Logic of Phantasy 45

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉岡

Lacan Seminar 14:

The Logic of Fantasy 11
幻见的逻辑

There is repetition intrinsic in every act, which is only permitted by the effect of retroaction - which is

exercised because of the fact of the signifying incidence which is put at its heart - and the retroaction of

this signifying incidence on what is called "the case" in question, whatever it may be.

在每一个行动，都有内在的重复，只有反动的效应，才容许这样。会发生反动的效应，是因为意符化的偶

然，被摆置在它的核心。这个意符化的偶然产生的反动，就是我们所谓的受到置疑的「个案」，不管它的名

称是什麽。

Naturally, it is not enough for me to proclaim that I am walking! All the same it is already a beginning of

action. It is an operetta action: "Marchons, marchons..." It is also what is called, in a certain ideology,

commitment, which is what gives it its well known comic character.

当然，我宣称「我正在走路」，光是这样还不够！它仍然只是一个行动的开始。它是一个轻鬆歌剧的行动：

「前进！前进！」在某些意识形态里，它也被称之为「献身」，这个特性，众所皆知，有点滑稽。

The important thing to detect about what is involved in an act, is to search where the logical structure

gives us - and gives us qua logical structure - the possibility of transforming into an act what, at first

approach, could be nothing other than a pure and simple passion. "I fall to the ground" or "I stumble", for

example. Reflect on this, that the fact of this signifying duplication, namely, that in my "I fall on the

ground" there is the affirmation that I fall on the ground: "I fall to the ground" becomes, transforms by

fall, into something signifying. I fall to the ground and by this I perform the act in which I demonstrate

that I am, as they say, utterly crushed (atterre).

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要侦查出一个行动会牵涉到什麽，重要的是要寻找出，这个逻辑结构，或作为逻辑结构的本身，在哪里让

我们将道道地地是一个纯净而简单的激情，一接近时，有可能将它转变成为一个行动。例如，「我摔倒地

上」，或「我绊倒」。你们反思一下，这个意符化的复制，换句话说，从「我摔倒地上」，我肯定了「我摔倒地

上」的意义：由由摔倒这个动作，「我摔倒地上」变成为某件意符化的东西。我摔倒地上，是憑藉这个「我」来

执行这个行动，在此，我证明了我完全被压倒，不妨这样说。

(14) In the same way," I stumble" - even "I stumble" which bears in itself so manifestly the passivity of

missing something - can be, if it is taken up and reduplicated by the affirmation, "I stumble", the

indication of an act in so far as I myself assume the sense, as such, of this stumbling.

（第十四）同样地，「我绊倒」，即使「我绊倒」的本身，如此显而易见地，具有身不由己的漏失跟被动，它

有时也会是一个行动的指示，假如它从「我绊倒」的这个肯定，获得从事及复制，因为是我自己承受这个绊

倒的意义本身。

There is nothing here which goes against the inspiration of Freud, if you remember that at a particular

page of the Traumdeutung and very precisely on the one where he designates for us the first lineaments

of his research on identification, he underlines very clearly himself - legitimating in advance the

intrusions that I make of the Cartesian formula into the theory of the unconscious - the remark that Ich

has two different senses in the same sentence, when one says "Ich denke was gesundes Kind Ich war"

"I think" - or: Ich bedenke, as he said exactly: I meditate, I reflect, I gargle - "at the thought of what a

healthy child - Ich bin ... Ich war - I was".

在此，没有一样东西牴触到佛洛伊德的啟发，假如你们记得，在「梦的解析」的特别的一页，确实就在他跟

我们指明为「认同的研究」的初始轮廓的那一页，他自己非常清楚地强调，预先认可，我使用笛卡尔的「我

思故我在」的公式，闯入无意识的理论。
「我」在同一个句子里，具有两个不同的意义，当他说：「我思故我

在」，如他明确地说：我沉思、我反思、我漱口，一想到我是一位多麽健康的小孩。

The essentially signifying character as such, is reduplicated by the act. The repetitive and intrinsic

insistence of repetition in the act, is what allows us to connect up in an original fashion - and in such a

fashion that it can subsequently satisfy in the analysis of all its varieties - the definition of the act.

这个基本上是意符化的特性，本身是由行动来复制。这个在行动中，重复的一再地及本质上的坚持，就是

使我们能够以一个原创性的方式来连接。这样一种方式，随后在各种各样的精神分析经验，可以满足行动

的定义。

Here I can only indicate in passing - for we will have to come back to it - that the important thing is not

so much in the definition of the act, as in its consequences. I mean, what results from the act in terms

of change of surface.

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在此，我只能顺便指明出来，因为我们将必须回到它。重要的不是这个行动的「定义」，而是在「它的结果」。

我的意思是，从表面的术语来说，这个行动的结果是什麽？

For if I spoke earlier about the incidence of the cut on the topological surface - that I designate as that of

the Moebius strip - if after the act, the surface is of a different structure in such a case, if it is of a still

different structure in another one or even if in certain cases it may not change, here is something that is

going to propose for us models (if you wish) to distinguish what is involved in terms of the incidence of

the act, not so much in the determination as in the mutations of the subject.

假如我早先曾提到，在这个地形的表面，这个切割的偶然性，我指明它作为摩比斯带状的偶然切割，假如

在「切割」的行动之后，这个表面在这种情形之下，属於不同的结构，假如它属於一个更加不同的结构，或

即使在某些情形里，它可能不会改变，还是会有某件东西，将会跟我们提出一个模式，用来区别在偶然的

行动中所牵涉的东西，关键不是在於这个「决定」，而是在於生命主体的「转变」。

Now, there is a term which for some time I have left to the testing and the tasting of those who surround

me, without ever frankly responding to the objection made to me - and which has been made to me for a

long time - that Verleugnung - since this is the term in question - is the term to which there should be

referred the effects that I reserve for Verwerfung. I spoke enough about the latter, since today's

discourse, not to have to go back on it. I simply highlight here that what is of the order of Verleugnung is

always what is concerned with the ambiguity that results from the effects of the act as such.

现在，有一段时间，我使用一个术语，来测试及试探我周遭的人，是否坦白回应对我的批评，长久以来我

就曾经遭受这样的批评。
「否认」是一个颇受到置疑的术语，因为它牵涉到我保留给「拒绝」的效应。对於后者，

我曾经不厌其烦地谈论，今天的真理论述，就不再去谈论它。在此，我仅仅强调，「否认」的层次，总是会

牵涉到行动的本身的影响，造成的结果往往是模糊不清。

I cross the Rubicon. That can be done ... all by itself. It is enough to take the train at Cesena in the right

direction, once you are on the train, you can do nothing more about it, you cross the Rubicon. But this is

not an act. It is not an act either when you cross the Rubicon thinking about Caesar, it is an imitation of

Caesar's act. But you already see that imitation takes on in the dimension of the act, a quite different

structure to the one that is usually supposed for it. It is not an act, but it can all the same be one! And

there is even no other possible definition for the suggestions, otherwise so excessive, as those entitled

the Imitation of Jesus Christ, for example.

「我越过鲁比康河」。这个动作本身就可以完成。我们只要在西塞拿搭乘火车，朝着正确的方向，一但你在火

车上，你什麽事都不用做，你就会越过鲁比康河。但是这个並不算是一个行动。就算是你越过鲁比康河时，

你缅怀凯撒，也不算是一个行动。那是对於凯撒的行动的模仿。但是你们已经看出，在这个行动的向度上，

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「模仿」具有完全不同於通常大家认为的结构。模仿並不是一个行动，但是它有时可能会成为一个行动！这

里甚至没有其它可能的定义能够被建议，就算是轰轰烈烈的模仿，例如，「模仿耶稣基督」这样的名目。

Around this act - whether it is imitation or not - whether it is the original act itself, the one that the

historians of Caesar tell us clearly the sense of is indicated by the dream, which precedes this crossing

of the Rubicon – which is none other than the sense of incest - it is a matter of knowing, at each of these

levels, what is the effect of the act.

环绕这个行动，无论是模仿与否，无论它本身是否是一个具有原创性的行动，研究凯撒的历史学家清楚地

告诉我们，在越过鲁比康河之前，凯撒所做的这个梦，所指示的意义，那道道地地就是乱伦的意义，在这

个行动的影响，在每一个意义的层次上。

It is the labyrinth proper to the recognition of these effects by a subject who cannot recognise it,

because he is entirely - as subject - transformed by the act, it is these effects that are designated,

wherever the term is correctly employed, by the rubric of Verleugnung.

对於无法体认出这个梦的生命的主体，体认出这些影响，就是一道迷宫的本体，因为作为一位生命的主体，

他完全被这个行动所改变。就是这些影响，被「否认」的架构指明出来，不管这个术语在哪里被正确地运用。

The act then is the only locus where the signifier has the appearance - the function in any case - of

signifying itself. Namely, to function outside its possibilities. the subject, in the act, is represented as

pure division. The division, we will say, is his Reprasentanz. The true sense of the term Reprasentanz is

to be taken at this level for it is starting from this representance of the subject as essentially divided, that

one can sense how this function of Reprasentanz may effect what is called representation; which makes

the Vorstallung depend on an effect of the Reprasentanz.

这个行动因此是唯一的轨迹，在那里，意符具有本身被意符化的表象，或功用。换句话说，要在它的可能

性的外面，行使功用。在行动中，生命的主体，被呈现当着是分裂的主体。我们不妨这样说，这种分裂就是

他的「符号再现」。
「符号再现」这个术语的真实意义，要从生命的主体，充当基本上是分裂的「符号代表」，

开始的这个层次来看待。我们能够感觉出来，这个「符号再现」的功用，可能会影响到所谓的「符号」。这使的

符号的「观念」要依靠「符号再现」的影响而定。

We are stopped by the time.. There is going to be question for us the next time of how it is possible for

there to be presentified the impossible-to-choose element of alienation. The matter is well worth the

trouble of being put off for a discourse reserved to it, since it is a matter of nothing other than the status

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of the Other, where it is evoked for us in the most urgent fashion, so as not to lead to precipitation and

error, namely, the analytic situation. But this model that is given to us by the act as division and final

support of the subject, a point of truth which - let us say it in parenthesis before separating - is the one

which justifies the rise to the summit of philosophy of the function of existence, which undoubtedly is

nothing other than the veiled form in which there is presented, for thinking, the original character of the

act in the function of the subject.

因为时间关系，我们只能告一段落。下一次我们将面临的问题，是如何将难於选择的疏离的因素，具体呈

现出来。这个问题很值得让我们延迟到一个专门讨论它的论述，因为这个问题道道地地就是大它者的地位。

在那里，我们会迫不及待地引述疏离，这样我们才不会犯下严重错误，换句话说，就是在精神分析的情境

里。但是，行动所给予我们的模式，作为生命主体的分裂及最后的支持，是一个真理的点，（在分开之前，

让我们用括弧方式保留它），它让我们很有理由，提升到「实存功用的哲学」的鼎盛。无可置疑的，它道道

地地就是被遮蔽的形式，在那里，生命主体的功用，产生的这个行动的原创特性，以思想的方式，被呈现

出来。

Why has this act, in its agency, remained veiled, and this for those who knew best how to mark its

autonomy - against Aristotle who had not and for good reason the slightest idea of this - I mean, St.

Thomas?

为什麽这个行动，在其代理的状态，始终被遮蔽呢？这个问题，对於那些懂得如何去标示行动的自动自发

的人，例如，亚里斯多德，他对於这一点根本就没有概念，不是没有道理的。我的意思是，聖、汤姆士，也

是一样。

(16) It is no doubt because the other possibility of cutting is given us, in the impossible-to-choose part of

alienation (put within our reach, nevertheless, from the angle of analysis) - the same cut intervening at

the other vertex, the one designated here, which corresponds to the unconscious-I am not conjunction -

this is what is called acting-out and its status is what we will try to define the next time.

（第十六）无可置疑的，在疏离的不可能选择的部分，切割给我们另一个可能性，（可是，从精神分析学

的角度来看，我们还是能掌握得到）。相同的切割，在另外一个顶点介入，在这里所指明的这一个顶点介

入。它对应於这个「无意识的我没有实存」的连接。这就是我们所谓的「积极行动」，它的地位，我们下一次，

将会设法给它下个定义。

雄伯译

springherohsiung@gmail.com