:
. The S t r u c t u r e of Power i n American Society, i b i d . , p. 24.

3 ~ . ~M i.l l s : The Marxists, op. c i t . , p. 12.

4 ~ . ~M i. l l s : The New Left. Power, P o l i t i c s and People, p. 248.

7 ~ a n i e lBell: The End of I d e o l o a . New York, C o l l i e r Books ( 1961). B e l l based h i s

argument upon a s u p e r f i c i a l , and, i n some cases, d i s t o r t e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e ideas
of Marx and Mannheim. He showed t h i s i n h i s Epilogue t o TheE There nd
he consistently equated Marx1s theory with t h e vulgar marxism developed since S t a l i n -
ism. For example, he f a l s e l y s t a t e d t h a t Marx believed t h a t t h e r e only existed " c l a s s
t r u t h " and saw no autonomy f o r science. This f a l s e a t t r i b u t i o n of r e d u c t i o n i s t i c
thought t o Marx was r e l a t e d t o B e l l ' s misrepresentation of Marx's theory of c l a s s .
Though Marx c o n s i s t e n t l y analyzed " c l a s s " i n terms of t h e control of means of produc-
t i o n , B e l l talked of Marx1s theory a s i f it was based on an analysis of t h e d i s t r i b u -
t i o n of property. He misrepresented Mannheimls ideas t o f u r t h e r r a t i o n a l i z e h i s f a l s e
equation of Marx and vulgar marxism. We saw i n Chapter Two how Mannheimls concepts of
 ideology ( e.g. , t o t a l , p a r t i c u l a r ; s p e c i f i c , general) were meaningful only i f used
comparatively. Yet B e l l abstracted t h e idea of " t o t a l " ideology and equated it t o
a "secular religion1'. Then, t a l k i n g l i k e a neo-freudian, he s t a t e d t h a t "...
ide-
ology fuses these ( r e l i g i o u s ) energies and channels them i n t o p o l i t i c s . " (Ibid.,
p. 400.) H i s equation of secular r e l i g i o n and t o t a l ideology not only f a l s i f i e d
Mannheimts a n a l y s i s , it amounted t o a r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n f o r ignoring t h e problem of
ideology and hence ignoring t h e ideological foundation of h i s own ideas. When he
wrote t h a t "... t h e ideologiAal age has ended" ( I b i d . , p. 403) and t h a t "... few
i s s u e s can be formulated any more, i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , i n ideological forms" ( I b i d . ,
p. 404), he showed h i s ignorance of t h e problem of ideology. There i s no "ideol-
o g i c a l age", though, a s M i l l s showed, a p a r t i c u l a r ideological r h e t o r i c ( e. g. ,
liberalism, Stalinism) can l o s e i t s c r e d i b i l i t y under new conditions. And ideology
i s not a terminological question. The problem of ideology focusses on s o c i a l r e -
l a t i o n s , which include i n t e l l e c t u a l languages, not on l i n g u i s t i c s p e r se. Further-
more, B e l l misused Mannheimls d i s t i n c t i o n between "utopia" and "ideology" t o f u r t h e r
shore up h i s ignorance. When he wrote t h a t h he end-of-ideology i s not - should not-
be - t h e end of utopia a s well" ( I b i d . , p. 4O5), he was giving utopia an a bstract
academic meaning removed from t h e present p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of ideological strug-
g3e. This utopianism c o n s t i t u t e s an ideological p o s i t i o n because such a separation
of t h e f i t u r e from t h e past and present, a s Marcuse showed, functions t o mystify t h e
present s o c i a l conditions. When B e l l wrote t h a t "1f t h e end-of-ideology has any
. . meaning, it i s t o ask f o r t h e end of r h e t o r i c ... " ( Ibid. , p. 4061, showed t h a t
a n academic o r i e n t a t i o n (e.g., t h e ideology of scientism) had pervaded h i s whole
thought. The problem of ideology t o Marx or Mannheim was not t h e problem of r h e t o r i c .
Rhetoric i s t h e a b s t r a c t use of language which, upon examination, proves t o cover over
c r u c i a l i n t e l l e c t u a l and p r a c t i c a l problems. Mills, not Bell, prophesied t h e end of
r h e t o r i c when he foresaw t h e end of t h e end-of-ideology.

*c.w. Mills: The New Left, ibid., p. 251.

9~ new version of t h e end-of-ideology ideology has developed with t h e a s s i s t a n c e of

t h e academic languages of "general systems theory" and "behavioral science". The new
version has a more d i r e c t function within t h e corporate s o c i e t y evolving on t h i s con-
t i n e n t . The absurdity of t h e reformed version i s shown by t h e following meaningless
r h e t o r i c : "1f t h e r e i s any ideological p e c u l i a r i t y appropriate t o t h e achievement of
t h e t r a n s i t i o n it is n e i t h e r c a p i t a l i s m nor socialism but t h e s c i e n t i f i c ideology it-
s e l f applied t o society. A n ideology f o r t h e g r e a t t r a n s i t i o n must then be a s t r a t e g y
r a t h e r t h a n an ideology." (K. Boulding, quoted i n R. Kostelanetz: Beyond Left and
Right. New York, William Morrow (1968). ) We have already c r i t i c i z e d t h e notion of
" s c i e n t i f i c ideology" i n Chapters Four and Five. Boulding's word games which both
equated and d i f f e r e n t i a t e d "ideology" and " s t r a t e g y " i n t h e same sentence r e f l e c t t h e
continued f a i l u r e of academics t o c r e a t e a value-free or a p o l i t i c a l science. The
attempt t o transcend p o l i t i c s ensures t h e continued ignorance of t h e problem of Ide-
ology and i t s implications f o r s o c i a l science.

1C.W. Mills, op. c i t . , p. 251.

llC.W. M i l l s , op. c i t . , PP. 525-52.

 - 169 -
I

12c.w. Mills: The New Left, ibid., p. 250.

13c. W. Mills: a mar xi st^, op. c i t . , pp. 12-13.

14c.W, Mills: The New Left, op. c i t . , p. 252.

l5e.w. Mills: The b'Iarxists, op. c i t . , p. 17.

%bid., p. 21.

17stephen W. Rousseas and James Farganis: American P o l i t i c s and t h e End 'of

Ideology, i n I.L. Horowitz: The New Sociology. New York, Oxford University Press
( 19651, P. 287.

18c.w, Mills: The Marxists, op. c i t . , p. 18. 1

19c.w. Mills: The New Left, op. c i t . r p. 252.

2 0 ~ . ~M, i l l s : Methodological Consequences of t h e Sociology of Knowledge, ibid.,

P* 457.

2 1 ~ . ~ .M i l l s : The Marxists, op. c i t . , p. 11.

2 2 ~ e ep. 56 above.
 I

Chapter Eleven

Ideology a s Praxis: Sartre

-a
Jean Paul S a r t r e l s handling of t h e problem of ideology takes us f u l l c i r c l e

back t o t h e work of Marx and Engels. ~ h o u ~S ahr t r e used t h e term "ideology" i n a

d i f f e r e n t way than did Marx and Engels, a s i m i l a r pragmatic epistemology underlay

h i s concept of knowledge. But more v i t a l S a r t r e provided us with both a c r i t i q u e

and explanation of t h e marxism which has vulgarized Marx and Engelst i n s i g h t s i n t o

t h e problem of ideology, and a perspective, rooted i n h i s existentialism, t h a t can

humanize s o c i a l science. The r e l a t i o n between an e x p l i c i t handling of t h e problem

. of ideology and humanizing s o c i a l science w i l l become c l e a r a s we proceed.

Existentialism a s Ideology

S a r t r e considered h i s . e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theory t o be an ideology. By discussing

t h i s , we can draw out h i s handling of t h e problem of ideology. Early i n h i s study,

Sartre stated that

"... s i n c e I am t o speak of e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , l e t it be understood t h a t I t a k e

it t o be an tideologyl. It i s a p a r a s i t i c a l system l i v i n g on t h e margin of
Knowledge, which a t f i r s t i s opposed but i n t o which today it seeks t o be
integrated. "l

The two phrases " l i v i n g on t h e margin of" yet "seeks t o be integrated" i n t o Knowledge

a r e t h e key t o S a r t r e l s view of ideology. Much l i k e Berlin, he saw ideas becoming

o s s i f i e d i n t o systems t h a t function t o maintain ( n o t cause) human a l i e n a t i o n and

oppression. He saw t h e need f o r r e s i s t a n c e t o such ideas u n t i l a new, l i b e r a t i n g

synthesis of ideas re-enters human experience.

Existentialism is on t h e edge of knowledge because it i s an " i d e a l i s t p r o t e s t

against i d e a l ~ s m " ,both
~ i n marxian and p o s i t i v i s t s o c i a l science. It does not,

i n i t s e l f , c o n s t i t u t e human knowledge; but, by attacking t h e idealism i n these

f
two forms of s o c i a l science, it can help push knowledge t o a new stage. Thus,

existentialism i s a n "ideological project". What S a r t r e meant by "project" w i l l

be discussed below. About h i s existentialism acting a s a n ideological project,

S a r t r e wrote

"It must be understood t h a t whatever a n ideological p r o j k t may be i n

appearance, i t s ultimate goal i s t o change t h e basic s i t u a t i o n by be-
coming aware of i t s contradictions. Sprung f r o m a p a r t i c u l a r c o n f l i c t
which expresses t h e universality of c l a s s and condition, it aims a t
surpass ill^ it i n order t o reveal it (my emphasis), t o reveal it i n
order t o make it manifest t o a l l , t o manifest it i n order t o resolve
it. "3

Until we show what S a r t r e meant by existentialism acting a s an ideological

project t o change marxism, t h e f u l l meaning o f t h i s statement w i l l not be clear.

The basic point was made by S a r t r e i n another context. Re wrote t h a t h he t r u e

r o l e of t h e 'ideologies of existence! i s not t o describe an a b s t r a c t 'human r e a l i t y t

which has never existed, but constantly t o remind anthropology of t h e e x i s t e n t i a l

dimension of t h e processes ~ t u d i e d . " ~S a r t r e thus saw a n "ideology" a s a challenge

t o knowledge t o change i t s e l f . We can draw a p a r a l l e l between t h i s and Rapoportts

concept of "ideological struggle" which i s an attempt t o open up a new c l a s s of

problems. But S a r t r e ' s view was more profound f o r it was rooted i n a pragmatic

theory of knowledge which saw t h e resolution of i n t e l l e c t u a l problems i n p r a c t i c a l

affairs. He thus did not e r r a s Rapoport did by creating an abstract notion of in-

t e l l e c t u a l s a s a class. His statement t h a t an ideology "surpasses t o reveal; reveals

t o make manifest; and makes manifest t o resolve" did not r e f e r t o an academic exercise

but t o beyond" 3 lived s i t u a t i o n i n order t o resolve contradictions i n practice.

It w i l l take a discussion of S a r t r e ' s Idea of "project" t o c l a r i f y the d i f -

ference between him and, say, Rapoport. What i s important t o recognize i s S a r t r e l s

 I

r e j e c t i o n of a l l "ideology" t h a t i s reductionistic; t h a t attempts t o explain human

C

actions and events with s t a t i c categories. This i s how he viewed much of t h e ap-

p l i c a t i o n of "class ideology". C r i t i c i z i n g t h e mechanistic application of c l a s s

ideology t o l i t e r a t u r e , S a r t r e s a i d "... t h e majority of t h e works of mind a r e

complex objects, d i f f i c u l t t o c l a s s i f y , t h a t one can r a r e l y ' s i t u a t e 1 them i n re-

l a t i o n t o a s i n g l e c l a s s ideology, but r a t h e r t h a t they reproduce i n t h e i r prbfound

s t r u c t u r e t h e contradictions and struggles of contemporary i d e ~ l o g i e s . " ~

Here S a r t r e was s t r e s s i n g how knowledge has t o be seen i n terms of lived

Ideological struggles, not i n terms of s t a t i c theories. He was r e j e c t i n g t h e aca-

demic approach t o truth. An ideology is not t r u e o r f a l s e i n abstract. It gains

i t s v a l i d i t y by i t s e f f e c t s on human l i f e a s p a r t of a l a r g e r ideological struggle.

Thus he wrote t h a t "... a n ideological system i s a n irreducible."6 By t h i s he meant

t h a t what i s important i s not t h e l a b e l l i n g o f people with c e r t a i n s t a t i c ideological

categories, but understanding how an ideological system, which includes contradictory

ideologies7 and i s a r e a l struggle, a f f e c t s human beings. Does t h e ideological system,

f o r example, help a persongo beyond h i s own alienation?

S a r t r e wrote t h a t an ideological "... system i s a n alienated man who wants t o

go beyond h i s a l i e n a t i o n and who g e t s entangled i n alienated words; it i s a n achieve-

ment o f awareness which finds i t s e l f deviated by i t s own instruments and which t h e

c u l t u r e transforms i n t o i t s own p a r t i c u l a r Weltans~hauung."~ S a r t r e always emphasized

t h e s p e c i f i c human person. "~deology",a s an idea, only has meaning i f it; i s under-

stood i n terms of concrete lives. We need t o l e a r n t o develop knowledge from an

understanding of t h e h i s t o r i c a l nature of s p e c i f i c human acts. We need t o understand

how t h e ideological struggle becomes a system of thought, of a p a r t i c u l a r form, with

a p a r t i c u l a r e f f e c t , f o r a particular hwnan. We need t o know how and why an ideologi-

c a l system has a r e i f y i n g o r a l i b e r a t i n g e f f e c t f o r a hwnan being.

 - 173 -
I 4
It i s because marxism has f a i l e d t o do t h i s t h a t t h e r e i s a need f o r an

i n j e c t i o n of e x i s t e n t i a l ideology i n t o t h e ideological struggle. Positivistic

s o c i a l science a l s o f a i l s here, but S a r t r e saw r e v i t a l i z e d marxism a s a superior

s o c i a l science.9 I n f a c t , i n Marx's own work, S a r t r e saw the recognition of t h e

need f o r an e x i s t e n t i a l awareness. This i s t h e basis o f S a r t r e ' s e x i s t e n t i a l

marxism. He believed t h a t 'I.,. Marx's own Marxism, while indicating t h e dialec-

t i c a l opposition between knowing and being (which S a r t r e r e j e c t s , J.H. ), contained

i m p l i c i t l y t h e demand f o r an e x i s t e n t i a l foundation f o r h i s theory."1

S a r t r e , therefore, saw a n ideology a s a n attempt t o push t h e knowledge

within t h e ideological struggle o f a h i s t o r i c a l period t o a new stage. This w i l l

make more sense i f t h e reader thinks o f what Kuhn s a i d about "paradigm change" o r

what Rapoport s a i d about "ideological struggle". We can say t h a t knowledge comes

from ideological struggle because c e r t a i n "paradigms", o r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of prob-

lems, methods and theories, come t o dominate research under p a r t i c u l a r conditions.

New forms of knowledge, however, w i l l develop a s new needs develop, even i f they

a r e not i n i t i a l l y integrated within t h e dominant form. The conflict between these

forms of knowledge, a s expressed i n d i f f e r e n t ideas, i s a part of a l a r g e r ideolog-

i c a l struggle. S a r t r e ' s study was a search f o r a method t h a t w i l l r a i s e new prob-

lems (e.g. , existential ones) within t h e ideological struggle of our time.

For S a r t r e , l i k e Marcuse, t h e r o l e of philosophy i s e x p l i c i t l y ideological.

Philosophy has t h e t a s k of i n j e c t i n g new problems, methods and theories i n t o t h e

ideological struggle a s existing ideologies cease t o a s s i s t t o f r e e humans from

t h e i r alienation. This i s done by d i r e c t i n g them beyond t h e i r lived contradictions.

For S a r t r e , t h l s i s t h e only way a human can gain r e a l understanding of h i s existence.

S a r t r e thus made t h e statement t h a t " I f philosophy i s t o be simultaneously a t o t a l l z a -

 - 174 -
a
I

t i o n of knowledge, a method, a regulative Idea, an offensive weapon, and a com-

munity of language, i f t h i s "vision of t h e world" i s a l s o an instrument which

ferments r o t t e n s o c i e t i e s , i f t h i s p a r t i c u l a r conception of a man o r o f a group

of men becomes the c u l t u r e and sometimes t h e nature of a whole c l a s s - then it

i s very c l e a r t h a t the periods of philosophical c r e a t i o n a r e rare. "I1

S a r t r e believed t h a t philosophy i s

"... born from the movement of society; ( t h a t ) every philosophy i s prac-

t i c a l , even t h e one which a t f i r s t appears t o be t h e most contemplative.
I t s method is a s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l weapon."l2

Existentialism i s a "revolution i n t h e revolution" ;I3 a n attempt t o challenge

marxian philosophy, a s part of a revolutionary change i n t h i s century, t o go

beyond t h e vulgar form t h a t has developed since t h e Soviet revolution and counter-

revolution.

Vulgar Marxism and Positivism

S a r t r e l s handling of ideology combined a c r i t i q u e of vulgar o r " ~ t a l i n i s t

Marxism", an a r t i c u l a t i o n of e x i s t e n t i a l ideology, and a pragmatic concept of know-

ledge. Let us look a t each of these i n t u r n t o see how S a r t r e accomplished h i s

breakthrough on t h e problem o f ideology. Then we w i l l be i n a position t o summarize

t h e findings of t h i s section of t h e thesis.

S a r t r e t s c r i t i c i s m of vulgar marxism was rooted i n h i s unwillingness t o

reduce human a c t i o n t o an analysis of h i s t o r i c a l conditions. Of vulgar marxism he

wrote

"...S t a l i n i s t Marxists a r e blind t o events.

When they have reduced t h e
meaning of them t o t h e universal, they a r e q u i t e willing t o recognize
t h a t a residue remains, but they make of t h i s residue t h e simple e f f e c t
of chance. "14

E a r l i e r i n h i s study, S a r t r e c l a r i f i e d what he meant by "the universal" when he

reproached

"...contemporary Marxism f o r throwing over t o t h e side of chance a l l t h e

concrete determinations of human l i f e and f o r not preserving anything of
h i s t o r i c a l t o t a l i z a t i o n except i t s abstract skeleton of universality. The
r e s u l t i s t h a t it has e n t i r e l y l o s t t h e meaning of what it is t o be a man
... 11 15

S a r t r e argued t h a t i f man makes history, then t h i s reductionism must be

rejected. But we must f i r s t be c l e a r what we mean by "man makes history". Sartre

argued t h a t

"... t h i s means t h a t he o b j e c t i f i e s himself i n it and i s alienated i n it.

I n t h i s sense History, which i s t h e proper work of &a a c t i v i t y and of
-
a l l men, appears t o men a s a foreign force exactly insofar a s they do
not recognize t h e meaning of t h e i r enterprise (even when l o c a l l y success-
f u l ) i n t h e t o t a l , objective result. "I6

The s i m i l a r i t y with Marx and Engelst view of how ideology helps maintain a l i e n a t i o n

i s striking.

Further c l a r i f y i n g t h i s , S a r t r e asked "How a r e we t o understand t h a t man

makes history i f a t t h e same time History makes him?" C r i t i c i z i n g vulgar marxism,

he answered: " ~ d e a l i s tMarxism seems t o have chosen t h e e a s i e s t interpretation:

e n t i r e l y determined by p r i o r circumstances - that is, i n the f i n a l analysis, by

economic conditions - man i s a passive product, a sum of conditioned reflexes."l7

Whether S a r t r e used t h e term " ~ t a l i n i s t " , "contemporary", or " i d e a l i s t "

marxism, it i s c l e a r t h a t he believed t h a t l i v i n g man has been l o s t by marxism.

Marxism has r e i f i e d i t s e l f . The theory o f t h e s o c i a l and economic r e l a t i o n s among

men i s no longer a theory, but a r e i f i e d t r u t h , with t h e concept of "truth" having

a l l t h e academic connotations I have c r i t i c i z e d . "Dialectic materialism" has become

an i d e a l i s t philosophy because the acting humans, and t h e ideological struggle t h a t

a f f e c t s them I s not t h e core of t h e ideas. I n S a r t r e t s words: "what contemporary

Marxists have forgotten i s t h a t man, alienated, mystified, r e i f i e d , etc. s t i l l remains

a man. ii 18

One reason f o r t h i s r e i f i c a t i o n o f marxism i s t h e f a i l u r e t o r o o t a l l

ideas i n praxis. Marx and Engels developed t h e i r ideas out o f praxis, but vulgar

marxists have taken them l i t e r a l l y , not a s part of a h i s t o r i c a l context. An ex-

ample i s how Engelst statement about men being a "product of c i r c m ~ t a n c e s " ~i 9s

often taken l i t e r a l l y . S a r t r e c l a r i f i e d t h i s by s t a t i n g t h a t It.. . men make t h e i r

h i s t o r y on t h e basis of r e a l , p r i o r conditions ... but it i s the men who make it

and not t h e p r i o r condition^."^^

S a r t r e had a general explanation of how and why marxism became vulgarized.

And h i s study, h i s e x i s t e n t i a l project, was an attempt t o make up f o r t h e lack.

S a r t r e wrote t h a t "Marxism lacks any hierarchy of mediations which would permit it

t o grasp t h e process which produces t h e person and h i s product inside a c l a s s and

within a given society a t a given h i s t o r i c a l moment. "21 These mediations, f o r

S a r t r e , would deal more inclusively with human experience. There is simply no way

t o understand human experience by reducing it t o a c l a s s theory with a p r i o r i cate-

gories. "The point i s t o subordinate nothing a p r i ~ r i . " ~ ~

Depending on a s t a t i c and r e d u c t i o n i s t i c c l a s s theory, vulgar marxists have

ignored o r forgotten about t h e human biography.

"Today's marxists a r e concerned only with a d u l t s ; reading them, one would

believe t h a t we a r e born a t t h e age we earn our f i r s t wages. They have
forgotten t h e i r own childhoods."23

Because of t h i s S a r t r e believed t h a t psychoanalysis was relevant t o h i s e x i s t e n t i a l

project. "~sychoanalysis, conceived a s a mediation, does not bring t o bear any new

principle of explanation"24 but it can challenge marxism t o be more inclusive i n i t s

inquiry i n t o human experience.

Without these mediations, marxism i t s e l f has become r e i f i e d . The method

implicit i n it has not been d i a l e c t i c , i.e., ideas have not been reformulated with

praxis. Instead, thought has tended t o be i d e a l i s t , i.e., accepted a s "ideas" per

-
se. S a r t r e contrasted h i s method with t h e marxian method:

ma he Marxist method i s progressive because it is t h e r e s u l t -

i n t h e work of
Marx himself - of long analysis. Today synthetic progression i s dangerous.
Lazy Marxists make use of it t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e r e a l , a p r i o r i ; p o l i t i c a l
t h e o r i s t s use it t o prove t h a t what has happened had t o happen just a s it
did. They can discover nothing by t h i s method of pure exposition. The proof
i s t h e f a c t t h a t they know i n advance what they must find. Our method is
h e u r i s t i c ; it teaches us something new because it i s a t once both regres-
s i v e and progressive. "25

S a r t r e ' s regressive method allows us t o study t h e " h i s t o r i c a l p a r t i c u l a r i t y

of t h e object" under considerat ion. Without t h i s appqoach, t h e s p e c i f i c i t y of human

a c t i o n and events i s l o s t and t h e meaning of them vulgarized. As Marx stressed t h e

s p e c i f i c i t y of h i s t o r i c a l periods,26 S a r t r e emphasized t h e s p e c i f i c i t y of e x i s t e n t i a l

acts. The e x i s t e n t i a l project then i s a n attempt t o broaden t h e method u t i l i z e d with-

i n marxism.

S a r t r e linked h i s e x i s t e n t i a l ideology t o Marxts own work. ma he very notions

which Marxist research employs t o describe our h i s t o r i c a l society - exploitation,

alienation, f e t i s h i z i n g , r e i f i c a t i o n , etc. - a r e precisely those which most immediate-

l y r e f e r t o e x i s t e n t i a l structures. "27 But these notions need t o be applied s p e c i f i -

c a l l y f o r knowledge t o go beyond vulgarized marxism. As S a r t r e said h he object of

existentialism - due t o the default of t h e Marxists - is the p a r t i c u l a r man i n t h e

s o c i a l f i e l d , i n h i s c l a s s , i n an environment of c o l l e c t i v e objects and of other

p a r t i c u l a r people. "** O r , put another way: " ~ x i s t e nialism

t ... can only affirm the
s p e c i f i c i t y of t h e h i s t o r i c a l event; it seeks t o r e s t o r e t o t h e event i t s function

and i t s multiple dimenslons. '129

An example of t h i s f o r S a r t r e was the study of "...how the worker projects

himself toward h i s own s e l f - o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n i n terms of material, h i s t o r i c a l condi-
tions. lt3O The character of such a study would be much d i f f e r e n t than reducing

a l l behavior and experience of workers t o a r e i f i e d notion of "the working class".

Such reductionism i s not only vulgar, it can a c t u a l l y increase t h e a l i e n a t i o n of

people. A very important statement by S a r t r e shows how t h i s can happen. "~ach

time t h a t t h e e n t e r p r i s e of a man or a group o f men becomes an object f o r other

men who surpass it toward t h e i r ends and f o r t h e whole of society, t h i s e n t e r p r i s e

guards its f i n a l i t y a s i t s r e a l unity, and it becomes, f o r t h e very people who i n i -

I

t i a t e d it, a n external object which tends t o dominate them and t o survive them. 1133-

It i s important t o understand how t h i s statement r e l a t e s t o S a r t r e ' s idea

of knowledge. Knowledge becomes a l i e n a t i n g and dominating when it is t r e a t e d i n

a n i d e a l i s t manner. This occurs when ideas a r e t r e a t e d i n a b s t r a c t from praxis.

Such i d e a l i s t ideas, even i f c r i t i c a l of t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s of a society,

function t o oppress people. Not growing with t h e i r own experience, but superim-

posed onto people by those objectifying them, i d e a l i s t categories tend t o become

new, r e i f i e d beliefs. When t h i s happens, human praxis doesn't change, though

r h e t o r i c does; and t h e new r h e t o r i c can function t o f u r t h e r a l i e n a t e people i n t h e

way t h a t Marx and Engels saw ideology - e.g., a b s t r a c t categories - alienating

people.

S a r t r e believed t h a t marxism, with i t s emphasis on progressive methods,

did just this. He wrote t h a t

"Marxism, a f t e r drawing us t o it a s t h e moon draws t h e t i d e s , a f t e r trans-

forming a l l our ideas, a f t e r l i q u i d a t i n g t h e categories of our bourgeois
thought, abruptly l e f t us stranded. It did not s a t i s f y our need t o under-
stand. I n t h e p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n i n which we were placed, it no longer
had anything new t o teach us, because it had come t o a stop."3*

This understanding, i n a " p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n " , i s what S a r t r e believed e x i s t e n t i a l

ideology could begin t o provide. This point i s usually misunderstood, especlally by

 ,
t h e vulgar marxists and the p o s i t i v i s t and behaviorist s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s a l l o f

whom seem t o lack awareness of human existence. S a r t r e made h i s intention c l e a r

when he wrote: "our i n t e n t i o n is not, a s i s too often claimed, t o 'give the ir-

r a t i o n a l i t s duel, but, on t h e contrary, t o reduce t h e part of indetermination and

non-knowledge, not t o r e j e c t Marxism .in t h e name o f a t h i r d path o r of an i d e a l i s t

humanism ..."33
Here S a r t r e described e x i s t e n t i a l "ideology", a s an attempt "... t o reduce

t h e p a r t o f indetermination and non-knowledge". Though S a r t r e was aware t h a t ex-

i s t e n t i a l ideology could become i d e a l i s t i c i t s e l f , it was not h i s intention t o

polarize it, a s a t o t a l theory of man, against marxism. H i s i n t e n t i o n was t o break

up t h e r e i f i c a t i o n within marxism. Any mystification of existentialism a s a t o t a l

. theory of humans i s therefore a d i s t o r t i o n of S a r t r e l s philosophy. When h i s c r i t i c s

or, i n some cases, h i s d i s c i p l e s , t r e a t S a r t r e ' s theory a s a t o t a l theory, t h i s re-

f l e c t s t h e i r own idealism.

S a r t r e concentrated on a c r i t i c i s m of marxism because it i s marxism t h a t he

wanted t o challenge and change. H i s criticisms, however, a l s o apply t o p o s i t i v i s t i c

s o c i a l science. I n f a c t , according t o S a r t r e , vulgar marxism and p o s i t i v i s t i c social

science have s i m i l a r orientations. He pointed t h i s out by writing t h a t

"we must r e s o l u t e l y r e j e c t t h e so-called 'positivism' which imbues today's

Marxist and impels him t o deny t h e existence o f these significations. The
supreme rnystif i c a t i o n o f positivism i s t h a t it claims t o approach s o c i a l
experience without any a p r i o r i whereas it has decided a t t h e s t a r t t o deny
one of i t s fundamental structures and t o replace it by i t s opposite."34

For S a r t r e , these "significations" included statements of u t i l i t y , means and ends,

which help us understand "...men and r e l a t i o n s among men across t h e s t r u c t u r e s of

society."35 Positivism, though claiming t o be thoroughly empirical, refuses, a p r i o r i ,

t o deal with these significations. Denying t h e Importance of studying anthropology,

 - 180 -
I

it bases i t s theorizing on t h e r e i f i e d form of d e s c r i p t i o n of which Marcuse was

critical. S a r t r e concluded t h a t "A p o s i t i v i s t who held onto h i s t e l e o l o g i c a l

c o l o r blindness i n p r a c t i c a l l i f e would not l i v e 1 0 n . g . " ~ ~

This "color blindness" i s i n both positivism and vulgar marxism. Both e r r

i n not recognizing sociology i t s e l f t o be a dynamic hwnan creation. Both forms of

sociology l a c k t h e kind of s e l f - c r i t i c i s m which I have emphasized. F a i l i n g t o un-

derstand t h e problem of ideology, both forms of sociology look only outward, i.e.,

projecting, using t h e i r assumed categories t o s o r t out events i n such a way t h a t a

proof f o r them is always found.

The needed s e l f - c r i t i c i s m w i l l only a r i s e when it is understood t h a t " t h e

.
sociologist ... i s an object of history1'.37 A s S a r t r e said: "Indeed, t h e sociol-

o g i s t and h i s 'objectt form a couple, each one of which i s t o be i n t e r p r e t e d by t h e

other; t h e relationship between them must be i t s e l f i n t e r p r e t e d a s a moment i n h i s -

t o r y . 1 ' 3 ~ This w i l l not make sense unless t h e t r a d i t i o n a l idea of o b j e c t i v i t y ,

,
s t r e s s i n g " s c i e n t i f i c method" - r u l e s , logic, etc. - i s rejected. We have seen how

s u p e r f i c i a l t h i s view of science and o b j e c t i v i t y i s . S a r t r e l s point w i l l be under-

stood only i f t h e need t o specify our knowledge, with- regressive and progressive

methods, i s a l s o understood. I f t h e s o c i o l o g i s t does not undertake t h i s specifying

or s i g n i f y i n g of events, he w i l l simply accumulate observations of events t h a t r e i n -

f o r c e h i s or her categories and ideology, without even knowing t h e r o o t s or conse-

quences of such description.

S a r t r e s t r e s s e d t h e need f o r t h e s o c i o l o g i s t t o t o t a l i z e 3 9 h i s or her own

r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e events o r objects being studied. I n t h i s way, he or she can

g a i n new i n s i g h t s i n t o t h e meaning of human events. "... without

S a r t r e wrote t h a t

a movement, without a r e a l e f f o r t a t t o t a l i z a t i o n , t h e givens of sociology ... and

 ,
psychoanalysis w i l l sleep s i d e by side and w i l l not be integrated i n t o 'Know-

ledge1."lC0 This d i a l e c t i c view of sociology, taking account of t h e human a s t h e

source of knowledge, must be thoroughly r a d i c a l ; r a d i c a l i n method a s well a s i n

theory. This means t h a t it must l o c a t e i t s e l f i n human history, never allowing i t s

ideas t o become abstract. A s S a r t r e put it: "... sociology, a temporary moment of

t h e h i s t o r i c a l t o t a l i z a t i o n , discovers new mediations between concrete men and t h e

material conditions of t h e i r l i f e , between human r e l a t i o n s and t h e r e l a t i o n s of pro-

duction, between persons and classes ( o r some t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t s o r t of grouping)."lC1

If sociology f a i l s t o recognize t h a t i t s t a s k is t o develop and continually re-evaluate

these mediations and instead t r i e s t o develop The v a l i d theory, then it w i l l lose con-
.
t a c t with men, women and children - as r e a l , l i v i n g people - and t o t a l l y f a i l t o under-
stand t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s among them. I f t h i s occurs, it w i l l not have r e a l knowledge

but images .
S a r t r e l s c r i t i c i s m of p o s i t i v i s t i c sociology can be compared with t h a t of

C. Wright M i l l s . We would expect some s i m i l a r i t y since both authors were conscious

of t h e ramifications of the problem of ideology f o r s o c i a l science. M i l l s 1 criticisms

of p o s i t i v i s t i c sociology focussed on t h e separation of "abstract empiricism" from

"grand theory".lC2 Conventional empiricism was "abstract" because i t s methodology was

abstracted from i n t e l l e c t u a l problem-solving. I t s methodology was more an orthodoxy

than a tool. Conventional theory was "grand" since it never linked i t s work t o the

c r i t i c a l , empirical study of problem areas.

S a r t r e was very s e n s i t i v e about t h i s problem. C r i t i c i z i n g Kardiner, S a r t r e

wrote h he 'basic personality1 fluctuates between a b s t r a c t universality a p o s t e r i o r i

and concrete substance a s a completely made t 0 t a l i t y . " ~ 3 These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , i. e.,

"abstract universality" and "concrete substance", come from a s o c i a l science which

 1

lacks mediations t h a t give us s p c c i f i c understanding of a human biography o r human

events. The "universality" comes from a grand theory of i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e "'sub-

stance" comes from a s t a t i c description of personality. S a r t r e preferred another

approach: "... i f we can determine t h e primary i n s t i t u t i o n s and follow t h e move-

ment by which t h e individual makes himself by surpassing them, then why do we need

t o put on t h e s e ready-made c l o t h e s along t h e way?"44 These "ready-made clothes"

a r e t h e a b s t r a c t theory (e.g., Kardinerts "basic personality") which is used t o

give order t o a s t a t i c d e s c r i p t i o n of human behavior. Without recognizing t h e prag-

k t i c nature of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge, and without mediational notions t h a t allow a

s p e c i f i c understanding of humans, human beings become l o s t i n these theories.

This kind of theory a r i s e s when t h e s o c i o l o g i s t lacks awareness about h i s

o r her work a s a moment i n history. What M i l l s c a l l e d "abstract empiricism" and

S a r t r e c a l l e d "hyper-empiricism1' r e s u l t s from t h i s naive objectivism. The b e l i e f

\

t h a t one i s a detached observer and an objective describer of events perpetuates

self-deception about how ideology operates within a l l science. S a r t r e emphasized

how t h e neglect of h i s t o r y helped shape t h i s u n c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e . Referring t o

sociology i n North America, t h e same sociology of which Mills was so c r i t i c a l , he

said: "Hyper-empiricism - which on p r i n c i p l e neglects connections with t h e past -

could a r i s e only in a country whose h i s t o r y i s r e l a t i v e l y s h 0 r t . " ~ 5

Even with i t s a h i s t o r i c a l character, S a r t r e saw a value t o t h i s hyper-

empiricism. he more sociology i s presented a s a hyper-empiricism, t h e e a s i e r i s

i t s i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o Marxism. e46 I f concern with d e t a i l e d description i s linked with

t h e marxian awareness of h i s t o r i c a l movement, then S a r t r e ' s e x i s t e n t i a l project w i l l

be advanced. It i s t h e lack of h i s t o r i c a l perspective and t h e r e l a t e d ignorance r e -

s u l t i n g from a d e n i a l of t h e problem of ideology, and not t h e commitment t o emplrlcism,

t h a t makes p o s i t i v i s t i c s o c i a l science Inadequate.

 It i s necessary t o s p e c i o why we have c a l l e d S a r t r e l s view of knowledge and

of ideology pragmatic. I n h i s Preface, S a r t r e made a statement which confirms t h i s

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of h i s handling of t h e problem of ideology. Referring t o h i s discus-

sion of existentialism, he wrote

"It is t h e nature of an i n t e l l e c t u a l quest t o be undefined. To name it (ex-

i s t e n t i a l i s m ) and define it is t o wrap it up and t i e t h e knot. What i s l e f t ?
A finished, already outdated mode of culture, something l i k e a brand of soap
- i n other words, an idea. "47

S a r t r e was not looking f o r t r u t h , v a l i d i t y or objectivity through naming and defining.

Existentialism is not t h e t r u t h , but an ideolokical project t o bring a new c l a s s of

problems i n t o marxism. Rather than being interested i n "truth", S a r t r e is interested

I n understanding, and t h i s i s not a s t a t i c , l i n g u i s t i c matter. "TO understand is t o

change, t o go beyond oneself. 1148

Two statements by S a r t r e made it c l e a r t h a t t h i s "change" does not r e s u l t

from "reflection" o r simply through t h e development' of c e r t a i n "ideas". F i r s t , he

wrote: "For us, r e f l e c t i o n is not reduced t o t h e sicmple imminence of i d e a l i s t sub-

jectivism; it i s a point of departure only i f it throws us back immediately among

things and men, i n t h e world."49 And, second, he wrote:

".., ideas do not change men. Knowing t h e cause of a passion is not enough t o
overcome it; one must l i v e i t , one must oppose other passions t o it, one must
combat it tenaciously, i n short one must 'work oneself 0 v e r ' . " 5 ~
b

These statements indicate t h a t S a r t r e d i d not consider understanding t o be passive

knowing, but a c t i v e changing. He continually spoke of gaining understanding by

"surpassing" c e r t a i n lived contradict ions. 5' For him, ideas were not t r u e o r f a l s e

i n themselves. Rather they a r e useful; they a i d us "go beyond" a s e t of circumstances

of which we a r e a living aspect. Understanding is not a subjective process. A situ-

a t i o n must be i n t h e process of change before a r e a l understanding of t h a t s i t u a t i o n

I can develop.
 I

S a r t r e believed t h a t we cannot go beyond marxism a t present. He believed

t h a t it i s " t h e philosophy of our time ... and ... we cannot go beyond it because
we have not gone beyond t h e circumstances t h a t engendered it."5* To S a r t r e , t h e

f a c t of scarc%%yi s what makes marxism v a l i d , but, once s c a r c i t y disappears, a new

philosophy, a "philosophy of freedom", can develop. A t present, marxism pin-points

problems t h a t e x i s t because of t h e r e a l i t y of s c a r c i t y i n t h e world. The ideas of

marxism a c t as 'I.,. guiding p r i n c i p l e s , a s i n d i c a t i o n s of jobs t o be done, a s prob-

lems - not a s concrete truths."53

So m a r x i s m i s pragmatic. It is not correct. It, a s a s e t of ideas, does

not correspond t o reality.5' Rather it gives us a d i r e c t i o n , a perspective on t h e

present s i t u a t i o n , i t s r o o t s , and a p o t e n t i a l s o c i a l r e a l i t y beyond it. The ex-

i s t e n t i a l p r o j e c t has v a l i d i t y "... because ( marxist) a s s e r t i o n s seem t o us insuf -

f i c i e n t l y defined and, a s such, capable of numerous i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ; i n a word, it

i s because t h e y appear t o us a s r e g u l a t i v e

Vulgar marxists, who see t h e i r ideas a s being t r u e r a t h e r than r e g u l a t i v e ,

a r e g u i l t y of doing " i d e a l i s t i c violence t o f a ~ t s " . 5 They

~ have a "Platonic" view

of knowledge, and, t h e r e f o r e , lack t h e a p t i t u d e t o understand l i v e d history. To

the Stalinist Bk~xist "... a worker i s not a r e a l being who changes with t h e world;
he i s a P l a t o n l c Idea. "57 D i a l e c t i c a l materialism has become a grand h i s t o r i c a l

theory which reduces human a c t s and awareness t o i t s t i d y categories. But S a r t r e

s t r e s s e d t h a t %he d i a l e c t i c " , a t l e a s t f o r e x i s t e n t i a l ideology, "on t h e contrary,

r e f u s e s t o reduce tt 58 .
S a r t r e ' s pragmatic view of ideas takes us back t o t h e epistemology of Marx

and Engels. You w i l l r e c a l l how they c a l l e d t h e i r epistemological premises "materi-

aln.59 S a r t r e was i n f u l l accord.

 - 185 -
I

"we w i l l i n g l y grant t h a t t h e group never has and never w i l l have t h e type

of metaphysical existence which people t r y t o give it. We repeat with
Marxism: t h e r e a r e only men and r e a l r e l a t i o n s among them. " 6 0

For S a r t r e , a s f o r Marx and Engels, knowledge must be h e u r i s t i c .

"... l i v i n g Marxism i s h e u r i s t i c ; i t s p r i n c i p l e s and i t s p r i o r knowledge

appear a s r e g u l a t i v e i n r e l a t i o n t o i t s concrete research. I n t h e work
of Marx we never f i n d e n t i t i e s . T o t a l i t i e s (e,g. t h e p e t i t e bourgeois of
t h e 1 8 Emmaire) a r e l i v i n g ; they f u r n i s h t h e i r own d e f i n i t i o n s within
t h e framework of t h e research."61

It has been contemporary marxismts f a i l u r e t o understand t h e pragmatic and

h e u r i s t i c n a t u r e of knowledge, and t h e r e l a t e d ignorance about t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l

problem of ideology, t h a t has led it t o become vulgarized. Thinking of ideas a s

being c o r r e c t o r i n c o r r e c t , contemporary marxists have been unable t o understand

how ideology and science i n t e r r e l a t e . Instead, they have c a l l e d t h e i r own ideas

" s c i e n t i f i c " and those they oppose "ideological". Though from a d i f f e r e n t stance,

they have made much t h e same e r r o r a s t h e end-of-ideology l i b e r a l academics.

S a r t r e r e l a t e d t h i s ignorance of t h e pragmatic nature of knowledge t o an

ignorance of t h e values and ends.

"By misunderstanding these p r i n c i p l e s , contemporary Marxism has prevented

i t s e l f from understanding s i g n i f i c a t i o n s and values. For it is a s absurd
t o reduce t h e s i g n i f i c a t i o n of an object t o t h e pure i n e r t m a t e r i a l i t y of
t h a t o b j e c t i t s e l f a s t o want t o deduce t h e law from t h e f a c t ( m y emphasis).
The meaning of a conduct and i t s value can be grasped only i n perspective
by t h e movement which r e a l i z e s t h e possibles a s it reveals t h e

Vulgar marxism, rooted i n an academic ( e . g . , i d e a l i s t i c ) epistemology, makes t h e

same e r r o r t h a t t h e value-free doctrine does. Both a r e ignorant of t h e problem of

ideology, a s a problem. Both a r e ignorant of t h e r o l e of "ends" i n human events;

o r , i n S a r t r e t s words, both lack a "hierarchy of f u t u r e s i g n i f i c a t i o n s f ' . 63

I have argued t h a t Marx and Engels1 theory of ideology was t h e f i r s t

a r t i c u l a t i o n of t h e problem of ideology. S a r t r e takes us back t o t h e i r i n s i g h t s ,

 I

though from a d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l context, with d i f f e r e n t d e f i n i t i o n s (e.&. , of

ideology), and f o r d i f f e r e n t reasons. S a r t r e broke out of t h e dichotomies of

value and f a c t , and of t h e subjective and objective, t o redefine t h e problem of,

knowledge and ideology i n a way t h a t helps us t o go beyond a l l mechanistic forms

of s o c i a l science. He not only c r i t i c i z e d vulgar marxism and p o s i t i v i s t i c s o c i a l

science; he d i d t h i s a s p a r t of a project which takes us t o a new, more profound

awareness of t h e problem of ideology.

Ideology a s a Project

The concepts of "praxis" and "project" a r e S a r t r e ' s substantive contribu-

t i o n s t o t h e problem of ideology. Praxis r e f e r s t o d e l i b e r a t e or purposeful action.

From praxis comes thought, and i n t o praxis goes thought. O r , t o be more accurate,

i n p r a x i s thought and a c t i o n become unified. I n S a r t r e l s words: "concrete thought

must be born from praxis and must t u r n back upon it i n order t o c l a r i f y it, not by

chance and without r u l e s , but - a s i n a l l sciences a l l techniques - i n conformity

with principles. 1164

Again we come face t o f a c e with t h e term "rules". Schwnpeter t r i e d and

f a i l e d t o define "science" by reference t o r u l e s and techniques. Kuhn pointed out

t h a t "paradigms" a r e primary t o rules. S a r t r e , l i k e Kuhn, saw r u l e s a s being prag-

matic, as rooted i n p r i n c i p l e s stemming from a type of praxis. But S a r t r e went be-

yond Kuhn because he s t a r t e d with an awareness of t h e problem of ideology. His study

was consclously ideological, 1. e., it was an attempt, i n Rapoport Is terms, t o i n t r o -

duce a new " c l a s s of problems" i n t o knowledge. S a r t r e l s search f o r a method con-

s t i t u t e s an ideological s t r u g g l e against a l l forms of knowledge t h a t a b s t r a c t human

existence.
 I

Of h i s concept "project", S a r t r e wrote "We affirm t h e s p e c i f i c i t y of the

human a c t , which c u t s across the s o c i a l milieu while s t i l l holding on t o i t s de-

terminations, and which transforms t h e world on t h e basis of given conditions. n @

S a r t r e was uncompromising i n h i s r e f u s a l t o reduce human a c t s and events t o any

grand theory. H i s ideological project was rooted i n h i s r a d i c a l humanism; a hu-

manism t h a t begins and always returns t o t h e l i v i n g person, but not a naive human-

ism t h a t ignores h i s t o r i c a l movement. He saw t h e l i v i n g human a s making history,

and stressed the need f o r knowledge t o begin and end with t h i s recognition. It i s

"the project" which underlies t h i s making of history. "It i s by transcending to-

ward t h e f i e l d of possibles and by r e a l i z i n g one p o s s i b i l i t y from among a l l t h e

others t h a t t h e individual o b j e c t i f i e s himself and contributes t o making History. 1166

With t h e a i d of t h e concept of "project", S a r t r e broke out of both subjec-

tivism and objectivism. He was therefore able t o avoid t h e insoluble dilemmas t h a t

those who begin with these naive c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s always face. The human i s not a

passive consumer of ideas, some of which a r e t r u e , some of which a r e f a l s e ; but an

a c t i v e maker of ideas t h a t a r e or a r e not useful f o r h i s or her project and a f f e c t

on history.

The human i s continually creating himself o r herself through praxis. For

S a r t r e t h i s "praxis i s a passage from objective t o objective through internaliza-

tion. "67 The human is not a possessor of e i t h e r "subjective" o r "objective" ideas.

A person is r e - c r e a t i q him o r h e r s e l f , through praxis. His o r her s u b j e c t i v i t y i s

t h e i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of past, present and f u t u r e events, and t h i s continually (e.8;. ,

d i a l e c t i c a l l y ) leads t o a new objective event. A b r i l l i a n t passage from S a r t r e

describes t h i s process:

" ~ h u sthe subjective contains within i t s e l f t h e objective, which it denies

and which it surpasses toward a new o b j e c t i v i t y ; and t h i s new o b j e c t i v i t y
 by v i r t u e of ob,iectification externalizes t h e i n t e r n a l i t y of t h e project
a s an o b j e c t i f i e d subjectivity. This means both t h a t t h e lived a s such f i n d s
i t s place i n t h e r e s u l t and t h a t t h e projected meaning of t h e a c t i o n appears
i n t h e r e a l i t y of t h e world t h a t it may g e t i t s t r u t h i n t h e process of t o -
t a l i z a t ion. " 68

This statement appears paradoxical and/or meaningless only i f one c l i n g s t o

a n academic view of knowledge and ignores t h e problem of ideology. Humans a r e a l -

ways engaged i n "projects", which "as a mediation between two moments of o b j e c t i v i t y

can account f o r h i s t o r y ; t h a t is, f o r human ~ r e a t i v i t y " . ~ gA s a c t i n g b e i w s we a r e

continually passing through action, r e f l e c t i o n and c r i t i c i s m (i.e., p r a x i s ) even i f

t h e process has d i f f e r i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s among d i f f e r e n t people.

I began t h i s discussion wZth Marx and Engelsr theory of ideology and con-

cluded t h a t t h e i r handling of t h e problem of ideology was rooted i n a pragmatic

understanding of knowledge. I then showed t h e s u p e r f i c i a l i t y of various versions

of t h e value-free doctrine and demystified a l l attempts t o define science i n i s o l a -

t i o n from ideology. I showed how an erroneous view of n a t u r a l science supported t h e

f a l s e handling of t h e problem of ideology i n t h e s o c i a l sciences. This allowed me

t o t u r n t o a discussion of more sophisticated handlings of t h e problem.

M i l l s and Marcuse helped me explain why t h e problem of ideology has been

ignored. And now S a r t r e has taken us f u l l c i r c l e , and with h i s r a d i c a l humanism, has

r a i s e d t h e basic problem i n a new way, i n a new context. The main difference between

S a r t r e , and Marx and Engels, i s S a r t r e r s consciousness of t h e r o l e of choice i n h i s -

tory. Marx and Engels r a i s e d t h e problem of ideology a s p a r t of t h e i r broad theory

of h i s t o r y and capitalism, but did not recognize t h e i r own work t o be an "ideological

project". To t h e extent t h a t Mannheim focussed on t h i s lack within Marx, h i s work

was a f u r t h e r c l a r i f i c a t i o n . S a r t r e not only discussed how ideology and science

i n t e r r e l a t e , he I s an example of t h i s process. He was describing t h e problem of

 Y I

ideology and applying t h l s awareness t o t h e end of humanizing s o c l a l science,

through h i s e x i s t e n t i a l ideology, a t t h e same time. I n s h o r t , S a r t r e t s work

-
i s t h e problem of ideology.

Many loose ends e x i s t thus f a r i n t h i s inquiry. Our purpose i n t h i s

f i r s t s e c t i o n has been t o make t h e problem of ideology e x p l i c i t , while r a i s i n g

o t h e r i s s u e s f o r l a t e r discussion. It i s now time t o pick up on t h e d i s c u s s i o n

of l o g i c ; t h a t Is, t o go i n t o i s s u e s i n t h e philosophy of s o c i a l science i n more

depth. This w i l l enable me t o d e a l with t h e pragmatic idea of knowledge i n more

depth.

Footnotes

l ~ e a nPaul S a r t r e : Search For a Method. New York, Alfred A. Knopf 1, P. 8.

The b e s t d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s work and S a r t r e l s r e l a t e d work La C r i t i q u e de l a
Raison Dialectique i s R.D. Laing and D.G. Cooper: Reason and Violence. London,
Tavistock ( 1964).

7 ~ a r t r e ' sr e j e c t i o n of i d e a l i s t marxism a l s o implies a r e j e c t i o n of sectarianism.

I d e o l o g i c a l s t r u g g l e s a r e not r e f l e c t e d i n t i d y ways i n human consciousness. In a
period of i d e o l o g i c a l s t r u g g l e , t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s w i t h i n and between d i f f e r e n t ide-
o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n s themselves a f f e c t t h e person. The q u e s t i o n i s not who has t r u e
o r f a l s e i d e a s , which is t h e epistemological approach which complements s e c t a r i a n i s m ,
b u t how c o n f l i c t i n g i d e a s , a s a n aspect of c o n f l i c t i n g s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , a f f e c t a
person.

8 ~ a r t r e , op. c i t .

9 ~ e r eS a r t r e d i f f e r s from Mills. M i l l s wrote " ~ 0 t hmarxism and l i b e r a l i s m bear t h e

trademarks of a pepiod of human h i s t o r y t h a t i s ending; both a r e marred by inadequate
a t t e n t i o n t o leading f a c t s and problems with which t h e world scene now presents u s . "
The Marxists, op. c i t . , p. 12.
 1 s a r t r e , op. c i t . , p. 177.

g
E 131 t a k e t h i s phrase from Regis Debray's Revolution i n t h e Revolution. Pelican
e ( 1968 I*
i
%
1 4 s a r t r e , op. c i t . , p. 126.

2 6 ~ i 1 1 sargued t h a t Marx was

t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c epoch ... "... concerned w i t h t r e n d s having t h e span of a h i s -
This p r i n c i p l e of h i s t o r i c a l s p e c i f i c i t y i s , f i r s t ,
a r u l e f o r s o c i a l i n q u i r y and r e f l e c t i o n ; it i s , second, a method f o r c r i t i c i z i n g
polemically o t h e r t h e o r i e s and conceptions; and, t h i r d , it i s a t h e o r y of t h e na-
t u r e of s o c i a l l i f e and of h i s t o r y . " (The Marxists, op. c i t . , p. 37. )

2 7 ~ a r t r e , op. tit., P. 175.

281bid., p. 133.
3 4 ~ b i d . , pp. 156-57. Vulgar marxism always s p l i t s t h e so-called "mature Marx"
from t h e "young ~ a r x " . The former i s equated with discovering economic laws,
and t h e l a t t e r with philosophical radicalism. Having done t h i s , it i s e a s i e r
t o r e i f y Marxls l a t t e r ideas i n t o a p o s i t i v i s t i c marxism. Only r e c e n t l y has
t h i s vulgarizing of Marx been fundamentally challenged. For example, see
Martin Nicolaus: The Unknown Marx. New Left Reviey, No. 48, Mar-Apr (1968);
and Raya Dunayevskaya: Marx's Humanism Today, i n Eric F r o m ( ed. ) : S o c i a l i s t
Humanism. New York, Anchor (19661, pp. 66-83. Showing how awareness of t h e
problem of ideology leads t o a marxist c r i t i q u e of Stalinism, t h e l a t t e r author
wrote: "The necessary ideology t o cover up t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n of t h e laborer did
not change i t s essence when it changed i t s form t o t h e s t a t e capitalism t h a t
c a l l s i t s e l f Communism. " ( Ibid. p. 73. )

3 9 ~ a r t r e ' snotion of " t o t a l i z e " r e l a t e d t o h i s use of t h e concept of d i a l e c t i c .

A s Laing and Cooper said: "...S a r t r e uses d i a l e c t i c t o c h a r a c t e r i z e both t h e
r e l a t i o n between t h e knower and t h e known, and t h e nature of t h e known."
(Reason and Violence, op. c i t . , p. 11. ) Because a t h e o r i s t Is r e l a t i o n t o " t h e
known" a f f e c t s t h e knowledge of t h e known "... t h e r e can be no f i n a l t o t a l i t i e s
i n history." ( I b i d . ) This aspect of t h e d i a l e c t i c makes it impossible t o a r r i v e
at a b s t r a c t t r u t h . One "...may even pride oneself t h a t one's own synthesis con-
tains the overall t r u t h -
u n t i l one discovers t h a t someone e l s e has incorporated
one's own synthesis i n t o h i s synthesis, d e t o t a l i z e d one's t o t a l i z a t i o n , and so on,
ad infinitum. " ( I b i d . , p. 12. )

4 0 ~ a r t r e ,op. c i t . , p. 84.

4 2 ~ . ~Mills:
. The Socioloaical Imagination, op. c i t .

4 3 ~ a r t r e ,op. c i t . , p. 71. Abram Kardiner: The Psschological F r o n t i e r s of Society.

New York, Columbia University Press ( 1945). While breaking from mechanistic psycho-
l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , t h i s study remains psychologistic i n i t s orientation. Neo-
freudian explanations a r e no more h i s t o r i c a l than behavioristic ones and it i s
Kardiner's r e l i a n c e on psychoanalytical concepts t h a t limited h i s approach. For an
i n t e g r a t e d , r a t h e r than e c l e c t i c , approach t o s o c i a l science which takes psychological
processes i n t o account, see C.W. Mills and H. Gerth: Character and Social Structure.
New York, Harcourt, Brace and World (1953).
4 4 ~ a r t r e , op. c i t . , PO 71.

45~b1d.

4 6 ~ b i d . p. 82.

471bid., p. Xxxiii.

4 8 ~ b i d . , p. 18.

491bid., p. 32.

5'1bid., pp. 12-13.

5l1bid., p. 111.

W ~ t h~e o ryy which attempts t o correspond t o r e a l i t y w i l l end up r e i f i e d . Episte-

mologies which stress t h e idea of "correspondence" a l l ignore t h e implications of
t h e problem of ideology f o r t h e o r i e s of knowledge.
 Chapter Twelve

A Neutral Logic: Weber

The ideology of scientism not only leads t o an ignorance of t h e problem

of ideology, it leads t o f a l s e notions of l o g i c and t h e r o l e of languag.3 i n science.

I n t h i s s e c t i o n I w i l l discuss problems of logic in t h e s o c i a l sciences i n a way

t h a t accounts f o r t h e problem of ideal3gy d i r e c t l y . To accomplish t h i s I w i l l

u t i l i z e t h e same method a s i n t h e f i r s t s e c t i o n and develop my points i n dialogue

with s e l e c t e d t h e o r i s t s .

Max Weberls work i s most commonly associated with t h e value-free doctrine.

His ideas a b m t e t h i c a l neutrality, o b j e c t i v i t y and logic i n t h e c u l t u r a l s c i e n c s s ,

and science a s a vocation a r e continually used t o shore up t h a t dsctnine. This chap-

t e r w i l l shqw t h a t Weberls notion of value-freedom d i f f e r e d from t h e contemporary

value-free dogma. Only a s u p e r f i c i a l treatment of h i s ideas can be used t o j u s t i f y

t h e end-of-ideologistls position. Rather than Weber being t h e o r i g i n a t o r of t h e

end-of-ideology, I w i l l argue t h a t he tended towards ' a pragmatic view of knowledge.

Dichotomies and Contradict ions

Weberls ideas about 13glc were a l l based on dichotomies d ~ l c hemphasized t h e

d i s t i n c t i o n between f a c t and value. For example, he emphasized "...the 13gical d i s -

t i n c t i o n between 1existen2;inl knowledge1, i.e. knowledge of what l i s l , and Inormative

/"
knowledge', i. e. knowledge of what 'should be'. "l I n one place, Weber spoke of

" t h e l o g i c a l disjunction between .., statements of l o g i c a l l y deduced or empirically

observed f a c t s and ... statements of p r a c t i c a l evaluations. "2 Whether he replaced

t h e term " e x i s t e n t i a l " with "empirical" and grouped " l o g i c a l u and empirical know-

ledge together, Weber's emphasis remained t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between normative or

evaluative and non-normat ive knowledge.

Such a v a r i e t y of terms f o r t h e same d i s t i n c t i o n can be confusing. But

Weberts confusion, as we s h a l l see, was more than terminological. I n f a c t , termi-

nological ambiguity usually r e f l e c t s \ conceptual problems. Such conceptual problems

\
were indicated by Weber's inclusion of "the value-oriented conduct" of people within

t h e "empirical" s i d e of h i s dichotomy. He spoke of "... t h e i n t r i n s i c a l l y simple

demand t h a t t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r and teacher (keep) ... unconditionally separate t h e

establishment of empirical f a c t s ( i n c l u d i n g t h e 'value-oriented' conduct of t h e

empirical individual whom he i s i n v e s t i g a t i n g ) and h i s own p r a c t i c a l evaluations

. I s h a l l argue t h a t it i s impossible t o separate evaluation from a study of

how values a f f e c t human behavior, and t h e r e f o r e t h a t Weber's dichotomy i s not tenable.

I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e above d i s t i n c t i o n , Weber i n s i s t e d on t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between

t h e " c u l t u r a l " and t h e " h i s t o r i c a l " sciences. Both areas remained part of t h e "em-

p i z i c a l " f o r Weber. A s he s t a t e d : "we wish t o understand on t h e one hand t h e r e l a -

tionships and t h e c u l t u r a l significance of individual events i n t h e i r contemporary

manifestations and on t h e other t h e causes of t h e i r being h i s t o r i c a l l y so and not

otherwise. "4 This d i s t i n c t i o n shows how Weberls value-fact dichotomy r e l a t e d t o a

concept of causation and t o a theory of s o c i a l action. For Weber, humans a c t because

of t h e meaning o r significance of events f o r them. The s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t must under-

stand t h i s process a s part of h i s or her study. Doing t h i s , however, does not explain
 I

events. Explanation reauires an h i s t o r i c a l study, or what Weber called a "causal

Weber made t h i s same d i s t i n c t i o n i n methodological terms. He wrote of the

difference between a " h e u r i s t i c instrumentt1, which a i d s t h e s c i e n t i s t understand

'3

the c u l t u r a l significance o f an event, and a "... l i n k i n an h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n

6

a s r e a l e f f e c t and cause ..." 6 For Weber

"... these a r e absolutely fundamental l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s and they w i l l a l -

ways remain so. And however much these two absolutely d i s t i n c t standpoints
become intertwined i n t h e practice of the student of c u l t u r e t h i s always -
happens and i s the source o f t h e most i n t e r e s t i n g methodological problems -
no one w i l l ever succeed i n understanding t h e l o g i c a l character of h i s t o r y
i f he i s unable t o make t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n a clearcut

Weber claimed the absolute necessity of h i s l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s f o r any

h i s t o r i c a l understanding t o occur. This claim must be evaluated. To do t h i s , it

is necessary t o outline f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n s and sub-distinctions i n Weberts work.

For instance, Weber distinguished "ontologicaf knowledge1\ o r "knowledge of c e r t a i n

'facts ... Ibelonging1 t o t h e t h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n 1 and ascertainable on t h e b a s i s

of c e r t a i n sources", from "nomological knowledge", or "knowledge of c e r t a i n known

b'
1 empirical r u l e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those r e l a t i n g t o t h e ways i n which human beings a r e
b
prone t o r e a c t under giveh situations".8 This d i s t i n c t i o n between rules and f a c t s

r e l a t e s t o t h e one between t h e study of c u l t u r a l significance and the study of his-

t o r i c a l causes. The former searches f o r t h e r u l e s of s o c i a l action, and t h e l a t t e r

looks f o r the causes of human events.

From t h i s we can see t h a t Weberts dichotomy between f a c t and value, i.e.,

between t h e empirical, e x i s t e n t i a l and l o g i c a l on t h e one hand and t h e normative

and evaluative on t h e other, was fundamental t o h i s view of s o c i a l science. In his

words:

here i s and always w i l l be ... an unbridgeable d i s t i n c t i o n among ( 1 ) those

 I

arguments which appeal t o our capacity t o become enthusiastic about and

our f e e l i n g f o r concrete p r a c t i c a l aims 'or c u l t u r a l forms and values,
( 2 ) those arguments i n which, once it i s a question of t h e v a l i d i t y of
e t h i c a l norms, t h e appeal is directed t o our conscience, and f i n a l l y ( 3 )
those arguments which appeal t o our capacity and need f o r a n a l y t i c a l l y
orderixq empirical r e a l i t y i n a manner which lays claim t o v a l i d i t y a s
empirical truth. This proposition remains correct, despite, a s we s h a l l
see, t h e f a c t t h a t those highest "values" underlying t h e p r a c t i c a l in-
t e r e s t a r e and always w i l l be decisively s i g n i f i c a n t i n determining t h e
...
focus of a t t e n t i o n of a n a l y t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n the sphere of t h e cul-
t u r a l sciences. "9
B
According t o t h i s view, though "values" a r e decisive i n determining the focus of

analysis, an "unbridgeable d i s t i n c t i o n " must remain between normative and empirical

activity. Here we begin t o see the contradictions t h a t a r i s e from Weberls dichoto-

mies. Not only did Weber t r e a t the study of value-oriented behavior a s empirical

knowledge, he admitted t h a t values a f f e c t the analysis of such behavior. This makes

it d i f f i c u l t , indeed, t o maintain h i s s p l i t between normative and empirical knowledge.

A f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n , one which draws a l l the preceding ones together, was

made by Weber. He argued t h a t meaning can never be deduced from facts.

"The f a t e of an epoch which has eaten o f the t r e e of knowledge i s t h a t it

must know t h a t we cannot l e a r n the meaning of t h e world from t h e r e s u l t s
of i t s analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must r a t h e r be i n a position
t o c r e a t e t h i s meaning i t s e l f . It must recognize t h a t general views of
l i f e and t h e universe can never be t h e products o f increasing empirical
knowledge, and t h a t t h e highest ideals, which move us most forcefully,
a r e always formed only i n the struggle with other ideals which a r e just
a s sacred t o others a s ours a r e t o us."1

Meaning, values, t h e normative o r whatever you c a r e t o c a l l it has a separate exist-

ence from logic, t h e existent or facts. I f we use the term "ideologyv (which Weber

avoids consistently) t o r e f e r t o the "struggle of ideals" with which Weber charac-

t e r i z e d values, we can see t h e s p l i t between science and ideology i n Weberrs thought.

Underneath t h e various dichotomies and d i s t i n c t i o n s i s t h e belief t h a t science and

ideology e x i s t i n separate realms.

.-
We could r e j e c t Weber's theory of logic on t h e b a s i s of our e a r l i e r discus-
 I

sion. Doing t h i s , however, would f a i l t o c r i t i c a l l y evaluate the sophisticated

system of thought t h a t surrounded h i s dichotomies. To do t h i s , we have t o ask

what, i f any, l o g i c a l value h i s d i s t i n c t i o n s have. What a r e t h e consequences of

approaching s o c i a l science with h i s orientation? It i s a l s o necessary t o evaluate

Weber's treatment o f values t o contrast it with my approach t o values t h a t accounts

4 @

f o r t h e r o l e of ideology i n a l l knowledge.

I n t e r p r e t a t i v e Understanding

To do t h i s , we need t o discuss Weber's general approach t o s o c i a l science.

For example, what did he mean by "understanding"? How did h i s methodology r e f l e c t

h i s general approach? What did he mean, i n d e t a i l , by "empirical"?

Because of t h e dichotomy between t h e normative and t h e empirical, Weber

s t r e s s e d how understanding, not evaluation, was t h e task of s o c i a l science. He

wrote of how It.. . when the h i s t o r i a n begins t o 'evaluate', causal analysis almost

always ceases - to t h e prejudice o f t h e s c i e n t i f i c r e s u l t s ... (and of how) h i s

most important t a s k ... i s t h e task of 'understanding1. "I1 Elaborating on t h i s

view of s o c i a l science Weber wrote:

v very science of psychological and s o c i a l phenomena i s a science of human

conduct (which includes a l l thought and a t t i t u d e s ) .
These sciences seek
t o 'understand1 t h i s conduct and by means of t h i s understanding t o 'ex-
'.
p l a i n ' it 1 i n t e r p r e t a t i v e l y "I2

For Weber, explanation was rooted i n i n t e r p r e t a t i v e understanding. This

approach r e l a t e d t o Weberls theory about t h e "value-oriented" nature of human

conduct. A s Weber s t a t e d " I n t e r p r e t a t i o n can and does become f i r s t 'value-inter-

pretation', i.e. it teaches us t o 'understand' the i n t e l l e c t u a l , psychological and

s p i r i t u a l content ... of human conduct. Weber a l s o believed t h a t t h i s orienta-

t i o n could be used t o understand the way a t h e o r i s t ' s values affected h i s o r her

work.
 I

Me wrote of how "the 'value-analytical1 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ... enables us t o 'under-

stand1 ( t h e ) r e l a t i o n s ( of a n i n t e l l e c t u a l work, h i s example being Marxls K a ~ i t a l )

t o values". l4 his i n t e r p r e t a t i v e understanding, however, did not mean t h a t the

s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t mkkes value-judgments o r evaluates human conduct. F o r Weber,

"sober empirical analysist1 always excluded "the i n s e r t i o n of personal e v a l ~ a t i o n ~ $ , ? . 1 ~

We s h a l l s e e how Weber's attempt t o undertake a value-free analysis of other's values

was rooted i n a f a l s e notion of logic.

Weber admitted t h a t h i s approach presupposed It.. . t h e existence of a n uncon-

d i t i o n a l l y v a l i d type of knowledge i n the s o c i a l sciences, i.e. the a n a l y t i c a l order-

ing of empirical s o c i a l reality."16 We s h a l l argue t h a t t h i s presupposition i s not

justifiable. Fundamental confusion underlies t h e attempt t o understand human conduct

i n a neutral or value-
4Fee way.
Weberls understanding of laws and causation showed t h i s basic confusion. I

have already mentioned t h a t Weber contrasted t h e study of t h e c u l t u r a l significance

of events with the causal analysis o f them. For him it was t h e l a t t e r question t h a t

r e l a t e d t o t h e development of laws. Thus he wrote t h a t h he focus of a t t e n t i o n on

r e a l i t y under t h e guidance of values which lend it significance and t h e s e l e c t i o n and

ordering of t h e phenomena which a r e thus affected i n t h e l i g h t of t h e i r c u l t u r a l sig-

nificance i s e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from t h e analysis of r e a l i t y i n terms of laws and

general concepts."l7 Weber believed t h a t causes and laws derived from them can be

distinguished, fundamentally, from h e u r i s t i c instruments. He emphasized t h i s point

by writing t h a t "... t h e meaning of h i s t o r y a s a science of r e a l i t y can only be t h a t

it t r e a t s p a r t i c u l a r elements of r e a l i t y not merely a s h e u r i s t i c instruments but a s

t h e objects of knowledge, and p a r t i c u l a r causal connections not as premises of know-

ledge, but a s a causal factors. Laws and values were unrelated i n Weberls
 I

scheme, yet values a f f e c t analysis. Laws were t o be t r e a t e d a s representations

of causal connections of objects, unaffected by any normative evaluation. Yet

t h e s e l e c t i o n and ordering of "objects" i s r e l a t e d t o t h e c u l t u r a l significance

of events, a s i n t e r p r e t e d by t h e individual s c i e n t i s t . Here we see t h e contra-

d i c t i o n within Weber Is work.

i/ r

Weber expanded on h i s concept of causation. F i r s t , he asked "...' whether

t h e introduction of ' p o s s i b i l i t i e s ' i n t o t h e 'causal enquiry! implies a renuncia-

t i o n of causal knowledge a l t o g e t h e r ...?"'9 Since i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s basic t o

a n a l y s i s and includes a consideration of t h e r o l e of values i n human conduct, it

i s possible t h a t a v a r i e t y of causal l i n k s a r e v a l i d i n s o c i a l science. Because

o f t h i s , Weber was asking whether t h e concept of "cause" had any v a l i d i t y whatso-

ever. He concluded t h a t "... t h e opposite of 'chance' i s not ... ! n e c e s s i t y 1 , but

r a t h e r 'adequate ( cause) ..."*O I n saying t h i s , Weber was r e j e c t i n g t h e notion of

absolute cause.

Weber's concept of "understanding" was based upon a n interdependence of value

and f a c t . Yet he attempted t o develop a n e u t r a l logic. His approach t o causation 4

a l s o shows t h i s contradiction. Because he r e j e c t e d t h e notion of absolute cause,

Weber r e a l i z e d t h a t "laws" have a conceptual basis. He wrote t h a t t h e s c i e n t i s t

must bear "... i n mind t h a t (laws) r e s t on t h e a b s t r a c t i o n of c e r t a i n components of

t h e r e a l causal chain, on t h e conceptual g e n e r a l i z a t i o n of t h e r e s t of t h e components

i n t h e form of judgments of objective p o s s i b i l i t y , and on t h e use of these t o mould

t h e event i n t o a causal complex with a c e r t a i n s t r u c t u r e . Yet he continued t h a t

"1t i s not s u f f i c i e n t f o r us t h a t i n t h i s case one agrees and remains aware

t h a t a l l our 'knowledget i s r e l a t e d t o a c a t e g o r i c a l l y formed r e a l i t y , and
t h a t , f o r example, ! c a u s a l i t y ! is a category of 'our' thought. Causality
has a s p e c i a l c h a r a c t e r when it i s t h e question of t h e Iadequacy' of causa-
t ion. "22

Weber based h i s ideas about logic on a r i g i d dichotomy between value and f a c t .

 ,
Yet he admitted t h a t understanding human events involves a value interpretation.

Nevertheless, he re-affirmed h i s i n i t i a l dichotomy. The r e s u l t i n g dilemma was

shown i n h i s confused discussion of laws and cause. Laws were seen a s represen-

t a t i o n s of r e a l causal connections among objects. . But because of h i s own dilemma

regarding values and f a c t s , and the greater v a l i d i t y of probability over determi-

n i s t i c theory, Weber spoke of adequate cause. He acknowledged t h e conceptual

character of laws and of t h e idea of causation, but then gave h i s notion of ade-

quate causation a special status. He did not l i k e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t h i s idea

of empiricism was rooted i n a special thought process, i.e. a n ideology, and t r i e d

i n every way t o give it a more special validity.

Weberls a r b i t r a r y separation of value and f a c t led him t o a self-contra-

dictory approach t o logic. Though i n one place he t r i e d t o give h i s idea of

"adequate cause" a special ( e.g. n e u t r a l ) meaningt i n another place he admitted

the "... s t r i c t l y r e l a t i v e nature of the d i s t i n c t i o n between 'adequate1 and 'chance1

causation which i s determined by any of t h e possible goals of knowledge."23 But

Weber did not c r i t i c a l l y analyze h i s own "goals of knowledge" and r e l a t e them t o

h i s ideas about knowledge. Had he done t h i s he would have taken a d i f f e r e n t path

i n discussing f a c t s and values.

Weber became trapped i n a d i l e m a s i m i l a r t o t h a t of Mannheim. He acknowledged

t h a t t h e r e were no absolute causes, hence no absolute laws; but s t i l l attempted t o

t r e a t empiricism i n an a b s t r a c t manner. Over and over he emphasized t h a t "The

significance of a configuration of c u l t u r a l phenomena and the basis of t h e i r signi-

ficance cannot ... be derived and rendered I n t e l l i g i b l e by a system of a n a l y t i c a l

laws, however perfect it may be, since the significance of c u l t u r a l events presupposes

a palue-orientation towards these events. "24 Weberls dilemma was rooted i n t h e f a c t

t h a t analysis* i n i t s e l f , cannot t e l l us about t h e significance of events. He
J-

consistently emphasized t h a t

he number and type of causes which have influenced any given event a r e
always i n f i n i t e and t h e r e i s n o t h i m i n t h e t h i w s themselves (my empha-
sis) t o s e t them apart a s alone meriting. A chaos of ' e x i s t e n t i a l judg-
ments! about countless individual events would be t h e only r e s u l t of a
serious attempt t o analyze r e a l i t y 'without p r e s ~ p p o s i t i o n s 1 . ~ ~ 2 5

This statement shows how Weberls handling of t h e r e l a t i o n s of values and

f a c t s led him t o a confusing theory of logic. There a r e always presuppositions

i n knowledge; yet Weber wanted h i s own l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between f a c t s and values

t o be t r e a t e d a s fundamental. He continually avoided t h e implications of h i s di-

lemma. I n one place he wrote of how It.. . t h e knowledge of causal m i s not the
-
end of investigation but only a means."26 This t r a n s l a t i o n of causal ideas i n t o

ideas about ends and means simply obscured Weberls underlying contradiction. How-

ever, when he s t a t e d t h a t he inversion of 'cause and effect! propositions i n t o

'means-ends1 propositions i s possible wherever t h e e f f e c t i n question can be

s t a t e d precisely"27 he was approaching a pragmatic understanding of knowledge.

Before I discuss t h i s pragmatic tendency it i s necessary t o evaluate Weberls ideas

about methodology.

I d e a l Types and Ideology

Weberls concept of t h e "ideal-type" was c e n t r a l t o h i s methodology. He

spoke of h he d i s t i n c t i o n between simple c l a s s o r generic concepts which merely

summarize t h e common f e a t u r e s of c e r t a i n empirical phenomena and the quasi-generic

ideal-tme ..."28 The function of t h e ideal-type was based upon t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n .

"1ts function i s t h e comparison with empirical r e a l i t y i n order t o e s t a b l i s h itg

divergencies o r s i m i l a r i t i e s , t o describe them with the most unambi~uously
i n t e l l i g i b l e concepts, and t o understand and explain them causally."29 We have

already seen how Weber f a i l e d t o c l a r i f y what c o n s t i t u t e d "unambiguous and in-

t e l l i g i b l e concepts". H i s own ambiguity about t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of values and

f a c t s made t h i s c l a r i f i c a t i o n impossible. S t i l l Weber did recognize t h e need t o

consider t h e presuppositions of any (e.g. a n empirical) perspective. He d i s -

cussed h i s ideal-type method i n terms of t h i s when he wrote: "Whoever accepts

t h e proposition t h a t t h e knowledge of h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y can or should be a

presuppositionl less^ copy of b b j e c t i v e ' f a c t s , w i l l deny t h e value of t h e i d e a l -

type. tt30

The basic problem with Weberls l o g i c i s t h a t on t h e one hand he maintained

a value-fact dichotomy a s fundamental t o a l l understanding, and on t h e other hand

he acknowledged t h e pragmatic nature of a n a l y t i c a l categories. Furthermore, ' h e

recognized t h e influence values had on t h e s e categories. Like Mannheim, he ad-

mitted t h a t presuppositions enter i n t o t h e s e c a t e g o r i e s ; but unlike Mannheim, he

d i d not r e l a t e t h i s point t o t h e problem t h a t ideology presents f o r a l l forms of

knowledge. As we continue, we s h a l l s e e how h i s 'ideal-type' concept covered over

h i s neglect of t h i s problem.

Weber considered h i s ideal-type method t o be h e ~ i s t i c . ~ ' He wrote t h a t

"The i d e a l - t y p i c a l concept w i l l help t o develop our s k i l l i n imputation i n

gesearch; it i s no 'hypothesis1 but it o f f e r s guidance t o t h e construction
of hypotheses. It i s not a d e s c r i p t i o n of r e a l i t y but it aims t o give un-
ambiguous means of expression t o such a description. "32

Here t h e term "description" entered Weberls vocabulary. The use of t h i s term was

an attempt t o maintain t h e anbiguous dichotomy between f a c t and value. If the

ideal-type i s not description, yet is t h e b a s i s of description, what i s description?

" ~ e s c r i p t i o n "becomes a n a b s t r a c t i o n unless a d i a l e c t i c r e l a t i o n between value and

f a c t , ideological model and Inquiry i s acknowledged. To do t h i s , we must r e j e c t

t h e s c i e n t i s t i c b e l i e f t h a t language and thought can be value-free. I n not em-

 - 204 -
,

phasizing t h e c e n t r a l i t y of language t o both human conduct and human knowledge,

Weber tended t o r e i f y h i s own notions of r e a l i t y . His a b s t r a c t notion of

"description" was a r e s u l t of h i s f a i l u r e t o deal with t h e problem of ideology

t h a t was implied by h i s own confusion about logic. 9

Weber wrote of how a n ideal-type could be a representation of ideas ex-

i s t i n g within a n epoch of history. He wrote t h a t "An i d e a l type of c e r t a i n s l t u -

a t i o n s , which can be abstracted from c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o c i a l phenomena of

a n epocho might - and t h i s i s indeed q u i t e o f t e n t h e case - have a l s o been present

i n t h e minds of t h e persons l i v i n g i n t h a t epoch a s an i d e a l t o be s t r i v e n f o r i n

p r a c t i c a l l i f e or a s a maxim f o r t h e r e g u l a t i o n of c e r t a i n s o c i a l relationships. "33

Here Weber recognized t h e l i n k between ideologies and science, though he did not

develop t h e point. Recall Marx and Engels1 argument t h a t ideas stem from p r a c t i c e ;

and theory, through a b s t r a c t i o n , orders and r e f i n e s them. From t h i s they concluded

t h a t when theory is seen a s t h e source of ideas, t h a t is, i f ideas a r e t r e a t e d a s

a b s t r a c t e n t i t i e s , then ideology i s being c r e a t e d t o f u r t h e r oppress people i n t h e i r

..
p r a c t i c a l lives. Weber was approaching t h i s same awareness, but h i s a b s t r a c t notion

of knowledge (which is d i f f e r e n t from a recognition of how knowledge r e l i e s on ab-

s t r a c t i o n and imagination) kept him from carrying t h i s thought through t o a r e j e c t i o n

of h i s contradictory and formal position on values and f a c t s . 34

Weberls idea of "ideal-type" methodology i s both a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of and a

symptom of confusion about t h e problem of logic. The c l a r i f i c a t i o n r e s u l t e d from

h i s awareness of t h e h e u r i s t i c nature of methodology. He made t h i s awareness

e x p l i c i t when he wrote t h a t "... methodology can only bring us r e f l e c t i v e understand-

ing of t h e means which have demonstrated t h e i r value i n p r a c t i c e by r a i s i n g them t o

t h e l e v e l of e x p l i c i t consciousness; it i s no more t h e pre-condition of f r u i t f u l

i n t e l l e c t u a l work than t h e knowledge of anatomy i s t h e pre-condition f o r Icorrect;l
UJ
walking."35 Here we see a s l i g h t s i m i l a r i t y between S a r t r e and Weber. Both theo-

r i s t s saw methodological knowledge a s being ex post f a c t o or r e f l e c t i v e . Sartrels

idea of praxis and Weberls concept of "ideal-type" hence overlap, though they cer-

t a i n l y a r e not i d e n t i c a l . C. W. Mills, who always emphasized t h e interdependency

of problem, method and theory, and c r i t i c i z e d a b s t r a c t methodology, was l i k e l y in-

f luenced by t h i s aspect i n Weberls thought. %

Emphasizing t h e need f o r a pragmatic epistemology, Weber wrote

"only by laying bare and solving substantive problems can sciences be

established and t h e i r methods developed. On t h e other hand, purely
epistemological and methodological r e f l e c t i o n s have never played t h e
c r u c i a l r o l e i n such developmen%. "37

When Weber wrote most of h i s methodological papers, he was immersed i n h i s compara-

t i v e s t u d i e s of r e l i g i o n , and these ideas were probably of a pragmatic value.

Others, however, have taken Weberls ideas, much a s some took Marx and Engelst ideas,

and t r e a t e d them a s "purely epistemological and methodological". Later, I w i l l show

how t h i s process helped with t h e development of t h e value-free doctrine, a s a dogma.

Weberts confusion, rooted i n h i s contradictory handling of f a c t and value,

was what allowed t h e a b s t r a c t concept of "model" t o develop i n contemporary science.

This concept, widespread i n a time of over-specialization and a b s t r a c t formalism

(e.g., general systems theory), d e f i n i t e l y has r o o t s i n a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

of Weberls work. As Hughes wrote:

"such scholars a s Joseph Schwnpeter, Weberls g r e a t e s t successor i n t h e r o l e

of a n economic s o c i o l o g i s t , have delineated t h e concept (Weberls ideal-
type, J.H.) more p r e c i s e l y under t h e new term of lmodell. And on t h i s b a s i s
new 1modelsl have become an enormously popular stock-in-trade among s o c i a l
s c i e n t i s t s . "38

Schumpeterls e r r o r s , with which we have d e a l t , were t h e r e s u l t of taking on

t h e same confusion a s Weber had regarding t h e r e l a t i o n s of value and f a c t .

 I

Schumpeter may have r e f i n e d t h i s confusion i n t o t h e idea of "model", but we have

seen how s u p e r f i c i a l t h e r e s u l t s of t h i s precision were. Much a s t h e end-of-

ideology proved t o be a "mood", "models" a r e proving t o be a f o r m a l i s t i c and ab-

s t r a c t attempt t o avoid t h e problems of ideology, logic and language t h a t a r e

basic t o science.3g

The Value-Free Doctrine and t h e University

Weberls c l a s s i c statement of h i s version of t h e value-free doctrine was

given i n h i s paper Science a s a I n it t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between ap-

proaches t o education and approaches t o t h e r e l a t i o n s of f a c t and value i n Weberls

work became clear. We r a i s e d t h i s matter i n Chapter Five by discussing t h e nature

of s c i e n t i s t i c education i n t h e n a t u r a l sciences. An evaluation of t h i s r e l a t i o n -

s h i p shows why we must understand how t h e s t r u c t u r e and function of education, and

of science, a f f e c t s whether and how t h e problem of ideology i s studied, and

t h e form t h a t t h e o r i e s of l o g i c take.

I n h i s paper Weber wrote "One can only demand of t h e teacher t h a t he have

t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t e g r i t y t o see t h a t it i s one t h i n g t o s t a t e f a c t s , t o determine

mathematical o r l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s or t h e i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e of c u l t u r a l values,

while it i s another thing t o answer questions of t h e value of c u l t u r e and i t s in-

dividual contents and t h e question of how one should a c t i n t h e c u l t u r a l community

and i n p o l i t i c a l associations. lt4' Here we see how Weberls dichotomy between t h e

normative and t h e empirical pervaded h i s "philosophy" of education. It i s important

t o note t h a t t h i s s e p a r a t i o n of t h e so-called normative from t h e f a c t u a l i n the

classroom r e l a t e d t o t h e preference f o r a c e r t a i n type of classroom. About t h e

classroom Weber wrote

 I

"1n the lecture-room we stand opposite our audience, and it has t o remain
s i l e n t . I deem it irresponsible t o exploit t h e circumstance t h a t f o r t h e
sake of t h e i r career the students have t o attend a teacher's COUPS> while
t h e r e i s nobody present t o oppose him with criticism. "42

Here we see how Weberls value-free doctrine r e l a t e d t o a c e r t a i n type of authority

r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t h e classroom. I f students a r e "condemned t o silence", a s Weber

assumed and believed they must be, then t h e r e i s a pragmatic argument f o r d i s t i n -

guishing between personal evaluation and the presentation of f a c t s . I f t h e class-

room Weber described i s both inevitable and j u s t i f i a b l e , I cannot disagree t h a t

"... it is somewhat convenient t o demonstrate one's courage i n taking a stand where

t h e audience and possible opponents a r e condemned t o silence. 1143

Weber had no ambivalence about t h e way authority should be used i n the c l a s s -

room. "In view of t h e f a c t t h a t c e r t a i n value-questions which a r e of decisive p o l i t -

i c a l significance a r e permanently banned from university discussion, it seems t o me

t o be only i n accord with t h e dignity of a representative of science t o be s i l e n t

a s well about such value-problems a s he i s allowed t o t r e a t . "44 The teacher, not

only the student, i s condemned t o silence about value-questions. But Weber was not

consistent on t h i s matter. For example, Weber emphasized the need t o question con-

ventional values, and t h i s has implications f o r one's view of education.

"what we must vigorously oppose i s t h e view t h a t one may be l s c i e n t i f i c a l l y l

contented with t h e conventional self-evidentness o f very widely accepted
value- judgments. The specific function of science, it seems t o me, i s just
the opposite: namely t o ask questions about these things which convention
makes s e l f -evident. "45

And Weber cannot have i t both ways. He cannot s t a t e t h a t "~undamentaldoubt i s the

f a t h e r of a l l knowledge"46 and a l s o believe t h a t t h e l e c t u r e r and students should

not deal with value questions. It appears t h a t Weber was unable t o doubt h i s own

assumpt ions about t h e classroom.

It i s relevant t o ask how t h i s contradiction developed and how it affected

 - 208 -

Weberls approach t o logic. An evaluatioh of h i s image of the university can help

us c l a r i f y t h i s question. Weber acknowledged t h a t one's view of t h e university

w i l l a f f e c t how one r e l a t e s , or t r i e s not t o r e l a t e , values t o teaching. Accord-

ing t o him, t h i s "... i n the l a s t analysis (must) be decided with reference t o

those tasks, which the individual, according t o h i s own value-system, assigns t o

t h e universities. "47

For Weber, "... ' i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t e g r i t y ' i s the only specific v i r t u e which

( t h e university) should seek t o inculcate. "'* I n the context of Weberts statement

about doubting conventional values and h i s emphasis on interpreting t h e values i m -

plied i n human conduct, t h e association of " i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t e g r i t y " with t o t a l l y

value-free teaching seems absurd. I n t e l l e c t u a l i n t e g r i t y , f o r Weber, implied t h e

d i s c i p l i n e t o not pass value judgements; yet knowledge came from doubt about con-

ventional ideas and understanding of t h e r o l e of values i n conduct. This suggests *

t h a t Weber was caught between h i s r o l e a s a teacher i n a t r a d i t i o n a l university and

h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l curiousity.

Weber rejected t h e idea of democratic r e l a t i o n s within t h e classroom. He

stated that

"~emocracyshould be used only where it is i n place. S c i e n t i f i c t r a i n i n g , a s

we a r e held t o practice it i n accordance with t h e t r a d i t i o n of German uni-
v e r s i t i e s , i s t h e a f f a i r of an i n t e l l e c t u a l aristocracy, and we should not
hide t h i s from ourselves. "49

As i n so many other topics, Weber's ambiguity led him t o hold a self-contradictory

position. On the one hand, he accepted t h e t r a d i t i o n a l , a r i s t o c r a t i c university.

On t h e other hand, he recognized how c a p i t a l i s t i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n was a f f e c t i n g the

university. Speaking about t h e l a r g e i n s t i t u t e s growing i n German u n i v e r s i t i e s i n

h i s time, he wrote t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s "... t h e same condition t h a t i s found wherever

c a p i t a l i s t enterprise comes i n operation: the 'separationt of the worker from h i s
means of p r o d ~ c t i o n ~ . " 5Weber
~ seemed disturbed by t h i s and implied t h a t t h e qual-

i t y of learning would be detrimentally affected. Yet, a gage l a t e r , he described

mediocre teaching i n t h e u n i v e r s i t y a s natural. h he predominance of mediocrity

i s r a t h e r due t o t h e laws of human cooperation, e s p e c i a l l y of t h e c o o p e ~ a t i o nof

s e v e r a l bodies, and i n t h i s case, cooperation of t h e f a c u l t i e s who recommend and of

t h e m i n i s t r i e s of education. '15' Rather than undertaking a s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s of

t h e u n i v e r s i t y and s i t u a t i n g t h e s o c i a l and educational r e l a t i o n s i n t h e classroom )r

w i t h i n t h i s , Weber's ambiguity led him t o mystify t h e problems of education i n t o

"laws of human cooperation".

Weber desired t h e t r a d i t i o n a l u n i v e r s i t y ; he saw capitalism c r e a t i n g a di-

v i s i o n of labour which took c o n t r o l out of t h e hands of t h e teacher; y e t , he accepted

as n a t u r a l t h e bureaucratic r e l a t i o n s h i p s within t h e s e divided i n s t i t u t i o n s . He was

c l e a r l y confused about t h e kind of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s which a r e best f o r teaching

and learning. He was unable t o t r a n s l a t e h i s i n s i g h t s about doubting conventions

i n t o an appropriate philosophy of education. H i s awareness of t h e conditions i n

in education was i d e a l i s t i c , not s t r a t e g i c . He adhered t o t h e value-free doctrine

i n education because of h i s u n c r i t i c a l acceptance of t h e a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i o n s i n t h e

t r a d i t i o n a l u n i v e r s i t y a s it was being incorporated by capitalism.

For Weber values were b a s i c a l l y an individual matter, and t h i s r e l a t e d t o

h i s confusion about education. As he said: "To apply t h e r e s u l t s of ... a n a l y s i s

i n t h e making of a decision ... i s not a t a s k which science can undertake; it i s

r a t h e r t h e t a s k of t h e a c t i n g , w i l l i n g person; he weighs and chooses from among t h e

values Involved according t o h i s conscience and h i s personal view of t h e ~ o r l d . " 5 ~

Here Weber again r e l i e d on t h e dichotomy between t h e normative and t h e empirical.

But we see t h a t i n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , t h e normative i s rooted i n t h e "willing

 3

person"; i n h i s o r her personal view of the w o r l d . Values a r e personal, while

f a c t s a r e s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l . Yet, according t o Weber, people a c t i n terms

of the meaning of events, which i s affected by values. Weber Is personalistic

view of values and h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i v e sociology once again clash.

If values a r e solely personal, they a r e not open t o s c i e n t i f i c validation.

And, i n several places, Weber a s much a s s t a t e d t h i s . I n one place, he wrote ". ..

one cannot - because it is a value judgment - r e f u t e t h i s point of view.1153 I n

another place, he wrote

"Only on t h e assumption of belief i n t h e v a l i d i t y of values i s t h e attempt

t o espouse value-judgments meaningful. However, t o judge t h e v a l i d i t y of
such values i s a matter of f a i t h . It may perhaps be a task f o r t h e specu-
l a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f l i f e and t h e universe i n quest of t h e i r meaning.
But it c e r t a i n l y does not f a l l within the province o f an empirical science
in t h e sense i n which it i s t o be practised here."54

Weberts r i g i d separation of values from f a c t s led him t o see only a "hair-

l i n e between
~ ~ ~ f a i t h and science. For him values had an almost mystical character.

For example, declaring h i s despair about t h e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of Western culture, Weber

wrote " ~ r e c i s e l yt h e ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public l i f e

e i t h e r i n t o t h e transcendental realm of t h e mystic or i n t o t h e brotherliness of d i r e c t

and personal human relation^."^^ A l i t t l e f a r t h e r , speaking about t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l

person becoming religious, he continued

"... such an i n t e l l e c t u a l s a c r i f i c e i n favor of an unconditional religious

devotion i s e t h i c a l l y q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t matter than t h e evasion of the plain
duty of i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t e g r i t y , which s e t s i n i f one lacks t h e courage t o
c l a r i f y one's own ultimate standpoint and r a t h e r f a c i l i t a t e s t h i s duty by
feeble r e l a t i v e judgments. I n my eyes, such r e l i g i o u s r e t u r n stands higher
than t h e academic prophecy, which does not c l e a r l y r e a l i z e t h a t i n the lec-
ture-rooms of t h e university no other v i r t u e holds but plain i n t e l l e c t u a l
integrity. "57

Weber was trapped by t h e very i n t e l l e c t u a l i z a t i o n with which he characterized

Western culture. Searching f o r "one's own ultimate standpoint" i s rooted i n a f a l s e

 I

understanding of consciousness, language and methodology. No person has an ultimate

standpoint or ultimate assumptions. n~ssumptions"a r e notions t h a t we c r e a t e t o en-

gage and c r i t i c i z e our own and o t h e r ' s ideas. They a r e pragmatic. We make other

peoplels behavior and experience relevant and meaningful t o our own by using language

i n a comparative way. This does not, i n any way, mean t h a t we possess some ultimate

p o s i t i o n or assumption. Chapter Nineteen on language and logic w i l l attempt t o c l a r -

i f y t h i s matter.

Weberts obsession with locating ultimates r e l a t e d t o h i s s p l i t t i n g of values

from f a c t s . H i s highly individualized view of values and evaluation underlay h i s own

need t o s p l i t t h e normative off from t h e empirical. Yet, i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , he a l s o saw

t h e inadequacy of t h i s . For example, he wrote of how "The transcendental presupposi-

t i o n of every c u l t u r a l science l i e s not i n our finding a c e r t a i n c u l t u r e or any Icul-

t u r e t i n general t o be valuable but r a t h e r i n t h e f a c t t h a t we a r e c u l t u r a l beings,

endowed with t h e capacity and t h e w i l l t o take a d e l i b e r a t e a t t i t u d e towards t h e world

and t o lend it significance. "58 This admlssion t h a t our a b i l i t y t o know about c u l t u r e

i s rooted i n our c u l t u r a l makeup i n v a l i d a t e s an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c approach t o human

values.

Weberls concern with ultimates o r "transcendental presuppositions" and h i s

b e l i e f t h a t t h e individual "willlng person" lends significance t o t h e world kept him ,

from seeing how t h e problems of ideology and l o g i c were r e l a t e d . An i n t e l l e c t u a 1 ~ -

ductionism i s apparent i n h i s work and i t i s t h i s t h a t l e d Weber i n t o so many dead-

ends. Yet, he was aware of t h e importance of us being c u l t u r a l beings t o be a b l e t o

understand culture. Had he based h i s a n a l y s i s of values and f a c t s on t h i s awareness

he might have avoided h i s own Confusion.

What leads c e r t a i n c u l t u r a l values t o be emphasized over others? Weber

 I

refused t o look a t t h i s question; i n f a c t , he was unable t o consider it because of

h i s value-free o r i e n t a t i o n t o science. This question, t h e kind t h a t follows from

an adequate handling of the problem of ideology, forces us t o consider how our own

l i f e s t y l e and our place i n t h e culture leads us t o emphasize c e r t a i n values over

others. It forces us t o study how and why these values a f f e c t our s e l e c t i o n and

treatment of a c e r t a i n c l a s s of problems. Weber did not deal with these questions

because h i s beginning point, what he accepted a p r i o r i , excluded t h e i r consideraticn.

Social Policy and Ideology

When Weber discussed " s o c i a l policy", he changed h i s orientation t o t h e study

of values. He acknowledged t h a t c o n f l i c t existed between d i f f e r e n t value systems,

but did not see how ideological struggle i n t h e society r e l a t e d t o t h i s c o n f l i c t .

I n h i s words:

"Normative standards of value can and must be t h e objects of dispute i n a

discussion of a problem of s o c i a l policy because t h e problem l i e s i n the
domain of general c u l t u r a l values. And t h e c o n f l i c t occurs not merely, a s
we a r e too e a s i l y inclined t o believe today, between "class i n t e r e s t s " but
between general views on l i f e and t h e universe a s we11."59

When discussing s o c i a l policy, Weber consistently undermined h i s more general i n t e l -

l e c t u a l position. Though values were seen a s personal points of view, not open t o

v a l i d a t i o n by analysis, what he called "endst' were open t o c r i t i c a l analysis. This

d i s t i n c t i o n of values and -960 one we have refused t o make, is the way Weber ap-

plied h i s general theory t o p r a c t i c a l matters without dealing with the problem of

ideology o r revamping h i s view of logic accordingly.

Ends, f o r Weber, could be evaluated technically. His position probably

influenced Schwnpeter who a l s o treated ends i n t h i s way. Let us r e c a l l t h a t f o r

Weber "causal analysis provides absolutely no value judgment and a value judgment I s
 I

absolutely nut a causal explanation. '16' I n view u r t h i s t o t a l s e p a ~ a t i o n~f value

judgments f r o m causal analyses, consider Weber1s following statement about the re-

l a t i o n of ends and analysis. " S t r i c t l y and exclusively empirical analysis can pro-

vide a solution only where it i s a question of a means adequate t o the r e a l i z a t i o n

I
of an absolutely unambiguous given end. "62 To say t h a t value judgments or evalua-

t i o n s of analyses can be avoided when ends a r e "absolutely unambiguous" and "given"

is t o say nothing. It side-steps the basic issue of why some ends become dominant

i n i n s t i t u t i o n s and become t h e emphasis f o r a p a r t i c u l a r approach t o analysis. No

"ends" a r e given. A s o c i a l arrangement of science and p o l i t i c s always underlies

t h e dominance of one end over another.

Weberls discussion o f s o c i a l policy, i n p a r t i c u l a r h i s s h i f t from a discus-

s i o n of f a c t s and values t o means and ends, undermined h i s own attempt t o conceptu-

a l i z e a n e u t r a l logic. This c o n f l i c t between the t h e o r e t i c a l , value-free Weber and

t h e p r a c t i c a l , policy-concerned Weber was shown i n t h e following statement:

"... t h e s c i e n t i f i c treatment of value-judgments may not only understand and

emphatically emphasize t h e desired ends and t h e ideals which underlie them;
it can a l s o 'judge1 them c r i t i c a l l y . This c r i t i c i s m can of course have only
a d i a l e c t i c a l character, i.e. it can be no more than a formal l o g i c a l judg-
ment of h i s t o r i c a l l y given value-judgments and ideas, a t e s t i n g of the ideals
according t o t h e postulate of t h e i n t e r n a l consistencx of the desired end.''63

Treating ends a s being " h i s t o r i c a l l y given" ignores the reasons why c e r t a i n values

and ends ( e. g. , monetary) come t o dominant a period. Weber Is "causal, h i s t o r i c a l "

analysis could not deal with t h i s question because he did not take t h e way dominant

values a f f e c t causal analysis, nor t h e ideological function of t h i s relationship,

i n t o account i n t h i s theory o f logic.

This so-called technical approach t o ends and values i s common among those

who dichotomize science and ideology. This approach i s part of t h e ideological

 I

foundation o f t h e l i b e r a l , academic approach t o s o c i a l science. Weber Is commitment

t o t h i s ideology was shown by h i s statement t h a t

he use of the term 'progress1 is legitimate i n our d i s c i p l i n e s when it re-

f e r s t o 'technical1 problems, i.e. t o t h e 'means1 of a t t a i n i n g an unambigu-
ously given end. It can never elevate i t s e l f i n t o t h e sphere o f Iultimate1
evaluations. "64

Again Weber talked o f "unambiguously given" ends, which avoids t h e problem of why

some ends a r e dominant and what t h e e f f e c t s of such dominance a r e f o r science. He

again talked of "ultimates" and, i n the process, abstracted these s o r t s o f questions

i n t o the realm of t h e transcendental, away from c r i t i c a l analysis. The f a c t t h a t h i s

concepts were a b s t r a c t does not change the ideological function o f a neutral logic.

I n f a c t , a s I argued i n Chapter Ten, such abstraction i s t h e form t h a t l i b e r a l ide-

ology takes.

Weber consistently avoided t h e question of why some valuys dominate. His

a b s t r a c t treatment of ends, and h i s emphasis on t h e ends t h a t a r e given by "history"

- which i s a l s o a b s t r a c t and neglects the way a p a r t i c u l a r power and authority system

i n a society leads t o c e r t a i n values being emphasized - a c t u a l l y functioned t o rein-

force the dominant ends. It was i n t h i s sense t h a t Weberls approach t o values was i n

t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e established order. To a b s t r a c t value judgments i n t o t h e realm of

t h e transcendental and t h e personal, and t o deal only technically with t h e so-called

given ends, does not c o n s t i t u t e an evaluation o f the way c e r t a i n ends and means per-

vade an approach t o science. Weberls approach t y p i f i e d what both Mills and Marcuse

c r i t i c i z e d when they argued t h a t a b s t r a c t empiricism has authoritarian, i f not t o t a l -

i t a r i a n , overtones. Because it helps maintain an ignorance of t h e reasons why c e r t a i n

f a c t s , ends and r e l a t e d s o c i a l relationships predominate, Weber's approach was inher-

e n t l y conservative.

Weberls extremism, i.e., h i s t r e a t i n g of values a s personal, h i s t r e a t i n g of

a n a l y s i s a s s o c i a l , and h i s avoidance of t h e problem of ideology by t a l k i n g of ends

a s given, was shown by t h e following statement.

"Science today i s a 1vocation8 organized i n s p e c i a l d i s c i p l i n e s i n t h e s e r v i c e

of s e l f - c l a r i f i c a t i o n and knowledge of i n t e r r e l a t e d facts. It is not t h e g i f t
of grace of s e e r s and prophets dispensing sacred values and revelations, nor
does it partake of t h e contemplation of sages and philosophers about t h e mean-
ing of t h e universe. This, t o be sure, i s t h e inescapable condition of our
h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n . We cannot evade it so long a s we remain t r u e t o our-
selves. "65

Weber did not point out t h a t t h e meaning we a s c r i b e t o t h e universe i s r e l a t e d t o t h e

ideological foundations of a t h e o r i s t ' s . o r i e n t a t i o n t o science. The organization of

" s p e c i a l d i s c i p l i n e s " and t h e " i n t e r r e l a t e d f a c t s " that a r e emphasized by them a r e

both a n expression and a r e s u l t of these foundations. The very notion of science a s

a vocation is rooted i n t h e professionalization of science a s p a r t of c a p i t a l i s t in-

dustrialization.

I n t h e Foreword t o t h e Methodolo~yof t h e Social Sciences, S h i l s wrote "...

(Weber's) powerful mind, which s t r o v e r e s t l e s s l y f o r c l a r i t y a t l e v e l s where h i s

contemporaries were s a t i s f i e d with ambiguities and c l i c h e s , drove through t o t h e

f'undamental problems of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between general sociological concepts and

propositions on t h e one hand, and concrete h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y on t h e other. 1166

view of o w a n a l y s i s - t h e exposure of Weber's contradictory handling of value and

fact - we cannot agree t h a t he reached !fundamental problems". A s Mannheim s t r o v e

f o r c l a r i t y a t new l e v e l s i n h i s treatment of t h e sociology of knowledge and ideology,

Weber s t r o v e f o r c l a r i t y regarding methodology. But h i s i n a b i l i t y t o deal c r i t i c a l l y

with h i s own categories kept him from reaching t h e l e v e l of i n s i g h t t h a t Mannheim

reached. Weber could not even begin t o discuss t h e problem of ideology or problems

of logic implied by it while he maintained h i s dichotomy between values and f a c t s .

 Weber depended on a formal logic t o cover over h i s confusion.

" ~ ls lc i e n t i f i c work presupposes t h a t t h e r u l e s of logic and method a r e val-

i d ; t h e s e a r e t h e general foundations of our o r i e n t a t i o n i n t h e world; and,
a t l e a s t f o r our s p e c i a l question, these presuppositions a r e t h e l e a s t prob-
lematic aspect of science. Science f u r t h e r presupposes t h a t what i s yielded
by s c i e n t i f i c work is important i n t h e sense t h a t it i s 'worth being known1.
I n t h i s , obviously, a r e contained a l l our problems. For t h i s presupposition
cannot be proved by s c i e n t i f i c means. It can only be i n t e r p r e t e d with r e f e r -
ence t o i t s ultimate meaning, which we must r e j e c t o r accept according t o
our ultimate p o s i t i o n towards l i f e . B67

When Weber s t a t e d t h a t "presuppositions a r e t h e l e a s t problematic aspect of sdiencefl

one wonders why he took so much time t o prove t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e value-free doctrine

and develop a theory of l o g i c from it. I n doing t h i s , Weber was t r y i n g t o make h i s

own presuppositions e x p l i c i t . But he did not t r e a t h i s p,resuppositions c r i t i c a l l y

o r h i s t o r i c a l l y f o r t h a t would involve a consideration of t h e problem of ideology.

- It was h i s f a i l u r e t o do t h i s t h a t l e d him i n t o t h e r e h n of t h e transcendental.

H i s i n t e l l e c t u a l reductionism, i.e., h i s obsession with i n t e l l e c t u a l c l a r i f i c a t i o n ,

made it impossible f o r him t o t a c k l e t h e problem of ideology. Searching f o r one's

"ultimate position" is a r e t r e a t from t h i s problem. And Weber did r e t r e a t . Rather

9

t h a n analyzing how p a r t i c u l a r presuppositions function f o r a p a r t i c u l a r kind of

science, he t r e a t e d them a s a personal matter. The way Weberls value-free ideas

have functioned t o shore up t h e end-of-ideology ideology, however, a r e q u i t e h i s -

torical.

Weberts i n t e l l e c t u a l individualism i s t y p i c a l of a l l those who separate

t h e i r presuppositions or values off from t h e i r s o c i a l r o l e s (e.g. , scientist,

teacher). There i s some t r u t h i n saying that a n a l y s i s w i l l not give us answers t o

value questions. Knowledge, which i s conceptualized and communicated i n a b s t r a c t e d

language, w i l l c e r t a i n l y not give us any c l u e s about p r a c t i c a l matters. But know-

ledge, seen a s praxis, can accomplish t h i s because it e x p l i c i t l y stems from practice.

I n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , it was Weber's academic view of knowledge t h a t underlay h i s

errors.

Doctrine Becomes Dogma

An academic view of knowledge i s very u s e f u l f o r those who use knowledge

1x1 t h e guise of abstracted o b j e c t i v i t y t o f u r t h e r t h e p o l i t i c a l decisions of t h e

s e a t u s quo. How much can we a s s o c i a t e Weber with t h i s modern trend? I s he t h e

f a t h e r of t h e value-free dogma or were h i s ideas r e i f i e d and used a s r a t i o n a l i z a -

t i o n s f o r t h i s dogma? Weber c e r t a i n l y tended towards t h e a b s t r a c t empiricism t h a t

m d e r l i e s t h e end-of-ideology ideology. His separation of empiricism from t h e nor-

I
saative i s t h e foundation on which t h e more vulgar r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s f o r t h i s scien-

t i s m rest. H i s p r i v a t i s t treatment of values a l s o served a s a r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n f o r

academics who do research and teaching t h a t inherently s t r e s s e s c e r t a i n (e.g., 'cap-

l t a l i s t ) values. The value-free doctrine helps an academic believe t h a t h i s or her

values a r e a personal matter. Criticism of t h e consequences ( r e a l values) of one's

life-work i s r a r e f o r those who separate t h e public and t h e p r i v a t e s e l f .

When Weber wrote t h a t he s o c i a l sciences, which a r e s t r i c t l y empirical

s c i e n c e s , a r e t h e l e a s t f i t t e d t o presume t o save t h e individual t h e d i f f i c u l t y of

making a choice, and they should t h e r e f o r e not c r e a t e t h e impression t h a t they can

do so,"68 we see, i n a n u t s h e l l , both h i s s o p h i s t i c a t i o n and t h e reason why h i s ideas

were and a r e u s e f u l t o t h e vulgar end-of-ideologists. Knowledge cannot save us from

choice, and those who search f o r absolutes or "ultimates" i n science a r e p o t e n t i a l l y

no l e s s a u t h o r i t a r j a n i n t h e i r dependency than a r e r e l i g i o u s bigots. But n e j t h e r i s

choice something separated from knowledge. Such a separation i s rooted I n a f a l s e

n o t i o n of knowing and of being. We can choose t h e c l a s s of problems with which we

 I

w i l l work i n tcrnis of t h e probable consequcnces of t h a t work which wc value.

This approach, not Weber's, i s how t o conceptualize t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between

choice and knowledge.

From t h i s stance, Weberts ideas become a s s i m p l i s t i c a s those of

~ ~ it i s u n f a i r t o reduce Weberls
Ries, which I discussed i n Chapter ~ h r e e .But

thought t o such ignorant assumption^.^^ For example, while Ries used t h e value-

f'ree doctrine t o make Marx's sociology appear a s c i e n t i f i c , Weber acknowledged

t h e value of "... t h e science of s o c i a l economics s i n c e Marx. "'I Furthermore,

t h e r e a r e statements by Weber t h a t show how today's value-free doctrine and t h e

end-of-ideologists d i s t o r t Weber's value-fact dichotomy. They took it out of

t h e context within which it was developed, and thus absolutized t h e doctrine.

It became crude ideology - s o l e l y a r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n f o r t h e scientism of t h e

established order. We can be c r i t i c a l of Weber f o r not t r e a t i n g h i s own pre-

suppositions s o c i o l o g i c a l l y and h i s t o r i c a l l y ; but we s t i l l cannot reduce h i s

p o s i t i o n t o today's dogma of value-freedom.

We may disagree with Weberls individualized view of values and evalua-

tion - rooted i n h i s ignorance of t h e problem of ideology - but we have t o admit

t h a t he t r e a t e d "evaluation" a s a problem. For example he wrote t h a t "we a r e

f a r removed, then, from t h e view t h a t t h e demand f o r t h e exclusion of value-

judgments i n empirical a n a l y s i s implies t h a t discussions of evaluation a r e

s t e r i l e or meaningless. "72 I n another place, he wrote t h a t " ~ ant t i t u d e of

moral indifference has no connection with s c i e n t i f i c l o b J e c t i v i t y I . "73 Both

these statements show t h a t Weber did not equate value-freedom o r o b j e c t i v i t y

with b e i n ~ ;value-- or i n d i f f e r e n t . To t h e extent t h a t indifference about

t h e consequences of one's academic research and teaching characterizes s o c i a l

 I

science today - and I would argue it i s now typical - Weberls value-free doc-

t r i n e has been replaced with a psychopathic version.

Weberls a t t i t u d e towards t h e university and teaching underlay h i s r i g i d

separation of problems of value f r o m those of fact. Weberls own statements sub-

s t a n t i a t e t h i s interpretation. Talking about the p o s s i b i l i t y of dialogue i n t h e

journal Archiv, of which he was a n e d i t o r , he wrote "... t h e r e a r e psychological

l i m i t s everywhere and especially i n Germany t o the p o s s i b i l i t y of coming together

f r e e l y with one's p o l i t i c a l opponents i n a neutral forum, be it s o c i a l or i n t e l -

lectual. 1174 Value-freedom i n analysis may therefore have been more an attempt t o

g e t a t p o l i t i c a l differences e x p l i c i t l y , i.e. i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , than t o deny t h e

p o l i t i c a l differences. And such may have been j u s t i f i e d , though a l i t t l e naive.

It i s one thing t o a r b i t r a r i l y emphasize t h e separation of value from f a c t t o

f a c i l i t a t e a more i n t e l l e c t u a l l y based debate. It is q u i t e another thing t o be-

l i e v e t h a t values a r e not inherent, a s ideology, i n the a n a l y t i c a l arguments.

Weber seemed t o project his pragmatically understood categories onto t h e w o r l d ,

and, i n doing such, he became t o t a l l y unaware of t h e ideological struggles - both

p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s and the r e l a t e d struggle over the relevance of c e r t a i n c l a s s e s

of problems - around him. He was not even able t o see how h i s own value-free doc-

t r i n e was a n aspect of t h i s struggle.

A similar i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was presented by Gouldner. He argued t h a t

Weber's If... promotion of the value-free doctrine may, then, be seen not so much

a s an e f f o r t t o m o r a l i z e a s t o d e p o l i t i c i z e the University and t o remove it from

the p o l i t i c a l struggle."75 But such an attempt was naive f o r t h e s t r u c t u r e and

function of teaching and learning i s inherently p o l i t i c a l , and only appears t o be

neutral i n a time of ideological homogeneity. Once a n ideologicel system begins

 I

t o break down - when c o n f l i c t i n g values begin t o develop - t h e p o l i t i c s of

education becomes more c l e a r . This i s what is happening now ( 1969) i n North

America. The c o n f l i c t t h a t underlies and r e s u l t s from t h i s i s p a r t l y respon-

s i b l e f o r opening up t h e kinds of questions with which I am dealing.

Weberts a r i s t o c r a t i c u n i v e r s i t y and h i s value-free doctrine may have

f a c i l i t a t e d t h e production of grand theory. It did not help t o break down t h e

d i v i s i o n of mental and physical labour, and t o make theory relevant t o t h e prac-

t i c e of t h e mass of people. Nor d i d it lead t o an i n t e l l e c t u a l handling 'of t h e

problem of t h e r e l a t i o n s of ideology and science. Instead, t h e value-free doc-

t r i n e developed within t h e ivory towers of Germany u n t i l t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l s (some,

most went on being value-free under H i t l e r ) were themselves forced t o f l e e t h e

universities.

Weberts value-free d o c t r i n e must be analyzed by i t s e f f e c t s , not accord-

ing t o a b s t r a c t principles. I t s e f f e c t was & t o make academics more conscious

of t h e p o l i t i c s of education. It did not educate students and teachers t o be

a r t i c u l a t e about t h e problem of ideology. Instead, it reinforced a f r a g i l e facade

of n e u t r a l i t y i n t h e u n i v e r s i t i e s which proved t o be passlve i n t h e f a c e of fascism.

A s Max Lerner wrote "we must not f o r g e t t h a t a Germany which b u i l t a l o f t y and i m -

posing house f o r t h e i n t e l l e c t was a l s o capable of what was perhaps t h e g r e a t e s t

c o l l e c t i v e crime i n human history. 11 76

Academic and Pragmatic Logic i n Weber

What can we conclude about t h e worth of Weberts methodological ideas?

I s t h e r e any value whatsoever i n h i s value-free doctrine? The best way t o approach

these questions i s by t r a c i n g through t h e two s t r a i n s , one academic and t h e other

 - 221 -
I

pragmatic, i n h i s logic. Weberls academic s t r a i n was dominant a s our above

a n a l y s i s of h i s dichotomies, contradictions and i n t e l l e c t u a l reductionism

showed. A discussion of h i s approach t o t h e question of "meaning" w i l l ex-

emplify h i s academic approach t o logic f o r t h e purposes of our comparison.

For Weber, t h e empirical sciences cannot s e t t l e questions of "meaning".

I n saying t h i s , Weber was not implying t h a t "meaning" i s a p r a c t i c a l matter.

For him, "meaningn was a philosophical matter, t h a t i s , something t o be s e t t l e d

through philosophical r e f l e c t i o n . As he s a i d "Philosophical d i s c i p l i n e s can go

f u r t h e r and l a y bare t h e !meaning1 of evaluations, i.e., t h e i r ultimate meaning-

f u l s t r u c t u r e and t h e i r meaningful consequences, i n other words, they can in-

d i c a t e t h e i r 'place1 within t h e t o t a l i t y of a l l t h e possible l u l t i m a t e l evalua-

t i o n s and delimit t h e i r spheres of meaningal v a l i d i t y . 1177

Once again we s e e Weberls concern with "ultimates". Throughout h i s

discussions of l o g i c , he wrote of ultimate meanings rooted i n ultimate problems. 78

This academic treatment of "meaning" l e d Weber t o p o s t u l a t e ultimates which were

s o l e l y p r i v a t e matters of contemplation. Weberls approach t o logic, however, was

not one-dimensional. I n several places, he expressed a pragmatic o r i e n t a t i o n t o

l o g i c ; t h a t i s , looking t o p r a c t i c a l matters, not philosophical r e f l e c t i o n , a s t h e

way t o c l a r i f y t h e meaning of knowledge. I already quoted Weberls statement t h a t

"... t h e meaning of h i s t o r y a s a science of r e a l i t x can only be t h a t it t r e a t s

ledge but a s -
p a r t i c u l a r elements of r e a l i t y not merely a s h e u r i s t i c instruments but a s t h e

o b j e c t s of knowledge, and p a r t i c u l a r causal connections not a s premises of know-

causal f a c t 0 r s . " 7 ~ Other statements show t h a t Weber recognized

t h a t t h e " p a r t i c u l a r elements of r e a l i t y " and our knowledge of them was going

through continual changes. He wrote of

 "... t h e meaninglcssncss of t h e idea which prevails occasionally even
among historians, namely, t h a t t h e goal of t h e c u l t u r a l sciences, how-
ever f a r it may be from r e a l i z a t i o n , i s t o construct a closed system
of concepts, i n which r e a l i t y i s synthesized i n some s o r t of permanent-
and universally valid c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and from which it can again be
deduced. The stream of immeasurable events flows unendingly towards e-
t e r n i t y . The c u l t u r a l problems which move men form themselves ever anew
and i n d i f f e r e n t colors, and t h e boundaries of t h a t area i n t h e i n f i n i t e
stream o f concrete events which acquires meaning and significance f o r us,
i. e. , which becomes an " h i s t o r i c a l individual1', a r e constantly subject t o
change. The i n t e l l e c t u a l contexts from which it i s viewed and s c i e n t i f i -
c a l l y analyzed ~ h i f t . " 8 ~

Here, i n contrast t o Weberls dominant, academic approach t o logic, "meaning" was

r e l a t e d t o t h e significance o f events, and not t o "ultimates" derived f r o m philo-

sophical r e f l e c t i o n .

Other statements by Weber reinforce t h i s interpretation. For example,

"The h i s t o r y of t h e s o c i a l sciences i s and remains a continuous process passing

from the attempt t o order r e a l i t y a n a l y t i c a l l y through t h e construction of con-

cepts - t h e dissolution of t h e a n a l y t i c a l constructs s o constructed through t h e

expansion and s h i f t of the s c i e n t i f i c horizon - and t h e reformulation anew o f con-

cepts on t h e foundations thus transformed. 118' This statement even suggests t h a t

Weber was approaching a notion of "praxis" i n h i s studies. When he s t a t e d t h a t

"... concept-construction depends on t h e s e t t i n g of t h e problem, and t h e

l a t t e r v a r i e s with t h e content of c u l t u r e i t s e l f . The r e l a t i o n s h i p be-
tween concept and r e a l i t y i n the c u l t u r a l sciences involves t h e trans-
i t o r i n e s s of a l l such syntheses."82

he was approaching the d i a l e c t i c idea of knowledge around which S a r t r e developed

h i s idea of " p r a ~ i s " . ~ 3It i s important t o note t h a t once we acknowledge t h a t the

syntheses t h a t c o n s t i t u t e knowledge a r e rooted i n a changing c u l t u r e and changing

concepts it i s absurd t o search f o r ultimate meanings.

The pragmatic s t r a i n i n Weberls thought was shown when he wrote, about

h i s t o r i c a l research, t h a t "... t h e concepts a r e not ends but a r e means t o the end

 L

of understanding phenomena which a r e s i g n i f i c a n t from concrete individual view-

points,I184 This emphasis on t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of phenomena can be found through-

out Weberls writings. I n another place he s t a t e d t h a t

"...s o c i a l science i n our sense i s concerned with p r a c t i c a l signi_Ii_~a~c&.

This significance however can very o f t e n be brought unambiguously t o mind
only by r e l a t i n g t h e empirical data t o a n i d e a l l i m i t i n g case."@

For Weber, "conceptx", p a r t i c u l a r l y "ideal-types", have a pragmatic func-

t i o n i n inquiry. Saying t h i s , however, does not t e l l us s p e c i r i c a l l y how he un-

derstood t h e M c t i o n of concepts i n inquiry. To o u t l i n e t h i s it is necessary

t o discuss how Weber understood t h e process of "abstraction" and t h e r o l e of

"presuppositions" i n science.

Weber wrote of how It... t h e a t t r i b u t i o n of e f f e c t s t o causes takes place

through a process of thought which includes a s e r i e s of abstractions."86 "~auses"

were not mystified by Weber. As he s a i d " ~ v e nt h e f i r s t s t e p towards a n h i s t o r i -

c a l judgment i s t h u s ... a process of abstraction."87 Weber recognized t h a t

".., 'theory1 i s involved i n t h e 'fact1 ... "88 Such a n awareness of t h e r o l e

of a b s t r a c t thought i n science undercuts t h e s c i e n t i s t i c view of discovery and

interpretation. As Weber s t a t e d "... t h e formulation of propositions about

h i s t o r i c a l causal connectims not only makes use of both types of a b s t r a c t i o n ,

namely, i s ~ l a t i n na:zd g e n e r a l i z a t i o n ; it shows a l s o t h a t t h e simplest h i s t o r i c a l

judgment concerning t h e historical,'significancel of a 'concrete f a c t 1 i s f a r

removed from being a simple r e ~ i s t r a t i o nof something lfoundl i n an already

f i n i s h e d form. "89 A judgment i s always t i e d t o a s e t of presuppositims. Such

presuppositions a r e necessary t o guide inquiry; t o de1;emnlnc t h e " p r a c t i c a l

significance" of c e r t a i n events. "A chaos of ' e x i s t e n t i a l judgments1 about

countless individual events would ... r e s u l t (from a m l y s i s ) Iwithout presuppositions. ,190

 I

An awareness of t h e r o l e of presuppositions i n inquiry i n v a l i d a t e s t h e notion

of s t r i c t determinism. The claim of s t r i c t determinism "... f a i l s t o observe

t h a t i n order t o be a b l e t o reach t h i s r e s u l t even i n t h e simplest case, t h e

t o t a l i t y of t h e e x i s t i n g h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y including every one of i t s c a u s a l

r e l a t i o n s h i p s must be assumed a s 'given1 and presupposed a s known. "9'

I f presuppositions a r e involved i n inquiry t h e n t h e b e l i e f i n t h e

dualism between t h e " s u b j e c t i v e " and t h e "objective" i s untenable. I n a way

s i m i l a r t o S a r t r e Weber wrote "The o b l e c t i v e v a l i d i t y of a l l empirical knowledge

r e s t s e x c l u s i v e l y upon t h e ordering of t h e given r e a l i t y according t o c a t e g o r i e s

which a r e s u b j e c t i v e i n a s p e c i f i c sense, namely, i n t h a t t h e y present t h e pre-

suvvositions of our knowledge and a r e based on t h e presupposition of t h e value

of those t r u t h s which empirical knowledge alone i s a b l e t o g i v e us."92 Saying

t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s a r e j e c t i o n of t h e idea of o b j e c t i v e , value-free o r non-subjec-

t i v e knowledge. And Weber acknowledged t h i s . "It i s not t h e determination of

t h e h i s t o r i c a l l c a u s e s l f o r a given Iobjectl t o be explained which i s ' s u b j e c t i v e t

... - r a t h e r i s it t h e d e l i m i t a t i o n of t h e h i s t o r i c a l 'object', of t h e I i n d i v i d u a l 1

i t s e l f , f o r i n t h i s t h e r e l e v a n t values a r e d e c i s i v e and t h e conception of t h e

values i s t h a t which i s s u b j e c t t o h i s t o r i c a l change."93

A l l t h e s e statements i n d i c a t e t h e pragmatic s t r a i n i n Weberls thought.

H i s awareness of t h e r o l e of a b s t r a c t i o n and t h e r e l a t e d , r o l e of presuppositions

l e d him t o a view of knowledge q u i t e d i f f e r e n t than t h a t which we have c a l l e d

scientistic. Others have recognized t h i s aspect of Weber. Gerth and M i l l s wrote

t h a t Weberts "... conceptual nominalism and h i s pragmatic outlook a r e opposed t o

a l l r e i f i c a t i o n of lunanalyzed1 processes. "g4

Because of t h i s o r i e n t a t i o n , Weber recognized t h e uncertainty of a l l

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science, and t h a t ultimately t h e purpose one saw f o r science would a f f e c t t h e

nature of science. he question as t o how f a r , f o r example, contemporary

' a b s t r a c t theory' should be f u r t h e r elaborated, i s ultimately a l s o a question

of t h e s t r a t e g y of science, which must, however concern i t s e l f with other prob-

lems a s well. "95 Depending on one's " s t r a t e g y f o r science", a s Weber put it,

one w i l l have d i f f e r e n t methods of evaluating phenomena. Weber made t h i s same

point when he wrote "...without t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r ' s evaluative ideas, t h e r e

would be no p r i n c i p l e of s e l e c t i o n of subject-matter and no meaningful knowledge

of t h e concrete r e a l i t y . "g6 The primary r o l e of these evaluative ideas i n science

i n v a l i d a t e s t h e s i m p l i s t i c p o s i t i v i s t i c notion of o b j e c t i v i t y . Weber a l s o recog-

nized t h i s . he lob j e c t i v i t y l of t h e s o c i a l sciences depends ... on t h e fact

t h a t t h e empirical data a r e always r e l a t e d t o those evaluative ideas which alone

make them worth knowing and t h e significance of t h e empirical data i s derived from

these evaluative ideas. "97

With t h i s awareness of t h e r o l e of presuppositions and evaluative ideas

i n knowledge, we might have expected Weber t o understand how ideology and logic

interrelate. I n one place Weber seemed t o i n d i c a t e such an understanding. "It

i s of course e a s i l y overlooked t h a t however important t h e significance even of

t h e purely l o g i c a l l y persuasive force of ideas ... nonetheless empirical-historical

events occurring i n men's minds must be understood a s primarily p s ~ c h o l o ~ i c aand

ll~

not l o g i c a l l y conditioned. !l9* But t h i s point was never thought through by Weber.

Instead of seeing logic i n a pragmatic way and admitting t h a t it can never be

value-free, Weber s t a t e d he categories of l o g i c , wh3.ch i n i t s present s t a t e of

development i s a specialized d i s c i p l i n e l i k e any other, require, i f they a r e t o

be u t i l i z e d with assurance, t h e same d a i l y f a m i l i a r i t y a s those of any other

d i s c i p l i n e . "99 This treatment of "logic" a s a s p e c i a l i z e d d i s c i p l i n e i s what

 ,
makes it d i f f i c u l t t o see how t h e "categories" of any approach t o logic r e l a t e

t o an ideological orientation.

Weber was unwilling and/or unable t o think through h i s hypothesis about

presuppositions and evaluative ideas. I n many places he admitted t h a t logic was

not value-free, but he did not make t h e implications of t h i s e x p l i c i t . He did

admit t h a t a s t r u g g l e was involved between d i f f e r e n t evaluative ideas. As he

said: very meaningful value-judmnent about someone e l s e ' s a s p i r a t i o n s must

be a c r i t i c i s m from t h e standpoint of one's own Weltanschauurq; it must be a

s t r u g g l e against another's i d e a l s from t h e standpoint of one's own. "100 I n one

place he admitted t h a t s c i e n t i f i c d i s c i p l i n e s r e f l e c t p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e s when

he r e f e r r e d t o anthropology a s t h e d i s c i p l i n e where "... t h e p o l i t i c a l and com-

mercial s t r u g g l e s of nations f o r world dominance a r e being fought with increasing

acuteness. "lo' But he never analyzed t h e implications of these points and d i s -

cussed t h e r e l a t i o n s of ideology and logic. There a r e statements made by Weber

which could have been developed i n t o such an analysis. For example, he wrote

that

"The q u a l i t y of an event as a 'social-economic1 event i s not something

which it possesses l o b j e c t i v e l y ' . It i s r a t h e r conditioned by t h e
o r i e n t a t i o n of our cognitive i n t e r e s t , a s it a r i s e s from t h e s p e c i f i c
c u l t u r a l s i g n i f i c a n c e which we a t t r i b u t e t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r event i n a
given case. "102

Here Weber avoided t h e term "ideology", but t h e phrase " t h e o r i e n t a t i o n of our

cognitive i n t e r e s t " has a d e f i n i t e s i m i l a r i t y with t h e notion of ideology.

What can we conclude about Weberls approach t o logic? It i s more than

ambiguous - it i s confusing. Weber never i n t e r r e l a t e d h i s d i f f e r e n t ways of

analyzing t h e r e l a t i o n of value and f a c t and hence ended up with a n a r r a y of

s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y positions. Though he did not accept a value-free notion of

 - 227 -
I

logic, h i s academic approach t o "meaning" can e a s i l y lead t o such a theory. Or,

conversely, though h i s assessment of t h e r o l e of presuppositions and "evaluative

ideas" i n science leads t o a consideration of t h e problem of ideology, because

of h i s academic o r i e n t a t i o n , Weber could not undertake such an analysis.

Weber presented a hypothesis t h a t could begin t o explain h i s own confusion.

He s t a t e d t h a t

"~11 reskarch i n t h e c u l t u r a l sciences i n an age of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , once it

i s oriented towards a given subject matter through p a r t i c u l a r s e t t i n g s of
problems and has established i t s methodological principles, w i l l consider
t h e a n a l y s i s of t h e data a s an end i n i t s e l f . It w i l l discontinue assess-
ing t h e value of t h e individual f a c t s i n terms of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o
ultimate value-ideas. Indeed, it w i l l l o s e i t s awareness of i t s ultimate
rootedness i n t h e value-ideas i n general. And it i s well t h a t should be
so. But t h e r e comes a moment when t h e atmosphere changes. The significance
of t h e u n r e f l e c t i v e l y u t i l i z e d viewpoints becomes uncertain and t h e road
is l o s t i n t h e twilight. "13

Though Weber saw t h e relevance of analyzing "ultimate value-ideas", t h e academic

ideology, which r e i f i e s t h e h i s t o r i c a l l y rooted s p e c i a l i z a t i o n of research and

teaching, was too pervasive i n h i s o r i e n t a t i o n f o r him t o undertake such a study.

Weber lacked t h e s k i l l s , rooted i n t h e sociology of knowledge, f o r undertaking

t h e necessary s e l f - c r i t i c i s m t o expose t h e s p e c i f i c i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of ideology

and l o g i c i n h i s own work and time.

"...t h e i n e v i t a b l e monistic tendency of every type of

Weber wrote of

thought which i s not s e l f - c r i t i c a l ..."lo4It i s i r o n i c , but understandable,

t h a t t h e one-dimensional value-free doctrine or end-of-ideology ideology r e l i e s

so heavily on Weberls work.

Footnotes

'Max Weber: The Methodology of t h e S o c l a l Sciences. E.A. S h i l s and II. A. Finch

(eds. ), New York, The Free Press ( l949), p. 51. This volume includes t h r e e
essays by Weber w r i t t e n between 1903 'and 1917. Rather than examining them
separately, I have taken Weberls ideas on logic a s a whole. This made t h e
task of t h i s chapter more d i f f i c u l t , i n f a c t , the most d i f f i c u l t of the
t h e s i s , since Weber has many contradictions within and between h i s essays.
An analysis of h i s work, a s a whole, however, was necessary t o accomplish a
thorough c r i t i q u e of t h e most sophisticated attempt t o develop a neutral ap-
proach t o logic.
31 " ~ e b e rmade r a t h e r u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y vague and c o n f l i c t i n g claims about
both t h e nature and uses of i d e a l types. Some of h i s a s s e r t i o n s suggest t h a t .
i d e a l types a r e systems of concept;, t h a t i s , nontheoretic formulations; others
suggest t h a t they a r e systems of statements, which would imply t h a t they were
t h e o r e t i c formulations. Again, he makes a s s e r t i o n s t h a t i n d i c a t e t h e i r use i s
merely h e u r i s t i c - t h a t they a r e not, themselves, susceptible t o conf imnation
o r disconfirmation; but he a l s o claims t h a t they belong t o t h e context of Vali-
dation o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n r a t h e r than t o t h e context of discovery when he a s s e h s
t h a t they a r e m e t h o d o l o ~ i c a l l qindispensable i n t h e construction of social-science
theory. " Richard S. Rudner: Philosophy of Social Science. Englewood C l i f f s , N. J. ,
Prentice-Hall (1966), p. 54. Rudner, l i k e most academics who have studied Weber,
recognized Weberls conceptual ambiguity but f a i l e d t o r e l a t e t h i s t o an ignorance
of t h e r e l a t i o n s between t h e problem of ideology and logic.

fj4weber was aware of some of t h e same problems t h a t concerned Marx but h i s academic
treatment of knowledge l e d him i n a d i f f e r e n t direction. Some authors saw Weberls
approach a s a n improvement over Marx. For example, Hughes wrote t h a t Weber "...
did not s t o p when he had incorporated what he found v a l i d i n Marxism i n t o t h e
canon of h i s own thinking; we went on t o r e l a t e t h e one-sidedness of h i s t o r i c a l
materialism t o t h e u n i l a t e r a l character of a l l s o c i a l theory, and t o give Marxism
a new dimension by running another u n i l a t e r a l sequence of h i s own." (H.S. Hughes:
Consciousness and Society, op. c i t . , pp. 316-17. ) On t h e basis of t h i s study, I
would make t h e opposite claim.

35 Weber, op. c i t . , p. 115.

36 Mills included both Marx and Weber i n what he c a l l e d t h e " c l a s s i c t r a d i t i o n " i n

sociology: "...
it i s obviously a s a kind of 'conversation' with Marx t h a t much
of Max Weberls ... work occurs ...It C.W. Mills: 1rnap.e~of Man. New York, George
B r a z i l l e r ( 1960), pp. 9-10.
3 7 ~ e b e r , op. c i t e , p. 116.

j8~.s. Hughes: Consciousness and Society, op. c i t . , p. 314.

3 9 ~ h eterm "model" has been used t o r e f l e c t both an academic and pragmatic orienta-
t i o n t o knowledge. Thoup;h c r i t i c a l of t h e way it i s used by those who search f o r a
n e u t r a l l o g i c , it has some value, a s used i n Chapter Seven, when discussing how an
ideological model r e l a t e s t o a s c i e n t i f i c paradigm. Mills used t h e term s i m i l a r t o
t h i s when discussing Marx: "A model i s a more or l e s s systematic inventory of the
elements t o which we must pay a t t e n t i o n i f we a r e t o understand something. It i s
not t r u e or f a l s e ; it i s useful and adequate t o varying degrees. A the or^, i n con-
t r a s t , is a statement which can be proved t r u e or f a l s e , about t h e casual weight
and t h e r e l a t i o n s of t h e elements of a model. Only I n terms of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n
can we understand why Marx's work i s t r u l y g r e a t , and a l s o why it contains so much
t h a t is erroneous, ambiguous, or inadequate. His model i s what i s g r e a t ; t h a t i s
what is a l i v e i n marxism." C.W. M i l l s : The Marxists, op. c i t . , p. 36.

'Max Weber: Science A s A Vocation, i n H. Gerth and C.W. M i l l s (eds. ): From Max
Weber. New York, Oxford University Press (1958)~ pp. 129-56.

44webep: The Methodology of t h e Social Sciences, OP. cite , P- 8.

4 5 ~ b i d .a p. 13.

'%bid., p. 7.

471bid., PP. 2-3.

481bid. 9 p. 3.

49Weber: Science As A Vocation, op. c i t . , p. 134.

5 0 ~ b i d . , p. 131.

51~bid., p. 132.

5 2 ~ e b e r : The Methodology of t h e Social Sciences, op. c i t . , p. 53.

531bid., p. 4.

5 4 ~ b i d . , p. 55.

5 5 ~ b i d . , p. 100.
5 6 ~ e b e r : Science As A Vocation, op. c i t . , p. 155.

57 bid. , pp. 155-56.

5 8 ~ e b e r : The Methodology of the Social Sciences, op. c i t . , p. 81.

60 Chapter Twenty.

6 1 ~ e b e r , op. c i t e , P. 123-

6 2 ~ b i d,
. p. 26.

6 3 ~ b i d . , p. 54.

6 4 ~ b i a . , p. 38.

6 5 ~ e b e r : Science As A Vocation, op. c i t . , p. 152.

6 6 ~ e b e r : The Methodolom. of t h e Social Sciences, op. c l t . , p. iv.

6 7 ~ e b e r : Science A s A Vocation, op. c i t . , p. 143.

6 8 ~ e b e r : The Methodology of t h e Social Sciences, op. c i t . , p. 19.

7 0 would
~ say t h i s , however, about Parson's f u n c t i o n a l i s t ~ o ~ i o l o g i ~ m .

7 5 ~ l v i nW. Gouldner: Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Sociology, i n

Maurice S t e i n and Arthur Vidich: Sociology on T r i a l . Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . ,
Prentice-Hall ( 19631, p. 39.

76Max Lerner: Education and a Radical Humanism. Columbus, Ohio S t a t e University

Press (19621, p. 19.

7 7 ~ e b e r : The Methodology of t h e Social Sciences, op. c i t . , p. 18.

7%or example, Weber spoke of t h e .. ultimate elements of meaningful human

"... t r u l y ultimate problems," i n Gerth and Mills:
'I.

conduct." (Jbld., p. 52) and of

From Max Weber, op. c i t . , p. 151.
7 9 ~ e b e r : The Methodolony of t h e Social Sciences, OP* ~1%
J P.. 135.

8 0 ~ b i d . , p. 84.

81~bid., p. 105.

821bid.

83The comparison between Weber and S a ~ t r ei s relevant, but cannot be pushed too
f a r . Though Weber, l i k e S a r t r e , was concerned with t h e s i g n i f i c a t i o n s of human
a c t i o n , h i s separation of t h e normative and empirical could not allow him t o
develop an e x i s t e n t i a l project t o challenge p o s i t i v i s t i c sociology t o deal with
t h i s matter. And, unlike S a r t r e , Weber t r i e d t o study individual s i g n i f i c a t i o n s
i n an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c way.

84Webe~: The Methodology of t h e Social Sciences, op. c i t . , p. 106.

8%bid., p. 79.

861bid., p. 171.

'?Ibid., p. 173.

881bid.

891bid.s p. 175.

901bld., p. 78.

91~bid., p. 88.

921bid. , p. 110.

94Gerth and Mills: From Max Weber, op. c i t . , p. 55.

95~ebep: The Methodology of t h e Social Sciences, op. tit.. p. 89.

961bid., p. 82.
 - 233 -
I

Weber:
lo2 The Methodology of t h e S o c l a l Sciences, op. c i t . , p. 64.

13 I b i d . , p. 112.

lo4bid., p. 69.
 I

Chapter Thirteon

A Hurnanist Logic: Bronowski

Sometines t h e s i m p l i c i t y of an a n a l y s i s r e f l e c t s it relevancy. This

i s t h e case with Bronowski's Science and Human ~ a l u e s . 1 A l e x t h l y c r i t i c i s m

of Weberls conf'using writings on l o g i c was required t o show t h e impossibility

of a value-free logic. A short discussion w i l l s u f f i c e t o demonstrate t h e r e l e - -

vance of Bronowski's humanist approach t o science, values and logic.

The Context of Science

Bronowski argued t h a t our c u l t u r e "...erodes our sense of t h e context

In which judgments must be m : ~ d e . " ~His i n t e r e s t was i n t h e s o c i a l context re-

quired f o r c r i t i c a l soienoe t o flourish. Bronowski was a thorough-going prag-

matist. Unlike Weber, he not only saw problems of f a c t but a l s o problems of

value i n a p r a g m t i c way. 9 e stood opposed t o technicians who t a l k only of ab-

s t r a c t f a c t s and never of t h e concrete conseq;nences of science. He was c r i k i c a l

of t h e s c i e n t i s t who takes "...flight Pron ( s c i e n c e ' s ) conseqxences by p r o t e s t -

ing t h a t others have f a i l e d ilirneU3 As he s t a t e d "we l i v e i n a w o r l d which i s

penetrated t'nrough and t:wough by science.. ."4 and continued thab h he world

today i s made, it i s powered by science; and f o r any man t o abdl2nte a n i n t e r e s t

i n science i s t o walk with open eyes towards slavery. "5

For Bronowski science was a v'ltal p a r t of human r e a l i t y and cannot

be t r e a t e d a s a s p e c i a l i z a t i o n or a profession. Bronowski believed th%tt h e

dominant dichotomy between t h e so-called " a r t s " and "sciences" keeps us

from understanding how science has penetrated our lives. He talked of

"... t h e prejudice of the humanist who takes h i s science sourly, and e-

qually, the petty view which many s c i e n t i s t s take of t h e i r own a c t i v i t y
and t h a t of others. When men misunderstand t h e i r own work, they cannot
understand t h e work o f others; so t h a t it i s natural t h a t these scien-
tists have been indifferent t o the a r t s . They have been content, with
t h e humanists, t o think science mechanical and neutral; they could there-
f o r e j u s t i f y themselves only by the claim t h a t it i s practical. By t h i s
lame c r i t e r i o n they have of course found poetry and music and painting
a t least unreal and often meaningless. I challenge a l l these judgments. 11 6

H i s r e j e c t i o n of t h e technical (what we have c a l l e d " s c i e n t i s t i c " ) view of science

and h i s concern f o r t h e 'I.. . likeness between t h e c r e a t i v e a c t s o f t h e mind i n a r t

and i n s c ~ e n c e "led
~ Bronowski t o r e j e c t t h e common "boundary between knowledge and

use ".8 As he wrote, "!There a r e o f course people who i i k e t o draw a l i n e between

pure and applied science; and oddly, they a r e often the same people who find a r t

unreal. '9

In a sense, Bronowski saw science a s one form of a r t . He did not subscribe

t o the view t h a t reduces a l l knowledge t o immediate use. For him "Man does not

invent by following e i t h e r use or tradition,"1 but by gaining understanding of

relevant problems with the a i d of l i n g u i s t i c metaphors. Obviously, t h e uses of

science and t h e p r i o r i t i e s of any s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e which underlie these manifest

uses e n t e r s i n t o t h i s . Bronowski was not saying t h a t science i s a neutral accumu-

l a t i o n of so-called objective observations. Like Toulmin, who we s h a l l discuss i n

Chapter Sixteen, Bronowski believed t h a t

"NO s c i e n t i f i c theory i s a c o l l e c t i o n of facts. It w i l l not even do t o

c a l l a theory t r u e o r f a l s e i n t h e simple sense i n which every f a c t i s
e i t h e r so o r not so. "I1

Science stems from human understanding. The use t o which knowledge i s

put and t h e methods of obtaining it cannot be separated, but neither can the

human c r e a t i v i t y basic t o science be ignored. It i s t h i s c r e a t i v i t y which finds

 ,
"unity i n hiddcn l i k e n e s ~ " . A~ s~ Bronowslii wrotc

he s c i e n t i s t loolcs f o r order i n t h e appearances of nature by exploring

such likeness. For order does not display i t s e l f of i t s e l f ; i f it can
be s a i d t o be t h e r e a t a l l , it i s not t h e r e f o r t h e mere looking. There
i s no way of pointing a f i n g e r or a camera a t it; order must be discov-
ered and, i n a deep sense, it must be c r e a t e d . 1 ~ ~ 3

Bronowski, unlike Weber, placed s c i e n t i f i c judgments within a human and

s o c i a l context. Below we s h a l l discuss t h e "sociology of knowledge" t h a t i s i m -

p l i c i t i n h i s approach. Before doing t h a t l e t us look a t h i s handling of f a i r l y

common problems of logic.

The Habit of Truth

Bronowski's approach t o what he c a l l e d t h e "habit of t r u t h " c o n t r a s t s

sharply with t h e s c i e n t i s t i c approach t o t r u t h . Truth does not come from record-

ing "facts". " I f we did not ( b u i l d a map) ," he argued, "our minds would contain

only a c l u t t e r of i s o l a t e d experience^."'^ For Bronowski, discovery did not come

from " t h e f a c t s " , but involves t h r e e d i s t i n c t processes. F i r s t , t h e r e i s "the

s e p a r a t e data of t h e sensest1; second, t h e r e i s " t h e coherence of ... our experience";

and t h i r d , t h e r e i s t h e a t t a c h i n g of "a symbol or a namett t o t h i s coherence. 15

This i s obviously a s i m p l i s t i c d e s c r i p t i o n of how a s c i e n t i f i c discovery

occurs. But it does help us make sense of some very complicated problems of logic.

For example, about h i s " t h r e e steps1', Bronowski wrote

he words t r u e and f a l s e have t h e i r place a t t h e l a t t e r s t e p s , when t h e

d a t a of t h e senses have been put together t o make a thing which i s held
i n t h e mind. Only then i s it meaningful t o ask whether what we think a -
bout t h e thing i s true. That i s , we can now deduce how t h e thing should
behave, and see whether it does so. "I6

Much confusion i n t h e philosophy of science r e s u l t s from t h e use of t h e term " t r u t h t t

s o l e l y i n terms of "facts". What i s important i s t h a t Bronowskils pragmatic orien-

t a t i o n avoids t h i s common error.

Bronowski over-simplified t h e problem of v e r i f i c a t i o n by reducing the

question of t r u t h t o deductive logic. For example, about s c i e n t i f i c theory, he

wrote:

"The construction i s t r u e or f a l s e by t h e t e s t of i t s behaviour. We have

constructed t h e thing from t h e data; we now deduce how t h e t h i n g should
behave; and i f it does not, then our construction was f a l s e . What was
f a l s e was not t h e sense data but our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of them: we construct-
an halluc i n a t ion. " '7

We w i l l have t o leave our c r i t i c i s m of deductive logic u n t i l Chapter Sixteen.

O f s c i e h t i f i c laws, Bronowski said:

"1t begins with a s e t of appearances. It organizes these i n t o laws. And

a t t h e c e n t r e of t h e laws it f i n d s a knot, a point a t which several laws
cross: a symbol which gives u n i t y t o t h e laws t h e m ~ e l v e s . " ~ ~

He believed t h a t t h e concept or "symbol" which gives u n i t y t o t h e laws themselves

must be t e s t e d

It... by i t s implications. That i s , when t h e concept has been b u i l t up from

some experiences, we reason what behaviour i n other experiences should
l o g i c a l l y flow from it. I f we f i n d t h i s behaviour, we go on holding t h e
concept a s it is. I f we do not f i n d t h e behaviour which t h e concept l o g i -
c a l l y implies, then we must go back and c o r r e c t it. I n t h i s way l o g i c and
experiment a r e locked together i n t h e s c i e n t i f i c method, i n a constant t o
and f r o i n which each follows t h e other.lt19

I n Chapter Sixteen, I s h a l l argue t h a t a l l formal, academic approaches t o

logic a r e inadequate because they a r e not rooted i n t h e subject matter they pur-

port t o be evaluating. Throughout t h e t h e s i s , I s h a l l argue t h a t a pragmatic

o r i e n t a t i o n t o l o g i c does have such a rooting. Bronowski tended toward t h i s same

view. He e x p l i c i t l y r e j e c t e d both " p o s i t i v i s t i c " and "behaviouristic" t h e o r i e s

of logic I n favor of h i s "conceptual method".

Bronowski argued "... t h a t thinking a s we understand it i s made possible

only by t h e use of names or symbols. "20 Thought, language and human r e a l i t y a r e

t h e r e f o r e completely intertwined. As Bronowski s a i d h he world which the human

mind knows and explores does not survive i f it i s emptied of thought. An

adequate logic must take t h i s interdependence of human thought and r e a l i t y i n t o

account. Yet, according t o Bronowski, t h e "common view" i n logic does not do

t h i s , but engages i n " c l a s s i c a l " debates about matters of t r u t h and falsehood.

As he wrote:

"These debates a r e s c h o l a s t i c exercises i n absolute logic. They begin from

concepts which a r e held t o be fixed absolutely; they then proceed by deduc-
t i o n ; and what is found i n t h i s way i s subject t o no f u r t h e r t e s t . The de-
ductions a r e t r u e because t h e f i r s t concepts were true: t h a t is t h e scho-
l a s t i c system. "22

Bronowski concluded h i s discussion of " t h e h a b i t of t r u t h " by c o n t r a s t i n g

"two ways of looking f o r truth". He wrote t h a t

"one i s t o f i n d concepts which a r e beyond challenge, because they a r e held

by f a i t h o r by a u t h o r i t y or t h e conviction t h a t they a r e self-evident.
This i s t h e mystic submission t o t r u t h which t h e East has chosen, and
which dominated t h e axiomatic thought of t h e scholars of t h e Middle Ages."23
*
He described t h e other, t h e one t o which he adhered, a s"... t h e h a b i t of t e s t i n g
and correcting t h e concept by i t s consequences i n experience ..."24 Science i s

not value-free, but pragmatic. Like Dewey, who I s h a l l discuss i n Chapter Twenty,

Bronowski believed it i s "By doubting we a r e l e d t o inquire, and by inquiry we

perceive t h e truth. "25

The Myth of t h e "IS" and "ought"

Bronowskils o r i e n t a t i o n t o epistemology has d i r e c t implications f o r t h e

widespread b e l i e f t h a t science can be neutral.

" ~ f ,a s many think, science only compiles an endless dictionary of f a c t s ,

then it must be n e u t r a l (and neuter) a s a machine i s ; it cannot bear on
human values. But of course science is not a g i a n t dictionary, any more
than l i t e r a t u r e i s ; both a r e served by, they do not serve, t h e makers
of t h e i r d i c t i o n a r i e s . "26
I n rejec tirg the poss ility 0 f a neutral science o r logic, Bronowski was aware

t h a t he was accepting pragmatism. He wrote of "My method derived from the t r a -

d i t i o n o f pragmatism which, since William James advanced it about 1890 (and

Charles Peirce before t h a t ) , has been the most o r i g i n a l philosophical thought

i n America. It27 According t o the pragmatic view o f science "... every f a c t i s a

field - a criss-cross of implications, those t h a t lead t o it and those t h a t lead

from it.u2*

But Bronowski did not just affirm h i s pragmatic method. He returned t o

questions derived from h i s original concern about "the context i n which judgments

must be made". He dealt with some of the sociological questions which a r e implied

by h i s approach t o logic. For example, Bronowski was skeptical of t h e separation

of the "is" or empirical f r o m t h e "ought1' o r normative i n science. His analysis

of t h e habit of t r u t h undermined the dichotomy on which Weber t r i e d t o develop a

neutral logic. But he went beyond c r i t i c i s m and suggested how and why t h e separa-

t i o n occurred and i s maintained.

Bronowski believed t h a t human conduct i s a s open t o empirical inve,stigation

a s n a t u r a l phenomena. But, unlike Weber, he proposed t h a t we should alwaysrlook a t

both the r o l e of "duties" and of "freedom" when we study human conduct. Our under-

standing of the nature of v e r i f i c a t i o n , and a b o l i t i o n of t h e confusion t h a t underlies

t h e value-fact dichotomy, w i l l depend on t h i s twofold study:

" ~ o s i t i v i s t sand analysts a l i k e believe t h a t t h e words and ought belong

t o d i f f e r e n t worlds, so t h a t sentences which a r e constructed with usu-
\
a l l y have a v e r i f i a b l e meaning, but sentences constructed with ought never
have. This i s because ... a l l B r i t i s h empiricist philosophy i s individual-
ist. And it i s of course c l e a r t h a t i f t h e only c r i t e r i o n of t r u e and f a l s e
which a man accepts i s t h a t man's, then he has no base f o r s o c i a l agreement.
The question how a man ought t o behave i s a s o c i a l question, which always
involves several people; and i f he accepts no evidence and no judgment ex-
cept h i s own, he has no t o o l s with which t o frame a n answer. " 2 9
 - 240 -
I

Bronowski thus argued t h a t t h e separation of t h e "is" and "ought" i s

rooted i n t h e individualism of much philosophical speculation and t h e philo-

sophy of science developed f r o m t h i s . This individualism gives us a d i s t o r t e d

view of knowledge. A s Bronowski s a i d "... a l l our knowledge has been b u i l t up

~ o m m u n a l l ~ "and
3~ "... t h e r e i s a s o c i a l nexus which alone makes v e r i f i c a t i o n

possible. " 3 l

The "is" and t h e "ought" a r e united once a sociology of knowledge per-

spective i s brought t o bear on science. It i s a s o c i a l arrangement, what Bron-

owski c a l l e d t h e "fellowship of s c i e n t i s t s " , which makes science possible. It '

i s t h i s arrangement which implies t h a t "We ouaht t o a c t i n such a way t h a t what

-
i s t r u e can be v e r i f i e d t o be ~ 0 . ~ 3 ~

What way of a c t i n g , what s o c i a l arrangement f a c i l i t a t e s t h e development

of science? Bronowski argued t h a t t h e a c t s of science cannot be understood i n

terms of professional codes. He l i s t e d t h r e e t h i n g s t h a t characterized t h e

s c i e n t i s t f o r him. First, "... comes independence i n observation and thence i n

thought."33 S c i e n t i s t s give "... a value t o t h e new and t h e bold i n a l l t h e i r

work.1'3~ Second, "Science has bred t h e love of o r i g i n a l i t y a s a mark o f inde-

pendence. "35 And, t h i r d , "dissent" c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e s c i e n t i s t . A s Bronowski

said "...t h e profound movements of h i s t o r y have been begun by unconforming

men. "36

The r e l a t i o n between d i s s e n t and science is a n important one. We touched

on it when o u t l i n i n g Kuhn's idea of " s c i e n t i f i c revolutions". About d i s s e n t ,

Bronowski wrote:

isse sent i s not i t s e l f a n end; it i s t h e surface mark of a deeper value.

Dissent i s t h e mark of freedom, a s o r i g i n a l i t y i s t h e mark o f independ-
ence of mind. And a s o r i g i n a l i t y and independence a r e p r i v a t e needs f o r
t h e existence of a science, so d l s s e n t and freedom a r e . i t s public needs.
 No one can be a s c i e n t i s t , even i n private, i f he does not have in-
dependence of observation a'nd of thought. But i f i n addition science
i s t o become e f f e c t i v e a s a public practice, it must go f u r t h e r ; it
must protect independence. The safeguards which It must o f f e r a r e
patent: f r e e inquiry, f r e e thought, f r e e speech, tolerance. "37

I n sharp contrast t o Weber, Bronowski recognized t h a t isse sent i s the native

a c t i v i t y of the s c i e n t i s t , and it has got him Into a good deal of trouble i n

the l a s t years. But i f t h a t i s cut o f f , what i s l e f t w i l l not be a s c i e n t i s t .

And I doubt whether it w i l l be a man."38 And, because of t h i s , Bronowski rec-

ognized t h a t the so-called private and public aspects of science can not be

divided. A c e r t a i n form of "social nextus" provides t h e context f o r t h e ac-

t u a l i z a t i o n of science.

Science i s founded on c e r t a i n values and requires a s o c i a l arrangement

t h a t glves those values a human expression. Science is not rooted i n f a c t -

finding but i n t h e "commitment t o explore t h e Only when both t h i s

commitment and a s o c i a l arrangement t h a t f a c i l i t a t e s it e x i s t do any l o g i c a l

requirements of science become self-evident. And these "rules" a r e never s t a t i c .

That i s why, a s Bronowski said, "There a r e , oddly, no technical r u l e s f o r success

i n science. rr 40

Bronowski argued t h a t f o r science t o f l o u r i s h a "democracy" must exist.

He, l i k e Berlin, recognized t h a t p o l i t i c a l philosophy and science ultimately

relate. Bronowski believed t h a t t h i s democracy comes when you "... fuse ... t h e
private and public needs"'' of science. And, l i k e M a r c u ~ e ,he
~ ~did not believe

t h a t "tolerance" i s enough t o accomplish t h i s . The basis of science, the s o c i a l

,
r e l a t i o n s t h a t f a c i l i t a t e f r e e inqulry, must e x i s t i n a society i f science i s t o

survive.

If t h i s i s so, i f science i s b a s ~ don values, how can it be value-free?

Bronowski answered t h i s question a s follows:

"Science is not a mechanism but a human progress, and not a s e t of find-

ings but the search f o r them. Those who think t h a t science i s e t h i c a l l y
neutral confuse t h e findings of science, which are, with the a c t i v i t y of
science, which is not. "43

Bronowski believed t h a t the s c i e n t i f i c a c t s must be respected more than t h e re-

s u l t s since the l a t t e r depend on t h e former. This humanism pervaded h i s analy.sis.

"Science a t l a s t respects t h e s c i e n t i s t more than h i s theories; f o r by i t s nature

it must prize t h e search above the discovery, and the thinking (and with it t h e

t h i n k e r ) above the thought."44 And Bronowski i s , c o n s i s t e n t i n h i s humanism.

Near the end of h i s book, he wrote "... t h a t the concept i s more profound than
i t s lawsr and t h e a c t of judging more c r i t i c a l than t h e judgment. "45

Bronowski did not engage i n a sociological analysis t o determine what

s o c i a l ( including p o l i t i c a l and economic) r e l a t i o n s f a c i l i t a t e science and which

hinder science.' But h i s ideas show t h e relevance of such an inquiry. I n fact,

Bronowskils terminology is not adequate f o r such an inquiry. He talked of "the

society of s c i e n t i s t s " a s i f t h e s o c i a l nexus of science i s autonomous from the

broader s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . He implied t h i s again when he wrote o f how "the society

46
of s c i e n t i s t s has survived ( h i s t o r i c a l ) changes without a revolution". Yet, no

understanding of the development of science i s possible without tracing the changes

i n t h e s o c i e t i e s i n which it has been developing.

The main emphasis of Bronowski's analysis remained h i s humanism. His con-

cern was with "what s c i e n t i s t s do"47 not with a mystified, abstracted notion of

science. This commitment did not lead i n t o t h e complications of formal logic.

Instead, he saw t h e relevance of an analysis of t h e conditions t h a t underlie

science. As he wrote "we must l a y bare t h e conditions which make it possible f o r

i
 ( s c i e n t i s t s ) t o work a t a l l . tW

Bronowskits a n a l y s i s implied a t o t a l r e j e c t i o n of scientism and i t s

value-free ideology. Such a scientism, though r a t i o n a l i z e d with a technical

rh
'&''body of kno~wledge", not only d i s t o r t s our understanding of sciencey but allows

an u n c r i t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c ideas. I n Bronowskils words:

he body of technical science burdens and t h r e a t e n s us because we a r e

t r y i n g t o employ t h e body without t h e s p i r i t ; we a r e t r y i n g t o buy t h e
corpse of science. We a r e hag-ridden by t h e power of nature which we
should command, because we think i t s command needs l e s s devotion and
understanding than i t s discovery. 1149

Bronowski proposed a s c i e n t i f i c "ethic" t o "command" t h e power of science. The

idea i s too undeveloped t o be taken seriously. What is c l e a r , however, i s t h a t

t h e myth of a n e u t r a l l o g i c helps maintain our ignorance of t h e precarious equi-

librium between t h e p o l i t i c a l and economic context of science and t h e development

of independent, o r i g i n a l and c r i t i c a l thought. Andy perhaps more important, a

facade of n e u t r a l i t y i s no defense against a p o l i t i c a l system when it becomes

h o s t i l e t o t h e commitments of science. When t h e r e i s repression of c r i t i c i s m and

d i s s e n t , a science t h a t maintains a value-free facade i s e a s i l y reduced t o no more

than r h e t o r i c , technique and obedience.

, Footnotes

'J. Bronowski: Science and Human Values. Pelican ( 1964).

%bid., p. 9.
371b3.d.~ pp. 67-8.

38Ibid., p. 68.

391bid.. p. 68.

QO1bid.

411bid., p. 69.

4 2 ~ ~ Marcuse:
~ b ~ Repressive
~ t Tolerance, i n R.P. Wolff e t al.: A Critiaue of Pure
Tolerance. Boston, Beacon Press ( 1965)~pp. 81-117,

4 3 ~ .Bronowski, op. tit. p. 70-

*1bid., p. 71.

45~bid., p. 80.

'%bid. , pp. 74-5.

471bid., p. 77.

48, id.

'%bid., p. 78.
 ,
Chapter Fourteen

An Authoritarian Logic: Durkheim

Weberts ideas cannot serve a s t h e b a s i s of a value-free logic. His

i n t e l l i g e n t confusion had l i t t l e t o do with t h e value-free dogma often as-

sociated with h i s name. Durkheim had more c l a r i t y i n h i s work, but it i s

rooted i n a dangerous simplicity. He over-simplified l o g i c a l questions and

i n t h e process d i s t o r t e d t h e problem of ideology. I n doing t h i s he exempli-

fied t h e a u t h o r i t a r i a n p o t e n t i a l of sociologism. Durkheimrs approach t o logic

is t h e kind t h a t can be used t o r a t i o n a l i z e t h e obedient, technical and rhetor-

i c a l scientism t h a t our a n a l y s i s of Bronowski c r i t i c i z e d .

The Study of Social Facts a s Ideology

Durkheiml s c e n t r a l point was t h a t " s o c i a l f a c t s " e x i s t , have an "objective

r e a l i t y " and t h e r e f o r e must be " t r e a t e d a s things".2 These s o c i a l f a c t s have two

p ~ o p e r t i e s : f i r s t , "being general throughout t h e extent of a given society", and

second, being "capable of exercising over t h e individual e x t e r i o r c o n s t r a i n t " .

O r , another way Durkheim characterize'$jja s o c i a l f a c t was by i t s "... power of ex-

t e r n a l coercion which it exercises or i s capable of exercising over individuals"

and t h e f a c t t h a t " i t s own existence is independent of t h e individual forms it

4
assumes i n I t s diffusion".

We could argue, i n a b s t r a c t , about t h e worth of t h i s idea, but t h i s would

*
be t o no a v a i l . It i s necessary t o see what point of view, what ideology, r e l a t e d

t o Durkheimls notion of a " s o c i a l f a c t " . And Durkheim was q u i t e e x p l i c i t i n t h i s

regard. When outlining h i s idea of a " s o c i a l f a c t " , he was a l s o arguing f o r a

 I

c e r t a l n type of s o c l a l relationsh3p. For fnstance, Durkhelm wrote t h a t %ach

individual drinks, sleeps, e a t s , reasons; it i s t o s o c i e t y t s i n t e r e s t t h a t these

functions be exercised i n an orderly manner."5 This statement may appear so gen-

e r a l t h a t disagreement with it, or agreement, f o r t h a t matter, seems absurd. But

t h e r e i s a d e f i n i t e p a t t e r n t o Durkheimts ideas of "society", "functions" and "or-

der".

A statement of t h e value of these terms t o Durkheim appeared e a r l y i n h i s

book. Referring t o t h e construction of s o c i a l f a c t s , he wrote "of course, when I

f i l l y consent and conform t o them, t h i s c o n s t r a i n t i s f e l t only s l i g h t l y , i f a t

a l l , and i s t h e r e f o r e unnecessary. "6 Here, he showed t h e value he placed on t h e

individual adapting t o t h e coercive e f f e c t s of s o c i a l f a c t s . His view of educa-

t i o n was a f u r t h e r expression of t h i s value. When Durkheim wrote t h a t "... a l l

education i s a continuous e f f o r t t o impose on (my emphasis) t h e c h i l d ways of

seeing, f e e l i n g and a c t i n g which he could not have a r r i v e d a t spontaneously,"7

it was c l e a r t h a t f o r him education should function t o ensure t h i s adaption.

The idea of " s o c i a l f a c t s " i s connected with a p a r t i c u l a r ideology. Durk-

heim not only saw s o c i e t y a s a f o r c e over and above t h e individual, but implied

t h a t t h i s i s both n a t u r a l and good. As we proceed, we s h a l l see how t h i s orienta-

t i o n r e l a t e d t o t h e type of logic Durkheim advocated and t o h i s inadequate handling

of t h e problem of ideology.

One sentence summed up Durkheimts view of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e individual

t o t h e society. U t i l i z i n g t h e g e s t a l t metaphor t o make h i s point, he s t a t e d t h a t

"It (group condition) i s t o be found i n each p a r t because i t e x i s t s i n t h e whole,

r a t h e r than Pn t h e whole because it e x i s t s i n t h e parts."8 H i s value of t h e whole

I

o r general ( i. e. , "society" ) over t h e p a r t ( i. e. , "individual") i s q u i t e e x p l i c i t .

 - 248 -
I

It was s t a t e d even more c l e a r l y when he wrote "... t h e system formed by t h e i r as-

s o c i a t i o n represents a s p e c i f i c r e a l i t y which has i t s own c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . 119 It

seems indisputable t h a t t h e a s s o c i a t i o n of humans c r e a t e s a r e a l i t y over and above

any one of us. But saying t h i s does not even begin t o c l a r i f y methodological prob-

lems i n t h e s o c i a l sciences. This view covers up important value problems. It ig-

nores how our values a f f e c t our way of approaching problems rooted i n t h e associa-

t i o n of many humans; how an approach t o logic p a r a l l e l s t h e way we l o c a t e , define

and study these problems; and how a n approach t o logic and c e r t a i n values a f f e c t s

which problems we consider relevant and meaningful out of t h e p o t e n t i a l problems

implied by t h e a s s o c i a t i o n of many humans.

A f t e r o u t l i n i n g h i s idea of a " s o c i a l f a c t " , Durkheim discussed h i s socio-

logical rules - r u l e s f o r observation, r u l e s f o r distinguishing t h e so-called normal

and pathological, r u l e s f o r c l a s s i f y i n g what he c a l l e d " s o c i a l types", r u l e s f o r ex-

plaining s o c i a l f a c t s , and r u l e s f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g sociological proofs. I w i l l look

a t each one of these i n order t o draw out contradictions and problems and t o show

why Durkheimts approach t o logic i s inadequate.

Logical Rules a s Ideological Rules: 1 - Rules of Observation

Durkheim outlined t h r e e r u l e s o r p r i n c i p l e s f o r t h e observation of s o c i a l

facts. They a r e a l l t r a d i t i o n a l points t h a t , upon a n a l y s i s , prove t o ignore r e a l

problems. Durkheim began by s t a t i n g t h a t h i s method "eradicates a l l preconceptions".

We saw i n our discussion of ideology how t h i s i s a n impossible task. Our discussion

of Mannheim, f o r example, showed how concepts of r e a l i t y always Imply presuppositions

t h a t must be made e x p l i c i t i f our knowledge is t o be inclusive enough t o be s e l f -

critical.
 Durkheim c l e a r l y lacked t h i s awareness. By arguing a b s t r a c t l y , he t r i e d

t o make h i s method appear t o be f r e e of preconceptions. By arguing t h a t s o c i a l

f a c t s must be t r e a t e d a s things, external t o t h e individual, he s e t up a dichot-

omy between what i s objective ( f a c t s or phenomena) and what i s subjective ( t h e i r

individual representation). This dichotomy proves t o be untenable once it i s

recognized t h a t t h e s c i e n t i s t i s an individual operating with a s e t of b e l i e f s

broader than any f a c t s he o r she a r t i c u l a t e s . His method was supposedly concern-

ed only with the s o c i a l "phenomenon represented i n t h e mind" and not with the

representations themselves. This separation, however, is a n impossible one once

the r o l e of b e l i e f i n science i s recognized.

I n a statement linked with t h i s confusing logic, Durkheim wrote

" ~ u t ,because these ideas a r e nearer t o us and more within our mental
reach than t h e r e a l i t i e s t o which they correspond, we tend n a t u r a l l y
t o s u b s t i t u t e them f o r the l a t t e r and t o make them the very subject
of our speculations. Instead of observing, describing, and comparing
things, we a r e content t o focus our consciousness upon, t o analyze,
and t o combine our ideas. Instead of a science concerned with r e a l i -
t i e s , we produce no more than a n ideological analysis. "lo

It i s absurd t o say t h a t one i s concerned only with " r e a l i t i e s " , not with ideas

about them, when one i s i n the process of creating ideas oneself. Yet, it i s upon

t h i s " t r i c k " t h a t Durkheim's case was b u i l t . He implied t h a t there a r e s o c i a l f a c t s

t h a t we t r e a t a s things, and there a r e ideas about them. His ideas a r e based on the

things - hence he had no preconceptions. This i s t h e c i r c u l a r argument hidden with-

i n Durkheimls verbiage.

C r i t i c i z i n g Spencer Is d e f i n i t i o n of s o c i e t i e s , Durkheim concluded "... so

here again a c e r t a i n conception of s o c i a l r e a l i t y i s substituted f o r r e a l i t y it-

s e l f . "11 We must admit t h a t there i s a large difference between ideas anchored t o

an empirical process and those created without any commitment t o such a process, but
 I

t h i s i s much d i f f e r e n t from saying t h a t one can distinguish r e a l i t y from con-

ceptions about s o c i a l r e a l i t y . Yet, Durkheim implied t h a t h i s r u l e s could do

the latter.

Durkheimls e r r o r was i n believing i n t h e external r e a l i t y of h i s own

ideas. Out of h i s s o c i a l research he created l o g i c a l concepts (e.g., s o c i a l

facts). Yet, he made a dichotomy between "concepts" and "things", with t h e

description and explanation of the l a t t e r being seen a s science. Again c r i t -

i c i z i n g Spencer he wrote "... t h e f a c t s accumulated i n h i s sociology seem t o

function principally a s arguments, since they a r e employed t o i l l u s t r a t e anal-

yses of concepts r a t h e r than t o describe and explain things. "I2 This dichotomy

between concepts and things, between argument and description-explanation, i s

self-contradictory since it i s i t s e l f a n argument. This i s t h e f a t e o f a l l

dichotomies i n logic which a r e given an ontological connotation.13 The problem

of logic and ideology w i l l be c l a r i f i e d when the primary r o l e o f argument i n a l l

knowledge i s acknowledged and a l l pretense t h a t one's ideas a r e objective, se,

i s ended.

Even i f Durkheim was unaware t h a t he was arguing a point of view and t h a t

h i s logic was r e l a t e d t o it, h i s statements show t h i s was the case. For example,

i n c r i t i c i z i n g moralists who search f o r t h e "essence" r a t h e r than the "nature" of

e t h i c s , Durkheim wrote "They have not yet arrived a t t h e very simple t r u t h t h a t , a s

our ideas (representations) of physical things a r e derived from these things them-

selves and express them more o r l e s s exactly, s o our idea of e t h i c s must be derived

from the observable manifestation of the r u l e s t h a t a r e functioning under our eyes,

r u l e s t h a t reproduce them i n systematic form. "I4 This analogy between things and

so-called e t h i c a l "rules" r e f l e c t s Durkheim's ideology - what has been called the

 I

" s o l i d a r i s t school of p o l i t i c a l philusophy" - and a theory of loglc. The re-

l a t i o n s h i p between t h e two i s what concerns us. I n linking ( i . e . , reducing)

e t h i c s t o r u l e s , i n t r e a t i n g r u l e s a s given ( "functioning under our eyes"),

and i n u t i l i z i n g a s c i e n t i s t i c view of t h e n a t u r a l sciences, Durkheim narrowed

t h e f i e l d of e t h i c s (e.g., values) and logic down i n such a manner t h a t he had

a tautology. Those who a r e mystified by verbiage (e.g., who s t i l l t r e a t lan-

*
guage magically) may not recognize t h e point of view t h a t was implied by Durk-

heim. Once t h e problem of logic i s a r t i c u l a t e d i n t h e broader context of t h e

problem of ideology, however, h i s point of view i s exposed.

Durkheim a l s o had a f o r m a l i s t i c view of laws t h a t r e l a t e d t o h i s o v e r a l l

point of view. H i s version of t h e value-free doctrine - whereby h i s own point

of view w;ls seen as a study of s o c i a l f a c t s , a s things, without concepts - was

f u r t h e r reinforced by an a r b i t r a r y d i s t i n c t i o n he made between "proper laws" and

"laws" t h a t a r e r e a l l y "maxims f o r action". C r i t i c i z i n g economists who judge

s o c i e t y and implying t h a t he never made such judgments, Durkheim wrote "... what
a r e commonly c a l l e d 'laws' a r e generally unworthy of t h i s designation s i n c e they

a r e merely maxims f o r a c t i o n , or p r a c t i c a l precepts i n disguise. A little

f u r t h e r he wrote about t h e " t r u e laws of nature".16 I f we c o n t r a s t t h i s approach

with Kuhnls we see how a mystification of s c i e n t i f i c laws can be used t o make

c e r t a i n judgments appear t o be objective i n some metaphysical or transhuman sense.

Durkheimls statement t h a t "... s o c i a l pheonomenon a r e things and ought t o

be t r e a t e d a s things"17 r e f l e c t s a p a r t i c u l a r way t h a t values can be woven i n t o a

system of logic. The "ought" r e f l e c t s t h e judgment being made. The "phenomenon"

or "things" represent t h e t e r m i n o l o a ~of obdectivity. The approach t o logic i s

inadequate because it lacks self-consciousness and ignores t h e basic questions

 - 252 -
I

r a i s e d i n t h e f i r s t section of t h i s study. These questions a r e fundamental t o

any logic t h a t i s t o be rooted i n i n t e l l e c t u a l , not t r a d i t i o n a l i s t , values.

Durkheimls f i r s t r u l e or p r i n c i p l e o f observation was a f a i t h more than

a rule. And, i n saying t h i s , I am not suggesting t h a t what i s needed i s a v a l i d

rule. An approach t o l o g i c , which accounts f o r t h e problem of ideology, w i l l not

be based on " r u l e s " , but on conscious, pragmatic judgments about method. Rather

than s t r e s s i n g t h e pragmatic character of method, Durkheim wrote of t h e profes-

s i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e academic and r e l i e d on t h i s fop backing t o h i s argument. Of

t h e professional s o c i o l o g i s t he wrote " ~ must

e emancipate himself from t h e f a l l a -

cious ideas t h a t dominate t h e mind of t h e layman; he must throw o f f , once and f o r

a l l , t h e yoke of these empirical categories, which from long continued habit have

become tyrannical. "I8 But, a s Bronowski pointed out, professionalization i s not

s u f f i c i e n t backing f o r an argument. We cannot assume t h a t t h e academic knows in-

t r i n s i c a l l y what he or she i s doing; t h a t he knows about something because he or

she i s an academic. Rather, we must look a t how t h e t r a i n i n g of t h e academic de-

velops h i s or h e r commitments t o a c l a s s of problems, methods and theories. Doing

t h i s undermines Durkheimls approach, f o r h i s " r u l e s " and " s o c i a l f a c t s " prove t o

be r e l a t e d t o c e r t a i n ideological commitments, rooted i n s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , but

not synonymous with s o c i a l r e a l i t y .

Durkheimls second "rule" a l s o proved t o be s u p e r f i c i a l l y conceived. Durk-

helm c a l l e d h i s second r u l e "definition". This "rule" negated t h e f i r s t r u l e

(having no preconceptions) because t h e d e f i n i t i o n of r e a l i t y always involves pre-

conceived ideas. Had Durkheim applied h i s t h r e e r u l e s t o each other, he might

have been able t o recognize t h e mechanistic character of h i s logic. A linear,

non-dialectic thought process kept him from doing t h i s .

 Once again a tautology underlay t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h i s rule. Durlcheim

wrote t h a t "1n order t o be objective, t h e d e f i n i t i o n must obviously deal with

phenomenon, not a s ideas, but i n terms of t h e i r inherent properties. Ill9 Here,

Durkheim wrote a s Bhough he was i n a chemistry laboratory where p r o p e r t i e s can

be defined experimentally. H i s use of t h e a d j e c t i v e "inherent1' showed t h a t he

viewed experimentation i n a metaphysical, non-pragmatic way. More v i t a l , h i s

poorly conceived, experimental notion of d e f i n i t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d a d e n i a l t h a t

he, a s a s o c i o l o g i s t , was one human among many. There a r e two problems with

t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of d e f i n i t i o n f o r t h e s o c i a l sciences. F i r s t , we must ask how

do you deal with s o c i a l and human phenomenon without ideas? How do you discover

( r e l e v a n t ) "properties", t o use h i s term, without ideas? A mysticism i s implied

i n Durkheimls approach. He implied t h a t knowledge about t h e phenomenon was held

before t h e defining begins. But how? To answer t h i s , Durkheim would have had t o

abandon h i s idea of a " s o c i a l f a c t " with i t s dichotomy between "concepts" and

"things". Common sense and science, l a y person and professional, would a l s o

cease t o e x i s t i n mutually exclusive realms. 20

Durkheim may have seen h i s own e r r o r .

"Since t h e d e f i n i t i o n i n question is placed a t t h e beginnings of t h e

science, it cannot possibly aim a t a statement concerning t h e essence
of r e a l i t y ; t h a t must be a t t a i n e d subsequently. The s o l e function of
t h e d e f i n i t i o n is t o e s t a b l i s h contact with things; and since t h e l a t -
t e r can be grasped by t h e mind only from i t s e x t e r i o r s , t h e d e f i n i t i o n
expresses them i n terms of t h e i r e x t e r n a l q ~ a l i t i e s . " ~ ~

I d o n ' t wish t o argue here with Durkheimls idea of "mind" (grasping external

q u a l i t i e s ) o r h i s notion of t h e "essence of r e a l i t y " . The relevant point is t h a t

Durkheimls second r u l e was based on a r e v e r s a l of t h e process of inquiry and he

himself seemed t o recognize t h i s .

 The second problem with Durkheimts view of d e f i n i t i o n arose from h i s

own idea of a s o c i a l fact. If s o c i a l f a c t s which a r e rooted i n t h e association

of many humans have a r e a l i t y over and above each individual, how i s the indi-

vidual s c i e n t i s t t o define t h e i r so-called properties i n a manner similar t o t h e

way a natural s c i e n t i s t defines the properties of matter? Using the type of logic

developed by J.S. ~ i 1 1 , Durkheim

~* t r i e d t o develop r u l e s f o r making h i s s o c i a l

f a c t s i n t e l l i g i b l e , but there i s no analogy between these methods and d i r e c t ex-

perimentation with the properties of matter. Furthermore, when we discuss the

philosophy of t h e physical sciences i n Chapter Sixteen, we s h a l l see t h a t t h e

notion of "properties" is simplistic even f o r t h e so-called "exact sciences".

Durkheim held t o t h e p o s i t i v i s t f a i t h t h a t r e a l i t y can be defined without

bias. He wrote t h a t "Since objects a r e perceived only through sense perception,

we can conclude: Science, t o be objective, ought t o s t a r t , not with concepts

formed independent t o them, but with these same perception^."^^ He then argued

t h a t science 'I... needs concepts t h a t adequately express things as they a c t u a l l y

a r e , and not a s everyday l i f e finds it useful t o conceive them. "' From t h i s , we

again see Durkheimls dilemma. The phrase "things a s they a c t u a l l y are1' i s very

powerful and deceptive. But what things, associated with what problems, and what

c l a s s of problems, and selected on what basis? A l l t h e questions t h a t a r i s e from

t h e problem of ideology were ignored by Durkheim. And again it i s the professional,

f r e e o f t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y o f "everyday l i f e " , who becomes the one who can see things

a s they r e a l l y are. As Durkheim said: "Science, then, has t o c r e a t e new concepts;

it must dismiss a l l lay notions ..."25 But l a y power a f f e c t s the s c i e n t i s t and

h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f problems. It a f f e c t s t h e t r a i n i n g and commitments of the pro-

fessional and establishes a p o l i t i c a l function f o r science. Again, we see t h a t

 I

the yucstions a r i s i n g from t h e problem of ideology were not and could not be

d e a l t with i n terms of Durlcheimts rules.

The weaknesses i n Durkheimls t h i r d r u l e follow from those of t h e f i r s t

two. H i s t h i r d "rule" s t r e s s e d t h e need t o obtain an objective representation

of s o c i a l f a c t s . Durkheim handled t h i s question with a nomothetic logic. Ac-

cording t o t h i s t h e more s t a b l e a s o c i a l f a c t i s t h e more objective it i s . The

s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t must s t r i v e f o r "... t h e elimination of what i s v a r i a b l e and

hence subjective ...,,26

It i s f r u i t l e s s t o engage i n a n a b s t r a c t argument about t h e r e l a t i v e

merits of ideographic o r nomothetic data.*7 It depends on t h e kind of problem

and t h e values and ends desired. It depends on t h e f i e l d of study and t h e sub-

j e c t matter involved, not on some absolute " t r u t h " about logic i t s e l f . What i s

important i s t o note how focussing on t h e s t a b l e data and ignoring t h e v a r i a b l e

data complements Durkheimls ideology. His emphasis on s o c i a l order and s o c i a l

control and h i s emphasis on s t a b l e data a r e complementary.

I shall return t o t h i s relationship later. For now, we can say t h a t

Durkheimts t h i r d so-called "rule" i s r e a l l y an expression, i n formal l o g i c , of a

s e t of b e l i e f s about society. That i s not t o say t h a t no valuable knowledge can

ever come from problems rooted i n h i s p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f s . It i s with Durkheimts

understanding of t h a t knowledge t h a t we a r e concerned and it has proven t o be

quite superficial.

2 - Rules For Distllyl;uishing t h e Normal and Pathological

Discussing Durkheimls r u l e s f o r distinguishing t h e normal and t h e patho-

l o g i c a l allows us t o expand on t h e question of values i n science and how any

handling of t h i s i s r e l a t e d t o one's approach t o logic. Durkheim rejected the

common view t h a t "... science can teach us nothing about what we ought t o de-
s i r e . "28 His approach involved t w o things. First,

"... by revealing the causes of phenomenon, science furnishes the

means of reproducing them. Every means i s from another point of
view, a n end. "29

But how a r e we t o determine t h e ends t o which s c i e n t i f i c knowledge should be put?

Durkheim replied t o t h i s with h i s second point. " I f , then, we can find an objec-

t i v e c r i t e r i o n , inherent i n the f a c t s themselves, which enables us t o distinguish

s c i e n t i f i c a l l y between health and morbidity i n t h e various orders of s o c i a l phe-

nomena, science w i l l be i n a position t o throw l i g h t on p r a c t i c a l problems and

s t i l l remain f a i t h f u l t o i t s own method."30

To search f o r a n "objective c r i t e r i o n inherent i n t h e f a c t s " i s t o forget

t h a t t h e f a c t s a r e themselves r e l a t e d t o an exclusive c l a s s o f problems and t o a n

o r i e n t a t i o n t o knowledge t h a t i s relevant t o studying them. For example, Durk-

heimls nomothetic sociology created a d i f f e r e n t kind o f f a c t s than would a dialec-

t i c sociology l i k e t h a t developed by ~ u r v i t c h . ~ ~

Durkheim seemed t o think t h a t h i s logic had escaped t h i s problem. Con-

t r a s t i n g h i s logic with c l a s s i c a l economists1 and with s o c i a l i s t s 1 , he wrote

h hey presuppose propositions which, t r u e o r not, can be proved only a t a

more advanced stage of science. This i s j u s t t h e case where we should
apply t h e r u l e previously established. Instead o f aspiring t o determine
a t t h e outset the r e l a t i o n s of t h e normal and t h e morbid t o v i t a l forces,
l e t us simply seek some external and perceptible c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which w i l l
enable us merely t o distinguish these two orders of f a c t s . "32

The problem with t h i s i s t h a t he s t a r t e d with t h e "two orders of f a c t s " - t h e normal

and the pathological - a s an a priori. And the erroneous p o s i t i v i s t i c assumption

t h a t one can build f a c t s s t r i c t l y on external preceptions was again enunicated.

Yet a b e l i e f t h a t what i s general i s t r u e and normal, and t h a t what is v a r i a b l e

i s f a l s e and pathological, i s what r e a l l y underlay Durkheimts position. He wrote

"We s h a l l c a l l 'normal1 these s o c i a l conditions t h a t a r e t h e most generally d i s -

t r i b u t e d and t h e others Imorbid1 or lpathologicall. "33 From t h i s , an "average

type" representing t h e normal was constructed - and supposedly an objective

c r i t e r i a of value has been established.

This method is deceptive. It only appears t o be a value-free approach

t o values. For instance, Durkheim wrote

" ~ f t e rhaving established by observation t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r f a c t i s gen-

e r a l , he w i l l go back t o t h e conditions which determined t h i s g e n e r a l i t y
i n t h e past and w i l l then i n v e s t i g a t e whether these conditions a r e s t i l l
given i n t h e present or i f , on t h e contrary, they have changed. I n t h e
f i r s t case he may properly designate t h e phenomenon a s normal; and, i n
t h e second, r e f u s e it t h i s designation. "34

The same view is expressed i n another way:

"1t i s impossible t o deduce t h e g r e a t e r from t h e l e s s , t h e genus from t h e

species. But t h e species, s i n c e it i s contained i n t h e genus, can be d i s -
covered i n t h e l a t t e r . " %

I n both statements, t h e r e i s t h e assumption t h a t t h e general i s t r u e and normal

and t h e d e f i n i t i o n s and t h e r u l e s of logic t h a t Durkheim expounded reinforced

t h i s assumption. But b e l i e f t h a t conformity t o t h e s o c i a l order is still

remained fundamental t o both. And t h i s b e l i e f i s f a r from being value-free.

A look a t Durkheimls t h r e e r u l e s f o r "normal sociology" shows t h e super-

f i c i a l i t y of t h i s method. His r u l e s were:

"1. A s o c i a l f a c t i s normal, i n r e l a t i o n t o a given s o c i a l type a t a

given phase of i t s development, when it is present i n t h e average so-
c i e t y of t h a t species a t t h e corresponding phase of i t s evolution.
2. One can v e r i f y t h e r e s u l t s of t h e preceding method by showing t h a t
t h e g e n e r a l i t y of t h e phenomenon i s bound up with t h e general conditions
of collective l i f e of t h e s o c i a l type considered.
3. This v e r i f i c a t i o n i s necessary when t h e f a c t i n question occurs i n a
s o c i a l species which has not yet reached t h e f u l l course of i t s evolu-
t ion. "36
 When c r i t i c a l l y analyzed, these t h r e e r u l e s prove t o be t a u t o l o g i c a l

statements based on t h e assumption t h a t what i s general can be equated with

what i s normal. The normal i s t h e average f o r a s o c i e t y i n i t s present phase

of evolution ( r u l e I ) . This i s t h e case because of t h e g e n e r a l i t y of t h e so-

c i a l f a c t s ( r u l e 2). This c i r c u l a r logic solves nothing, p a r t i c u l a r l y because

of i t s formality, i . e . , lack of h i s t o r i c a l example. The general i s assumed t o

be necessary or t r u e , not r e l a t i v e , i f t h e p a r t i c u l a r species has not f u l l y

evolved ( r u l e 3 ) . But how do we evaluate t h e degree of evolution. There i s

no doubt t h a t an h i s t o r i c a l - b i o l o g i c a l theory could e s t a b l i s h some norms t o

help us speculate about t h i s , but t h i s i s q u i t e different than saying t h a t our

s o c i a l f a c t s a r e v e r i f i e d because they a r e general a t a stage i n evolution.

The r e l i a n c e on "evolution" f o r backing f o r Durkheimls logic r a i s e s v a s t com-

p l i c a t i o n s and questions t h a t do not consolidate Durkheimls position, but r a t h e r

show t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y of having l o g i c a l r u l e s , p e r se. Durkheim seemed aware

t h a t h i s r u l e s did not stand on t h e i r o m and t h a t they required backing, but

he did not consider t h e need t o go beyond h i s s o c i a l f a c t s f o r such a backing.

Here l i e s t h e major e r r o r i n h i s argument.

It i s common i n s o c i a l science f o r a logic and d e f i n i t i o n s t o be developed

which support t h e b e l i e f s of t h e t h e o r i s t . This does not mean t h a t knowledge can-

not be developed i n t h i s way, but it does mean t h a t t h i s process should be made

explicit. Durkheim i s an excellent example of t h i s . His approach, which he

summarized with t h e statement "1n order t h a t sociology may t r e a t f a c t s a s things,

t h e s o c i o l o g i s t must f e e l t h e necessity of studying them e x c l u s i ~ e l y , "allowed

~~

him t o develop ideas t h a t continue t o be of use t o s o c i a l science. But what i f

t h e socio1op;ist wants t o study f a c t s d i a l e c t i c a l l y ? What i f he o r she wants t o

study t h e r e l a t i o n s of f a c t s t o h i s t o r i c a l conditions and change? A different

logic and d i f f e r e n t aims w i l l have t o be developed.

Knowledge derived from a d i a l e c t i c a l sociology would a l s o have a d i f f e r -

ent function. What was t h e function of Durkheimls logic and knowledge. He s t a t e d

that:

" I n order t h a t sociology may be a t r u e science of t h i n g s , t h e g e n e r a l i t y

o f phenomenon must be taken a s t h e c r i t e r i o n of t h e i r normality.
a s , moreover. t h e advantap- of re~.,ulatine:a c t i o n a t t h e s a m
time a s t h o w h t ( m y emphasis 1 . 1 ' 3 ~

The general, defined by an exclusive treatment of f a c t s , i s a c r i t e r i o n f o r nor-

mality only i f you want it t o be, and, i n addition, t h e r e a r e other ways t o define

t h e general. The second p a r t of t h e quote shows why Durkheim believed h i s way was

t h e r i g h t way. The s o c i o l o g i s t l s job i s t o help maintain t h e s t a t u s quo, or t h e

normal; t h e two being s i m i l a r t o Durkheim. This r e f l e c t s t h e l a t e n t a u t h o r i t a r -

ianism i n Durkheimls logic.

3 - Rules For C l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,

Durkheim then outlined h i s r u l e s f o r c l a s s i f y i n g " s o c i a l types". Since

t h e normal and pathological were r e l a t i v e t o what Durkheim c a l l e d " s o c i a l species"

he required such a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n h i s r u l e s of logic. Durkheim believed t h a t

h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n e x i s t e d between t h e extremes of t h e nominalism associated with

h i s t o r i a n s and t h e realism associated with philosophers. For him, t h e former was

mainly d e s c r i p t i v e and t h e l a t t e r a b s t r a c t . His method, t h e "... only method ac-

ceptable i n a science of observation" d e a l t with "... decisive or c r u c i a l f a c t s

which have s c i e n t i f i c value ..."39

This concern with t h e relevance of f a c t s does not seem t o f i t with Durk-

heimls o v e r a l l logic. This concern with relevancy i s c o n s i s t e n t with t h e conclu-

sions of our discussion of t h e problem of ideology. The c l a s s of problems t h a t

concerns us and r e l a t e s t o our o v e r a l l ideological o r i e n t a t i o n w i l l determine

t h e relevance or irrelevance of c e r t a i n observations f o r us. Durkheim came t o

a s i m i l a r conclusion when he argued f o r t h e use of a limited number of s o c i a l

types. According t o him, t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of s o c i a l types "... w i l l only be

u s e n t l if it permits us t o c l a s s i f y other c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s than those serving a s

i t s b a s i s and i f it procures f o r us a framework f o r f a c t s t o come. "40 For Durk-

heim, such a c l a s s l f l c a t i o n could not come from an excessive concern with t h e

uniqueness or t h e commonality of s o c i a l events.

This concern may be a reason why C. W. Mills considered Durkheim one of

t h e c l a s s i c s o c i o l o g i s t s , t h a t t r a d i t i o n i n sociology t h a t provides an a l t e r n a -

t i v e t o both a b s t r a c t empiricism and grand theory. Durkhelm' s approach t o

c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , f o r example, had a p o t e n t i a l s h i l a r i t y t o t h a t developed by

M i l l s when he contrasted "macroscopic" and "mlcroscopicl' research and argued

t h a t we must l e a r n t o " s h u t t l e " between t h e two.

Durkheimls formalism, rooted i n h i s conservatism, however, could not

allow f o r a dynamic c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of s o c i a l types. Instead of a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n

which could d e a l e x p l i c i t l y with changing s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s , he ended up c r e a t i n g

another l e v e l of a b s t r a c t i o n i n h i s logic. What he c a l l s " s o c i a l morphology" took

t h e place of a h i s t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c study of s o c i e t i e s . His commitment t o order,

t o tradition - and h i s r u l e s of logic t h a t r e f l e c t e d t h i s commitment - made such

a study impossible.

It i s important t o note t h a t t h i s " s o c i a l morphology", based on an analogy

between biology and sociology, can lead t o , and/or r e s u l t from, a r a c i s t mentality.

For example, Durkhcim s t a t e d "only colonization can be compared t o reproduction by

 I

germination; and i n order t h a t the type may p e r s i s t , t h e colonial society must

not mix with any' other society of a d i f f e r e n t species o r variety. "" his s t a t e -

ment showed one danger o f an u n c r i t i c a l application of a nomothetic logic t o h~unan

affairs. When you see the average a s being t h e normal, and both a s being objec-

t i v e , you can begin t o think of a mixture of one s o c i a l type with another a s lead-

i n g t o a l o s s i n t h e purity of the normal. Racism can be attached t o t h i s system

of logic much t o o easily. This shows t h e a u t h o r i t a r i a n p o t e n t i a l of a n a b s t r a c t

approach t o logic.

4 - Rules For Explanation

Durkheim then outlined h i s r u l e s f o r explanation and yet another l e v e l of

a b s t r a c t i o n was created. H i s chapter begins with t h e sentence: "The establish-

ment of species i s , above a l l , a means of grouping f a c t s t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r

interpretation. "43 Since Durkheimls idea of a s o c i a l f a c t , of normal sociology,

and of "social morphology", implied an ideological orientation, h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

of f a c t s obviously w i l l also. Taking it t o a new l e v e l of abstraction did not

change t h i s , it only obscured it.

Durkheim clouded over h i s ideological o r i e n t a t i o n with h i s epistemology.

He f i r s t distinguished between t h e use and t r u t h of a f a c t . He s t a t e d t h a t "To

show how a f a c t i s useful i s not t o explain how it originates o r why it i s what

it i s . 1144 The statement "why i s what 3 is" shows how Durkheim viewed f a c t s

i n an e s s e n t i a l i s t i c manner and t h a t t h i s r e i f i e d view of f a c t s and a formal logic

a r e c l e a r l y related. Treating f a c t s a s "external things" and f a i l i n g t o understand

one's ideological orientation can lead t o the erroneous epistemologies which see

f a c t s a s being t r u e o r f a l s e i n a b s t r a c t from t h e i r context.

 I

Durlchcimls explanation o f explanation, t h a t is, h i s way uf eskiblishing

t h e t r u t h of a f a c t , r e f l e c t e d h i s ideological o r i e n t a t i o n c l e a r l y . He accepted

a causal determinism and r e j e c t e d t e l e o l o g i c a l explanations. He did not believe

t h a t h i s concern with human needs, r e l a t e d t o h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between normal and

pathological s o c i a l f a c t s , implied any teleology.

"Thus t h e f a c t t h a t we allow a place f o r human needs i n sociological ex-

planations does not mean t h a t we even p a r t i a l l y r e v e r t t o teleology.
These needs can M'luence s o c i a l evolution only on condition t h a t they
themselves, and t h e changes they undergo, can be explained s o l e l y by
causes t h a t a r e deterministic and not a t a l l purposive. "45

Discussing t h e cause of a s o c i a l f a c t , Durkheim claimed t h a t "... we must

seek s e p a r a t e l y t h e e f f i c i e n t cause which produces it and t h e function it f u l -

~ ~ determination of t h e function of a s o c i a l f a c t was r e f e r r e d t o a s

f i l l ~ . " The

a t e l e o l o g i c a l or purposive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n because "... these questions of inten-

t i o n a r e too subjective t o allow of s c i e n t i f i c treatment. r147 Durkheim r e j e c t e d a

d i r e c t study of human i n t e n t i o n s but did not r e j e c t a functional a n a l y s i s of them.

His preference f o r a b s t r a c t , causal explanations r e l a t e d t o h i s preference f o r

what o f t e n goes with it: a b e l i e f i n t h e maintenance of t h e s o c i a l order. Thus

\
h e wrote "consequently, t o explain a s o c i a 1 , f a c t it i s not enough t o show t h e

cause on which it depends; we must a l s o , a t l e a s t i n most cases, show i t s func-

t i o n i n t h e establishment of s o c i a l order (my emphasis). "48 A functional and

causal a n a l y s i s and a concern with a c l a s s of problems rooted i n a commitment t o

t h e s t a t u s quo were t h e r e f o r e r e l a t e d i n Durkheimls logic.

The r e l a t i o n s h i p between Durkheimts commitment t o t h e s o c i a l order and

what I s h a l l c a l l h i s conservative rationalism was shown by t h e following s t a t e -

ment :

" ~ i m i l a r l y ,i n proportion as t h e s o c i a l milieu becomes more complex and

more unstable, t r a d i t i o n s and conventional b e l i e f s a r e shaken, become
 more indeterminate and more unsteady, and r e f l e c t i v e powers a r e developed.
Such r a t i o n a l i t y i s indispensable t o s o c i e t i e s and individuals i n adapting
themselves t o a more mobile and more complex environment. "49

From t h i s we can conclude t h a t Durkheimls "normal sociology" was supposed t o help

replace t h e function of t r a d i t i o n s i n t h e maintenance of t h e s t a t u s quo. Durkheim

was not t a l k i n g of using reason t o democratically c o n t r o l change, but of using

r a t i o n a l techniques t o help control, t h a t i s , adapt, people t o t h e s o c i a l order.50

Marcuse's c r i t i q u e of p o s i t i v i s t i c s o c i a l science, discussed i n Chapter Nine, was

rooted i n t h e recognition of t h i s conservative role.

Durkheim's conservative view of "society1' and h i s r u l e s of explanation

were t h e r e f o r e complementary. But t h e r e i s another way t o show how h i s logic and

ideology i n t e r r e l a t e d . Durkheim saw t h e individual a s being subordinate t o s o c i e t y

and h i s r l g i d s p l i t t i n g of t h e d i s c i p l i n e s of sociology and psychology r e f l e c t e d

i

t h i s belief. Here is a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c statement:

"When t h e individual has been eliminated, s o c i e t y alone remains. We must,

then, seek t h e explanation of s o c i a l l i f e i n t h e nature of society it-
s e l f . It i s q u i t e evident t h a t , since it i n f i n i t e l y surpasses t h e i n d i -
vidual i n time a s well a s i n space, it i s i n a p o s i t i o n t o impose upon
him ways of a c t i n g and thinking which it has consecrated with i t s pres-
t i g e . "51

Durkheim argued t h i s p o s i t i o n i n a somewhat unexpected way: by using an a n t i -

r e d u c t i o n i s t i c argument. He argued t h a t i n t h e same way t h a t organic phenomenon

cannot be explained by reference t o inorganic phenomenon s o c i a l f a c t s cannot be

explained by psychological ones. " I n a word, t h e r e i s between psychology and

sociology t h e same break i n continuity a s between biology and p h d h e m i c a l

sciences. "52

Those who t r y t o reduce s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l events t o psychological

process a r e , of course, i n error. Each subject matter must have i t s autonomy t o

solve prublerns. I, t h e r e f o r e , accept Durkheim's nun-reductionistic o r i e n t a t i o n .

The consequen-e of t h i s , however, should not be t o mystify " s o c i e t y n , but t o un-

derstand how s o c i a l processes a r i s e from human a c t i v i t y . As we continue we s h a l l

s e e t h a t Durkheim tended t o p e r s o n i f g s o c i e t y , r a t h e r t h a n t o approach t h i s type

of understanding.

Durkheiml s idea of " c o l l e c t i v e consciousness" r e f l e c t e d t h i s personif i c a -

t i o n of society. He developed t h i s concept (though held have had t o c a l l it a

"thing" ) i n t h e following manner: " I n d i v i d u a l minds, forming groups by mingling

and f u s i n g , g i v e b i r t h t o a being, psychological i f you w i l l , but c o n s t i t u t i n g a

psychic i n d i v i d u a l i t y of a new sort.''53 He commented on t h i s i n a footnote: "In

t h i s sense, and f o r t h e s e reasons, one can and must speak of a c o l l e c t i v e conscious-

ness d i s t i n c t from i n d i v i d u a l consciousness. ,154 From t h i s we can s e e how Durkheim

accepted a view of t h e " i n d i v i d u a l " a s being autonomous and s e p a r a t e ; y e t , r e a l i z i n g

t h a t s o c i o l o g i c a l f o r c e s do e x i s t , he had t o p o s t u l a t e a s o c i a l u.He failed

t o s e e t h a t t h e very c o r e of t h e experience of t h e i n d i v i d u a l , a s mediated by lan-

guage and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d behaviour, i s s o c i a l i n nature. H i s s p l i t t i n g of t h e

i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y was, t h e r e f o r e , rooted i n a f a l s e understanding of t h e n a t u r e

of human experience i t s e l f .

The degree t o which t h i s d i s t o r t i o n went i n Durkheimls work can be shown

by t h e following statement: o ore over, born of o t h e r s o c i e t i e s

without a break i n c o n t i n u i t y , we can be e n t i r e course of s o c i a l

e v o l u t i o n t h e r e has not been a s i n g l e

d e l i b e r a t i o n whether o r not they would

c o l l e c t i v e l i f e r a t h e r t h a n another. " 5 5 The f a c t urkheim even considered

t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of " i n d i v i d u a l s d e l i b e r a t i n g on c o l l e c t i v e l i f e " showed

 h i s tendency t o accept t h e view of t h e i n d i v i d u a l a s a n autonomous, r a t i o n a l

agent. This view of t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s rooted i n l i b e r a l s o c i a l theory. Yet,

Durkheimls concern with s o c i o l o g i c a l problems provided him with a c o n f l i c t i n g

orientation. He thus wrote t h a t "... c o l l e c t i v e ... tendencies a r e caused not

by t h e consciousness of i n d i v i d u a l s but by t h e c o n d i t i o n s i n which t h e s o c i a l

group i n i t s t o t a l i t y i s placed. 11 56

I do not d i s a g r e e with t h e o r i e n t a t i o n of t h i s l a s t statement. It i s

over t h e q u e s t i o n of l o g i c t h a t I diverge from Durkheim. I n searching f o r ab-

s t r a c t causes and i n r e l y i n g on a nomothetic l o g i c a s i f it r e f l e c t s a n inde-

pendent c a u s a l r e a l i t y , Durkheim was unable t o s e e t h a t h i s own ( o r o t h e r ' s )

l o g i c a c t e d a s a pragmatic t o o l u s e f u l f o r developing some forms of knowledge

f o r some kinds of problems. Durkheim ended up b e l i e v i n g i n h i s own c r e a t i o n :

h i s "normal, s o c i a l f a c t s " . H i s "normal, s o c i a l f a c t s " e x i s t e d over and above

him a l s o , almost s e r v i n g t h e f u n c t i o n t h a t "god" does f o r t h e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s .

An a b s o l u t e o r a p r i o r i , o u t s i d e i n q u i r y , was implied by h i s sociologism.

H i s debate with psychology i s a debate with h i s own assumptions about

When he s t a t e d h i s c a u s a l p r i n c i p l e a s h he de-

should be sought among t h e s o c i a l f a c t s pre-

i
' d e d i n g it and not among t h e s t a t e s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l consciousness, 1157

p o l a r i z e d t h e e x i s t e n c e of s o c i a l f a c t s and " t h e individual". One could suggest

t h a t Durkheim was trapped i n t h e perennial i d e a l i s t dilemma of whether a person

c r e a t e s r e a l i t y o r whether it e x i s t s independently. He had not considered t h e

p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t because a person does not c r e a t e r e a l i t y it does not follow t h a t

a person s e e s it a s an a l i e n , s u p e r i o r force. This i d e a l i s t dilemma f a i l s t o

'
d i s t i n g u i s h between types of r e a l i t y ( e. g,. , i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e a l i t y , sexual r e a l i t y )

and thus l e a d s t o a r e i f i e d n o t i o n of experience.

 Durkheim's commitment t o t h e s o c i a l order and h i s r e l a t e d l o g i c l e d

him t o hold a n a b s t r a c t view of s o c i e t y and t o a b s t r a c t t h e process of ex-

p l a n a t i o n a s well, Yet, he claimed t h a t h i s method d i d not seek " t h e sources

of l i f e o u t s i d e t h e l i v i n g being". 58 Let us d e a l with t h i s apparent contra-

d i c t i o n by looking a t t h e "conception of s o c i e t y he himself s a i d emerges from

h i s group of r u l e s u . 5 9

Durkheim s t a t e d t h a t he accqpted n e i t h e r t h e d o c t r i n e s which s e e a

"break i n c o n t i n u i t y between t h e i n nor those of n a t u r a l

law. I t h i n k he was c o r r e c t i n t h i t h a n c r e a t i n g a n orig-

i n a l approach, he combined t h e worst of t h e two d o c t r i e 4. Two quotations sup-

port t h i s interpretation. First: "... t h e i n d i v i d u a l f i n d s himself i n the

presence of a f o r c e which i s s u p e r i o r t o him and before which he bows; but t h i s

f o r c e i s a n e n t i r e l y n a t u r a l one. 11 60 Second, he s t a t e d :

"Since t h e s u p e r i o r i t y of s o c i e t y t o him i s not simply physical but i n -

t e l l e c t u a l and moral, it has nothing t o f e a r from a c r i t i c a l examina-
t i o n . By making man understand by how much t h e s o c i a l being i s r i c h e r ,
more complex, and more permanent t h a n t h e i n d i v i d u a l being, r e f l e c t i o n
can only r e v e a l t o him t h e i n t e l l i g i b l e reasons f o r t h e subordination
demanded of him and f o r t h e sentiments of attachment and r e s p e c t which
h a b i t has f i x e d i n h i s

This s p l i t between t h e i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y i s c l e a r . The i n d i v i d u a l i s sub-

o r d i n a t e and a n a t u r a l n e s s i s a t t r i b u t e d t o such subordination.

Durkheimls r u l e s of explanation a r e r e a l l y a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e s o c i a l

order; p o t e n t i a l l y , any form of s o c i a l order. I n c r e a t i n g h i s normal sociology,

i n takLng t h e person out of s o c i a l s c i e n c e and r e p l a c i n g t h e study of "man i n

s o c i e t y i n h i s t o r y u 6 * with t h e study of " s o c i a l f a c t s " a s t h i n g s e x t e r n a l t o t h e

person, Durkheim c r e a t e d a " c o l l e c t i v e being which is, i t s e l f , a being i n i t s

own The subordination of t h e pexBsont o t h i s "being1' was n a t u r a l i n

h i s sociology. It i s a sociology which, i n Pxlrkhefmis own words, .. sees i n
I!.

a l l common l i f e ..."
64
t h e s p i r i t of d i s c i p l i n e t h e e s s e n t i a l cbndition of With

Durkheimls version of scientism, science was not only metaphysical, but poten-

t i a l l y a u t h o r i t a r i a n , a s well.

5 - Rules For Establishing Proof

L
Durkheim then discussed rules/f or e s t a b l i s h i n g s o c i a l o g i c a l proof. Here,

he showed t h e r e l i a n c e of h i s on t r a d i t i o n a l logic. Showing how he

reduced l o g i c t o experimental Durkheim s t a r t e d t h e chapter with t h e

sentence: "we have only one way t o demonstrate t h a t a given phenomenon i s t h e

cause of another, viz., t o compare t h e cases i n which they a r e simultaneously

present o r absent, t o s e e i f t h e v a r i a t i o n s they present i n these d i f f e r e n t com-

binations of circumstances i n d i c a t e t h a t one depends on t h e other. "65 1n e f f e c t ,

he manipulated logic t o r e i n f o r c e h i s causal theory. He believed t h a t "a given

e f f e c t has always a s i n g l e corresponding cause".66 Rather than discussing t h i s

causal assumption i n a c r i t i c a l manner, Durkheim s t a t e d t h a t 'I... only philosophers

have ever questioned t h e logic of t h e causal r e l a t i o n . For t h e s c i e n t i s t t h e r e i s

no question about i t ; it i s assumed by t h e very method of science. 11 67 Kuhn s

analysis argued t h e exact opposite. He pointed out t h a t "cause" i s a term given

a b s t r a c t meaning by philosophers ( l i k e Durkheim, i n t h i s regard). I n Chapter Six-

teen, we s h a l l see how t h e notion of cause i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e unless approached

pragmatically.

Durkheim's b e l i e f i n causal theory and h i s treatement of f a c t s a s things

were r e l a t e d . He believed i n t r e a t i n g f a c t s exclusively and I n determinine; s t r u c -

t u r a l causal r e l a t i o n s among them. As a technluue, t h i s i s of some value, f o r

some problems. But t o believe t h a t a f a c t derived from t h i s technique i s an

external r e a l i t y i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . And t h i s i s what Durkheim believed.

For instance, of t h e method of c o r r e l a t i o n , he s t a t e d : " 1 t s v a l i d i t y i s due

>-
t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e concomitant v a r i a t i o n s display t h e causal r e l a t i o n s h i p

not by coincidence ... but i n t r i n s i c a l l y . 68

,I
Later, he wrote: "AS soon a s

one has proved t h a t i n a c e r t a i n number of cases, two phenomena vary w h &e

another, one i s c e r t a i n of being i n t h e presence of a law. "69 such my t i f i c a -

t i o n of experimental method has nothing whatsoever t o do with t h e develop nt

of a s e l f - c r i t i c a l s o c i a l science. An a b s t r a c t nature, an "essence"

t r i b u t e d t o t h e ideas of "cause" and la^^" and, a s such, t h e r o f method

i n science was ignored. One wonders why Durkheim undertook a study of logic

a t a l l , except t o j u s t i f y t h e absolutes t h a t he accepted beforehand.

It i s important t o s e e how t h i s mystified view of t r u t h p a r a l l e l s

Durkheim's p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n of "society". His logic had t h e same assumptions

a s did h i s view of society. For example, discussing h i s data on suicide, Durk-

heim wrote:

"since each of these f i g u r e s contains a l l t h e individual cases Indis-

criminately, t h e individual circumstances which may have had a share
i n t h e production of t h e phenomenon a r e neutralized and, consequent-
l y , do not c o n t r i b u t e t o i t s determination. The average, then, ex-
presses a c e r t a i n s t a t e of t h e group mind '7' ...
This i s a n i n t e r e s t i n g logic. I n t h e process of manipulating f i g u r e s , individual

experience was abolished. Durkheimls l o g i c was one t h a t ended up believing t h a t

general f a c t s have more r e a l i t y than human behaviour. I n t h e process a new r e a l i t y

("group mind") i s created t o complement h i s a b s t r a c t , mystified logic.

Scientism and Authoritarianism

Durkheim ended h i s study with t h r e e conclusions. F i r s t , he claimed h i s

method "is e n t i r e l y independent of philosophy".71 This i s t h e case because " t h e

p r i n c i p l e of causality1' i s "applied t o s o c i a l p h e n ~ r n e n a " . ~But

~ a s our c r i t i q u e

has shown h i s " p r i n c i p l e of c a u s a l i t y " was r e a l l y an expression of h i s view of

society. The problem of logic was ignored i n t h e process and h i s logic became

r u l e s f o r documenting and maintaining t h e s t a t u s quo.

His claim was t o have created a value-free methodology which was superi- \
or t o "... i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , communistic and s o c i a l i s t doctrines ... (which tend) fL.
... not t o describe or i n t e r p r e t , but t o reform s o c i a l organization. "73 B U ~we

have seen how h i s nomothetic logic i t s e l f p a r a l l e l e d a commitment t o t h e mainte-

nance of t h e s o c i a l order. A commitment t o t h e s t a t u s quo, no matter how much it

i s s o p h i s t i c a t e d with s o c i a l theory, which i n Durkheimts case tended toward n a t u r a l

law, s t i l l r e f l e c t s values. Again we s e e t h e impossibility of a value-free science

or logic.

For Dwkheim duty or d i s c i p l i n e was equated with I n h i s own words:

" ~ i s c i p l i n ehas i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n i t s e l f . It is good t h a t man should be

disciplined. "74

This ideology pervaded a l l of h i s work, including h i s logic. He d i d admit t h a t

"... our reasoning i s not a t a l l revolutionarg. We a r e even, i n a sense,

e s s e n t i a l l y conservative. "75

Even so, he seemed unaware t h a t t h e l o g i c he used, a s d i s t i n c t from t h e one he

formalized ( h i s " r u l e s " ) , included h i s conservative reasoning.

Reasoning ( i. e., l o g i c ) can be revolutionary or conservative. It i s not a

method independent of one's o v e r a l l perspective or commitments. Durkheim remained

 I

uslaware of t h i s and trlecE t o give h l s "reason" an autonomous Status. Discussing

h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e normal and t h e pathological he wrote: "1t i s yet

possible f o r us t o vindicate t h e l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s of reason i n t h e s o l u t i o n of

t h e problem j u s t s t a t e d , without r e v e r t i n g t o ideology. "76 Durkhelm t r e a t e d t h e

problem of ideology i n t h e way t h a t Mannheim l a b e l l e d "particular". He showed

no awareness of how ideology c o n s t i t u t e s an i n t e l l e c t u a l problem i n i t s e l f ; one

t h a t was implied i n h i s own work.

Durkheimls claim t o be be accepted. Since h i s " r u l e s "

and t h e i r r a t i o n a l e s depended second conclusion t h a t h i s method

i s objective must a l s o be rejected. We saw how(his idea of o b j e c t i v i t y was r e a l l y

a m y s t i f i c a t i o n of methodology.

ency: "we have shown how t h e sociologi

.c
The f o l l o ing statement c l e a r l y shows t h i s tend-

to, disregard t h e preconceptions which

he had of f a c t s , i n order t o f a c e t h e f a c t s themselves; how he has t o discriminate

among them according t o t h e i r most objective c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ; how he must seek i n

t h e f a c t s themselves ... 1177 Facts a r e t r e a t e d a s e x t e r n a l s , external even t o

methodology. According t o Durkheim, we must "face t h e f a c t s themselves ... accord-

ing t o t h e i r objective c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ... and must seek i n t h e f a c t s themselves
..."t h e i r meaning. The fact t h a t it was Durkheimrs own logic t h a t led him t o see

f a c t s i n t h i s way, a s things, i s t o t a l l y ignored. It was && logic ( t h e term " r u l e s "

r e f l e c t s h i s attempt t o represent h i s logic and method a s being objective, p e r s e )

t h a t l e d t o t h i s r e i f i e d view of f a c t s . It was h i s adherence t o conservative

rationalism t h a t l e d him t o personify s o c i a l f a c t s ; t o give h i s own c r e a t i o n more

r e a l i t y than human experience.

His l a s t conclusion was t h a t h i s method was "exclusively sociological". 78

By t h i s he meant "... t h a t a s o c i a l f a c t can be expla3ned only by another s o c i a l

f a c t . t'79 This exclusiveness i s one way of keeping t h e study of s o c i e t y i n the

abstract. His ideological o r i e n t a t i o n , h i s rationalism and h i s formal logic

l e d t o a " s o c i ~ l o ~ i s m " :a sociology without people; one t h a t j u s t i f i e s t h e

s o c i a l order, per z, and hence one t h a t c a n a c t as a s c i e n t i s t i c r a t i o n a l i z a -

t i o n f o r authoritarianism.

The t a s k of Durkheimls sociology was

"... no longer a matter of pursuing desperately an objective t h a t re-

t r e a t s as one advances, but of working with steady perseverance t o
maintain t h e normal .state, of re-establishing it i f it i s threatened,
and of rediscovering conditions i f they have changed. The duty of t h e
statesman i s no longer t o push s o c i e t y toward an i d e a l t h a t seems a t -
t r a c t i v e t o him, but h i s r o l e i s t h a t of t h e physician: he prevents
t h e outbreak of i l l n e s s e s by good hygiene, and he seeks t o cure
when they have appeared. "80

Catlin, who wrote t h e Introduction t o t h e Free Press e d i t i o n of D u r k h e k s book,

a l s o noted t h a t Durkheimls sociology& an a u t h o r i t a r i a n p o t e n t i a l i n it

This i s f a r d i f f e r e n t than saying it can be used f o r a u t h o r i t a r i a n ends

very mode of reasoning, not j u s t t h e kind of knowledge

thoritarianism. C a t l i n ended h i s Introduction: " ~ f ,

s o c i o l o g i s t has b u i l t t h e s t r u c t u r e of popular d i c t a t o r s h i p , with t h e other he

has indicated t o us t h e deeper volcanic forces t h a t must destroy i n time, by a

c e r t a i n law of human seismology, every tyranny t h a t does violence t o our sub-'

s t a n t i a l natures. 11 82

Durkheimls contribution was not a s a logician, aware of t h e problem of

ideology; it was, a s C a t l i n s a i d , one of renewing our i n t e r e s t i n n a t u r a l law. 83

But what has t h i s t o do with s o c i a l science? It i s t h e tendency t o r e l f y general

f a c t s i n t o n a t u r a l laws which underlies t h e a u t h o r i t a r i a n p o t e n t i a l i n h i s soci-

ology. H i s "sociological r u l e s " ended up being means t o enforce s o c i a l r u l e s , not

means whereby our understanding of human experience and behaviour i s enhanced.

 Another tendency e x i s t s within Durkheimls logic. In

almost aware t h a t h i s l o g i c was pragmatic and not i n t r i n s i c . We have

t h a t i t s ideological function - making s o c i a l f a c t s appear a s

was fundamental t o any methodological value it had. I n places Durkhe

of how " f a c t s must be t r e a t e d a s things", a s i f he knew he was c r e a t i

odology most appropriate t o h i s conservative commitments.

2lked meth-

Had he not l e f t h i s

discussion of "conceptions of society" u n t i l t h e end of t h e book perhaps he

might have recognized t h a t h i s logic and type of knowledge p a r a l l e l e d h i s own

ideology about society. Then he would have been i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o be s e l f -

c r i t i c a l and t o recognize t h e authoritarianism t h a t h i s sociologism implied. We

could only speculate where such an awareness on h i s p a r t might have led.

Footnotes

l ~ m i l eDurkheim: The Rules of Sociological Method. New York, The Free Press
(1966). By sociologism we r e f e r t o t h e o r i e s t h a t tend t o reduce human experience
and behaviour t o s o c i o l o g i c a l explanations. They a r e ignorant of what S a r t r e c a l l e d
"mediations" and do not s i t u a t e t h e i r knowledge i n ongoing human praxis. They a r e
p o t e n t i a l l y a u t h o r i t a r i a n because a b s t r a c t , r e d u c t i o n i s t i c ideas can e a s i l y func-
t i o n i n t h e i n t e r e s t s of those who c o n t r o l c e n t r a l i z e d power. Sociologistic ideas
do not specify t h e meaning of existence f o r people within a c e r t a i n s e t of s o c i a l
r e l a t i o n s , but r a t h e r tend t o r a t i o n a l i z e t h e function of those s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s ,
and, a s such, can help i n t h e maintenance of them regardless of t h e i r consequences.
For a discussion of Durkheimls sociologism, which recognizes i t s reductionism, but
not i t s authoritarianism, see Edward A. Tiryakian: S o c i o l o ~ i s mand Existentialism.
Englewood C l i f f s , N. J., Prentice-Hall ( 1962).
 91bid., p. 103.
10
Ibid., p. 14.

lllbid., p. 21.

1311~ogicalt h e o r i e s which f a i l t o note t h e r e l a t i v i t y of propositions t o t h e gSven

s t a g e of inquiry a t t a i n e d , e r e c t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n of empirical and r a t i o n a l i n t o a
r i g i d difference i n t h e ontological natures of t h e i r respective subject-matters."
John Dewey: Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston
(1938), p. 305. I n Chapter Twenty, I s h a l l c r i t i c i z e t h e tendency of academic,
formal logicians t o t r e a t t h e i r dichotomies ontologically, i.e., a s though they
a r e rooted i n t h e character of Being. I a m using t h e term "ontology" i n t h i s
general sense, not i n t h e s p e c i f i c philosophical sense of S a r t r e , Heidegger and
o t h e r e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s and phenomenologists.

14Durkheim, op. c i t . , P. 23.

2 0 ~ nChapter Twenty, I discuss how b e l i e f i n a formal or pragmatic approach t o

l o g i c a f f e c t s how one views t h e r e l a t i o n of common sense t o science.

21~urkheim, op. c i t . , P. 42.

2 2 ~ o h nS t u a r t M i l l : Auguste Comte and Positivism. Ann Arbor, University of

Michigan Press (1961). M i l l ' s view of knowledge a s t h e study of "successions and
co-existence of phaenomenat' ( Ibid. p. 7 ) and h i s treatment of l o g i c , laws, causes,
e t c . i n terms of t h i s i s s i m i l a r t o t h e mechanistic approach of Durkheim.

251bid., pp. 43-4.

*7For a discussion of t h i s matter, see Gordon W. Allport: The General And The
Unique I n Psychological Science, i n F.H. Sanford and E. J. Capaldi ( eds. 1: & I
-
vancing Psycho1op;ical Science, Volume 1. Belmont, Wadsworth Pbulishing ( 19641,
PP. 70-83.

28Durkheim, op. tit., p. 47.

31~or a discussion of Gurvitchls sociology see P. Bosserman: D i a l e c t i c a l

Sociolony. Boston, Porter Sargent (1968). Gurvitch saw Weber a s a " r a d i c a l
nominalist" who denied t h e existence of human c o l l e c t i v i t i e s , and saw Parson's
sociology as an extension of t h i s error. But, unlike Durkheim, he approached
t h e study of c o l l e c t i v e s i n a d i a l e c t i c a l way.

4 1 ~ . ~Mills:
. Images of Man, op. c i t .
5 0 ~ h e npeople a r e not a b l e t o evaluate d i f f e r e n t a l t e r n a t i v e s and have no choice
nor c o n t r o l over both t h e ends and means of s o c i a l change we can r e f e r t o such
 I

Chapter F i f t e e n

A Polemical Logic: Popper

Karl Popper's ideas could be seen a s a s t e p towards a logic t h a t accounts

f o r t h e problem of ideology or a s a s t e p away from t h e l o g i c s t h a t could not han-

d l e questions a r i s i n g from t h i s problem. H i s almost pragmatic understanding of

methodology supports t h e former i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , while t h e formalism of h i s argu-

ment supports t h e l a t t e r . Because of t h e marginal and ambiguous character of h i s

approach, an examination of Popper w i l l help us make t h e t r a n s i t i o n from b l a t a n t l y

inadequate t h e o r i s t s , l i k e Durkheim, t o t h e o r i e s t h a t can deal with l o g i c a l prob-

lems I n an ideological context.

Formal and Pragmatic Criticism

Though Popper's ideas on methodology come c l o s e t o a pragmatic understand-

ing of l o g i c , h i s method of c r i t i c i s m did not. He o f t e n seemed t o be basing h i s

argument on disagreements with h i s own vulgar c r e a t i o n ( " h i s t o r i c i s m " ) r a t h e r than

representing f a i r l y t h e views with which he claimed t o disagree. I n comparing and

c r i t i c i z i n g theories of l o g i c , Bentley outlined what a pragmatic method of c r i t i -

cism e n t a i l s : "Our purpose i s not so much t o debate t h e r i g h t s and wrongs of these

procedures, a s it i s t o exhibit t h e differences i n m a t e r i a l s and workmanship, and

t o i n d i c a t e t h e types of r e s u l t s thus f a r offered. "l Popperls method of c r i t i c i s m

was too formal t o even approximate t h i s approach. He admitted t h a t he had con-

s t r u c t e d arguments i n support of h i s t o r i c i s m t h a t were not brought forward by t h e

so-called h i s t o r i c i s t s themselves. He a l s o admitted t h a t he had "... t r i e d to

 I

perfect a theory which has often been put forward but perhaps never i n a f u l l y

developed form."2 As our a n a l y s i s w i l l show, t h i s method compounds confusion.

Popper ended h i s introduction with t h e statement: "BY introducing ( t h e some-

what unfamiliar l a b e l ' h i s t o r i c i s m ' ) I hope I s h a l l avoid merely verbal quib-

bles ..."3 Yet, because t h e "perfect theory" and t h e arguments against it were

-
h l s creation, t h e r e was a tendency f o r debate about "historicism" t o become no

more than verbal quibbling.

I w i l l attempt t o show t h a t t h e few relevant ideas r a i s e d by Popper can

be organized and a r t i c u l a t e d i n a way t h a t avoids h i s formalism. As we s h a l l

see, t h e " f u l l y developed form" of h i s t o r i c i s m of which Popper spoke did not

r e a l l y c l a r i f y t h e problem of logic, nor of ideology, though both have much t o

do with t h e questions with which he was concerned.

Popper's book was organized i n four s e c t i o n s t h a t combine what he c a l l e d

pro and a n t i - n a t u r a l i s t i c positions. Popper outlined both t h e "pro and a n t i -

n a t u r a l i s t doctrines of historicism" and then c r i t i c i z e d each. I n h i s own terms

we f i n d t h a t Popper i s a n a n t i - h i s t o r i c i s t and a pro-naturalist.

By h i s t o r i c i s m Popper meant "... a n approach t o s o c i a l sciences which

assumes t h a t h i s t o r i c a l prediction i s t h e i r p r i n c i p l e aim, and which assumes

t h a t t h i s aim i s a t t a i n a b l e by discovering t h e ... 'laws1 o r ' t r e n d s 1 t h a t under-

l i e t h e evolution of history. "4 He included Marx, J.S. M i l l , Comte and others

i n t h i s classification. His main point, a n important one, was t h a t s o c i a l

s c i e n t i f i c laws a r e not h i s t o r i c a l predictions. We s h a l l see, a s we proceed,

t h a t t h e general theory t o which t h i s main point was attached was f a r l e s s

c r e d i b l e than t h e point i t s e l f .
 I

Anti-Naturalist 1Iistoricism: 1 - Methods i n t h e Social and Natural Sciences

Popper's f i r s t s e c t i o n was an a r t i c u l a t i o n and r e f u t a t i o n of what he

c a l l e d t h e a n t i - n a t u r a l i s t form of historicism. This " ~ i s t o r i c i s ma s s e r t s t h a t

t h e h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i v i t y of s o c i a l laws makes most of t h e methods of physics

inapplicable t o sociology. "5 Such a h i s t o r i c i s m sees no p o s s i b i l i t y of scien-

t i f i c g e n e r a l i z a t i o n or experimentation i n t h e s o c i a l sciences because 'I. ..

s o c i a l uniformities a r e not laws of nature, but man-made ..." and, furthermore,

because "... a r t i f i c i a l i s o l a t i o n would eliminate p r e c i s e l y those f a c t o r s i n

sociology which a r e most important. "6 The emergence of novel and unique condi-

t i o n s , t h e complexity of s o c i e t i e s and t h e "inexactitude of prediction" r e s u l t -

ing from t h i s a r e a l s o used a s arguments a g a i n s t t h e relevance of t h e methods of

physical science f o r problems I n t h e s o c i a l sciences.

In addition, "... t h e influence of predictions upon predicted eventsl17

i s s t r e s s e d by these h i s t o r i c i s t s . Describing t h i s position, Popper wrote "We

a r e faced, i n t h e s o c i a l sciences, with a f u l l and complicated i n t e r a c t i o n be-

tween observer and observed, between subject and object. "8 The " i n t e r a c t i o n

between observer and observed, between subject and object" undermines a n a t u r a l -

i s t i c form of o b j e c t i v i t y i n t h e s o c i a l sciences.

h he s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t may be s t r i v i n g t o f i n d t h e t r u t h ; but, a t t h e same

time, he must always be exerting a d e f i n i t e influence upon society. The
very f a c t t h a t h i s pronouncements 3 e x e r t an influence destroys t h e i r
objectivity.

Remember t h a t t h i s was Popper's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e "perfect theory" of

historicism. He warned t h a t it may lead "...t o t h a t extreme form of r e l a t i v i s m

which holds t h a t o b j e c t i v i t y and t h e i d e a l of t r u t h , a r e a l t o g e t h e r inapplicable

i n t h e s o c i a l sciences ... "lo He a l s o warned t h a t it may lead t o t h e "sociology

of knowledge" p o s i t i o n t h a t " s o c i a l science may thus function a s a midwife, help-

 I

ing t o bring f o r t h new s o c i a l periods; but it can equally well serve, i n t h e

hands of conservative i n t e r e s t s , t o r e t a r d impending s o c i a l changes. 1111

This l a t t e r statement, i n general, represents my own argument. In the

l a s t chapter I c r i t i c i z e d Durkheimts r u l e s of sociology because they tend t o

f u l f i l l conservative i n t e r e s t s , yet were presented a s though they were value-

free. The way a c l a s s of problems, methods and t h e o r i e s function within t h e

s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l system c o n s t i t u t e s t h e main problem of ideology f o r t h e

s o c i a l sciences. Yet I have not b u i l t my argument on what Popper c a l l e d an

a n t i - n a t u r a l i s t position. A c l a r i f i c a t i o n of why t h e sociology of knowledge

t h e s i s and a n a n t i - n a t u r a l i s t posture need not be combined w i l l go a long way

t o show why Popper's c r e a t i o n of "historicism" f a i l e d t o f u r t h e r our understand-

ing of t h e problem of logic.

According t o Popper a b e l i e f i n holism a l s o underlay t h e a n t i - n a t u r a l i s t

form of historicism.12 In addition, a b e l i e f i n i n t u i t i o n r e l a t e d t o t h i s form

of historicism. This is t h e view t h a t whereas " ~ h y s i c saims a t causal explana-

tion: sociology ( aims ) a t an understanding of purpose and meaning. "I3 Popper

outlined "three variants'' of t h i s b e l i e f . he f i r s t a s s e r t s t h a t a s o c i a l event

i s understood when analyzed i n terms of t h e forces t h a t brought it about. "I4 The

purposes or i n t e r e s t s of individuals and groups a r e t h e key t o t h i s kind of under-

standing. The second goes beyond t h i s "teleology" t o account f o r t h e "significance1'

o r "meaning1' of a n event. The t h i r d goes beyond both of these t o "... an a n a l y s i s

of ( a n e v e n t ' s ) genesis, e f f e c t s and s i t u a t i o n a l value. This t h i r d v a r i a n t con-

cerned i t s e l f with h i s t o r i c a l trends, t h e subject around which Popper based much

of h i s analysis.

Popper argued t h a t these h i s t o r i c i s t s did not believe t h a t q u a n t i t a t i v e

methods were applicable i n sociology i n the way t h a t they a r e i n physics. For

them, sociology "... t r i e s t o understand h i s t o r i c a l development more i n quali-

t a t i v e terms ..." 16 According t o t h i s l i n e of thinking, causal explanations

o f h i s t o r i c a l trends cannot take a mathematical form.

2 - Essentialism versus Nominalism

Popper then came t o h i s main point: t h e dispute between essentialism

versus nominalism. This i s a c o n f l i c t r e s u l t i n g from "the so-called problem

of u n i v e r ~ a l s " ,something
~~ which I w i l l discuss i n depth when analyzing Toulmin .

and Peweyls theories of logic. According t o Popper, t h i s problem "... i s usually

interpreted a s a purely metaphysical problem; but l i k e most metaphysical problems,

it can be reformulated so a s t o become a problem of s c i e n t i f i c method. 18

Nominalists see a "universal term" a s "a l a b e l attached t o a s e t of many

d i f f e r e n t things".19 E s s e n t i a l i s t s (sometimes called r e a l i s t s ) "believe i n the

existence of universals1' and argue t h a t "Science must s t r i p away the accidental

and penetrate t o t h e essence of things (and) ... t h e essence of anything i s always

something universal. 11 20 I n contrast, "Methodological nominalists .. . regard words

merely a s useful instruments of description. !12' This l a t t e r methodology, claimed

Popper, "... has been victorious i n the n a t u r a l sciences. " He theref ore concluded:

"Thus i n t h e s o c i a l sciences, we should expect methodological n a t u r a l i s t s

t o favour nominalism, and a n t i - n a t u r a l i s t s t o favour essentialism. Yet
I n f a c t ( i n the s o c i a l sciences) essentialism seems t o have the upper
hand ... It has been suggested t h a t while the method of t h e natural
sciences i s fundamentally nominalistic, s o c i a l science must adopt a
methodological essentialism. "22

Popper argued t h a t a l l h i s t o r i c i s t s "... w i l l be inclined t o side with

essentialism and against nominalism so f a r a s the methodology of s o c i a l science

i s concerned. " 2 3 According t o him, t h i s tendency r e l a t e s t o t h e problem of

 I

"detecting an i d e n t i t y I n things t h a t change". *' H i s t u r i c i s t s a r e mainly con-

cerned with change. Yet, "Even i f nothing remains unchanged, we must be a b l e

t o i d e n t i f y what has changed i n order t o speak of change a t a l l . tI25 sociology

faces a p a r t i c u l a r problem regarding t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of change i n s o c i a l

institutions. Developing a h i s t o r i c i s t approach t o s o c i a l change, Popper s t a t e d

that

"A n a t u r a l i s t i c description of contemporary i n s t i t u t i o n s of government

... might have t o present them a s e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from what they
were four c e n t u r i e s ago. Yet we can say t h a t , i n so f a r a s t h e r e i s a
government, it i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same, even although it may have
changed considerably. Its function within modern s o c i e t y i s e s s e n t i a l l y
analogous t o t h e function i t then f u l f i l l e d . "26

Popper t h u s argued t h a t h i s t o r i c i s m i s a form of functionalism with a b i a s

towards essentialism. This a s s o c i a t i o n of essentialism and h i s t o r i c i s m r e f l w t s

Popper's o v e r a l l argument. Our discussion of Marx and Engels showed t h a t they

r e j e c t e d t h e e s s e n t i a l i s t notion of knowledge. For them, giving ideas an "essence"

was t h e i d e o l o g i s t ' s profession. Popper's placement of Marx (and Engels) i n h i s

c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of h i s t o r i c i s m was not j u s t i f i a b l e . I n one sense, they were func-

t i o n a l i s t s s i n c e they analyzed how our ideology and s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s functioned

i n t h e d i v i s i o n of labour and p o l i t i c a l economy, but t h e i r emphasis on t h e "his-

t o r i c a l s p e c i f i c i t y " of events ruled out t h e kind of trans-epochal functionalism

of wnich Popper spoke. Popper was c l e a r l y arguing more with a vulgar marxism -
a naive Hegelianism - than with t h e sociology of Marx.

Pro-Naturalistic Historicism: The Problem of H i s t o r i c a l Prediction

Popper claimed t h a t h i s t o r i c i s m was "fundamentally a n t i - n a t u r a l i s t .27

But a pro-naturalism can a l s o underlie historicism, and with many of i t s assurnp-

t i o n s Popper agreed. He agreed t h a t "...sociology has t o explain and t o predict

events, with t h e h e l p of t h e o r i e s o r of u n i v e r s a l laws (whlch it t r i e s t o d i s -

cover). ,I 28 He disagreed, however, t h a t t h e s e laws a r e h i s t o r i c a l i n nature.

The " h i s t o r i c i s t " , even i f a " n a t u r a l i s t " , maintained h i s b e l i e f i n

h i s t o r i c a l laws. According t o Popper, t h e h i s t o r i c i s t "... claims t h a t sociol-

ogy i s t h e o r e t i c a l h i s t o r y " 2 9 with h i s t o r y providin(; t h e laws t h a t h e l p " e x p l a i n

and p r e d i c t " events. The h i s t o r i c i s t b e l i e v e s i n 'I.. . laws of h i s t o r i c a l devel-

opment which determine t h e t r a n s i t i o n from one period t o another. I! 30

It i s with t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of h i s t o r i c i s m , whether rooted i n a n a n t i

o r p r o - n a t u r a l i s t i c p o s t u r e , t h a t Popper fundamentally d i f f e r e d . Popper's idea

o f s c i e n t i f i c p r e d i c t i o n d i f f e r e d fundamentally from t h a t he a t t r i b u t e d t o h i s -

toricism. He d i s t i n g u i s h e d two kinds of prediction: "prophecy" and "technolog-

ical". The former prophecizes events; t h e l a t t e r "... a r e , s o t o speak, construc-

t i v e , i n t i m a t i n g t h e s t e p s open t o us i f we want t o achieve c e r t a i n r e s u l t s . 11 31

I n t h i s r e g a r d , Popper was a p o l o g e t i c f o r sounding l i k e a pragmatist.

He wrote "I do not wish t o be taken a s implying t h a t a l l s c i e n c e s , o r even a l l

s c i e n t i f i c p r e d i c t i o n s , a r e fundamentally p r a c t i c a l ...
'132 H e continued "I

c e r t a i n l y wish t o hint; a t a f e a t u r e t h e y e x h i b i t i f looked a t from t h e pragmatic

s t a n d p o i n t ; but my use of t h i s terminology is n e i t h e r intended 50 mean t h a t t h e

pragmatic p o i n t of view i s n e c e s s a r i l y s u p e r i o r t o any o t h e r , nor t h a t s c i e n t i f i c

i n t e r e s t i s l i m i t e d t o pragmatically important prophecies and t o p r e d i c t i o n s of a

t e c h n o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r . "33 Then he summarized h i s argument: ".. . h i s t o r i c i s t s ,

q u i t e c o n s i s t e n t l y with t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t s o c i o l o g i c a l experiments a r e u s e l e s s

and impossible, argue f o r h i s t o r i c a l prophecy - t h e prophecy of s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l

and i n s t i t u t i o n a l developments - and a g a i n s t s o c i a l engineering, a s t h e p r a c t i c a l

aim of t h e s o c i a l sciences. 11 34
 - 284 -
I

According t o Popper, his kind of h i s t o r y with which h i s t o r i c i s t s wish

t o i d e n t i f y sociology looks not only backwards t o t h e past, but forward:; t o t h e

future. a35 With t h i s h i s t o r i c a l idea of science, Popper disagreed. I n opposi-

t i o n t o i t , he advocated "... a methodology which aims a s a technological social

science. 1'36 Such a s o c i a l science

"...would be a n t i - h i s t o r i c i s t ,
bus by no means a n t i - h i s t o r i c a l . H i s t o r i c a l
experience would serve a s a most important source of information. "37

After advocating an a h i s t o r i c i s t s o c i a l science or what Popper c a l l e d a

"technological s o c i a l science", he returned t o h i s c r i t i c i s m of t h e h i s t o r i c i s t

argument t h a t "Social midwifery i s t h e only p e r f e c t l y reasonable a c t i v i t y open t o

us, t h e only a c t i v i t y t h a t can be based upon s c i e n t i f i c foresight. "j8 An examina-

t i o n of t h i s point w i l l show t h a t Popper's "perfect theory" was r e a l l y a r e f l e c t i o n

of h i s own ideological orientation.

Popper saw a contradiction between ideas of freedom and ideas of necessity

i n the h i s t o r i c i s t l s notion of s o c i a l midwifery. He wrote t h a t h i s t o r i c i s t doc-

trines "... teach t h a t t h e t r a n s i t i o n from t h e realm of necessity i n which mankind

a t present s u f f e r s t o t h e realm of freedom and reason cannot be brought about by

reason but - miraculously - only by harsh necessity by t h e blind and inexorable

laws of h i s t o r i c a l development, t o which they counsel us t o submit. 113' On t h e

b a s i s of one quotation from t h e preface t o Capital he then took Marx a s a repre-

s e n t a t i o n of t h i s theory.

"when a s o c i e t y has discovered t h e n a t u r a l law t h a t determines i t s own move-

ment, even then it can neither overleap t h e n a t u r a l phases of i t s evolution,
nor s h u f f l e them out of t h e world by a stroke of t h e pen. But t h i s much it
can do: it can saorten and l e s s e n t h e birth-pangs. This formulation, due t o
Marx, e x c e l l e n t l y represents the h i s t o r i c i s t position. "40

Taking t h i s a s , t h a t i s , making it i n t o a tenet of historicism, r a t h e r than a

phrase a t one stage of t h e development of Marxl s thought Popper believed he

had exposed a l o g i c a l contradiction between t h e "peculiar v a r i e t y of fatalism"42

and what he c a l l e d t h e " a c t i v i s t exhortation" of historicism. He took another

quotation from Marx; t h e statement t h a t "The philosophers have only jnterpreted

t h e world i n d i f f e r e n t ways: t h e point, however, i s t o channe it ..."43 and, on

t h e b a s i s of t h e f a t a l i s m he e a r l i e r a t t r i b u t e d t o Marx, r e i n t e r p r e t e d t h e s t a t e -

ment t o mean: h he h i s t o r i c i s t can only i n t e r p r e t s o c i a l development and a i d it

i n various ways; h i s point, however, i s t h a t nobody can change it. I144

Here we see t h e p e r i l of a formal, academic approach t o c r i t i c i s m . Popper

talked about "a pure h i s t o r i c i s t " and "the c o n s i s t e n t historicist",lC5 a s though any

attempt t o make s o c i a l events i n t e l l i g i b l e must be a p e r f e c t , l o g i c a l l y c o n s i s t e n t ,

a b s t r a c t model. I n f a c t , h i s c r e a t i o n of a pure, c o n s i s t e n t h i s t o r i c i s m served h i s

own purposes: t h a t of presenting h i s ideological o r i e n t a t i o n i n t h e language of

logic. It i n no way provided a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h e sociology of Marx.

I n t h e Thesis on Feuerbach, t h e r e a r e statements t h a t make it abundantly

c l e a r t h a t Marx was not a f a t a l i s t . There he talked of how " p r a c t i c a l - c r i t i c a l

w

a c t i v i t y " i s t h e b a s i s of s c i e n t i f i c problem solving. His eighth point i s worth

quoting:

" ~ ls l
o c i a l l i f e i s e s s e n t i a l l y p r a c t i c a l . A l l t h e mysteries which urge
theory i n t o mysticism f i n d t h e i r r a t i o n a l s o l u t i o n i n human p r a c t i c e
and i n t h e comprehension of t h i s practice. "46

From t h i s it i s q u i t e c l e a r t h a t Marx did not see f a t a l i s t i c laws as t h e f o r c e

of history. It i s possible f o r people t o i n t e r p r e t some statements from Marx's

l a t t e r work, where h i s hypotheses about h i s t o r l c a l materialism were nore thor-

oughly developed, i n such a vulgar way. And vulgar marxism has been rampant

s i n c e t h e S t a l l n i s t counter-revolution i n t h e Soviet Union. But no where did

Marx t a l k of having "... t o submit t o t h e e x i s t i n g laws of development, j u s t a s

 I

we have t o submit t o t h e law of g r a ~ i t y . " ~ 7Popper's manufactured c r i t i q u e of

Marx, rooted i n h l s f o r m a l i s t i c approach t o c r i t i c i s m and l o g i c , stands i n sharp

c o n t r a s t t o S a r t r e l s pragmatic and progressive c r i t i c i s m of vulgar marxism.

I n concluding t h e second p a r t of h i s study, Popper s t a t e d t h a t It... from

t h e standpoint of h i s t o r y , though not of l o g i c , methodologies a r e usually by-

products of philosophical views. ltb7 This i s an absurd statement. History and

l o g i c were placed i n d i f f e r e n t realms, yet methodology r e l a t e d t o both. How can

t h i s be? It i s impossible t o s p l i t a stlldy of logic from a study of h i s t o r y once

t h e relevance of ideology t o logic is acknowledged. Popper's mis-handling of t h e

soclology of knowledge r e l a t e d t o t h e polemical uses t o which he put h i s formal

logic. I n c r e a t i n g an a b s t r a c t i o n c a l l e d "historicism", and under t h e pretense

of dealing with h i s t o r i c i s m "only i n so f a r a s it i s a doctrine of method,49 t h e

ideological underpinnings of Popper's own c r e a t i o n were obscured. But with h i s

c r i t i c i s m s of h i s c r e a t i o n "historicism" they begin t o become e x p l i c i t .

Criticisms of Anti-Naturalist Historicism: 1 - Scientism and Historicism

Popper began h i s c r i t i c i s m of a n t i - n a t u r a l i s t h i s t o r i c i s m with a discus-

s i o n of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between theory and practice. He argued t h a t he more

f r u i t f u l debates on method a r e always inspired by c e r t a i n p r a c t i c a l problems ...

and nearly a l l debates on method which a r e not so inspired a r e characterized by

t h a t atmosphere of f u t i l e s u b t l e t y which has brought methodology i n t o disrepute

with t h e p r a c t i c a l research worker. 1t50 On t h e b a s i s of t h i s statement, he then

developed h i s "technological approach t o sociology". This approach r e s t e d on

".., an analogy between t h e methods of t h e s o c i a l and t h e n a t u r a l sciences .. .'151

But it was not t o be "a dogmatic methodological naturalism" or what Popper c a l l e d

 ,

"scientism". 52 Hather i t i s an analogy t h a t s t r e s s e d t h e "... fundamental simi-

l a r i t y between t h e n a t u r a l and t h e s o c i a l sciences. II 53

Awareness of t h i s fundamental s i m i l a r i t y can be a challenge t o scientism.

Scientism, t o Popper, was "... t h e i m i t a t i o n of what c e r t a i n people m-lstake f o r

t h e method and language of science. "54 As he said: "... we can hardly o f f e r a

stronger argument against these dogmatic n a t u r a l i s t s than one t h a t shows t h a t

some of t h e methods they a t t a c k a r e fundamentally t h e same a s t h e methods used

i n t h e n a t u r a l sciences. I1 55

The "pursuit of t h e analogy between n a t u r a l and s o c i a l science"56 was

Popper's s t r a t e g y f o r attacking t h e h i s t o r i c i s t l s b e l i e f i n h o l i s t i c or "utopian

engineering". It was t h e way he developed h i s argument f o r what he c a l l e d "piece-

meal tinkering" with s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . It i s a s t r a t e g y t h a t combined two sep-

a r a t e issues: f i r s t , a s p e c i f i c analogy between t h e n a t u r a l and s o c i a l sciences;

and, second, a "theory" about the nature of s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . The two must be

d e a l t with separately t o avoid confusion. Such a separation exposes t h e f a l l a c y

i n Popperls thought.

Popper's view of s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s was shown by t h e following statexlent:

"The term ' s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n 1 i s used here i n a very wide sense, t o include

bodies of a p r i v a t e a s well a s of a public character. Thus I s h a l l use it
t o describe a business, whether it i s a small shop o r an insurance company,
and likewise a school, or an 'educational system1, or a police f o r c e , or a
Church, or a law court. "57

This i s a formal concept without any h i s t o r i c a l reference or s o c i a l analysis.

Popper's claim 'I.. . t h a t t h e technological approach i s q u i t e independent of a l l

questions of 1 0 r i g i n ~ "does
~ ~ not i n v a l i d a t e t h e need t o know, i n a specif i c way,

t h e h i s t o r i c a l development of i n s t i t u t i o n s t o understand how they function. With-

out t h i s kind of knowledge one ends up with an a b s t r a c t functionalism t h a t approxi-

mates t h e essentialism ( " s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s " ) t h a t Popper e a r l i e r t r i e d t o

a s s o c i a t e with h i s t o r i c i s m and marxism.

Popper contrasted h i s piecemeal t i n k e r i n g with t h e " h o l i s t i c " view of

s o c i a l science t h a t he a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e h i s t o r i c i s t s . He argued t h a t t h e whole,

i. e. , society a s a whole, "... can never be t h e object of s c i e n t i f i c inquiry. 1159

Instead

" I f we wish t o study a thing, we a r e bound t o s e l e c t c e r t a i n aspects of

it. It i s not possible forus t o observe o r t o describe a whole piece of
t h e world or a whole piece of nature 1160 ...
The h i s t o r i c i s t s , who, f o r Popper, saw t h e t a s k of s o c i a l science a s developing

h i s t o r i c a l laws t o explain and predict changes i n t h e whole society, have there-

f o r e taken on a n impossible task. So "... i n p r a c t i c e they always f a l l back on

a somewhat haphazard and clumsy although ambitious and r u t h l e s s a p p l i c a t i o n of

what i s e s s e n t i a l l y a piecemeal method without i t s cautious and s e l f - c r i t i c a l

character. 1161

We need t o look a t Popper's view of methodology i n t h e n a t u r a l sciences

t o see how h i s piecemeal or technological s o c i a l science r e l a t e d t o h i s b e l i e f i n

t h e u n i t y of method of a l l science. Our a n a l y s i s of t h e f o u r t h and l a s t s e c t i o n

of h i s study w i l l b e s t allow us t o do t h i s . For now, i t i s important t o note t h a t

Popper defined t h e a n t i - n a t u r a l i s t h i s t o r i c i s m a s "utopian"; a s wanting t o grasp

t h e whole development of society, and t o "... c o n t r o l a l l , or rnearlyl a l l , these

relationships ..."62 And he saw t h i s a s a " l o g i c a l impossibility"63 rooted i n a

misunderstanding of t h e s c i e n t i f i c method.

Popper described t h e s c i e n t i f i c method as:

"we t r y ; t h a t i s , we do not merely r e g i s t e r an observation, but make

a c t i v e attempts t o solve some more or l e s s p r a c t i c a l and d e f i n i t e
problems. And we make progress i f , and only i f , we a r e prepared t o
 l e a r n from our mistakes: t o recognize our e r r o r s and t o u t i l i z e them
c r i t i c a l l y instead of persevering i n them dogmatically. Though t h i s
a n a l y s i s may sound t r i v i a l , it describes, I believe, t h e method of
a l l empirical sciences."64

According t o Popper, t h e h o l i s t view of s o c i a l science f a i l e d t o understand "...

t h a t a l l knowledge, whether i n t u i t i v e or discursive, must be of a b s t r a c t aspects,

and t h a t we can never grasp t h e 'concrete s t r u c t u r e of s o c i a l r e a l i t y i t s e l f I. 1r65

2 - Popper's P o l i t i c s

This c r i t i c i s m of what Popper c a l l e d "holism" i s j u s t i f i e d . Any approach

t o s o c i a l science t h a t seeks t o understand h i s t o r i c a l laws and t o c o n t r o l a l l

s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s implied by them i s not only dogmatic, but psychotic. Such a

so-called " s o c i a l science'' would be c l o s e r t o theological thought than pragmatic,

empirical thought. But Popper was implying more than t h i s general c r i t i q u e of

scientism. For one thing, h i s own p o l i t i c s pervaded h i s argument. When he wrote

that the h i s t o r i c i s t s "... t e l l us t h a t we a r e forced ... t o r e g u l a t e t h e whole

of s o c i a l l i f e ..."and t h a t this "... i s merely a t y p i c a l attempt t o t h r e a t e n us

with ' h i s t o r i c a l f o r c e s 1 and 'impending developments1 .. t h e r e i s a touch of

anti-communist paranoia implied. Who a r e t h e h i s t o r i c i s t s t h a t want t o do t h i s ?

Popper admitted t h a t "historicism" i s h i s p e r f e c t theory. Yet he c l e a r l y saw

"them" a s a p o l i t i c a l enemy. I n t h i s regard h i s methodological discussion seems

t o be more a polemic than a committed attempt t o c l a r i f y problems i n logic. Since

Popper's ideological o r i e n t a t i o n was i m p l i c i t , not e x p l i c % t , i n h i s discussion he

f a i l e d t o connect t h e problem of logic t o t h e problem of ideology.

I f Popper had been more s p e c i f i c i n h i s polemic, some of h i s more valuable

ideas might have been b e t t e r a r t i c u l a t e d . For example, when he s t a t e d t h a t : he

h o l i s t i c planner overlooks t h e f a c t t h a t it i s easy t o c e n t r a l i z e power but impos-

s i b l e t o c e n t r a l i z e a l l t h a t knowledge which i s d i s t r i b u t e d over many individual

 I

minds, and whose ceni;ralization would be necessary f o r t h e wise wiefding of

c e n t r a l i z e d power,"67 he was touching on t h e important r e l a t i o n s h i p of p o l i t i c a l

power and s o c i a l knowledge which g r e a t l y underlies t h e problem of ideology. In

a footnote, he speculated on t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p a s follows: "... t h e progress of

science depends on f r e e competition of thought, hence on freedom of thought, and

hence, ultimately, on p o l i t i c a l freedom. 1168 I n c o n t r a s t t o Popper, however,

Bronowski made t h i s matter (discussed i n Chapter Twelve) c e n t r a l t o h i s approach

t o logic. Because of h i s f o r m 1 approach t o l o g i c , t h e r e l a t i o n between p o l i t i c s

and science was only of a secondary importance t o Popper. He was more concerned

with building a polemic against t h e p o l i t i c s with which he disagreed than with

analyzing how p o l i t i c s and science generally i n t e r r e l a t e .

Popperls concern about c e n t r a l i z e d power c e r t a i n l y a p p l i e s t o ~ t a l i n i s t

communism ( i n c o n t r a s t t o s o c i a l i s t humanism) and t o corporate capitalism. 69 In

both systems those with power make policy decisions a f f e c t i n g t h e mass of people

without r e a l knowledge about t h e many consequences. This does not mean t h a t they

don't achieve t h e s p e c i f i c consequences ( e. g., prof it, c o n t r o l , etc. ) t h a t concern

them, but t h i s i s not t h e same a s considering t h e many consequences. For example,

i n both cases, t h e people a r e without s e l f -determination, i.e. , r e a l c o n t r o l over

t h e decisions t h a t a f f e c t them. Had Popper discussed, s p e c i f i c a l l y , how and why

t h i s happens, and gone on t o propose more l i b e r a t i n g ways of r e l a t i n g power and

knowledge, h i s point might have been of some value. As it stands, h i s blanket

a s s o c i a t i o n of historicism, marxism and S t a l i n i s t communism i s a poor polemic

based on a poor argument. Because of h i s f a i l u r e t o deal with h i s own ideology,

under t h e pretense of being a value-free logician, Popper ended up being "ideolog-

i c a l " i n a crude, non-intellectual way.

 I

3 - A P r i o r i Arguments and Scientism

Popper went on t o c r i t i c i z e the h i s t o r i c i s t ' s belief t h a t ". .. s o c i a l

experiments a r e useless because it i s impossible t o repeat them under precisely

s i m i l a r conditions. '170 He argued t h a t t h i s "... conterkion r e s t s upon a gross

misunderstanding of t h e experimental methods of physics. 11 71

He wrote t h a t he s t r i k i n g differences with which the h i s t o r i c i s t is so

much preoccupied, t h a t i s t o say, t h e differences between t h e conditions prevalent

i n various h i s t o r i c a l periods, need not c r e a t e any d i f f i c u l t i e s peculiar t o s o c i a l

sclence. "72 This i s t h e case because t h e It... physicist knows t h a t very dissimilar

things may happen under what appear t o be precisely similar conditions. "73 There-

fore, t h e t a s k of a n experiment i s "... t o f i n d what kind o f s i m i l a r i t y i s relevant

and what degree of s i m i l a r i t y s u f f i c i e n t . 1'74 Popper declared t h a t "It i s impossible

t o decide a p r i o r i about any observed difference or s i m i l a r i t y , however s t r i k i n g ,

whether o r not it w i l l be relevant f o r the purpose o f reproducing an experiment. ,,75

If one i s consistent i n h i s o r her r e j e c t i o n of a p r i o r i analysis, t h i s

w i l l lead t o a pragmatic understanding of logic and of knowledge generally. To

t h e extent t h a t he did t h i s , we a r e i n agreement with Popper. A mystified under-

standing o f n a t u r a l science, which we c r i t i c i z e d i n Chapter Six, d e f i n i t e l y i s

t h e b a s i s of much of the a n t i - n a t u r a l i s t tendencies among s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s . But

a s before it i s Popper's misuse of t h i s point t o build an a p r i o r i , a n t i - h i s t o r i -

c i s t case t h a t demands our criticism. We can accept t h a t sclence, a s an approach,

i s not fundamentally d i f f e r e n t f o r t h e study of society than f o r the study of so-

c a l l e d nature. I n both areas, science a c t s a s a human tool.

As we saw with Durkheim, t h e r e i s t h e danger of making the analogy between

t h e natural and s o c i a l sciences i n t o a r a t i o n a l e f o r conservatism, and, i f t h i s i s

pushed, i n t o one f o r authoritarianism. The f a c t t h a t science can be used a s a

t o o l f o r many d i f f e r e n t ends often g e t s forgotten and t h e dominant, contemporary

use of science g e t s mystified. C r i t i c i ~ mi s l o s t and t h e "authority" of science

and t h e established p o l i t i c a l system become t h e b a s i s of b e l i e f i n it. This i s

what Bronowskils pragmatic view of science pointed out. Though Popper warned us

against t h i s "scientism", h i s own p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n of h i s t o r i c i s m and h i s poor

polemic against it cloaked over t h i s general and important problem. For example,

about t h e h i s t o r i c i s t t s skepticism about t h e human's a b i l i t y t o adapt t o new "be-

wildering condl"tionsn, Popper s a i d "Such f e a r s seem t o me p a r t of t h e h i s t o r i c i s t

hysteria - t h e obsession with t h e importance of s o c i a l change ...e76 It i s not

easy t o see what t h e point is, though h i s d i s l i k e f o r "historicism" i s clear.

Popper c e r t a i n l y was not dealing with t h e problem of s c i e n t i f i c and s o c i a l s t a s i s

and change i n an i n t e l l e c t u a l manner.

Popper's discussion progressed t o t h e important question: a r e generaliza-

t i o n s confined t o h i s t o r i c a l periods? It is t h i s s o r t of question t h a t makes t h e

sociology of knowledge t h e s i s and hence t h e problem of ideology relevant t o t h e

discussion of logic. Though Popper f a i l e d t o understand t h e implications of h i s

own question, my own discussion can draw them out.

F i r s t , Popper s t a t e d t h a t he did not believe t h a t "... observations and

experiments a r e ... l o g i c a l l y p r i o r t o theories. "77 He continued "... t h a t
t h e o r i e s a r e p r i o r t o observation a s well a s experiments, i n t h e sense t h a t t h e

l a t t e r a r e s i g n i f i c a n t only i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e o r e t i c a l problems. n78 He c l e a r l y

r e j e c t e d t h e idea of induction a s a general theory of logic. As he said: "I do

not believe, therefore, i n t h e 'method of g e n e r a l i z a t i o n t , t h a t i s t o say, i n t h e

view t h a t science begins with observations from which it derives i t s t h e o r i e s by

 - 293 -
I

some process of generalization o r induction. I1 79

But Popper avoided t h e important question: where do our t h e o r i e s come

from?; o r , b e t t e r stated: what experience shapes t h e nature of our theories?

Instead of discussing t h i s , he jumped t o two r e l a t e d "conclusions" t h a t prove

t o be unargued assumptions. F i r s t , he said: "... t h e h i s t o r i c i s t overrates

t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e somewhat spectacular d i f f e r e n c e s between various his-

t o r i c a l periods ..."80 and, second, he said: "... t h e r e seems no reason why

we should be unable t o frame sociological t h e o r i e s which a r e important f o r a l l

s o c i a l periods. lt8' Clearly t h i s is a matter f o r inquiry. It is not enough t o

s t a t e t h e s e points and b u i l d an argument from it. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , i n doing t h i s ,

Popper approached h i s own historicism. Though he saw laws rooted i n t h e o r e t i c a l

sociology i n a pragmatic way, he s t i l l ended up believing i n an essentialism and

a kind of h i s t o r i c i s t philosophy. For instance, he wrote t h a t "... t h e s i g n i f i-

cance of t h e a l l e g e d changes of human nature i s dubious, and very hard t o as-

sess. 1 can agree with t h e l a t t e r p a r t of t h e statement, but t h e f i r s t p a r t

suggests t h a t Popper's a n t i - h i s t o r i c i s m r e f l e c t s h i s allegiance t o t h e established

order more than a commitment t o c l a r i f y i n g t h e l o g i c a l problems involved i n evalu-

a t i n g s o c i a l events.

It i s indeed d i f f i c u l t t o begin t o disentangle ideology from logic i n

Popper. His part-polemic against h i s t o r i c i s m and p a r t - c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h e

analogy between t h e n a t u r a l and s o c i a l sciences did not lead t o a c l e a r statement

of problems. Instead it leads t o a premature statement of b e l i e f . Though he re-

jected scientism, he ended up with a view of science t h a t can e a s i l y t u r n i n t o

t h i s doctrine.

To show t h i s , l e t us look a t Popper's statement t h a t

 ",.. it i s an important postulate of scientific methodology t h a t we should
search f o r laws with an unlimited realm of vali'dity. I f we were t o admit
laws t h a t a r e themselves subject t o change, charge could never be explain-
ed by laws.n83

F i r s t , according t o t h i s , science has an a p r i o r i postulate; something t h a t

e a s i l y leads t o t h e u n c r i t i c a l approach t y p i c a l of scientism. And, second, whlle

I accept t h a t t h e notion of "law" i s useful i n anchoring observations and i n t e r -

pretations - i n guiding inquiry - t h e laws do not have t o be placed outside inquiry.

This, a l s o t y p i c a l of 'scientism, i s what Popperts statement implies. His c r i t i c i s m

of scientism, utopianism and h i s t o r i c i s m ended up with a s many a p r i o r i e s a s he

a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e doctrines around which he b u i l t h i s own case.

C r i t i c i s m of Pro-Naturalistic Historicism: 1 - Laws, Trends and Causes

Popper continued h i s discussion of laws i n t h e s o c i a l sciences by c r i t i -

c i z i n g p r o - n a t u r a l i s t i c historicism. From it, we can gleam some i n s i g h t s , but an

overriding confusion prevailed. Popper f i r s t lumped p r o - n a t u r a l i s t i c h i s t o r i c i s m

i n t o t h e category of "scientism". Since I have already suggested t h a t Popperts

thought process could lead t o a form of scientism, we must be more c a r e f u l with

t h e term. It is worth considering t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t since "historicism" i s

Popperts " p e r f e c t theory", t h e scientism he a t t r i b u t e s t o "it" could a l s o be h i s

own. Because formal logic takes statements out of t h e i r i n i t i a l context and, i n

t h i s sense, nurtures an e c l e c t i c form of c r i t i c i s m , it i s easy f o r a t h e o r i s t u t i -

l i z i n g t h i s method t o prboject h i s or her own ideas i n t o t h e argument of those being

criticized. Real t h e o r e t i c a l dialogue i s impossible unless t h e l o g i c a l categories

being used a r e e x p l i c i t l y r e l a t e d t o t h e ideological o r i e n t a t i o n of an author.

 Popper argued t h a t a b e l i e f i n a law of evolution underlay pro-haturalis-

t i c historicism. He wrote t h a t " ~ n d e e d ,t h e recent vogue of historicism might be

regarded a s merely p a r t of t h e vogue of evolutionism - a philosophy t h a t owes i t s

influence l a r g e l y t o t h e somewhat sensational c l a s h between a b r i l l i a n t s c i e n t i f i c

hypothesis concerning t h e h i s t o r y of t h e various species of animals and plants on

e a r t h , and a n older metaphysical theory which, i n c i d e n t a l l y , happened t o be p a r t

of a n established r e l i g i o u s Then, again t r e a t i n g theory i n a quasi-

pragmatic fashion, he argued t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between hypotheses and laws must

be kept c l e a r i f we a r e t o avoid such metaphysical b e l i e f s about science: "...

t h e f a c t t h a t a l l laws of nature a r e hypotheses must not d i s t r a c t our a t t e n t i o n

from t h e f a c t t h a t not a l l hypotheses a r e laws, and t h a t more especially h i s t o r i -

c a l hypotheses a r e , a s a r u l e , not universal but singular statements about one in-

dividual event, or a number of such events. "85 On t h e b a s i s of t h i s , he rejected

t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of any evolutionary law. h he idea t h a t any concrete sequence or

succession of events ... can be described or explained by any one law, or by any

one d e f i n i t e s e t of laws, is simply mistaken. 1186

Popper continued by warning us t h a t t a u t o l o g i c a l thought can r e s u l t from

a confusion of laws and hypotheses: 'I... once we believe i n a law of r e p e t i t i v e

life-cycles - a belief a r r i v e d a t by analogical speculations, or perhaps inherited

from Plato - we a r e s u r e t o discover h i s t o r i c a l confirmation of it nearly every-

where. "87 Here, Popper r a i s e d a question t h a t ultimately takes us t o t h e problem

of ideology. The important question i s how such a b e l i e f i n universals a s r e a l i -

t i e s , r a t h e r than a s pragmatic notions, develops? What form of s o c i a l i z a t i o n and

t r a i n i n g underlies such b e l i e f s ? The f a c t t h a t Popper d i d n ' t concern himself with

t h i s implication does not a l t e r t h e f a c t t h a t h i s own statement can lead t o such a

quest ion.
 - 296 -
I

Popper continued by discussing t h e confusion t h a t r e s u l t s from using

notions from physics i n sociology. For example, t h e idea of laws of motion i n

physics does "... not intend to imply t h a t t h e body o r system i n question under-

goes any i n t e r n a l o r s t r u c t u r a l change, but only t h a t it charges i t s p o s i t i o n

r e l a t i v e t o some ( a r b i t r a r i l y chosen) system of co-ordinates. I?* Yet, according

t o Popper, i n sociology t h e idea is o f t e n used t o imply a law by which a s t r u c t u r a l

change occurs. For him, t h i s was a form of metaphysical thinking and he concluded

t h a t "Since t h e r e is no motion of s o c i e t y i n any sense s i m i l a r o r analogous t o

motion of physical bodies, t h e r e can be no such laws. ,I 89

This l i n e of argument has several implications. One i s t h a t a d i r e c t

analogy between t h e n a t u r a l and s o c i a l sciences i s inadequate. Rather than con-

cluding t h a t t h e r e can be no evolutionary or h i s t o r i c a l laws, one could argue t h a t

t h e notion of laws has a d i f f e r e n t function i n t h e two realms of subject matter.

This does not n e c e s s a r i l y lead t o a scientism or t o t h e kind of h i s t o r i c i s m Popper

articulated. It can lead t o a use of universals a s anchors f o r t h e study of s o c i a l

events. We must consider t h e r a d i c a l proposal t h a t t h e universals could be values;

c r i t i c a l judgments about human s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s t h a t would a f f e c t t h e c l a s s of prob-

lems with which s o c i a l science deals. Our discussion of B e r l i n ' s approach t o t h e

problem of ideology i n Chapter Seven already r a i s e d t h i s point.

The other consideration i s t h a t basing an argument about laws of change

on an analogy between t h e n a t u r a l and s o c i a l sciences i s i t s e l f deceptive. Though

t h e logic involved i n an experiment i n t h e n a t u r a l and s o c i a l sciences may be simi-

l a r (e.g., assessing arguments i n a l l t h e i r implications) t h e "subject matters" a r e

not. Thus, though no experiments nor laws l i k e t h a t In physics a r e possible i n

sociology, " a r b i t r a r i l y chosen" values (comparable t o a r b i t r a r i l y chosen "points" )

by which t o evaluate " i n t e r n a l and s t r u c t u r a l " changes i n a s o c i a l system could

function t o e s t a b l i s h "laws". And i n a way similar t o how the natural s c i e n t i s t

changes experimental conditions i n an attempt t o c r e a t e and/or f i n d a hypothesized

relationship, s o the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t could be involved i n such "experimenting".

The conservative s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t may use techniques t o help t o keep the social

system close t o the values of t h e s t a t u s quo. The r a d i c a l may use techniques t o

t r y t o change the system t o be closer t o other values. The f o r m and content of

t h e knowledge of t h e t w o w i l l obviously be different.

Can revolutionary analysis and s t r a t e g y i t s e l f be seen a s an experimental

"technique"? Once a r i g i d analogy between t h e natural and s o c i a l sciences (wheth-

e r of a " s c i e n t i s t i c " or formal kind) i s rejected, t h i s idea becomes credible.

Popper "solved" the dilemma r e s u l t i n g from h i s formal analogy between the

natural and s o c i a l sciences with the d i s t i n c t i o n between "trends" and "laws". He

wrote t h a t "A statement a s s e r t i n g t h e existence of a trend i s e x i s t e n t i a l , not uni-

versal ... (while) a universal law, on t h e other hand, does not a s s e r t existence

... Within Popperls logic, a universal " a s s e r t s t h e impossibility of something

or other". 'l Popper considered " e x i s t e n t i a l " statements t o be metaphysical i n the

sense of being unscientific. For him "... a l l knowledge, whether i n t u i t i v e o r

discursive, must be of a b s t r a c t aspects, and t h a t we can never grasp the 'concrete

structure o f social reality i t s e l f ' . "'* For him any belief i n such "concrete know-

ledge of ' r e a l i t y i t s e l f ' " was a form of " m y s t i ~ i s m " . ' ~

For Popper, the confusion of trends and laws underlay most of the e r r o r s

i n doctrines of historicism. I n h i s words: here i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t the habit

of confusing trends with laws, together with the i n t u i t i v e observation of trends

( such a s technical progress ) , inspired the c e n t r a l doctrines of evolut ionism and

 I

historicism - t h e ductrlnes of t h e inexorable laws of biological evolution and of

t h e i r r e v e r s i b l e laws of motion of society. "94 A misunderstanding of t h e charac-

t e r of causal explanation a l s o r e l a t e d t o t h i s confusion. Popper described "cause"

i n t h e following way: "1 suggest t h a t t o give a causal explanation of a c e r t a i n

s ~ e c i f i cevent means deducing a statement describing t h i s event from t w o kinds of

premises: from some universal laws, and from some singular or s p e c i f i c statements

which we may c a l l t h e s p e c i f i c i n i t i a l conditions. "95 He continued: " ~ h u swe have

two d i f f e r e n t c o n s t i t u e n t s , two d i f f e r e n t kinds of statements which together y i e l d

a complete causal explanation: (1)Universal statements of t h e character of nat-

u r a l laws; and ( 2 ) s p e c i f i c statements pertaining t o t h e s p e c i a l case i n question,

c a l l e d t h e ' i n i t i a l conditionst. "96 From t h e former, we "... can deduce, with

t h e help of t h e i n i t i a l conditions ..."a " s p e c i f i c statement" which "we may a l s o

c a l l a s p e c i f i c prognosis". And he i n i t i a l conditions ( or more precisely, t h e

s i t u a t i o n described by them) a r e usually spoken of a s t h e cause of t h e event i n

question, and t h e prognosis ( o r r a t h e r t h e event described by t h e prognosis) a s

the effect ... 97

I1

Popper made two conclusions from t h i s precise understanding of cause.

They again show Popper's quasi-pragmatic view of science. F i r s t , he said: "...

we can never speak of cause and e f f e c t i n an absolute way, but must say t h a t an

event i s a cause of another event - i t s effect - i n r e l a t i o n t o some universal

law. "98 It i s important t o note t h a t a b e l i e f i n absolute causes, rooted i n an

ignorance of t h e character of science, underlies what we have c a l l e d scientism.

The f a i l u r e t o deal with t h e problem of ideology, or i t s implications f o r l o g i c ,

grows from t h i s b e l i e f i n absolute causes. Popper did not conclude t h i s , though

it i s consistent with h i s view of "causet1.

 Popper's second point was t h a t It. .. t h e use of a theory f o r p r e d i c t i n g
some s p e c i f i c event i s j u s t another aspect of i t s use f o r explain3ng such an

event". And, a s he s a i d , It... whether we use a theory f o r t h e purpose of ex-

planation, of prediction, o r of t e s t i n g , depends upon our i n t e r e s t ...'199 For

our purposes, t h e t h i n g t o note is t h a t theory has a pragmatic value and not an

e s s e n t i a l t r u t h or falsehood. As Popper said: " ~ h e o r i e sthus cannot contain

e i t h e r t r u e or f a l s e information; they a r e nothing but instruments, s i n c e they

can only be convenient or inconvenient, economical or uneconomical, supple and

s u b t l e , o r e l s e creaking and crude. 1,100

Popper's formalism, linked t o h i s ignorance of how t h e problem of ide-

ology established problems f o r l o g i c , l e d him t o neglect one v i t a l problem about

s c i e n t i f i c theory. Take t h i s statement: "... t h e formulation of t h e universal

law which we t r y t o explain has t o incorporate a l l t h e conditions of i t s v a l i d i t y ,

s i n c e otherwise we cannot a s s e r t it u n i v e r s a l l y ..."Io1 NOW, i f we must incor-

porate a l l t h e conditions underlying t h e v a l i d i t y of a law, we must, ultimately,

account f o r t h e way values and ideology a f f e c t t h e c l a s s of problems with which

we a r e dealing. The p o l i t i c a l context t h a t underlies t h e p r i o r i t i e s of research

must be taken i n t o account since t h e relevance of some problems over others i s

rooted i n t h i s . TG ignore t h i s I s t o imply t h a t a "universal" has an a p r i o r i

q u a l i t y , which is what Popper's logic supposedly argued against.

Popper avoidcd t h i s question by saying, i n a f o r m a l i s t i c way, t h a t It. ..

t h e causal explanation of a r e g u l a r i t y c o n s i s t s i n t h e deduction of a law (con-

t a i n i n g t h e conditions under which t h e r e g u l a r i t y a s s e r t e d holds) from a s e t of

more general laws which have been t e s t e d and coMirmed independently. "Io2 This
 - 300 -
I

just pushes t h e problem f u r t h e r back and, i n t h e process, obscures it. What

establishes the relevance o f "these more general laws ... t e s t e d independently"

f o r the problem a t hand? I n Kuhn's words, they c o n s t i t u t e a paradigm, and, a s

we have argued, t h e r e is a n analogy between the c l a s s of problems (and laws)

constituting a paradigm and the way ideology a f f e c t s s c i e n t i f i c research.

From h i s discussion of laws, trends and causes, Popper concluded t h a t

'I.. . h i s t o r i c i s t s overlook the dependency of trends on i n i t i a l conditions. "

They thus ".,.believe t h a t these tendencies ( t r e n d s ) can be immediately derived

from universal laws alone ... He concluded t h a t
"lo3

"This ...
i s t h e c e n t r a l mistake of historicism. I t s 'laws of develov-
mentl t u r n out t o be absolute trends; trends which, l i k e laws, d o not
depend on i n i t i a l conditions, and which carry us i r r e s i s t i b l y i n a
c e r t a i n d i r e c t i o n i n t o t h e future. They a r e t h e basis of uncondition-
a l provhecies a s opposed t o conditional s c i e n t i f i c predictions. 11 104

Were Popper t o have tackled t h e problems of ideology I have outlined, he might

have seen t h a t h i s own use of t h i s conclusion r e f l e c t e d a n ideological o r i e n t a t i o n

and, i n addition, implied i n t e l l e c t u a l problems t h a t make logic i n the s o c i a l

sciences more complicatedlo5 than he has suggested.

When Popper s t a t e d t h a t "... we have a l l t h e time t o t r y t o imagine con-

d i t i o n s under which t h e trend i n question would disappear, 'Io6 he showed t h a t he

was unaware of t h i s deeper l e v e l of problems. He argued t h a t t h i s use o f imagina-

tion l'... i s j u s t what t h e h i s t o r i c i s t cannot do."107 He s t a t e d that t h e h i s t o r i -

cist "...cannot imagine a change i n the conditions of change. '1108 y e t , with h i s

own conservative commitments, Popper could be c r i t i c i z e d f o r t h i s lack. Imagina-

t i o n d e f i n i t e l y has something t o do with t h e awareness t h a t t h e r e a r e not absolute

causes. It can a l s o be argued t h a t imagination and a commitment t o work f o r condi-

t i o n s t h a t f u l f i l l an imagined potential leads t o a r a d i c a l s o c i a l science. This

 I

presents a problem f o r s o c i a l science t h a t no amount of formal logic or r e l a t e d

polemics can abolish. It takes us r i g h t back t o t h e question of "utopia" and

thus shows t h a t a d i f f e r e n t handling of utopian (which Popper r e l a t e d t o his-

t o r i c i s m ) than t h a t of Popper is required.lo9

2 - Hypothetical-Deductive Models and Individualism

We now come t o a summary statement of Popper's logic: what he c a l l e d

t h e "hypothetical-deductive method". I s h a l l now show t h i s conceptualization

of logic i s not adequate once (and i f ) t h e basic problems I have r a i s e d a r e

acknowledged. Popper summarized h i s method a s follows: he methods always

c o n s i s t i n o f f e r i n g deductive causal explanations, and i n t e s t i n g them (by way

o f p r e d i c t i o n s ) . ttl10 By t e s t i n g a theory, Popper meant applying what is some-

times c a l l e d t h e " n u l l hypothesis". A prognosis i s compared with experimental

r e s u l t s or some other form of observation. "~greementwith them i s taken a s

corroboration of t h e hypothesis though not a s f i n a l proof; c l e a r disagreement

i s considered a s r e f u t a t i o n or f a l s i f i c a t i o n . "'11 This emphasis on r e f u t i n g o r

n u l l i f y i n g a hypothesis r e l a t e s t o t h e r e j e c t i o n of absolute causes and demands

comparisons before any v a l i d i t y i s assumed. As Popper said:

"only i f we cannot f a l s i f y them i n s p i t e of our best e f f o r t s can we say

t h a t they have stood up t o severe t e s t s . This i s t h e reason why t h e
discovery of instances which confirm a theory means very l i t t l e i f we
have not t r i e d , and f a i l e d , t o discover r e f u t a t i o n s . I ' l l 2

Taken i n a formal way, t h i s method sounds convincing. But it leaves

unanswered, l e t alone unasked, questions t h a t a f f e c t t h e v a l i d i t y of methodology.

For example, what a r e t h e o r i g i n s of our theories? Popper's hypothetical-deductive

method t r e a t e d t h i s question a s i r r e l e v a n t t o methodology. He s p l i t t h e study of

t h e o r i g i n of a theory from t h e t e s t i n g of a theory. The former, he wrote,

If.. . r e l a t e s ... t o an e n t i r e l y p r i v a t e matter. 11113

We have already commented on Popper's s u p e r f i c i a l treatment of t h e

sociology of knowledge. This separation of t h e o r i f f i n s of problems, methods ,

and t h e o r i e s from t h e t e s t i n g of a problem and theory by a c e r t a i n method a l -

lows a tautology t o operate within a c l a s s of problems. Unless t h e o r i g i n of

t h e method i t s e l f i s studied, r a t h e r than assumed t o be " s c i e n t i f i c " (which is

what is t y p i c a l ) , t h e word "science" (which has a powerful, magical q u a l i t y )

cloaks over t h e problem of ideology. Unless t h e r e l a t i o n between problems,

methods and t h e o r i e s is studied, a l l can become t r e a t e d i n an a p r i o r i way.

Popper wants no a p r i o r i e s but h i s own. This is t y p i c a l of those who mix

polemics and l o g i c i n such a way as t o confuse us about t h e problems of ide-

ology and logic.

Popper's approach t o logic a l s o led him t o a b e l i e f i n s c i e n t i f i c models.

Of models, Popper wrote:

or most of t h e objects of s o c i a l science i f not a l l of them a r e a b s t r a c t

objects; they a r e t h e o r e t i c a l constructions ...
These objects, these
t h e o r e t i c a l constructions, used t o i n t e r p r e t our experience a r e t h e r e -
s u l t of constructing c e r t a i n models ( e s p e c i a l l y of i n s t i t u t i o n s ) i n order
t o explain c e r t a i n experiences ...
"114

What a r e t h e r o o t s of these so-called models? Popper would answer t h a t t h i s i s

unimportant. I would r e p l y t h a t it has something t o do with t h e problem of ide-

ology and t h e sociology of knowledge, and, since Popper's hypothetical-deductive

method r e l i e d on models, with t h e problem of logic. Wanting t o keep t h e o r i g i n

of theory i n a " p r i v a t e " realm I doubt i f Popper would be a b l e t o continue t h e

discussion from there.

 - 303 -
I

Popper believed t h a t h i s hypothetical-deductive method and t h e idea

of "models" destroyed t h e methodological essentialism which he e a r l i e r connected

with historicism. I n contrast t o t h i s approach, he advocated a "methodological

individualism". He stated: "... t h e t a s k of s o c i a l theory i s t o construct and

t o analyze our sociological models c a r e f u l l y i n d e s c r i p t i v e or nominalist terms,

t h a t I s t o say, i n terms of individuals, of t h e i r a t t i t u d e s , expectations, r e l a -

t i o n s , etc. - a postulate which may be c a l l e d lmethodological individualism'. 11115

It i s hard t o know how much of Popper's "methodological individualism" -

which he contrasted with "methodological collectivism"'l6 r e f l e c t e d t h e dichotomy

between t h e so-called individualism of c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t i e s and t h e so-called

collectivism of communist s o c i e t i e s . This p o s s i b i l i t y opens up several i n t e r e s t -

ing questions. For example, Popper's s p l i t t i n g of t h e o r i g i n s and t h e t e s t i n g of

theory i n t o p r i v a t e and public realms p a r a l l e l s i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c assumptions about

human behaviour. According t o t h i s view, " t h e individual" has an essence separate

from h i s or her p a s t , present or f u t u r e s o c i a l experience. Here we have a c l u e

about how ideology i s thoroughly wed i n t o Popper's logic.

Popper admitted t h a t h i s "... i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e methods of science

was not influenced by any knowledge of t h e methods of t h e s o c i a l sciences."117

I n a sense, t h i s meant t h a t Popper developed h i s logic without any knowledge of

t h e arguments which t h e logic was t o assess. This i s why he had such a b s t r a c t

notions about i n s t i t u t i o n s and ended up t r e a t i n g them a s models created by t h e

scientist. Take t h i s statement: "... s o c i a l e n t i t i e s such a s i n s t i t u t i o n s or

a s s o c i a t i o n s a r e ( n o t ) concrete n a t u r a l e n t i t i e s ... ( b u t ) rather ... a b s t r a c t

models constructed t o i n t e r p r e t c e r t a i n s e l e c t e d a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n s between in-
dividuals. 1'118 For Popper, " i n s t i t u t i o n s " were not "concrete n a t u r a l e n t i t i e s " .

Rather, they were " a b s t r a c t models". The " r e l a t i o n s between individuals" seem

t o be t h e proper subject matter, but these too were "abstract" f o r Popper. When

t h i s statement i s examined c r i t i c a l l y , it proves t o be q u i t e nonsensical. Main-

t a i n i n g a s p l i t between t h e "private origin1' and "public t e s t i n g " of a theory,

Popper could not recognize t h a t our ideas about society a r e themselves rooted i n

our s o c i a l experience. Having an ideology t h a t s t r e s s e d individualism, r e l a t i o n s

among individuals become t h e a b s t r a c t c r e a t i o n of t h e s c i e n t i s t . A strange s o c i a l

theory underlay Popper's logic.

Popper's methodological individualism was completed by h i s rationalism.

He assumed t h a t people a c t "... more or l e s s r a t i o n a l l y ... f o r t h e attainment of

whatever ends they may have ... and t h i s makes i t possible t o construct simple
models of t h e i r actions and i n t e r a c t i o n s ...1''19 This assumption and method can

lead t o some useful knowledge i n t h e s o c i a l sciences, but only some. Since it

leaves t h e study of "ends" out of t h e process of inquiry it narrows t h e scope of

inquiry immensely. This exclusion of t h e study of ends complements Popper's ig-

norance of t h e problem of ideology and h i s f o r m a l i s t i c logic.

Popper wanted t o make it c l e a r t h a t h i s methodological individualism and

use of r a t i o n a l models did not imply "... i n ( h i s ) opinion t h e adoption of a

psychological method. 1'120 His individualism and rationalism, however, did imply
121
a psychology. Rather than dealing with h i s own o r i e n t a t i o n ( o f which he may

have been ignorant because of h i s ignorance of subject matters i n t h e s o c i a l

s c i e n c e s ) , Popper pushed t h i s i s s u e t o t h e background and a formal logic again

dominated. For example, he created an a r b i t r a r y d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e "theo-

 - 305 -
I

r e t i c a l " and " h i s t o r i c a l " sciences; t h e former being i n t e r e s t e d i n l'universals",

and t h e l a t t e r i n "facts". This s p l i t , l i k e a l l of h i s , covers over t h e problem

of the was we organize f a c t s a s universals - which r e l a t e s t o t h e problem of ide-

ology. No amount of t a l k about "models" can make t h i s problem go away. And,

though t h e s p l i t may r e i n f o r c e t h e s p l i t between t h e o r i g i n and t h e t e s t i n g of

t h e o r i e s ( t h e former t h e concern of h i s t o r i c a l and t h e l a t t e r t h e concern of t h e

t h e o r e t i c a l sciences, according t o popper), t h e relevance of t h e r e l a t i o n s be-

tween problems, methods and t h e o r i e s w i l l remain.

Popper expanded on h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e h i s t o r i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l

sciences. Of t h e " c l a s s i c a l h i s t o r i a n s " , he wrote:

" ~ i m i n ga t o b j e c t i v i t y , they f e e l bound t o avoid any s e l e c t i v e point of

view; but s i n c e t h i s i s impossible, they usually adopt points of view
without being aware of them. This must defeat t h e i r e f f o r t s t o be ob-
j e c t i v e , f o r one cannot possibly be c r i t i c a l of one's own point of view,
and conscious of i t s l i m i t a t i o n s , without being aware of it,"l2*

I n t e r e s t i n g l y t h e same judgment can be applied t o Popper. Throughout our discus-

s i o n we have seen t h a t Popper i s not "conscious of h i s point of view or i t s l i m i -

tations". To ignore t h e problem of ideology when discussing logic leads t o an

u n c r i t i c a l , formal argument.

3 - Objectivity and t h e Sociology of Knowledge

What was Popper's view of o b j e c t i v i t y ? He placed " o b j e c t i v i t y " i n t h e

public realm of h i s dichotomy. He wrote t h a t :

".., what i s usually c a l l e d ' s c i e n t i f i c ~ b d e c t i v i ti~s ~based, t o some

e x t e n t , on s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . The naive view t h a t s c i e n t i f i c objec-
t i v i t y r e s t s on t h e mental or psychological a t t i t u d e of t h e individual
s c i e n t i s t , on h i s t r a i n i n g , care, and s c i e n t i f i c detachment, generates
a s a r e a c t i o n t h e s k e p t i c a l view t h a t s c i e n t i s t s can never be objec-
t i v e . "123
 - 306 -
I

But he erred i n associating t h e view he c r i t i c i z e d with t h e sociology of know-

ledge. Of t h i s skepticism of o b j e c t i v i t y , he said: "This doctrine, developed

i n d e t a i l by t h e so-called tsociology of knowledge1 e n t i r e l y overlooks t h e so-

c i a l or i n s t i t u t i o n a l character of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge, because it i s based on

t h e naive view t h a t o b j e c t i v i t y depends on t h e psychology of t h e individual

scientist."124 We saw with our study of Mannheim t h a t t h e sociology of know-

ledge perspective i s not rooted i n t h i s psychologism, but i n t h e problems t h a t

t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l contexts and human world views present

f o r logic. And, from t h i s perspective, science becomes a world view - with i t s

views of o b j e c t i v i t y themselves having a foundation i n c e r t a i n forms of human

and s o c i a l relationships. I f Popper had pointed out t h a t Mannheim was caught

between t h e old epistemologies and t h e new r e a l i z a t i o n of how t h e socio-histori-

c a l context a f f e c t s world views, and hence was trapped with an epistemological

pseudo-problem, he would have been r a i s i n g a v i t a l matter. But he did not s t a t e

this. We can conclude t h a t Popperts own formalism made it impossible f o r him t o

understand t h e problems with which Mannheim was grappling.

Popper's b e l i e f i n t h e " s o c i a l or public character of science11125 was

r e l a t e d t o h i s r e j e c t i o n of t h e b e l i e f i n absolute causes. This l a t t e r b e l i e f

and a s e c t a r i a n view of o b j e c t i v i t y - whereby some grouping i s s a i d t o possess

"the t r u t h " ( e. g. , to understand r e a l i t y ) - a r e also related. But saying t h a t

" t h e sociology of knowledge overlooks ... t h e s o c i a l or public character of

science" shows t h e danger of dealing with problems i n the philosophy of t h e

s o c i a l sciences without knowing about t h e underlying subject matter. In fact,

t h e sociology of knowledge perspective, a s o c i a l psychological one, fundamentally

questions t h e dichotomy of science i n t o " ~ r i v a t e "and "public" and looks f o r t h e

 - 307 -
I

way a p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r i s t ' s biography and h i s t o r i c a l trends i n t e r s e c t within a

s o c i a l structure. 126 Its main concern i s with the relationships between t h e

character o f an i n t e l l i g e n s i a , the s c i e n t i f i c problems with which it deals,

and i t s methods of dealing with them.

It i s both ironic and indicative t h a t Popper was willing t o speak of the

i n s t i t u t i o n s of science a s "concrete natural e n t i t i e s " and not a s a b s t r a c t models

created by methodological individualism. I c e r t a i n l y agree. Popper needed t o

admit the r e a l i t y of these social i n s t i t u t i o n s t o reinforce h i s argument. Since

he rejected a belief i n absolute causes and saw s c i e n t i f i c theory a s something

instrumental, not t r u e o r f a l s e per se, he needed t h i s s o c i a l r e a l i t y upon which

t o base h i s notion of truth. But a s a r e s u l t the "theory" of i n s t i t u t i o n s which

rationalized h i s hypothetical-deductive method was exposed. Scientific institu-

t i o n s e x i s t but other ones a r e methodological creations. I n view of t h i s contra-

diction, it is i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t Popper rejected t h e idea t h a t s c i e n t i f i c objectiv-

i t y r e s t s on t r a i n i n g , etc. I f it does not r e s t on this,127 then what? Even i f

he wished t o r e j e c t absolute causes, Popper's confusion led him t o postulate a

type of logic, a formal logic, which existed independent of s o c i a l relationships.

Popper's dichotomies cloak over important problems and underlie h i s ig-

norance about t h e problem of ideology and t h e problems it presents f o r logic.

They led him ( i. e., he leads himself) t o t a l k of "the r i g h t man" being a t t r a c t e d

t o science. 12* They led him t o t a l k o f "the human o r personal factor" which he

saw a s "the i r r a t i o n a l element i n most, i f not a l l , i n s t i t u t i o n a l s o c i a l theo-

r i e s ; "129 of "... the human factor" which he saw a s "... the ultimately uncertain
and wayward element i n s o c i a l l i f e and i n a l l s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . "I3' I n other

words, these dichotomies t o o k Popper t o a poorly conceived social and p o l i t i c a l

theory which i s b e s t c a l l e d a grand theory. 13' The i n s t i t u t i o n a l becomes t h e

r a t i o n a l (hence h i s r a t i o n a l models) and t h e "human f a c t o r " becomes t h e "ir-

rational - uncertain" aspect of s o c i a l l i f e . Human experience and behaviour

g e t s carved up i n t o s i m p l i s t i c categories t o prop up fomnal logic. This crude

method which i s t h e r e a l method i n Popper's study (what he saw a s h i s logic i s

only a p a r t of h i s r e a l l o g i c , i. e., way of arguing or approaching problems)

can be avoided by a conscious handling of logic i n terms of t h e problem of ide-

ology.

To f u r t h e r confuse problems of l o g i c , Popper ended up admitting "...

t h a t t h e o b j e c t i v i t y of science, and so science i t s e l f ... a r e both based upon
... freedom. 11132 As Bronowski argued, c e r t a i n human and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s f a c i l -

i t a t e and others f r u s t r a t e these relationships. A thorough inquiry i n t o t h i s

problem would expand on t h e problems with which I am here concerned. This recog-

n i t i o n , which c o n t r a d i c t s Popper's dominant point of view, can lead t o an aware-

ness of how values a r e p a r t of ( d i f f e r e n t than being r e l a t e d t o ) science; and how

t h e problems of ideology and logic can be b e t t e r understood. But we would need

a d i f f e r e n t beginning point than t h a t provided by Popper t o undertake t h i s in-

quiry.

Popper's motivation was not t o make such a c l a r i f i c a t i o n . He ended h i s

discussion with t h e statement: "It almost looks a s i f h i s t o r i c i s t s were t r y i n g

t o compensate themselves f o r t h e l o s s of an unchanging world by clinging t o t h e

f a i t h t h a t change can be foreseen because it i s ruled by an unchanging law. 11133

Here i s psychological reductionism, par excellence. Popper negates t h e arguments

of h i s t o r i c i s t s with a polemical statement. Since most of the arguments were

Popper's, he has mainly negated himself. I n a way s i m i l a r t o MacRae, who I d i s -

cussed i n Chapter Three, Popper implied t h a t t h e h i s t o r i c i s t s were r e l i g i o u s

(e.g., "revelation", "clinging t o the f a i t h " ) i n contrast t o t h e rational logic

of a m y s t i f i e d view of science. But t h i s r h e t o r i c a l dichotomy between s c i e n c e

and r e l i g i o n cloaks over t h e problem of ideology and makes a reasonable i n q u i r y

i n t o t h e problems of l o g i c impossible. Our t a s k now i s t o show t h e d i r e c t i o n s

f o r such a n inquiry.

Footnotes

l ~ o h nDewey and Arthur F. Bentley: Knowillg and t h e Known. Boston, Beacon

Press (19491, p. 207.

2 ~ a r R.
l Popper: The Poverty of Historicism. New York, Harper and Row ( 19641,
P. 3.

1 2 s i n c e Popper based h i s argument f o r a "technological s o c i a l science" on a

c r i t i c i s m of holism and h i s t o r i c i s m , I s h a l l leave my examination of t h i s u n t i l
I d i s c u s s t h e f o u r t h s e c t i o n of h i s study.

13popper, op. c i t . , p. 20.

Q l ~ t a t e m e n t scould be a b s t r a c t e d from Marx's w r i t i n g t h a t emphasize t h e primary
r o l e of p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e i n determining h i s t o r i c a l outcomes. For example, s e e
Marx's statements quoted by Roger Garaudy: Karl Marx: The Evolution of H i s Thought.
New York, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Publishers (1967), From Utopia t o Class Struggle, pp. 169-
77.
4 2 ~ o p p e r , op. c i t e , P. 51.

4 3 ~ b i d ., p. 52. This i s t h e eleventh point i n Marx 1 s Thesis on Feuerbach, i n Karl

Marx and Frederick Engels: The German I d e o l o m , op. c i t . , Appendlx, pp. 197-99.

5 2 ~ b i d . Popper's use of t h e term "scientism" d i f f e r s from my own because, even

if he r e j e c t e d what he c a l l e d "dogmatic n a t u r a l i s t " views of science, he main-
t a i n e d a formalized approach t o s c i e n c e himself. My t h e s i s argues t h a t formal
l o g i c i t s e l f a i d s r a t i o n a l i z e t h e ideology o f sclentism.
681bid. , p. go.
6 9 ~ o c i a l i s thumanism o r what i s often called " l i b e r t a r i a n socialism" d i f f e r s from
S t a l i n i s t communism i n i t s commitment t o abolish a l l forms o f authoritarianism i n
society. The a b o l i t i o n of s t a t e bureaucracies, including a n a u t h o r i t a r i a n police
system, not only the a b o l i t i o n of an exploitative and alienating economy, i s the
revolutionary goal o f s c o i a l i s t humanism. Now t h a t t h e s t a t e has become thoroughly
integrated i n t o advanced and centralized i n d u s t r i a l capitalism, and a l l t h e in-
s t i t u t i o n s i n society have taken on a corporate nature (hence the term "corporate
capitalism") it i s absurd t o think of using s t a t e bureaucracies f o r l i b e r t a r i a n
ends. Both centralized power and t h e form of knowledge useful t o a centralized
society would have t o be replaced f o r humans t o have any r e a l self-determination.

70popper, op. c i t . , p. 93.

9 3 ~ o p p e r l sapproach t o "universals" was not pragmatic. For Dewey, whom I discuss
i n Chapter Twenty, " u n i v e r s a l s ' ~were required a s " d i r e c t i v e concepts" f o r ongoing
inquiry, but they must themselves be grounded i n inquiry. The achievement of cer-
t a i n consequences, i. e. , "end-in-view" within an e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n , remains
t h e goal of science. I n t h a t Popper ignored t h e r o l e of universals i n a l t e r i n g
e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n s , h i s notions of u n i v e r s a l s tended t o be metaphysical. Be-
cause he ignored t h e pragmatic nature o f universals, he a l s o ended up with a
metaphysical notion of r e a l i t y . Saying t h a t it i s mystical t o suggest t h a t we
can know "concrete r e a l i t y " separates t h e knower from t h e known and ignores t h e
t r a n s a c t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of inquiry. Because of t h i s separation, t h e r e were only
e x i s t e n t i a l "statements1' and not any e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n s f o r Popper. This
shows why formal approaches t o logic have d i f f i c u l t y s i t u a t i n g knowledge i n praxis.
15~romthe stance of a formal logician, t h a t i s , t h e problems become more
simple f r o m a pragmatic stance.

106~opper, op. c i t . , p. 129.

lO91t i s common f o r formal logicians and end-of-ideologists t o be h o s t i l e t o -

wards utopian ideas. Reifying the f a c t s of the established order, they a r e un-
a b l e t o deal with s o c i a l and human relationships t h a t go beyond t h a t order. As
Seeley wrote: "A sociology conceived a s a science of society must, it seems,
pride i t s e l f on i t s ' r e a l i s n l unless it i s t o give up i t s s c i e n t i f i c preten-
sions. The realism involved turns out - a s with novelists and painters - t o be
a romanticism of the existent, and more p a r t i c u l a r l y of t h a t i n the existent
t h a t i s l e a s t evocative of the a e s t h e t i c joys. It i s a romanticism because it
evolves and perpetuates a romantic f i c t i o n : t h a t the f o s s i l of what i s , i s the
only r e a l i t y , o r i n any case more r e a l than the forming f l e s h of the not-yet-
realized. No more violent d i s t o r t i o n of r e a l i t y can be well imagined, and yet

-
it is, o r seems t o be, t h e indispensable prologue f o r a 'science of society1.
And t h a t indispensable prologue neatly disposes, before it i s well begun, with
t h e heart and meaning of the human drama, which, whatever e l s e it i s , is a be-
coming. It i s a becoming, moreover, i n which it i s of the very essence of i t s
essence t h a t what it w i l l be is f u l l y i n any i n t e l l i g i b l e sense implicit i n
what it i s , so t h a t , Marx t o the contrary, the new society is never v i s i b l e i n
the womb of the old. It is not v i s i b l e i n t h e womb of t h e old, i n a society such
a s ours, because it i s not there. It i s not t h e r e t o be seen because the new
society i s conceived & the old and not i n it; and it i s conceived i n the large
sense of conception which i s the measure by which psychology exceeds biology and
imagination outruns the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of protoplasm." John Seeley: Mankind As
Fact By Faith, i n R. Ulich (ed. ): Education and t h e Idea of Mankind. New York,
Harcourt, Brace and World (19641, pp. 39-40.

llO~opper, op. c i t . , p. 131.

'141b id.

1 2 1 ~ h eneo-Keynsian a n a l y t i c economists develop so-called r a t i o n a l models i n much

t h e same way a s Popper proposed. But they, l i k e Popper, obscure t h e behaviorist
o r neo-Freudian approaches t o psychology t h a t complement t h e i r own specialized
knowledge. The b e h a v i o r i s t s emphasize t h e conditioning of behavior t o dominant
norms while t h e neo-Freudians emphasize t h e adaption of t h e individual t o t h e
dominant c u l t u r e . Both ignore t h e consequences of such conditioning or adaption.
The so-called " r a t i o n a l assumptions" of a n a l y t i c economists a r e r e a l l y fomnula-
t i o n s of t h e approaches i n psychology t h a t complement t h e same ideological orien-
t a t i o n . For a c r i t i q u e of behaviorist psychology, s e e Norman Malcolm: Behaviorism
a s a Philosophy of Psychology, i n T. W. Wann ( ed. ) : Behaviorism and Phenomenology.
Chicago, Phoenix Books (1964) , pp. 141-54. For a c r i t i q u e of neo-Freudianism, see
Herbert Marcuse: Eros and Civilization. New York, Vintage (19551, pp. 217-51.

122~opper, op. c i t . , p. 152.

12%.w. Mills argued t h a t biography, h i s t o r y and s o c i e t y a r e t h e "... co-ordinate

points of t h e proper study of man." (The Socioloaical I m a ~ i n a t i z ,op. c i t . , p.
143.) He believed t h a t "Whatever e l s e he may be, man i s a s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l
a c t o r who must be understood, i f a t a l l , i n c l o s e and i n t r i c a t e i n t e r p l a y with
s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l s t r u c t u r e s . " ( I b i d . , p. 158. ) This o r i e n t a t i o n undercuts
t h e dichotomy between t h e so-called p r i v a t e and public because it allows us t o
s i t u a t e t h e very problems, methods and t h e o r i e s with which a t h e o r i s t deals i n
a broader context.

1 2 7 n ~ e s ton1' a r e Popperls words. I p r e f e r t o t a l k of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between

t h e socialization of t h e s c i e n t i s t , t h e c l a s s of problems with which he or she
deals, and t h e p o l i t i c a l function of science i n any given s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l
context.
128~opper, op. c i t . , p. 157.

12g~bid.

13'c.w. Mills considered "grand theory" t o be t h e tendency which complemented

" a b s t r a c t empiricism". Grand theory does not stem from h i s t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c
s t u d i e s t h a t s i t u a t e events, but from f o r m a l i s t i c and often r e d u c t i o n i s t i c
Ideas t h a t a r e f i x e d a t a l e v e l of a b s t r a c t i o n t h a t ignores t h e s p e c i f i c i t y
and context of events. M i l l s c r i t i c i z e d grand theory when he wrote: "unless
one assumes some t r a n s - h i s t o r i c a l theory of t h e nature of h i s t o r y , or t h a t
man i s a non-historical e n t i t y , no s o c i a l science can be assumed t o transcend
history." (The Sociological Imagination, op. c i t . , p. 146. ) Mills was a l s o
c r i t i c a l o f t h e notion of s c i e n t i f i c laws o r p r i n c i p l e s t h a t complement grand
theory: ''we do not know any universal p r i n c i p l e s of h i s t o r i c a l change; t h e
mechanisms of change we do know vary with t h e s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s we a r e examining.
For h i s t o r i c a l change i s change of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s , of t h e r e l a t i o n s among
t h e i r component parts. J u s t a s t h e r e i s a v a r i e t y of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s , t h e r e
i s a v a r i e t y of p r i n c i p l e s of h i s t o r i c a l change." ( I b i d . , p. 150. ) The f a c t t h a t
Popper r e l i e d on grand theory t o develop h i s c r i t i q u e of historicism shows how
formal notions of logic and grand theory can become complementary.

132~opper, op. c i t . , p. 159.

 Chapter Sixteen

Logic As Argument: Toulmin

It i s not enough t o c r i t i c i z e t h e o r i e s of logic from t h e stance of t h e

problem of ideology. To understand t h e relevance of t h e problem of ideology

f o r problems of logic and t o develop an approach t o logic t h a t accounts f o r

t h e problem of ideology, we need t o undertake a c r i t i c a l examination of issues

i n t h e f i e l d of l o g i c i t s e l f . Toulminls work provides us with t h e b a s i s f o r

such a discussion. Through outlining h i s general ideas about t h e philosophy of

science and h i s p a r t i c u l a r ideas about logic, we w i l l be a b l e t o develop t h e r e -

l a t i o n s h i p s between ideology and logic i n a s p e c i f i c manner. Toulminls view of

logic a s a t o o l f o r evaluating arguments w i l l be t h e b a s i s f o r t h i s development.

I n c o n t r a s t t o Popper, Toulmin provides us with a c l e a r and u s e f u l per-

spective on t h e philosophy of science. He did not mix polemics with logic -

which is not t o say t h a t h i s discussion of logic does not have any implications

for politics. It i s a pragmatic perspective c o n t r a s t i n g sharply with f o r m a l i s t i c

and metaphysical notions common i n t h e philosophy of science. To show t h i s I w i l l

o u t l i n e and discuss Toulmints understanding of s c i e n t i f i c discovery, laws, theo-

r i e s and t h e notion of determinism, and then r e l a t e them t o my general t h e s i s .

Sc l e n t i f i c Discovery: Toulminl s Rejection of Sc ientism

Toulmin saw t h e physical sciences a s "organized common sense".' By t h i s

he meant t h a t he novelty of t h e conclusion comes, not from the d a t a , but from

the inference: by it we a r e led t o l o o k a t familiar phenomena i n a new way,

not a new phenomena i n a familiar way."2 This point, t h a t the inference and

not the data per underlies s c i e n t i f i c discoveries, i s fundamental t o every-

thing e l s e Toulmin s t a t e d about science. It i s the basis of h i s c r i t i q u e of

epistemological theories and approaches t o logic which see e i t h e r inductive

o r deductive methods a s the basis of science.

These new points o f view, or discoveries, a s Toulmin c a l l e d them, a r e

developed with new "inferring techniques". New technical operations allow t h e

s c i e n t i s t t o see "phenomena i n a new way". New models which " f i t the f a c t s "

a r i s i n g from the new techniques a r e developed and new relationships become

problematic. Referring t o the s e t of b e l i e f s , or doctrine, t h a t develops with

a new model, Toulmin wrote "The doctrine i s , so t o speak, p a r a s i t i c on these

techniques: separated from them i t t e l l s us nothing, and w i l l be e i t h e r un-

c?
intelligible o r else mi~leading."~

This view of s c i e n t i f i c discovery i s incompatible with t h e belief i n

absolute causes and laws. There i s no place f o r a metaphysical assumption about,

t h a t is, b e l i e f i n , the nature o f science once s c i e n t i f i c discoveries a r e seen

i n t h i s pragmatic way. Toulmin therefore concluded t h a t a principle established

through a new model, new techniques and new f a c t s i s not a "law1' Der se. Instead

"... one might almost a s well c a l l the principle a 'law of our method of repre-
sentation! a s a flaw o f nature!."'

Toulmin, l i k e Kuhn, warned operations a r e the basis of any discovery and

projected "law". Rather than t r e a t i n g "laws" i n a s c i e n t i s t 3 c way and asking

formal questions about t h e i r t r u t h o r falsehood of a law o r i t s correspondence

 - 320 -
I

with r e a l i t y , Toulmin discussed t h e scope of a s c i e n t i f i c p r i n c i p l e or law.

He pointed out t h a t t h e s o c i a l i z a t i o n and t r a i n i n g of t h e s c i e n t i s t i s basic

t o t h e use of t h e methods, problems and t h e o r i e s r e l a t e d t o a new model. "It

always has t o be remembered t h a t t h e scope of a law or p r i n c i p l e i s not i t s e l f

w r i t t e n i n t o it, but i s something which i s l e a r n t by s c i e n t i s t s i n coming t o

understand t h e theory ... lt5 Because of Popper's dichotomy between t h e "public"

( s c i e n c e a s an i n s t i t u t i o n ) and t h e "private" ( o r i g i n of problems), he was un-

a b l e t o understand t h i s important relationship. Popper's formalism and h i s

private-public dichotomy both c o n t r a s t with Toulminrs pragmatic and d i a l e c t i c

approach.

Toulmin a l s o re3 ected any f o r m a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e inferences

of science. He r e j e c t e d t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n or t r a d i t i o n a l approach t o logic when

he s t a t e d t h a t "... none of t h e s u b s t a n t i a l inferences t h a t one comes across i n

t h e physical sciences is of a s y l l o g i s t i c type. "6 Instead, inferences represent,

i n a s p e c i f i c manner, t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s ( e . g . , f a c t s ) t h a t new techniques open

up f o r observation. he h e a r t of a l l major discoveries i n t h e physical sciences

i s t h e discovery of novel methods of representation; and so f r e s h techniques by

which inferences can be drawn - and drawn i n ways which f i t t h e phenomena under
i n v e s t i g a t i ~ n . " ~The widespread b e l i e f i n t r a d i t i o n a l logic and developments

from it i s g r e a t l y responsible f o r t h e general ignorance among s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s

about t h e relevance of t h e problem of ideology t o a l l aspects of t h e i r methodology.

Toulmint s awareness of t h e interdependence of technique, Inference and t h e

scope of laws l e d him t o r e j e c t t h e notion of deductive l o g i c a s an adequate

d e s c r i g t i o n o f t h e s c i e n t i f i c method. He argued t h a t " t h e o r i e s and observations

a r e not; deductively connected" and furthermore t h a t "models a r e nut deductive".

Using an exarnple from physics, he wrote: "TO say 'Light t r a v e l s i n s t r a i g h t

l i n e s 1 i s , therefore, not t o sum up compactly t h e observed f a c t s about shadows

and lamps: it i s t o put forward a new way of looking a t t h e phenomenon, with

t h e help of which we can make sense of t h e observed f a c t s about lamps and

shadows. "* Theory i s not deduced from f a c t s because theory i s n e i t h e r rooted

i n inductive generalization nor i n formal logic. It i s , therefore, a pseudo-

problem t o argue whether a theory i s t r u e or f a l s e i n terms of t h e f a c t s . As

Toulmin wrote: "FOP i t i s not t h a t our t h e o r e t i c a l statements ought t o be en-

t a i l e d by t h e data, but f a i l t o be, and so a s s e r t things t h e data do not warrant:

they n e i t h e r could be nor need t o be e n t a i l e d by them, being n e i t h e r generaliza-

t i o n s from them nor other l o g i c a l constructs out of them, but r a t h e r p r i n c i p l e s

i n accordance with which we can make inferences about phenomena. Toulmin con-

cluded t h a t s c i e n t i f i c discovery "... cannot be abstracted from experience but

must be f r e e l y invented. "I0 Imagination, not metaphysics, i s then fundamental

t o science.

Toulmin expanded h i s argument by c o n t r a s t i n g . t h e physical and t h e n a t u r a l

sciences. He argued t h a t t h e former a r e "explanatory", while t h e l a t t e r a r e "de-

scriptive". I n c o n t r a s t t o b i o l o g i s t s , Toulmin argued t h a t "... p h y s i c i s t s do

not hunt out r e g u l a r i t i e s i n phenomenon, but i n v e s t i g a t e t h e form of r e g u l a r i t i e s

whose existence i s already recognized. "I1 This helps c l a r i f y what Toulmin meant

when he s t a t e d t h a t physical "science i s organized common sense". Similar t o

Dewey, i n t h i s regard, he believed t h a t "... it i s t h e notions of contemporary

c omrnon sense which provide t h e background of ideas by reference t o which phenom-

ena a r e chosen f o r investigation. "I2 The physical sciences search f o r t h e form

and scope of common r e g u l a r i t i e s . A s c i e n t i f i c discovery leads t o a new way

of looking a t r e g u l a r i t i e s and with t h i s new problems, methods and t h e o r i e s

develop. " ~ e c l a s s iifc a t ion of subject matter i n t h e l i g h t of discovery i s

t h e r u l e i n t h e physical sciences."13

Toulmin recognized t h e interdependence of theory and f a c t s i n t h e

physical sciences. " ~ physics,

n it i s no use even beginning t o look a t things

u n t i l you know exactly what you a r e looking for: observation has t o be s t r i c t l y

controlled by reference t o some p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r e t i c a l problem. "I4 Like Kuhn,

whose h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s of paradigms l e d t o a s i m i l a r conclusion, Toulmin

concluded "... how d i f f e r e n t a r e s c i e n t i f i c explanations of t h e physical type

from anything we could o r d i n a r i l y speak of a s descriptions, "I5 The s c i e n t i s t i c

b e l i e f t h a t t h e o r i e s i n t h e physical sciences describe sense-data - t h a t gener-

a l i z a t i o n s from observations make up t h e s e t h e o r i e s - underlies much confusion
i n t h e philosophy of science. A metaphysical view of science develops because

s i m p l i s t i c notions of "cause" and " t r u t h " a r e projected i n t o t h e explanatory

processes of t h e physical sciences. The f a l s e notions a r e then applied t o other

a r e a s of science (e.g., sociology) and t h e s c i e n t i f i c r h e t o r i c spreads.

Toulminls approach t o logic complements t h e above view of s c i e n t i f i c

discovery. H i s r e l a t e d c r i t i c i s m of t r a d i t i o n a l and formal logic a l s o stems

from it. The n a t u r a l sciences, being more d e s c r i p t i v e than explanatory, can

f i n d some value i n formal logic. The i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y of formal ( e. g., deductive)

logic t o a l l subject matter is what Toulmin~sc l a r i f i c a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c discov-

ery implied.
S c i e n t i f i c Laws: A Pragmatic View of Explanation

Toulmin's discussion of s c i e n t i f i c "laws" emphasized t h e context of

discovery. This emphasis has implications f o r our c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h e problem

ideology presents f o r logic. He s t r e s s e d "... how necessary it i s always t o un-

derstand a physical p r i n c i p l e i n t h e context of i l s use,"16 and again we see h i s

pragmatic orientation. To understand laws, it i s necessary t o see how they a r e

used t o help us explain phenomenon. According t o t h i s view, it i s t h e represen-

t a t i o n of phenomenon t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s an explanation. This i s not t h e same a s a

generalization from observations. Laws, a s representative statements, a r e con-

d i t i o n a l or contextual. They a r e not t a u t o l o g i c a l ; tha? is, they a r e not re-

ducible t o t h e observations. To emphasize h i s r e j e c t i o n of t h e t a u t o l o g i c a l view

o f laws, Toulmin argued t h a t "...t h e scope of a law i s s t a t e d separately from t h e

law i t s e l f . " 1 7 This pragmatic d i s t i n c t i o n allows us t o understand how a law i s

r e l a t e d t o t h e context of observations, but i s not reducible or limited t o t h i s

context .
Toulminls discussion of "laws" emphasized t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e

t h e o r e t i c a l problems and t h e experimental context. The need t o r e a l i z e t h e s e

i n t e r r e l a t i o n s , or what Kuhn c a l l e d a "paradigm", was basic t o Toulmin's orienta-

t i o n t o t h e philosophy of science. " I f you understand t h e t h e o r e t i c a l problem,

t h e reasons f o r t h e conditions of t h e experiment w i l l almost c e r t a i n l y be c l e a r

t o you; unless you understand t h e problem they c e r t a i n l y w i l l not. "I8 Toulmin

continually s t r e s s e d t h a t 'I... unless your t h e o r e t i c a l problem has been c a r e f u l l y

thought out, experiments w i l l be premature."19 According t o t h i s view, science

i s n e i t h e r empirical nor t h e o r e t i c a l . It i s problematic. This conclusion about

the philosophy of science p a r a l l e l s t h e orientation of C.W. Mills when he argued

t h a t sociology can n e i t h e r be rooted i n "abstract empiricism" o r "grand theory".

Through the consideration of t h e o r e t i c a l problems "theoretical ideals"

a r e established; t h a t i s . imagined, and It... it is by using these ideals t h a t the

physical sciences become, a s they a r e sometimes c a l l e d , exact sciences. ll2O The

"exact sciences" do not have the mystified nature t h a t s o c i a l scientism a t t r i b u t e s

t o them. For example, their exactness does not come from a theory bein@; exactly

true. Nor does it come from the mathematical character of much of t h e theory i n

t h e exact sciences. I n c o n t r a s t t o these s c i e n t i s t i c d i s t o r t i o n s of science,

exactness comes f r o m an adequate answer, i n an experimental context, t o t h e

question: under what circumstances can you regard something a s "X" ( a t h e o r e t i c a l

i d e a l )?

Those who a r e searching f o r exactness i n t h e s o c i a l sciences, but misun-

derstand what t h i s means, end up extrapolating what they take t o be experimental

r a t i o n a l e s from t h e "exact sciences1' without t h e i r contextual and t h e o r e t i c a l re-

l a t i o n s h i p being made e x p l i c i t . A confused scientism i s inevitable when t h e re-

l a t i o n of problems, methods and theories i s not accounted f o r a s part of t h e logic

of any subject matter. Much of what now passes f o r " s o c i a l science" research re-

s u l t s f r o m an "envy" of t h e exact sciences and a r e l a t e d myopia about problems

rooted i n t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s of society.

Because of t h e representative nature of laws, t h e physicist w i l l not ask:

"IS the r u l e t r u e ? "21 The s c i e n t i f i c t r u t h of a theory i s not something i n t r i n s i c

but something p r a m t i c . I n Toulminl s words:

" ~ u ~ ~ one o s esays that laws of nature a r e not t r u e , f a l s e o r probable;

t h a t these terms a r e indeed not even applicable t o them; and t h a t scien-
t i s t s a r e accordingly not i n t e r e s t e d i n the question of the ! t r u t h 1 of
 laws of nature - a l l o f which might f a i r l y be said: one does not there-
by deny the obvious, namely t h a t s c i e n t i s t s seek the truth. One points
out, r a t h e r , t h a t t h e abstract noun ' t r u t h 1 i s wider i n i t s application
than t h e adjectjve I t r u e ' , t h a t d i f f e r e n t types of statements need t o
be l o g i c a l l y assessed i n d i f f e r e n t terms, and t h a t not every c l a s s of
statement i n which a s c i e n t i s t deals need be such a s can be spoken of
a s 'true! / ' f a l s e !/!probable '. "22

The way we use t h e term "true" w i l l r e f l e c t an underlying orientation t o episte-

mology. Formal logicians r e i f y l i n g u i s t i c s and thus t a l k of "truth" i n abstract

from a context. A pragmatic orientation t o logic always s i t u a t e s the matter o f

v a l i d i t y i n a p a r t i c u l a r context. Distinguishing "true" from "truth" can help

c l a r i f y t h e implications of the problem of ideology f o r logic because it forces

us t o r e l a t e matters o f v a l i d i t y t o the context within which a c l a s s of problems,

methods and theories have significance.

Laws have what Toulmin called an "ambivalent logic status". They a r e

conditioned, but not tautological. Because laws function t o a i d and d i r e c t ob-

servations, a s well a s t o open up new problems, Toulmin called them "middle-

l e v e l propositions". "1t is the middle-level propositions i n the hierarchy of

physics which alone a r e called 'laws1, and they alone have an ambivalent l o g i c a l

status."23 Once t h i s l o g i c a l s t a t u s of laws i s understood, it becomes c l e a r why

t h e question "IS t h e law t r u e ? " has t o be replaced with the question "Under what

circumstances does it hold?" The d i s t i n c t i o n between laws a s representations

and statements about t h e i r application could be the basis of a humanistic, even

e x i s t e n t i a l i s t , philosophy of science. Once we recognize the c e n t r a l r o l e o f

human judgment i n the c r e a t i o n and use of science, then we can begin t o s i t u a t e

l o g i c a l matters i n the context of arguments about t h e ends we wish t o r e a l i z e

with the a i d of science. As Toulmin remarked: he laws themselves do not do

 I

anything: it i s we who do things wlth them, and t h e r e a r e several different

kinds of things we can do with t h e i r help. 11 24

Toulmin continued by asking whether laws a r e necessary o r contingent.

He rejected t h e value o f t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l question because it is rooted i n a

f a l s e understanding o f laws. "1n i t s way, t o c a l l laws of nature tcontingent'

i s a s misleading a s t o c a l l them 'necessary1, f o r t o do s o i s t o focus too much

l i g h t on a s e t of questions which never a r i s e with reference t o laws of nature,

namely, questions about t r u t h and f a l s i t y . "25 The question i s based on a con-

f'used notion of how f a c t s and laws r e l a t e :

"physicists never have occasion t o speak of t h e laws themselves, e i t h e r

a s corresponding or a s f a i l i n g t o correspond t o t h e f a c t s . The l o g i c a l
r e l a t i o n between the laws and t h e f a c t s i s indirect: by talking a s
though they were connected any more closely than they a r e , one creates
only conf'vsion and misunderstanding. "26

This confusion i s rooted i n t h e f a i l u r e t o distinguish between laws a s represen-

t a t i o n s and t h e scope or application o f laws. Seeing laws a s being "necessary"

can lead t o a view of them a s being "maxims". Socialization t o theological and

metaphysical thought i n our society i s s u f f i c i e n t l y widespread t h a t t h e scien-

t i s t i c notion of necessary laws can t u r n science i n t o religion. Science then

becomes a search f o r t r u t h ; or, with the more l i b e r a l logicians who s t i l l be-

l i e v e i n natural law, a search f o r p r o b a b i l i t i e s t h a t approximate "the truth".

I n f a c t , laws a r e not maxims but have a r e s t r i c t e d relevance o r appli-

cability. As Toulmin said: "... words l i k e 'true', l f a l s e l and lprobable' a r e

applicable not t o laws themselves so much a s t o t h e statements which c o n s t i t u t e

applications of laws ..."27 Science does not deduce i t s conclusions from laws.

he conclusions about the world which s c i e n t i s t s derive from laws of nature a r e

not deduced from these laws, but r a t h e r drawn i n accordance wlth them a s appllca-
tions of them ... 28
11

S c i e n t i f i c Theories: Demystifying the Notion of Cause

Since s c i e n t i f i c discoveries a r e not deductions from laws, a l l mechanistic

logical analogies must be abandoned before an adequate "theory o f theory" can be

developed. Toulmin believed t h a t the analogy between a map and a theory was use-

f u l a s a replacement f o r t r a d i t i o n a l approaches t o logic: "... whereas t o t r e a t

laws of nature on the pattern of generalizations i s positively misleading, and t o

think of them a s r u l e s o r licences r e f l e c t s only part of t h e i r nature, the analogy

between physical theories and maps extends f o r q u i t e a long way and can be used t o

illuminate some dark and dusty corners i n the philosophy of science. " 2 9 H i s view

of theory was rooted i n a c r i t i c i s m of deductive logic. He argued t h a t "... only

where premises and conclusion a r e comparable ... is there room f o r a deductive

c0nnexion."3~ We s h a l l see below t h a t such comparability i s unlikely even i n t h e

most s y l l o g i s t i c instance. More important, Toulmin recognized the need f o r scien-

t i f i c theory t o be useful beyond i t s original context f o r it t o allow f o r predic-

tion. As he said: "...a science i s nothing i f i t s laws a r e never used t o ex-

p l a i n o r predict anything. "3l

Laws t h a t a r e useful f o r prediction and explanation, t h a t i s , laws t h a t

have a "middle-range" l o g i c a l s t a t u s , a r e developed with the aid of a c e r t a i n form

of observation. Discussing the physicist a s a surveyor of phenomenon, Toulmin

wrote: "... physicists prefer t o make a limited number of observations covering

a wide range of circumstances, r a t h e r than a l a r g e r number of observations cover-

ing a smaller range of c i r c ~ m s t a n c e s . " 3 ~These observations do not lead t o causal

theories. The b e l l e f t h a t they do i s one of the major e r r o r s t h a t underlies t h e

Ideology of scientism. It i s when t h e laws a r e being used i n problem solving

t h a t t h e idea of "cause" develops. As Toulmin said: "... wherever t h e sciences

a r e applied t o p r a c t i c a l problems, t h e r e one f i n d s t a l k of causes and e f f e c t s . "33

We become concerned with "causes" when we a r e manipulating experimental conditions

t o t r y t o obtain a hypothesized end or t h e o r e t i c a l ideal. "~evelopmentswhich we

a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n producing, preventing or counteracting - these a r e t h e t y p i c a l

s o r t s of t h i n g about whose causes we ask. a 34

Toulminls pragmatism i s again evident. He t r e a t e d "causes" a s "diagnos-

t i c " and r e j e c t e d any tendency t o see causes i n an anthropocentric way. Locating

"causes" p e r s e i s not t h e aim of t h e physical sciences. Instead, it i s repre-

senting r e g u l a r i t i e s i n phenomena i n a way t h a t allows f o r both explanation and

prediction. The idea of c a u s a l i t y comes only with t h i s l a t t e r stage i n science.

I f t h e determination of c a u s a l i t y i s not t h e aim of science. why has t h e

a b s t r a c t debate over t h e notion of c a u s a l i t y persisted? C r i t i c i z i n g Bertrand

~ u s s e 1 1 ,Toulrnin
~~ r e j e c t e d any equation of c a u s a l i t y and t h e s c i e n t i f i c method.

Such an equation i s based on an ignorance of t h e character of f a c t s . The " f a c t s "

coming from s c i e n t i f i c inquiry a r e t r e a t e d a s being e s s e n t i a l r a t h e r than a s be-

ing conditional.

Toulmin was c r i t i c a l of t h i s r e i f i e d view of f a c t s .

"To t a l k , i n t h e philosophy of science, of t h e o r e t i c a l physics f a l s i f y i n g

by a b s t r a c t i o n and t o ask f o r t h e f a c t s and nothing but t h e f a c t s , i s t o
demand t h e impossible, l i k e asking f o r a man drawn t o no p a r t i c u l a r pro-
jection and having no p a r t i c u l a r scale. I n epistemology, too, t o argue
t h a t our everyday concepts f a l s i f y by a b s t r a c t i o n o r a r e necessary con-
d i t i o n s of experience with t h e suggestion t h a t one thereby points t o a
defect i n our conceptional equipment or t o an unfortunate l i m i t a t i o n on
our capacity f o r experiencing, i s t o evince a s i m i l a r misconception. I f
we a r e t o say anything, we must be prepared t o abide by the r u l e s and
conventions t h a t govern t h e terms i n which we speak: t o adapt these i s
 no submission, nor a r e they shackles. Only i f we a r e so prepared can we
hope t o say anything t r u e or anything untrue. It i s unreasonable t o com-
plain, a s philosophers have so often done, because we cannot t e l l the
t r u t h without talking. "36

An a b s t r a c t view of c a u s a l i t y and f a c t s , not a concrete awareness of t h e methods

of science, underlies a l l epistemology which searches f o r t r u e knowledge p e r se.

This search always ends up d i s t o r t i n g and mystifying t h e nature of science a s a

human endeavour. And, a s we have continually emphasized, such a scientism func-

t i o n s t o j u s t i f y t h e established f a c t s of t h e established order.

Determinism: The Myth o f Scientism

Are so-called laws of nature universally applicable? Toulmin pointed out

t h a t philosophers f r o m J.S. M i l l t o Bertrand Russell have accepted the need t o

postulate t h e uniformity of nature, but he rejected such a premise f o r two reasons.

F i r s t , he believed it was necessary t o make a d i s t i n c t i o n between laws and general-

izations. h his difference between laws and generalizations is connected with ...
t h e f a c t t h a t natural h i s t o r i a n s a r e committed f o r the most p a r t t o the everyday

c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of t h e i r subject matter, whereas it i s open t o physical s c i e n t i s t s

t o r e c l a s s i f y t h e i r s a s they go along. "37 From t h i s , he concluded: "So it i s not

nature t h a t i s uniform, but s c i e n t i f i c procedure; and it i s uniform only i n t h i s ,

t h a t is, it i s methodological and self-correcting. "38 I f physical laws come from

a continual r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of subject matter it i s impossible t o j u s t i f y t h e

notion of determinism o r t h e uniformity of nature i n terms of them.

Toulminls second reason f o r r e j e c t i n g the premise of t h e uniformity of

nature was based on h i s c r i t i q u e of deductive logic. Since s c i e n t i f i c discoveries

Toulmin believed t h a t s c i e n t i f i c inquiry was based on inference and argument and

not on deduction and causal theory. Referring t o chemical formula, he wrote:

"NO experimental statements can be deduced from the ... formula; rather ... we
can i n f e r experimental conclusions by arguing i n accordance with t h e formula. I, 39

The notion of determinism i s i t s e l f dependent upon t h e methods of infer-

ence. The "must" or deterministic s t e p i n any t h e o r e t i c a l deduction depends on

t h e v i t a l minor premise; t h e statement i n the argument which declares a represen-

tation. This dependency makes t h e notion o f determinism thoroughly conditional.

This c r i t i q u e of deductive and formal logic l e d Toulmin t o distinguish between

"believing t h a t ..." something e x i s t s and "reaardinq ( something) 9"something.

Believing i n t h e notion of determinism o r the uniformity of nature, f o r example,

i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t than regarding phenomenon within a deterministic model. We

could consider the former metaphysical determinism and the l a t t e r methodological

determinism.

Toulmin argued t h a t "... a model can only be used t o explain the behaviour
of things which a r e i n f a c t d i s t i n c t from it. "40 The s c i e n t i s t uses the model -
a point of view which i n t e r r e l a t e s problems, methods and theories - as a conceptual

and l i n g u i s t i c t o o l . The point of view i s not i n t r i n s i c t o t h e data. To believe

t h i s i s t o ignore not only the function of s c i e n t i f i c paradigms but t h e existence

and judgment o f the s c i e n t i s t . The data doesn't t e l l the s c i e n t i s t something.

The s c i e n t i s t does something t o make sense of t h e data. A c l a r i f i c a t i o n of mat-

t e r s of logic shows t h a t human praxis i s the basis of science.

What t h e metaphysical notion o f determinism ignores i s the f a c t t h a t the

point of view o r model t h a t a s c i e n t i s t u t i l i z e s is i t s e l f learned. As Toulmin

said:

"... t h e physicist l e a r n s a s p a r t of h i s t r a i n i n g , t o think and speak i n

terms of h i s t h e o r e t i c a l models ... But t o t h e outsider t h e s e t h e o r e t i -
c a l models, however v i v i d , a r e n e i t h e r f a m i l i a r nor immediately i n t e l l i -
g i b l e and t h e i r r o l e i s i t s e l f something which he needs t o have explain-
ed. "41

Those who don't recognize or admit t h i s f a i l t o understand t h e r o l e of models,

paradigms and ideologies as points of view t h a t a f f e c t ongoing inquiry. Their

confusion about t h e nature of s c i e n t i f i c discovery, laws, t h e o r i e s and d e t e r -

minism i s rooted i n t h i s ignorance.

Logic a s Argument: 1 - The J u s t i f i c a t o r y Task of Logic

Toulmin's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of science was rooted i n h i s c r i t icism of formal

logic and h i s view of s c i e n t i f i c theory as a map or metaphor. Let us now look a t

t h e approach t o matters o f logic t h a t p a r a l l e l s t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . As we pro-

ceed we s h a l l s e e t h a t Toulminls ideas allow us t o develop a very s p e c i f i c under-

standing of t h e relevance of t h e problem of ideology f o r logic.

Toulmin began h i s discussion by r e j e c t i n g any analogy between logic and

psychology, sociology, technology or mathematics. According t o him, t h e f i r s t

analogy sees logic a s founded i n t h e "laws of thought" and t h e l o g i c i a n ' s concern

i s with obtaining "normal thinking p r o c e s ~ e s " . ~Toulmin

~ took Dewey a s a n example

of t h e second analogy; t h a t i s , t h e sociological approach t o logic. According t o

him, t h i s approach sees h a b i t s - manners of acting - becoming accepted a s r u l e s

43
which i n t u r n lead t o h a b i t s of inference. The t h i r d analogy o r technological

approach t o logic i s concerned with " t h e manner of i n f e r r i n g or with questions of

technique" p e r se. 44
 I

Toulmin r e j e c t e d the f i r s t and second analogies. "1f one thinks of logic

a s an extension of psychology o r sociology, t h e notion of l o g i c a l form remains i m -

penetrably obscure - indeed, it can be explained only i n terms of even more myste-

r i o u s notions, being accounted f o r a s a s t r u c t u r e of r e l a t i o n s between psychic en-

t i t i e s or s o c i a l behaviour p a t t erns. 1145 He a l s o r e j e c t e d t h e t h i r d approach. For

Toulmin logic was not primarily concerned with technique but "... its primary busi-
ness is a r e t r o s p e c t i v e , j u s t i f i c a t o r y one - with t h e arguments we can put forward
afterwards t o make good our claims t h a t t h e conclusions a r r i v e d a t a r e acceptable,

because j u s t i f i a b l e , conclusions. 1146

Toulmin argued t h a t mathematics seemed t o overcome t h e obscurity of t h e

f i r s t two approaches, but t h a t i t s form was not adequate f o r t h e " j u s t i f i c a t o r y

task" of logic. He chose another analogy more appropriate f o r these purposes.

"There i s one s p e c i a l v i r t u e i n t h e p a r a l l e l between logic and jurispru-

dence: it helps t o keep i n t h e c e n t r e of t h e p i c t u r e t h e c r i t i c a l func-
t i o n of t h e reason. The r u l e s of logic may not be t i p s or generalizations:
they nono t h e l e s s apply t o men and t h e i r arguments -
not i n t h e way t h a t
laws of psychology o r maxims of method apply, but r a t h e r a s standards of
achievement which a man, i n arguing, can come up t o or f a l l s h o r t of, and
by which h i s arguments can be judged. "47

This analogy avoids t h e p i t - f a l l s of a s t r i c t l y cognitive, s o c i o l o g i s t i c ,

t e c h n i c a l or mathematical approach t o logic, but it s t i l l presents a problem f o r

t h e sociology of knowledge. The "standards of achievement" of jurisprudence do

not transcend t h e s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l function. To develop t h i s idea, l e t us

t r a c e through Toulminls analogy.

2 - The Layout of Arguments

Toulmin was concerned about t h e form t h a t arguments take. He undertook

an a n a l y s i s of t h i s form by developing pragmatic d i s t i n c t i o n s which formal logic

 I

c o n s i s t e n t l y ignores. His f i r s t d i s t i n c t i o n was between ( a ) t h e "claim o r con-

clusions whose merits we a r e seeking t o e s t a b l i s h " and ( b ) t h e &&d o r "facts

we appeal t o a s a foundation f o r our claim 11 48 .

When we described Toulminls approach t o s c i e n t i f i c theory, we argued

t h a t t h e f a c t s do not "speak f o r themselves". An inference i s required between

t h e f a c t s and a claim and Toulmin argued t h a t logic must concern i t s e l f with

" t h e nature and j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s step".49 He t h e r e f o r e made a second d i s -

tinction: t h a t between ( a ) t h e da.t;a and claim and ( b ) t h e warrant.

Whereas t h e appeal t o data i s supposed t o be made e x p l i c i t l y when we

make any claim, t h e appeal t o a warrant i s usually made i n only an i m p l i c i t

manner. We make a claim on t h e b a s i s of data, or from d a t a , since o r because

we accept more general hypotheses o r warrants. These more general hypotheses

"... c e r t i f y t h e soundness of a l l arguments of t h e appropriate type, and have

accordingly t o be established i n a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t way from t h e f a c t s we produce

a s data. "5'

Warrants i n logic a r e analogous t o laws i n s c i e n t i f i c theory. Both have

a middle-range s t a t u s . The f a i l u r e t o acknowledge t h e i m p l i c i t appeal t o such

warrants or hypotheses, t h e f a i l u r e t o admit t h a t a conclusion does not spring

from " t h e f a c t s " s,underlies much confusion i n logic. For one t h i n g , t h e

f a i l u r e t o recognize the r o l e of warrants i n logic allows t h e e f f e c t s of t h e com-

mitments of a s c i e n t i s t on h i s or her work t o go unscrutinized. Processes t h a t

a r e i n f a c t rooted i n t h e s o c i a l arrangement of science hence become mystified

ana idealized. Our awareness of t h e meaning and consequences of s c i e n t i f i c work

i s hindered i n t h e process.

As I proceed i n t h i s chapter, I w i l l argue t h a t t h e commitment of a s c i e n t i s t

 - 334 -
I

t o c e r t a i n warrants is where ideology and logic fuse. Toulmin talked of commit-

ments i n the following way: h he data we c i t e i f a claim i s challenged depend

on the warrants we a r e prepared t o operate within t h a t f i e l d , and the warrants

t o which we commit ourselves a r e implicit i n the p a r t i c u l a r steps from data t o

claims we a r e prepared t o take and t o admiteu5' Toulmin, l i k e Kuhn, was aware

t h a t the warrants we use t o argue a point a r e r e l a t e d t o commitments t h a t a r e

not rooted i n data.

Further d i s t i n c t i o n s a r e required t o f u l l y scrutinize t h e f o r m of any

argument. To evaluate a n argument "... we need t o add some e x p l i c i t reference

t o t h e degree of force which our data confer on our claim i n v i r t u e of our war-

rant."52 This demands a q u a l i f i e r which allows us "... t o discuss e x p l i c i t l y

t h e extent t o which (a- p a r t i c u l a r law f i t s t h e case under consideration ...

whether it must be inevitably be applied ... o r whether special f a c t s may make

the case an exception t o the r u l e o r one i n which t h e law can be applied only

subject t o c e r t a i n qualifications. "53

Toulminfs t h i r d d i s t i n c t i o n , t h a t between ( a ) the q u a l i f i e r and ( b ) t h e

claim made f r o m the data i n terms of the warrant, helps us t o extend our l o g i c a l

assessment o f any argument. But, i n Toulminls scheme, i n addition t o a q u a l i f i e r ,

an argument a l s o needs a rebuttal. The d i s t i n c t i o n between ( a ) the q u a l i f i e r , and

( b ) the r e b u t t a l was the fourth one Toulmin mads t o help understand the layout of

arguments. The former "... establishes a presumption", while the l a t t e r , "... by

s e t t i n g aside one possible r e b u t t a l tends t o confirm the presumption thereby cre-

a t e d . ~ Argument
~ ~ i s thus d i a l e c t i c a l . It requires a hypothesls i n accordance

with which we argue a claim, but it a l s o requires an understanding of what con-

s i t u t e s the negation of t h a t hypothesis, Once t h i s i s recognized the s c i e n t i s t i c

notions of laws, causes and determinism a r e thoroughly demystified.

On the basis of these d i s t i n c t i o n s , Toulmin contrasted two s o r t s of ques-

tions t h a t any evaluation of an argument must consider. F i r s t , there is "the

a p p l i c a b i l i t y of a p a r t i c u l a r warrant" t o an argument, and, second, there i s "the

r e s u l t we s h a l l get from applying the warrant". Toulmin contrasted the two ques-

t i o n s because "... i n asking about the correctness of t h e r e s u l t we may have t o

inquire i n t o both these things independently. "55 Too often t h e correctness o r

t r u t h of an argument i s discussed by mixing the two questions together. The re-

s u l t i s not only contusion about matters of logic, but a l s o about t h e relevance

of ideology t o o u r theories.

Toulmin made a f i f t h distinction. Not only do we need ( a ) a q u a l i f i e r

and r e b u t t a l f o r our warrant, we need ( b ) a backing f o r them. The backing gives

authority t o t h e warrant; t h e warrant has v a l i d i t y and value "on account of" t h e

backing. An analysis of r e l a t i o n s of the backing " t o our data, claims, warrants

and conditions of rebuttal"56 w i l l therefore c l a r i f y t h e layout of any argument.

The inclusion of the concept of backing takes us f u l l c i r c l e i n our eval-

uation of any argument. Warrants a r e "... hypothetical, bridge-like statements,

but the backing f o r warrants can be expressed i n t h e form of categorical s t a t e -

ments of f a c t q u i t e a s well as can t h e data appealed t o i n d i r e c t support of our

conclusions. "57 So argument goes a s follows: d i r e c t data, hypothetical warrant,

indirect data. Through analyzing the layout of arguments we can see t h a t the

p a r t i c u l a r data relevant t o the problem a t hand and the general data we r e f e r t o

f o r backing a r e always related through hypotheses. It should be pointed out t h a t

both t h e f a c t s , a s d i r e c t data, and as i n d i r e c t data, and the hypotheses or

warrants w i l l be associated with a p a r t i c u l a r point of view, model, paradigm o r

ideology. Toulminls c l a r i f i c a t i o n shows t h a t t h e more s p e c i f i c and c r i t i c a l we

become over matters of logic t h e more d i f f i c u l t it i s t o avoid t h e problem of

ideology.

Toulminls discussion could lead t o skepticism o r cynicism about knowledge;

or it can lead t o a n awareness of t h e r o l e of imagination i n science. Those who

want "the whole t r u t h and nothing but t h e t r u t h " w i l l be d i s i l l u s i o n e d by a n

awareness of t h e l e v e l s of argument (e.g., data, warrant, backing) involved i n

making claim. Those who want f a c t s and theory t o f i t unambiguously and per-

manently w i l l be disturbed by an awareness of these many levels. Such s i m p l i s t i c

or naive expectations a r e often replaced with cynicism. Yet those who acknowledge

t h e pragmatic nature of science, r e a l i z i n g t h a t i n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , regardless

#
of t h e extent of our knowledge, human choice, c r e a t i v i t y and imagination a r e fun-

damental, w i l l develop new i n s i g h t s and an impetus t o f u r t h e r humanize our know-

ledge.

3 - The F a l l a c i e s of S y l l o g i s t i c Logic

This conceptualization of t h e form of argument allowed Toulmin t o develop

a thorough c r i t i q u e of s y l l o g i s t i c logic. The " i n t e r n a l complexity" of such an

approach t o logic i s hidden because t h e kinds of pragmatic d i s t i n c t i o n s Toulmin

made a r e not usually applied t o syllogisms. To show t h i s complexity, Toulmin in-

s i s t e d on disentangling "... two d i s t i n c t things - t h e force of universal premises,

when regarded a s warrants and t h e backing on which they depends f o r t h e i r author-
ity."58 This difference between "an inference-warrant and i t s backing" i s

usually concealed within s y l l o g i s t i c logic. The syllogism

"...may have i n use both t h e force of a warrant and t h e f a c t u a l content

of i t s backing, two aspects which we can bring out by expanding it i n
d i f f e r e n t ways. Sometimes it may be used, standing alone, i n only one
of these two ways a t once; but o f t e n enough, e s p e c i a l l y i n arguments,
we make t h e s i n g l e statement do both jobs a t once and gloss over, f o r
b r e v i t y I s sake, t h e t r a n s i t i o n from backing t o warrant -
from t h e fac-
t u a l information we a r e presupposing t o t h e inference-licence which
t h a t information j u s t i f i e s us i n employing. "59

This d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e f o r c e of an inference warrant and i t s back-

ing shows t h a t t h e syllogism has "... an exaggerated appearance of uniformity a s

between arguments i n d i f f e r e n t f i e l d s ...'160 But even more confusing . is its It..

power of disguising a l s o t h e g r e a t difference between t h e things t r a d i t i o n a l l y

classed together a s 'premises1. '16' The two-fold d i s t i n c t i o n betwean premises and

conclusion t h a t i s made i n s y l l o g i s t i c logic i s i n s u f f i c f b n t l y complex because one

premise, what Toulmin c a l l e d t h e singular premise, 'I... expresses a piece of in-

formation m m which we a r e drawing a conclusion", while t h e other, t h e universal

premise, It.. . expresses, not a piece of information a t a l l , but a guarantee i n

accordance with which we can s a f e l y t a k e t h e s t e p from our data t o our conclu-

sion. 1162

This d i s t i n c t i o n helps c l a r i f y which issues rooted i n a s i m p l i s t i c logic

a r e pseudo-problems and which deserve our a t t e n t i o n . For example, do "universals"

have any e x i s t e n t i a l implications or a r e they s o l e l y conceptual t o o l s f o r t h e

scientist? Toulmin argued t h a t "NO e n t i r e l y general answer can be given t o t h e

question, f o r what determines whether t h e r e a r e or a r e not e x i s t e n t i a l implica-

t i o n s i n any p a r t i c u l a r case is not t h e form of statement i t s e l f , but r a t h e r t h e

p r a c t i c a l use t o which t h i s form i s put on t h a t occasion. "63 I n d i f f e r e n t in-

 - 338 -
,

stances, a universal statement can be "... construed a s a permissive inference-

warrant or a s a f a c t u a l report of our observations. "64 When we replace t h e

formal question, "DO universals have e x i s t e n t i a l implications?", with t h e prag-

matic question, "HOW is a universal used and intended?", we no longer need concern

ourselves with pseudo-problems. The s t a t u s of a "universal" w i l l depend on t h e

context of i t s use and t h e manner i n which it functions I n inquiry. A "universal"

might be an attempt a t a summary of already ascertained f a c t s which a r e relevant,

a s backing, t o a n argument; or, it might be no more than what Dewey c a l l e d a

" d i r e c t i n g concept ion" which f a c i l i t a t e s experimentat i o n i n inquiry. I shall

discuss t h e pragmatic approach t o t h e problem of universals i n depth i n Chapter

Twenty.

The "... syllogism tends t o conceal from us ( t h e ) d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of back-

ing which our general b e l i e f s may r e q u i r e ..."65 Yet knowing of these i s funda-

mental t o t h e assessment of an arzument. The s y l l o g i s t i c l o g i c i a n "... has i n t h e

past cramped a l l general statements i n t o h i s predetermined form ... He has

f a i l e d t o make t h e necessary d i s t i n c t i o n s between t h e character of h i s warrants

and t h e c h a r a c t e r of h i s backing. "warrants a r e one thing, backing another; back-

ing by enumerative observation i s one thing, backing by taxonomic c l a s s i f i c a t i o n

another; and our choices of idiom, though perhaps s u b t l e , r e f l e c t these differences

f a i r l y exactly. t167 I n other words, s y l l o g i s t i c , formal logic has ignored t h e use

of d i f f e r e n t "idioms" i n d i f f e r e n t arguments. Ignoring these differences it i s

unable t o ask questions about t h e r e l a t i o n s of language t o praxis which i s one way

t h a t t h e problem of ideology and i t s implications f o r issues i n logic can be ap-

proached.

Toulminls c r i t i c i s m of s y l l o g i s t i c arguments a l s o implied a c r i t i c i s m of

t h e r e l a t e d notion of "formal validity". "1t i s sometimes argued ... t h a t the

 I

v a l i d i t y of s y l l 3 g i s t i c arguments i s a conscqucnce of the f a c t t h a t the conclu-

sions of these argwnenks a r e simply 'formal transformationsl of t h e i r premises. 11 68

According t o t h i s view, once the universal premise i s expanded into a warrant "...
t h e p a r t s of the conclusion a r e manifestly the same a s the p a r t s of t h e premises

and the conclusion can be obtained simply by shuffling the p a r t s of the premises

and rearranging them. 1169

Toulmin could not accept t h i s formal approach t o validity. He argued t h a t

once "... we s u b s t i t u t e t h e backing f o r the warrant, i. e. i n t e r p r e t the universal

premise i n the other way, there w i l l no longer be room f o r applying the idea of

formal v a l i d i t y t o our argument. "70 Once we examine the f o r m of an argument and

recognize the d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e force of an inference-warrant and i t s back-

ing, we see t h a t t h e q u a l i t y of an argument i s "... not r e a l l y a consequence of

i t s formal p r 0 p e r t i e s . " 7 ~ As Toulmin stated: "once we bring i n t o the open the

backing on which ( i n the l a s t r e s o r t ) t h e soundness of our arguments depends, the

suggestion t h a t v a l i d i t y i s t o be explained i n terms of 'formal properties', i n

any geometrical sense, loses i t s plausibility.

The v a l i d i t y of an argument i s then not formal but pragmatic. The use

t o which t h e statements within a syllogism a r e put must be determined before i t s

v a l i d i t y can be evaluated. For instance, is the argument what Toulmin called a

"warrant-using" one where the claim i s made i n accordance with a warrant; o r , i s

it a "warrant-establishing" one where a ''novel warrant" i s argued with the help

of an independently v e r i f i e d s e t of data and conclusion. The v a l i d i t y of the

former depends on the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the warrant and the v a l i d i t y of i t s backing.

The v a l i d i t y of the l a t t e r depends on the way i n which the novel warrant I s devel-

oped from the data and conclusion. Neither form of v a l i d i t y can be determined by
r e s t r i c t i n g one's evaluation t o the formal nature of the argument. I n the

same way t h a t we must replace formal with pragmatic questions when we d i s -

cuss "universals", we must do t h i s when we determine the v a l i d i t y of a n a r -

gument.

The notion of formal v a l i d i t y not only f a i l s t o examine the form of

an argument it cannot account f o r t h e way warrants o r general hypotheses a r e

developed. "A general statement i n physical theory, a s Newton reminds us,

must be construed not a s a S t a t i s t i c a l report about the behaviour of a very

l a r g e number of objects, but r a t h e r a s an open warrant o r principle of compu-

tation: it is established by t e s t i n g it i n sample s i t u a t i o n s where both data

and conclusion a r e independently known, then rendered general by induction,

and f i n a l l y applied a s a r u l e of deduction i n f r e s h s i t u a t i o n s t o derive novel

conclusions f r o m our data."T3 The warrant does not come from a straightforward

deduction or induction. An "open warrant" o r "principle o f computation" has a

pragmatic function i n inquiry. It represents adequately the way the r e l a t i o n -

ship between data and claims a r e argued. The scope of t h e warrant i s then gen-

eralized by so-called "induction", and deductive processes a r e used t o broaden

the application o f the warrant. The only difference between induction and de-

duction i s the stage o f a n argument which we wish t o evaluate. These notions

a r e themselves pragmattc. Formal logicians often argue t h a t "the data and back-

ing positively e n t a i l t h e conclusion". 74 This i s what deduction has come t o mean

t o those who believe i n formal validity. This b e l i e f , however, i s based on an

ignorance of t h e many l e v e l s of' argument t h a t need t o be scrutinized f o r v a l i d i t y

t o be discerned.
 - 341 -
I

4 - Substantlal Arguments and Ideology

Toulmin a l s o c r i t i c i z e d the a n a l y t i c a l interpretation of logic.

He argued t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l arguments must be distinguished from a n -

-
c a l ones i f l o g i c a l theory i s t o account f o r the various forms of arguments

developed i n science. Substantial arguments involve a substantial o r sub-

stantive step "... i n passing t o the conclusion from the information we have

t o r e l y on ( datum and backing) ... Such an argument produces "... a s

grounds f o r a conclusion statements of q u i t e other l o g i c a l types than the

conclusion i t s e l f . "76 For instance, i n such arguments, people "... adopt

moral positions, and pass aesthetic judgments, and declare support f o r scien-

t i f i c theories o r p o l i t i c a l causes .. Appealing o r referring t o these

questions brings what Toulmin called "substance" i n t o an argument which i s

d i f f e r e n t than t h a t implied i n the data and claim. I n contrast, an analytic

argument has a non-substantive relationship between the backing and the con-

clusion. That i s , "... t h e backing f o r the warrant authorizing it includes

e x p l i c i t l y the information conveyed i n the conclusion i t s e l f . 1178

An argument i s often t r e a t e d a s i f it was a n a l y t i c a l when, i n f a c t ,

substance beyond the information provided gives it backing. As Toulmin said:

"...we have t o bring out the d i s t i n c t i o n between backing and warrant explic-
i t l y i n any p a r t i c u l a r case i f we a r e t o be c e r t a i n what s o r t of argument we

a r e concerned with ..."79 The reduction of a l l types of argument t o the

analytic forms accounts f o r the widespread ignorance among logicians of the

problem of ideology. A s u b s t a n t i a l argument brings i n t o i t s backing ideas

having t h e i r basis i n b e l i e f s and r e l a t e d s o c i a l practice which a r e not

" s c i e n t i f i c " i n the narrow, analytic sense. When Toulmin discussed the need
 - 342 -
I
,

t o always a s s e s s arguments within a context, he was suggesting a s i m i l a r

point. He r e f e r r e d t o t h e assessment of arguments I n terms of t h e i r con-

text a s criticism. "Criticism of t h i s s o r t i s , i n t h e widest sense of t h e

word, e t h i c a l criticism: it t r e a t s an utterance a s a n a c t i o n performed i n

a given s i t u a t i o n , and asks about t h e merits of t h i s a c t i o n when looked a t

i n t h e context of i t s performance. "80

Criticism, i n i t s widest sense, must be based on a n awareness of

what we have c a l l e d t h e problem of ideology. The r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e

problems, methods and t h e o r i e s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e a paradigm or a model, t h e

s o c l a l and p o l i t i c a l function of t h e c l a s s of problems emphasized by such a

model and t h e form and content of knowledge developed from it is c e r t a i n l y

relevant f o r assessing s u b s t a n t i a l arguments. Furthermore, t h e concern with

t h e context of an argument can lead t o a sociology of knowledge o r i e n t a t i o n

f o r assessing arguments. Toulmin recognized t h i s when he talked of 'I.. . the

field-dependence of t h e c r i t e r i a we employ i n t h e p r a c t i c a l buslness of argu-

ment. !l8' He touched on one of t h e implications of t h i s o r i e n t a t i o n when he

continued "... it i s only n a t u r a l t o expect t h a t inference-warrants i n d i f -

f e r e n t f i e l d s s h ~ u l dneed e s t a b l i s h i n g by q u i t e d i f f e r e n t s o r t s o r proce-

cedure. 11 82

S u b s t a n t i a l arguments a r e c l e a r l y not ideology-free. But can we t r e a t

so-called a n a l y t i c arguments a s being ideology-free? Though h i s treatment of

t h i s question was not i n terms of t h e problem of ideology, Toulmints argument

suggests t h a t we cannot. He asked: "... upon what foundation ( do a n a l y t i c

arguments depend f o r t h e i r v a l i d i t y . Does such an argument depend upon

i t s e l f , so t o speak, f o r i t s v a l i d i t y ? O r i s an argument which makes a claim

on t h e b a s i s of i t s data and i t s backing always a tautology?

Toulmin believed t h a t s c i e n t i f i c argument should have some p r a c t i c a l ,

predictive value and t h i s led him t o be s k e p t i c a l of a n a l y t i c arguments. "1f

t h e purpose of an argument is t o e s t a b l i s h conclusions about which we a r e not

e n t i r e l y confident by r e l a t i n g them back t o other information about which we

have g r e a t e r assurance, it begins t o be a l i t t l e doubtful whether any genuine,

p r a c t i c a l argument could ever be properly analytic. "84 A "genuine, p r a c t i c a l

argument" always involves a r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e "general" and t h e " p a r t i c -

ular". A s we argued above, argument i s d i a l e c t i c a l . The general includes a l l

t h e assumptions and b e l i e f s t h a t underlie or r e l a t e t o any problem and method.

The p a r t i c u l a r includes t h e data and t h e claim made from it. Only i f we t r e a t

t h e language within which an argument i s expressed a s t h e particular85 and ig-

nore t h e r e a l meaning o r s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e words, t h a t i s , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s

beyond t h e p a r t i c u l a r data and claim implied by them, can we even begin t o a r -

gue t h a t a n a l y t i c logic is possible. Toulmin r e j e c t e d t h i s

"... r a t h e r limited doctrine about t h e nature and scope of logic. I f t h e

only p r i n c i p l e s of inference properly so-called a r e statements about t h e
meanings of our words, then (some have argued) it i s misleading t o apply
t h e t i t l e of i n f e r r i n g - r u l e s t o other s o r t s of general statement a l s o ,
which a r e concerned with matters of substance and not simply with t h e
meanings of our words: a s a r e s u l t , t h e whole notion of inference-war-
r a n t s , a s s e t out i n t h i s essay, has been pushed aside a s confused. 1186

The a n a l y t i c or l i n g u i s t i c approach t o l o g i c i s ignorant of t h e complexity and

t h e form of arguments. It ignores t h e f a c t t h a t warrants a r e always used, prag-

matically, t o help us argue. It ignores t h e relevance of t h e context ( e.g. , ex-

perimental, p o l i t i c a l , e t c . ) f o r assessing t h e v a l i d i t y of any argument. Its

s i m p l i c i t y may be a t t r a c t i v e , but it does not help us c l a r i f y t h e problems

ideology and logic present f o r t h e s o c i a l sciences.

On t h e basis of h i s discussion of substantive and a n a l y t i c arguments,

Toulmin concluded "... t h a t even a n a l y t i c syllogisms a r e not v a l i d i n v i r t u e

of t h e meanings of words alone ..."87 I f we a r e t o admit t h a t arguments a l -

ways involve "inference-warrants" which help us t o make t h e jump from data t o

a claim, and some such view of argument seems necessary i f we a r e t o avoid a

metaphysical scientism, then we a l s o w i l l have t o abandon t h e s c i e n t i s t i c d i -

chotomy between "science" and "ideology". I f "substance" beyond our data i s

Involved i n a l l u s e f u l s c i e n t i f i c claims and we t h e r e f o r e undertake a study

of t h e b e l i e f s and r e l a t e d s o c i a l p r a c t i c e t h a t underlies c e r t a i n "substance"

then we again come face t o face with t h e problem of ideology. It i s a problem

t h a t a narrow, formal logic can ignore. It i s not one, however, t h a t a narrow,

formal logic can annihilate.

Toulmin's conclusions were more limited than my own. After examining

t h e a n a l y t i c a l syllogism, he concluded t h a t t h e "principle of Syllogism e n t e r s

logic when t h e second premiss of an a n a l y t i c syllogism i s misinterpreted a s

s t a t i n g a datum instead of a warrant or i t s backing, and t h e argument i s there-

upon ( apparently) l e f t without any authorizing warrant. !l8* My own argument does

not c o n t r a d i c t , but builds upon, t h i s analysis. Though Toulminls r e j e c t i o n of

s y l l o g i s t i c and a n a l y t i c a l , t h a t i s , formal logic was based upon a study of t h e

layout of arguments, my own argument t h a t formal logic functions a s p a r t of t h e

ideology of scientism is reinforced by h i s analysis.

 - 345 -
,

5 - Formal Logic and t h e S c i e n t i s t i c Myth of Determinism

On t h e b a s i s of h i s c r i t i c i s m of formal logic Toulmin warned us of the

dangers of s i m p l i c i t y i n matters of logic. "Many of t h e current problems i n

t h e l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n spring from adopting t h e a n a l y t i c paradigm-argument a s a

standard by comparison with which a l l other arguments can be c r i t i c i z e d . a 89

It i s a mistake, he argued, t o apply t h e " a n a l y t i c paradigm" beyond its proper

scope, which i s f a r d i f f e r e n t from saying t h a t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r l o g i c a l and ide-

ological paradigm has been of no value. As Toulmin said: 'I.. . it would be

q u i t e another ( t h i n g ) t o t r e a t t h i s type of argument a s a paradigm and t o demand

t h a t arguments i n other f i e l d s should conform t o i t s standards regardless, or t o

b u i l d up from a study of t h e simplest forms of argument alone a s e t of categories

intended f o r a p p l i c a t i o n t o arguments of a11 s o r t s : one must a t any r a t e begin

by inquiring c a r e f u l l y how f a r t h e a r t i f i c i a l s i m p l i c i t y of one's chosen model

r e s u l t s i n these l o g i c a l categories a l s o being a r t i f i c i a l l y simple. 1190

Several common e r r o r s r e s u l t from t h i s overuse of t h e a n a l y t i c paradigm.

For one thing, i t s over-application has l e d t o t h e f a l l a c i o u s equation of t h e

idea of "deduction" with t h a t of "necessity". I n an attempt t o extend i t s con-

t r o l over contemporary s o c i a l science, t h e ideology of scientism over-applies

l o g i c a l c a t e g o r i e s , and, a s such, c r e a t e s such mystifications. As we saw above

Toulmin r e j e c t e d t h e idea t h a t necessity or determinism was deducible from t h e

s c i e n t i f i c method. He elaborated on t h i s argument by contrasting h i s d i s t i n c -

t i o n between a n a l y t i c and s u b s t a n t i a l arguments with four other common d i s t i n c -

t i o n s i n logic. He pointed out t h a t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between a n a l y t i c and sub-

s t a n t i a l arguments was not t h e same a s t h a t between formally v a l i d arguments

and other types. Any argument It.. . may be expressed i n a formally valid

manner, provided t h a t the warrant i s formulated e x p l i c i t l y a s a warrant and

authorizes precisely t h e s o r t of inference i n question ..."91 He a l s o pointed

out t h a t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n was not t h e same a s t h a t between "warrant-usingn and

"warrant-establishing" arguments. Though it i s more d i f f i c u l t t o s t a t e warrant-

establishing arguments i n a formally valid manner we cannot equate formally

v a l i d arguments with analytic ones.

Toulmin a l s o pointed out t h a t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n was not the same a s t h a t

developed by analyzing the "ports o f words1' appearing i n an argument. He argued

that he t a s k of identifying analytic arguments cannot ... be performed by

looking f o r key words ... ( b u t ) can be done only by looking a t the nature of
t h e problem under investigation, and the manner i n which we e s t a b l i s h t h e war-

r a n t s relevant t o i t s solution. t~~~ Lastly, and t h i s i s most relevant t o us, he

pointed out t h a t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n was not synonymous with t h a t between "... argu-

ments whose conclusions can be inferred necessarily or c e r t a i n l y and those whose

conclusions can be inferred only possibly or with p r ~ b a b i l i t y . " ~Rather

~ than

an argument being necessary or conclusive because it i s analytic, it can only

be t r e a t e d a s such It... when t h e warrant authorizes the s t e p from data t o claim

unambiguously. "94 This unambiguity would i t s e l f depend on a p a r t i c u l a r paradigm,

model or ideology, so a deterministic conclusion, a s the ideology of scientism

t r e a t s "determinism", could never be j u s t i f i a b l e .

Once these four d l s t l n c t i o n s a r e c l e a r l y distinguished from the one

between analytic and s u b s t a n t i a l arguments, we can enhance our c l a r i t y about

problems i n logic. Referring t o the confusion t h a t r e s u l t s from confounding

 these d i s t i n c t i o n s , Toulmin wrote: " ~ e r h a p s , indeed, i t would be b e t t e r t o

scrap t h e words 'deductively 1 and Inecessarily e n t i r e l y , and t o replace them

e i t h e r by I a n a l y t i c a l l y l or by lunequivocallyt according t o t h e needs of t h e

example. 11 95

6 - Idealized and Working Logic

Toulmin believed t h a t t h e assessment of p r a c t i c a l arguments was t h e

subject matter of logic. What he c a l l e d "working logic", i n c o n t r a s t t o "ide-

a l i z e d logic", should be t h e concern of logic. The overuse of t h e a n a l y t i c

paradigm leads t o such an idealized logic. But we have seen t h e p i t - f a l l s of

"... t h e i d e a l of t h e subject ( o f l o g i c ) a s a formal, deductive and presumably

I - axiomatic science. 't96 A t t h i s point it is u s e f u l t o ask how t h e idealized ver-

s i o n of logic has developed and persisted. I s h a l l expand on t h i s i n Chapter

Twenty.

Toulmin r e f e r r e d t o t h e two views of geometry among Greek i n t e l l e c t u a l s

and suggested t h a t a s i m i l a r d i v i s i o n e x i s t s among those who presently believe

i n idealized logic. Some believed t h a t t h e It... subject applied d i r e c t l y t o

t h e changeable objects of t h e material world, while others claimed t h a t ( i t )

r e f e r r e d r a t h e r t o an independent c l a s s of change-free things ...n97 I n logic

t h e former leads t o a b e l i e f t h a t "propositions a r e t e n s e l e s s " and can be applied

d i r e c t l y t o a v a r i e t y of subject matters. The l a t t e r view leads t o a b e l i e f t h a t

t h e subject matter i t s e l f w i l l prove t o be mzde of "change-free, time-independent

objects". 98 Though both these formal, mathematical-like approaches t o logic have

a place, they cannot f u l f i l l what Toulmin c a l l e d t h e " j u s t i f i c a t o r y task" of a

working logic.
 "The trouble does not l i e within t h e formal systems themselves: it would
be p o i n t l e s s t o argue t h a t one could not have formal mathematical calcu-
li concerned with t h e r e l a t i o n s between propositions, since everyone
knows what elaborate and sophisticated propositional c a l c u l i have i n
-
f a c t been b u i l t up i n recent years. The objections t u r n r a t h e r on t h e
question, what a p p l i c a t i o n these c a l c u l i can have t o t h e p r a c t i c a l as-
sessment of arguments - whether t h e r e l a t i o n s so elegantly formalized
i n these systems a r e , i n f a c t , t h e ones which concern us when we ask
i n p r a c t i c e about t h e cogency, f o r c e and a c c e p t a b i l i t y of arguments. 1199

Toulmin did not believe t h a t a working logic could ever r e s u l t from a

reformed version of i d e a l i z e d logic. And t h e contemporary idea t h a t logic i s

t h e study of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s among propositions i s a reformed version of ide-

*
a l i z e d logic. "A c r i t i c ' s business i s t o inquire how f a r c e r t a i n statements

c i t e d a s data support a conclusion or statement of claim; so t h a t a formal logic

of propositions w i l l have t o be transcribed so a s t o r e f e r t o statements before

we can hope t o apply i t s r e s u l t s . "100 When I c r i t i c i z e Kaufmannls rule-centered

logic i n Chapter Seventeen, I w i l l show t h e inadequacies of a l l approaches t o

logic which only reform i d e a l i z e d logic.

Toulmin recognized t h a t our view of language a f f e c t s our understanding

of logic. And he r e j e c t e d t h e s t a t i c approach t h a t idealized logic takes t o

language. " c e r t a i n l y language a s we know it c o n s i s t s , not of timeless proposi-

t i o n s , but of utterances dependent i n a l l s o r t s of ways on t h e context or occa-

s i o n on which they a r e uttered. "'01 The p a r t i c u l a r context i n which language i s

used w i l l a f f e c t i t s meaning. Reforming formal l o g i c i n t o a logic of propositions

does not s i t u a t e language i n praxis nor see t h e relevance of doing t h i s f o r our

approach t o logic. I n Chapter Nineteen, I s h a l l argue t h a t a pragmatic approach

t o logic and awareness of t h e r e l a t i o n s of language and l o g i c a r e complementary.

Toulmin expressed a n i n t e r e s t i n t h e " h i s t o r i c a l t r a n s i t i o n " from t h e

Greekst idea of geometry t o t h e present views of formal logic. He asked: "why

should t h e medieval logic of statements have been abandoned, and displaced a l -

most e n t i r e l y by a propositional logic which r e l a t e s not contexf--dependent u t -

terances, but context-invariant propositions?"lo2 He suggested t h a t t h e inven-

t i o n of p r i n t i n g may p a r t l y explain t h i s change. With p r i n t i n g t h e r e came a

permanent recording of statements, and language came t o be thought of a s "con-

text-invariant". Before p r i n t i n g "... t h e t r a n s i e n t f irework-like character of

our utterances would remain overwhelmingly obvious. 'lo3 The search f o r "forms"

t h a t represented t h e changes, or "forms" t h a t were thought t o be t h e r e a l i t y be-

hind t h e changes, characterized t h e logic i n t h e period before t h e Guttenburg

galaxy.

Toulmin a l s o suggested t h a t t h e r e was a r e v i v a l of "Platonism" a f t e r t h e

17th century European s c i e n t i f i c revolution. A concern with employing "mathemat-

i c a l methods and models i n a l l speculations" expresses a P l a t o n i s t view about t h e

s t a t u s of mathematical e n t i t i e s . Toulmin r e j e c t e d t h i s new Platonism. I f we

"freeze statements i n t o timeless propositions before admitting them i n t o logic",

we cannot c r i t i c a l l y a s s e s s t h e layout of arguments. As he said: It... utterances

a r e made a t p a r t i c u l a r times and i n p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s , and they have t o be

understood and assessed with one eye on t h i s context. "lo' A b e l i e f i n timeless

propositions does not allow us t o a s s e s s t h e v a l i d i t y of an argument i n terms of

i t s o r i g i n s , nature and consequences. Freezing statements i n t o timeless proposi-

t i o n s makes it impossible t o study t h e r e l a t i o n s of language and logic, of language

and praxis, and of t h e relevance of t h e problem of ideology t o i s s u e s i n logic.

Unless we believe i n formal v a l i d i t y , which we have already c r i t i c i z e d , or have a

 - 350 -
1

metaphysical view of science, we have t o undertake t h i s thorough assessment of

a n argument.

Many who a r e a n t i - s c i e n t i s t i c i n r h e t o r i c s t i l l believe i n and use f o r -

mal logic. Their idealized logic has l i t t l e relevance t o t h e working logic of

the scientist. Because of t h e irrelevance of idealized l o g i c , and t h e s c i e n t i s t i c

dichotomy between theory and practice t h a t underlies t h i s idealized l o g i c , l o 5 some

logicians have t r i e d t o separate logic i n t o " l o g i c a l theory" and " l o g i c a l practice".

But t h i s simply formalizes t h e underlying error. I f logic i s t o c r i t i c a l l y a s s e s s

t h e v a l i d i t y of arguments, then it must be rooted i n t h e p r a c t i c e of inquiry. This

includes t h e use of theory. My discussion of Toulminls approach t o t h e philosophy

of science argued t h a t theory and experimentation have a d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p

i n t h e p r a c t i c e of inquiry. There i s no theory t h a t i s added t o practice. So we

must abandon, not reform, idealized logic and replace it with a logic t h a t can

assess arguments a s arguments. Such a revolution i n logic can help us go beyond

t h e pseudo-problems of formal logic, and pave t h e way f o r an e x p l i c i t consideration

of t h e problems t h a t ideology poses f o r t h e s o c i a l sciences. Such a revolution i n

logic i s fundamental t o t h e t a s k of humanizing t h e s o c i a l sciences.

Toulminls theory of logic i s relevant t o t h i s task. He acknowledged t h a t

logic was a normative d i s c i p l i n e and wrote t h a t "... i f logic i s a normative sub-

j e c t , concerned with t h e appraisal of arguments and t h e recognition of t h e i r

merits, 11106 we cannot expect t o have a s t a t i c science of logic t h a t e x i s t s sep-

a r a t e l y from t h e changing subject matters of t h e sciences themselves. Logic must

be rooted i n t h e changing subject matters of s c i e n t i f i c inquiry. And, i f l o g i c

i s t o be normative and judgmental, it cannot ignore how ideology a f f e c t s t h e o r i g i n ,

nature and consequences of d i f f e r e n t forms of argument. Once a formal logic which

 I

looks f o r t h e " i n t e r n a l consistency" of an argument i s replaced by a p r a c t i c a l

logic t h a t evaluates t h e "strength of argwncnts" t h e r e w i l l be no way t o avoid

t h e problem of ideology.

7 - Comparative Epistemological Analysis

On t h e b a s i s of h i s study, Toulmin made t h r e e conclusions. He f i r s t

concluded t h a t t h e f i e l d s of "logic" and "epistemology" require a rapprochement.

"... t h e proper business of both i s t o study t h e s t r u c t u r e s of

He argued t h a t

our arguments i n d i f f e r e n t f i e l d s ...'Io7 There have been several detrimental

e f f e c t s from t h i s dichotomy between l o g i c and epistemology. The separation of

t h e assessment of arguments, i. e. , logic, from t h e o r i e s of knowledge, i. e. ,

epistemology, has allowed our ignorance and confusion about t h e interdependence

of science and ideology t o go unchallenged. It has kept us without a language

or t h e awareness t o begin t o c l a r i f y t h e problems entailed. Neither formal l o g i c

nor a b s t r a c t t h e o r i e s of knowledge can help us t o see how a c l a s s of problems, t h e

methods and t h e o r i e s used t o study them, and t h e s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l context and

function of science a t a p a r t i c u l a r time underlie and a f f e c t t h e consequences of

our knowledge.

Toulminls second conclusion was t h a t t h e "comparative method" must be

u t i l i z e d i n assessing arguments. Once absolutes a r e taken out of science and

t h e notion of formal v a l i d i t y i s r e j e c t e d , we have no choice but t o inquire and

a s s e s s our arguments i n a comparative way. Once we r e j e c t t h e notion of formal

v a l i d i t y and s i t u a t e l o g i c i n changing subject matters, we r e a l i z e t h a t t h e nr-

of arguments i n one f i e l d cannot provide a "universal standard of merit and

v a l i d i t y " . lo* The v a l i d i t y of an argument must be determined by assessing it i n

terms of t h e relevant subject matter a t hand. The It.. . standards w i l l be f i e l d -
dependent, and ( t h e ) merits t o be demanded of an argument i n one f i e l d w i l l be

found t o be absent ... from e n t i r e l y meritorious arguments i n another. 11109

This means t h a t we cannot r e j e c t c e r t a i n problems a s being i r r e l e v a n t t o

t h e s o c i a l sciences because t h e i r logic does not appear t o conform t o t h e dominant

arguments i n another f i e l d . Validity must be assessed i n t h e concrete; i n sub-

stance, not a t t r i b u t e d because of a b s t r a c t form. Doing t h i s i s an impossible t a s k

f o r those who begin with fixed commitments t o s p e c i f i c t h e o r i e s and a r e l a t e d c l a s s

of problems, equating these with "science" and a l l ideas t h a t contrast with them

as "ideologyt1. A comparative, not one-dimensional, method i s required t o assess

t h e worth of arguments and t h i s demands a logic rooted i n dialogue not dogmatism.

I n Chapter Twenty-one I s h a l l discuss how t h e fragmentation of research and teach-

Ing makes t h e achievement of comparative logic nearly impossible a t present.

Toulmin's approach t o logic c o n t r a s t s sharply with t h a t of Popper. When

Toulmin s t a t e d t h a t questions about v a l i d i t y of arguments must be asked "within

t h e l i m i t s of a given f i e l d " , he was, i n e f f e c t , r e j e c t i n g Popper's formalism.

We saw how Popper developed a "perfect model" of "historicism" and then "arguing"

with h i s own model developed notions i n l o g i c ( e . g . , hypothetico-deductive models)

which he applied indiscriminately. He admitted t h a t he developed h i s theory of

l o g i c without knowledge of relevant subject matter i n t h e s o c i a l sciences. The

r e s u l t was a confused mixture of poor l o g i c , bad s o c i a l theory and crude polemlcs.

Toulmin's t h i r d conclusion was t h a t logic must cease t o be an a p r i o r i

subject. This i s t h e way Popper and a l l formal logicians t r e a t it. He argued

t h a t t h e study of logic must be both more empirical and more h i s t o r i c a l . "we

 d
must study t h e ways of arguing which have e s t blished themselves i n any sphere,

accepting them a s h i s t o r i c a l f a c t kn ing t h a t they m y be superseded, but

only a s t h e r e s u l t of a revolutionary advance i n our methods of thought.

11110

For Toulmin, t h i s meant t h a t "epistemological a n a l y s i s " must replace "episte-

mological theory " . This study of t h e ideology and logic of scientism con-

s t i t u t e s such a n analysis. By outlining t h e problem of ideology and discussing

issues i n l o g i c i n terms of it I have attempted t o bring about a rapprochement

of l o g i c and epistemology through a comparative analysis.

Footnotes

'stephen E. Toulmin: The Philosophy of Science. New York, Harper and Row
( 1 9 6 0 ) ~ p. 18.

2 ~ b i d . t p. 20.

31bid., p. 30.

'1bid.

51bid., p. 31.

%bid., p. 33.

7 ~ b i d . , p. 34.

*1bid., p. 41.

g ~ b i d . , p. 42.

11bid., p. 43.

bid., p. 44.

1 2 ~ b i d . , p. 46.

lkbid., p. 51.
141bid., p. 54.

151bid., P. 55.

16~bid., p. 58.

171bid., p. 63.

181bid., p. 66.

191bid., p. 67.
201bid., p. 70.
21~bid., p. 79.
22~bid., pp. 79-80.

23~bid., p. 84.

24~id., p. 89. Recognizing the distinction between laws as representations and

statements about the application of laws complements an awareness of the centrality
of judgment in science. As Toulmin said: "It is by recognizing the nature of this
division that one comes to see how physicists steer their way between the scylla
of fallible generalization and the Charybdis of empty tautology." (Ibid., p. 89. )

251bid., p. 98.

261bid.

271bid., p. 101.

281bid., p. 102.

291bid., p. 105.

3O1bid., p. 107.

311bid., p. 108.

321bid., p. 112.

331bid., p. 119.

341bid., p. 120.
3 5 ~ u s s e l l ~ssi m p l i s t i c understanding of t h e philosophy of science and l o g i c was
p a r a l l e l e d by h i s s u p e r f i c i a l understanding of t h e s o c i a l arrangement of science.
For example, i n Bertrand Russell: The Future of Science, New York, Philosophical
Library (1959), t h e r e i s no mention of t h e problem of ideology vis-a-vis science.

3 6 ~ o u l m i n , op. c i t . , p. 129.

371bid., p. 145.

381bid.s p. 148.

4 2 ~ t e p h e nE. Toulmin: The Uses of Argument. Cambridge, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press

(1964)s P- 3.

4 3 ~ nChapter Twenty, we s h a l l s e e t h a t Toulmin was i n e r r o r d e s c r i b i n g Dewey's

approach t o l o g i c i n t h i s way. I n no way was Dewey's approach t o l o g i c based on a
sociologism. Rather t h a n reducing i n f e r e n c e t o h a b i t s , Dewey argued f o r t h e widest
f l e x i b i l i t y i n t h e s c i e n t i f i c a b s t r a c t ions u t i l i z e d i n inquiry.

5 4 ~ b i d ., p. 102. The Winston D l c t i o n a r ~ ,College E d i t i o n ( 1957), d e f i n e s presump-

t i o n a s "a going beyond due bounds; bold forwardness ... a t a k i n g f o r granted;
acceptance and b e l i e f of something not f u l l y proved ... t h a t which forms a l o g i c a l
b a s i s f o r acceptance and b e l i e f , without a c t u a l proof: Law, t h e inference t h a t a n
a c t has been committed, o r t h a t a f a c t e x i s t s : Based upon circumstances t h a t
usually attend an act or f a c t ... " Argument always goes "beyond due bounds",
o r it i s not of any value. And t h a t i s why argument cannot be reduced t o de-
ductive, a n a l y t i c forms. V a l i d i t y comes not from a deductive inference but
from t h e q u a l i t y (e.g., backing) of an argument.

551bid.

561bid. * p. 103.

5 7 ~ b i d ., p. 105.

58rbid., p. 108.

591bid., pp. 111-12.

6 0 ~ b i d ., p. 113.
8 5 ~ fwe t r e a t language per s e a s i f it i s the argument and f a i l t o t r e a t language
a s an attempt t o conceptualize r e a l relationships and events from past, present
and even f u t u r e s i t u a t i o n s , then, i n e f f e c t , we a r e denying the p o s s i b i l i t y of
inference and discovery. A semantic approach t o t h e meaning of language a b s t r a c t s
words *om context, and though it can make some important points about language
forms, it cannot account f o r t h e way language i s used t o deal, a b s t r a c t l y , with
t h e significance of experience through time and events. The t h e o r i s t who analyzes
language i n a semantic way i s conceptualizing and hence cannot deny t h a t t h e per-
son who wrote what is being read was a l s o attempting t o use language t o t h i s end.
 9 6 ~ b i d . , P. 177.

971bid., p. 178.

%bid., P. 179.

%bid., pp. 179-80.

1O01bid., p. 180

1011bid.

lo3with p r i n t i n g it became f e a s i b l e t o c r e a t e language thak had a n independent,

m a t e r i a l r e a l i t y . This was fundamental t o t h e spread of s c i e n t i f i c i n q u i r y , but
i t a l s o p a r t i a l l y u n d e r l i e s t h e modern tendency t o r e i f y language. I f we remember
t h a t u n l e s s language i s s i t u a t e d i n p r a x i s it cannot be used t o c r e a t e knowledge,
t h e n t h e ihdependent, m a t e r i a l r e a l i t y pf language (e.g. books) should not c r e a t e
any problems f o r l o g i c .

104~oulmin, op. c i t . , p. 182. Toulminls concern with t h e scope of t h e o r i e s , t h e con-

t e x t of t h e i r use and t h e field-dependence of t h e c r i t e r i a we employ i n evaluating
them a l l r e f l e c t h i s j u s t i f i c a t o r y , pragmatic view of logic. The formal o r i e n t a t i o n
t o l o g i c d i s r e g a r d s t h e contemporary and/or h i s t o r i c a l r o o t i n g and functioning of
any p r o p o s i t i o n s , statements and language, and t h e r e f o r e l a c k s t h i s concern. Yet,
t o make good our claims, a s Toulminputs It, it i s always necessary t o argue i n
accordance with standards which have a f i e l d dependency. The f o r c e of t h e u n i v e r s a l
warrant, f o r example, a s backing f o r a p a r t i c u l a r claim, i s dependent on a f i e l d -
a s i t u a t i o n w i t h i n which a t h e o r y can be shown t o have relevance (e.g. have predfc-
t i v c v a l i d i t y i n terms of a problem an& r e l a t e d i d e a l ) . The f i e l d and r e l a t e d c r i -
t e r i a must be r e l e v a n t t o t h e s u b j e c t matter a t hand, and, s i n c e both t h e f i e l d
and s u b j e c t matter a r e changing (though s t r u c t u r e d ) through time, t h i s means t h a t
a d i a l e c t i c l o g i c i s r e q u i r e d t o make t h i s judgment. The grounds f o r a claim,
according t o Toulmin, a r e of a d i f f e r e n t l o g i c a l type t h a n t h e claim i t s e l f , and
can e n t a i l , f o r both f o r c e and backing, normative m a t t e r s l i k e t h e appeal t o a
p o l i t i c a l cause. To a s s e s s an argurncrit, then, i s u l t i m a t e l y t o a s s c j s t h e s i t u a t i o n ( s )
w i t h i n which a warrant, which can be an i d e o l o g i c a l m a t t e r , g a i n s significance. Prag-
mat i c d i s t i n c t i o n s between kinds of f i e l d s , say "experimental-educational" and " p o l i -
t i c a l " , a r e necessary f o r c l a r i t y . The d i f f i c u l t i e s of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e s e , e s p e c i a l l y
When t h e pragmatic o r i e n t a t i o n t o l o g i c i s not g e n e r a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d , does not reduce
t h e need f o r them. The need t o understand t h e field-dependence of c r i t e r i a we use t o
c l a r i f y how t h e inference-warrants i n d i f f e r e n t f i e l d s a r e e s t a b l i s h e d by d i f f e r e n t
Procedures i s i n d i s p e n s i b l e f o r developing a pragmatic, s e l f - c r i t i c a l s o c i a l inquiry.
When t h e formal o r i e n t a t i o n t o l o g i c i s c r i t i c i z e d and r e j e c t e d i n t h i s t h e s i s t h i s
means t h a t a paradigm of l o g i c , one which i d e a l i z e s t h e formal, deductive and axiom-
a t i c , and ignores l o g i c a l problems r e l a t e d t o t h e scope, context and f i e l d c r i t e r i a
O f d i f f e r e n t s u b j e c t m a t t e r s , must be surpassed. A s I have s t a t e d i n s e v e r a l p l a ~ e s ,
t h i s does not e n t a i l t h e r e j e c t i o n of t h e conceptual technique of determining t h e
formal v a l i d i t y of arguments, but it would involve t h e r e j e c t i o n of t h e narrow,
e s t a b l i s h e d formal l o g i c which obscures and/or ignores t h e problem of Ideology.
The r e l a t i o n s of language, a s an a s p e c t of p r a x i s , and l o g i c need t o be s t u d i e d
a s p a r t of t h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o j e c t . The d i s c u s s i o n of " ~ u l e sand The General-
i z e d o t h e r 1 ' , and h he S o c i a l F i e l d o f Science", i n Chapter Nineteen, i s only a
beginning.
( F. Collinge, t h e s i s s u p e r v i s o r , introduced me t o Toulminls work with t h e following
memo: "On r e f l e c t i o n , i t would seem t o me t h a t i f you a r e going t o put any respec-
t a b l e p h i l o s o p h i c a l conceptual c l o t h e s on your naked sociology of knowledge-type
impulses, it w i l l have t o be done i n terms of epistemology. Now i n conventional
p o s i t i v i s t i c epistemology ( o r any o t h e s ) t h e r e i s no hope -- a s poor Mannheim s o
adequately shows. T h i s , I t h i n k , i s f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t conventional epistemology
i s a l l hung up on what i s i n f a c t a hoary assumption about logic: t h a t any know-
ledge claim, t o be r e a l l y good, must f i t t h a t form known a s t h e a n a l y t i c form
wherein e x p l a n a t i o n s can be s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d deduced from premises. But some con-
temporary work on l o g i c shows t h i s t o be q u i t e probably a bad way t o look a t l o g i c
-- t h a t , b r i e f l y , t h e r e i s no such t h i n g a s a 'simple' deduction of e x p l a n a t i o n s ;
t h a t what appears t o happen i s t h a t explanations a r e produced by arguments t h a t
-
look deductive but a r e not -- explanations t h a t i n f a c t depend on a form of i n -
f e r e n c e which i s ' f i e l d dependent1. This means, o r could mean, t h a t t h e r e i s i n
e f f e c t not one but many l o g i c s , t h a t t h e r e i s no such t h i n g a s explanation,
t h a t l o g i c and epistemology a r e r e a l l y t h e same t h i n g i n t h a t both have t o do w i t h
t h e way each c o n c e p t u a l l y d i s t i n c t language organizes i t s experience and i t s l i n -
g u i s t i c metaphor-models t o d e a l w i t h i t s subj.ect-matter. .When you break down l o g i c
t h i s way, and when you make explanation, language and context - dependent, you
have p r e c i s e l y g i v e n a foundation f o r t a l k i n g about a sociology of knowledge. Even
a n anthropology. " - March 21, 1968)

'O51n Chapter Twenty I w i l l c r i t i c i z e t h e s c i e n t i s t i c dichotomy between theory

and p k a c t i c e and d i s c u s s how it i s r o o t e d i n a r e i f i e d approach t o l o g i c .

106~oulmin, op. c i t . , P. 187.

 Chapter Seventeen

A Rule-Centered Logic: Kauf~nann

Toulminls r e j e c t i o n o f formal, deductive logic and h i s t h e s i s t h a t t h e

proper study of logic is t h e assessment of p r a c t i c a l arguments a r e c l o s e l y re-

lated. Before we expand on t h i s t h e s i s by discussing how t h e relationships

between ideology and logic can be approached i n terms of language, it i s useful

t o discuss a sampling of theories of logic t h a t only appear t o be f r e e of the

f a l l a c i e s of Weber, Durkheim and Popper. I have selected the work of Kaufmann

and Winch since i n d i f f e r i n g ways they both base t h e i r argument on a discussion

of rules.

Approaching logic i n terms of r u l e s i s a widespread but inadequate tend-

ency i n contemporary s o c i a l science. Like a l l formal approaches t o logic it re-

s t r i c t s our awareness o f how ideology and logic i n t e r r e l a t e . Though Kaufmann

rejected t r a d i t i o n a l ideas of logic, h i s discussion of "rules" i s only a more

sophisticated attempt t o keep logic and ideology separate. Kaufmann can there-

f o r e be seen a s a reformer, not a r e v o l u t i o n i s t ( a s we.can c a l l Toulmin and

~ e w e y )i n the f i e l d o f logic.

Matters of Fact and Matters of Meaning

Kaufmann b u i l t h i s discussion around the d i s t i n c t i o n between "matters of

f a c t " , which he c a l l e d "synthetical propositions" t h a t deal with a causal analysis,

and " r e l a t i o n s of meaning", which he c a l l e d " a n a l y t i c a l propositions". This dis-

t i n c t i o n between meaning and f a c t c o n t r a s t s sharply with Dewey's logic which I

w i l l discuss i n Chapter Twenty. Though affected by Dewey, Kaufmann wrote:

"I could not accept t h i s theory of meaning. This l e d me t o a reconsidera-

t i o n of t h e problem how the l o g i c a l analysis of s c i e n t i f i c procedure
(methodology) i s r e l a t e d t o deductive logic. I came t o t h e conclusion
t h a t methodology must be c l e a r l y distinguished from deductive logic and
recognized a s a n autonomous r a t i o n a l discipline.

Kaufmann t r e a t e d "methodology" a s "an autonomous r a t i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e "

which d i f f e r s from deductive logic. This amounted t o a r e j e c t i o n of "epistemol-

ogy". Kaufmann thus wrote: "we s h a l l not assume t h a t t h e c o n f l i c t i n g epistemol-

ogical doctrines 'behind1 t h e methodological controversies lead t o t h e core of

these issue^."^ But does t h i s r e - d e f i n i t i o n solve anything? Does t h e c r e a t i o n

of a new " d i s c i p l i n e " solve t h e problem (e.g., abstracted views of knowledge) with

which t h e older d i s c i p l i n e l e f t us? To c l a r i f y t h i s l e t us see how Kaufmann ap-

p l i e d h i s d i s c i p l i n e of methodology, and t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between f a c t and meaning,

t o general issues i n t h e philosophy of science.

Kauf'mann applied h i s d i s t i n c t i o n t o a discussion of t h e r e l a t i o n of "know-

ledge and r e a l i t y " . We have seen throughout t h i s study how one's approach t o t h i s

question w i l l underlie one's o r i e n t a t i o n t o epistemology and logic and determine

whether t h e problem of ideology i s t r e a t e d problematically or i n a s u p e r f i c i a l

way. Our discussion of Mannheim showed t h a t even asking how r e a l i t y and knowledge

a r e related i s an error. Kaufmannls o r i e n t a t i o n t o t h i s question was one of seeing

"philosophy ... ( a s t h e ) analysis of experience". " ~ h i l o s o p h y "and "experience"

g e t placed i n d i f f e r e n t realms with t h e former associated with knowledge and t h e

l a t t e r with r e a l i t y . Consistent with t h i s orientation, Kaufmann talked of t h e

"genetic f a l l a c y " , t h a t i s , "... confounding ( t h e ) analysis of meanings with

causal explanation ..."'I n t h i s view, knowledge and meaning become abstracted

from experience and causation. For Popper, t h e so-called genetic f a l l a c y con-

founded questions about t h e o r i g i n and those about t h e v a l i d i t y of ideas. Both

t h e o r i s t s a r b i t r a r i l y separated meaning from f a c t and i n doing t h i s r a t i o n a l i z e d

t h e narrowness of t h e i r perspectives on logic.

Kaufmann a l s o applied h i s general d i s t i n c t i o n t o t h e r e l a t i o n of "lan-

guage and meaning". He came very c l o s e t o what Whorf c a l l e d t h e " n a t u r a l logic"

theory of l i n g u i s t i c s 5 since he saw language s o l e l y a s a l o g i c a l t o o l and f a i l e d

t o s i t u a t e language i n human praxis. H e believed t h a t language can be used t o do

a n a b s t r a c t a n a l y s i s of meanings. I n h i s words, t h e "... l o g i c a l analysis of t h e

meaning of synthetic propositions does not imply any reference t o t h e i r v a l i d i t y

(truth or falsity). 11 6 I n a sense, language was seen a s being value-free by Kauf-

mann.

Kaufmannrs notion of an " e l l i p t i c a l formulation" was r e l a t e d t o t h i s d i s -

t i n c t i o n between a n a l y t i c a l and s y n t h e t i c a l propositions. A n e l l i p t i c a l formula-

t i o n i s one t h a t "... does not take account of a l l t h e i r dimensions of r e l a t i o n -

alit~."~
This idea c e r t a i n l y can be useful since, a s we saw with Toulmin, many

arguments do not e x p l i c i t l y formulate a l l t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t a r e being implied

f o r t h e i r backing. But t o t r e a t t h i s question of " r e l a t i o n a l i t y " i n a formal way

minimizes, even o b l i t e r a t e s , i t s usefulness. For instance, Kaufmann talked of

how a synthetic proposition r e s t r i c t s t h e "frame of p o s s i b i l i t i e s " 8 t o allow

"empirical c o n t r o l " , and then contrasted an e l l i p t i c a l formulation with t h i s .

"1t i s t h e r e f o r e e l l i p t i c a l t o speak simply of a n e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n between two

propositions, without mentioning t h e t h i r d proposition t h a t i s i m p l i c j t l y r e -

f e r r e d to. IT 9
 There i s c l e a r l y t h e need t o r e s t r i c t one's statements ( e . g . , hypotheses)

t o a form t h a t i s empirically t e s t a b l e . Toulminls discussion of t h e layout of

arguments a l s o implied t h i s need. As long a s we recognize t h a t our warrants

and backing u l t i m a t e l y involve b e l i e f s t h a t a r e beyond t h e scope of d i r e c t in-

quiry, t h i s empirical o r i e n t a t i o n i s j u s t i f i a b l e . Kaufmann, however, did not

recognize t h i s . H i s idea of t h e " e l l i p t i c a l formulation'' was used t o maintain

h i s formal d i s t i n c t i o n between meaning and cause, not t o enhance our awareness

about t h e layout of s c i e n t i f i c arguments.

K a u h n n continued by c o n t r a s t i n g pre-sc i e n t i f i c and s c i e n t i f i c thought.

Again t h e view of "methodology" a s a n autonomous d i s c i p l i n e dominated h i s analy-

sis. For example he wrote t h a t It... t h e d e f i n i t i o n s i n a science a r e i n d i c a t i v e

of i t s method, and controversies ... over d e f i n i t i o n s usually r e f l e c t t h e i r disa-

greement about t h e methods t o be employed. "lo We can compare t h i s view with t h a t

of Kuhn who recognized t h e primacy of method but a l s o recognized t h a t a paradigm

of problems, methods and t h e o r i e s has i t s own logic. Kuhnfs approach allowed a

more i n c l u s i v e handling of problems of methodology (including d e f i n i t i o n s ) than

one t h a t removes methodology from a discussion of "paradigms" and, ultimately,

ideology.

Kaufmannts idea of science stands between t h e " s c i e n t i s t i c " one and t h e

more r a d i c a l , pragmatic one. For example, he did not accept t h e view of formal

logic t h a t Toulmin associated with t h e Greeks. He showed t h i s when he agreed with

E i n s t e i n ' s statement t h a t "In so f a r a s mathematics i s about r e a l i t y it i s not cer-

t a i n , and i n so f a r a s it i s c e r t a i n it i s not about r e a l i t y . " l l He c l e a r l y re-

jected t h e notion t h a t r e a l i t y i s e s s e n t i a l l y quantifiable. He wrote of "The

misleading expression t h a t q u a l i t i e s a r e ttransformedt i n t o quantities i n taking

such measurements is connected with t h e idea t h a t q u a n t i t i e s r a t h e r than quali-

t i e s reveal the t r u e nature of the universe. "I2 Kaufmannls concern with method

made him skeptical of these vulgar " s c i e n t i s t i c " notions. But h i s r i g i d distinc-

t i o n between "the l o g i c a l order of meanings and the temporal order of inquiry"13

made it impossible f o r him t o consider the r e l a t i o n s of method and ideology.

When we reduce matters of meaning t o a timeless, formal method, we have no way

t o understand how our methods a r e themselves meaningful only when u t i l i z e d i n

a n ideological context.

I n one place, Kaufmann showed some awareness of t h i s alternative. When

he wrote of t h e "methods ( h a b i t s ) of thought"14 and "habits" was h i s term, he

indicated t h a t methods and habits were related. If t h i s relationship i s expanded

you quickly f i n d t h a t t h e way "science1' i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d a f f e c t s t h e paradigm

of problems, methods and theories with which it i s concerned. Soon you confront

the problem of the sociology of knowledge. The h a b i t s and methods of a s c i e n t i s t

a r e r e l a t e d t o h i s or her t r a i n i n g ( s o c i a l i z a t i o n t o a paradigm) and t h i s w i l l

r e l a t e t o t h e s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l relevance and function of one paradigm over

another. I f we see t h a t t h e meaning of science i s r e l a t e d t o t h e consequences of

a p a r t i c u l a r f o r m and context of knowledge, and t h i s includes s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l

consequences, then the d i s t i n c t i o n between causes and meaning breaks down. From

t h i s point of view, "meaning" i s not something determined by a narrow, logical

analysis. It i t s e l f involves s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l forces t h a t a f f e c t the very

workings of science.
Reforming T r a d i t i o n a l Logic: Kaufmannls " ~ a s i c~ u l e s "

Kaufmannts s t a t u s between a crude scientism and a r a d i c a l and pragmatic

understanding of knowledge underlay h i s confusion about t h e nature ( I would say

function) of methodology or s c i e n t i f i c "rules". He showed t h i s confusion by

asking t h e t r a d i t i o n a l question of whether or not r u l e s or methods a r e a ~ r i o r i .

Consistent with h i s reformist i n c l i n a t i o n , he answered "no" slnc e

"...d e f i n i t i o n s ... do not make any a s s e r t i o n s about r e a l i t y a t a l l .

(Nor a r e t h e y ) derivable from t h e propositions t o which they apply.
But t h e r u l e s a r e a p r i o r i i n t h e sense t h a t - again because they
make no a s s e r t i o n s about r e a l i t y -
they cannot be r e f u t e d by 'ex-
perience' (observation); and they a r e a Driori f o r science because
'science' i s defined i n terms of them."l5

On t h e one hand r u l e s a r e n ' t a p r i o r i and on t h e other hand they are. We should

not expect any c l a r i t y from a f a l s e question. The important question i s not

whether r u l e s a r e a p r i o r i or not, but how they function. To ask t h i s question,

however, one has t o see logic and methodology i n a r a d i c a l way: a s the practical

assessment of arguments.

Rather than replacing h i s f a l s e question, Kaufmann outlined what he c a l l e d

t h e "basic r u l e s " of s c i e n t i f i c procedure. His d i s t i n c t i o n between meaning and

f a c t , rooted i n h i s f a l s e understanding of language and l o g i c , forced him t o

"reconcile" h i s dilemma about t h e question qu re r u l e s a p r i o r i ? " by postulating

"basic rules". Kaufmann only appeared t o be developing an argument. Rather than

correcting h i s fundamental e r r o r s , he, l i k e Durkheim, turned them i n t o more ab-

s t r a c t problems.

Rauf'mannls s t a t i c treatment of r u l e s contrasted sharply with t h a t of

Kuhnls. He s t a t e d t h a t : "... t h e r u l e s of s c i e n t i f i c procedure s t a t e t h e condl-

t i o n s f o r an exemption from the general prohibition against; changing the corpus

of a science. "16 Here, we see Kaufmannls conservative orientation t o science.

Summarizing Kaufmannls orientation, Bentley stated: "The correctness of s c i e n t i -

f i c decisions i n terms o f basic r u l e s depends s o l e l y on the knowledge established

a t the t h e , i. e. on previously accepted propositions which now serve a s p o u n d s

f o r the acceptance of new ones."17 This conservatism contrasts sharply with

Kuhnls concern with " s c i e n t i f i c revolutions". Kaufmannl s approach t o "rules"

was not rooted i n an awareness of paradigms and paradigm anomalies. Such a con-

cern with t h e d i a l e c t i c between orthodox and r a d i c a l ideas within science provides

a more inclusive understanding of methodology.

Kaufmann a l s o wrote t h a t "... t h e r e a r e no r u l e s of procedure t h a t forbid

a change i n the corpus of science. "I8 We again see the confusion t h a t was rooted

i n h i s attempt t o t r e a t methodology a s "an autonomous discipline". If no r u l e s

forbid change, and Kuhnps analysis showed t h i s t o be the case because specific

"rules" a r e r e l a t e d t o specific problems and paradigms, then it becomes problem-

a t i c how and why t h e norms of methodology change. But Kaufmann ignored t h i s .

He disregarded questions regarding the genesis of, or conditions t h a t give r i s e

t o , methodological norms. Though he p a r t i a l l y admitted t h a t r u l e s were not 2

~ r i o r i ,he did not extend h i s study of logic t o take the implications of t h i s

into account. He kept narrowly t o methodology a s "the logic of s c i e n t i f i c pro-

cedure" and s t a t e d t h a t "... t h e question of a c t u a l consensus ( over scientific

r u l e s ) is not one of the logic of s c i e n t i f i c procedure. "19

Defining logic i n t h i s narrow way may r a t i o n a l i z e the ignorance of

formal logicians about how and why a p a r t i c u l a r consensus over c e r t a i n r u l e s

develops, but it does not reduce t h e importance of t h i s problem. If we a r e

t o t r e a t logic a s t h e p r a c t i c a l assessment of arguments, then we ultimately

have t o face t h i s question. And t h i s i s the only r e a l a l t e r n a t i v e t o the

a b s t r a c t epistemologies Kauf'mann rejected. But, i n h i s assumptions, Kaufmann

did not r e a l l y break f r o m t r a d i t i o n a l logic. We see t h i s i n h i s statement:

".Since r a t i o n a l knowledge and empirical knowledge a r e d i f f e r e n t i n kind, there

is no way t h a t leads from t h e conception of absolute t r u t h t o a genuine logical

theory o f empirical procedure ..."20 This shows t h a t Kaufmannts d i s t i n c t i o n

between meantng and f a c t r e l a t e d t o h i s bifurcation of knowledge i n t o t h e

r a t i o n a l and t h e empirical. For him, "the conception of absolute t r u t h " i s

r a t i o n a l and logical, and no empirical procedure can f U f i l l the appropriate

criteria. Kauf'mann therefore replaced t h e a p r i o r 1 r u l e s of t r a d i t i o n a l logic

with "basic rules". But the inadequacies of t h e underlying formal approach re-

mained. I n Chapter Twenty, I w i l l discuss how an ontological, r a t h e r than prag-

matic, treatment of the d i s t i n c t i o n between the so-called r a t i o n a l and the em-

p i r i c a l underlies a11 formal approaches t o logic.

The d i s t i n c t i o n between the rational-logical and the empirical led

Kaufmann t o write:

"To solve a l o g i c a l problem i s t o explicate a n implicit meaning. To solve

an empirical problem i s t o perform a s e r i e s of steps terminating i n the
v e r i f i c a t i o n of an answer t o a question of fact. "21

Here we see an excellent example of the dichotomy between what Toulmin called

"idealized logic" and "working logic". I f logic i s t o have some relevance t o the

practice of argument, i t must be rooted i n empirical problem solving. I t cannot

be separated from t h i s , concerning i t s e l f with " i m p l i c i t meaning". Implicit

meaning proves t o be manufactured, academic meaning from a pragmatic perspective.

Kaufmann claimed t h a t the s c i e n t i f i c i d e a l was neither the search f o r

"a p r i o r i s t i c interpretation" nor rooted i n a belief i n the " f a l l a b i l i t y of the

human mind". Instead, it was concerned with the development of what he c a l l e d

"regulative principles". But we saw how Kaufmann s t i l l thought of logic i n terms

of a priories and "absolute truth1'. And h i s "regulative principles" or "basic

rules" were abstracted from inquiry because of t h i s . Kaufmann's understanding

of science theref ore remained orthodox, and, ultimately, s c i e n t i s t i c .

Kaufmann's Sc ientism

An examination o f Kaufmann's ideas about physical laws, c a u s a l i t y , t r u t h

and probability shows h i s s c i e n t i s t i c tendencies. H i s approach t o these questions

was r e l a t e d t o h i s r e j e c t i o n of the idea of immediate knowledge. He q u i t e r i g h t l y

believed t h i s notion was a f a l l a c y of both rationalism and empiricism. Yet h i s

own tendency t o accept t h e t r a d i t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e two orientations

affected h i s discussion of immediate knowledge. For instance, when he wrote t h a t

"only understanding of meanings can be c a l l e d 'self-evident' immediate know-

ledge."22 he accepted the belief t h a t the l o g i c a l analysis of meanings comes close

t o the notion o f absolute t r u t h i n rationalism.

Th'ough Kaufmann's handling of meaning was q u i t e t r a d i t i o n a l , he did ques-

t i o n t r a d i t i o n a l ideas about the so-called dichotomy between the objective and

the subjective. " ~ lthe

l frequently advanced arguments i n which conventionalism

i s contrasted, a s subjectivism o r idealism, with empiricism, a s objectivism o r

realism, miss the e s s e n t i a l methodological point. 1123 Kaufmann c l e a r l y rejected

the kind of objectivism we c r i t i c i z e d when we discussed Bergmann i n Chapter

Five. The " e s s e n t i a l methodological point" f o r Kaufmann was about the need

f o r regulative principles t o undertake any inquiry. Once t h e pragmatic nature

of both method and theory i s recognized, one cannot maintain a crude dichotomy

between the objective and subjective.

We saw e a r l i e r how Toulmin rejected both t h e deductive and inductive

theories of s c i e n t i f i c inference. Kaufmann1s i n t e r e s t i n methodology a l s o led

him t o a similar view. "1%i s not c l e a r l y enough recognized t h a t r e s u l t s of

inference ( i n the broadest sense) a r e implicit i n a l l statements about f a c t s ,

and t h a t t h e observational t e s t i s i n t e r r e l a t e d with other controls. "24 Both

t h e o r i s t s agreed t h a t inference does not come from observation and generaliza-

t i o n alone. It is on t h e nature of what Kaufmann called t h e "other controls"

t h a t they diverged. Kaufmannls handling of t h i s question, unlike t h a t of Toul-

min, was rooted i n the d i s t i n c t i o n between analytic and synthetic propositions.

Kauf'mann compared and contrasted four theories of t r u t h i n terms of t h e i r

concept of inference. He argued t h a t pragmatism and l o g i c a l positivism ( o r "co-

herence theory") were i n agreement about t h e issue o f inference. We s h a l l see

i n Chapter Twenty t h a t t h i s i s an inaccurate claim based on Kaufmannrs misunder-

standing o f the pragmatic theory of meaning. Kaufmann admitted t h a t some aspects

of "correspondence theory" remain i n l o g i c a l positivism, and it is just t h i s f a c t

t h a t makes pragmatism and coherence theory so d i f f e r e n t . Pragmatism does not see

inferences a s representations of data ( e i t h e r making sense of data o r correspond-

ing t o i t ) but a s statements which a r e useful i n the quest t o unify some existen-
 Kaufhann viewed probability theory a s t h e fourth theory of t r u t h . He

argued t h a t t h i s theory applied t o synthetic propositions, but not t o a n a l y t i c

ones. He wrote t h a t "... a n a l y t i c propositions ... contain no a s s e r t i o n s about

r e a l i t y ...t125 and t h a t "Certainty i s ... t h e mode of v a l i d i t y peculiar t o ana-

l y t i c propositions. "26 I n c o n t r a s t t o t h i s , Kaufmann argued t h a t a l l synthetic

propositions " a r e merely probable 11 27 .

Kaufmann's approach t o t h e problem of t r u t h and inference was rooted i n

h i s fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n between meaning and f a c t . Probability theory applied

t o t h e l a t t e r , but not t o t h e former. Kaufmann seemed t o accept a v a r i a t i o n of

t h e p o s i t i v i s t concept of t r u t h f o r a n a l y t i c propositions. The problem with t h i s

approach i s t h a t our view of inference and t r u t h must take i n t o account t h e t o t a l

process of inquiry. The s e l e c t i o n and s t a t i n g of problems, t h e hypothesizing and

t e s t i n g of s o l u t i o n s and t h e i r comparative f a l s i f i c a t i o n and v e r i f i c a t i o n , which

must include an assessment of t h e backing of an argument, a l l must be considered.

Kauf'mannls a b s t r a c t i o n of "meaning" from inquiry and h i s placement of it i n t h e

realm of formal logic made him unable t o do t h i s . Because of h i s dichotomy be-

tween meaning and f a c t and h i s fragmented approach t o matters of t r u t h or v a l i d i t y

Kaufmann could not even begin t o understand t h e process of inference i n science.

The Unity of Method

Kaufmann continued h i s discussion by bringing h i s d i s t i n c t i o n t o bear on

t h e problem of " l i f e and mind". He argued t h a t i t i s a "... f a i l u r e t o d i s t i n g u i s h

properly between matters of f a c t and r e l a t i o n s of meanings has beclouded discus-

slons of t h e r e l a t i o n between inanimate and animate nature and of t h a t between

psychical and physical fact."** Again we see a c l e a r separation between ques-

t i o n s of meaning and of genesis. Another study would be required t o discuss

t h i s question adequately,29 but a comment on t h e question o f logic i s possible

without doing t h i s . For example, Kauflnann's d i s t i n c t i o n a l s o led him t o r e j e c t

the p o l a r i t y between "causal" and "teleological" approaches. He wrote t h a t "1t

i s misleading t o contrast causal with teleological ... approaches, since t e l e o l -

ogy implies causality. lt3' One could s t a t e t h e reverse a l s o and say t h a t a causal

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a system implies a c e r t a i n teleology. The relevant point f o r

our discussion of ideology and logic i s not t h a t Kaufmann r i g h t l y wanted t o avoid

a n a b s t r a c t debate over cause and purpose, but t h a t h i s a p r i o r i separation of

meaning and f a c t led him t o reduce t h e l a t t e r t o an erroneous notion of "cause".

To c l a r i f y t h i s we need t o look a t Kaufmannfs statement t h a t the ail-

ure t o distinguish between 'end-in-viewf (Dewey's term) and ! r e a l end1 i s respon-

s i b l e f o r t h e erroneous view t h a t the temporal r e l a t i o n of cause and e f f e c t i s

reversed i n the means-end r e l a t i o n and t h a t t h e end is the f c r e a t o r f of the

means. "31 The pragmatic theory o f logic sees an end-in-view a s a means f o r

directing inquiry. It not only r e j e c t s t h e s c i e n t i s t i c notion of cause, it sees

human judgment and evaluation a s the core o f inquiry. Kaufmann t r i e d t o maintain

a causal, s c i e n t i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of knowledge even though he rejected the

epistemologies t h a t complemented t h i s . I f meaning can be determined by formal

logic, and not i n t h e s o c i a l and human consequences of inquiry, then it i s pos-

s i b l e t o believe i n some " r e a l end". But t h i s approach ignores the a f f e c t of

the ends of the established s o c i a l order on inquiry. I n short, Kaufmann was

unaware t h a t "cause" i s a concept t h a t i s rooted i n applied problem-solving,

and hence t h a t it always implies means and ends. H i s idea t h a t i n t h e pragmatic

understanding of logic t h e end "creates t h e means" is nonsense and f a i l s t o d i s -

tinguish between t h e end, a s t h e consequences of inquiry, and t h e end-in-view a s

a hypothesis.

Not only did Kaufmann f a i l t o c l a r i f y t h e question of ends and means,

but a l s o t h e so-called "psycho-physical problem". He argued t h a t four approaches

( p a r a l l e l i s m , c a u s a l i t y , monestic materialism and s p i r i t u a l i s m ) have been develop-

ed t o t h i s problem, but t h a t none have s e t t l e d it. "Dualists a s well a s monists

i n dealing with t h i s problem usually confound r e l a t i o n s of meanings with causal

r e l a t i o n s . "32 His view was t h a t "... methodological a n a l y s i s leads t o a s e t t l e -

ment of t h e problem. "33 It is one thing t o argue t h a t t h e problem of mind and

body has been mis-stated. Both d u a l i s t i c and monistic approaches do t h i s and a r e

r e d u c t i o n i s t i c i n t h e i r approach. But it i s q u i t e another thing t o suggest t h a t

problems rooted i n s p e c i f i c subject matters can be solved by an a b s t r a c t method-

ological analysis. I f logic i s seen a s having t h e t a s k of evaluating ongoing

inquiry taking place i n s p e c i f i c subject matters, it can a i d i n solving these

problems. But t h i s i s not what Kaufmannls methodological a n a l y s i s was intended

t o do.

Kaufmann did not t r e a t psychological and physical concepts a s t h e be-

h a v i o r i s t s do; t h a t i s , i n terms of so-called objective f a c t s . Nor did he t r e a t

them i n terms of "immediate apprehension". Instead, he pointed out t h a t t h e r e

was an analogy between t h e two kinds of concepts. He argued t h a t "The f i r s t

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s refuted by an analysis of meanings by which it i s made c l e a r

t h a t psycho-physical terms a r e not reducible t o physical terms ..."and t h e second

approach t o t a l l y f a i l s t o account f o r t h e r o l e of method. Kaufmann then argued

t h a t t h e " r u l e s of procedure" involved i n making analogies need t o be made ex-

plicit. He concluded t h a t :

he preference r u l e s of procedure concerning propositions about t h e

psycho-physical world a r e not s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t from those con-
cerning propositions about t h e physical world. The i d e a l s of u n i t y ,
s i m p l i c i t y , u n i v e r s a l i t y , and precision a r e i n both f i e l d s r e g u l a t i v e
p r i n c i p l e s of inquiry. But approximation t o t h e i d e a l s i s l e s s close
here than i n n a t u r a l science. "35

Kaufmann believed t h a t t h e same regulative p r i n c i p l e s apply t o t h e s o c i a l

and n a t u r a l sciences. Again we have t h e argument t h a t methods i n t h e n a t u r a l and

s o c i a l sciences a r e not fundamentally d i f f e r e n t . But what underlies t h e common

function and c r e d i b i l i t y of these r e g u l a t i v e i d e a l s or principles? This question

must be c l a r i f i e d t o thoroughly i n v e s t i g a t e s c i e n t i f i c methodology. I n making t h e

meaning of science a matter f o r formal logic and not a sociological problem, Kauf-

mann only developed a r h e t o r i c about t h e u n i t y of method. I n t h i s regard, he had

more i n common with those who use formal logic t o c o n t r a s t t h e methods of t h e so-

c i a l and n a t u r a l sciences than those who use a pragmatic logic t o show t h e u n i t y

of method i n t h e two subject matters. We w i l l see t h i s when we discuss Winch's

i d e a l i s t i c approach t o logic i n t h e next chapter.

Values a s Analytic Statements

Kaufmann's treatment of value judgments was c o n s i s t e n t with, and rooted

i n t h e same e r r o r s , a s h i s o v e r a l l analysis. Because values were r e l a t e d t o t h e

l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s of meaning i n h i s scheme Kaufmann denied t h ? p o s s i b i l i t y of value-

-
l e s s knowledge. However, though he r e j e c t e d objectivism, he maintained one funda-

mental assumption of such an orientation: t h a t method can be value-free. Like

 I

Weber, he used every a b s t r a c t argument available within h i s system t o keep the

analysis of f a c t s and values separate.

Kaufmann argued t h a t " t o regard value judgments a s synthetic propositions

and t o contrast them with value-free synthetic propositions i s t h e problem proton

pseudos i n value phil0sophy".3~ Because of h i s formal, deductive approach t o

meaning, he t r e a t e d value judgments a s a n a l y t i c propositions. This approach t o

values has a l l t h e l i m i t a t i o n s exposed by Toulmints c r i t i q u e of deductive theory.

The reduction of aspects of an argument ( e. g. , values) t o analytic forms does not

help us with t h e j u s t i f i c a t o r y task of logic. Matters of logic become idealized

and, consequently, t h e problem of ideology i s ignored. We cannot begin t o analyze

t h e ideological functioning of d i f f e r e n t approaches t o logic u n t i l t h e value-free

doctrine i s discarded in t o t a l .

Placing values i n a realm separated from f a c t s is not the s o l u t i o n t o t h e

"problem proton pseudos i n value philosophy". Once we account f o r t h e primary r o l e

of method i n science, we can no longer t r e a t " f a c t s " i n an a b s t r a c t way. And i f we

analyze t h e r e l a t i o n of method t o a perspective, paradigm or ideology, we see t h a t

values a r e r e l a t e d t o method and therefore facts. So there can be no value-free

propositions. Because of h i s formal approach t o meaning, Kaufmann was unable t o

recognize t h i s . Only i f t h e analysis of meaning i s put i n t o t h e realm of d i r e c t

inquiry does t h e r e j e c t i o n of t h e f a l l a c i o u s idea of value-free synthetic proposi-

t i o n s provide i n s i g h t i n t o t h e problem of ideology.

Issues i n t h e Social Sciences: 1 - The Natural and Social Sciences

On t h e b a s i s of h i s d i s t i n c t i o n and t h e argument he developed from i t ,

Kaufmann discussed i s s u e s s p e c i f i c t o t h e s o c i a l sciences. F i r s t , he discussed

t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e n a t u r a l and s o c i a l sciences. His general handling of

t h i s question does not c o n f l i c t with my own argument. Kaufmann recognized t h e

c e n t r a l i t y of t h i s i s s u e f o r other controversies over t h e logic of t h e s o c i a l

sciences. h he question of t h e r e l a t i o n between n a t u r a l and s o c i a l science i s

so important t h a t i n methodological controversies within t h e s o c i a l sciences

t h a t it can be made t h e c e n t r a l point of methodological analysis i n t h i s

fie1d.1'~M
~y motivation f o r discussing ideology and t h e n a t u r a l sciences i n

Chapter Six r e s t e d on t h i s same assumption. And, a s we saw, confusion over

t h i s " r e l a t i o n " underlay t h e e r r o r s of Durkheim, Popper and, a s we s h a l l see

i n Chapter Eighteen, Winch.

The general o r i e n t a t i o n of Kaufmann t o t h i s question does not a m to

diverge from an a n a l y s i s of l o g i c which accounts f o r t h e problem of ideology.

I n one place he acknowledged Toulmin's point about t h e need f o r logic t o a l -

ways be rooted i n and s p e c i f i c t o c e r t a i n subject matter. " h o t h e r f a c t o r re-

sponsible f o r p e r s i s t e n t methodological controversies i s t h e f a i l u r e t o r e a l i z e

t h a t each of two apparently c o n f l i c t i n g methods may have i t s proper place i n

t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r subject matter and may yield s i g n i f i c a n t r e -

s u l t s denied t o t h e other. "38 This general o r i e n t a t i o n , however, was not de-

veloped i n t o a n approach t o logic t h a t can account f o r t h e unity of method and

t h e p r a c t i c a l i t y of logic. As we proceed, we w i l l see t h a t a logic which i s

founded s o l e l y on an a n a l y s i s of "rules" does not have t h e character or p o t e n t i a l

t o do t h i s .
2 - Behaviorism and Introspection

Second, Kaufmann discussed t h e c o n f l i c t between "behaviorism and in-

trospectionism". On t h e b a s i s of h i s study of "methodology", he concluded t h a t

both these approaches i n psychology a r e i n e r r o r because they t r y t o j u s t i f y

t h e i r ideas on ultimate grounds. Both ignore t h e relevance of method. In his

words :

" ~ 0 t hdoctrines a r e i n t u i t i o n i s t i c . They hold i n common t h e b e l i e f t h a t

a s i n g l e , i s o l a t e d a c t can provide u l t i m a t e l y v a l i d knowledge of f a c t
and t h a t a l l mediate knowledge derives i t s v a l i d i t y from immediate
knowledge. "39

We can agree with t h i s general c r i t i c i s m , but not with t h e argument behind

it. Any theory t h a t purports t o be s c i e n t i f i c must include an a n a l y s i s of t h e r o l e

of method i n i t s conclusions. Once t h i s r o l e is recognized, a theory cannot be

j u s t i f i e d because i t s f a c t s a r e ultimate, but r a t h e r because t h e argument r e l a t e s

t o f a c t s , warrants and backings i n a more acceptable way than other arguments.

The " i n a more acceptable way" could be s t a t e d a s " i n a b e t t e r way", s i n c e t h e

significance and relevance of t h e argument, i n terms of c e r t a i n values or ends,

w i l l a f f e c t what i s and i s not acceptable a s an argument.

Kaufmann did not consider t h i s point. Instead, h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , which

was p a r t i a l l y responsible f o r h i s i n i t i a l awareness, was made i n t o an a b s t r a c t

p r i n c i p l e t o which a l l problems i n logic were reduced. When Kaufmann wrote t h a t

'I... it i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important t o separate l o g i c a l analysis of r u l e s of pro-

cedure from psychological description of cognitive processes,"40 he implied t h a t

t h e regulative principles or "rules" and t h e subject matter ( e . g . , problem of

cognition) a r e of two d i f f e r e n t orders. Because Kaufmann did not t r e a t h i s

d i s t i n c t i o n a s a pragmatic one, i n r e l a t i o n t o s p e c i f i c inquiry, he contradicted

h i s own point t h a t method and subject matter a r e interdependent. By s e p a r a t i n g

"description" from " r u l e s " , he came c l o s e t o implying t h a t t h e r e could be such

a t h i n g a s immediate knowledge. Yet t h i s i s what he based h i s c r i t i c i s m of

b e h a v i o r i s t and i n t r o s p e c t i v e t h e o r i e s upon.

The s e p a r a t i o n of so-called s c i e n t i f i c r u l e s from s c i e n t i f i c problems

complemented Kaufmannl s a b s t r a c t approach t o "meaning". Thus Kauf'mann wrote

that 'I.. . t h e meanings of t h e sentences t o be v e r i f i e d i n science a r e presupposed

i n t h e process of v e r i f y i n g them. "41 It i s t r u e t h a t a group of s c i e n t i s t s who

have been s o c i a l i z e d t o accept a paradigm "presuppose", and, unfortunately, r a r e l y

examine, t h e i d e o l o g i c a l meanings implied by t h e i r language. When paradigms come

i n t o c o n f l i c t , d i s p u t e s a r e u s u a l l y expressed i n terms of t h e usefulness of r u l e s

o r methods t o problems a t hand. Kaufmann ignored t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between method-

r u l e s and ideology because h i s view of science and r u l e s was s t a t i c . When t h e

a n a l y s i s of meaning i s a b s t r a c t e d from t h e realm of p r a c t i c a l a r g m e n t , t h e prob-

lem of ideology and i t s relevance f o r matters of l o g i c cannot be understood.

3 - Social Facts

Third, Kauf'mann discussed " s o c i a l f a c t s and t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " . We

have a l r e a d y c r i t i c i z e d t h e s c i e n t i s t i c treatment of s o c i a l f a c t s i n our discus-

s i o n of Durkheim. Kaufmann's reformism made h i s approach more enlightened, but

s t i l l one based on a n a b s t r a c t e d view of knowledge.

Kaufmann admitted t h a t terminological d i f f e r e n c e s i n s o c i a l science imply

digferences i n "applied" o r "postulated" methods and i n " p o l i t i c a l goals". But

because of h i s formal l o g i c he s t a t e d t h a t "... a justification (of a political

creed) i s logically impossible. "'* Since he did not t r e a t logic a s the p r a c t i c a l

assessment of arguments, he was unable t o deal with the relationships between the

s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l relevance and function of knowledge and the problems, methods

and theories t h a t take p r i o r i t y a t any time. He was a l s o unable t o assess the way

a particular " p o l i t i c a l creed" r e l a t e s t o the warrant and backing of a p a r t i c u l a r

type of argument i n the s o c i a l sciences.

Kaufmann made an a r b i t r a r y d i s t i n c t i o n between the l o g i c a l analysis o f

any sociological study and the explanation and evaluation of s o c i a l facts. Yet

an adequate evaluation of a " s o c i a l f a c t " depends on t h e sociological, and p o l i t i -

c a l concepts and b e l i e f s t h a t give it significance. Kaufmann did s t a t e t h a t "...

it is e l l i p t i c a l t o speak of the objective meaning of a sign without indicating

the implicitly presupposed scheme of i n t e r ~ r e t a t i o n , "but

~ ~ he did not mean by

t h i s t h a t ideology and logic a r e interdependent. The "scheme of interpretation"

f o r Kaufmann did not include the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s of a t h e o r i s t , but

supposedly transcended t h i s . Kaufmann' s "basic rules" were supposed t o account

f o r the logical analysis of implicit presuppositions, but without problems rooted

i n subject matter there can be no r e a l presuppositions. Kaufmannls position thus

becomes absurd.

4 - Social Laws

Fourth, Kaufmann discussed "physical and s o c i a l laws". We have already

discussed how a f a l s e notion of physical laws underlies much confusion about so-

called s o c i a l laws. We s h a l l see t h a t t h i s was t h e case with Kaufmann. He wrote

t h a t h he f a c t t h a t the principles of t h e s o c i a l sciences a r e l e s s 'unified1 than

larism i n the former. ,I 44 This i s one way t o approach problems rooted i n t h e

fragmentation of d i s c i p l i n e s i n t h e s o c i a l sciences, but, once again, it i s a

formal, contentless approach. It implies t h a t t h e "solution" t o t h i s problem

i s t o have common regulative principles f o r a l l t h e s o c i a l sciences. Yet t h e

range and root of problems i n the s o c i a l sciences makes t h i s impossible. The

d i f f e r i n g s o c i a l experiences and p o l i t i c a l ideologies of humans - rooted i n

t h e fragmentary development and q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t forms of development

between and within d i f f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s - means t h a t t h e methods or r u l e s ( I

would include values or ends) t h a t r e g u l a t e p a r t i c u l a r problems w i l l remain

varied. Differences i n c l a s s and c o r o l l a r y d i f f e r e n c e s i n s t a t u s , power and

control i n our society ensure t h a t c o n f l i c t i n g ideologies, l o g i c s and methods

w i l l a f f e c t s o c i a l inquiry. For a v i a b l e s o c i a l science with u n i f i e d p r i n c i -

ples t o develop, a s o c i a l system t h a t i s not based upon these d i s t i n c t i o n s

would have t o be i n existence. Only i n "idealized logic" can Kaufmannls solu-

t i o n work; and thus it i s irrelevant.

Kaufmann c l e a r l y valued t h e notion of t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y of method. I

have argued t h a t t h e d i s c i p l i n e s of t h e s o c i a l sciences can not P d l f i l l t h e

idea of u n r e s t r i c t e d universality. I n c o n t r a s t t o t h i s formal question, i s

t h e r e any value considering how s o c i a l theory, even utopian s o c i a l theory,

could provide t h e universal norms around which problems, methods and t h e o r i e s

gain t h e i r significance? Marcuse has suggested t h a t

"Social theory i s concerned with t h e h i s t o r i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e s which haunt

t h e established society as subversive tendencies and forces. The values
attached t o t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s do become f a c t s when they a r e t r a n s l a t e d
i n t o r e a l i t y by h i s t o r i c a l change. The t h e o r e t i c a l concepts terminate
with s o c i a l change.'145
It is t h i s l a t t e r perspective t h a t c l a r i f i e s why c o n f l i c t i n g ideologies imply

c onflic t i n g logics. When "methodology" i s t r e a t e d a s a n autonomous d i s c i p l i n e ,

however, it i s impossible t o see how both utopia and ideology a f f e c t both t h e

c l a s s of problems with which we deal and t h e method and r u l e s by which we do

this.

5 - Objectivity and t h e Sociology of Knowledge

F i f t h , Kaufmann discussed "the o b j e c t i v i t y of t h e s o c i a l sciences".

Here we see how he t r i e d t o avoid t h e problems r a i s e d by t h e sociology of know-

ledge by replacing "epistemology" with "methodology".

Referring t o Mannheimts r e j e c t i o n of t h e dualism between t h e genesis

and t r u t h of a n argument, Kaufmann s t a t e d : he abrupt and absolute dualism

between t v a l i d i t y t and texistencel - between 'meaning1 and Iexistence' - between

lessensel and ' f a c t t i s , a s has o f t e n been pointed out, one of t h e axioms of t h e

' i d e a l i s t i c 1 epistemology and noology prevailing today. 1146 He posed t h e dilemma

r e s u l t i n g from t h i s analysis a s follows: Epistemology "... claims t o be t h e

b a s i s of a l l science but i n f a c t is determined by t h e condition of science a t

any given time ..."47 Surprisingly, he then argued t h a t t h i s dilemma has no

bearing on methodology: "... we r e j e c t ... t h e t h e s i s t h a t t h i s f a c t has any

bearing upon methodological problems. 'lrC8 He argued t h a t "The sociology of know-

ledge i s concerned with conditions f o r t h e existence of b e l i e f s ; methodology

(which supplants t h e kind of epistemology c r i t i c i z e d by Mannheim once we have

emancipated ourselves from the idea of absolutely c e r t a i n knowledge of f a c t ) i s

concerned w i t h t h e c r i t e r i a of t h e i r correctness, i.e. with t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e

propositions under consideration. e 49

According t o Kauflnann, t h e "conditions f o r t h e existence of b e l i e f s "

and t h e " c r i t e r i a of t h e i r correctness" have no relation. Yet i f no "absolutely

c e r t a i n knowledge of f a c t " can e x i s t then " c r i t e r i a " themselves have t o be ex-

amined c r i t i c a l l y . The b e l i e f i n any p a r t i c u l a r c r i t e r i a f o r correctness has

something t o do with o t h e r b e l i e f s and both have something t o do with t h e con-

d i t i o n s f o r t h e i r existence. Though Kaufmann wanted t o "supplant t h e kind of

epistemology c r i t i c i z e d by Mannheim", he did not want t o take " c r i t e r i a " out of

an a ~ r i o r realm
i f o r c r i t i c a l examination. Replacing "epistemology" with "meth-

odology" without a l s o replacing t h e ideology and logic of scientism i s nothing

more than a manipulation of semantics.

Kaufmann admitted t h a t t h e r e was some value t o t h e questions r a i s e d by

Mannheim, but he misunderstood Mannheim's points. About t h e tendency t o see

causes a s exclusive of one another, he wrote:

" ~ r r o r sof t h i s kind can often be explained sociologically by reference t o

t h e e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n of t h e s c i e n t i s t , but they do not cease thereby
t o be e r r o r s ... Mannheim i s c e r t a i n l y r i g h t i n emphasizing t h a t t h i s w i l l
be e a s i e r f o r men who a r e l e s s deeply rooted i n t r a d i t i o n ... "5O

Kaufmann c l e a r l y wanted t o keep t h e sociology of knowledge and questions of method-

ology separated. To say t h a t "they do not cease thereby t o be e r r o r s " showed h i s

tendency t o keep t h e question of t r u t h or e r r o r abstracted from t h e question of

t h e conditions of t r u t h . However, h i s reformed, formal logic with i t s "basic

r u l e s " only obscures t h e conditional character of knowledge. A conservative

scientism t h a t works within narrowly consistent propositions may complement a

reformed, formal logic but once t h e r e l a t i o n s a r e recognized between t h e con-

servative ideological context of such a "science" and t h e logic t h a t j u s t i f i e s

it, i n a b s t r a c t , t h e attempt t o separate matters of t r u t h from conditions of

t r u t h proves t o be f u t i l e .

Kaufhann did not understand t h i s so he turned Mannheim's point i n t o a n

a b s t r a c t pseudo-problem. He argued t h a t isag agreement concerning t h e r u l e s . ..

i s disagreement with respect t o t h e meaning of a scientif i c knowledge1. "51 Though

he admitted t h a t t h e r u l e s a s c i e n t i s t accepts may r e l a t e t o h i s "traditionalism",

disagreements over these r u l e s r e l a t e only t o t h e meaning of science. I n Kauf-

mannls words: "... it i s only t h e s c i e n t i f i c s i t u a t i o n - t h e body of established

knowledge - not t h e s c i e n t i s t l s s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n i n general t h a t e n t e r s i n t o ...
t h e c o n t r o l of propositions of s o c i a l science."52 The s c i e n t i s t g e t s carved up

i n t o t h e professional who has learned t h e "established knowledge" and t h e non-

professional a f f e c t e d by t h e " s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n " . The problem of ideology i s ig-

nored and t h e r e f o r e the problem of logic i s ignored. Are we t o believe t h a t be-

cause a person i s a s c i e n t i s t he or she has "immediate knowledge", unconfounded

by one's s o c i a l i z a t i o n , commitments and uses of language? Kauf'mannls reformism

l e d him t o s c i e n t i s t i c metaphysics, not s c i e n t i f i c methodology.

Kaufmannts approach shows how a formal approach t o meaning, an a b s t r a c t

treatment of r u l e s , and a conservative d e f i n i t i o n of science can be i n t e r r e l a t e d .

These r e l a t i o n s h i p s v a l i d a t e the general t h e s i s o f ' t h e sociology of knowledge.

According t o Kaufmann, meaning had only t o do with t h e l o g i c a l analysis of prop-

ositions. The " c r i t e r i a " o r rules of science were not r e l a t e d t o sociology. And

"the body of established knowledge" i s t h e f i n a l a r b i t e r i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of

 - 383 -
I

these c r i t e r i a f o r analyzing propositions. We see t h a t Kaufmann t o o k no account

of " s c i e n t i f i c revolutions" - nor could he a s long a s the meaning of science has

nothing t o do with the s o c i a l significance of science.

Toulmin was c r i t i c a l of theories of logic t h a t emphasized propositional

analysis. He argued t h a t t h i s view f a i l e d t o account f o r t h e layout of arguments

and was rooted i n a narrow, f o r m a l logic. Kaufmannls approach c e r t a i n l y had t h i s

tendency. His "propositions" remain abstracted from the backings implied by them "

and hence they misrepresented the nature of t h e argument being made. Toulmin was

a l s o c r i t i c a l of abstracted notions of "laws" and "causes". Kaufmann's methodol-

ogy a l s o r e f l e c t e d t h i s tendency. For example, he saw the "laws" t h a t were implied

i n causal propositions a s being t o t a l l y independent of the sociology of knowledge.

" ~ i s t o r i c a lf a c t s cannot speak f o r themselves a s f a r a s causal r e l a t i o n s

among them a r e concerned; they require an interpretation. This seems t o
involve subjectivity, but the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has t o be i n conformity
with presupposed t h e o r e t i c a l laws, and these laws do not contain any
reference t o t h e h i s t o r i a n and h i s perspective. "53

I f "interpretation1' must be i n accordance with "presupposed t h e o r e t i c a l laws", how

does science change? Again, we see how a conservatism underlay Kaufmannts rule-

centered logic. And, furthermore, how and why did the "presupposed t h e o r e t i c a l

laws" develop and gain status? Kaufmann could not ask t h i s kind of question

because h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between meaning and f a c t i n h i b i t s inquiry into such ques-

tions.

6 - Value Problems

Kaufmann discussed "value problems i n the s o c i a l sciences". In my dis-

cussion of Weber and Bronowski, I argued t h a t "values" a r e not something added

t o f a c t s , but a r e the value we give t o a c l a s s of problems and the e f f e c t s on

humans of knowledge derived from them. Conflicting ideological orientations

w i l l a f f e c t science because d i f f e r e n t values a r e implied by them.

Kaufmannls approach contrasts sharply with t h i s . He attempted t o save

t h e value-free notion o f science with h i s formal distinctions. He did not t r e a t

"value problems1' a s the way values and ideologies a f f e c t the form, content and

consequences of science, but a s something a r i s i n g from t h e consensus of s c i e n t i s t

over axiological rules.

he formulation of value judgments ... i s usually e l l i p t i c a l ; t h e r e i s

no e x p l i c i t reference t o t h e i m p l i c i t l y presupposed axiological rules.
The complete formulation of a value judgment reveals t h a t it i s an an-
a l y t i c proposition. An appearance t o the contrary i s created by f a i l u r e
t o distinguish between the value judgment proper and t h e statement t h a t
the object under consideration possesses the properties by v i r t u e of
-
which a value i s t o be assigned i n conformity with given axiological
rules. "54

The assumption behind t h i s treatment of values a s analytic propositions i s t h a t

objects under consideration have properties and t h e i r value i s then assigned ac-

cording t o a b s t r a c t rules. Durkheim thought of f a c t and value i n a similar

mechanical way, but we showed how t h e propertles assigned a r e r e l a t e d t o t h e per-

spective of t h e t h e o r i s t and not derived from some s o r t o f purk d e f i n i t i o n o r

pure technique of observation. By s p l i t t i n g f a c t and meaning, Kaufmann was

implying t h a t t r u t h i s both i n t r i n s i c and pragmatic. Yet you cannot have it both

ways. We both describe properties and assign value i n accordance with techniques,

r u l e s and ideologies t h a t complement them.

It may be t r u e t h a t KauRnann could c r e a t e formal, value-free propositions,

but t h i s has nothing t o do with creating a value-free s o c i a l science. He talked

of how we .can "... reduce ( our propositions) t o value-free terms by making ex-

p l i c i t the properties ... o f o u r definitions. He a l s o wrote t h a t a value-free

 - 385 -
I

s o c i a l science "... demands t h a t t h e s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t indicate the c r i t e r i a

of correct valuation which he implicitly presupposes when he makes use of value

terms."56 This i s just a re-statement of Kaufmannls general orientation. And,

h i s orientation ignored things t h a t were implied by the problems he raised. We

do not remove the e f f e c t of values on science by abstracting them i n terms or

" c r i t e r i a of correct valuation". This i s Just a "methodological trick". It

formalizes the e f f e c t s of values, but does not evaluate them. If idealized logic

and i t s pseudo-problems is t o be replaced with working logic, it has t o f u l f i l l

the task o f evaluating arguments.

Kauf'mann disagreed with Weber1s argument t h a t science cannot decide on

ends. F i r s t , he quoted Weberls statement that:

"There is no ( r a t i o n a l or empirical) s c i e n t i f i c procedure of any s o r t t h a t

could yield a decision here (questions of ends). Least o f a l l can our
s t r i c t l y empirical science pretend t o spare the individual t h i s choice,
and therefore it should not c r e a t e the i l l u s i o n t h a t it can. "57

He then concluded t h a t t h e statement was e l l i p t i c a l . But making r u l e s e x p l i c i t

and then formalizing them does not s e t t l e t h e question t h a t Weber raised. Though

I rejected Weber's i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c notion of values and choice, once we recognize

how idsology and science r e l a t e and a c r i t i c a l study of logic shows t h i s , we see

t h a t commitments and choices a r e basic t o science.

Kaufmann argued t h a t the r e a l issue i s "... whether there can be an

ultimate j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r choosing one system o f axiological r u l e s r a t h e r than

another."5* I n a formalistic way, Kaufmann was r e a l l y asking whether we can find

any ultimate j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r any particular ideology. Once the so-called r u l e s

of logic a r e de-mystified, once it I s determined how r u l e s r e l a t e t o a c l a s s of

problems, methods and theories, h i s question can be re-stated i n t h i s manner.

But i s t h i s r e a l l y the v i t a l issue? Asking whether t h e r e can be an ultimate

j u s t i f i c a t i o n seems t o contradict Kaufmnnls r e j e c t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l episte-

mology. H i s formalism placed him i n such a contradictory position. Unable

t o see "meaning" i n terms of consequences, he ended up seeing c o n f l i c t s over

meaning and values a s a b s t r a c t , academic c o n f l i c t s i n Bxiological rules.

Kaufmann t r i e d t o maintain t h e c l a s s i c a l separation between value and

fact. H i s reformism was s u p e r f i c i a l , not fundamental. He admitted t h a t non-

"... determine t h e kind of knowledge be sought a f t e r ..."

t h e o r e t i c a l goals to

but then claimed t h a t "... they a r e not d i r e c t l y relevant f o r t h e question of

how such knowledge is t o be attained. "59 According t o t h i s l i n e of thought,

methodology can remain an autonomous study. But t h e important point f o r a prac-

t i c a l , working logic is how the so-called non-theoretical, e.g., ideological,

goals a f f e c t knowledge, including methodology, and how they a r e implied a s back-

ing t o t h e theory being developed. Whether you see Ideology a s being irrelevant

or i n d i r e c t l y o r " d i r e c t l y relevant" t o science w i l l g r e a t l y depend on whether

the logic you u t i l i z e is narrow and formal o r one t h a t scans the t o t a l process

of argument.

On t h e b a s i s o f h i s discussion of values Kaufmann argued f o r a c l e a r

d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e "is" and the "ought" i n science.

he reason why t h e value of a n action ( t h e 'ought!) cannot be deduced

from t h e properties of the a c t i o n ( t h e l i s t ) , though it i s assigned
by v i r t u e of these properties, i s t h a t t h e 'ought! i s defined i n terms
of s p e c i f i c ( a x i o l o g i c a l ) rules. This i s a l s o t h e reason why value can-
not be deduced from existence. 1160

But Kaufmann agreed t h a t the "properties of t h e action", e.g., the kind of know-

ledge, w i l l be affected by non-theoretical goals. So he admitted t h a t goals and

knowledge were related. And goals a r e r e l a t e d t o t h e so-called "ought". Only

i f t h e "ought" i s l e f t i n t h e a b s t r a c t realm of Kaufmann's "rules" can one

maintain a r i g i d separation of t h e "ought" and t h e "is". Clearly we cannot

deduce meaning from existence, but f o r reasons d i f f e r i n g from those of Kauf-

mann. Meaning i s an aspect of ongoing existence. Once Kaufmann's association

of values and so-called axiological r u l e s i s replaced with t h e association of

values and goals, t h e " i s " becomes t h e ought and t h e ought becomes t h e "is";

and we require a logic t h a t accounts f o r t h i s d i a l e c t i c through time and events.

7 - Economic Theory and Science

Seventh, Kaufmann discussed "the p r i n c i p l e s of economic theory". I

r a i s e d t h i s t o p i c when I c r i t i c i z e d Schumpeter Is value-fre'e view of economic

analysis. Kaufmann began by applying h i s a b s t r a c t view of "value" t o theories

of human behaviour. I have already c r i t i c i z e d t h i s approach. I n sum: it i s

not s u f f i c i e n t , though sometimes it may be necessary f o r purposes of c l a r i f i c a -

t i o n , t o formalize r u l e s of judging c o r r e c t behaviour. The roots of t h e meaning

(e.g., function) of behavioral norms i n t h e a c t u a l s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s a l s o must be

examined. Part of t h i s w i l l involve a n evaluation of t h e consequences of p a r t i c -

u l a r lived norms f o r a group of people. This might include a study of how be-

havioral norms ( e.g. , those of i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c competitiveness) a f f e c t t h e q u a l i t y

and mode of r e l a t i n g among a group of people. This form of Inquiry w i l l give us

some concrete ideas about meaning.

Kaufmannls rule-centered logic could not lead t o t h i s empirical approach

t o meaning. His b e l i e f t h a t "the l o g i c a l analysis of concepts i s not r e l a t i v e

t o any conditions"61 ( a very dogmatic and r e s t r i c t i n g b e l i e f ) blinded him t o

t h e p o t e n t i a l of an approach t o s o c i a l science where loglc was thoroughly in-

t e g r a t e d i n t o problems and subject matter. Such a s o c i a l science could help

s h i f t our focus from academic pseudo-problems t o lived s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l

problems. Such an involvement i n l i v e d s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l probiems would

i t s e l f have s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l implications, but so does Kaufmann's formal-

i s t i c logic. For example, a f t e r applying h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between analytic and

synthetic statements t o c l a s s i c a l and neo-classical, e. g. , l i b e r a l economic

theory, he concluded t h a t these t h e o r i e s were " s c i e n t i f i c " . By formalizing

t h e r u l e s implied i n these theories, he dissected matters of f a c t from those

of meaning and concluded t h a t It.. . there i s no reference i n economic theory

t o a peculiar normative v a l i d i t y or a normative method. rr 62

We have already indicated t h e l i m i t a t i o n s of t h i s form of logic.

S p l i t t i n g a n a l y t i c and synthetic statements and placing values i n t h e former

category i s more a diversion than a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h e problem of values

and f a c t s . It i s important t o note how t h i s approach can be used t o make

c e r t a i n types of economic theory, with d e f i n i t e s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l r o o t s ,

appear t o be " s c i e n t i f i c " . The logic then can have an ideological funct:on,

and once again we see how t h e problem of ideology and t h a t of logic a r e i n t e r -

twined.

8 - The Dilemma of Kaufmannls Methodology

Lastly l e t us look a t some of Kaufmann's "summary and conclusions".

Kaufmannls d i s t i n c t i o n between analytic and synthetic propositions was rooted

i n h i s attempt t o reform t r a d i t i o n a l logic. It was based on h i s assumption

that there i s a It.. . fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n between deductive reasoning ...
and inference i n s c i e n t i f i c procedure ...1t63 Our study suggests t h a t these

d i s t i n c t i o n s f a i l t o c l a r i f y t h e problem of logic. Rather than developing a

theory of logic or methodology from an analysis of arguments, Kaufmann t r i e d

t o salvage deductive logic. Making deductive logic t h e t o o l f o r determining

meaning and separating s c i e n t i f i c procedure from t h i s analysis of meaning does

not c l a r i f y how we develop arguments. Instead it c r e a t e s an a b s t r a c t , rule-

centered, formal logic which presents us with a s many (though d i f f e r e n t ) prob-

lems a s t r a d i t i o n a l epistemology.

Kaufknann admitted t h a t "There i s no ultimate j u s t i f i c a t i o n of these

r u l e s ; we cannot go by them i n discriminating between c o r r e c t and incorrect

s c i e n t i f i c decisions. "64 Such a mle-centered formal logic therefore takes us

t o a dead-end a s much a s t h e older epistemologies. Rules determine t h e valid-

i t y of a proposition, y e t , i n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , t h e r u l e s a r e a r b i t r a r y . We

a r e caught i n a vicious c i r c l e r e s u l t i n g from an academic approach t o logic.

The only way t o break out i s t o take t h e problem of ideology seriously.

The dead-end nature of Kaufmannts rule-centered approach t o logic was

grasped by Dewey and Bentley. "(Kaufrnann) requires decisions t o get t h e prop-

o s i t i o n s , r u l e s t o g e t t h e decisions, and higher r u l e s t o g e t changes i n t h e

lower r u l e s ; behind a l l of which he puts a backlog of invariant ( i .e., unchange-

a b l e ) properties which t h e r u l e s possess. 1165 Each s t e p i n Kaufmannls logic made

t h e problem of logic more and more removed from p r a c t i c a l inquiry and argument.

Kaufmannts formal d e f i n i t i o n of meaning i s responsible f o r t h i s manipulation

and e s c a l a t i o n of a b s t r a c t thought. When I discuss language and logic i n

Chapter Nineteen, I w i l l attempt t o c l a r i f y how such absurd argumentation occurs.

Ny examination of educational methods i n the s o c i a l sciences i n Chapter Twenty-

One w i l l a l s o help c l a r i f y t h i s matter.

Kauf'mam a l s o s t r e s s e d how theories of knowledge and value can " c l a r i f y

the c r i t e r i a o f correct b e l i e f and correct valuations". But, again, the formal

academic approach f a i l e d , Replacing a s t a t i c "epistemology" with a s t a t i c "meth-

odology" solves nothing. The r e a l a l t e r n a t i v e i s something l i k e what Toulmin

c a l l e d epistemological analysis, always rooted i n a specific subject matter.

Rather than being formal and academic, it would be pragmatic and practical.

To make t h i s s h i f t a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t handling of t h e problem of f a c t and

value i s required. Kauflnann wrote t h a t "... t h e contrast between f a c t and value

is not one between d i f f e r e n t realms of being, but between two d i f f e r e n t types of

r u l e s r namely, procedural r u l e s and axiological rules. "66 The idea t h a t f a c t and

value r e f l e c t "different realms of being" should be rejected, but abstracting the

problem i n t o axiology is not the solution. a act" and "value" a r e terms applied

t o d i f f e r e n t stages i n t h e process of ongoing inquiry and argument. Only i f we

r e i f y f a c t s and accept a s c i e n t i s t i c view of "laws" and "cause" do we get i n t o

a problem over the a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n s of f a c t and value. When Kaufmann s t a t e d

that 'I.. . t h e r e a r e no insoluble value problems,"67 and then suggested t h a t making

the l o g i c a l meaning of value terms unambiguous i s t h e way t o solve value problems,

we see where an a b s t r a c t treatment of t h i s question can lead. It i s possible t o

t a l k of solving value problems i n theory, but they a r e rooted i n practice, i . e . ,

i n t h e ongoing experience and behaviour t h a t i s developed and reinforced i n a

society, and it is t h e r e they must be solved. Only when we t r e a t knowledge a s

pragmatic, a s a means f o r changing t h e q u a l i t y of human l i f e , can we do t h i s .

Like Durlcheim and Popper, K a u m n n believed I n t h e u n l t y of method i n

t h e n a t u r a l and s o c i a l sciences. He wrote: "Comparison of physical laws and

s o c i a l laws has been misled by erroneous preconceptions concerning; t h e nature

of t h e former. '16* Like t h e other two t h e o r i s t s , h i s idea of t h e u n i t y of method

was formal and not rooted i n an understanding of logic which sees subject matter

and t h e assessment of argument working hand i n hand. Both t h e n a t u r a l and s o c i a l

sciences a r e characterized by t h i s " d i a l e c t i c " and it i s from t h i s stance t h a t we

should speak of t h e u n i t y of method.

Kaufmann applied h i s "methodology" t o t h e c l a s s i c a l controversies between

rationalism and empiricism, realism and idealism, and monism and dualism. Though

a discussion of t h e s e controversies i s not t h e "proper study" of t h i s t h e s i s , it

i s relevant t o make a b r i e f comment on Kaufmann's handling of them. Kaufmann a r -

gued t h a t t h e empiricists, who say t h e r e i s no indubitable t r u t h i n immediate ex-

perience, were c o r r e c t . Method i s always brought t o bear i n any inquiry. But he

disagreed t h a t any v a r i e t y of nominalism describes how we make abstractions. His

commitment t o formal logic and c e r t a i n r a t i o n a l i s t i c assumptions led him t o r e j e c t

t h i s approach. We can agree t h a t method i s always a t play. One of our main c r i t -

icisms of both vulgar tnarxism and 1Lberal positivism was t h a t they ignore t h i s e f -

fect. But a s we have argued, t h e a l t e r n a t i v e t o these doctrines i s not t o be found

i n a formal treatment of method.

Kaufmann agreed with t h e i d e a l i s t s t h a t knowledge i s rooted i n human ex-

perience, but then r e j e c t e d t h e i r notion t h a t t h e existence of t h e external world

depends on thought. This i s a confusing commentary s i n c e human experience e x i s t s

because we a r e i n biological, sociological and psychological relationships with

the l a r g e r environment. This would imply a t o t a l r e j e c t i o n of the i d e a l i s t p o s i -

-
t i o n , since it stereotypes knowledge a s being mental and autonomous. And the

a l t e r n a t i v e i s not a "realism" o r crude materialism which sees knowledge a s re-

f l e c t i n g the so-called external world. Our knowledge comes from our praxis, i n

S a r t r e t s pragmatic sense, and t h i s approach t o knowledge i s the r a d i c a l alterna-

t i v e t o both i d e a l i s t i c and crude m a t e r i a l i s t i c theories.

Kaufknann rejected reductionistic theories of knowledge and therefore re-

jected monism. And he did not subscribe t o a d u a l i s t i c notion a s an a l t e r n a t i v e

t o them. Neither monist nor d u a l i s t doctrines a r e tenable, but methodological

analysis of t h e kind Kaufmann undertook i s not the way t o c l a r i f y t h i s problem.

Ongoing inquiry w i l l continue t o give us new clues about human experience and

behaviour. Hopefully, we a r e ready t o r e j e c t both d u a l i s t i c notions of "mind

and body" and of "objective and subjective" and begin t o study the forces t h a t

a f f e c t t h e q u a l i t y of d i f f e r e n t i a l hwnan experience and behaviour. When we r e j e c t

these formal d i s t i n c t i o n s , we can leave behind abstract, ontological questions and

begin t o discover, i n practice, why some people's experience and behaviour i s in-

tegrated and healthy, while others i s fragmented (e.g., schizoid).69 Instead of

reducing human experience, behaviour and events t o a p r i o r i categories, we can

begin t o discover, i n practice, what the consequences of d i f f e r e n t modes of ex-

perience and behaviow? are.

Our conclusion i s t h a t no c l a r i f i c a t i o n of problems of logic can come

f r o m creating a d i s c i p l i n e of "meth~dology~
which operates i n abstraction from

ongoing problem solving. And t h i s i s what Kaufmann has created. As he said:

"Methodology does not speak 'about' empirical science i n t h e same sense a s em-

p i r i c a l science speaks about t h e world; it r a t h e r c l a r i f i e s t h e meaning of 'em-

p i r i c a l science '. '170 Instead of "rationalism" and "empiricism" we have "method-

ology" and "empiricism". This c o n s t i t u t e s a reform i n t h e way t r a d i t i o n a l logic

viewed science, but does not c o n s t i t u t e a r e a l break from it.

The r e a l a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e old epistemologies was c o n s i s t e n t l y emphasized

by C.W. Mills. I n h i s words:

It.., n e i t h e r Method nor Theory alone can be taken a s p a r t of t h e a c t u a l

work of t h e s o c i a l studies. I n f a c t , both a r e just t h e opposite. They
a r e statesmen-like withdrawals from t h e problems of s o c i a l science. "7l

Mills r e a l i z e d t h a t a de-mystified, pragmatic science and a self-conscious scien-

t i s t go hand i n halid. He a l s o r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e ideology and logic of scientism

i n h i b i t s ongoing profound research.

"To have mastered 'method' and 'theory1 i s t o have become a self-conscious

thinker, a man a t work and aware of t h e assumptions and implications of
whatever he i s about. To be mastered by tmethodl or 'theory' is simply t o
be kept from working, from t r y i n g , t h a t i s , t o f i n d out something t h a t i s
going on i n t h e world. "72

Kauf'mann's "methodology" was much more than a withdrawal from t h e problems

of s o c i a l science. It is a new form of r e i f y i n g knowledge t o replace t h e old epi-

stemological forms. Kauf'mann wanted t o make "... e x p l i c i t t h e i m p l i c i t t h e o r e t i c a l

laws i n s o c i a l science ... '17' without looking f o r t h e r o o t s of r u l e s , laws, causes

and meanings i n ongoing human a c t i v i t y . He believed t h a t h i s "methodology" had r e -

moved t h e "... obstacles t h a t a p r i o r i s t i c and r e l a t i v i s t i c f a l l a c i e s have ...1174

and yet, r a t h e r than going beyond t h i s f a l s e dilemma, he l e f t us with equally a b s t r a c t

ones. We a r e no b e t t e r off with an a b s t r a c t dilemma over "rules" than we were over

one of absolutes.
 Footnotes

' ~ e l i x Kaufmann: Methodology of t h e Social Sciences. New York, The Humanities

Press (19581, p. v i i . The d i s t i n c t i o n between "deductive logic" and "method-
ology", between a n a l y t i c a l propositions and synthetic propositions, has been
increasingly c r i t i c i z e d . Perhaps t h e best known c r i t i c i s m i s by Quine who r e f e r s
t o t h e two s i d e s of t h i s dichotomy a s "the two dogmas of empiricism". Quine, l i k e
Dewey, argued t h a t "Science i s a continuation of common sense, and it continues
t h e common sense expedient of swelling ontology t o simplify theory." (Willard V.
Quine: From A Logical Point of View. New York, Harper and Row (19631, p. 45. )
Like Dewey, who I discuss i n Chapter Twenty, he argued t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n s i n science
should be t r e a t e d pragmatically, not ontologically. He stated: "1n repudiating such
a boundary (between a n a l y t i c and synthetic propositions) I espouse a more thorough
pragmatism ( than Carnap). " ( Ibid. , p. 46. ) This thorough pragmatism is concerned
with t h e 'I... i n c l i n a t i o n t o a d j u s t one strand of t h e f a b r i c of science r a t h e r than
another i n accommodating some p a r t i c u l a r r e c a l c i t r a n t experience." ( I b i d . 1 This ap-
proach does not a b s t r a c t t h e "meaning" of d i s t i n c t i o n s i n t o ontology, which i s t h e
e r r o r t h a t Kaufmann made. For example, Kaufmann believed "... t h a t phenomenology
has disclosed t h e nature of t h e underlying problems" of meaning. (Kaufmann, op.
c l t . , p. 19.1 However, combining t h e e r r o r s of rationalism and empiricism, which
i s what phenomenology tends t o do, j u s t a b s t r a c t s t h e pseudo-problems of formal
logic I n t o a pseudo-pseudo-problem. I n a statement t h a t a p p l i e s t o phenomenology,
Dewey wrote: "~omel o g i c a l t h e o r i e s maintain t h a t both kinds of immediate knowledge
e x i s t and t h a t mediation and i n f e r e n t i a l knowledge r e s u l t from t h e union of t h e two;
a union i n which a p r i o r i f i r s t t r u t h s and empirical material a r e brought i n t o con-
nection with each other. " (Logic, op. c i t . , p. 139. ) The r e l a t i o n of phenomenology
t o t h e ideology and l o g i c of scientism has not been d e a l t with i n t h i s study. For
a c r i t i c a l study of phenomenology, see M. Merleau-Ponty: The Primacy of Percevtion.
J. M. Edie ( ed. ) , Northwestern University Press ( 1964).

5 ~ e ethe discussion of Whorf i n Chapter Nineteen.

%aufmann, op. c i t . , p. 31.

71bid., p. 3.

*lbid., p. 20.

'1bid.. p. 30.

1
'51bid., pp. 46-7.

161bid., p. 48.

17gnowim and t h e Known, op. c i t . , p. 215.

%bid. , p. 51.
191bia., p. 56.

2 9 ~ e eFloyd W. Matson: The Broken Ima~e. Gasden C i t y , Anchor ( 1 9 6 4 ) ; and Arthur

Koestler: The Ghost I n The Machine. London, Hutchinson (1967).

30~aufrnann, op. c i t . , P. 119.

3 1 ~ b i d . , p. 120.

3 2 ~ b i d . , p. 123.
3 4 ~ b i d . , pp. 125-6.

361bid., PP. 132-30

3 9 ~ b i d . , p. 150. There a r e more t h e o r e t i c a l controversies i n t h e history of

psychology than t h a t over introspection and behaviorism. I n some ways, t h i s
was a crude debate rooted i n a f a l s e understanding of human consciousness.
The c o n f l i c t between v a r i e t i e s of behaviorism and psychoanalysis i s a more
fundamental debate. Recently t h e c o n f l i c t s between t h e so-called " t h i r d f orcel'
In psychology, what i s sometimes c a l l e d " s e l f psychology", and t h e behaviorist
and neo-Freudian theories have played an important role.
5 9 ~ b i d . , p. 205. This i s t h e same e r r o r t h a t t h e psychologist A l l p o r t made i n
h i s d i s c u s s i o n of values i n t h e s o c i a l sciences. al or don W. Allport: The Nature
of Prejudice. Garden C i t y , Anchor ( 19581, pp. 477-80. )

65~nowinnand t h e Known, op. c i t . , p. 216.

66~aufmann, op. c i t . , p. 236.

6 9 w~ i l l be using t h e term schizoid i n t h e next f o u r chapters. "Such a schizoid

i n d i v i d u a l i n one sense i s t r y i n g t o be omnipotent by enclosing w i t h i n h i s own
being, without m x o u r s e t o a c r e a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p with o t h e r s , modes of r e l a -
t i o n s h i p t h a t r e q u i r e t h e e f f e c t i v e presence t o him of o t h e r people and of t h e
o u t e r world. He would appear t o be, i n a n u n r e a l , impossible way, a l l persons
and t h i n g s t o himself. The imagined advantages a r e s a f e t y f o r t h e t r u e s e l f ,
i s o l a t i o n and hence freedom from o t h e r s , s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , and c o n t r o l . 'I ( R . D.
Laing: The Divided S e l f , op. c i t . , p. 75. ) I w i l l argue t h a t a process l i k e wnat
Laing c a l l e d s c h i z o i d i s occurring when language i s r e i f i e d a s it i s i n t h e ide-
ology and l o g i c of scientism.

70~aufmann, op. c i t . , p. 240.

7 l ~ h eS o c i o l o g i c a l Method, op. c2t.s P. 122.

T21bid., p. 121.

73~aufmann, op. c i t . , p. 243.

 . Chapter Eighteen

A Schizoid Logic: Winch

It i s useful t o c r i t i c a l l y examine one other approach t o logic which

s t r e s s e s rules. Winch's work i s useful because h i s treatment of r u l e s was based

on a consideration of sociology more than formal methodology. Because it combines

a n academic view of epistemology with an academic view of sociology, it serves a s

an example of and stands a s a warning against e c l e c t i c approaches t o problems of

logic. A s well, Winch's approach shows how a misconstrued comparison of t h e

n a t u r a l and s o c i a l sciences leads t o a confusion about matters of logic.

The S p l i t Between Thought and 3 e a l i t y

Winch f i r s t discussed what he c a l l e d t h e "philosophical bearings" of h i s

approach t o t h e s o c i a l sciences. He claimed t h a t philosophy d e a l t with t h e con-

ceptual problem of "man's r e l a t i o n t o r e a l i t y " . ' Showing h i s o r i e n t a t i o n t o t h i s

problem, he wrote: "TO ask whether r e a l i t y i s i n t e l l i g i b l e i s t o ask about t h e

r e l a t i o n between thought and r e a l i t y . " 2 Like Kaufmann, h i s analysis began with

t h e assumption t h a t "thought" and " r e a l i t y " a r e separated. This i d e a l i s t assump-

t i o n runs throughout h i s work. When discussing Mannheimts handling of t h e problem

of ideology, we argued against any approach which ignores t h e f a c t t h a t thought and

language a r e an e s s e n t i a l aspect of s o c i a l r e a l i t y . The problem f o r logic i s thus

not how the two r e l a t e , but how d l f f e r e n t forms of thought function i n society. I

have c o n t i n u a l l p r a i s e d t h e question of how academic and formal thought functions

a t present and how t h e development of a pragmatic understanding of thought and

language might r e l a t e t o a change i n t h e function and q u a l i t y of t h e s o c i a l

sciences.

Winch's philosophical o r i e n t a t i o n was not t h e kind required t o develop a

p r a c t i c a l or working logic. Believing i n a s p l i t between thought and r e a l i t y , he

a l s o believed i n t h e value of formal s t u d i e s i n "metaphysics" and "epistemologyn.

For him, t h e 'I... discussion of t h e c e n t r a l questions of metaphysics and episte-

mology themselves may ... have l i g h t t o throw on t h e nature of human s o c i e t i e s . 113

This proposal i s somewhat deceptive. I f Winch was i n t e r e s t e d i n analyzing why

people come t o believe i n metaphysical and epistemological questions, then some-

t h i n g valuable could be learned. But t h i s was not what he meant. Instead of

t h i s , he was i n t e r e s t e d i n 'I.. . t r a c i n g t h e implications of t h e concepts we

use. He distinguished t h i s a n a l y s i s of concepts from empirical research, i. e. ,

t h e concepts were t o be analyzed i n a b s t r a c t from t h e i r s c i e n t i f i c use. Winch

thus believed i n "... t h e p i v o t a l r o l e of epistemology within philosophy. r15

Summarizing h i s o r i e n t a t i o n , he wrote: "... what i s r e a l l y fundamental t o

philosophy i s t h e question regarding t h e nature and i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of r e a l i t y . " 6

Winch's next t a s k was t o l i n k epistemology t o t h e s o c i a l sciences. It i s

worth noting t h a t t h i s approach i s t h e exact opposite t o t h a t of t h e sociology of

knowledge. He attempted t h i s by discussing the idea of "understanding". He asked:

"How i s ...any understanding possible? To answer t h i s question it i s

necessary t o show t h e c e n t r a l r o l e which the concept of understanding
plays i n t h e a c t i v i t i e s which a r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of human s o c i e t i e s . "7

His approach t o understanding was developed by c r i t i c i z i n g Dxrkheim and

by u t i l i z i n g ~ i t t ~ e n s t e i n F
. i r s t he quoted Durkhcim:
 "5 consider extremely f r u i t f u l t h i s idea t h a t s o c i a l l i f e should be
explained, not by t h e notions of those who p a r t i c i p a t e i n i t , but by
more profound causes which a r e unperceived by collsciousness and I
think a l s o t h a t these causes a r e t o be sought mainly i n the manner
according t o which the associated individuals a r e grouped. Only i n
t h i s way, it seems, can history become a science and sociology it-
self exist. "

But Winch could not accept the causal hypothesis. He was interested i n the

nature of the contact between "mind" and " r e a l i t y " and the question of mean-

ing i n terms of the nature of t h i s relationship. His c r i t i q u e of Durkheim

was, therefore, rooted i n h i s i d e a l i s t assumptions and not i n a c r i t i q u e of

Durkheirn's logic p e r se.

Discussing Wittgenstein, Winch s t a t e d t h a t "... t h e whole substance of

Wittgensteinls argument t h a t it is not those practices considered on t h e i r own

which j u s t i f y t h e application of categories l i k e language and meaning but the

s o c i a l context i n which these practices a r e performed. "9 Winch contrasted

Wittgenstein's approach t o "rules" with t h a t of ~ y e r l ' who he claimed was m i s -

takenly looking f o r r u l e s independent o f society.

This conzern with r e l a t i n g the "rules" used f o r understanding and the

s o c i a l context of t h e i r use may seem t o c o n f l i c t with Winch's assumptions about

t h e separation of thought and r e a l i t y . We might expect Winch t o t r e a t "rules"

more a s Kaufmann did; a s though "methodology" o r "epistemology" were an autono-

mous discipline. Winch, however, developed h i s concept of understanding and

r u l e s i n a very d i f f e r e n t manner.

Sociological and Epistemological Rules

To udderstand t h i s , we need t o discuss what Winch meant by "meaningful

behaviour". He developed t h i s idea by arguing f o r a closer relationship between

 - 401 -
I

epistemology and sociology. F i r s t , he stated: "... t h e philosophical elu-

c i d a t i o n of human intelligence, and the notions associated with t h i s , r e -

quires t h a t these notions be placed i n the context of t h e r e l a t i o n s between

men i n society. "" Then, on t h e basis of Wittgensteinls approach t o r u l e s ,

he wrote t h a t "... t h e r e l a t i o n s between sociology and epistemology must be

d i f f e r e n t from, and very much c l o s e r than what is usually imagined t o be t h e

case. "12 F i n a l l y , he argued t h a t concepts must be meaningful t o be explana-

tory. Epistemology needs t o analyze t h e meaning of philosophical concepts

and sociology needs t o analyze t h e meaning of s o c i a l concepts t o be a b l e t o

explain anything. The s o c i o l o g i s t , f o r Winch, i s then concerned with "mean-

ingj3-11 behaviour ". The new r e l a t i o n s h i p between sociology and epistemology

comes from t h i s concern since "... a l l behaviour which i s meaningful ... is

ips0 f a c t o rule-governed. "13 Because r u l e s operate i n both philosophy and

society, t h e study of epistemology has implications f o r t h e study of society.

A s we s a i d , Winch's treatment of "rules" is very d i f f e r e n t than t h a t

of Kaufmann. Though h i s philosophical o r i e n t a t i o n i s i d e a l i s t i c , h i s a c t u a l

approach t o " r u l e s " has a pragmatic overtone. For example, while Kaufmann

maintained t h e r a t i o n a l i s t i c conception of i n t e l l i g e n c e , Winch recognized t h e

interdependence of i n t e l l e c t u a l functions and p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y . For example,

discussing inference, he wrote t h a t earning t o i n f e r i s not j u s t a matter of

being taught about e x p l i c i t l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s between propositions; it i s learn-

ing t o do something. 1114

For Winch our habits and our methods of r e f l e c t i o n were intertwined.

" ~ u l e s "f o r undkrstanding do not obtain t h e i r v a l i d i t y because of any formalism,

but because o f t h e i r use. he only mode of l i f e which can undergoe a mean-

ingful development i n response t o environmental changes i s one which contains

within i t s e l f the means of assessing t h e significance of the behaviour which

it prescribes. "'5

The Disunity of Method and Sc ientism

Winch's idea of "meaningful behaviour" therefore helps us avoid the

trappings of a formal academic logic. How did Winch approach what he called

t h e "social studies as science" i n terms of t h i s orientation?

Winch pointed out t h a t f o r J.S. M i l l a l l explanations involved the

same l o g i c a l structure. We were c r i t i c a l o f Durkheim because l i k e J.S. M i l l

he held t o a stereotyped formal notion of logic. But Winch's conclusion, un-

l i k e our own, was t h a t explanation i n the natural and s o c i a l sciences i s fun-

damentally d i f f e r e n t . For him, t h e former a r e concerned with physical changes

while t h e l a t t e r a r e concerned with conceptual changes. I n contrast t o t h i s ,

I would argue t h a t t h e s o c i a l sciences a r e concerned with behavioral and struc-

t u r a l change. and t h a t "concepts" a r e used t o t h i s end. From t h i s point of view

t h e n a t u r a l and s o c i a l sciences explain i n a similar way though t o different

ends. A discussion of t h i s matter can help us see how Winch's i d e a l i s t i c as-

sumptions affected h i s approach t o t h e philosophy of science.

Winch's view of explanation was not metaphysical even though he d i d

t r e a t "concepts" i n terms of formal epistemology and not i n terms of the soci-

ology o f knowledge. He did not believe t h a t t h e "shareability" (my term) of

I

s c i e n t i f i c r u l e s stemmed from observations, but r a t h e r t h a t it was related t o

the power o f a "reference group" over a group of s c i e n t i s t s . He agreed with

Hwnels statement t h a t is evident, t h a t a l l s c i e n t i s t s have a r e l a t i o n ,

greater o r l e s s , t o human nature; t h a t however wide any of them seem t o run

from it, they s t i l l return back by one passage o r another. "I6 The notion of

"human nature" i s too s t a t i c t o explain how a s c i e n t i s t ' s work i s ultimately

rooted i n b e l i e f s t h a t a r e beyond the realm of d i r e c t inquiry. Discussing

the problem o f ideology is a more f r u i t f u l way t o r a i s e t h i s problem.

For Winch, both the study of natural and s o c i a l r e g u l a r i t i e s depended

upon having common rules. And he had an i n t e r e s t i n g comparison t o make regard-

ing the nature of r u l e s i n the two areas:

".,.whereas i n t h e case of t h e natural s c i e n t i s t we have t o deal with

only one s e t of r u l e s , namely, those governing t h e s c i e n t i s t ' s inves-
t i g a t i o n i t s e l f , here what t h e sociolopist i s studying, as well a s h i s
study o f it, i s a human a c t i v i t y and i s therefore carried on according
t o rules. And it i s these rules, r a t h e r than those which govern t h e
s o c i o l o g i s t l s investigation, which specify what i s t o count a s 'doing
the same kind of thing' i n r e l a t i o n t o t h a t kind of a c t i v i t y . "I7

This d i s t i n c t i o n between what i s being studied and the study of it can be useful.

I n t h e s o c i a l sciences, according t o Winch, r u l e s "govern" both t h e human a c t i v i t y

being studied ( s o c i a l r u l e s ) and the way it i s being studied (philosophical r u l e s ) ,

whereas it i s not t r u e t h a t s o c i a l r u l e s govern physical processes. This dis-

t i n c t i o n can help us become aware of just how integrated s o c i a l science and

society are. The study of how behavioral " m l e s " r e l a t e and change; of how

changes i n behavioral norms t h a t accompany large scale s o c i a l changes a f f e c t

and a r e affected by s c i e n t i f i c norms, follows from t h i s awareness.

But how r e a l i s the d i s t i n c t i o n ? When Winch s a i d t h a t it is the "rules" .

a

t h a t govern human behaviour and not those which govern our investigation of' t h i s
behaviour which w i l l "specify what i s t o count a s tdoing the same kind of

thing i n r e l a t i o n t o t h a t kfnd of a c t i v i t y " , he was saying t h a t so-called

philosophical or epistemological r u l e s a r e always subservient t o the Social

ones. It follows f r o m t h i s t h a t s o c i a l norms a r e the basis of i n t e l l e c t u a l

ones, since agreement about how t o study w i l l depend on agreement about what

t o study and t h e p a r t i c u l a r value we place on the human events out of which

our problems a r i s e . I f we begin t o think i n t h i s manner, Winch's philosoph-

i c a l separation of "thought" and " r e a l i t y " i s no longer tenable. Yet it was

Winch's own d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t led t o these questions.

Doesntt the same r e l a t i o n between logic and subject matter a s Winch

suggested f o r t h e s o c i a l sciences e x i s t f o r the natural sciences? I s n ' t it

a l s o s o c i a l norms (e.g., t h e t r a i n i n g of a s c i e n t i s t t o a paradigm) t h a t spec-

i f y what is t o count a s doing the same kind of thing, t h a t i s , a s a relevant

f a c t , f o r t h e natural s c i e n t i s t ? The r u l e s t h a t govern the natural s c i e n t i s t ' s

work and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n do not have an a p r i o r i , a h i s t o r l c a l o r trans-social

nature any more than those o f the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t . Winch was implying some-

thing metaphysical and meta-social about natural science investigation which

we saw, with Kuhn, is not accurate.

Winch's confusion was over the nature of s c i e n t i f i c subject matter.

The "physical world" i s given and t h e natural s c i e n t i s t studies "it" according

t o p r i o r i t i e s established by the discipline. But so i s the "social world" glven

i n the sense t h a t biological and h i s t o r i c a l processes have led t o the development

of human "society" independent of s o c i a l science. And the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t a l s o

has p r i o r i t i e s t h a t w i l l a f f e c t the e f f e c t s of knowledge on human society. The

natural sciences do not have one and bhe s o c i a l sciences two s e t s of rules.

The r u l e s of both kinds of investigation a r e rooted i n s o c i a l p r i o r i t i e s and

ultimately i n ideologies. It i s v i t a l t o recognize t h i s i f t h e r e a l nature

of t h e unity of method i n both f i e l d s i s t o be understood.

Winch's confusion about methods i n the n a t u r a l and s o c i a l sciences

l e d t o confusion about t h e idea of "prediction". Here he was similar t o Max

Weber. He wrote t h a t "1f 0 wants t o predict how N i s going t o act. he must

f a m i l i a r i z e himself with t h e concepts i n terms of which N i s viewing t h e s i t -

uation; having done t h i s he may, from h i s knowledge of N1s character, be able

t o predict with g r e a t confidence wbat decision N i s going t o take. Winch

was saying t h a t t h e s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t must know t h e "rules" by which a person

gains meaning i n any s i t u a t i o n i f he or she i s t o be a b l e t o predict a c t s .

I n a d d i t i o n , he was rejec,ting t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h e idea of prediction de-

veloped i n t h e n a t u r a l sciences f o r t h e s o c i a l sciences.

'I... t h e c e n t r a l concepts which belong t o our understanding of s o c i a l

l i f e a r e incompatible with concepts c e n t r a l t o t h e a c t i v i t y of scien-
t i f i c prediction. When we speak of t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of s c i e n t i f i c pre-
d i c t i o n of s o c i a l developments of t h i s s o r t , we l i t e r a l l y do not un-
derstand it because it has no sense. "19

But what do we mean when we t a l k of prediction? We do not mean, a s we

saw with Toulmin, t h a t knowledge abaut t h e causes of a phenomenon allow us t o

predict i t s behaviour. Rather what we c a l l e d "middle-range laws" s u f f i c i e n t l y

represent t h e dynamics of an event t o allow us t o predict how, given c e r t a i n

conditions, a s i m i l a r event w i l l occur. Winch's view of prediction i n the

n a t u r a l scgences was f a l s e . He implied t h a t t h e n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t i s rule-

f r ~ ei n h i s predictions, which i s not t h e case. The n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t does

not make p r e d i c t i o n s independent of the r u l e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t have

developed w i t h i n t h e r e l e v a n t paradigm and s u b j e c t matter. Winch was re-

j e c t i n g a "straw man" when he r e j e c t e d p r e d i c t i o n i n t h e s o c i a l sciences.

Ideal3zed and Working Logic

Flinch next discussed " t h e mind and society". Here we s e e how

Winch's view of l o g i c p a r a l l e l e d h i s attempt t o combine epistemology and

sociology. He made it c l e a r t h a t he did not b e l i e v e i n a meta-social view

of l o g i c . For him t h e "... c r i t e r i a of l o g i c a r e not a d i r e c t g i f t of god,

but a r i s e out o f , and a r e only i n t e l l i g i b l e i n t h e context o f , ways of l i v i n g

o r modes of s o c i a l l i f e . " 2 0 But what d i d he mean by saying t h a t l o g i c i s only

made i s t e l l i g i b l e i n t h e context of ways of l i v i n g ? Did he mean t h a t a b s t r a c t

l o g i c must be a p p l i e d t o p r a c t i c a l problems t o be i n t e l l i g i b l e ? O r , i n con-

t r a s t , d i d he mean t h a t l o g i c i s p r a c t i c a l ? We saw with our d i s c u s s i o n of

Toulmin how a b e l i e f i n t h e s e p a r a t i o n between " l o g i c a l theory" and " l o g i c a l

p r a c t i c e t 1 c a n s t i l l e x i s t when a t h e o r i s t r e j e c t s a metaphysical n o t i o n of logic.

We a l s o saw how a n " i d e a l i z e d l o g i c " and a "working l o g i c " a r e incompatible.

We must examine Winch's "philosophical bearings" t o r e v e a l what he

meant. For him philosophy must t a k e a n uncommitted look a t t h e c r i t e r i a of

l o g i c even i f it must be r e l a t e d t o t h e context of ways of l i v i n g t o be "made

intelligiblet1. "To t a k e a n uncommitted view of ... competing conceptions i s

p e c u l i a r l y t h e t a s k of philosophy ..."21 Agreeing with Wittgenstein, Winch

claimed t h a t " ~ h i l d s o p h yleaves everything a s it was. " 2 2 1t i s c l e a r from t h i s

t h a t Winch accepted a n a b s t r a c t , even i f not a meta-social, view of logic. Logic

i s i n t e l l i g i b l e only i n a l i v i n g c o n t e x t , but t h e philosopher need not evalu-

a t e how differaent "ways of l i v i n g " a f f e c t l o g i c . He o r she j u s t analyzes t h e

logic i n abstract.

This p o s i t l o n c o n f l i c t s with Winch's own assumptions, On t h e one hand,

he wanted t o b r i n g epistemology and sociology c l o s e r t o g e t h e r ; and on t h e ovher

hand, he was n o t w i l l i n g t o accept t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s f o r 13gic i n t h e

s o c i a l sciences. Even a f t e r a d m i t t i n g t h a t t h e "ways of l i v i n g " g i v e l o g i c

t h e i r i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , he wanted t o t r e a t l o g i c i n a b s t r a c t from e v a l u a t i n g

t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p betwsen it and human a c t i v i t y . In s h o r t , Winch wanted t o

keep philosophy a s a p r o f e s s i o n .

This p a r t l y e x p l a i n s why he t a l k e d of R.S. Lyndls " p h i l o s o p h i c a l con-

fusion" and of h i s " c o r r u p t use of s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t i v i t y " , r a t h e r t h a n debating

Lyndls p o i n t t h a t o b j e c t i v i t y can be n a i v e l y " i n favour of t h e going system",

" f r a n k l y biased" toward i t , o r c r i t i c a l of t h a t s o c i a l system.23 Winch was un-

w i l l i n g t o b r i n g philosophy down from i t s i v o r y tower t o begin t o e v a l u a t e how

d i f f e r e n t l o g i c s and ways of l i v i n g r e l a t e . We have a l r e a d y argued t h a t formal

academic l o g i c s r e l a t e t o conservative commitments and t h a t philosophy can be

no more v a l u e - f r e e t h a n science.

Winch was c r i t i c a l of Durkheim ( a n d Pareto, though he i s not r e l e v a n t

t o our s t u d y ) f o r t r e a t i n g p r o p o s i t i o n s and t h e o r i e s a s " f a c t s " . My own d i s c u s -

s i o n of Durkheim was c r i t i c a l of h i s r e i f i e d n o t i o n of f a c t s . Of Pareto, 'dinch

wrote: "1n a sense ( h e ) has not c a r r i e d h i s etnpiricism f a r enough. 1124 The

4
same t h i n g could be s a i d of Durltheim. I f the empiricist attitud,? is carried

f a r enough, and one s assumptions a r e made e x p l i c i t and c r i t i c a l l y evaluated,

t h e n we see t h a t t h e fundamental problem f o r t h e philosophy of science and

t h e sociology of knowledge i s t o understand d i f f e r e n t modes of discourse and

t h e i r f u n c t i o n i n society.

Winch went on t o d i s c u s s Weberls approach t o understanding and explan-

ation. You w i l l r e c a l l t h a t Weber distinguished " i n t e r p r e t a t i v e understanding"

from "causal explanation". Because of h i s Weberian-like idea of "meaningful be-

haviour" we might expect Winch t o accept t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n o r a t l e a s t t o accept

t h i s idea of "understanding". But he did not. Of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n Winch said:

" I n s h o r t , he adopts t h e e x t e r n a l point of view and f o r g e t s t o take account of

t h e ' s u b j e c t i v e l y intended sense1 of t h e behaviour he i s t a l k i n g about; and t h i s ,

I want t o say, i s a n a t u r a l r e s u l t of h i s attempt t o divorce t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s

l i n k i n g t h o s e workers from t h e i d e a s which t h e i r a c t i o n s embody ... "25 Weberls

acceptance of t h e " e x t e r n a l point of view" was rooted i n h i s confused understand-

ing of "cause". Though he recognized t h a t t h e s o c i a l sciences could not t r e a t

i t s s u b j e c t matter s o l e l y i n terms of cause and e f f e c t , and i n t h i s sense was

not s c i e n t i s t i c , Weberls r a d i c a l nominalism l e d him t o a n extreme form of i n t e l -

l e c t u a l reductionism. Because he r i g i d l y separated matters of f a c t and matters

of value, y e t considered value a matter of f a c t , he could never t r e a t explanation

i n a pragmatic way. So Winch was c o r r e c t f o r c r i t i c i z i n g Weber f o r d i v o r c i w

" s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s " from "ideas".

But t h e r e 9s a n i r o n y i n Winch's point. We have argued t h a t Winch

himself d i d not understand t h e methodology of t h e n a t u r a l sciences and hence

had a f a l s e id6a of causation. We have a l s o argued t h a t though he wanted t o

b r i n g epistemology and sociology c l o s e r t o g e t h e r he was not w i l l i n g t o follow

 - 409 -
1

t h e implications and abandon academic epistemology. I n a sense t h e n Winchts

c r i t i c i s m of Weber a p p l i e s t o himself.

This c r i t i c i s m of Weber has implications f o r our t h e s i s . For one

thing, i f the l s u b j e c t i v e l y intended s e n s e t of behaviour" i s t o be under-

stood f o r t h e humans being s t u d i e d , should it not a l s o be understood f o r t h e

social scientist? I f we abandon what Winch c a l l e d t h e " e x t e r n a l point of view"

and accept t h a t t h e s c i e n t i s t ' s b e l i e f s and problems a r e rooted i n "ways of

l i v i n g " , t h e n a new q u a l i t y of c r i t i c i s m - i d e o l o g i c a l c r i t i c i s m - has t o be

developed. To enable u s t o do t h i s , a l l epistemologies which d e f i n e "objectiv-

i t y " i n a way t h a t assumes t h e e x t e r n a l and c a u s a l point of view must be r e -

jected.

There i s a second implication. I f t h e above argument holds t h e n we

must r e a l i z e t h e need t o c o n s t a n t l y ask Lyndls q u e s t i o n I1~nowledgef o r what?"

o r t h e r e c e n t v e r s i o n nowle ledge f o r whom?" Once t h e r o l e of ideology i n l o g i c

i s analyzed, we cannot avoid adding t h i s concern with t h e c o n t r o l s over and

p r i o r i t i e s and consequences of knowledge t o those with which s o c i a l science

must deal.

The t h i r d i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t our approach t o l o g i c must account f o r

t h e e f f e c t s of t h e sociology of knowledge. This i s j u s t a r e v e r s e way of say-

ing what has been s t a t e d before. I f we cannot divorce s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s from

i d e a s , we cannot evaluate ideas without a l s o evaluating t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s

t h a t they grow out of and reinforce. And, a s we have c o n s i s t e n t l y argued, no

v a r i a t i u n of,so-called value-free science can account f o r t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s .

Winch's d i s c u s s i o n of " t h e mind and s o c j e t y " i s rooted i n a f a l s e a s -

 - 410 -
I

sumptlon of t h e n a t u r e of l o g i c i n t h e n a t u r a l sciences and h i s schizoid un-

derstanding of t h e r e l a t i o n of "thought and r e a l i t y " . When he wrote t h a t

"...t h e understanding of s o c i e t y i s l o g i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from t h e understand-

ing of n a t u r e ... t h e concepts i n terms of which we understand our own mental
processes and behaviour have t o be learned, and must, t h e r e f o r e , be s o c i a l l y

established ... "26 h e was ignoring t h e f a c t t h a t concepts i n &

h n a t u r a l and

s o c i a l s c i e n c e a r e learned and s o c i a l l y established. H i s argument, l i k e Pop-

p e r ' s , was g r e a t l y b u i l t on "straw men".

Academic Reductionism and Schizoid Logic

Winch ended h i s a n a l y s i s by d i s c u s s i n g "concepts and action". The

t i t l e shows how h i s "philosophical bearings" - his i d e a l i s t i c s p l i t t i n g of

thought and r e a l i t y - both i n t e g r a t e d and f a l s i f i e d h i s study. I n t h i s dis-

cussion, a s i n each of t h e above, we w i l l f i n d u s e f u l i n s i g h t s and a n a c h r o n i s t i c

dogmas combined.

Winch came very c l o s e t o t h e main point of t h i s study when he s t a t e d

that "... a new way of t a l k i n g s u f f i c i e n t l y important t o rank a s a new idea

implies a new s e t of s o c i a l relationship^."^^ I n t h e next chapter we s h a l l

d i s c u s s how Marx, S a r t r e and Mead a l l r e a l i z e d t h a t t o develop new ideas - and

theoretical insights - new s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s have t o develop. But Winch d i d not

r e a l l y accept t h i s notion of "praxis".

It i s i n t r i g u i n g t o study someone who i s caught between two t r a d i t i o n s .

On t h e one hand, Winch emphasized t h a t "TO g i v e a n account of t h e meaning of a

word i s t o d e s c r i b e t h e s o c i a l I n t e r c o u r s e i n t o which It e n t e r s . "28 We s e e h e r e

 ,

what we e a r l i e r c a l l e d t h e "near pragmatic" tendency i n Wjnch. But when he

talked of how " ... s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s between men e x i s t only i n and through

t h e i r ideas ... ''29 we again see how an i d e a l i s t i c philosophy pervaded h i s
thought. Ideas do not have an a b s t r a c t existence which mediates s o c i a l re-

lations. Ideas " e x i s t " because t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , i n s t i t u t i o n s and lan-

guage of humans enable "them" t o be documented and because "they" s o c i a l i z e

people t o believe i n "them". Winch's f a l s e treatment of ideas a s things i s

t h e root of h i s schizoid logic.

When we discuss t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between changing s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s

and changing ideas, we a r e dealing with one of t h e fundamental problems i n

t h e s o c i a l sciences. Winch's ambiguous and contradictory handling of t h i s

problem r e l a t e d t o h l s confusion over t h e r e l a t i o n of t h e n a t u r a l and s o c i a l

sciences. For example, arguing f o r a d i s t i n c t i o n between r e l a t i o n s of "con-

cepts" and "actions" i n t h e two sciences, he wrote:

" ~ event's
n character a s a n a c t of obedience i s i n t r i n s i c t o it i n a
way which is not t r u e of an e v e n t ' s character a s a c l a p of thunder;
and t h i s i s i n general t r u e of human a c t s a s opposed t o n a t u r a l e-
vents. I n t h e case of t h e l a t t e r , although human beings can think
of t h e occurrences i n question only i n terms of t h e concepts they
do i n f a c t have of them, y e t t h e events themselves have an e x i s t -
ence independent of those concepts ...
But it does not make sense
t o suppose t h a t human beings might have been issuing commands and
obeying them before they came t o form t h e concept of commnd and
obedience. " 3 O

"Human a c t s " and " n a t u r a l events" c e r t a i n l y a r e of a d i f f e r e n t quality. The

study of t h e l a t t e r , however, c o n s t i t u t e s a human a c t . Though t h e event has an

independent existence, t h e concept - derived from a combination of problems,

methods arld t h e o r i e s i n t h e physical sciences - i s rooted I n ongoing human

activity. I n t h i s sense, t h e study of so-called nature and humanity i s the

same. Hmans a r e , a f t e r a l l , "a p a r t of nature", and Winch's point, therefore,

seems t r i t e and meaningless.

But t h e r e ' s another matter t o r a i s e . Human a c t s a l s o have an existence

t h a t is independent of t h e observation and development of concepts. The obser-

vation and development of concepts i s a p a r t i c u l a r form of human a c t ; and it i s

not t o be confUsed with t h e a c t i t s e l f . A man "obeying" a command does not do

s o because he c a r r i e s a n academic concept of ''obedience" with him.

Winch's idealism underlay h i s projection of academic concepts onto a l l

human a c t i v i t y . And t h i s i d e a l i s t or academic reductionism i s no l e s s vulgar

than vulgar marxism. H i s attempt t o make t h e s o c i a l sciences d i f f e r e n t than

t h e n a t u r a l sciences was rooted i n h i s mystification of t h e l a t t e r and misun-

derstanding of t h e former. A l l science i s rooted i n human a c t i v i t y . A l l scien-

t i f i c concepts a r e r e l a t e d t o human acts. The representative, idiomatic nature

of both s o c i a l and n a t u r a l science gives it a u n i t y within human a c t i v i t y .

We might expect Winch's idealism t o lead him t o agree with Popper's

methodological individualism. There i s a s i m i l a r i t y between Winch's tendency

t o a t t r i b u t e a causal character t o academic "concepts" and Popper' s abstracted

treatment of s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c models. Winch saw human a c t s not i n terms of,

but a s being affected by, academic concepts. Popper saw ~nodelsof i n s t i t u t i o n s

a s being created by academics. It i s t h e i r b e l i e f i n t h e autonomy of "concepts"

t h a t gives them a cormaonality.

Winch, however, was q u i t e c r l t i c a l of Popper.

" ~ o p p e r ' s statemenb t h a t s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e j u s t explanatory modelz

introduced by the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t ; f w h i s own purposes i s palpably un-
t m e . The ways of thinking enlbgdied i n institutions govern t h e way t h e
members of t h e s o c i e t i e s studied by t h e s c i c n t l s t behavc."31
This c r i t i c i s m of Popper i s s i m i l a r t o my own. It again shows t h a t Winch

paid l i p service t o t h e sociology of knowledge. But Winch only r e f e r r e d t o

t h e a f f e c t on thinkine; of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t t h e s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t studied.

He did not r e f e r t o t h e a f f e c t of s c i e n t i f i c and educational i n s t i t u t i o n s on

t h e thinking of s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s themselves. Supposedly t h e philosopher who

does an "uncommitted a n a l y s i s " of how o t h e r ' s thought and s o c i a l i z a t i o n r e l a t e

i s him or h e r s e l f f r e e of t h e very processes studied i n other humans. But we

have seen both from an ideological and l o g i c a l point of view t h a t t h i s cannot

be t h e case. Winch and Popper thus both believed i n t h e autonomy of academia.

The one believed t h a t independently developed "concepts" have an almost causal

significance f o r human a c t s , t h e other t h a t t h e independently developed "models"

a r e only of a methodological significance.

Winch's view of "concepts" reminds me of Marx and Engels' d e f i n i t i o n

of ideology. The " t h r e e t r i c k s u 3 * t h a t these authors argued a r e used t o de-

velop ideology a r e s i m i l a r t o t h e way Winch r e l a t e d concepts and action. In

h i s work, t h e r e I s no a n a l y s i s of t h e s t r u c t u r e and function of science and

t h e way t h i s p r i o r i t i z e s problems, methods and theories. And t h i s i s t h e only

way t o analyze, s p e c i f i c a l l y , how any concepts develop from and a f f e c t human

activity. Do they, f o r instance, have t h e consequence of "oppressing" humans

by belng mystified, i r r e l e v a n t and u n i n t e l l i g i b l e ? O r , do they " l i b e r a t e " them

because of t h e i r p r a c t i c a l relevance and i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y ? This s o r t of question,

v i t a l once t h e fusion of ideology and logic i s recognized, cannot be d e a l t with

by WJnchts'idealistlc orientation.
 Winch's confusion about methods i n and r e l a t i o n s between t h e n a t u r a l

and s o c i a l sciences led him t o make an analogy between s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n and

I n t e l l e c t u a l dlalogue. For him "... s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n can more p r o f i t a b l y be

compared t o t h e exchange of ideas i n a conversation than t o t h e i n t e r a c t i o n of

forces i n a physical system. "33 We again see Winch's tendency t o reduce society

t o ideas about society. He continued with h i s analogy by s t a t i n g t h a t "... t h e

way t o understand events i n human h i s t o r y ... is more c l o s e l y analogous t o t h e
way i n which we understand expressions of ideas than i t i s t o t h e way we under-

stand physical processes. "34

Social i n t e r a c t i o n , however, i s not caused by "ideas". Ideas a r e an

aspect of human praxis. P a r t i c u l a r ideas - especially ones r e l a t e d t o scien-

t i f i c concepts - a r e not, i n any way, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of those among t h e popula-

t i o n a t large. They a r e ultimately rooted i n and a f f e c t t h e b e l i e f s of t h e

general society, but t h e p a r t i c u l a r kind of praxis within s c i e n t i f i c and educa-

t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s transforms them i n t o new systems of language with d i f f e r i n g

functions. This f a c t d i s c r e d i t s a l l attempts t o explain, l e t alone understand,

human behaviour or experience through a reduction of events t o formal academic

categories. To c l a r i f y how t h i s process occurs we must now t u r n t o a discussion

of language.

Footnotes

l ~ e t e rWinch: The Idea of a Social Science. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul
(19581, ~ e . 3 .
 3 ~ b i d . , p. 13.

bid., p. 4.

5~bid.

%bid.

7 ~ b i d . , p. 22.

81bid., pp. 23-4.

9 ~ b i d . , p. 35. 1 have not included Wittgenstein i n t h i s study, but I be l i e v e

h i s approach t o language and l o g i c has t h e p o t e n t i a l t o d e a l with t h e problem
of ideology. Wittgenstein was not a mechanistic o r r e d u c t i o n i s t i c t h e o r i s t ,
though many t r a i n e d i n l i n g u i s t i c philosophy tend t o be. He d i d "... not imag-
ine t h e meaning ( o f a word) as a n occult connection t h e mind makes between a
word and a t h i n g ..." I n s t e a d , he s i t u a t e d words i n praxis. A s he said:
our p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h a t which has pains o r s e e s o r t h i n k s i s of a mental
"...
n a t u r e is only, t h a t t h e word ' I t i n '1 have p a i n s t does not denote a p a r t i c -
u l a r body, f o r we c a n ' t s u b s t i t u t e f o r ! I t a d e s c r i p t i o n of a body." (Ludwig
Wittgenstein: The Blue and Brown Books. New York, Harper and Row (19651, pp.
73-4.) Because of t h e primary r o l e of l i n t p i s t i c techniques i n W i t t g e n s t e i n t s
approach, when it i s learned through a s c i e n t i s t i c educational system, it can
e a s i l y t u r n i n t o a f o r m a l i s t i c , meaningless r i t u a l .

' O ~ l f r e d J u l e s Ayer: Lannuaae, Truth and Logic. New York, Dover ( 1946).

llwinch, op. c i t . , p. 40.

2 3 ~ e eRobert S. Lynd: Knowledge f o r What? The Place of Social Science i n
American Culture. New York, Evergreen ( 1964), p. 121.

2%iinch, op. c i t . , p. 109.

'51bid., pp. 117-18.

271bid., pp. 122-23.

281bid., p. 123.

291bid. C r i t i c i z i n g Winch's idealism, Gellner has written: " ~ n s t i t u t i o n sa r e

indeed 'made' by t h e concepts of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s . But, however embedded a con-
cept may be i n one o r a s e t of i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h i s never proves t h e concept or
t h e t h e o r i e s or assumption b u i l t i n t o it t o be t r u e . I n s t i t u t i o n s may embody
falsehoods, p r o t e c t them, and be sustained by them. This ( d o e s ) not t u r n them
i n t o t r u t h s . " (Ernest Gellner: The Entry of t h e Philosophers. The Times L i t e r a r y
Su~alement. Apr. 4, 1968, p. 349. ) Such a c r i t i c i s m may have r e j e c t e d idealism,
but it d i d not r e j e c t a formal understanding of truth. As such it requires c r i t -
icism from t h e stance of t h e problem of ideology.

3%ee p. 10 above.

3%inch, op. c i t . , P. 128.

341bid., p. 132. What I have c a l l e d academic reductionism leads people t o f a l s e l y

see a l l knowledge a s based upon some form of epistemology. This e r r o r i s general
i n academia and i s a l s o made by t h e "new s o c i o l o g i s t s " who, we have been led t o
believe, have transcended both l i b e r a l positivism and vulgar marxism. For example,
t h e academic marxist ( o r "marxist scholar" depending on how you view him) T.B.
Bottomore, l i k e Winch, t r i e d t o keep philosophy and sociology separated. Treating
them i n an academic way, t h a t is, with no e x i s t e n t i a l reference f o r jdeas, it i s
possible t o do t h i s . Thus he s t a t e d : " ~ 0 t hDurkheim and Mannheim seemed t o claim
t h a t sociology can make a d i r e c t contribution t o philosophy, i n t h e sense of s e t -
t l i n g philosophical questions. But t h i s i s an e r r o r ; thus, epistemology i s t h e
b a s i s of a s o c i o l o ~ yof knowledge, not v i c e versa. A l l t h a t i s intended here i s
t o suggest t h a t sociology r a i s e s , t o a g r e a t e r extent than other sciences, philo-
sophical problems, and consequently t h a t t h e s o c i o l o g i s t who i s a t a l l conccrned
with the l a r g e r aspects of h i s subject i s led on t o consider philosophical
issues which a r e always i n t h e background of sociological reflection." (T.B.
Bottomore: Sociolopd. London, George Allen and Unwin (1962)~ p. 71. ) Without
considering t h e problems raised by e i t h e r Durkheim or Mannheim, he claimed
" t h i s i s an e r r o r ; thus, epistemology i s t h e basis of a sociology of knowledge,
not vice versa". Once inquiry, not t h e writing of e c l e c t i c textbooks, which
obscure problems, becomes our concern we f i n d t h a t Durkhehls way of dealing
with t h e philosophical implications of sociology were fundamentally d i f f e r e n t
than t h a t of Mannheim. This, not a formal consideration of t h e r e l a t i o n s of
"epistemology" and "sociology", i s what i s needed i f problems of logic i n t h e
s o c i a l sciences a r e t o be c l a r i f i e d . It i s noteworthy t h a t i n addition t o
Bottomore taking a formal, textbook approach t o both sociology and philosophy,
he accepted t h e logic of scientism. He believed t h a t "the sociologist (and of
course other s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s ) should be capable of distinguishing between
questions of f a c t and value questions". (Ibid., p. 69.) Furthermore, showing
h i s f a l s e understanding of t h e notion of "cause", he wrote t h a t ' I . . . the rela-
t i o n s between phenomena of t h e n a t u r a l world a r e mechanical r e l a t i o n s of
causality". ( Ibid. , p. 44. )
 Chapter Nineteen

Language and Logic: Mead

It i s now time t o consolidate t h e argument of t h i s study and t o point

t o i t s implications. I have contilmally referred t o t h e problem of language

i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e problems of both ideology and logic and w i l l now develop

t h i s point fully. For example, i n Chapter One, I quoted Marx and Engelst

statement t h a t "... language i s p r a c t i c a l consciousness ... (which) a r i s e s

from the need ... of intercourse with other men. "l I argued t h a t t h i s under-

standing of language underlay those authors1 d i s t i n c t i o n between ideology a s

f a l s e , e l i t i s t and r e i f i e d consciousness and knowledge a s p r a c t i c a l conscious-

ness. Then, a f t e r c r i t i c i z i n g various r h e t o r i c a l approaches t o t h e problem of

ideology and discussing why i n t e l l i g e n t approaches t o t h i s problem a r e so r a r e ,

I returned, i n Chapter Eleven, t o t h i s question. I argued t h a t S a r t r e l s con-

cern with "praxis" rela6ed him t o Marx and Engels on t h e question of language,

ideology and knowledge. I quoted S a r t r e a s saying:

"... ideas do not change men. Knowing t h e cause of a passion i s not

enough t o overcome it; one must l i v e it, one must oppose other pas-
sions t o it, one must combat it tenaciously, i n short one must
'work oneself over I . "*
S a r t r e viewed knowing a s a means t o change oneself; not indicative of a change

i n and of I t s e l f . According t o t h i s view, academic knowledge, t h a t i s , knowledge

t h a t i s not an e x i s t e n t i a l project, i s conservative since it allows t h e process

of knowing t o become abstracted from lived contradictions. Marx, Engels and

 - 419 -
I

S a r t r e not only agreed t h a t idcas a r e ultimately rooted i n praxls, but a l s o

t h a t they a r e impotent i f not r e l a t e d t o e x i s t e n t i a l and h i s t o r i c a l struggles.

S a r t r e , however, was aware of t h e relevance of method t o t h i s process.

He believed t h a t "Concrete thought must be born from praxis and must t u r n back

upon it i n order t o c l a r i f y it, not by chance and without r u l e s , but - as i n

a l l science and a l l techniques - i n conformity with principle^."^ Sartrels

"search f o r a method" was undertaken because marxism i s presently handicapped

by a lack of c l a r i t y about method. He recognized t h e need f o r "rules" or

"principles" i n knowledge, though it should be c l e a r t h a t h i s adherence t o t h e

idea of praxis made h i s idea of "rules" q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t than t h a t of

t h e academics.

The pragmatic o r i e n t a t i o n t o language and knowledge has c l e a r l y per-

vaded a l l aspects of my study. It was an important b a s i s f o r my c r i t i c i s m s

of formal logic. And it is fundmental t o t h e development of a working logic.

For example, I quoted Toulmin's statement t h a t "... language ... c o n s i s t s not

of timeless propositions but of utterances dependent ... on t h e context or oc-

casion ..."' t o show t h a t those who a r e developing a l t e r n a t i v e s t o formal logic

have t o see language a s a p r a c t i c a l matter. As well, i n Chapter Eighteen, I

quoted Winch's statement t h a t "... a new way of t a l k i n g s u f f i c i e n t l y important

t o rank a s a new idea implies a new s e t of s o c i a l relationships."5

This question of language i s then c e n t r a l t o our argument and requires

a more thorough examination. I n t h i s chapter, 1 w i l l examine t h e general t h e s i s

of Sapir and Whorf and evaluate i t s relevance t o t h e problems of ideology and

logic. I w l l l discuss one example of t h e misuse of t h i s t h e s i s and then r e l y

 I

heavily on t h e work o f George Herbert Mead t o h e l p c l a r i f y t h e matter. Mead

provides a n important b a s i s f o r my c r i t i c i s m s of s c i e n t i s t i c dichotomies and

discussion of ideology and i n q u i r y i n Chapter Twenty.

The H e u r i s t i c Character of Language

Accordin; t o S a p i r , t h e p a r t i c u l a r form a language t a k e s w i l l a f f e c t

t h e meaning of o n e ' s experience. "1t i s highly important t o r e a l i z e t h a t

once t h e form of a language i s e s t a b l i s h e d it can discover meanings f o r i t s

speakers which a r e not simply t r a c e a b l e t o t h e given q u a l i t y o f experience

i t s e l f but must be explained t o a l a r g e e x t e n t a s t h e p r o j e c t i o n of p o t e n t i a l

IUeaningS i n t o t h e raw m a t e r i a l of experience. " 6 It i s because of t h i s t'unction

of language t h a t human beings can "... transcend t h e immediately given i n t h e i r

i n d i v i d u a l experience and ... j o i n i n a l a r g e r comiion understanding. " ' I Secause

of t h i s function., language l i e s a t t h e h e a r t of science. Without la?Iguage, we

could not "transcend t h e immediately given" nor develop pragmatic modes of in-

f e r e n c e and p r e d i c t i o n . A s Sapir stated: "Language i s h e u r i s t i c ... i t s forms

predetermine f o r us certai!? modes of observation and b t e r p r e t a t i o n . 118

Saying t h i s should not l e a d t o t h e conclusion t h a t language transcends

experience. Such a view would mystify "languagen, a s many mystify " f a c t s " and

t h e point of my argument would be l o s t . " ~ a n g u a ~i se a t one and t h e same time

helping and r e t a r d i n g us i n our e x p l o r a t i o n of experience ... 119 While language

"... may ba looked upon a s a s-ym1>olic system which r e p o r t s o r r e f e r s t o o r o t h e r -

wise s u b s t i t u t e s f o r d i r e c t experience, it does not a s a matter of a c t u a l be-

haviour s t a n d a p a r t from o r run p a r a l l e l t o d l r e c t experience but completely

i n t e r p e n e t r a t e s with it. "lo

 I

The awareness of t h e function of language i n science has grown i n

t h e p a s t few decades. A long e s t a b l i s h e d ignorance about i t s h e u r i s t i c

f u n c t i o n underlay much of t h e confusion i n t r a d i t i o n a l epistemology and

logic. For example, Durkheim's naive treatment of " s o c i a l f a c t s " a s non-

concepts o r t h i n g s would not have been possible had he understood how lan-

guage i s i n e x t r i c a b l y involved i n t h e process of inference and generaliza-

t i o n i n science. Language does not function a s a n autonomous, value-free

t o o l which allows us t o i n v e s t i g a t e " r e a l i t y " . Language functions a s p a r t

of t h e behaviour of s o c i a l r e a l i t y . Because of t h i s Sapir wrote t h a t "...

it i s g e n e r a l l y d i f f i c u l t t o make a complete divorce between objective r e -

a l i t y and our l i n g u i s t i c symbols of reference t o it ... 1111

Language i s thus not merely a "symbolic system of reference". The

f a c t t h a t language d e r i v e s i t s meaning from a c t u a l contexts where it i s an

a s p e c t of "continuous behaviour" means t h a t "... it may be s e r i o u s l y doubted

whether t h e i d e a l of pure reference i s even a t t a i n e d by language,"12 including

i t s use i n s c i e n t i f i c discourse. Because of t h i s S a p i r l s general approach t o

language c a n be s a i d t o complement Toulmin's c r i t i q u e of formal logic.

The h e u r i s t i c nature of language presents an even more basic problem

t h a n t h i s f o r science. Once we r e j e c t t h e view which s t r e s s e s the r o l e of lan-

guage a s a symbolic system of reference we must account f o r t h e d i r e c t e f f e c t s

of language forms on behaviour. S a p i r argued t h a t "... i n t h e a c t u a l context

of behaviour ( language) cannot be divorced from a c t i o n .. . "13 Because of t h i s ,

he made a d i s t i n c t i o n between " p a t t e r n s of reference and p a t t e r n s of expres-

siont114 i n language. This d i s t i n c t i o n undermines t h e common sense and scicn-

t i s t i c dichotomies between "actions" and "words", between "theory" and "prac-

tice". Language i s an e s s c n t i a l aspect of behavior and hence can never be

used f o r pure reference.15 As Sapir said, t h e maxim "actions speak louder

than words"16 lacks i n s i g h t i n t o t h e nature of speech. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g

t h a t formal logic, which lacks an awareness of the h e u r i s t i c function of lan-

guage, has assumptions which p a r a l l e l t h i s common sense maxim. This is a f u r -

t h e r reason why one cannot accept t h e professionalization of t h e academic a s

a guarantee of c r i t i c a l intelligence. The professionalization of t h e academici i'

I
I
o f t e n means no more than a t r a n s l a t i o n of common sense ignorance i n t o sophis- i

t l c a t e d jargon. If we a r e t o develop a thoroughly pragmatic and humanistic

approach t o science we have t o become aware of t h e d i a l e c t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p be-

tween common sense and science. l7

S a p i r l s main concern was with t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of d i f f e r e n t languages.

And a n awareness of how t h e forms of p a r t i c u l a r languages a f f e c t so-called pat-

t e r n s of reference and expression of language would be required f o r any thorough

understanding of l i n g u i s t i c s and science. Our concern i s more with t h e general

implications of a n understanding of language f o r t h e problem of l o g i c , and, i n

terms of t h i s , of ideology.

We can discuss t h i s matter by r e l a t i n g a sociology of knowledge perspec-

t i v e t o S a p i r l s general approach t o language. For example, on t h e b a s i s of h i s

c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of world languages, Sapir concluded t h a t here i s no general

c o r r e l a t i o n between c u l t u r a l type and l i n g u i s t i c structure. "'* Hence a study

of t h e "overt c u l t u r a l pattern" of a people does not, i n i t s e l f , c l a r i f y t h e

p a r t i c u l a r h e u r i s t i c function of t h e language. For example, It cannot t e l l us

how language a f f e c t s t h e ideology of a people, t h e form and content of t h e i r

knowledge and t h e r a t i o n a l e s f o r both, or t h e i r behavlour. Sapir explajned

why t h i s approach i s not adequate: "TO a c e r t a i n extent t h i s lack of corre-

spondence may be due t o t h e f a c t t h a t l i n g u i s t i c changes do not proceed a t t h e

same r a t e a s most c u l t u r a l changes, which a r e on t h e whole f a r more rapid. 11 19

The s t r u c t u r e of language then may l a g behind t h e forms of behaviour

i
i n a culture. This i t s e l f presents a problern f o r epistemological analysis.

For instance. since academic s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s come from a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l

I
I
s t r a t a , and, equally important, since t h e i r t r a i n i n g occurs i n i n s t i t u t i o n s , '

whose dominant function i n s o c i e t y i s a conservative one, t h e l i n g u i s t i c cate- i ,

gories of t h a t grouping w i l l l i k e l y be inappropriate f o r understanding t h e ex-

perience and behaviour of people going through v a s t c u l t u r a l changes. For ex-

ample, an academic who i s immersed i n t h e language of a reference group which

accepts t h e end-of-ideology ideology would be incapable of understanding t h e

experience and behaviour of revolutionaries i n t h e society. Academics trained

t o t h i n k i n categories, which upon analysis prove t o be f o r m l i z a t i o n s of t h e

dominant values-of a society, could not begin t o understand t h e experience and

behaviour of a segregated ethnic minority. He or she could reduce such experi-

ence and behaviour t o academic categories, but t h a t i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from un-

derstanding it. Furthermore, one trained i n formal logic, f o r example, a n a l y t i c

philosophers, may see great complications i n a study of t h e uses of language of

people l i v i n g outside t h e ivory tower. But, a s Sapir s t a t e d , "... t h e normal

speaker does not a c t u a l l y f e e l t h e c l a s h ( s a y between d i f t e r e n t genders i n lan-

guage) which t h e lo&cian requires. lt20 People who engage i n the p r a c t i c a l

a f f a i r s of a society do not use language as t h e academic l o g i c i a n does. " ~ b -

s t r a c t terms, which a r e so necessary t o our thinking, may be infrequent i n a

language whose speakers formulate t h e i r behaviour on more pragmatic lines. 1,21

Sapir assumed t h a t t h e a b s t r a c t terminology of academia was necessary.

We can r e c a l l t h a t Marx and Engels viewed formal "abstractions" as a " t r i c k "

f o r c r e a t i n g and r a t i o n a l i z i n g ideology. Regardless of whether or not we ac-

cept t h i s , it i s not enough t o u n c r i t i c a l l y accept t h e a b s t r a c t l i n g u i s t i c s of

academia. We must ask how they function. We have already argued t h a t t h e for-

mal l o g i c of t h e u n i v e r s i t i e s has a conservative function, whereas a pragmatic

logic can function t o give people p r a c t i c a l knowledge; knowledge t h a t can help

them change t h e i r praxis. I w i l l take up t h i s question i n Chapter Twenty where

I show how a r e j e c t i o n of t h e dichotomies of scientism allows us t o have a prag-

matic understanding of t h e r o l e of a b s t r a c t i o n s i n inquiry.

Sc ienc e and Linguistics

Whorf developed t h e implications of an understanding of language f o r

science and logic more d i r e c t l y than did Sapir. He began with a discussion of

t h e question: i s language a n a t u r a l logic? Because of t h e h e u r i s t i c character

of language, he answered "no" . Whorf argued t h a t t h e notion of "natural logic"

was based on two f a l l a c i e s .

" ~ i r s tit
, does not see t h a t t h e phenomena of a language a r e t o i t s own
speakers l a r g e l y of a background character and so a r e outside the c r i t -
i c a l consciousness and control of t h e speaker who i s expounding n a t u r a l
logic. Hence, when anyone, a s a natural logician, i s t a l k i n g about rea-
son, logic, and t h e laws of c o r r e c t thinking, he i s apt t o be simply
marching i n s t e p with purely grammatical f a c t s t h a t have somewhat of a
background character i n h i s own language o r family of languages but a r e
 by no means universal i n a l l languages and i n no sense a common
substratum of reason. Second, natural logic confuses agreement
about subject matter, a t t a i n e d through use of language, with
knowledge of the l i n g u i s t i c process by which agreement i s a t -
tained: i . e . , with t h e province of the depised (and t o i t s
notion superfluous ) grammarian. " 22

These points a r e c r i t i c a l f o r t h i s study. Only i f words a r e treated

i n a r e l f i e d manner, i . e . , taken auk of t h e i r human context, can one i r e a t

language a s a n a t u r a l logic. To do t h i s contradicts w!zat we now know about

language. Such an approach i s tautological f o r it reduces " r e a l i t y " t o t h e

l i n g u i s t i c categories of a p a r t i c u l a r language. Since inference and argument

i s a comparative process, a s c i e n t i f i c use of l i n g u i s t i c s cannot r e f l e c t or

"grasp" r e a l i t y . Through language we come t o compare one aspect of r e a l i t y

with another and obtain some form of knowledge i n t h e process. This i s an

a c t i v e , not passive, process. The b e l i e f t h a t language i s a n a t u r a l logic

leads one t o accept a b s t r a c t r u l e s , i.e., r u l e s t h a t a r e seen i n a formal, not

pragmatic, way. But Whorf showed why t h i s notion of r u l e s i s unacceptable.

"... i f a r u l e has absolutely no exceptions, it i s not recognized a s a

r u l e or a s anything e l s e ; it i s then p a r t of t h e background of experi-
ence of uhich we tend t o remain unconscious. Never having experienced
anything i n contrast t o i t , we cannot i s o l a t e it and formulate it a s
a r u l e u n t i l we so enlarge our experience and expand OUT base of r e f -
erence t h a t we encounter an i n t e r r u p t i o n of i t s r e g u l a r i t y . 1123

Treating langmge a s a n a t u r a l loglc and t r e a t i n g logic i n a formal way

a r e t h e r e f o r e complemeatary. And, conversely, seeing both language and logic a s

parat of human praxis, a r e related. Once t h e form.of rationalism t h a t underlies

t h e b e l i e f i n n a t u r a l logic i s challenged, t h e t r a n s i t i o n from a formal t o a

pragmatic logic can be undertaken. Whorf saw t h e need to r e j e c t t h e c l a s s i c a l

notion of rationalism.
 "1t was found t h a t t h e background l i n g u i s t i c system ( i n other words,
t h e granunar) of each language i s not merely a reproducing i n s t r u -
ment f o r voicing ideas but r a t h e r i s i t s e l f t h e shaper of ideas, t h e
program and guide f o r t h e individual's mental a c t i v i t y , f o r h i s an-
a l y s i s of impressions, f o r h i s synthesis of h i s mental stock i n trade.
Formulation of ideas i s not an independent process, s t r i c t l y r a t i o n a l
i n t h e old sense, but i s part of a p a r t i c u l a r grammar, and d i f f e r s ,
from s l i g h t l y t o g r e a t l y , between d i f f e r e n t grammars. "24

From t h i s , he concluded t h a t "we c u t nature up, organize it i n t o concepts, and

a s c r i b e significances a s we do, l a r g e l y because we a r e p a r t i e s t o an agreement

t o organize it i n t h i s way - an agreement t h a t holds throughout o w speech com-

m m 3 . t ~and i s codified i n t h e p a t t e r n s of our language. ,125

Once again we f a c e t h e f a c t t h a t our commitments and our t r a i n i n g un-

d e r l i e our ideas. Because "we a r e p a r t i e s t o a n agreement t o organize nature

i n t h i s way", Whorf argued t h a t "... no individual i s f r e e t o describe nature

with absolute i m p a r t i a l i t y . "26 We have already argued t h i s point from t h e

stance of both t h e problems of ideology and logic. A c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s of

language f u r t h e r r e i n f o r c e s our argument against objectivism, t h e value-free

dogma and t h e end-of-ideology.

Whorf summarized h i s view i n terms of a "new p r i n c i p l e of r e l a t i v i t y

... which holds t h a t a l l observers a r e not led by t h e same physical evidence

t o t h e same p i c t u r e of t h e universe, unless t h e i r l i n g u i s t i c backgrounds a r e

s i m i l a r , or can i n some way be c a l i b r a t e d . " 2 7 On t h e basis of h i s s t u d i e s of

language, he r e f e r r e d t o "The r e l a t i v i t y of a l l conceptual systems, ours in-

cluded, and t h e i r dependence upon language stand revealed. "28 S p e c i f i c a l l y ,

i n t h e case of t h e English language, he argued t h a t "... we have ... a monistic

view of nature t h a t gives us only one c l a s s of word f o r a l l kinds of events."29

I n English we reduce events t o verbs, and t h e s t r u c t u r e of verbs makes J t d i f -

 - 427 -
I

f i c u l t t o s i t u a t e our ideas i n t h e ongoing world. " ~ n

' e v e n t t t o us means

'what our language c l a s s e s a s a v e r b t ... and ... it i s not p o s s i b l e t o de-

f i n e a n 'event i n terms of n a t u r e ...lt3O I n c o n t r a s t , some languages ( e. g. ,
~ o p i )can d e f i n e a n event by d u r a t i o n and can s e e a n event i n terms of nature,

t h a t is, t h e n a t u r a l background. This difference goes a long way i n explain-

ing why many i s s u e s i n t r a d i t i o n a l logic prove t o be pseudo-problems. The

formal view of "cause" and "laws", which we have already c r i t i c i z e d , may be

p a r t i a l l y rooted i n t h e monism of our language. I n a sense, t h e only "uni-

verse" t h a t t h e philosophers of scientism discuss i s t h e dominant universe of

discourse.

A n a n a l y s i s of language can t h e r e f o r e h e l p c l a r i f y problems i n t h e

philosophy of science. For instance, t h e view of "time" t h a t i s implied i n a

language may provide us with c l u e s about logic. The development of t h e n o t i o n

of mathematical time used i n physics may have been a f f e c t e d by t h e tendency of

our language t o a b s t r a c t events out of t h e i r n a t u r a l background. A s well, t h e

d i s t i n c t i o n between " p a s t " , "present" and " f u t u r e " , which i s r e l a t e d t o t h e

formal treatment of events, may have been necessary t o be a b l e t o develop t h e

concepts and operations t h a t a r e r e l a t e d t o "prediction".

Whorf argued t h a t t h e universe could be described without recourse t o

a concept of dimensional time. The n o t i o n of dimensional time has c l e a r l y a f -

f e c t e d t h e kind of knowledge and l o g l c t h a t we have developed, but such know-

ledge and l o g i c does not r e f l e c t "nature". The events which a r e s e l e c t e d i n

terms of our c a t e g o r i e s and problems have a grounding. h hey" can be seen i n

a v a r i e t y of ways. hey" can even be ignored. h he^" might not even e x i s t

i f they had no pragmatic value t o us. But it i s d i f f i c u l t t o imagine what a

d i f f e r e n t perspective on "events" would mean. We a r e a l l trapped, t o a

g r e a t e r o r l e s s e r degree, by our language and t h e ideology and logic t h a t com-

plements it.

Whorf asked: "HOW would a physics constructed along these l l n e s (with-

out dimensional time) work ...?'' He answered: "perfectly, a s f a r a s I can

see though of course it would r e q u i r e d i f f e r e n t ideology and perhaps d i f f e r e n t

.
mathemat i c s "31 He recognized t h a t "ideology" and "science" were not exclusive

because language never functions a s a n a t u r a l logic. Language and ideology a r e

not a t a l l synonymous, but t h e former forms a s e l e c t i v e foundation f o r t h e l a t -

ter.

A n awareness of t h e relevance of l i n g u i s t i c s f o r science and ideology

can, i n Whorf Is words, contribute t o "our sense of perspective". 32 It can open

up questions i n t h e sociology of knowledge and philosophy of science from a new

direction. For instance, " r e a l i t y " i n English i s defined a s a noun or thing. *

This i s one reason why t h e dichotomies of scientism have been taken t o be

'reality" or t o reveal r e a l i t y . This has a l s o l e d t o untold pseudo-problems

i n philosophy. Treating " r e a l i t y " a s a t h i n g or things, while not understanding

t h e h e u r i s t i c function of language, t h e philosophers of scientism have t o t a l l y

f a i l e d t o c l a r i f y t h a t science i s a human endeavour undertaken within t h e on-

going events of nature. As a student of Whorf said:

"Reality, then, i s more l i k e a value we a s s i g n t o things i n order t h a t

our f u t u r e behaviour may be guided t o desired r e s u l t s ... The problem
of r e a l i t y , then, i s t h e problem of what i s e f f e c t i v e , and it would
seem a t t h i s point t h a t r e a l i t y i s determined by forms of behaviour."33
Reif ied Linguistics

An analysis of language does not necessarily c l a r i f y t h e problems

of ideology and logic. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of " l i n g u i s t i c r e l a t i v i t y "

need not even lead t o an awareness of these problems. Semanticists who f a l s e -

l y take " r e l a t i v i t y " t o mean t h a t t h e meaning of words can be understood and

manipulated formally and a n a l y t i c philosophers who t r e a t words a s things, with-

out any s i t u a t i o n a l reference, a r e but two examples. A s p e c i f i c example i s

t h e formal manner i n which Landau applied t h e idea of l i n g u i s t i c r e l a t i v i t y t o

questions of logic. Landau was not concerned with how formal l i n g u i s t i c s can

function t o c r e a t e an approach t o logic t h a t covers up t h e ideological under-

pinnings of a s c i e n t i s t i c form of knowledge. He spoke of how "a l i n g u i s t i c

system possesses a d e f i n i t e logic,"34 not of how a l i n g u i s t i c and l o g i c a l system

can function ideologically. He was more i n t e r e s t e d i n maintaining t h e logic of

a l i n g u i s t i c system during inquiry than i n understanding how t h a t logic a f f e c t s

t h e outcome of inquiry.

H i s adherence t o t h e maxim of " i n t e r n a l consistency1' of formal logic

was shown by h i s statement t h a t "A sometime v i o l a t i o n of a r u l e c o n s t i t u t e s an

error: but a general disregard of i t s r u l e s and regulations transforms t h e lan-

guage i n t o nonsense. 1'35 Landau thus used a formal analysis of l i n g u i s t i c s t o

argue f o r more l i n g u i s t i c precision. He did not discuss how such precision can

narrow t h e realm of inquiry t o t h e point of being tautological. He did not dls-

cuss t h e need t o consciously attempt t o break from the l i m i t s of both technical

languages and t h e general language and thought t h a t complements i t i f new meta-

phors t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e process of inference a r e t o be developed. He even

argued against mixing l i n g u i s t i c systems. "TO c ombine t h e unrelated, t o mix

i r r e l e v a n c i e s , t o confuse d i f f e r e n t grammars, t o build a miscellaneous vocab-

ulary - t h i s i s t o produce a polyglot t h a t i n v i t e s t h e disorganization of a

discipline. "36

This use of t h e hypothesis of l i n g u i s t i c r e l a t i v i t y i s r e l a t e d t o an

ignorance of t h e problem of ideology. To t h e extent t h a t Whorf recognized

t h a t h i s a n a l y s i s had implications f o r t h e problem of ideology, Landau can be

accused of d i s t o r t i n g t h e hypothesis. Landau accepted a naive view of scien-

t i f i c discovery and t h e o r i g i n of problems; a view t h a t t o t a l l y ignored t h e

r o l e of ideology i n science, and, i n t h i s sense, he f a i l e d t o understand t h e

implications of l i n g u i s t i c s f o r science. For example, he s t a t e d t h a t

"None of t h i s i s t o suggest t h a t minds must be kept closed t o new ideas.

A science must always be open t o suggestions which may be productive of
knowledge. Nor does it matter where o r how such suggestions originate.
S c i e n t i s t s speculate and guess, they a r e i n t u i t i v e , they have hunches
a s t o s i m i l a r i t i e s between seemingly diverse worlds. A l l of t h i s , how-
ever, belongs i n what Reichenbach has c a l l e d t h e "context of discovery".
I n t h i s context, which is n e i t h e r limited t o science or a p a r t of s c i -
ence, t h e s c i e n t i s t i s sovereign. He has f r e e choice. There a r e no
s c i e n t i f i c l i m i t s on what he does. "37

Landau, l i k e Popper, separated t h e o r i g i n s of problems from t h e a c t u a l process

of inquiry. Such a separation reduces science t o an a b s t r a c t formal process and

ignores t h e ongoing a c t i v i t y t h a t i s involved i n inquiry. For Landau, it was

"formal r u l e s " which must guide inquiry. According t o him, once t h e s c i e n t i s t

chooses h i s l i n g u i s t i c s and logic

"... he i s no longer sovereign. He i s now constrained by t h e 'language

of s c i e n c e 1 , by t h e s e t of formal r u l e s t h a t make up i t s grammar."38

He c a l l e d t h i s c o n s t r a i n t t h e "due process of inquiryv.

 Toulmin made many valuable points through h i s analogy between law and

logic. Landau's analogy is f a r more r e s t r i c t i n g . It tends t o narrow our a t -

t e n t i o n r a t h e r than open it t o fundamental problems. Landau's concern was

with tightening up t h e metaphors used i n any d i s c i p l i n e . He wanted us t o s t a y

with a so-called grammatic logic once a metaphor was selected t o guide inquiry.

The development of precise, a b s t r a c t "models" was h i s overriding aim. His ref-

erence t o language was j u s t one means of doing t h i s . Rather than analyzing

language a s a means t o c l a r i f y how d i f f e r e n t approaches t o logic function ide-

ologically, he was concerned with r e f i n i n g formal concepts with t h e a i d of for-

mal l i n g u i s t i c s .

We have c o n s i s t e n t l y c r i t i c i z e d such a formal approach t o concepts.

When Landau s t a t e d t h a t "The more developed (formal) t h e language (model) the

c l e a r e r a r e i t s concepts, t h e more e x p l i c i t and c e r t a i n a r e i t s rules, "39 he

was making t h e same assumption t h a t underlies a l l formal approaches t o logic.

But we have seen - e s p e c i a l l y when we c r i t i c i z e d Kaufmann - how formalizing

"rules" does not enhance c e r t a i n t y but c r e a t e s another a p r i o r i ( e . g . , Kauf-

mannfs "basic r u l e s " ) and thus takes an aspect of logic outside the process

of inquiry. Toulminls approach t o logic was valuable because it exposed t h i s

and t r e a t e d logic as a pragmatic d i s c i p l i n e always rooted i n subject matter.

Refining and formalizing t h e logic of a l i n g u i s t i c metaphor removes

language from i t s human context. It t r e a t s language a s a " n a t u r a l logic'';

exactly what Whorf argued a ~ a i n s t . That i s why we cannot accept Landau's

statement t h a t
 he logic of a model i s very s t r i c t : It i s expressed i n t h e precise
vocabulary ( o p e r a t i o n a l ) of a s c i e n t i f i c language. The logjc or p r o -
gram of a metaphor i s pre-scientific: it r e t a i n s t h e r e l a t i v e ambi-
guity of t h e natural language i n which it i s s t a t e d . "4O

Landau c a l l e d t h i s formalization t h e transformation from "a n a t u r a l t o

a s c i e n t i f i c language, "41 but, i n f a c t , it c r e a t e s an a b s t r a c t logic ( t h e logic

of models) and separates subject matter from logic. Many pseudo-problems and

mystifications a r e created i n t h e process. And t h e ideological underpinnings

of a p a r t i c u l a r logic or body of knowledge a r e l e f t obscured.

I n h i s paper, Landau talked of t h e process of verifying t h e analogy

implied by t h e p a r t i c u l a r model t h a t i s being formalized. This notion of "ver-

i f i c a t i o n " , however, w i l l tend t o be tautological since t h e so-called "due pro-

cess of inquiry" l i m i t s a s c i e n t i s t t o t h e logic of t h e model. The ideological

backing implied by t h e logic and model w i l l , t h e r e f o r e , be ignored and " v e r i f i -

cation" e a s i l y becomes nothing more than an u n c r i t i c a l r i t u a l which has no

significance i n terms of inquiry.

Landau warned us not t o take metaphors l i t e r a l l y :

"Metaphors a r e frequently taken l i t e r a l l y and t h i s means t h a t a presumed

analogy i s allowed t o become an i d e n t i t y without any demonstration of
evidence - i . e . an a s s e r t i o n of f a c t t h a t may be and usually i s errone-
ous. One may add t h a t t h e more familiar and conventional t h e metaphor,
t h e g r e a t e r i s t h i s danger.

Yet h i s "due process of inquiry" leads t o just such a r e i f i c a t i o n . Defining

science as It.. . a movement from natural languages t o t e c h n i c a l languages, from

metaphors t o models ...ltQ3 r e s t r i c t s inquiry so t h a t t h e arguments implied by

science go unscrutinized. This i s one reason why " f a m i l i a r and conventional

metaphors" rooted i n t h e dominant ideology of our s o c i e t y have become t h e b a s i s

of a s c i e n t i f i c orthodoxy.
 Landau's view of "science" p a m l l e l e d h i s concern with fornlal models

and h i s r e l a t e d ignorance of t h e way d i f f e r e n t l o g i c s f u n c t i o n ideologically.

He claimed t h a t developing a n "... a b s t r a c t deductive system ... i s t h e h a l l -

mark of science. "44 I f obtaining "unambiguous correspondence " between a model

and (Landau would have t o s a y ) r e a l i t y i s seen a s t h e b a s i s of science, then

s c i e n c e i t s e l f becomes a b s t r a c t . The " t h e o r e t i c a l n a t u r e of science" of which

Landau wrote does not mean t h a t concepts have t o become formalized and logic

reduced t o t h e r u l e s of r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r model. If theory i s

seen i n a pragmatic way, a s Toulmin described it, t h e n s c i e n c e no longer i s

r e d u c i b l e t o a deductive logic.lC5 Because Landau equated h i s "due process of

inquiry" with obtaining " p u r i t y of method"46 he became trapped by t h e f a l l a c i e s

of scientism. Rather t h a n a n a n a l y s i s of language being used t o c l a r i f y how

l o g i c and ideology i n t e r r e l a t e , f o r him it was a means t o achieve t h e impossible

- value-free models, a value-free logic.

Language and Pragmatic Logic: 1 - Behaviorism and Epistemology

We saw above t h a t Whorfls theory of l i n g u i s t i c s took him very c l o s e t o

a pragmatic t h e o r y of knowledge. Once we recognize t h a t " t h e problem of r e a l i t y

i s t h e problem of what i s e f f e c t i v e " , we have t o a s k how ideology and language

a f f e c t human goals and t h e behaviour r e l a t e d t o them. Once we begin t o do t h i s

t h e r e i s no need t o engage i n a b s t r a c t , academic debates about logic.

Mead's a n a l y s i s of language and consciousness provides us with t h e

necessary c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h i s matter. I n t h e context of our a n a l y s i s of ide-

ology and l o g i c , h i s concepts become valuable t o an extent t h a t m o s t contemporary

s o c i o l o g i s t s and philosophers have not recognized. To show t h i s , I w i l l discuss

h i s ideas about t h e way language functions i n s o c i a l i z a t i o n and s o c i a l control.

Rather than beginning with a b s t r a c t problems i n l o g i c , Mead attempted

t o ground h i s a n a l y s i s of logic i n relevant subject matter. This c o n t r a s t s

sharply with t h e approaches taken by Weber, Durkheim and Popper, and f u l f i l l e d

what Toulmin c a l l e d "epistemological analysis". For example, Mead argued t h a t

with t h e growth of b e h a v i o r i s t i c psychology ,47 our understanding of "conscious-

ness" advanced t o a point where t h e older epistemologies were no longer credi-

ble. He argued t h a t a

"Prebehavioristic psychology had a f o o t i n two worlds. I t s material was

found i n consciousness and i n t h e world of physiology and physics. As
long, however, a s psychology was occupied with s t a t e s of consciousness
which c o n s t i t u t e d objects, t h e r e was an i n e v i t a b l e duplication. The
whole physiological and physical apparatus could be s t a t e d i n terms of
s t a t e s of consciousness, and solipsism hovered i n t h e background. lt4*

"Consciousness" remained an a p r i o r i i n such a psychology and no matter how

much concern t h e r e was f o r physiological data t h e r e remained a dualism between

t h e so-called "mind" and "body".

Mead argued t h a t "A b e h a v i o r i s t i c psychology, on t h e other hand, t h a t

i s not responsible f o r t h e content of t h e object, becomes a science t h a t i s

cognate with physiology and dynamics, and escapes t h e t r a i l of t h e epistemo-

l o g i c a l serpent;."49 Such an o r i e n t a t i o n i s concerned with human a c t s and finds

It... i t s objects given i n t h e world with which a l l science deals."5' It no

longer looks f o r " s t a t e s of consciousness" p e r se. Because of t h i s , it was

more consistent with t h e approaches developed by t h e n a t u r a l sciences.

"The n a t u r a l sciences s t a r t pragmatically with a world t h a t i s t h e r e ,

within which a problem has a r i s e n , and introduces hypothetical r e -
constructions only i n so f a r a s i t s s o l u t i o n demands them. They a l -
ways have t h e i r f e e t upon t h e s o l i d ground of unquestioned objects
of observation and experiment ... "5l
 P r e b e h a v i o r i s t i c psychology d i d not have t h i s s c i e n t i f i c o r i e n t a t i o n

but i n s t e a d was rooted i n "speculative philosophy". And t h i s psychology "...

c a r r i e d t h e epistemological problem i n t o t h e experience of t h e individual. "52

Even though empirical methods were used i n psychology, " s t a t e s of conscious-

ness were s t i l l regarded a s cognitive".53 An a r b i t r a r y " b i f u r c a t i o n of na-

t u r e " remained which kept psychology from s i t u a t i n g c o g n i t i v e processes i n

t h e ongoing conduct of t h e human.

Mead saw behaviorism a s t h e r a d l c a l break from t h e dualisms of specu-

l a t i v e philosophy. With it t h e " a c t i v e i n t e r e s t s of t h e organism'' became t h e

focus of psychology. Rather t h a n perception and c o g n i t i o n being approached i n

terms of " s t a t e s of consciousness'' p e r s e they were approached i n terms of be-

haviour. I n t h i s new approach "'The percept i s r e l a t i v e t o t h e perceiving in-

d i v i d u a l , but r e l a t i v e t o h i s a c t i v e i n t e r e s t , not r e l a t i v e i n t h e sense t h a t

i t s content i s a s t a t e of h i s consciousness."~4 This behaviorism "... placed

t h e c e n t r a l nervous system i n t h e world of t h i n g s ..."55 and t h e "mind" of t h e

human was no longer seen a s a detached a p r i o r i o r " s p e c t a t o r " of r e a l i t y .

2 - F o ~ Logic
l and Ongoing A c t i v i t y

I n i t s e l f , t h i s grounding of consciousness i n behaviour d i d not provide

a new perspective f o r t h e human sciences.

"It remained f o r pragmatism t o t a k e t h e s t i l l more r a d i c a l p o s i t i o n t h a t

i n immediate experience t h e percept stands over a g a i n s t t h e i n d i v i d u a l ,
not i n a r e l a t i o n of awareness, but simply i n t h a t of conduct. Cognition
i s a process of f i n d i n g out something t h a t i s problematic, not of e n t e r -
ine; i n t o r e l a t i o n with a world t h a t i s there. "56

According t o t h i s view, t h e r e i s no longer a person, wkth a mind, who perceives

reality. Instead t h e r e i s a person engaged i n ' I o n g o i ~a c t i v i t y " . This con-

duct " o u t l i n e s and defines objects" f o r t h e person. His o r h e r consciousness

i s t h e r e f o r e a c t i v e , not passive; it i s rooted i n t h e a c t i v i t y of t h e organism.

According t o Mead, our changing concepts of "time" have a f f e c t e d our

approach t o consciousness and t o epistemology. Here we begin t o s e e how we

can r e l a t e h i s ideas t o t h e l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s of Whorf. Objects have a d i f -

f e r e n t meaning f o r a person depending on t h e relevance o r i r r e l e v a n c e of them

t o h i s o r her ongoing a c t i v i t y . There i s no "objective world" out t h e r e which

a person perceives. There i s a world w i t h i n which a person a c t s . -

The meaning of t h e world w i l l depend on t h e r e l a t i o n i n space and time

of d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t s t o t h e person i n h i s o r her p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t y . There

i s no timeless r e a l i t y t h a t a person perceives. There i s ongoing a c t i v i t y ,

a c t i v i t y through time and space, which makes d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s of t h e world,

a t d i f f e r e n t periods, problematic f o r him o r her.

The n o t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y t h a t we have c r i t i c i z e d throughout t h i s study

i s no longer c r e d i b l e once consciousness i s seen i n terms of ongoing human con-

duct through time and space. Also, t h e erroneous c h a r a c t e r of formal l o g i c i s

exposed,once t h i s new understanding of consciousness i s generalized t o o t h e r

problems.

"Objects which i n a thousand ways a r e i d e n t i c a l f o r t h e two i n d i v i d u a l s

a r e y e t fundamentally d i f f e r e n t through t h e i r l o c a t i o n i n one s p a t i o -
temporal plane, involving a c e r t a i n succession of events, or i n an-
other. Eliminate t h e temporal dimension, and bring a l l events back t o
a n i n s t a n t t h a t i s t i m e l e s s , and t h e i n d i v i d u a l i t y of t h e s e o b j e c t s
which belongs t o them i n behaviour i s l o s t , except i n s o f a r a s they
can r e p r e s e n t t h e r e s u l t s of past conduct. "57

This new approach t o consciousness helps explain how formal l o g i c came

t o be mistaken a s t h e b a s i s of science. A timeless approach t o events, taklng

events out of t h e context of ongoing a c t i v i t y , does have a f u n c t i o n i n human

conduct .
"we a b s t r a c t time from t h i s space f o r t h e purposes of our conduct.
C e r t a i n objects cease t o be events, cease t o pass a s t h e y a r e i n
r e a l i t y passing and i n t h e i r permanence become t h e conditions of
our a c t i o n , and events take place with reference t o them. 115*

Our ongoing a c t i v i t y does not immerse us i n some metaphysical "present" o r

"immediate experiencett f o r i f it did it would not be ongoing. For Mead, our

ongoing a c t i v i t y It... belongs e i t h e r t o t h e passing present, o r t o t h e ir-

revocable p a s t , o r t o t h e contingent future."59

It i s possible t o t r e a t some events i n a timeless, formal way. And

without t h i s formal treatment of some events, a t c e r t a i n junctures i n ongoing

a c t i v i t y , we could not l e a r n o r predict. Such an a b s t r a c t i o n allows us t o make

judgments necessary f o r us t o develop more i n t e l l i g e n t behaviour. But t h i s i s

a d i f f e r e n t t h i n g than saying t h a t a l l knowledge i s formal. The ground of know-

ledge remains our ongoing a c t i v i t y and t h e problems t h a t a r i s e from t h i s . Be-

cause of t h i s perspective we can say tbat Mead, l i k e Marx and S a r t r e , was a

t h e o r i s t of human praxis.

This approach t o consciousness means t h a t "There i s a r e l a t i v i t y of

t h e l i v i n g Individual and i t s environment, both a s t o form and content (my

e m p h a s i ~ ) . " ~I n~ our ongoing a c t i v i t y through time and space not only t h e

content but t h e form of a c t i v i t y and problems change. Abstracting a "form"

from p a s t a c t i v i t y and superimposing it onto new a c t i v i t y and problems, rooted

i n a q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t "praxis", i s t h e main e r r o r t h a t l i e s a t t h e r o o t

of f orrnal logic.
3 - The Generalized Other and S c i e n t i f i c Rules

This new approach t o consciousness has an additional relevance f o r our

study. Besides s h i f t i n g our a t t e n t i o n away from epistemological pseudo-problems

t o human praxis, it gives us a n additional foundation f o r a sociology of know-

ledge perspective. I f we must approach consciousness of t h e world i n terms of

ongoing a c t i v i t y , then any adequate study of logic must account f o r t h e way

people a f f e c t each other. For example, we have talked of how a grouping of

s c i e n t i s t s work on a c l a s s of problems because of t r a i n i n g and commitments t o a

common paradigm.

Mead r e f e r r e d t o t h i s process i n a p a r t i c u l a r way. "1f we a r e t o co-

operate successfully with others, we must i n some manner get t h e i r ongoing a c t s

i n t o ourselves t o make t h e common a c t come off. '16' A s c i e n t i s t is not working

on "his" or "her" problem. He or she i s working on a common problem, i n terms

of a common paradigm, i n h i s or her own way. he objective of t h e a c t i s then

found i n t h e life-process of t h e group, not i n those of t h e separate individuals

alone. The " s e l f " i s not something i s o l a t e d from "others", and t h i s applies

a s much f o r t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y and r e f l e c t i o n of a s c i e n t i s t a s any other

form of praxis. His o r her behaviour i s s o c i a l and therefore h i s or her con-

sciousness must have a s o c i a l foundation. I n s c i e n t i f i c work, as well a s i n any

form of work, t h e individual "... organizes h i s own response by t h e tendencies

on t h e p a r t of others t o respond t o h i s a c t . n63

This approach means t h a t a l l views of consciousness "as a s o r t of

s p i r i t u a l s t u f f " must be discarded. A l l t h e o r i e s of logic and epistemulogy

which imply or assume t h e existence of an autonomous consciousness must a l s o be

discarded. The very core of science, t h e c r e a t i v e r e f l e c t i o n of a person

who i s engaged i n a c t i v e problem solving, i s i t s e l f r e l a t e d t o t h e ongoing

a c t i v i t y of others. "1t i s j u s t because t h e individual f i n d s himself taking

t h e a t t i t u d e s of t h e others who a r e involved i n h i s conduct t h a t he becomes

an object f o r himself. "64 Becoming an "object f o r oneself", or what C.W.

M i l l s r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e s k i l l s of controversy with oneself, i s what c r i t i c a l

comparative thought i s a l l about.

This general approach can give us a more r e a l i s t i c understanding of t h e

development of "rules" i n science than f orrnal approaches t h a t a b s t r a c t "rules"

out of t h e context of ongoing human a c t i v i t y . To show t h i s we need t o under-

stand what Mead meant by t h e "generalized other". I n b r i e f , he outlined two

stages i n t h e development of t h e generalized other i n t h e child. First, i n

"playt', t h e c h i l d a c t s a s he sees others acting. Second, i n the child

has i n t e r n a l i z e d "rules" or "regulated procedures" so t h a t he or she no longer

r e q u i r e s others t o Imitate. Others r e a c t t o t h e c h i l d ' s play i n such a way t h a t

h l s or her own behaviour becomes organized i n t o predictable games. 65

This process a l s o occurs f o r s c i e n t i s t s . The so-called "rules" of s c i -

ence a l s o have a foundation i n a "generalized other". Certain behaviour and

r e l a t e d consciousness comes t o have a s i m i l a r value f o r a grouping of s c i e n t i s t s .

It i s even possible t o t a l k of t h e changing " r u l e s " of t h e " s c i e n t i f i c game".

" ~ u l e s "become t h e way t h a t t h i s s i m i l a r i t y i n meaning i s communicated e f f i c i e n t -

l y and passed on. Without t h e underlying behavioral s o c i a l i z a t i o n and r e s u l t i n g

praxis, t h e " r u l e s " , however, would have no meaning.

 This approach helps t o demystify s c i e n t i f i c ideas and t o pinpoint

t h e human a c t i v i t y t h a t complements them. A s c i e n t i f i c "idea" i s not some-

t h i n g t h a t r e f l e c t s "laws" o r "causes". Using Mead's terms, it i s a n "aroused

organized a t t i t u d e " of a s o c i a l grouping whose common a c t s a r e communicated i n

terms of "rules". "Laws" and " o b j e c t i v i t y " have no r e a l i t y outside the common

a c t s and common values of t h e s c i e n t i s t s .

"we assume t h e generalized a t t i t u d e of t h e group, i n t h e censor t h a t

stands a t t h e door of our imagery and inner conversations, and i n
t h e a f f i r m a t i o n of t h e laws and axioms of t h e universe of discourse
... Our t h i n k i n g i s a n i n n e r conversation i n which we may be taking
t h e r o l e s of s p e c i f i c acquaintances over a g a i n s t ourselves, but usu-
a l l y it i s with what I have termed t h e 'generalized o t h e r 1 t h a t we
converse, and s o a t t a i n t o t h e l e v e l s of a b s t r a c t thinking, and t h a t
impersonality, t h a t so-called o b j e c t i v i t y t h a t we cherish. l r G 6

This approach t o l o g i c may s t a r t l e , even shock, those deeply s o c i a l i z e d

t o scientistic rationalizations. But unless we a g r e e t h a t t o t h e extent t h a t

common meanings e x i s t f o r any group of s c i e n t i s t s t h e i r a c t s a l s o mdst have com-

mon meaning, "science" becomes perceived a s a metaphysical matter. This approach

does not say t h a t s c i e n t i s t s c r e a t e r e a l i t y , but n e i t h e r does i t assume t h a t they

discover "it". Both a r e f a l s e . A s Mead said: "... objects e x i s t i n nature ( and

i n s o c i e t y ) a s t h e p a t t e r n s of our a c t i o n s . r167 we must a c t i n a common way t o

g a i n common meanings about objects. Without human p r a x i s , t h e r e i s no science;

and t h e type of common p r a x i s w i l l u n d e r l i e both t h e form and content of science.

4 - The S o c i a l F i e l d of Science

Mead developed t h e implications of t h i s b e h a v i o r i s t approach t o con-

sciousness f o r l o g i c i n a more s p e c i f i c manner. I n h i s words: " l f knowledge

i s discovery of t h e unknown, t h i s world i s not known - it i s simply there. I,68

The world does not have t o be known t o e x i s t . This i s t h e epistemological

double-bind of i d e a l i s t philosophy. A p a r t i c u l a r form and content of know-

ledge r e s u l t s from a p a r t i c u l a r type of problem solving i n t h e world. It

does not r e s u l t from t h e attempt t o know t h e nature of t h e world Per se. I f

t h i s i s so then logic cannot be viewed a s something t h a t helps make t h e world

i n t e l l i g i b l e t o us. It i s something t h a t helps us make sense of and evaluate

t h e knowledge, both t h e arguments and consequences involved, i n t h e world.

A s Mead stated:

" ~ o g i c a ln e c e s s i t y obtains i n t h e f i e l d of r e f l e c t i v e thinking. To

t r a n s f e r it t o t h e world t h a t i s t h e r e , and within which thought
i s occupied i n t h e s o l u t i o n of problems, would be t o dismiss ex-
perimental science a s a meaningless and pernicious d i s c i p l i n e and
t o r e t u r n t o t h e science of dogma.lt69

Our knowledge i s not of t h e so-called essences of t h e world nor i s it

something abstracted from our own existence i n t h e world. Knowledge i s developed

through a p a r t i c u l a r type of s o c i a l experience of humans, not through a discovery

of some trans-human " r e a l i t y " . For science t o e x i s t , humans must f i r s t share a

common concern f o r an object or event. Their common gestures become symbolic

f o r t h i s common concern. Communication r e s u l t s when a grouping of people in-

t e r n a l i z e each o t h e r ' s a t t i t u d e s about t h e meaning of t h e symbols. For Mead,

t h i s allowed consciousness, but did not yet c o n s t i t u t e knowledge. Knowledge

r e s u l t s when we know "what t h e import of t h e symbols i s " . 70 This i s a p r a c t i c a l

matter; one of a c t i n g i n t h e world and evaluating t h e consequences within t h e

common language and meaning t h a t have developed t o t h a t point i n time.

 An individual "mind" never comes t o "know" something. Significant

s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s and language a r e c r u c i a l f o r t h e symbols, communication,

consciousness and knowledge t o develop f o r a person. Mead believed t h a t "...

i n t h e thought o f t h e s c i e n t i s t t h e supposition of h i s mind and h i s s e l f a l -

ways involves other minds and selves a s presuppositions and a s standing upon

t h e same l e v e l of existence and evidence. lr7' Even more important, a s a &-

u ~ and
l s o c i a l world must e x i s t f o r t h e r e t o be n a t u r a l science, a s o c i a l

and n a t u r a l world must e x i s t f o r t h e r e t o be s o c i a l science. Events i n t h e

n a t u r a l and s o c i a l world a r e the ground from which a l l knowledge i s developed.

Records and arguments kept i n s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e indispensable f o r a l l

knowledge. A "universe of discourse" t h a t gives a person a footing from which

t o think, r e f l e c t and conceptualize is fundamental t o a l l science.

From t h i s perspective, it can be argued t h a t t h e r e "is no l i m i t t o t h e

f i e l d of knowledge". 72 There i s no t r u e s o c l a l science! Rather, depending on

t h e events o r objects with which a group of s c i e n t i s t s begin, and t h e "universe

of discourse" they a c t and think within, a d i f f e r e n t type of knowledge, with a

d i f f e r e n t function, w i l l develop. This does not mean t h a t t h e r e a r e n ' t d i f -

f e r e n t q u a l i t i e s o f knowledge, o r t h a t knowledge can s t a r t anywhere and proceed

anywhere. Inquiry is not a t a l l random or e c l e c t i c . But it does mean t h a t

s o c i a l science depends on t h e changing s o c i a l world f o r i t s events and t h a t t h e

s o c l a l s c i e n t i s t i s p a r t of t h e s o c i a l world he or she i s studying. The p o s i -

t i o n he o r she has within the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e and t h e r e l a t e d peer and r e f -

erence groups t h a t a c t a s a "generalized other" w i l l g r e a t l y mediate t h e mean-

ing t h a t t h e changing world w i l l have. I t i s upon t h i s f a c t t h a t t h e sociolr~gg

of knowledge perspective r e s t s . And it i s because of t h i s f a c t t h a t ideology

becomes problematic f o r a l l science.

A " s o c i a l science" problem i s , therefore, never rooted i n an objec-

t i v e l y describable r e a l i t y , but from t h e s o c i a l f i e l d of t h e s c i e n t i s t . The

"universe of' discourse" within which a p a r t i c u l a r s c i e n t i s t thinks and works

w i l l underlie h i s or her s e l e c t i o n and treatment of problems. The problem

does not come from t h e "mind" of t h e s c i e n t i s t ; t h e events of t h e world a s

s e l e c t i v e l y perceived underlie it. Mead argued t h a t t h e "... world may be

s a i d t o contain t h e problem within i t s e l f , and so t o surround t h e problem. 1173

But t h e "working hypothesis" with which any s c i e n t i s t proceeds w i l l be an out-

growth of t h e p a r t i c u l a r meanings of events t h a t a r e associated with h i s or

her "generalized other". The character of t h e ongoing praxis, f o r example,

t h e p o l i t i c a l relevance of any s o c i a l grouping of s c i e n t i s t s , w i l l be t h e b a s i s

of t h e p a r t i c u l a r i t y of t h e problems with which they deal.

"...t h e world t h a t I s t h e r e includes and surrounds t h e problem i n t h e

sense t h a t t h e problem i s a l s o t h e r e within t h e f i e l d of conduct, f o r ,
a s has been indicated, t h e problem a r i s e s i n t h e conduct of individuals
and out of t h e c o n f l i c t of a c t s which i n h i b i t one another because t h e
same object c a l l s out mutually antagonistic responses. When these prob-
lems pass i n t o t h e f i e l d of r e f l e c t i o n , they a r e so formulated t h a t
they would occur i n any experience, t h a t i s , they take on a universal
f om. "74

The "problem" i s not something detached from t h e s c i e n t i s t . It i s

s i t u a t e d i n h i s or her own praxis - i n t h e nature of t h e ongoing a c t i v i t y and

t h e way t h i s a f f e c t s one's response t o s o c i a l events. The problem must, by

def i n i t i o n , then be h i s t o r i c a l l y and biographically spec i f ic.

 he problem must happen t o an individual, it can have no other locus
than i n t h e biography, but t h e terms i n which he defines it and seeks
i t s s o l u t i o n must be universal, t h a t is, have common import. This lo-
c a t i o n of t h e problem i n the experience of t h e individual i n i t s h i s -
t o r i c a l s e t t i n g dates not only t h e problem but a l s o t h e world within
which t h a t problem a r i s e s . For a world within which an e s s e n t i a l s c i -
e n t i f i c problem has a r i s e n i s a d i f f e r e n t world from t h a t within which
t h i s problem does not e x i s t , t h a t i s , d i f f e r e n t from t h e world t h a t i s
t h e r e when t h i s problem has been solved. '175

The "universality" of any problem does not come from t h e o b j e c t i v i t y of a scien-

t i s t , but from two things: t h e "universe of discourse" within which t h e scien-

t i s t operates and generalizes, and t h e f a c t t h a t events i n t h e world a r e t h e

b a s i s of problems. A p a r t i c u l a r form of r e f l e c t i o n , which i s always r e l a t e d t o

a p a r t i c u l a r "generalized other", gives concepts rooted i n problems, methods and

t h e o r i e s a p a r t i c u l a r universal character. A c e r t a i n kind of human praxis, i n

t h e context of h i s t o r i c a l trends, remains t h e b a s i s of anything about which t h e r e

i s r e f l e c t i o n or generalization. As long a s we don't mystify t h e "generalized

other" i n t o something a b s t r a c t , i. e. , over and above ongoing human praxis, we

can almost t r e a t a paradigm and a "generalized other" a s being synonymous.

Such an approach has obvious implications f o r our study. For example,

one1s "... goal i n t h e p u r s u i t of knowledge i s not a f i n a l word but t h e s o l u t i o n

of a problem i n t h e world t h a t is there. "76 Naking t h e world i n t o "a picture

of a b s t r a c t i o n s " and/or assigning "a metaphysical r e a l i t y t o facts"77 t h a t a r e ,

i n f a c t , rooted i n our ongoing conduct i n t h e world i s c l e a r l y not t h e way t o

do t h i s . Our c r l t i c l s m of t h e ideology and logic of scientism i s t h e r e f o r e r e -

inforced by Mead's a n a l y s i s of t h e s o c i a l f i e l d s of science.

5 - Ideology and Language

We s t i l l have t o show how Mead's approach t o t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of lan-

guage and l o g i c r e v e a l s t h e i d e o l o g i c a l underpinnings of science. A study of

t h e r e l a t i o n of ideology t o p o l i t i c a l science r e f e r r e d t o t h e relevance of

Mead's work.

" ~ e a d ' spoint is t h a t language does not express i d e a s e x i s t i n g a n t e -

c e d e n t l y i n a l l minds, nor does it p a s s i v e l y r e f l e c t ' d a t a t from
t h e o b j e c t i v e environment. Rather, language i s a s o c i a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d
product t h a t focuses a t t e n t i o n on s e l e c t e d a s p e c t s of t h e environment
i n s p e c i a l i z e d ways: The p r e v a i l i n g universe of discourse s e t s a frame
f o r our perception of t h e problems and p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n s o c i a l l i f e . n78

One i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s i s t h a t formal " l o g i c s " a r e a b s t r a c t i o n s of a p a r t i c u -

l a r "universe of discourse", r a t h e r than evaluations of t h e worth, f o r example,

t h e consequences, of t h a t universe of discourse. This i s j u s t another way of

saying t h a t formal l o g i c has no r e a l content. But t h i s does not y e t make t h e

connection between ideology, language and l o g i c e x p l i c i t .

Mead himself made t h i s connection when he wrote t h a t :

"A person l e a r n s a new language and, a s we say, g e t s a new soul. He puts

himself i n t o t h e a t t i t u d e of t h o s e t h a t make use of t h a t language. He
cannot read i t s l i t e r a t u r e , cannot converse with those t h a t belong t o
t h a t community, without taking on i t s p e c u l i a r a t t i t u d e s . He becomes
i n t h a t sense a d i f f e r e n t individual. You cannot convey a language a s
a pure a b s t r a c t i o n ; you i n e v i t a b l y i n some degree convey a l s o t h e l i f e
t h a t l i e s behind it ... '79

This implies t h a t t o l e a r n a universe of discourse you must l e a r n a new way of

life. For a c e r t a i n c l a s s of problems, methods and t h e o r i e s and concepts rooted

i n them t o have meaning t o a s c i e n t i s t , t h e ongoing a c t i v i t y of those who a c t a s

one's "generalized o t h e r " and a r e a s s o c i a t e d with t h e s e "concepts1' must a l s o have

meaning. A l i f e - s t y l e and work-style and a r e l a t e d s e t of commitments i s t h e n

involved i n any form of science. To take us f u l l c i r c l e again, these conunlt-

ments a r e u l t i m a t e l y p o l i t i c a l and ideological. Both a s implied backings f o r

a n argument and a s a r t i c u l a t i o n s o r u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n s of p o s i t i o n s rooted i n

r e a l p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s , o n e ' s i n t e l l e c t u a l work always has a n i d e o l o g i c a l

underpinning. Mead has presented u s with a n a n a l y s i s of language and l o g i c

which points t o t h e i n t r i c a c i e s and a c t u a l workings of t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s 2

practice.

Footnotes

l s e e p. 14 above.

2 ~ e ep. 183 above.

3 ~ e ep. 186 above.

4 ~ e ep. 348 above.

5See p. 410 above.

6 ~ d w a r dSapir: Culture, Language and Personalitx. Berkeley, University of

C a l i f o r n i a Press (19641, P. 7.

7 ~ id.
b
' 5 ~ h e i d e a l of "pure referencet1 i s rooted i n a near-schizophrenic understand-
ing of language, experience and behaviour. It suggests t h a t we can observe our-
s e l v e s and make sense of what we see without being involved. I n f a c t , t h e i n t e r -
r e l a t i o n of language and behaviour a f f e c t s us a l l , including t h e s c i e n t i s t . And
t h i s i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p i s e s s e n t i a l f o r us t o be a b l e t o study experience and
behaviour. Once we acknowledge t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s c i e n t i s t always works within
a " s o c i a l f i e l d " which a f f e c t s t h e things he or she generalizes about and t h e
way he o r she makes g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s we can abandon t h e pseudo-problems of scien-
tism.

161n t h e motto of Maryland which reads "deeds a r e more e f f e c t i v e than wordstt,

deeds a r e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h males and words with females. (The New Merrian-Webster
Pocket Dictionarx, Richmond H i l l , Ontario, Simon and Schuster ( 19681, p. 623.)
Not only i s t h e n o t i o n t h a t a c t i o n s or deeds speak louder than words an erroneous
one, but it may be rooted i n t h e sex-role s o c i a l i z a t i o n of our c u l t u r e . This pos-
s i b i l i t y r a i s e s s e v e r a l questions. For example, how much i s t h e r e i f i c a t i o n of
language i n academia rooted i n t h e d i v i s i o n of labour between males and females
( a t work with a d u l t s ; a t home with c h i l d r e n ) and t h e d i s s o c i a t i o n of theory from
prac'tice, even mind from body, t h a t r e s u l t s from t h i s ?

171 t a k e up t h i s matter i n Chapter Twenty.

1 8 s a p i r , op. c i t . , p. 34.

191btd., P. 35.

2 0 ~ b i d . , p. 36.

21~bid.

2 2 ~ e n j a m i nWhorf: Science and L i n g u i s t i c s , i n P. Gleeson and Nancy Wakefield

( eds. ): Lanffuane and Culture. Columbus, Ohio, Charles E. M e r r i l l (19681, p. 43.

231bid. , p. 41.

241bid., p. 45.

25~bid.

%bid.

27~bid.

2 8 ~ b i d . , p. 47. I f Whorf meant t h a t our concepts a r e r e l a t l v e t o a p a r t i c u l a r

l i n g u i s t i c - i d e o l o g i c a l - l o g i c a l paradigm, I am i n agreement with him on t h i s
point. If he was caught, a s Mannheim, between a s c i e n - t i s t i c notion of t r u t h and
o b j e c t i v i t y and a r e l a t i v i s m rooted i n a developing skepticism of t h i s Idea, I
am not. The f a c t t h a t he even considered t h e idea of "absolute i m p a r t i a l i t g "
Suggests t h e l a t t e r I n t e r p r e t a t i o n . A s I have c o n t i n u a l l y s t r e s s e d , once we r i d
ourselves of t h e ideology, l o g i c and l i n g u i s t i c s of scientism, t h e r e l e v a n t
q u e s t i o n becomes one of evaluating t h e d i f f e r e n t functions and consequences
of d i f f e r e n t forms and contents of knowledge.

3'1bid, See Deweyls d i s c u s s i o n of verbs i n Chapter Twenty f o r more c l a r i t y on

t h i s point.

3 4 ~ 1 a r t i nLandau: Due Process of Inquiry. The American Behavioral S c i e n t i s t ,

October, 1965, pp. 4-10.

371bid. Landau's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Reichenbach seems t o c o n t r a d i c t t h e g i s t of

t h i s statement. "Every t h e o r y of knowledge must s t a r t from knowledge a s a given
sociological f a c t ... Knowledge... i s a very concrete t h i n g ; and t h e examina-
t i o n i n t o i t s p r o p e r t i e s means studying t h e f e a t u r e s of a s o c i o l o g i c a l phenom-
enon. " (H. Reichenbach: Experience and Predict ion. Chicago, Phoenix ( 19381,
P* 3 . )

381b id.

4 4 ~ b i d ., p. 9.

4 5 ~ fby s t a t l n g t h a t science i s t h e o r e t i c a l a person implies t h a t theory i s

deductive, he i s mistaken. But t h e r e i s a c o n t r a r y way of seeing s c i e n c e a s
being t h e o r e t i c a l i n nature. Writing of Freud's theory, Althusser asked:
"... i n t h i s organic practice-technico-theoretical whole do wc have a whole
t h a t i s t r u l y s t a b i l j z e d and founded a t t h e s c i e n t i f i c l e v e l ? I n other words,
i s t h e theory r e a l l y theory i n t h e s c i e n t i f i c sense? O r i s it not, on t h e
contrary, a simple t r a n s p o s i t i o n i n t o theory of t h e methodology of t h e prac-
t i c e ( t h e c u r e ) ? Hence t h e very common modern view t h a t beneath i t s t h e o r e t i -
c a l exterior ... psychoanalysis remains a mere p r a c t i c e t h a t does sometimes
gives r e s u l t s , but not always; a mere p r a c t i c e extended i n t o a technique
( r u l e s of a n a l y t i c method), but without a theorx, a t l e a s t without a t r u e
theory; what it c a l l s theory being merely the blind t e c h n i c a l concepts i n
which it r e f l e c t s t h e r u l e s of i t s practice; a mere p m c t i c e without theory
... perhaps then, even simply a kind of magic? t h a t succeeds, l i k e a l l magic,
because of i t s p r e s t i g e - and i t s p r e s t i g e , applied t o t h e f u l f i l l m e n t of a
s o c i a l need or demand, t h e r e f o r e i t s only j u s t i f i c a t i o n , i t s r e a l j u s t i f i c a -
tion. " (Louis Althusser: Freud and Lacan. New Left Review, May-June, 1969,
No. 55, p. 53.) Often theory i s j u s t t h e a b s t r a c t i o n of t h e r u l e s of some
technique and formal l o g i c i s used t o attempt t o obscure t h i s f a c t . Only a
pragmatic approach t o logic i s a b l e t o s c r u t i n i z e t h e t o t a l a c t i v i t y involved
i n inquiry, and, a s such, determine whether t h e r e is any t h e o r e t i c a l s i g n i f i -
cance i n a s c i e n t i f i c argument.

46~andau, op. c i t e , Pa 10-

4 7 ~ h eterm "behaviorism" has been associated with two d i s t i n c t tendencies i n

t h e s o c i a l sciences. Mead's behaviorism was not t h a t of Watson, Pavlov, Hull
o r Skinner - t h e so-called objective psychologists. This kind of behaviorism
i s thoroughly i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e ideology and l o g i c of scientism. Mead's be-
haviorism was more s i m i l a r t o t h a t s t r e s s e d by Dewey who argued t h a t while
human events have t o be studied from t h e standpoint of conduct t h i s process
cannot be t r e a t e d i n an external, so-called o b j e c t i v i s t way.

4 8 ~ e o r g eH. Mead: The Genesis of t h e Self and Social Control, i n M.R. Konvitz
and Gail Kennedy (eds. ) : The American Pragmatists. New York, Meridian (19601,
P* 259.
%bid.

57~bid,
. pp. 266-67.

5 8 ~ b i d . , p. 267.

59m i d . , p. 264.

6 0 ~ b i d . , pp. 267-68.

61,id. , p. 268-69.

6 2 ~ b i d . , p. 269.

631bid. p. 272.

641bld., p. 273.

'5My use of t h e term "games" should not be given r e l a t i v i s t i c connotations.

Because s c i e n t i s t s l e a r n r u l e s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r paradigm much a s c h i l d r e n
l e a r n r u l e s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r game does not mean t h a t t h e r e a r e not real con-
sequences t h a t r e s u l t from s c i e n t i f i c games. It does, however, emphasize t h a t
t h e d i f f e r e n t consequences of doing d i f f e r i n g kinds of t h i n g s i n i n q u i r y a r e
o f t e n t h e r e s u l t of t h e i n t e g r a t i o n of s c i e n t i s t s i n t o c e r t a i n s o c i a l r e l a t i o n -
ships.

6 6 ~ b i d ., PP. 276-77.

6 7 ~ b i d . , p* 277-

6 8 ~ s e l mS t r a u s s (ed. ): George Herbert Mead on S o c i a l psycho log^. Chicago, The

University of Chicago Press (19641, p. 45.

691bid., p. 46.

7 0 ~ b i d . , p. 51.

7 1 ~ b i d . B p, 53.

72~bid., p. 56.

731bid., p, 58.

741bid.

7 5 ~ b i d . , p. 59.

7 6 ~ b i d . , p. 60.
78William E. Connolly: P o l i t i c a l Science and Ideolofq. New York, Atherton Press
(1967), p. 96. I have not included a d i s c u s s i o n of Noam Chomsky i n t h i s study.
Like Wittgenstein, Chornsky's approach t o l i n g u i s t i c s can, p o t e n t i a l l y , account
f o r t h e problem of ideology. For examole, i n a d i s c u s s i o n of l i n g u i s t i c s and
p o l i t i c s he wrote: " S c i e n t i f i c i d e a s and p o l i t i c a l i d e a s can converge and, i f
t h e y converge independently because t h e y have each developed i n t h e same d i r e c -
t i o n , t h a t i s f i n e . But they should not be made t o converge a t t h e c o s t of
d i s t o r t i o n and suppression or anything l i k e that." (Noam Chomsky: L i n g u i s t i c s
and P o l i t i c s . London, England, New Left Review, Sept.-Oct., 1969, No. 17, p.
30.) H i s understanding of t h e r e l a t i o n of s c i e n c e and p o l i t i c s , however, r e -
mained formal; probably because h i s o r i e n t a t i o n t o l i n g u i s t i c s ( f o r example,
h i s i d e a of Isgenerative r u l e s " ) seems t o be a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e formal l o g i c a l
needs of t h e academic models p r e s e n t l y being developed by t h e dominant approach
t o behavioral s c i e n c e i n t h e United S t a t e s .

791bid. This statement by Mead was perhaps t h e most c r u c i a l i n providing t h e

i n i t i a l i d e a s around and out of which I developed t h i s study. I mention t h i s t o
p o i n t out how necessary it i s t o read someone, a s a "generalized other", who has
a r t i c u l a t e d one's hunches f o r any t h e s i s t o develop. I f what I have s a i d about
t h e s o c i a l f i e l d of science has v a l i d i t y , it obviously has t o apply t o my own
work. The relevance of Mead's work d i d not s t r i k e me e x i s t e n t i a l l y u n t i l I
moved i n t o a "commune" and began t o f i n d my language changing a s my h a b i t s
changed.
 Chapter Twenty

Ideology and Inquiry: Dewey

The problem of ideology i s rooted i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e

s o c i a l arrangement of science, f o r example, t h e d i v i s i o n between mental and

physical labour i n society, t h e c l a s s of problems, methods and t h e o r i e s t h a t

dominates science, and t h e s o c i a l and human consequences of such a s e t up.

The problem of logic i s rooted i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between methods of evalu-

a t i n g knowledge and t h e ideological function of a p a r t i c u l a r o r i e n t a t i o n t o

knowledge. For example, I have argued throughout t h i s study t h a t formal logic,

a s a method of evaluating knowledge, complements t h e s c i e n t i s t i c research t h a t

i s done f o r t h e established s o c i e t y on t h e pretense of being value-free. It

i s a study of language t h a t shows t h e inadequacies of a l l t h e o r i e s of knowledge

t h a t f a i l t o t a k e t h e problems of ideology and l o g i c i n t o account. Once it i s

recognized t h a t language i s not value-free, but functions h e u r i s t i c a l l y a s part

of human praxis, t h e attempt t o develop an epistemology t h a t i s f r e e of ideology

proves t o be f u t i l e . As one author put it: "A given language i n c l i n e s i t s users

... t o accept 'rlaturallyt a c e r t a i n metaphysics or epistemology and thus u l t i -

mately influence b e h a ~ i o u r . " ~This i s much t h e same a s saying, a s did Marx

and Engels, t h a t ideology mediates behaviour and consciousness.

Whether a t h e o r i s t personifies ideology i n t o "the ideologue" and i n

t h e process mystifies science, avoids t h e whole i s s u e with " s o c i o l ~ ~ i s m "or

,

I s more sophisticated and uses formal "logic" t o help r a t i o n a l i z e t h e a r b i t r a r y

8
s e p a r a t i o n of science from ideglogyY2t h e r e remains an ignorance about t h e

r e l a t i o n s of language t o praxis and the implications of t h i s f o r t h e prob-

I

lems of ideology and logic. Once t h e r e l a t i o n s of p o l i t i c s and science a r e

conceptualized, with t h e a i d of t h e notion of "ideological s t r u g g l e " , then

scientism i t s e l f becomes exposed a s a n ideology and t h e ideological f u n c t i o n

of t h e t h e o r i e s of knowledge t h a t j u s t i f y it becomes apparent. A formal o r

academic approach t o l o g i c tends t o r e i f y our means of evaluating arguments

and i n t h e process it d i s t o r t s our understanding of t h e problems of ideology

and logic. Whether such formalization takes t h e form of attempting t o devel-

op value-free o r n e u t r a l concepts, or t r e a t s "rules" i n a b s t r a c t from a con-

s i d e r a t i o n of t h e i d e o l o g i c a l context within which i n t e l l e c t u a l judgments a r e

always made, formal l o g i c serves t h e same purpose of obscuring t h e problem

t h a t ideology poses f o r logic.

But where does t h i s c l a r i f i c a t i o n leave us? My c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h e

problems of ideology and l o g i c i n t h e s o c i a l sciences was not intended t o

n u r t u r e a n i h i l i s t i c r e l a t i v i s m about knowledge. I f t h i s r e s u l t s , t h e n my

argument has been a b s t r a c t e d , perhaps even given an ontological s t a t u s , and

t h e reader i s s t i l l searching f o r some a b s t r a c t c r i t e r i a f o r j u s t i f y i n g one

argument over another. The a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h i s i s t o develop a n approach t o

l o g i c which strengthens our i n t e l l e c t u a l commitment t o s o c i a l science.

Throughout t h i s t h e s i s I have argued t h a t s i n c e knowledge i s pragmatic,

t h a t i s , rooted i n p r a x l s , then only a pragmatic o r i e n t a t i o n t o l o g i c can a s -

sist us evaluate t h e arguments involved i n c r e a t i n g knowledge. I f our means

of e v a l u a t i n g arguments do not deal e x p l i c i t l y with t h e r e l a t i o n s of language

and praxis, ideology and logic, then our logic w i l l not be inclusive enough

t o f u l f i l l i t s task. Logic i n t h e s o c i a l sciences must be a b l e t o avoid t h e

dichotomies of scientism i f it is t o have a function beyond t h a t of r a t i o n -

a l i z i n g t a u t o l o g i c a l statements. A logic t h a t cannot account f o r t h e problem

of ideology i s useless a s a t o o l t o assess arguments.

Though Dewey did not conceive of h i s approach t o logic i n t h e s e terms,

pragmatism does f u l f i l l t h e above requirements. I w i l l show t h i s , f i r s t , by

contrasting Dewey's approach t o logic with t h e formal approach and, second,

by c r i t i c i z i n g t h e s c i e n t i s t i c dichotomies between objective and subjective,

t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l , and empirical and nonnative. On t h e b a s i s of t h i s

c r i t i q u e * I w i l l develop a perspective on t h e question of. method and "rules"

t h a t takes account of t h e implications of t h e problem of ideology f o r logic.

This w i l l involve a discussion of t h e form t h a t s o c i a l inquiry which does not

ignore ideology can take.

Formal and Pragmatic Logic

Dewey c r i t i c i z e d formal logic because it leads us t o believe t h a t

something can "... be an object of knowledge p e r se.ll3 As he said: "When

the a c t and object of perception a r e i s o l a t e d from t h e i r place and function

i n promoting and d i r e c t i n g a successful course of a c t i v i t i e s i n behalf of use-

enjoyment, they a r e often taken t o be exclusively cognitive. "4 This i s o l a t i o n

of an a c t or object from i t s place or function leads t o t h e pseudo-problems of

academic epistemology. For example, an academlc o r i e n t a t i o n t o knowledge leads

t o f a l s e questions about which one of many a b s t r a c t , t h a t I s , imagined approaches

t o epistemology, i s "most real". "1t i s only when an object of f o c a l obser-

vation i s regarded a s an object of knowledge i n i s o l a t i o n t h a t t h e r e a r i s e s

t h e notion t h a t t h e r e a r e two kinds of knowledge, so opposed t o each other

t h a t philosophy must e i t h e r choose which i s ' r e a l 1 or f i n d some way of rec-

onciling t h e i r respective I r e a l i t i e s 1 . "5 As I proceed, I s h a l l discuss how

academic c o n f l i c t s between rationalism and empiricism, and idealism and ma-

t e r i a l i s m a r e rooted i n t h i s confusion.

Being anti-academic does not necessarily imply t h a t one i s a n t i -

intellectual. An a t t a c k on scientism i s not a n a t t a c k on science. Rather,

i n terms of t h i s study, it i s a n attempt t o have t h e problem of ideology in-

cluded i n t h e c l a s s of problems with which s o c i a l science deals. This would

e n t a i l no l e s s than a s c i e n t i f i c revolution i n my estimation.

The d i s t i n c t i o n between anti-academic and a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l i s basic

t o t h i s thesis. When t h e l o g i c i a n Moore wrote t h a t it was always "... things

which other philosophers have s a i d t h a t suggested philosophical problems t o

me" and t h a t he did "... not t h i n k ... t h a t t h e world o r t h e sciences would

even have suggested t o me any philosophical problems ..." 6 we have an example

of t h e academic mentality and some hunches about t h e kind of praxis t h a t under-

l i e s t h e pseudo-problems of traditional epistemology. Not conceptualizing

problems i n terms of language and praxis nor ideology and l o g i c , academics

think within t h e narrow l i n g u i s t i c boundaries of t h e i r specialized d i s c i p l i n e s

and work within those of t h e i r ivory tower. I n t h e process, academic philosophy

and logic have become absurd.

 This i s o l a t i o n of a human a c t or n a t u r a l object from i t s context

creates dichotomies which, when superimposed onto t h e ongoing world, leads

t o an unnecessary fragmentation of subject matter. About t h i s " p e t r i f i c a -

t i o n of d i s t i n c t i o n s " , Dewey and Bentley wrote:

" ~ h i l o s o p h i c a ldiscourse i s t h e chief wrong-doer i n t h i s matter.

Either d i r e c t l y or through psychology a s a n a l l y it has t o r n t h e
i n t e l l e c t u a l , t h e emotional, and t h e p r a c t i c a l asunder, e r e c t i n g
each i n t o an e n t i t y , and thereby c r e a t i n g t h e a r t i f i c i a l problem
of g e t t i n g them back i n t o working terms with one another. Espe-
c i a l l y has t h i s taken place i n philosophy since t h e s c i e n t i f i c
revolution of a few c e n t u r i e s ago. For t h e assumption t h a t it
c o n s t i t u t e d n a t u r a l science an e n t i t y complete i n and of i t s e l f
n e c e s s a r i l y s e t man and t h e world, mind and nature a s mindless,
subject and object, iqner and outer, t h e moral and t h e physical,
f a c t and value, over against one another a s inherent, e s s e n t i a l ,
and t h e r e f o r e absolute separations. "7

The contemporary d i s c i p l i n e s of t h e s o c i a l sciences a r e themselves exposed a s

being ideological once t h e e f f e c t s of t h e fragmentation of subject matters and

8
t h e academic logic t h a t obscures these e f f e c t s a r e themselves scrutinized.

Dewey and Bentley viewed formal logic a s being presocial-scientific.

"we may t a k e Darwinls great demonstration of t h e ' n a t u r a l 1 o r i g i n of

organisms a s marking t h e s t a r t of t h e new e r a i n which man himself
i s t r e a t e d a s a n a t u r a l member of a universe under discovery r a t h e r
than a s a superior being endowed with I f a c u l t i e s ' from above and be-
yond, which enable him t o 'oversee1 it. I f we do t h i s , we f i n d t h a t
almost a l l l o g i c a l e n t e r p r i s e s a r e s t i l l c a r r i e d on i n pre-Darwinian
patterns. "9

Formal l o g i c i s not only abstracted from t h e subject matter of t h e s o c i a l and

b i o l o g i c a l sciences, it is i n contradiction t o t h i s subject matter. The v a r i -

a t i o n s of formal logic provide no r e a l choice f o r those i n t e r e s t e d i n a logic

t h a t can help evaluate arguments rooted i n ongoing substantive inquiry. I f we

r e l y on formal logic 'I... we a r e asked t o take our choice between t r a d i t i o n a l

logic, which was formulated not only long before t h e r i s e of science but when

a l s o t h e content and methods of science were i n r a d i c a l opposition t o those of

present science, and t h e new purely tsymbolistic l o g i c r t h a t recognized only

mathematics, and even a t t h a t i s not so much concerned with methods of mathe-

matics a s with l i n g u i s t i c formulations of i t s r e s u l t s . 11 10

What Dewey c a l l e d t r a d i t i o n a l logic was not o r i g i n a l l y constructed i n

a b s t r a c t i o n from ongoing events. There was a type of praxis, r e l a t e d use of

language and ideological o r i e n t a t i o n which complemented it i n i t s time and ~ "

place of origin. Dewey pointed out t h a t t h e forms i n A r i s t o t e l i a n logic were

'I.. . not f o r m a l i s t i c ... not independent of r s u b j e c t s r known". Rather, t h e

subjects were exclusively concerned with t h e d e f i n i t i o n and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of

so-called "essences" and had "... no room f o r any l o g i c of discovery and in-

~ention.~"' A s Dewey wrote: "These considerations explain t h e ease with which

a l o g i c a l theory which was s t r i c t l y ontological or e x i s t e n t i a l i n i t s o r i g i n a l

reference became a merely formal logic when t h e advance of science destroyed

t h e background of essences and species upon which t h e o r i g i n a l logic was

based. "12

The l o g i c of today which i s rooted i n t r a d i t i o n a l logic i s formal be-

cause it has "forms without subject matter".

"When e t e r n a l essences and species a r e banished from s c i e n t i f i c subject

matter, t h e forms t h a t a r e appropriate t o them have nothing l e f t t o
which they apply; of necessity they a r e merely formal. They remain i n
h i s t o r i c a l f a c t a s monuments of a c u l t u r e and science t h a t have disap-
peared, while i n logic they remain a s 'barren f o r m a l i t i e s t o be formally
manipulated. "I3

This separation of language forms from human praxis. i s what c o n s t i t u t e s t h e r e -

 - 458 -
I

i f i c a t i o n of "knowledge". Nowhere has i t gone t o t h e extent t h a t it has with

formal logic. It must be c l e a r t h a t formalizing ideas which have a c l e a r r e -

l a t i o n t o subject matter and human praxis does p

J c o n s t i t u t e such a r e i f i c a -

tion. The use of mathematics i n ongoing inquiry i n physics, f o r example, does

not c o n s t i t u t e such a r e i f i c a t i o n . Doing t h e l a t t e r does not c o n t r a d i c t t h e

pragmatic approach t o logic. I n contrast t o r e i f i e d logic, t h e so-called in-

dependence of such forms "... i s intermediate, not f i n a l and complete. 'I4

A pragmatic approach t o logic c o n t r a s t s sharply with a formal, r e i f i e d

approach. It is based "... upon t h e postulate t h a t knowings a r e always and

everywhere inseparable from t h e knows - that t h e two a r e twin aspects of common

fact. "15 Dewey was fundamentally opposed t o t h e separation of logic from ongo-

ing inquiry and t h e ongoing a c t i v i t y t h a t goes with it. "Whatever r e l a t i v e

novelty may be found i n my position c o n s i s t s i n regarding t h e problem a s be-

longing t o t h e context of t h e conduct of inquiry and not i n e i t h e r t r a d i t i o n a l

ontological or t h e t r a d i t i o n a l epistemological context. "16

Dewey and Bentley summarized t h e i r approach i n t h e Preface t o t h e i r

"terminological inquiry" i n t o contemporary t h e o r i e s of logic.

"... knowing i s co-operative and a s such i s i n t e g r a l with communication. \

By i t s own processes it i s a l l i e d with t h e postulational. It demands

t h a t statements be made a s descriptions of events i n terms of t h e dura-
t i o n s i n time and areas i n space. It excludes a s s e r t i o n s of f i x i t y and
attempts t o impose them. It i n s t a l l s an openness and f l e x i b i l i t y i n t h e
very process of knowing. It t r e a t s knowledge as i t s e l f inquiry as a -
goal within inquiry, not a s a terminus outside or beyond inquiry. "'7

Once "knowledge" i s seen as a "goal within inquiry" then inquiry can be seen as

a p a r t i c u l a r form of human praxis. This perspective avoids t h e p i t - f a l l s t h a t

develop out of t h e dichotomies of scientism. As we s h a l l see, it allows us t o

understand and undertake s o c i a l science without ignoring t h e problem of ide-

ology.

.e Dichotomies of Scientism: 1 - Objective and Subjective

The value-free dogma or t h e end-of-ideology ideology accepts t h e

dichotomy between t h e object and t h e subject without question. Epistemological

theories t h a t complement t h e s c i e n t i s t i c ideology a l l begin with t h i s dichotomy

a s a n a ~ r i o r i . Dewey and Bentley pointed out t h a t t h i s dichotomy has an onto-

l o g i c a l connotation.

"1t i s a f a m i l i a r f a c t t h a t t h e h i s t o r i c a l systems of epistemological

philosophy did t h e i r b e s t t o make ontological conclusions depend upon
p r i o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e conditions and nature of knowledge. A f a c t
which i s not so f a m i l i a r , which indeed i s o f t e n ignored, i s t h a t t h i s
attempt was i t s e l f based upon an ontological assumption of l i t e r a l l y t
tremendous import; f o r it was assumed t h a t whatever e l s e knowledge i s [
o r i s not, it i s dependent upon t h e independent existence of a knower
and of something t o be known; occurring, t h a t i s , between mind and t h e
world; between s e l f and n o t - s e l f ; or, i n words made f a m i l i a r by use,
between subject and object. "I8

This b e l i e f i n t h e independent existence of t h e knower and t h e known,

t h i s placement of "'man t h e analyzer' outside of, or over against t h e world of

h i s analysis"19 is contradicted by our a n a l y s i s of language i n Chapter Nineteen.

I n f a c t , a non-theory of language and an a l i e n a t e d type of praxis which allows

people t o think of l i n g u i s t i c forms i n a r e i f i e d manner complements such a b e l i e f .

Dewey's approach recognized t h e relevance of t h e study of language f o r

logic. Like Pierce, he made a "...f l a t denial of ( t h e ) separation of word,

idea and object ...";20 a d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t s c i e n t i s t i c philosophers c o n s i s t e n t l y

make. As Bentley said of Dewey's approach t o logic, he adequate development

of t h e theory of inquiry must await the development of a general theory of /
language i n which form and matter a r e not separated. "21 Such a theory, of /
t h e kind Mead developed i n h i s s t u d i e s of s o c i a l i z a t i o n , would see "... lan-
guage, with a l l i t s speaking and writings, a s man-himself-ln-action-dealing-

with-things ..."22 Because it would not separate t h e word, t h e object and

t h e idea, such an approach t o language would not p o s t u l a t e "... t h e interven-

ing realm of names a s a new and t h i r d kind of f a c t lying between man a s speaker

and things a s spoken of ...1123

The r e i f i c a t i o n of l i n g u i s t i c forms, and a l l t h e ignorance t h i s implies

about problems of ideology and logic, postulates t h e existence of such a t h i r d

realm of f a c t s . Developing a theory of logic which is adequate f o r t h e s o c i a l

sciences "... w i l l r e q u i r e complete abandonment of t h e customary i s o l a t i o n of

t h e word from t h e man speaking, and likewise of t h e word from t h e thing spoken

of o r named. "24 The "basic postulate" of t h i s approach "... i s t h a t t h e know-

i n g ~a r e observable f a c t s i n exactly t h e same sense a s a r e t h e subject matters

t h a t a r e known. lf25 Rather than fragmenting t h e person, t h e object under con-

s i d e r a t i o n , and t h e idea about it - and t r e a t i n g each of them a s an a b s t r a c t i o n

- Dewey's method of observation t r e a t s "... t h e speaker o r knower along with t h e

spoken of or known a s being one common durational event. "26 Rather than t r e a t -

ing "man t h e analyzer" a s though he were separated from t h e world of a n a l y s i s ,

t h e praxis t h a t underlies any a c t of knowiq i s acknowledged by h i s approach.

This approach invalidates t h e ontological meaning t h a t scientism a t -

t r i b u t e s t o t h e dichotomy between t h e subjective and objective. Once we look

a t language a s an aspect of human praxis, we see human "... experience a s neither*

subjective o r objective but a s a method or system of organization ..."27 or
/
/

what Dewey c a l l e d a "transaction". As Dewey and Bentley wrote:

"What has been completely divided i n philosophical discourse i n t o man ,/

and t h e world, inner outer, s e l f and n o t - s e l f , subject object,
individual and s o c i a l , p r i v a t e and public, etc. a r e i n a c t u a l i t y par-
t i e s i n l i f e - t r a n s a c t i o n s . The philosophical problem of how t o get
them together is a r t i f i c i a l . "28 I
Dewey's c r i t i q u e of t h e dichotomy between t h e subjective and objective

should not i t s e l f be given an ontological meaning.2g As he s a i d , anyone who

"... puts what i s s a i d i n an ontological context instead of t h a t of inquiry

is sure t o go amiss i n respect t o understanding ( m y p o s i t i o n ) . '130 ~ n ay t -

t r i b u t i o n of ontological meaning t o t h i s dichotomy "... needs t o be replaced

by consideration of t h e conditions under which they occur a s d i s t i n c t i o n s , and

of t h e s p e c i a l uses served by t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s . 11 31

Abstracting t h e process of naming i n t o a t h i r d realm of f a c t and t h e

c r e a t i o n of formal l o g i c a r e i n t e r r e l a t e d errors. However, t h i s does not mean

t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s t h a t epistemological theory has r e i f i e d were not functional

i n advancing inquiry under c e r t a i n conditions.

"What happens when d i s t i n c t i o n s which a r e indispensable t o f o m and use

i n an e f f i c i e n t conduct of inquiry -
t h a t i s t o say, one which meets
i t s own conditions as inquiry -
a r e converted i n t o something ontologi-
c a l , t h a t i s t o say, i n t o something taken t o e x i s t on i t s own account
p r i o r t o inquiry and t o which inquiry must conform, i s e r h i b i t e d ...
i n t h e epistemological phase of modern philosophy; and yet t h e new
science could not have accomplished i t s revolution i n astronomy,
physics, and physiology i f it had not i n t h e course of i t s own d e a -
opment of method been a b l e , by means of such d i s t i n c t i o n s a s those t o
which theory gave t h e names 'subject and ' o b j e c t 1 , lmindl and ' t h e
worldl, e t c . , t o slough off t h e vast mass of i r r e l e v a n t preconceptions
which kept ancient and medieval cosmology from a t t a i n i n g s c i e n t i f i c
standing. "32
 The dichotomies of t h e s c i e n t i s t i c ideology a r e rooted i n a modern

type of "word magic". When pragmatic d i s t i n c t i o n s a r e converted i n t o onto-

l o g i e s , t h e words become t r e a t e d as being autonomous, t h a t i s , a s carrying

t h e i r own meanings. Dewey Is pragmatic approach t o logic was an attempt t o

place t h e categories of s c i e n t i f i c language themselves i n t o t h e realm of

inquiry. The word magic of t h e epistemologists of scientism led them t o

treat "...a use, function, and s e r v i c e rendered i n conduct of inquiry a s

i f it had ontological reference a p a r t from inquiry. "33 And pragmatic logic

is "... an attempt t o convert a l l t h e o n t o l o ~ i c a l ,a s p r i o r t o inquiry, into

t h e l o g i c a l a s occupied wholly and s o l e l y with what takes place i n t h e con-

duct of inquiry a s a n evergoing concern. ,134

Like C.W. Mills, Dewey was opposed t o t h e separation of questions of

"method" or "theory" from t h e problems a t hand. Once any issues of l o g i c

derived from a c o n t r a s t of common sense and s c i e n t i f i c knowledge a r e "...

placed and t r e a t e d i n t h e context of d i f f e r e n t types of problems demanding

d i f f e r e n t methods of treatment and d i f f e r e n t types of subject matter, t h e

problem involved assumes a very d i f f e r e n t shape from t h a t which it has when

it i s taken t o concern t h e ontological 1 r e a l i t y t . 1 r 3 5 Dewey even argued t h a t

t h e p o l a r i z a t i o n of r a t i o n a l i s t and empiricist philosophies was rooted i n t h e

a b s t r a c t i n g of questions of theory from t h e context of inquiry. h he f a i l u r e

of t h e controversy t o a r r i v e a t s o l u t i o n through agreement i s an important

ground of t h e idea t h a t it i s worthwhile t o take these c o n s t i t u e n t s of con-

troversy out of an ontological context, and note how they look when they a r e
placed within t h e context of t h e use they perform and the service they render

i n t h e context of inquiry.

The sc i e n t i s t i c dichotomy between objective and subjective not only

leads t o ontological d i s t i n c t i o n s between t h e knower and t h e known, but be-

tween t h e r a t i o n a l and t h e empirical. The s c i e n t i s t i c ideology i s so ingrained

i n our educational system t h a t t h e notion t h a t a person "reasons" about objects

and other persons he or she "experiences" has become almost an axiom. Because

t h e c o n f l i c t between "reason" and "experience" has been given an ontological

connotation, t h e d i s t i n c t i o n impedes r a t h e r than f a c i l i t a t e s inquiry i n t o human

experience and behaviour. Both s i d e s of t h e c o n f l i c t are, i n e f f e c t , a n t i -

scientific. Dewey even argued t h a t

/
"The two doctrines, t h a t t h e r e is an immediate knowledge of e x i s t e n t i a l
objects or of q u a l i t i e s a s sense-data, and t h a t there i s an immediate
knowledge of r a t i o n a l principles -
necessarily go together. Atomistic
empiricism and r a t i o n a l a priorism a r e c o r r e l a t i v e doctrines. "37

Both doctrines reduce t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of inquiry t o something postulated

o u t s i d e inquiry. One reduces inquiry, and, i n e f f e c t , human existence, t o t h e

reasoning of t h e knower or subject. The other reduces it t o t h e knower's ex-

perience of t h e known or object. Both ignore t h e praxls of inquiry and t h e f a c t

t h a t knowledge always involves what S a r t r e c a l l e d mediations and t o t a l i z a t i o n s .

The matter of mediations and t o t a l i z a t i o n s leads us t o a discussion of t h e second

dichotomy of scientism.

2 - Theory and Practice

Because they r e i f y l i n g u i s t i c forms, t h a t i s , do not s l t u a t e language

i n praxis, formal approaches t o logic t r e a t theory a s a realm unto i t s e l f .

Dewey not only r e j e c t e d t h i s separation of theory from p r a c t i c e , he provided

an h i s t o r i c a l explanation of how t h i s s c i e n t i s t i c dichotomy developed. Por

example, discussing t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l s t a t u s between Greek c i t i z e n s , on t h e

one hand, and Greek a r t i s a n s and t r a d e r s , on t h e other hand, he s t a t e d t h a t

he d e f i n i t e l y socio-practical d i v i s i o n between workers and non-citizens who

were s e r v i l e , and t h e members of t h e l e i s u r e c l a s s who were f r e e c i t i z e n s , was

converted by philosophical formulation i n t o a d i v i s i o n between p r a c t i c e and

theory, experience and reason. 1138

This statement shows how Dewey's pragmatic approach t o logic and Marx

and Engelsf handling of t h e problem of ideology c o n v e r a . Marx and Engels be-

lieved t h a t ideology, a s f a l s e and e l i t i s t ideas, was rooted i n t,he d i v i s i o n

between physical and mental labour and t h e consequent treatment of language and

consciousness a s being abstracted from practice, Dewey explained t h e f a l l a c i e s

of formal logic i n a s i m i l a r way, though he did not deal e x p l i c i t l y with t h e

problem of ideology. His own a n a l y s i s of t h e d i v i s i o n of labour i n e a r l y

western c u l t u r e , where "...t h e s o c i a l s t a t u s of t h e persons engaged i n carry-

ing on t h e a c t i v i t i e s i n question was so enormously d i f f e r e n t ...'39 t h a t some

techniques were considered "lower1' and some "higheru, l e d him t o a s i m i l a r un-

derstanding of t h e dualism between theory and p r a c t i c e , He argued t h a t t h e

d i f f e r e n t s t a t u s associated with d i f f e r e n t techniques "... when ... r e f l e c t i v e l y

formulated, became t h e dualism of t h e empirical and r a t i o n a l , of theory and prac-

t l c e , and, i n our own day, of common sense and science, 1140

 Problems of logic and t h e problem of ideology converge once a h i s t o r i c a l

analysis of t h e uses of language and knowledge is undertaken. But a p a r t i c u l a r

approach t o logic and knowledge i s i t s e l f required f o r such a study t o be pos-

sible. The s h i f t from a formal, idealized o r i e n t a t i o n t o logic t o an o r i e n t a t i o n ;

which f a c i l i t a t e s h i s t o r i c a l inquiry i n t o t h e uses of language, can be considered

a change i n paradigms. It only appears t a u t o l o g i c a l t o say t h a t a new perspective

i s required t o understand t h e shortcomings of an older one. The pragmatic value

o f t h e new perspective and implied c r i t i c i s m of t h e older one i s t h e v i t a l matter.

Dewey proposed such a change i n perspective, t h a t i s , a s h i f t away from

approaches t o logic and r e l a t e d subject matter t h a t i s rooted i n t h e s c i e n t i s t i c

dichotomy between theory and practice, science and common sense. He emphasized

t h e need t o always s i t u a t e our inquiry within p a r t i c u l a r s e t t i n g s . As he

wrote:

"..,we never experience nor form judgments about objects and events i n
i s o l a t i o n , but only i n connection with a contextual whole. The l a t t e r ;
i s what i s c a l l e d a t s i t u a t i o n f . " 4 1

This approach, s i m i l a r t o t h a t of S a r t r e with h i s emphasis on mediations and

t o t a l i z a t i o n s , avoids t h e p i t - f a l l s of both f a c t u a l i t y and rationalism.

"It i s more or l e s s a commonplace t h a t it i s possible t o c a r r y on obser-

vations t h a t amass f a c t s t i r e l e s s l y and yet t h e observed ' f a c t s f lead
nowhere. On t h e other hand, it i s possible t o have t h e work of observa-
t i o n so controlled by a conceptual framework fixed i n advance t h a t the
very things which a r e genuinely decisive i n t h e problem i n hand and i t s
solution, a r e completely overlooked. Everythlng i s forced i n t o t h e pre-
determined conceptual and t h e o r e t i c a l scheme. The way, and t h e only way,
t o escape t h e s e two e v i l s , i s s e n s i t i v i t y t o t h e q u a l i t y of a s i t u a t i o n
a s a whole. "42
 When t h e " s i t u a t i o n " i s ignored, science becomes scientism and t h e a f -

f e c t s of common sense on inquiry a r e ignored. This leads t o t h e myths about

laws, causes and determinism which we exposed, with t h e a i d of Toulmin, i n

Chapter Sixteen. The pseudo-problems of t r a d i t i o n a l epistemology r e s u l t from

t h i s ignorance. h he separation and opposition of s c i e n t i f l c subject matter

t o t h a t of common sense, when it i s taken t o be f i n a l , generates those contro-

v e r s i a l problems of epistemology and metaphysics t h a t s t i l l dog t h e course of

philosophy.1143 The p r a c t i c e of science and debates over t h e character of s c i -

ence become t r e a t e d i n a metaphysical manner because knowledge is not s i t u a t e d ,

t h a t i s , t r e a t e d a s a form of praxis. Yet t h e e f f e c t s of t h e " s i t u a t i o n " on

t h e t o t a l process of inquiry a r e pervasive.

"... t h e u n s e t t l e d , indecisive character of t h e s i t u a t i o n with which in-

quiry i s compelled t o deal a f f e c t s a l l of t h e subject matters t h a t e n t e r
i n t o a l l inquiry. It a f f e c t s , on t h e one hand, t h e observed e x i s t i n g
f a c t s t h a t a r e taken t o l o c a t e and delimit t h e problem; on t h e other
hand, it a f f e c t s a l l of t h e suggestions, surmises, ideas t h a t a r e en-
t e r t a i n e d a s p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n s of t h e problem. "44

What we c a l l "common sense" a f f e c t s a l l s i t u a t i o n s of inquiry. What I

I
s a i d about language having a general, h e u r i s t i c function i n a l l science, a func-

t i o n t h a t i n v a l i d a t e s Weberls manufactured d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e normative

and t h e empirical, can a l s o be s a i d of what Dewey c a l l e d t h e " s i t u a t i o n " .

"It i s a commonplace t h a t every c u l t u r a l group possesses a s e t of mean-

ings which a r e so deeply embedded i n i t s customs, occupations, t r a d i -
t i o n s , and ways of i n t e r p r e t i n g i t s physical env'lronment and group-
l i f e , t h a t they form t h e basic categories of t h e language-system by
which d e t a i l s a r e interpreted. Hence they a r e r e g u l a t i v e and 'norma-
t i v e ' of s p e c i f i c b e l i e f s and judgments."%

Sometimes common sense r e f e r s t o t h e meanings accepted by a c u l t u r a l group.

The s c i e n t i s t , i n h i s o r her inquiry, i s always affected by these meanings.

Sometimes it r e f e r s t o t h e significance of things - where it has an a c t i v e

connotation of the s o r t S a r t r e associated with praxis. "1n any case, the

difference between t h e two meanings may be reduced, without doing violence

t o t h e f a c t s , t o t h e difference between phases and aspects of special prac-

t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s t h a t a r e looked into, questioned and examined with reference

t o what may o r should be done a t a p a r t i c u l a r time and place and t h e r u l e s and

precepts t h a t a r e taken f o r granted i n reaching a l l conclusions and i n a l l so-

c i a l l y correct behavior. u 46

Deweyls emphasis on s i t u a t i n g our inquiry brings i n t o question t h e

s c i e n t i s t i c dichotomy between theory and practice, science and common sense.

" ~ o i n gand knowing a r e both involved i n common sense and science - involved so
i n t r i c a t e l y a s t o be necessary conditions of t h e i r existence .. . the difference
between common sense and science (does n o t ) consist i n the f a c t t h a t knowing i s

t h e important consideration i n science but not i n common sense. "47 The prag-

matic approach t o logic t r e a t s both common sense and science a s "transactions".

Whether a human i s engaged i n inquiry, a s a s c i e n t i s t , o r i s dealing with the

p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s of l i f e , he o r she i s i n a constant transaction

e". -
with t h e -
world of things and other The person i s not i n t e r a c t i n g i n the sense
- - - " - -- - - - ----
t h a t "interaction" implies a s p l i t between subject and object.
--"--.-".-..-. ----.-..."__.l__.___,,_,_"l~___,._,___.,
, __ . .. - - .- . .....

This t r a n s a c t i o n a l approach negates two dominant ways of viewing common

sense and science. "One of these ways t r e a t s them a s names f o r mental f a c u l t i e s

o r processes, while t h e other regards them a s l r e a l i s t i c l i n the epistemological

 - 468 -
1

sense i n which t h a t word i s employed t o designate s u b j e c t s a l l e g e d t o be Icnow-

a b l e e n t i r e l y a 3 a r t from human participation. "49 I n r e j e c t i n g formal l o g i c ,

Dewey was a l s o r e j e c t i n g these ways of looking a t common sense and science.

For him both a r e i n a d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p throughout inquiry. For Dewey

"... common sense1 is a usable and u s e f u l name f o r a body of f a c t s t h a t a r e

so basic t h a t without systematic a t t e n t i o n t o them 'science1 cannot e x i s t ,

while philosophy i s i d l y speculative a p a r t *om them because it i s then de-

prived of footing t o stand on and a f i e l d of s i g n i f i c a n t a p p l i ~ a t i o n . " ~ ~

Theory and p r a c t i c e both involve praxis or purposive behaviour. One

has t o be thoroughly schizophrenic t o envision theory without a human transac-

tion. This i s why Dewey r e j e c t e d s c i e n t i s t i c approaches t o logic. For him t h e

difference between science and common sense "...r e s i d e s i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e

subject matters, not i n t h e i r basic l o g i c a l forms and r e l a t i o n s . " He continued

that "...t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n subject matters i s due t o t h e difference i n t h e

problems r e s p e c t i v e l y involved; and, f i n a l l y , t h a t t h i s difference s e t s up a

d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e ends o r objective consequences they a r e concerned t o achieve."51

This is not t o say t h a t science, a s a p a r t i c u l a r form of praxis, with p a r t i c u l a r

values, cannot become a b s t r a c t e d from common sense. "The f a c t t h a t w!?at science 1

i s f i s about what common sense subject matter i s of, i s disguised from ready I
i

recognition when science becomes so highly developed t h a t t h e immediate subject

i
of inquiry c o n s i s t s of what has previously been found out. "52 To understand I
such an a b s t r a c t i o n of science from common sense, however, i s a sociological

and h i s t o r i c a l matter, not something gleaned from a b s t r a c t epistemology or

formal logic.
What I have c a l l e d t h e s o c i a l arrangement of science underlies t h i s question.

The problem of ideology i s t h e problem of logic because unless t h e

s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t has a perspective on how t h e s o c i a l arrangement of science

a f f e c t s t h e c h a r a c t e r , ends and consequences of science, these l a t t e r things

become mystified i n t o matters of a b s t r a c t epistemology and formal logic.

Logic then becomes abstracted and i s unable t o f u l f i l l i t s t a s k of assessing

arguments. Logic must be rooted i n subject matters and not t r e a t e d a s an ab-

s t r a c t d i s c i p l i n e i f it i s t o have any s i g n i f i c a n t application.

Dewey argued t h i s same point.

" I n t h e most important matters t h e e f f e c t of science upon t h e content

and procedures of common sense has been d i s i n t e g r a t i v e . This d i s i n t e -
-"-- .i -s - a s o c i a l , not l o g i c a l , f a c t . But it i s t h e chief
g r a t i v e influence
G a s o n why it seems so easy, so ! n a t u r a l t , t o make a sharp d i v i s i o n
between common sense inquiry and i t s logic and s c i e n t i f i c inquiry and
i t s logic. " 53

The study of t h e sociology of knowledge, i f not used i n a r e d u c t i o n i s t i c way,

i s necessary i f we a r e t o develop approaches t o logic t h a t account f o r ideology.

Because Weber and Popper were unaware of t h e relevance of t h e sociology of know-

ledge f o r matters of logic they remained ignorant of t h e problem of ideology a s

an i n t e l l e c t u a l problem. A study of how and why t h e s o c i a l arrangement of s c i -

ence has " d i s i n t e g r a t i v e " e f f e c t s on common sense a t present would be q u i t e

necessary t o r e a l i z e t h e s h i f t from a formal t o a pragmatic perspective on logic.

I n addition, it would a i d i n t h e development of. subject matter t h a t complemented

a pragmatic o r i e n t a t i o n t o knowledge.

Dewey was not i n t e r e s t e d i n a b s t r a c t d e f i n i t i o n s . He was i n t e r e s t e d

i n t h e ~ ~ e c i f i c a t i o nof5 ~r e l a t i o n s i n a s i t u a t i o n within which humans a r e i n

t r a n s a c t i o n with others and t h e world. Inquiry, f o r him, was not t h e o r e t i c a l

p e r se. It always had "... t h e goal of establishment of an objectively u n i f i e d

e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n . " 55 Here t h e term "objective" was not given an ontologi-

c a l meaning, but r a t h e r r e f e r s t o t h e impartial56 judgment of whether or not

consequences of c e r t a i n operations f u l f i l l t h e end-in-view, i.e., constitute

a s o l u t i o n t o a problem. Objectivity has t o do with t h e ---

commitment t o s i t u a t e

inquiry and a s s e s s argument i n terms of t h e i r e x p l i c i t and i m p l i c i t backing,

not with being of an academic profession or believing i n a metaphysical notion

of reason or f a c t s . An objective inquiry sees "... inquiry a s advancing from

t h e indeterminate s i t u a t i o n s i n f u l l a c t i v i t y throughout, and requires t h e

'objects1 determined by inquiry t o be held within i t s system, f u t u r e a s well

a s past. "57 To c l a r i f y what a pragmatic approach t o o b j e c t i v i t y e n t a i l s , it

i s necessary t o discuss t h e s c i e n t i s t i c dichotomy between f a c t and value.

3 - Fact and Value

Dewey's emphasis on s i t u a t i n g inquiry helps t o demystify t h e s c i e n t i s t i c

dichotomy between common sense and science. To complete our c r i t i q u e of formal

logic, t h e s c i e n t i s t i c dichotomy between f a c t and value, empirical and norma-

t i v e must a l s o be evaluated. For example, when we focus on t h e " s i t u a t i o n " ,

t h a t i s , s i t u a t e our language and knowledge i n ongoing praxis, we no longer

can separate ideas about values from those about f a c t s . Only i f we t r e a t lan-

guage a s a t h i r d realm of f a c t can we a r b i t r a r i l y separate ideas about values

from those about f a c t s and a t t r i b u t e an independent, ontological s t a t u s t o each.

Since language and ideas do not c o n s t i t u t e a t h i r d realm of f a c t , t h i s d i v i s i o n

i s not tenable.

Dewey consistently c r i t i c i z e d the belief i n f a c t u a l i t y t h a t complements

t h e s c i e n t i s t i c dichotomy between value and fact. He rejected the common as-

sumption t h a t he f a c t s a r e out there and only need t o be observed, assembled

and arranged t o give r i s e t o s u i t a b l e and grounded generalizations. "58 Igno-

rance o f t h e problem o f ideology and o f the relevance of language f o r problems

i n logic underlies t h e s c i e n t i s t i c mystification of f a c t s . It therefore breeds

a n ignorance about t h e character of s c i e n t i f i c u n d e ~ s t a n d i n g . ~Treating

~ facts

in abstraction from t h e i r context makes it imposSible t o r e a l i z e t h a t "under-

standing" r e f e r s t o t h e significance or s i t u a t i o n a l relationships. Dewey point-

ed out t h a t "1n science, since meanings a r e determined on the ground of t h e i r

r e l a t i o n s a s meanings t o one another, r e l a t i o n s become the objects of inquiry

... '160 Being ignorant of t h i s , t h e ideologists of scientism, Durkheim being a

main example, t r e a t "facts" as "things" o r "essences". Dewey c l a r i f i e d t h i s

matter a s follows:

"Understanding o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s a matter of the ordering of those

materials t h a t a r e ascertained t o be f a c t s ; t h a t i s , determination
o f t h e i r relations. I n any given subject matter t h e r e e x i s t many re-
l a t i o n s of many kinds. That p a r t i c u l a r s e t of r e l a t i o n s which i s r e l -
evant t o t h e problem i n hand has t o be determined. Relevant t h e o r e t i -
c a l conceptions come i n t o play only a s the problem i n hand i s c l e a r
and d e f i n i t e ; t h a t is, theory alone cannot decide what s e t o f r e l a -
t i o n s i s t o be i n s t i t u t e d , or how a given body of f a c t s i s t o be
understood.

The dichotomy between f a c t s and values i s what i s used t o r a t i o n a l i z e

the a b s t r a c t empiricism of scientism. Observations can be accumulated, but no

understanding i s possible u n t i l they obtain some significance. And t h i s sig-

nificance i s i t s e l f rooted i n values - not seeing values i n an a b s t r a c t , onto-

 l o g i c a l o r metaphysical way - but a s goals i n terms of which we evaluate con-

sequences. Dewey s t a t e d t h i s same point.

"1t follows t h a t i n s o c i a l inquiry ' f a c t s ' may be c a r e f u l l y ascertained

and assembled without being understood. They a r e capable of being or-
dered or r e l a t e d in t h e way t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s understanding of them
only when t h e i r bearing i s seen, and 'bearing' i s a matter of connec-
t i o n with consequences. "62

Dewey argued t h a t f a c t u a l i t y presented a more serious problem f o r t h e

s o c i a l sciences than f o r t h e n a t u r a l sciences.

"The r e s u l t of taking f a c t s a s f i n i s h e d and over with i s more serious

i n inquiry i n t o s o c i a l phenomena than it i s with respect t o physical
objects. For t h e former a r e inherently h i s t o r i c a l . lt63

The context or s i t u a t i o n within which an object o r event t h a t i s being observed

gains i t s meaning i s always h i s t o r i c a l l y contingent. When s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s

change, t h e s i t u a t i o n s within which people a c t a l s o change. Behaviour and ex-

perience changes and t h e r e f o r e " f a c t s " or s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s within

s i t u a t i o n s a l s o change. Dewey, l i k e Marcuse, opposed a l l a n a l y s i s which r e i f i e d

f a c t s i n t o a n a h i s t o r i c a l , ontological realm.

Dewey r e j e c t e d t h e dichotomy between f a c t s and values because he r e -

jected t h e formal approach t o logic which complemented and r a t i o n a l i z e d it.

Facts and values can be separated only i f l i n g u i s t i c forms a r e r e i f i e d and

. f a c t s a r e mystified. Only then can we t r e a t f a c t s a s being d i s t i n c t from ideas.

This m y s t i f i c a t i o n of f a c t s , a s we showed throughout our study, i s rooted I n a

f a l s e understanding of t h e philosophy of physical science. As Dewey s t a t e d :

"... I f t h e r e i s one lesson more than any other taught by t h e methods of t h e

physical sciences it i s t h e s t r i c t c o r r e l a t i v i t y of f a c t s and ideas. "64 Ideas

i n a l l t h e sciences, whether s o c i a l , n a t u r a l or physical, have a function and

no f a c t s can be developed without r e c o w s e t o them. "A g e n e r a l i z a t i o n i n tha

form of a hypothesis i s a p r e r e q x i s i t e condition of s e l e c t i o n and ordering of

materials a s f a c t s . 1165

For Dewey, "ideas a r e a n t i c i p a t e d consequences".66 Since both values /

and f a c t s play a r o l e i n a n t i c i p a t i n g t h e consequences of inquiry, they cannot

be a r b i t r a r i l y s p l i t . Values a f f e c t t h e end-in-view of inquiry. They have a

function i n t h e ongoing praxis of inquiry. The r e l a t i o n s which a r e determined

t o be s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h e context of a c e r t a i n problematic s i t u a t i o n , i. e.,

" f a c t s " , a l s o function t o d i r e c t inquiry. The d i s t i n c t i o n between "facts1' and

"values" can t h e r e f o r e only be made i n a pragmatic way, i f a t a l l , and never i n

t h e t o t a l way t h a t t h e value-free dogmas impose on science.

Because of t h e pervasiveness of t h e ideology and logic of scientism i n

academia and i n t h e c u l t u r e a t l a r g e , f o r example, t h e f a c t t h a t t h e dichotomies

of scientism a r e embedded i n and reinforced by our very language and praxis, it

i s d i f f i c u l t t o conceptualize a n a l t e r n l t i v e perspective on t h e question of

values and f a c t s . Though c r i t i c a l of formal r e i f i e d l o g i c , Dewey himself un-

knowingly teaded t o t h i n k of ideas i n terms of t h e s c i e n t i s t i c dichotomies.

For example, i n 1938 he wrote:

"observed f a c t s i n t h e i r o f f i c e of l o c a t i r x and describing t h e problem a r e

existential; i d e a t i o n a l subject mat%er i s non-existential. How, then, do
they cooperate with each other i n t h e r e s o l u t i o n of a n e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n ?
The pro5lsn i s insoluble save a s it i s recognized t h a t both observed f a c t s
and entertained idcas a r e operational. Ideas a r e o p e r a t i m a 1 i n t h a t they
i n s t i g a t e and d i r e c t f u r t h e r operations of observation; they a r e proposals
and plans f o r a c t l n g upon e x i s t i n g conditions t o bring new f a c t s t o l i g h t
and t o organize a l l t h e selected f a c t s i n t o a coherent wh0le."~7

Though Dewey s t r e s s e d t h e functional character of both ideas and f a c t s , he s p l i t

t h e two i n terms of t h e i r e x i s t e n t i a l or non-existential character. This

treatment of "ideas" a s being non-existential can e a s i l y lead t o t h e t r e a t -

ment of ideas and language a s a t h i r d realm of f a c t , and, ultimately, t o t h e

ontological s e p a r a t i o n of value from f a c t .

But l a t e r , i n 1948, Dewey saw h i s error.

"One of t h e authors of t h i s volume (J. D. ) wishes t o make spec i f i c cor-

r e c t i o n of c e r t a i n statements i n h i s Logic, t h e Theory of Inauiry about
observations. A s f a r a s those statements l i m i t t h e word t o cases of what
a r e c a l l e d 'sense-perception' - or, i n l e s s dubious language, t o cases
of observation under conditions approaching those of laboratory c o n t r o l
- they should be a l t e r e d . For t h e d i s t i n c t i o n made i n t h a t t e x t between
'observationt and ' i d e a t i o n ' he would now s u b s t i t u t e a d i s t i n c t i o n be-
tween two phases of observation, depending on comparative temporal-
s p a t i a l range o r scope of subject matter."68

This d i a l e c t i c a l understanding of observation and of t h e r o l e of values and

f a c t s within ongoing inquiry is e s s e n t i a l i f we a r e t o avoid both a b s t r a c t

empiricism and grand theory. And such a n approach shows t h a t utopia, seen a s

f o r a c t i n g upon e x i s t i n g conditions t o bring new f a c t s " , f o r example,

new s o c i a l and human r e l a t i o n s h i p s " t o l i g h t u , i s not a t a l l contrary t o scien-

t i f i c inquiry. Dewey, l i k e Marcuse i n t h i s regard, recognized t h a t since i n -

quiry i s human i n essence it can be used f o r e i t h e r a l i e n a t i n g or l i b e r a t i n g

purposes.

I f we t h i n k of ideas a s e x t e r n a l things, we w i l l never be a b l e t o de-

velop approaches t o l o g i c which account f o r t h e problem of ideology. Dewey

did s t r e s s t h e point t h a t "ideas" a r e "escapes" from ongoing behaviour; and

human consciousness, e s p e c i a l l y when r e f l e c t i v e and/or expanding, 69 c e r t a i n l y

tends t o go beyond t h e immediate s i t u a t i o n of t h e person. It does not follow

from t h i s , however, t h a t ideas a r e external thlngs. To t r e a t them a s such i s

t h e ultimate of projections. Rather than projecting "ideas" and language i n t o

a t h i r d realm of f a c t s , Dewey emphasized t h e functional character of an idea

when one i s involved i n inquiry.

"1n short, unless it i s c l e a r l y recognized t h a t i n evers case of ob-

s t r u c t e d ongoing behavior 'ideas' a r e temporary deviations and escapes,
what I have c a l l e d t h e i r functional and operational standing w i l l not
be understood. Every- is an escape, but escapes a r e saved from be-
ing evasionq so f a r a s they a r e put t o use i n evoking and d i r e c t i n g
observations of f u r t h e r f a c t u a l material.1r70

Dewey believed t h a t t h e ontological controversy between rationalism

and empiricism was s e l f - r e i n f o r c i n g because of i t s f a l s e understanding of ideas.

A f a i l u r e t o recognize t h e f'unctional character of ideas when one i s engaged i n

inquiry leads t o a d i s t o r t e d view of both f a c t s and concepts. Both s i d e s of

t h e controversy between f a c t u a l i t y and theory t r e a t logic i n a formal way.

Dewey wrote of "... t h e l o g i c a l mistake of those methods t h a t t r e a t conceptual

subject matter as i f it consisted of f i r s t and ultimate s e l f - v a l i d a t i n g t r u t h s ,

p r i m i p l e s , norms ". He continued: "AS so often happens with contrary one-

sided views, t h e d e f e c t s of t h e f a c t u a l , so c a l l e d ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' sshool and

of t h e conceptual school, provide arguments by which each e ~ o k e sand s l ~ p p o r t s

t h e view of t h e other. "71

If we separate Pact and value, i n theory, and do not see both a s as-

pects involved i n t h e praxis of inquiry, then both become t r e a t e d a s though

they a r e e x t e r n a l t o humans. The view t h a t f a c t s a r e "out t h e r e t o be dis-

covered" and t h e view t h a t values a r e " s e l f - v a l i d a t i n g t r u t h s " a r e complementary.

The function and e f f e c t s of both f a c t s and v a l ~ l e sa r e l e f t unscrutinized within

t h i s frame of reference. For example, from t h e stance of t h e s c i e n t i s t l c ide-

olz~gy, values a r e t r e a t e d a s independent of inquiry. As Dewey pointed out "...

It... t h e f o r m l i s t i c p o s i t i o n i s very l i k e l y t o provoke a r e a c t i o n t h a t con-

t r i b u t e s t o strengthening t h e theory of fixed a p r i o r i schemes of value, known

by d i r e c t r a t i o n a l i n t u i t i o n . "72 Such a mystification makes it impossible t o

s i t u a t e values a s ideas about goals - what we value, what we would l i k e t o

see more of i n t h e ongoing praxis t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s inquiry. Furthermore, when

values a r e t r e a t e d a b s t r a c t l y , f o r example, a s r a t i o n a l i n t u i t i o n , t h e range of

ends, r e l a t i v e t o t h e a c t u a l and p o t e n t i a l means a v a i l a b l e , which a r e accepted

in both common sense and science, w i l l remain unnecessarily narrow. For example,

i f we t r e a t "values" a s a b s t r a c t i o n s , engage i n so-called value-free research,

and, upon completion, r e t u r n t o value-questions, t h e ideas we have about values

w i l l have remained unquestioned and w i l l tend t o remain t r a d i t i o n a l . The goals

stemning from these ideas about values w i l l be r e s t r i c t e d t o those already ac-

cepted by t h e established, dominant society. The range of ends i n terms of which

soc l a 1 inquiry could be undertaken w i l l consequently remain narrow and unimagina-

tive.

Dewey believed t h a t t h i s approach t o values was p r e - s c i e n t i f i c . He

compared t h e implied s o c i a l determinism of a scientism which r e i f i e s values and

goals t o those of t h e established order t o t h e prenatural s c i e n t i f i c a t t i t u d e to-

wards "nature". For Dewey,

It... physical science has, i n p r a c t i c a l fact;, l i b e r a t e d and v a s t l y exbend-

ed t h e range of ends open t o common sense and has enormously increased
t h e range and power of t h e means a v a i l a b l e f o r a t t a i n i n g them. I n ancient
thought, ends were fixed by nature; departure from those ends t h a t were
antecedently s e t and fixed by t h e very nature of things, was impossible;
t h e attempt t o i n s t i t u t e ends of human devising was taken t o be t h e sure
road t o confusion and chaos. I n t h e moral f i e l d , t h i s conception s t i l l
e x i s t s and i s even probably dominant. "73
The s c i e n t i s t i c myth about determinism, which we c r i t i c i z e d i n Chapter Sixteen,

i n e f f e c t , helps r a t i o n a l i z e t h e values of t h e established society.

Dewey believed t h a t It... t h e past h i s t o r y of s o c i a l thought has been

dominated by t h e conceptual approach. "Y4 Whether it was a b e l i e f i n "ontologi-

c a l and cosmological fixed ends", which i s what Dewey believed was widespread

i n h i s time, "... t h e conceptions were not framed with reference t o t h e needs

and tension e x i s t i n g a t a p a r t i c u l a r time and place or a s methods of resolving

i l l s then and t h e r e e x i s t i n g , but a s universal p r i n c i p l e s applicable anywhere

and everywhere. t175 This so-called conceptual approach, which t r e a t s values a s

formalisms without any e x i s t e n t i a l significance, complements t h e value-free

dogma. Scientism i s not only founded on a r h e t o r i c a l dichotomy between science

and ideology, it i s a l s o founded on one between "science" and "morality". This

i s t h e main reason why t h e l i b e r a l values of t h e end-of-ideologists a r e abstract-

ed from s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s . Because of a b e l i e f i n t h e dichotomy between science

and common sense, scientism does not account f o r t h e a f f e c t of established

values on t h e ends of inquiry. Yet, "Common sense ideas, b e l i e f s and judgments

i n every c u l t u r e a r e controlled by t e l e o l o g i c a l conceptions, by ends; i n nodern

language, by considerations of value. 1176

Dewey's pragmatic approach t o logic emphasized t h e means and ends of

inquiry r a t h e r than t r e a t i n g science a s a f a c t u a l , value-free endeavour. Both

values, o r goals t h a t a f f e c t inquiry, and f a c t s , or s i g n i f i c a n t s i t u a t i o n a l

r e l a t i o n s h i p s , were seen i n t h e context of ongoing inquiry. From t h i s stance,

some methods or means a r e b e t t e r than others f o r achieving a p a r t i c u l a r end.

"1t does not follow i n any of these cases t h a t t h e ' b e t t e r ' methods
a r e i d e a l l y p c r f e c t , or t h a t they a r e r e g u l a t i v e or 'normative'
 because of conformity t o some absolute form. They a r e t h e methods which
experience up t o t h e present shows t o be the best methods a v a i l a b l e f o r
achieving c e r t a i n r e s u l t s , while a b s t r a c t i o n of these methods does sup-
p l y a ( r e l a t i v e ) norm or standard f o r f u r t h e r undertakings. rr77

Dewey emphasized t h e same point i n another way when he wrote t h a t "Realistic

s o c i a l thinking i s precisely t h e mode of observation which discriminates ad-

v e r s e and favorable conditions i n an e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n , 'adverse' and 'fa-

vorable' being understood i n connection with t h e end proposed. "78

Both values and f a c t s a r e relevant t o t h e means and ends of s o c i a l

s c i e n % i f i c inquiry. Though Dewey did not analyze and c r i t i c i z e t h e ideology

of sc8entism d i r e c t l y , h i s pragmatic o r i e n t a t i o n led him t o r e j e c t any tend-

ency t o exclude t h e matter of ends from ongoing inquiry. The preconception

t h a t evaluations should be excluded from inquiry excludes "... ends (conse-

quences) from t h e f i e l d of inquiry and reduces inquiry a t i t s very best t o

t h e C ~ u n c a t e dand d i s t o r t e d business of finding out means f o r r e a l i z i n g ob-

j e c t i v e s already s e t t l e d upon. "79 He continued: " ~ r o mt h e l o g i c a l stand-

point, it r e s t s upon t h e postulate t h a t some end i s already so fixedly given

t h a t P t i s outside t h e scope of inquiry, so t h a t t h e only problem f o r inquiry

i s to a s c e r t a i n and manipulate t h e materials by which t h e end may be a t t a i n - i

ed. Whether we take Weber and h i s sophisticated separation of t h e n o m t i v e

and empirical, a s all example, or Durkheimls crude reduction of t h e normative t o

t h e average, a s determined by t h e nomothetic, we see t h i s exclusion of ends from

inquiry. Because they r e i f i e d l i n g u i s t i c forms and f a i l e d t o s i t u a t e inquiry i n

praxis, t h e i d e o l o g i s t s of scientism prove t o be a n t i - s c i e n t i f i c a t b e s t ; schiz-

ophrenic a t worst.
 To be a b l e t o a l t e r our categories of thought and see l o g i c a l dis-

t i n c t i o n s i n a pragmatic, non-ontological way, it i s necessary t o transform

our understanding of t h e r o l e of r u l e s , propositions, e t c . i n inquiry. Once

we do t h i s , we can engage i n s o c i a l inquiry without regressing t o t h e scien-

t i s t i c dichotomy between value and f a c t so a s t o r a t i o n a l i z e t h e inadequate

nature of our studies. I n t h i s regard, Dewey emphasized t h a t "a proposition

must be defined by i t s f'unction",81 t h a t is, a s "an instrumental use of lan-

guage'.82 The f a i l u r e t o do t h i s leads t o t h e f a l s e notion of "immediate

knowledge'' which we have argued t h a t both rationalism and empiricism accept.

"AS soon a s it i s forgotten t h a t they a r e means and t h a t t h e i r value i s de-

termined by t h e i r e f f i c a c y as operative means, they appear t o be objects of

immediate knowledge instead of being means of a t t a i n i n g knowledge. "83 The

f a i l u r e t o see propositions a s instrumental uses of language a l s o leads t o a

d e n i a l of existence or immediate experience. As we saw with Popper, when t h e

d i s t i n c t i o n s within knowledge a r e given an ontological s t a t u s , human conscious-

ness of e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n s comes t o be thought of a s being impossible and

mystical.

The r e i f i c a t i o n of method, "rules", propositions, e t c . , and t h e f a l s e

notions of logic t h a t go with t h i s process, complement t h e exclusion of values

from inquiry. Again emphasizing t h e functional or pragmatic character of logi-

c a l propositions, Dewey wrote t h a t h he f a c t t h a t they have f u l f i l l e d t h e de-

mands imposed upon them i n previous i n q u i r i e s i s not l o g i c a l proof t h a t , i n

t h e form i n which they have emerged, they a r e organs and i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s

 84
which w i l l s a t i s f y the demands of a new problematic s i t u a t i o n . " Separating

method o r theory from a "problematic s i t u a t i o n " i s what allows formal logi-

cians and other ideologists of scientism t o t r e a t "facts" and "values" a s

abstractions. Such a r e i f i c a t i o n leads t o "the conversion o f a function i n

inquiry i n t o an independent structure. 1t85 The formal logicians t h a t t r y t o

discern the nature o f these so-called "independent structures" forget t h a t

methods, r u l e s , propositions, etc. only have meaning, value and consequence

within a problematic situation. The r e s u l t of t h i s r e i f i c a t i o n is not theo-

r e t i c a l dialogue and c l a r i f i c a t i o n but "meaningless jumble" or what I e a r l i e r

called "word games". I f we a r e t o develop an ideology and logic t h a t f a c i l i -

t a t e s a relevant and s c i e n t i f i c approach t o s o c i a l inquiry, we can never for-

get t h a t

isco course t h a t i s not controlled by reference t o a s i t u a t i o n i s not

discourse, but a meaningless jumble, just a s a mass of pied type i s
not a font much l e s s than a sentence. A universe of experience i s
t h e precondition o f a universe of discourse. "86

It is because S a r t r e l s notion of praxis and h i s e x i s t e n t i a l project stressed

the need f o r knowledge t o be r e l a t e d t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n of a person

and h i s or her h i s t o r i c a l t o t a l i z a t i o n s and s i g n i f i c a t i o n s t h a t he was so

fundamental t o t h i s study.

Dewey's pragmatic approach t o logic was not opposed t o the use but

only t h e misuse and over-use of r u l e s and propositions i n inquiry. To c l a r i f y

the functional character of method, s o a s t o bring both value and f a c t i n t o

the praxis o f inquiry, he suggested t h a t logicians c l e a r l y distinguish t h e

e x i s t e n t i a l q u a l i t i e s o f a s i t u a t i o n from the functional r o l e of a l l method.

 "FOP p r a c t i c a l purposes no harm r e s u l t s i n i d e n t i f y i n g t h e function wlth
t h e q u a l i t y a s a n existence, j u s t a s no harm r e s u l t s from identifying
a n object a s a spade because t h e operative use and t h e consequence of
t h e use of t h e object a r e integrated with i t s existence. But f a i l u r e
f o r t h e purposes of t h e o r s t o d i s t i n g u i s h existence and function has
been t h e source of continued d o c t r i n a l confusion. "87

I f t h e e x i s t e n t i a l q u a l i t i e s of a s i t u a t i o n and t h e functional r o l e of method

a r e not distinguished, i n theory, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of ignoring t h e r e a l i t y of

t h e e x i s t e n t i a l q u a l i t i e s and/or t h e reduction of them t o methodological cate-

g o r i e s from past inquiry, which have become t r e a t e d a s a p r i o r i e s , i s g r e a t l y

increased. I n e i t h e r case, t h e "function i s transformed i n t o an independent

s t r u c t u r e " and t h e r e i f i c a t i o n of human events i s well underway. The pseudo-

problems of s c i e n t i s t i c epistemologies, not t h e r e a l l o g i c a l problems of on-

going inquiry, t h e n become t h e p r i o r i t y . A f a l s e understanding of theory and

a r e l a t e d ignorance of t h e f a c t t h a t language i s i t s e l f a form of behaviour

underlie t h i s m y s t i f i c a t i o n of knowledge.

I n Chapter Seventeen, we saw a n example of t h i s r e i f i c a t i o n . Failing

t o d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e e x i s t e n t i a l q u a l i t i e s of a problematic s i t u a t i o n

and t h e flunctional r o l e of method, Kaufmann abstracted "meaning" i n t o a formal

problem. It was not h i s concern with r u l e s or propositions t h a t underlay t h i s

e r r o r , but h i s f a i l u r e t o s i t u a t e method i n ongoing inquiry. This r e l a t e d t o

h i s ignorance about t h e r e l a t i o n of language t o logic. For example, Kaufmann

saw "meaning" a s a matter f o r deductive logic. He was concerned with t h e r e -

l a t i o n s h i p s between propositional meanings. This concern r e s t e d on an u n c r i t i -

c a l use of language.

Dewey c l a r i f i e d t h i s problem a s follows:

 "... judgment, l i k e inquiry, i s temporal. It i s temporal not i n the
external sense t h a t t h e a c t of judging takes time, but i n t h e sense
t h a t i t s subject matter undergoes r e c o n s t i t u t i o n i n a t t a i n i n g t h e
f i n a l s t a t e of determinate r e s o l u t i o n and u n i f i c a t i o n which i s t h e
ob j ec t i v e t h a t governs judgment.
It i s necessarily involved i n what has been s a i d t h a t t h e l i n g u i s t i c
form which expresses, or i s t h e symbol of, judgment i s a t r u e verb;
t h a t i s , one expressing a c t i o n and change.
When & appears i n judgment it has temporal f o r c e , d i s t i n c t from was
or w i l l be, and d i s t i n c t from t h e I i s 1 ' o f a proposition where l i s t
designates a non-temporal or s t r i c t l y l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n between mean-
ings. When it i s s t a t e d t h a t ' t h e boy i s running1 t h e reference t o
change, time and place l i e s on t h e surface. When one says ' t h i s i s
r e d 1 t h e temporal reference is l i n g u i s t i c a l l y disguised. But t h e
statement c e r t a i n l y does not mean t h a t is inherently red or is
always red. Color q u a l i t y changes t o some e x t e n t with every change
i n l i g h t . It is r e d now, but only under a s p e c i f i a b l e s e t of condi-
t i o n s , and a completely grounded judgment demands t h a t the conditions
be stated. "88

Kaufmann, t y p i c a l of formal logicians i n t h i s regard, r e i f i e d language and thus

r e i f i e d f a c t , theory, meaning, science, and, i n e f f e c t , human beings. This does

not mean t h a t t h e ideology of scientism r e s t s on a semantic problem. Seman-

t i c i s t s usually accept t h e r e i f i e d uses of language and then attempt t o manipu-

l a t e t h e meanings of words without reference t o t h e i r b a s i s i n and consequence

on human B u t it does point out how indispensable a r a d i c a l "'going

t o t h e r o o t s " ) study and use of l i n g u i s t i c s i s f o r c l a r i f y i n g l o g i c a l problems.

4 - Ideology and Inquiry

This study has shown t h a t t h e widespread and r h e t o r i c a l separation of

"science" from "ideologyfi i s rooted i n an ignorance of t h e problem of ideology,

a f a l s e understanding of t h e philosophy of t h e physical sciences, and upon a

r e i f i e d formal use of language and logic. This r h e t o r i c a l separation of " s c i -

ence" and "ideology" and t h e ignorance t h a t r e s u l t s from it i t s e l f serves a

s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l function. A fragmented and over-specialized "science"

r e f l e c t s a fragmented and over-specialized society. The awareness of t h e

s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l consequences of science i s retarded within such a s o c i a l

arrangement; and, i n t u r n , such ignorance i s i t s e l f functional i n maintaining

t h e fragmented and over-specialized s o c i a l system t h a t complements it. As

science and technology play a more dominant r o l e i n s o c i e t y , and t h e language

and c a t e g o r i e s of scientism spread i n t o common sense uses, formal logic, i n

p a r t i c u l a r , functions t o obscure and mystify t h e character and consequences of

t h e s o c i a l arrangement of scientism. It i s i n t h i s sense t h a t we can consider

formal l o g i c i a n s t h e most sophisticated of t h e i d e o l o g i s t s of scientism. Though

t h e end-of-ideology mood has faded, formal logic continues t o r a t i o n a l i z e scien-

t i s m i n a more a b s t r a c t and perhaps more viable manner.

t
Where l i e s t h e a l t e r n a t i v e ? Our r e j e c t i o n of r e i f ied l i n g u i s t i c s means
.\
t

","- _l^_."_l *" -

t h a t we cannot solve t h e dilemma of s o c i a l science i n theory.
-" I"
The dilemma t h a t

t h e ideology of scientism presents f o r s o c i a l inquiry can be c l a r i f i e d i n theo-

r e t i c a l language, a s t h i s study shows, but t h e s o l u t i o n l i e s i n a new form of

f

praxis out of which new forms and content of inquiry can develop. i\
In Chapter Twenty-one, I s h a l l b r i e f l y o u t l i n e t h e implications of t h i s

study f o r t h e university. Before doing t h i s , it is important t o present a gen-

e r a l p i c t u r e of t h e form, though not necessarily of t h e problems and content, 90

of an approach t o s o c i a l science t h a t does not a ~ b i t r a r i l yd i s a s s o c i a t e inquiry

from ideology. Dewey, l i k e S a r t r e , was thoroughly pragmatic i n h i s v i s i o n of

science and he t h e r e f o r e provides us with such a perspective. For him "Scien-

t i f i c knowing i s t h a t p a r t i c u l a r form of p r a c t i c a l human a c t i v i t y which i s con-

cerned with t h e advancement of knowing a p a r t from concern with o t h e r p r a c t i c a l

a f f a i r s . "91 I n t h i s view, knowing i s not the monopoly of science - an e l i t i s t

a t t i t u d e widespread among academics. A l l human a c t i v i t y involves knowledge.

It i s t h e form of knowing which distinguishes science from other types of how-

ledge. S c i e n t i f i c inquiry is not t o be described, nor a r e l o g i c a l issues t h a t

a r i s e from s c i e n t i f i c inquiry t o be approached, i n an ontological Way. Such

issues a r e t o be "...placed and t r e a t e d i n the context of d i f f e r e n t types of

problems demanding d i f f e r e n t methods of treatment and d i f f e r e n t types of sub-

j e c t matter ..."9*

For Dewey t h e method and outcome of s c i e n t i f i c inquiry

'I.. . becomes warranted assertion. 'Proof 1 , which t h e older l o g i c s en-

deavored t o e s t a b l i s h under v a l i d i t i e s of i t s own f o r t h e c o n t r o l of
knowledge, i s here t o be developed within, and a s a phase of, inquiry;
a l l c e r t a i n l y becomes subject t o inquiry including t h e c e r t a i n t i e s of
t h e s e very canons of logic which older logics have t r e a t e d a s t h e Pow-
e r m l possessors of c e r t a i n t y i n t h e i r own right."93

A "warranted a s s e r t i o n " is an adequate judgment about t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of conse-

quences of p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n a problematic s i t u a t i o n . I n Mead's terms

a warranted a s s e r t i o n comes when we know what i s t h e import of symbols which have

both common meaning and common reference i n t h e ongoing world. To understand how

such a judgment develops a t a stage i n inquiry, it i s necessary t o understand t h e

f u n c t i o n a l r o l e of a b s t r a c t i o n s i n inquiry. Misunderstanding about t h i s aspect

of inquiry underlies t h e major mystifications of scientism. Since ideas a r e

odd
"anticipations" - as both means and ends of inquiry -ifunction a s conceptual

t o o l s i n inquiry, a b s t r a c t i o n s beyond one's immediate experience o r one's

" e x i s t e n t i a l reference", a s Dewey c a l l e d i t , a r e fundamental t o successful

inquiry. As Dewey said: "Abstraction from assured and c e r t a i n e x i s t e n t i a l

reference belongs t o everx suggestion of a possible solution; otherwise i n -

quiry comes t o an end and p o s i t i v e a s s e r t i o n takes i t s place. n94 Positive

a s s e r t i o n and warranted a s s e r t i o n a r e not t h e same thing. A s p e c i a l form of

a b s t r a c t i o n i s required f o r s c i e n t i f i c inquiry. "A f l i g h t away from what

t h e r e and then e x i s t s does not of i t s e l f accomplish anything. "95 Dewey a r -

gued t h a t he p e c u l i a r i t y of s c i e n t i f i c a b s t r a c t i o n l i e s i n t h e degree of

i t s 'freedom from p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n t i a l adhesions. a96

The function of a b s t r a c t i o n i n inquiry must be distinguished from

t h e notion of a b s t r a c t "reason" associated with rationalism and deductive

logic. S c i e n t i f i c a b s t r a c t i o n always has reference t o a problematic s i t u a -

tion. If dishssoclated from t h i s it e a s i l y regresses t o a r e d u c t i o n i s t i c

philosophical idealism or materialism. 97 I n Dewey I s words:

h he g e n e r a l i t y of s c i e n t i f i c subject matter a s such means t h a t

it is f r e e d from r e s t r i c t i o n t o conditions which present themselves
a t p a r t i c u l a r times and places. Their reference is t o 9 s e t of
time and place conditions - a statement which i s not t o be confused
w i t h t h e d o c t r i n e t h a t they have no reference t o a c t u a l e x i s t e n t i a l
occasions. " 9 8

S c i e n t i f i c a b s t r a c t i o n i s based on what Dewey c a l l e d " d i r e c t i n g concep-

t i o n s " or " r u l i n g ideas". He c a r e f u l l y avoided t h e s c i e n t i s t i c jargon about

'"laws", "causes", etc. Ruling ideas help a n t i c i p a t e t h e a l t e r n a t i v e consequences

of doing a l t e r n a t i v e operations, and, a s such, allow a "judgment of evaluation".

Oft t h i s process Dewey wrote:

" ~ n q u i r yi n t o s o c i a l phenomena involves judgments of evaluation, f o r

they can be understood only i n terms of eventuations t o which they
a r e capable of moving. Hence, t h e r e a r e many possible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s
 i n t h e a b s t r a c t a s t h e r e a r e possible kinds of consequences. This
statement does not e n t a i l carrying over i n t o s o c i a l phenomena a
teleology t h a t has been outmoded i n t h e case of physical phenomena.
It does not imply t h a t t h e r e i s some purpose r u l i n g s o c i a l events
or t h a t they a r e moving t o a pre-determined goal. The meaning i s
t h a t any problematic s i t u a t i o n , when it i s analyzed, presents, i n
connection with t h e idea of operations t o be performed, a l t e r n a t i v e
possible ends i n t h e sense of terminating consequences. Even i n
physical inquiry, what t h e inquirer observes and t h e conceptions he
e n t e r t a i n s a r e controlled by a n objective purpose -t h a t of a t t a i n -
ing a resolved s i t u a t i o n . The difference between physical and s o c i a l
inquiry dbes not r e s i d e i n t h e presence or absence of a n end-in-view,
formulated i n terms of possible consequences. It c o n s i s t s i n t h e r e -
spective s u b j e c t matters of t h e purposes, This difference makes a
g r e a t p r a c t i c a l difference i n t h e conduct of inquiry ... ltg9

It i s v i t a l t o understand t h e function of these d i r e c t i n g concepts.

Dewey outlined " t h e t h r e e indispensable l o g i c a l conditions of conceptual subject

matter i n s c i e n t i f i c method":

"... (1)t h e s t a t u s of t h e o r e t i c a l conceptions a s hypothesis which (2)

have a d i r e c t i v e function i n c o n t r o l of observation and ultimate prac-
t i c a l transformation of antecedent phenomena, and which ( 3 ) a r e t e s t e d
and continually revised on t h e ground of t h e consequences they produce
i n e x i s t e n t i a l application. "loo

I f they a r e not understood pragmatically, these " d i r e c t i v e conceptions" become

t r e a t e d as a p r i o r i e s with a s t a t u s outside ongoing inquiry. The long-term use

of concepts makes t h i s a continual problem.

"Directing conceptions tend t o be taken f o r granted a f t e r they have once

come i n t o general currency. I n consequence they e i t h e r remain i m p l i c i t
or unstated, or e l s e a r e propositionally formulated i n a way which is
s t a t i c instead of functional. F a i l u r e t o examine t h e conceptual s t r u c -
t u r e s and frames of reference which a r e unconsciously implicated i n
even t h e seemingly most innocent f a c t u a l i n q u i r i e s i s t h e g r e a t e s t
s i n g l e defect t h a t can be found i n any f i e l d of inquiry. "lol

The s o c i a l sciences a r e more retarded than t h e n a t u r a l sciences i n t h i s

regard. Directing conceptions tend t o a t t a i n a f i x e d , ontological meanlng i n

s o c i a l inquiry. "one of t h e simplest ways of grasping t h e l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e

 - 487 -
I

between s o c i a l inquiry t h a t r e s t s upon fixed conceptual principles and physical

inquiry i s t o note t h a t i n the l a t t e r the theoretical controversies which e x i s t

concern t h e efficacy of different conceptions of procedure, while i n t h e former

they a r e about questions of an alleged i n t r i n s i c t r u t h o r f a l s i t y . "Io2 Both

Kuhn and Toulmin c r i t i c i z e d the s c i e n t i s t i c notion of truth, but they f a i l e d t o

discuss t h e ideological significance of the replacement of t h i s notion with a

pragmatic approach t o t h e question of validity. Dewey did t h i s when he pointed

out t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e f a i l u r e t o understand the function of s c i e n t i -

f i c a b s t r a c t i o n and t h e maintenance of a narrow, established range of ends with-

i n contemporary s o c i a l science. He believed t h a t d i s t i n c t i v e l y moral matters

It.. . w i l l continue t o be matter of customs and of conflict of customs u n t i l in-

quiry has found a method of abstraction which, because of i t s degree of remote-

ness from established customs, w i l l bring them into a l i g h t i n which t h e i r

nature w i l l be i n d e f i n i t e l y more c l e a r l y seen than i s now the case. 11103 This

would not mean t h a t s o c i a l science would become neutral towards p r a c t i c a l mat-

ters. Rather it would have a f l e x i b i l i t y i n the range of abstractions t h a t a r e

u t i l i z e d t o determine the significance of r e l a t i o n s within a problematic s i t u a -

tion. "Failure t o encourage f e r t i l i t y and f l e x i b i l i t y i n formation of hypo-

theses a s frames of reference i s closer t o a death warrant of science than any

other thing. II 104

Dewey made some statements about s c i e n t i f i c abstraction which could be

misinterpreted i n a s c i e n t i s t i c way. For example, he wrote t h a t "The a c t u a l

course of s c i e n t i f i c inquiry has shown t h a t the best i n t e r e s t s of human l i v i n g

i n general, a s well a s those of s c i e n t i f i c inquiry i n particular, a r e best served

 - 488 -
I

by keeping such inquiry 'pure', t h a t i s f r e e from i n t e r e s t s t h a t would bend

t h e conduct of inquiry t o serve concerns a l i e n (and p r a c t i c a l l y sure t o be

h o s t i l e ) t o t h e conduct of knowing a s i t s own end and proper terminus. 11105

One might a s s o c i a t e Dewey and Weber on t h e b a s i s of t h i s statement, but such

would negate Dewey's pragmatic understanding of logic. Dewey did not believe

t h a t inquiry could be f r e e of ideology, but he did not conclude from t h i s , a s

Mannheim tended t o , t h a t a l l knowledge i s r e l a t i v e or i r r e l e v a n t . Nor did he

ignore t h e point t h a t c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s f a c i l i t a t e and others r e t a r d f l e x i b l e

inquiry. Like Bronowski, h i s awareness t h a t a c e r t a i n context i s required f o r

t h e "habit of t r u t h " t o develop made him r e a l i z e t h e importance of distinguishing

between technique and r h e t o r i c , on t h e one hand, and open thorough inquiry, on

t h e other.

The aim of science, then, i s not t h e c r e a t i o n cf a b s t r a c t i o n s , but t h e

a l t e r a t i o n of conditions according t o what Dewey c a l l e d an end-in-view. Though

inference i s necessary a s a s t a g e i n inquiry, inquiry does not end with i n f e r -

ence. Io6 Thls point i s v i t a l i f we a r e t o grasp t h e r a d i c a l d i f f e r e n c e between

t h e ideology of scientism and a pragmatic o r i e n t a t i o n t o s o c i a l science. Ac-

cording t o t h e l a t t e r view, t h e outcome of a s c i e n t i f i c judgment 'I.. . i s not a

1conceptionl nor even a 1pronouncement I , but t h e fill a c t i v i t y ( my errphasis )

t h a t rounds out inquiry. 1 1 1 ~ 7It i s "... when t h e consequences of (experimental'

observation) combine with f a c t s already obtained s o a s t o c o n s t i t u t e a u n i f i e d

t o t a l s i t u a t i o n ( t h a t ) inquiry comes t o a n end. "lo8This conclusion of incpiry

can never be taken i n a n ontological way s i n c e t h e " f a c t s already ascertained"

a r e themselves a r e f l e c t i o n of a model, paradigm and u l t i m a t e l y an ideology

which may be being replaced by another o r i e n t a t i o n a s anomalies develop with-

i n it. Judgment, r e l a t e d t o a thorough understanding of t h e problems, methods

and t h e o r i e s t h a t a r e relevant t o t h e problem a t hand, remains fundamental t o

inquiry.

Dewey's notion of a " t o t a l u n i f i e d s i t u a t i o n " has a c l o s e s i m i l a r i t y

t o S a r t r e l s notion of "praxis", A comparison of t h e two t h e o r i s t s w i l l serve

t o emphasize my point about t h e character and function of s c i e n t i f i c abstrac-

tions. As we saw i n Chapter Eleven, S a r t r e believed t h a t " t h e point i s t o sub-

.
ordinate nothing a p r i o r i " lo9 His c r i t i q u e of vulgar marxism and i t s reduc-

tionism t o a p r i o r i e s l e d him t o t h e same view of ideas, a s being pragmatic,

t h a t Dewey's c r i t i q u e of formal l o g i c l e d him to. For S a r t r e "ideas" were

never t r u e or f a l s e , but were "regulative", t h a t i s , " p r i n c i p l e s ... a s jobs

110
t o be done". Knowledge i s not i n t e r e s t e d i n d e f i n i t i o n L e r s e but i s i t s e l f

a "project" t o h e l p understand human praxis and t h e way h i s t o r i c a l t o t a l i z a t i o n s

and s i g n i f i c a t i o n s function, a s universals, within a p a r t i c u l a r form of praxis.

And knowledge, a s a p r o j e c t , has a p r a c t i c a l import. As S a r t r e said: "To un-

11111
derstand is t o change and t o go beyond oneself.

Dewey used t h e term " e x i s t e n t i a l " i n a d i f f e r e n t way than did S a r t r e ,

but t h i s does not reduce t h e s i m i l a r i t y of h i s idea of inquiry changing a s i t u -

a t i o n and S a r t r e t s s i m i l a r understanding of human praxis. Dewey conceptualized

h i s approach t o logic more i n t h e language of experimentalism. hat s c i e n t i f i c

i n q u i r e r s do, a s d i s t i n c t from what they say, i s t o execute c e r t a i n operations

of experimentation - which a r e operations of doing and making - t h a t modify

 i

antecedently given e x i s t e n t i a l conditions so t h a t t h e transformations a r e

f a c t s which a r e relevant and weighty i n solution of a given problem."l12

I n contrast, S a r t r e conceptualized I n t h e language of existentialism a s a

philosophy opposed t o scientism both i n i t s vulgar marxist and p o s i t i v i s t i c

form. He defined "praxis" a s "a passage from objective t o objective through

internalization". I n place of what Dewey called s c i e n t i f i c abstractions,

o r d i r e c t i n g concepts, S a r t r e ref erred t o t h e " t o t a l i z a t i o n s " of t h e person,

f o r example, a s c i e n t i s t , which attempt t o understand the s i g n i f i c a t i o n s

(values, ends ) t h a t a f f e c t behaviour and experience i n a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l

and h i s t o r i c a l setting. The outcome of praxis, t h e purposeful surpassing

of t h e past, i s not a s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t idea from Dewey's notion of

a "modification of antecedently given e x i s t e n t i a l conditions".

A s i m i l a r notion of freedom underlay both t h e o r i s t s and t h e i r approach

t o knowledge. S a r t r e saw h i s e x i s t e n t i a l project a s an attempt t o a l t e r the

c l a s s of problems with which marxism dealt. Dewey saw a l l inquiry a s an a t -

tempt t o a f f e c t the "movement", i. e., t h e consequences of a s i t u a t i o n by u t i -

l i z i n g human judgment. As he said: "The purpose of t h e operations of obser-

vations which d i f f e r e n t i a t e conditions i n t o obstructive f a c t s and positive

resources i s precisely t o indicate the intervening a c t i v i t i e s which w i l l give

the movement (and hence i t s consequences) a d i f f e r e n t f o r m from what it would

take i f it were l e f t t o i t s e l f ; t h a t i s , movement toward a proposed unified

e x i s t e n t i a l situation. "'14 Both abandoned the s c l e n t i s t i c myth about deter-

minism. Rather than concluding t h a t humans can have no r e a l control, t h a t i s ,

freedom t o change conditions according t o chosen ends, and a r e t h e r e f o r e

trapped in a r e l a t i v i s m of myths, both developed a thoroughly pragmatic

approach t o knowledge. Once we see knowledge a s a goal within inquiry o r

a s a p r o j e c t t o change human praxis, we have t o abandon r e d u c t i o n i s t i c and

deterministic t h e o r i e s of knowledge. Once we r e j e c t t h e ideology and logic

of scientism, i n a l l i t s ramifications and v a r i e t i e s , we can recognize t h a t

judgment and freedom, not relativism, replace t h e metaphysical notions of

laws, causes, f a c t , theory, etc.

Once we abandon t h e s c i e n t i s t i c dichotomies between t h e objective and

subjective, theory and p r a c t i c e , value and f a c t , we can begin t o understand

why s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c inquiry cannot be f r e e of ideology. But n e i t h e r i s in-

quiry n e c e s s a r i l y reducible t o t h e dominant ideological r e l a t i o n s i n t h e so-

ciety. Because t h e s c i e n t i s t i c ideology ignores t h e problem of ideology and

r e i f i e s l o g i c a l problems it i s unable t o understand t h a t inquiry i s a human

project. Because of t h i s , contemporary s o c i a l science tends t o be reduced t o

t h e ideology of t h e e s t a b l i s h e d order. The c r u c i a l r o l e t h a t judgment and

evaluation play i n inquiry i s not acknowledged and s o c i a l science becomes

g l o r i f i e d custom.

The very foundation of inquiry i n what Dewey c a l l e d a n "indeterminate

problematic s i t u a t i o n " i s r e l a t e d t o ideology. The pragmatic approach t o logic

recognizes t h a t " s o c i a l c o n f l i c t s and confusions e x i s t ... before problems f o r

inquiry e x i s t " . For Dewey t h e s o c i a l conditions t h a t a f f e c t scientific so-

c i a 1 inquiry were threefold. They can 'I... (1)grow out of a c t u a l tensions,

needs, ' t r o u b l e s l ; ( 2 ) have t h e i r subjcct matter determined by t h e conditions

t h a t a r e material means of bringing about a unified s i t u a t i o n ; and ( 3 ) ( o r

be) ... r e l a t e d t o some hypothesis, which i s a plan and policy f o r existen-

t i a l resolution of t h e c o n f l i c t i n g s o c i a l situation. ~ l stages
l of in-

quiry a r e then affected by t h e s o c i a l arrangement of science, and a l l prob-

lems, methods and t h e o r i e s a r e therefore ideological.

The s c i e n t i f i c abstractions and end-in-view t h a t a r e means t o bring-

ing about a "unified s i t u a t i o n " a r e a l s o r e l a t e d , though not rooted, i n t h e

ideological r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n society. Dewey quoted a statement by Cornford

t o express t h e same point: co here i s an inalienable and ineradicable frame-

work of conceptions which i s not of our own making, but given t o us ready-

made by s o c i e t y - a whole apparatus of concepts and categories, within which

and by which individual thinking, however daring and o r i g i n a l , i s compelled

t o move. 11117 The normative and regulative categories of language, a s an as-

pect of praxis, i s f u r t h e r evidence of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p between ideology and

inquiry. But inquiry, if it i s t o be s c i e n t i f i c i n t h e pragmatic sense, can-

not be dependent on t h e s e conceptions and categories. It cannot escape them,

but n e i t h e r should it t r e a t them as a p r i o r i e s outside inquiry. Dewey believed

I
that he e v i l s i n current s o c i a l judgments of ends and p o l i c i e s a r i s e ... from 1

Importations of judgments of value outside of inquiry. "'18 The ideology of

scientism, with i t s ontological dichotomies, c r e a t e s such a p r i o r i e s , and thus

metaphysics, a t t h e very foundation of inquiry. With t h e a i d of formal logi-

cians, f a c t s , t h e o r i e s and values get r e i f i e d i n t o mutually exclusive realms.

The evaluation of t h e r o l e of f a c t , theory and value, a s aspects of inquiry,

therefore becomes impossible, and mystified views about s c i e n t i f i c d e s c r i p t i o n ,

explanation, etc. replace consciousness about t h e c e n t r a l i t y of judgment i n

s c i e n t i f i c inquiry.

The s o c i a l arrangement of contemporary science underlies t h e ideology

of sc ientism. The compartmentalization of s o c i a l science i s t h e s o c i a l founda-

t i o n of t h e widespread ignorance of t h e problem of ideology and t h e implications

of t h i s f o r issues i n logic. Once formal logic i s demystified and logic i s ap-

proached i n a pragmatic manner, we can begin t o see how incompatible a r e a frag-

mented, so-called value-free s o c i a l science and a s o c l a l science t h a t nurtures

consciousness of t h e c e n t r a l i t y of judgment. Dewey argued t h a t 'I.. . a survey

from t h e l o g i c a l point of view of t h e h i s t o r i c a l development of t h e s o c i a l

d i s c i p l i n e s d i s c l o s e s t h e causes of s p l i t t i n g up s o c i a l phenomena i n t o a number

of r e l a t i v e l y closed compartments and t h e i n j u r i o u s e f f e c t s of t h e division. 11 119

Dewey, l i k e S a r t r e , was a thorough-going pragmatist. Language, logic -

a s t h e theory of inquiry,and t h e p r a c t i c e of inquiry were a l l s i t u a t e d i n human

praxis. His r a d i c a l departure from formal logic allowed him t o develop a per-

spective on matters of logic t h a t is fundamental t o t h e s c i e n t i f i c revolution

t h a t i s necessary i f we a r e t o humanize s o c i a l inquiry. His attempt t o replace

ontology with logic provides a perspective on science t h a t can account f o r t h e

problem of ideology. His c l a r i t y about matters of logic does not give us a new

a b s t r a c t and f a l s e s e c u r i t y t o replace t h e t r a d i t i o n a l ones rooted i n formal

logic. Instead, we a r e confronted with t h e freedom t o make judgments, i n ac-

cordance with pragmatic p r i n c i p l e s , a s S a r t r e a l s o recognized. It i s i n t h i s

sense t h a t we can consider both S a r t r e and Dewey a s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t logicians.

The implication of t h e i r approach i s t h a t we a r e always f r e e t o make choices

i n our inquiry. Our choices must come from and r e t u r n t o e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a -

t i o n s , but t h a t i s what choice is a l l about.

The P o l i t i c s of Inquiry

Dewey's pragmatic approach t o logic has d i r e c t implications f o r

politics. Science can never transcend p o l i t i c s , but s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c in-

quiry, rooted i n consciousness of t h e r o l e of judgment and choice, can a l t e r

t h e formct h a t p o l i t i c s takes. Dewey r e l a t e d h i s theory of l o g i c t o p o l i t i c s

a s follows:

"Without systematic formulations of r u l i n g ideas, inquiry i s kept i n

t h e realm of opinion and a c t i o n i n t h e realm of c o n f l i c t . For u l t i -
mately t h e only l o g i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e t o open and above board proposi-
t i o n a l formulation of conceptual a l t e r n a t i v e s ( a s many a s p o s s i b l e )
i s formation of c o n t r o l l i n g ideas on t h e ground of e i t h e r custom and
t r a d i t i o n o r some s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t . The r e s u l t i s dichotomization of
a s o c i a l f i e l d i n t o conservatives and progressives, ' r e a c t i o n a r i e s 1
and l r a d i c a l s 1 , etc. "120

I f d i r e c t i n g ideas f o r a c t i o n a r e not formulated on a n "open and above board"

b a s i s , then t h e development of s e c t a r i a n and academic ideas fs i n e v i t a b l e .

Whether we c r i t i c i z e vulgar marxism or l i b e r a l positivism - each with t h e i r

r h e t o r i c a l p o l i t i c a l function i n d i f f e r i n g s o c i e t i e s - both lack awareness of

t h e r o l e of judgment i n science. Sectarian and/or academic r h e t o r i c i s r e -

quired t o cloak over t h e i r mutual ignorance and t h e i n a b i l i t y of e i t h e r orien-

t a t i o n t o deal with t h e question of human judgment and freedom e x p l i c i t l y .

Though Dewey's approach r e j e c t e d t h e logic of scientism, it i s unclear

whether he r e j e c t e d a l l aspects of t h e ideology t h a t complements it. His argu-

ment t h a t inquiry must be able t o consider "as many conceptual a l t e r n a t i v e s

a s possible" was not rooted i n an inquiry about t h e range of ends t h a t d i f -

f e r e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s (e.g., t h e u n i v e r s i t y ) w i l l t o l e r a t e f o r ongoing, prag-

matic inquiry. A theory of pragmatic logic i s u s e l e s s without i n s t i t u t i o n a l

s e t t i n g s within which pragmatic inquiry can occur. His approach, therefore,

needs t o be expanded i f we a r e t o develop a l l t h e implications of our c r i t i -

cism of t h e ideology and logic of scientism. H i s emphasis on "unifying an

e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n " needs t o be combined with t h e d i a l e c t i c a l awareness

of milieux and s t r u c t u r e s t h a t C.W. Mills stressed. Otherwise, inquiry can

i t s e l f become abstracted from t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l - s t r u c t u r a l r e a l i t i e s i n so-

ciety. It ls possible t h a t educational i n s t i t u t i o n s on t h i s continent, with

t h e i r repressive tolerances and surplus r h e t o r i c , could nurture pragmatic

ideas about logic and knowledge, and yet none of t h e r e a l i t i e s necessary f o r

pragmatic inquiry exist. The way Deweyrs pragmatic philosophy of education

was misinterpreted and misused i n t h e American educational system should be

warning enough. 12'

C.W. M i l l s , who was more aware of t h e p o l i t i c a l r h e t o r i c of t h e end-

of-ideologists than of t h e l o g i c a l r h e t o r i c of t h e f o r m a l i s t s , emphasized t h e

s t r a t e g i c aspect of inquiry. "Any adequate 'answer1 t o a problem ... w i l l

contain a view of t h e s t r a t e g i c points of i n t e r v e n t i o n - of t h e ' l e v e r s ' by

which t h e s t r u c t u r e may be maintained or changed; and an assessment of those

who a r e i n a position t o intervene but a r e not doing so. . In the social

sciences, t h e a b s t r a c t determination of t h e significance of r e l a t i o n s within

a s i t u a t i o n i s not enough t o accomplish some end-in-view. The s o c i a l and

p o l i t i c a l controls operating i n a society, and the "ideological struggle" t h a t

r e l a t e s t o any s p e c i f i c inquiry, a r e themselves relevant t o t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of

an end-in-view. A s t r a t e g i c judgment about "those who a r e i n a p o s i t i o n t o in-

tervene" i n t o s i t u a t i o n s i s indispensable i f our o r i e n t a t i o n i s t o be consistent-

l y pragmatic. '

Footnotes

' ~ o l l o Handy: Philosophyls Neglect of t h e Social Sciences. Philosophy of Science.

No. XXV, April, 1958, p. 119.

2 ~ cyr i t i c i s m s of t h e s e " t a c t i c s " f o r avoiding t h e problem of ideology were

s t a t e d i n Chapter Three.

3John Dewey: Logic: The Theory of Inquirg, op. c i t . , p. 67.

6 ~ o h nDewey and Arthur F. Bentley: Knowing and t h e Known, op. c i t . , p. 231.

8 ~ e eRobert S. Lynd: Knowledpe f o r What?, op. c i t . , e s p e c i a l l y The Social

Sciences As Tgols, pp. 114-79. Lynd can be considered t h e precursor t o C.W. Mills
as a c r i t i q u e of American s o c i a l science.

g~nowinnand t h e Known, op. c i t . , p. 205.

~ O L O P ~ C ,op. c i t . , p. 79.
15~nowing and t h e Known, op. c i t . , p. 53.

-- 3

2OIbid. , p. 5. P i e r c e argued t h a t t h e purport of any concept i s i t s con- 1

ceived bearing upon our condu ( Pragmatism, op. c i t . , p. 126. ) This pragmatic
approach and h i s awareness t h a t language i s a n aspect of p r a x i s and does not con-
s t i t u t e a t h i r d realm of f a c t s complemented h i s r e j e c t i o n of both inductive and
deductive approaches t o logic. Similar t o Toulmin i n t h i s regard, he saw t h e Pole
of philosophy and l o g i c a s t h e assessment and development of argument. AS he said:
"1ts reasoning should not form a chain which is no s t r o n g e r t h a n i t s weakest l i n k ,
b u t a c a b l e whose f i b e r s may be ever s o s l e n d e r , provided t h e y a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y
numerous and i n t i m a t e l y connected." ( I b i d . , p. 81. ) Because of t h i s , he used t h e
term "adduction", from adduce - " t o bring forward a s evidence o r example" to-
d e s c r i b e h i s approach t o logic.
-1

29~houghNorman 0. Brown, perhaps more t h a n anyone r e c e n t l y , has challenged us

t o question t h e "boundaries" through which we have ldarned t o see ourselves and
think. For example, he argued t h a t h he body, l i k e t h e body p o l i t i c , i s a t h e a t r e ;
everything i s symbolic. " ( Love 1s Body. New York, ~ l n d a g e( 1966 ) , p. 131. ) Though
he questions t h e same d i s t i n c t i o n s t h a t t h e i d e o l o h and l o g i c of s c i e n t i s m r e i f y ,
he tended t o make h i s c r i t i c i s m s i n t o a new ontdogy. A s Marcuse wrote of Brown:
" ~ n l e s st h e a n a l y s i s t a k e s t h e road of r e t u r n from t h e symbollc t o t h e l i t e r a l ,
from t h e i l l u s i o n t o t h e r e a l i t y of t h e i l l u s i o n , it remains i d e o l o g i c a l , r e -
placing one m y s t i f i c a t i o n by another. " ( Love Mystified: A C r i t i q u e , i n Nerrations:
Essays I n C r i t i c a l Theory. Boston, Beacon Press (19681, p. 235. )
30~nowinaand t h e Known, op. c i t . , p. 316.

"Ibid., p. 276.

3 2 ~ b i d . , p. 324.

331bid., p. 320.

3 4 ~ b i d . , p. 276.

3 5 ~ b i d . Dp. 326.

361bid., p. 318.

~ ~ L O P ~ op.
C , cit., P. 154.

3*1bid. , p. 73.

3 9 ~ b i a . , P. 72.

'O1bid.s p. 73.

bid., p. 66.

421bid., p. 70.

4%nowing and t h e Known, op. c i t . , p. 315.

4 5 ~ o p i ~op.
, cit., P. 62.

47~nowing and t h e Known, op. c i t . , p. 281. I n t h i s discussion, I am not equating

common sense with p r a c t i c e nor s c i e n c e with theory. Rather I am suggesting t h a t
t h e s p l i t between t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e i s absurd, but t h a t t h e one between s c i e n c e
and common sense, b o t h of which have a p r a c t i c e , is problematic f o r l o g i c and
requires clarification.

4 8 ~ h en q t i o n of t r a n s a c t ion i n Dewey Is w r i t i n g s complements Mead's concern with

t h e "generalized o t h e r " , " s o c i a l f i e l d " , e t c . Both a r e s i m i l a r , i n t h i s r e g a r d ,
t o Martin Buber and h i s n o t i o n of human experience a s d i a l o g i c a l ( " I - ~ h o u " ) .
See Paul E. Pfuetze: S e l f , Society. Existence. New York, Harper ( 1961).
52~nowingand t h e Known, op. c i t . , p. 281.

5%0 Dewey and Bentley, s p e c i f i c a t i o n was h he most highly perfected naming be-
haviour. Best exhibited i n modern science. Requires freedom from the defective-
l y r e a l i s t i c a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e form of syllogism commonly known a s A r i s t o t e l i a n . "
( Knowing and t h e Known, op. c i t . , p. 302. )

55Logic, op. c it. , P. 105.

5 6 ~ h euse of t h i s term can c r e a t e confusion. By "impartial" Dewey did not mean

"objective", i n terms of objectivism or having technical professional s k i l l s of
research. Rather he meant t h a t t h e objective consequences of doing c e r t a i n things
must be t h e method of evaluating them. The people doing c e r t a i n things, including
professional researchers, may be t h e l e a s t impartial i n evaluating r e s u l t i n g con-
sequences.

57~nowinnand t h e Known, op. c i t . , p. 212. What we consider t o be t h e "objects"

of s o c i a l inquiry w i l l complement our o r i e n t a t i o n s t o questions of logic ( i n -
cluding " o b j e c t i v i t y " ). Dewey proposed a thoroughly m a t e r i a l i s t i c approach t o
t h i s question. "... a r t i f a c t s on t h e s i d e of t h e p a r t taken by environmental
conditions and a r t s a s acquired s k i l l s on t h e organic s i d e do a l l t h e work t h a t
s p i r i t s , souls, minds, consciousness and organisms a s ( ex) c i t a t i v e s have been
c a l l e d upon t o do, having, of course, t h e advantage of being a s observable a s
t h e t r e e s and f o s s i l s t h a t primary i n q u i r i e s deal with, while being, i n addition,
t h e means through which they a r e subjected t o inquiry." (Sidney Ratner and J u l e s
Altman (eds. ): John Dewey and Arthur Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence
1932-1951. Rutgers University Press (19691, pp. 625-26. )

5 8 ~ o n i c , op. c i t . . P. 495.

5 9 ~ i k eToulmin, Dewey r e j e c t e d t h e s c i e n t i s t i c notion of d e s c r i p t i o n , but, un-

l i k e Toulmin, he s t r e s s e d understanding o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n instead of explanation,
and evaluation i n s t e a d of prediction. Toulmin was more concerned with t h e r o l e
of representation i n inference and with laws, while Dewey was more i n t e r e s t e d
i n t h e f u l l a c t i v i t y of inquiry and i n t h e r o l e of postulations within t h i s .
For a discussion of science, which i s more thoroughly pragmatic than Toulmin,
but which does not t o t a l l y r e j e c t idealized logic, see Reuben Abel: Pragmatism
and t h e Outlook of Modern Science. Philosophical and Phenomenological Research,
VOL 27, 1966-67, pp. 45-54.
6 0 ~ ~ g i op.
c , cit.. p. 116.

671bid. , pp. 112-1 3.

691f we reduce a l l i d e a s t o a functional i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , then we c r e a t e a new

form of metaphysics f r o m Dewey's logic. It i s therefore v i t a l t o make a dis-
t i n c t i o n between how ideas a r e f'unctional within d i r e c t inquiry, and t h e var-
ious other implications of expanded consciousness. Sometimes expanded conscious-
ness i s a necessary s t a g e i n problem solving, but sometimes it serves t o a l t e r
t h e mode of knowing and being and t h e q u a l i t y of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e
knower and t h e known. Research i n t o t h e e f f e c t s of psychedelic drugs may yet
show how t h e mode of being and knowing a r e related. See Duncan Blewett: The
F r o n t i e r s of Beillp;. New York, Award (1969), especially Chapters Two and Three.

7Jcnowiw and t h e Known, op. tit. P. 319.

7'~0gic, op. c i t . , pp. 503-04.

7 6 ~ b i d . , p. 96. Very f e w American s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s have an adequate perspective

on values and inquiry. One of t h e few who approaches such a perspective i s
Robert Merton who has w r i t t e n "1n t h e end, it i s t h e values held by people oc-
cupylng d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s i n s o c i e t y t h a t provide t h e rough bases f o r t h e
r e l a t i v e importance assigned t o s o c i a l problems and ... t h i s sometimes leads
t o badly d i s t o r t e d impressions of t h e s o c i a l significance of various problems,
even when these a r e judged i n t h e l i g h t of reigning values." (Robert K. Merton
and Richard A. Nisbet ( eds. ): Contemporary Social Problems. New York, H a r C ~ u r t ,
Brace and World ( 19661, p. 782. )
82Knowing and t h e Known, op. c i t . , p. 223.

8 3 ~ ~ g i cop.
, cit. , p. 140.

89~ayakawahas w r i t t e n %cept f o r t h e f a c t t h a t we sometimes a c t without think-

ing, it would seem obvious t h a t how we a c t is determined by how we think. But
even when we a c t without thinking, our a c t i o n s a r e l i k e l y t o follow t h e l i n e s
l a i d down by our p a t t e r n s of thought, which i n t u r n a r e determined by t h e lan-
guage we use." (S.I. Hayakawa (ed. ): The Use and Misuse of Language. Greenwich,
Connecticut, Fawcett (1962), p. v i i i . ) This, plus h i s statement t h a t "Meanings
a r e semantic reactions t h a t take place i n ~ e o p l e "( I b i d . , p. v i i i - i x ) grasps
t h e erroneous o r i e n t a t i o n of general semantics. Such an approach i s o l a t e s both
language and thought from t h e s o c i a l f i e l d and a t t r i b u t e s meaning not t o t h e
consequent es of c e r t a i n behaviour, i n a p a r t i c u l a r context, but t o something
i n s i d e of us. I f we apply P i e r c e ' s notion " t h a t t h e purport of any concept i s
i t s conceived bearing upon our conduct" and r e c a l l Hayakawals a u t h o r i t a r i a n
conduct during t h e s t r i k e a t San Francisco S t a t e College i n 1969, we have f u r -
t h e r evidence of t h e academic and u n s c i e n t i f i c character of semantics. Not only
i s semantics, with i t s r e i f i e d view of language, not a v a l i d way t o approach t h e
study of language, a s an aspect of behaviour, it can a l s o function t o obscure
t h e ideological o r i e n t a t i o n of a t h e o r i s t and h i s or her theories.

9 O ~ o rideas about t h e kinds of problems t h a t pragmatic inquiry might tackle see

Knowledge For What?, op. c i t . , Some Outrageous Hypotheses, pp. 202-250.

9 l ~ n o w i mand t h e Known, op. c i t . , p. 282.

970nce we r e j e c t a l l v a r i e t i e s of the ideology and logic of scientism, we can
gain a perspective on t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between materialism and idealism. S a r t r e l s
c r i t i c i s m of vulgar marxism and i t s metaphysical understanding of materialism
was based on such a perspective. For example, he wrote t h a t "when t h e materi-
a l i s t claims t o be c e r t a i n of h i s principles, h i s assurance can come only from
i n t u i t i o n o r a n a p r i o r i reasoning, t h a t i s , from t h e very speculations which
he condemns. I now r e a l i z e t h a t materialism is a metaphysics hiding behind pos-
itivism, but it i s a self-destructive metaphysics, f o r by undermining metaphys-
i c s out of principle, it deprives i t s statements of any foundation." (Materialism
and Revolution, i n George Novak (ed. ): Existentialism versus Marxism. New York,
Delta (1966)~ p. 88. ) T h i s i s why vulgar marxism becomes a f a i t h . As S a r t r e said:
"I have witnessed conversions t o materialism; one enters i n t o materialism a s a
religion." (Ibid., p. 101. ) It i s important t o note Marx had a pragmatic and not
a metaphysical perspective on materialism and idealism. For example, Marx believed
t h a t a "consistent naturalism o r humanism distinguishes i t s e l f both from idealism
and materialism, c o n s t i t u t i n g a t the same time the unifying t r u t h of both".
(Quoted by Colwyn Williamson: Ideology and the Problem of Knowledge, op. c i t .
Marx believed t h a t "~ommunisma s a f u l l y developed naturalism i s humanism and a s
a f u l l y developed humanism i s naturalism" (T.B. Bottomore (ed.): Karl Marx: Early
Writiw. Toronto, McGraw-Hill (1964), p. 155) and because of t h i s saw it a s a
reconcilation of materialism and idealism. A s part of t h e h i s t o r i c a l movement
t o communism, he believed t h a t "Natural science w i l l ... abandon i t s a b s t r a c t
m a t e r i a l i s t o r r a t h e r i d e a l i s t orientation and w i l l become the basis of a human
science ..." ( I b i d . , pp. 163-64. ) He, l i k e S a r t r e , was aware t h a t once materi-
alism becomes s e c t a r i a n and academic ( reductionistic ) it turns into i t s ~ ~ r ~ l l a ? ? ~ ,
idealism.

9 8 ~ o a i i ,op. c i t . , p. 117. On pp. 448-49 above (footnote 45), I made a d i s t i n c t i o n

between two ways of understanding the t h e o r e t i c a l nature of science. I rejected
t h e one associated with deductive logic and accepted the one t h a t argues t h a t
science must be rooted i n general problems and not just i n practice and technique.
I n t h i s regard, Dewey's argument t h a t s c i e n t i f i c abstractions must have generality
( "be f r e e from p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n t i a l adhesions") complements the view taken by
Althusser.
10%nowinn and t h e Known, op. c i t . , p. 327.

lo4-, op. c it. , p. 508.

105~nowingand t h e Known, op. c l t . , p. 283.

'O6IIewey would not have t r e a t e d an "inference" a s an explanation or a b a s i s f o r

a prediction, but a s a p o s t u l a t i o n which would serve t o d i r e c t inquiry t o an
end o r objective consequence. To t h e extent t h a t Toulmin t r e a t e d an inference
as an end i n inquiry, he had t h e tendency t o r e v e r t back t o s c i e n t i s t i c meta-
physics.

l o 8 ~ o g i c , op. c i t . , p. 131.

logsee p. 176 above.

'losee p. 184 above.

ll%ee p. 183 above.

l 1 2 ~ b i d . , p. 488.

113see p. 187 above.

'141bid., p. 500.
''O~eor~e Novak argued t h a t t h e pragmatists a r e t h e "ideological cousins" of t h e
p o s i t i v i s t s . ( P o s i t i v i s m and Marxism i n Sociology. I n t e r n a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s t Review,
Vol. 29, No. 4, July-August, 1968, p. 27.) Certainly most Marxist-Leninists would
take Dewey's statement as proof of h i s l i b e r a l ideology. S t i l l I have argued t h a t
vulgar, s e c t a r i a n marxism and l i b e r a l positivism both represent t h e ideology and
logic of scientism. For example, t a k e t h e following statements by Lenin on t h e
theory of knowledge: "There is d e f i n i t e l y no difference i n p r i n c i p l e between the
phenomenon and t h e t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f , and t h e r e can be no such d i f f e r e n c e ... know-
complete and more exact .,.
ledae emerges from iznorance ( t h a t i s ) incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more
t h e transformation of lthings-in-themselves' i n t o
lthings-for-us', t h e appearance of 'phenomena1 when our sense-organs experience
a j o l t from external o b j e c t s , t h e disappearance of Iphenomena1 when some obstacle
prevents t h e a c t i o n upon our sense-organs of an object which we know t o e x i s t . The
s o l e and unavoidable deduction t o be made from t h i s - a deduction which a l l of us
make i n everyday p r a c t i c e and which materialism d e l i b e r a t e l y places a t t h e founda-
t i o n of i t s epistemology - i s t h a t outside us, and independently of us, t h e r e ex-
i s t objects, t h i n g s , and bodies and t h a t our perceptions a r e images of t h e e x t e r n a l
world. " (V. I. Lenin: Materialism and Emvirio-Criticism. Moscow, Foreign Languages
Publishing House (1947). pp. 99-100.) Here we see a c l a s s i c a l statement of corre-
spondence theory, a v a r i a t i o n of scientism. Seeing perceptions a s images of t h e
e x t e r n a l world i s rooted i n t h e i d e a l i s t notion t h a t we observe r e a l i t y - with an
a p r i o r i mind. Lenin t h e revolutionary i n p o l i t i c a l matters becomes Lenin t h e aca-
demic i n epistemological matters. He did begin t o r e v i s e h i s ideas about knowledge
i n h i s Philosovhical Notebooks, but Marxist-Leninists have tended t o remain f a i t h -
f u l t o t h e e a r l y s c i e n t i s t i c notions. A c r i t i q u e t h a t Dewey made of Trotsky shows
how, even with t h e marxian concern f o r t h e "unity of theory and practice". Marxism-
Leninism has c o n s i s t e n t l y had a vulgar, s c i e n t i s t i c idea of t r u t h , laws, etc. Dewey
f i r s t argued "... t h a t t h e end i n t h e sense of consequences provides t h e only b a s i s
f o r moral ideas and a c t l o n " and then compared t h i s with Trotsky's statement t h a t
" d i a l e c t i c a l m t a r i a l i s m knows no dualism between means and ends". Rather than
Trotsky concluding from t h i s t h a t t h e means must be evaluated by t h e i r objective

...
consequences, he r e v e r t e d t o deductive logic by saying t h a t " ( t h e l i b e r a t i n g moral-
i t y of t h e p r o l e t a r i a t ) deduces a r u l e of conduct from t h e laws of t h e develop-
ment of s o c i e t y , t h u s primarily from t h e c l a s s struggle, t h e law of a l l laws". We
have already c r i t i c i z e d t h i s notion of law and t h e formal, deductive notion of
v a l i d i t y i n Chapter Sixteen. The important thing t o note i s how Dewey, a " l i b e r a l " ,
had a more d i a l e c t i c , and, I might add, " m a t e r i a l i s t " outlook than Trotsky, a
"marxist!'. Dewey was i n t e r e s t e d i n " t h e a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s of means and consequences"
t o l i v i n g humans, not in formal, a b s t r a c t j u s t i f i c a t i o n s - "laws" - f o r action. H e
was aware t h a t "No s c i e n t i f i c law can determine a moral end save by deserting t h e
p r i n c i p l e of interdependence of means and ends." The adherence of Marxist-Leninism
Co deductive logic and t h e a b i l i t y of Central Committees t o r a t i o n a l i z e t h e i r au-
t h o r i t a r i a n i s m i n metaphysical terms a r e c l o s e l y r e l a t e d . This study strongly sug-
g e s t s t h a t i n terms of t h e question of knowledge, t h e "Marx" i n "~arxisrn- en in ism"
should be removed. (John Dewey: Means and Ends, i n Leon Trotsky e t a l . : Their Morals
and Ours: Marxist versus Liberal Views of Morality, New York, Merit Publishers
(1966). 1
121'1~ragmatism", a s it became i n t e r p r e t e d within t h e dominant educational system
i n t h e United S t a t e s , h a s t o do with technique, not t h e a c t i v i t y , involved i n in-
quiry. This i s one reason why Dewey h e s i t a t e d t o a s s o c i a t e h i s theory of logic
with t h e term "pragmatism". To him, "pragmatic" meant "the function of conse-
quences a s necessary t e s t s of t h e v a l i d i t y of propositions". (Loaic, op. c i t . ,
p. i v . ) For t h e e s t a b l i s h e d i n s t i t u t i o n s , and i n l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l r h e t o r i c , it
has come t o mean t h e expedient, o r t h e useful, i n terms of predetermined ~ n d s .
This established meaning i n no way concerns i t s e l f with t h e evaluation of conse-
quences. The degree t o which Dewey's approach t o logic and r e l a t e d approach t o
education has been d i s t o r t e d i s shown by t h e following statement: "~eweypoints
out t h a t a t l e a s t one important f a c t o r i n avoidance of dogmatism or indoctrina-
t i v e teaching is, not t o avoid taking a stand, but t o make c l e a r both t h e posi-
t i o n taken and one's reasons f o r taking it. To do so not only removes t h e aura of
an a u t h o r i t a r i a n pronouncement, but a l s o provides f o r one's hearers or readers a
b a s i s f o r making t h e i r own assessments of t h e p o s i t i o n s , so t h a t they can thereby
a r r i v e a t t h e i r own conv9ctions; a t l e a s t they a r e helped toward such a r r i v a l . "
(Ernest E. Bayler: Pragmatism i n Educa3ion. New York, Harper and Row ( 1 9 6 6 ) ~p.
9 . ) Here Dewey's approach i s f a l s e l y presented a s taking a stand and explaining,
verbally, why you have done so. There is no mention of knowledge being a goal
within inquiry. Instead we have a reversion t o "conviction" with no concern f o r
consequences.

122~heSoci2lonical Ima~jination, op. c i t . , p. 131. I n h i s doctoral t h e s i s , C.W.

Mills concluded t h a t Dewey's s o c i a l psychology was a "model f o r l i b e r a l s " . He
argued t h a t Dewey's approach t o education emphasized t h e " l i b e r a l and engineer-
ing standpoint". M i l l s 1 approach t o t h e sociology of knowledge, however, was
s l i g h t l y s o c i o l o g i s t i c , t 3 a t i s , r e d u c t i o n i s t i c . I n h i s 1943 P o s t s c r i p t on h i s
t h e s i s , he admitted t h a t studying Dewey without t r a c i n g t h e influence of Mead on
him was an "unrepresentative a c t t h a t i s i n t e l l e c t u a l l y unwarranted". He a l s o ex-
pressed doubts about research i n t h e sociology of knowledge t h a t did not consider
" l a r g e r epistemological concerns". Because Mills t r e a t e d Dewey within a narrow
p o l i t i c a l sociological perspective and did not deal with Dewey i n terms of matters
of logic, ideology and language (Mead), h i s t h e s i s was s u p e r f i c i a l . I can, however,
agree with Mills t h a t Dewey's "... own a n a l y s i s leads him away from a s p e c i f i c a t i o n
of t h e locus of ( s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l ) forces. He i s pushed upon a high and gener-
a l l e v e l of a b s t r a c t i o n , a l e v e l incommensurate with h i s epistemological exhorta-
t i o n s . " (Sociology and Pramatism. New York, Oxford University Press (1966), p.
453. ) That is why I have argued t h a t unless t h e r e i s s p e c i f i c inquiry i n t o t h e
workings of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of education we w i l l not be i n a p o s i t i o n t o be
s t r a t e g i c i n our quest f o r a pragmatic form of s o c i a l science.
 SECTION I 1 1

Chapter Twenty-one

The University and t h e Ideology and Logic of Scientism

/ v d
The ideology and logic of scientism doesqdevelop i n a vacuum. A full

understanding of t h e r o o t s and e f f e c t s of s c i e n t i s t i c r h e t o r i c demands a n an-

a l y s i s of t h e human and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s t y p i c a l i n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n t h a t

nurtures abstracted, academic uses of languages and spreads such r h e t o r i c i n t o

t h e established society. Such understanding is fundamental t o any s t r a t e g y f o r

enhancing t h e development of pragmatic s o c i a l inquiry. There a r e many ways t o

approach such a study of t h e university. Since my aim i s t o round out t h e i m -

p l i c a t i o n s of t h e problem of ideology and logic f o r our view of education, and

not t o complete a thorough study of t h e university,' I w i l l only develop my

points i n general terms.

The ideology and l o g i c of scientism pervades t h e educational system i n

Canada. For example, it is t h e r u l e , not t h e exception, t o read statements l i k e

"Sociology does not attempt t o formulate answers t o current s o c i a l questions or

provide s o l u t i o n s t o t h e problem of contemporary s o c i a l l l f e u 2 i n "descriptions"

of government educational programs. Such an academic view of t h e d i s c i p l i n e s of

t h e s o c i a l sciences i s c h a r a c t e r i s t k and it serves CYo obscure t h e contemporary

s o c i a l arrangement and a c t u a l and p o t e n t i a l consequences of science. An empiri-

c a l study of t h e function and consequences of s o c i a l science, however, exposes

t h e mythical nature of t h i s kind of value-free r h e t o r i c i n t h e educational sys-

tem. I n t h e conclusion of one such study, B a r i t z wrote t h a t

"Many i n d u s t r i a l s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s have put themselves on auction. The

power e l i t e s of America, especially t h e i n d u s t r i a l e l i t e , have bought
t h e i r services - which when applied t o a r e a s of r e l a t i v e power leave
r e s t r i c t e d t h e freedom of millions of workers. Time was when a man
h e w t h a t h i s freedoms were being curtailed. Social s c i e n t i s t s , how-
ever, a r e too s o p h i s t i c a t e d f o r t h a t . The f i r e s of pressure and con-
t r o l on a man a r e now kindled i n h i s own thinking. "3

Here I am not so much concerned with an a n a l y s i s of t h e academic market-

place a s with t h e means by which t h e value-free dogma i s maintained w i t h i n t h e

university. When it so b l a t a n t l y d i s t o r t s t h e character of s c i e n t i f i c inquiry

and i s contradicted by t h e present p o l i t i c a l and economic function of science,

how has t h i s dogma p e r s i s t e d ? Why has t h e u n i v e r s i t y not been able t o develop

approaches t o education, both teaching and research, t h a t can account f o r t h e

problem of ideology and t h e ramifications of t h i s f o r matters of logic? And,

conversely, what changes i n t h e u n i v e r s i t y would be required f o r it t o be a

c e n t e r of pragmatic inquiry?

We have already s t a r t e d t o answer these questions. I n Chapter Six, I

discussed Kuhnls reference t o t h e textbooks of science "... truncating the

s c i e n t i s t I s ' sense of h i s d i s c i p l i n e ' s h i s t o r y ...

'I and then proceeding t o "...
Kuhn compared t h i s "nar-
supply a s u b s t i t u t e f o r what they have e l ~ m i n a t e d " . ~

row and r i g i d " education t o t h e pedagogy of theology. The textbooks, themselves

an aspect of t h e academic marketplace, can be s a i d t o help educate ignorance.

Because t h e "subject matter" i s a b s t r a c t e d from i t s h i s t o r i c a l development and

r e i f i e d i n t o a " d i s c i p l i n e " , f o r example, physics or sociology, it tend:; t o

become more t h e basis of a professional i d e n t i t y than indicative of an in-

volvement i n ongoine; inquiry within a paradigm which always has t h e p o t e n t i a l

of forming anomalies. This s c i e n t i s t i c education therefore nurtures a conser-

vative approach t o subject matter and reinforces a general conformist s e t of

beliefs. Since a r e i f i e d and mystified "subject matter" i s more r e s i s t a n t t o

change than one t r e a t e d e x i s t e n t i a l l y and pragmatically, t h e c r i t i c a l s k i l l s

of inquiry a r e not being learned.

This a n a l y s i s was expanded i n Chapter Twelve when I discussed Weberls

confused handling of t h e university. Because he believed "value questions a r e

permanently banned from u n i v e r s i t y discussion", he a l s o argued t h a t both s t u -

dents and teachers should be "condemned t o silence" on such matters. But he

a l s o recognized t h a t c a p i t a l i s t i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n was turning u n i v e r s i t i e s in-

t o bureaucratic i n s t i t u t i o n s with education being taken out of t h e c o n t r o l of

educators. Because he t r e a t e d "values" a s s o l e l y an individual matter, and,

though t h i s contradicted h i s awareness of t h e incorporation of t h e u n i v e r s i t y

i n t o c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y , he a l s o believed t h a t t h e individual assigns t a s k s t o

t h e u n i v e r s i t y according t o "ultimate values"; he never undertook a study of

t h e ideology and e f f e c t s of c a p i t a l i s t u n i v e r s i t i e s .

Since Weberls time, t h e incorporation of t h e u n i v e r s i t y i n t o c a p i t a l i s t

s o c i e t y has been completed. We have a retrospective perspective where Weber

had none. The value-free doctrine has become dogma a s academia has been i n t e -

grated i n t o t h e corporate society. The end-of-ideology i s exposed a s crude

p o l i t i c a l rhetoric once the academic marketplace i s analyzed. The university

now functions a s Durkheim believed a l l education should function: t o "impose"

a n ideology on a new generation and ensure t h e i r conformity and adaption t o

t h e dominant norms.

Perhaps we a r e now witnessing a deterioration n f t h i s authoritarian

education. This i s not occurring because the i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e reforming them-

selves t o become l i b e r t a r i a n , but because the t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i a l i z a t i o n of the

young is no longer s ~ c c e e d i n g . ~Regardless of t h e increase of dropouts and

signs of r e b e l l i o n among many youth, we s t i l l have t o ask what the effects of

t h e dominant education a r e i n terms of t h e a b i l i t y o f people t o undertake prag-

matic inquiry. One discussion of t h e e f f e c t s of corporate, s c i e n t i s t i c educa-

4

t i o n concluded t h a t what "... education of t h i s kind conveys t o i t s recipients

i s a pretense of knowledge and understanding where none a c t u a l l y e x i s t s , a ?re-

tense which r e a d i l y develops i n t o a n e f f e c t i v e bar t o learning and thus becomes

more destructive than ignorance i t s e l f . ,I 6

Studying t h e Obvious: 1 - The Boundaries of Academia

Though t h i s i s a valid c r i t i c i s m , it i s t o o general t o c l a r i f y our

questions. How, s p e c i f i c a l l y , i s the ideology and logic of scientism taught

and learned. The fragmented character of the sciences and the complementary

wnhistorlcal, often a h i s t o r i c a l and r e i f i e d treatment of subject matter as

"disciplines" c e r t a i n l y creates the conditions within which a formal, idealized

logic and the value-free dogma can be learned and maintained. The very organi-
zation of the subject matter along bureaucratic l i n e s pred'lsposes people t o

such an orientation.

The subject matter, however, i s not something which e x i s t s i n ab-

s t r a c t i o n from the human praxis within the university. Once we r e j e c t t h e

s c i e n t i s t i c belief t h a t l a x u a g e constitutes a t h i r d realm of f a c t , we can

no longer t r e a t subject matter a s being independent of the human and s o c i a l

relationships of the university. The r e i f i e d uses of language, f o r example,

plagiarism, eclecticism (theory without method o r problem) and dilettantism,

t h a t complement a s c i e n t i s t i c a l l y understood subject matter a r e an aspect of

these s o c i a l and human relations. For example, the use of language i n the

classroom underlies and reinforces the ideology and logic of scientism because

the "meaning" of words becomes associated with the setting; and t h e r o l e s ,

s t a t u s , authority and power ( o f grading) t h a t a f f e c t s the experience and be-

haviour of students and teachers within t h a t setting. Yet f o r pragmatic in-

quiry t o be undertaken ideas about problems, methods and theories have t o be

situated; t h a t i s , have an e x i s t e n t i a l reference. When the meaning of language

comes mainly from i t s mediatiw function within these impersonal s o c i a l relation-

ships, rather than from one's involvement i n ongoing, cooperative inquiry, it i s

easy f o r notions of "method" and "theory" t o become abstracted from a c t u a l or

potential problems t h a t a r e implied by the social f i e l d s within which a person

studies, works and lives.

The idea of "inquiry" should not be mystified. Inquiry i s r e l a t e d t o

e x i s t e n t i a l doubt which i s r e l a t e d t o what Dewey called an "indeterminate,

IF-

problematic situation". Yet when "... t h a t which i s taught i s thought of a s

essentially s t a t i c ... i t i s taught a s a finished product, with l i t t l e regard

e i t h e r t o the ways i n which it was originally b u i l t up o r t o changes t h a t w i l l

surely occur i n the future.l17 This forces a concern with problems into the

background, and technique and the a b i l i t y t o a r t i c u l a t e the specialized uses

of technique become equated with "subject matter". Though scientism mystifies

technique and verbal intelligence, and, i n e f f e c t , t r e a t s them a s science,

these a r e only aspects of inquiry. Without there being the a c t i v i t y of i n a u i r s ,

language and technique have no meaning, relevance o r consequence, except re-

ceiving or not receiving marks and c r e d i t s f o r t h e student and salary f o r the

teacher.

We can see from t h i s t h a t a n understanding of the roots and consequences

o f t h e ideology and logic of scientism can be gained by looking a t obvious oc-

currences i n t h e university. When we l e a r n t o study "the obvious" i n s o c i a l

events, we w i l l be f u l f i l l i n g one condition f o r developing a pragmatic approach

t o s o c i a l inquiry. But, while our s o c i a l i z a t i o n i s abstracted into a p r i o r i

perceptions, emotions and motivations8 and uses of language; and people develop

a defensive conservative mode of r e l a t i n g t o others and the world, such a con-

cern w i l l be rare. Laing pointed out t h i s dilemma when he wrote t h a t s o c i a l

events "... often go out o f view i n space and time a t a boundary between here

and now, and there and then - a boundary which unfortunately consigns here and

now t o u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y without information from there and then, which i s ,

however, beyond our reach. s 9

Prom a s o c i a l psychological perspective, t h e development and reinforce-

ment of these "boundaries" a r e t h e r o o t s of human unconsciousness. The s o c i a l

and human r e l a t i o n s h i p s of t h e u n i v e r s i t y do not cause them; but, were t h e

milieux within whlch learning occurs t o be changed appropriately, these bound-

a r l e s would not become t h e unconscious, unquestioned b a s i s of abstracted, aca-

demic knowledge. I n t h e classroom, or t h e o f f i c e of t h e professor, where t h e r e

i s formal s e a t i n g , where mainly formal behaviour predominates, language and

thought become formalized. I n t h e informal c a f e t e r i a , where t h e r e i s informal

s e a t i n g and informal behaviour, people g e t a break from t h i s formal thought

and language. But nowhere do students and teachers engage i n ongoing dialogue,

~ 5 t hc l e a r e x i s t e n t i a l references. They a r e both continually s h i f t i n g from

formal, public s e t t i n g s t o informal, but s t i l l public settings. Their experi-

ence, t h a t i s , how they f e e l about t h i s , i s never a b l e t o a f f e c t what they do -

unless they drop out of t h e whole process. I n terms of t h e i r experience, though

perhaps not apparent t o a n observer of t h e i r behaviour, t h e t r a n s i t i o n from one

t o t h e other, from one "here and now" out of a "there and then" i n t o another '

"here and now" involves a massive s t r u c t u r a l boundary. It is a boundary t h a t en-

compasses a l l aspects of experience and behaviour: everything from muscle-tone,

body posture, perceptions of r o l e s , s t a t u s and a u t h o r i t y , t h e phenomenology of

t h e eyes, uses of language, and t h e form and content of thought. The break be-

tween t h e t w o m i l i e u i s usually conditioned t o a system of b e l l s , but t h e

e f f e c t s of t h e s t r u c t u r a l boundary a r e not momentary. They p e r s i s t and compound

i n t o a v a r i e t y of forms of anxiety, and, i n some cases, a r e acted out t r a g i c a l l y ,

a s suicide. lo
 1 - 513 -

2 - The Schizoid Praxis i n Academia

This i s hardly t h e means t o develop t h e awareness and s k i l l s required

f o r and involved i n pragmatic inquiry. But t h e schizoid, sometimes schizo-

phrenic, existence t h a t r e s u l t s from t h e educational maze i s t h e r u l e , not t h e

exception. For instance, "the schizophrenic i s ... someone who has been accus-

tomed t o r e l a t i n g t o symbol-objects r a t h e r than person-objects ..."I1 In the

i n t e r p l a y between s e l f and others, t h e s e l f or "sense of being" of t h e schizo-

phrenic "takes r o o t more i n what we f e e l i n s i d e , i n what we t h i n k and imagine,

than i n what we a c t u a l l y don.'* The schizophrenic "takes refuge i n t h e world

of symbol-objects, and f o r f e i t s t r i a l and e r r o r experience i n t h e e x t e r n a l

world".13 This c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of t h e schizophrenic i s too general t o apply

t o academia d i r e c t l y . But i f we think of t h e r e i f i e d uses of language i n aca-

demia a s a n example of taking refuge i n symbol-objects, t h e analogy begins t o

take on d i r e c t meaning. Words can be used i n a hollow way. hey mean l i t t l e

t o t h e development of our t o t a l personality unless we connect them up with some

kind of l i v e d experience. "I4 Because humans "can t a l k about things without

having any a c t u a l experience of them"15 we can cut ourselves "off from r e a l

l i v i n g i n t h e world, from r e a l commitments t o ( o u r ) a c t s , and ( c a n ) take refuge

16
i n f a b r i c a t i o n s of '( our) s e l f fantasy".

The u n i v e r s i t y s p e c i a l i z e s i n t h e r e i f i e d uses of words and hence it

reinforces and nurtures t h i s schizophrenic-like existence. Because schizo-

phrenic behaviour does not predominate i n t h e u n i v e r s i t y , it does not follow

t h a t t h i s predisposition i s not being wartured and reinforced within i t s

 milieux. I n h i s study on The Divided Self, Laing argued It.. . that there i s

a comprehensible t r a n s i t i o n from the sane schizoid way of being-in-the-world

t o a psychotic way of being-in-the-worldC7 And Laingls description of the

"schizoid mode of being" has a r e a l s i m i l a r i t y with what i s common i n the uni-

versity. The s p l i t between the private and public, the so-called "real" and

"false" s e l f i n Laingls terms which i s so fundamental t o t h e schizoid person,

i s t y p i c a l within academia. A s one university psychiatrist has stated: "...

i n a community ( l i k e t h e university) t h a t is community c h i e f l y i n a geographic

sense and where t r u s t i s limited, a huge discrepancy e x i s t s between private

musings and public statements 11 18 .

I n such a community, where "unilateral relationships" predominate, re-

lationships among humans a r e typically schizoid. Laing desmibed the dilemma

the schizoid person has over establishing relationships a s follows: 'I... there

i s a n attempt t o c r e a t e relationships t o persons and things within the individ-

u a l without recourse t o t h e outer world o f persons and things a t a l l ... but,

of course, t h i s a u t i s t i c , private intra-individual 'worldt i s not a feasible

s u b s t i t u t e f o r the only world there r e a l l y i s , t h e shared world."19 With the

s c i e n t i s t i c education of the university and i t s dichotomies, with the fragmented

nature o f subject matter, and with the e f f e c t o f the boundaries of academia, it

'
i s d i f f i c u l t t o experience a shared world. And yet t o t h e extent t h a t one has

expectations of academia being a community, one may s t r i v e f o r such a sharing

of experience. As one begins t o learn t h a t t h e r e a l i t y and rhetoric of the

university don't jibe, one's defense becomes l i k e t h a t which Laing a t t r i b u t e d

t o t h e schizoid person. ithe her he turns t h e other person i n t o a thing, and

depersonalizes or o b j e c t i f i e s h i s own feelings towards t h i s thing, o r he af-

f e c t s ( f e e l s ) indifference. "20

Since "a person ( i n academia, J.H. ) can r e l a t e himself only t o de-

personalized persons" ( students, faculty, administration or s t a f f ) people

.
l e a r n t o f e a r "a r e a l l i v e d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with r e a l l i v e people 11 21

In an i n s t i t u t i o n t h a t i s n e i t h e r a community nor a t o t a l l y organized bureau-

cracy, where people have n e i t h e r t h e r e a l s e c u r i t y of " d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n -

ships with r e a l people" nor t h e f a l s e s e c u r i t y of a t o t a l organization of

t h e i r time and work, people a r e prone t o develop what Laing c a l l e d t h e "un-

embodied self". The person who is caught i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n may t r y t o "dis-

entangle himself from h i s body and thereby achieve a desired s t a t e of d i s -

c a r n a t e s p i r i t ~ a l i t ~ ~ ~The
. 2 *search f o r meaning i n a b s t r a c t uses of language

- i n r e i f i e d method and theory - can f u l f i l l a function f o r a person when t h e

P o s s i b i l i t y of finding meaning through r e a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s i s inhibited. Aca-

demic ideas a r e nurtured i n t h e u n i v e r s i t y because of t h e general impossibility

of People r e l a t i n g with others i n an ongoing way. The world of "symbol-objects"

f u l f i l l s a r e a l need, but because t h e underlying need f o r r e l a t i o n s h i p s 1s f u r -

t h e r deprived, t h e schizoid rnode of being i s being created.

Concern f o r a b s t r a c t empiricism and grand theory i n t h e u n i v e r s i t y i s

a schizoid form of withdrawal from t h e world. As Laing wrote about t h e schiz-

oid: " ~ n s t e a dof t h e individual meeting t h e world with an i n t e g r a l selfhood, he

disavows part of h i s own being a l m g with h i s disavowal of t h e immediate a t t a c h -

ment t o things and people i n t h e w o r l d . "23 As C.W. Mills noted, a concern

f o r e i t h e r method or theory, without problems t h a t have an e x i s t e n t i a l r e f -

erence, i s a withdrawal from the problems of s o c i a l science. What he did

not recognize was t h e schizoid character of someone obsessed with f a c t u a l i t y '

or r e i f i e d concepts. Durkheim's treatment of ideas a s "things" i s a c l a s s i -

c a l example of a schizophrenic sociology.

The s p l i t between t h e p r i v a t e and t h e public helps preserve t h e kind

of u n i v e r s i t y s t r u c t u r e t h a t both nurtures and reinforces t h e s p l i t i n t h e

f i r s t place. The schizoid person "begins by s l a v i s h conformity and Compli-

ance ... ( a n d ) t h e f a l s e s e l f systemls compliance with t h e w i l l of others

reaches i t s most extreme form i n t h e automatic obedience ... of t h e cataton-

iCne2' The r e i f i c a t i o n of language, t h e schizoid mode of being, and t h e

learning of s c i e n t i s t i c dichotomies, helps c r e a t e people w!io w i l l t o l e r a t e

t h i s very process.

We could interchange Marx's notion of "alienation" f o r t h e term

schizoid. Marx believed t h a t t h e academic philosopher was "himself an a b s t r a c t

form of a l i e n a t e d man".25 He believed t h a t when a person " o b j e c t i f i e s himself

by d i s t i n c t i o n from and i n opposition t o a b s t r a c t thought, which c o n s t i t u t e s

a l i e n a t i o n a s it e x i s t s and a s it has t o be transcended",26 an extreme form of

a l i e n a t i o n occurs. And, i f we r e c a l l our discussion of Marx i n Chapter One,

t h i s a l i e n a t e d academ-lc i s t h e person who c r e a t e s ideology.

This a l i e n a t i o n i s general i n academia. ~ h o u g hthey t r y t o ignore it,

people i n t h e u n i v e r s i t y a r e r e l a t i n g t o each other continually. The educational

function of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n , i n contrast t o an i n d u s t r i a l function, means t h a t

people a r e both the producers and the product. I n a sense people a r e creating

a relationship - out o f which a form of knowledge is developed. But the mode

of r e l a t i n g i s a b s t r a c t and impersonal. The alienated uses of language and the

s t r u c t u r e s t h a t underlie t h i s lead both students and teachers t o objectify them-

selves i n terms of a b s t r a c t thought, i f it can be considered thought a t a l l . As

one analysis of c a p i t a l i s t education has stated:

"Student labour i s alienated i n t h e same sense t h a t the product i s f o r

t h e f u t u r e employer r a t h e r than f o r t h e student himself. Since the
product is embodied i n the s k i l l s o f the student himself, he becomes
allenated from himself. Thus modern education and technology, when
continued i n t h e c a p i t a l i s t mode, frequently gives r i s e t o t h e indi-
vidual psychological estrangement often confused with the concept of
a l i e n a t ion. "27

It matters l i t t l e what we name t h i s "psychological estrangement". The

term schizoid i s adequate because it emphasizes the s p l i t s t h a t occur when

People a r e engaged i n objectifying themselves through an estranged relationship.

The important thing i s t o determine the s t r u c t u r a l arrangement of t h e university

t h a t maintains t h i s process. I n t h i s regard, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t t h e "??~les"

of t h e university bureaucracy complement the "rules" of the ideology and logic

of scientism. The r u l e s of the bureaucracy 'I... a r e not i n t r i n s i c t o t h e sub-

ject, but a r e an imposed schedule o f courses, grades, prerequisites, and depart-

ments t h a t s a t i s f y - at l e a s t symbolically - a s o c i a l need f 3 r degrees, licenses

and s k i l l s . "28 Neither a r e the so-called "rules" of t h e ideology and logic of

scientism i n t r i n s i c t o subject matter. As we have shown, they a r e a ~ r t o r i e s

imposed onto subject matter t h a t s a t i s f y - at l e a s t symbolically -a s o c i a l need

i n t h e society. The habits developed among those who survive, and graduate

e i t h e r up o r out, complement a l l the dichotomies of scientism. For example,

t h e graduate c a r r i e s with him o r her the obsession with f a c t u a l i t y that was

learned while i n training.

The roots and e f f e c t s o f t h e relationship between the enforced bound-

a r i e s t h a t e x i s t through space and time i n the ongoing events of the univer-

s i t y , on t h e one hand, and t h e ideology and logic of scientism, on the other,

a r e subtle. The term "authoritarian" touches on t h e character of t h e class-

room: t h e formalized approaches t o logic and t h e development of the value-

f r e e dogma a r e both mediated through an a u t h o r i t a r i a n milieu. But there is

no simple oppressor-oppressed r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the university. A l l people -

students, faculty, s t a f f and administration - a r e encircled by the structure
vis-a-vis t h e p a r t i c u l a r rnilieux within which they a c t and donlt a c t , move

and don't move. Some believe, some disbelieve and others don't care about

the symbols, technology, s t a t u s and r h e t o r i c t h a t integrates the i n s t i t u t i o n .

But each reaction i s a v a r i a t i o n on a theme. No matter what reaction, there

i s no presence of ongoing, pragmatic inquiry with c l e a r s i t u a t i o n a l and exis-

t e n t i a l references f o r people. What talking there i s i s usually without r e f -

erence, and when people t a l k about "the university" they speak about the sym-

bols, technology, s t a t u s and rhetoric of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n , not about the con-

sequences o f a s c i e n t i s t i c education f o r them and society.

3 - The Tautology Between Milieu and Structure

From t h i s stance, a perspcctive t h a t attempts t o account f o r t h e

interdependencies of what C.W. Mills called character and s o c i a l structure,

we can consider the classroom, i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e t o t a l environment of t h e

university, t o be a "tautological situation". It i s tautological because

t h e way it is structured, t h a t is, i t s predetermination by university bureau-

cracy, makes it; impossible f o r people within it t o gain a perspective on the

set-up. And, i f by chance some people begin t o gain such a perspective, they,

a s a minority, o r even a l l of t h e people i n t h e s i t u a t i o n , haven't t h e control

o r power t o a l t e r it from i t s prearranged course. Furthermore, because t h e

classroom i s a part of a s o c i a l f i e l d , 2 9 it implies a c t u a l and potential

problems f o r inquiry. Within t h e university milieux t h e r e e x i s t s t h e s o c i a l

events t h a t could a c t a s a situational reference f o r pragmatic inquiry. But

without language and thought being directed towards these s i t u a t i o n s , these

problems cannot become objectified. Instead it is t y p i c a l f o r people t o be

passively a t t e n t l v e t o the abstracted uses of language i n t h e classroom. In

t h i s s i t u a t i o n it is understandable how people come t o think of words a s being

a t h i r d realm of facts. The impersonal s o c i a l relationships i n the classroom

c r e a t e an alienated use of language, The reference group, and t h e potential

peer group i f and when you graduate up, i s d i s t a n t from t h e student from the

time he o r she enters t h e i n s t l t u t i o n . And a d i s t a n t other", i n

Mead's terms, leads t o a d i s t a n t , r e i f i e d view o f knowledge.

Sometimes t h e r e a r e "ideas" expressed t h a t suggest e x i s t e n t i a l r e f -

erences f o r possible problems f o r inquiry. But t h e r e is no milieu, means s

-
time f o r these ideas t o be evolved i n t o ongoing, cooperative inquiry. As t h e

Berkeley Manifesto stated:

 I
"we a l l know what happens when wc r e a l l y get 'turned on1 by a great ?
idea, a great man, o r a great book: we pursue t h a t i n t e r e s t a t the
r i s k of flunking out. The pursuit of thought, a painful but highly
I
exhilarating process, requires above a l l , the element of time. 1130
1
Commitments a r e learned i n t h i s situation, but they a r e not those required t o

engage i n t h e a c t i v i t y t h a t can lead t o significant knowledge. Through iden-

tif ications with r e i f ied subject matter, people become committed t o t h e i r

"discipline" and career. Some become professors, a s a "career", but they

flunction much the same a s i f they had graduated i n t o any other profession i n

the corporate society.

This tautological s i t u a t i o n does not a r i s e spontaneously. Besides the

alienated praxis of t h e students and teachers, t h e r e i s t h e administrative

Praxis of those who control, manage and service t h e a p r i o r i e s and r u l e s of

education. But i f language i s r e i f i e d i n t o an impersonal verbal relationship

between students and teachers, it cannot be used t o understand how t h e S~FJC-

t u r e of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n and the various milieux i n t e r r e l a t e .

Uing and Marcuse, i n d i f f e r i n g ways, recognized how t h i s i n t e r r e l a t i o n

occurs. I n a statement not s p e c i f i c a l l y associated with education, but never-

t h e l e s s appropriate t o t h e "mass course" t h a t is t h e foundation of the univer-

s i t y , Laing stated:

" A l l those people who seek t o control the behaviour o f l a r g e numbers

of other people work on t h e experiences of those other people. Once
people can be induced t o experience a s l t u a t i o n i n a similar way,
they can be expected t o behave i n similar ways. Induce people t o
a l l want t h e same things, f e e l t h e same t h r e a t , then t h e i r behaviour
i s already captive -
you have acquired your consumers o r your cannon-
fodder. " 3 l

L a i w ' s d i a l e c t i c I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e schizoid condltlon, h i s analysis of t h e

wfurced s p l i t between what is experienced, t h a t is, t h e " r ~ a sl e l f " , and what
h

bchaviour is expected, t h a t i s , t h e " f a l s e s e l f " , and t h e consequences o f t h i s

i n our society, provides a perspective within which t h e relationship between

t h e daily, obvious events of t h e university and t h e development of t h e ideology

and logic of scientism begin t o be. clarified. A s a n example, t h e grading sys-

tem i s so c e n t r a l t o t h e experience and behaviour of both students and faculty

i n t h e university t h a t it tends t o integrate t h e i n s t i t u t i o n . Students come

I

t o value grades ("they a l l want t h e same thing"), even i f f o r d i f f e r i n g reasons.

Students perform i n terms of t h e grades ("they f e e l t h e same t h r e a t " ) , even if

f o r d i f f e r i n g reasons. The grading system a s a

It... system of accountancy a c t s t o break up t h e continuity and consist-

ency of t h e work of instruction and t o d i v e r t the i n t e r e s t of the stu-
dents from the work i n hand t o the making of a passable record. (This)
puts a premium on mediocrity and perfunctory work, and brings academic
l i f e t o revolve around t h e o f f i c e of t h e Keeper of t h e Tape and Sealing
wax. 'I32

The way each student experiences these bureaucratic r u l e s IS, of course,

personal. But corporate i n s t i t u t i o n s function on t h e basis of behaviour, and

bchaviour i n t h e university i s stereotyped and predictable. A s long a s t h e ef-

f e c t s of t h e privatized experience of students remain private and do not become

a force, with implications f o r unpredictable behaviour i n t h e i n s t i t u t i u n , It i s

of no concern t o those who control, manage o r service t h e university. Psychologi-

c a l and counselling services come with each and every i n s t a n t university, t o t r y

t o ensure t h a t problems remain privatized.

The alienated, schizoid praxis complements t h e ideology and logic of

sciontism too muoh t o be ignored. For t h e value-free dogma t o p e r s i s t , people

 must ~ilalcoa s p l i t botweon t h o i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l function and expeoted bchuviour,

and t h o i r private l i f o . The university t r a i n s people t o do t h i s I n a vory a f -

l'iciont way. The granting of sooial s t a t u s and increased chances of mobility

has more than an economic function a f t e r graduation. It a l s o serves t o r o b -

force the behaviour required f o r people t o aooept such work and t h e r a t i o n a l i -

zations f o r t h e consequences of it.

Once t h e private and public a r e s p l i t , it is e a s i e r t o maintain rhetor-

i c a l s p l i t s between objective and subjective, theory and practice, f a c t and

value, even body and mind. Once t h e person i n academia develops semantic s k i l l s

he o r she i s able t o manipulate ideas selected without any s i t ~ a t i o n a lreference

i n such a way a s t o r a t i o n a l i z e these s p l i t s . A mystification of "facts", "laws".

"causes", etc. and philosophies of science t o "back up" such a mystification a r e

a common example of such rationalizations. I f one is r e a l l y sophisticated, he

o r she can even develop impressive metaphysical and ontological systems t o ac-

complish t h i s .

Marcuse recognized t h e function of public rhetoric in maintaining t h e

2 p r i o r i e s of scientism. He spoke of "the public language - a language which

determines 'a ~ r i o r i lt h e d i r e c t i o n i n which t h e thought process rn0ves".3~

Once t h e dichotomies of scientism a r e t r e a t e d a s a ~ r i o r i e s ,thought can be

used i n such a way t h a t they a r e always being reinforced. What Runclman has

said about vulgar marxism o r Natural Law might very well be said of a l l vari-

e t i e s of scientlsm. A l l s c i e n t i s t l c approaches t o knowledge "... a r e impervious

t o evidence not because t h e i r proponents do not adduoe any i n support of t h e i r
position, but because t h e conclusions argued from t h e evidence r e s t s upon an

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which, i f consistently maintained, can be guaranteed i n advance

t o cover any f a c t which t h e observor might bring back from t h e sociological

study of t h e contingent world. 1' 3' A s long a s the private-public s p l i t i s

maintained and a s long a s behaviour i n the university i s predictable and uni-

v e r s i t y s t r u c t u r e i s sable, "the meaning o f words ( w i l l remain) r i g i d l y sta-

b i l i ~ e d "i n~ such
~ a way t h a t t h e dichotomies of sc~ientismremain intact.

It would take a "rupture" i n t h e l i f e and work s t y l e of a person whose .

thought i s s t a b i l i z e d within t h e dichotomies of scientism before comparative

thought and inquiry could begin. An e x i s t e n t i a l revelation would be needed t o

recognize t h a t one's praxis, an unthinking or mindless praxis i n t h i s case, and

not the academic languages o r subject matter p e r se, underlay one's acceptance

of t h e s c i e n t i s t i c dichotomies. Only then could someone recognize t h a t "...

t h e f a c t s a r e never given immediately and never accessible immediately; they

a r e established, !mediated1 by those who made them; t h e t r u t h , t h e 'whole t r u t h '

surpasses these f a c t s and requires the rupture with t h e i r appearances. 1136

Marcuse's remedy tended t o be academic f o r t h i s t o t a l conditioning t o

scientism. He q u i t e r i g h t l y pointed out t h a t "repression invalidates t h e aca-

demic enterprise i t s e l f , even p r i o r t o a l l r e s t r i c t i o n s on academic freedom",

but he continued

he pre-empting of the mind vibrates impartiality and objectivity: un-

l e s s t h e student l e a r n s t o think i n the opposite direction, he w i l l be
inclined t o place t h e f a c t s i n t o t h e predominant framework of values.
Scholarship, i.e. t h e acquisitlon and communication o f knowledge, pro-
h i b i t s t h e p u r i f i c a t i o n and i s o l a t i o n o f f a c t s from t h e context of t h e
whole thought. "37
His idea of "thinking i n the opposite directiont1 remained formalized, even

i f with d i a l e c t i c a l overtones. Marcuse consistently t r e a t e d "thought" i n ab-

s t r a c t from praxis. For example, he stated: "Where t h e mind has been made

into a subject-object o f p o l i t i c s and policies, i n t e l l e c t u a l autonomy, the

realm o f 'puret thought has become a matter of p o l i t i c a l education ( o r rather:

counter-education). Furthermore, he was a l i t t l e bureaucratic, even mech-

a n i s t i c , i n h i s solution. oreov over, the r e s t o r a t i o n o f freedom of thought

may necessitate new and r i g i d r e s t r i c t i o n s on teachings and practices i n the

educational i n s t i t u t i o n s which, by t h e i r very methods and concepts, serve t o

enclose t h e mind with t h e established universe o f discourse and behaviour -

thereby precluding a w i o r i a r a t i o n a l evaluation of the alternatives. "39

Though it i s t o t a l l y u n r e a l i s t i c t o imagine an i n s t i t u t i o n a l solution

t o s o fundamental a problem a s t h a t posed f o r inquiry by t h e ideology and logic

of scientism, Marcuse i s one of t h e few t h e o r i s t s who has exposed t h e depth o f

t h e problem. He believed t h a t t h e "mental space f o r denial and r e f l e c t i o n rnust

first be recreatedttQ0before a r a t i o n a l , I would say "pragmatic", evaluation of

h i s t o r i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e s would be possible. I f t h e "spurious neutrality1' of t h e

university i s t o be both challenged and replaced, there c l e a r l y must be a t o t a l

t r a n s f o r m t i o n of the praxis within it. But " r i g i d r e s t r i c t i o n s on teachings

and practices" i n t h e university would not accomplish t h i s . Such an idea i s it-

s e l f one-dimensional and potentially authoritarian. Since the ideology and logic

of scientism obtains reinforcement from the t o t a l s t r u c t u r e of the university,

it i s absurd t o imply t h a t t h e use o f r e s t r i c t i o n s within it could l i b e r a t e

inquiry.
 The "bureaucratic ethosllQ1 of t h e u n i v e r s i t y i t s e l f compl6ments t h e

value-free dogma, and u t i l i z i n g bureaucratic means " t o open t h e mental

space" necessary f o r pragmatic inquiry i s not only u n r e a l i s t i c , it i s s e l f -

contradictory. The content of c l a s s e s might become more "radical" even

"revolutionary", and r h e t o r i c might change accordingly ( e s p e c i a l l y i f t h e

r a d i c a l ideas a r e graded), but t h e thought would remain academic. People

who a r e integrated i n t o t h e d a i l y workings of a bureaucracy a r e not l i k e l y

t o become s o c i o l o g i c a l l y perceptive or c r i t i c a l about t h e milieux within

which they work. Their commitment t o t h e maintenance of t h e milieu of t h e

i n s t i t u t i o n within which they work i n h i b i t s them from developing what Mills

c a l l e d "the s k i l l s of controversy with oneself, which we c a l l thinking and

with others which we c a l l debate".42 Believing t h a t one's work i s value-free

t h e academic i s not l i k e l y t o 'I... see t h e r o o t s of h i s own b i a s e s and frus-

t r a t i o n s (which i s necessary) i f he is t o t h i n k c l e a r l y about himself, or

about anything. 1'43

4 - Business-Like Control of Academia

Mannheim believed t h a t "the fundamental tendency of a l l bureaucratic

44
thought is t o t u r n problems of p o l i t i c s i n t o problems of administrations".

Today t h e u n i v e r s i t y bureaucracy turns problems of education i n t o problems of

administration a s well. This makes it necessary t o study t h e p o l i t i c s of edu-

c a t i o n i f we a r e t o have a thorough c r i t l q u e of scientlsrn.

The p o l i t i c a l nature of u n i v e r s i t y administrations has long been recog-

nized by c r i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s . Veblenls study of higher education published i n

1919 foresaw the e f f e c t s of the incorporation o f the university into the capi-

t a l i s t economy. With the growing business-like control over education, he ar-

gued t h a t learning would become "...a merchantable commodity, t o be produced

on a piece-rate plan, rated, bought and sold by standard u n i t s , measured,

counted and reduced t o s t a p l e equivalence by impersonal, mechanical t e s t s . 1145

Veblen did not believe t h a t t h i s business-like control o f education

only affected administrative tasks. The t o t a l s t r u c t u r e of t h e university

was affected by t h e new business-like control over higher education. For in-

stance, he i n s t a l l a t i o n of a rounded system of -scholastic accountancy brings

with it, i f it does not presume, painstaking d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e personnel and

t h e courses of i n s t r u c t i o n i n t o a s e r i e s of bureaux and departments. t146 only

an i d e a l i s t who denied t h e r e a l i t i e s o f i n s t i t u t i o n s would t r y t o argue t h a t

t h e organization of university education i n t o departments is determined by the

changing problems, methods and theories i n p a r t i c u l a r subject matter. The frag-

mentation of subject matter into so-called "disciplines" has not occurred because

o f the pragmatic needs of Inquiry, but primarily because of t h e needs of t h e

bureaucrat y.

Veblen believed t h a t t h e business-like control o f t h e university a l s o

affected t h e motivation f o r and q u a l i t y of teaching. " ~ i k eother workmen, under

pressure of competition, the members of t h e academlc s t a f f w i l l endeavour t o keep

UP t h e i r necessary income by cheapening t h e i r product and increasing t h e i r market-

able outcome. 'lQ7 This may seem a strange way t o r e f e r t o "professors", who a r e

t r a d i t i o n a l l y thought t o transcend the marketplace, but once we have demystified

the ideology and logic of scientism and s i t u a t e a l l language i n human praxis,

we need some such analysis of how the academic i s affected by h i s o r her m i -

l i e u and i n s t i t u t i o n , and t h e s t r u c t u r a l relationship between it and the r e s t

of society. I f anything, Veblen understated h i s analysis. Today t h e univer-

48
s i t y i s thoroughly integrated i n t o t h e marketplace. The Academic Marketplace,

with i t s publish o r perish ethic, i t s textbook credo, i t s division between

, ~ ~i t s c a r e e r i s t motivatidns
teaching and research, i t s " g r a n t m a n ~ h i ~ "and -
where obtaining a n administrative position i s often a goal, and teaching and/or

research a means - can only be distinguished from t h e c a p i t a l i s t marketplace

through metaphysical c2assifications.

On t h e basis o f h i s study, Veblen concluded t h a t t h e business-like

control of t h e u n i v e r s i t y was detrimental t o a l l aspects of inquiry. "~othing

but continued workday f a m i l i a r i t y with t h i s system of academic grading and

c r e d i t , a s it takes e f f e c t i n t h e conduct and control o f instruction, and a s

i t s f u r t h e r elaboration continues t o employ t h e t a l e n t s and t h e deliberation

of college men, can enable any observor t o appreciate t h e extraordinary lengths

t o which t h i s matter is c a r r i e d i n practice, and t h e pervasive way i n which it

r e s i s t l e s s l y bends more and more of current i n s t r u c t i o n t o i t s mechanical t e s t s

and progressively s t e r i l i z e s a l l personal i n i t i a t i v e and ambition t h a t comes

within i t s sweep. '150 As he said: Since "it i s bad business policy t o c r e a t e

unnecessary annoyance",51 "a truculent quietism i s often accepted a s a mark of

s c i e n t i f i c maturity"52 within the university. Throughout t h i s study, we have

seen how much of what passes f o r " s c i e n t i f i c maturity" i s nothing more than

s c i e n t i s t i c rhetoric.
 Veblen, l i k e Weber i n t h i s regard, realized t h a t "Skepticism i s t h e be-

ginning of ~ c i e n c e . " 5 ~But, unlike Weber, and more l i k e Bronowski, he realized

t h a t c e r t a i n conditions a r e required f o r t h e creative doubt involved i n inquiry

t o be nurtured. That i s why h i s solution t o t h e problems of university was more

p o l i t i c a l than t h a t proposed by Marcuse. I n Veblenls view:

" ~ lt hla t i s required i s t h e a b o l i t i o n of t h e academic executive (read

President, J.H. ) and of t h e governing board. Anything short of t h i s
heroic remedy is bound t o f a i l , because t h e e v i l s sought t o be reme-
died a r e inherent in these organs, and i n t r i n s i c t o t h e i r functioning. rr 54

On t h e basis of h i s s t r u c t u r a l insights about t h e university, he argued It... that

no remedy or corrective can be contrived t h a t w i l l have anything more than a

transient p a l l i a t i v e e f f e c t , so long a s these conditions t h a t . c r e a t e the d i f f i -

c u l t y a r e allowed t o remain i n force. 11 55

Academic Freedom a s a Repressive Tolerance

Veblen's insight into t h e s t r u c t u r a l r o o t s o f university problems was

not paralleled by t h e recognition t h a t basic change i n t h e university i s impos-

s i b l e while it is integrated into t h e marketplace. The conditions t h a t a r e

detrimental t o inquiry h&e remained and expanded i n t h e university since the

time of Veblen.

Goodman believed t h a t

"veblenls model i s drawn t o o closely f r o m old-fashioned business admini-

s t r a t i o n with i t s chain-of-command bureaucracy and a r b i t r a r y hiring and
f i r i n g , a s i t u a t i o n i n which scholars a r e resentful, insecure and res-
tive. But our modern model i s drawn from both public administration,
developed f o r placid c i v i l service
management, with i t s philosophy of belonging
... ...
and from s c i e n t i f i c business
"56

I n contrast t o Veblen, he took account of what Marcuse called repressive tolerance

 i n h i s analysis of t h e university. He recognized how t h e structure of t h e

university allows c e r t a i n freedoms from i n s t i t u t i o n a l authority, but under-

mines freedoms & a l t e r milieux t o f a c i l i t a t e inquiry. 57

"1n effect, it i s the genius o f strong administration t o weaken t h e

community by keeping the teachers out of contact with the students,
t h e teachers out of contact with one another and with t h e world, and
t h e students imprisoned i n t h e i r adolescent subculture and otherwise
obediently conformist ...
Modern administration i s o l a t e s the individ-
uals, the groups, and the studies and, by standardizing and coordina-
t i n g them, reconstructs a social machine ...
The machine has no edu-
c a t i v e use, but it occupies the time of t h e students ( i n a period of
youth unemployment), it pays t h e s a l a r i e s of scholars, and it manu-
factures licenses and marketable s k i l l s . 1 ' 5 ~

Within t h i s "social machine" there i s frequent reference t o academic freedom.

It does not r e f e r t o t h e freedom of inquiry or t h e freedom t o c r e a t e t h e context

t h a t would nurture what Bronowski called "the h a b i t of truth". This would re-

quire the replacement o f r e i f ied "disciplines" ; hence of t h e curricula and

bureaucratic system. Rather, it r e f e r s t o the p r i v a t i s t freedom o f t h e academic.

" ~ o r t i f i e di n t h e i r departments and tenure and t h e kind of academic

freedom t h a t i s ( d i l a t o r i l y ) protected by... (University Teachers1
Association, J.H. ), t h e senior scholars a r e not much disturbed by
e i t h e r t h e students o r by one another o r by t h e administration. And
society i s s a t i s f i e d by the symbolic proof t h a t a l o t of education
i s going on, f a t s y l l a b i , hundreds o f thousands of diplomas, bales
of published research. And indeed, the students a r e educated i n the
process. Most of them learn
society, t o conform and batten. "59
... the s e c r e t o f o u r uniquely glamorous

It i s worth kxamining "academic freedom" a s a s p e c i f i c example of repres-

s i v e tolerance i n t h e university. One author has argued t h a t " O u r university

system works because it exploits t h e c r e a t i v i t y of those who a r e w i l l i n g t o

compromise t h e i r academic freedom t o enjoy t h e personal s a t i s f a c t i o n of studying

and learning f o r t h e i r own sake. '60 Here the use of t h e term "academic freedom"
implies t h a t freedom of inquiry has t o do with having freedom within t h e

milieu within which one works, and t h a t t h e university does not allow or

provide t h i s . Certainly someone i n t h e university who thinks, works and

l i v e s i n terms of t h e dichotomies of scientism w i l l appear t o have academic

freedom. But i t i s a r e i f i c a t i o n of appearances and t h e r e l a t e d f a i l u r e t o

undertake comparative inquiry t h a t leads t o f a l s e , s c i e n t i s t i c generalizations.

Within t h e present system, t h e academic exchanges t h e freedom t o undertake s i g -

n i f i c a n t experiments with education f o r h i s or her r i g h t t o have a s u b j e c t i v i s t ,

p r l v a t i s t involvement with e i t h e r abstracted empiricism or grand theorizing.

Neither c o n s t i t u t e s ongoing inquiry and an impersonal, schizoid system of teach-

ing i s required t o cover up t h i s shortcoming. A s long a s t h e academic behaves,

f o r example, teaches; according t o t h e norms of t h e corporate u n i v e r s i t y , h i s

or her subjective, p r i v a t e world of ideas i s tolerated. By t h e time most aca-

demics achieve tensure, they a r e s a t i s f a c t o r i l y socialized t o t h e a p r i o r i e s

and r u l e s of both t h e bureaucracy and t h e ideology and logic of scientism, so

t h e r e i s l i t t l e change of such non-conformity. 61

There a r e s p e c i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n a l procedures t h a t underlie t h e repres-

s i v e l y t o l e r a n t form of academic freedom. Writing about t h e theory and prac-

' t i c e of academic freedom, one author s t a t e d that:

"The mere exercise of one's academic freedom should not be cause f o r

dismissal whether or not one enjoys tenure. This i s t h e theory. What
of t h e practice? I n t h e absence of a contractual provision t o t h e
contrary, a professor without tenure may be dismissed without cause
... Hence t h e n e c e s s i t y of delimiting t h e scope of academic freedom
a s h i s tenured confrere who cannot be dismissed f o r exercising aca-
demic freedom because i n t h e case of t h e l a t t e r t h e u n i v e r s i t y must
show cause. Here, it seems t o me, r e s t s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of tenure
t o academic freedom. "62
This author was obviously ignorant of the relationship between tenure policies

and t h e repressive tolerances of s c i e n t i s t i c education and therefore saw the

issue of academic freedom i n l e g a l i s t i c terms, but he did expose t h e contra-

dictions between theory and practice, the rhetoric and r e a l i t y of the univer-

sity. Such a contradiction between the theory and practice of academic freedom

can i t s e l f be rationalized by the ideology and logic of scientism, so we have

another example of i t s one-dimensionality.

Structure A s Function: The P o l i t i c a l Economy of the University

Goodman tended t o focus h i s analysis on t h e a f f e c t of t h e bureaucractic

university s t r u c t u r e on t h e so-called "community of scholars". He did not see

such a s t r u c t u r e a s a r e f l e c t i o n of, t h a t i s , a means t o f u l f i l l , t h e functions

of t h e university. Once we admit the mythical nature of the "community of schol-

ars", and r e a l i z e t h a t rhetoric about t h i s myth i t s e l f has a p o l i t i c a l function

i n integrating t h e business-like control of the university,63 we can begin t o

analyze t h e university i n terms o f pragmatic requirements f o r s o c i a l inquiry.

Rather than accepting t h e ideology and logic of scientism and only conceiving

ideas within the bounds of i t s dichotomies, we can begin t o e s t a b l i s h regulative

principles f o r ongoing inquiry i n t o t h e workings of t h e university i n society.

What a r e t h e consequehces of t h e bureaucratic workings of the university?

Such an analysis of t h e consequences of university s t r u c t u r e can give us insights

i n t o the functions it serves, The two maLn consequences o r functions of univer-

s i t y s t r u c t u r e a r e i t s r o l e i n the p o l i t i c a l economy and the r e l a t e d creation of

the ideology and logic of scientism. Awareness of the f i r s t function of t h e uni-

v e r s i t y has grown since t h e student revolt against the corporate university has

accelerated. The myths of t h e ivory tower a r e quickly being exposed and people

a r e beginning t o see higher education a s an i n t e g r a l part of advanced i n d u s t r i a l

o r s t a t e capitalism. A s one author put it: "1t i s no accident, I think, t h a t a s

-
Time magazine cheerfully points out i n a recent issue, the leaders of business

and heads of u n i v e r s i t i e s have become interchangeable parts. tt 64

The growing interchangeability of business and university e l i t e s r e f l e c t s

t h e s t r u c t u r a l integration of higher education i n t o the p o l i t i c a l economy of s t a t e

capitalism. We have t o understand t h i s integration, a t l e a s t i n general tePms, t o

be a b l e t o t r a c e t h e roots and consequences of t h e ideology and logic of scientism.

For example, it i s necessary t o r e a l i z e t h e relationship between the PationaliZa-

t i o n of c a p i t a l i s t production and t h e s o c i a l i z a t i o n of the c o s t s of higher educa-

tion. I n a time of a growing technical-scientific labour force

"NO one corporation can afford t o t r a i n i t s own labour force f o r t h e r e i s

no way t o insure t h a t i t s investment, once trained, w i l l not seek employ-
ment elsewhere. The c o s t s of t r a i n i n g therefore have t o be ~ o c i a l i z e d . " ~ ~

The s o c i a l i z a t i o n o f t h e c o s t s of education and advanced i n d u s t r i a l o r

s t a t e capitalism a r e complementary because the structures of t h e s t a t e and of t h e

marketplace have fused. Universities and collcges could not have been centralized

under corporate control i n the manner t h a t multi-national corporations66 have cen-

t r a l i z e d and integrated other aspects of t h e economy. "Because science and tech-

nology a r e b a s i c a l l y s o c i a l i n nature - they cannot be owned and controlled like

a machine - private corporations and indeed individual countries have met with
g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y i n t h e i r attempts t o monopolize these new productive forces. 11 67

So t h e s t r u c t u r e s of t h e s t a t e have become e s s e n t i a l t o t h e maintenance of t h e

c a p i t a l i s t system.

We cannot understand t h e s o c i a l arrangement of science nor c l a r i f y t h e

problem of ideology within s t a t e capitalism i f we hold t o a mechanistic o r reduc-

t i o n i s t i c view of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of business and t h e university. We, t h e r e f o r e ,

require a d i a l e c t i c a l , s t r u c t u r a l perspective; not one rooted i n some conspiracy

theory. OIConnor provided t h i s perspective when he wrote t h a t

"... t h e s o c i a l character of s c i e n t i f i c and technical knowledge means t h a t

ultimately no p r i v a t e form of business organization can completely contain
and control it. For t h i s knowledge t o contribute t o t h e benefit of t h e
corporations, t h e intervention of t h e s t a t e i s needed. I n e f f e c t , a form
of s t a t e capitalism must accompany t h e growth of t h e corporate conglomer-
ate. "68

Though higher education i s not owned by corporations, it i s g r e a t l y con-

t r o l l e d by them. The character and extent of t h i s control, however, has been

g r e a t l y ignored, I f we s t i l l think t h e danger t o u n i v e r s i t y autonomy stems from

government interference, we f a i l t o n o t i c e t h a t corporate involvement i n higher

69
education, with t h e a i d of t h e s t a t e , has gone beyond interference and become

control. Surely t h e common use of provincial, f e d e r a l or s t a t e p o l i c e on camPuses

is i n d i c a t i v e t h a t t h e older concern f o r government interference i s a r e d herring.

Once we understand t h a t "From t h e standpoint of t h e corporations, it i s more

r a t i o n a l t o combine t e c h n i c a l - s c i e n t i f i c labour power with c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e

technology, than t o combine simple labour power with labour-intensive technolo-

g i e ~ , ~we
' begin t o understand why higher education has been socialized. But t h e

u n i v e r s i t i e s do not j u s t provide t h e technical-scientific labour f o r c e required

f o r s t a t e capitalism. The teaching of t h e ideology and logic of s c l e n t i s m i s it-

s e l f indispensable i f people i n t h i s new labour force a r e t o work without ques-

tioning the consequences of what they do.

With t h i s understanding of t h e extent of corporate control of the mi-

v e r s i t i e s , we can no longer see the immense overproportion of corporate directors

on university Boards of Governors a s being accidental o r t o do with honour or

status. This is t h e e r r o r t h a t Porter made i n h i s study of t h e interchangeability

of corporate and university e l i t e s . For example, he wrote:

"Whether o r not power comes from the vast array of honorific r o l e s held by
t h e economic e l i t e is d i f f i c u l t t o say. There i s a n element o f decision-
making, but t h e r e i s a l s o a n important element of honour i n t h e sense
t h a t election t o them i s much l i k e e l e c t i o n t o t h e ' r i g h t 1 club."7l

The reason why Porter was ambiguous on t h i s matter was because h i s study was not

analytical, but more a combination of a b s t r a c t empiricism and grand theory. 72

For example, discussing t h e r e l a t i o n s between corporate and university e l i t e s , he

s t a t e d t h a t "The explanation does not l i e i n any i n t r i n s i c l i n k between the two,

but l i e s rather i n the s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a society based on corpomte

capitalism. "73 I n saying t h i s he did not r e a l i z e t h a t s c i e n t i f i c explanations

never deal with " i n t r i n s i c s " but, i n the case of t h e s o c i a l sciences, with struc-

t u r a l matters. And it i s t h e s t r u c t u r a l change i n capitalism, i t s transfomnation

i n t o what Porter c a l l e d "cdrporate capitalism", t h a t underlies t h e new power t h a t

corporate e l i t e s have over and within universities.

I have continually stressed t h a t there i s no s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p

between an understanding of t h e roots and consequences of t h e ideology and logic

of scientism and p o l i t i c a l rhetoric. We can see another example of t h i s by con-

t r a s t i n g the s c i e n t i s t i c approach o f Porter, a s a s o c i a l democrat, with t h a t of

Galbraith, a l i b e r a l . For instance* Galbraith acknowledged the same S ~ P U C ~ U P ~ ~

s h i f t t h a t OtConnor described, though he understood it i n a very different way.

He compared t h e r o l e of what he named "the educational and s c i e n t i f i c estate" t o

t h e r o l e of banks i n an e a r l i e r stage of capitalism. And he argued t h a t t h i s es-

t a t e stands "... i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e industrial system much a s did the banking and

financial community t o t h e e a r l i e r stages of i n d u s t r i a l de~eloprnent."~' For Gal-

braith, " ~ 0 t howe ( or owed) t h e i r prestige and influence t o t h e i r association

with t h e decisive f a c t o r of production. "75

Galbraith s t r e s s e d one important difference between t h e educational and

s c i e n t i f i c e s t a t e and t h e banks i n h i s h i s t o r i c a l analogy. he educational and

s c i e n t i f i c e s t a t e has no control over t h e supply of t a l e n t similar t o t h a t of the

banker over access t o savings. "76 Unlike Porter, he acknowledged t h a t because

corporate power i s fundamental t o t h i s society, the educat,ional and sc i e n t i f i q

e s t a t e has no r e a l c o n t r o l over the consequences of i t s t r a i n i n g and research.

Though t h i s acknowledgement begins t o undermine Galbraithts main hypothesis t h a t

the "technostructure" has gained significant power i n t h i s society, he stated t h a t

t h e executives of business s i t on university boards p a r t i a l l y f o r "...the oppor-

t u n i t y t o maintain c l o s e r liason with sources of t a l e n t and t o keep more closely

abreast o f s c i e n t i f i c and technological innovation. 11 77

Galbraith did not r e l a t e h i s awareness about the educational and s c i e n t i f -

i c e s t a t e t o t h e ideology and logic of scientism. Though h i s study of The New

I n d u s t r i a l S t a t e was rooted i n an awareness of the s t r u c t u r a l interdependence of

education, science and corporations, he accepted enough of the mythology of the

 l i b e r a l u n i v e r s i t y t o ignore t h i s implication of h i s analysis. For example, over

t h e question of whether o r not t h e educational and s c i e n t i f i c e s t a t e " w i l l i d e n t i f y

i t s e l f with t h e goals of t h e ( i n d u s t r i a l system)" he answered t h a t "No generaliza-

t i o n i s possible. "78 Yet a study of t h e problems of ideology and logic shows t h a t

a n ideology and logic of scientism is being created in t h e u n i v e r s i t i e s and t h a t

it complements t h e goals of s t a t e capitalism.79 Furthermore, accepting t h e l i b e r a l

notion of academic freedom which we have already c r i t i c i z e d , Galbraith Wrote t h a t

"the educational and s c i e n t i f i c e s t a t e is not i n h i b i t e d p o l i t i c a l l y by t h e t i e s of

organization"80 t h a t have developed between i t and corporations. To suggest t h a t

a n "estate" t h a t i s integrated i n t o corporate s o c i e t y is not p o l i t i c a l l y i n h i b i t e d

is t o t r e a t " p o l i t i c s " a s something unrelated t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n and uses of power.

G a l b r a i t h l s notion of " p o l i t i c s " i s therefore s i m i l a r t o t h e a b s t r a c t way t h a t l i b -

e r a l s i n t h e corporate s o c i e t y t r e a t a l l matters of value.

For our purposes it i s important t o note t h a t Galbraith, l i k e OIConnor,

recognized t h e s t r u c t u r a l change i n capitalism t h a t complements t h e new corporate

controls over t h e university. The u n i v e r s i t y i s not j u s t a "service s t a t i o n f 1f o r

corporations within s t a t e capitalism. I t s function within t h e p o l i t i c a l economy

of advanced i n d u s t r i a l capitalism goes f a r deeper than t h i s . And because of t h l s ,

n e i t h e r t h e categories of vulgar marxism or of t h e end-of-ideology can understand

t h e dynamics of t h e university. A s learning and s c i e n t i f i c technique themselves

Secome commodities i n t h e p o l i t i c a l economy, and a s t h e s t a t e has bccome a co-

manager of corporate capitalism, t h e s e categories become more and more inappropriate

and d i s t o r t i n g . The s o c i a l i z a t i o n of people t o a view of s o c i e t y which reduces

"class struggle1' solely t o conflicts a t the point of i n d u s t r i a l production, o r

t o a view t h a t a l l c l a s s struggle has ended, i t s e l f serves t o obscure the new

s o c i a l and economic r e l a t i o n s developing a s the p o l i t i c a l economy o f t h e univer-

s I t y expands.

According t o OfConnor, the corporate university is t i e d i n t o s t a t e capi-

talism I n four ways. I n advanced i n d u s t r i a l capitalism, it has become a point

of production. Once we demystify the s c i e n t i s t i c dichotomies, especially t h a t

between theory and practice, we a r e i n a b e t t e r position t o understand how the

university functions within the division of labour - including mental labour -

i n t h i s society. Second, a s an i n t e g r a l part of t h e research and development

system of the corporate marketplace, the university has become a point of mer-

chandizing. Third, because it i s integrated with t h e s t a t e , t h e university has

become a center of s t a t e bureaucratic s o c i a l control. The fourth function i s

rooted i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of the university t o imperialism. Within advanced

i n d u s t r i a l capitalism the s t a t e i s involved

"...i n t h e accumulation of capital: abroad: i n t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of raw

materials, t h e c r e a t i o n of Investment opportunities, t h e creation o f
cheap labour havens, and the s t a b i l i z a t i o n of international banking
centers. The s t a t e guarankes foreign investments, s t a b i l i z e s t h e
monetary system under the reign of t h e dollar, provides the economic
i n f r a s t m c t u r e f o r - p r i v a t e inuestments with public funds, subsidizes
exports, bribes l o c a l c l i e n t bourgeoisies and m i l i t a r y groups, creates
favorable t a r i f f agreements, controls world commodity organizations,
and generally exercises economic , p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y control over
unstable areas ( i. e. a l l underdeveloped areas 1. "81

The university i s a part of t h i s s t r u c t u r a l mosaic. It does not just service t h e

s t a t e and the corporations; i t s t r a i n i n g and i t s research and development often

82
make it fundamental t o t h e p o l i c i e s o f t h e l a t t e r .
 This general p i c t u r e of t h e p o l i t i c a l economy of t h e u n i v e r s i t y must be

specified i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r case of any university i n Canada. OIConnorls out-

l i n e of t h e i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e u n i v e r s i t y i n t o s t a t e capitalism c l e a r l y f i t s t h e

l a r g e multi-universities i n t h e United States. A study of t h e way t h e Canadian

u n i v e r s i t y is structured by and functions a s p a r t of t h e c o n t i n e n t a l i s t process

would more c l e a r l y determine t h e p o l i t i c a l economy of t h e u n i v e r s i t y i n t h i s

Country.83 It i s l i k e l y t h a t a s Canada becomes t h e primary area of United S t a t e s 1

corporate investment i n t h e world t h a t t h e continental academic marketplace w i l l

become more integrated i n t o t h e continental p o l i t i c a l economy. Academics t m i n e d

i n one multi-university w i l l teach i n another a s it s u i t s t h e i r c a r e e r , without

e x i s t e n t i a l knowledge of t h e s i t u a t i o n s of those they "teacht', t h a t i s , t r a i n . I n

t h e process, t h e ideology and l o g i c of scientism w i l l not only d i s t o r t and impede

inquiPy, it w i l l a l s o help obscure t h e growing l o s s of self-determination f o r t h e

people of Canada.

m h s Ab,out The University

Unless we abandon t h e l i b e r a l notion of t h e u n i v e r s i t y , including t h e w t h

of t h e community of scholars, and engage i n pragmatic inquiry i n t o problems implied

by t h e function of t h e u n i v e r s i t y , we w i l l not be a b l e t o understand t h e r o o t s and

consequences of t h e ideology and logic of scientism i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l capi-

talism. I r o n i c a l l y , t h e l i b e r a l view of t h e u n i v e r s i t y i s o f t e n expressed most

a r t i c u l a t e l y by academics who s e e and define themselves a s " r a d i c a l s " , even

"Marxists". This shows how t h e ideology and logic of scientism has a f f e c t e d and
been accepted by the so-called "social c r l t i c s " of academia. Because they have

accepted an academic o r i e n t a t i o n t o knowledge, they have not engaged i n the in-

quiry needed t o understand university structure a s a r e f l e c t i o n of i t s function

i n the p o l i t i c a l economy. Thus when they have t o j u s t i f y t h e i r own praxis they

r e v e r t t o the myths about t h e l i b e r a l university. But t h i s i s not a s strange a s

it f i r s t appears. Those who control or manage the university don't require myths

t o rationalize their activity. Their ongoing exercise of authority and the i n s t i -

t u t i o n a l consequences of t h i s i s enough t o r a t i o n a l i z e t h e i r position within the

university. W h s a r e usually taken more seriously by those without, but depend-

ent upon, power.

Let me exemplify t h i s point. After the i n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i s i s a t S i r George

Williams University, Montreal, i n 1969, a l o c a l group of academic radicals wrote

that 'I... t h e University must be maintained a s t h e center of f r e e thought, vigor-

ous debate, and t h e confrontation o f ideas, i n a s e t t i n g f r e e o f any constraints

on academic freedom. "84 It is s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t they saw "ideas", not peoples

with d i f f e r i n g forms o f praxis, a s being i n confrontation. When t h e r e i s funda-

mental debate, it i s people, not ideas, t h a t a r e i n confrontation, even i f t h e

m i l i t a n t behaviour associated with t h e term "confrontation" i s not i n existence.

Ideas a r e rooted i n language and language i s a form of behaviour. But t h s academic

radicals did not s i t u a t e t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l "ideas" i n ongoing behaviour. It is

a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t they assumed t h a t the university & a center of f r e e thought

and academic freedom. It i s t r u e t h a t those who accept the ideology and logic of

~ ~ i e n t i sam
r e "free" t o "thlnk" and "debate" i n t h e university. Thought, however*

i s not one-dimensional, but comparative.

begins t o question these "axiomstt and a l t e r s h i s o r her teaching and research

approaches t o open up inquiry into matters ignored by the ideology and logic of

scientism, he or she w i l l not find t h e university t o be so tolerant. It i s note-

worthy t h a t the concern of these academic radicals with maintaining "a s e t t i n g

f r e e of anv constraints on academic freedom" on one page was replaced with the

concern f o r "the f r e e s t possible discourse permitted" a page l a t e r . They shifted

f r o m abstract values t o a r e i f i e d s o c i a l realism8* - with no inquiry t o back up

e i t h e r generalization.

These'radical academics called themselves t'socialists". And, l i k e a l l

vulgar and/or academic marxists, they showed a c e r t a i n detached reverence f o r the

s o c i a l i s t s who have obtained p o l i t i c a l power and/or t h e o r e t i c a l prestige. But

consistent with the s c i e n t i s t i c approach t o events, they abstracted these "great

men'' out of t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l and biographic context, and, i n doing t h i s , used

them a s rationalizations f o r t h e i r own praxis i n the university. Totally ignoring

the f a c t t h a t revolutionary s o c i a l i s t s undertook t h e i r profound t h e o r e t i c a l work

out of u n i v e r s i t i e s and while they engaged i n p o l i t i c a l struggles, they wrote t h a t

"1t is hardly accidental t h a t the outstanding t h e o r e t i c a l leaders of the world

s o c i a l i s t mwement - Marx, Engels, Mao, Gramsci, Castro and many others - were
university producti. "89 The a b i l i t y t o manipulate language without reference t o

relevant information i s one o f t h e s k i l l s t h a t t h e university provides those who

think by i t s r u l e s and a priories. As a way t o r a t i o n a l i z e f i r s t principles, it

i s adequate. As a basis f o r inquiry, i t i s not.

These academic r a d i c a l s conveniently f a i l e d t o study Marx and Engelst

theory of ideology and t o apply it t o themselves. But they persisted t h a t t h e i r 1
r o l e a s t h e o r e t i c a l s o c i a l i s t s was t o combat "...bourgeois ideology i n a l l i t s
forms - not by abuse, vilifica'cion, slander and hysterical outbursts, but by

patient argunent and the slow formulation of a coherent a l t e r n a t i v e world world. 11 9'

But if anything i s "bourgeois", i n t h e sense t h a t it denies the ideological Sig-

nificance of a p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n i n c a p i t a l i s t society, it i s the l i b e r a l

notion of t h e university a s a place where "the principles of autonomy and academic

freedom f o r a11 p o l i t i c a l vj.ewpoints a r e upheld".g1 Yet t h i s i s what t h e academic

r a d i c a l s stated. In doing t h i s , they abstracted 'the university" out of its con-

t e x t within s t a t e c a p i t a l i s t society. d l 1 p o l i t i c a l viewpoints a r e not a r t i c u l a t e d

i n the university. Certain people, with c e r t a i n biographies mediated by p a r t i c u l a r

s o c i a l c l a s s , s t a t u s , etc., who have experienced c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l events, g e t in-

t o the university. Others But more important f o r the purposes of t h i s

study, a l l p o l i t i c a l viewpoints t h a t a r e expressed i n the university a r e taught

within, t h a t i s reduced t o , t h e dichotomies of scientism. The "analysis" presented

by these academic radicals i s i t s e l f an example of t h i s process.

Patient a~gLU?Ientand coherent a l t e r n a t i v e s a r e indispensable f o r pragmatic

inquiry. But argument and a l t e r n a t i v e s must be i n terms of ongoing inquiry, and

not i n terms of f i r s t principles. The i n t e r e s t i n g thing i s how those who t h i n k i n

terms of f i r s t principles, t h a t i s , have a s t a t l c p o l i t i c a l identity, a r e t h e ones

who often have nothing but "abuse, v i l i f i c a t i o n , slander and h y s t e r i c a l outbursts"

t o t r y t o show t h a t a person with similar s c i e n t i s t i c assumptions about knowledge,

 These academic r a d i c a l s see themselves a s t h e t h e o r i s t s of t h e s o c i a l i s t

movement. They want t o be " f r e e t o do t h a t t h e o r e t i c a l work which i s necessary

t o t h e formation of a p o l i t i c a l l y v i a b l e r a d i c a l movement". 93 But i n t h e i r

"analysis" of t h e u n i v e r s i t y , an analysis t h a t s h i f t s from f i r s t principles t o

r e l f i c a t i o n s of t h e obvious, t h e r e is a notable l a c k of subject matter and t h e

s k i l l s of c r i t i c a l , pragmatic inquiry. For example, they accepted "the mainte-

nance of academic freedom, with a l l t h e r i g h t s and obligations t h a t t h i s e n t a i l s I1 94

without considering t h e r o o t s and- consequences of what i s c a l l e d "academic freedom1'

i n t h e university. They whole-heartedly accepted t h e notion, of t h e "obligations

e n t a i l e d by academic freedom'' without pointing out t h e consequences of these so-

c a l l e d "constraints" f o r inquiry.

Ultimately, t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e i r position r e s t e d on what they c a l l e d

t h e i r "experience". Though having a d i f f e r e n t r h e t o r i c than Popper, t h e s e aca-

demic r a d i c a l s r e l i e d on t h e same psychologism t o obscure t h e problems i n t h e i r

position. Thus they wrote t h a t

"Those of us who have been r a d i c a l s f o r many years know from experience

t h a t every movement f o r change a t t r a c t s a l u n a t i c f r i n g e a s a well-
greased machine a t t r a c t s g r i t . G r i t , however, has enough sense not t o
claim t h a t it makes t h e machine run or t h a t it i s t h e machine. And a s
a machine must be cleaned from t h e t o time i f it i s not t o grind t o a
h a l t , t h e r a d i c a l movement must from time t o time c l e a n off i t s oppor-
t u n i s t i c - d i r t f o r t h e same reason. "95

We have seen i n t h i s study how t h e ideology and logic of scientism, whether

Vulgar marxist or l i b e r a l p a s l t i v i s t , often r e l i e s on mechanical metaphors. Such

metaphors, e s p e c i a l l y when used t o r a t i o n a l i z e the authoritarianism of p a r t i e s ,

c l a s s e s or e l i t e s over t h e "masses", f o r example, t h e regimes of S t a l i n o r Nixon,

a r e often associated with n i h i l i s t i c consequences. Radical academics who look

a t ongoing events through grand theory a r e no l e s s vulgar o r simplistic and

contradictory i n t h e i r generalizations than academics with non-leftist beliefs.

Their schizoid praxis and r e i f i e d uses of language makes them more similar t o ,

than d i f f e r e n t from, those within the ivory tower with whom they agree t o dis-

agree.

Radical and Conservative Critiques of t h e University

O u r c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h e roots and consequences of t h e ideology and

logic of scientism w i l l be enhanced i f we continue t o u t i l i z e a comparative

method. Let me therefore polarize t h e l i b e r a l view o f - t h e university with

t h a t held by many r a d i c a l students and some conservative scholars.

A common criticism of the university among student r a d i c a l s i s t h a t

"... under t h e present patterns o f ownership t h e u n i v e r s i t y J s very production

- s c i e n t i f i c and technical knowledge and t h e brainpower t o apply and t r m s m i t

it - i s i t s e l f t h e very s t u f f of which imperialism i s made. "96 Because o f t h i s

criticism, many r a d i c a l students argue t h a t "... a s much a s t i r e d ex-radical

professors w i l l squawk, o r l i b e r a l s warn of t h e a n t i - i n t e l l e c t ~ ~ a l i s m

of the

r i g h t , r a d i c a l s must t r e a t t h e university a s they would a slumlord or a napalm

factory. "97 The function of u n i v e r s i t i e s within the p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y

economy makes them complicit i n the imperialism of t h e s t a t e c a p i t a l i s t nations

over t h e r e s t of humanity. I n Canada, u n i v e r s i t i e s a r e quickly becoming branch-

plant subsidiaries of t h e U.S. academic marketplace and a s such function t o extend

t h e c o n t i n e n t a l i s t process.

Because t h e dichotomies of scientism a r e t r e a t e d ontologically and not

pragmatically, t h a t i s , a s useful f o r p a r t i c u l a r but not a l l inquiry, it becomes

d i f f i c u l t i f not Impossible f o r academics t o understand t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between

t h e u n i v e r s i t y and t h i s imperialism. For example, i f a n academic thinks of him

or h e r s e l f a s a n p b s e r v o r of imperialism, with one's own p r i v a t e b e l i e f s , and

does not r e a l i z e t h a t he or she i s within a s o c i a l f i e l d t h a t has a s t r u c t u r a l

r e l a t i o n t o an i n s t i t u t i o n which has a s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n with t h e r e s t of t h e

p o l i t i c a l economy, which functions i m p e r i a l i s t i c a l l y , one cannot even begin t o

analyze, t h a t is, t o t a l i z e , t h e c l a s s of problems rooted i n t h e problem of ide-

ology. That is why C.W. Mills was c o r r e c t when he argued t h a t i f matters of

method o r theory a r e a b s t r a c t e d from s p e c i f i c problems t h a t t h e academic w i l l

tend towards a b s t r a c t empiricism or grand theory. The power of t h e s c i e n t i s t i c

- where theory i s s p l i t from p r a c t i c e , t h e subjective

r h e t o r i c of t h e ivory tower

is s p l i t from t h e objective and value i s s p l i t from f a c t - keeps t h e academic from

conceptualizing t h e problems rooted i n t h e very s t r u c t u r e s t h a t he or she works

and l i v e s within.

Treating t h e dichotomies of scientism i n an ontological way may prove t o

have d i r e consequences beyond our g r e a t e s t imagination. I f we continue t o look

a t and study t h e world of ongoing events i n terms of " o b j e c t i v e t t , "theory" and

"fact", on %he one hand, and "subjective", " p r a c t i c a l " and "value", on t h e other

hand, we w i l l probably not be a b l e t o control, l e t alone understand, t h e conse-

quences of present s o c i a l structures. Perhaps t h e matter of ecology and p o l l u t i o n

i s t h e best example. Formal, academic and fragmented "studies" about these

problems w i l l be unable t o simplify, c l a r i f y or communicate t h e r o o t s , conse-

quences and fundamental a l t e r n a t i v e s t o present p o l i c i e s and t h e s t r u c t u r e s

t h a t underlie them. Though they impede inquiry i n t o these matters, and though

t h e r e i s a slowly growing awareness of t h e danger of continuing t o t h i n k i n terms

of them, t h e dichotomies of scientism p e r s i s t . As Lerner said:

" ~ a c hof us builds h i s l i t t l e p r i v a t e universe, with i t s f e a r s and hopes

and aspirations. But on another l e v e l we a r e a l l aware t h a t t h e r e a r e
forces i n t h e world outside which can pick up t h i s p r i v a t e universe of
ours and smash it l i k e an eggshell. "g8

Lerner's belief t h a t it i s t h e "world outside" t h a t t h r e a t e n s our existence,

not t h e p a r t i c u l a r s t r u c t u r a l arrangement of technology, production and science,

etc.of which we a r e a p a r t , i s i t s e l f rooted i n t h e ideology and logic of scientism.

But he was i n t h e process of questioning these assumptions. I n c o n t r a s t t o those

who s t i l l accept t h e l i b e r a l myths about t h e u n i v e r s i t y , he r e a l i z e d t h a t "a s o c i a l

science i n b l i n d e r s can lead only t o s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s i n uniform."99

Lerner believed t h a t f i v e trends underlie t h e world c r i s i s today. The

existence of nuclear weapons, t h e growth of revolutionary nationalism, what he

c a l l e d t h e armed doctrine of communism, p o l i t i c a l wars and t h e need f o r world au-

t h o r i t y were t h e issues around which he based h i s c r i t i q u e of education. In his

words "To p r e s e n t ' t h e nature and operation of these forces i s one of t h e t a s k s of

the ... educational system today. 11 100

We can assume t h a t by t h i s he did not mean t h a t education should indoc-

t r i n a t e people with t h e ideology of anti-communism under t h e guise of being value-

free. I n f a c t , he was c r i t i c a l of t h e " l i b e r a l mentalityu t h a t complements such

a n approach t o education. This l i b e r a l mentality "... has paralyzed much of our
educational thinking, and has led by r e c o i l t o a brand of educational policy

proposals which would make t h e schools and u n i v e r s i t i e s merely t h e instruments

o f t h e s t a t e , and would make the t e s t o f t r u t h not whether it i s valid and veri-

f i a b l e but whether it makes t h e existing power s t r u c t u r e viable. 1'101 And, with

t h e integration of t h e university i n t o t h e p o l i t i c a l economy of s t a t e capitalism

and the predominance of t h e value-free dogma and formal logic i n academia, t h i s

is what has happened.

Lerner linked t h i s tendency t o reduce matters of v a l i d i t y t o matters of

power t o what I have named scientism. For example, he quoted the pragmatist

William James who wrote t h a t his systematic denial on science's part of per-

sonality a s a condition of events, t h i s rigorous b e l i e f t h a t i n i t s own e s s e n t i a l

and innermost nature our world i s a s t r i c t l y impersonal world, may, conceivably,

a s t h e whirligig o f time goes around, prove t o be t h e very defect t h a t our de-

scendants w i l l be surprised a t i n our boasted science, t h e omission t h a t t o t h e i r

eyes w i l l most tend t o make it look perspectiveless and short."lo2 He then argued

for It.. . a f e e l i n g f o r experience and f o r t h e exacting r e l a t i o n of language, ideas,

and r e a l i t y which i s t h e nub of t h e whole s c i e n t i f i c method. 1,103

~ e r n e believed
r that "... a philosophy o f education today can be nothing

short o f a philosophy f o r resolving t h e t r i p l e c r i s i s of our tirne."lo4 By "philos-

ophy" he did not mean a n academic philosophy which formalizes these issues i n t o

propositions, t h e v a l i d i t y of which a r e determined i n a b s t r a c t from ongoing events.

His view of knowledge and education was more accurate than that.
 "... t h e process of education i s neither a pouring of a l i q u i d i n t o a
vessel by force nor t h e evoking o f a gushing fountain f r o m i t s source
by t h e necromancy o f love - although i f I had t o choose between them
I should prefer t h e l a t t e r image. I have c a l l e d it a convergence, o r
b e t t e r , an encounter of t h e student, teacher, and i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a d i -
t i o n , taking place not i n a vacuum but i n a r e a l world, i n which a l l
three - nay, a l l four, t h e world too -a r e a t every moment franscend-
ed and transformed. "15

If we see education a s an encounter between those engaged i n inquiry i n

c e r t a i n subject matter and those i n the process of becoming engaged i n r e l a t e d

i n q u i r ~ ,and alwztys s i t u a t e t h i s i n the ongoing world, and, furthermore, i f we

r e a l i z e t h a t i n such a n encounter everything - persons, subject matter and ongo-

ing events - a r e being transformed, then t h e notion of education a s t r a i n i n g with-

i n bureaucratic milieux and s t r u c t u r e s seems a g r e a t disaster. We can always play

semantic games and argue, r h e t o r i c a l l y , t h a t formal education i s such an encounter

o r is i n t h e process of being reformed t o become t h i s , but a look a t t h e obvious

( e.g., mass courses, grading, c r e d i t s , t h e academic marketplace) quickly shows

t h a t tfiis i s absurd. We can a l s o attempt t o j u s t i f y the ranking system o f t h e

university by arguing t h a t it c o r r e l a t e s with expertise i n p a r t i c u l a r subject

matter and i s therefore indispensable t o higher education. But the f a c t t h a t t h e

curricula and bureaucratic r u l e s a r e mainly a p r i o r i t o both teacher and student,

and t h e added f a c t t h a t courses a r e taught i n terms of externals, f o r example,

textbooks and exams, not a s people engaged i n cooperative inquiry, undermines t h i s

position. Only i f we ignore the d i a l e c t i c s between s t r u c t u r e a s function, and

C ~ ~ S S ~a s
O milieux,
O ~ t h a t i s , i f we ignore the significant f a c t s , can we consider

t h e present bureaucratic and s c i e n t i s t i c t r a i n i n g t o be educational.

 Lerner maintained t h e belief t h a t there must be a t r a d i t i o n a l teacher

f o r t h e r e t o be education. He believed t h a t t h i s was necessary t o break stu-

dents f r o m t h e i r isolated "bounds of experience".

h he peer group can t r a n s d t only what it i s capable of transmitting

within the bounds of i t s experience - and usually t h e experience is
limited. Sometimes, since there i s a l s o a tyranny i n t h e peer group,
what it transmits is only t h e enforced cynicism of ignorance and a
mocking a t t i t u d e toward t h e l i f e of the mind."lo6

But exactly t h e same point applies t o academics. They can a l s o have a " t ~ r a n n y

in t h e i r peer group". Because it i s an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d peer group, it mY be

more schizoid, and, with i t s r e i f i e d l i n g u i s t i c s , i t s boundaries may be more i m -

penetrable. The ranking system of t h e academic marketplace can so obscure i n t e l -

l e c t u a l endeavours t h a t it becomes impossible t o know who, if anyone, i s engaged

s i g n i f i c a n t ongoing inquiry. And t h e r e is no ongoing milieu within which t h i s

can be evaluated. Most important, university milieux a r e b l a t a n t l y h o s t i l e t o on-

g o i n g , c r i t i c a l and pragmatic inquiry because such can d i s r u p t , even subvert, t h e

h i e r a r c h i c a l nature of academia. As one anthropologist has stated: "It follows

t h a t t h e more emphasis t h e r e i s on s o c i a l ranking within a university t h e more

subversive ideas become, because a good idea can come from any member of a group

without regard t o t h e various accidents of h i s t o r y t h a t have created a p a r t i c u l a r

power s t r u c t u r e i n t h e university a t a given time. 11107 once we analyze the struc-

t u r e of t h e university a s a r e f l e c t i o n of i t s function, we can no longer speak of

t h e university a s being an accident of h i s t o r y , but t h e above point i s nonetheless

relevant.
 P o l i t i c s and Logic i n the Multiversity

I n a paper e n t i t l e d University? Impossible! Collenge s e t out a more formal

c r i t i q ~ eof the university. Though i t does not s p e c i f i c a l l y analyze Simon Fraser

University, t h e issues on t h a t campus - especially c o n f l i c t s between (and within)

the P o l i t i c a l Science, Sociology and Anthropology Department and the administration

- a r e the roots of many of the problems raised. Because the analysis stems from

r e a l university issues, but a l s o because Collenge r e l a t e d p o l i t i c a l problems i n

t h e university t o matters of logic i n t h e s o c i a l sciences, an evaluation of t h i s

Paper allows me t o consolidate t h e implications of my critique of the ideology and

logic of scientism f o r t h e university i n a speclfic way.

Collenge believed t h a t t h e problems of t h e university a r e of a "radical"

nature. lo* He believed t h a t "... our problems a r e SO mdamental a s t o require a

wholly new philosophical system, i n which t h e idea of the university might make

sense ... (and t h a t ) the current problems of the university a r e nothing l e s s than

paradigm cases of t h e malaise i n western culture. "Io9 his seems a strange way t o

t a l k about problems i n the university, a s "paradigm cases", but l e t us see where

t h i s approach t o analysis takes us.

Collenge argued t h a t f o r a university t o be a "community", t o have a "one-

ness", it requires a "language o r shared symbols11,t h a t i s , communication t h a t can

deal with " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c relationships and problems11 of a l l t h e community and yet

of a university community, Collenge made several "heavy inferences", mostly t o do

with language and logic. He pointed out t h a t the "special languages" within the

university make a community impossible. Since "the 'meaning1 of a word i s most

usually a function o f the way t h e word i s used", these special languages become

"unintelligible t o anyone not specially trained i n them". He saw these special

languages a s "one of the s e c r e t weapons man has invented t o understand a puzzling

but a l s o believed t h a t "the disciplines of academia not only do not

t a l k t o one another, by and large, but show decreasing signs of wanting o r being

a b l e t o do so I' . They have become exclusive.

This "parochialism" has become a matter of university structure. Univer-

s i t y s t r u c t u r e i s becoming analogous t o t h e l a r g e r s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e "... f o r dis-

c i p l i n e s t h a t do not communicate i n t e l l e c t u a l l y (and hence cannot share substan-

t i v e understandings) a r e ips0 facto i n precisely t h e same r e l a t i o n one t o another

a s a r e the i n t e r e s t and pressure groups of society a t large: functionally d i f f e r -

entiated, they must compete with one another f o r a share of t h e a v a i l a b l e resources

and do so by mobilizing power. "'I3 Collenge thus saw the special languages and

functionsr and t h e competition among the disciplines, leading t o a p o l i t i c a l Pro-

cess. " B u t i n the university p o l i t i c s i s bad form and consequently t h e p o l i t i c s

of university l i f e a r e even d i r t i e r because clandestine and unadmitted. "'I4 This

contradiction puts p a r t i c u l a r pressure on t h e administration which "... has t o

operate a s if reason were t h e sole c r i t e r i o n , when power i s , and yet being unable

t o count on t h e continuity of r e l a t i v e power. This i s how Collenge explained

why "such administrations become authoritarian".

 On t h e basis of h i s notion of a university community, Collenge a l s o made

some "logical" points. F i r s t , he argued t h a t t h e &-versity i s r e a l l y a multi-

versity, that i s , "... a c o l l e c t i o n of communities depending on the r u l e s of po-

l i t i c a l c o a l i t i o n and c o n f l i c t f o r i t s structure. "16 He believed t h a t

"1%i s s o c i e t y writ small. No wonder u n i v e r s i t i e s lead nobody; no wonder

they have been i n t h e r e a r of every s o c i a l movement f o r t h e l a s t two
centuries. "117

Collenge then s h i f t e d a t t e n t i o n t o ,"problems of knowledge". He asked:

"What i s it, t o 'know', especially i n a world o f special languages and special

references? "118 He was concerned i f t h e r e was any basis f o r t h e university, a s

a community, i n terms of t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of science.

"~ndeed, t h e hard sciences are interdisciplinary; they & mutually share

and/or understand t h e i r respective metaphoric systems; it is t h e i r gen-
i u s t o do so. We can therefore t a l k about a community o f science."119

But when he looked a t t h e "humanities and s o c i a l sciences", h i s pessimism about a

university community returned. He argued t h a t "science and t h e r e s t ( t h e humani-

t i e s and s o c i a l sciences) i n point of f a c t speak not just d i f f e r e n t special lan-

guages, but d i f f e r e n t kinds of languages between which t h e r e may be no r e a l pos-

s i b i l i t y of translation. '!I2' He believed t h a t t h e r e a r e d i f f e r e n t "teleological

r u l e s " within t h e two areas of knowledge, and they therefore have " d i f f e r e n t S o r t s

of communication".

"...t h e languageo f science r e s t s on a r u l e s t r u c t u r e t h a t is wholly

empirical and non-normative. The languages of t h e s o c i a l sciences and
humanities are, conversely, normative, even moral, i n t h e i r very es-
sence. "121

Collene;ets b e l i e f t h a t t h e humanities and s o c i a l sciences a r e normative t o

" t h e i r very t h e o r e t i c a l core" raised p a r t i c u l a r problems f o r the process of explana-

t i o n i n s o c i a l science. He argued t h a t "... while t h e problem remains t o ex-
p l a i n system change, t h e very meaning of system undergoes a r a d i c a l change f o r

t h e simple reason t h a t t h e language i n which we think about system is part of

t h e foundation of system i t s e l f - we are t h e system, and we a r e thinking about

changing ourselves. This r a i s e d several methodological problems. For in-

stance, can an i n v e s t i g a t o r "... be properly 'objective' about a system of

which he is a part?" Collenge believed t h a t "... t h e r e is something f i n a l l y

odd i n t r y i n g t o be objective about t h e subjective b a s i s of a language, using

t h a t language. 11123

How do we g e t out of t h i s dilemma? Collenge believed t h e s o l u t i o n was

t h e c r e a t i o n of a "logic of e t h i c s i n terms of which judgments of r i g h t and

wrong can be analyzed a s l o g i c a l categories". But t h e r e i s no such logic a t

present because of t h e "anti-normative p o s i t i v i s t i c path t h a t philosophy and

western thought generally have taken s i n c e t h e renaissance". So, even a n anal-

y s i s of t h e problems of knowledge leads t o a conclusion t h a t t h e university, a s

a community, i s a n impossibility. The u n i v e r s i t y i s

I1
... a t r o o t , a n e t h i c a l 'pohram1, a system of moral choices about t h e
purposes of s o c i a l a c t i o n and change. It is because language i t s e l f i s ,
and so i s society. But i f t h e r e i s no l o g i c of e t h i c s by which t h a t
s t r u c t u r e can be explained and c r i t i c i z e d , with what a r e we left?"124

What we a r e l e f t with depends on where we began and what we assumed a t

t h e beginning of our analysis. Let us r e t r a c e Collenge's formal c r i t i q u e of t h e

university - both h i s sociological and philosophical considerations. He q u i t e

r i g h t l y r e l a t e d t h e fragmented character of t h e d i s c i p l i n e s t o a p o l i t i c a l Process.

But h i s conceptualization of t h i s - that i s , h i s own metaphor - must be s c r u t i n i z e d

 carefully. His one-to-one analogy between u n i v e r s i t y s t r u c t u r e and t h e l a r g e r
p
s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e i s too neat and too a b s t r a c t t o allow us t o analyze consequen-

t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , including ideological ones, between t h e u n i v e r s i t y and so-

ciety, I n t h i s metaphor, " i n t e r e s t and pressure groups" compete f o r resources.

If we extend t h e analogy, t h e administration functions l i k e t h e government, with

t h e same i n s e c u r i t i e s about i t s continuity. And, according t o t h e logic of t h i s

metaphor, it i s no wonder t h a t both forms of administration become authoritarian.

With i t s t a l k of " i n t e r e s t groups" and "competition f o r scarce resources",

0
t h e metaphor i s i t s e l f rooted i n l i b e r a l ideology. Liberal ideology tends t o re-

duce a l l s o c i a l problems, whether rooted i n c l a s s , race, etc., t o i n t e r e s t groups

competing f o r scarce resources. It ignores t h e f a c t t h a t those who own and/or

c o n t r o l production, d i s t r i b u t i o n , marketing and consumption have access t o immense

wealth, while t h e vast majority of t h e population i s e i t h e r marginal or impoverish-

ed. As t h e s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s i n North America have been exposed, t h i s metaphor has

been so contradicted t h a t l i b e r a l s , l i k e Galbraith, have had t o change t h e i r per-

spective sharply.

It a l s o i s a metaphor t h a t a b s t r a c t s c r i t e r i a from t h e notion of a "com-

munity of scholars", i t s e l f a myth, and then evaluates trends i n t h e u n i v e r s i t y i n

terms of such c r i t e r i a . It i s l i t t l e wonder then t h a t it remains a formal c r i t i q u e

without having any b a s i s i n an a n a l y s i s of t h e functions of t h e u n i v e r s i t y within

s t a t e capitalism. Though a u n i v e r s i t y community i s impossible i n t h e present ~ 0 ~ 1 -

e t y , t h e university, a s a p a r t of t h e corporate society, continues t o f u l f i l l i t s

functions. A c r i t i q u e t h a t i s t o be relevant t o any s t r a t e g y t o humanize inquiry*

and such would involve the replacement of the fragmented, competitive university

of which Collenge i s c r i t i c a l , must begin from t h e concrete, not idealized, view

of the "empirical-contingent" world.

Collenge did point out t h a t " p o l i t i c s i s bad form" i n t h e university but

he did not expose t h e ideology and logic of scientism which obscures t h e power

plays within the university. Nor did he discuss why there a r e scarce resources

f o r higher education and how t h i s underlies much of t h e competition among univer-

s i t y departments. Such an analysis would involve an analysis of the p r i o r i t i e s of

governments and t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of resources t o them. This question, which u l t i -

mately forces us t o look a t the corporate c a p i t a l i s t system of production and dis-

t r i b u t i o n of resources and wealth, i s fundamental t o understanding u n i v e r s i t y prob-

lems. The place of t h e university within s t a t e capitalism means t h a t we have t o

understand the workings o f the l a t t e r t o understand the problems of t h e former. 125

Wnat a r e t h e power struggles i n the university about? From Collenge's a-

nalysis you g e t t h e picture o f a p o l i t i c a l disciplines struggling over scarce re-

sources f o r purely academic reasons. A look a t the s o c i a l arrangement of science

and the p o l i t i c s of education however quickly dispels any such notion. Research

t h a t functions i n t h e military-industrial set-up g e t s surplus financing whereas re-

searchers t h a t do not have a d i r e c t o r indirect function i n t h i s set-up must scrimp

f o r resources. 126 Not a l l possible subject matters a r e taught within t h e univer-

s i t y , and expansion of one department over another, say, i n enrollment an3 re-

Sources, does not occur because of f r e e competition i n an open market. Yet t h i s

1s t h e image t h a t Collenge Is metaphor conjures up. The l i b e r a l metaphor, even if

extended t o take the power struggles o f t h e university i n t o account, cannot ac-

count f o r t h e a c t u a l workings o f t h e university.

But what of h i s l o g i c a l points? Does h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between "science"

and "the r e s t " , a s he c a l l e d t h e humanities and s o c i a l sciences, hold up? While

h i s concern with language and logic i s relevant t o a study of t h e university h i s

understanding of language remained formal. Saying t h a t "the language of science

r e s t s on a r u l e s t r u c t u r e t h a t is wholly empirical and non-normative" suggests

t h a t t h e natural sciences a r e value-free both i n technique and theory. But t h e

"paradigms" within which natural science operates a r e not, a s Kuhn showed, unhis-

torical. Nor a r e t h e techniques t h a t a r a fundamental t o them. The s o c i a l arrange-

ment of the physical sciences i n t e r r e l a t e s experimental techniques and technology

i n such a manner t h a t science and p o l i t i c s ultimately have an overlapping teleology

o r s e t of goals. Collengels l o g i c a l points, l i k e h i s p o l i t i c a l ones, a l s o had roots

i n l i b e r a l theory and t h e ideology and logic of scientism. For example, "facts" and

the "uses t o which science i s put" were a r b i t r a r i l y separated by him. I n a footnote

he s t a t e d t h a t he problems o f making nerve gas a r e s c i e n t i f i c ; whether t o make it,

or whether t o use it, those a r e p o l i t i c a l matters, uniquely n o m n a t i ~ e . " ~ ~Whqt

7 he

f a i l e d t o menuon was t h e existing relationship between p o l i t i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c

i n s t i t u t i o n s ensures t h a t c e r t a i n research, with p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l goals i n

mind, i s given p r i o r i t y . The so-called military-industrial complex does not t r e a t

t h e university a s a sanctuary, but a s a plant. It i s a n academic matter t o debate,

i n abstract - that i s , without reference t o ongoing events - whether " f a c t s " and

"uses" a r e separate o r not. The consequences of a c e r t a i n s o c i a l arrangement of

science and education i s what must concern us i n a time when science i s thorough-

l y integrated into t h e corporate society.

Collenge, l i k e Weber i n t h i s regard, s p l i t the normative from the empiri-

c a l i n h i s view o f t r u e science. But, unlike Weber, he t r e a t e d s o c i a l science a s

a special normative form of inquiry. But t h i s s p l i t and the dilemma t h a t r e s u l t s

from it i s unreal, even f o r t h e so-called hard sciences. Only i f we mystify the

hard o r exact sciences, ignore t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l development, and ignore Toulmints

point t h a t t h e i r exactness comes not from theory being "true", but from the exact

Specification of t h e conditions under which we can consider something t o f u l f i l l a

t h e o r e t i c a l ideal, can we maintain t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between "science" and "the r e s t "

of inquiry. But t h e specification of t h e so-called hard sciences, l i k e a l l speci-

fications, occurs within a s o c i a l f i e l d , with the a i d of human technology, i n terms

of ideals t h a t a r e of some pragmatic value t o c e r t a i n s o c i a l groupings.

I f we think of "science" a s being an academic and value-free venture? we

can think of it a s being unrelated t o consequences. And t h e s c i e n t i s t i c dichoto-

mies between objective and subjective, theory and practice, value and f a c t a l l re-

inforce such a belief. But a l l inquiry, whether i n the natural, physical o r s o c i a l

Sciences, has implications f o r us. Collenge's formal understanding of physical s c i -

ence? khere it i s supposedly simply a question of whether an "explanation does, or

does not, f i t the facts"128 a b s t r a c t s aspects of the a c t i v i t y of science out of

t h e i r s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l context. It i s therefore unable t o s c r u t i n i z e the

implications of t h i s context f o r inquiry. If inquiry i s t o be rooted i n a c t u a l

 ' - 557 -.

events, and a working logic t o help assess p r a c t i c a l arguments i s t o be establish-

ed, problems implied by the context of the a c t i v i t y of science w i l l have t o be in-

cluded i n the subject matter of science i t s e l f . There i s nothing, except a contin-

ued belief i n t h e ideology and logic o f scientism and t h e university, a s it func-

tions, t o stop us from extending inquiry i n t o such matters.

But Collenge was trapped within the s c i e n t i s t i c dichotomies. He broadened

h i s i n t e r e s t I n problems i n knowledge t o include the problems o f the multiversity,

but never s i t u a t e d the multiversity i n i t s s o c i a l context. He argued t h a t academics

a r e p o l i t i c a l , though t h i s i s r h e t o r i c a l l y i n bad form. But what a r e they

p o l i t i c a l f o r o r about? What positions do they, i n t h e main, hold within t h e "ide-

ological struggles" of the society and globe? Collengels metaphor f a l s e l y implied

t h a t they a r e value-free and purely academic, and t h a t t h e i r p o l i t i c s i s a means

t o t h i s end. But f r o m t h e very beginning of t h e i r s o c i a l i z a t i o n and training,

academics a r e learning a c l a s s of problems, methods and theories, and a logic t o

complement such a "paradigm", which has a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l function

and i s r e l a t e d t o c e r t a i n s o c i a l and human consequences. Since they a r e unable t o

understand problems rooted i n t h e i r own experience i n t h e university, we cannot

expect anything but obscurity when they analyze "other problems. Their

s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l function might even be considered t o be t h e c r e a t i o n o f ob-

scurity.

We a r e a l l a part o f s o c i a l , biological and physical systems. Science i n

a l l realms has implications f o r "changing ourselves". Like Winch i n t h i s regard,

Collenge t r i e d t o distinguish between physical and s o c i a l sclence i n terms of human

values, norms o r morality. But we a r e a l l involved i n the globe - i t s ecology,
i t s geography, i t s s o c i a l structures, etc. - and we a s a species have affected
a l l these things. I f we a r e t o control the consequences of a l l forms o f science

and technology i n ways we wish, then we w i l l quickly have t o break from s c i e n t i s -

t i c dichotomies - including t h a t between "sciencet' and "humanities - and t r e a t

inquiry a s a human endeavour t h a t ultimately r e s t s on our freedom t o make judgments

about and control consequences. The issue o f human survival i s quickly reconciling

t h e general and t h e p a r t i c u l a r question o f what values, a s goals o r a s a n end-in-

view, we must have f o r a l l inquiry. O u r judgments may have mainly been i n e r r o r

t o t h i s point i n t h e h i s t o r y o f science, and t h i s i s g r e a t l y because the ideology

and logic of scientism within academia have inhibited such a c r i t i c a l , relevant

form of inquiry f r o m developing. This, however, does not a l t e r t h e urgent need t o

e s t a b l i s h such inquiry.

The ideology and logic of scientism i s not rooted i n t h e cognitions o f

academics. It i s rooted i n t h e schizoid uses of language and underlying praxis

t h a t a r e d a i l y reinforced by the obvious events o f t h e university. Once metaphors

t h a t have a p a r t i c u l a r ideological leaning and a r e r e l a t e d t o t h e function of a

p a r t i c u l a r f o r m and content of knowledge become formalized, we can deceive ourselves

i n t o believing t h a t we can solve problems i n t h e realm of pure theory. Because the

university t r a i n s us t o use language i n a r e i f i e d , academic way, we a r e unable t o

s i t u a t e t h e o r e t i c a l problems within t h e ideological struggles i n the world. I f we

a r e ignorant o f t h e ideological roots of our metaphors, then we cannot evaluate

ideas i n terms o f t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o l i v i n g consequences. Collengels formal analysis

of t h e p o l i t i c s and logic of t h e multiversity, though exposing some problems, ob-

scured t h e underlying problem of ideology and t h e implications of t h i s f o r logic.

A formal "logic of e t h i c s " is not a s o l u t i o n t o t h e problems of t h e university or

of knowledge. Academics could debate such a notion and s t i l l maintain t h e i r schiz-

oid praxis. A u n i v e r s i t y with courses on t h e "logic of e t h i c s " would s t i l l nurtU..e

t h e ideology and logic of sclentism and f u l f i l l i t s function within t h e p o l i t i c a l

economy of s t a t e capitalism. Changing t h e s t r u c t u r e s and t h e s o c i a l and education-

a l r e l a t i o n s t h a t lead t o t h i s schizoid praxis, and t o formal solutions t o formally

conceived problems, i s t h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e p o l i t i c a l and l o g i c a l problems of t h e

multiversity.

Pragmatic Inquiry and Social Change

This a n a l y s i s of t h e u n i v e r s i t y - of i t s boundaries and schizoid praxis,

i t s repressive tolerances, i t s m c t i o n i n t h e p o l i t i c a l economy, i t s myths and

t h e i n a b i l i t y of academics t o understand i t s problems a t t h e i r r o o t s - should d i s -

pel any reformist notion t h a t a minor change here, and another there, could t u r n

t h e u n i v e r s i t y i n t o a c e n t e r of pragmatic inquiry. I agree with Veblenls prognosis

t h a t a t o t a l s t r u c t u r a l change i n t h e u n i v e r s i t y , and, because of i t s incorporation

i n t o s t a t e capitalism, a change i n t h e complete s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e , would be required

before it could become a place of learning. The ideology and l o g i c of scientism i s

not only fundamental t o academia, but a l s o t o t h e corporate s o c i e t y , and it w i l l not

be replaced u n t i l t h a t s o c i e t y i s i n t h e process of fundamental transformation*

I f we believe t h a t t h e argument of t h i s study has some value and t h a t it

not only exposed t h e f a l l a c i e s of t h e ideology and logic of scientism, but pin-

points the r o o t s and consequences of it, then we should not formalize t h e argu-

ment into an academic language and c r e a t e new c r i t i c a l rhetoric t o co-exist with-

i n the boundaries of academia. The tendency t o do t h i s i s very strong because

our conditioning t o a b s t r a c t language predisposes us t o even a b s t r a c t a c r i t i q u e

I

of t h i s very tendency. To counter t h i s it i s necessary t o r e t u r n t o C.W. Mills1 I

question about t h e l e v e r s of change available f o r t h e t a s k of humanizing science.

Since t h i s has not been a study of t h e r a d i c a l movement and t h e corporate society,

or of t h e Canadian movenent and s o c i a l structure, i n p a r t i c u l a r , any generalizations

about s o c i a l change and revolution would amount t o grand theory and nothing more.

And it i s too e a r l y t o t e l l what t h e e f f e c t s on t h e university w i l l be' from a con-

tinuation and growth o f t h e student movement, o r what t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f transform-

ing t h e corporate society a r e a t t h i s time.

But t h i s study nevertheless does have some bearing on Mills' question about

strategy. If we r e f l e c t back on t h e t h e o r i s t s who provided r e a l i n s i g h t s fnto the

problems of ideology and logic, from which I developed my characterization and c r i -

t i q u e of t h e ideology and loglc o f scientism, we can gain v i t a l clues about approaches

t o analysis %hat, if consistently realized, can themselves a c t a s an aspect o f t h e

strategy f o r accomplishing t h e s o c i a l - s c i e n t i f i c revolution needed i n our society.

For exampl'e, it was Marx who continually emphasized t h a t "not c r i t i c i s m , but revolu-

t i o n i s t h e driving force of history". Such can be a warning t o not t r e a t ideas

i n an academic way, but t o always s i t u a t e method and theory In problems t h a t a r e

rooted i n ongoing events. Once we do t h i s - and make praxis the beginning and end
of inquiry - we a r e not l i k e l y t o forget another statement by Marx, t h a t t h e "...
products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism". 131

Unless we combine t h i s anti-academic orientation with an anti-reductionis-

t i c one, t h e r e i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t we w i l l become s e c t a r i a n i n our analyses.

Unlike vulgar marxists of today, Marx recognized t h a t t h e categories of theory a r e

pragmatic; t h a t they serve t o c l a r i f y problems and courses of action f o r humans.

Knowledge does not define human o r s o c i a l essences. To believe t h a t it can i s t o

a b s t r a c t method and theory from praxis and t o revert t o metaphysical obscurities.

That is why* i n reference t o those he named " c a p i t a l i s t s " , Marx emphasized t h a t

"we do not mean ... t h a t ( t h e y ) cease t o be persons". 132

Nor was Marx a grand t h e o r i s t unaware o f h i s own praxis. He realized i n

h i s time what I have attempted t o analyze i n our own: t h a t an alienated, schizoid

praxis cannot be t h e basis of humanistic, pragmatic knowledge. When he wrote t h a t

"social relationships take on an independent existence (and) t h e r e appears a divi-

s i o n within t h e l i f e of each individual",133 he was concerned with what I have

c a l l e d a schizoid existence. Like Laing, Marx was aware t h a t l s o l a t e d individuals

never c l a r i f y , but only mystify, t h e roots and consequences of events. His s t a t e -

ment t h a t "conditions ... had won an independent existence over against t h e separate

individuals j u s t because of t h e i r separation a s individuals ... and through t h e i r

separation had become a bond a l i e n t o them ... applies t o any university you

wish t o name.

But what a r e we t o do with Marxfs statement t h a t "revolutionary ideas ...

predispose a revolutionary class"?135 Many people, those S a r t e called t h e "Lazy
 Marxists", would l i k e t o revert back t o the r e i f i e d categories of vulgar marxism.

The need f o r h i s t o r i c a l l y specific inquiry, however, can never be surpassed. In

t h i s regard, I agree with S a r t r e who has said t h a t

t h e student r e v o l t is perhaps t h e f i r s t manifestation o f the new themes

'I..

...
and new c l a s s c o n f l i c t s of o u r society every revolutionary movement i n
a new society invents i t s practice but does not invent a s quickly i t s theo-
ry. And so it r e s o r t s t o t h e previous revolution. I n 1848 people used the
1, :) /language of t h e French Revolution of 1789. This kind of continuity is natu-
/ r a l and today the new student revolution must use t h e language o f t h e work-
e r s ' revolution, t h e Leninist revolution ... Thus t h e students have tended
t o deny t h e i r bourgeois origins and claim t o be a t the service of t h e peo-
ple ... The workers say fine, but do not burn my car. I n f a c t , however,
students a r e t h e i r own avant-guard. And t h e more t h e students study t h e
more they w i l l a t t a c k and ~ o n t e s t . " l 3 ~

The theory and practice of t h e student revolution w i l l have t o undergo continuous

transformation u n t i l a r a d i c a l consciousness of the roots and consequences of cor-

porate structures complements s t r a t e g i e s t o bring about the needed social-scientific

revolution. H i s t o r i c a l l y specific pragmatic studies w i l l be required t o challenge

r e ~ ~ l ~ t i o n rhetoric
ary rooted i n Leninism, and t o bring about a r e a l unity of theory

and practice.

C.W. Mills i s one of t h e few models we have i n North America f o r h i s t o r i c a l -

l y specific inquiry. Though he lacked t h e p o l i t i c a l milieu of Sartre, he developed

a similar c r i t i q u e of academic and vulgar approaches t o knowledge. He recognized

t h a t t h e end-of-ideology was a "mechanistic response t o the ideology o f Stalin-

.
i s m 137 And, r a t h e r than the decline of socialism i n the 193Ots being the end

of a l l ideology, he pointed out t h a t it was "the ending of p o l i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n

i t s e l f as public f a c t " in North America. 138

But M i l l s never a r t i c u l a t e d the problem of ideology o r t h e problems t h i s

presented f o r matters of logic, a s problems. He t r e a t e d "ideology" i n a general

way, a s e i t h e r " j u s t i f y i n g o r c r i t i c i z i n g c e r t a i n i n s t i t u t i o n s and practices".

Though he did develop a perspective t h a t d e a l t with t h e d i a l e c t i c s of milieux

and s t r u c t u r e s i n society, t h e t a s k of t r a n s l a t i n g t h i s perspective i n t o an ide-

ological project t o challenge a l l forms of scientism remained f o r Sartre.

I n our time it is S a r t r e who represents the struggle against both scien-

t i s m and the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s t h a t nurture t h i s dogma. S a r t r e has waged an ide-

ological struggle against both l i b e r a l positivism and vulgar marxism. The aim of

h i s ideological project has been t o "reduce the part of indetermination and non-

knowledge"139 and, a s such, t o enhance human freedom. His goal was t o transform

t h e method of t h e s o c i a l sciences s o t h a t t h e e x i s t e n t i a l dimension becomes funda-

mental t o our studies. This is not a mystification of "existence", but a perspec-

t i v e consistent with t h a t of Mead and Dewey and t h e i r emphasis on the s o c i a l f i e l d

of Science. A s S a r t r e said: he object o f existentialism ... i s the p a r t i c u l a r

man i n t h e s o c i a l f l e l d , i n h i s c l a s s , i n an environment of c o l l e c t i v e objects and

of other p a r t i c u l a r people. "140 Like Marx, S a r t r e believed t h a t "man, alienated,

mystified, r e i f i e d , etc. s t i l l remains a man 11 141 .

Unless "science" is of some' value, t h a t is, i n d i c a t i v e of jobs t o be done,

it camlot be considered t o be knowledge. Scientism does not c o n s t i t u t e knowledge

because it does not s i t u a t e i t s ideas about f a c t , value o r theory i n ongolng events.

Ignoring o r denying t h e i r own praxis, and how it i s i n t e r r e l a t e d with m i l i e u and

S ~ P U C ~ U P t~hSe , ideologists of scientism c r e a t e r e i f i e d , mystified views of t h e

world. I n contrast t o t h i s S a r t r e realized t h a t t h e "sociologist ... i s an object

of history"lq2 and t h a t problems, methods and theories come from a n objectification,

t o t a l i z a t i o n and universalization of one's relationship t o ongoing events. It i s

because of t h i s t h a t t h e s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t does not define but r a t h e r encounters

society i n a l l h i s o r her work. And, a s S a r t r e stressed, "TO understand i s t o

change, t o go beyond oneself. I, 143

To develop the kind of s o c i a l science envisioned by Marx, Mills, Sartre,

Mead and Dewey, t h e dichotomies of t h e ideology and logic o f scientism w i l l have

t o be discarded. They impede t h e kind of inquiry needed t o develop both the form

and content appropriate t o a humanistic s o c i a l science. While academics fragment

t h e world and t h e i r experience i n t o objective and subjective, t h e o r e t i c a l and prac-

t i c a l , value and f a c t , t h e structures t h a t nurture and reinforce these dichotomies

continue t o expand. If t h i s i s allowed t o continue, t h e ideology and logic o f

scientism and the s t r u c t u r e s t h a t complement it may culminate i n a s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g ,

t o t a l i t a r i a n society where not only academia but a l l i n s t i t u t i o n s w i l l obscure t h e

roots and d i r e consequences of t h e p o l i c i e s of the dominant society.

This s c i e n t i s t i c t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m i s already developing t o t h e south, i n the

heartland of s c l e n t i s t i c education. I n a publication e n t i t l e d learn in^ and Crea-

t i v i t y circulated t o "science" teachers i n the United S t a t e s , two academics gave

t h e following advice:

"AS already pointed out, a teacher can reinforce, shape, and chain behavior,
a s well a s place it under stimulus control. Each student i s i n a complex
world of reinforcement schedules. His behavior i s shaped and controlled by
reinforcement schedules i n the home, community, and peer group, a s well as
i n the classroom, The teacher w i l l experience d i f f i c u l t y when h i s reinforce-
ment schedules f o r t h e student must compete wlth other schedules t h a t exer-
c i s e a more powerful control over student behavior.
Good students have t h e i r l i v e s arranged so t h a t they have a consistent s e t
 of reinforcement schedules t h a t a r e congruent with those provided by the
school. Fortunate a r e both t h e students and t h e teachers who l i v e i n a
s c i e n t i f i c community, such a s those around m i s s i l e bases, i n which t h e
school, t h e family, and t h e community a l l reinforce t h e learning of s c i -
ence. The advantage f o r a student l i v i n g i n a boarding school, such as
a n English public school, is t h a t t h e whole p a t t e r n of l i f e a c t i v i t i e s
i s run on schedules of reinforcement t h a t a r e consistent with those of
t h e educational a c t i v i t i e s . "144

I f and when t h e m i s s i l e s f i r e t h e t r a i n i n g of these "good students" i n t h e ideology

and logic of scientism w i l l have no pragmatic value, whatsoever, f o r t h e i r o r our

survival.

Footnotes

A' thorough study would analyze t h e " i n t e r e s t groups" (administration, f a c u l t y ,

s t a f f and s t u d e n t s ) of a u n i v e r s i t y ; t h e r e l a t i o n of a u n i v e r s i t y t o provincial-
regional and national-continental s t r u c t u r e s and i t s function within them; i t s
h i s t o r i c a l development i n terms of t h e above two matters, and t h e p o l i t i c a l con-
f l i c t s occurring i n and around t h e u n i v e r s i t y as p a r t of broader p o l i t i c a l and
ideological s t r u g g l e s now occurring.

2 ~ r i t i s hColumbia Department of Education, Division of Curricula Guidance, P. 49.

3 ~ h eServants of Power, op. c i t . , pp. 209-10.

4 ~ e ep. 112 above.

%ee Edgar Z. Friedenberg: The Vanishing Adolescent. Boston, Beacon Press ( 1964
and J u l e s Henry: Culture Auainst Man. Toronto, Alfred A. Knopf ( 1963) f o r a general
discussion of t h e a f f e c t s of bureaucratic and a u t h o r i t a r i a n high schools on youth.
For a ~ d i s c u s s i o nof t h e attempts t o r a t i o n a l i z e a u t h o r i t a r i a n high school education
s e e my Two Winnipeg Schools. This Magazine I s About Schools. Vol. 2, No. 4, Autumn
(1968).

6 ~ a A.~ Baran
l and Paul M. Sweezy: Monopoly Cagital. Middlesex, England, Penguin
(19681, P. 313.

7 ~ o h nDewey: Exgerjence and Education. New York, C o l l i e r ( 19631, p. 19.

 8 ~ e eC. Wright M i l l s and Hans Gerth: Character and Social Structure, op. c i t . ,
especially pp. 19-22 f o r a perspective on how human perceptions, emotions and mo-
t i v a t i o n s develop out of organic sensations, f e e l i n g s and impulses; and pp. 81-84
and pp. 137-39 f o r a discussion of t h e development of language t h a t complements
t h e approach taken i n t h i s chapter.

9 ~ . ~Laing:
. The Obvious, i n David Cooper (ed. ): The Dialectics of Liberation.
Middlesex, England, Penguin ( 19681, p. 14.

losee W i l l i a m D. Temby: Suicide, i n Graham B. Blaine e t al.: Emotional Problems

of t h e Student. Garden City, N.Y., Anchor (1966)~ pp. 147-69. This discussion of
s u i c i d e r e f l e c t s applied scientism. Searching f o r t h e cause of student suicides,
t h e author concluded t h a t "the incidence of death of a parent ... i s statistically
significant". ( I b i d . , p. 152. ) This neo-Freudian with h i s computer did mention t h a t
"the most common l o c a t i o n chosen f o r t h e s u i c i d a l a c t was t h e college" ( I b i d . , P.
154.) but nowhere d i d he s i t u a t e suicide, as a n a c t t h a t should speak loudly, i n
t h e kind of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s t h a t students face in university. When t h e ideology
and logic of scientism i s applied t o problems within t h e university, I t s shallow-
ness i s over-exposed.

' l ~ r n e s t Becker: M i l l s 1 Soc l a 1 Psychology and t h e Great H i s t o r i c a l Convergence on

t h e Problem of Alienation, i n The New Sociology, op. c i t . , p. 123.

'~R.D. Laing: The Divided S e l f , op. c i t . , p. 17.

18Donald J. McCulloch: The Community of t h e University, i n H. Adelman and D. Lee

( eds. 1: ,The University Game. Toronto, Anansi ( 1 9 6 8 ) ~p. 33.

l g ~ h eDivided S e l f , op. c i t . , pp. 74-75.

2 3 ~ b i d ., p. 82.

'%id., p. 102.

2 5 ~ e c k e r , op. c i t . 8 P. 124.

%bid.

2 7 ~ o h nand Margaret Rowntree: Youth As Class* i n Our en era ti on, Vol. 6, Nos. 1-2,
May-June-July, 1968, p. 173.

2 8 ~ a u lGoodman: Gornpulsory Mis-Educat ion and t h e Community of Scholars. New York,

Vintage (19661, p. 255.

2?For a discussion on how inquiry Is always rooted i n a s o c i a l f i e l d , see PP- 440-

44 above.

3%e Want A University, The Berkeley Free Speech Movement, 1964.

34.~.
Uing: The P o l i t i c s of Experience. Middlesex, England, Penguin (1967)s PO 80.

3 2 ~ h o r s t e i nVeblen: The Hipher Learning I n America. New York, H i l l and WaW ( 1965)1
PP* 76-77.

3 k e r b e r t Marcuse: Repressive Tolerance, op, c i t . , p. 96.

3%.~. Runcirnan: Sociological Evidence and P o l i t i c a l Theory, i n Readinas I n The
philosophy of t h e S o c i a l Sciences, op. c i t . , p. 562.

35Marcuse, op. c l t . , p. 96.

361bid. r p. 99.

371bid., p. 113.

3*1bid., pe i12.

%bid., pi. 100-1.

V01bid. * p. 112.

''see The S o c i o l o ~ i c a lImmlnation, op. c i t . , pp. 100-18.

4 2 ~ .Wright ~ i l l s : ass Society and Liberal Education, I n Power. p o l i t i c s and

People, op. c i t . ,
p. 369.
4 3 ~ b i d . Marcuse himself tends towards a version of t h e value-free doctrine. When
he s t a t e d " t h a t t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n (between l i b e r a t i w and repressive teaching) i s
not a matter of value-preference but of r a t i o n a l c r i t e r i a " (Repressive Tolerance,
op. c i t . , p. 101) he accepted t h e s c i e n t i s t i c dichotomy between value and f a c t ;
and, i n e f f e c t , between reason and experience. His a b s t r a c t , u n r e a l i s t i c c r i t i c i s m
of education i s rooted i n h i s academic orientation.

4 4 ~ . Petras: The P o l i t i c s of Bureaucracy. Liberation. February, 1966, p. 21.

'heblen, op. c i t . , p. 163.

lC8T. Caplow and R. J. McGee: The Academic Marketplace. New York, Science Editions
(1961).

4 g ~ o ra discussion of "grantmanship" i n t h e u n i v e r s i t i e s , s e e Robert Engler: Social

Science and Social Consciousness: The Shame of t h e Universities, i n T. Roszak (ed. ):
z h e D i s s e n t i m Academy. New York, Pantheon (1967). About t h e textbook industry Eng-
l e r writes: " ~ u b l i s h e r sscramble i n t o t h e l u c r a t i v e textbook market (approximately
one t h i r d of a l l industry s a l e s ) and they become l i s t e d on t h e market. lTextbooksl,
r e p o r t s t h e chairman of C ~ l l i e rand Macmillan, 'may reasonably be expected t o con-
s t i t u t e t h e s i n g l e most important c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of product f o r t h e next t e n years. '"
(Ibid. , p. 187. ) I r o n i c a l l y , t h e publisher of The Dissenting Academy was mentioned
i n t h e following context: "RCA has taken over Random House, which had previously ac-
quired Knopf and taken over pantheon." ( I b i d . , p. 188. ) If a n a n a l y s i s of t h e monop-
o l i z a t i o n of t h e textbook industry and inter-locking d i r e c t o r s h i p s was done on t h e
publishers l i s t e d i n t h e bibliography of t h i s study, perhaps t h e tedious work of
footnoting might be abolished and a l l references replaced with t h e phrase he
company". Need I add t h a t t h e monopolization of books i s a very good b a s i s f o r
censorship?

5 ~ e b l e n ,op. c i t . , p. 93.
56~oodman, op. c i t . , p. 234.

5 7 ~ o ra d i s c u s s i m of what Eric F r o m c a l l e d t h e "ambiguity of freedom", see Escape

From Freedom, New York, Avon ( 1965), Chapter Two, e s p e c i a l l y p. 48.

58~oodman, op. c i t . , p. 227.

591bid., p. 225.

6 0 ~ e s l i eDewart: Education and P o l i t i c a l Values : The Dilemma of Liberal Democracy,

i n Prospects For Chame. Toronto, McGraw-Hill.

6 1 ~ o ra disoussion of t h e "apprehension" and "caution" of academics, see Paul F.

Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr.: The Academic Mind. Glencoe, Ill., The Free
Press ( 19581.

621). Pharand: Two Aspects of Tenure. CAUT Bulletin. March, 1965.

6 3 ~ nexcellent example of such r h e t o r i c i s i n t h e Educational Policy f o r t h e Liberal

A r t s , Regina Campus, University of Saskatchewan: " ~ b o v ea l l , t h e r o l e of c r i t i c , of
examiner of i n s t i t u t i o n s and ideas, belongs t o t h e modern u n i v e r s i t y functioning a s
a comtnunity of scholars. Its c r i t i c i s m should be sustained by constant reference t o
e s s e n t i a l human values, which demands a d e l i b e r a t e renewal of t h e study of t h e nature
of love, of j u s t i c e , freedom, beauty, science: i n f a c t , a l l those values which give
meaning and substance t o l i f e . This implies a de-emphasis of mere t o p i c a l i t y i n t h e
subject matter of t h e l i b e r a l a r t s curriculum. Further, t h i s examination r e q u i r e s
t h a t a l l l i b e r a l a r t s students should be involved with a wide range of subject mat-
t e r , so presented t h a t t h e study may be enabled t o synthesize h i s t o t a l experience
i n t h e l i b e r a l a r t s college. Such a program w i l l frequently c a l l f o r a kind of in-
t e l l e c t u a l slum-clearance, a breaking up of those conventional myths which a r e f r e -
quently i d e n t i f i e d with r e a l i t y . This constant c r i t i q u e must be applied f i r s t t o
t h e s t r u c t u r e and function of t h e u n i v e r s i t y i t s e l f . " For a case study of t h e con-
t r a d i c t i o n s between u n i v e r s i t y r h e t o r i c and r e a l i t y , see Rhetoric and R e a l i t s i n
t h e University: A Case Study of Regina Campus. Port Arthur, Department of Psychology,
Lakehead University, mimeographed, 1967.

6$lenry Aiken: The Sick University. The New Pork Review of Books. Vol. v i i , No. 6,
Oct. 20, 1966; and W'nat Is A Liberal Education? The New York Review of Books. V o l .
v i i , No. 7, N3v. 3, 1966.

65~amesOlConnor: The University and t h e P o l i t i c a l Economy. New York, Leviathan.

Vol. 1, No. 1, Narch, 1969, p. 14.

6 6 ~ e l v i l l eWatkins: The Multi-National Corporations and Can?da. Our Generation.

Vol. 6, No. 4, Spring-June, 1969, pp. 97-102.
 6 7 ~ 1 ~ o n nop.~ ~c ,i t . , p. 14.

6 9 ~ h eUniversities Act of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1963, rends t h a t he management, ad-

ministration, and c o n t r o l of t h e property, revenue, business and a f f a i r s of t h e
University a r e vested i n t h e B ~ a r d . " With t h e dominance of corporate d i r e c t o r s on
University Bsards, t h e S t a t e is, i n e f f e c t , handing over c o n t r o l of higher educa-
t i o n t o t h e corporations.

71~ohn Porter: The V e r t i c a l Mosaic. University of Toronto Press ( 1967 ) s P* 30-

7 2 ~would t be f r u i t f u l t o undertake a thorough examination of t h e way Porter r e -

l a t e d or d i d n l t r e l a t e h i s data and h i s claims. I n h i s study, t h e r e i s no e x p l i c i t
development of a t h e s i s , a s M i l l s did i n The Power E l i t e , but a n accumulation of
d a t a without d i r e c t i n g p r i n c i p l e s even being made e x p l i c i t . Thus we g e t statements
l i k e : " ~ a r x l sc l a s s t h e o r i e s have i n t h e main been abandoned by contemporary theo-
r i s t s f o r t h e good reason t h a t t h e f a c t s do not f i t t h e theory. " ( I b i d . P. 18. )
We have already c r i t i c i z e d t h i s deductive notion of theory. The important t h i n e t o
note is how Porter s t a t e d h i s "ideas" separate from an evaluation of t h e s i g n i f i -
cance of h i s observations. I n a sense, Porter e s t a b l i s h e s no f a c t s about c l a s s and
power i n Canada. This job has s t i l l t o be done.

7 3 ~ o r t e r ,op. c i t . , p. 301.

T4~ohnK. Galbraith: The New I n d u s t r i a l State. aoston, Houghton Mifflin ( 1967)*

p. 282.

781bid. , p. 292.
P

7g~hroughoutt h i s study, especially i n Chapter Eleven, I have a r g ~ e dt h a t vulgar

InarXism and l i b e r a l positivism a r e both v a r i a t i o n s of t h e ideology and logic of
scientism. I f we t h i n k only of t h e United S t a t e s a s a s t a t e c a p i t a l i s t system*
then t h i s argument seems weak. For a convincing argument t h a t t h e U.S.S.R. must
a l s o be considered a s t a t e c a p i t a l i s t system, see Raya m y e v s k a y a : N i ~ x i s mand
Freedom. New York, Twayne Publishers (19641, Chapter XIIL
8 0 ~ a l b r a i t h ,op. c i t e * Po 294.

810l~onnor, op. c i t . , p. 15.

8 2 ~ e eJames Ridgeway: " u n i v e r s i t i e s a s Big ~ u s i n e s s " . Burnaby, The Peak, Wed.,

Oct. 9, 1968, pp. 14-15 and The D i s s e n t i w Academy, op. c i t .

83~etween1946-66 d i r e c t investments i n Canada by U.S. corporations r o s e from 2.5

t o 16.8 million. I n 1946 Canada was t h e second highest a r e a f o r d i r e c t investments
from U.S. corporations ( L a t i n America was highest with 3.1 m i l l i o n ) , but by 1966
Canada had become t h e area with t h e most d i r e c t investments. Europe was second i n
1966 with 16.2 and Latin America was t h i r d with 9.9 million. (Saturday Review,
Nov. 22, 1969.) Seeley has argued t h a t Canadian u n i v e r s i t i e s a r e not immune from
t h e a u t h o r i t a r i a n type of r u l e t h a t occurs i n U.S. u n i v e r s i t i e s . (John Seeley: The
" ~ e r k e l e yIssue" I n Time And Place, i n H. Adelam and D. Lee: The University Game.
Toronto, Anansi (1968), pp. 137-45.) For a discussion of t h e kind of authoritarian-
i s m t h a t occurs in Canadian u n i v e r s i t i e s , where t h e reasoning of a University Presi-
dent is compared with t h a t i n Mein Kampf, see John R. Seeley: California Correction-
-a.- l F a c i l i t y ( M i n i m u m Security Winq): The University of California. Berkeley Teach-
In, Nov. 17, 1967.

8%ugene D. Genovese e t al.: " ~ n i v e r s i t yMust Be Maintained A s Center of Free

~hought". Montreal, The Georgian. Wed. , Mar. 12, 1969. To s i t u a t e my discussion of
t h e u n i v e r s i t y and t h e ideology and l o g i c of scientism I have selected, f o r examina-
t i o n , analyses of t h e u n i v e r s i t y done by academics from S i r George Williams and
Simon Fraser University. These a r e t h e English-speaking campuses which have had t h e
most i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t , and issues have been sharpened i n both cases. For ~nyown
a n a l y s i s of issues a t Simon Fraser University, see Jim Harding: What I s Happening
A t SFU? Our Generation. Vol. 6, No. 3, Jan., 1969, pp. 52-67; and The S t r i k e A t SFLT,
pamphlet, Oct. 22, 1969.

8 8 ~ o c i a lc r i t i c i s m t h a t stems from f i r s t principles ends up a s s o c i a l realism. Ab-

s t r a c t c r i t i c i s m s of "society" i n theory complement t h e concrete acceptance of so-
c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t h e l i v e s of academic radicals.
9*For data that begins t o provide a perspective on how channelling occurs within
Canadian education, s e e Porter, op. c i t . , Chapter Six.

93~enovese, op. c it.

98Nax Lerner: Fducat ion and a Radical Humanism. Columbus , Ohio S t a t e University
(1962)~ p. 3. Another conservative scholar who i s c r i t i c a l of t h e l i b e r a l u n w e r s i t y
i s George Grant: The University Curricula. The University Game, op. c i t . , pp. 47-68.
Grant argues "So monolithic i s t h e agreement of s o c i e t y about ends, so pervasive
t h e ideology of l i b e r a l i s m which expresses t h a t agreement, t h a t t h e question about
knowing cannot be r a i s e d seriously." ( I b i d . , p. 48. ) Though he did not analyze what
I c a l l e d "the tautology between milieu and s t r u c t u r e " he did argue t h a t "...the
u n i v e r s i t y curriculum, by t h e very s t u d i e s it incorporates, guarantees t h a t t h e r e
should be no s e r i o u s c r i t i c i s m of i t s e l f or of t h e society. " ( I b i d . , p. 66.)

9 % ~Lerner: Ideas Are Weapons. New York, Viking Press (1939), p. 277

100~bid., p. 4.

lollbid. , p. 15.
lo21bid., pp. 19-20.

103~bid,, p. 20.

lo41bid., p. 24. "From one aspect t h e world i s passing through a power c r i s i s ; from
another it i s a c r i s i s o f c o l l e c t i v e w i l l and b e l i e f ; from s t i l l another a c r i s l s

151bid., p. 47. The notion t h a t education i s an encounter i s f a r more accurate than

any of t h e common one-dimensional definitions. A school-centered, sub ject-centered,
teacher-centered or student-centered d e f i n i t i o n amounts t o t h e same thing because
-
it does not account f o r t h e p o t e n t i a l c h a ~ i ei n a l l i n s t i t u t i o n s , people and know-
ledge -
i f educational r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e non-authoritarian. The fad around student-
centered teaching ( C a r l R. Rogers: Student-Centered Teaching, i n Client-Centered
Therapy. Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n i1951), pp. 384-428. ) i n t h e past few years is,
i n consequence, a new method of s o c i a l c o n t r o l i n t h e classroom. It leaves unques-
tioned t h e boundaries, schizoid praxis, tautology between s t r u c t u r e and milieu and
business-like c o n t r o l of t h e university.

17~icharKd. Pope: Democracy i n t h e University. Toronto, Department of Antro-

pology, York University, mimeographed, 1965.

lo8Frank B. Collenge: University? Impossible! Burnaby, B r i t i s h Columbia. Focus.

Vole 1, No. 1, March-April, 1969, pp. 24-29. By " r a d i c a l " , Collenge meant t h a t
t h e u n i v e r s i t y is impossible f o r both what he c a l l e d " empirical-cont ingent" and
" l o g i c a l l y necessary" reasons. O u r a n a l y s i s suggests t h a t Collengels formal analy-
sis of u n i v e r s i t y problems does not "go t o t h e roots", but i s i n d i c a t i v e of d i s i l -
lusionment with t h e l i b e r a l notion of u n i v e r s i t y without atandonirg t h e myth en-
tailed.

1151n September, 1968, when Acting President of Simon Braser University Strand
s t a t e d publically: "perhaps I am old fashioned, but I b e l i e v e u n i v e r s i t y problems
can be resolved through reason r a t h e r than power. " (Address, Sept. 9, 1968. ) I n
November, a f t e r t h e c r i s i s over admissions p o l i c i e s , t h e administration issued, i n
p a r t , t h e following statement: *"Itwas t h e persons occupying t h e building who re-
placed reason by f o r c e when they chose t o occupy the administrative building and it
was t h e occupants of t h e building who decided t h a t , i f they were t o be renoved, they
would be removed by force." (SFU Press Release, Nov. 27, 1968.) George Orwell has
written: " ~ o l i t i c a llanguage ... i s designed t o make l i e s sound t r u t h f u l and murder
respectable, and t o glve an appearance of s o l i d a r i t y t o pure wind." (The P o l i t i c s of
pureaucmcg, op. c i t . ) Now, a s Permanent President, Strand s t i l l addresses h i s memos
"TO a l l members of t h e u n i v e r s i t y community".

116~ollenge, op. c i t . , p. 26. Collengels b e l i e f t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t a r i a n n3ture of

u n i v e r s i t y administrations i s rooted i n t h e fragmented nature of t h e u n i v e r s i t y i s
contradicted by Kerr's a n a l y s i s o f t h e multiversity. For example, Kerr wrote t h a t
he u n i v e r s i t i e s themselves w i l l have t o exercise more s t r i n g e n t controls by cen-
t r a l i z i n g authority, p a r t i c u l a r l y through t h e a u d i t process. I n a few s i t u a t i o n s ,
s e l f - r e s t r a i n t has not been enough r e s t r a i n t ; as one r e s u l t , g r e a t e r external re-
s t r a i n t w i l l be imposed i n most situations." (See Hal Draper: The Mind of Clark
-
Kerr, Independent S o c i a l i s t Club, Berkeley, 1964.1

12%or a s p e c i f i c discussion o f these r e l a t i o n s h i p s , see my The New Radicals I n

B r i t i s h Columbia, Tn D. Roussopoulos and Paul Audley. (eds. ): The New Radicals I n
-
Canada. Toronto, Copp-Clark ( 1970 1.

1 2 6 ~ h eDissentinc Academy, op. c it.

127collenge, op. c i t e s P. 28.

129see Watson Thomson: Speaking t cross The Barriers. Queen1s ~ u a r t e r u .Vol. uv,
Winter, No. 4, pp. 601-14.

130see p. 18 above.

l 3 l ~ e ep. 18 above.

1 3 2 ~ e ep. 20 above.

l33See p. 20 above.

l3Osee p. 19 above.
135~ee p. 19 above.

136~uotedby E r i c Bockstael on CBC Radio, Ideas, January 3, 1969. For a n e,ucellent

discussion of t h e French Revolution 1968 see Andre Glucksman: Strategy and Revolu-
tion. New Left Review. No. 52, Nov.-Dec., 1968, pp. 67-121.

l37see p. 160 above.

'7r8see p. 159 above.

'j9see p. 179 above. For a discussion of t h e significance of S a r t r e l s ideological

project see Andre Gorz: S a r t r e and Marx. New Left Review. No. 37, May-June, 1966,
pp. 33-52. S a r t r e ' s ideological p r o j e c t i s o f t e n c a l l e d a philosophical anthropology.
Konrad Lorenz has w r i t t e n " ~ h i l o s o p h i c a lanthropology of a type neglecting biologi-
c a l f a c t has done its worst by imbuing humanity with t h a t s o r t of pride which only
comes before, but causes, a f a l l . " (On Agmession. Toronto, Bantam (1966), p. 288.)
This l e g i t i m a t e warning does not apply t o S a r t r e , but it does, f o r example, t o
Richard M. Zaner: An Approach To A Philosophical Anthropology. Philosophical and
Phenomenoloaical Research. Vol. 27, 1966-67, pp. 55-68.

140see p. 177 above.

14%ee pp. 175-76 above.

142~ee p. 180 above.

143~ee p. 183 above.

144~otm J. S u l l i v a n and Calvin W. Taylor: Learninn and C r e a t i v i t e -

with s p e c i a l
emphasis on science. Washington, D. C. National Science Teachers Association. A
Department of National Education Association (1967), p. 11.
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- Karl Polanyi: The Great Transformation. Boston, Beacon Press (1957).

Karl Popper: The Logic of S c i e n t i f i c Discovery. New York, Basic Books ( 1959 ).

The Poverty of Historicism. New York, Harper and Row (1964).

John Porter: The V e r t i c a l Mosaic. University of Toronto Press (1967).

Sidney Ratner and J u l e s Altman (eds. ): John Dewey and Arthur Bentles: A
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Joan Robinson: Economic Philosophy. Middlesex, England, Penguin ( 1964) .
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' V a r i e t i e s of Modern Social Theory. New York, E. P. Dutton

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Bertrand Russell: The Future of Science. New York, Philosophical Library (1959).

Edward Sapir: Culture, Lanmage and Personality. Berkeley, University of California

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 Jean Paul S a r t r e : be in,^ and Nothimness. Hazel E. Barnes ( t r a n s . ) New York,
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Adam Schaff: A Philosophy of Man. London, Lawrence and Wishart (1963).

H. Selsam and H. Martel (eds. 1: Reader I n The Marxist P h i l o s o u h ~ . New York,

I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s ( 1963 ) .
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Anselm S t r a u s s (ed.): Georne Herbert Mead on S o c i a l P s ~ c h o l o a . The University

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Claude Levi Strauss: The Savane Mind. University of Chicago Press (1966).

Gerald Sykes: The Hidden Remnant. New York, Harper and Brothers ( 1962 1.

Edward A. Tiryakian: S o c i o l w i s m and Existentialism. Englewood C l i f f s , N. J. ,

Prentice-Hall ( 1962).

Stephen Toulmin: The Philosophy of Science. New York, Harper and Row (1960).

The Uses of Amument. Cambridge University Press ( 1964).

Leon Trotsky e t a l . : T h e i r M3rals and Ours: Marxist versus L i b e r a l Views of

Morality. New York, Merit Publishers ( 1966 ).

Morrfs Van Cleve: E x i z t e n t i a l i s m I n Education. New York, Harper and Row ( 1966).

T h o r s t e i n Veblen: The Higher Learning i n America. New York, H i l l and Wang (1965).

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\Max Weber: The M e t h o d ~ l o mof t h e S o c i a l Sciences. E.A. S h i l s and H.A. Finch (eds. 1,
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'-- Lance1n.t L. :,lhyte: The Next Develo~mcnt of Man. New York, Mentor ( 1.962).

The Unconscious Before Freud. Garden C i t y , Anchor ( 1962).

P e t e r Winch: The Idea of a S o c i a l Science. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul (1958).

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 ' - 582 -

Articles

Reuben Abel: Pragmatism and t h e Outlook of Modern Science. Philosophical and

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Henry Aiken: The Sick University. New York Review of Books. Vol. VII, No. 6,
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What i s a Liberal Education? New York Review of Books. Vol. V I I ,

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Gordon W. Allport: The General and t h e Unique i n Psychological Science, i n F.H.

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Louis Althusser: Frepd and Lacan. New Left Review. May-June, 1969.

Perry Anderson: Components of t h e National Culture. New Left Review. No. 50,
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Ernest Becker: M i l l s ' S o c i a l Psychology and t h e Great H i s t o r i c a l Convergence on

t h e Problem of Alienation, i n I.L. Horowitz (ed. ): The New S o c i o l o ~ .New York,
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Gustov Bergmann: Ideology, i n May Brodbeck (ed. 1: Readims i n t h e Philosophy of

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,
, L. von Bertalanffy: An Essay on t h e R e l a t i v i t y of Categories. Philosophy of
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Science. Vol. 22, No. 4, October, 1955, pp. 243-63.

Fred Brown: Behavioral Science: A Reappraisal. Burnaby, Behavioral Science Founda-

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Noam Chomsky: Linguistics and P o l i t i c s . New Left Review. No. 17, September-
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I .

J e r r y Cohen: The Philosophy of Marcuse. New Left Review. No. 57, September-
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Frank B. Collenge: University? Impossible! Burnaby, B.C. O C U . Vol. 1, No. 1,

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 Arthur K. Davis: Social Theory and Social Problems. P h i l o s o ~ h l c a land Phenomenol-
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l Vol. XVIII, No. 11, Dec., 1957. '

Leslie Dewart: Education and P o l i t i c a l Values: The Dilemma of Liberal Education.

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Hal Draper: The Mind of Clark Kerr. Berkeley, Independent S o c i a l i s t Club, 1964.

Socialism From Above and Socialism From Below. Our Generation. Vol. 6,
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Raya Dunayevskaya: Marx1s Humanism Today. i n Eric F r o m (ed. ): S o c i a l i s t Humanism.

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Ernest Gellner: The Entry of The Philosophers. The Times L i t e r a r y Supplement.

April 4, 1968.
I

Eugene D. Genovese e t a l : " ~ n i v e r s i t yMust Be Maintained a s Center of Free Thought."

Montreal, The Geor~ian. Wed., March 12, 1969.

Andre Gorz: S a r t r e and Marx. W L e r t ; Review. No. 37, May-June, 1966, pp. 33-52.

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Rollo Handy: Philosophy~sNeglect of The Social Sciences. Philosophy of Science.

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Jim Harding: Action Research, Social Change and Ideology I n The Social Sciences.
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P r e r e q u i s i t e s Of An Integrated Social Science. Canadian Alternatives.

Vol. 1, No. 2, 1966.

Jihetoric an4 R e a l i t y I n The Universits: A Case Study of R e ~ i n aCam~us.

Port Arthur, Department of Psychology, Lakehead University, mimeographed, 1967.

Two Winnipeg Schools. This Magazine I s About Schools. Vol. 2, No. 4,

~utumn, 1968.

W e d Y Absurdity and Joy I n The Classroom. Ottawa, Canadian Union of

Students, 1969,

What 1s Happening a t Simon Fraser University? Our Generation. Vol. 6,

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 Jim Hard*: The New Radicals i n B r i t i s h Columbia, i n D. Roussopoulos and Paul
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Irving L. Horowitz: Estab1,ishment Sociology: The Value of Being Value-Free.

Inquiry. ~ s l o ,Norway. Universitets forlaget. Vol. 1, No. 6.

Aldous Huxley: Knowledge and Understanding, i n Tomorrow and Tomorrow and Tomorrow.
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Arthur Koestler: Thinking Aside, i n The Act of Creation. London, Hutchinson (1964)
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R.D. La*: The Obvious, i n David Cooper ( ed. 1: The D i a l e c t i c s of Liberation.

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Martin Landau: Due Process of Inquiry. The American Behavioral Scientist.

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D.G. MacRae: The Crisis of Sociology, i n J.H. Plumb (ed. ): C r i s i s I n The Human-
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Herbert Marcuse: Repressive Tolerance, i n R.P. Wolff e t al.: A Critique of Pure

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Karl Marx: Thesis on Feuerbach, i n Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: z h e German
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Abraham H. Maslow: Interpersonal ( ~ - T h o u )Knowledge As a Paradigm For Science.

,--
/ i n The P s ~ c h o l o nof~ Science. New York, Harper and Row, pp. 103-118.

/ George H. Mead: The Genesis of Self and Social Control. i n M.R. Konvitz and Gail
/
Kennedy ( eds. ) : z h e American P r a ~ m a t i s t s . New York, Meridian ( 1960 )

C. Wright Mills: Methodological Consequences of The Sociology of Knowledge. i n

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Power, P o l i t i c s and People. New York, Ballantine ( 1963).

The Nazi Behemoth. i n Power, P o l i t i c s and People. New York,

Ballantine ( 19631.

The Structure of Power I n American Society. i n Power, P o l i t i c s

and People. New York, Ballantine ( 1963).

Mass Society and Liberal Education. i n Power, P o l i t i c s and

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Barrington Moore Jr.: Revolution I n America? The New York Revlew of Books. Jan. 30,
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 Garwer Murphy: The Future of Social Psychological Perspectives. i n 0. Kline-
,---"berg ( ed.
): Perspectives I n Social psycho lo^. ( 1965 1.

Martin Nicolaus: The Unknown Marx. New Left Review. No. 48, March-April, 1968.

George Novack: Positivism and Marxism I n Sociology. International S o c i a l i s t

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Review. Vol. 29, No. 4, July-August, 1968.

James O'Connor: The University and The P o l i t i c a l Economy. Leviathan. Vol. 1,

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J. Petras: The P o l i t i c s of 13ureaucracy. Liberation. Feb., 1966.

D. Pharand: W o Aspects of Tenure. CAUT Bulletin. March, 1965.

Richard K. Pope: Democrac~I n The Universitg. Toronto, Department of Anthro-

p010gys York university, 1965.

Willard V. Quine: TWO Dogmas of Empiricism. i n From A Logical Point of View.

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Raymond E. Ries: .- Social Research. Vol. 32, No. 2 ,

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Stephen W. Rousseas and James Farganis: American P o l i t i c s and The End of Ideology.
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John and Margaret Rowntree: Youth As Class. OurGeneration. Vol. 6, 110s. 1-2, May-
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Joseph A. Schwnpeter: Is The History of Economics A History of Ideology? i n D.

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millan ( 1966 ).

John Seeley: Mankind As Fact By Faith. i n R. Ulich (ed. ): Education and The Idea
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C a l i f o r n i a Correctianal F a c i l i t y (Minimum Securl.ty ~ i w )The

: Uni-
v e r s i t y of California. Berkeley Teach-In, Nov., 17, 1967.

The " ~ e r k e l e yIssue" I n Time and Place. I n H. Adelman and D. Lee

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 Edward J. Shoben J r . : Towards a Concept of The N o m l Personality. i n L. Gorlow
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of Ad;lustment. Toronto, Mc-
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George G. Simpson: Biology and The Nature of Science. Science. Vol. 139s No. 3550,
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-
John J. Sullivan and Calvin W. Taylor: Learmiw and C r e a t i v i t g with Special
Reference t o Science. Washington, D.C., National Science Teachers Association.
A Department of National Educational Association ( 1967 1.

R. Thompson and H.R. Brown: Social Science and The Ideolom of The Status Quo.
Saskatoon, Students For A Democratic University, 1968.

Watson Thomson: SpeaFing Across The Barriers. 9ueen1s Quarterlq. Vol. IXV,
Winter, No. 4, pp. 601-14.

Melville Watkins: The Multi-National Corporation and Canada. Our Generation.

Vol. 6, No. 4, Spring-June* 1969, pp. 97-102.

Max Weber: Science As A Vocation. i n Hans Gerth and C.W. Mills. (eds. ): From Max
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Weber. New York, Oxford University Press (19581, pp. 129-56.

Benjamin Whorf: Science and Linguistics. i n P. Gleeson and Nancy Wakefield (eds. 1:
,
Language and Culture. Colwnbus, Ohio, Charles E. M e r r i l l (1968).

Colwyn Williamson: Ideology and The Problem of Knowled~e. Edmonton, Department of

Philosophy, University of Alberta, mimeographed, undated.

- K.H. Wolff: The Soclology of Knowledge and Sociological Theory. i n G. Llewellyn

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Richard Zaner: A n Approach To Philosophical Anthropology. Philosophical and

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We Want A University. The Berkeley Free Speech Moveme-nt, pamphlet, 1964.