ARIEL M. LOS BAOS, on behalf of P/Supt.
Victor Arevalo, SPO2 Marcial Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene and PO1 offense.[9] Pedro attached to his motion a Comelec Certification dated September 24, 2001 that he was exempted from the
Raul Adlawan, and in his personal capacity,
Petitioner,
- versus -
JOEL R. PEDRO, Respondent. G.R. No. 173588
April 22, 2009
DECISION
BRION, J.
We review in this petition for review on certiorari[1] the September 19, 2005 decision[2] and the July 6,
2006 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80223. The petition seeks to revive the case against
respondent Joel R. Pedro (Pedro) for election gun ban violation after the CA declared the case permanently dismissed
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
THE ANTECEDENTS
Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without the required written authorization from the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) a day before the May 14, 2001 national and local elections. The Information reads:
That on or about the 13th day of May 2001 at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, in [S]itio
Bantauyan, [B]arangay Bantad, Municipality of Boac, Province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously carry a Revolver Cal. 357, Magnum Ruger 100 loaded with six (6)
ammunitions, with Serial No. 173-56836 outside his residence during the election period, without
authorization in writing from the Commission on Election[s].
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The accusation was based on Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (Code) after the
Marinduque Philippine National Police (PNP) caught Pedro illegally carrying his firearm at a checkpoint at Boac,
Marinduque. The Boac checkpoint team was composed of Police Senior Inspector Victor V. Arevalo, SPO2 Marshal
Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene, and PO1 Raul Adlawan. The team stopped a silver-gray Toyota Hi-Ace with plate number
WHT-371 on the national highway, coming from the Boac town proper. When Pedro (who was seated at the rear portion)
opened the window, Arevalo saw a gun carry case beside him. Pedro could not show any COMELEC authority to carry a
firearm when the checkpoint team asked for one, but he opened the case when asked to do so. The checkpoint team saw
the following when the case was opened: 1) one Revolver 357 Magnum Ruger GP100, serial number 173-56836, loaded
with six ammunitions; 2) one ammunition box containing 100 bullets; 3) two pieces speed loader with six ammunitions each;
and 4) one set ear protector. Pedro was with three other men. The checkpoint team brought all of them to the Boac police
station for investigation.
The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro for violating the election gun ban, i.e., for
carrying a firearm outside of his residence or place of business without any authority from the Comelec. After an inquest, the
Marinduque provincial prosecutor filed the above Information against Pedro with the Marinduque Regional Trial Court (RTC)
for violation of the Codes Article XXII, Section 261 (q),[5] in relation to Section 264.[6]
Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the RTC granted. [7] The preliminary investigation,
however, did not materialize. Instead, Pedro filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Information contains
averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification[8] and/or that the facts charged do not constitute an
gun ban. The provincial prosecutor opposed the motion.
The RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the prosecutors to return the seized articles to
Pedro.[10]
The petitioner, private prosecutor Ariel Los Baos (Los Baos), representing the checkpoint team, moved to reopen
the case, as Pedros Comelec Certification was a falsification, and the prosecution was deprived of due process when the
judge quashed the information without a hearing. Attached to Los Baos motion were two Comelec certifications stating that:
(1) Pedro was not exempted from the firearm ban; and (2) the signatures in the Comelec Certification of September 24,
2001 were forged.
The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings, as Pedro did not object to Los Baos motion.[11] Pedro moved
for the reconsideration of the RTCs order primarily based on Section 8 of Rule 117, [12] arguing that the dismissal had
become permanent. He likewise cited the public prosecutors lack of express approval of the motion to reopen the case.
The public prosecutor, however, manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen the case. The trial
court, for its part, rejected the position that Section 8, Rule 117 applies, and explained that this provision refers to situations
where both the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or
the offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the information was quashed
upon motion of the accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedros arraignment date.
Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTCs mandated reopening.[13] He
argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that the
dismissal contemplated under Section 8, Rule 117 refers to situations where either the prosecution and the accused
mutually consented to, or where the prosecution alone moved for, the provisional dismissal of the case; in rejecting his
argument that the prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code [14] or Act No. 3326[15] find no application
to his case as the filing of the Information against him stopped the running of the prescriptive periods so that the prescription
mandated by these laws became irrelevant; and, in setting the case for arraignment and pre-trial conference, despite being
barred under Section 8 of Rule 117.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The CA initially denied Pedros petition. For accuracy, we quote the
material portions of its ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
The trial court erred in ruling that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to provisional dismissals
on motion of the accused. The Rule merely provides that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed,
except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. Nothing in the
said rule proscribes its application to dismissal on motion of the accused.
Nevertheless, we find no basis for issuing the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition,
as there is no showing that the error was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of
discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
 grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law.
Before the petitioner may invoke the time-bar in Section 8, he must establish the following:
1. the prosecution, with the express conformity of the accused or the accused
moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served, with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of
the case.
Although the second paragraph of Section 8 states that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after the issuance thereof, without the case having been revived, such provision
should be construed to mean that the dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the
order of dismissal on the public prosecutor, as the public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with
the timeliness requirement unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
In the instant, case, the records are bereft of proof as to when the public prosecutor was
served the order of dismissal dated 22 November 2001. Absent such proof, we cannot declare that the
State is barred from reviving the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
In his motion for reconsideration, Pedro manifested the exact date and time of the Marinduque provincial
prosecutors receipt of the quashal order to be 2:35 p.m., December 10, 2001, and argued that based on this date, the
provisional dismissal of the case became permanent on December 10, 2002. Based on this information, the CA reversed
itself, ruling as follows:
On 9 September 2005, we ruled that Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to a dismissal on motion
of the accused. However, we did not issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition, because it was shown
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reopening of the case. Moreover,
we stated that we cannot rule on the issue of whether or not the State is barred from reopening the case
because it was not shown when the public prosecutor was served the order of dismissal.
xxx
The arguments raised in the respondents motion for modification were duly passed upon in
arriving at the decision dated 9 September 2005, and no new matters were raised which would warrant
a reconsideration thereof.
On the other hand, the petitioner was able to prove that the motion to reopen the case was
filed after the lapse of more than one year from the time the public prosecutor was served the notice of
dismissal. Therefore, the state is barred from reopening the case.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Joel Pedros motion for partial reconsideration is hereby GRANTED,
and respondent Ariel Los Banos motion for modification of judgment is, accordingly, DENIED.
To summarize this ruling, the appellate court, while initially saying that there was an error of law but no grave abuse of
discretion that would call for the issuance of a writ, reversed itself on motion for reconsideration; it then ruled that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion because it failed to apply Section 8, Rule 17 and the time-bar under this provision.
THE PETITION
Los Baos prays in his petition that the case be remanded to the RTC for arraignment and trial, or that a new
charge sheet be filed against Pedro, or that the old information be re-filed with the RTC. He contends that under Section 6 of
Rule 117, an order sustaining a motion to quash does not bar another prosecution for the same offense, unless the motion
was based on the grounds specified in Section 3(g)[16] and (i)[17] of Rule 117. Los Baos argues that the dismissal under
Section 8 of Rule 117 covers only situations where both the prosecution and the accused either mutually consented or
agreed to, or where the prosecution alone moved for the provisional dismissal of the case; it can also apply to instances of
failure on the part of the prosecution or the offended party to object, after having been forewarned or cautioned that its case
will be dismissed. It does not apply where the information was quashed. He adds that although the trial court granted the
motion to quash, it did not categorically dismiss the case, either provisionally or permanently, as the judge simply ordered
the return of the confiscated arms and ammunition to Pedro. The order was open-ended, and did not have the effect of
provisionally dismissing the case under Section 8 of Rule 117.
Los Baos also contends that the CA gravely erred when: (1) it ruled in effect that the Order dated November 22,
2001 granting the motion to quash is considered a provisional dismissal, which became permanent one year from the
prosecutors receipt of the order; the order to quash the Information was based on Section 3 of Rule 117, not on Section 8 of
this Rule; (2) it granted Pedros motion for reconsideration and denied Los Baos motion for modification of judgment, when
Section 6 of Rule 117 clearly provides that an order granting a motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense.
He notes that the grounds Pedro relied upon in his motion to quash are not subsections (g) or (i) of Rule 117, but
its subsections (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and (h) that it contains averments which if true would
constitute a legal justification. Pedros cited grounds are not the exceptions that would bar another prosecution for the same
offense.[18] The dismissal of a criminal case upon the express application of the accused (under subsections [a] and [h]) is
not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, because his application is a waiver of his constitutional prerogative
against double jeopardy.
In response to all these, respondent Pedro insists and fully relies on the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 to
support his position that the RTC should not have granted Los Banos motion to reopen the case.
THE ISSUES
The issue is ultimately reduced to whether Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to the case, as the CA found. If it
applies, then the CA ruling effectively lays the matter to rest.If it does not, then the revised RTC decision reopening the case
should prevail.
OUR RULING
We find the petition meritorious and hold that the case should be remanded to the trial court for
arraignment and trial.
Quashal v. Provisional Dismissal
a. Motion to Quash
A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails, before entering his plea, the validity of the criminal
complaint or the criminal information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defect apparent on
the face of the Information.[19] The motion, as a rule, hypothetically admits the truth of the facts spelled out in the complaint
or information. The rules governing a motion to quash are found under Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 3 of
this Rule enumerates the
grounds for the quashal of a complaint or information, as follows:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is
prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
b. Provisional Dismissal
On the other hand, Section 8, Rule 117 that is at the center of the dispute states that:
SEC.8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more
than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of
the order without the case having been revived.
A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur:
1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a provisional
dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for its
provisional dismissal;
2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and
4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.[20]
In People v. Lacson,[21] we ruled that there are sine quanon requirements in the application of the time-bar rule
stated in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117. We also ruled that the time-bar under the foregoing provision is a
special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right
or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the
accused.
c. Their Comparison
An examination of the whole Rule tells us that a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal
are far different from one another as concepts, in their features, and legal consequences. While the provision on provisional
dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash results in a
provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.
A first notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is that it does not exactly state what a provisional dismissal is. The
modifier provisional directly suggests that the dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers to are those that are temporary
in character (i.e., to dismissals that are without prejudice to the re-filing of the case), and not the dismissals that are
permanent (i.e., those that bar the re-filing of the case). Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals
are those barred by the principle of
double jeopardy,[22] by the previous extinction of criminal liability,[23] by the rule on speedy trial,[24] and the dismissals after
plea without the express consent of the accused.[25] Section 8, by its own terms, cannot cover these dismissals because
they are not provisional.
A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a provisional dismissal. This is in
marked contrast with a motion to quash whose grounds are specified under Section 3. The delimitation of the grounds
available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a class in itself, with specific and closely-defined
characteristics under the Rules of Court. A necessary consequence is that where the grounds cited are those listed under
Section 3, then the appropriate remedy is to file a motion to quash, not any other remedy. Conversely, where a ground does
not appear under Section 3, then a motion to quash is not a proper remedy. A motion for provisional dismissal may then
apply if the conditions required by Section 8 obtain.
A third feature, closely related to the second, focuses on the consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. This
feature also answers the question of whether the quashal of an information can be treated as a provisional
dismissal. Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 117 unmistakably provide for the consequences of a meritorious motion to
quash. Section 4 speaks of an amendment of the complaint or information, if the motion to quash relates to a defect curable
by amendment. Section 5 dwells on the effect of sustaining the motion to quash - the complaint or information may be re-
filed, except for the instances mentioned under Section 6. The latter section, on the other hand, specifies the limit of the re-
filing that Section 5 allows it cannot be done where the dismissal is based on extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy. Section 7 defines double jeopardy and complements the ground provided under Section 3(i) and the exception
stated in Section 6.
Rather than going into specifics, Section 8 simply states when a provisional dismissal can be made, i.e., when the
accused expressly consents and the offended party is given notice. The consent of the accused to a dismissal relates
directly to what Section 3(i) and Section 7 provide, i.e., the conditions for dismissals that lead to double jeopardy.This
immediately suggests that a dismissal under Section 8 i.e., one with the express consent of the accused is not intended to
lead to double jeopardy as provided under Section 7, but nevertheless creates a bar to further prosecution under the special
terms of Section 8.
This feature must be read with Section 6 which provides for the effects of sustaining a motion to quash the
dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the basis for the dismissal is the extinction of
criminal liability and double jeopardy. These unique terms, read in relation with Sections 3(i) and 7 and compared with the
consequences of Section 8, carry unavoidable implications that cannot but lead to distinctions between a quashal and a
provisional dismissal under Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what has been provided under
Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule when a motion to quash is meritorious are the terms of Section 6. The failure of the
Rules to state under Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to further prosecution shows that the framers
did not intend a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal to be confused with one another; Section
8 operates in a world of its own separate from motion to quash, and merely provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to
dismissals other than those grounded on Section 3. Conversely, when a dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under
Section 3, Section 8 and its time-bar does not apply.

Other than the above, we note also the following differences stressing that a motion to quash and its resulting
dismissal is a unique class that should not be confused with other dismissals:
First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to question the efficacy of the complaint or information
filed against him or her (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast, a case may be provisionally dismissed at the instance of
either the prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to the conditions enumerated under Section 8, Rule 117. [26]
Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as stated under Section 2 of Rule 117; these requirements
do not apply to a provisional dismissal.
Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information for defects or
defenses apparent on face of the information; a provisional dismissal may be grounded on reasons other than the defects
found in the information.
Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the arraignment (Section 1, Rule 117); there may be a provisional
dismissal of the case even when the trial proper of the case is already underway provided that the required consents are
present.[27]
Jose P. Balbuena, Sr. of the Law Department, Committee on Firearms and Security Personnel of the Comelec, granting him
an exemption from the ban and a permit to carry firearms during the election period) [29] that Pedro attached to his motion to
quash. This COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde that is not an appropriate motion to raise in, and cannot support, a
motion to quash grounded on legal excuse or justification found on the face of the Information. Significantly, no hearing
was ever called to allow the prosecution to contest the genuineness of the COMELEC certification.[30]
Thus, the RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling that a quashal of the Information was in order. Pedro, on the other
hand, also misappreciated the true nature, function, and utility of a motion to quash. As a consequence, a valid Information
still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.
One final observation: the Information was not rendered defective by the fact that Pedro was charged of violating Section
261(q) of the Code, instead of Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, which amended Section 261(q); these two sections aim to
penalize among others, the carrying of firearms (or other deadly weapons) in public places during the election period without
the authority of the Comelec. The established rule is that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or
preamble of the information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated; the crime
committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information [31] Further,
in Abenes v. Court of Appeals,[32] we specifically recognized that the amendment under Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 does
not affect the prosecution of the accused who was charged under Section 261(q) of the Code.

Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms, impermanent until the time-bar applies, at which time it becomes WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and accordingly declare the assailed September 19, 2005 decision
a permanent dismissal. In contrast, an information that is quashed stays quashed until revived; the grant of a motion to and the July 6, 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80223 respectively MODIFIED and REVERSED.
quash does not per se carry any connotation of impermanence, and becomes so only as provided by law or by the Rules. In The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque for the arraignment and trial of respondent Joel R.
re-filing the case, what is important is the question of whether the action can still be brought, i.e., whether the prescription of Pedro, after reflecting in the Information the amendment introduced on Section 261(q) of the Code by Section 32 of
action or of the offense has set in. In a provisional dismissal, there can be no re-filing after the time-bar, and prescription is Republic Act No. 7166.
not an immediate consideration.
SO ORDERED.
To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts whose respective rules refer to different
situations that should not be confused with one another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the
complaint or information, as shown on its face, the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All
other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information, before arraignment and under the circumstances
outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional dismissal.

Thus, we conclude that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to the reopening of the case that the RTC ordered and
which the CA reversed; the reversal of the CAs order is legally proper.

Pedros Motion to Quash

The merits of the grant of the motion to quash that the RTC initially ordered is not a matter that has been ruled
upon in the subsequent proceedings in the courts below, including the CA. We feel obliged to refer back to this ruling,
however, to determine the exact terms of the remand of the case to the RTC that we shall order.

The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the Information contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification [Section 3(h), Rule 117], and that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense [Section 3(a), Rule 117]. We find from our examination of the records that the Information duly charged a specific
offense and provides the details on how the offense was committed.[28] Thus, the cited Section 3(a) ground has no merit. On
the other hand, we do not see on the face or from the averments of the Information any legal excuse or justification. The
cited basis, in fact, for Pedros motion to quash was a Comelec Certification (dated September 24, 2001, issued by Director
[G.R. No. 132624. March 13, 2000]
FIDEL M. BAARES II, LILIA C. VALERIANO, EDGAR M. BAARES, EMILIA GATCHALIAN and FIDEL
BESARINO, petitioners, vs. ELIZABETH BALISING, ROGER ALGER, MERLINDA CAPARIC, EUSTAQUIO R.
TEJONES, ANDREA SAYAM, JENNY ISLA, WILMA ROGATERO, PABLITO ALEGRIA, ROLANDO CANON, EDITHA
ESTORES, EDMUNDO DOROYA, TERESITA GUION, DANNY ANDARAYAN, LOURDES CADAY, ROGELIO MANO,
EVANGELINE CABILTES AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF RIZAL, Antipolo, Rizal, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch
71 dated August 26, 1997.[1]
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioners Fidel M. Baares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Baares, Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel Besarino were the accused
in sixteen criminal cases for estafa[2] filed by the private respondents. The cases were assigned to the Municipal Trial Court
of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II. Ncm
After the petitioners were arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty,[3] they filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned
cases on the ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of the failure of the parties to undergo conciliation
proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal.[4] Petitioners averred that since they
lived in the same barangay as private respondents, and the amount involved in each of the cases did not exceed Two
Hundred Pesos (P200.00), the said cases were required under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local
Government Code of 1991[5] and Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.[6] to be referred to
the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay concerned for conciliation proceedings before
being filed in court.[7]
The municipal trial court issued an Order, dated July 17, 1995 [8] denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
they failed to seasonably invoke the non-referral of the cases to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo. It added that such failure to invoke non-referral of the case to the Lupon amounted to a waiver by
petitioners of the right to use the said ground as basis for dismissing the cases.[9]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, claiming that nowhere in the Revised Rules of
Court is it stated that the ground of prematurity shall be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. [10]
On November 13, 1995, the municipal trial court issued an Order dismissing the sixteen criminal cases against petitioners
without prejudice, pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. [11] Scncm
More than two months later, on February 26, 1996, private respondents through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the
abovementioned criminal cases against petitioners, stating that the requirement of referral to the Lupon for conciliation had
already been complied with.[12] Attached to the motion was a Certification dated February 13, 1996 from the Lupong
Tagapamayapaof Barangay Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal[13] stating that the parties appeared before said body regarding the
charges of estafa filed by private respondents against petitioners but they failed to reach an amicable settlement with
respect thereto. Petitioners filed a Comment and Opposition to Motion to Revive claiming that the Order of the municipal
trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the cases had long become final and executory; hence, private
respondents should have re-filed the cases instead of filing a motion to revive.[14]
On March 18, 1996, the municipal trial court issued an Order [15] granting private respondents Motion to Revive. Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[16] of the aforementioned Order which was denied by the municipal trial court.[17]
Petitioners thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, a petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition
assailing the Order dated March 18, 1996 of the municipal trial court. They claimed that the said Order dated November 13,
1995 dismissing the criminal cases against them had long become final and executory considering that the prosecution did
not file any motion for reconsideration of said Order.[18] In response thereto, private respondents filed their
Comment,[19] arguing that the motion to revive the said cases was in accordance with law, particularly Section 18 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.[20]
After the parties submitted additional pleadings to support their respective contentions, [21] the Regional Trial Court rendered
the assailed Decision denying the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition, stating as follows:
Evaluating the allegations contained in the petition and respondents comment thereto, the Court regrets
that it cannot agree with the petitioner(sic). As shown by the records the 16 criminal cases were
dismissed without prejudice at the instance of the petitioners for failure of the private respondent to
comply with the mandatory requirement of PD 1508. Since the dismissal of said cases was without
prejudice, the Court honestly believes that the questioned order has not attained finality at all.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Sdaamiso
SO ORDERED.[22]
The Regional Trial Court, likewise, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[23] of the aforementioned Decision for lack
of merit.[24]
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following questions of law:
1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not
appealed within the reglementary period, as in the present case;
2. Whether or not the action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice may be revived by
motion after the order of dismissal had become final and executory; and
3. Whether or not the court that had originally acquired jurisdiction of the case that was dismissed
without prejudice still has jurisdiction to act on the motion to revive after the order of dismissal has
become final and executory.[25]
Petitioners contend that an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within the
reglementary period. Hence, if no motion to revive the case is filed within the reglementary fifteen-day period within which to
appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration of the courts order, the order of dismissal becomes final and the case may only
be revived by the filing of a new complaint or information. [26] Petitioners further argue that after the order of dismissal of a
case attains finality, the court which issued the same loses jurisdiction thereon and, thus, does not have the authority to act
on any motion of the parties with respect to said case.[27]
On the other hand, private respondents submit that cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure such
as the criminal cases against petitioners are not covered by the rule regarding finality of decisions and orders under the
Revised Rules of Court. They insist that cases dismissed without prejudice for non-compliance with the requirement of
conciliation before the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay concerned may be revived
summarily by the filing of a motion to revive regardless of the number of days which has lapsed after the dismissal of the
case.[28]
Petitioners contentions are meritorious. Sdaad
A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by
the court.[29] As distinguished therefrom, an "interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose of a case completely, but
leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.[30]
This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order [31] if no motion for
reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.
In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals,[32] we stated thus:
The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however mean that said dismissal order was
any less final. Such order of dismissal is complete in all details, and though without prejudice,
nonetheless finally disposed of the matter. It was not merely an interlocutory order but a final disposition
of the complaint.
The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the courts decision or order disposing of
the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same.[33]
After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the
court which rendered it to further amend or revoke.[34] A final judgment or order cannot be modified in any respect, even if
the modification sought is for the purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion by the court which rendered the same. [35]
After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes outside the courts power
to amend and modify, a party wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint.
This was explained in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,[36] where we ruled thus: Scsdaad
The dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the reglementary period to reconsider or set aside
the dismissal, effectively operated to remove the case from the Courts docket. Even assuming
the dismissal to be without prejudice, the case could no longer be reinstated or "revived" by
mere motion in the original docketed action, but only by the filing of another
complaint accompanied, of course, by the payment of the corresponding filing fees prescribed by law.
xxx
[S]ince theoretically every final disposition of an action does not attain finality until after fifteen (15) days
therefrom, and consequently within that time the action still remains within the control of the Court, the
plaintiff may move and set aside his notice of dismissal and revive his action before that period lapses.
But after dismissal has become final after the lapse of the fifteen-day reglementary period, the
only way by which the action may be resuscitated or "revived" is by the institution of a
subsequent action through the filing of another complaint and the payment of fees prescribed by
law. This is so because upon attainment of finality of the dismissal through the lapse of said
reglementary period, the Court loses jurisdiction and control over it and can no longer make a
disposition in respect thereof inconsistent with such dismissal.[37] (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to private respondents claim, the foregoing rule applies not only to civil cases but to criminal cases as well. In Jaca
vs. Blanco,[38] the Court defined a provisional dismissal of a criminal case as a dismissal without prejudice to the
reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the
offense."[39]Supremax
Thus, the Regional Trial Court erred when it denied the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition and ruled that the
order of the municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing without prejudice the criminal cases against
petitioners had not attained finality and hence, could be reinstated by the mere filing of a motion to revive.
Equally erroneous is private respondents contention that the rules regarding finality of judgments under the Revised Rules
of Court[40] do not apply to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Private respondents claim that
Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure allows the revival of cases which were dismissed for failure to
submit the same to conciliation at the barangay level, as required under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local
Government Code. The said provision states:
Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1508[41] where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall
be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been
complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without
a warrant.[42]
There is nothing in the aforecited provision which supports private respondents view. Section 18 merely states that when a
case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the issues
to the Lupon, the same may be revived only after the dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay
conciliation as required under the Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case may be
revived by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has
lapsed.
Moreover, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure expressly provides that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to
cases covered by the former:
Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules. The regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court shall
apply to the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as they are not
inconsistent therewith.[43]
A careful examination of Section 18 in relation to Section 22 of the 1991 Revised Rule of Summary Procedure and Rule 40,
Section 2 in relation to Rule 13, Sections 9 and 10, [44] and Rule 36, Section 2[45] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, leads to no other conclusion than that the rules regarding finality of judgments also apply to cases covered by the
rules on summary procedure. Nothing in Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure conflicts with the
prevailing rule that a judgment or order which is not appealed or made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the
prescribed fifteen-day period attains finality.[46] Hence, the principle expressed in the maxim interpretare et concordare
legibus est optimus interpretandi, or that every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form
a uniform system of jurisprudence [47] applies in interpreting both sets of Rules.
The rationale behind the doctrine of finality of judgments and orders, likewise, supports our conclusion that said doctrine
applies to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:
The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at
the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date set by law. [48] Misjuris
It is but logical to infer that the foregoing principle also applies to cases subject to summary procedure especially since the
objective of the Rule governing the same is precisely to settle these cases expeditiously.[49] To construe Section 18 thereof
as allowing the revival of dismissed cases by mere motion even after the lapse of the period for appealing the same would
prevent the courts from settling justiciable controversies with finality,[50] thereby undermining the stability of our judicial
system.
The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken impression of petitioners and the municipal trial court that the non-
referral of a case for barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code of 1991 [51] may be raised in a
motion to dismiss even after the accused has been arraigned.
It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law [52] is not
jurisdictional in nature[53] and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss.[54] The Court
notes that although petitioners could have invoked the ground of prematurity of the causes of action against them due to the
failure to submit the dispute to Lupon prior to the filing of the cases as soon as they received the complaints against them,
petitioners raised the said ground only after their arraignment.
However, while the trial court committed an error in dismissing the criminal cases against petitioners on the ground that the
same were not referred to the Lupon prior to the filing thereof in court although said ground was raised by them belatedly,
the said order may no longer be revoked at present considering that the same had long become final and executory, and as
earlier stated, may no longer be annulled[55] by the Municipal Trial Court, nor by the Regional Trial Court or this
Court.[56] Scjuris
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II
dated August 26, 1997 and its Order dated January 29, 1998 in SCA Case No. 96-4092 are hereby SET ASIDE and
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-0829, 94-0830, 94-0831, 94-0832, 94-0833, 94-0836, 94-0838, 94-0839, 94-0841, 94-0843, 94-
0847, 94-0848, 94-0850, 94-0854 and 94-0058 of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo are ordered DISMISSED, without
prejudice, pursuant to Sec. 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
SO ORDERED. KAPUNAN
STATE PROSECUTOR AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ON SSS CASES IN REGION V, ROMULO SJ. TOLENTINO, AND BELIEVE THAT THE OFFENSE HAS BEEN COMMITTED, THAT THE ACCUSED IS PROBABLY
REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR SANTIAGO GUILTY THEREOF AND THAT THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION IS WITH THE PRIOR
M. TURINGAN, as alter ego of the G.R. No. 150606 AUTHORITY AND APPROVAL OF THE REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR.[2]
Secretary of Justice in Region V, in
their official capacities, and, for and Present: The case was raffled to the RTC of Naga City, Branch 23, presided by respondent Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. It
in representation of the PEOPLE OF was set for arraignment on August 7, 2001. On said date, counsel for private respondent moved for the deferment of the
THE PHILIPPINES and MARITES PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,* arraignment and requested time to file a motion to quash the Information, which request was granted by the court.
C. DE LA TORRE, in her official SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
capacity as counsel for the Complainant, CORONA, On August 10, 2001, private respondent filed a Motion to Quash, thus:
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS) AZCUNA, and
Bicol Cluster, GARCIA, JJ. Accused, through counsel, most respectfully moves to quash the Information x x x upon the
Petitioners, sole ground that State Prosecutor Romulo SJ Tolentino, not being the City Prosecutor nor the Provincial
Promulgated: Prosecutor, has no legal personality nor is he legally clothed with the authority to commence
- versus - prosecution by the filing of the Information and thus prosecute the case.[3]
June 7, 2007

HON. PABLO M. PAQUEO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 23, of the City of Naga, and Accused On August 16, 2001, State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an Opposition to Motion to Quash[4] on the following
BENEDICT DY TECKLO, grounds:
Respondents.
(1) He (State Prosecutor Tolentino) is authorized to investigate, file the necessary Information
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x and prosecute SSS cases since he was designated as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases by
Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan by virtue of Regional Order No. 97-024A
DECISION dated July 14, 1997;

AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus alleging that respondent Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr., Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 23, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the Orders dated August 24, 2001 and October 15, 2001. The Order dated August 24, 2001 granted the Motion to
Quash of private respondent Benedict Dy Tecklo, thus dismissing the Information filed by petitioner State Prosecutor
Romulo SJ. Tolentino. The Order dated October 15, 2001 denied State Prosecutor Tolentinos Objection and Motion
dated September 5, 2001.
The facts are:
On June 22, 2001, petitioner State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino filed an Information charging private
respondent Benedict Dy Tecklo, the owner/proprietor of Qualistronic Builders, of violation of Sec. 22 (a) in relation to Sec.
28 (e) of Republic Act No. 8282[1] for failing to remit the premiums due for his employee to the Social Security System
despite demand.
The Information contains a certification by State Prosecutor Tolentino, thus:
(2) In a letter[5] dated October 24, 2000, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo confirmed such
authority and that Informations to be filed in court by prosecutors-designate do not need the
approval of the Regional State Prosecutor or Provincial or City Prosecutor;
(3) Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Regional State Prosecutor, as alter ego of the
Secretary of Justice, is vested with authority to designate Special Prosecutors; and
(4) The City Prosecutor has been inhibited by the private complainant from investigating SSS
Cases as it is the Panel of Prosecutors that is now acting as City Prosecutor over all city
cases involving violations of the Social Security Act. As acting Prosecutor, the panel outranks
the City Prosecutor.
On August 24, 2001, the RTC issued an Order quashing the Information and dismissing the case, thus:
For resolution is a motion to quash filed by x x x counsel for the accused, with an opposition to
the same filed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino, the prosecutor who filed the information.

CERTIFICATION
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE REQUIRED INVESTIGATION IN THIS CASE HAS BEEN
CONDUCTED BY THE UNDERSIGNED SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW
AND UNDER OATH AS OFFICER OF THE COURT, THAT THERE IS REASONABLE GROUND TO
The motion is based on the lack of legal personality of State Prosecutor Tolentino, [not being]
legally clothed with the authority to commence prosecution by the filing of the information and, thus,
prosecute the case.
 One of the grounds provided by the rules to quash an Information is paragraph (c), of Sec. 3
of Rule 117.
(c) that the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.
A glance on the face of the information would glaringly show that it was filed by State
Prosecutor Romulo Tolentino, without the approval of the City Prosecutor of Naga City, the situs of the
crime, a blatant violation of the third paragraph of Sec. 4 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
An information filed by a qualified and authorized officer is required for the jurisdiction of the
court over the case (Villa v. Ibaez, et al., 88 Phil. 402).
A justification put up by State Prosecutor Tolentino is a Regional Order No. 07-024-A subject
of which is the Designation of Personnel issued by the Regional State Prosecutor which in effect
designated him as the special prosecutor to handle the investigation of all SSS cases filed before the
Offices of the City Prosecutor of the Cities of Naga, Iriga and Legaspi and the Offices of the Provincial
Prosecutor of the different provinces in the Bicol Region, except the provinces of Catanduanes and
Masbate, and if evidence warrants to file the necessary information and prosecute the same in the court
of [appropriate] jurisdiction.
The designation of State Prosecutor Tolentino to investigate, file this information if the
evidence warrants, and to prosecute SSS cases in court does not exempt him from complying with the
provision of the third paragraph of [Sec. 4 of] Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, that
no complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the Provincial or City Prosecutor or Chief State Prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy. The designation given to Prosecutor Tolentino came from the Regional
Chief State Prosecutor [who] is not one of those mentioned exclusively by the Rules to approve in
writing the filing or the dismissal of an information.
Also, as ruled by this court in a similar case which was dismissed, the second attached
document supporting the opposition to the motion, is but an opinion of the Chief State prosecutor which
has no force and effect to set aside the mandatory requirement of the Rules in the filing of an
information in court.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion is granted, The information is hereby
ordered quashed and dismissed.[6]
Petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an Objection and Motion praying that the Order dated August 24,
2001 be set aside and that the case entitled People v. Tecklo be scheduled for arraignment without unnecessary delay.
In an Order dated October 15, 2001, respondent Judge denied Tolentinos Objection and Motion, thus:
For consideration is an Objection and Motion filed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino,
praying that the Order of this court dated August 24, 2001 be set aside and the case be scheduled for
arraignment.
Acting on said motion upon receipt thereof, the court gave the defense a period of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the order dated September 18, 2001 to file its comment and/or opposition; however,
the period lapsed with the court never receiving any comment and/or opposition from the defense.
The records show that the issue raised in the pleadings from both parties is whether
Prosecutor Tolentino, in filing the information, can just ignore the provision of the third paragraph of Sec.
4 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on [C]riminal [P]rocedure.
It is the stand of this court, when it ruled and so holds that Prosecutor Tolentino may conduct
exclusive investigation and prosecute all violations of the provisions of the SSS Laws within the Bicol
Region, but in the filing of the information in court, he must comply with [x x x] the above-cited provision
of the rules on criminal procedure, that is, to have the provincial or city prosecutor at the situs of the
offense approve in writing said information. It was further ruled by this court that failure to secure said
written authority of the provincial or city prosecutor would touch on the jurisdiction of this court.
With the foregoing, this court cannot find any legal basis to disturb its ruling of August 24,
2001. The instant objection and motion is therefore denied.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioners, thereafter, filed this petition praying for the nullification of the Orders dated August 24,
2001 and October 15, 2001.
The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino is duly authorized to file the
subject Information without the approval of the City Prosecutor?
In their Memorandum,[8] petitioners allege that State Prosecutor Tolentino was duly authorized to file the
Information based on the following:
1. Petitioner Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan, per Regional Order dated July 14,
1997, authorized State Prosecutor Tolentino to file the necessary Information for violations of
Republic Act No. 8282 in the Bicol Region, except Masbate and Catanduanes, and to
prosecute the same in courts of competent jurisdiction. This was in response to the request of
the SSS, Region V for the designation of a Special Prosecutor to handle the prosecution of
said criminal cases with the Office of the City Prosecutor and Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of the cities of Naga, Legaspi and Iriga and all provinces of the Bicol Region.
2. Per ruling of the Chief State Prosecutor in his letter dated October 24, 2000, . . . the information to be
filed in court by prosecutors-designate do not need the approval of the Regional State
Prosecutor or the Provincial or City Prosecutor. An administrative opinion interpreting existing
rules issued by agencies directly involved in the implementation of the rules should be
respected and upheld.
Respondent judge quashed the Information based on Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure in relation to the third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:

Rule 112. Sec 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. x x x
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without
the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.[9]
Rule 117. Sec. 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on
any of the following grounds:
xxx
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.
Notably, changes in the third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 were introduced in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000. It is noted that the letter dated October 24, 2000 of Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, upon which State Prosecutor Tolentino relies to support his authority to file the subject
Information without the approval of the City Prosecutor, was issued before the changes in the third paragraph of Sec. 4,
Rule 112 were introduced in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
While the old 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, stated that [no] complaint or information may be
filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal of
chief state prosecutor, the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that [n]o complaint or information may be filed
or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. Since the provision is couched in negative terms
importing that the act shall not be done otherwise than designated, it is mandatory.[10]
An examination of the functions[11] of the Regional State Prosecutor under Sec. 8 of Presidential Decree No.
1275[12] showed that they do not include that of approving the Information filed or dismissed by the investigating prosecutor.
It is a rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the
exclusion of all others, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law officers authorized to approve the filing or
dismissal of the Information of the investigating prosecutor, the Information filed by petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino did
not comply with the requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the non-
compliance was a ground to quash the Information under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Petitioners also contend that the accused must move to quash at any time before entering his plea and the trial
court is barred from granting further time to the accused to do so; and that there is no evidence in support of the motion to
quash.
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the Motion to Quash provides:
SECTION 1. Time to move to quash.At any time before entering his plea, the accused may
move to quash the complaint or information.
SEC. 2. Form and contents. The motion to quash shall be in writing, signed by the accused or
his counsel and shall distinctly specify its factual and legal grounds. The court shall consider no grounds
other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.
The Court finds that there is substantial compliance by private respondent with the rule above quoted, as it was
satisfactorily explained in his Memorandum[13] that his counsel orally moved to quash the Information before the arraignment
on August 7, 2001. In an Order issued on the same date, respondent Judge required private respondents counsel to file a
motion to quash within five days from the issuance of the Order. Accordingly, the motion was filed on August 10, 2001.
Moreover, there was no need to submit any evidence to support the ground for quashing the Information, since it
was apparent and within judicial notice that petitionerState Prosecutor Tolentino was not the City Prosecutor or the
Provincial Prosecutor.
As regards the allegation of willful miscitation of the ground for quashing the Information, the Court finds that
respondent Judge failed to cite in his Order the correct paragraph under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court where the ground
relied upon for quashing the Information is enumerated. What is important, however, is that he correctly cited the ground for
quashing the Information.
Certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weigh pertinent
considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation.[14]
In this petition for certiorari, the Court finds that respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in
dismissing the Information filed by petitioner State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino for failure to comply with the third
paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The Rules of Court governs the pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines. For
the orderly administration of justice, the provisions contained therein should be followed by all litigants, but especially by
the prosecution arm of the Government.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 107964-66. February 1, 1999]
THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES represented by the PANEL OF PROSECUTORS, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN, Presiding Judge, Branch 52, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, and IMELDA R. MARCOS, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
On January 9, 1992, three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, as
amended,[1] in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265[2] were filed against private respondent Imelda R. Marcos
before Branch 158 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig (herein Branch 158-Pasig). Said Informations docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 90384-92, 90385-92 and 90386-92 were amended prior to arraignment.[3]
After arraignment, where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the People thru herein petitioner, Panel of
Prosecutors from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Solicitor General filed separate motions for consolidation of the
three (3) Informations pending before Branch 158-Pasig with the 21 other cases pending before RTC Branch 26-Manila
(herein Branch 26-Manila).[4] The Solicitor General alleged in its motion that the indictable acts under the three informations
form part of and is related to the transaction complained of in criminal cases 91-101732, 91-101734 and 91-101735 pending
before Branch 26-Manila[5] and that these two groups of cases (the Pasig and Manila cases) relate to a series of
transactions devised by then President Ferdinand Marcos and private respondent to hide their ill-gotten wealth.[6] The RTC
of Pasig granted the motion for consolidation provided there is no objection from the presiding judge of Branch 26-
Manila.[7] Before the Manila RTC, the three (3) informations were re-raffled and re-assigned instead to Branch 52-Manila
presided by public respondent Judge Nitafan wherein the three informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 90384-92, 90385-92 and
90386-92) were re-numbered as Criminal Case Nos. 92-107942; 92-107943 and 92-107944.
Then, without private respondent yet taking any action or filing any motion to quash the informations, respondent
judge issued an order dated July 20, 1992 requiring petitioners to show cause why criminal case number 92-107942 should
not be dismissed on the ground that it violates private respondents right against ex post facto law.[8] In that order,
respondent judge said that a check with official publications reveals that CB Circular 960 is dated 21 October 1983 (x x x)
and that said regulatory issuance was imperfectly published* in the January 30, 1984 issue of the Official
Gazette.[9] Respondent judge concluded that since the date of violation alleged in the information was prior to the date and
complete publication of the Circular charged to have been violated, the information in this case appears peremptorily
dismissible, for to apply the Circular to acts performed prior to its date and publication would make it an ex post facto law,
which is a violation of the Constitution.[10]
On the same day, respondent judge issued another order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the two other
criminal informations (92-107943 and 92-107944) should not be dismissed on the ground that private respondents right to
double jeopardy was violated.[11] It is respondent judges posture that based on the Solicitor-Generals allegations in its
Motion for Consolidation filed in Branch 58-Pasig that the three cases form part of a series of transactions which are subject
of the cases pending before Branch 26-Manila, all these cases constitute one continuous crime. Respondent judge further
stated that to separately prosecute private respondent for a series of transaction would endow it with the functional ability of
a worm multiplication or amoeba reproduction.[12] Thus, accused would be unduly vexed with multiple jeopardy. In the two
orders, respondent judge likewise said that the dismissal of the three seemingly unmeritorious and duplicitous cases would
help unclogged his docket in favor of more serious suits.[13] The prosecution complied with the twin show cause orders
accompanied by a motion to inhibit respondent judge.
On August 6, 1992, respondent judge issued an order denying the motion for consolidation (embodied in the
prosecutions compliance with the show cause orders) of the three informations with those pending before Branch 26-Manila
on the ground that consolidation of cases under Rule 31 of civil procedure has no counterpart in criminal procedure, and
blamed the panel of prosecutors as apparently not conversant with the procedure in the assignment of cases. As additional
justification, respondent judge stated that since he is more studious and discreet, if not more systematic and methodical,
than the prosecution in the handling of cases, it would be unfair to just pull out the case when he had already studied it. [14]
The next day, August 7, 1992, respondent judge issued an 8-page order dismissing criminal case no. 92-107942 on
the ground that the subject CB Circular is an ex post facto law.[15] In a separate 17-page order dated August 10, 1992,
respondent judge also dismissed the two remaining criminal cases (92-107943 & 92-107944) ruling that the prosecution of
private respondent was part of a sustained political vendetta by some people in the government aside from what he
considered as a violation of private respondents right against double jeopardy. [16] From his disquisition regarding continuing,
continuous and continued offenses and his discussion of mala prohibita, respondent judge further ratiocinated his dismissal
order in that the pendency of the other cases before Branch 26-Manila had placed private respondent in double jeopardy
because of the three cases before his sala.
The prosecution filed two separate motions for reconsideration which respondent judge denied in a single order dated
September 7, 1992 containing 19 pages wherein he made a preliminary observation that:
(T)he very civil manner in which the motions were framed, which is consistent with the high ideals and standards of
pleadings envisioned in the rules, and for which the panel should be commended. This only shows that the Members of the
panel had not yielded to the derisive, panicky and intimidating reaction manifested by their Department Head when, after
learning the promulgation of the orders dismissing some of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos cases, Secretary Drilon went to the
media and repeatedly aired diatribes and even veiled threats against the trial judges concerned.
By the constitutional mandate that A member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence (Sec 7[3], Art. VIII, judges are precluded from being dragged into running debates with parties-litigants or
their counsel and representatives in media, yet by reason of the same provision judges are mandated to decide cases in
accordance with their own independent appreciation of the facts and interpretation of the law. Any judge who yields to
extraneous influences, such as denigrating criticisms or threats, and allows his independence to be undermined thereby,
leading to violation of his oath of office, has no right to continue in his office any minute longer.
The published reaction of the Hon. Secretary is to be deplored, but it is hoped that he had merely lapsed into impudence
instead of having intended to set a pattern of mocking and denigrating the courts. He must have forgotten that as Secretary
of Justice, his actuations reflect the rule of law orientation of the administration of the President whom he represents as the
latters alter ego.[17] (emphasis supplied).
The dispositive portion of the order denying the motions for reconsideration provides:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds no valid reason to reconsider the dismissals heretofore
decreed, and the motions for reconsideration are consequently denied for manifest lack of merit.[18]
Obviously dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the case via petition for certiorari, where the primary issue raised is
whether a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal and subsequently dismissed a criminal information or complaint
without any motion to that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the latters right against ex post
facto law and double jeopardy.
Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Time to move to quash. At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the complaint or
information. (emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the above rule that the accused may file a motion to quash an information at any time before entering a plea
or before arraignment. Thereafter, no motion to quash can be entertained by the court except under the circumstances
mentioned in Section 8 of Rule 117 which adopts the omnibus motion rule. In the case at at bench, private respondent
pleaded to the charges without filing any motion to quash. As such, she is deemed to have waived and abandoned her right
to avail of any legal ground which she may have properly and timely invoke to challenge the complaint or information
pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 117 which provides:
Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefore. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to
quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege
the same in his motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense
charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in
paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of section 3 of this Rule. (emphasis supplied)
It is also clear from Section 1 that the right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused. There is nothing in the
rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the
accused. A motion contemplates an initial action originating from the accused. It is the latter who is in the best position to
know on what ground/s he will based his objection to the information. Otherwise, if the judge initiates the motion to quash,
then he is not only pre-judging the case of the prosecution but also takes side with the accused. This would violate the right
to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. Such independence and impartiality cannot be expected from a
magistrate, such as herein respondent judge, who in his show cause orders, orders dismissing the charges and order
denying the motions for reconsideration stated and even expounded in a lengthy disquisition with citation of authorities, the
grounds and justifications to support his action. Certainly, in compliance with the orders, the prosecution has no choice but
to present arguments contradicting that of respondent judge. Obviously, however, it cannot be expected from respondent
judge to overturn the reasons he relied upon in his different orders without contradicting himself. To allow a judge to initiate
such motion even under the guise of a show cause order would result in a situation where a magistrate who is supposed to
be neutral, in effect, acts as counsel for the accused and judge as well. A combination of these two personalities in one
person is violative of due process which is a fundamental right not only of the accused but also of the prosecution.
That the initial act to quash an information lodged with the accused is further supported by Sections 2, 3 and 8 of Rule
117 which states that:
Section 2. The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by the accused or his counsel. It shall specify distinctly the factual
and legal grounds therefor and the Court shall consider no grounds other than those stated therein, except lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Section 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
various offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
Section 8. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads (Emphasis supplied).
Section 2 requires that the motion must be signed by accused or his counsel; Section 3 states that the accused may
file a motion, and; Section 8 refers to the consequence if the accused do not file such motion. Neither the court nor the
judge was mentioned. Section 2 further, ordains that the court is proscribed from considering any ground other than those
stated in the motion which should be specify(ied) distinctly therein. Thus, the filing of a motion to quash is a right that
belongs to the accused who may waived it by inaction and not an authority for the court to assume.
It is therefore clear that the only grounds which the court may consider in resolving a motion to quash an information
or complaint are (1) those grounds stated in the motion and (2) the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged,
whether or not mentioned in the motion. Other than that, grounds which have not been sharply pleaded in the motion cannot
be taken cognizance of by the court, even if at the time of filing thereof, it may be properly invoked by the defendant. Such
proscription on considerations of other grounds than those specially pleaded in the motion to quash is premised on the
rationale that the right to these defenses are waivable on the part of the accused, and that by claiming to wave said right, he
is deemed to have desired these matters to be litigated upon in a full-blown trial. Pursuant to the Rules, the sole exception is
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged which goes into the competence of the court to hear and pass judgment on the
cause.
With these, the rule clearly implies the requirement of filing a motion by the accused even if the ground asserted is
premised on lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Besides, lack of jurisdiction should be evident from the face of the
information or complaint to warrant a dismissal thereof. Happily, no jurisdictional challenge is involved in this case.
Assuming arguendo that a judge has the power to motu proprio dismiss a criminal charge, yet contrary to the findings
of respondent judge, the grounds of ex post facto law and double jeopardy herein invoked by him are not applicable.
On ex post facto law, suffice it to say that every law carries with it the presumption of constitutionality until otherwise
declared by this court.[19] To rule that the CB Circular is an ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional. However,
neither private respondent nor the Solicitor-General challenges it. This Court, much more the lower courts, will not pass
upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it void unless directly assailed in an appropriate action.
With respect to the ground of double jeopardy invoked by respondent judge, the same is improper and has neither
legal nor factual basis in this case. Double jeopardy connotes the concurrence of three requisites, which are: (a) the first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (c) the
second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first[20] or the second offense includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. [21] In this case,
it is manifestly clear that no first jeopardy has yet attached nor any such jeopardy terminated. Section 7, Rule 117 provides:
When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessary included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
x x x x x x x x x.[22]
Under said Section, the first jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after
arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.[23]
Other than the Solicitor-Generals allegation of pending suits in Branch 26-Manila, respondent judge has no other
basis on whether private respondent had already been arraigned, much less entered a plea in those cases pending before
the said Branch. Even assuming that there was already arraignment and plea with respect to those cases in Branch 26-
Manila which respondent judge used as basis to quash the three informations pending in his sala, still the first jeopardy has
not yet attached. Precisely, those Branch 26-Manila cases are still pending and there was as yet no judgment on the merits
at the time respondent judge quashed the three informations in his sala. Private respondent was not convicted, acquitted
nor the cases against her in Branch 26-Manila dismissed or otherwise terminated which definitely shows the absence of the
fifth requisite for the first jeopardy to attached. Accordingly, it was wrong to say that the further prosecution of private
respondent under the three informations pending Branch 56-Manila would violate the formers right against double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, Premises considered, the petition is GRANTED and the two orders dated January 20, 1990, as well
as the orders dated August 7, 1992, August 10, 1992 and September 7, 1992 all issued by respondent judge are hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
CRISTETA CHUA-BURCE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Subject of the present appeal by certiorari is the decision dated November 27, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 12037, (a) affirming in toto the trial courts decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa, and (b) denying her Motion for
Reconsideration in a Resolution dated March 25, 1993. The Regional Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40,
rendered a joint decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, in
Criminal Case No. C-2313, and likewise found petitioner liable for the amount of P150,000.00 in Civil Case No. R-3733.
Only the criminal case is before us for review. h Y
The uncontroverted facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On August 16, 1985, Ramon Rocamora, the Manager (of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Calapan Branch, Oriental
Mindoro) requested Fructuoso Peaflor, Assistant Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of the cash inside the vault,
which should total P4,000,000.00, more or less. During this initial cash count, they discovered a shortage of fifteen bundles
of One Hundred Pesos denominated bills totalling P150,000.00. The One Hundred Peso bills actually counted was
P3,850,000.00 as against the balance of P4,000,000.00 in the Cash in Vault (CIV) Summary Sheet, or a total shortage of
P150,000.00. The next day, to determine if there was actually a shortage, a re-verification of the records and documents of
the transactions in the bank was conducted. There was still a shortage of P150,000.00.
The bank initiated investigations totalling four (4) in all. The first was by Ramon Rocamora, the Manager. The second was
by the banks internal auditors headed by Antonio Batungbakal. Then, the banks Department of Internal Affairs conducted an
independent investigation. Thereafter, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) came in to investigate. All of these
investigations concluded that there was a shortage of P150,000.00, and the person primarily responsible was the banks
Cash Custodian, Cristeta Chua-Burce, the herein accused. Jksm
On November 4, 1985, unable to satisfactorily explain the shortage of P150,000.00, the accuseds service with the bank was
terminated.
To recover the missing amount, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) filed a Civil Case for Sum of Money
and Damages with Preliminary Attachment and Garnishment docketed as Civil Case No. R-3733 against petitioner and her
husband, Antonio Burce. Esm
Prior to the filing of the Answer, the following Information for Estafa was filed against petitioner:
"That on or about the 16th day of August 1985, and for a period prior and subsequent thereto, the
above-named accused, with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, and with intent to defraud, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, in her capacity as Cash Custodian of the Metrobank,
Calapan Branch, take from the Banks Vault the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
(P150,000.00) PESOS, which is under her direct custody and/or accountability, misappropriate and
convert to her own personal use and benefit, without the knowledge and consent of the offended party,
despite repeated demands for her to account and/or return the said amount, she refused and failed, and
still fails and refuses to the damage and prejudice of the Metrobank, Calapan Branch, in the
aforementioned amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS.
Contrary to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, November 27, 1985."[1]
Both civil and criminal cases were raffled to the same branch of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro,
Branch 40. Esmsc
Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question, viz., that the resolution of the civil case was determinative of her guilt or innocence in the criminal case. [2] The trial
court, over the vehement opposition of the private and public prosecutors, granted the motion and suspended the trial of the
criminal case.[3] On petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court ruled that there was no prejudicial
question.[4]
Petitioner was arraigned and assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty.[5] While the trial of the criminal case
was suspended, the trial of the civil case continued. At the time of arraignment, the civil case was already submitted for
decision. Hence, during the pre-trial conference of the criminal case, the parties agreed to adopt their respective evidence in
the civil case as their respective evidence in the criminal case.[6] The trial court ordered the parties to submit their written
agreement pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court.[7]Thereafter, petitioner, duly assisted by her counsel,
with the conforme of the public prosecutor, entered into the following pre-trial agreement:[8]
"COMES NOW, the accused, assisted by counsel, and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully
submits this Pre-Trial agreement:
1. That the evidence already adduced by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. R-3733 will be adopted by the
prosecution as its evidence in Criminal Case No. C-2313;
2. That the evidence to be adduced by the defendant in Civil Case No. R-3733 will also be adopted as
evidence for the defense in Criminal Case No. C-2313.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is prayed that the foregoing pre-trial agreement be admitted in
compliance with the Order of this Court dated April 19, 1988.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, August 20, 1990.
CRISTETA CHUA-BURCE (sgd.)
Accused
Assisted By:
RODRIGO C. DIMAYACYAC (sgd.)
Defense Counsel
San Vicente, Calapan
Oriental Mindoro
IBP O.R. No. 292575
May 11, 1990
Quezon City
With Conformity:
EMMANUEL S. PANALIGAN (sgd.)
Prosecuting Fiscal
Pursuant to the pre-trial agreement, the public prosecutor filed a Motion to Adopt Evidence. [9] Both the pre-trial agreement
and said Motion were granted by the trial court.[10]
On March 18, 1991, the trial court rendered a consolidated decision [11] finding petitioner (a) guilty of estafa under Article 315
(1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code in the criminal case, and (b) liable for the amount of P150,000.00 in the civil case. The
dispositive portion of decision provides -
- In Criminal Case No. C-2313 -
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Cristeta Chua-Burce guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa, punishable under Art. 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, which
imposes a penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period
but considering that the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty provided for shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total amount
not to exceed twenty years. Esmmis
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be one degree lower as
minimum of arresto mayor with a penalty range of One Month and One Day to Six Months, as minimum
to prision mayor in its maximum period, as maximum, or a penalty of Six years to Twelve Years.
Considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the court hereby imposes upon the
accused to suffer imprisonment from SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor in its maximum period, as
 minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor, in its minimum period, as maximum. The civil liability
shall not be imposed in this case due to a separate civil action. Esmso
- In Civil Case No. R-3733 -
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Metrobank, ordering defendants
Cristeta Chua-Burce and Antonio Burce, spouses, to pay Metrobank the amount of P150,000.00
representing the amount misappropriated with the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from August
15, 1985 until fully paid and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner seasonably appealed her conviction in the criminal case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed a separate
appeal in the civil case.
In a decision dated November 27, 1992,[12] the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision in toto. Petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration was likewise denied.[13] Hence, the recourse to this Court. Msesm
Petitioner raises the following issues:[14]
1. IS THE RESULT OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE?
2. CAN THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS ALREADY DENIED ADMISSION IN THE ORDER OF THE FORMER JUDGE
OF THE SAME COURT?
3. DOES PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF MISAPPROPRIATION OR CONVERSION EXISTS (sic)
AGAINST THE PETITIONER WHEN THERE WERE OTHER PERSONS WHO HAD DIRECT AND
GREATER ACCESS IN THE CASH-IN-VAULT?
4. IS RULE 111 SECTION 2 (a) OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
APPLICABLE IN (sic)THE CASE AT BAR?
5. WAS THERE A VALID PROCEEDING WHEN THE FISCAL WAS NOT ACTUALLY PRESENT AND
DID NOT CONTROL AND SUPERVISE THE PROSECUTION OF THE CASE? Exsm
In gist, (1) petitioner contends that the trial court erred in taking into account the results of the polygraph examination as
circumstantial evidence of guilt considering the inherent unreliability of such tests, and the fact that the previous trial judge
who handled the case already ruled such evidence as inadmissible; (2) petitioner insists that there can be no presumption of
misappropriation when there were other persons who had access to the cash in vault; and (3) petitioner questions the
validity of the trial of criminal case considering that the pre-trial agreement dispensed with the intervention of the public
prosecutor in a full-blown trial of the criminal case. Kyle
The Office of the Solicitor General, for the State, contends that the guilt of petitioner has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt by the following facts which were duly established during trial - first, petitioner was the cash custodian who was
directly responsible and accountable for the cash-in-vault. Second, the other persons who had access to the vault facilities
never used the duplicate keys to open the safety deposit boxes and the cash safe from where the P100.00 bill
denominations were located. In fact, the duplicate keys were offered in evidence still in their sealed
envelopes. Third, alterations and superimposition on the cash-in-vault summary sheet were made by petitioner to cover the
cash shortage. Lastly, there was a valid joint trial of the civil and criminal cases.
The crucial issues, in our mind, are (1) whether there was a valid trial of the criminal case, and (2) whether the elements of
the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code were duly proven beyond reasonable doubt. Kycalr
First, petitioner assails the validity of the proceedings in the trial court on the ground that the public prosecutor did not
intervene and present any evidence during the trial of the criminal case. The records clearly show that the pre-trial
agreement was prepared by petitioner with the conforme of the public prosecutor. Thereafter, petitioner filed
a consolidated memorandum for both civil and criminal cases. Section 5 of Rule 110[15] requires that all criminal actions
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The rationale behind the rule is "to prevent
malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons."[16] The records show that the public prosecutor actively
participated in the prosecution of the criminal case from its inception. It was during pre-trial conference when the parties
agreed to adopt their respective evidence in the civil case to the criminal case. This is allowed under Section 2 (e) of Rule
118 of the Rules of Court[17] which provides that during pre-trial conference, the parties shall consider "such other matters as
will promote a fair and expeditious trial." The parties, in compliance with Section 4 of Rule 118,[18] reduced to writing such
agreement. Petitioner, her counsel, and the public prosecutor signed the agreement. Petitioner is bound by the pre-trial
agreement, and she cannot now belatedly disavow its contents. [19]
On the second issue. Petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal
Code.[20] In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence or (b) by
means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person.[21]Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa with abuse of confidence, since the breach of confidence takes the
place of the fraud or deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas.[22]
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are: [23]
(1) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other
circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is
guaranteed by a bond;
(2) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or a
denial on his part that he received it;
(3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and
(4) that there be demand for the return of the property.
Have the foregoing elements been met in the case at bar? We find the first element absent. When the money, goods, or any
other personal property is received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3)
for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing
received.[24] Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee
may set up even against the owner.[25] In this case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for the
cash-in-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere bank
employees. Calrky
In People v. Locson,[26] the receiving teller of a bank misappropriated the money received by him for the bank. He was found
liable for qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller is the possession of the bank. We explained
in Locson that -
"The money was in the possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the bank, and the possession
of the defendant was the possession of the bank. When the defendant, with grave abuse of confidence,
removed the money and appropriated it to his own use without the consent of the bank, there was the
taking or apoderamiento contemplated in the definition of the crime of theft."[27]
In the subsequent case of Guzman v. Court of Appeals,[28] a travelling sales agent misappropriated or failed to return to his
principal the proceeds of things or goods he was commissioned or authorized to sell. He was, however, found liable for
estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and not qualified theft. In the Guzman case, we explained the
distinction between possession of a bank teller and an agent for purposes of determining criminal liability -
"The case cited by the Court of Appeals (People vs. Locson, 57 Phil. 325), in support of its theory that
appellant only had the material possession of the merchandise he was selling for his principal, or their
proceeds, is not in point. In said case, the receiving teller of a bank who misappropriated money
received by him for the bank, was held guilty of qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the
teller is the possession of the bank. There is an essential distinction between the possession by a
receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the
proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former case,
payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or
keeper of the funds received, and has no independent right or title to retain or possess the same as
against the bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an
independent, autonomous, right to retain money or goods received in consequence of the agency; as
 when the principal fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages
suffered without his fault (Article 1915, [N]ew Civil Code; Article 1730, old)." Mesm
Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no juridical possession over the missing funds. Hence, the element of
juridical possession being absent, petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa under Article 315, No. 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code.[29]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b)
of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is ordered RELEASED from custody unless she is being held for some other lawful
cause. No costs. Slx
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court
of Appeals. The 5 November 2001 Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in
a suit to quash Informations filed against petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez
("petitioners"). The 14 March 2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and Chief Executive Officer,
Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation
("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings3 from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a
drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the
tunnels end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had
discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque
("MTC") with violation of Article 91(B),4 sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the
Philippines ("PD 1067"),5 Section 86 of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD
984"),7 Section 1088 of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"),9 and Article 36510 of the
Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.11
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations were "duplicitous" as the
Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid
were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain
allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.
The Ruling of the MTC
In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 ("Joint Order"), the MTC 12 initially deferred ruling on petitioners motion for lack of
"indubitable ground for the quashing of the [I]nformations x x x." The MTC scheduled petitioners arraignment in February
1997. However, on petitioners motion, the MTC issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997 ("Consolidated Order"),
granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The
MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. The MTC held:
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to "mine tailings" which were precipitately discharged
into the Makulapnit and Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the Tapian drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to
institute adequate measures to prevent pollution and siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the very term and
condition required to be undertaken under the Environmental Compliance Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence required to prove the single fact of pollution
constituting violation of the Water Code and the Pollution Law which are the same set of evidence necessary to prove the
same single fact of pollution, in proving the elements constituting violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant to the
Philippine Mining Act. In both instances, the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate were
allegedly violated. In other words, the same set of evidence is required in proving violations of the three (3) special laws.
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the parties and after taking into consideration the
applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the three (3) aforesaid laws are concerned, only the
Information for [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act should be maintained. In other words, the Informations for [v]iolation of
Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the elements
constituting the aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining
Act (RA 7942).
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for [v]iolation of the Water Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-
47, 96-48 and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[]
Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and 96-52 for [v]iolation of the Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to be tried on the merits.
The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code should also be maintained and heard in a full blown
trial because the common accusation therein is reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property. It is the damage
to property which the law punishes not the negligent act of polluting the water system. The prosecution for the [v]iolation of
Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the prosecution for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property. 13
The MTC re-scheduled petitioners arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and 29 May 1997. In the hearing of 28 May
1997, petitioners manifested that they were willing to be arraigned on the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but
not on the charge for violation of RA 7942 as they intended to appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it maintained the
Informations for that offense. After making of record petitioners manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and
ordered the entry of "not guilty" pleas on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion
of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942. Petitioners petition was raffled to Branch
94. For its part, public respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same court assailing that portion of the Consolidated
Order quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public respondents appeal was raffled to Branch 38.
On public respondents motion, Branch 38 ordered public respondents appeal consolidated with petitioners petition in
Branch 94.
The Ruling of Branch 94
In its Resolution14 of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public respondents appeal but denied petitioners petition. Branch
94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and
ordered those charges reinstated. Branch 94 affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch 94 held:
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion that there can be no absorption by one offense of
the three other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from each other. The elements of
proving each violation are not the same with each other. Concededly, the single act of dumping mine tailings which resulted
in the pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers was the basis for the information[s] filed against the accused each
charging a distinct offense. But it is also a well-established rule in this jurisdiction that
"A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires
proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information
under one does not bar prosecution under the other. x x x."
xxxx
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different from one another. Each
of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not although they stemmed from a
single act.15
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Branch 94 acted with grave abuse of
discretion because (1) the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article 365 of the RPC "proceed
from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and
(2) the duplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova. 16Petitioners further contended that
since the acts complained of in the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are "the very same acts
complained of" in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners should
only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC.17
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94s ruling. The appellate court held:
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the aforementioned Informations for being
duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides the grounds upon which an
information may be quashed. x x x
xxxx
[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3, Rule 117].
xxxx
We now go to petitioners claim that the resolution of the public respondent contravened the doctrine laid down in People vs.
Relova for being violative of their right against multiple prosecutions.
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the Peoples argument with respect to the variances in the mens rea of the two
offenses being charged to be correct. The Court, however, decided the case in the context of the second sentence of Article
IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution (now under Section 21 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather than the first sentence
of the same section. x x x
xxxx
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the case at Bench since the Informations filed
against the petitioners are for violation of four separate and distinct laws which are national in character.
xxxx
This Court firmly agrees in the public respondents understanding that the laws by which the petitioners have been [charged]
could not possibly absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of
an additional fact or element which the other does not, although they stemmed from a single act. x x x
xxxx
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that would give rise to any suspicion that public
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial
Courts quashal of the Informations against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds
no error in the trial courts denial of the petitioners motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. 18
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in its Resolution of 14 March 2002.
Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN MAINTAINING THE CHARGES FOR
VIOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE CHARGES FOR
VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067) AND POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING
THAT:
A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067), THE POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT OF
POLLUTING THE BOAC AND MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU DUMPING OF MINE TAILINGS.
B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND MULTIPLE CHARGES
CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986 THAT
"AN ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES
WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED
BY A COMMON SET OR OVERLAPPING SETS OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS."
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE ELEMENT OF
LACK OF NECESSARY OR ADEQUATE PRECAUTION, NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE
UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY
OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE WATER CODE, POLLUTION CONTROL
LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONERS[.]19
The Issues
The petition raises these issues:
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges and
only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand; and
(2) Whether Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v. Relova.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule
11020 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing
laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense. 21
Under Section 3(e), Rule 11722 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a
ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in
preparing his defense.23 Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information
charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations.
On this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property because (1) all the charges filed against them "proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of
polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the
RPC "absorbs" the other charges since the element of "lack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness
and imprudence" is common among them.
The contention has no merit.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one
offense.24 The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for "the same offense."25 In People v. Doriquez,26 we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act
are not "the same"
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased
elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no
obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other.27 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present. 28 However, for the limited purpose of
controverting petitioners claim that they should be charged with one offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94s
comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on
which petitioners were charged, there is one essential element not required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the dumping of mine tailings into the
Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System without prior permit from the authorities concerned. The gravamen of
the offense here is the absence of the proper permit to dump said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the
prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. One can be validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has
complied with the terms of its Environmental Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the necessary
precautions to prevent damage to property.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is
the pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the accused must be exonerated under this law although there was
unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful violation and gross neglect on jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged
the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same
the Marcopper should ensure the containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If act or set of acts. x x x30 (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
there was no violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had done everything to Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against multiple prosecutions based on a single act not only because the
ensure containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does not follow, however, that they cannot be question of double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being
prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code because violation of the Environmental prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short,
Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these laws. petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of Section 21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.
necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14
to property. This element is not required under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine March 2002 of the Court of Appeals.
tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river system, much more from violation or neglect to abide by the SO ORDERED.
terms of the Environmental Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are mal[a] prohibita in
contrast with those punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.29
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same incident, is consistent with
settled doctrine.
On petitioners claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067,
PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the
former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting
them.
People v. Relova not in Point
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution contravenes this Courts ruling in People
v. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the Courts statement in Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the
accused by "multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by
a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements."
This contention is also without merit.1avvphil.net
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging one Manuel Opulencia ("Opulencia")
with theft of electric power under the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring, violated Opulencias right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not
because the offenses punished by those two laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges was
punished by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the
same act under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. We held:
The petitioner concludes that:
"The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the
Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereofand that the
second offense is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information."
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This is clear both from the express terms of the
constitutional provision involved which reads as follows:
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." x x x
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioners position is that it must be examined, not under
the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same
section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy
is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior
prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second
sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double