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CRIMINAL LAW

J. BERSAMIN

REVISED PENAL CODE (BOOK I)

Felonies

Stages of execution

ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 178512, FIRST DIVISION, November 26, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.:

Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender. Without proof of such
intent, the felony may only be serious physical injuries. Intent to kill may be established through the
overt and external acts and conduct of the offender before, during and after the assault, or by the
nature, location and number of the wounds inflicted on the victim.

Criminal Law; Frustrated Homicide; Elements of.The elements of frustrated homicide


are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his
assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present. Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts found
none of the qualifying circumstances in murder under Article 248 to be present, we immediately
proceed to ascertain the presence of the two other elements.

Same; Same; Intent to Kill; The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is
the intent of the offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the
infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege in the
information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a
general criminal intent, which is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill,
being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the
acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v.
People, 480 SCRA 188 (2006), we considered the following factors to determine the presence of
intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number
of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. We have also considered as determinative factors the
motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim.

FACTS:

Alexander Flojo was fetching water below his rented house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old
Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman, the brother of his land lady,
Lucila Bautista, hit him on the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo did to him.
Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying, "Pasensya ka na Mang Alex" and told the latter to just
go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at
around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While pouring
water into a container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his
left face and chest.

Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left portion of
his body and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino
immediately loaded Alexander into his motorcycle (backride) and brought him to the
Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors immediately
rendered medical assistance to Alexander. Alexander stayed in the emergency room of said
hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was brought to the second floor of the said hospital

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where he was confined for two days. Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to the Polymedic
General Hospital where he was subjected for further medical examination.

Alexander sustained two stabbed wounds. One of which was on the zygoma, left side, and
about one (1) cm. long. The other is on his upper left chest which penetrated the fourth
intercostal space at the proximal clavicular line measuring about two (2) cm. The second stabbed
wound penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung of the victim which resulted to blood air in the
thoracic cavity thus necessitating the insertion of a thoracostomy tube to remove the blood.
According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the physician who treated the victim at the Mandaluyong
City Medical Center, the second wound was fatal and could have caused Alexanders death
without timely medical intervention.

On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on
December 25, 1997 at around midnight, he passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a
motorcycle. At that point, he accidentally hit Alexanders back, causing the latter to throw
invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued between them. They even
rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander on the cheek causing blood to ooze from the latters
face.

The RTC convicted the petitioner. On appeal, the CA affirmed the petitioners conviction.
The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide?

RULING:

YES. The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim,
as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying
circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
present. Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts found none of the qualifying circumstances in
murder under Article 248 to be present, we immediately proceed to ascertain the presence of the
two other elements.

The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the fist fight
between him and Alexander. He claims that the heightened emotions during the fistfight
naturally emboldened both of them, but he maintains that he only inflicted minor abrasions on
Alexander, not the stab wounds that he appeared to have sustained. Hence, he should be held
liable only for serious physical injuries because the intent to kill, the necessary element to
characterize the crime as homicide, was not sufficiently established. He avers that such intent to
kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of
homicide; and that the crime is homicide only if the intent to kill is competently shown.

The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the


offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then
prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent,
which is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill, being a state of mind,
is discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the
accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. We considered the following
factors to determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors;
(2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the
malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We have
also considered as determinative factors the motive of the offender and the words he uttered at
the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim.

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Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present.
We concur with them. Contrary to the petitioners submission, the wounds sustained by
Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight
between them. The petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical
records indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper
left chest and the other on the left side of his face. The petitioners attack was unprovoked with
the knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his submission, and firmly proving
the presence of intent to kill. There is also to beno doubt about the wound on Alexanders chest
being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely medical intervention.

With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all the
acts of execution that should produce the felony of homicide as a consequence, but did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical
attention accorded to Alexander, he was properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.

We have no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings of the trial
and appellate courts on the credibility of Alexanders testimony. It is not disputed that the
testimony of a single but credible and trustworthy witness sufficed to support the conviction of
the petitioner. This guideline finds more compelling application when the lone witness is the
victim himself whose direct and positive identification of his assailant is almost always regarded
with indubitable credibility, owing to the natural tendency of the victim to seek justice for
himself, and thus strive to remember the face of his assailant and to recall the manner in which
the latter committed the crime. Moreover, it is significant that the petitioners mere denial of the
deadly manner of his attack was contradicted by the credible physical evidence corroborating
Alexanders statements. Under the circumstances, we can only affirm the petitioners
conviction for frustrated homicide.

Complex crimes and composite crimes

PEOPLE vs. VILLAFLORES


G.R. No. 184926, FIRST DIVISION, April 11, 2012, BERSAMIN, J.

Circumstantial evidence is admissible as proof to establish both the commission of a crime


and the identity of the culprit.

Criminal Law; Composite Crimes; Rape with Homicide; The felony of rape with homicide
is a composite crime. A composite crime, also known as a special complex crime, is composed of
two or more crimes that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the
product of a single criminal impulse.The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A
composite crime, also known as a special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes that
the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal
impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law, and differs from a
compound or complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: Article 48.
Penalty for complex crimes.When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one
circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

Marita, a four-year-old girl, was playing at the rear of their residence in the morning of
July 2, 1999 when Julia, her mother, first noticed her missing from home. Maritas parents
searched for her but did not find her. In her desperation, Julia sought out a clairvoyant, wherein

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the latter hinted that Marita might be found only five houses away from their own. Following the
clairvoyants direction, they found Maritas lifeless body covered with a blue and yellow sack
inside the comfort room of an abandoned house about five structures away from their own house.
Her face was black and blue, and bloody. Post mortem examination also revealed multiple deep
lacerations at the hymen.

Two witnesses, Bautista and Solidum, narrated that at about 10:00am of July 2, 1999, they
saw Villaflores, leading Marita by the hand. At about noon time they were at Villaflores house
where they used shabu for a while. Jovie related that about 3:00pm, he heard cries of a child as he
passed by the house of Villaflores. At about 7:00pm, Jovie saw again Villaflores carrying a yellow
sack towards a vacant house. It was the sack that he saw earlier in the house of Batman.

The RTC and CA found Villaflores guilty of the special complex crime of rape with
homicide based on circumstantial evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the special complex crime of rape
with homicide.

HELD:

Yes. Circumstantial evidence is admissible as proof to establish both the commission of a


crime and the identity of the culprit.

We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the commission of rape when only the
victim is left to testify on the circumstances of its commission. The Rules of Court allows
circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as the identity of the
culprit. Direct evidence proves a fact in issue directly without any reasoning or inferences being
drawn on the part of the factfinder; in contrast, circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact in
issue, such that the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence. To
be clear, then, circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony
would ultimately lead to setting a felon free.

In resolving to convict Villaflores, both the RTC and the CA considered several
circumstances, which when "appreciated together and not piece by piece," according to the CA,
were seen as "strands which create a pattern when interwoven," and formed an unbroken chain
that led to the reasonable conclusion that Villaflores, to the exclusion of all others, was guilty of
rape with homicide.

The duly established circumstances we have considered are the following.

1. Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum saw Villaflores holding Marita by the hand (akay-
akay) at around 10:00 am on July 2, 1999, leading the child through the alley going
towards the direction of his house about 6 houses away from the victims house.
2. Marita went missing after that and remained missing until the discovery of her lifeless
body on the following day.
3. Solidum passed by Villaflores house at about 3:00 pm of July 2, 1999 and heard the
crying and moaning (umuungol) of a child coming from inside.
4. At about 7:00 pm of July 2, 1999 Solidum saw Villaflores coming from his house
carrying a yellow sack that appeared to be heavy and going towards the abandoned
house where the childs lifeless body was later found.
5. Manito, the father of Marita, identified the yellow sack as the same yellow sack that
covered the head of his daughter (nakapalupot sa ulo) at the time he discovered her
body; Manito also mentioned that a blue sack covered her body.
6. A hidden pathway existed between the abandoned house where Maritas body was
found and Villaflores house, because his house had a rear exit that enabled access to

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the abandoned house without having to pass any other houses. This indicated
Villaflores familiarity and access to the abandoned house.
7. Several pieces of evidence recovered from the abandoned house, like the white rope
around the victims neck and the yellow sack, were traced to Villaflores. The white
rope was the same rope tied to the door of his house, and the yellow sack was a wall-
covering for his toilet.
8. The medico-legal findings showed that Marita had died from asphyxiation by
strangulation, which cause of death was consistent with the ligature marks on her
neck and the multiple injuries including abrasions, hematomas, contusions and
punctured wounds.
9. Marita sustained multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, and had fresh blood from
her genitalia. The vaginal and periurethral smears taken from her body tested positive
for spermatozoa
10. The body of Marita was already in the second stage of flaccidity at the time of the
autopsy of her cadaver at 8 pm of July 3, 1999. The medico-legal findings indicated that
such stage of flaccidity confirmed that she had been dead for more than 24 hours, or at
the latest by 9 pm of July 2, 1999.

These circumstances were links in an unbroken chain whose totality has brought to us a
moral certainty of the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide.

As to the rape, Marita was found to have suffered multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations,
injuries that Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, the medico-legal officer who had conducted the autopsy of
her cadaver attributed to the insertion of a blunt object like a human penis. The fact that the
vaginal and periurethral smears taken from Marita tested positive for spermatozoa confirmed that
the blunt object was an adult human penis.

As to the homicide, her death was shown to be caused by strangulation with a rope, and
the time of death as determined by the medico-legal findings was consistent with the recollection
of Solidum of seeing Villaflores going towards the abandoned house at around 7 pm of July 2, 1999
carrying the yellow sack that was later on found to cover Maritas head. Anent the identification
of Villaflores as the culprit, the testimonies of Solidum and Bautista attesting to Villaflores as the
person they had seen holding Marita by the hand going towards the abandoned house before the
victim went missing, the hearing by Solidum of moaning and crying of a child from within
Villaflores house, and the tracing to Villaflores of the yellow sack and the white rope found at the
crime scene sufficiently linked Villaflores to the crime.

Circumstances affecting Criminal Liability

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PO2 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ
G.R. No. 175602 January 18, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.

The sufficiency of the allegations of the facts and circumstances constituting the elements of
the crime charged is crucial in every criminal prosecution because of the ever-present obligation of
the State to duly inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation.

Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit the felony.Conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit the felony. Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be
direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts. Herein, both lower courts
deduced the conspiracy between the accused from the mode and manner in which they
perpetrated the killings. We are satisfied that their deduction was warranted. Based on the
foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal responsibility for the fatal shooting by Edwin of
Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused were convincingly shown to have acted in concert to achieve
a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in concert
was manifest not only from their going together to the betting station on board a single

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motorcycle, but also from their joint attack that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing successive
shots at Moises and immediately followed by Edwins shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after
the other. It was also significant that they fled together on board the same motorcycle as soon as
they had achieved their common purpose. To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in
every detail of the execution; neither did he have to know the exact part performed by his co-
conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts. Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy
between PO2 Valdez and Edwin was properly inferred and proved through their acts that were
indicative of their common purpose and community of interest.

Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Treachery is the employment of means,


methods, or forms in the execution of any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and
specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the
execution of any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its
execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. It encompasses a wide variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the
appreciation of which is particular to a crime committed. Corollarily, the defense against the
appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied and dependent on each
particular instance. Such variety generates the actual need for the State to specifically aver the
factual circumstances or particular acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or
aggravate the liability for the crime in the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to
defend himself.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Pleadings and Practice; The real nature of
the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of
law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.The real nature of the
criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of
law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. In People v. Dimaano,
469 SCRA 647 (2005), the Court elaborated: For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must
state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly vio lated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form
as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to
be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will
be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every
element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable
him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

Same; Evidence; A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his
liability is to prohibit the introduction or consideration against the accused of evidence that tends to
establish that detail.A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his
liability is to prohibit the introduction or consideration against the accused of evidence that tends
to establish that detail. The allegations in the information are controlling in the ultimate analysis.
Thus, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged
included in the offense proved. In that regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the

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information, constitute the latter; an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the
latter.

FACTS:

On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, Estrella Sayson, (Estrella) was at
the canteen (which also includes a jai alai betting station) located at 77 Corregidor Street, Bago
Bantay, Quezon City. Estrella was preparing for the celebration of the birthday of her second
husband, Wilfredo Lladones, which was held later in the evening. Estrellas son, the deceased
Moises Sayson, a former policeman, and his wife, Susan Sayson (Susan) owned the said canteen
and managed the betting station. At about 9:00 oclock in the evening, Estrellas other sons
Joselito Sayson (Joselito) and Ferdinand Sayson (Ferdinand) arrived at the canteen to greet their
stepfather. At about 10:00 oclock in the evening, the celebration was interrupted with the arrival
of Eduardo Valdez(PO2 Valdez) and Edwin Valdez (Edwin), who alighted from a motorcycle in
front of the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin asked the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio
(Jonathan), to come out. Moises approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to reason with them.
He went out and advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force Jonathan to go out of the fronton.
Estrella then heard one of the accused-appellants threaten Moises with the words Gusto mo
unahin na kita? Moises replied huwag. Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises fell and
was continuously fired upon even after he was sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand immediately
approached the scene to help his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot on the left
temporal portion of his head and fell. Somebody told Joselito to run away, but he was hit at the
back while running.

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused in the RTC with
three counts of murder qualified with treachery for the killing of Ferdinand, Moises and Joselito.

ISSUE:

Whether the conviction for murder is proper.

RULING:

It is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three homicides,
instead of three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently alleging the
attendance of treachery.

Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of any of the
crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to
the offending party arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of
the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or
information.

The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused with intent to kill,
qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did xxx assault,
attack and employ personal violence upon the victims by then and there shooting [them] with a
gun, hitting [them] on various parts of their bodies which [were] the direct and immediate cause
of [their] death[s] did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how
treachery attended each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the
killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of
the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the
victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery,
for there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the
term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a

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conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances
constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the
informations.

A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability is to


prohibit the introduction or consideration against the accused of evidence that tends to establish
that detail. The allegations in the information are controlling in the ultimate analysis. Thus, when
there is a variance between the offense charged in the information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged
included in the offense proved.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO


G.R. No. 177743 January 25, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.

An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim must have mounted an unlawful
aggression against the accused. Without such unlawful aggression, the accused cannot invoke self-
defense as a justifying circumstance.

Criminal Law; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; Elements of Self-Defense.In order


for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the following
elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no
unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is
nothing to repel.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Once an accused in a prosecution for murder or
homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to
prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his
criminal liability.By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal
injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for
murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the
burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that
would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the
victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the
satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense
by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength of
his own evidence, because the Prosecutions evidence, even if weak, would not be disbelieved in
view of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings.

Criminal Law; Murder; Penalties; Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes reclusion
perpetua to death as the penalty for murder.The imposition of reclusion perpetua by the CA was
warranted under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes reclusion perpetua to
death as the penalty for murder. Under the rules on the application of indivisible penalties in
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed if there
are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances. Yet, the Court points out that the RTC
erroneously imposed RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH as the penalty. Such imposition was
bereft of legal justification, for reclusion perpetua and death, being indivisible, should not be
imposed as a compound, alternative or successive penalty for a single felony. In short, the
imposition of one precluded the imposition of the other.

Same; Same; Civil Indemnities; Damages that may be Awarded when Death Occurs due to a
Crime.The Court also modifies the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the
death indemnity of P50,000.00. When death occurs due to a crime, the damages to be awarded

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may include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (b) actual or compensatory
damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages.

Same; Same; Damages; Moral Damages; Although mental anguish and emotional sufferings
of the surviving family were not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must
nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of the deceased to their moral
status quo ante.The CA and the RTC should also have granted moral damages in addition to the
death indemnity, which were of different kinds. The death indemnity compensated the loss of life
due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental
anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving family of Olais. Although mental anguish and
emotional sufferings of the surviving family were not quantifiable with mathematical precision,
the Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of the deceased
to their moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, P50,000.00 should be reasonable as
moral damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, we are bound to award despite the
absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs mental anguish and emotional suffering.

Same; Same; Same; Temperate Damages; It is already settled that when actual damages
substantiated by receipts sum up to lower than P25,000.00, temperate damages of at least
P25,000.00 become justified, in lieu of actual damages in the lesser amount actually proved by
receipts.Another omission of the CA and the RTC was their non-recognition of the right of the
heirs of the victim to temperate damages. The victims wife testified about her familys incurring
funeral expenses of P36,000.00, but only P18,000.00 was backed by receipts. It is already settled
that when actual damages substantiated by receipts sum up to lower than P25,000.00, temperate
damages of at least P25,000.00 become justified, in lieu of actual damages in the lesser amount
actually proved by receipts.

Same; Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages
may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances.The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may
be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one
or more aggravating circumstances. The Civil Code permits such damages to be awarded by
way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages. In light of such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have
recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages on account of the
attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant circumstance in
murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder.

FACTS:

At around 9:30 p.m. on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road
in Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head
with a piece of wood called bellang. Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him
again in the head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only
because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to
run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was
pronounced dead on arrival.

At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he
had been standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to
be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the
latter had continued hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a
karate expert, had also kicked him with both his legs; that he had thus been forced to defend
himself by picking up a stone with which he had hit the right side of the victims head, causing
the latter to fall face down to the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon
seeing that Olais was no longer moving.

Both RTC and CA found Fontanilla guilty of murder qualified by treachery.

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ISSUE:

Whether the conviction of Fontanilla for the crime of murder is proper.

RULING:

The conviction is proper. Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be


appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful
aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to
repel.

By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that
caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or
homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to
prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid
his criminal liability.

Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais
did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanillas act of hitting the
victims head with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an
unreasonable response to the victims fistic attack and kicks. Indeed, had Olais really attacked
Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some injury from the aggression. It remains, however,
that no injury of any kind or gravity was found on the person of Fontanilla when he presented
himself to the hospital; hence, the attending physician of the hospital did not issue any medical
certificate to him. Nor was any medication applied to him. In contrast, the physician who
examined the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had been hit on the head more than once. The
plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and
number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent
or repel an attack from Olais. We consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds
manifested the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself.

The CA and the RTC found that treachery was attendant. We concur. Fontanilla had
appeared out of nowhere to strike Olais on the head, first with the wooden stick, and then with a
big stone, causing Olais to fall to the ground facedown. The suddenness and unexpectedness of
the attack effectively denied to Olais the ability to defend himself or to retaliate against
Fontanilla.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RUEL TUY


G.R. No. 179476, 9 February 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

The accused must prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the crime scene to
support his alibi.

Ruel Tuy, Ramon Jr. and Raul Salcedo conspired, attacked, and inflicted mortal
wounds using firearms and a bolo on Orlando Barrameda that caused his instantaneous
death, at about 4:00 p.m. on October 11, 2001 at Brgy. Bani, Tinambac, Camarines Sur. The
Information alleged treachery because of the use of superior strength with arms, and means
and methods to insure its execution, without risk to himself from the defense Barrameda
might make. It was also noted that Barrameda was the barangay captain at the time the
crime was committed. The Salcedos remain at large.

Barramedas son Severino declared that he witnessed the shooting by the Salcedos
and the hacking by Tuy. The autopsy showed that Barrameda sustained five hack wounds and

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two gunshot wounds. On the other hand, Tuy claimed he was processing copra in Brgy.
Olango, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, which was corroborated by his son Ramil.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Tuy of murder, which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals (CA).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Tuy is guilty of murder even though he claimed he was at a different
location when the crime was committed.

RULING:

YES. The CA and the RTC rejected the alibi of Tuy. We agree with their rejection. To
begin with, his absence from the scene of the murder was not firmly established considering
that he admitted that he could navigate the distance between Brgy. Olango (where he was
supposed to be) and Brgy. Bani (where the crime was committed) in an hour by paddle boat
and in less than that time by motorized banca. Also, eyewitness Severino positively
identified him as having hacked his father. The failure of Tuy to prove the physical
impossibility of his presence at the crime scene negated his alibi. Moreover, the medico-
legal evidence indicating that the victim sustained several hack wounds entirely corroborated
Severinos recollection on the hacking.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FILOMENO MAYINGQUE, et al.


GR No. 179707, 6 July 2010, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

When the accused admitted that he was the author of the death of the victim and his
defense was anchored on self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the justifying
circumstance to the satisfaction of the court.

Alibi is an inherently weak and unreliable defense, because it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to disprove.

About 5:00 in the afternoon of 30th day of May, 1999 Salvacion Tusi and her husband,
Edgardo Tusi, the victim herein, were resting in front of their house located at Pedro Sabido St.
BF Resort Village, Las Pinas City, together with a cousin, Ruben Bernal. Toribio, Filomeno and
Gregorio, all surnamed Mayingque, always had a drinking spree in the place of Edwin
Macas every Sunday and were very noisy. Edgardo asked them not to be noisy. Accused
Toribio arrived and without saying anything stabbed the victim two times. Salvacion
shouted for help while her cousin Ruben Bernal was about to help her husband but Roly,
Edwin Macas and Gregorio arrived and helped in the killing of the victim. The four
continuously stabbed the victim with bladed weapons.

The Regional Trial Court found the appellants guilty of murder, and sentenced each
to suffer reclusion perpetua, and to pay to the heirs of the deceased P50,000.00 and to the
wife of the deceased P20,000.00 for the burial expenses. This was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Mayingque, et al. are guilty
of murder.

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RULING:

NO. It is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of
witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as
great respect, if not conclusive effect. In view of the foregoing, the court sustained the
conviction.

Toribios claim of self-defense is without merit. The essential elements of self-defense


are: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. By
invoking self- defense, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements
of self-defense. The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused
admitted that he was the author of the death of the victim and his
defense was anchored on self- defense, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the
justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. Both the trial court and the CA
rejected Toribios plea of self-defense.

Filomenos defense of alibi is without merit. Filomenos alibi would place him in
Golden Gate, Moonwalk, Las Pias City, at the time of the commission of the crime. The
CA rejected such alibi by indicating that the distance between Golden Gate, Moonwalk, Las
Pinas City and Pedro Sabido Street, BF Resort Village, Las Pinas City where the crime was
committed could be negotiated through a 30-minute tricycle ride, which did not render
impossible for Filomeno to be in the place of the crime when it was committed. Alibi is an
inherently weak and unreliable defense, because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove. To establish alibi, the accused must prove: (a) that he was actually in another place
at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (b) that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime when the crime was perpetrated. Physical impossibility refers
to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the
place where the crime was committed, as well as to the facility of access between the two
places.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE N. MEDIADO


G.R. No. 169871, 2 February 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

An accused who asserts self-defense admits his infliction of the fatal blows and bears
the burden of satisfactorily establishing all the elements of self-defense. Otherwise, his
conviction for the felony of murder or homicide will be affirmed.

Jimmy Llorin was having a conversation with Rodolfo Mediado, Joses father, at the
dancing hall at Pulang Daga, Balatan, Camarines Sur at 9:00 a.m. on March 20, 1997, while
Jimmys wife Lilia was at a meeting at the barangay hall 35 meters away. Lilia witnessed
Jose emerge from behind Jimmy, hacked him twice on the head with a bolo, and
continued hacking even when Jimmy had already fallen to the ground. Jose ran but a
kagawad caught up with him and brought him to the police station.

Jose confessed to the crime but alleged that he merely defended himself and his father
Rodolfo, because Jimmy punched Rodolfo and hit him with a stone, and even threw the stone
at Jose as he passed by the barangay hall.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Court of Appeals (CA) rejected Joses defense and
found that treachery attended the crime when Jose attacked Jimmy from behind.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Joses justifying circumstance of self-defense and defense of a relative is

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meritorious.

RULING:

NO. The RTC and the CA correctly rejected Joses claim of self-defense and defense of
a relative because he did not substantiate it with clear and convincing proof.

Indeed, upon invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, Jose assumed the
burden of proving the justification of his act with clear and convincing evidence. This is
because his having admitted the killing required him to rely on the strength of his own
evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence, which, even if it were weak,
could not be disbelieved in view of his admission.

It is also notable that unlawful aggression is the condition sine qua non for the
justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of a relative. There can be no self-defense
unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-
defense. As the CA pointed out, however, Jose did not support his claim that Jimmy had
committed aggression by punching Rodolfo and by throwing stones at him and his father. In
fact, he and his father were not able to identify any weapon used by Jimmy aside from the
stone that he supposedly picked up from the ground. Even that testimony was contrary, for
Jose testified that he had unsheathed his bolo and hacked Jimmy after dodging the stone
thrown at him. Plainly, he did not establish with clear and convincing proof that Jimmy
had assaulted him or his father as to pose to either of them an imminent threat of great
harm before he mounted his own attack on Jimmy.

Moreover, the post-mortem examination disclosed that Jimmy had sustained a total of
seven wounds: two incised wounds and five hack wounds. The nature, number, and gravity of
Jimmys wounds spoke not of defense on the part of Jose but of a criminal intent to kill
Jimmy. They indicated beyond doubt the treacherous manner of the assault, that is, that
Jose thereby ensured that the killing would be without risk and would deny to Jimmy any
opportunity to defend himself.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MELANIO NUGAS


G.R. No. 172606, 23 November 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by


independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.

Glen Remigio, with his wife Nila and their two children, was driving the family car
along Marcos Highway in Antipolo, Rizal, when two men signaled them to hitch a ride. Glen
allowed the two men, one of whom was carrying a maroon plastic bag, at the rear of the
vehicle. But as they neared Masinag Market, the men took out their knives and pointed them
at Glens and Nilas necks, warning them not to make any wrong move lest they be harmed.
Glen continued driving when one of the men suddenly stabbed him and then they both left.

Glen still continued driving on the way to the nearest hospital but he collapsed, lost
control of the vehicle, and ran over two pedestrians who died and broke an arm,
respectively. Concerned citizens rushed Glen to the nearest hospital while Nila stayed behind
to look after their children and check the vehicle. The maroon plastic bag was found still inside
the vehicle. It contained several identification cards and receipts in the name of a certain
Araneta, a fork knuckle, and keys. Not long after, Glen died.

An Information for murder was filed against Jonie Araneta, and later on against
Melanio Nugas, who was previously an unidentified co-conspirator of Araneta. They were

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positively identified by Nila during the trial. Araneta agreed to enter a plea of guilty as an
accomplice to homicide, while trial continued as regards Nugas. Nugas claimed the stabbing
was in self-defense because Glen punched him and leaned forward as if to get something
from the dashboard, which Nugas thought was a gun. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found
Nugas guilty of murder, which the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Nugas was guilty of murder.

RULING:

YES. By pleading self-defense, an accused admits the killing, and thereby assumes
the burden to establish his plea of self-defense by credible, clear and convincing evidence;
otherwise, his conviction will follow from his admission of killing the victim. Self-defense
cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by independent and competent
evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, the accused must discharge the
burden of proof by relying on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the
States evidence, because the existence of self-defense is a separate issue from the existence of
the crime, and establishing self-defense does not require or involve the negation of any of the
elements of the offense itself.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with
physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is
impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude,
nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to
attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim,
such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by
an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.

Consequently, Nugas had absolutely no basis for pleading self-defense because he


had not been subjected to either actual or imminent threat to his life. He had nothing to
prevent or to repel considering that Glen committed no unlawful aggression towards him.

With unlawful aggression, the indispensable foundation of self-defense, not having


been established by Nugas, it is superfluous to still determine whether the remaining
requisites of self- defense were attendant.

JOSE REYES y VACIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


GR Nos. 177105-06, 4 August 2010, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

A quasi-judicial officer rendering a decision contradicting to a judgment in court is


liable for violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith,
or gross inexcusable negligence.

The mitigating circumstance of old age under Article 13 (2) of the Revised Penal Code is
applied only when the offender was over 70 years at the time of the commission of the offense.

Belen Lopez Vda. de Guia was the registered absolute owner of two parcels of
agricultural land located in Santa Barbara, Baliwag, Bulacan. Her son, Carlos de Guia forged
a deed of sale over the land in his favor. Subsequently, he sold it to Ricardo San Juan, and
the latter mortgaged it to Simeon Yangco. Upon learning of such, Belen filed an adverse

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claim in the Register of Deeds and filed a civil action for cancellation of sale, reconveyance
and damages. The Court of First Instance upheld the validity of the sale of the land between
Belen and Carlos, and between Carlos and Ricardo. Upon appeal to the Immediate
Appellate Court, it was dismissed due to non-payment of docket fees.

Meanwhile, Ricardo executed a deed of reconveyance on favor of the lands tenants.


The land was subdivided into several lots, and individual TCTs were issued in the names of
the tenants. Belen filed a motion to reinstate her appeal. The IAC promulgated its decision
granting Belen her appeal and declaring null and void the sales in dispute. When Belen
sought the execution of the judgment, she found out the reconveyance made by Ricardo.
Ricardo and the tenants were ordered to reconvey the land to Belen.

Belen also filed in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
a complaint for ejectment and collection of rents against the tenants. Jose Reyes, as
Provincial Adjudicator, rendered a decision dismissing Belens complaint for ejectment and
collection of rents and affirming the respective TCTs of the tenants.

The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations in the Sandiganbayan, one
charging the petitioner with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, and the other with
usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding Reyes guilty of both charges.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Reyes is guilty of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019
2. Whether or not Reyes is guilty under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code

RULING:

1. YES. The essential elements of the offense under Section 3 (e) are the following:
a. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or
official functions;
b. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
c. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the
discharge of his functions.

The petitioner was fully aware of the finality of the decision of the case between
Belen and Ricardo prior to his promulgation of the decision in the DARAB case. Yet, the
petitioner still rendered his decision in DARAB Case that completely contradicted and
disregarded the prior decision issued by the IAC, by invalidating Belens title on the land
and upholding the TCTs of the tenants. He thereby exhibited manifest partiality, for such
decision of his was a total and willful disregard of the IACs final decision. Likewise, the
petitioners ruling in DARAB Case gave unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference to the
tenants by allowing them to remain in possession of the land and to enjoy the fruits.

2. NO. In usurpation of judicial function, the accused, who is not a judge, attempts to
perform an act the authority for which the law has vested only in a judge. However, Reyes
task as Provincial Adjudicator when he rendered judgment in DARAB Case was to adjudicate
the claims of the opposing parties. As such, he performed a quasi-judicial function, closely
akin to the function of a judge of a court of law. He could not be held liable under Article
241 of the Revised Penal Code, considering that the acts constitutive of usurpation of judicial
function were lacking herein.
Also, the Sandiganbayan erred in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of old age
in favor of Reyes by virtue of his being already over 70 years old. The mitigating

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circumstance of old age under Article 13 (2) of the Revised Penal Code applied only when the
offender was over 70 years at the time of the commission of the offense. Reyes, being only
63 years old when he committed the offenses charged, was not entitled to such mitigating
circumstance.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RENATO DADULLA Y CAPANAS


G.R. No. 172321, 9 February 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court has expressly required that qualifying and
aggravating circumstances be specifically alleged in the information.

Renato Dadulla (Dadulla) was charged with rape and attempted rape. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) convicted him as charged, but the Court of Appeals (CA) modified the
decision. The CA lowered the penalty in the rape case from death to reclusion perpetua
because of the Prosecutions failure to allege in the Information the qualifying circumstance
of Dadullas relationship to his daughter AAA, thus, making him liable for simple rape only.
Further, the CA held that Dadulla was
guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape, because his act of opening the
zipper and buttons of AAAs shorts, touching her, and pulling her from under the bed
constituted only acts of lasciviousness.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the CA properly modified the penalty in the rape case from death to
reclusion perpetua.

2. Whether or not the CA correctly convicted Dadulla of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted
rape.

RULING:

1. YES. The failure to allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship in the


information in Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK precluded a finding of qualified rape against
the accused. Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court has expressly required that qualifying
and aggravating circumstances be specifically alleged in the information. Due to such
requirement being pro reo, the Court has authorized its retroactive application in favor of
even those charged with felonies committed prior to December 1, 2000 (i.e., the date of the
effectivity of the 2000 revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure that embodied the
requirement).

The term aggravating circumstance is strictly construed when the appreciation of the
modifying circumstance can lead to the imposition of the maximum penalty
of death. Consequently, the qualifying circumstance of relationship, even if established
during trial, could not affect the criminal penalty of the accused by virtue of its non-
allegation in the information. The accused could not be convicted of the graver offense of
qualified rape, although proven, because relationship was neither alleged nor necessarily
included in the information. Accordingly, the accused was properly convicted by the CA for
simple rape and justly punished with reclusion perpetua.

2. YES. According to People v. Collado, the difference between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness lies in the intent of the perpetrator as deduced from his external acts. The
intent referred to is the intent to lie with a woman. Attempted rape is committed when
the touching of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate; otherwise,
there can only be acts of lasciviousness. Thus, the Dadullas act of opening the zipper and
buttons of AAAs shorts, touching her, and trying to pull her from under the bed

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manifested lewd designs, not intent to lie with her. The evidence to prove that a definite
intent to lie with AAA motivated Dadulla was plainly wanting, therefore, rendering him
guilty only of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR., et al.


G.R. No. 158362, 4 April 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

The essence of treachery lies in the suddenness of the attack that leaves the victim
unable to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the offense. Consequently,
treachery may still be appreciated even if the victim was facing the assailant.
Haide Cagatan (Haide) was busy preparing dinner in his family's kitchen. While her
sister- in-law, Remedios Cagatan (Remedios), was attending to her child, she saw Gilberto
Villarico, Sr., Gilberto Villarico, Jr., Jerry Ramentos, and Ricky Villarico (Villarico, et al.)
standing at the rear of the kitchen aiming their firearms at the door. Ricky Villarico noticed
Remedios, and pointed his gun at her, causing her to drop to the ground and shout.
Afterwards, she heard three gunshots.

Francisco Cagatan (Francisco) also heard the gunshots, which caused him to hide.
From his hiding place, he was able to recognize Villarico, et al. standing by the kitchen door,
aiming their guns upwards. Lolita Cagatan also heard the gunshots and, after the chaos, she
recalled Haide coming towards her saying that he was shot by "Berting". Haide succumbed to
his gunshot wounds shortly after being brought to the clinic.

For their part, Villarico, et al. denied that they killed Haide, and offered their
respective alibis. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Villarico, et al. guilty of homicide
aggravated by dwelling. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) modified the RTC's decision,
finding them guilty of murder, upon finding that the killing was attended by treachery.
Villarico, et al. assert that (1) the witnesses failed to positively identify them as the persons
who had actually shot at Haide; and (2) treachery did not attend the alleged killing, because
there was no proof showing that they had consciously and deliberately adopted the mode of
attacking the victim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Haide, so as to qualify the crime to murder.

RULING:

YES. The essence of treachery lies in the suddenness of the attack that leaves the victim
unable to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the offense. It is the
suddenness of the attack, coupled with the inability of the victim to defend himself or to
retaliate that brings about treachery. Consequently, treachery may still be appreciated even if
the victim was facing the assailant.

In this case, treachery was present as when Villarico, et al. gunned down Haide, the
latter was preoccupied win the kitchen with getting dinner ready for his household, unaware of
the imminent assault from outside of his kitchen. Further, the testimonies of Remedios and
Francisco revealed that Villarico, et al. strategically positioned themselves such that it would
ensure the accomplishment of their design to kill Haide without any possibility of escape or
retaliation from him.

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RICARDO MEDINA, JR. y ORIEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,


respondent.
G.R. No. 161308, January 15, 2014, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.

Credibility of witnesses is determined by the conformity of their testimonies to human


knowledge, observation and experience.

Remedial Law; Evidence; The non-identification and non-presentation of the weapon


actually used in the killing did not diminish the merit of the conviction primarily because other
competent evidence and the testimonies of witnesses had directly and positively identified and
incriminated Ricardo as the assailant of Lino. Hence, the establishment beyond reasonable
doubt of Ricardos guilt for the homicide did not require the production of the weapon used in
the killing as evidence in court, for in arriving at its findings on the culpability of Ricardo the
RTC, like other trial courts, clearly looked at, considered and appreciated the entirety of the
record and the evidence. For sure, the weapon actually used was not indispensable considering
that the finding of guilt was based on other evidence proving his commission of the crime.

Criminal Law; Justifying Circumstances; Defense of Relatives; In order that defense of a


relative is to be appreciated in favor of Ricardo, the following requisites must concur, namely: (1)
unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the aggression; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the
person making the defense took no part in the provocation.Like in self-defense, it is the accused
who carries the burden to prove convincingly the attendance and concurrence of these requisites
because his invocation of this defense amounts to an admission of having inflicted the
fatal injury on the victim.

FACTS:

This case concerns the fatal stabbing of Lino Mulinyawe (Lino). The stabbing was
preceded by a fight during a basketball game between Ross Mulinyawe, Linos son, and Ronald
Medina, the younger brother of Ricardo and Randolf. Ross was brought to the hospital for
treatment. Once Lino learned that his son had sustained a head injury inflicted by one of the
Medinas, he forthwith went towards the house of the Medinas accompanied by his drinking
buddies. Along the way, Lino encountered Randolf whom he confronted about the fight. The two
of them had a heated argument. Lino, already holding the knife in his right hand, swung the
knife at Randolf who was not hit. Randolf retreated towards the store and took two empty bottles
of beer, broke the bottles and attacked Lino with them. Arriving at the scene, Ricardo saw what
was happening, and confronted Lino. A commotion ensued between them. Ricardo entered their
house to get a kitchen knife and came out. Lino made a thrust at Ricardo but failed to hit the
latter, who then stabbed Lino on the left side of his chest, near the region of the heart. Lino fell
face down on the ground. After that, Ricardo walked away, while Randolf threw the broken
bottles at the fallen Lino.

The Office of the City Prosecutor charged Randolf with homicide. The information was
amended with leave of court to include Ricardo as a co-conspirator. The Defense claimed that it
was Lino who had attacked Ricardo with a knife, and that Lino had accidentally stabbed himself
by falling frontward and into his own knife.

RTC acquitted Randolf but convicted Ricardo of homicide. It found no evidence of


conspiracy between Randolf and Ricardo because their actions appeared to be independent and
separate from each other and did not show that they had mounted a joint attack against Lino. CA
affirmed the judgment of RTC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the lower court gravely erred in its factual finding that the petitioner stabbed
Lino in spite of the fact the prosecution withheld the presentation of the actual knives
during the hearing of the case.

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2. Whether the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative is present in this case.

RULING:

1. The lower court is correct in finding Ricardo guilty of homicide despite non-
presentation of the actual knives used Ricardo and Lino.

Ricardo contends that the State did not present as evidence in court the two knives
wielded by him and Lino despite repeated demands for their presentation; that had the knives
been presented, his assertion that Lino had stabbed himself when he stumbled and lost his
balance while swinging his knife at Randolf would have been thereby validated; and that in his
testimony, Dr. Emmanuel Aranas of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Southern Police District,
did not rule out the possibility that the wounds sustained by Lino were self-inflicted.

The non-identification and non-presentation of the weapon actually used in the killing did
not diminish the merit of the conviction primarily because other competent evidence and the
testimonies of witnesses had directly and positively identified and incriminated Ricardo as the
assailant of Lino. Hence, the establishment beyond reasonable doubt of Ricardos guilt for the
homicide did not require the production of the weapon used in the killing as evidence in court,
for in arriving at its findings on the culpability of Ricardo the RTC, like other trial courts, clearly
looked at, considered and appreciated the entirety of the record and the evidence. For sure, the
weapon actually used was not indispensable considering that the finding of guilt was based on
other evidence proving his commission of the crime. In addition, the witnesses incriminating
Ricardo were not only credible but were not shown to have harbored any ill-motive towards him.
They were surely entitled to full faith and credit for those reasons, and both the RTC and the CA
did well in according such credence to them. Their positive identification of him as the assailant
prevailed over his mere denial, because such denial, being negative and self-serving evidence, was
undeserving of weight by virtue of its lack of substantiation by clear and convincing proof. Hence,
his denial had no greater evidentiary value than the affirmative testimonies of the credible
witnesses presented against him.

2. CA is correct for not appreciating the justifying circumstance of defense of a


relative.

In order that defense of a relative is to be appreciated in favor of Ricardo, the following


requisites must concur, namely: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) in case the provocation was given
by the person attacked, that the person making the defense took no part in the provocation.

In invoking defense of a relative, Ricardo states that his immediate impulse upon seeing
Randolf being attacked by Lino with a knife was to get his own weapon and to aid in the defense
of Randolf. But that theory was inconsistent with his declaration at the trial that Linos fatal wound
had been self-inflicted, as it presupposes direct responsibility for inflicting the mortal wound. Thus,
his defense was unworthy of belief due to its incongruity with human experience.

PEOPLE vs. BAUTISTA


G.R. No. 177320, FIRST DIVISION, February 22, 2012, BERSAMIN, J.

Criminal Law; Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165); Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs; Elements of Illegal Sale of Shabu.To secure a conviction for illegal sale of
shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (a) the identities of the buyer and the
seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment for the thing. What is material in prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti as evidence. The requisites for illegal sale of shabu were competently and convincingly
proven by the Prosecution. PO2 Tayag, as the poseur-buyer, attested that Bautista sold shabu to
him during a legitimate buy-bust operation. According to Forensic Chemist Arturo, the substance

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subject of the transaction, which weighed 0.05 gram, was examined and found to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. PO2 Caragdag declared that he
recovered the buy-bust money from Bautistas hand right after the sale. Further, the Prosecution
later presented as evidence both the sachet of shabu subject of the sale and the buy-bust money
used in the buy-bust operation. Thereby, the Prosecution directly incriminated Bautista.

Same; Same; Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of Illegal Possession of


Dangerous Drugs.For illegal possession of a dangerous drug, like shabu, the elements are: (a)
the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous
drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug. The elements of illegal possession of a dangerous drug were similarly
competently and convincingly established by the Prosecution. SPO1 Ybaez stated that upon
seeing the pre-arranged signal given by PO2 Tayag, he and the other members of the team
proceeded to arrest Bautista; and that he frisked Bautista and then recovered six other plastic
sachets from Bautistas pocket. Undoubtedly, the frisking was legally authorized as a search
incidental to the lawful arrest of Bautista for evidence in the commission of illegal drug pushing.
Forensic Chemist Arturo certified that each of the sachets contained different shabu of different
weights.

Same; Same; Same; Corpus Delicti; Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance
of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has been actually committed;
The dangerous drug is itself the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law prohibiting the
possession of the dangerous drug.In drug-related prosecutions, the State bears the burden not
only of proving the elements of the offenses of sale and possession of shabu under Republic Act
No. 9165, but also of proving the corpus delicti, the body of the crime. Corpus delicti has been
defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a
crime has been actually committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual
commission by someone of the particular crime charged. The corpus delicti is a compound fact
made up of two (2) things, viz: the existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of the
criminal charge, and the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or result. The
dangerous drug is itself the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law prohibiting the
possession of the dangerous drug. Consequently, the State does not comply with the
indispensable requirement of proving corpus delicti when the drug is missing, and when
substantial gaps occur in the chain of custody of the seized drugs as to raise doubts on the
authenticity of the evidence presented in court.

FACTS:

An informant went to the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Caloocan Police Station
to report the peddling of illegal drugs by Bautista. Forthwith, Police Insp. Cesar Cruz formed a
team to conduct a buy-bust operation against Bautista. PO2 Tayag, designated as the poseur-
buyer, was given a P100.00 bill as buy-bust money, on which he placed his initials ALT. The rest of
the buy-bust team would serve as back up for PO2 Tayag.

Upon arriving at the target area, the informant pointed out Bautista to the team. Bautista
was then standing in front of a house. PO2 Tayag and the informant then approached Bautista
even as the rest of the team took up positions nearby. The informant introduced PO2 Tayag to
Bautista as biyahero ng shabu, after which the informant left PO2 Tayag and Bautista alone to
themselves.

PO2 Tayag told Bautista: Cesar, pakuha ng piso. Bautista drew a plastic sachet from his
pocket and handed it to PO2 Tayag, who in turn handed the P100.00 bill buy-bust money to
Bautista. PO2 Tayag then turned his cap backwards as the pre-arranged signal to the back-up
members. The latter rushed forward and arrested Bautista. Upon informing Bautista of his
constitutional rights, SPO1 Ybaez frisked him and found in his pocket six other plastic sachets,
while PO2 Caragdag seized the buy-bust money from Bautistas hand. The team brought Bautista
and the seized plastic sachets back to the police station.

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In the police station, the team recorded the buy-bust bill in the police blotter and turned
over the plastic sachets to PO2 Hector Castillo, the investigator on duty.PO2 Castillo marked the
sachet handed by Bautista to PO2 Tayag as CBS (Bautistas initials).

Insp. Cruz, Forensic Chemist Albert S. Arturo conducted a laboratory examination on the
contents of the marked sachets, and stated in his Physical Science Report that the marked sachets
contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous substance.

Bautista however denied the charge. He claimed that on April 25, 2003, at around 6:00
p.m., he and his wife, Rosario, were in their house cutting cloth to be made into door mats when
PO2 Tayag and two others barged and they forced him to go with them, with PO2 Tayag hitting
him on the nape. He was brought to and detained at the Caloocan City Jail.

ISSUE:

Whether illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu were established beyond reasonable
doubt.

HELD:

Yes. Bautistas denial and defense of frame-up were given no consideration due to their
being self-serving and uncorroborated. We declare such treatment warranted. He did not present
Rosario, his wife, to corroborate his claim of being framed up although she was supposed to have
been around at the time of his arrest. He did not also adduce evidence to substantiate his story of
being falsely incriminated in a frame-up by competent evidence. His claim thereon did not prevail
over the positive identification of him by PO2 Tayag as the drug pusher he had transacted with.

The requisites for illegal sale of shabu were competently and convincingly proven by the
Prosecution. PO2 Tayag, as the poseur-buyer, attested that Bautista sold shabu to him during a
legitimate buy-bust operation. According to Forensic Chemist Arturo, the substance subject of the
transaction, which weighed 0.05 gram, was examined and found to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. PO2 Caragdag declared that he recovered the buy-bust
money from Bautistas hand right after the sale. Further, the Prosecution later presented as
evidence both the sachet of shabu subject of the sale and the buy-bust money used in the buy-
bust operation. Thereby, the Prosecution directly incriminated Bautista.

For illegal possession of a dangerous drug, like shabu, the elements are: (a) the accused is
in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
drug.

The elements of illegal possession of a dangerous drug were similarly competently and
convincingly established by the Prosecution. SPO1 Ybaez stated that upon seeing the pre-arranged
signal given by PO2 Tayag, he and the other members of the team proceeded to arrest Bautista;
and that he frisked Bautista and then recovered six other plastic sachets from Bautistas pocket.
Undoubtedly, the frisking was legally authorized as a search incidental to the lawful arrest of
Bautista for evidence in the commission of illegal drug pushing. Forensic Chemist Arturo certified
that each of the sachets contained different shabu of different weights.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MELANIO DEL CASTILLO y


VARGAS, HERMOGENES DEL CASTILLO y VARGAS, ARNOLD AVENGOZA y DOGOS,
FELIX AVENGOZA y DOGOS, RICO DEL CASTILLO y RAMOS, and JOVEN DEL CASTILLO y
ABESOLA, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 169084 January 18, 2012, FIRST DIVISION

Criminal Law; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; Defense of Stranger; Elements of.In


order for self-defense to be appreciated, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence

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the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself. On the other hand, the requisites of defense of strangers are,
namely: (a) unlawful aggression by the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or
repel it; and (c) the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil
motive. In self-defense and defense of strangers, unlawful aggression is a primordial element, a
condition sine qua non. If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-
defense and defense of strangers are unavailing, because there would be nothing to repel.

Same; Same; Same; When the accuseds defense is self-defense he thereby admits being the
author of the death of the victim, that it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the justifying
circumstance to the satisfaction of the court.By invoking self-defense and defense of strangers,
Arnold and Joven in effect admitted their parts in killing the victims. The rule consistently
adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accuseds defense is self-defense he thereby admits
being the author of the death of the victim, that it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the
justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. The rationale for the shifting of the burden
of evidence is that the accused, by his admission, is to be held criminally liable unless he
satisfactorily establishes the fact of self-defense. But the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is not thereby lifted from the shoulders of the State, which carries it until the end of the
proceedings. In other words, only the onus probandi shifts to the accused, for self-defense is an
affirmative allegation that must be established with certainty by sufficient and satisfactory proof.
He must now discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, not on the
weakness of that of the Prosecution, considering that the Prosecutions evidence, even if weak,
cannot be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing.

Same; Conspiracy; Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy may be deduced from
the mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of
action and a community of interest.Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is either
express or implied. Thus, the State does not always have to prove the actual agreement to commit
the crime in order to establish conspiracy, for it is enough to show that the accused acted in
concert to achieve a common purpose. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner of
the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action and a
community of interest. Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate
the existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose,
conspiracy is evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals. Once a conspiracy is
established, each co-conspirator is as criminally liable as the others, for the act of one is the act of
all. A co-conspirator does not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither does he
have to know the exact part performed by the co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal act.

Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Abuse of Superior Strength; Abuse of superior strength is


present if the accused purposely uses excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked, or if there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and
aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of superior strength.Abuse of superior strength is an
aggravating circumstance that qualifies the killing of a person to murder. It is present if the
accused purposely uses excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked, or if there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and aggressor, and
the latter takes advantage of superior strength. Superiority in strength may refer to the number of
aggressors and weapons used.

Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Voluntary Surrender; Requisites for Voluntary Surrender


to be Appreciated as a Mitigating Circumstance.In order that voluntary surrender is appreciated
as a mitigating circumstance, the following requisites must concur: (a) the accused has not been
actually arrested; (b) the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latters agent;
and (c) surrender is voluntary. The third requisite requires the surrender to be spontaneous,

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indicating the intent of the accused to unconditionally submit himself to the authorities, either
because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessary
for his search and capture.

Same; Murder; Penalties; Murder is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, being indivisible, the attendance of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances would not affect the penalties.Any determination of whether or not Hermogenes
was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was vain in light of the penalty
for murder being reclusion perpetua to death under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Due to both such penalties being indivisible, the attendance
of mitigating or aggravating circumstances would not affect the penalties except to aid the trial
court in pegging the penalty to reclusion perpetua if the only modifying circumstance was
mitigating, or the mitigating circumstances outnumbered the aggravating circumstances; or to
prescribe the death penalty (prior to its prohibition under Republic Act No. 9346) should there be
at least one aggravating circumstance and there was no mitigating circumstance, or the
aggravating circumstances outnumbered the mitigating circumstances.

Same; Civil Indemnity; The awards of civil indemnity and moral damages are also proper,
but their corresponding amounts should be increased to P75,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.The awards of civil indemnity and moral damages are also proper, but their
corresponding amounts should be increased to P75,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
The actual damages of P15,000.00 and P8,000.00 granted to the heirs of Sabino and Graciano,
respectively, were also warranted due to their being proven by receipts. However, the Court has
held that when actual damages proven by receipts amount to less than P25,000.00, as in the case
of Sabino and Graciano, the award of temperate damages amounting to P25,000.00 is justified in
lieu of actual damages for a lesser amount. This is based on the sound reasoning that it would be
anomalous and unfair that the heirs of the victim who tried and succeeded in proving actual
damages of less than P25,000.00 only would be put in a worse situation than others who might
have presented no receipts at all but would be entitled to P25,000.00 temperate damages. Hence,
instead of only P15,000.00 and P8,000.00, the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages should
be awarded each to the heirs of Sabino and Graciano.

Same; Temperate Damages; Article 2224 of the Civil Code provides that temperate damages
may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with
certainty.The heirs of Victor did not present receipts proving the expenses they incurred by
virtue of Victors death. Nonetheless, it was naturally expected that the heirs had spent for the
wake and burial of Victor. Article 2224 of the Civil Code provides that temperate damages may be
recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with
certainty. Hence, in lieu of nominal damages of P10,000.00 awarded by the CA, temperate
damages of P25,000.00 are awarded to the heirs of Victor.

Same; Exemplary Damages; Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be
granted when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstance.Exemplary
damages of P30,000.00 should be further awarded to the heirs of the victims because of the
attendant circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code,
exemplary damages may be granted when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstance. It was immaterial that such aggravating circumstance was necessary to qualify the
killing of each victim as murder.

FACTS:

All accused were charged in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) with three counts of murder.
Perfinian, the eyewitness, testified on the following incidents: On March 20, 2000, at about 9:00
pm, he had just left the house of one Lemuel located in Sitio Bulihan, Barangay Balete, Batangas
City (Bulihan) to walk to his own home located also in Bulihan when he heard someone pleading:
Huwag po, huwag po! He followed the direction of the voice, and saw the assault by all the
accused against Sabino D. Guinhawa (Sabino), Graciano A. Delgado (Graciano), and Victor B.

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Noriega (Victor). He recognized each of the accused because he saw them from only six meters
away and the moon was very bright.

Perfinian recalled that the accused surrounded their victims during the assault; that
Arnold stabbed Graciano on the stomach with a bolo, causing Graciano to fall to the ground; that
Rico hacked Graciano with a bolo; that when Victor tried to escape by running away, Hermogenes
and Felix pursued and caught up with him; that Felix hacked Victor; and that when Sabino ran
away, Melanio and Joven pursued him.

Arnold and Joven admitted the killing but interpose the justifying circumstances of self-
defense and defense of a stranger.

RTC convicted the accused of murder, but appreciated voluntary surrender as a mitigating
circumstance in favor of Hermogenes, one of the accused. CA affirmed the convictions.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of a stranger can be


appreciated in favor of the accused.
2. Whether there is conspiracy among the accused.
3. Whether abuse of superior strength can be appreciated in this case.
4. Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in
favor of Hermogenes.

RULING:

1. Arnold and Joven did not act in self-defense or in defense of strangers.

In self-defense and defense of strangers, unlawful aggression is a primordial element, a


condition sine qua non. If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-
defense and defense of strangers are unavailing, because there would be nothing to repel.

By invoking self-defense and defense of strangers, Arnold and Joven in effect admitted
their parts in killing the victims. It becomes incumbent upon them to prove the justifying
circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. However, Arnold and Joven did not adequately
prove unlawful aggression. We note that in addition to the eyewitness account of Perfinian
directly incriminating them, their own actuations immediately after the incident confirmed their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As the CA cogently noted, their flight from the neighborhood
where the crimes were committed, their concealing of the weapons used in the commission of the
crimes, their non-reporting of the crimes to the police, and their failure to surrender themselves
to the police authorities fully warranted the RTCs rejection of their claim of self-defense and
defense of stranger.

Similarly, the victims supposed motion to draw something from their waists did not put
Arnold and Jovens lives in any actual or imminent danger. What the records show is that Arnold
and Joven did not actually see if the victims had any weapons to draw from their waists. That no
weapons belonging to the victims were recovered from the crime scene confirmed their being
unarmed. Lastly, had they been only defending themselves, Arnold and Joven did not tell the trial
court why they had repeatedly hacked their victims with their bolos; or why they did not
themselves even sustain any physical injury.

2. The State duly established conspiracy.

The accused, armed with bolos, surrounded and attacked the victims, and pursued
whoever of the latter attempted to escape from their assault. Thereafter, the accused, except
Hermogenes, fled their homes and together hastily proceeded to Antipolo, Rizal. Their individual
and collective acts prior to, during and following the attack on the victims reflected a common
objective of killing the latter. Thereby, all the accused, without exception, were co-conspirators.

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Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is either express or implied. Thus, the
State does not always have to prove the actual agreement to commit the crime in order to
establish conspiracy, for it is enough to show that the accused acted in concert to achieve a
common purpose. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of
the offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime
indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest. Once a
conspiracy is established, each co-conspirator is as criminally liable as the others, for the act of
one is the act of all.

In view of the foregoing, the Court rejects the pleas for exculpation of the other accused
grounded on their respective alibis considering that Arnold and Jovens admission of sole
responsibility for the killings did not eliminate their liability as co-conspirators.

3. Abuse of superior strength can be appreciated in this case.

Abuse of superior strength is an aggravating circumstance that qualifies the killing of a


person to murder. It is present if the accused purposely uses excessive force out of proportion to
the means of defense available to the person attacked, or if there is notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of superior strength. Superiority
in strength may refer to the number of aggressors and weapons used.

A gross disparity of forces existed between the accused and the victims. Not only did the
six accused outnumber the three victims but the former were armed with bolos while the latter
were unarmed. The accused clearly used their superiority in number and arms to ensure the
killing of the victims. Abuse of superior strength is attendant if the accused took advantage of
their superiority in number and their being armed with bolos. Accordingly, the crimes committed
were three counts of murder.

4. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should not be appreciated in


favor of Hermogenes.

In order that voluntary surrender is appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the


following requisites must concur: (a) the accused has not been actually arrested; (b) the accused
surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latters agent; and (c) surrender is voluntary.
The third requisite requires the surrender to be spontaneous, indicating the intent of the accused
to unconditionally submit himself to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or
he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessary for his search and capture.

Although Hermogenes went to Barangay Chairman Aloria of Bulihan after the killings, he
did so to seek protection against the retaliation of the victims relatives, not to admit his
participation in the killing of the victims. Even then, Hermogenes denied any involvement in the
killings when the police went to take him from Chairman Alorias house. As such, Hermogenes
did not unconditionally submit himself to the authorities in order to acknowledge his
participation in the killings or in order to save the authorities the trouble and expense for his
arrest.

Nonetheless, any determination of whether or not Hermogenes was entitled to the


mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was vain in light of the penalty for murder being
reclusion perpetua to death under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659. Due to both such penalties being indivisible, the attendance of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances would not affect the penalties except to aid the trial court in pegging
the penalty to reclusion perpetua if the only modifying circumstance was mitigating, or the
mitigating circumstances outnumbered the aggravating circumstances; or to prescribe the death
penalty (prior to its prohibition under Republic Act No. 9346) should there be at least one
aggravating circumstance and there was no mitigating circumstance, or the aggravating
circumstances outnumbered the mitigating circumstances.

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Penalties

EMERITU C. BARUT, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.


G.R. No. 167454 September 24, 2014, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.

Criminal Law; Damages; Moral Damages; Death Indemnity; Moral damages and death
indemnity require neither pleading nor evidence simply because death through crime always
occasions moral sufferings on the part of the victims heirs.Anent the civil liability, the RTC
granted P250,000.00 without specifying the amounts corresponding to actual and moral damages,
as well as to the civil indemnity for the death of Vincent. The CA affirmed the grant. Both lower
courts thereby erred on a matter of law. Actual and moral damages are different in nature and
purpose. To start with, different laws govern their grant, with the amounts allowed as actual
damages being dependent on proof of the loss to a degree of certainty, while the amounts allowed
as moral damages being discretionary on the part of the court. Secondly, actual damages address
the actual losses caused by the crime to the heirs of the victim; moral damages assuage the
spiritual and emotional sufferings of the heirs of the victim of the crime. On the civil indemnity
for death, law and jurisprudence have fixed the value to compensate for the loss of human life.
Thirdly, actual damages may not be granted without evidence of actual loss; moral damages and
death indemnity are always granted in homicide, it being assumed by the law that the loss of
human life absolutely brings moral and spiritual losses as well as a definite loss. Moral damages
and death indemnity require neither pleading nor evidence simply because death through crime
always occasions moral sufferings on the part of the victims heirs.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The death indemnity and moral damages are fixed at P75,000.00
each in view of homicide being a gross offense.The death indemnity and moral damages are fixed
at P75,000.00 each in view of homicide being a gross offense. Considering that the decisions of
the lower courts contained no treatment of the actual damages, the Court is now not in any
position to dwell on this. Nonetheless, the Court holds that despite the lack of such treatment,
temperate damages of P25,000.00 should be allowed.

Same; Same; Temperate Damages; Article 2224 of the Civil Code declares that temperate
damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be
proved with certainty.Article 2224 of the Civil Code declares that temperate damages may be
recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with
certainty. There is no longer any doubt that when actual damages for burial and related expenses
are not substantiated with receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are warranted, for it
is certainly unfair to deny to the surviving heirs of the victim the compensation for such expenses
as actual damages. This is based on the sound reasoning that it would be anomalous that the heirs
of the victim who tried and succeeded in proving actual damages of less than P25,000.00 would
only be put in a worse situation than others who might have presented no receipts at all but
would still be entitled to P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

FACTS:

SPO4 Vicente Ucag was coming from a picnic in Laguna and returning home onboard a
passenger jeepney driven by his brother on the South Luzon Expressway. Ucags wife and 16-year-
old son Vincent were then riding an owner-type jeep driven by Villas on the same route. When
the latter vehicle exited at the Sucat Interchange ahead of Ucags passenger jeepney, PNCC guards
Conrado Ancheta and Barut stopped Villas and directed him to park his vehicle at the road side.
After informing Villas that his vehicle had no headlights, Ancheta asked for his driving license.
Right about then, the passenger jeepney carrying Ucag stopped where Villas jeep had parked.
Ucag and Danilo Fabiano, a co-passenger, alighted and approached Ancheta and Barut to inquire
what the matter was. Apprised of the reason for the stoppage of Villas jeep, Ucag requested the
return of Villas driving license. But Ancheta refused because he had already issued the Traffic
Violation ticket. Ucag argued with Ancheta and Barut. Later on, however, Ucag turned around in
order to avoid further argument, and simply told Villas to return for his driving license the next
day. This apparently irked Ancheta, who dared Ucag to finish the issue right there and then.

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Ancheta suddenly pulled out his .38 caliber revolver and fired it several times, hitting Ucag on
both thighs. Ucag fired back and hit Ancheta. Fabiano and Villas witnessed the exchange of
gunshots.

Upon seeing the exchange of gunshots, Vincent Ucag rushed towards his father to go to
his succor. Before Vincent could reach his father, however, Barut fired at Vincent(the son) in the
chest causing the latters death.

Barut was tried for and found guilty of homicide by the Regional Trial Court and ordered
to indemnify the heirs of Vincent Ucag in the total amount of P250,000.00, inclusive of the
actual and moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of
Barut.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the conviction of the crime of homicide is proper.


2. Whether the award of damages is proper.

RULING:

1. The conviction is proper.

There is nocompelling reason to set aside the factual findings of the trial court. Villas and
Fabiano had clearly and consistently testified that Barut had been the person who had shot
Vincent; and that Baruts bare denial of firing at Vincent cannot prevail over their positive and
categorical identification of him as the perpetrator.

Barut adverts to the extrajudicial sworn statement that Villas gave barely a day following the fatal
shooting of Vincent in which he declared not having seen Barut fire a gun. the RTC could not take
the declaration of Villas into consideration because Villas extrajudicial sworn statement
containing the declaration had not been offered and admitted as evidence by either side. The CA
stressed that only evidence that was formally offered and made part of the records could be
considered; and that in any event, the supposed contradiction between the extrajudicial sworn
statement and the court testimony should be resolved in favor of the latter.

2. The award of damages is not proper.

Anent the civil liability, the RTC granted P250,000.00 without specifying the amounts
corresponding to actual and moral damages, as well as to the civil indemnity for the death of
Vincent. The CA affirmed the grant. Both lower courts thereby erred on a matter of law. Actual
and moral damages are different in nature and purpose. To start with, different laws govern their
grant, with the amounts allowed as actual damages being dependent on proof of the loss to a
degree of certainty, while the amounts allowed as moral damages being discretionary on the part
of the court. Secondly, actual damages address the actual losses caused by the crime to the heirs
of the victim; moral damages assuage the spiritual and emotional sufferings of the heirs of the
victim of the crime. On the civil indemnity for death, law and jurisprudence have fixed the value
to compensate for the loss of human life. Thirdly, actual damages may not be granted without
evidence of actual loss; moral damages and death indemnity are always granted in homicide, it
being assumed by the law that the loss of human life absolutely brings moral and spiritual losses
as well as a definite loss. Moral damages and death indemnity require neither pleading nor
evidence simply because death through crime always occasions moral sufferings on the part of the
victims heirs.

The death indemnity and moral damages are fixed at P75,000.00 each in view of homicide
being a gross offense. Considering that the decisions of the lower courts contained no treatment
of the actual damages, the Court is now not in any position to dwell on this. Nonetheless, the
Court holds that despite the lack of such treatment, temperate damages of P25,000.00 should be
allowed. Article 2224 of the Civil Code declares that temperate damages may be recovered when

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some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. There is
no longer any doubt that when actual damages for burial and related expenses are not
substantiated with receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are warranted, for it is
certainly unfair to deny to the surviving heirs of the victim the compensation for such expenses as
actual damages.

FELINA ROSALDES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.


G.R. No. 173988 October 8, 2014, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.

Family Code; Corporal Punishment; Special Parental Authority; Teachers; The Family Code
expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or
individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis).
Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her
infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even
fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted only
for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no
less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a
school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental
authority (i.e., in loco parentis), viz.: Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental
authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents. In no case
shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special
parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)

Criminal Law; Child Abuse; In the crime charged against the petitioner, the maltreatment
may consist of an act by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual.In the crime charged
against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds or by words
that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being.
The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner went overboard in
disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year-old boy, when she pinched hard Michael
Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as]
the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling
a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him
down on the floor. On her part, the trial judge said that the physical pain experienced by the
victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school
altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school
where he had to adjust again. Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic
worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, the information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the proximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given
by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the proximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed. The information explicitly averred the offense of child abuse charged
against the petitioner in the context of the statutory definition of child abuse found in Section
3(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the petitioners
challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form and substance. Her last chance to
pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to
quash on the ground that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form,
or did not charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge.

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FACTS:

Seven-year-old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary


School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his classroom
when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner, Felina Rosaldes, who was then
asleep on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her.
When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat, petitioner went to Michael and
pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As
he fell, Michael Ryans body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to
pick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Petitioner was
convicted of the crime of child abuse in the RTC which was affirmed by CA on appeal.
ISSUE:

Whether the conviction of the petitioner of the crime of child abuse is proper.

RULING:

The conviction is proper.

Petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered by
Michael Ryan to maltreat or malign him. She insists that her act further came under the doctrine
of in loco parentis. However, although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline
Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent
and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. She could not
justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of
him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code (Art. 233), which has expressly
banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or individual
engaged in child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis).

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse thusly:


x x x (b) Child abuse refers to the maltreatment, whether
habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following: x
xx
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being; x x x x

In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an
act by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner went
overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year-old boy, when she pinched
hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the
floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but
instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears
and pushed him down on the floor.

SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADOR MONREAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 173822, 13 October 2010, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC, when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of
age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed.

Salvador Atizado, Salvador Monreal and Danilo Atizado were charged with the crime of
murder. One of the witnesses, Simeona Mirandilla, narrated that she and the victim, Rogelio
Llona, were seated in the house of Manuel Desder when she suddenly heard thundering steps
and two gunshots. She then saw Salvador Atizado pointing a gun at the lying form of Llona.
While trying to help Llona, Mirandilla heard three clicking sounds and when she turned, she

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saw Monreal pointing a gun at her. All the accused fled the scene. Llona was brought to the
hospital but he was pronounced dead.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal guilty of
murder but acquitted Danilo Atizado because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The penalty imposed on the accused was imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and
payment of civil indemnity. Such decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the CA was correct in affirming the conviction of both the accused.
2. Whether or not the penalty imposed on Monreal was proper.

RULING:

1. YES. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement


concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Yet, the State did
not have to prove the accused previous agreement to commit the murder, because their
conspiracy was deduced from the mode and manner in which they had perpetrated their
criminal act. They had acted in concert in assaulting Llona, with their individual acts
manifesting a community of purpose and design to achieve their evil end. As it is, all the
conspirators in a crime are liable as co-principals.

Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
offended party might make. For treachery to be attendant, the means, method, or form of
execution must be deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offenders. Moreover,
treachery must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack.

The CA held that Mirandillas testimonial narrative sufficiently established that treachery
attended the attack on the victim because Atizados shooting the victim at the latters back
had been intended to ensure the execution of the crime; and that Atizado and Monreals
conspiracy to kill the victim was proved by their presence at the scene of the crime each
armed with a handgun that they had fired except that Monreals handgun did not fire.

The SC concurs with the CA on the attendance of treachery. The petitioners mounted
their deadly assault with suddenness and without the victim being aware of its imminence.
Neither an altercation between the victim and the assailants had preceded the assault, nor
had the victim provoked the assault in the slightest. The assailants had designed their assault
to be swift and unexpected, in order to deprive their victim of the opportunity to defend
himself. Such manner constituted a deliberate adoption of a method of attack that ensured
their unhampered execution of the crime.

2. NO. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying
circumstances, the CA correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado,
which was conformable with Article 63 (2) of the RPC. But reclusion perpetua was not the
correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor over 15 but under 18 years of age. The RTC
and the CA did not appreciate Monreals minority at the time of the commission of the
murder probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial.

Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when the

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crime was committed on April 18, 1994.

Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC, when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years
of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. Based on Article 61 (2)
of the RPC, reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion perpetua to death.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and Article 64 of the RPC, therefore, the range of
the penalty of imprisonment imposable on Monreal was prision mayor in any of its periods,
as the minimum period, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as the maximum period.
Accordingly, his proper indeterminate penalty is from six years and one day of prision mayor,
as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum period.

Criminal and Civil Liabilities

DEGAOS vs. PEOPLE


G.R. No. 162826, FIRST DIVISION, October 14, 2013, Bersamin, J.

Novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability under the penal laws of the
country. Only the. State may validly waive the criminal action against an accused. Novation is
relevant only to determine if the parties have meanwhile altered the nature of the obligation prior to
the commencement of the criminal prosecution in order to prevent the incipient criminal liability of
the accused.

Same Same Novation is not a ground under the law to extinguish criminal
liability.Novation is not a ground under the law to extinguish criminal liability. Article 89 (on
total extinguishment) and Article 94 (on partial extinguishment) of the Revised Penal Code list
down the various grounds for the extinguishment of criminal liability. Not being included in the
list, novation is limited in its effect only to the civil aspect of the liability, and, for that reason, is
not an efficient defense in estafa. This is because only the State may validly waive the criminal
action against an accused. The role of novation may only be either to prevent the rise of criminal
liability, or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic transaction, whether or not it was
such that the breach of the obligation would not give rise to penal responsibility, as when money
loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to.

FACTS:

Narciso Deganos is engaged in the selling of religious articles and books. He came to know
Lydia Bordador for he frequently visited her house to sell said religious articles and books. While
at the house of Lydia, he saw her counting pieces of jewelry. He asked her if she could show said
pieces of jewelry to his sister, Aida Luz, to which she agreed. Thereafter, Deganos returned the
jewelry and Aida Luz called Bordador if she could trust Deganos to get the pieces of jewelry for
her to sell the same. Bordador agreed on the condition that if they could not pay in cash, they
should pay it one month or return the unsold jewelry within the said period.

She delivered the said jewelry starting sometime in 1986 as evidenced by several
documents entitled "Katibayan at Kasunduan", the earliest of which is dated March 16, 1986.
Everytime Narciso Degaos got jewelry from her, he signed the receipts in her presence. They
were able to pay only up to a certain point. However, receipt nos. 614 to 745 dated from April 27,
1987 up to July 20, 1987 were no longer paid and Deganos failed to return the jewelry covered by
such receipts. Despite oral and written demands, he failed and refused to pay and return the
subject jewelry. As of October 1998, the total obligation of the accused amounted to P725,000.00.

A case for estafa was then filed in the RTC against Deganos and Luz. However, the RTC
rendered a decision finding Deganos guilty of Estafa and acquitting Luz for the crime for
insufficiency of evidence. As defense on appeal, Deganos alleged that out of his indebtedness, he
already made partial payments in the amount of P53,307.00 which has the effect of extinguishing

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his criminal liability as there exist novation as to the basis of his culpability. The CA affirmed the
decision of RTC. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether novation converted the liability of Degaos from criminal to purely civil in
nature.

HELD:

No. Degaos claims that his partial payments to the complainants novated his contract
with them from agency to loan, thereby converting his liability from criminal to civil. He insists
that his failure to complete his payments prior to the filing of the complaint-affidavit by the
complainants notwithstanding, the fact that the complainants later required him to make a
formal proposal before the barangay authorities on the payment of the balance of his outstanding
obligations confirmed that novation had occurred.

The legal effects of novation on criminal liability were explained by the Court, through
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in People v. Nery: The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the filing of
the criminal information in court by the state prosecutors because up to that time the original
trust relation may be converted by the parties into an ordinary creditor-debtor situation, thereby
placing the complainant in estoppel to insist on the original trust. But after the justice authorities
have taken cognizance of the crime and instituted action in court, the offended party may no longer
divest the prosecution of its power to exact the criminal liability, as distinguished from the civil. The
crime being an offense against the state, only the latter can renounce it.

It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of the means recognized by the
Penal Code whereby criminal liability can be extinguished; hence, the role of novation may only
be to either prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original
basic transaction, whether or not it was such that its breach would not give rise to penal
responsibility, as when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is
resorted to.

Novation is not a ground under the law to extinguish criminal liability. Not being included
in the list, novation is limited in its effect only to the civil aspect of the liability, and, for that
reason, is not an efficient defense in estafa. This is because only the State may validly waive the
criminal action against an accused.

Although the novation of a contract of agency to make it one of sale may relieve an
offender from an incipient criminal liability, that did not happen here, for the partial payments
and the proposal to pay the balance the accused made during the barangay proceedings were not
at all incompatible with Degaos liability under the agency that had already attached.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BRINGAS BUNAY y DAM-AT


G.R. No. 171268, 14 September 2010, EN BANC (Bersamin, J.)

Death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal in this Court totally
extinguished his criminal liability. It likewise extinguished the civil liability that was based
exclusively on the crime for which the accused was convicted because no final judgment
of conviction was yet rendered by the time of his death. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
convicted accused Bringas Bunay for the offense of qualified rape and imposed the penalty of
death. This decision was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).

Bunay was ordered confined in the New Bilibid Prison pending his appeal.
During the pendency of his case, the court received a notice informing it that Dam-At has
died.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the criminal and civil liability of accused were extinguished upon his
death.

RULING:

YES. Death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal in this Court totally
extinguished his criminal liability. Such extinction is based on Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code, which pertinently provides:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.


Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal


penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment.

The death of the accused likewise extinguished the civil liability that was based
exclusively on the crime for which the accused was convicted (i.e., ex delicto), because no final
judgment of conviction was yet rendered by the time of his death. Only civil liability
predicated on a source of obligation other than the delict survived the death of the accused,
which the offended party can recover by means of a separate civil action.

REVISED PENAL CODE (BOOK II)

Crimes against Persons

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.


EDGARDO LUPAC y FLORES, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 182230 September 19, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.

Criminal Law; Rape; The essence of rape is carnal knowledge of a female either against her
will (through force or intimidation) or without her consent (where the female is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or is demented).The essence of rape is
carnal knowledge of a female either against her will (through force or intimidation) or without
her consent (where the female is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years
of age, or is demented). The Prosecution showed during the trial that AAA had been asleep when
he forced himself on her. Such showing competently established the rape thus charged, as defined
by paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code, for AAA, being unconscious in her sleep, was
incapable of consenting to his carnal knowledge of her. Indeed, the Court has uniformly held in
several rulings that carnal knowledge of a female while she was asleep constituted rape.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Direct evidence is not the only means of
proving rape beyond reasonable doubt, circumstantial evidence would also be the reliable means to
do so.Direct evidence was not the only means of proving rape beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence would also be the reliable means to do so, provided that (a) there was
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences were derived were proved;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances was such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. What was essential was that the unbroken chain of the established
circumstances led to no other logical conclusion except the appellants guilt.

Same; Same; Res Gestae; For the application of the rule on res gestae, three requisites must
be shown to concur, namely: (a) that the principal act, the res gestae, must be a startling

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occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate
attending circumstances.Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states: Section 42. Part of
the res gestae.Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given
in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material
to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. For the
application of this rule, three requisites must be shown to concur, namely: (a) that the principal
act, the res gestae, must be a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the
declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.

FACTS:

Under appeal is the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed
the rape conviction of Edgardo Lupac but modified the trial courts characterization of the offense
as statutory rape because of the failure of the People to properly establish the victims minority
under 12 years at the time of the commission of the rape.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the CA correctly convicted Lupac for the crime of rape.


2. Whether award of exemplary damages is proper despite CAs non-appreciation of the age
of the victim being under 12 years at the time of the commission of the alleged rape.

RULING:

1. CA is correct in convicting Lupac for the crime of rape.

CA correctly rectified the mistaken characterization by the RTC of the crime as statutory
rape where being under 12 years of age is an element. Although the information alleged that AAA
had been only 10 years of age at the time of the commission of the rape, the State did not reliably
establish such age of the victim.

Still, the conviction of Lupac for rape is upheld despite AAAs minority under 12 years not
being competently proved because the information also properly charged him with raping AAA by
its express averment that the carnal knowledge of her by him had been against her will and
consent. The essence of rape is carnal knowledge of a female either against her will (through
force or intimidation) or without her consent (where the female is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or is demented). The Prosecution showed
during the trial that AAA had been asleep when he forced himself on her. Such showing
competently established the rape thus charged, as defined by paragraph 1 of Article 266-A,
Revised Penal Code, for AAA, being unconscious in her sleep, was incapable of consenting to his
carnal knowledge of her. Indeed, the Court has uniformly held in several rulings that carnal
knowledge of a female while she was asleep constituted rape.

Lupac assails the absence of credible direct evidence about his having carnal knowledge of
AAA because she herself, being then asleep and unconscious, could not reliably attest to his
supposed deed. The position of Lupac is bereft of merit, however, because his conviction should
still stand even if direct evidence to prove penile penetration of AAA was not adduced. Direct
evidence was not the only means of proving rape beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial
evidence would also be the reliable means to do so provided that that the unbroken chain of the
established circumstances led to no other logical conclusion except the guilt of the accused. The
following circumstances combined to establish that Lupac consummated the rape of AAA,
namely: (a) when AAA went to take her afternoon nap, the only person inside the house with her
was Lupac; (b) about an hour into her sleep, she woke up to find herself already stripped naked as
to expose her private parts; (c) she immediately felt her body aching and her vaginal region

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hurting upon her regaining consciousness; (d) all doors and windows were locked from within the
house, with only her and the brief-clad Lupac inside the house; (e) he exhibited a remorseful
demeanor in unilaterally seeking her forgiveness (Pasensiya ka na AAA), even spontaneously
explaining that he did not really intend to do that to her, showing his realization of the gravity
of the crime he had just committed against her; (f) her spontaneous, unhesitating and immediate
denunciation of the rape to Tita Terry and her mother (hindot being the term she used); and (g)
the medico-legal findings signified the forceful penetration of her with a blunt instrument, like an
erect penis.

The Court holds that AAAs denunciation of Lupac as her rapist to Tita Terry and her own
mother with the use of the words hindot and inano ako ni Kuya Ega without any appreciable
length of time having intervened following her discovery of the rape was part of the res gestae
(that is, rape). For the application of this rule, three requisites must be shown to concur, namely:
(a) that the principal act, the res gestae, must be a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were
made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (c) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances. The
requisites were met herein. AAA went to Tita Terrys house immediately after fleeing from Lupac
and spontaneously, unhesitatingly and immediately declared to Tita Terry that Lupac had
sexually abused her. Such manner of denunciation of him as her rapist was confirmed by Tita
Terrys testimony about AAAs panic-stricken demeanor that rendered it difficult to quickly
comprehend what the victim was then saying. Of course, AAAs use of the words hindot and
inano ako ni Kuya Ega said enough about her being raped.

2. The Court needs to add exemplary damages to the civil damages awarded to AAA.

Under the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed in a criminal case as part of the
civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.

Conformably with the Civil Code, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the
entitlement of AAA to exemplary damages on account of the attendance of the aggravating
circumstance of her minority under 12 years. It should not matter that the CA disregarded her
testimony on her age. At least, the RTC found her testimony on her minority under 12 years at the
time of the rape credible enough to convict the accused of statutory rape. Nor was it of any
consequence that such minority would have defined the rape as statutory had it been sufficiently
established. What mattered was to consider the attendance of an aggravating circumstance of any
kind to warrant the award of exemplary damages to the victim. This was the point stressed in
People v. Catubig, to wit: It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due
the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it
is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the
offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within
the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

PEOPLE vs. SABADLAB


G.R. No. 175924, FIRST DIVISION, March 14, 2012, BERSAMIN, J.

Criminal Law; Rape; Statutes; The Anti-Rape Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353); It is notable that
among the amendments of the law on rape introduced under Republic Act No. 8353 (The Anti-Rape
Act of 1997) is Section 266-D, which adverts to the degree of resistance that the victim may put up
against the rapist.Sabadlabs allegation that AAA did not sustain any bodily injuries was actually
contrary to the medical certification showing her several physical injuries and the penetration of
her female organ. This should debunk without difficulty his submission that she did not offer any
resistance to the sexual assaults she suffered. Her resistance to Sabadlabs order for her to go with
him was immediately stifled by his poking of the gun at her throat and by appearance of his two
cohorts. At any rate, it is notable that among the amendments of the law on rape introduced
under Republic Act No. 8353 (The Anti-Rape Act of 1997) is Section 266-D, which adverts to the

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degree of resistance that the victim may put up against the rapist, viz.: Article 266-D.
Presumptions.Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the act of rape in any
degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated as to render her/him
incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the acts
punished under Article 266-A.

Same; Same; Complex Crimes; Forcible Abduction with Rape; Although forcible abduction
was seemingly committed, accused cannot be held guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction
with rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit the rape. Under the circumstances, the
rape absorbed the forcible abduction.The principal objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in
abducting AAA from Dapitan Street and in bringing her to another place was to rape and ravish
her. This objective became evident from the successive acts of Sabadlab immediately after she had
alighted from the car in completely undressing her as to expose her whole body (except the eyes
due to the blindfold), in kissing her body from the neck down, and in having carnal knowledge of
her (in that order). Although forcible abduction was seemingly committed, we cannot hold him
guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape when the objective of the abduction
was to commit the rape. Under the circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.

FACTS:

AAA was then walking on Dapitan St. in Makati City, proceeding towards MA Montessori
to fetch her employers son who was studying there. Suddenly, a man (later identified as
Sabadlab) grabbed her by the shoulder and ordered her to go with him. She recognized him to be
the man who had persistently greeted her every time she had bought pandesal near her
employers house in the past two weeks. Alarmed, she refused to do his bidding, but Sabadlab
poked a gun at her throat. Two other men whom she did not recognize joined Sadablab at that
point. They forced her into the backseat of a parked car, and one of Sadablab cohorts blindfolded
her with a handkerchief. The car moved forward, and stopped after twenty minutes of travel. Still
blindfolded, she was brought out of the car. Sabadlab said that he would remove her clothes.
Sabadlab then undressed her, leaving only the blindfold on her. One of them tied her hands
behind her back. Sabadlab began kissing her body from the neck downwards.

Although blindfolded, she knew that it was Sabadlab because his cohorts were calling out
his name as he was kissing her body. Then they made her lie flat on the ground with her hands
still tied behind her back. Sabadlab raped her in that position. The others took their turns in
raping her after Sabadlab. To prevent her from shouting for help, Sabadlab stuffed her mouth
with crumpled newspapers. The three ravished her again and again, that she could not remember
the number of times they did so.

Sabadlab and his cohorts returned a blindfolded AAA by car back to Dapitan Street, but
let her go only after sternly warning that they would surely kill her if she told anyone about the
rapes. Once they left, she proceeded to MA Montessori to fetch her ward. She waited there until
5:30 pm. Upon her arrival at the house, AAAs employer noticed the kiss marks on her neck. AAA
at first lied about the kiss marks, but she ultimately disclosed the rapes because her irritated
employer slapped and boxed her on the stomach to force her to disclose.

On March 13, 2002, her employer brought AAA to the Makati Police Station to report the
rapes. AAA underwent medico-legal examination later that day at the PNP Crime Laboratory in
Camp Crame Quezon City.

Afterwards, AAA and the policemen went to the vicinity where she had usually bought
pandesal to look for the suspects. She spotted Sabadlab in one of the nearby restaurants and
pointed to him. The policemen apprehended Sabadlab and brought him to the station, where he
gave his name as Erland Sabadlab y Bayquel. That was her first time to know the name of
Sabadlab.

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The City Prosecutor of Makati immediately charged Sabadlab and two John Does with
forcible abduction with rape. The RTC convicted Sabadlab on the crime charged. The CA affirmed
the conviction.

ISSUE:

WON the accused is guilty of forcible abduction with rape.

HELD:

NO. The crime committed is simple rape as defined under Article 266-A of RPC.

Firstly, the supposed inconsistencies dwelled on minor details or collateral matters that
the CA precisely held to be badges of veracity and manifestations of truthfulness due to their
tendency of demonstrating that the testimony had not been rehearsed or concocted. It is also
basic that inconsistencies bearing on minor details or collateral matters should not adversely
affect the substance of the witness declaration, veracity, or weight of testimony. The only
inconsistencies that might have discredited the victims credible testimony were those that
affected or related to the elements of the crime. Alas, that was not true herein.

We hardly need to remind that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses
and of weighing their credibility is best left to the trial judge by virtue of the first-hand
impressions he derives while the witnesses testify before him. The demeanor on the witness chair
of persons sworn to tell the truth in judicial proceedings is a significant element of judicial
adjudication because it can draw the line between fact and fancy. Their forthright answers or
hesitant pauses, their quivering voices or angry tones, their flustered looks or sincere gazes, their
modest blushes or guilty blanchesall these can reveal if the witnesses are telling the truth or
lying in their teeth. As the final appellate reviewer in this case, then, we bow to the age-old norm
to accord the utmost respect to the findings and conclusions on the credibility of witnesses
reached by the trial judge on account of his unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and
on account of his personal access to the various indicia available but not reflected in the record.

Secondly, Sabadlabs allegation that AAA did not sustain any bodily injuries was actually
contrary to the medical certification showing her several physical injuries and the penetration of
her female organ. This should debunk without difficulty his submission that she did not offer any
resistance to the sexual assaults she suffered. Her resistance to Sabadlabs order for her to go with
him was immediately stifled by his poking of the gun at her throat and by appearance of his two
cohorts. At any rate, it is notable that among the amendments of the law on rape introduced
under Republic Act No. 8353 (The Anti-Rape Act of 1997) is Section 266-D, which adverts to the
degree of resistance that the victim may put up against the rapist, viz.: Article 266-D.
Presumptions.Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the act of rape in any degree
from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated as to render her/him incapable
of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the acts punished
under Article 266-A.

Crime committed is simple rape not forcible abduction with rape

The principal objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting AAA from Dapitan
Street and in bringing her to another place was to rape and ravish her. This objective became
evident from the successive acts of Sabadlab immediately after she had alighted from the car in
completely undressing her as to expose her whole body (except the eyes due to the blindfold), in
kissing her body from the neck down, and in having carnal knowledge of her (in that order).
Although forcible abduction was seemingly committed, we cannot hold him guilty of the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit the
rape. Under the circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.

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Award of damages

The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in a criminal case as
part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. The Civil Code allows such damages to be awarded by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. Present here was the need for exemplarity. Thus, the CA should have recognized the
entitlement to exemplary damages of AAA on account of the attendance of use of a deadly
weapon. It was of no moment that the use of a deadly weapon was not specifically alleged in the
information.

Accordingly, the Court grants the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition
to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and the moral damages of P50,000.00 the CA awarded to
AAA. Sabadlab is further liable for interest of 6% per annum on all the civil damages.

BACOLOD vs. PEOPLE


G.R. No. 181544, FIRST DIVISION, April 11, 2012, Bersamin, J.

Criminal Law Rape The essence of rape is carnal knowledge of a female either against her
will (through force or intimidation) or without her consent (where the female is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or is demented). Hymenal injury has never
been an element of rape, for a female might still be raped without such injury resulting. The
essence of rape is carnal knowledge of a female either against her will (through force or
intimidation) or without her consent (where the female is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or is demented). It is relevant to know that carnal
knowledge is simply the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman. Thus,
although AAA testified on her sexual penetration by Taguilid, the fact that her hymenal injury was
not fresh but already deephealed was not incompatible with the evidence of rape by him. In this
regard, her claim that he had previously subjected her to similar sexual assaults several times
before May 29, 2002, albeit not the subject of this prosecution, rendered the absence of fresh
hymenal injury not improbable even as it showed how the deep healed laceration might have
been caused.

Criminal Law Rape Evidence Witnesses Judicial experience has enabled the courts to
accept the verity that when a minor says that she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape was committed against her.There can be no question that the testimony of a
child who has been a victim in rape is normally given full weight and credence. Judicial experience
has enabled the courts to accept the verity that when a minor says that she was raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed against her. The credibility of such a
rape victim is surely augmented where there is absolutely no evidence that suggests the possibility
of her being actuated by ill motive to falsely testify against the accused. Truly, a rape victims
testimony that is unshaken by rigid cross examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or
contradictions in its material points is entitled to full faith and credit.

FACTS:

At about 4:00 pm on May 29, 2002 Taguilid suddenly entered AAAs room while she was
resting. The room of AAA was in the third floor of the house owned by her parents. Taguilid is a
cousin of her mother who had been living with her family since 2000. Upon entering her room, he
pushed her down on her back, then inserted his finger in her vagina and later on inserted his
penis in her vagina. She cried and pushed him away, but to no avail. Then, he next turned her
over and penetrated her anus with his penis while in that position and that she did not shout for
help because he threatened to kill her if she did. At the time of the rape, AAA was 12 years and ten
months old, having been born on July 28, 1989.

The Prosecution further established that BBB, AAAs father, was at the time tending to the
family store at the ground floor when he decided to go up to the third floor to look for and talk to

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AAA. Upon reaching her room, he found Taguilid standing by her bed in the act of raising the
zipper of his pants, and AAA was on her bed, crying and uttering inaudible words. BBB saw that
her skirt was raised up to her waist, and her panties, though still on her, were disheveled (wala sa
ayos) and that it seemed to BBB that his sudden appearance in the room had taken Taguilid by
surprise, causing the latter to hurriedly leave the room even before BBB could say anything to
him.

BBB later on brought his daughter to the United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) in
Quezon City for a medico-legal examination before reporting the matter to the barangay office.
He lodged a complaint for rape with the police authorities in order to seek their assistance in the
arrest of Taguilid.

The RTC then rendered a decision finding Taguilid guilty of the crime of rape. During
trial, testimonies of AAA were outright. She answered all questions of her ordeal in clear-cut
language. She mentioned the word "pinataob" to describe the next position the accused assumed
to penetrate her anus. The decision of RTC was affirmed by the CA.

Taguilid argues that AAAs testimony on how the rape had happened and how easily he
had undressed her indicated that he did not use force and intimidation against her that her fear
of him had been only the product of her imagination and that her silence during the entire event,
and her failure to escape from him or to report his allegedly previous sexual assaults had revealed
her having voluntarily consented to the sexual act.

ISSUE:

Whether Taguilid is guilty of Rape.

RULING:

Yes. There can be no question that the testimony of a child who has been a victim in rape
is normally given full weight and credence. Judicial experience has enabled the courts to accept
the verity that when a minor says that she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape was committed against her. The credibility of such a rape victim is surely
augmented where there is absolutely no evidence that suggests the possibility of her being
actuated by ill-motive to falsely testify against the accused. Truly, a rape victims testimony that is
unshaken by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its
material points is entitled to full faith and credit.

Taguilids defense at the trial was plain denial of the positive assertions made against him.
He then declared that the charge of rape against him resulted from BBBs misunderstanding of
what had really occurred in AAAs bedroom just before BBB had appeared unannounced. Yet,
such denial was devoid of persuasion due to its being easily and conveniently resorted to, and due
to denial being generally weaker than and not prevailing over the positive assertions of both AAA
and BBB.

Also, Taguilids explanation of why he was then zipping his pants when BBB found him in
AAAs bedroom, that AAAs stabbing had caused his pants to fall off, was implausible without him
demonstrating how the pants had been unzipped from AAAs stabbing of him as to cause the
pants to fall off. Besides, Taguilids act of quickly leaving the room of AAA without at least
attempting to tell BBB the reason for his presence in her room and near the bed of the sobbing
AAA if he had been as innocent as he claimed exposed the shamness and insincerity of his denial.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HENRY ARCILLAS


G.R. No. 181491, July 30, 2012, BERSAMIN, J.

The rape of a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age by the common-law spouse of her
mother is qualified rape. Yet, the crime is only simple rape, although the State successfully proves

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the common-law relationship, where the information does not properly allege the qualifying
circumstance of relationship between the accused and the female. This is because the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is inviolable.

FACTS:

In the evening of May 12, 2000, AAA, then 13 years old, went to sleep in a room together
with her two sisters, CCC and EEE, her mother (BBB) and the latters live-in partner, accused
Henry Arcillas. At around 11PM, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was lying on top
of her. She found out that accused Henry Arcillas was on top of her. She noticed that she had no
more short pants and panties and that she felt pain in her vagina. She also noticed that something
had been inserted into her vagina and that the accused was making a push and pull movement on
top of her. She then pushed away the accused and awakened her mother Josie, who was just
asleep near her. AAA told her mother that she was sexually abused by Henry Arcillas. BBB then
grabbed an ax and struck the accused with it but the latter was not hit.

Thereafter, BBB complained to Jimmy Lorena, the Barangay Kagawad. Jimmy then
summoned Henry Arcillas and during the confrontation Henry Arcillas was made to sign a
statement and was made to promise that he would not do the same act again. Despite the
confrontation, however, the victim, still lodged a complaint for rape against Henry Arcillas before
the Police Station.

Henry Arcillas testified that he had a drinking spree in the house of the owner of the
thresher where he worked. They started drinking hard liquor, after which he went home very
drunk. He then went to sleep together with his live-in partner, BBB, and the latters three
daughters, CCC, EEE and AAA. BBB was on his left side while AAA was on his right. At around
11PM on that same day, Henry Arcillas was awakened when AAA complained to her mother that
he held her shorts. At that juncture, his live-in partner tried to strike him with an ax. Henry
claimed that he was able to touch the body of AAA but he did not know what part of her body he
had touched nor which part of his body had touched AAA. He, however, denied having sexually
molested the latter.

The RTC convicted Arcillas of qualified rape. The conviction was affirmed by the CA,
however, it modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua on the ground that the
information did not allege that Henry Arcillas was her mothers common-law husband, instead of
the victims step-father, the qualifying circumstance the information alleged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA is correct in affirming the finding of guilt by the RTC (YES)

RULING:

The CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Arcillas for SIMPLE RAPE. Under Article 266-
B of the RPC, Rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. The death penalty shall also be
imposed if the crime of rape is committed when the victim is under 18 years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim.

It is the rule that rape is qualified and punished with death when committed by the
victims parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or by the common-law spouse of the victims parent. However, an accused
cannot be found guilty of qualified rape unless the information alleges the circumstances of the
victims over 12 years but under 18 years of age and her relationship with him. The reason is that
such circumstances alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty; hence, they are
special qualifying circumstances. As such, both the age of the victim and her relationship with the
offender must be specifically alleged in the information and proven beyond reasonable doubt
during the trial; otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed.

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The minority of AAA was sufficiently alleged in the information. The Prosecution
established that her age when the rape was committed was thirteen years and two months by
presenting her birth certificate. As to her relationship with Arcillas, the information averred that
he was the step-father of AAA. It turned out, however, that he was not her stepfather, being only
the common-law husband of BBB. The RTC itself found that he and BBB were only "live-in
partners." In addition, AAAs birth certificate disclosed that her father was CCC, who had been
married to BBB, who was widowed upon the death of CCC in 1996. No evidence was adduced to
establish that BBB and Arcilla legally married after CCCs death.

Arcillas being the common-law husband of BBB at the time of the commission of the rape,
even if established during the trial, could not be appreciated because the information did not
specifically allege it as a qualifying circumstance. Otherwise, he would be deprived of his right to
be informed of the charge lodged against him.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEDRO BUADO, JR. y CIPRIANO


G.R. No. 170634, EN BANC, January 8, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.:

Criminal Law; Rape; Guiding Principles in the Prosecution of Rape.In reviewing rape
convictions, the Court has been guided by three principles, namely: (a) that an accusation of rape
can be made with facility; it is difficult for the complainant to prove but more difficult for the
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape
as involving only two persons, the rapist and the victim, the testimony of the complainant must
be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that the evidence for the Prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the Defense.

Criminal Law; Rape; The essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a female either against
her will (through force or intimidation) or without her consent (where the female is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or is demented).The essence of
rape is the carnal knowledge of a female either against her will (through force or intimidation) or
without her consent (where the female is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or is
under 12 years of age, or is demented). Carnal knowledge of a female simply means a male having
bodily connections with a female. As such, the presence or absence of injury or laceration in the
genitalia of the victim is not decisive of whether rape has been committed or not. Such injury or
laceration is material only if force or intimidation is an element of the rape charged; otherwise, it
is merely circumstantial evidence of the commission of the rape.

Criminal Law; Rape; Qualified Rape; Minority and Relationship; Penalties; Death Penalty;
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty is imposed if the rape is
committed with the attendance of any aggravating/qualifying circumstances. One of such
aggravating/qualifying circumstances is when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Both
minority and actual relationship must be alleged and proved; otherwise, conviction for rape in its
qualified form will be barred.

Same; Same; Death Penalty; With the intervening passage on June 24, 2006 of Republic
Act No. 9346, the imposition of the death penalty has become prohibited.With the intervening
passage on June 24, 2006 of Republic Act No. 9346, however, the imposition of the death penalty
has become prohibited. The retroactive application to Criminal Case No. 974-V-99 of the
prohibition against the death penalty must be made here because it is favorable to the accused.
Nonetheless, he shall not be eligible for parole, because Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346
expressly provides that persons whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason
of this Act shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), as
amended.

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FACTS:

On April 13, 1999, at about 3:00 p.m., CCC and her children were attending a get-together
party in the adjacent house of DDD, then already married. The accused summoned AAA home
from the party. Upon AAA getting home, he ordered her to enter the bedroom, and once she was
inside, he undressed her and inserted his finger in her vagina. He then went on top of her and
inserted his penis in her vagina, giving vent to his lust. AAA could only cry while he was forcing
himself on her.

Missing AAA at the party, CCC returned to the house and saw that her husband was there.
He cursed her many times, but she simply ignored him and went upstairs, where she found AAA
crying. AAA told her mother that her father had just molested her. AAA further told her mother
that he had done the same thing to her several times in the past, starting when she was still in
Grade I. At the time, AAA was already in Grade 4. AAA told her mother that he had also raped her
several times in the past only when CCC was not home, but that she had kept silent about the
rapes because she had been too afraid of him to complain. Besides, AAA also knew that he kepta
gun at home and had a violent temper, having frequently beaten his wife and children for no
apparent reason. AAA explained in court that she finally revealed her ordeals to her mother
because her sufferings had become unbearable, saying: Nahihirapan po ako.

It was not until June 9, 1999, however, that CCC and AAA mustered the courage to leave
home and denounce the fathers crimes. They hastened to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to finally lodge a complaint against him.

The rape of BBB was committed a few months later. At 6:00 a.m. of November 10, 1999,
the accused commanded BBB, who was then in the kitchen of their house, to undress and lie
down on a piece of plywood laid out on the ground. Already naked from the waist down, he
pushed her down to the floor, and lubricated his penis and BBBs vagina with cooking oil.

He next went on top of her, inserted his penis into her genitalia, and made pumping
motions. He ignored all her pleas for him to stop. She stated that he had also raped her many
times previously but that she had kept silent about the rapes out of fear of him. But she could not
anymore bear her pain that last time; hence, she went to her older sister DDDs house and finally
reported the rape to DDD. When BBB was narrating about her last rape, DDD could only embrace
her young sister and cry.

Later on, DDD called up their mother who was then staying at the DSWD Haven in
Alabang to tell her about what the accused had just committed against BBB. CCC advised DDD to
bring BBB to the DSWD office in Valenzuela. The DSWD office endorsed BBB to the Child
Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), where Dr. Mariella S. Castillo examined
the child.

The RTC convicted the accused. Elevated to the Court on automatic appeal, the records
were transferred to the CA for intermediate review. The CA affirmed the conviction, but reduced
the death penalty to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:

WON Pedro Buadoy Cipriano Jr. is guilty of two counts of rape committed against his two
minor daughters.

RULING:

YES. Ultimately and frequently, the resolution of the charge of rape hinges on the
credibility of the victims testimony. The RTC as the trial court and the CA as the intermediately
reviewing tribunal did not overlook or disregard any fact or circumstance of significance. Instead,
they correctly appreciated the evidence, and rightly concluded that the accused committed the

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rapes of his own daughters. They regarded and accepted AAA and BBB as credible witnesses
whose recollections about their fathers lecherous acts deserved the fullest faith and credence.

The trial records entirely supported the lower courts findings in favor of the credibility of
AAA and BBBs recollections. Indeed, AAA and BBB deserved the credence accorded to them, for
they were reliable in their recollection of their ordeals at the hands of the accused. AAA narrated
the rape in sufficient detail and candor during her direct examination.

On the other hand, the accused did not bring to the Courts attention any facts and
circumstances of weight that, if properly considered, would change the result into one favorable
to him. He did not also submit to us any argument that would lead us to doubt the findings of the
RTC and the CA on the credibility of AAA and BBB.

Although the accused would discredit AAA by harping on her failure to immediately
report the rape and to denounce him sooner to the proper authorities, the Court cannot but reject
his attempt to discredit AAAs accusation. The attempt would rest on drawing an inference of
estoppel against AAA, in that AAA would have denounced him sooner if he had truly ravished
her. However, the inference of estoppel could be properly drawn against AAA only if the trial
records did not plausibly explain the cause of delay. We find that his frequent acts of domestic
violence against even the young members of his family caused AAA and her mother to fear him.
He justified his violent tendencies by describing himself as a strict disciplinarian at home. His
justification was implausible, however, considering that his having been once charged with child
abuse in which the victim had been one of his own sons confirmed that his chastisement had
exceeded the tolerable limits of parental discipline. Moreover, AAA knew that he had kept a gun
at home. This, coupled by his childrens undue fear of him, cowed AAA into silence about her
great sufferings for a long period of time, and explained why she came out into the open to
denounce him only on June 9, 1999. By then, his unabated lecherousness towards AAA had
become unbearable. Under the circumstances, the delay in reporting him to the proper
authorities is not a factor in determining the credibility of the charge against him of his own
daughter.45 To a child of very tender years like AAA, the threats of actual physical harm would
definitely instill a fear overwhelming enough to force her to suffer her ordeals in silence for a
period of time.

Verily, there has never been any uniformity or consistency of behavior to be expected from
those who had the misfortune of being sexually molested. The Court has pointed out that some of
them have found the courage early on to publicly denounce the abuses they experienced, but that
there were others who have opted to initially keep their harrowing ordeals to themselves and to
just move on with their lives as if nothing had happened, until the limits of their tolerance were
reached. AAA belonged to the latter group of victims, as her honest declarations to the trial court
revealed. Also, we cannot expect from the immature and inexperienced AAA to measure up to the
same standard of conduct and reaction that we would expect from adults whose maturity in age
and experience could have brought them to stand up more quickly to their interest. Lastly, long
silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape to the proper authorities have not always been
considered as an indication of a false accusation.

The ill motive that supposedly impelled AAA and BBB to initiate the charges against their
own father (i.e., they hated him because of the physical abuse he had inflicted on them and on
their mother)is unworthy of serious consideration. To start with, the imputation of ill motive,
being out rightly speculative, was unreliable. Moreover, the imputed ill motive, even assuming it
to be true, did not necessarily mean that the very serious charges of rape were fabricated only to
get back at him. And, finally, the Court has not been deterred from affirming the conviction in
incestuous rape by rejecting the lecherous father simputation of ill motive based on alleged
familial discord and undue influence, hostility or revenge, or on parental punishment or
disciplinary chastisement.

The accused argues that the findings of old healed vaginal lacerations during the physical
examinations disproved the charges against him, stressing that the old healed lacerations, being
indicative of the lapse of three months from the time of the alleged sexual assault to the time of

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the medical examination, belied AAAs claim of being raped on April 13, 1999, which was but only
two months prior to the medical examination. He insists that the finding that her genitalia
showed no fresh laceration or hymenal injury suffered in the previous seven days was inconsistent
with BBBs claim about being raped nine hours prior to her physical examination.

The arguments of the accused are unwarranted. The essence of rape is the carnal
knowledge of a female either against her will (through force or intimidation) or without her
consent (where the female is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years of
age, or is demented).

Carnal knowledge of a female simply means a male having bodily connections with a
female. As such, the presence or absence of injury or laceration in the genitalia of the victim is not
decisive of whether rape has been committed or not. Such injury or laceration is material only if
force or intimidation is an element of the rape charged; otherwise, it is merely circumstantial
evidence of the commission of the rape. Verily, a medical examination and a medical certificate,
albeit corroborative of the commission of rape, are not indispensable to a successful prosecution
for rape. The accused may then be convicted solely on the basis of the victims credible, natural
and convincing testimony. This is no less true when the rape victim testifies against her own
father; unquestionably, there would be reason to give her testimony greater weight than usual.

In fine, the proof of guilt adduced against the accused for each of the rapes charged was
beyond reasonable doubt if all he could assert in his defense was a mere denial of the positive
declarations of his two minor daughters. He now deserves to the fullest extent the condign
penalties the law sets for his crimes.

We next deal with the penalty to be properly meted on the accused. Under Article 266-B
of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty is imposed if the rape is committed with the
attendance of any "aggravating/ qualifying circumstances." One of such "aggravating/qualifying
circumstances" is "when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim." Both minority and actual
relationship must be alleged and proved; otherwise, conviction for rape in its qualified form will
be barred.

In Criminal Case No. 912-V-99, the amended information alleged that AAA was only ten
years old when the rape was committed in April 1999 and that she was the daughter of the
accused. During the trial, however, the Prosecution adduced no evidence to establish her
minority save her testimony and that of her mothers. In the absence of proof of AAAs minority,
we concur with the CAs conclusion that he could not be properly found guilty of qualified rape.
Indeed, his substantial right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
would be nullified otherwise. Accordingly, the CA correctly prescribed reclusion perpetua as the
penalty.

On the other hand, the amended information in Criminal Case No. 974-V-99 sufficiently
stated the minority of BBB and her being the daughter of the accused. Further, the Prosecution
established that BBB was only nine years old at the time of the rape on November 10, 1999
through her certificate of live birth. In addition, her own mother and older sister DDD both
attested that she was the legitimate daughter of the accused. In fact, even the accused himself
admitted his legitimate paternity of BBB.61 Considering that the Prosecution duly proved BBBs
minority and her relationship with the accused, the CA correctly affirmed the penalty of death
meted by the RTC.

With the intervening passage on June 24, 2006 of Republic Act No. 9346, however, the
imposition of the death penalty has become prohibited. The retroactive application to Criminal
Case No. 974-V-99 of the prohibition against the death penalty must be made here because it is
favorable to the accused. Nonetheless, he shall not be eligible for parole, because Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9346 expressly provides that persons "whose sentences will be reduced to

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reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act" shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103
(Indeterminate Sentence Law), as amended.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TOMASTEODORO y ANGELES


G.R. No. 175876, FIRST DIVISION, February 20, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.:

The recantation of her testimony by the victim of rape is to be disregarded if the records
show that it was impelled either by intimidation or by the need for the financial support of the
accused.

Criminal Law; Rape; Statutory Rape; Elements of.The crimes charged were two counts of
statutory rape. The elements of statutory rape are that: (a) the victim is a female under 12 years or
is demented; and (b) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim. Considering that the
essence of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a female without her consent, neither the use of
force, threat or intimidation on the female, nor the females deprivation of reason or being
otherwise unconscious, nor the employment on the female of fraudulent machinations or grave
abuse of authority is necessary to commit statutory rape. Full penile penetration of the females
genitalia is not likewise required, because carnal knowledge is simply the act of a man having
sexual bodily connections with a woman.

Same; Same; Same; The Court has clarified in People v. Campuhan, 329 SCRA 270 (2000),
that the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act
is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. All that is necessary to reach the consummated stage of
rape is for the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act to come into contact
with the lips of the pudendum of the victim.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Recantation; As a rule, recantation is viewed with


disfavor; Before allowing the recantation, therefore, the court must not be too willing to accept it,
but must test its value in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely
affected to cross-examine the recanting witness both upon the substance of the recantation and the
motivations for it.As a rule, recantation is viewed with disfavor firstly because the recantation of
her testimony by a vital witness of the State like AAA is exceedingly unreliable, and secondly
because there is always the possibility that such recantation may later be repudiated. Indeed, to
disregard testimony solemnly given in court simply because the witness recants it ignores the
possibility that intimidation or monetary considerations may have caused the recantation. Court
proceedings, in which testimony upon oath or affirmation is required to be truthful under all
circumstances, are trivialized by the recantation. The trial in which the recanted testimony was
given is made a mockery, and the investigation is placed at the mercy of an unscrupulous witness.
Before allowing the recantation, therefore, the court must not be too willing to accept it, but must
test its value in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected to
cross-examine the recanting witness both upon the substance of the recantation and the
motivations for it. The recantation, like any other testimony, is subject to the test of credibility
based on the relevant circumstances, including the demeanor of the recanting witness on the
stand. In that respect, the finding of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to
great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons necessitate its re-examination, the reason being that
the trial court is in a better position to hear first-hand and observe the deportment, conduct and
attitude of the witnesses.

FACTS:

Two informations charged Teodoro with statutory rape.

BBB left home in Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte on an errand in Surigao; that her children,
including AAA, were left under the care of Teodoro, her common-law husband; that late that
night, he returned home drunk, and his arrival roused the children from their sleep, because they
had not yet eaten; that they eagerly ate the food he set down for them; that soon after the dinner,
he told the children to go to bed; that the children went to sleep in their respective places on the

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floor; that AAA became puzzled when he turned off the lights that were supposed to be left on;
that AAA eventually fell asleep beside her siblings; that at some point later in the night, he roused
AAA, and ordered her to strip naked; that she initially defied him, but he himself then undressed
her; that he took off his pants and drawers down to his knees, exposing his penis; that he went on
top of her, inserted his penis in her vagina, and made push and pull movements; that she felt a
sharp pain inside her vagina; that he stopped his movements when she protested due to her pain
becoming unbearable, because he did not want the other children to be roused from sleep; that
he returned to his own place, but she got up to relieve herself; that she felt searing pain in her
vagina as she was relieving herself; and that she did not tell her mother upon the latters return
from Surigao about what Teodoro had done to her.

Anent the second rape committee, BBB was again away from the house, having gone to
Manila. Teodoro committed the rape in a fashion similar to that in the first rape. However, AAA
could no longer bear her ordeal, and told of the rapes to CCC, the older brother of BBB. CCC
immediately reported the crimes to the Kitcharao Police Station. The police quickly arrested
Teodoro. Upon BBBs return in the afternoon, CCC informed her about what Teodoro had done to
her daughter. BBB and CCC took AAA to the Kitcharao District Hospital for physical and medical
examination.

During the trial, AAA and BBB testified for the Prosecution, but two years later recanted
and turned hostile towards the Prosecution, now telling the RTC that Teodoro had only touched
AAAs vagina on the nights of December 18, 1997 and February 8, 1998.

On his part, Teodoro claimed that he had only caressed or touched AAAs body on the
night of February 8, 1998; that before going home from work on that day, he had joined his
friends in drinking Kulafu; that he had arrived home late that night, and had gone to bed after
serving the children food to eat; that he had later awakened to find somebody sleeping beside
him; that he had embraced and caressed the different parts of the body of that person, whom he
thought was BBB whom he had earlier sent off to Surigao on an errand; that he had realized that
he was caressing AAA only after she shouted; that he had then gotten up to go to a different part
of the room; that he did not rape AAA on the night of December 18, 1997, although he admitted
being at home then.

The RTC rendered its judgment convicting Teodoro on both counts of statutory rape
notwithstanding the recantations by AAA and BBB. On appeal, the CA sustained the RTC, and
ignored AAAs recantation for being dictated by her familys financial difficulties.

ISSUES:

1. WON the rapes charged against Teodoro established beyond reasonable doubt?
2. WON the recantation by AAA be accepted?

RULING:

The crimes charged were two counts of statutory rape. The elements of statutory rape are
that: (a) the victim is a female under 12 years or is demented; and (b) the offender has carnal
knowledge of the victim. Considering that the essence of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a
female without her consent, neither the use of force, threat or intimidation on the female, nor the
females deprivation of reason or being otherwise unconscious, nor the employment on the female
of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority is necessary to commit statutory rape. Full
penile penetration of the females genitalia is not likewise required, because carnal knowledge is
simply the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman.

The Court declares that the findings of the RTC and the CA on the commission of the
two counts of statutory rape by Teodoro were well-founded. AAAs recollections given in
court when she was only eight years old disclosed an unbroken and consistent narration of her
ordeals at his hands. She thereby revealed details that no child of her very tender age could have

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invented or concocted. The only rational and natural conclusion to be made by any objective
arbiter is to accord the fullest credence to her.

Yet, Teodoro would have us undo his convictions for statutory rape, arguing that AAAs
description of his acts in Cebuano-Visayan, the dialect spoken by AAA, was guihilabtan, not
lugos, the former being the dialect term for touching and the latter for rape.

Teodoros argument is directly belied by the established facts. AAA remained categorical
and steadfast about what Teodoro had done to her all throughout her testimony in court,
even during her delivery of the supposed recantation. She narrated how he had committed
the rape in the evening of December 18, 1997 by undressing her and himself, going on top of her,
inserting his male organ into her vagina, and making push and pull motions, causing her to suffer
severe pain in her vagina.

Moreover, to believe Teodoros argument is to belie that AAA exhibited at the time of her
physical examination by Dr. Abrenillo a peripheral erythema, or redness, in her hymen, as well as
tenderness and gaping in her labia majora and labia minora. Dr. Abrenillo explained the
significance of her physical findings.

In objective terms, carnal knowledge, the other essential element in consummated


statutory rape, does not require full penile penetration of the female. The mere touching of
the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute
carnal knowledge. All that is necessary to reach the consummated stage of rape is for the penis of
the accused capable of consummating the sexual act to come into contact with the lips of the
pudendum of the victim. This means that the rape is consummated once the penis of the
accused capable of consummating the sexual act touches either labia of the pudendum.
The touching that constitutes rape does not mean mere epidermal contact, or stroking or grazing
of organs, or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims vagina, or
the mons pubis, but rather the erect penis touching the labias or sliding into the female genitalia.
Accordingly, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum
constitutes consummated rape proceeds from the physical fact that the labias are physically
situated beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, such that for the penis to touch either of
them is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface of the female genitalia. It is
required, however, that this manner of touching of the labias must be sufficiently and
convincingly established.

Here, the proof of the penis of Teodoro touching the labias of AAA was sufficient
and convincing. Dr. Abrenillo found the peripheral erythema in the hymen of AAA and the fact
that her labia majora and labia minora were tender and gaping, exposing the hymenal opening. In
other words, the touching by Teodoros penis had gone beyond the mons pubis and had reached
the labias of the victim. Such physical findings, coupled with the narrative of AAA that, one,
Teodoro went on top of her body; two, he inserted his penis into her vagina; three, he
made push and pull motions thereafter; and, four, she felt great pain inside her during
his push and pull movements, rendered the findings of rape against him unassailable as
to the rape committed on February 8, 1998. With respect to the rape committed on December 18,
1997, we concur with the RTC and CAs conclusion that AAAs testimonial account thereon
likewise sufficiently and convincingly established the commission of rape. She suffered severe
pain inside her genitalia while his penis was penetrating her, which could only be understood in
the light of the foregoing explanation made herein about his penis attaining some degree of
penetration beneath the surface of her genitalia.

Apart from being incompatible with the established facts, Teodoros argument remained a
matter of pure semantics. For sure, rape as defined and used by the Revised Penal Code is a legal
term whose exact nuances and juridical consequences no victim of AAAs tender age and naivete
could already fully know or realize. As such, her usage of the term guihilabtan to describe in the
dialect what he had done to her should not be confined to what he would have us accept as the
entire characterization of his deeds. Indeed, his argument on the distinction between the dialect
terms guihilabtan and lugos reflected nothing better than his self-serving opinion on their

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meanings. Such opinion, already by its nature argumentative, should not prevail over the physical
evidence. Worse, it was not even relevant, for what he ought to have done, instead, was to flesh
out his opinion through a credible demonstration during the trial that by her usage of the dialect
term guihilabtan she really meant mere touching of her genitalia that did not amount to his
having carnal knowledge of her.

Teodoros further submission that AAA recanted the accusations against him is
bereft of substance.

Even during her intended recantation, AAA cried most of the time. Such demeanor
reflected how much she despised what he had done to her twice. As such, her supposed
recantation did not conceal the impelling motive for it being that her mother and her family still
needed the material support of Teodoro. This was confirmed even by BBB. BBB was then rearing
four young children by Teodoro (the youngest being born when he was already detained), as well
as AAA and her five siblings that BBB had from an earlier relationship. She unabashedly needed
the material support of Teodoro; hence, she prevailed on AAA to withdraw her charges against
him. But a recantation under such insincere circumstances was unacceptable.

As a rule, recantation is viewed with disfavor firstly because the recantation of her
testimony by a vital witness of the State like AAA is exceedingly unreliable, and secondly
because there is always the possibility that such recantation may later be repudiated.
Indeed, to disregard testimony solemnly given in court simply because the witness recants it
ignores the possibility that intimidation or monetary considerations may have caused the
recantation. Court proceedings, in which testimony upon oath or affirmation is required to be
truthful under all circumstances, are trivialized by the recantation. The trial in which the recanted
testimony was given is made a mockery, and the investigation is placed at the mercy of an
unscrupulous witness. Before allowing the recantation, therefore, the court must not be too
willing to accept it, but must test its value in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the
party adversely affected to crossexamine the recanting witness both upon the substance of the
recantation and the motivations for it. The recantation, like any other testimony, is subject to the
test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances, including the demeanor of the recanting
witness on the stand. In that respect, the finding of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses is
entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons necessitate its re-examination, the reason
being that the trial court is in a better position to hear first-hand and observe the deportment,
conduct and attitude of the witnesses.

PEOPLE VS VICTORINO REYES


G.R. No. 173307, FIRST DIVISION, July 17, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.

Slightest penetration of the labia of the female victim's genitalia consummates the crime of
rape.

FACTS:

Earlier, at around 7:00 p.m., AAA and her 9-year-old sister, BBB, had watched television at
his house just across the street from their house. By 9:00 p.m., AAA and BBB rose to go home, but
as they were leaving, Reyes suddenly pulled AAA into the store attached to the sala of his house.
He told her in the dialect: Umaykan ta agiyyot ta. (Come here and let us have sex). Alarmed by
what his words denoted, AAA struggled to free herself from him. BBB went to her succor by
pulling her away from him, but his superior strength prevailed. BBB could only cry as he dragged
AAA into the store. BBB was left outside the store crying.

Inside the store, Reyes kissed AAA and mashed her breasts. He threatened her: If you will
shout, I will kill you. He pulled down her long pants and panties below her knees, took out his
penis, grabbed her by the waist, and used his body to anchor her back to a nearby table. She
fought back by boxing and pushing him away, but her efforts were futile. He twice tried to pry
open her legs, but she strained hard to close them. On the second attempt, however, her effort

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was not enough to prevent him from pulling her legs apart, and he then thrust his penis into her
vagina and made push and pull movements. Although his penis achieved only a slight
penetration of her vagina, he succeeded in satisfying his lust, as confirmed later on when
CCC, the mother of the victim, found semen on AAAs panties.

After he had satisfied his lust, Reyes threatened to kill both AAA and BBB should they tell
anyone else about what had happened. Then they hurriedly left for home. Upon their arrival in
their house, CCC called out to her daughters to go to bed. Only BBB immediately complied
because AAA tarried outside, only to have her mother again call her inside. AAA entered the
house this time, but went to where the aparador was and took out fresh panties. CCC saw her
doing so and became suspicious. She also saw fear in the face of her daughter. When she
inspected the soiled underwear of AAA, CCC discovered that her panties were wet with
semen. Upon being interrogated, AAA admitted that Reyes had raped her.

At around 6:00 a.m. of the next day, December 27, 1996, CCC reported the rape of her
daughter by Reyes to the Barangay Chairman of San Aurelio, who accompanied AAA and her
father to the Balungao Police Station to bring the criminal complaint for rape. At the request of
the Balungao Police, Dr. Ingrid Irena B. Gancinia, the Municipal Health Officer of Rosales,
Pangasinan, conducted a medical examination on AAA at around 3:30 p.m. of that day.

The findings reflected no hymenal lacerations noted with one examining finger difficult to
penetrate the vaginal canal.

Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan filed the information
charging Reyes with rape. Reyes pleaded not guilty to the information.

Although admitting that AAA and BBB had watched television in his house at the time of
the rape, Reyes insisted that he had been sleeping on the sofa in front of the television set in the
sala of his house from 7:30 p.m. of December 26, 1996 until 2:30 a.m. of the next day. He denied
the accusation, and called attention to the medical findings showing that AAAs hymen was
intact; hence, she was still a virgin.

The RTC convicted Reyes as charged. The CA affirmed Reyes conviction. Hence, this
appeal. Reyes insists that the fact that AAAs hymen had remained intact, per the medico-
legal report, revealed that no rape had been committed.

ISSUE:

WON the evidence adduced by the State competently proved that the crime reached the
consummated stage.

RULING:

YES. His insistence is not persuasive. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, the breaking of the hymen of the victim is not among
the means of consummating rape. All that the law required is that the accused had carnal
knowledge of a woman under the circumstances described in the law. By definition, carnal
knowledge was "the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman." This
understanding of rape explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates
the crime.

During her examination of AAA, Dra. Gancinia found pamamaga (swelling) on the victims
labia majora. Dra. Gancinia opined that such swelling was possibly caused by the insertion of a
hard object, like a hard penis, or by friction with hard objects even without removing the panties
or pants of AAA. Although such medical finding, left alone, was susceptible of different probable
interpretations, AAAs testimonial narration about how Reyes had sexually assaulted her,
including how his penis had only slightly penetrated her vagina, confirmed that he had
carnal knowledge of her.

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More specifically, the presence of the swelling in AAAs labia majora was an
indication of the penetration by the erect penis of the labia majora of the accused. As
such, there was sufficient factual foundation for finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
rape, for, in objective terms, carnal knowledge, the other essential element in consummated
statutory rape, does not require full penile penetration of the female. The mere touching of the
external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to
constitute carnal knowledge. All that is necessary to reach the consummated stage of rape is
for the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act to come into contact with the
lips of the pudendum of the victim. This means that the rape is consummated once the penis of
the accused capable of consummating the sexual act touches either labia of the pudendum. The
touching that constitutes rape does not mean mere epidermal contact, or stroking or grazing of
organs, or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims vagina, or the
mons pubis, but rather the erect penis touching the labias or sliding into the female genitalia.
Accordingly, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum
constitutes consummated rape proceeds from the physical fact that the labias are physically
situated beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, such that for the penis to touch either of
them is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface of the female genitalia. It is
required, however, that this manner of touching of the labias must be sufficiently and
convincingly established.

PEOPLE vs. PLACER


G.R. No. 181753, FIRST DIVISION, October 9, 2013, Bersamin, J.

In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that treachery attended the killing of the
victim, the crime is homicide, not murder.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Treachery is not presumed but must be proved as conclusively as the crime itself. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the unsuspecting victim. Hence, treachery is
absent when the victim was placed on his guard, like when a heated argument has preceded the
attack, or when the victim was standing face to face with his assailants.

FACTS:

Maria Gernale and her husband, Rosalino Gernale, were on their way home on board a
tricycle. They were in the company of Marias father, another female passenger and five young
children. While their tricycle was moving, another tricycle carrying Ramon and Virgilio Placer
(Appellants) almost hit them. Appellants and Rosalino alighted from their respective tricycles and
a heated altercation ensued between them. When things had subsided, Gernale and appellants
proceeded their separate ways.

Sometime later, Maria realized that appellants were chasing them. The latter were able to
overtake the tricycle driven by Rosalino and later blocked its path. Appellants alighted from their
tricycle and proceeded towards the direction of Rosalino who had also alighted from his tricycle.
A confrontation followed and Angelina Gestiada, Rosalinos sister, tried to pacify appellants. But
appellant Ramon Placer did not heed as he stabbed Rosalino in the chest. Maria who was only
about two steps away saw the incident. Rosalino fell towards the direction of his tricycle and just
as he was about to fall, this time Virgilio stabbed him in the stomach.

Thereafter, appellants immediately fled the area on board their tricycle. It was Virgilio
who drove the tricycle. Maria frantically shouted for help and Angelina ran towards the house of
their nearest relative to ask for assistance. Rosalino was brought to the Bulan Municipal Hospital
where he was pronounced dead.

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The RTC convicted Ramon and Virgilio of murder upon finding the Statess version more
credible than that of the Defense.

Ramon and Virgilio appealed via notice of appeal directly to the Court but the Court
remanded the appeal to the CA. Virgilio subsequently filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw
Appeal in the CA, averring that he had already served more than six years in detention for this
case and had thus qualified to apply for parole or executive clemency; that he had already applied
for parole or executive clemency; and that he would need a certification of non-appeal to support
his application for parole or executive clemency.

On the other hand, the CA affirmed Ramons conviction. Ramon still contends that he
incurred no criminal liability because he had acted in self-defense in stabbing Rosalino; that,
assuming that he was criminally liable for the killing of the victim, the crime committed
was homicide, not murder; and that his voluntary surrender was a mitigating circumstance that
entitled him to a lower penalty.

ISSUE:

Whether treachery is present to qualify the killing to murder.

HELD:

No. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. Treachery is not presumed but must be proved as conclusively as the crime itself.

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the unsuspecting victim.
Hence, treachery is absent when the victim was placed on his guard, like when a heated argument
has preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to face with his assailants.

The fatal stabbing of Rosalino by Ramon was immediately preceded by two altercations
between Ramon and Virgilio, on one hand, and Rosalino, on the other. The first altercation
occurred right after the near-collision of the tricycles, while the other happened shortly after
Ramon and Virgilio had blocked Rosalinos tricycle. During the second altercation, Rosalino stood
face to face with Ramon and Virgilio. It was then when Ramon stabbed the victim twice, the
sequential method of attack being borne out in the necropsy report showing that Rosalino had
sustained two fatal stab wounds in the chest and abdomen. Under the circumstances, Rosalino
was rendered completely aware of the imminent danger to himself from Ramon and Virgilio,
rendering their assault far from sudden and unexpected as to put Rosalino off his guard against
any deadly assault. To stress, treachery cannot be appreciated if the victim was forewarned of an
impending danger and could have foreseen the aggression of the accused.

With treachery not being proved beyond reasonable doubt, the crime Ramon was properly
guilty of was homicide.

VIRGILIO TALAMPAS y MATIC v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 180219, November 23, 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

The penalty for homicide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal.
With the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its medium period, or 14 years, eight months, and one day to 17 years and four months.
This is pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. It is such period that the maximum term of
the indeterminate sentence should be reckoned from.

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Jose Sevillo (Jose), Eduardo Matic (Eduardo) and Ernesto Matic (Ernesto) were in front of
Joses house in Bian, Laguna. Jose noticed Virgilio Talampas (Talampas), who was then riding a
bicycle, passed by and stopped. Talampas alighted the bicycle, brought out a revolver, and poked
the same to Eduardo and fired it. Talampas again fired his gun three (3) times one shot hitting
Ernesto at the right portion of his back causing him (Ernesto) to fall on the ground with his face
down; another shot hit Eduardo on his nape causing him (Eduardo) to fall down on his back.
Thereafter, Talampas ran away, while Jose and his neighbors brought Ernesto and Eduardo to the
hospital. The gunshot was fatal to Ernesto, thereby causing his death.

Talampas was charged with homicide. By way of defense, Talampas claimed self-
defense and accidental death.

The trial court rejected his defense and found Talampas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed his
conviction. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the lower courts erred in rejecting his claim of self-defense and
accidental death.
2. Whether or not the imposition of penalty was correct.

RULING:

1. NO. Firstly, in the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and the
victim. The established circumstances indicated that such did not happen here, for it was
Talampas who had initiated the attack only against Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not been at
any time a target of Talampas attack, he having only happened to be present at the scene of the
attack. In reality, neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed any unlawful aggression against
Talampas. Thus, Talampas was not repelling any unlawful aggression from the victim (Ernesto),
thereby rendering his plea of self-defense unwarranted.

Secondly, Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a
defense. The records eliminate the intervention of accident. Talampas brandished and poked
his revolver at Eduardo and fired it, hitting Eduardo, who quickly rushed to seek refuge behind
Ernesto. At that point, Talampas fired his revolver thrice. One shot hit Ernesto at the right
portion of his back and caused Ernesto to fall face down to the ground. Another shot hit
Eduardo on the nape, causing Eduardo to fall on his back. Certainly, Talampas acts were by no
means lawful, being a criminal assault with his revolver against both Eduardo and Ernesto.

Lastly, the fact that the target of Talampas assault was Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not
excuse his hitting and killing of Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct
consequence of Talampas felonious deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas poor aim
amounted to aberratio ictus, or mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him
from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability.

2. NO. The penalty for homicide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court, in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, is mandated to

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prescribe an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal
Code, and the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. With the absence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14
years, eight months, and one day to 17 years and four months. This is pursuant to Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code. It is such period that the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be reckoned from. Hence, limiting the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence at
only 14 years and eight months contravened the express provision of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, for such penalty was within the minimum period of reclusion temporal.
Accordingly, the Court must add one day to the maximum term fixed by the lower courts.

The Court found to be unnecessary the increment of one day as part of the minimum term
of the indeterminate sentence. It may be true that the increment did not constitute an error,
because the minimum term thus fixed was entirely within the parameters of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. Yet, the addition of one day to the 10 years as the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence of Talampas may occasion a degree of inconvenience when it will be
time for the penal administrators concerned to consider and determine whether Talampas is
already qualified to enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Hence, in order to
simplify the computation of the minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence, the Court
deleted the one-day increment from the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence.

The Court imposed the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PATRICIO TAGUIBUYA


G.R. No. 180497, 5 October 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

The accused in a prosecution for rape can be convicted on the basis of the sole testimony
of the victim provided the victim and her testimony are credible, convincing, and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things.

Patricio Taguibuya (Taguibuya) was charged with two counts of rape and violation of
R.A. 7610, committed against his own daughter, AAA, then a minor. Taguibuya pleaded not
guilty and denied the charges claiming that AAA had fabricated the charges for his and his
wifes refusal to allow her to go to Baguio with her boyfriend.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Taguibuya guilty of the two counts of
rape but dismissed the case for violation of R.A. 7610.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the findings of the RTC, specially noting the
credibility of AAA in contrast of the denials of Taguibuya.

Taguibuya appealed in the Supreme Court assailing the convictions for being solely
based on testimony of AAA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting Taguibuya based solely on
testimony of AAA.

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RULING:

NO. The urging of the accused Taguibuya, that the RTC and the CA should not have
accorded faith to the evidence of his guilt because the only witness presented to prove the
accusations was the victim herself, is unworthy of consideration. Such urging cannot acquit
him, considering that it is already settled that the accused in a prosecution for rape can be
convicted on the basis of the sole testimony of the victim provided the victim and her
testimony are credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things. Conviction or acquittal in a prosecution for rape has often depended more often
than not almost entirely on the credibility of the victims testimony, for, by the very nature
of the crime, the victim is usually the only one who can testify on its occurrence.

The Court also reminded that the worth of witnesses has been based on their quality,
not on their quantity. Accordingly, the RTC correctly considered AAA to be forthright and
consistent in her recollection of the details of her ordeals at the hands of her own father.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AVELINO FELAN


G.R. No. 176631, 2 February 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

Although the information alleged that the victim was only 14 years of age at the time of
the rape, the State must duly establish such circumstance by presenting a birth certificate,
baptismal certificate, or other competent document showing the victims age. A testimony
regarding the victims age without any independent proof is insufficient.

On February 12, 1995 at about 10:00 p.m., Felan roused his 14-year-old daughter AAA
from sleep inside their house. He removed her panty, spread her legs, inserted his penis into
her vagina, and made pumping motions until he satisfied himself. AAA, who cried out from
vaginal pain, left and stayed with her friends. She was advised to report the incident to a
social worker from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), which AAA
did. The social worker brought AAA to the police to report the rape, then to the hospital for
medical examination, where AAAs hymen was found to be torn possibly due to sexual
intercourse. Felan denied the allegation, saying that AAA fabricated the story out of anger for
not providing her basic needs and admonishing her to stop using illegal drugs.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Felan of qualified rape and imposed on him the
death penalty. The Court of Appeals (CA) found him guilty of simple rape only because
AAAs minority was not established. Felan was imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Felan appealed before the Supreme Court, saying that AAA was an unreliable witness because
she had poor memory, used illegal drugs, and was engaged in prostitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Felan is guilty of simple rape because AAAs minority was not
established, and despite that AAA allegedly used drugs or was engaged in prostitution.

RULING:

YES. The attempt to discredit AAA on the ground of her being a user of illegal drugs
and of her having engaged in prostitution deserved no consideration. First of all, AAAs use of
illegal drugs and engaging in prostitution, even if true, did not destroy her credibility as a
witness or negate the rape. Indeed, the Court has ruled that the victims moral character was
immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of an accused for rape, there being absolutely
no nexus between it and the odious deed committed. Moreover, even a prostitute or a woman
of loose morals could fall victim of rape, for she could still refuse a mans lustful advances.

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The CA correctly pronounced the accused liable for simple rape and properly punished
him with reclusion perpetua. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, supra, rape is qualified and punished by death if it is
alleged and proved that the victim was a minor during the commission of the crime and that
the offender was her parent. Although the information alleged that the victim was only 14
years of age at the time of the rape, the State did not duly establish such circumstance
because no birth certificate, or baptismal certificate, or other competent document showing
her age was presented. Her testimony regarding her age without any independent proof is not
sufficient. As a result, the penalty for simple rape was properly reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEY TORIAGA


G.R. No. 177145, 9 February 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

The defense of consensual sexual intercourse, like the sweetheart defense, demands
corroboration.

Toriaga was a close friend and a drinking buddy of the victim AAAs father, and an
employee in the balut business of AAAs aunt, CCC. He was given a sleeping area inside CCCs
house. AAA, then 13 years old, was keeping watch of CCCs house while the latter went out
with her family. At the night of November 26, 1995, Toriaga was drinking at the house of
AAAs father, only 20 meters away. Early in the evening, Toriaga came to CCCs house
drunk. AAA let him in, and then she went upstairs to watch television.

When she believed Toriaga was about to sleep after opening his folding bed and
switching off the lights, AAA sat on the stairs. But then Toriaga held an ice pick to her neck
and dragged her downstairs where he ordered her to strip naked and lie on the folding bed.
Toriaga mounted her and AAA felt him insert his penis in her vagina. He only stopped because
AAA pretended to be unconscious.

Toriaga then dragged her back upstairs. AAA felt the ice pick to her stomach, so she lied face
down to protect herself from the slash. But Toriaga stabbed her back until he believed her
to be dead. Afterwards, he left the house. AAA, only pretending to be dead, crawled to the
window and shouted for help. The neighbors came to her rescue. Two separate Information
was filed for rape and frustrated homicide. Toriaga was convicted for the latter.

Before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Toriaga said he merely returned to CCCs
house and slept. He was convicted of rape. Before the Court of Appeals (CA), Toriaga
changed into an affirmative defense of consensual sexual intercourse with AAA, and that he
should only be liable for qualified seduction. The CA affirmed the rape conviction.

Before the Supreme Court (SC), Toriaga based his defense of consensual intercourse on
the fact that AAA did not shout for help and on her failure to escape when Toriaga
momentarily left her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Toriaga is guilty of rape despite his allegation of consensual sexual
intercourse with AAA.

RULING:

YES. The defense of consensual sexual intercourse, like the sweetheart defense, demands
corroboration. Yet, Toriaga offered no corroboration, thereby exposing his belatedly offered

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defense as a self-serving after-thought resorted to after his original defenses of denial and alibi
had failed to ensure his acquittal by the CA. Thus, his new defense deserved scant
consideration.

The physical evidence spoke more vividly than the testimony of AAA, whose multiple
injuries confirmed the use of brutal force and violence in her rape. Also, the multiple stab
wounds she sustained negated his claim of consensual sexual intercourse.

The CAs rejection of Toriagas contention of being liable only for qualified seduction
was correct. Indeed, the information did not allege the presence of the elements of qualified
seduction, to wit: (a) that AAA was a virgin; (b) that she was over 12 and under 18 years of age;
(c) that he had sexual intercourse with her; and (d) that there was abuse of authority, or of
confidence, or of relationship.

The RTC and the CA correctly determined the penalty of reclusion perpetua as
imposable. The information alleged the use of a bladed weapon in the commission of the
rape. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is
committed with use of a deadly weapon, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
The prosecution established that Toriaga wielded an ice pick to intimidate her into submission
and later to assault AAA with intent to kill her to seal her mouth forever. Under Article 63, 2,
Revised Penal Code, where the prescribed penalties of reclusion perpetua and death, and there
are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances present or attendant, like herein, the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposable.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHARLIE BUTIONG


G.R. No. 168932, 19 October 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

In the rape of a woman deprived of reason or unconscious, the victim has no will. The
absence of will determines the existence of rape. Such lack may exist not only when the victim is
unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also when she is suffering some mental deficiency
impairing her reason
or free will.

AAA, then a 29-year old mental retardate, was invited by Charlie Butiong (Butiong)
to go over his house. As she had stepped inside the house, Butiong locked the door and took
off his shorts. He successfully had carnal knowledge of AAA. AAA told her sister about what
happened and was brought to the police station and National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
AAA underwent medico- legal examination which revealed that hymen was intact but orifice
is wide. Noticing disorientation of AAA, she was endorsed to psychiatric section for
evaluation. The results showed that she had a mild level of mental retardation and that her
mental age was that of a child aged six to seven years old.

Butiongs only witness, an expert psychologist, assailed the reliability of the tests
utilized to evaluate the retardation of AAA. The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment
finding Butiong guilty of rape noting that there was nothing in the witness testimony that
would invalidate the findings of psychologists of National Center for Mental Health. The
Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction in toto.

Butiong contended that State did not establish rape because there is no evidence
showing the exact date of the rape and presence of spermatozoa from victims genitalia; that
the test used to evaluate AAA retardation was unreliable for not ascertaining personal history
and examinations by clinician as required in People v. Cartuano; and that the State did not
establish elements of rape considering that metal retardate did not qualify as a woman
deprived of reason and woman under 12 years of age.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not State sufficiently established rape committed to AAA and her
mental retardation.

RULING:

YES. Rape has been sufficiently established. The exact date of rape and the absence of
spermatozoa from womans genitalia are not elements of rape. The date of rape need not to be
precisely proved nor did the absence of spermatozoa negate or disprove the rape. The basic
element of rape is carnal knowledge which includes even the slightest penetration of the
genitalia. As such, mere touching of external genitalia constitutes consummated rape.

Rape was committed because AAA was mental retardate. In rape committed by force, the
will of victim is nullified; hence, the necessity in proving real resistance on part of woman.
In rape of a woman deprived of reason, the woman has no will. In that case, it is not
necessary that she should offer real opposition or resistance. Carnal knowledge of woman so
weak in intellect as to be incapable of legal consent constitutes rape under paragraph 1 of
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. The traditional degrees of mental retardation are: a)
idiot, having an IQ of 0 to 19 and equivalent to two- year old child; b) imbecile, having IQ of
20 to 49 and equivalent to seven-year old child; and c) moron, having IQ of 50 to 69 and
equivalent to twelve-year old child. AAA, considering the findings of the psychologist, had
mental age of six to sever years old and is equated with imbecility. The thorough evaluation of
history of the victim and the laboratory examination by a clinician were not necessary because
the case did lack any clinical findings on the mentality of the victim as opposed to the case of
People v. Cartuano. As such, Butiongs carnal knowledge of AAA amounted to rape of a person
deprived of reason.

Crimes against Property

PEOPLE vs. WAGAS


G.R. No. 157943, First Division, September 4, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.*

The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. In order to overcome the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is required
to adduce against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such proof is not only in
relation to the elements of the offense, but also in relation to the identity of the offender. If the
Prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the accused to be
freed, it becomes the Court's constitutional duty to acquit him.

Criminal Law; Estafa; Estafa by Postdating Checks; In order to constitute estafa under this
statutory provision, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the
efficient cause of the defraudation; In other words, the Prosecution must show that the person to
whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the
issuance of the check by the offender.

Same; Same; Same; Elements of.The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a)
a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is
issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof.
It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the non-
payment of a debt. Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer of the
check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of
the notice of dishonor.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; In every criminal prosecution,
however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond

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reasonable doubt.In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime
itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did
not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing
the check.

Mercantile Law; Negotiable Instruments Law; Checks; Under the Negotiable Instruments
Law, a check payable to cash is payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery
without the need of an indorsement.The check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash.
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be
negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an indorsement. This rendered it highly probable
that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Caada, his brother-in-
law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself see
or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the person
who signed for and received the stocks of rice was Caada.

Criminal Law; Estafa; Estafa by Postdating Checks; What the law punishes is the fraud or
deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check.It bears stressing that the accused, to be
guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in order to defraud the complainant. What
the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could
not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The
proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded
Ligaray by means of the check.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Under the law of evidence, the court shall consider evidence solely
for the purpose for which it is offered, not for any other purpose.The letter of Wagas did not
competently establish that he was the person who had conversed with Ligaray by telephone to
place the order for the rice. The letter was admitted exclusively as the States rebuttal evidence to
controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of entering into any transaction with Ligaray on the
rice; hence, it could be considered and appreciated only for that purpose. Under the law of
evidence, the court shall consider evidence solely for the purpose for which it is offered, not for
any other purpose. Fairness to the adverse party demands such exclusivity. Moreover, the high
plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he had signed the letter only because his sister and
her husband had pleaded with him to do so could not be taken for granted.

Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct
identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the offense with
the participation of the accused. The first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but
to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the commission of the crime can be
established, without competent proof of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
there can be no conviction.

Criminal Law; Estafa; Civil Liability; An accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be
held civilly liable where the preponderance of the established facts so warrants.An accused,
though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where the preponderance of the
established facts so warrants. Wagas as the admitted drawer of the check was legally liable to pay
the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due course. Consequently, we pronounce and hold him
fully liable to pay the amount of the dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from
the finality of this decision.

FACTS:

Wagas was charged with estafa. After Wagas entered a plea of not guilty, the pre-trial was
held, during which the Defense admitted that the check alleged in the information had been
dishonored due to insufficient funds.

At the trial, the Prosecution presented complainant Ligaray as its lone witness. Ligaray
testified that Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone; that he released the
goods to Wagas and at the same time received BPI check for P200,000.00 payable to cash and

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postdated; that he later deposited the check but the check was dishonored due to insufficiency of
funds; that despite repeated demands, Wagas did not pay him.

On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet Wagas because
they transacted through telephone only; that he released the 200 bags of rice directly to Robert
Canada, the brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt upon receiving the rice.

In his defense, Wagas admitted having issued the BPI check to Canada, not to Ligaray. He
denied having any telephone conversation or any dealings with Ligaray. He explained that the
check was intended as payment for a portion of Canadas property that he wanted to buy, but
when the sale did not push through, he did not anymore fund the check.

On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a letter apparently signed


by hi, and addressed to Ligarays counsel, wherein he admitted owing Ligaray P200,000.00 for
goods received. However, he insisted that he had signed the letter only because his sister and her
husband (Canada) had begged him to assume the responsibility.

The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged. Wagas appealed
directly to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal.

ISSUE:

WON Wagas is guilty of estafa.

RULING:

NO. In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or
issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This
means that the offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by
reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the Prosecution
must show that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his
money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender.

The essential elements of the crime charged are that:


(a) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time
the check is issued
(b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check and
(c) damage to the payee thereof.

It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the
nonpayment of a debt. Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer of
the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt
of the notice of dishonor.

In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself,
must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not
establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the
check.

Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom
he was transacting over the telephone. Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not
personally see and meet whoever he had dealt with and to whom he had made the demand for
payment, and that he had talked with him only over the telephone.

Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere
delivery without the need of an indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had
issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Caada, his brother-in-law, who then

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negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself see or meet Wagas
at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who signed for
and received the stocks of rice was Caada.

It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the
check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the
mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he
had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had
been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check.

Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Caada who received the rice from him and who
delivered the check to him. Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that Caada
was then acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no factual and legal bases to conclude and find
that Caada had been acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and legal bases for the RTC to infer so
obtained despite Wagas being Caadas brother-in-law.

The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person who had
conversed with Ligaray by telephone to place the order for the rice. The letter was admitted
exclusively as the States rebuttal evidence to controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of
entering into any transaction with Ligaray on the rice hence, it could be considered and
appreciated only for that purpose. Under the law of evidence, the court shall consider evidence
solely for the purpose for which it is offered, not for any other purpose. Fairness to the adverse
party demands such exclusivity. Moreover, the high plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that
he had signed the letter only because his sister and her husband had pleaded with him to do so
could not be taken for granted.

It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus probandi in
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei
incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who asserts, not he who denies,
must prove, and as a means of respecting the presumption of innocence in favor of the man or
woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the
correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the
offense with the participation of the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State beyond
reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the
defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is inconsequential if, in the first place,
the State has failed to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability. The presumption of
innocence dictates that it is for the Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused
to establish innocence. Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof
on his or her shoulders. For this reason, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime
but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the commission of the crime can be
established, without competent proof of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
there can be no conviction.

An accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where the
preponderance of the established facts so warrants. Wagas as the admitted drawer of the
check was legally liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due course. Consequently,
we pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the amount of the dishonored check, plus legal
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARISSA BAYKER


G.R. No. 170192, February 10, 2016, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION

An illegal recruiter can be liable for the crimes of illegal recruitment committed in large
scale and estafa without risk of being put in double jeopardy, provided that the accused has been so
charged under separate informations.

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Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment; Elements of.Illegal recruitment is committed by a


person who: (a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited
practice enumerated under Article 34 and Article 38 of the Labor Code; and (b) does not have a
license or authority to lawfully engagein the recruitment and placement of workers. It is
committed in large scale when it is committed against three or more persons individually or as a
group.

Same; Same; Even the mere employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal
recruitment could be held liable, along with the employer, as a principal in illegal recruitment once it
was shown that he had actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment.The accused-
appellants denial of her participation in the illegal recruitment activities of Bermudez and
Langreo did not gain traction from her charging her co-accused with the sole responsibility for
the illegal recruitment of the complainants. Based on the testimonial narration of the
complainants regarding their recruitment, she was unqualifiedly depicted as having the primary
and instrumental role in recruiting them for overseas placement from the inception. Also, her
claim of having been only casually associated with GNB Marketing did not preclude her criminal
liability for the crimes charged and proved. Even the mere employee of a company or corporation
engaged in illegal recruitment could be held liable, along with the employer, as a principal in
illegal recruitment once it was shown that he had actively and consciously participated in illegal
recruitment. This is because recruitment and placement include any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, as well as referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.

Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale; Estafa; Double Jeopardy; The conviction of
the accused-appellant for illegal recruitment committed in large scale did not preclude her personal
liability for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) on the ground of
subjecting her to double jeopardy; Double jeopardy could not result from prosecuting and convicting
the accused-appellant for both crimes considering that they were entirely distinct from each other
not only from their being punished under different statutes but also from their elements being
different.The conviction of the accused-appellant for illegal recruitment committed in large
scale did not preclude her personal liability for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal
Code on the ground of subjecting her to double jeopardy. The elements of estafa as charged are,
namely: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2)
the offended party, or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.
In contrast, the crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale, as indicated earlier, requires
different elements. Double jeopardy could not result from prosecuting and convicting the
accused-appellant for both crimes considering that they were entirely distinct from each other
not only from their being punished under different statutes but also from their elements being
different.

FACTS:

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati filed in the RTC in Makati two separate
amended informations Illegal Recruitment and Estafa against Marissa Bayker, Nida Bermudez and
Lorenz Langreo.

Only Bayker and Langreo were arrested because Bermudez, who eluded arrest, continues
to remain at large. However, the trial proceeded only against Bayker because of the lack of
notification of subsequent proceedings to Langreo.

The State presented four witnesses, namely: Virgilio Caniazares, Reynaldo Dahab, Basilio
Miparanum and PO3 Raul Bolido.

Caniazares testified that he and Dahab had met Bayker at the house of a friend in Makati
City, and she had then presented herself to be recruiting workers for overseas employment,
probably as hotel porters in Canada; that he had gone to her residence in Pembo, Makati City to
pay P4,000.00 for his medical examination, and she had then accompanied him to the Medical
Center in Ermita, Manila for that purpose; that she had gone to his house to inform him that he

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would be deployed as a seaman instead but the he had to pay P6,000.00 more; that he had paid
the P6,000.00 to her, for which she had issued a receipt; that two weeks thereafter, she had called
him about his deployment; that he had gone to her office but no one was around; that he had
then proceeded to her house, and she had then told him that his seamans application would not
push through; that the two of them had then proceeded to her office bringing all his certificates of
employment, and that it was here that she had introduced him to her manager, Bermudez, who
promised his deployment in Hongkong within two weeks; that because he had not been deployed
as promised, he had gone to the POEA, where he had learned that the accused had not been
issued the license to recruit and place people overseas; and that he had then decided to charge
them all with illegal recruitment and estafa in the PNP-CIDG in Camp Crame, Q.C.

Dahab declared that he had met the Bayker at the Guadalupe Branch of Jollibee to pay
P2,500.00 for his medical examination; that a week later, he had undergone the three-day training
in Mandaluyong City, for which he paid P2,500.00; that she had then demanded from him the
placement fee of P25,000.00; and that after he had not been able t raise the amount, he never saw
her again; and that Caniazares soon called him to urge that he should complain against the
accused in the PNP-CIDG.

According to Miparanum, he met Bayker through Caniazares, who was his cousin.
Miparanum went to the residence of Bayker to apply as a seaman. He delivered to her P6,000.00
for his seamans book. She again asked an additional P6,000.00 for the seamans book, and
P40,000.00 as the placement fee. Miparanum followed up on his application after two weeks, but
was instead made to undergo training, and he paid P2,700.00 for his certificate. Sensing that he
was being defrauded, Miparanum later proceeded to file his complaint at the PNP-CIDG.

Subsequently, Dahab recanted his testimony, and stated that he had only requested
assistance from Bayker regarding his medical examination. He insisted that he had voluntarily
paid P5,000.00 to her and she had then paid the amount to the Medical Center for his medical
examination.

The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for having violated Section
6(m) of RA8042 and for the crime of estafa. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE:

WON the accused is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa. Yes.

RULING:

I. Illegal Recruitment Committed in Large Scale

Illegal recruitment is committed by a person who: (a) undertakes any recruitment activity
defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 and Article 38
of the Labor Code; and (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers. It is committed in large scale when it is committed against
three or more persons individually or as a group.

The accused-appellants denial of her participation in the illegal recruitment activities of


Bermudez and Langreo did not gain traction from her charging her co-accused with the sole
responsibility for the illegal recruitment of the complainants. Based on the testimonial narration
of the complainants regarding the recruitment, she was unqualifiedly depicted as having the
primary and instrumental role in recruiting them for overseas placement from the inception. Also,
her claim of having been only casually associated with GNB Marketing did not preclude her
criminal liability for the crimes charged and proved. Even the mere employee of a company or
corporation can be engaged in illegal recruitment once it was shown that he had actively
and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. This is because recruitment and
placement include any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or

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procuring workers, as well as referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for


employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.

Dahabs supposed recantation by no means weakened or diminished the case. Its being
made after he had lodged his complaint against her with the PNP-CIDG (in which he supplied the
details of his transactions with he) and after he had testified against her in court directly
incriminating her rendered it immediately suspect. It should not be moreweighty than his first
testimony against her which that was replete with details. Its being the later testimony of Dahad
did not necessarily cancel his first testimony on account of the possibility of its being obtained by
coercion, intimidation, fraud, or other means to distort or bend the truth.

Recantation by a witness is nothing new, for it is a frequent occurrence in criminal


proceedings. As a general rule, it is not well regarded by the courts due to its nature as the mere
afterthought of the witness. To be given any value or weight, it should still be subjected to the
same tests for credibility in addition to its being subject of the rule that it be received with
caution. The criminal proceedings in which sworn testimony has been given by the recanting
witness would be rendered a mockery, and put at the mercy of the unscrupulous witness if such
testimony could be easily negated by the witnesss subsequent inconsistent declaration. The result
is to leave without value not only the sanctity of the oath taken but also the solemn rituals and
safeguards of the judicial trial. If only for emphasis, we reiterate that it is a dangerous rule to
reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who has given it
later on changed his mind for one reason or another, for such a rule will make a solemn trial a
mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.

II. Estafa

The conviction for illegal recruitment committed in large scale did not preclude the
personal liability for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC on the ground of subjecting
to double jeopardy. The elements of estafa as charged are, namely: (1) the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party, or a third party
suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. In contrast, the crime of illegal
recruitment committed in large scale requires different elements. Double jeopardy could not
result from prosecuting and convicting the accused for both crimes considering that they were
entirely distinct from each other not only from their being punished under different statutes but
also from their elements being different.

The active representation by the accused of having the capacity to deploy abroad despite
not having the authority or license to do so from the POEA constituted deceit as the first element
of estafa. Her representation induced the victim to part with his money, resulting in damage that
is the second element of the estafa.

Crimes against Chastity

NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,


respondent.
G.R. No. 166441 October 8, 2014, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.

The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted
rape and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts
of lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts of the offender establish the intent to lie with
the female. However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape
without proof of his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate the females vagina.

Criminal Law; Rape; Rape is consummated once the penis capable of consummating the
sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female.The basic element of rape then and now is
carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge is defined simply as the act of a man having
sexual bodily connections with a woman, which explains why the slightest penetration of the

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female genitalia consummates the rape. In other words, rape is consummated once the penis
capable of consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female.

Same; Same; Frustrated Rape; As the evolving case law on rape stands, rape in its frustrated
stage is a physical impossibility, considering that the requisites of a frustrated felony under Article 6
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are that: (1) the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony; and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of
the perpetrators will. Obviously, the offender attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal
knowledge of his victim.It is noteworthy that in People v. Orita, 184 SCRA 105 (1990), the Court
clarified that the ruling in People v. Eriia, 50 Phil. 998 (1927), whereby the offender was declared
guilty of frustrated rape because of lack of conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ
of the offended party, was a stray decision for not having been reiterated in subsequent cases. As
the evolving case law on rape stands, therefore, rape in its frustrated stage is a physical
impossibility, considering that the requisites of a frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code are that: (1) the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony; and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrators
will. Obviously, the offender attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his
victim, because from that moment all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished, leaving nothing more to be done by him.

Same; Same; Attempted Rape; In attempted rape, the concrete felony is rape, but the
offender does not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge.In attempted rape,
therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of execution
of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape,
and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that should
produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be
shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his
intent to lie with the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of
criminal law, that showing must be through his overt acts directly connected with rape. He
cannot be held liable for attempted rape without such overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie
with the female. In short, the State, to establish attempted rape, must show that his overt acts,
should his criminal intent be carried to its complete termination without being thwarted by
extraneous matters, would ripen into rape, for, as succinctly put in People v. Dominguez, Jr., 636
SCRA 134 (2010): The gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had been
committed is the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis
into the vagina, before the interruption.

Same; Same; As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) for as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their
equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the perpetrators intent really was.We
clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted rape did
not include equivocal preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts directly
connected to rape as the intended crime, but the latter, whether external or internal, had no
connection with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the preparatory acts
would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony. His preparatory acts could
include his putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the
other for himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that
evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct connection to rape. As a
rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Code for as long as they
remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no one could
determine with certainty what the perpetrators intent really was.

Same; Acts of Lasciviousness; Attempted Rape; It is obvious that the fundamental difference
between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the offenders intent to lie with the female.It
is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is
the offenders intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable,
but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed, therefore,

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when the touching of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent
to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the
sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the felony of
acts of lasciviousness is committed.

Same; Same; Elements of.Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of
acts of lasciviousness is consummated when the following essential elements concur, namely: (a)
the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of either sex; and
(b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or
(ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the
offended party is under 12 years of age. In that regard, lewd is defined as obscene, lustful,
indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality that has relation to moral impurity; or
that which is carried on a wanton manner.

Same; Rape; The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner,
even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape.
The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own
declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. A good
illustration of this can be seen in People v. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 (1997), where the accused was
charged with attempted rape through an information alleging that he, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission
of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of
the undersigned [complainant], a minor, and about to lay on top of her, all against her will,
however, [he] did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
Rape by reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, undersigned
complainant push[ed] him away. The accused was held liable only for acts of lasciviousness
because the intent to commit rape is not apparent from the act described, and the intent to have
sexual intercourse with her was not inferable from the act of licking her genitalia. The Court also
pointed out that the act imputed to him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual
intercourse.

Same; Acts of Lasciviousness; Penalties; Pursuant to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), the petitioner, being guilty of acts of lasciviousness, is punished with prisin correccional.
Pursuant to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner, being guilty of acts of
lasciviousness, is punished with prisin correccional. In the absence of modifying circumstances,
prisin correccional is imposed in its medium period, which ranges from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum of the penalty should come from arresto mayor, the penalty next lower than
prisin correccional which ranges from one (1) month to six (6) months. Accordingly, the Court
fixes the indeterminate sentence of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two (2)
years, four (4) months and one day of prisin correccional, as the maximum.

FACTS:

Petitioner Norberto Bartolome and his wife Belinda Cruz were engaged in the selling of
plastic wares and glass wares in different municipalities around the country. Norberto and
Belinda employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their wares in Bangar, La Union. Upon
reaching Bangar, La Union, they brought out all the goods and wares for display. Two tents were
fixed in order that they will have a place to sleep. Belinda and the driver proceeded to Manila in
order to get more goods to be sold.

At around 1:00 oclock in the morning, AAA and BBB went to sleep. Less than an hour
later, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her. Norberto was mashing
her breast and touching her private part. AAA realized that she was divested of her clothing and
that she was totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to scream or shell be killed. AAA tried to
push Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas fell on deaf ears. She fought
back and kicked Norberto twice. Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires.

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Petitioner was convicted of attempted rape in the RTC. The conviction was affirmed by CA
on appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners climbing on top of the undressed AAA such that they
faced each other, with him mashing her breasts and touching her genitalia with his hands,
constituted attempted rape.

RULING:

The act constitutes acts of lasciviousness and not attempted rape.

In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not
perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the
female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement
of the commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts
of execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by
the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a
clear showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is
beyond the sphere of criminal law, that showing must be through his overt acts directly
connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted rape without such overt acts
demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short, the State, to establish attempted rape,
must show that his overt acts, should his criminal intent be carried to its complete termination
without being thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape, for, as succinctly put in
People v. Dominguez, Jr.: The gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had
been committed is the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the
penis into the vagina, before the interruption.

The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia
with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively
ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his
intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs
towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or susceptible of double
interpretation.

If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute acts of
lasciviousness? It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness is the offenders intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female
is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted rape is
committed, therefore, when the touching of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to
penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such
showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.

The information charged that the petitioner remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id]
on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast. With such allegation of the
information being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty
only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her vagina
and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his
erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference
about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.

Crimes against the Civil Status of Persons

NOEL A. LASANAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 159031, FIRST DIVISION, June 23, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.

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Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her first marriage, albeit on its face void and inexistent for lack of a marriage
license, is guilty of bigamy as defined and penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

Civil Law; Family Code; - The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of
the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused and Socorro. The
requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a
subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit: Article 40. The absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

Same; Same; Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance
of criminal liability for bigamy.Considering that the accuseds subsequent marriage to Josefa
was an undisputed fact, the third element of bigamy was established. Nonetheless, he submits
that his marriage to Josefa was invalid because of lack of a recorded judgment of nullity of
marriage. Such argument had no worth, however, because it was he himself who failed to secure a
judicial declaration of nullity of his previous marriage prior to contracting his subsequent
marriage. In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 272 (2004), the Court has explained that
[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate
that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage.

FACTS:

On February 16, 1968, Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the MTC of San Miguel, Iloilo solemnized
the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo without the benefit of a marriage
license. The records show that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of
cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license. On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo
reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose
Church in Iloilo City. They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that
purpose. Both ceremonies were evidenced by the corresponding marriage certificates. In 1982,
Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because of irreconcilable differences.

On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a
religious ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their
marriage certificate reflected the civil status of the accused as single.

On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and
damages against Socorro in the RTC in Iloilo City. The complaint alleged that Socorro had
employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in securing his consent to their marriage; and that
subsequent marital breaches, psychological incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him to
suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and social humiliation warranting the award of damages.
In support of his complaint, he further alleged, among others, that he was married to the
defendant on February 16, 1968 which marriage was officiated by Hon. Carlos B. Salazar,
Municipal Judge of San Miguel, Iloilo which marriage was ratified by a wedding at San Jose
Church, Iloilo City on August 27, 1980 and registered at the office of Iloilo City Registrar.

In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iloilo City. After due proceedings, the accused was formally indicted for bigamy. On
November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39) rendered its judgment in Civil Case No. 23133 dismissing
the accuseds complaint for annulment of marriage, and declaring the marriage between him and
Socorro valid and legal. The accused appealed to the CA.

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The RTC (Branch 38) found accused NOEL LASANAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of BIGAMY punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Aggrieved, the
accused appealed his conviction to the CA, contended that because he had not been legally
married to Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not established. However, the CA dismissed
the appeal.

Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari. He argues that the
RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, asserting that the civil law rule embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a
judicial declaration of nullity before one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply
in this purely criminal prosecution; that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he
should still be acquitted because his subsequent marriage was null and void for being without a
recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the
Family Code; that, consequently, an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the
subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking; and that his good faith and lack of criminal intent
were sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability.

ISSUE:

WON the accused is guilty of Bigamy?

RULING:

YES. Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing elements
attendant.

The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of a
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused and Socorro. The
requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a
subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code.

The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.

In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity
is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires
is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.

We note that in petitioners case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was
declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration
of nullity of his first marriage. Following petitioners argument, even assuming that a complaint
has been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a
decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such
cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or
inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and eventually
file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioners strained reading of the law is against its simple
letter.

Pursuant to Teves, the accuseds conviction for bigamy is affirmed. The crime of
bigamy was consummated from the moment he contracted the second marriage without his
marriage to Socorro being first judicially declared null and void, because at the time of the
celebration of the second marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still deemed valid and subsisting
due to such marriage not being yet declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction. What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy, is when he contracts a

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second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is
that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

The accuseds defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration


especially because the records show that he had filed a complaint for the annulment of
his marriage with Socorro prior to the institution of the criminal complaint against him
but after he had already contracted his second marriage with Josefa. But even such defense
would abandon him because the RTC (Branch 39) dismissed his complaint for annulment of
marriage after the information for bigamy had already been filed against him, thus confirming the
validity of his marriage to Socorro.

Considering that the accuseds subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed


fact, the third element of bigamy was established. Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage
to Josefa was invalid because of lack of a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage. Such argument
had no worth, however, because it was he himself who failed to secure a judicial declaration of
nullity of his previous marriage prior to contracting his subsequent marriage. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. A
plain reading of Article 349 of the RPC, therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the
States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure
that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of
futurity and commitment.

QUASI-OFFENSES

REYNALDO S. MARIANO VS PEOPLE


G.R. No. 178145. July 7, 2014, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.:

To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere
negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard of the
consequences is required. The Prosecution must further show the direct causal connection between
the negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. In the absence of any cogent reasons,
therefore, the Court bows to the CAs observations that the petitioner had driven his pick-up truck at
a fast speed in order to overtake the jeep of Ferdinand, and in so attempting to overtake unavoidably
hit Ferdinand, causing the latters injuries.

Contrary to the petitioners insistence, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender


cannot be appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal Code, expressly states
that in the imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.

Criminal Law Reckless Imprudence Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but


without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason
of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform
such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

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Same Same Penalties The penalty for the offender guilty of reckless imprudence is
based on the gravity of the resulting injuries had his act been intentional.The penalty for
the offender guilty of reckless imprudence is based on the gravity of the resulting injuries
had his act been intentional. Thus, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code stipulates that
had the act been intentional, and would constitute a grave felony, the offender shall suffer
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisin correccional in its medium period if it
would have constituted a less grave felony, arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed and if it would have constituted a light felony, arresto menor in
its maximum period shall be imposed. Pursuant to Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, a
grave felony is that to which the law attaches the capital punishment or a penalty that in
any of its periods is afflictive in accordance with Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code a
less grave felony is that which the law punishes with a penalty that is correctional in its
maximum period in accordance with Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code and a light
felony is an infraction of law for the commission of which a penalty of either arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both is provided.

FACTS:

Ferdinand de Leon was driving his owner type jeep along Barangay Engkanto, Angat,
Bulacan. Accused-appellant Reynaldo Mariano was driving his red Toyota pick-up with his wife,
Rebecca, and their helper, Rowena Aos, as passengers.

The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon and almost bumped it.
Ferdinand got mad, overtook the pick-up and blocked its path. Reynaldo Mariano stopped the
pick-up behind the jeep. Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and approached Reynaldo. Ferdinand
claimed that he and Reynaldo had an altercation. However, Reynaldo insisted that he just stayed
inside the pick-up and kept quiet while Ferdinand hurled invectives at him. Urbanita tried to
pacify Ferdinand and sought the assistance of Luis de Leon. Luis intervened and told Ferdinand
and Reynaldo magpasensiyahan na lamang kayo at pagpasensiyahan mo si Ferdinand.
Ferdinand and Reynaldo heeded the advice of Luis and they went their separate ways.

Ferdinand decided to drop by his mothers house in San Roque, Angat to pick up some
items. He parked his jeep in front of the house of his mother and alighted therefrom. However, he
was bumped by a moving vehicle, thrown four (4) meters away and lost consciousness.

Ferdinand was brought to the Sto. Nio Hospital in Bustos, Bulacan, where he stayed for
two and a half days and incurred medical expenses amounting to P17,800.00 On September 15,
1999, Ferdinand was transferred to St. Lukes Medical Center in Quezon City, where he stayed
until September 25, 1999 and incurred medical expenses amounting to P66,243.25. He likewise
spent P909.50 for medicines, P2,900.00 for scanning, P8,000.00 for doctors fee and P12,550.00 for
the services of his caregivers and masseur from September 12 to October 31, 1999. Ferdinand
suffered multiple facial injuries, a fracture of the inferior part of the right orbital wall and
subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe head trauma, as evidenced by the certification issued by
Dr. Hernando L. Cruz, Jr. of St. Lukes Medical Center. Urbanita, received the amount of
P50,000.00 from Reynaldo Mariano by way of financial assistance, as evidenced by a receipt dated
September 15, 1999.

The RTC convicted the petitioner of frustrated homicide. On appeal, the CA modified the
felony committed by the petitioner from frustrated homicide to reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify Ferdinand de Leon in the amount of
P58,402.75 as actual damages and P10,000.00 as moral damages.

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ISSUES:

1. WON the conviction of petitiner for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries is proper?
2. WON voluntary surrender may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance in favor of
petitioner?
3. WON the penalty imposed by the CA is correct?

RULING:

1. YES. We affirm the conviction of the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an


act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons,
time and place. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more
than a mere negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard
of the consequences is required. The Prosecution must further show the direct causal connection
between the negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. In the absence of any cogent
reasons, therefore, the Court bows to the CAs observations that the petitioner had driven his
pick-up truck at a fast speed in order to overtake the jeep of Ferdinand, and in so attempting to
overtake unavoidably hit Ferdinand, causing the latters injuries.

2. NO. Contrary to the petitioners insistence, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary


surrender cannot be appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal Code,
expressly states that in the imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.

3. NO, CA erred in imposing on the petitioner the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting
in serious physical injuries.

The penalty for the offender guilty of reckless imprudence is based on the gravity of the
resulting injuries had his act been intentional. Thus, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
stipulates that had the act been intentional, and would constitute a grave felony, the offender
shall suffer arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it
would have constituted a less grave felony, arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed; and if it would have constituted a light felony, arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed. Pursuant to Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, a grave felony is that to
which the law attaches the capital punishment or a penalty that in any of its periods is afflictive in
accordance with Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code; a less grave felony is that which the law
punishes with a penalty that is correctional in its maximum period in accordance with Article 25
of the Revised Penal Code; and a light felony is an infraction of law for the commission of which a
penalty of either arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both is provided.

Ferdinand had sustained multiple facial injuries, a fracture of the inferior part of the right
orbital wall, and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe head trauma; that he had become
stuporous and disoriented as to time, place and person. It was also on record that he had testified
at the trial that he was unable to attend to his general merchandise store for three months due to
temporary amnesia; and that he had required the attendance of caregivers and a masseur until
October 31, 1999.

With Ferdinand not becoming insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind, his physical injuries
did not fall under Article 263, 1, supra. Consequently, the CA incorrectly considered the
petitioners act as a grave felony had it been intentional, and should not have imposed the penalty
at arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. Instead, the
petitioners act that caused the serious physical injuries, had it been intentional, would be a less

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grave felony under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, because Ferdinands physical injuries
were those under Article 263, 3, supra, for having incapacitated him from the performance of the
work in which he was habitually engaged in for more than 90 days.

Conformably with Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from one to four months. As earlier
mentioned, the rules in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code are not applicable in reckless
imprudence, and considering further that the maximum term of imprisonment would not exceed
one year, rendering the Indeterminate Sentence Law inapplicable, the Court holds that the
straight penalty of two months of arresto mayor was the correct penalty for the petitioner.

SPECIAL LAWS

Anti-Child Abuse Law (R.A. No. 7610, as amended)

GEORGE BONGALON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.*

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse
under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is
punished under the Revised Penal Code.

FACTS:

On May 11, 2000 at Legazpi City, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit on the person of Jayson Dela Cruz, 12 years of age, acts of
physical abuse by striking said child with his palm hitting the latter at his back and by slapping
him hitting his left cheek and uttering derogatory remarks to the latters family, which acts of the
accused are prejudicial to the childs development and which demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of the said child as a human being.

Further, the Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson and his older brother
Roldan, both minors, joined the procession for the Santo Nio; that when the procession passed
in front of the house of Bongalon, the latters daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones
at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that he confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names like
"strangers" and "animals"; that he struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on
the face; that the petitioner then went to the brothers house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz,
their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house; that Rolando later brought
Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent
medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital; that the doctors who
examined Jayson issued two medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered two contusions.

On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He
explained that he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his
minor daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldans throwing stones at them and about
Jaysons burning Cherrylyns hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a
fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters.

After trial, the RTC found and declared petitioner guilty of child abuse. On appeal, CA
affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Bongalon is guilty of the crime charged (NO)

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RULING:

At the outset, we should observe that the petitioner has adopted the wrong remedy in
assailing the CAs affirmance of his conviction. His proper recourse must be an appeal taken in
due course. Hence, he should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead
of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of
the decision, and not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision, the same is beyond the
province of a special civil action for certiorari.

However, the procedural transgressions of the petitioner, we opt to forego quickly


dismissing the petition, and instead set ourselves upon the task of resolving the issues posed by
the petition on their merits. We cannot fairly and justly ignore his plea about the sentence
imposed on him not being commensurate to the wrong he committed. His plea is worthy of
another long and hard look. If, on the other hand, we were to outrightly dismiss his plea because
of the procedural lapses he has committed, the Court may be seen as an unfeeling tribunal of last
resort willing to sacrifice justice in order to give premium to the rigidity of its rules of procedure.
But the Rules of Court has not been intended to be rigidly enforced at all times. Rather, it has
been instituted first and foremost to ensure justice to every litigant.

Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that
the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree
with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of Republic Act No.
7610. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson
had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that
he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of
hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his
being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor
daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan.

Considering that Jaysons physical injury required five to seven days of medical
attention the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code. The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day
to 30 days of imprisonment. Furthermore, in imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to
consider the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation because the petitioner lost his
reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power. With his having acted
under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor daughters, and that
Jayson had burned Cherrlyns hair, the petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
passion.

The Court sets aside the decision of the CA and enter a new judgment that petitioner is
found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 10
days of arresto menor.

FELINA ROSALDES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.


G.R. No. 173988 October 8, 2014, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.

Family Code; Corporal Punishment; Special Parental Authority; Teachers; The Family Code
expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or
individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis).
Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her
infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even
fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted only
for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no
less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a

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school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental
authority (i.e., in loco parentis), viz.: Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental
authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents. In no case
shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special
parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)

Criminal Law; Child Abuse; In the crime charged against the petitioner, the maltreatment
may consist of an act by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual.In the crime charged
against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds or by words
that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being.
The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner went overboard in
disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year-old boy, when she pinched hard Michael
Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as]
the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling
a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him
down on the floor. On her part, the trial judge said that the physical pain experienced by the
victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school
altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school
where he had to adjust again. Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic
worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, the information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the proximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given
by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the proximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed. The information explicitly averred the offense of child abuse charged
against the petitioner in the context of the statutory definition of child abuse found in Section
3(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the petitioners
challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form and substance. Her last chance to
pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to
quash on the ground that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form,
or did not charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge.

FACTS:

Seven-year-old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary


School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his classroom
when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner, Felina Rosaldes, who was then
asleep on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her.
When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat, petitioner went to Michael and
pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As
he fell, Michael Ryans body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to
pick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor.

Petitioner was convicted of the crime of child abuse in the RTC which was affirmed by CA
on appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the conviction of the petitioner of the crime of child abuse is proper.

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RULING:

The conviction is proper. Petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the
physical injuries suffered by Michael Ryan to maltreat or malign him. She insists that her act
further came under the doctrine of in loco parentis. However, although the petitioner, as a
schoolteacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical
injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence
suffered at her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of
disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the
Family Code (Art. 233), which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a
school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental
authority (i.e., in loco parentis).

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse thusly: x x x x


(b) Child abuse refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual
or not, of the child which includes any of the following: x x x x
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being; x x x x

In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an
act by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner went
overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year-old boy, when she pinched
hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the
floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but
instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears
and pushed him down on the floor.

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019, as amended)

TEOFILO GIANGAN, SANTOS BONTIA and LIBERATO DUMAIL v.


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 169385, AUGUST 26, 2015, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION

Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act (RA) No. 3019; Elements of.In every prosecution for the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, the State must prove the following essential elements, namely: 1. The accused is a public
officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in the discharge of his
functions; 3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
The first element was present, for Giangan was indisputably a government official at the time of
the alleged commission of the offense charged.

Same; Same; Same; Giangan as the barangay chairman acted upon the honest and sincere
belief that he was then summarily abating the nuisance that a regular user of the obstructed road
had just reported to him. A further indication of the good faith of Giangan was the turning over of
the wooden posts to the police station, manifesting that the accused were acting within the scope of
their authority.Conformably with the foregoing, we find that the Sandiganbayan erred in ruling
that Giangan and his co-accused had acted with gross bad faith and manifest impartiality when
they removed the wooden posts of the fence of Bernadas. On the contrary, their actuations
evinced good faith. We note that it was not at all disputed that access through the road had long
been permitted even by the owner and her predecessor. In that context, Giangan as
the barangay chairman acted upon the honest and sincere belief that he was then summarily
abating the nuisance that a regular user of the obstructed road had just reported to him. A further
indication of the good faith of Giangan was the turning over of the wooden posts to the police

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station, manifesting that the accused were acting within the scope of their authority. Good
faith means honest, lawful intent; the condition of acting without knowledge of fraud, and
without intent to assist in a fraudulent or otherwise unlawful scheme. Also, the act complained of
was rendered inconsistent with the manifest partiality and bad faith that the law punished.

Same; Same; Same; Manifest Partiality; Manifest partiality should be inferred only if there
was a clear showing that there had been others who had been bothered by the similar allegedly
illegal constructions and had complained, but the accused, in their capacities as barangay officials,
did not deal with such complaint with the same alacrity.The Sandiganbayan further erred in
finding the presence of manifest partiality on the basis that there had been other allegedly illegal
constructions that the accused did not similarly remove in their capacities as barangay officials.
Bias should still not be imputed against them because they were acting on the complaint against
the inconvenience brought about by the obstruction erected on the access road. Manifest
partiality should be inferred only if there was a clear showing that there had been others who had
been bothered by the similar allegedly illegal constructions and had complained, but the accused,
in their capacities as barangay officials, did not deal with such complaint with the same alacrity.
Indeed, in People v. Atienza, 673 SCRA 470 (2012), the Court affirmed the findings of
the Sandiganbayan that there was no manifest impartiality or bad faith on the part of the accused
public officials where the evidence adduced did not show that they had favored other persons
similarly situated.

FACTS:

In his capacity as the barangay chairman of Barangay Luyang in the Municipality of


Carmen, Cebu at the time material to this case, Giangan, along with his co-accused Domail, a
barangay councilor, and Bontia, the head of the barangay tanods, were charged with the violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 under the following information:

x x x That on or about the 16th day of February 1996, at Barangay Luyang, Municipality of
Carmen, Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above named
accused, public officers, having been elected, appointed and qualified to such public positions
above mentioned, taking advantage of their public positions and committing the offense in
relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other,
with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously destroy the fence made of wooden posts and straight wires in an
agricultural land situated at Luyang, Carmen, and owned by Aurelia F. Bernadas, without proper
court order or authority of law, thus accused in the performance of their official functions had
given unwarranted benefits, preference or advantage to themselves, to the damage, injury and
prejudice to Aurelia F. Bernadas.

The RTC rendered its judgment finding all of the accused guilty as charged. The
Sandiganbayan affirmed the judgment of conviction.

ISSUE:

WON Giangan is guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

RULING:

NO. The Court acquitted Teofilo Giangan for failure to establish his guilt of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.

In every prosecution for the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the State must prove
the following essential elements, namely:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence in the discharge of his functions; and

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3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his functions.

The first element was present, for Giangan was indisputably a government official at the
time of the alleged commission of the offense charged.

Anent the second element, the three modes of committing are distinct and different from
one another. The second element enumerates the different modes by which means the offense
penalized in Section 3(e) may be committed. Partiality is synonymous with bias which excites
a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are. Bad faith
does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or
intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. Gross negligence has been so defined as
negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that
care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. These
definitions prove all too well that the three modes are distinct and different from each other.
Proof of the existence of any of these modes in connection with the prohibited acts under Section
3(e) should suffice to warrant conviction.

Conformably with the foregoing, we find that the Sandiganbayan erred in ruling that
Giangan and his co-accused had acted with gross bad faith and manifest impartiality when they
removed the wooden posts of the fence of Bernadas. On the contrary, their actuations evinced
good faith. We note that it was not at all disputed that access through the road had long been
permitted even by the owner and her predecessor. In that context, Giangan as the barangay
chairman acted upon the honest and sincere belief that he was then summarily abating the
nuisance that a regular user of the obstructed road had just reported to him. A further indication
of the good faith of Giangan was the turning over of the wooden posts to the police station,
manifesting that the accused were acting within the scope of their authority. Good faith means
honest, lawful intent; the condition of acting without knowledge of fraud, and without intent to
assist in a fraudulent or otherwise unlawful scheme. Also, the act complained of was rendered
inconsistent with the manifest partiality and bad faith that the law punished.

The Sandiganbayan further erred in finding the presence of manifest partiality on the
basis that there had been other allegedly illegal constructions that the accused did not similarly
remove in their capacities as barangay officials. Bias should still not be imputed against them
because they were acting on the complaint against the inconvenience brought about by the
obstruction erected on the access road. Manifest partiality should be inferred only if there was a
clear showing that there had been others who had been bothered by the similar allegedly illegal
constructions and had complained, but the accused, in their capacities as barangay officials, did
not deal with such complaint with the same alacrity.

In light of the foregoing, the guilt of Giangan was not established beyond reasonable
doubt. Hence, he is entitled to acquittal.

Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22)

TEODORO A. REYES vs. ETTORE ROSSI


G.R. No. 159823, FIRST DIVISION, February 18, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.:

The rescission of a contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will warrant the
suspension of the criminal proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for violations of the
Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) arising from the dishonor of the checks the buyer
issued in connection with the sale.

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Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prejudicial Questions; A prejudicial question generally


comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the former an issue that must first be determined before the latter may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.

Same; Same; Same; To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the
suspension of the criminal actions, reference is made to the elements of the crimes charged. The
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 requires the concurrence of the following elements, namely:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment;
and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment. The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks knowing them to be
without funds upon presentment. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is
whether or not the breach in the fulfillment of Advanced Foundations obligation warranted the
rescission of the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced
Foundation would be found to have committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of the
contract, such result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the criminal
responsibility for issuing the dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned elements show,
he already committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a time
when the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties. His obligation to fund the
checks or to make arrangements for them with the drawee bank should not be tied up to the
future event of extinguishment of the obligation under the contract of sale through rescission.
Indeed, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a worthless check was already the
offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal proceedings for the violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action for rescission of the
conditional sale.

FACTS:

Petitioner Teodoro A. Reyes and Advanced Foundation Construction Systems Corporation


executed a deed of conditional sale involving the purchase by Reyes of equipment consisting of a
Warman Dredging Pump HY 300A worth P10,000,000.00. The parties agreed therein that Reyes
would pay the sum of P3,000,000.00 as downpayment, and the balance of P7,000,000.00 through
four post-dated checks. Reyes complied, but in January 1998, he requested the restructuring of his
obligation under the deed of conditional sale by replacing the four post-dated checks with nine
post-dated checks that would include interest at the rate of P25,000.00/month accruing on the
unpaid portion of the obligation.

Advanced Foundation assented to Reyes request, and returned the four checks. In turn,
Reyes issued and delivered the nine postdated checks in the aggregate sum of P7,125,000.00
drawn against the United Coconut Planters Bank.

Rossi deposited three of the post-dated checks on their maturity dates in Advanced
Foundations bank account at the PCI Bank in Makati. Two of the checks were denied payment
ostensibly upon Reyes instructions to stop their payment, while the third was dishonored for
insufficiency of funds.
Rossi likewise deposited two more checks in Advanced Foundations account at the PCI
Bank in Makati, but the checks were returned with the notation Account Closed stamped on
them. He did not anymore deposit the three remaining checks on the assumption that they would
be similarly dishonored.

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In the meanwhile, Reyes commenced an action for rescission of contract and damages in
the RTC. Rossi charged Reyes with five counts of estafa and five counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. Another criminal charge for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was lodged
against Reyes.

Reyes claims that the checks had not been issued for any valuable consideration; that he
had discovered from the start of using the dredging pump involved in the conditional sale that
the Caterpillar diesel engine powering the pump had been rated at only 560 horsepower instead
of the 1200 horsepower Advanced Foundation had represented to him; that welding works on the
pump had neatly concealed several cracks; that on May 6, 1998 he had written to Advanced
Foundation complaining about the misrepresentations on the specifications of the pump and
demanding documentary proof of Advanced Foundations ownership of the pump; that he had
caused the order to stop the payment of three checks; that Advanced Foundation had replied to
his letter on May 8, 1998 by saying that the pump had been sold to him on an as is, where is basis;
that he had then sent another letter to Advanced Foundation on May 18, 1998 to reiterate his
complaints and the request for proper documentation of ownership; that he had subsequently
discovered other hidden defects, prompting him to write another letter; and that instead of
attending to his complaints and request, Advanced Foundations lawyers had threatened him with
legal action.

Reyes assailed the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati over the
criminal charges against him on the ground that he had issued the checks in Quezon City; as well
as argued that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati should suspend the proceedings
because of the pendency in the RTC of the civil action for rescission of contract that posed a
prejudicial question as to the criminal proceedings.

The Assistant City Prosecutor handling the preliminary investigation recommended the
dismissal of the charges of estafa and the suspension of the proceedings relating to the violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 based on a prejudicial question.

The City Prosecutor of Makati approved the recommendation of the handling Assistant
City Prosecutor. Further, it is respectfully recommended that the proceedings in the charge for
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the respondent be suspended until the prejudicial
question raised in Civil Case Q-98-35109 for Rescission of Contract and Damages which is now
pending with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 224, has been duly resolved.

Rossi appealed the resolution of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice, but the
Secretary of Justice denied Rossis petition for review.

After the denial of his motion for reconsideration on April 29, 2002, Rossi challenged the
resolutions of the Secretary of Justice by petition for certiorari in the CA.

In the petition for certiorari, Rossi insisted that the Secretary of Justice had committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the suspension
of the criminal proceedings by the City Prosecutor of Makati on account of the existence of a
prejudicial question, and in sustaining the dismissal of the complaints for estafa. The CA
GRANTED the instant petition in so far as the issue of the existence of prejudicial question is
concerned.

ISSUE

WON the civil action for rescission of the contract of sale raised a prejudicial question
that required the suspension of the criminal prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

RULING

NO. A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that

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must first be determined before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale for the suspension on the ground
of a prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.

Two elements that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial
question are (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Contending that the rescission of the contract of sale constitutes a prejudicial question,
Reyes posits that the resolution of the civil action will be determinative of whether or not he was
criminally liable for the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. He states that if the contract would
be rescinded, his obligation to pay under the conditional deed of sale would be extinguished, and
such outcome would necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings for the
violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

The action for the rescission of the deed of sale on the ground that Advanced
Foundation did not comply with its obligation actually seeks one of the alternative
remedies available to a contracting party under Article 1191 of the Civil Code.

Article 1191 of the Civil Code recognizes an implied or tacit resolutory condition in
reciprocal obligations. The condition is imposed by law, and applies even if there is no
corresponding agreement thereon between the parties. The explanation for this is that in
reciprocal obligations a party incurs in delay once the other party has performed his part of the
contract; hence, the party who has performed or is ready and willing to perform may rescind the
obligation if the other does not perform, or is not ready and willing to perform.

It is true that the rescission of a contract results in the extinguishment of the obligatory
relation as if it was never created, the extinguishment having a retroactive effect. The rescission is
equivalent to invalidating and unmaking the juridical tie, leaving things in their status before the
celebration of the contract. However, until the contract is rescinded, the juridical tie and the
concomitant obligations subsist.

To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension


of the criminal actions, reference is made to the elements of the crimes charged. The
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 requires the concurrence of the following elements, namely:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment;
and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment. The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks knowing them to be
without funds upon presentment. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is
whether or not the breach in the fulfilment of Advanced Foundations obligation warranted the
rescission of the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced
Foundation would be found to have committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of the
contract, such result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the criminal
responsibility for issuing the dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned elements show,
he already committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a time
when the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties. His obligation to fund the
checks or to make arrangements for them with the drawee bank should not be tied up to the
future event of extinguishment of the obligation under the contract of sale through rescission.
Indeed, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a worthless check was already the
offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal proceedings for the violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action for rescission of the
conditional sale.

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Accordingly, we agree with the holding of the CA that the civil action for the
rescission of contract was not determinative of the guilt or innocence of Reyes.

HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON v. ELVIN CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 157547, 23 February 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance
of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22(BP 22).

The late Eduardo Simon (Simon) was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22(BP 22) (Criminal Case No. 275381) in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. More
than three years later, Elvin Chan (Chan) filed in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the
collection of the principal amount of P336,000.00 against Simon (Civil Case No. 915-00), with
an application for a writ of preliminary attachment which was granted by the MeTC. Simon
filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for
damages, on the ground of litis pendentia. Chan opposed the said motion.

The MeTC in Pasay City granted Simons urgent motion and dismissed Chans
complaint. It held that in both civil action for sum of money and criminal cases for violation
of BP 22, the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same
facts, are identical. It ruled that the complaint for sum of money is already barred since Chan
did not waive or made a reservation as to his right to pursue the civil branch of the criminal
case for violation of BP 22 against Simon. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City
affirmed the dismissal of Chans complaint. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
RTC. It held that the civil case was an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code, hence, there is no more need to reserve the filing of the separate
independent civil action.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Chans civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil
Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.
2. Whether or not the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil
aspect in Criminal Case No. 275381) bar the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the
MeTC in Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia.

RULING:

1. NO. There is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued
in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Sections 1 and 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, effective December 1, 2000. The said provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in
effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless
applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate
any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or
arise from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at
the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the
rules of procedure, except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they
permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of
the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for
being ex post facto under the Constitution. Moreover, the application of the rule would not be
precluded by the violation of any assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted
from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.

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The CAs reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez to give due course
to the civil action of Chan independently and separately of Criminal Case No.
275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on
all fours with this case, which is a prosecution for a violation of BP 22. Although the Court
has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct
crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22, the procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities
arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions
of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or
may institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil
Code, as DMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the
Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil
action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check. To repeat,
Chans separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the prosecution
for the violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained under both Supreme Court
Circular 57-97 and the said provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the
allegations of fraud and deceit.

2. YES. For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the


concurrence of the following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of
parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts;
and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered
in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the
other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil.

A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that
all the elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action
involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon,
are the same. Secondly, the information in Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in
Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280
worth P336,000.00 payable to cash, thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs
prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were identical in
all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other
by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same claim.

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 9165)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ,


accused-appellant.*
G.R. No. 173474 August 29, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.

The credibility of the evidence of the corpus delicti in a prosecution for illegal possession of
marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, depends on the integrity of the chain of
custody of the marijuana from the time of its seizure until the time of its presentation as evidence in
court. Short of that, the accused is entitled to an acquittal because the State fails to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Exclusionary Rules; The consequence of a


violation of the guarantees against a violation of personal security and privacy and against
unreasonable searches and seizures is the exclusion of the evidence thereby obtained.No arrest,
search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority.
So sacred are the right of personal security and privacy and the right from unreasonable searches
and seizures that no less than the Constitution ordains in Section 2 of its Article III, viz.: Section
2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against

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unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The consequence of a violation of the guarantees
against a violation of personal security and privacy and against unreasonable searches and
seizures is the exclusion of the evidence thereby obtained. This rule of exclusion is set down in
Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution, to wit: Section 3. xxx (2) Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Same; Same; Warrantless Arrests; There are circumstances in which the arrest, or search
and seizure, although warrantless, are nonetheless valid or reasonable. Among the circumstances
are those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.The right against warrantless
arrest, and the right against warrantless search and seizure are not absolute. There are
circumstances in which the arrest, or search and seizure, although warrantless, are nonetheless
valid or reasonable. Among the circumstances are those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, which lists down when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully made by a peace
officer or a private person, namely: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

Same; Same; Warrantless Searches and Seizures; The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures admits of exceptions.The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures admits of the following exceptions, namely: (a) warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court; (b)
seizure of evidence under plain view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless
search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk situations (Terry search); and (g) exigent and
emergency circumstances. In these exceptional situations, the necessity for a search warrant is
dispensed with.

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Elements of Illegal Possession of Marijuana.The


elements of illegal possession of marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, are that: (a)
the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be marijuana, a prohibited
drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug. What must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of possession
of the prohibited drug itself. This may be done by presenting the police officer who actually
recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness, being the person who has the direct knowledge of
the possession.

Same; Evidence; Chain of Custody Rule; In every criminal prosecution for possession of
illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account for the custody of the incriminating evidence from the
moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is offered in evidence.In every criminal
prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account for the custody of the
incriminating evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is
offered in evidence. That account goes to the weight of evidence. It is not enough that the
evidence offered has probative value on the issues, for the evidence must also be sufficiently
connected to and tied with the facts in issue. The evidence is not relevant merely because it is
available but that it has an actual connection with the transaction involved and with the parties
thereto. This is the reason why authentication and laying a foundation for the introduction of
evidence are important.

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FACTS:

Belocura was a police officer. While he was driving his owner-type jeep using a
government plate, about thirty police officers blocked his path. Recovered from Belocuras jeep
was a red plastic bag under the drivers seat the contents of which turned out to be two bricks of
marijuana wrapped in newspaper.

Belocura, charged with illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Republic Act No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was found guilty of
the crime charged by the Regional Trial Court. CA affirmed the conviction.

Belocura argues that the Prosecution did not establish his guilt for the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt; that his warrantless arrest was unlawful considering that his only
violation was only a breach of traffic rules and regulations involving the illegal use of a government
plate on his newly-assembled jeep; that the warrantless search of his jeep was contrary to law for
violating his right against illegal search and seizure protected under Section 17, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution; and that the bricks of marijuana supposedly seized from him,
being the fruit of a poisonous tree, were inadmissible against him.

ISSUE:

Whether Belocura should be acquitted of the crime charged based on the following ground:

1. Warrantless search and seizure;


2. Failure to prove the fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself; and
3. Failure to establish the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs.

RULING:

Belocura should be acquitted of the crime of charged for failure of the prosecution
to prove the fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself and failure to establish the
chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs. The warrantless searcha and seizure
conducted in Belocuras jeepney, however, is valid and hence, it cannot be a basis for
acquittal.

1. Warrantless Search and Seizure

Belocura argues that his arrest and the ensuing search of his vehicle and recovery of the
incriminating bricks of marijuana were in violation of his aforementioned rights under the
Constitution because he was then violating only a simple traffic rule on the illegal use of a
government plate. He claims that the arresting policemen had no probable cause to search his
vehicle for anything.

Indeed, no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a
competent judicial authority. However, this rule admits exceptions. One of the exceptions to a
valid warrantless is arrest is in flagrante delicto and one of the exceptions to a valid warrantless
search is one that is conducted incidental to a lawful arrest. Both exceptions are present in this
case.

Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating Section 31 of Republic Act No. 4139 (The
Land Transportation and Traffic Code) which he even admitted. The arrest was valid, therefore,
and the arresting policemen thereby became cloaked with the authority to validly search his
person and effects for weapons or any other article he might use in the commission of the crime
or was the fruit of the crime or might be used as evidence in the trial of the case, and to seize from
him and the area within his reach or under his control, like the jeep, such weapon or other article.
The evident purpose of the incidental search was to protect the arresting policemen from being
harmed by him with the use of a concealed weapon. Accordingly, the warrantless character of the
arrest could not by itself be the basis of his acquittal.

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2. Failure to prove the fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself

The elements of illegal possession of marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
are that: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be marijuana, a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug. What must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the
fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself. This may be done by presenting the police
officer who actually recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness, being the person who
has the direct knowledge of the possession.

Chief Insp. Divina who headed the team of policemen disclosed that it was PO2 Santos, a
member of the team, who had discovered and had actually recovered the red plastic bag
containing the bricks of marijuana from the jeep. The Prosecution also presented SPO1 Rojas,
another member of the team, but he provided no direct evidence about the possession by
Belocura of the confiscated marijuana bricks, and actually stated that he did not witness the
recovery of the marijuana bricks from Belocura.

Based on the foregoing, Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas declarations were insufficient
to incriminate Belocura, much less to convict him. If neither of them was personally competent to
be an eyewitness regarding the seizure of the marijuana bricks from Belocura, their testimonies
could not be accorded probative value, considering that the Rules of Court requires that a witness
could testify only to facts that he knew of his own knowledge, that is, only to those facts derived
from his own perception. Only PO2 Santos could reliably establish Belocuras illegal possession of
the marijuana bricks, if Chief Insp. Divinas account was to be believed. Surprisingly, the RTC did
not give due and proper significance to the failure to present PO2 Santos as a witness against
Belocura. As the arresting officer who alone actually seized the marijuana bricks from Belocuras
vehicle beyond the viewing distance of his fellow arresting officers, PO2 Santos was the
Prosecutions only witness who could have reliably established the recovery from Belocura of the
marijuana bricks contained in the red plastic bag labeled as SHIN TON YON. Without PO2
Santos testimony, Chief Insp. Divinas declaration of seeing PO2 Santos recover the red plastic
bag from under the drivers seat of Belocuras jeep was worthless.

3. Failure to establish the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs

The Prosecution thereby failed to establish the linkage between the bricks of marijuana
supposedly seized by PO2 Santos from Belocuras jeep following his arrest and the bricks of
marijuana that the Prosecution later presented as evidence in court. That linkage was not
dispensable, because the failure to prove that the specimens of marijuana submitted to the
forensic chemist for examination were the same marijuana allegedly seized from Belocura
irreparably broke the chain of custody that linked the confiscated marijuana to the marijuana
ultimately presented as evidence against Belocura during the trial. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
demanded that unwavering exactitude must be observed in establishing the corpus delictithe
body of the crime whose core was the confiscated prohibited substances. Thus, every fact
necessary to constitute the crime must be established.

The first link in the chain of custody started with the seizure from the jeep of Belocura of
the red plastic bag said to contain the marijuana bricks. The first link was immediately missing
because the Prosecution did not present PO2 Santos, the only person with direct knowledge of
the seizure and confiscation of the marijuana bricks. Without his testimony, proof that the
marijuana bricks were really taken from the jeep of Belocura did not exist. The second link was
the turnover of the marijuana bricks by PO2 Santos to another officer back at the WPD
Headquarters. As to this, Chief Insp. Divina stated that he learned following the seizure by PO2
Santos that the marijuana bricks were turned over to the General Assignment Section for
investigation. That was all. On the other hand, SPO1 Rojas testimony contributed nothing to the
establishment of the second link because he had immediately left after seizing the gun from
Belocura. As for the subsequent links, the records showed that the marijuana bricks were
forwarded to the General Assignment Section on March 22, 1999, but the Prosecution did not

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prove the identities of the officer from the General Assignment Section who received the red
plastic bag containing the marijuana bricks, and the officer from whom the receiving officer
received the marijuana bricks. Although Chief Insp. Nelson Yabut prepared the request for
laboratory examination of the marijuana bricks, which were thereafter examined by Forensic
Chemist Valdez, the records did not show if Chief Insp. Yabut was the officer who had received
the marijuana bricks from the arresting team. The request for laboratory examination was dated
March 23, 1999, or the day following Belocuras arrest and the seizure of the marijuana bricks from
his jeep; however, the Prosecution did not identify the person from whom Chief Insp. Yabut had
received the marijuana bricks.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERON DELOS SANTOS y


MARISTELA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DARWIN RELATO y AJERO
G.R. No. 173794 January 18, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.

Statutory rules on preserving the chain of custody of confiscated prohibited drugs and
related items are designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of the evidence to be presented
against the accused. Their observance is the key to the successful prosecution of illegal possession
or illegal sale of prohibited drugs.

Criminal Law; Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (RA No. 9165); Chain of
Custody Rule; Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides for the procedure to be followed in the
seizure and custody of prohibited drugs.Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides the
procedure to be followed in the seizure and custody of prohibited drugs, to wit: Section 21.
Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The
apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.

Same; Same; Same; The marking immediately after seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link, because succeeding handlers of the prohibited drugs or related items will use the
markings as reference.The marking immediately after seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link, because succeeding handlers of the prohibited drugs or related items will use the
markings as reference. It further serves to segregate the marked evidence from the corpus of all
other similar and related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are
disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, obviating switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence. It is crucial in ensuring the integrity of the chain of custody, which is
defined in Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, thus: b. Chain
of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item,
the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use
in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

Same; Same; Same; In a prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine


hydrochloride prohibited under Republic Act No. 9165, the State not only carries the heavy burden of
proving the elements of the offense of, but also bears the obligation to prove the corpus delicti,
failing in which the State will not discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond

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reasonable doubt.In a prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine


hydrochloride prohibited under Republic Act No. 9165, the State not only carries the heavy
burden of proving the elements of the offense of, but also bears the obligation to prove the corpus
delicti, failing in which the State will not discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is settled that the State does not establish the corpus delicti
when the prohibited substance subject of the prosecution is missing or when substantial gaps in
the chain of custody of the prohibited substance raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the
prohibited substance presented as evidence in court. Any gap renders the case for the State less
than complete in terms of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Relato
deserves exculpation, especially as we recall that his defense of frame-up became plausible in the
face of the weakness of the Prosecutions evidence of guilt.

FACTS:

PO3 Sonny Evasco of the Bulan Police Station received a tip from his asset to the effect
that Relato would be peddling illegal drugs around midnight in Barangay Aquino, Zone 7, Bulan,
Sorsogon. A team to conduct a buy-bust operation against Relato was immediately organized.

Relato and a companion (later identified as Pido Paredes) arrived together on board a
motorcycle in the site of buy bust operation. Relato alighted to confer with the asset who was the
poseur buyer. After the transaction was completed, PO3 Evasco signaled to the rest of the team,
who drew near and apprehended Relato. Seized from Relato was the marked P500.00 buy-bust
bill. The poseur buyer turned over to PO3 Evasco the two transparent sachets containing
crystalline substances that Relato sold to the poseur buyer. Paredes escaped. SPO1 Masujer
marked the two transparent sachets with his own initials EM upon returning to the police
station.

Both RTC and CA found Relato guilty for violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).

ISSUE:

Whether the conviction of Relato is proper.

RULING:

The conviction is not proper. A review of the records establishes that the procedures
laid down by Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR regarding seizure and custody of prohibited drugs
were not followed. Several lapses on the part of the buy-bust team are readily apparent. To start
with, no photograph of the seized shabu was taken. Secondly, the buy-bust team did not
immediately mark the seized shabu at the scene of the crime and in the presence of Relato and
witnesses. Thirdly, although there was testimony about the marking of the seized items being
made at the police station, the records do not show that the marking was done in the presence of
Relato or his chosen representative. And, fourthly, no representative of the media and the
Department of Justice, or any elected official attended the taking of the physical inventory and to
sign the inventory.

While the last paragraph of Section 21(a) of the IRR provides a saving mechanism to
ensure that not every case of non-compliance irreversibly prejudices the States evidence, it is
significant to note that the application of the saving mechanism to a situation is expressly
conditioned upon the State rendering an explanation of the lapse or lapses in the compliance with
the procedures. Here, however, the Prosecution tendered no explanation why the buy-bust team
had failed to mark the seized shabu immediately after the arrest. Nevertheless, even assuming
that marking the shabu at the scene of the crime by the buy-bust team had not been practical or
possible for the buy-bust team to do, the saving mechanism would still not be applicable due to
the lack of a credible showing of any effort undertaken by the buy-bust team to keep the shabu
intact while in transit to the police station.

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In a prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride


prohibited under Republic Act No. 9165, the State not only carries the heavy burden of proving
the elements of the offense of, but also bears the obligation to prove the corpus delicti, failing in
which the State will not discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. It is settled that the State does not establish the corpus delicti when the
prohibited substance subject of the prosecution is missing or when substantial gaps in the chain
of custody of the prohibited substance raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the prohibited
substance presented as evidence in court. Any gap renders the case for the State less than
complete in terms of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Relato
deserves exculpation, especially as we recall that his defense of frame-up became plausible in the
face of the weakness of the Prosecutions evidence of guilt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GERON DE LOS SANTOS Y


MARISTELA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 170839 January 18, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BESAMIN J.

The mere denial of knowledge that a substance is a regulated drug is insufficient to


exculpate the person found in possession of it, for he must have to satisfactorily explain how the
drug came to his possession. Without his satisfactory explanation, he will be presumed to have
animus possidendi, or the intent to possess. His guilt will then be established beyond reasonable
doubt.

Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs; In a prosecution for possession of illegal substances, proof of animus possidendi on the part
of the accused is indispensable.In a prosecution for possession of illegal substances, proof of
animus possidendi on the part of the accused is indispensable. But animus possidendi is a state of
mind, and is thus to be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior
and contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. It may and
must be inferred usually from the attendant events in each particular case. Upon the States
presenting to the trial court of the facts and circumstances from which to infer the existence of
animus possidendi, it becomes incumbent upon the Defense to rebut the inference with evidence
that the accused did not exercise power and control of the illicit thing in question, and did not
intend to do so. For that purpose, a mere unfounded assertion of the accused that he did not
know that he had possession of the illegal drug is insufficient, and animus possidendi is then
presumed to exist on his part because he was thereby shown to have performed an act that the
law prohibited and punished.

FACTS:

An alert security guard halted Geron Delos Santos y Maristela as he was about to bring a
gift-wrapped box out of the Somerset Condominium in Leveriza Street, Pasay City. When Delos
Santos opened the box for inspection upon demand of the security guard, the box contained
plastic bags with 6.2 kilograms of suspected shabu. The security guard forthwith apprehended
Delos Santos and impounded the box and its contents. The National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) was immediately notified of the incident, and it dispatched its agents to the place.
Subsequently, Delos Santos was charged with a violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).

Delos Santos denied the accusation, claiming that while he was cleaning at the ground
floor of the condominium the occupant of Unit 706 called the guard on duty to ask for help in
cleaning the unit; that he was summoned to do the chore, and while he was waiting outside Unit
706, a non-tenant known to him only as Wilson requested him to bring the gift-wrapped box to
someone near the Jollibee Vito Cruz extension branch; that when he was already downstairs, the
security guard on duty wanted to check the gift-wrapped box; that he voluntarily handed the box
for inspection; that the security guard opened the box in his presence and discovered the shabu;
that he told the security guard on duty that he had no knowledge of the contents of the box and
was only instructed by Wilson to deliver it; that upon the arrival of the NBI agents, he told them

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that the box had come from Unit 706; that the NBI agents proceeded to Unit 706 and found more
shabu contained in four large suitcases, four small suitcases, and small bags; and that the NBI
agents demanded the keys of the unit from him but he replied that he did not have any key
because he was a mere janitor of the building.

Delos Santos contends that the State did not establish that he had animus possidendi, or
the intent to possess the regulated substances in question.

RTC convicted Delos Santos as charged which was affirmed by CA on appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the contention of Delos Santos on failure to establish animus possidendi is


correct.

RULING:

The contention is not correct. In a prosecution for possession of illegal substances,


proof of animus possidendi on the part of the accused is indispensable. But animus possidendi is a
state of mind, and is thus to be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration
the prior and contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. It
may and must be inferred usually from the attendant events in each particular case. Upon the
States presenting to the trial court of the facts and circumstances from which to infer the
existence of animus possidendi, it becomes incumbent upon the Defense to rebut the inference
with evidence that the accused did not exercise power and control of the illicit thing in question,
and did not intend to do so. For that purpose, a mere unfounded assertion of the accused that he
did not know that he had possession of the illegal drug is insufficient, and animus possidendi is
then presumed to exist on his part because he was thereby shown to have performed an act that
the law prohibited and punished.

It cannot be disputed that Delos Santos had animus possidendi. His conduct prior to and
following his apprehension evinced his guilty knowledge of the contents of the gift-wrapped box
as shabu. His uncorroborated story of having been summoned to help in the cleaning of Unit 706
was a sham excuse that he peddled to explain his presence in the Somerset Condominium. His
explanation was useless, however, because he was no longer employed as a janitor of the Somerset
Condominium at the time of his arrest after being already terminated from employment.
Correlatively, his willingness to run for Wilson the errand of delivering the gift-wrapped box to
the unnamed person near the Jollibee Vito Cruz extension branch proved that he was serving as a
courier of shabu. Besides, his guilty knowledge was confirmed by his unreasonable refusal to exit
from Unit 706 despite the demand of the NBI agents to do so, and by his stealthy transfer to the
adjoining Unit 705. Had he been truly innocent, he would have voluntarily cooperated with the
NBI agents instead of attempting to escape from them.

PEOPLE vs. BAUTISTA


G.R. No. 177320, FIRST DIVISION, February 22, 2012, BERSAMIN, J.

Criminal Law; Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165); Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs; Elements of Illegal Sale of Shabu.To secure a conviction for illegal sale of
shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (a) the identities of the buyer and
the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment for the thing. What is material in prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti as evidence. The requisites for illegal sale of shabu were competently and
convincingly proven by the Prosecution. PO2 Tayag, as the poseur-buyer, attested that Bautista
sold shabu to him during a legitimate buy-bust operation. According to Forensic Chemist Arturo,
the substance subject of the transaction, which weighed 0.05 gram, was examined and found to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. PO2 Caragdag declared that he

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recovered the buy-bust money from Bautistas hand right after the sale. Further, the Prosecution
later presented as evidence both the sachet of shabu subject of the sale and the buy-bust money
used in the buy-bust operation. Thereby, the Prosecution directly incriminated Bautista.

Same; Same; Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of Illegal Possession of


Dangerous Drugs.For illegal possession of a dangerous drug, like shabu, the elements are: (a)
the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous
drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug. The elements of illegal possession of a dangerous drug were similarly
competently and convincingly established by the Prosecution. SPO1 Ybaez stated that upon
seeing the pre-arranged signal given by PO2 Tayag, he and the other members of the team
proceeded to arrest Bautista; and that he frisked Bautista and then recovered six other plastic
sachets from Bautistas pocket. Undoubtedly, the frisking was legally authorized as a search
incidental to the lawful arrest of Bautista for evidence in the commission of illegal drug pushing.
Forensic Chemist Arturo certified that each of the sachets contained different shabu of different
weights.

Same; Same; Same; Corpus Delicti; Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance
of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has been actually committed;
The dangerous drug is itself the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law prohibiting the
possession of the dangerous drug.In drug-related prosecutions, the State bears the burden not
only of proving the elements of the offenses of sale and possession of shabu under Republic Act
No. 9165, but also of proving the corpus delicti, the body of the crime. Corpus delicti has been
defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a
crime has been actually committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual
commission by someone of the particular crime charged. The corpus delicti is a compound fact
made up of two (2) things, viz: the existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of the
criminal charge, and the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or result. The
dangerous drug is itself the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law prohibiting the
possession of the dangerous drug. Consequently, the State does not comply with the
indispensable requirement of proving corpus delicti when the drug is missing, and when
substantial gaps occur in the chain of custody of the seized drugs as to raise doubts on the
authenticity of the evidence presented in court.

FACTS:

An informant went to the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Caloocan Police Station
to report the peddling of illegal drugs by Bautista. Forthwith, Police Insp. Cesar Cruz formed a
team to conduct a buy-bust operation against Bautista. PO2 Tayag, designated as the poseur-
buyer, was given a P100.00 bill as buy-bust money, on which he placed his initials ALT. The rest of
the buy-bust team would serve as back up for PO2 Tayag.

Upon arriving at the target area, the informant pointed out Bautista to the team. Bautista
was then standing in front of a house. PO2 Tayag and the informant then approached Bautista
even as the rest of the team took up positions nearby. The informant introduced PO2 Tayag to
Bautista as biyahero ng shabu, after which the informant left PO2 Tayag and Bautista alone to
themselves.

PO2 Tayag told Bautista: Cesar, pakuha ng piso. Bautista drew a plastic sachet from his
pocket and handed it to PO2 Tayag, who in turn handed the P100.00 bill buy-bust money to
Bautista. PO2 Tayag then turned his cap backwards as the pre-arranged signal to the back-up
members. The latter rushed forward and arrested Bautista. Upon informing Bautista of his
constitutional rights, SPO1 Ybaez frisked him and found in his pocket six other plastic sachets,
while PO2 Caragdag seized the buy-bust money from Bautistas hand. The team brought Bautista
and the seized plastic sachets back to the police station.

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In the police station, the team recorded the buy-bust bill in the police blotter and turned
over the plastic sachets to PO2 Hector Castillo, the investigator on duty.PO2 Castillo marked the
sachet handed by Bautista to PO2 Tayag as CBS (Bautistas initials).

Insp. Cruz, Forensic Chemist Albert S. Arturo conducted a laboratory examination on the
contents of the marked sachets, and stated in his Physical Science Report that the marked sachets
contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous substance.

Bautista however denied the charge. He claimed that on April 25, 2003, at around 6:00
p.m., he and his wife, Rosario, were in their house cutting cloth to be made into door mats when
PO2 Tayag and two others barged and they forced him to go with them, with PO2 Tayag hitting
him on the nape. He was brought to and detained at the Caloocan City Jail.

ISSUE:

Whether illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu were established beyond reasonable.
doubt

HELD:

Yes. Bautistas denial and defense of frame-up were given no consideration due to their
being self-serving and uncorroborated. We declare such treatment warranted. He did not present
Rosario, his wife, to corroborate his claim of being framed up although she was supposed to have
been around at the time of his arrest. He did not also adduce evidence to substantiate his story of
being falsely incriminated in a frame-up by competent evidence. His claim thereon did not prevail
over the positive identification of him by PO2 Tayag as the drug pusher he had transacted with.

The requisites for illegal sale of shabu were competently and convincingly proven by the
Prosecution. PO2 Tayag, as the poseur-buyer, attested that Bautista sold shabu to him during a
legitimate buy-bust operation. According to Forensic Chemist Arturo, the substance subject of the
transaction, which weighed 0.05 gram, was examined and found to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. PO2 Caragdag declared that he recovered the buy-bust
money from Bautistas hand right after the sale. Further, the Prosecution later presented as
evidence both the sachet of shabu subject of the sale and the buy-bust money used in the buy-
bust operation. Thereby, the Prosecution directly incriminated Bautista.

For illegal possession of a dangerous drug, like shabu, the elements are: (a) the accused is
in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
drug.

The elements of illegal possession of a dangerous drug were similarly competently and
convincingly established by the Prosecution. SPO1 Ybaez stated that upon seeing the pre-arranged
signal given by PO2 Tayag, he and the other members of the team proceeded to arrest Bautista;
and that he frisked Bautista and then recovered six other plastic sachets from Bautistas pocket.
Undoubtedly, the frisking was legally authorized as a search incidental to the lawful arrest of
Bautista for evidence in the commission of illegal drug pushing. Forensic Chemist Arturo certified
that each of the sachets contained different shabu of different weights.

REYES vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 180177, FIRST DIVISION, April 18, 2012, BERSAMIN, J.

The burden rests in the Prosecution to see to it that the evidence of guilt satisfies the
standard of moral certainty demanded in all criminal prosecutions. The standard demands that all
the essential elements of the offense are established as to leave no room for any doubt about the
guilt of the accused. The courts should unfailingly impose the standard in order to prevent injustice
from being perpetrated against the accused.

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Criminal Law; Buy-bust Operations; The buy-bust operation, according to People v.


Garcia, 580 SCRA 259 (2009), was susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its
use as a tool for extortion, and the possibility of that abuse was great.The buy-bust operation
mounted against petitioner resulted from the tip of an unnamed lady confidential informant.
Such an operation, according to People v. Garcia, 580 SCRA 259 (2009), was susceptible to police
abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion, and the possibility of that
abuse was great. The susceptibility to abuse of the operation led to the institution of several
procedural safeguards by R.A. No. 9165, mainly to guide the law enforcers. Thus, the State must
show a faithful compliance with such safeguards during the prosecution of every drug-related
offense.

Same; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.The successful
prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires: (a) proof that the transaction or sale took
place, and (b) the presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti, or the dangerous drugs
themselves. On the other hand, the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
necessitates the following facts to be proved, namely: (a) the accused was in possession of
dangerous drugs, (b) such possession was not authorized by law, and (c) the accused was freely
and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs. For both offenses, it is crucial
that the Prosecution establishes the identity of the seized dangerous drugs in a way that the
integrity thereof has been well preserved from the time of seizure or confiscation from the
accused until the time of presentation as evidence in court. Nothing less than a faithful
compliance with this duty is demanded of all law enforcers arresting drug pushers and drug
possessors and confiscating and seizing the dangerous drugs and substances from them.

FACTS:

A lady confidential informant went to the Police Station to report on the drug dealing
activities of a certain alias Boy (later identified as petitioner) on M. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa,
Manila. A buy bust team of ten members, including PO2 Erwin Payumo as designated poseur
buyer, was formed.

From the police station, the lady confidential informant called petitioner by phone. The
latter instructed her to wait on M. Mapa Street. Thus, the buy bust team proceeded to that area,
PO2 Payumo and the lady confidential informant arrived together to wait for petitioner.

Petitioner came by five minutes later, and, after asking the lady confidential informant
whether PO2 Payumo was the buyer, instructed Payumo to follow him to his house where he told
PO2 Payumo to wait. Two other individuals, later identified as Conchita Carlos and Jeonilo Flores,
were also waiting for petitioner. Petitioner asked PO2 Payumo for the payment, and the latter
complied and handed the marked money consisting of three P50.00 bills all bearing the initials
TF. Petitioner then went into a room and returned with a plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance that he gave to PO2 Payumo.

Payumo after a sale placed a missed call to PO1 Miguelito Gil, a member of the buy bust
team, thereby giving the prearranged signal showing that the transaction was completed. He then
arrested petitioner after identifying himself as an officer. PO2 Payumo recovered another sachet
containing white crystalline substance from petitioners right hand, and the marked money from
petitioners right front pocket.

The rest of the buybust came around and recovered two sachets also containing white
crystalline substance from the sofa where Conchita and Jeonilo were sitting. The buybust team
thus also arrested Conchita and Jeonilo. With proper markings made, the seized items were
thereafter turned over to the Western Police District Crime Laboratory for examination and the
items were found positive for methampethamine hydrochloride or shabu.

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Petitioner denied that there had been a buybust operation, and claimed that he had been
framed up. He claims that he was at his house entertaining his visitors Conchita and Jeonilo in the
afternoon of January 20, 2005. Conchita was selling to him a sofa bed for P800.00, while Jeonilo
was only contracted by Conchita to drive the jeepney carrying the sofa bed. The three of them
were surprised when a group of armed men in civilian clothes barged into his house and
conducted a search, and arrested them. He was also surprised to see a plastic sachet when the
armed men emptied his pocket. According to him PO2 Payumo was not among those who
entered and searched his house and the three of them were made to board a van where PO1
Rudolf Mijares demanded P30,000.00 for his release and that because he told them he had no
money to give to them, one of the men remarked: Sige, tuluyan na yan. They were then brought
to the police station.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner is guilty of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

HELD:

No. The burden rests in the Prosecution to see to it that the evidence of guilt satisfies the
standard of moral certainty demanded in all criminal prosecutions. The standard demands that all
the essential elements of the offense are established as to leave no room for any doubt about the
guilt of the accused. The courts should unfailingly impose the standard in order to prevent
injustice from being perpetrated against the accused.

The buybust operation mounted against petitioner resulted from the tip of an unnamed
lady confidential informant. Such an operation, according to People v. Garcia, was susceptible to
police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion, and the possibility of
that abuse was great. The susceptibility to abuse of the operation led to the institution of several
procedural safeguards by R.A. No. 9165, mainly to guide the law enforcers.

For both offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, it is crucial that
the Prosecution establishes the identity of the seized dangerous drugs in a way that the integrity
thereof has been well preserved from the time of seizure or confiscation from the accused until
the time of presentation as evidence in court. Nothing less than a faithful compliance with this
duty is demanded of all law enforcers arresting drug pushers and drug possessors and confiscating
and seizing the dangerous drugs and substances from them.

Here, the Prosecution failed to demonstrate a faithful compliance by the arresting lawmen
of the rule on chain of custody. To start with, the fact that the dangerous drugs were
inventoried and photographed at the site of arrest upon seizure in the presence of
petitioner, a representative of the media, a representative of the DOJ, and any elected
public official, was not shown. As such, the arresting lawmen did not at all comply with the
further requirement to have the attending representative of the media, representative of the DOJ,
and elected public official sign the inventory and be furnished a copy each of the inventory.
Instead, the records show that PO2 Payumo placed the markings of RRS1 on the sachet
allegedly received from petitioner and RRS2 on the two sachets allegedly seized from
petitioners hand already at the police station with only petitioner present.

The omissions noted herein indicated that the State did not establish the identity of the
dangerous drugs allegedly seized from petitioner with the same exacting certitude required for a
finding of guilt.

Although PO2 Payumo declared that he was the one who had received the sachet of shabu
(RRS1) from petitioner and who had confiscated the two sachets of shabu (RRS2) from
petitioner, all of which he had then sealed, nothing more to support the fact that the evidence
thus seized had remained intact was adduced. s

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In fact, the State did not anymore establish to whom the seized articles had been endorsed
after PO2 Payumo had placed the markings at the station, and with whose custody or safekeeping
the seized articles had remained until their endorsement to P/Insp. Macapagal for the laboratory
examination. The Prosecution did not show to whom the seized articles had been turned over
following the conduct of the laboratory examination, and how the seized articles had been kept in
a manner that preserved their integrity until their final presentation in court as evidence of the
corpus delicti.

Such lapses of the Prosecution were fatal to its proof of guilt because they demonstrated
that the chain of custody did not stay unbroken, thereby raising doubt on the integrity and
identity of the dangerous drugs as evidence of the corpus delicti of the crimes charged.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHAD MANANSALA y LAGMAN,


accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 175939 April 3, 2013, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.

The due recognition of the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation through the criminal complaint or information is decisive of whether his
prosecution for a crime stands or not. The right is not transgressed if the information sufficiently
alleges facts and omissions constituting an offense that includes the offense established to have
been committed by the accused.

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Marijuana; The Supreme Court held as
prevailing the doctrine that the illegal sale of marijuana absorbs the illegal possession of marijuana,
except if the seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of another quantity of marijuana
not covered by or not included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity of marijuana was probably
intended for some future dealings or use by the accused.For sure, there have been many
occasions in which the Court has found an accused charged with the illegal sale of marijuana in
violation of Section 4 guilty instead of the illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8.
In the oft-cited case of People v. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561 (1997), the Court held as prevailing the
doctrine that the illegal sale of marijuana absorbs the illegal possession of marijuana, except if the
seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of another quantity of marijuana not covered
by or not included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity of marijuana was probably intended
for some future dealings or use by the accused. The premise used in Lacerna was that the illegal
possession, being an element of the illegal sale, was necessarily included in the illegal sale.

Same; Same; Same; Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs; The involvement of a single
object in both the illegal sale as the crime charged and the illegal possession as the crime proved is
indispensable, such that only the prohibited drugs alleged in the information to be the subject of the
illegal sale is considered competent evidence to support the conviction of the accused for the illegal
possession.The involvement of a single object in both the illegal sale as the crime charged and
the illegal possession as the crime proved is indispensable, such that only the prohibited drugs
alleged in the information to be the subject of the illegal sale is considered competent evidence to
support the conviction of the accused for the illegal possession. As such, the illegal possession is
either deemed absorbed by or is considered a necessary element of the illegal sale. On the other
hand, any other illegal substance found in the possession of the accused that is not part of the
subject of the illegal sale should be prosecuted under a distinct and separate information charging
illegal possession; otherwise, the fundamental right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him would be flagrantly violated.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Variance Between Allegations and Proof; The rule is that when
there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or
established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged.The CA
correctly declared that the illegal possession of marijuana was a crime that is necessarily
included in the crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been charged with.
The right of Manansala to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him

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enunciated in Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution was not violated simply because
the information had precisely charged him with selling, delivering, giving away and distributing
more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves. Thereby, he was being sufficiently given notice
that he was also to be held to account for possessing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana
leaves. As Lacerna and similar rulings have explained, the crime of illegal sale of marijuana
defined and punished under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, implied the prior
possession of the marijuana. As such, the crime of illegal sale included or absorbed the crime of
illegal possession. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as
charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved included in that which is charged. According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court (1985),
the rule then applicable, an offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter.

FACTS:

On October 18, 1994 the Philippine National Police in Olongapo City (PNP) conducted a
test-buy operation against Manansala, a suspected dealer of marijuana. On the same date,
following the test-buy, the PNP applied for and obtained a search warrant from the RTC, Branch
72, Olongapo City (Search Warrant No. 8-94) to authorize the search for and seizure of prohibited
drugs in Manansalas residence located at No. 55 Johnson Extension, Barangay East Bajac Bajac,
Olongapo City. The search yielded the 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves subject of the
information, which the search team recovered from a wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also
seized was the amount of P655.00 that included the two marked P50.00 bills used during the test
buy.

The information alleged that on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of October, 1994, in
the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without being lawfully authorized did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and distributing more or less 750
grams or kilo of marijuana dried leaves placed in a small wooden box inside the cabinet, which
are prohibited drugs, found in his possession and control.

The crime thereby charged was a violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs). But instead of finding him guilty of the crime charged after
trial, the RTC convicted him for a violation of Section 8, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659 (Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs).

On appeal, Manansala assigned as one of the reversible errors committed by the RTC that
the trial court had erred in convicting him for illegal possession of prohibited drugs on the
misplaced and inaccurate theory that the offense of illegal possession of marijuana in violation of
Section 8 was necesarily included in the offense of illegal sale of marijuana in violation of Section
4. The CA disagreed with Manansala, however, and held that his conviction for the illegal
possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8 under the information that had alleged the
illegal sale of marijuana under Section 4 was proper.

ISSUE:

Whether the conviction of Manansala for a violation of Section 8, which the information
did not allege, instead of for a violation of Section 4, which the information alleged, was not in
violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
brought against him.

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RULING:

The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
brought against the petitioner was not violated.

In the oft-cited case of People v. Lacerna, the Court held as prevailing the doctrine that
the illegal sale of marijuana absorbs the illegal possession of marijuana, except if the seller was
also apprehended in the illegal possession of another quantity of marijuana not covered by or not
included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity of marijuana was probably intended for some
future dealings or use by the accused. The premise used in Lacerna was that the illegal possession,
being an element of the illegal sale, was necessarily included in the illegal sale.

Any other illegal substance found in the possession of the accused that is not part of the
subject of the illegal sale should be prosecuted under a distinct and separate information charging
illegal possession; otherwise, the fundamental right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him would be flagrantly violated.

The 750 grams of marijuana leaves is distinct and separate from the quantity of marijuana
worth P100.00 that was the object of the test buy. The 750 grams of marijuana dried leaves had
been seized from the possession Manansala on October 19, 1994 by virtue of the search warrant,
while the attributed illegal sale of marijuana had happened on October 18, 1994 during the test
buy conducted to support the application of the search warrant.

Nonetheless, the conviction of Manansala stands. The CA correctly declared that the
illegal possession of marijuana was a crime that is necessarily included in the crime of
drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been charged with. The right of
Manansala to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him enunciated in
Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution was not violated simply because the information
had precisely charged him with selling, delivering, giving away and distributing more or less 750
grams of dried marijuana leaves. Thereby, he was being sufficiently given notice that he was also
to be held to account for possessing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves. As Lacerna
and similar rulings have explained, the crime of illegal sale of marijuana defined and punished
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, implied the prior possession of the
marijuana. As such, the crime of illegal sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal possession.
The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged. According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court (1985), the rule
then applicable, an offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter.

PEOPLE VS. ARNOLD TAPERE


G.R. NO. 178065, February 20, 2013, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.

An accused arrested during a valid entrapment operation is not entitled to an acquittal on


the ground that his arrest resulted from instigation.

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Shabu; Elements of.To establish the
crime of illegal sale of shabu as defined and punished under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165, the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt (a) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the identity of the object and the consideration of the sale; and (b) the delivery of the
thing sold and of the payment for the thing. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, like shabu, requires simply the consummation of the selling transaction, which
happens at the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. In short, the Prosecution
must show that the transaction or sale actually took place, and present in court the thing sold as
evidence of the corpus delicti.

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Same; Same; Instigation; Entrapment; Instigation and Entrapment, Distinguished.


Instigation takes place when a peace officer induces a person to commit a crime. Without the
inducement, the crime would not be committed. Hence, it is exempting by reason of public
policy; otherwise, the peace officer would be a co-principal. It follows that the person instigating
must not be a private person, because he will be liable as a principal by inducement. On the other
hand, entrapment signifies the ways and means devised by a peace officer to entrap or apprehend
a person who has committed a crime. With or without the entrapment, the crime has been
committed already. Hence, entrapment is not mitigating. Although entrapment is sanctioned by
law, instigation is not. The difference between the two lies in the origin of the criminal intentin
entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal, but in instigation, the law
officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests it to the accused, who adopts the idea
and carries it into execution.

FACTS:

At 7:10 p.m. of September 2, 2002, the team proceeded on board the jeep of SPO2 Cabahug
to Alcuizar Avenue in San Antonio, Iligan City where Tapere engaged in drug pushing. They
stopped at some distance from the target area, and walked the rest of the way. They posted
themselves within view of the target place, which was on the left side of the road going towards
Tipanoy, Iligan City and a few meters from the Tubod Bridge. The first structure nearest the
bridge on the left side of the road going towards Tipanoy was a blacksmith shop, and next to the
shop was a row of stalls where fish, meat and other commodities were sold. The agents spotted
Tapere vending lanzones along that side of the road to Tipanoy, outside the row of stalls.

With each agent being strategically posted, Salgado was signalled to approach Tapere according
to the plan. Salgado went towards Tapere. The agents saw the two conversing for a brief while
before Salgado handed money to Tapere. In turn, Tapere took a small heat-sealed plastic sachet
from his pocket and gave it to Salgado. After accepting the sachet, Salgado made the pre-arranged
signal of scratching his head to signify the consummation of the transaction. The agents rushed
towards Tapere, introduced themselves as PDEA agents, and placed him in custody. They
searched him and recovered the P100.00 bill (Exhibit E-1) from his right pocket. At that point, he
voluntarily produced three more sachets of shabu from his pocket and handed them to SPO2
Bastatas. The agents brought Tapere to the PDEA headquarters in Camp Cabili, Tipanoy, Iligan
City.

On the other hand, Tapere denied the accusation. He and his wife rendered their own
version of the incident that led to his arrest.

Arnold P. Tapere was charged with, tried for and found guilty of illegally selling shabu in violation
of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) by
the RTC which sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction and the prescribed penalty. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

WON the apprehension of Tapere was the product of an instigation, not entrapment; and
that he should consequently be acquitted because instigation was an absolutory cause.

RULING:

NO. The State conclusively established the concurrence of the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. Firstly, the members of the buybust team identified Tapere as the person with
whom Salgado had contracted on the purchase of the shabu. Secondly, the subject of the sale was
one plastic sachet of shabu that the PNP Crime Laboratory later on confirmed in due course to
contain methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. It is of no consequence that three
other sachets of shabu recovered from Taperes possession at the time of his arrest were also
presented as evidence during the trial, or that the Prosecution failed to specify which of the four

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sachets was the sachet involved in the transaction between him and Salgado, because what is
decisive is that one of the four sachets was definitely the subject of the transaction between
Tapere and the poseur buyer. Thirdly, the consideration of the sale was P100.00, and the actual
payment of that amount through the P100.00 bill bearing serial number YU859011 covered by the
public prosecutors certification ensured the identification of it as the consideration. And,
fourthly, the Prosecutions witnesses fully described the details of the consummated sale of shabu
between Tapere as seller and Salgado as buyer.

The members of the buy-bust team substantially complied with the requirements of Sec.
21(1), RA No. 9165. To shield the operation from suspicion, they first saw to the certification of the
buy-bust bill by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, pursuant to their then standard
operating procedure.22 After arresting Tapere, they lost no time in bringing him and the
confiscated sachets (marked and identified as "AT-1" to "AT-4", inclusive) to the PDEA office,
where Team Leader SPO2 Englatiera immediately prepared and signed the request for laboratory
examination. Due to the lateness of the hour, PO1 Margaja, another member of the team, brought
the request and the sachets to the PNP Crime Laboratory on the next day, and the request and the
sachets were received in due course. Sr. Police Insp. Jabonillo of the PNP Crime Laboratory
subjected the sachets to examination, and confirmed the presence in all of them of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. She also gave the weights of the contents of
the four sachets in her Chemistry Report No. D-083-02 dated September 4, 2002. Her report was
approved by her superior, Police Supt. Sabong of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory. Based on all
the foregoing, there was a conscious effort exerted by the buy-bust team to ensure the proper
incrimination of Tapere.

Tapere was caught in flagrante delicto committing the illegal sale of shabu during the buy-
bust operation. In that operation, Salgado offered to buy from him a definite quantity of shabu for
P100.00. Even if, as he claims, he was unaware that Salgado was then working as an undercover
agent for the PDEA, he had no justification for accepting the offer of Salgado to buy the shabu.
His explanation that he could not have refused Salgado's offer to buy for fear of displeasing the
latter was implausible. He did not show how Salgado could have influenced him at all into doing
something so blatantly illegal. What is clear to us, therefore, is that the decision to peddle the
shabu emanated from his own mind, such that he did not need much prodding from Salgado or
anyone else to engage in the sale of the shabu; hence, he was not incited, induced, instigated or
lured into committing an offense that he did not have the intention of committing.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO GONZALES y SANTOS,


also known as TAKYO, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 182417 April 3, 2013, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.

The State, and no other party, has the responsibility to explain the lapses in the procedures
taken to preserve the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs. Without the explanation by the State,
the evidence of the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on the
ground that his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt.

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.To
secure a conviction of the accused charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs as defined and
punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the State must establish the
concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the transaction or sale took place
between the accused and the poseur buyer; and (b) that the dangerous drugs subject of the
transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.

Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Words and Phrases; Chain of Custody means the duly
recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant
sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction

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Same; Same; Corpus Delicti; Words and Phrases; The corpus delicti is a compound fact
made up of two (2) things, viz.: the existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of the
criminal charge, and the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or result.Without
such dangerous drugs being presented as evidence, the State does not establish the corpus delicti,
which, literally translated from Latin, refers to the body of the crime, or the actual commission by
someone of the particular offense charged. Corpus delicti, as the Court puts it in People v. Roluna,
231 SCRA 446 (1994) is: xxx the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to
the fact that a crime has been actually committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the
actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. The corpus delicti is a compound
fact made up of two (2) things, viz.: the existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of the
criminal charge, and the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or result.

Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs
or related items by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other
identifying signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon
arrest.The first stage in the chain of custody is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related
items. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying signs,
should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon arrest. The
importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied, because succeeding handlers of the
dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. Also, the marking operates to
set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other material from the moment
they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby
forestalling switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. In short, the marking immediately
upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the
preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value.

Same; Same; Same; By way of exception, Republic Act No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations both state that the non-compliance with the procedures thereby delineated and set
would not necessarily invalidate the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs provided there were
justifiable grounds for the non-compliance, and provided that the integrity of the evidence of the
corpus delicti was preserved.By way of exception, Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR both state
that the non-compliance with the procedures thereby delineated and set would not necessarily
invalidate the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs provided there were justifiable grounds
for the non-compliance, and provided that the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti was
preserved. But the non-compliance with the procedures, to be excusable, must have to be justified
by the States agents themselves. Considering that PO1 Dimla tendered no justification in court
for the non-compliance with the procedures, the exception did not apply herein. The absolution
of Gonzales should then follow, for we cannot deny that the observance of the chain of custody as
defined by the law was the only assurance to him that his incrimination for the very serious crime
had been legitimate and insulated from either invention or malice. In this connection, the Court
states that the unexplained non-compliance with the procedures for preserving the chain of
custody of the dangerous drugs has frequently caused the Court to absolve those found guilty by
the lower courts.

FACTS:

Gonzales was formally charged in the RTC with a violation of Section 5, Article II, of
Republic Act No. 9165 alleging willful, unlawful, and felonious sale, trade, delivery, giving away,
dispatching in transit and transporting dangerous drug consisting of one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet of methylamphetamine hydrochloride weighing 0.194 gram. Both RTC
and CA convicted the accused of the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Whether the guilt of the accused for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

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RULING:

To secure a conviction of the accused charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs as
defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the State must establish
the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the transaction or sale took place
between the accused and the poseur buyer; and (b) that the dangerous drugs subject of the
transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.

Anent the second element, it is indispensable for the State to establish that the dangerous
drugs subject of the transaction or sale and subsequently examined in the laboratory are the same
dangerous drugs presented in court as evidence. The identity of the dangerous drugs is essential
to proving the corpus delicti. To achieve that end, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 and Section
21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 (IRR) define the
procedures to be followed by the apprehending officers in the seizure and custody of the
dangerous drugs.

Although PO1 Dimla, the States lone witness, testified that he had marked the sachet of
shabu with his own initials of ED following Gonzales arrest, he did not explain, either in his
court testimony or in the joint affidavit of arrest, whether his marking had been done in the
presence of Gonzales, or done immediately upon the arrest of Gonzales. Nor did he show by
testimony or otherwise who had taken custody of the sachet of shabu after he had done his
marking, and who had subsequently brought the sachet of shabu to the police station, and, still
later on, to the laboratory. Given the possibility of just anyone bringing any quantity of shabu to
the laboratory for examination, there is now no assurance that the quantity presented here as
evidence was the same article that had been the subject of the sale by Gonzales. The
indeterminateness of the identities of the individuals who could have handled the sachet of shabu
after PO1 Dimlas marking broke the chain of custody, and tainted the integrity of the shabu
ultimately presented as evidence to the trial court. We hardly need to reiterate that the chain of
custody, which Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, supra, explicitly describes as
the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court
for destruction, demands such record of movements and custody of seized items to include the
identities and signatures of the persons who held temporary custody of the seized item, the dates
and times when such transfers of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court
as evidence, and the final disposition.

A further review of the records underscores that poseur-buyer PO1 Dimla nowhere
recalled in court that he and PO2 Chua had conducted the physical inventory and photographing
of the shabu subject of the sale by Gonzales. In fact, in their joint affidavit of arrest,24 PO1 Dimla
and PO2 Chua did not mention any inventory and photographing. The omission can only mean
that no such inventory and photographing were done by them. The omission of the inventory and
photographing exposed another weakness of the evidence of guilt, considering that the inventory
and photographing to be made in the presence of the accused or his representative, or within the
presence of any representative from the media, Department of Justice or any elected official, who
must sign the inventory, or be given a copy of the inventory, were really significant stages of the
procedures outlined by the law and its IRR.

By way of exception, Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR both state that the non-compliance
with the procedures thereby delineated and set would not necessarily invalidate the seizure and
custody of the dangerous drugs provided there were justifiable grounds for the non-compliance,
and provided that the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti was preserved. But the non-
compliance with the procedures, to be excusable, must have to be justified by the States agents
themselves. Considering that PO1 Dimla tendered no justification in court for the non-compliance
with the procedures, the exception did not apply herein. The absolution of Gonzales should then
follow, for we cannot deny that the observance of the chain of custody as defined by the law was
the only assurance to him that his incrimination for the very serious crime had been legitimate
and insulated from either invention or malice. In this connection, the Court states that the

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unexplained non-compliance with the procedures for preserving the chain of custody of the
dangerous drugs has frequently caused the Court to absolve those found guilty by the lower
courts.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LARRY MENDOZA


G.R. No. 192432, FIRST DIVISION, June 23, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.

The law enforcement agents who conduct buy-bust operations against persons suspected of
drug trafficking in violation of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA No. 9165), otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, should comply with the statutory requirements
for preserving the chain of custody of the seized evidence. Failing this, they are required to render
sufficient reasons for their non-compliance during the trial; otherwise, the presumption that they
have regularly performed their official duties cannot obtain, and the persons they charge should be
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Chain of Custody Rule; Buy-Bust Operations; The
identity of the dangerous drugs should be established beyond doubt by showing that the dangerous
drugs offered in court were the same substances bought during the buy-bust operation.The
presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if not indispensable in every
prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. As such, the identity of the dangerous drugs
should be established beyond doubt by showing that the dangerous drugs offered in court were
the same substances bought during the buy-bust operation. This rigorous requirement, known
under RA No. 9165 as the chain of custody, performs the function of ensuring that unnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Marking; The marking after seizure by the arresting officer, being
the starting point in the custodial link, should be made immediately upon the seizure, or, if that is
not possible, as close to the time and place of the seizure as practicable under the obtaining
circumstances.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Without the insulating presence of the representative from
the media or the Department of Justice (DOJ), or any elected public official during the seizure and
marking of the sachets of shabu, the evils of switching, planting or contamination of the evidence
that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads.

Same; Same; Same; The last paragraph of Section 21(1) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 expressly provides a saving mechanism to the
effect that not every case of noncompliance with the statutory requirements for the physical
inventory and photograph of the dangerous drugs being made in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof
would prejudice the States case against the accused. But in order for that saving mechanism to
apply, and thus save the day for the States cause, the Prosecution must have to recognize first the
lapse or lapses, and then credibly explain them.

Same; Same; Same; With the chain of custody being demonstrably broken, the accused
deserved to be acquitted of the serious charges.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumption of Regularity; The Supreme Court (SC) has usually
presumed the regularity of performance of their official duties in favor of the members of buy-bust
teams enforcing our laws against the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Same; Same; Same; The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only
when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official

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duty.The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only when no reason
exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty. And
even in that instance the presumption of regularity will not be stronger than the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the
constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent.

FACTS:

Policemen Arnel Diocena and Alfredo DG Lim testified that, on September 29, 2007,
they received reports that an alias Larry was selling shabu at St. Claire Street, Barangay
Calumpang, Binangonan, Rizal. They organized a buy-bust operation where Diocena acted as
the poseur buyer while Lim served as back-up. They proceeded to the target area with their asset
at around 10:45 p.m. There Diocena and the asset waited in the corner on their motorcycle while
Lim and the other cops positioned themselves in the perimeter. The asset texted Larry and they
waited for him to arrive. Later, Larry arrived and told them, Pasensya na at ngayon lang dumating
ang mga items. Larry then asked them how much they were buying and Diocena told P500.00
worth. Larry took out two plastic sachets of shabu and gave it to Diocena who gave him a marked
P500 bill. Diocena lit the left signal light of his motorcycle to signal Lim and the other cops that
the deal was done. They then arrested Larry who turned out to be the accused. After frisking
him, they recovered another sachet of shabu from him.

The defense witnesses version was that on that day, he was minding his own business,
eating with his wife when his friend Rolly Lopez knocked on the door. Rolly was wanted by the
cops (may atraso) and asked Mendoza for help to get them off his back. Rolly texted
somebody and after there was another knock. It was the police led by one Dennis Gorospe who
asked Mendoza for his identity. When he said yes, Gorospe cuffed him after showing him sachets
of shabu with his initials. Gorospe was then taken to the police station where he was interrogated
and asked how much protection money he can cough up. When he refused, he was arrested and
drug tested. He claims that he was supposed to be a regalo to the new police chief.

The RTC convicted the accused of violating Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165. The accused
appealed but the CA affirmed the conviction of the accused.

ISSUE:

WON the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violations of Section 5 and
Section 11 of RA No. 9165.

RULING:

NO. The State did not satisfactorily explain substantial lapses committed by the
buy-bust team in the chain of custody; hence, the guilt of the accused for the crime
charged was not established beyond reasonable doubt

The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if not


indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. As such, the identity of
the dangerous drugs should be established beyond doubt by showing that the dangerous drugs
offered in court were the same substances bought during the buy-bust operation. This rigorous
requirement, known under RA No. 9165 as the chain of custody, performs the function of ensuring
that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. The dangerous
drugs are themselves the corpus delicti to discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti. That
proof is vital to a judgment of conviction. On the other hand, the Prosecution does not comply
with the indispensable requirement of proving the violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165
when the dangerous drugs are missing but also when there are substantial gaps in the chain of
custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the authenticity of the evidence
presented in court.

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An examination of the records reveals that the buy-bust team did not observe the
statutory procedures on preserving the chain of custody.

To start with, the State did not show the presence during the seizure and
confiscation of the contraband, as well as during the physical inventory and photographing of
the contraband, of the representatives from the media or the Department of Justice, or of
any elected public official. Such presence was precisely necessary to insulate the apprehension
and incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity.

It is notable that PO1 Diocena, although specifically recalling having marked the
confiscated sachets of shabu with the initials of the accused immediately after the seizure, did not
state if he had made his marking in the presence of the accused himself or of his representative,
and in the presence of a representative from the media or the Department of Justice, or any
elected public official.

Similarly, P/Insp. Lim did not mention in his testimony that a representative from the
media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official was present during the seizure
and marking of the sachets of shabu.

The consequences of the failure of the arresting lawmen to comply with the
requirements of Section 21(1), supra, were dire as far as the Prosecution was concerned.
Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the Department of
Justice, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, the
evils of switching, planting or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts
conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly
heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the sachets
of shabu that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the
trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the insulating presence of such
witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.

Secondly, the records nowhere indicated, contrary to the claim of P/Insp. Lim, that
the buy-bust team, or any member thereof, had conducted the physical inventory of the
confiscated items. We know this because the States formal offer of evidence did not include
such inventory. Without the inventory having been made by the seizing lawmen, it became
doubtful whether any shabu had been seized from the accused at all.

And, thirdly, although PO1 Diocena asserted that photographs of the confiscated items
and the marked money were taken at the police station, it still behooved him to justify why the
photographs of the seized shabu was not taken immediately upon the seizure, and at the place of
seizure. The State did not explain this lapse. The pictorial evidence of the latter kind would have
more firmly established the identity of the seized shabu for purposes of preserving the chain of
custody.

The last paragraph of Section 21(1) of the IRR of RA No. 9165 expressly provides a saving
mechanism to the effect that not every case of non-compliance with the statutory
requirements for the physical inventory and photograph of the dangerous drugs being made in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof would prejudice the States case against the accused.
But in order for that saving mechanism to apply, and thus save the day for the States cause, the
Prosecution must have to recognize first the lapse or lapses, and then credibly explain them.

It appears that the application of the saving mechanism in this case was not
warranted. The Prosecution did not concede that the lawmen had not complied with the
requirement for the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign

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the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. Also, the Prosecution did not tender any
justification why no representatives from the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected
public official had been present during the seizure and confiscation of the shabu. The omissions,
particularly the failure to justify on the part of the lawmen, were strange and improbable,
particularly because the records indicated that the lawmen had sufficient time and the
opportunity to prepare for the proper conduct of the buy-bust operation against the accused due
to such operation having come in the aftermath of a successful test buy.

In all, the buy-bust team had about 48 days the period intervening between July 10, 2007,
when the test buy was conducted, and August 28, 2007, when the crimes charged were committed
within which to have the media and the Department of Justice be represented during the buy-
bust operation, as well as to invite an elected public official of the place of operation to witness
the operation. It puzzles the Court, therefore, that the buy-bust team did not prudently follow the
procedures outlined in Section 21(1), supra, despite their being experienced policemen who knew
the significance of the procedures in the preservation of the chain of custody.

With the chain of custody being demonstrably broken, the accused deserved to be
acquitted of the serious charges. Even if we rejected the frame-up defense of the accused, the
unexplained failures and lapses committed by the buy-bust team could not be fairly ignored. At
the very least, they raised a reasonable doubt on his guilt which is a doubt growing reasonably out
of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a captious doubt; not a doubt engendered merely by
sympathy for the unfortunate position of the defendant, or a dislike to accept the responsibility of
convicting a fellow man. If, having weighed the evidence on both sides, you reach the conclusion
that the defendant is guilty, to that degree of certainty as would lead you to act on the faith of it
in the most important and crucial affairs of your life, you may properly convict him. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not proof to a mathematical demonstration. It is not proof beyond the
possibility of mistake.

Thus, the accused was entitled to be acquitted and freed, for in all criminal
prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecutions duty is to prove each and every
element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for
any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must further prove the
participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. In doing all these, the
Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success
upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the
Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less
than the Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no
burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not
overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. In other words, the weakness of the
defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the
Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the
crime charged and in identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.

The CA and the RTC erred in relying on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty of the arresting officers

Even if the foregoing conclusion already renders any further discussion of the applicability
of the presumption of regularity in favor of the members of the buy-bust team superfluous, we
need to dwell a bit on the matter if only to remind the lower courts not to give too much primacy
to the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty at the expense of the higher
and stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused in a prosecution for violation of
the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002.

We have usually presumed the regularity of performance of their official duties in favor of
the members of buy-bust teams enforcing our laws against the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. But
the presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence of irregularity or of any failure to perform a
duty.

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The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only when no reason
exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty. And
even in that instance the presumption of regularity will not be stronger than the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the
constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent. Trial courts are instructed to apply this
differentiation, and to always bear in mind that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty could not prevail over the stronger presumption of innocence
favoring the accused. Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of the accused being presumed
innocent would be held sub ordinate to a mere rule of evidence allocating the burden of evidence.
Where, like here, the proof adduced against the accused has not even overcome the presumption
of innocence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could not be a factor to
adjudge the accused guilty of the crime charged.

Moreover, the regularity of the performance of their duty could not be properly
presumed in favor of the policemen because the records were replete with indicia of their
serious lapses. As a rule, a presumed fact like the regularity of performance by a police officer
must be inferred only from an established basic fact, not plucked out from thin air. To say it
differently, it is the established basic fact that triggers the presumed fact of regular performance.
Where there is any hint of irregularity committed by the police officers in arresting the accused
and thereafter, several of which we have earlier noted, there can be no presumption of regularity
of performance in their favor.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLITO ANDAYA y REANO


G.R. No. 183700, FIRST DIVISION, October 13, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.

The non-presentation of the confidential informant as a witness does not ordinarily


weaken the State's case against the accused. However, if the arresting lawmen arrested the
accused based on the pre-arranged signal from the confidential informant who acted as the
poseur buyer, his non-presentation must be credibly explained and the transaction established by
other ways in order to satisfy the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt because the
arresting lawmen did not themselves participate in the buy-bust transaction with the accused.

Criminal Law Dangerous Drugs Act Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs Elements of.To
secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs as
defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act
of 2002), the State must establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the
transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseurbuyer and (b) that the
dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus
delicti.

FACTS:

A team composed of SPO1 Aguila, SPO1 Cabungcal, Eric de Chavex, PO1 Lindberg,
Edwalberto Vilar and asset Bagsit was constituted to conduct a buy-bust. Bagsit, an asset of the
police reported that he had arranged to buy shabu from Pablito Andaya. Two pieces of Php
100.00 bills both duly marked X were given to Bagsit to act as poseur-buyer. Upon reaching the
designated place, the team members alighted from their vehicles and positioned themselves
where they could see and observe the asset. Bagsit then knocked on the door of Andayas house.
After brief talks, the marked money then was given to Andaya and Bagsit received something in
return. The pre-arranged signal signifying the consummation of the transaction was given. The
team members approached Andaya and the asset, introduced themselves as police officers and
arrested Andaya. The merchandise was sent to the Regional Crime Laboratory in Camp Vicente
Lim, Laguna and specimen was positive for methampethamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a
dangerous drug.

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The RTC convicted Andaya for violating Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
based on the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the operation. The decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

On appeal before the Supreme Court, Andaya insisted that the non-presentation of
confidential informant was adverse to the Prosecution, indicating that his guilt was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether the Prosecution's non-presentation of the confidential informant was adverse to


the Prosecution and would indicate that the guilt of the accused was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING:

Yes. (Because of the peculiar circumstance where the informant is at the same time the
poseur-buyer)

To secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs as defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002, the
State must establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the transaction
or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer; and (b) that the dangerous drugs
subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.

A buy-bust operation is a valid and legitimate form of entrapment of the drug pusher. In
such operation, the poseur buyer transacts with the suspect by purchasing a quantity of the
dangerous drug and paying the price agreed upon, and in turn the drug pusher turns over or
delivers the dangerous drug subject of their agreement in exchange for the price or other
consideration. Once the transaction is consummated, the drug pusher is arrested, and can be held
to account under the criminal law. The arresting police officer or private person is favored in such
instance with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.

In every criminal prosecution, it is the State, and no other, that bears the burden of
proving the illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond reasonable doubt. This responsibility
imposed on the State accords with the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, who has
no duty to prove his innocence until and unless the presumption of innocence in his favor has
been overcome by sufficient and competent evidence. Proof of the transaction must be credible
and complete.

The confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated to be the
poseur buyer himself. It is notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the
basis of the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. The pre-arranged signal signified to the
members of the buy-bust team that the transaction had been consummated between the poseur
buyer and Andaya. However, the State did not present the confidential informant/poseur
buyer during the trial to describe how exactly the transaction between him and Andaya
had taken place. There would have been no issue against that, except that none of the
members of the buy-bust team had directly witnessed the transaction, if any, between
Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their being positioned at a distance from the poseur
buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction.

Indeed, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 punishes any person, who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless
of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. Under the
law, selling was any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical whether for money or any other consideration; while delivering was any act

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of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means,
with or without consideration.

Given the legal characterizations of the acts constituting the offense charged, the
members of the buy-bust team could not incriminate Andaya by simply declaring that they had
seen from their positions the poseur buyer handing something to Andaya who, in turn, gave
something to the poseur buyer. If the transaction was a sale, it was unwarranted to infer from
such testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team that what the poseur buyer handed over
were the marked P100.00 bills and that what Andaya gave to the poseur buyer was the shabu
purchased.

PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA) v. RICHARD BRODETT and


JORGE JOSEPH
GR No. 196390, 28 September 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an enforcement of the


Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (Republic Act No. 9165) that are the property of a
third person are subject to be returned to the lawful owner who is not liable for the unlawful act
but the trial court may not release such objects pending trial and before judgment.

Richard Brodett and Jorge Joseph was charged with a violation of Section 5, in
relation to Section 26(b), of Republic Act No. 9165. The State also filed another information
charging only Brodett with a violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165. During the course of the
proceedings in the Regional Trial Court, Brodett filed a Motion To Return Non-Drug
Evidence. He claimed that during his arrest, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency had seized
several personal non-drug effects from
him, including a 2004 Honda Accord car with license plate no. XPF-551; and that PDEA
refused to return his personal effects despite repeated demands for their return. He prayed
that his personal effects be tendered to the trial court to be returned to him upon
verification. The Office of the City Prosecutor objected to the return of the car because it
appeared to be the instrument in the commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No.
9165 due to its being the vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs. The
RTC directed the release of the car. PDEA appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition
for certiorari but it was likewise denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the car should be released for being a personal non-drug effect.

RULING:

NO. It is not open to question that in a criminal proceeding, the court having
jurisdiction over the offense has the power to order upon conviction of an accused the seizure
of (a) the instruments to commit the crime, including documents, papers, and other effects
that are the necessary means to commit the crime; and (b) contraband, the ownership or
possession of which is not permitted for being illegal. The court having jurisdiction over the
offense has the right to dispose of property used in the commission of the crime, such
disposition being an accessory penalty to be imposed on the accused, unless the property
belongs to a third person not liable for the offense that it was used as the instrument to
commit. It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car belonged to Myra Brodett,
who was not charged either in connection with the illegal possession and sale of illegal drugs
involving Brodett and Joseph that were the subject of the criminal proceedings in the RTC, or
even in any other criminal proceedings.

The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or

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J. BERSAMIN

instruments of the unlawful act, including the properties or proceeds derived from illegal
trafficking of dangerous drugs and precursors and essential chemicals, is Section 20 of R.A.
No. 9165. The Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence did not intimate or allege that the car had
belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had belonged to Myra Brodett, a third
person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release, because she was under the
obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime. The
car is a property in custodia legis and may not be released during the pendency of the trial.
The status of the car for the duration of the trial in the RTCas being in custodia legis is
primarily intended to preserve it as evidence and to ensure its availability as such. To release
it before the judgment is rendered is to deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as
evidence.

Indeterminate Sentence Law (R.A. 4103, as amended)

BACOLOD vs. PEOPLE


G.R. No. 206236, FIRST DIVISION, July 15, 2013, Bersamin, J.

It is imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused,
and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of
the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery.

Criminal Law Penalties Indeterminate Sentence Law Section 1 of the Indeterminate


Sentence Law requires the court, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, to sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. Accordingly, the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty in this case should be within the range of the medium
period of the penalty, i.e., from 16 years and 1 day to 20 years, because neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the crime and the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that
prescribed for the crime, without regard to its periods.

FACTS:

*No Facts stated but the accused was charged with Arson in the RTC and affirmed by the
CA.

The petitioner submits that both the RTC and the CA erred in their appreciation of the
evidence. He insists:

1. That no witness had actually seen him set the house on fire;
2. That the State did not show that he had the motive to commit the arson; and
3. That only circumstantial evidence was presented against him, but such evidence, not
being incompatible with the hypothesis favoring his innocence, was insufficient to
support a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUES:

1. Whether direct evidence is necessary to establish the guilt of a person beyond reasonable
doubt. (NO)
2. Whether the RTC correctly imposed the penalty for the crime committed. (NO)

RULING:

Direct evidence is NOT necessary to establish the guilt of a person beyond


reasonable doubt.

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The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the
accused cannot be proved by evidence other than direct evidence. Direct evidence is not the sole
means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because circumstantial evidence, if
sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence. The crime charged may also be proved by
circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence.
Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that which "goes to prove a fact or series of facts
other than the facts in issue, which, if proved, may tend by inference to establish a fact in issue".

The RTCs reliance on circumstantial evidence was sanctioned by Rule 133, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court, which requires for circumstantial evidence to warrant the conviction of an
accused that, firstly, there are more than one circumstance; secondly, the facts from which the
circumstances arose are duly established in court; and, thirdly, the circumstances form and
unbroken chain of events leading to the fair conclusion of the culpability of the accused for the
crime for which he is convicted.

Ostensibly, our rules "make no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of
circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred. No greater degree of certainty is
required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct, for in either case, the trier of
fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused."

RTC erred in imposing the penalty for the crime committed.

The indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor in its medium period, as


minimum, to 16 years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum, prescribed by
the RTC was legally erroneous.

The information specifically alleged that the house burned by the accused was an
inhabited dwelling. Pursuant to Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613 (Amending the Law
on Arson), the penalty to be imposed if the property burned is an inhabited house or dwelling is
from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. Not being composed of three periods,
however, such penalty should be divided into three equal portions of time, and each portion
forms one period of the penalty. Yet, reclusion perpetua, being an indivisible penalty,
immediately becomes the maximum period, leaving reclusion temporal to be divided into two in
order to fix the medium and minimum periods of the penalty. The three periods of the prescribed
penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua are then as follows:

Minimum period 12 years and 1 day to 16 years;


Medium period 16 years and 1 day to 20 years;
Maximum period reclusion perpetua.

Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law requires the court, in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, to sentence the
accused "to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense." Accordingly, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty in this case should
be within the range of the medium period of the penalty, i.e., from 16 years and 1 day to 20 years,
because neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the crime;
and the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree to that prescribed for the crime, without regard to its periods.

It appears, therefore, that the maximum of the indeterminate penalty fixed by the
RTC fell short by one day in order to come within the medium period of the prescribed
penalty. Although such fixing by the RTC was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
CA uncharacteristically condoned the violation. The correction should now be made to make the
sentence conform to law. Accordingly, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence of the
petitioner is 16 years and one day of reclusion temporal.

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J. BERSAMIN

Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act


(R.A. No. 9344 , as amended by R.A. No. 10630, and in relation to P.O. 1829)

ROSAL HUBILLA VS PEOPLE


G.R. No. 176102. November 26, 2014; FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.

The Court recognizes the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006) to protect the best interest of the child in conflict with the law through measures that
will ensure the observance of international standards of child protection, and to apply the principles
of restorative justice in all laws, policies and programs applicable to children in conflict with the
law. The mandate notwithstanding, the Court will not hesitate or halt to impose the penalty of
imprisonment whenever warranted on a child in conflict with the law.

Criminal Law Penalties Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) prescribes the
penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide. Considering that the petitioner was then a
minor at the time of the commission of the crime, being 17 years, four months and 28
days old when he committed the homicide on March 30, 2000, such minority was a
privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to prisin mayor.

Same Children in Conflict with the Law Republic Act No. 9344 Penalties Although
Section 38 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child in
conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the
child offender turns twentyone (21) years of age, pursuant to Section 40 of RA No. 9344.
We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction
for homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no
longer legally feasible or permissible.

Same Same Same Same While Section 5(c) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9344 bestows
on children in conflict with the law the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of
their liberty imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to
certain restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment. A review of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that imprisonment of children in conflict with the
law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5(c) of Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on
children in conflict with the law the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of
their liberty imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to
certain restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or
imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall
be for the shortest appropriate period of time. Thereby, the trial and appellate courts did
not violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the penalty of
imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the penalty was imposed as a last recourse
after holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the suspension of his
sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by
the law.

Same Same Same Same Following Section 51 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9344, the
petitioner, although he has to serve his sentence, may serve it in an agricultural camp or
other training facilities to be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau
of Corrections (BuCor), in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), in a manner consistent with the offender childs best interest. Such
service of sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular penal institution.

FACTS

Alejandro Dequito was at the gate of Dalupaon Elementary School watching the
graduation ceremony of the high school students. While watching, his cousin Jason Espinola,
herein victim, arrived. Later, however, appellant approached the victim and stabbed the latter.
With the appellants left arm around the neck of the victim, appellant stabbed the victim using a

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CRIMINAL LAW
J. BERSAMIN

bladed weapon. He aided the victim as the latter was already struggling to his feet and later
brought him to the hospital.

Nicasio Ligadia, witness Dequitos companion at the time of the incident, corroborated
the testimony of Dequito on all material points.

Marlyn Espinosa, the mother of the deceased, testified that her son was stabbed in front
of the [elementary] school and later brought to the Bicol Medical Center. She stated that her son
stayed for more than a month in the hospital. Thereafter, her son was discharged. Later, however,
when her son went back to the hospital for a check-up, it was discovered that her sons stab
wound had a complication. Her son was subjected to another operation, but died the day after.

The RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner guilty of homicide as charged, and
sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four years and one day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the petitioners conviction but reduced appellant's sentence to six
months and one day to six years of prision correccionalas minimum, to six years and one day to
twelve years of prision mayor as maximum. On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the
CA sentenced appellant to an indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.

ISSUES

1. WON the CA imposed the correct penalty imposable on him taking into
consideration the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9344, the Revised Penal Code
and Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law). YES.

2. WON he was entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of sentence under
Republic Act No. 9344. NO.

3. WON imposing the penalty of imprisonment contravened the provisions of Republic


Act No. 9344 and other international agreements. NO.

RULING

1. Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for
homicide. Considering that the petitioner was then a minor at the time of the commission of the
crime, being 17 years, four months and 28 days old when he committed the homicide on March
30, 2000, such minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to
prision mayor.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence
should be within the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision
correccional (i.e., six months and one day to six years). For the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence, prision mayor in its medium period eight years and one day to 10 years was proper
because there were no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA
imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight
years and one day of prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to
enable him to apply for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968.

The petitioners insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor
Republic Act No. 9344, nor any other relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction
of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence would be to impose an
illegal penalty, and would cause the Court to deliberately violate the law.

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A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law), Section 46 (2), in
conjunction with Section 5 (k), provides that the restrictions on the personal liberty of the child
shall be limited to the minimum. Consistent with this principle, the amended decision of the CA
imposed the ultimate minimums of the indeterminate penalty for homicide under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its part, Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and
appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even for the sake of
enabling the child in conflict with the law to qualify for probation.

2. Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968, which disqualifies from
probation an offender sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six
years, the petitioner could not qualify for probation. For this reason, we annul the directive of the
CA to remand the case to the trial court to determine if he was qualified for probation.

3. Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a
child in conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until
the child offender turns 21 years of age, pursuant to Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344.

We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for
homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no longer
legally feasible or permissible.

Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would be in violation of his
rights as a child in conflict with the law as bestowed by Republic Act No. 9344 and international
agreements. A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that
imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited.
While Section 5 (c) of Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on children in conflict with the law
the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper
disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the imposition of
imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b)
the detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time.Thereby, the
trial and appellate courts did not violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by
imposing the penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the penalty was imposed
as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the suspension of
his sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by the
law.

A survey of relevant international agreements supports the course of action taken herein.
The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing
Guidelines), the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh
Guidelines) and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty are
consistent in recognizing that imprisonment is a valid form of disposition, provided it is imposed
as a last resort and for the minimum necessary period.

Following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve his
sentence, may serve it in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, in a manner consistent with the offender childs
best interest. Such service of sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular penal institution.

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