ADOPTION CASE

FIRST DIVISION

ANA JOYCE S. REYES, G.R. No. 167405

Petitioner,

Present:

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),

- versus - Ynares-Santiago,

Austria-Martinez,

Callejo, Sr., and

Chico-Nazario, JJ.

HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Presiding

Judge, RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch

67, ATTY. PAULINO SAGUYOD, the

Clerk of Court of Branch 67 of the RTC

at Paniqui, Tarlac in his capacity as

Special Administrator, CORAZON

CHICHIOCO, ANGELITO LISING,

ERLINDA ESPACIO, GONZALO Promulgated:

ZALZOS and ERNESTO LISING,

Respondents. February 16, 2006

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review seeks to modify the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 14, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74047 as well as the
Resolution dated May 14, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration. In
the assailed judgment, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the
September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002 Resolutions of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67 in Spec. Proc. No. 204 but
refrained from dismissing the petition for letters of administration and
settlement of estate on the ground that petitioner must first prove that she
was legally adopted by the decedent, Elena Lising.

On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a

petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate
of the late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, where it was
docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 204 and raffled to Branch 67. Chichioco
claimed that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate on July
31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante
Zalzos, Erlinda Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising,
Alfredo Lising and respondents Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.

According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in

the municipalities of Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces
of jewelry and money which were allegedly in the possession of petitioner
Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased. Chichioco prayed that
she be appointed administrator of the estate, upon payment of a bond,
pending settlement and distribution of Lising’s properties to the legal heirs.

On November 6, 1998, petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the

petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latter’s
husband, Serafin Delos Santos, who died on November 30, 1970. She
asserted that the petition should be dismissed and that the appointment of an
administrator was unnecessary, since she was the only heir of Lising who
passed away without leaving any debts. She further asserted that Chichioco
is unfit to serve as administrator of Lising’s estate because of her
“antagonistic interests” against the decedent. Chichioco and her alleged co-
heirs have questioned the decedent’s title to a piece of real property which
forms a large part of the estate.
 On November 11, 1998, petitioner filed a Supplement to the
Opposition attaching thereto the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac stating that on page 76, Book No. 01 of the
Register of Court Decrees, Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin
Delos Santos pursuant to a decision rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 by
Judge Julian Lustre of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, Branch 3,
promulgated on December 21, 1968 and duly registered with the Office of
the Civil Registrar on January 29, 1969.

Petitioner also submitted a Certification issued by the Clerk of Court

of the RTC-Tarlac City, stating that a judgment was rendered in Spec. Proc.
No. 1410 on December 21, 1968 decreeing petitioner’s adoption by Elena
Lising and Serafin Delos Santos. She also presented a copy of Judicial Form
No. 43 indicating that the adoption decree was on file in the General Docket
of the RTC-Tarlac City, wherein the dispositive portion of the adoption
decree was recorded as follows:

In view of the foregoing, the court finds this petition a proper case
for adoption and therefore grants the same. Consequently, the Court
declares that henceforth, the child Ana Joyce C. Zalzos is freed from all
legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural
parents Orlando Zalzos and May C. Castro, and is to all legal intents and
purposes the child of the petitioners Serafin delos Santos and Elena
Lising.
 Petitioner likewise submitted a Decree of Final Distribution issued by
the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that, upon the death
of Serafin Delos Santos, death benefits were paid to his widow, Elena
Lising, and his “daughter”, Ana Joyce Delos Santos, in accordance with
pertinent provisions of law.

On April 5, 1999, the RTC ordered respondents to submit

documentary evidence to prove the jurisdictional facts of the case and to
comment on petitioner’s opposition. Only Rosario L. Zalsos appears to have
filed a Comment/Reply to Oppositor’s Opposition, after which the RTC
ordered the parties to submit memoranda thereon. On July 22, 1999, the
case was deemed submitted for resolution.

Meanwhile, on June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed
before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the adoption decree
docketed as SP No. 53457. They claimed that no proceedings for the
adoption of petitioner took place in 1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of
Tarlac and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had no records of the
adoption case. Petitioner’s natural mother supposedly connived with the
court personnel to make it appear that petitioner was adopted by the Delos
Santos spouses and that the CFI’s order for initial hearing was published in a
weekly newspaper which was not authorized to publish court orders in
special proceedings.
 Upon motion of Chichioco, the RTC ordered on October 4, 1999, the
suspension of hearings in Spec. Proc. No. 204 pending the outcome of SP
No. 53457. Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals dismissed SP No.
53457 for failure to comply with the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court. The said dismissal became final and executory on
March 8, 2000.

Thereafter, on August 22, 2000, petitioner filed a motion before the

RTC praying that the opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204 be finally resolved
and that the petition be dismissed. This was followed by an Urgent Ex Parte
Motion filed by petitioner on October 17, 2000 praying for the immediate
resolution of her opposition.

On November 16, 2000, respondents filed a Comment to the

opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on petitioner’s
claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain “badges of
fraud.” Respondents also informed the RTC that they have filed a criminal
complaint against petitioner before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
Tarlac City, for alleged falsification of the adoption decree and Judicial
Form No. 43, docketed as I.S. No. 00-1016.

Subsequently, the RTC issued a Resolution dated December 12, 2000

deferring resolution of petitioner’s opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204,
pending the outcome of the criminal case filed against the latter. In the
meantime, the parties were enjoined from dissipating or disposing any or all
of the properties included in the estate of Elena Lising without order from
this Court.

On December 13, 2000, Chichioco filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint

Special Administrator before the RTC on the ground that there was yet no
true determination and appraisal of the decedent’s universal estate. It was
prayed therein that the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Paulino Saguyod, be
appointed special administrator as he was “an experienced and able person
in the management of properties” and is “honest, impartial, competent and
acceptable to the majority of the interested parties.”

In the meantime, the Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause to

charge petitioner with falsification of public documents per resolution dated
January 5, 2001. Petitioner thus appealed the said finding to the Office of
the Regional State Prosecutor.

On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents’ motion for the

appointment of a special administrator and appointed its branch clerk of
court, Atty. Saguyod. Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the grounds
that the branch clerk of court was disqualified from taking on the task of
special administrator, and that Atty. Saguyod was appointed without being
required to file a bond. Petitioner also reiterated that the petition should be
dismissed because she is the sole heir of the decedent. However, the RTC
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on November 5, 2001.

On January 14, 2002, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor

reversed the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor and dismissed the criminal
complaint against petitioner. Undaunted, Chichioco filed a petition for
review before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs filed a

motion before the RTC to enjoin petitioner from conducting business in a
property belonging to the estate. Respondent Chichioco alleged that
petitioner converted the basement of Lising’s residence into a billiard hall
without authority of the special administrator.

Acting on said motion, the RTC issued a resolution on September 18,

2002, the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Oppositor Ana Joyce Reyes is hereby enjoined

from conducting business activity in any of the properties left by the
decedent. The Special Administrator is also empowered to take control
and possession of the listed personal and real properties of the decedent
and those that may be found to be owned or registered in the name of the
same.
 SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution

which was denied by the RTC on November 12, 2002. On even date, the
DOJ also issued a resolution dismissing respondent Chichioco’s petition for
review in the criminal case.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari

before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74047, assailing
the September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002 resolutions of the RTC.
Petitioner alleged that said resolutions were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction since as sole heir,
she had the right to possess and use the decedent’s property, title over which
automatically passed on to her upon the latter’s death. Moreover, the special
administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had yet to file a bond and submit an inventory
of the decedent’s estate.

Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be

dismissed since the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of SP No. 53457
constituted res judicata as to the former. There was likewise no valid
challenge to her adoption and she consequently remains to be the sole heir of
the decedent. Thus, she stressed that there was no need for the appointment
of an administrator or for the settlement proceedings.
 In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment nullifying the
resolutions of the trial court. It held that the presiding judge, Judge Cesar M.
Sotero, gravely abused his discretion in appointing his branch clerk of court
as special administrator. Citing Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez, the appellate court
reasoned that such act could engender a suspicion that Judge Sotero and his
clerk are in cahoots in milking the decedent’s estate. Moreover, Atty.
Saguyod failed to comply with the requirements of a bond and inventory and
could not therefore take control and possession of any of the decedent’s
properties.

However, the appellate court refused to dismiss Spec. Proc. No. 204
since the dismissal of SP No. 53457 was not a judgment on the merits and
did not operate as res judicata to the former. It was also incumbent upon
petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the
Delos Santos spouses since, according to the appellate court, “imputations of
irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a
cloud of doubt.”

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied on March

15, 2005, hence this petition on the following assigned errors:
 A. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER HAD TO PROVE THE VALIDITY OF HER
ADOPTION DUE TO IMPUTATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES
IN VIEW OF SECTION 47 OF RULE 39.

B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

DISMISSAL IN SP NO. 53457 WAS NOT A DISMISSAL ON
THE MERITS.

The petition is meritorious.

On the first assigned error, we agree with petitioner that she need not
prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had
already presented before the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted a
certification from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree
was registered therein and also a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 and a
certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the
General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City. Both certifications were issued
under the seal of the issuing offices and were signed by the proper officers.
These are thus presumed to have been regularly issued as part of the official
duties that said public officers perform.

It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public

document required by law to be entered into the public records, the official
repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting
the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as well as the
court which rendered the judgment.
 Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. As such, the certifications issued by the local civil
registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioner’s adoption
which are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are prima
facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as
proof of the fact of petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until
contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere “imputations of
irregularities” will not cast a “cloud of doubt” on the adoption decree since
the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the
contrary is offered.

In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be
presented only in a separate action brought principally for the purpose of
nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a
proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate, as categorically held in
Santos v. Aranzanso. Accordingly, respondents cannot assail in these
proceedings the validity of the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioner’s
claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical
pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is
void, the certifications regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated
therein, should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioner’s status as
an adopted child of the decedent remains unrebutted and no serious
challenge has been brought against her standing as such. Therefore, for as
long as petitioner’s adoption is considered valid, respondents cannot claim
any interest in the decedent’s estate. For this reason, we agree with
petitioner that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.

As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:

From all the foregoing it follows that respondents - x x x and those

who, like them x x x, claim an interest in the estate x x x as alleged first
cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view
of the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted children
exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same
holds true as long as the adoption must be - as in the instant case -
considered valid. (Emphasis added)

Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily

exclude respondents from inheriting from the decedent since they are mere
collateral relatives of the latter. To allow the proceedings below to continue
would serve no salutary purpose but to delay the resolution of the instant
case. After all, the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 is the logical
consequence of our pronouncement relative to the presumed validity of
petitioner’s adoption.

Moreover, it must be stressed that all the evidence pertinent to the

resolution of the petitioner’s opposition, which is actually a motion to
dismiss the petition for letters of administration and settlement of the estate,
is a matter of record in the instant case. The same has in fact been submitted
for resolution before the RTC more than six years ago and is so far the only
pending incident before the RTC. The parties have likewise amply
ventilated their positions on the matter through their respective pleadings
filed before the lower courts. No useful purpose will thus be served if we let
the RTC resolve the matter, only for its ruling to be elevated again to the
Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. The remand of the case to
the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the
Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the evidence before it.
This is in keeping with the avowed purpose of the rules of procedure which
is to secure for the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceeding. Hence, since the grounds for the dismissal of
Spec. Proc. No. 204 are extant in the records and there is no cogent reason to
remand the case to the RTC, Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.

Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no need to discuss petitioner’s

second assigned error.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Special

Proceedings No. 204 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City,
Branch 67 is DISMISSED.
 FIRST DIVISION

IN RE: PETITION FOR G.R. Nos. 168992-93

ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P.

LIM, Present:

MONINA P. LIM, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

Petitioner. CARPIO,

x-----------------------x CORONA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

IN RE: PETITION FOR BERSAMIN, JJ.

ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE

P. LIM,

Promulgated:

MONINA P. LIM,

Petitioner. May 21, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
 DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim

(petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision dated 15 September 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL.
PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the
consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P.
Lim.

The Facts

The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by

profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were
childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to
them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of
their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that
they were the children’s parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim
(Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven
days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March
1977. Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s
clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.

The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own.
They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname “Lim” in
all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November
1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario
(Olario), an American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the

amnesty given under Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) to those individuals
who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed
separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial
court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At
the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old
and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
 Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as
evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. Michael also gave his consent to
his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. Petitioner’s husband
Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael.

In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and

Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and
the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. The DSWD issued a
similar Certification for Michael.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing

the petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried,
petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The
trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory
citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family
Code.
 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the
motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion,
the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions
under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioner’s argument that mere
consent of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law,
there are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his
qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in this
case, must comply.

As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint
adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court
ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental
authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his
parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.

Hence, the present petition.

Issue
 Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of
whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

The Court’s Ruling

Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed

because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount
interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the
legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” is not applicable to adoption cases. She
argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the
time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married,
while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not
anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the
age of majority.

We deny the petition.

Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife

 It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without
being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm
the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed
lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil

capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted
of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically
capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the
adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in
keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16)
year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived
when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of
the adoptee’s parent;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for
Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations
with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the
Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption
decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or
consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the
legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government
allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country may be
waived for the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative

within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of

his/her Filipino spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to

adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
 (c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of
the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following

cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter

of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate

son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the
illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be
exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word “shall” in the above-quoted provision means that
joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which
is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The
rule also insures harmony between the spouses.

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having

remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly
adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself,
without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying
the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions

enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the
legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the
children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner
and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that
Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove
that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he
must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has
legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to
enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s

qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The
children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees
the legitimate children of petitioner.

Effects of Adoption

Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore

necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached the age
of majority. This is untenable.

Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being. The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. Even
the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority
over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian
of the person or property of the children.

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is,
when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age — emancipation
terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who
shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However,
parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article
V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:

ARTICLE V

EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological

parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be
vested on the adopter(s).

SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the

legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and
as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to
legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind.
To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in
keeping with the means of the family.

SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the

adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession
without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and
his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary
succession shall govern.

Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological
parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate
child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but
not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to
be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and
compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore, even if emancipation terminates
parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the
adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the
surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their
parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights.
Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child,
enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support
and successional rights.

We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in
the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. But, as we have
ruled in Republic v. Vergara:

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes,

which is the promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law
should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than
defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion,
understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to
provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children.
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s
decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it
cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is
amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make
our own legislation to suit petitioner.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would

show that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed
a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles
Superior Court.

We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage

between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a
decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree
for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the
marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time
the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint
adoption is mandatory.
 WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision
dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City,
Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against
petitioner.

FIRST DIVISION

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN G.R. No. 164948

Petitioner,

Present

PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

 Respondent. June 27, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
77826 which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for
Adoption of the petitioner herein.

The Antecedents

On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the

United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of
Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos
who was born on August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on
September 7, 1987; and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5,
1989. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s
brother, and Amelia Ramos.
 Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died
on May 19, 1990, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria
Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married
there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer
communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws
from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are
being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives
abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to
adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent to the
adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-
old widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully
employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own
home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a
restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the
minors; her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the minors.
Petitioner’s brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income,
signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in
petitioner’s custody.

Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her

favor, as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable

Court that after publication and hearing, judgment be rendered allowing
 the adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon
Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the
minor children’s name follow the family name of petitioner.

Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the
premises.

On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social

Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by
Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit a
report thereon not later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing
of the petition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its
behalf. Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to present
her evidence ex parte.

The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine

Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written consent executed
by her and her siblings. The petitioner marked in evidence the Affidavit of
Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel
Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in
Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.

On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the

DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the
following recommendation:
 In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma &
Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible for adoption because of the
following reasons:

1. Minors’ surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented

to their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is
in view of her inability to provide the parental care, guidance
and support they need. An Affidavit of Consent was executed
by the mother which is hereto attached.

2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their
willingness to be adopted and joins the petitioners in Guam,
USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of consent is hereto
attached. The minors developed close attachment to the
petitioners and they regarded her as second parent.

3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian

who has also family to look after. As young adolescents they
really need parental love, care, guidance and support to ensure
their protection and well being.

In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended

that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D.
Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial
custody is hereby further recommended to be dispensed with
considering that they are close relatives and that close attachments
was already developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors.

Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:

 The mother of minors came home together with her son John
Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to enable her appear
for the personal interview concerning the adoption of her children.

The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata
Landingin was conceived after the death of their paternal grandmother and
guardian. The paternal relatives including the petitioner who attended the
wake of their mother were very much concerned about the well-being of
the three minors. While preparing for their adoption, they have asked a
cousin who has a family to stay with minors and act as their temporary
guardian.

The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and
after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily
consented. She realized that her children need parental love, guidance and
support which she could not provide as she already has a second family &
residing in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her children have
been supporting her children up to the present and truly care for them, she
believes her children will be in good hands. She also finds petitioners in a
better position to provide a secured and bright future to her children.

However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in

evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner,
likewise, failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia
assents to the adoption.
 On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for
adoption, rendered a decision granting said petition. The dispositive portion
reads:

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine

Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all
legal obligations obedience and maintenance from their natural parents
and that they be declared for all legal intents and purposes the children of
Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with considering
that parent-children relationship has long been established between the
children and the adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the children be
changed from “Dizon-Ramos” to “Ramos-Landingin.”

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar

of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect the corresponding changes/amendment
in the birth certificates of the above-mentioned minors.

SO ORDERED.

The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals on December

2, 2002. In its brief for the oppositor-appellant, the OSG raised the
following arguments:

I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE
PROPOSED ADOPTEES’ BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.

II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF
THE PETITIONER’S CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW.

III
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH
THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED
ADOPTEES.

On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision reversing the ruling of

the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary
consent of Amelia Ramos, the children’s natural mother. Moreover, the
affidavit of consent of the petitioner’s children could not also be admitted in
evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated
or acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although petitioner
has a job, she was not stable enough to support the children. The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated

November 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in
Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May 21, 2004, which

the CA denied in its Resolution dated August 12, 2004.

Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari on

September 7, 2004, assigning the following errors:
 1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS
OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE
AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE
RESULT OF THE CASE.

2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN

CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT
FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE CHILDREN.

The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following:
(a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written
consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the
affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopter’s
children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner
is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.
 The Court’s Ruling

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as
stated in Malkinson v. Agrava, that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to
allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and
give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation
of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus
be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives
of the law.

However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals, the Court also ruled that the
liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as
it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and
privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the
paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted
child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The
Court’s position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend
to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the
discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on
best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights
of the parents over the child.

Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the

Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:

Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being

properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold
his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to
the adoption is hereby required:

(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal

guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has
legal custody of the child;

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of

age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;

(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over,

of the adopter, if living with said adopter and the latter’s souse,
if any;

(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

 The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the
best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.

Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable

for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent
to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental
rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents.
In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos
to the adoption.

We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to
interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son, John
Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and
Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not
require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her
minor children. Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos
as witness in support of the petition.
 Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the
biological mother is no longer necessary because when Amelia’s husband
died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back. The children were then
left to the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal
relatives, including petitioner, who provided for the children’s financial
needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively abandoned the
children. Petitioner further contends that it was by twist of fate that after 12
years, when the petition for adoption was pending with the RTC that Amelia
and her child by her second marriage were on vacation in the Philippines.
Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and during the
meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker that she conformed to the
adoption of her three children by the petitioner.

Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition

with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9
thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot
be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will
suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors
had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written
consent of their legal guardian.

Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his

child without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties. The term means neglect and refusal to perform the
filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds
presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects
to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the

care of others is not such an abandonment. To dispense with the
requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at
the time of adoption.

In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of

Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her
children. Petitioner’s testimony on that matter follows:

Q Where is the mother of these three children now?

A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.

Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an
instance where she communicated with the family?
A None, sir.

Q How about with her children?

A None, sir.

Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?

A I do not know, sir.

Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?

A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another
man.

Q From whom did you learn that?

 A From others who came from Italy, sir.

Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second
marriage?
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.

Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:

Q Where is your mother now?

A In Italy, sir.

Q When did your mother left for Italy?

A After my father died, sir.

Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?
A Two years old, sir.

Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother
communicate with you?
A No, sir.

However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also
stated the following:

IV. Background of the Case:

xxxx

Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the
care and custody of their maternal grandmother. However, she died in
Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of their deceased father now serves as
their guardian. The petitioner, together with her children and other
relatives abroad have been supporting the minor children financially,
even during the time that they were still living with their natural
parents. Their mother also sends financial support but very minimal.

xxxx
 V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for
Adoption:

xxxx

As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger
siblings. She helps them in their lessons, works and has fun with them.
She also encourages openness on their problems and concerns and
provides petty counseling. In serious problems she already consult (sic)
her mother and petitioner-aunt.

xxxx

In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein

minors, Amelia recalled that they had a happy and comfortable life. After
the death of her husband, her in-laws which include the petitioner had
continued providing support for them. However being ashamed of just
depending on the support of her husband’s relatives, she decided to work
abroad. Her parents are also in need of financial help as they are
undergoing maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm
land which she used in going to Italy and worked as domestic helper.

When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3
children to the care & custody of her mother-in-law who returned home
for good, however she died on November 2000.

While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from
Tarlac. They became live-in partners since 1995 and have a son John
Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of them are considered Italian
residents. Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment
of his marriage and his wife is amenable to it. He is providing his
legitimate family regular support.

Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-

P15,000 a month through her parents who share minimal amount of
P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The petitioner and other
paternal relatives are continuously providing support for most of the needs
& education of minors up to present.

Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her
children, or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was
merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even
while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly
obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for,
as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious
personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to
the children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent
in-laws provide.

Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors

herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties between the biological
mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same shall then be vested on
the adopter. It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial
consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to
deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. More proof has
to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that
the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an
adopting parent. Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes
precedence in adoption.

Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court
shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of
evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings
of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose
or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap
of paper barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and
the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on
documents unless formally offered.

Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint

Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity
of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of
petitioner’s children was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for
it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document
notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103,
which states:

Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and

authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered authentic if the
acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance with the
following requirements:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an

ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé d
affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or
place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or
officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place
where the act is done.

(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify

that the person acknowledging the instrument or document
is known to him, and that he is the same person who
executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act
and deed. The certificate shall be under his official seal, if
he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his
 certificate shall so state. In case the acknowledgment is
made before a notary public or an officer mentioned in
subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the certificate
of the notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador,
minister, secretary of legation, chargé de affaires, consul,
vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he
is accredited. The officer making the authentication shall
certify under his official seal that the person who took the
acknowledgment was at the time duly authorized to act as
notary public or that he was duly exercising the functions
of the office by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that
as such he had authority under the law to take
acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place
where the acknowledgment was taken, and that his
signature and seal, if any, are genuine.

As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate children did

not comply with the afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the
Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be proved either by
anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.

Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by

petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate children, the
same is inadmissible in evidence.

In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was
not stable enough to support the children and is only relying on the financial
backing, support and commitment of her children and her siblings.
Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is financially capable as she
has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house, and currently earns
$5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and
siblings have likewise committed themselves to provide financial backing
should the need arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on the
statement in the Home Study Report that “petitioner has limited income.”
Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on the financial backing of her
children and siblings in order to support the minor adoptees. The law,
however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a position to provide
support in keeping with the means of the family.

Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the

child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a
position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with
the means of the family.

According to the Adoption Home Study Report forwarded by the

Department of Public Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam
to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate children, as
the latter are already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time
of the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-
time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a
month. Petitioner’s main intention in adopting the children is to bring the
latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo,
Guam, but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that
the limited income might be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.

Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will

be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three
children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age.
While petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her
children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support
the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal
relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not
prove nor support petitioner’s allegation that her siblings and her children
are financially able and that they are willing to support the minors herein.
The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.

While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of
intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate
against reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not
prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby

DENIED.

[G.R. No. 143989. July 14, 2003]

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to

as “DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM”), respondent.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children.
The realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita
Lahom to take into their care Isabelita’s nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up
as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and
support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and
Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple
decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition
was issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the
spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City
changed the name “Jose Melvin Sibulo” to “Jose Melvin Lahom.”
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs.
Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred -

“7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused
to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly
her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had made known his desire
to revoke respondent’s adoption, but was prevented by petitioner’s supplication, however
with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest
may pertain to respondent in the future.

“x x x xx
x xxx

“10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the
feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation
Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until
the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his
profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.

“x x x xx
x xxx

“13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her
household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a
son, but respondent remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a
year.

“14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila
became more frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner
would need most the care and support from a love one, but respondent all the more
remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a son.

“15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner’s nephews and
nieces whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were
only motivated by their desire for some material benefits from petitioner.

“16. That in view of respondent’s insensible attitude resulting in a strained and

uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded
feelings, knowing that after all respondent’s only motive to his adoption is his expectancy
of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly
shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner,
thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of
adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has
been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its existence, hence this petition
for revocation.”
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute
deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.

Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:

“SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. – Upon petition of the adoptee, with the
assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is
incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the
life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to
comply with parental obligations.

“Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by
the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes
provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.” (emphasis supplied)

Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of
action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by
way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply,
i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of
then Article 348 of the Civil Code and Article 192 of the Family Code.

In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:

“On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No.
8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court, having been designated Family Court in A.M. No.
99-11-07 SC.

“On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint, is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court could render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino,
et al., 95 Phil. 365).

“Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to
rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face of
the petition, indeed there is lack of cause of action.

“Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired under the provisions of
the Family Code should be respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that petitioner
is entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said right
should have been exercised within the period allowed by the Rules. From the averments
in the petition, it appears clear that the legal grounds for the petition have been
discovered and known to petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the filing of the
instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any, had already prescribed.
(Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court)

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is ordered

dismissed.”

Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
petitioner raises the following questions; viz:

1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by
an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?

2. In the affirmative, has the adopter’s action prescribed?

A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the subject.
In ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the family. The
continuity of the adopter’s family was the primary purpose of adoption and all matters
relating to it basically focused on the rights of the adopter. There was hardly any
mention about the rights of the adopted. Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and
England, in an effort to preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor
recognized adoption. It was only much later when adoption was given an impetus in law
and still later when the welfare of the child became a paramount concern. Spain itself
which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman law
concept of adoption which, subsequently, was to find its way to the archipelago. The
Americans came and introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unlike most
countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an overriding consideration. In the
early part of the century just passed, the rights of children invited universal attention; the
Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948, followed by the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of the
Child, were written instruments that would also protect and safeguard the rights of
adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 on adoption, later modified
by the Child and Youth Welfare Code and then by the Family Code of the Philippines,
gave immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the
United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a
State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with
social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the
adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most
importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new
family but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to
rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal
ties created by adoption.

Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right
to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case,
both being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due
process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the
right has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a
present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.

In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida
C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential
Decree No. 603) allowed an adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of them.
After the trial court had rendered its decision and while the case was still pending on
appeal, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint
adoption by the husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case
should be dismissed for having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without being joined
by the husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined
by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The petition to
adopt Jason, having been filed with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still
in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without being joined by her
husband, according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs. Miller, spouses
Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July
1988, the couple filed a petition to formalize Michael’s adoption having theretofore been
taken into their care. At the time the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed
aliens to adopt. After the decree of adoption and while on appeal before the Court of
Appeals, the Family Code was enacted into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens
from adopting Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the
adoption decree. In discarding the argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court
ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the
time the petition was filed.

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action
to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already
abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code
to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court
should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been
initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be
pursued.

Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the five–year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter
would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The
exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a
person has no vested right in statutory privileges. While adoption has often been referred
to in the context of a “right,” the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is a privilege that is governed
by the state’s determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of
the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter
to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a
right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been
exercised.

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right
to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to
be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law.
Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live
with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the
legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits
otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized
by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and
testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his
estate.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 118680. March 5, 2001]

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, all surnamed RODRIGUEZ,
ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO TAN TE, TE ENG SUY,
LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S.
DETALIA, HUBERT CHIU YULO, PATERIO N. LAO, LORENSITA M. PADILLA,
IMMACULATE CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND LILIAN EXPRESS, INC. and TIO
TUAN, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1994 which
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozamiz City in Civil
Case No. OZ-1397.

The facts of this case are as follows:

On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated
proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of herein petitioner,
Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. On August 1, 1946, the CFI granted the petition and
declared petitioner Pedrosa the adopted child of Miguel and Rosalina.
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into
an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel’s estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal
proportion the estate of Miguel.

On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of
petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein respondent Rosalina
as defendants docketed as OZ 349.

On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption.
Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals.

On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an
extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel
and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel
Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters.

The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of land
covering a total area of 224,883 square meters. These properties were divided among
Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina.
The heirs of Miguel were given 226 square meters of parcel 2, and 9,567 square meters
and 24,457 square meters of parcels 7 and 9, respectively. The total land area allocated to
the heirs of Miguel was 34,250 square meters.

Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes
were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer
some parcels to the other respondents herein.

Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3, designated as Lot 504, were
transferred to respondents Chuan Lung Fai, but not included in the Deed of Settlement
and Partition, were transferred to respondent Lilian Express, Inc. and are now registered
under TCT No. T-11337. Parcel 6, Lot 560, was subdivided among Ramon, Jose,
Carmen and Mercedes and was designated as Lots 560-A, 560-B, 560-C, 560-D and 560-
E. Lot 560-A covering 500 square meters was transferred to respondent Victorino Detall
and was subsequently transferred to Jerome Deiparine who registered it under his name
under TCT No. T-10706. Lot 560-B with 500 square meters was transferred to
respondent Petronilo Detalla and was later transferred to respondent Hubert Chiu Yulo
who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-11305. Lot 560-C was transferred
and registered under the name of respondent Paterio Lao with TCT No. T-10206. Lot
560-D was sold to and subsequently registered in the name of Lorensita M. Padilla under
TCT No. T-10207. The remaining portion, Lot 560-E consisting of 43,608 square meters
was bought by respondent Immaculate Concepcion College and was registered in its
name under TCT No. T-10208.

On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of
petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion to Dismiss. On June 25, 1986, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the
properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto
were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives.

Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was
filed on January 28, 1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to
include the allegation “that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made between the
plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed.”

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Its ruling was premised on the following grounds:

1) that the participation of Rosalina has already estopped her from questioning the
validity of the partition, and since she is already estopped, it naturally follows that Maria
Elena, her successor-in-interest, is likewise estopped, applying Article 1439 of the Civil
Code;

2) that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the partition is null and void is
weakened by her inconsistent claim that the partition would have been alright had she
been given a more equitable share;

3) the action is essentially an action for rescission and had been filed late considering
that it was filed beyond the 4 year period provided for in Article 1100 of the Civil Code;

4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals
in a Resolution dated December 20, 1994.

Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that the following errors were allegedly
committed by the Court of Appeals in -

I. ……FINDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION

ENTERED INTO BY DEFENDANT JUREDINI AND DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
RODRIGUEZES WAS VALID AND BINDING UPON THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN SAID TRANSACTION

II. ……CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAVE

ALREADY PRESCRIBED TWO (2) YEARS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION IN THE NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION

III. ...…CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS

BARRED OR ESTOPPED IN FILING THIS CASE (sic) IN VIEW OF THE
DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED BY
HEREIN DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WHO WERE THEN PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS IN AC[C]-G.R. NO. SP-00208

IV. ……SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES’ CLAIM THAT AS THEY

HAVE NOT AS YET RECOGNIZED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AS AN ADOPTED
DAUGHTER OF MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THEM
TO HAVE HER PARTICIPATE IN THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT,
EXHIBITS “S” AND “I”

V. ……CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAD NOT

CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN THAT MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ WAS A CO-OWNER OF
THE LANDS SOLD AND HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION OF THOSE LANDS

VI. ……FINDING THAT PORTION OF LOTS NOS. 504 AND 560 SOLD TO THE
OTHER DEFENDANTS–APPELLEES WERE CLEAN AND FREE FROM
ENCUMBRANCES OR ANY FLAWS HENCE WERE VALID

VII. ……FINDING THAT THE PLANTIFF–APPELLANT NEVER APPEARED IN

COURT TO TESTIFY OR REBUT THE ASSERTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS–
APPELLANTS THAT THERE WAS A VALID PARTITION

VIII. ……AWARDING PLAINTIFF–APPELLANT DAMAGES FOR THE INCOME

OF HER SHARE IN THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION

In sum, the issues to be resolved in our view are (1) whether or not the complaint for
annulment of the “Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition” had already
prescribed; (2) whether or not said deed is valid; and (3) whether or not the petitioner is
entitled to recover the lots which had already been transferred to the respondent buyers.

Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial partition has not
yet prescribed since the prescriptive period which should be applied is four years
following the case of Beltran vs. Ayson, 4 SCRA 69 (1962). She also avers that Sec. 4,
Rule 74 which provides for a two-year prescriptive period needs two requirements. One,
the party assailing the partition must have been given notice, and two, the party assailing
the partition must have participated therein. Petitioner insists these requirements are not
present in her case, since she did not participate in the “Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
and Partition.” She cites Villaluz vs. Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963), where we held that a
deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no
knowledge and consent to the same, is fraudulent. She asserts that she is an adoptive
daughter and thus an heir of Miguel.

Petitioner also contends that the respondent buyers were buyers in bad faith since they
failed to exercise the necessary due diligence required before purchasing the lots in
question. In the alternative, petitioner wants to redeem the said lots as a co-owner of respondent
Rodriguezes under the provisions of Article 1620 of the New Civil Code.
Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if the partition would be allowed. She
asks for the rescission of the said partitioning under Articles 165-175 of the Civil Code.

Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner had already prescribed. In
addition, they argue that petitioner, Maria Elena, and Rosalina already have their shares
in the estate of Miguel Rodriguez reflected in the compromise agreement they entered
into with the respondent Rodriguezes in AC- G.R. SP 00208. Finally, respondents aver
that the non-participation of Maria Elena in the extrajudicial partition was understandable
since her status as an adopted child was then under litigation. In any case, they assert that
the shares of Miguel’s heirs were adequately protected in the said partition.

Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have
participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2)
when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all
the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are
represented by themselves or through guardians.

Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition.
Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.

The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De
Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:

[The action to annul] a deed of “extrajudicial settlement” upon the ground of fraud...may
be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to
have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.

Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three
years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983,
was executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has
not yet prescribed.

Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of

extrajudicial settlement. It states:

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a

newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section;
but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof.

Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings,
the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a
notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is
agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication was done in
the instant case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria
Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.

The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial
partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition
executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to
the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her
adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the
collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the provisions of
Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that
they were not aware of Maria Elena’s adoption since they even filed an action to annul
the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since the
adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time they executed the deed of
partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed only twenty six (26)
years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response to prevent Maria
Elena from inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid and
existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that private respondents executed the deed
of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.

In the case of Segura vs. Segura, the Court held:

This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in gist that a person who has been
deprived of his lawful participation in the estate of the decedent, whether as heir or as
creditor, must assert his claim within two years after the extrajudicial or summary
settlement of such estate under Sections 1 and 2 respectively of the same Rule 74.
Thereafter, he will be precluded from doing so as the right will have prescribed.

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was
null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid
partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the
nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule,
“no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof.” As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the
excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the
partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.

To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise.
Maria Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina,
only represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel
predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically vested to his child and widow, in
equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes’ interests did not include Miguel’s estate but only
Pilar’s estate.

Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given the circumstances in this
case, we are constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue. The
properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name
of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally
attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for
such purpose.

Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No receipts, agreements or any other
documentary evidence was presented to justify such claim for damages. Actual damages,
to be recoverable, must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot
simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount
of damages. The same is true for moral damages. These cannot be awarded in the
absence of any factual basis. The unsubstantiated testimony of Loreto Jocelyn Pedrosa is
hearsay and has no probative value. It is settled in jurisprudence that damages may not
be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence. Nonetheless, the failure of the petitioner to
substantiate her claims for damages does not mean that she will be totally deprived of any
damages. Under the law, nominal damages are awarded, so that a plaintiff’s right, which
has been invaded or violated by defendants may be vindicated and recognized.

Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was
not adequately and properly proved, (2) petitioner was unlawfully deprived of her legal
participation in the partition of the estate of Miguel, her adoptive father, (3) respondents
had transferred portions of the properties involved to third parties, and (4) this case has
dragged on for more than a decade, we find it reasonable to grant in petitioner’s favor
nominal damages in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. The amount to be
awarded as such damages should at least commensurate to the injury sustained by the
petitioner considering the concept and purpose of said damages. Such award is given in
view of the peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons extant in this case. Thus,
the grant of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS to petitioner as
damages is proper in view of the technical injury she has suffered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The “Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
and Partition” executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared invalid.
The amount of P100,000.00 is hereby awarded to petitioner as damages to be paid by
private respondents, who are also ordered to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.