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Ian Barton

Mr. Gonzalez

English 102

28 March 2016

The Morality of Drone Killings

Drone strikes have been on the rise in the Middle East in recent years. It has been a topic

of controversy since the beginning of the Obama Administration. However, it is only brought to

the publics attention when a drone strike misses its target and hits a large civilian population.

Whenever there is a terrorist attack, whether it be in the U.S., France, Belgium, or in the Middle

East, drone strikes are quickly increased to ensure there are no more attacks in the West. Drone

strikes have multiple benefits and detriments to which each side of the controversy attempts to

argue that one outweighs the other. When the CIA decides to launch drone strikes against high

value Taliban and Al-Queda targets, effort is made to curtail the loss of innocent lives to martyrs.

Those in favor of drone strikes attempt to appeal to the desire of military families. The sources

referenced also repeatedly attempt to persuade the audience that the loss of a few civilians is

better than the loss of thousands of people to a terrorist attack. Those against drone strikes appeal

to the sympathy of the public by highlighting the facts about drone targets. The middle ground

acknowledges both sides of the argument, but is unable to provide a solution that could benefit

both sides. Ultimately, is the death of civilians by drone strikes in the Middle East justifiable?

Andrew Cockburn, author and researcher of National Security, explains that the event

which launched the drone controversy occurred on March 17, 2011, in a northwest Pakistani

district. The events which occurred on this date were superseded by the release of Lahore, a

former Special Forces soldier who was under contract by the CIA. According to Andrew
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Cockburn, Lahore was arrested by Pakistani officials for shooting and killing two terrorists the

previous year. Cockburn wrote in his book, that the killing generated outrage across Pakistan. To

have Lahore released, the U.S. Ambassador in Pakistan negotiated a release price of $2.34

million in diyat, blood money (Cockburn 217). After Lahore was released, the CIA sought

revenge for the embarrassment by launching a drone strike against one of the alleged good

Taliban, Sherabat Khan Wazir. Cockburn says that a good Taliban focuses their energies on

fighting the Americans across the border in Afghanistan while maintaining cordial relations with

the government and military in Islamabad (Cockburn 217). On March 17, a drone spotted

Sherabat getting into a car with three other Taliban heading towards a town meeting. There were

reports that the CIA had multiple opportunities to kill Sherabat without civilian casualties and

that the CIA waited until they arrived at the meeting to launch two Hellfire missiles that killed

forty-four people. This event sparked the controversy because of the stance the U.S. government

took on the deaths. The government remained adamant that every single one of the victims

deserved his fate (Cockburn 218), even though witnesses and survivors of the event reported

that the group was discussing mining rights in the area. Ann Rogers, the co-author of the book

Unmanned, states that after extensive research, the Living Under Drones project concluded that

the Pakistani military outpost had been informed of the jirga ten days before (Rogers 88). It

is still uncertain whether the CIA knew about the jigra in advance because information is

routinely scrubbed and limited by the CIA.

Proponents against the use of drones argue that drones are sold on the premise that

sacrifice rests on the value of life and the confusion between just and unjust wars (Baggaiarini

131-132). Privatized warfare is a site where economic and military objectives intersect, showing

that this alignment cannot be separated from the dynamic social meaning attributed to war,
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combat and sacrificial violence (Baggiarini137). By reducing the number of troops in the area,

the CIA has become the judge and executioner of those who appear to be insurgents; therefore,

the number of civilians killed has increased dramatically. One of Baggiarinis sources accounts

for a total of 50 civilians killed for every militant. In other words, the number of high-level

targets killed, as a percentage of total casualties, is low: roughly 2% (Baggiarini 137).

Baggiarini continues on that the CIA tries to cover up the number of innocent deaths by labeling

the targeted area with the most dehumanizing and homophobic terms, while labeling technology

in sexual innuendo references. For instance, the term for people attempting to flee attacks are

referred to as squirters, while the code name for casualties is bugsplat. Suspected militants are

termed poor bastards, prairie dogs, barbarians, savages and rats slithering through the

slums and are imagined as mice being snagged by hawks circling above (Baggiarini 138). The

transition to drones attacking targets instead of troops makes fighting just wars easier, but it will

also facilitate the prosecution of unjust wars (Kaag 153). Kaag, a Psychology professor at

Cornell, conveys the dangers of using drones because of the ease at which just and unjust wars

can be confused. To Kaag, unjust wars refers to the relentless killings of innocent people in

which their deaths can be easily avoided. This results in the increased deaths of those who can be

easily avoided by placing more soldiers in the field who have the moral viewpoint of avoiding as

much collateral damage in terms of civilians lives as possible. Under this onslaught, people in

the Middle East began changing their lifestyles to such ways that they no longer bring attention

to themselves when they are outside. For example, people tried not to gather in large groups,

fearful of displaying a potentially lethal signature (Cockburn 226). The U.S. government

maintains a positions that civilian casualties [are] nonexistent or minimal (though of course
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death by drone for a military aged male [thirteen years or older] brought involuntary posthumous

enlistment, according to U.S. methodology, as a militant) (Cockburn 226).

James Rae, author and researcher of how to manage and resolve international conflict,

explains that many philosophers often merge drone warfare and the war on terror in order to

ponder whether the war on terror can justify the increased use of drones (Rae 80). Rae quotes

that a war ceases to be moral when it becomes a turkey shoot because of the ethical

disconnection that occurs from the extensive kill list (Rae 80). The idea that this kill list is more

extensive in regions that are in non-combat areas within countries that the United States is not at

war with, troubles many. Especially when more civilians, rather than terrorists, are killed by

drone strikes in non-threatening areas. Rae continues by stating that further actions in non-

combat zones without international sanction would raise doubts as to whether the U.S. possesses

the moral justification of drone killing. The main issue Rae has with drone attacks is the way

they are conducted and used. For instance Drone strikes are stealth attacks on unsuspecting

individuals that sometimes includes innocent civilians; terrorism operates in much the same way,

though more frequently targets civilians directly (Rae 81). The similarity between drone and

terrorist attacks is unprecedented, although the intentional killing of civilians is considered much

worse than accidently killing civilians; to a certain extent the U.S. could be considered terrorists

as well. The constant usage of acts of terrorism by both sides has created a situation of which

there is no end.

Proponents of using drones to attack specific targets argue that the most prevalent benefit

is the reduction of American soldiers on the ground in harms way. Jefferey A. Sluka, an author

who has written multiple books on the Middle East argues this point. This reduction has led to an

increase in civilian casualties but is justified by the Air Force, which claims that its priority is to
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precisely target insurgents while avoiding civilian casualties (Sluka 181). In efforts to ensure

that each air strike is legal, a military lawyer is always present to ensure civilian casualties are at

a minimum. It is then advocated by stating that drones project power without projecting

vulnerability and to permit surgical strikes against persons identified as the enemy while

minimizing collateral damage and preventing the sacrifice of troops (Calhoun 48). By appealing

to the families of soldiers, who wish the safe return of their family member, Calhoun and Sluka

provide a reasonable argument for drones. Another strategy advocates of drone usage utilizes is

providing examples of how drones prevent the excess killing of people on both sides. Sluka

specifically used a reference of extending the warriors arm with the use of drones. He

illustrates that moving away from the battlefield by killing via remote control is an acceptable

form of warfare (Calhoun 49). The research done by Calhoun and Sluka is backed by citations

and references, making their arguments stronger with improved credibility. Sluka uses the

arguments from the opposers of drone usage to show that the United States has lost the battle for

the hearts and minds of the American public in the war on terror (Sluka 175). This reasoning

shows that the increased civilian casualties has impacted not only those in the Middle East but

around the world. The biggest source of tension comes from civilian casualties, no matter how

hard the U.S. government tries to justify the death of civilians it creates more tension in the

region. As a result, Calhoun is able to illustrate in his book that both pro-drone and anti-drone

perspectives may seem at face value to be based on sound reasoning, which explains why people

hold their respective positions so forcefully. Arguing for the victims of drone strikes reinforces

the notion that civilian casulties by drones is indisputably wrong an act of cold blooded

murder, showing empathy towards the enemy. However, this empathy should be placed on the

American soldier, who are selflessly risking their lives to make the world a safer place. As a
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counter argument, moving the war on terror away from the battlefield implies that killing by

remote control is an acceptable form of warfare (Calhoun 49).

Another argument for drone usage and justifying civilian deaths is from a legal point of

view. World War I and II involved great sovereign powers marching on a foreign sovereign soil.

However, nowadays the enemy often involves individuals with no allegiance to a country, no

formal military training and no official constituency (McNab 1). McNab argues the usage of

drones through the legal aspect of international law. According to the United Nations (U.N.)

Charter Article 51 and customary international law, the use of force in self-defense so long as it

is necessary and proportionate is acceptable (McNab 2). With this reasoning, the U.S. believes

that it has the ability to retaliate for the unprovoked attack on New York City on September 11,

2001 and use force in another country without the consent of that country. Therefore, the use of

drone strikes to kill targets is within the legal parameters set by the U.N.. After September 11th,

the U.N. attempted to set a formal definition of terrorism, as well as adopt an instrument to

condemn and punish acts of terrorism (McNab 3). The formal definition of terrorism is the

unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property, to intimidate or coerce a

government, civilian population or a segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social

objectives. Under this definition, all acts of terrorism were condemned and all countries were

urged to aid in international efforts to combat terrorism, including reminding all countries that

aiding terrorists was a breach of obligations and therefore countries harboring terrorists could be

invaded by other countries to eliminate terrorists. One of the points of drone usage references the

legal parameters and discusses the consequences that come with attacking a group in a foreign

land. Another problem with the McNab source is that does not address drone usage and only

concentrates on the overall legality of terrorism and how countries can respond to ensure the
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security of the world. McNab explains that countries have to respond to acts of terrorism even if

there is no attacks on their country. For instance, China is legally obligated to respond to a

terrorist attack on the United States, even though they were not attacked.

An area in which both sides of the drone usage controversy may be able to agree is

explored in the book Unmanned: Drone Warfare and Global Security by Ann Rogers and John

Hill. Throughout the book, Rogers argues that with the right balance between identifying the

difference between targets and civilians, drone strikes could be used to take out threats against

the U.S.. Both Rogers and Hill appeal to Americans and specifically to the families of

servicemen by stating that usage of drones reduce soldiers deaths. In addition, Rogers and Hill

appeal to the American desire, of avoiding killing more civilians than actual targets. Drones

minimized collateral damage in Afghanistan because they utilized good intelligence for accurate

targeting (Rogers 95). The system that is in place to ensure that the CIA is accountable for each

mission does not work properly because the CIA often scrubs the footage taken from drones to

ensure Congress only sees what the CIA wants them to see. The authors arguments are strong

because they acknowledge that the system currently in place works, but needs further regulations

to ensure the safety of the innocent civilian population, while addressing aspects that reduce the

risk of American deaths.

The proponents and opponents of the morality of drone strikes are able to make strong

arguments using multiple strategies to convey their point. Those that state drone strikes are moral

believe it is beneficial to the American public and specifically those in the military; the

opponents argue that the U.S. has no right to be killing innocent people in an effort to save a

larger population. Both sides of the argument have drawbacks because of their efforts to

persuade U.S. citizens that the government is making the right decisions. However, those in
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favor of the moral use of drones do have the ability to look at the argument from multiple points

of view to understand where peoples decisions come from rather than dismissing the other side.
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Work Cited

Baggiarini, Bianca. "Drone Warfare and the Limits of Sacrifice." Journal of International
Political Theory 11.1 (2015): 128-44. Web.

Calhoun, Laurie. We Kill because we can: From Soldiering to Assassination in the Drone Age.
London: Zed Books, 2015. Web.

Cockburn, Andrew. Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins. Firstition ed. New York,
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2015. Web.

Kaag, John J., Kreps, Sarah E. (Sarah Elizabeth), and Ebooks Corporation. Drone
Warfare., 2014. Web.

McNab, Molly, and Megan Matthews. "Clarifying the Law Relating to Unmanned Drones and
the use of Force: The Relationships between Human Rights, Self-Defense, Armed
Conflict, and International Humanitarian Law." Denver Journal of International Law and
Policy 39.4 (2011): 661. Web

Rae, James DeShaw, John Crist, and Palgrave Connect (Online service). Analyzing the
Drone Debates: Targeted Killings, Remote Warfare, and Military Technology.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Pivot, 2014. Web.

Rogers, Ann, John Hill, and Inc ebrary. Unmanned: Drone Warfare and Global Security.
New York;London;: Pluto Press, 2014. Web.

Whitehead, Neil L., and Sverker Finnstrm. Virtual War and Magical Death: Technologies
and Imaginaries for Terror and Killing. London;Durham;: Duke University Press, 2013.
Web.

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