15. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.

ALMA BISDA y GAUPO and

GENEROSA JENNY ROSE BASILAN y PAYAN, appellants

G.R. No. 140895. July 17, 2003

Topic: Any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness if she can perceive and
perceiving, can make known to others, and that she is capable of relating truthfully facts
for which she is examined.
Facts

The victims classes had just ended and she was on her way to her school bus
Unknown to Angela, appellants Alma and Jenny Rose were outside of the school gate
waiting for her. They approached the young girl, and told her that her parents were
waiting for her at the Jollibee Restaurant. Angela initially refused to go with the two
women, but because Alma held on to her hand so tightly and poked a knife at her. With
Angela in tow, Alma and Jenny Rose boarded a white taxi and went to a dirty house
where they changed Angelas clothes. The girl was made to wear blouse and shorts,
yellow t-shirt and a pair of panties. Several days have passed when the mother
Marymae received a telephone call from a woman demanding for ransom money.

Issue

Whether or not the competency of the witness and the truth of testimony are impaired when a
child witness is not examined on the nature of the oath and the need for her to tell the whole
truth,

Ruling

In this case, Angela was six years old when she testified. [66] She took an oath to
tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth before she testified on direct
examination. There was nary a whimper of protest or objection on the part of the
appellants to Angelas competence as a witness and the prosecutions failure to
propound questions to determine whether Angela understood her obligation and
responsibility of telling the truth respecting the matter of her testimony before the court.
The appellants did not even bother requesting the trial court for leave to conduct a voir
direexamination of Angela. After the prosecution terminated its direct examination, the
appellants thereafter cross-examined Angela extensively and intensively on the matter
of her testimony on direct examination. It was only in this Court that the appellants
raised the matter for the first time, that there was failure on the part of the prosecution to
examine Angela on the nature of her oath, and to ascertain whether she had the
capacity to distinguish right from wrong. It is too late in the day for the appellants to
raise the issue.
The determination of the competence and capability of a child as a witness rests
primarily with the trial judge. The trial court correctly found Angela a competent witness
and her testimony entitled to full probative weight. Any child regardless of age, can be a
competent witness if she can perceive and perceiving, can make known to others, and
that she is capable of relating truthfully facts for which she is examined.
The credibility of Angela and the verisimilitude of her testimony is not impaired by her
failure to shout for help when the appellants took her, or to make any attempt to call her
parents or to escape from her captors and to use the telephone to call her parents. At
five years old, she could not be expected to act and react to her kidnapping and
detention like an adult should. She did not shout and seek help from the school security
guards because the appellants told Angela that her parents were waiting for her.
Appellant Basilan was the niece of Angelas yaya. She then believed that nothing was
amiss. It was only when she failed to see her parents that Angela blamed herself for
going with the appellants in the first place.
16. PEOPLE V. DE JESUS

Facts: Amelita Murillo alleges that her common law spouse raped their four daughters. One of them, Ma.
Cristina testified that their father started inserting his fingers in her vagina when she was two years old
and at other times he would insert his penis in her vagina while they are sleeping in their room. Ma.
Cristina said she did not told anyone about the incidents because she was afraid that her father would
spank her. Mauro de Jesus denied the allegations and claimed that he loves his daughters. He testified
before the trial court that his common law wife, Amelita, gets irritable when she has no money and
would initiate a quarrel. He also stated that Amelita caused him to be incarcerated before on charges of
raping their four of their children. He stayed in jail for four days and was eventually released because the
NBI findings showed negative results of rape. Despite presenting an expert witness, De Jesus was
convicted by the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the child, Ma. Cristina is a competent evidence against Mauro.

Ruling: The victim, Ma. Cristina, testified that she was around two years old when her father allegedly
abused her. On the date she testified, Ma. Cristina had just turned six years old. How she is able to recall
an incident that happened four years before she testified and relate in court her experience when she
was barely two years old is something that is quite perplexing to the mind of the Court. It is well-
established that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he or she can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known his or her perception to others, that is, he or she is capable of relating
truthfully facts for which the child is examined. The requirements of a childs competence as a witness
are: (a) capacity of observation, (b) capacity of recollection and (c) capacity of communication. A child
may be a competent witness where he or she has sufficient capacity to understand the solemnity of an
oath and to comprehend the obligation it imposes, and where he or she has sufficient intelligence to
receive just impressions as to the facts of which the child is to testify and relate them correctly, although
he or she is very young.

The Supreme Court finds cogent reason to re-evaluate the trial courts assessment regarding the
credibility of Ma. Cristina as a witness. She testified on direct examination that her father inserted his
finger as well as his penis in her vagina several times when, in fact, on cross-examination, she testified
that she did not know what ari means. The trial court erred in finding Mauro guilty of rape as the child
understood ari, penis or titi as the finger of her father. Nowhere could we find from said testimony any
indication that the father successfully placed, or tried to insert, his penis and penetrated at least
the labia of the victim. The victim only said in her testimony that Mauro placed his finger in her vagina
while bathing her and while she was asleep. Under such situation, neither could appellant be held guilty
of attempted rape. In case of rape of a woman under 12, only carnal knowledge had to be proved to
establish the crime. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual
bodily connections with a woman. For this purpose, it is enough if there was even the slightest contact of
the male sex organ with the labia of the victims genitalia. However, there must be proof, by direct or
indirect evidence, of such contact. It has been ruled that in the absence of any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted
rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
17. PP. v. CAETE (Presentation of Child Witness)
FACTS:
A case was filed against Kakingco Caete for allegedly raping, Alma a minor and the
niece of the accused on two occasions in 1996 of which he was convicted for the said
crime.
The appellant avers that the prosecution had a difficulty proving that the appellant
raped the private complainant in light of her testimony. When the prosecution tried to
elicit from the offended party how appellants penis could have been inserted into her
vagina with his pants still on and the appellants counsel objected to the question, the
presiding judge himself took the cudgels for the prosecution and propounded questions
on the private complainant. Worse, the presiding judge posed leading questions to the
private complainant. The presiding judge was biased and partial to the prosecution.

ISSUE: whether or not the mode of questioning of the judge is valid

HELD:

YES

The Court finds nothing improper in the questions posed by the trial court. Neither are
the questions prejudicial to the appellant or suggestive of any partiality of the trial
court. It bears stressing that from the testimony of the private complainant.

Parenthetically, under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rule on Examination of a Child

Witness, child witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be
allowed by the trial court in all stages of the examination if the same will further the
interest of justice. Objections to questions should be couched in a manner so as not to
mislead, confuse, frighten and intimidate the child.
18. Jesusa Odenel Genil vs. JUDGE ROGACIANO Y. RIVERA,
Municipal Trial Court, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental

A.M. No. MTJ-06-1619

Facts: Nancy Silfaban, one of complainants constituents filed before the

MTC of Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental two criminal complaints against Roderick
Sales, one for rape and the other for forcible abduction with rape. On even date,
Nancy also filed a criminal complaint against Janice Sales for violation of
Republic Act 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, docketed as Criminal Case No.
3793.

Judge Rivera conducted a preliminary investigation of the said two complaints

after the accused was ordered to submit his counter-affidavit, which preliminary
investigation was made in open court.

During the above-said preliminary investigation, Nancy, a minor, was called to the
witness stand and, in the course of her testimony subjected to humiliation as all
those present, including respondent, the counsel for the defense Atty. Arturo
Erames, and SPO4 Herminigildo Ortiz Cadungog (SPO4 Cadungog) of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) who acted as prosecutor, were laughing.[2]

The letter-complaints were eventually referred for investigation to Judge Orlando

C. Velasco of Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court of Bayawan City who directed
respondent to file his Comment thereon and to require the public prosecutor and
the counsel of Roderick Sales to also submit their respective comments.
Respecting the conduct of preliminary investigation in open court on August 13,
2003, respondent claimed that not only did Nancy not request otherwise; she, albeit
a minor, looks energetic, psychologically mature and somewhat aggressive who
answers questions quickly, and there was nothing in her affidavit or testimony
which warranted the exclusion of the public from the proceedings. And respondent
disclaimed the occurrence of any laughing incident during the preliminary
investigation, he adding that all were eager to observe the proceedings.

In his Investigation Report, Judge Velasco noted that Nancy was subjected to
unhampered ridicule, embarrassment and humiliation during the preliminary
investigation, and respondent even ordered her to turn clockwise to the delight of
every one present.

The OCA recommends that the administrative case against respondent be

docketed as a regular administrative matter and that he be fined in the amount of
P21,000 for gross ignorance of the law, with warning that a repetition of the same
or similar act would be dealt with more severely, in light of the following
observations:

Respondent judge displayed blatant insensitivity to the child victim. He allowed the defense
counsel to cross-examine the child witness and her mother which caused them extreme
humiliation and embarrassment. xxx Parties cannot be subjected to direct examination or cross-
examination. Questions or issues that may arise during the investigation should be addressed to
the investigating judge who should propound the same to the party concerned. Noteworthy is that
the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 21 November 2000) does not
permit a defense counsel to even approach a child who is testifying if it appears that the child is
fearful of or intimidated by the counsel. xxx Neither does the Rule require a manifestation from
the child or her mother to exclude the public from the hearing. The court may motu proprio
exclude the public from the courtroom to protect the right to privacy of the child; if requiring the
child to testify in open court would cause psychological harm to him; if it would hinder the
ascertainment of truth or result in his inability to effectively communicate due to embarrassment,
fear or timidity; and if the evidence to be produced is of such character as to be offensive to
decency or public morals.

Issue:

1) Whether the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness provides that

when a child witness testifies, the court may, motu proprio, order
the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons who do not have
direct interest in the one.

2) Whether the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to

cross-examine the witness which the complainant may present.

Held:

1) Yes

The same Rule on Examination of a Child Witness provides that when a

child testifies, the court, moto proprio, order the exclusion from the courtroom of
all persons who do not have a direct interest in the case. In issuing such order, the
court is to consider, inter alia, the developmental level of the child, the nature of
the crime, and the nature of his testimony regarding the crime. It may also exclude
the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced is of such character
as to be offensive to decency or public morals.

2) Yes.

The accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the

witness which the complainant may present. As the above-quoted provisions of
the Rules direct, after a preliminary investigation is conducted, the investigation
judge must perform his ministerial duty to transmit within ten days after the
conclusion thereof the resolution of the case together with the entire records to the
provincial prosecutor.

If on the other hand he determines, after examining the complaint and other
documents offered in support thereof, that there is no ground to continue with the
inquiry, he should dismiss the complaint and transmit the order of dismissal
together with the records of the case to the provincial prosecutor with ten days
from the filing of the complaint. And, examination or cross-examination by the
parties proscribed.

Yet respondent not only allowed SPO4 Cadungog who acted as prosecutor
to cross-examine the accused Roderick Sales; he also allowed the defense counsel
to propound questions to Nancy and her mother. It is a fundamental principle that
the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the
witnesses which the complainant may present.

Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the
respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all
other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witness to be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.
 [G.R. No. 144405. February 24, 2004]

19. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FERDINAND

MATITO Y TORRES, A.K.A. FREDDIE, appellant.
Facts:

Mariano Raymundo was shot three times while standing at his backyard. During the trial
against the accused, the following were the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution:

1. Testimony of the widow narrating how Mariano identified accused as the shooter right
before he collapsed.

2. Testimony of Marianos daughter narrating how accused was looking for her father
and uttering threats against him while drunk.

3. Serious quarrels between the victim and accused.

4. Quarrels between the victims and accuseds children.

5. Accused tested positive for nitrates on his hands.

Issue: Whether circumstantial evidence may be the sole basis of a criminal conviction.
Held:
Yes.
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that indirectly proves a fact in
issue through an inference which the fact finder draws from the evidence
established. Cases have recognized that in its effect upon the courts, circumstantial
evidence may surpass direct evidence in weight and probative force. [18]

To warrant a conviction, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
In this case, the combination of the circumstances forms an unbroken chain that
points to appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime.
20. People v. Sevilleno 425 SCRA 247

Facts:

On July 25, 1995, appellant Paulino Sevilleno y Villanueva alias Tamayo was charged with rape with
homicide.

At around 10:00 in the morning of July 22, 1995, 9-year old Virginia and 8-year old Norma, both
surnamed Bakia, met appellant on their way to a store in Brgy. Guadalupe, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental. Appellant offered them bread and ice candy then invited Virginia to watch a beta show.
Appellant and Virginia thereafter headed to the direction of the sugarcane fields while Norma followed.
However, she changed her mind and went home instead.

Rogelio Bakia, Virginias and Normas father, came home at around 11:00 that same morning and looked
for Virginia. They were informed by Norma that Virginia went with appellant to Sitio Guindali-an.
Rogelio immediately set out after her. He met appellant in Sitio Guindali-an but he denied any knowledge
of Virginias whereabouts. Rogelio noticed fingernail scratches on appellants neck and a wound on his left
cheek.

The following day, Rogelio and Eugenio Tiongson again met appellant at the house of former barangay
captain Paeng Lopez. When asked where Virginia was, appellant answered that she was in a sugarcane
field known as Camp 9, also located in Brgy. Guadalupe. Immediately, they proceeded to the designated
place where they found Virginias corpse covered with dried sugarcane leaves. She was naked except for
her dress which was raised to her armpits. Her legs were spread apart and her body bore multiple wounds.

Another prosecution witness, Maria Lariosa, testified that on July 22, 1995 at around noontime, she saw
appellant and Virginia pass by her house near Camp 9. The following day, July 23, 1995, she saw
appellant emerge alone from the sugarcane fields in Camp 9 with scratches on his face and neck.

Issue:

Whether or not the circumstances relied upon by the trial court as bases for his conviction did not prove
beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime.

Ruling:

We are not persuaded. Appellants act of going to the house of the victim may not be consistent
with ordinary human behavior, but is nevertheless possible. While an appellants post-incident behavior is
never proof of guilt, neither is it of innocence. The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the
conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence require the presence of the following requisites:

1) There are more than one circumstance;

(2) The inference must be based on proven facts; and

(3) The combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of
the accused.
To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to
leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the appellant. Jurisprudence requires
that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair
reasonable conclusion pointing to the appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the
crime.These, the prosecution were able to establish.

It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not
mean such a degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only
moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a conviction,
this exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not
available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing
circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under
conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all
circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded places
will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.
MALLARI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Complainant Boyose was a teacher at the Bustamante High School, Davao City. At the
start, she had a good working relationship with the school principal, appellant Mallari. However,
their relationship turned sour when she began to question appellant Mallari on alleged
unaccounted school funds. One morning, while Boyose was at the Guidance Office, a man
approached her and asked if he can still enroll his nephew.

In the afternoon of the same day, Boyose rode on a jeepney bound for Sasa, Davao. She
observed that the man who talked to her in the morning was also in the same jeepney. Few
minutes later, the man drew and pointed a gun at Boyoses temple.She grabbed the gun and
grappled for its possession but she failed. Eventually, she was able to get out of the jeepney and
ran away but the man followed her and shot her repeatedly.

Boyose was hit in the lower mouth and at her back. She shouted for help. A man helped her and
brought her to the San Pedro Hospital where she was treated and confined.

Amparado told the police that Mallari asked him to kill Boyose. But the job was latter offered to
Zaldy Bontia. Zaldy allegedly admitted participation in the incident and implicated his brother
Leonardo Bontia as the gunman. Melanio Mallari, Leonardo Bontia and Zaldy Bontia, were
accordingly charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder.

The RTC found the three accused guilty of the crime of frustrated murder based on
circumstantial evidence. The CA upheld the findings of the trial court, except as to the stage of
the crime committed; it convicted the accused-appellants of attempted murder. This Petition
was filed only by Mallari.

Issue: Whether there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish petitioners guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Held: The Petition is meritorious. In the absence of direct proof, a conviction may still be based
on circumstantial evidence. But to warrant such conviction, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance, (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven, and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. If the totality of the circumstances eliminates beyond
reasonable doubt the possibility of innocence, conviction is proper; otherwise, the accused
must be acquitted.
Here, other than the victims letter to petitioner tending to establish his ill motive, there is
hardly any evidence to corroborate his co-accuseds extrajudicial confessions (later recanted) or
to establish the probability of his actual participation (by inducement) in the commission of the
crime. Considering that the strength of the prosecution evidence against him falls short of the
required quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, his constitutional right to be presumed
innocent must prevail. Consistent with the above principles, and in view of the dearth of
evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner must be acquitted.
 22. MCC v Ssangyong

Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC) conducts business through telephone calls and facsimile
or telecopy transmissions with one of its suppliers, Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong).

On 2000, Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro Forma Invoice containing the terms and conditions
of their transaction. MCC sent back by fax to Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature of
Chan, MCCs manager.It was agreed that payment would be made through letter of credit.However,
despite Ssangyong's demands, MCC failed to open a letter of credit.

Ssangyong then filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against defendant MCC
before the RTC. Petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that respondent failed to present the
original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. Petitioner contends that the
photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their
supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792,
because the law merely admits as the best evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand,
respondent posits under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of the pro
forma invoice is admissible in evidence since it is an electronic document and, therefore, the best
evidence under the law and the Rules.

Issue: Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and
admissible in evidence as such?

Held: No.

Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect the
data accurately. Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as
the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must
foremost be an electronic data message or an electronic document.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792 defines the Electronic Data
Message refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means,
but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.

However, Congress excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy
(except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the ordinary fax
machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term "electronic data message."

The laws definition of electronic data message, which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with
electronic document, could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paper-
based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each
other, and have different legal effects. .

Thus,the terms electronic data message and electronic document, as defined under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence.
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA v. FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS
and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO

G.R. No. 124893. April 18, 1997.

PUNO, J.

Facts:

On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position
of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of
Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. Private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr.,
a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the
COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy" against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age
qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by
facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on
Elections National Office, Manila.

Issue:

Whether the petition filed by Sales comply with the formal requirements of
pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Held:

No.

Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC

Rules of Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a
genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all
the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining
on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was
originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham
pleading. The uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading should
have restrained the COMELEC en banc from acting on the petition and
issuing the questioned order. The COMELEC en banc should have waited
until it received the petition filed by registered mail.