1.

0 Introduction
One of the major world accident in oil and gas or petrochemicals industry was in Mumbai at
west coast of India on 27 July 2005.

The Mumbai or also known as Bombay High field is India's largest offshore oil and gas field.
Located in the Arabian Sea about 160 km west of the Mumbai coast, the Mumbai High Basin
is 75 km long and 25 km wide. The oil and gas field has been operating by the Oil and Natural
Gas Corporation (ONGC) since 1974 and was divided into the north and south blocks. Northern
block was located a production complex, 100km from shore, consisting of four bridge-linked
platforms.

The for bridge-linkage platforms were Wellhead Process Platform (NA) built in 1976.
Residential platform (MHF) in 1978 while the Mumbai High North (MHN) platform was
constructed in 1981 and outfitted for production of 80,000 barrels of crude oil per day. MHN
platform was a 30 years old 7-storey steel structure. Morever, Additional Process Platform
(MHW) was for gas compressor and water injection.

Figure 1: Mumbai High Field

Oil was exported to shore-based facilities via subsea pipelines. The structure was supported by
an eight-legged steel jacket and was 65m and 25m wide. The MHN facility separated oil and
gas carried by risers from the nearby wells, the NA and BHF platforms, and sent them onshore
by separate undersea pipelines. There was no structural protection for riser.
2.0 Discussion
2.1 Accident description

On July 27th 2005, the Samundra Suraksha, a multipurpose support vessel, was working in the
Mumbai High field completing a diving support campaign. Although owned by ONGC, the
100m long vessel was operated by the Shipping Company of India (SCI). At approximately
1400hrs, a cook in the galley of the Samundra Suraksha cut off the tips of two of his fingers.
The vessels master then ordered the recovery of its diving bell and divers. At roughly 1445hr,
the OIM (Offshore Installation Manager) received a request from Samundra Suraksha in the
MHN radio room to transfer the injured crew member.

On that day, weather conditions of the event were unfavourable. Monsoon rains, high winds
and accompanying high seas (4-5m swell), had grounded the helicopters servicing the offshore
platforms in the Mumbai High field. The MI-172 helicopter was parked on the MHN helideck,
since it was deteriorating weather conditions, flight and landing aboard the Samundra
Suraksha to retrieve the injured personnel was prohibited. The MSV captain then sent a request
to MHN for a basket transfer of the injured crew member via crane transfer.

When their call went unanswered, the vessel requested the assistance of medical professionals
and attention from several other platforms and jack-ups operating in the field. Request were
denied since there was no doctor available and also due to POB (personnel on board). When
the vessel reached MHN on a second occasion via radio, the situation was discussed between
the platforms OIM and the vessels master. Decission had been made that the injured person
would be transferred in a basket via the platforms south crane.

The leeward crane of MHN was out of commission at this time, so the vessel began to approach
the platform on its windward side. The Samundra Suraksha was a DP (Dynamically Positioned)
class vessel with multiple thruster control options. As the vessel continued to approach the
platform at approximately 1530hrs, it was observed by the master that the starboard azimuth
thruster pitch was sluggish. He promptly decided to continue approaching MHNs windward
side, as a lot of time had already been lost in search of medical attention for the vessels injured
crew member.

For the approach, the operating mode of the thrusters was switched from DP to emergency
mode. The injured person was successfully transferred to the platform. As the Samundra
Suraksha moved away from the platform, it experienced a large heave from ongoing ocean
swells and the thrusters were unable to compensate. The helideck of the vessel struck one or
more of the export gas-lift risers in the SW region of MHN. The resulting gas leak ignited and
flames spread rapidly to adjacent risers with no fire protection. Emergency shutdown valves
did not contain the flow of hydrocarbons in several of the longer risers, some of which reached
12km in length. Explosions occurred and the fire escalated extremely quickly.

The duration of the immensely destructive fire was just under two hours and it engulfed the
entirety of MHN and MHF, as illustrated in Figure 2 below. Nearby platforms and jack-ups
working in the area were severely affected by heat radiation.

Figure 2: MHN Platform Engulfed in Flames

The incident shows the catastrophic consequence of an oil rig fire. The unlimited supply of fuel
and oxygen normally contribute to the extremely rapid growth and spread of the fire. Under
normal practice, a multi purpose support vessel can only engage an oil rig under normal weather
conditions. In addition, the incident vessel was a dynamically positioned vessel with computer-
controlled thrusters which could remain in one position on the sea. It was still not clear why
the vessel went so close to the MHN, went out of control and hit the riser.

The MHN was completely destroyed in the fire, along with a helicopter positioned in it. At the
time of this incident, no regulatory body or organization for the governance of offshore safety
in oil and gas existed in India. Another factor influencing the disastrous series of events was
the lack of procedures and measures for risk mitigation, which is predominantly at fault of the
operator.
 Explosion
Followed by fire

FLAME EXPLOSION

FROM OTHER IGNITION GAS IGNITION

UNIT SOURCE LEAKAGE SOURCE

PIPE FROM FROM

VESSEL
PIPELINE SEPARATOR
LEAK LEAK

EXCESSIVE
PRESSURE

EXTERNAL FIRE FAULT OF

UNSUITABLE
EXPLOSION HEAT OPERATOR
PLATFROM
ENERGY LOAD
POSITION

NO
STRUCTURAL
PROTECTION

Chart 1: Fault Tree Analysis

2.2 Onsite impact

The rapid spread of the flames also hindered rescue operations, as only a small portion of
lifeboats and rafts could be launched. Over a 15-hour period, 362 of the 384 POB that day
were rescued, along with 11 pronounced dead and 11 lost at sea. Rescue operations were also
severely affected by weather conditions, as the monsoon had grounded all helicopters in the
area for several days. At the end, tthe Samundra Suraksha MSV caught fire due to several
explosions. Flames were extinguished and the vessel was towed off-site, only to sink on
August 1st 2005. 36 hours after the initial impact, an emergency response vessel rescued 6
divers in a saturation diving bell.

2.3 Offsite impact

The major fire that destroyed the production platform left several dead despite rescue
measures taken by the Indian Coast Guard. ONGC Chairman and Managing Director Subir
Raha stated that after the medical evacuation was completed, the yet to be established vessel
apparently lost control and collided with the process platform, which resulted in fire (Syed
Firdaus Ashraf, 2005). The mishap causes serious oil leakage, engulfing the platform and the
vessel in major fire.

The personnel at the platform and vessel controlled the fire and abandoned the platform and
vessel when the inferno went out of their hands. The platform was burning till the next
morning, though the oil spill has been brought to the bay with the help of ONGC and Navy
personnel. The damage to Samudra Suraksha was big, but not enough to sink it. ONGC
insured the vessel for $60 million (Syed Firdaus Ashraf, 2005).

2.4 Prevention action and control taken in avoiding the accident to happen again
The devastating fire was being investigated thoroughly to find out its root cause. Royal Dutch/
Shell assisted ONGC in the investigation, and Shell assisted the committee. ONGC Chairman
said that ONGC will restore oil production in two-week time about 70% of the 100 000 barrels
per day output lost due to the massive fire at the Bombay High North Platform.

At the time of the platform fire, India was lacking a government body for offshore oil and gas
operations. The standards and regulations were set only by ONGC. Though the platforms
operator is Indias largest and most profitable company, they did not have a set of offshore
rules and regulation until 2004 (BOEMRE, 2011).

There was a total failure in risk mitigation on the Bombay High North Platform regarding the
export risers. Risk management and collision avoidance measures would have provided
 guidance on the issue of approaching vessels. An immobile, moving vessel within certain
limits of a fixed platform should always be seen as a threat, as the platform does not have the
ability to move out of the harms way. A safer design of the platform itself may have avoided
the events that quickly escalated to disaster in July of 2005.

The Indian Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas is fully responsible for all exploration,
production and export/ import of petroleum and natural gas in India. In 2000, the Ministry
formed the Indian Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD), which would be responsible for
governing oil and gas operations and setting safety objectives. A Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) between the U.S. department of the Interiors Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) and OISD were instated. The MOU
highlighted that the United States and India would share common offshore oil and gas
regulatory knowledge over the next years. The Bombay High platform disaster has created
urgency for cooperation between both parties and the MOU was signed on July 21st 2006. In
2008, 174 new rules and regulations were added to OISDs drafted offshore rules (Walker,
n.d.)

3.0 Conclusion
The production of oil was restored in just 5 weeks, as lines were diverted to Mumbai High
South facilities. In 2006, ONGC spent $280 million USD to rebuild the platform and its
extensions in the Mumbai High field. As a result of the inferno in 2005, India eventually created
a much-needed offshore regulatory body to observe, monitor and control offshore oil and gas
activities. Though this body will not solve and prevent all safety issues, it will majorly decrease
the risk associated with operations in Indias offshore.

4.0 References

A. Bhardwaj. (2012). Topic 10: ONGC Mumbai High Accident (July 27, 2005 @ West Coast
of India). [Online]. [Accessed September 14, 2017]. Available from world wide web:
http://imechanica.org/node/13369

Bailey, C. University of Manchester. Mumbai High North Platform Fire, India. [Online].
[Accessed September 13, 2017]. Available from world wide web:
http://www.mace.manchester.ac.uk/project/research/structures/strucfire/CaseStudy/HistoricFi
res/Other/default.htm
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement. (2011). BOEMRE
Cooperation with India. [Online]. [Accessed on September 15, 2017]. Retrieved from
http://www.boemre.gov/international/india.htm
INDIATIMES NEWS NETWORK. (2005). Major fire at ONGC's Bombay High, 3 killed.
[Online]. [Accessed September 12, 2017]. Available from world wide web:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Major-fire-at-ONGCs-Bombay-High-3-
killed/articleshow/1184129.cms
Muzahid Khan, Student at University of Petroleum & Energy Studies. (2011). ONGC Mumbai
High Accident. [Online]. [Accessed September 14 2017]. Available from world wide web:
https://www.slideshare.net/MuzahidKhan/ongc-mumbai-high-accident
Syed Firdaus Ashraf. (July 28, 2005). What really caused the ONGC fire. [Online]. [Accessed
on September 15, 2017]
Walker, S. (n.d.) Presentation to the Marine Safety Forum from Health and Safety Executive
(HSE). [Online]. [Accessed on September 14, 2017]. Retrieved from
http://www.npchse.net/safety/pdf/useful%20information/Mumbai-north-Blow-outreport.pdf