Está en la página 1de 333

X SIMPOSIO

IBEROAMERICANO
SOBRE PROTECCIN
DE SISTEMAS ELCTRICOS

DE POTENCIA

MEMORIA TCNICA
Monterrey. Mxico. Mayo 2011
X SIMPOSIO
IBEROAMERICANO
SOBRE PROTECCIN
DE SISTEMAS ELCTRICOS

DE POTENCIA
Mayo de 2011 Monterrey, Nuevo Len. Mxico

Lunes 23 de mayo
Operation and Design of a Protection Relay for Transformer Condition Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H. T. Yip, S. Hosseini, M. Moscoso, G. J. Lloyd, y K. Liu (Reino Unido) 1
Improvements to Transformer Differential ProtectionDesign and Test Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H. T. Yip, M. Moscoso, G. Lloyd, K. Liu, y Z. Wang (Reino Unido) 9
Nuevo Algoritmo Para Proteccin Diferencial de Transformadores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H. Davila (Canad) 17
Modern Line Current Differential Protection Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H. Miller, J. Burger, N. Fischer, y B. Kasztenny (Estados Unidos) 29
Smarter Time Sync: Applying the IEEE PC37.238 Standard to Power System Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C. Brunner, y G. S. Antonova (Estados Unidos) 55
An Experimental Analysis of High-Speed-Distance Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C. Dzienis, M. Kereit, J. Blumschein, M. Claus (Alemania) 65
Medicin de la Impedancia de Lnea y Tierra para una Estimacin Correcta del Factor de Tierra (K0) en Lneas
de Transmisin y Mejora de la Confiabilidad de la Proteccin de Distancia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M. Gutirrez, y M. Krugger (Estados Unidos, Austria) 73
Empleo de Nomogramas para Localizacin de Fallas en Redes de Distribucin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. Gonzlez, A. Martnez, R. Meja, y J. J. Mier (Mxico) 81
Real-Time Multiterminal Fault Location System for Transmission Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Y. Gong, M. Mynam, A. Guzmn, G. Benmouyal, y B. Shulim (Estados Unidos) 89
Proteccin de Lneas de Transmisin de Doble Circuito con Relevadores de Sobre-Corriente . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. Njera, y D. Sebastin (Mxico) 95
Metodologa para el Anlisis de Perturbaciones en Sistemas de Potencia Mediante ATPDRAWCaso de Puente
Abierto en la Lnea EsmeraldaYumbo 2 a 230 kV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D. A. Tejada, y S. S. Urbaez (Colombia) 103
Contina en la pgina v. . .

iii
X SIMPOSIO IBEROAMERICANO SOBRE PROTECCIN DE SISTEMAS ELCTRICOS DE POTENCIA

UNIVERSIDAD AUTNOMA DE NUEVO LEN


Dr. Jess Ancer Rodrguez, Rector

FACULTAD DE INGENIERA MECNICA Y ELCTRICA


M. C. Esteban Bez Villarreal, Director

COMISIN FEDERAL DE ELECTRICIDAD


Mtro. Antonio Vivanco Casamadrid, Director General
Ing. Jos Abel Valdz Campoy, Director de Operacin
Ing. Noe Pea Silva, Subdirector de Transmisin
Ing. Luis Carlos Hernndez Ayala, Subdirector de Generacin
Ing. Jess Eliseo Ramos, Subdirector de Distribucin
Ing. Eduardo Meraz Ateca, Subdirector del Centro Nacional de Control de Energa
Ing. Romn Ramrez Rodrguez, Coordinador de Protecciones, Comunicacin y Control

COMIT ORGANIZADOR
Dr. Ernesto Vzquez Martnez, Presidente
Ing. Jos Abel Valdz Campoy, Secretario Ejecutivo
Dr. Arturo Conde Enrquez, Responsable, Programa Tcnico
Dr. Manuel Antonio Andrade Soto, Responsable, Logstica
Dr. Marco Tulio Mata Jimnez, Logstica
Dra. Gina Mara Idrraga Ospina, Responsable, Exposicin Industrial
Ing. Ramiro Patio Bedolla, Exposicin Industrial
Ing. Sergio David Gonzlez Cant, Exposicin Industrial
Ing. Gerardo manuel Robledo Leal, Exposicin Industrial

c Copyright
Memoria del X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia (ISBN XXXX-XXXX).
2011 por la Universidad Autnoma de Nuevo Len, todos los derechos reservados.
ISBN XXXX-XXXX
. . . contina de la pgina iii
Martes 24 de mayo
Protecting Distribution Feeders for Simultaneous Faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J. Betanzos, H. E. Lemus, E. Alczar, D. Snchez, y H. J. Altuve (Mxico) 113
Communications for the Smart Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M. Adamiak, y P. Sanza (Estados Unidos) 123
Wide Area Monitoring with Phasor Measurement Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M. Wache, y H.-J. Herrmann (Alemania) 133
Implementacin de la Smartgrid en Redes de Distribucin Existentes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. Arzuaga, y R. Quintanilla (Espaa) 137
Esquema de Proteccion y Control para la Interconexion en 13.8 kV del Permisionario Mexico-Carbon. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M. A. Ortiz, L. del . Diego, y P. Martnez (Mxico) 145
El Mantenimiento Centrado en Confiabilidad con el Apoyo de los Sistemas de Protecciones de las
Subestaciones de Distribucin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J. Betanzos, y J. C. Lpez (Mxico) 153
Using Fault Tree Analysis to Evaluate Protection Scheme Redundancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. R. Sandoval, C. A. Ventura, H. J. Altuve, R. A. Schwartz, D. A. Costello, D. A. Tziouvaras, y D. Snchez 159
(Mxico, Estados Unidos)
Experiencias Operativas y Criterios para Determinar Fallas de Alta Impedancia en Lineas de Transmi-
sin de Energa a Alto Voltaje . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C. S. Urbaez, J. A. Calderon, y L. E. Llano (Colombia) 179
Abatimientos de Voltaje Prolongados en la Red de Media Tensin Ante Fallas en la Red de 230 Y 115
kV en Zona de Distribucin Culiacn Divisin Noroeste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E. Acosta, e I. Soto (Mxico) 199
Energy Production Using the Co-Generation of Methane Gas Connected to Copels Distribution Grid
Tests and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E. J. Rufato, C. M. V. Tahan, y C. C.B. de Oliveira (Brasil) 205
Mircoles 25 de mayo
Optimal Energy Resource Allocation in a Microgrid Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. Hajimiragha, A. Palizban, S. Allan, M. Adamiak, y M. Zadeh (Estados Unidos, Canad) 209
CALBECK: Un Software para Calibraciones Totalmente Automatizadas de Relevadores de Proteccin en
Centrales Generadoras. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . M. V. Gonzlez, A. Ahumada, C. Moreno, J. Lizrraga, . E. Gmez, D. I. Zamorano, y J. A. Castro 219
(Mxico)
Increased Sensitivity of Loss of Field Protection Based on Admittance Measurement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H.-J. Herrmann, y A. Smit (Alemania, Estados Unidos) 225
New Algorithm for Transformer Diferential Protection That Will Detect Turn-To-Turn Faults in Windings
Transformers in a Secure Manner and Faults Within the Diferential Protection Zone in Transformers
and Generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R. A. Cordova (Mxico) 235
Why We Should Measure Line Impedance? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. Vandiver, y A. Apostolov (Estados Unidos) 247
Event-Driven Load Shed Scheme and Operation Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M. Adamiak, M. Schiefen, G. Schauerman, y B. Cable (Estados Unidos) 257
Protection of Battery Energy Storage Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R. Hedding, y P. Hayes (Estados Unidos) 263
Power System Protection TestingExploring the IEEE C37.233 Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . V. Madani, H. DoCarmo, M. Adamiak, R. Beresh, D. Novosel, P. McLaren, J. Verzosa, M. Kezunovic, 269
A. Apostolov, J. Ariza, E. Udren, y G. Henneberg (Estados Unidos)
IEC 61850 Goose Applications to Distribution Protection Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. Apostolov, y B. Vandiver (Estados Unidos) 283
IEC 61850 - Impact on Protection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .M. C. Janssen (Pases Bajos) 295
Ethernet as a Channel for Protective Relaying. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J. Benckenstein (Estados Unidos) 301
Testing Ethernet Network for Goose Tripping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D. Espinosa, R. Aguilar, J. Ariza, y J. Mendoza (Mxico, Estados Unidos) 317

v
Mensaje del Comit Organizador
El Comit Organizador del X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos
de Potencia, SIPSEP, da la ms cordial bienvenida a los participantes. Es un honor para
nosotros recibirlos en la ciudad de Monterrey y tener la posibilidad de compartir estos das
con ustedes.
El Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia es un
evento en el cual los ingenieros de toda Iberoamrica pueden intercambiar experiencias entre
s y con especialistas de los pases de mayor nivel de desarrollo tecnolgico. Se mantienen
vigentes los objetivos originales del Simposio y su intencin de promover el acercamiento
entre universidades, centros de investigacin, fabricantes de equipos, y empresas elctricas
de diversos pases.
En las nueve ediciones anteriores del evento, han participado poco ms de 1500 ingenieros
de 25 pases, se han presentado 313 ponencias, se han dictado 23 conferencias magistrales y se
han desarrollado 10 meses redondas. La exposicin de equipos ha sido un elemento importante
del evento, en la que se ha contado con la participacin de las firmas ms reconocidas en la
especialidad, a nivel mundial. Ms de 600 ingenieros de una diversidad de pases han asistido
a los 19 cursos tutoriales que se han impartido en el marco de estos nueve Simposios.
En el X SIPSEP se presentarn 33 ponencias por especialistas de 11 pases, se dictarn tres
conferencias magistrales y un panel, que estarn a cargo de personalidades reconocidas inter-
nacionalmente y versarn sobre conceptos de Smart Grid y experiencias en la implementacin
de redes inteligentes. Nuevamente, se contar con una exposicin industrial, en la que partici-
parn los fabricantes ms innovadores del mundo. Adems, se dictarn dos cursos tutoriales,
dedicados a los temas de proteccin de lneas de transmisin y calidad de la energa.
El Comit Organizador desea hacer patente su reconocimiento y gratitud a la Universidad
Autnoma de Nuevo Len, la Facultad de Ingeniera Mecnica y Elctrica, y a la Comisin
Federal de Electricidad por el apoyo y estmulo que han brindado en la organizacin de este
evento.
Esperamos que el efecto satisfaga las expectativas de todos los participantes y constituya
una experiencia til para su desarrollo profesional.

Comit Organizador,
Monterrey, Mxico. Mayo de 2011.

vii
Empresas Representadas en la Exposicin Industrial
ABB Mxico, S. A. de C. V.

Allectro, S. A. de C. V.

ALSTOM GRID (AREVA)

ENOSERV

ERL

Fonkel Mexicana, S. A. de C. V.

INDUSTRIA SIGRAMA, S. A. de C. V.

INELAP, S. A. de C. V., una Empresa de Grupo Arteche

Ingeniera e Instrumentacin Internacional, S. A. de C. V. (AMETEK)

ISA S. R. L.

Ivesco, S. A. de C. V.

MABREX, S. A. de C. V.

OMICRON electronics Corp. USA

Ontario Instruments, S. A. de C. V.

Oropeza Ingenieros, S. A. de C. V.

PROTECSA Ingeniera, S. A. de C. V.

Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, S. A. de C. V.

Siemens, S. A. de C. V.

Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia Computarizada, S. A. de C. V.

Transmisin Y Distribucin, S. A. de C. V. (GE Digital Energy Multilin)

ZIV Aplicaciones y Tecnologa, S. L.

ix
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 1

Operation and Design of a Protection Relay for Transformer Condition


Monitoring

H.T. YIP, S. HOSSEINI, M. MOSCOSO, G.J. LLOYD, K. LIU


ALSTOM GRID
UK

e-mail: graeme.lloyd@alstom.com

KEYWORDS

Transformer condition monitoring, protection.

1 INTRODUCTION
Power transformers are a critical link in the ac transportation of electricity from the generating stations
to end users. In terms of total investment, electric power utilities invest at least as much in
transformers as they do in generating stations. Transformers are expected to last 20 to 30 years, and in
many cases, even longer.
The application of monitoring systems to transformers offers benefits in more cost-effective utilization
by detecting faults that can be fixed before causing irreparable damage or in diagnosing faults and
determining if they can be repaired, lived with, or require transformer replacement.
Overloading power transformers beyond the nameplate rating can cause a rise in temperature of both
transformer oil and windings. If the winding temperature rise exceeds the transformer limits, the
insulation will deteriorate and may fail prematurely. Prolonged thermal heating weakens the insulation
over time, resulting in accelerated transformer loss-of-life. Through-fault currents create forces within
the transformer that can eventually weaken the winding integrity. Transformer overexcitation causes
transformer heating and increases exciting current, noise, and vibration.
A comprehensive transformer protection scheme needs to include protection against transformer
overload, through-fault and overexcitation, as well as protection for internal faults.
Measurable indicators of transformer serviceability include electrical load; top-oil, hottest-spot and
ambient temperatures; fault history; and measured excitation. Utilities that use these indicators can
make intelligent profit/risk decisions and plan optimal transformer loading and maintenance. Also
smart IEDs with standard flexible communications can ease integration of these devices into the
customer control system.
Although transformer monitoring systems have been on the market for some years and have achieved
success in detecting and diagnosing problems, their adoption is far from universal. The perceived
barriers to the more general application of transformer monitoring include high costs of installation
and maintenance, incompatibility between systems and transformers of different manufacture and the
difficulty of collecting an assimilating the output of diverse systems across a network.
Including many of the transformer monitoring features in a standard protection relay reduces the cost
barriers. Also, the flexibility and standardization of the protection relay communications allows data
easier collection and interfacing to the customers existing SCADA systems.
This paper discusses the operation and design of a transformer protection relay that includes many of
the common transformer condition monitoring features required making condition monitoring a more
economical option.
2

2 TRANSFORMER RELAY DESIGN FOR CONDITION MONITORING


A comprehensive transformer protection relay for protecting two and three winding transformers
(including autotransformers), with up to 5 sets of three-phase CT inputs and 4 voltage inputs has been
designed. The relay includes protection against transformer overload, through-fault and
overexcitation, as well as standard protection functions such as differential, overcurrent and earth fault
etc for internal faults.
The relay includes a number of measurable indicators of transformer serviceability monitoring the
electrical load; top-oil, hottest-spot and ambient temperatures; fault history; and measured excitation.
Utilities that use these indicators can make intelligent profit/risk decisions and plan optimal
transformer loading and maintenance.
The protection relay includes many of the common transformer condition monitoring features
required, as listed below and described in more detail later in the paper:
Transformer top oil and hot spot temperature calculation taking into account the ambient
temperature, load variations and oil thermal parameters, based on IEEE Standard C57.91-1995
[2]
Transformer loss of life calculation, based on IEEE Standard C57.91-1995 [2], providing data
on accumulated loss of life, rate of loss of life, aging acceleration factor and residual life hours
Transformer through fault monitoring based on I2t calculation of the maximum fault current
and fault duration per phase
Temperature monitoring for example of top oil, bottom oil, cooler inlet/outlet oil, tap changer
compartment oil and winding hotspot temperature via the relays ten RTD inputs or four
current loop inputs (CLIO - current loop inputs and outputs)
Monitoring and alarming of other sensor quantities, such as tap changer position, oil level,
bushing oil pressure via the relay current loop inputs
Load and short circuit current and system voltages monitoring via the protection relay current
and voltage transformer inputs. The relay can also provide CT and VT supervision of these
inputs.
The relay includes flexible industry standard communication options to interface the relay protection
and condition monitoring functions to the customers SCADA system. For example the relay supports a
number of standard protocols such as MODBUS, IEC60870-5-103, DNP 3.0 and IEC61850 and rear
port communication port options such as RS485, fibre optic, Ethernet or redundant Ethernet plus a
front communications port for local access.
The relay also includes programmable leds for user friendly local indication and programmable
scheme logic for easy scheme customization. Sequence of event and disturbance recording features
are also included that can help diagnosing faults and alarms.
As described above the relay includes four transducer (current loop) inputs with flexible ranges of 0-
1mA, 0-10mA, 0-20mA or 4-20mA which can be used with a number of external monitoring sensors
to indicate temperature, oil level etc. Associated with each input there are two time delayed protection
stages, one for alarm and one for trip. Each stage can be set for 'Over' or 'Under' operation. Four
current loop outputs are also provided with ranges of 0-1mA, 0-10mA, 0-20mA or 4-20mA which can
alleviate the need for separate transducers. These may be used to feed standard moving coil ammeters
for analog indication of certain measured quantities or for input to SCADA using an existing analog
RTU. Up to 24 digital inputs are available to provide status information from external devices such as
CBs or external sensors and up to 24 output contacts are available to provide alarm and trip outputs.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 3

Figure 1: Transformer protection and condition monitoring functional diagram

3 TRANSFORMER THERMAL MODEL FUNDUMENTALS


Factors that influence the transformer thermal characteristic and generate heat, which causes a rise of
temperature are mainly Core losses and Conductor resistance loss (usually referred to as Copper loss
i.e. I2R loss). The losses in a transformer are shown in the following diagram.

Losses of a
Transformer

Load No-Load
Losses Losses

Copper Stray Apparent Core Losses


Losses Losses Losses (iron losses)

Hysteresis Losses

Eddy-Current Losses

P4318ENa
Figure 2: Transformer Losses

The rating of a transformer usually depends upon the maximum permitted working temperature of the
transformer insulation [1]. The steady-state temperature rise is reached when these losses are balanced
4

by the transformer cooling due to radiation, convection and conduction of heat. The losses increase
with output and the maximum output or transformer rating is based on the losses that give the
maximum permitted temperature Tp. The permitted temperature rise p also depends upon the ambient
temperature of the surrounding air Ta:
Maximum temperature rise p = Tp - Ta
During energization, the transformer inrush current causes the transformer to be overloaded for a short
duration until its temperature reaches Tp. The inrush current is well in excess of the full-load current
(perhaps up to 10 times) but the transient time is sufficiently short to ensure that p is not exceeded.

4 THERMAL MONITORING AND PROTECTION


The relay thermal overload monitoring and protection is based on IEEE Standard C57.91-1995 [2].
The thermal overload trip is based on the hot spot temperature H or top oil temperature TO, each
with its own exclusive time constant setting. The top oil temperature can be calculated or can be
measured directly by one of the current loop or RTD inputs. The hot spot temperature can only be
calculated. The ambient temperature A can be measured directly or an average value can be set by
the user (average ambient temperatures covers 24 hour time periods). Since transformer loads are
becoming increasingly non-linear, RMS current values are used to replicate the winding hotspot
temperature. The winding, the temperature of which is under supervision, can be selected as either HV
or LV or TV or biased current. It is recommended to select the biased current option so that an overall
thermal condition monitoring of the transformer is carried out.
The biased current used by the thermal protection element is not the same as the biased current used
by the differential protection. To calculate the bias current, the thermal element considers the
maximum rms phase current of each transformer winding. The thermal bias current calculation is as
follows.
MaxHVI rms + MaxLVI rms + MaxTVI rms
I bias =
2
The relay has up to three hot spot stages and up to three top oil stages. The Top Oil tripping signal is
asserted when the top oil (measured or calculated) temperature is above the setting and the time delay
has elapsed. Also, the Hot Spot tripping signal is asserted when the hottest-spot (calculated only)
temperature is above the setting and the time delay has elapsed.
If a more accurate representation of the thermal state of the transformer is required, the use of
temperature monitoring inputs (RTDs or Current Loop Inputs (CLI)) which target specific areas is
recommended. Also, for short time overloads, the application of RTDs/CLI and overcurrent
protection can provide better protection.
4.1 Top oil temperature
If the top oil temperature is not available as a measured input quantity, it is calculated every cycle by
the following equation:

TO = A + TO

TO = Top oil temperature


A = Ambient temperature
TO = Top oil rise over ambient temperature due to a step load change
A can be acquired by measurement directly or can be set by the user through the user interface.

4.2 Hot spot temperature


The hot spot temperature can only be obtained by calculation. The following equation is used to
calculate the hot spot temperature every cycle:
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 5

H = TO + H

Where:
H = Hot spot (winding) temperature
TO = Top oil temperature
H = Hot spot rise above top oil temperature
4.3 Cooling modes
Four cooling modes are available in the relay - Natural, Forced A ir, Forced O il, Forced Air O il.
The oil exponent and winding exponent can be set independently for each mode. These exponents are
empirically derived and are required to calculate the variation of H and TO with load changes.
The oil and winding exponent values changes for each mode of cooling to approximately account for
changes in the resistance and viscosity with changes in load.
The cooling mode selection can be made in the relay by using digital inputs or can be set to a fixed
mode in the setting file. The digital inputs enable the thermal characteristic to be changed to match the
different cooling modes as fans and pumps are switched on and off.

5 LOSS OF LIFE STATISTICS


As stated in IEEE Std. C57.91-1995 [2], aging of insulation is a time function of temperature, moisture
and oxygen content. The moisture and oxygen contributions to insulation deterioration are minimized
due to modern oil preservation systems. Therefore, temperature is the key parameter in insulation
ageing. Temperature distribution is not uniform; the part with the highest temperature undergoes the
greatest deterioration. Therefore the hottest spot temperature is considered in loss of life calculations.
As indicated in IEEE Std. C57.91-1995 the aging acceleration factor is the rate at which transformer
insulation aging for a given hottest spot temperature is accelerated compared with the aging rate at a
reference hottest spot temperature. For 65C average winding rise transformers, the reference hottest
spot temperature is 110C. For 55C average winding rise transformers, the reference hottest spot
temperature is 95C. For hottest spot temperatures in excess of the reference hottest spot temperature
the aging acceleration factor is greater than 1. For hottest spot temperatures lower than the reference
hottest spot temperature, the aging acceleration factor is less than 1.
The relay includes a single stage definite time delay alarm based on aging acceleration factor (FAA)
and loss of life (LOL). Measurements are also available for Accumulated loss of life (LOL) in hours,
Residual life at reference hottest spot temperature, Rate of loss of life (ROLOL) in %, Aging
acceleration factor (FAA), Mean aging acceleration factor (FAA,m), and Residual life hours at FAA,m
(Lres(FAA,m)).
The model used for loss of life statistics is based on the equations for Loss of Life LOL and
Accelerated Aging Factor FAA as stated below.
Loss of life is calculated every hour according to the following formula:
LOL = L( H ,r ) Lres ( H ,r )
Where:
L(H,r) = life hours at reference winding hottest-spot temperature. This parameter is set by the user.
Lres(H,r) = residual life hours at reference winding hottest-spot temperature.
The insulation aging acceleration factor FAA, for each time interval t, is calculated according to the
following formula:
6

B
A + B B
L( H , r ) e H ,r + 273
H ,r + 273 H + 273
FAA = = =e
L( H )
A +
B

H + 273
e
Where:

L(H) = life hours at winding hottest-spot temperature.


H = hottest-spot temperature as calculated in thermal overload protection.
H,r = hottest-spot temperature at rated load.
B = constant B from the life expectancy curve. This parameter is set by the user. IEEE Std.
C57.91-1995 [2] recommends a B value of 15000.

The residual life hours at reference hottest-spot temperature is updated every hour as follows:
3600
FAA,i ( H )
i =1
Lres ( H ,r ) = Lres,p ( H ,r )
3600
Where:
Lres,p(H,r) = residual life hours at reference temperature one hour ago.
FAA,i(H) = mean aging acceleration factor, as calculated above. It is calculated every second.
The accumulated loss of life (LOL) is updated in non-volatile memory once per hour. It is possible to
reset and set a new loss of life figure, in the event that a relay is applied in a new location with a pre-
aged resident transformer.
Daily rate of loss of life (ROLOL) in percentage per day is given as follows and it is updated every
day:
24
ROLOL = FAA,m ( H ) 100%
L ( H , r )

The mean aging acceleration factor FAA,m is updated per day and is given by:

N N
FAAn t n FAAn
n =1 n =1
FAA, m = N
=
N
t n
n =1
Where:
FAAn is calculated every cycle
tn = 1cycle
FAA, m states the latest one-day statistics of FAA. When the relay is energized for the first time, FAA, m
default value is 1.
The residual life in hours at FAA,m is updated per day and is given by:
Lres ( H , r )
Lres (FAA, m ) =
FAA, m

6 THROUGH FAULT MONITORING AND CONTROL


According to statistics [3], through faults is the main culprit in causing transformer failure and
according to IEEE Std. C57.109-1993 [4] mechanical effects are more significant than thermal
effects for fault-current magnitudes near the design capability of the transformer. However, at
fault-current magnitudes close to the overload range, mechanical effects are less important unless the
frequency of fault occurrence is high. Figure 3 below depicts an example initiation of a through fault.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 7

Through fault
current for fault 2
Equivalent Source 1 Through fault Equivalent source 2
0.02484 pu 275kV 132kV current for fault 2 0.09684 pu
10000MVA HV LV 25
00 MVA
600:1 1200:1

CT1 CT2

Through fault 2
Through fault 1 Single phase fault
Single phase fault 275/132/33 kV Three phase fault
Three phase fault 240MVA
Positive and Negative sequence
impedances:
XHV = j0.134pu
XLV = j0.075pu
XTV = -j0.024pu
Zero sequence impedance:
XHV = j0.067pu
XLV = j0.0375pu
XTV = -j0.012pu

Figure 3: Through fault monitoring example

As fault duty and feeder exposure increase, the incidence and severity of through faults
experienced by a transformer will tend to go up over time. IEEE Std. C57.12 [5] provides
construction guidelines for short-circuit withstand for transformers. The standard states that a
transformer shall withstand 2 seconds of a bolted fault at the transformer terminals.
In the relay design the through fault monitoring element can monitor the HV, the LV or the TV
winding. In three winding applications, the winding through which the highest current would flow
during an external fault should be monitored. The through fault current monitoring function gives the
fault current level, the duration of the faulty condition and the date and time for each through fault.
An I2t calculation based on the recorded time duration and maximum current is performed for each
phase. This calculation is only performed when the current is above the provided setting and if the
differential protection element has not started. Cumulative stored calculations for each phase
can be monitored so that the user may schedule the transformer maintenance based on this
data. This may also justify possible system enhancement to reduce through fault level.
A single stage alarm is provided for through-fault monitoring. The alarm is issued if the
maximum cumulative I2t in the three phases exceeds the relevant setting. A through fault event
is recorded if any of the phase currents is bigger than a trigger setting. This setting should be
greater than the overload capability of the transformer. According to IEEE Std. C57.109-1993
[4], values of 3.5 or less multiples of normal base current may result from overloads rather than
faults. IEEE Std. C57.91-1995 [2], states that the suggested limit of load for loading above the
nameplate of a distribution transformer with 65C rise is 300% of rated load during short-time
loading (0.5 hours or less). On the other hand, the suggested limit of load for loading above the
nameplate of a power transformer with 55C rise is 200% maximum.

7 OVEREXCITATION MONITORING AND PROTECTION


The magnetic flux inside the transformer core is directly proportional to the applied voltage and
inversely proportional to the system frequency. Overvoltage and/or underfrequency conditions can
produce flux levels that saturate the transformer core. This could cause stray flux to be induced in
unlaminated components that have not been designed to carry the flux. The resulting eddy currents in
solid components (core bolts and clamps) and end of core laminations can cause rapid overheating and
damage. These abnormal operating conditions can exist in any part of the power system, so any
transformer may be exposed to overexcitation. A severely overexcited transformer should be
disconnected to avoid transformer damage.
For overfluxing protection and alarming the relay includes three definite time setting stages and one
DT/IDMT setting stage plus a single stage alarm setting that can be combined to create a combined
multi-stage V/Hz trip operating characteristic using programmable scheme logic. Reference should be
made to the manufacturers withstand characteristics before formulating these settings.
8

Transient overfluxing conditions can cause unwanted operation of the transformer differential
protection if stabilization is not provided. Overexcitation of a power transformer is a typical case of
a.c. saturation of the core that produces odd harmonics in the exciting current. The third harmonic is
the most suitable for detecting overexcitation conditions, but either the delta connection of the CTs or
the delta connection compensation of the differential relay filters out this harmonic. The fifth
harmonic, however, is a reliable quantity for detecting overexcitation conditions.
The relay filters the differential current and determines the fundamental component and the fifth
harmonic component. If the ratio (5th harmonic component)/(fundamental component) exceeds the set
value in at least one phase in two consecutive calculations, and if the differential current is larger than
0.1 pu, differential tripping is blocked selectively per phase.
The 5th harmonic element can also be used to raise an alarm due to persistent overfluxing that may be
caused by geomagnetic disturbances that may not be detected by the conventional a.c. overfluxing
protection.

8 CONCLUSION
Power transformers are a critical link in the ac transportation of electricity from the generating stations
to end users. The application of monitoring systems to transformers offers benefits in more cost-
effective utilization by detecting faults that can be fixed before causing irreparable damage or in
diagnosing faults and determining if they can be repaired, lived with, or require transformer
replacement. Although transformer monitoring systems have been on the market for some years and
have achieved success in detecting and diagnosing problems, their adoption is far from universal. The
perceived barriers to the more general application of transformer monitoring include high costs of
installation and maintenance, incompatibility between systems and transformers of different
manufacture and the difficulty of collecting an assimilating the output of diverse systems across a
network.
This paper discusses the operation and design of a transformer protection relay that includes many of
the common transformer condition monitoring features required making condition monitoring a more
economical option.

9 REFERENCES
[1] Guide for Loading Mineral-Oil-Immersed Power Transformers Rated in Excess of 100
MVA (65C Winding Rise), IEEE Std. C57.115-1991.
[2] IEEE Guide for Loading Mineral-Oil-Immersed Transformers, IEEE Std C57.91-1995.
[3] W. H. Bartley, An Analysis of Transformer Failures1988 through 1997, The
Locomotive, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company.
[4] Guide for Liquid-Immersed Transformer Through-Fault-Current Duration, IEEE Std
C57.109-1993 (R2008).
[5] IEEE Standard General Requirements for Liquid-Immersed Distribution, Power, and
Regulating Transformers, IEEE Std. C57.12.00-1993.
[6] CIGRE Technical Brochure Ref. 343, Recommendations for Condition Monitoring and
Condition Assessment Facilities for Transformers, Working Group A2.27, April 2008.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 9

IMPROVEMENTS TO TRANSFORMER DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION DESIGN


AND TEST EXPERIENCE

H.T. YIP, M MOSCOSO, G LLOYD, K LIU, Z WANG


ALSTOM Grid
United Kingdom
tony.yip@alstom.com

KEYWORDS

New algorithms, transformer differential protection, CT saturation, magnetising inrush.

1 INTRODUCTION

Percentage Bias characteristics have been commonly applied for transformer differential
protection. Traditional protection schemes use dual slope or multiple slope characteristics
to provide stability during CT saturation, together with second harmonic as a restraining
or blocking quantity for inrush conditions. However, studies have shown that there is a
limitation with the dual slope characteristic for stability, to avoid requiring excessive over-
dimensioning of the CTs. The second harmonic blocking has also been shown to slow
down the protection for internal faults if CT saturation occurs [1], [2]. This is because CT
saturated waveforms can also contain a high second harmonic component. Early studies
on magnetizing inrush indicates that the second harmonic content might be 15% or more
of the fundamental current [3]. Recent studies indicate that improvements in the
transformer design and core steel result in low content of second harmonic (as low as
7%) [3].

This paper presents new algorithms that have been developed to improve the
performance of transformer biased differential protection. A transient bias algorithm has
been implemented which increases the operating threshold momentarily when there is a
sudden increase in the bias current, thus enhancing stability during external faults. This
approach will not affect the performance during internal faults, since the differential
current will rise much faster than the bias currents. A novel CT saturation detection
algorithm has been developed. It is based on the fact that magnetising inrush and
saturated current waveforms are distorted and discontinuity patterns can be observed on
both waveforms. This new technique emphasizes the discontinuity pattern by
differentiating the differential current making it possible to distinguish magnetising inrush
from CT saturation within a cycle. A no gap detection algorithm has been applied to
complement the CT saturation detection. It considers the number of samples above a
dynamic threshold within the last N executions. The assertion of CT saturation or no
gap detection unblocks the differential protection from the second harmonic blocking. As
a result, the restrained differential element is allowed to trip even during CT saturation,
giving faster tripping times for internal faults.
10

2 TRANSIENT BIAS TECHNIQUE

To provide further stability for external faults, additional measures are considered on the
calculation of the bias current: delayed bias, maximum bias and transient bias.

The delayed bias is calculated on a per phase basis and it is the maximum of the
fundamental bias quantities calculated within the last cycle. The delayed bias provides
added stability when an external fault is cleared and the fault currents drop off.

Ibias A_delayed = Maximum [Ibias, A(n), Ibias,A (n-1), ........., Ibias,A (n (k-1))] Equation 1

Ibias B_delayed = Maximum [Ibias, B(n), Ibias,B (n-1), ........., Ibias,B (n (k-1))] Equation 2

Ibias C_delayed = Maximum [Ibias, C(n), Ibias,C (n-1), ........., Ibias,C (n (k-1))] Equation 3

The maximum bias is the maximum of the delayed bias currents from all three phases.
The maximum bias is used to prevent mal-operation under external faults conditions,
when spill current could flow into a healthy phase the CT of which is partially saturated.
Ibias,max = Maximum [IbiasA_delayed, Ibias,B_delayed, Ibias,C_delayed] Equation 4

The maximum bias is used to calculate the differential operating current Iop, using the
following equations by considering the multiple slope characteristic shown in Figure 1:
I s1
Characteristic equation for the range: 0 I bias ,max Equation 5
K1
Iop = I s1 Equation 6

I s1
Characteristic equation for the range: I bias , max I s 2 Equation 7
K1
Iop = K1 I bias , max Equation 8

Characteristic equation for the range: I bias I s 2 Equation 9

Iop = K1 I s 2 + K 2 (I bias , max I s 2 ) Equation 10

I s1
K1: characteristic slope in range I bias , max I s 2 Equation 11
K1
K2: characteristic slope in range I bias , max I s 2 Equation 12

Idiff (pu)

Restraint region

K2
Operating region

K1
Is1

Is2 Ibias (pu)

Figure 1 Tripping characteristic of differential protection


X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 11

The transient bias is introduced when there is a sudden increase in the mean bias
measurement. The transient bias decays exponentially and it resets to zero once the
relay trips, or if the mean bias quantity is below the restrained element setting. The
operating current threshold is calculated at the maximum bias current. The transient
bias is calculated on a per phase basis and it is added to the operating current
calculated at the maximum bias. Therefore, the following differential current thresholds
are available:
Diff threshold phase A = Iop at max bias + transient bias_phase A Equation 13

Diff threshold phase B = Iop at max bias + transient bias_phase B Equation 14

Diff threshold phase C = Iop at max bias + transient bias_phase C Equation 15

The differential current is compared against the differential current threshold given above
on a per phase basis. If the differential current is above the threshold, then the biased
differential element might trip as long as the second harmonic and fifth harmonic
blockings are not asserted.
The transient bias technique considers a time decay constant, stability coefficients and
the differential function settings to provide a dynamic bias characteristic. Figure 2 shows
the differential thresholds calculated by the relay on a per phase basis for a AN external
fault on the star side of a Ynd11 transformer. It can be observed that the transient bias
has enhanced relay stability. For the relay to trip, the differential current should be
above the operating current at max bias + transient bias.

2 2
Transient bias - phaseB
Transient bias - phase A
Ibdiff - Phase B differential
1.5 Iadiff - Phase A Diff current 1.5 current
Differential threshold Phase B

Differential threshold phase A


I (pu)
I (pu)

1 1

0.5 0.5

0 0
0 0.5 1 1.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
t(s) t(s)

2
Transient bias - phase C

1.5 Icdiff - Phase C Diff current

Differential threshold phase C


I (pu)

0.5

0
0 0.5 1 1.5
t(s)

Figure 2 Transient bias external fault

Figure 3 shows the nominal biased characteristic, the dynamic threshold and the
differential current loci. The differential currents increment from A to B, meanwhile the
differential current thresholds also increase from A to B. It can be observed that
considering the nominal characteristic for phases A and B results in a mal-operation
because Iadiff and Ibdiff are above the nominal characteristic. Taking into account the
transient bias quantities prevents an unwanted trip because Iadiff and Ibdiff are below
the dynamic threshold. From B to C the differential currents are below the dynamic
threshold from B to C.
12

3.00 3.00
Nominal characteristic
2.50 2.50 Nominal characteristic
Iadiff - Phase A diff current
Ibdiff - Phase B Diff Current
2.00 B' Differential threshold phase A 2.00

Diff (pu)

Diff (pu)
Differential threshold phase B
B B'
1.50 1.50
B
1.00 1.00

C' A'
0.50 A' 0.50
C'
C C
A A
0.00 0.00
0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
Bias (pu) Bias (pu)

3.00

Nominal characteristic
2.50
Icdiff - Phase C Diff Current
2.00
Diff (pu) Differential threshold phase C

1.50
B'

1.00

A' B
0.50
C'
C
A
0.00
0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
Bias (pu)

Figure 3 Differential characteristic with transient bias external fault

The transient bias enhances the stability of the differential element during external
faults and allows for the time delay in CT saturation caused by small external fault
currents and high X/R ratios. For single-end or double-end fed faults the differential
current is dominant and the transient bias has no effect.
Figure 4 shows the differential thresholds calculated by the relay on a per phase
basis for a BN internal fault on the delta side of a Ynd11 transformer. The transient
bias does not prevent the operation of the differential element as the differential
current is above the operating current at max bias + transient bias.
2
6
transient bias - Phase A transient bias - Phase B
5
1.5 Iadiff - Phase A Diff Current Ibdiff - Phase B diff current

4
Differential threshold phase A Differential threshold phase B
I (pu)

I (pu)

1 3

2
0.5
1

0 0
0 0.5 1 1.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
t(s) t(s)

transient bias - Phase C


5

Icdiff - Phase C Diff current


4

Differential threshold phase C


I (pu)

0
0 0.5 1 1.5
t(s)

Figure 4 Transient bias internal fault

Figure 5 shows that the dynamic threshold coincides with the nominal characteristic
because the transient bias for phase A is zero. For phases B and C the operating
currents have been increased due to the transient bias, but since this is an internal
fault the dynamic thresholds are well below the differential current loci.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 13

6.00
3.00
Nominal characteristic
B
2.50 5.00
Ibdif - Phase B diff current

2.00 4.00 Differential threshold phase B

Diff (pu)
Diff (pu)
1.50 3.00
Nominal characteristic B'

1.00 2.00
Iadiff - Phase A diff current

0.50 1.00 C'


Differential threshold phase A A'

0.00 0.00 A
C
0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
Bias (pu) Bias (pu)

6.00
Nominal characteristic
B
5.00
Icdiff - Phase C diff current

4.00
Differential threshold phase C

Diff (pu)
3.00
B'

2.00

1.00
C'A'

0.00 A
C
0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
Bias (pu)

Figure 5 Transient bias differential characteristic internal fault

No transient bias is produced under load switching conditions. Also, no transient


bias is generated when the CT comes out of saturation.

3 CT SATURATION AND NO GAP DETECTION TECHNIQUES

When second harmonic blocking is used to stabilize the restrained differential element
during inrush conditions, the CT saturation detection technique can be used to enhance
the restrained differential element operating time during internal faults with CT
saturation. The content of second harmonic may be above the second harmonic
threshold during internal faults with CT saturation. As a result, the biased differential
element may be blocked during an internal fault. If the fault level is not high enough,
then the unrestrained differential element will not be asserted; thus a fast trip cannot be
achieved. When the CT comes out of saturation, the biased differential element would
be operative. The result is a delayed differential trip [1], [2]. The delayed trip can be
avoided either by unblocking the biased differential element during internal faults or by
using a CT with a sufficiently high knee point voltage to avoid CT saturation (which might
not be possible).
The CT saturation detection technique distinguishes between magnetising inrush and
saturation; therefore, the relay stability is maintained during inrush conditions. To detect
a CT saturation condition the differential current samples on a per phase basis are
considered. The relay analyzes the differential current waveforms considering their
derivatives and dynamic and fixed thresholds that were determined by RTDS (real time
digital simulator) tests. The CT saturation detection logic unblocks the low set
differential element during CT saturation to allow the biased differential element
operation.
The no gap detection technique compliments the CT saturation technique. It considers
the number of samples on a per phase basis above a dynamic threshold within the last
N executions. This threshold is a function of the second harmonic content. If the
summation of the number of samples above the dynamic threshold is above or equal to
a fixed threshold (determined by RTDS tests) then there is no gap, and the blocking of
low set differential element is prevented.
The differential biased trip is affected by the CT saturation and no gap detection
techniques. If the second harmonic blocking is asserted and either the CT saturation
detection or no gap detection technique is asserted, then the biased differential trip is
14

unblocked. A biased differential trip will occur if the fifth harmonic blocking is not
asserted and the bias differential start signal is asserted. The differential biased trip logic
is described in Figure 6.

Is CrossBlock enabled?
5th Har Blk A
Yes = 1
No = 0

Id Bias Start A & Id Bias Trip A

2nd Har Blk A


&
CT Saturation A &


No Gap A 5th Har Blk B
&

External fault A Id Bias Start B & Id Bias Trip B

2nd Har Blk B


&
CT Saturation B &


5th Har Blk C
No Gap B
&

External fault B Id Bias Start C & Id Bias Trip C

&
2nd Har Blk C

CT Saturation C &


&
No Gap C
&

External fault C

Figure 6 Differential biased trip logic

Extensive real time simulation testing has been done to evaluate these techniques.
Figure 7(a) is the disturbance record for a AN internal fault from a relay with CT
saturation and No gap detection enabled, the operating time of the low set differential
element is 28 ms. It can be observed that both the CT saturation logic and the no gap
detection logic are asserted. The CT saturation and No gap detection logics
complement each other. Figure 7(b) is the disturbance record for a AN internal fault
from a relay with CT saturation and No gap detection disabled. The operating time is 57
ms. Hence, the relay is 29 ms faster if the CT saturation and No gap detection is
enabled.

(a) Enabled (b) Disabled

Figure 7 (a) CT saturation and no gap detection enabled (b) CT saturation and no
gap detection disabled
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 15

4 CT REQUIREMENTS
To determine the CT requirements for the differential function through fault injection tests
were performed under different X/R ratios, CT burdens, fault currents, fault types and
point on wave fault inception. The fault current waveforms considered a six fault
sequence, where the second set of three faults was controlled to generate the opposite
flux movement in the CT than the first set [4].
To establish the CT requirements the burden was incremented and the six fault
sequence repeated, until either the burden limit had been reached, or the relay mal-
operated.
Figure 8 shows the CT requirements when the transient bias technique is applied and
when it is not. It can be observed that when the transient bias technique is not included
the K factor is more than 5 times the K factor when the transient bias technique is
included.

Transient bias technique applied


Transient bias not applied
45.0 300.0
X/R = 5
40.0 X/R = 5
X/R = 10
250.0 X/R = 10
35.0 X/R = 20
X/R = 20
30.0 X/R = 40
200.0 X/R = 40
X/R = 80 X/R = 80
25.0 X/R = 120 X/R = 120
K

K
150.0
20.0
15.0 100.0
10.0
5.0 50.0

0.0 0.0
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 64 0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 64
If If

Figure 8 CT Requirements with and without transient bias

Considering the results shown in Figure 8 when the transient bias technique is applied
the CT requirements might be quoted as follows:

System K
Knee point voltage
conditions (CT dimensioning factor)
In < IF 64In K = 25 VK 25 In (RCT + 2RL + Rr)(1)
5 X/R 20 VK 25 In (RCT + RL + Rr)(2)
In < IF 64In K = 40 VK 40 In (RCT + 2RL + Rr) (1)
20 <X/R 120 VK 40 In (RCT + RL + Rr) (2)
Table1 CT requirements

Where:
K = CT dimensioning factor
IF = maximum external fault current
X/R = primary system X/R ratio
In = Relay rated current
Rr = resistance of any other protective relays sharing the current transformer ()
(1)
= single phase fault or phase-phase-ground fault
(2)
= three phase fault or phase-phase fault
To ensure that through fault stability is achieved the following ratios:
16

Vk-HV / Rtot-HV : Vk-LV / Rtot-LV


Vk-HV / Rtot-HV : Vk-TV / Rtot-TV
Vk-LV / Rtot-LV : Vk-TV / Rtot-TV
should not exceed a maximum disparity of 4:1. Fulfilling the disparity ratios ensures that
during a through fault condition the flux density in the current transformers is not greatly
different [5].
Where:
Vk-HV = Knee point voltage of CT at HV side
Rtot-HV = Total burden connected to CT at HV side = (RCT+ 2Rl + Rr) or (RCT + Rl + Rr)
Vk-LV = Knee point voltage of CT at LV side
Rtot-LV = Total burden connected to CT at LV side = (RCT+ 2Rl + Rr) or (RCT + Rl + Rr)
Vk-TV = Knee point voltage of CT at TV side
Rtot-TV = Total burden connected to CT at TV side = (RCT+ 2Rl + Rr) or (RCT + Rl + Rr)

5 CONCLUSIONS

It has been demonstrated that the transient bias algorithm improves the stability of the
biased differential element because the biased characteristic varies dynamically taking
into consideration the increase in bias current as well as the differential settings. In
addition, the CT requirements for a biased differential element are much lower when the
transient bias technique is included.

The CT saturation and no gap detection techniques improve the operating times as the
biased differential element is not longer blocked during internal faults with CT saturation.

6 REFERENCES

[1] IEEE Std C37.91-2000 Guide for Protective Relay Application to Power Transformers

[2] ALSTOM Transformer Differential Protection Relay MBCH publication R6070L

[3] BLACKBURN J. L., 1997. Protective Relaying Principles and Applications. 2nd ed.
New York: New York

[4] NGTS 3.24.18 Issue 1 2000 Unit Feeder Main Protection

[5] ALSTOM KBCH Manual KBCH/EN-M-G11


X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 17

Nuevo Algoritmo Para Proteccin Diferencial


de Transformadores
Hugo Davila P.Eng.
ERLPhase Power Technologies Ltd


ResumenEste documento presenta un nuevo algoritmo, sus Las tcnicas comunes aplicadas para la proteccin de
fundamentos, resulta dos de p ruebas de validacin p or transformadores sern rpidamente revisadas en la Seccin-II.
simuladores en tiemp o real (RTDS) , adems de los conceptos
bsicos de proteccin convencional, est a t cnica comb ina los En los ltimos aos, la tecnologa de proteccin basada en
principios de la prot eccin diferencial porcentu al y proteccin microprocesadores ha ayudado al desarrollo y mejoras de las
direccional de corriente, y usando conceptos muy fundamentales
tcnicas de proteccin y han ganado confiabilidad debido a los
como la ley de Kirchoff (corriente que entra=corriente que sale),
estas tcnicas p odrn s er t ambin im plementada para la avances tecnolgicos (doble procesador, comunicaciones por
proteccin dif erencial de barras de b aja impedan cia, se ver fibra ptica), haciendo de la proteccin mas sofisticada.
claramente como los efectos tradicionales de saturacin de TCs y
niveles de cor riente directa (DC of fset) no tendrn mayor
incidencia en la decisin final de la operacin del rele, con la cual II. PROTECCION DIFERENCIAL CONVENCIONAL
el reto de ignorar las operaciones en falso debido a los fenmenos
indicados sean de ay uda a la confiabilidad y seguridad de la A. Diferencial Porcentual
operacin de los transformadores de potencia dentro del sistema,
estas tcni cas mant ienen la caracterstica porcentual diferencial
de doble pendiente y es su pervisado por el Nuevo alg oritmo Los reles de proteccin diferencial con restriccin porcentual
Delta-Phase/ROCOD. han estado en servicio por muchos aos. La Fig. 1 muestra el
diagrama de conexiones del rele diferencial tpico. Los reles
ndice TrminosTransformador, Des fase Angular, Delta- diferenciales suman las Corrientes de cada entrada o salida
Phase, ROCOD, Registro de fallas, Diferencial, Oscilografias, IO asociado al dispositivo, para determinar la diferencia entre las
(Corriente de operacin), IR (Corriente de restriccin). Corrientes entrantes y salientes al rele. Una diferencia
sustancial indicara una falla en el elemento protegido o entre
los transformadores de corriente (TCs) localizados alrededor
I. INTRODUCION del transformador.
La proteccin de transformadores de potencia, es muy critica,
dado su importancia dentro del sistema, as como la magnitud
de la inversin que el mismo demanda, por tanto su proteccin
deber ser segura, confiable y altamente sensible para la
deteccin de fallas de alta impedancia dentro de la zona de
proteccin, la presencia de saturacin debido a fallas externas
de alta capacidad, la presencia de contenido de corriente
directa, y el bloqueo frente a fenmenos de insercin y
sobreexcitacin.

El falso disparo de un rel que protege un transformador de


Fig-1 Esquema convencional de proteccin diferencial
potencia puede ocasionar apagones de gran magnitud, que
puedan incluir varias lneas de transmisin o alimentadores
Convencionalmente los valores de medida adoptados estn
conectados a la unidad, adems la desconexin de un
sujetos a evaluacin numrica de acuerdo al principio de
transformador de potencia puede hacer colapsar el sistema,
medicin de proteccin diferencial.
ocasionando sobrecarga en el sistema, o incidir en la
estabilidad del mismo. Por tanto es imperativo tener una
proteccin altamente confiable y segura.

Hugo Davila works for ERLPhase Power Technologies, Winnipeg, Canada (e-mail: hdavila@erlphase.com).
18

La caracterstica de arranque (pick-up), tiene tres etapas, que


se usa en la forma convencional para proteccin numrica.
La proteccin diferencial tiene que enfrentar diferentes casos
que pueden causar la operacin errnea y compensarlos segn
sea necesario, entre estos factores tenemos bsicamente:
Errores de los TCs
Relacin de transformacin en los TCs
Relacin variable de los transformadores debido a la
presencia de TAPs en el LTC para la regulacin.
Desfase angular de la Corrientes, debido al grupo de
conexin de transformador.
Corrientes de Insercin debido a la energizacin del
transformador (2da y 4ta armnica).
Corrientes altas de excitacin, debido a fenmenos de
sobrexcitacin (5ta armnica).
Saturacin de TCs.
Existencia del componente de corriente directa en Fig-3, Muestra una ampliacin de la zona-1
transformadores (DC Offset).

III. CONSIDERACIONES EN LA PROTECCION DIFERENCIAL


Aqu mencionaremos los ya muy conocidos casos que se
presentan durante la ocurrencia de fallas y que han sido
motivo para la aplicacin de diversas tcnicas y la tcnica
presente que hace de la proteccin segura contra estos efectos
que son La Saturacin de TCs y presencia de Corriente
Directa en la corriente de falla (DC Offset).

Saturacin de TCs:
Si un TC es sometido a corrientes altas en el lado primario que
causa la saturacin de la corriente secundaria, esta corriente
secundaria no ser representativa de la corriente primaria y
por tanto puede causar la operacin diferencial incorrecta, un
ejemplo de la saturacin de TC se muestra en la figura
siguiente.

Fig-2 Caracterstica tpica de Operacin porcentual de un rele


diferencial numrico.
Caracterstica de doble pendiente Fig-2, muestra la
caracterstica de doble pendiente, donde se pueden observar
claramente tres zonas de operacin segn se presente la falla.
Donde denominaremos IDIFF=IO y IRES=IR.

Zona-1: Considera el mnimo valor de arranque de la funcin


diferencial y contempla los errores de TCs, presencia de
LTC, Corriente de excitacin y margen de ajuste.

Zona-2: O pendiente-1, considera bsicamente la proteccin


del transformador bajo consideraciones lineales sin saturacin
de los TCs.

Zona-3: O Pendiente-2, considera bsicamente la proteccin


contra fallas con niveles de corriente altos y presencia de
saturacin en los TCs. Fig-4, Caracterstica tpica de saturacin en transformadores
de corriente
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 19

Como se puede ver en la Fig-4 la forma de onda senoidal de la El desfase angular es usado para supervisar la
corriente secundaria esta distorsionada durante varios ciclos. caracterstica tradicional de doble pendiente para
Este error en la corriente secundaria puede crear una cantidad proteccin diferencial.
de corriente IO para una falla externa y tener como El ngulo entre las entradas es calculada muy
consecuencia un falso disparo. Varias tcnicas se han usado rpidamente y fcilmente usando el producto
para detector la saturacin de TCs para bloquear el rele de vectorial I1.I2=I1xI2 Cos ().
falsos disparos.

Componente de Corriente Directa (DC Offset):

Como se puede ver en la Fig-4 la corriente DC o componente


directa de corriente (DC Offset) puede acomodar la saturacin
del TC. Esta presencia de corriente directa (DC Offset) puede
aparecer en el secundario del TC an si no existe saturacin.
Algunos reles de transformador usan tcnicas en el software
para reducir o remover el DC Offset por el uso de algn
proceso de filtrado, introduciendo desfases de corriente y
retardos de tiempo en recomponer las corrientes.

IV. REVISION DEL NUEVO ALGORITMO


La proteccin diferencial implementa dos algoritmos
asociados a la caracterstica tradicional diferencial de doble
pendiente, hablamos de Delta-Phase y ROCOF.

A. DELTA-PHASE ( -)

El Nueva tcnica denominado como Delta Pase (-),


esencialmente compara la informacin del ngulo de fase de Fig-A, Plano de operacin para Falla Interna
todas las corrientes que entran y salen de la zona protegida
(por fase) para distinguir si la falla ocurrida es externa o
interna a la zona de proteccin. El umbral del ngulo de fase
usado para comparar fallas internas (Fig-A) es < 90 entre
cualquier corriente de entrada o de salida a la zona de
proteccin y si el ngulo de fase de cualquiera de las
corrientes que entra con respecto a la corriente que sale de la
zona de proteccin es > 90, entonces la falla es declarada
como externa (Fig-B) a la zona de proteccin y el Rele ser
bloqueado. Este Nuevo principio asegura significativamente la
operacin de la funcin diferencial contra operaciones en falso
durante energizacion y fallas externas de una manera muy
elegante y sencilla comparada al mtodo tradicional
caracterstica de Pendiente. Es importante notar que la
tcnica - , por diseo requiere de por lo menos dos (2)
cantidades fasoriales (I1, I2) para comparacin, como se
indica en las figuras adjuntas, en caso que se tenga disponible
solo una cantidad fasorial, la supervisin de el mtodo Delta-
Phase se desactivara, y la proteccin se volver al mtodo
tradicional de operacin caracterstica de Pendiente.
El Algoritmo en Resumen: Fig-B, Plano de Bloqueo para Falla Externa
Usa el concepto de la ley de Kirchoff (corriente que
entra=corriente que sale)
No considera las desviaciones de las magnitudes de
corriente por efectos de Saturacin de TC y
contenido de corriente continua (DC offset), debido a
que solo considera la diferencia angular para
comparacin.
20

B. RAZON DE CAMBIO DE DIFERENCIAL (ROCOD)

La tcnica Rate Of Change Of Differential


(ROCOD) esencialmente utiliza la primera derivada .EC-04
o razn de cambio de la secuencia positiva de la
corriente de operacin IO, y la corriente de La lgica ROCOD a continuacin es usada para
restriccin IR, que entra y sale de la zona de Habilitar o Bloquear el disparo como se ilustra en el
proteccin. diagrama lgico funcional (Fig-1). El principio
derivado usado en la tcnica ROCOD elimina la
El principio Matemtico usa la derivada de la dependencia (efecto de restriccin) de las
DIFERENCIAL (u OPERACION) y corriente de condiciones de carga en la corriente de restriccin
RESTRICCION, la cual es una extensin del polarizada de los terminales del transformador. Esto
principio que se esta usando en muchos reles es porque la derivada de la carga constante
modernos basados en microprocesadores como (magnitud constante de los fasores segn Ecuacin-
proteccin diferencial de baja impedancia 2) previa a la falla ser tericamente cero.
porcentual.
Por tanto la Ecuacin-4 refleja las condiciones para
Considere el principio diferencial porcentual identificar la posibilidad de falla interna incluso bajo
aplicado para un dispositivo de proteccin de n condicin de transformador sobrecargado o falla
terminales: interna con muy alta impedancia.

La nueva Lgica ROCOD (Rate Of Change Of


. EC-01 Differential) que supervisa el algoritmo -, es
rpida, confiable y sensitiva para todas las fallas
Es la corriente diferencial o de operacin, la cual es internas, se ha probado su efectividad en diferentes
la suma fasorial absoluta de las corrientes que entran fallas internas y se ha obtenido el 100% de
y salen de la zona de proteccin. operaciones correctas con Resistencia de fallas en
el rango desde 0.1 hasta 200 Ohm.
La correspondiente corriente de restriccin absoluta El siguiente esquema booleano indica la operacin de
individual (corriente de polarizacion) implementada un rele de proteccin diferencial.
es:

.EC-02

Normalmente, el siguiente criterio es usado para


disparo de reles diferenciales porcentuales de baja
impedancia:
Fig-5, Diagrama Lgico Funcional del algoritmo de
proteccin que incluye las tcnicas Delta-Phase y
EC-03 ROCOD

Donde f implica alguna funcin de IR, la cual es la


Caracterstica de Pendiente.

Luego diferenciando la Ecuacin-3 (la cual es la


misma si diferenciamos las ecuaciones 1 y 2) con
respecto al tiempo, en ambos casos da el algoritmo
ROCOD:
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 21

Las ventajas del algoritmo ROCOD es como sigue:


A.-Caso (i) Energizacion del Transformador sin carga
Trabaja con la misma velocidad como acta el Descripcin: En este caso de prueba, El transformador es
diferencial tradicional con caracterstica de pendiente excitado en el lado HV, sin carga en el lado LV. El rele no
para fallas internas. debera operar para este caso debido la corriente de insercin
Habilita - para todas las fallas externas, corriente de en los lados LV y HV.
magnetizacin, saturacin de TC, etc., incrementado la
seguridad.
No requiere ningn ajuste nuevo.
No hay impacto en la performance de los recursos del
procesador.
No depende de la funcionalidad 87N. la funcin 87N es
independiente y disponible para ser usado segn se
requiera.
La tcnica es independiente de los efectos de carga del
transformador para fallas internas.

V. RESULTADO DE PRUEBAS DE VALIDACION DEL NUEVO


ALGORITMO

Pruebas intensivas de validacin del nuevo algoritmo se han llevado


acabo usando un simulador en tiempo real (RTDS), de la que algunos
de sus resultados se muestran a continuacin.

Figure A1.0: Energizacion de transformador sin carga,-


operacin estable durante energizacion.

A) Energizacion de transformador sin carga.

Casos de Prueba

Varios casos de pruebas fueron realizados, los siguientes son


solo algunos de ellos.

i) Pruebas de energizacion del transformador (con y sin carga)


Como se muestra.

ii) Conectar dos transformadores en paralelo, uno en servicio


alimentando la carga, y uno fuera de servicio. Energizar el
transformador fuera de servicio para verificar que ningn
transformador se dispara.
. Figure A2.: Caracterstica Diferencial sin carga-Observe las
iii) El mismo que (i) pero creando una falla interna durante la corrientes de operacin y restriccin.
energizacion para mostrar que el rele opera.
iv) Conectar un transformador alimentando la carga radial,
luego crear una falla interna para probar el disparo del rele.
v) Aplicar fallas externas con y sin saturacin de TCs
vi) Aplicar fallas internas de baja impedancia y de alta
impedancia(200 Ohm).
vii) Chequear la operacin del rele para todo tipo de fallas
(AG, BG, CG, AB, BC, CA, ABG, BCG, CAG, ABC)
22

Figure A3.: Corrientes en los lados AT y BT durante la


energizacion Figure B2: Caracterstica Diferencial durante energizacion con
carga pasiva en el lado de BT.
Observaciones:
1. El rele opera como se espero en la energizacion sin carga
2. Restriccin Armnica (ajustado a 20%) ha prevenido
satisfactoriamente el disparo.

B.- Caso(i) Energizacion del Transformador-Con carga

Descripciones: En este caso de prueba, el transformador del


lado AT es excitado con una carga pasiva en el lado BT. El
rele no debera operar en este caso debido a la presencia de
corriente de insercin en los lados BT y AT.
Figura

Figure B3: Relacin de fases de las corrientes en los lados AT


y BT durante la energizacion del transformador con carga
pasiva en el lado BT.

Figure B1.: Energizacion de transformador con carga,-


operacin estable durante energizacion.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 23

C.-Caso (ii) Energizacion del Transformador en Paralelo-


Con Carga

Figure C1: Energizacion del transformador en paralelo con carga Figure C3: ngulos de las corrientes de fase en AT y BT durante la
pasiva en el lado BT. energizacion de transformador en paralelo con carga pasiva en el
lado de BT.

D.- Caso (iii) Energizacion de Transformador con falla interna


Sin carga

Figure C2: Caracterstica Diferencial durante energizacion del


transformador en paralelo con carga pasiva en el lado de BT.

Figure D1: Energizacion de transformador con falla interna sin carga


en el lado de BT.
24

E.-Caso (iii) Energizacion de Transformador-con falla interna-con


Carga

Figure D2: Caracterstica Diferencial durante energizacion de


transformador con falla interna sin carga en el lado de BT. Figure E1: Energizacion de transformador con falla interna y con
carga pasiva en el lado de BT.

Figure D3: Corrientes en el lado AT y BT durante energizacion de Figure E2: Caracterstica Diferencial durante energizacion de
transformador con falla interna sin carga en el lado de BT. transformador con falla interna y con carga pasiva en el lado de BT.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 25

Figure E3: ngulos de las corrientes de fase en AT y BT durante la Figure F2: Corrientes en los lados AT y BT durante falla interna en
energizacion de transformador en paralelo con carga pasiva en el lado AT (100% del debando, Fase A) con carga pasiva en el lado de
lado de BT. BT.

F.- Caso (iv) Transformador Alimentando una carga radial-Con falla G.- Caso (v) Falla Externa sin saturacin de CTs
interna

Figure G1: Falla externa sin saturacin de CT, el rele 87 no se activa


.

Figure F1: Resumen de falla interna en el lado AT (100% de


devanado, Fase A), con carga pasiva en el lado BT, con resistencia
de falla de 0.1 ohm.

Figure G2: Falla externa sin saturacin de CT, el rele 87 no se activa


26

Figure G3: Falla externa sin saturacin de CT, La corriente de


operacin IO es irrelevante o muy minimo.
Figura H3: Falla externa con saturacin de CT, se ve claramente el
contenido de corriente de operacin IO.
H.- Caso (v) Falla Externa con saturacin de CTs
I.- Caso (vi) Falla Interna de alta impedancia (200Ohm).

Figura H1: Falla externa con saturacin de CT, la funcin 87 Trip se


Figura I1: Falla interna de alta impedancia (200Ohm), podemos ver
mantiene inactiva..
como la funcin 87Trip se activa

Figura H2: Falla externa con saturacin de CT, se ve claramente


como la falla ingresa a la zona de operacin, la cual es bloqueada por
el algoritmo DP. Figura I2: Falla interna de alta impedancia (200Ohm), podemos ver
como la falla entra en la regin de IO min.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 27

Figura I2: Falla interna de alta impedancia (200Ohm), podemos ver Figura J2: Falla interna de baja impedancia, se puede observa como
la presencia de corriente de operacin. la corriente de operacin es muy significativa.

J.- Caso (vi) Falla Interna de baja impedancia.

Figura J1: Falla interna de baja impedancia, podemos ver como la


funcin 87Trip se activa

Figura J2: Falla interna de baja impedancia, se puede observa como


la corriente de operacin entra francamente en la regin de disdparo.
28

VI. CONCLUSIONES
Dentro de las conclusiones de la aplicacin de este Nuevo
algoritmo podemos mencionar lo siguiente:
La combinacin de las tecnicas Delta-Phase/ROCOD
aplicado a la caracterisitca diferencial porcentual,
incrementa la confiabilidad para el caso de fallas
internas de alta impedancia
Incrementa la Seguridad para el caso de fallas de alta
magnitud externas y cercanas a la zona de proteccin
en condicin de alto cometido de corriente directa
(DC offset) , la cual corresponde a la regin de la
pendiente-2 en el esquema tradicional de doble
pendiente.
No hay dependencia en las magnitudes diferenciales
solamente. En el pasado aun con reles diferenciales
numricos se han tenido falsos disparos o falta de
disparos durante fallas.
La tcnica Delta-Phase proporciona informacin si la
falla es interna o externa, mientras que la tcnica
ROCOD determina la sensibilidad de la falla dentro
de la zona de operacin.
La combinacin de estas tcnicas mejora la
Confiabilidad, Sensibilidad y Seguridad tanto para
Fallas externas, internas de baja y alta impedancia.

VII. REFERENCES

[1] ERLPhase Power Technologies, Transformer and Bus Bar Protection


Techniques, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.
[2] RTDS test results, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

[3] Secured Busbar Differential Protection Using A Computationally


Efficient Dot Product Technique, Power System Protection and
Automation 2010, New Delhi, India.

VIII. BIOGRAPHY

Hugo Davila
Tiene el grado de Inegniero Mecanico-Electrico de la
Universidad Nacional de Ingenieria (UNI) en Lima-Peru.
Hugo es un miembro activo del IEEE, actualmente es Gerente
Regional de ERLPhase Power Technologies Ltd(inicialmente
NXTPhase) para la Region Centro America, Mexico y El
Caribe, Antes de unirse a NXTPhase, El trabajo para
Beckwith Electric Company como Ingeniero de Soporte
Tecnico en Proteccion y Control. Tambien tiene experiencia
trabajando como Ingeniero de campo en proteccion y control
para las principales empresas utilitarias de su pais, y es autor y
coauthor de varios documentos tecnicos sobre aplicaciones en
proteccion de sistemas de potencia. (e-mail:
hdavila@erlphase.com).
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 29

Modern Line Current Differential


Protection Solutions
Hank Miller and John Burger, American Electric Power
Normann Fischer and Bogdan Kasztenny, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc.

AbstractLine current differential protection creates digital microwave and direct fiber-optic connections as well as
challenges for relay design and application. From a design synchronous optical network (SONET) or synchronous digital
perspective, the distributed nature of the line current differential hierarchy (SDH) systems, applications of line current
system imposes limits on the amount of data that can be
exchanged between the system terminals and calls for data
differential schemes kept expanding.
alignment schemes to enable the differential protection principle. The key benefits of differential protection as applied to
From the application perspective, line current differential power lines include good performance on multiterminal and
schemes are concerned with CT saturation, particularly in dual- series-compensated lines and lines of any length as compared
breaker applications; in-zone reactors and line-charging current; with distance or directional comparison schemes; considerable
in-line and tapped transformers; sensitivity to high-resistive immunity to changing system conditions, long-term evolution
faults; single-pole tripping; security on channel impairments;
of the system, or nontraditional short-circuit current sources,
application to lines with more than three terminals; and so on.
This paper reviews technical solutions to the line current
such as wind generators, photovoltaic sources, or power
differential design and application, addressing the common electronic-based sources in general; good sensitivity; and
design constraints and utility-driven application needs. The simplicity of application, at least from the protection
paper is a tutorial in this challenging area where protection perspective.
principles and applications mix with communications and signal The art of microprocessor-based line current differential
processing. protection advanced with the first generation of relays
bringing achievements in data synchronization, working with
I. INTRODUCTION wide-area communications equipment, enhancing protection
As a unit protection having its zone delimited by location principles (e.g., the Alpha Plane line differential element), or
of current transformers (CTs), the differential protection standardizing physical interfaces between relays and
principle is considered superior with respect to selectivity, multiplexers (IEEE C37.94).
sensitivity, and speed of operation as compared with Many lessons were learned during this period. Originally
directional comparison, phase comparison, or stepped distance designed for direct fiber connections, line current differential
schemes. schemes were mostly deployed over multiplexed channels
The differential function responds to the sum of all the because high-bandwidth fiber pairs were utilized for shared
currents of its zone of protection. Ideally, this sum equals zero data traffic. Protection engineers needed to learn new skills
under all events except for internal faults. Practically, related to digital communications. The communications
measurement errors and shunt elements inside the zone may equipment originally designed around carrying voice data
create a spurious differential signal, calling for adequate needed some adjustments to support protection applications.
countermeasures. These countermeasures became more Post-event analysis related to communications impairments
sophisticated with advancements in the field of differential was difficult because of the lack of recording and data-
protection and progressed from adding an intentional time gathering facilities at the interface between relays and
delay, percentage restraint, and harmonic restraint and multiplexers or modems.
blocking to sophisticated external fault detection algorithms Looking at both the lessons learned from the first
and adaptive restraining techniques. generation of line differential relays and at the emerging needs
As applied to line protection, the differential principle for new functions and features, this paper outlines general
faced the limitations of line length. Analog schemes using design directions for a next generation line current differential
pilot wires can only be applied to very short lines because of protection system.
signal attenuation due to series resistance and the shunt The paper provides a utility perspective on needs and
capacitance of the pilot. These applications are still beneficial expectations for a new line current differential relay. These
because the very short lines cannot be adequately protected new functions include better security against CT saturation in
with distance relays. applications with dual-breaker terminals, line-charging current
The development of microprocessor-based line current compensation, multiterminal applications, a redefined role of
differential schemes utilizing digital communications channels backup functions, and accommodating in-line transformers, to
redefined the field of line protection. name a few.
When suitable long-haul digital communications channels From the relay design point of view, this paper addresses
became more readily available because of the deployment of the stated requirements and describes an optimized line
30

current differential scheme working with limited bandwidth C. Channel Requirements


channels, while providing for high performance in terms of Both direct point-to-point fiber and multiplexed
operation speed, sensitivity, and security under CT saturation connections should be supported.
and channel impairments. Direct point-to-point fiber can be made available for
critical applications. In this respect, users expect relays to
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR NEXT GENERATION LINE CURRENT support longer distances. This allows the elimination of
DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION amplifiers along the fiber path and the related infrastructure
Microprocessor-based line current differential schemes (e.g., housing, redundant power supply, physical security
found their broad field applications only a decade or so ago. perimeter, access roads, cybersecurity requirements).
Many lessons have been learned from these first generation Multiplexed connectivity is required for the majority of
schemes. When looking forward at the next generation of line regular applications when direct fiber connections cannot be
current differential schemes, the following requirements have spared and instead only 64 kbps or a multiple thereof is made
been identified from a utility perspective. available for line current differential protection.
A modern relay should provide for redundant channel
A. High Performance
options at least in two-terminal applications. In particular, one
Advances in bus and transformer differential protection channel may be a direct fiber connection, and the standby
brought to life high-performance products. This pertains to channel may be a multiplexed connection.
speed of operation, sensitivity, and immunity to CT saturation.
These improvements were possible because of the availability D. Charging Current Compensation
of high-performance microprocessors, high-speed sampling, Line-charging current compensation is an expected feature
optimum internal data buses, and new algorithms. Subcycle of a modern line current differential relay.
trip times became common, while requirements for CTs were In networks operated with a considerable unbalance,
considerably relaxed by the implementation of external fault charging current compensation may be highly beneficial, even
detectors and better restraining techniques. if using sequence differential elements, such as a negative-
Equally high performance is expected from the next sequence differential element (87LQ).
generation of line current differential relays. In some 765 kV installations, the positive-sequence
charging current is in the range of several hundred to over
B. Protection Security
1,000 A, and it may be higher than either the load or fault
Even though their application constantly broadens, line level.
current differential schemes tend to be used on higher voltage,
critical lines and those relatively shorter in length. Whether E. Redefined Role of Backup Functions
protecting lines carrying gigawatts of power in the expanding Traditionally, a line current differential relay provides basic
765 kV network or protecting transmission lines connecting distance backup to cover cases of unavailability of the
distributed generation, line current differential schemes must differential function because of problems with the
be exceptionally secure. communications channels. Typically, these distance functions
At least three areas affect the security of a line current are of a common design and slower speed and may face some
differential scheme: performance issues.
The robustness of the relay hardware and firmware. A new trend has emerged that calls for a line relay rather
The robustness of the applied algorithms and logic. than a line current differential relay, a full-featured distance
The ability to deal with channel impairments and long relay, a distance backup relay, or a simple overcurrent backup
fiber circuits. relay.
The first two categories apply to any microprocessor-based In this concept, a multipurpose line relay is provided with
relay. Manufacturers have developed significant knowledge in the same form factor, wiring, and ordering/procurement,
designing for relay and algorithm performance. regardless of the served function. This allows a generic panel
The latter category is specific to line current differential design and expands the standardization of panels, wiring, and
relays and relates to relay interaction with a communications substation integration, leading to reduced cost and shortened
networka relatively complex system that is out of the design and production cycles.
control of relay designers and only partially under the control Functions of such a relay are still differentiated to allow for
of the protection engineers at the user organization. Lessons controlling the value and cost to the user.
learned in this respect should be incorporated in the next In one aspect of this concept, there is little or no
generation schemes, including unexpected channel differentiation between a full-featured distance relay and a line
asymmetry, channel switching, error detection capabilities, current differential relay. The application may be decided late
accidental loopback, accidental cross-connection of relays, into the project, or it may change at some point in time, but
and so on. the relay mounted in the panel is capable of providing both
In addition, a modern relay should provide for recording or functions, even though not necessarily simultaneously. Some
evidence-gathering capabilities to aid post-event analysis in functions may only be operational when the communications
areas related to communications impairments. are not in service.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 31

F. Multiterminal Applications
A modern relay should provide protection for lines with
more than three terminals. This need is driven by tapped loads
or distributed generation tapped to transmission lines.
G. Auxiliary Functions
A modern relay should support modern and emerging
functions in a variety of areas. This includes but is not limited
to state-of-the-art Ethernet connectivity, synchrophasors,
IEC 61850, secure point-to-point digital signaling, user-
programmable math, customizable user interfaces, and cross-
tripping.
The relay must also support current CIP (Critical
Infrastructure Protection) requirements for passwords,
security, and disturbance monitoring, including digital
disturbance recorder (DDR), Sequential Events Recorder
(SER), and digital fault recorder (DFR) requirements.
Fig. 1. Simplified architecture of a typical line current differential system.
H. Single-Pole Tripping and Reclosing
We expect that under congested transmission, increased The multiple relays in the system depend on each other in
penetration of distributed generation, and the overall order to serve their purpose of providing the line current
expansion of the North American power system, more and differential protection but are located at different substations
more transmission lines will be protected using the single-pole and operate autonomously in terms of sampling, frequency
tripping and reclosing philosophy. tracking, transmission and reception of data, filtering, and
A modern line current differential relay should be capable protection calculations.
of single-pole tripping and reclosing. This applies to tripping Each relay samples its analog input currents via an analog-
from the differential, as well as backup functions. to-digital (A/D) converter to obtain a digital representation
(iD) of the analog inputs (iA). The sampling rate may vary from
I. Self-Monitoring and Relay Maintenance a few kilohertz to less than 20 samples per cycle, depending
A new trend of extending maintenance intervals based on on the design. Typically, the same digital data feed the line
the amount of self-monitoring in microprocessor-based relays current differential subsystem of the relay, as well as all the
has gained momentum. other local functionsmetering, fault recording, and
The concept supported by the emerging NERC (North protection (distance backup, breaker failure, overcurrent, and
American Electric Reliability Corporation) standards so on). Therefore, the sampling is typically of high resolution
encourages relay manufacturers to quantify the extent and and rate, even though the line current differential function may
strength of self-monitoring in their microprocessor-based utilize these data at lower sampling rates.
relays so that adaptive maintenance programs can be formally The sampling may be performed at a constant rate or at a
established at the user organizations. variable rate, tracking the power system frequency. The
As a logical consequence of this trend, the next generation samples may be taken asynchronously with the local relay
relays should be designed with the ease of quantification of time or synchronously with the absolute time to simplify
the embedded self-monitoring in mind and with the goal of implementation of synchrophasor measurements.
making the self-monitoring as strong as possible without Some implementations allow the relays in the differential
impacting the availability of the device. The ultimate goal is system to sample asynchronously from each other, while some
the option to run to fail with all relay failures being fail safe implementations use the communications channel to force
and detectable by the self-monitoring tests. synchronization of the relay sampling clocks.
Line current differential schemes offer extra opportunities To facilitate the line current differential function, the local
in this respect. Because multiple, independent relays constitute current data must be communicated to the remote terminals
the protection system, data are shared and can be crosschecked ( i TX i RX in Fig. 1). Each relay that receives a full set of
between the relays in the differential system.
data from all its remote peers can align the data, run its
differential trip equations, and operate autonomously in the
III. A TYPICAL LINE CURRENT DIFFERENTIAL SYSTEM so-called master mode. Each relay that only serves the data
With reference to Fig. 1, the most distinctive feature of a but does not receive all the remote data because of a
line current differential protection system is that it consists of permanent lack of communication (channel not installed) or a
multiple relays operating independently and linked by a digital temporary loss of communication is referred to as working in
communications channel. the slave mode. Direct transfer tripping (DTT) from masters
allows the slave relays to issue the trip command to their
breakers.
32

Channels traditionally used for line current differential goal to null out the offset, meaning to force synchronization of
protection are limited in bandwidth (64 kbps is a typical the two clocks. This approach works satisfactorily in two-
value), and therefore only limited amounts of data can be terminal applications but becomes complex in multiterminal
exchanged between the relays at different line terminals. In applications.
this respect, various line current differential designs differ Another method is to time-stamp the transmitted data with
considerably. the local time and, knowing the clock difference between the
Some relays exchange samples of currents, some relays two relays, resample the data to align them to the same time
work on phasors, and yet others work on nonconventional instants. This method works naturally for any number of
quantities such as a positive or negative current charge terminals as it allows each relay to freewheel without forcing a
between consecutive zero crossings of the current. larger group of relays into relative synchronism.
This variety of approaches is driven by the substantial The channel-based synchronization method works well if
design challenge of conveying sufficient amounts of data to the channel is symmetrical. If the transmit and receive delays
facilitate adequate protection performance, meeting channel differ, the alignment becomes less accurate, leading to a
bandwidth limitations, and providing for robust data phantom shift between the local and remote current
synchronization, all at the same time. measurements. Various protection algorithms have different
When working with current samples, the system can collect immunity to such shifts if they are minor, but with major
and exchange samples at a rate that is high enough for asymmetry, both dependability and security are impacted to
accurate interpolation (e.g., 1 kHz). As a result, the design the point of a complete loss of function.
challenge of data synchronization can be met by measuring In such cases, line current differential relays employ
the data latency between the remote and local relays and synchronization, if needed, based on an external time
interpolating (resampling) the remote current samples to align reference to augment or substitute for the channel-based
them with the local samples. While resampling, the relay can synchronization. Until now, the Global Positioning System
perform frequency tracking (i.e., take new virtual samples at (GPS) has been the only practical way to provide for common
the rate following the actual system frequency). As an extra timing across wide areas. Reliance on a satellite system and
advantage, the actual sampling clocks of the individual relays additional devices is not an ideal protection solution.
in the system do not have to be synchronized. Therefore, applications with symmetrical channels have been
When working with phasors, the system faces a considered superior, while the need for GPS assistance has
disadvantage that twice as much bandwidth is required to send been considered the least preferred solution.
the real and imaginary parts of the currents. As a result, the However, terrestrial systems are emerging for providing a
phasor exchange rate cannot be high enough to facilitate common time reference [1]. These systems are synchronized
phasor interpolation, and the relay sampling clocks must be to GPSfor the benefit of using true time under normal
synchronized. This complicates the design, particularly in conditionsvia multiple receivers located at multiple
multiterminal applications where more than two relays need to geographical locations but continue to provide common
stay synchronized. Also, in order to track system frequency, timing independently should all the GPS inputs be lost. These
this kind of design must control relay sampling clocks with systems are a part of the communications infrastructure that is
the concurrent goals of staying synchronized and following used for line current differential communications in the first
the power system frequency. Additionally, filtered phasors place. Therefore, they are a safe means of providing for
suppress high-fidelity information in the input currents, such external time reference without introducing more devices,
as harmonics or rate of change of currents, making certain unnecessary interdependencies, or reduced reliability or
applications more difficult, such as in-line transformers or fast availability.
detection of CT saturation. There are two distinct communications channel
Data synchronization (alignment) is one of the key applications for line current differential protection: dedicated
elements of a line current differential system. Commonly, a point-to-point channels (typically fiber based) and multiplexed
channel-based synchronization method known as a ping- channels.
pong algorithm is used to estimate clock offset between two Dedicated point-to-point channels remove any third-party
relays working via a communications channel. This well- devices between the two communicating relays and, with
established timing method for communications networks them, all the associated failure modes. Such channels are
measures a two-way travel time by time-stamping the sending inherently symmetrical, and any communications impairments
and receiving of communications events and exchanging some are caused only by the relays themselves or the passive media
of the time stamps. Assuming that the channel is symmetrical between the relays.
(meaning it is of the same latency in both directions), the total As long-haul-dedicated channels are more expensive and
channel time can be recalculated into the clock offset between are usually available only under special circumstances,
the two relays (see Section XI for more information). With the multiplexed channels are used, typically within a
knowledge of this offset, the system is capable of aligning the SONET/SDH infrastructure. Multiplexed channels put third-
data. party devices between the communicating relays with all their
One method of alignment is to use the measured clock complexity, failure modes, and ride-through attempts often
offset to control the local sampling time at both ends with the designed for nonprotection applications. This requires the line
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 33

current differential relays to be designed for a variety of Note that when sending packets 16 times a 60 Hz power
failure modes caused by the active communications cycle over a 64 kbps channel, we can only use 66 bits, having
infrastructure between the relays. practically no room for payload even when significantly
This paper elaborates on a number of aspects briefly optimizing the payload and the overhead.
introduced in this section, while reviewing design directions Still, when designing relays for high-speed operation, it is
for a new line current differential system. beneficial to keep the rate at which fresh data are passed from
subsystem to subsystem high so that the total data latency is
IV. RELAY DESIGN CONSTRAINTS BECAUSE OF AVAILABLE minimized. Therefore, it is advantageous to exchange the
CHANNEL BANDWIDTH analog data between line current differential terminals
From the relay design perspective, the primary constraint multiple times per cycle.
of a microprocessor-based line current differential system is As shown by our simple calculations, the task of passing
the requirement to work with a communications channel of a the right data at a high rate is not trivial. It is clear that the
limited bandwidth. protection-driven payload and the communications-driven
Today, line current differential relays must work with constraints must be addressed in a concurrent design in order
64 kbps channels. Even though direct point-to-point fiber to yield a high-performance scheme. It is very important
connections allow bandwidths in the range of tens of megabits which quantities are sent, how often, and how they are
per second, and multiplexed channels can be requested with a encoded, packetized, and protected for integrity.
bandwidth of Nx64 kbps, the 64 kbps bandwidth continues to When moving data within a single relay using internal data
be a common application scenario. buses designed adequately, we do not have to apply as much
To realize the amount of data that can be conveyed for optimization. When working with a low-bandwidth channel in
protection purposes over a 64 kbps channel, let us assume a a line current differential system, however, an important part
sampling rate of 16 samples per cycle and review the of protection design is to select protection algorithms that
following: maximize the available bandwidth.
64,000 bits per second = In general, the following solutions aid the design:
1,067 bits per a 60 Hz power cycle = Smart encoding. Properties of the sent data, if studied
267 bits per quarter of a 60 Hz power cycle = carefully, may allow reducing the number of bits
66 bits per each of 16 sample sets in a 60 Hz power required to convey their values. For example, a
cycle negative-sequence restraint can be sent as per unit of
The 267 bits available every quarter of a cycle or 66 bits the highest phase current restraint. Or the value of
available 16 times a cycle may seem sufficient. However, as current can be encoded on a log-based scale rather
with any digital communications scheme, there is always than a linear scale to recognize the wide range of
certain overhead in the communications packet on top of the current signals.
actual payload. In a line current differential system, the Interleaving, or sending small fragments of slowly
digitally encoded values of currents are the payload. The changing data in consecutive packets. For example,
major components of the overhead include the following: the channel-based synchronization calculations can be
A header is required to tell consecutive packets apart run at a rate lower than the packet rate.
at the receiving end. A total of 15 bits may be needed. Sending various pieces of data at optimum rates
The integrity of the data must be protected by required by the applied protection equations.
redundancy checks such as Bose, Ray-Chaudhuri, Increasing the packet size so that the payload-to-
Hocquenghem (BCH) Code or Cyclic Redundancy overhead ratio becomes more favorable.
Code (CRC). A total of 32 bits is typically needed. Selecting the payload in a way that maximizes the
Channel-based synchronization methods need to information content in it, given the intended protection
append certain time values to the packet. A total of algorithms.
16 bits or more may be required. In order to illustrate the concept, consider the packet and
The packet must support basic addressing to prevent protection equations presented in this paper. This solution
accidental cross-connection of line differential relays. works with 1 kHz samples of currents and utilizes proven
A total of 4 to 8 bits may be required for basic Alpha Plane protection equations [2].
addressing.
DTT and other flags must be supported. A total of 4 to
8 bits may be used for this purpose.
The above can add 50 to 80 bits of overhead.
34

Table I summarizes the packet content. Restraint quantities are magnitudes that can be
TABLE I encoded using fewer bits. In addition, the restraint
PACKET PAYLOAD DEFINITION quantities are auxiliary terms and can be encoded with
lower accuracy without sacrificing security.
Symbol Meaning
The five restraint terms can be interleaved, saving
iA(k) Present (k-th) sample of the line current, A-phase extra communications bandwidth.
iA(k-1) k-1 sample of the line current, A-phase The negative- and zero-sequence restraint terms can
iA(k-2) k-2 sample of the line current, A-phase be encoded as per-unit values with respect to the
highest phase restraint, further reducing the bandwidth
iB(k)
requirement.
iB(k-1) As above, B-phase The packet format makes the solution scalable, as it
iB(k-2) works with any number of local currents at a given
iC(k)
line terminal. The packet always contains the partial
differential and partial restraint terms.
iC(k-1) As above, C-phase
The following sections explain how this packet format
iC(k-2) enables fast detection of saturated CTs, provides for proper
IAR Restraint term, A-phase restraint in dual-breaker applications, and supports line-
charging current compensation and protection of in-line power
IBR Restraint term, B-phase
transformers.
ICR Restraint term, C-phase
IQR Negative-sequence restraint term V. DUAL-BREAKER TERMINALS AND PROTECTION SECURITY
IGR Zero-sequence (3I0) restraint term A. Introduction
Dual breaker refers to a line configuration where the line is
The payload of Table I can be encoded using slightly more
terminated in a double-bus double-breaker, breaker-and-a-
than 100 bits, allowing us to send packets every
half, or ring-bus substation (Fig. 2). Modern line protection
3 milliseconds (3 milliseconds at 64 kbps allows 192 bits).
relays support two three-phase sets of current inputs and
The following sections of this paper explain in detail how
measure the two currents independently. These relays work
the individual data items in the packet are calculated prior to
with the internally summed current for the main protection
transmission and consumed upon reception. In short, the
functiondistance, ground directional overcurrent in a pilot-
instantaneous values are total line currents at the sending
assisted scheme, or the line current differential. At the same
terminal (a sum of all the local currents, such as from the two
time, it provides for two independent breaker failure functions,
breakers of a dual-breaker termination), while the restraint
two independent autoreclosers, metering, recording, and time-
terms are sums of magnitudes of all the local currents (such as
coordinated backup, all responding to the individual breaker
from the two breakers of a dual-breaker termination). Simply
currents.
put, the instantaneous values are partial line differential
currents, and the restraint terms are partial line restraint
currents.
The selected payload provides the following benefits:
Fresh data are sent every 3 milliseconds, or more than
five times a 60 Hz cycle, minimizing latencies and
speeding up operation of the relay.
A packet lost just before or during an internal fault
erases only 3 milliseconds of data, allowing for fast
recovery and preventing delayed operation of the
relay.
Working with 1 kHz samples offers good fidelity of
differential current measurements and allows the
calculating of harmonics for in-line transformer
applications and fast detection of saturated CTs.
Sending three samples of instantaneous current per
packet improves the payload-to-overhead ratio.
Sending one value of a restraint per packet (or per
three samples of instantaneous values) reduces Fig. 2. Dual-breaker line termination and application of dual CT input
relays.
bandwidth requirements, while it is sufficient for
protection applications.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 35

As a result, dual CT input line relays enable a complete differential functions. Two approaches are used independently
protection, metering, monitoring, and fault recording solution and simultaneously in order to secure these functions.
for dual-breaker line terminals. First, the notion of a through-fault current is developed via
Dual-breaker applications working with breaker currents proper restraint terms. These terms are inserted into the
may create some protection challenges. communications packet, utilizing a minimum possible
First, the two CTs may be rated much higher as compared bandwidth. The restraints are not used directly for tripping but
with the load of the protected line, challenging protection feed into generalized Alpha Plane trip equations (see
sensitivity and calling for low settings compared with the CT Section VII).
secondary values. Second, an external fault detection logic is implemented to
Second, a through fault across the two breakers may signal the occurrence of an external fault and increase security
challenge protection security, particularly if the remote line beyond the natural level provided by the restraint terms.
terminals are weak and/or the applied settings are sensitive.
B. Partial Differential and Restraint Terms
With reference to Fig. 3, an external fault below CT-2
draws a fault current from the local system via CT-1 and from Consider the three-terminal line configuration of Fig. 4,
the remote terminal(s) via the protected line. The local relay with each line end terminated as a dual-breaker connection.
responds to the internally summed iCT-1 and iCT-2 currents T1 T2
(iL(MEAS)). With no CT errors, this virtual current is the line
current at the local terminal. When considering CT errors, i1 CT-1 CT-3 i3
however, this current is measured with a finite accuracy as
i(T1) i(T2)
compared to the real line current (iL(TRUE)).
Strong
system i2 CT-2 CT-4 i4
i(T3)

iCT-1 CT-1 CT-5 CT-6


T3
iL(MEAS)
Weak
system i5 i6
iL(TRUE)
Fig. 4. Sample three-terminal, dual-breaker line configuration.
iCT-2 CT-2
In the proposed design, each relay calculates its partial
differential and partial restraint term as follows:
i A ( T1) = i1A + i 2A (1a)

Fig. 3. A through-fault scenario challenging protection security of a dual- i B( T1) = i1B + i 2B (1b)
breaker line application.
i C( T1) = i1C + i 2C (1c)
If the fault current is high and the CT carrying the current
away from the line terminal saturates (CT-2, in this case), I AR ( T1) = I1A + I2A (2a)
enough error can develop in the measured line current, and its
direction may be reversed with respect to the true current, I BR ( T1) = I1B + I2B (2b)
especially if the true current is low because the remote line
ICR ( T1) = I1C + I 2C (2c)
terminal(s) are relatively weak.
Close-in reverse faults depress the voltages, while CT IQR ( T1) = I1Q + I2Q (3a)
errors can reverse the measured line current. With enough CT
saturation, any line protection method can be defeated in this IGR ( T1) = I1G + I2G (3b)
situation: distance, ground directional overcurrent, line current
differential, phase comparison, and so on, unless the relay where lowercase symbols stand for instantaneous values, and
design and/or the application logic address the issue explicitly. uppercase symbols denote magnitudes.
Ground (zero-sequence) and negative-sequence elements Similar terms are calculated for Terminals T2 and T3.
are particularly vulnerable during faults that do not produce a If required, CT ratio matching between the local CTs and
sequence component in the primary currents (three-phase remote CTs of the protected line is performed prior to the
symmetrical faults and line-to-line faults for ground elements, calculations.
and three-phase faults for negative-sequence elements). Under The above quantities constitute the core protection payload
these fault conditions, the true primary sequence current is per Table I. Each terminal calculates its partial terms and
zero, but a CT error will generate a secondary sequence sends them to its peers.
current. Assume now that an external fault occurs at the T1
This paper is concerned with the phase (87LP), ground terminal. Under CT saturation, the partial differential current
(87LG), and negative-sequence (87LQ) line current sent by this terminal may have a considerable error in it.
However, at the same time, this terminal sends a restraint term
36

that reflects the external fault current, feeding the Alpha Plane
trip equations with information to counterbalance the errors in
the differential signal.
Upon receiving and aligning all the partial terms, each
relay calculates the total line differential and restraint currents

for the 87LP function (A-phase is shown; B- and C-phases are
similar):
i ADIF = i A ( T1) + i A ( T2 ) + i A ( T3) = ... Fig. 5. External fault detection logic.
(4)
... = i1A + i 2A + i3A + i 4A + i5A + i 6A A simplistic implementation of this method would require
I ARST = I AR ( T1) + I AR ( T2) + I AR ( T3) = ... instantaneous values of all the currents of the line differential
(5) zone to be communicated between the relays. This
... = I1A + I 2A + I3A + I 4A + I5A + I6A requirement is not practical and has been overcome as follows.
and for the 87LQ and 87LG functions: Each terminal uses (8) to derive its own instantaneous
restraining current based on its local currents and the partial
IQRST = IQR ( T1) + IQR ( T2) + IQR ( T3) = ...
(6) differential terms from the remote terminals (refer to Fig. 4;
... = I1Q + I2Q + I3Q + I4Q + I5Q + I6Q the phase indexA, B, or Cis omitted).
IGRST = IGR ( T1) + IGR ( T2) + IGR ( T3) = ... i RST ( T1) = i1 + i 2 + i( T2 ) + i( T3) (8a)
(7)
... = I1G + I 2G + I3G + I 4G + I5G + I6G
i RST ( T2 ) = i3 + i 4 + i( T1) + i( T3) (8b)
In this way, each relay in the line current differential
system derives the true value of the restraint current,
i RST ( T3) = i5 + i 6 + i( T1) + i ( T2) (8c)
regardless of the location of the fault and the short-circuit
capacity behind any given relay. For example, the T3 terminal where x stands for the absolute value of an instantaneous
may be very weak, therefore producing very little restraint for
a fault at T1. However, it will receive the T1 partial restraint signal x.
values to counterbalance possible errors in the T1 partial The above terms are not communicated between the relays
differential current. but used locally. Each relay executes the logic of Fig. 5 using
Note that the proposed design is scalable and works with its instantaneous local restraint (8) and the line differential
any number of local currents without the need to modify the current (4).
communications package or increase the bandwidth. The other The relay at the terminal with an external fault is
local currents can be line reactor currents, calculated line- guaranteed to detect the fault because it measures the through-
charging currents, or currents of a small bus included in the fault current. The other relays may or may not detect the fault,
line protection zone, as long as the relay hardware supports depending on the current flow between the terminals. If a
extra current inputs. given terminal is weak, it may not detect the external fault
The line differential and restraint currents feed into located at the remote strong terminal.
generalized Alpha Plane trip equations, as explained in Therefore, the EFD flag derived locally is added to the
Section VII. communications payload and consolidated with the other
terminals upon reception, as shown in Fig. 6.
C. External Fault Detection Logic
Stub bus To outgoing packets
In addition to relying on natural levels of restraint, the
solution described in this paper incorporates an explicit EFDA
external fault detection (EFD) logic with the intent to increase Local terminal EFDB
EFD
security further during external faults and relax the CT EFDC

requirements and related engineering effort of verifying the Remote terminals EFD1
CTs. (incoming packets)
EFD2
Fig. 5 presents the EFD logic. This method is successfully EFD3
used in bus and transformer differential relays [3] [4]. An ...

increase in the instantaneous restraining signal (above the


Fig. 6. Consolidating EFD flags between phases and line terminals.
threshold P) without a similar increase in the differential
current (multiplier q) signifies an external fault. The dropout In this way, all the relays work with the same amount of
timer (DPO) ensures security throughout the fault duration. information, and all behave correctly. A weak terminal, T3 for
example, may receive an incorrect value of the partial
differential current from T1 because of an external fault at T1
and considerable CT saturation. On its own, the T3 terminal
may not be able to detect the event as an external fault, but it
receives the EFD flag from the T1 terminal informing it
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 37

explicitly about the external fault. As a result, a differential The EFD logic is scalable and works seamlessly with any
term in any given packet with a potential error because of an number of local currents at any given terminal without the
external fault and CT saturation is always accompanied by the need to modify or expand the packet.
EFD flag and an elevated restraint term. In our example, the Upon asserting the EFD flag, the relay increases security
T3 terminal is fully prepared to deal with the event at T1, even by intentionally raising its natural restraint terms. This may
though it does not have any direct visibility into this event include harmonic restraintadding harmonics in the
(i.e., it does not measure the i1 and i2 currents directly). differential current to the restraint or adding a portion of the
Fig. 7 presents a simulation example illustrating the phase restraints to the negative- and zero-sequence restraint
restraint terms and the EFD logic. The terminal with the terms to secure these elements under external faults that do not
external AB fault asserts the EFD flag safely before CT produce any natural sequence restraint. The intentionally
saturation impacts accuracy and produces considerable errors amplified auxiliary restraint term feeds into the Alpha Plane
in the A-phase current sent by this terminal. Note that the trip equations as explained, further increasing protection
restraint term in the A-phase is considerable, already security.
stabilizing the 87LP function.
VI. MULTITERMINAL LINE APPLICATIONS
Line current differential relays have been primarily
designed to cover two- and three-terminal line applications.
iCT-2, A

Typically, two communications ports are provided on a relay.


These ports can be used to communicate with two remote
relays in a nonredundant way, allowing for a three-terminal
line application. Or the two ports can be used for redundant
communication between two relays in a two-terminal
iCT-1, A

application.
Recently, reasons to provide for more than three-terminal
line applications became more compelling.
Some utilities tap subtransmission and transmission lines to
feed distribution stations and larger industrial loads. In some
i, A

cases, five taps can be encountered, constituting a seven-


terminal application. Instantaneous fault clearing in such cases
is typically accomplished using distance protection in a pilot-
assisted scheme, with the pilot installed only between the two
IR, A

stations. The distance functions are set to overreach the far-


end bus but set short of the low-voltage buses of the tapped
i, A-phase, A

transformers. This setting rule may be difficult to meet for


longer lines and/or when a large transformer is located close to
one of the substations. In such cases, extra pilot channels may
be required between some of the taps and the main terminals
i, B-phase, A

to allow explicit blocking for faults in the lower voltage


system.
The application is usually complicated. The line current
differential protection principle is a better alternative for lines
with multiple taps. With a constantly progressing deployment
of digital communications channels and advancements in relay
design, line current differential schemes became more readily
Fig. 7. Critical signals at the dual-breaker terminal for an external AB fault: available.
currents across the two breakers, partial differential current (measured and More recently, distributed generation has been tapped into
actual), partial restraint, delta changes in differential and restraint currents and
the EFD flags.
subtransmission or transmission lines the same way loads used
to be tapped. This poses an even greater challenge, as the
The described logic delivers similar performance to that of short-circuit response of these nontraditional sources may
a modern, low-impedance bus or transformer relay. It is cause problems or uncertainty for traditional protection
capable of detecting external faults even if considerably principles. These sources often include power electronics with
underrated CTs are installed. As long as the CTs perform with fast controllers designed to provide a low-voltage ride-through
no or only minor errors in the first 3 milliseconds of an capability or just protect the source itself from damage.
external fault, the logic works correctly. This level of Protection engineers struggle with modeling these generators
performance is achieved at the expense of adding just 1 bit to for short-circuit studies, and as a result, some level of
the communications payload. uncertainty remains in these applications.
38 10

Because lines tapping new generation are essential to In this solution, the external time reference synchronization
having the generation available in the first place, they may method is used (see Section XI), while deterministic Ethernet
apply single-pole tripping and reclosing. This complicates with guaranteed bandwidth and latency becomes the data
protection applications further. transport mechanism (Fig. 8). In a way, the next generation
Very often, however, lines connecting distributed SONET/SDH built for utility applications, including
generation have digital communications channels available. protection and synchrophasors, becomes a part of the line
Line current differential protection is a natural solution in this current differential system. This is a simple and robust
case, eliminating complexity and uncertainty related to the solution for N-terminal line current differential relaying
behavior of nontraditional sources, while reducing the danger because of the following:
of overtripping and increasing availability of the added The SONET/SDH network is entirely under the
generation. control of the user. It can be deployed and configured
In order to provide multiterminal (N-terminal) line current for redundancy and is operated and maintained as a
differential protection, a differential relay must first resolve protection-grade system.
the following issues: The common time reference provided by the system is
Consolidation of all the terminal currents for independent from GPS. Even if all dispersed receivers
protection calculations. are lost, the system maintains common time across the
Connectivity between N terminals. wide area.
Synchronization between N terminals, given their With the SONET/SDH deterministic communications
actual connectivity pattern. backbone, a portion of Ethernet traffic is isolated for
The solution outlined earlier in this paper of sending partial deterministic delivery across a wide area. In this way,
differential and partial restraint terms from each relay solves Ethernet is more of a connectivity media between the
the first problem. Regardless of the number of local currents at line current differential relays and the multiplexers,
each line terminal (single breaker, dual breaker, small bus), while the actual transport is rigorously controlled by
the same optimized packet conveys all the information the next generation SONET, using its deterministic
required to provide a high-performance line current backbone.
differential function. The next section explains how the Alpha Using the same system for timing and data transport
Plane principle is applied to an arbitrary number of terminals. improves reliability by reducing the total number of
Another challenge is the connectivity between N terminals. devices and associated failure modes.
Direct point-to-point connections require each relay to support
N 1 communications ports for exchange of data with all its
peers (e.g., six ports for a seven-terminal application). This

M
increases the relay part count and, as a result, impacts cost,

UX
availability, and reliability.
MUX

In addition, the user needs to provide a number of point-to-


point connections: 1 channel for 2 terminals, 3 for 3 terminals,

MUX
MU

6 for 4 terminals, 9 for 5 terminals, and so on. This of course


X

assumes all relays are masters. A hybrid solution allows some


relays to be slaves (i.e., only serve the data) with a few other
relays being masters capable of receiving all the data,
asserting a trip, and sending it via DTT to the slaves. This
reduces the number of required connections, at the cost of Fig. 8. Multiterminal line current differential application with next
generation SONET/SDH systems.
slowing down the operation.
Channel-based synchronization may be an even greater Multiterminal line current differential applications can be
challenge, depending on the method applied. Solutions that implemented in a simple and robust way by utilizing a next
force synchronization of relay sampling clocks face more generation SONET/SDH system and tasking it with providing
difficulties. a common wide-area time reference independent from GPS
The challenge of connectivity and data synchronization is and deterministic Ethernet connectivity in the relay-
easy to solve from the point of view of a modern multiplexer-fiber-multiplexer-relay path.
communications system such as SONET/SDH. Recently,
these communications systems have provided for
deterministic transport mechanisms, including deterministic
Ethernet for protection applications as well as common
timing with the capacity of being a GPS-independent common
time source [1].
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia11 39

VII. GENERALIZED ALPHA PLANE FOR MULTITERMINAL This paper introduces a generalized N-terminal Alpha
APPLICATIONS Plane concept. This method calculates a two-terminal
A. Introduction equivalent for a general N-terminal case and applies the tried-
and-true Alpha Plane principle to the two equivalent currents.
The Alpha Plane current differential protection principle
compares individual magnitudes and angles of the zone B. Mapping N-Terminal Currents Into Two-Terminal
currents. The principle is easy to understand for the case of a Currents
two-terminal line. Under balanced conditions, the two currents The general N-terminal Alpha Plane works with two
of the zone (IL and IR) are equal in magnitude and opposite in equivalent currents (IL EQ and IR EQ) calculated from the N
phase. This yields an operating point on the Alpha Plane of currents of an arbitrary N-terminal zone, using the differential
k = 1180. Under internal faults, the complex current ratio, and restraint terms as a transformation tool.
k, departs from this ideal blocking point, allowing the Alpha Consider a general N-terminal differential zone of
Plane element to operate. Blocking and operating regions are protection, as shown in Fig. 10a. The classical differential
shaped as pictured in Fig. 9, with typically two easy-to-set principle derives the following differential and restraining
parameters. currents for this zone (all currents are phasors in the following
equations, and | | stands for the phasor magnitude):
Im(k)
I DIF( N ) = nN=1 In (9a)

I RST ( N ) = nN=1 I n (9b)


RESTRAIN
OPERATE
(a) (b)
I2 IL EQ
g le
An

Re(k) I1

I3
1

IDIF(N) IDIF(2)
s

IRST(N) IRST(2)
diu
Ra

IN
I4 IR EQ

Fig. 10. The principle of a generalized Alpha Plane.


Fig. 9. Typical Alpha Plane characteristic.
Now consider the two-terminal case of Fig. 10bthe
Typically, the phase (87LP) and either the negative- natural application for the Alpha Plane.
sequence (87LQ) or ground (87LG) Alpha Plane elements are The two virtual currents in the two-terminal equivalent are
applied. sought such that the same differential and the same restraining
Because of its many advantages, the principle has been currents are measured in the two-terminal equivalent as in the
successfully implemented and proven by a long field record actual N-terminal application.
[5]. The most important advantages are: significant tolerance
I DIF( 2 ) = I DIF( N ) (10a)
to CT saturation and synchronization errors, excellent
sensitivity and speed of the 87LQ and 87LG elements, I RST( 2) = I RST ( N ) (10b)
significant tolerance of the 87LQ and 87LG elements to the
line-charging current, and good performance in series- The two currents of the two-terminal equivalent have a
compensated lines. total of four degrees of freedom (two magnitudes and two
While intuitive and straightforward in two-terminal angles), while we have a total of three boundary equations: the
applications, the Alpha Plane is less intuitive in a general N- real and imaginary parts of the differential current (10a) and
terminal case. Complex current flow patterns can be the magnitude of the restraining current (10b).
encountered, such as a circulating currenta current leaving In this method of representing N currents of a differential
the zone at one terminal to reenter it at the other. These zone by two equivalent currents for the Alpha Plane, the
patterns must be analyzed carefully in order to avoid a failure fourth balance equation calls for one of the two sought
to trip by responding to one of the currents flowing out of the equivalent currents to be along the line of a specific current of
zone to feed a load or circulating to the other line terminal. the N-terminal zone. This specific zone current (IP) is selected
Many possible permutations of ratios between many possible as the one that has the largest projection on the differential
currents complicate understanding, implementation, testing, current phasor.
and post-event analysis. The rationale behind this choice is that during external
faults with CT saturation, the spurious differential signal, if
40

significant, will be approximately located along the line of the Solving for the two-current equivalent, we obtain:
fault current. Therefore, by selecting the reference current IP IL EQ = 11.1 A11.7 and IR EQ = 18.9 A160
that is closest in phase to the differential current, we position Note that when calculated for this two-terminal equivalent,
the two equivalent Alpha Plane currents along the lines of the
the differential and restraining currents are 11.2 A128 and
current flowing in and out of the zone. 30 A, exactly as in the original three-terminal system.
To select the reference current IP, the following auxiliary
The above two equivalent currents give the operating point
numbers are calculated first:
on the Alpha Plane of 1.71148.3. Fig. 11 presents this case
(
R n = real In I*DIF( N ) ) (11) graphically.
Three-terminal application Two-terminal equivalent
where n = 1..N.
The current with the highest value of R becomes the IRST IRST

reference current IP.


IDIF IDIF
Let us denote the angle of this current as :

Imaginary

Imaginary
I3 IR EQ
I1 IL EQ
= angle ( Ip ) (12) I2

The differential current is shifted for the convenience of


subsequent calculations as follows:
I X = IDIF( N ) 1 ( ) (13) Real Real

And the two currents of the two-terminal equivalent are Fig. 11. Graphical illustration of the numerical Example 1.
now calculated as follows: 2) Example 2
I L EQ = Continue the simulation example of Fig. 7, and refer to
Fig. 12, presenting the zone differential and restraining

( )
2
Im ( I X ) I RST( N ) Re ( IX )
2
currents in the A-phase. The equivalent Alpha Plane yields an
(14a)
+ j Im ( IX ) 1
( )
operating point of about 0.5170. Note that in this case, the
2 I RST ( N ) Re ( IX ) IP current is selected with some approximation, as the line

current differential system does not work directly with the
(
I R EQ = IRST ( N ) IL EQ 1 ) (14b) individual currents at the faulted terminal. Still, the large
restraint term compared with the spurious differential keeps
The traditional Alpha Plane protection principle takes over the equivalent Alpha Plane in the blocking region.
from here, working with the IL EQ and IR EQ currents. 100
The classical differential principle has been used in this
0
iCT-2, A

method as a mathematical mapping tool to project the general


case of an N-terminal differential zone into an equivalent two- 100

terminal zone, requiring the differential and restraining 200


0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
currents be identical between the N-terminal application and EFD
its two-terminal equivalent. 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
The principle is applied to the phase, negative-sequence,
IADIF, IARST, A

150
and ground differential elements with the filtered differential
100
and restraint currents obtained via (4) through (7) from the
partial terms communicated between the relays. 50

0
C. Numerical Examples 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35

1) Example 1
kMAG (87LP)

1
Consider the following three-terminal application:
0.5 Set point:
I1 = 10.0 A160 Radius = 5
I2 = 8.0 A175 0
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
I3 = 12.0 A30
200
kANG (87LP)

The differential current is IDIF(N) = 11.2 A128. 150


Set point:
Following the proposed method, we calculate: 100 Stability angle = 120
R1 = 97.37A2, R2 = 49.50A2, R3 = 20.14A2 50
0
Therefore, the first current is selected as the reference, 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
time, s
IP = 10.0 A160. This means one of the equivalent currents
will be located on the line of 160 or 20. Fig. 12. Secondary current of the saturated A-phase CT for the case of
Fig. 7, line differential and restraint currents, and the equivalent Alpha
The restraining current is IRST(N) = 30.0 A. Planemagnitude and angle.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 41

D. Discussion charging current can amount to hundreds of primary amperes.


The generalized Alpha Plane allows implementation of the In some cases, the charging current can be comparable with
tried-and-true two-terminal principle to multiterminal lines, the fault current.
retaining key advantages while enabling new applications. The Line-charging current leaks from the differential
following are worth noticing: measurement and affects both the security and dependability
The generalized principle is transparent in two- of differential protection. The phase differential element
terminal applicationsthe two equivalent currents (87LP) is impacted more than the sequence elements (87LQ
always equal the two actual currents. and 87LG).
In three-terminal applications, the principle behaves Consider line energization, external faults, and internal
nearly identically, with the heuristic implementation faults in the context of the line-charging current.
of the two-terminal rule developed by analyzing 1) Line Energization
possible current flow patterns. During line energization, the energizing terminal draws the
Any case with a balanced differential current yields an total charging current. If the energizing voltage is balanced
ideal blocking point on the Alpha Plane (1180). and the line well transposed, the charging current is composed
Decreasing the differential currentsuch as by line- predominantly of positive-sequence current and therefore only
charging current compensation (Section VIII)brings affects the phase elements. If the line and/or the supply
the Alpha Plane point closer to the ideal blocking voltage are unbalanced, an unbalanced charging current may
position. flow. As the charging current is fed from one terminal only, it
Any case with higher restraint brings the Alpha Plane appears as a single-feed current, and as such, it cannot be
point closer to the ideal blocking point. The method addressed by any restraint means. Increasing the pickup
allows applications where the restraint term is permanently above the charging current or using the remote
intentionally increased, such as when using harmonic breaker status to temporarily boost security are practical ways
restraint in transformer protection (Section IX). of dealing with the line-charging current during energization.
The principle works well without the need to If the line is not well transposed and the total charging
communicate all local currents from all terminals. The current is high, we may have to increase the pickup of the
line differential and restraint terms enabled by the 87LQ and 87LG functions considerably, potentially
proposed communications package map well into the diminishing their natural protection sensitivity.
generalized Alpha Plane. 2) External Faults
The principle works exceptionally well during external During external faults, changes in voltages induce extra
faults under CT saturation. First, by relying on the true charging current. This includes both fault inception and
restraint term, the calculated Alpha Plane point shows clearance. As the fault voltages are unbalanced, asymmetrical
a strong blocking tendency. Second, extra security is charging currents are induced, potentially impacting the 87LQ
added by the nature of the Alpha Plane itself. and 87LG functions.
The principle works very well for the 87LQ and 87LG This situation is not a major concern, however, because the
elements. Under internal faults, the elements currents external fault current produces restraints for all three 87LP,
are close in phase and differ only by the system 87LQ, and 87LG functions. These restraint terms allow
nonhomogeneity angles. The generalized Alpha Plane counterbalancing of the charging current component in the
returns a strong unblocking indication in this case, differential current. Weak systems may pose some challenge
regardless of the magnitudes of the compared currents. as they do not generate large currents that would boost
Under external faults, including faults that do not restraint terms but allow voltages to depress considerably, thus
produce any natural restraint (phase-to-phase faults for creating larger charging currents.
the 87LG, for example), a cross-phase restraint may
be used upon detecting an external fault (EFD bit 3) Internal Faults
asserted). With increased restraint, the equivalent During internal faults, the charging current caused by the
Alpha Plane point shifts safely toward blocking. change in voltages subtracts from the fault current, potentially
By reducing a differential zone of protection with any reducing sensitivity. Typically, this is not a major concern for
number of terminals to a single operating point on the the 87LQ and 87LG functions because high sensitivity is
Alpha Plane, the principle simplifies implementation, required during high-resistance ground faults, and these faults
testing, and post-event analysis. do not change voltages much. Therefore, only small zero- and
negative-sequence charging currents are generated during
VIII. LINE-CHARGING CURRENT COMPENSATION high-resistance faults. However, if the pickup settings are
increased to deal with energization of a poorly transposed line,
A. Impact of the Line-Charging Current and Benefits of sensitivity may be impacted.
Compensation In general, line-charging current is not a major concern for
High-voltage overhead lines draw about 1 A per each the 87LQ and 87LG functions, unless the line is not well
kilometer of length (about 1.6 A per mile). For high-voltage transposed or is operated under considerable unbalance (e.g.,
cables and extra-high-voltage overhead lines, the total caused by single-phase reactor operation).
42

If high sensitivity is required from the 87LP function, line- The average line voltage can be approximated by the
charging current is, however, a significant concern. average terminal voltage, and therefore:
Line-charging current can be compensated for in a line 1 d
current differential relay using voltage signals. This section i C _ TOTAL = CTOTAL ( v1 + v 2 + v3 ) (15b)
3 dt
explains and illustrates the basic principles of compensation
and presents a method to make the compensation immune to Rearranging further:
problems with voltage transformers (VTs). 1 d 1 d
i C _ TOTAL = CTOTAL v1 + CTOTAL v 2 + ...
B. Principle of Line-Charging Current Compensation 3 dt 3 dt
(15c)
The purpose of line-charging compensation is to remove 1 d
... + CTOTAL v3
the charging current from the differential current. Ideally, the 3 dt
method applied should work under balanced and unbalanced In other words, the total charging current is the sum of
conditions, transposed and nontransposed lines, energization, three components:
external faults, internal faults, and other events.
i C _ TOTAL = i C1 + i C2 + i C3 (16a)
With reference to Fig. 13, a multiterminal line draws a
charging current through its distributed capacitances. The each derived from a single line terminal voltage:
exact distribution of this current depends on the line and 1 d
system parameters, as well as on the voltage profile along the i C1 = CTOTAL v1 (16b)
3 dt
line and its segments. Higher voltages draw larger charging
currents. Open-ended lines develop an overvoltage at the open 1 d
i C2 = C TOTAL v 2 (16c)
end while not drawing any current from that end. During 3 dt
faults (internal or external) voltages change and become
1 d
unbalanced, causing changes in the charging current, with the i C3 = CTOTAL v3 (16d)
charge flowing out and into the line. 3 dt
The above explains that each terminal can calculate a share
of the total charging current based on local voltage and a
portion of the total line capacitance proportional to the number
of line terminals that perform the compensation at any given
time.
These fractions of the charging current when summed up
by the final differential current will null out the actual
Fig. 13. Distributed capacitance three-terminal line. charging current.
This principle is keythe line current differential system
From the differential protection point of view, however, the
effectively calculates the charging current based on the
total charging current is of primary interest. Contributions to
average voltage from all line terminals, without sending any
the differential current from the individual line terminals are
voltages between the relays. Instead, each terminal subtracts
secondary. If so, the total line-charging current can be well
its share of the charging current from the measured current
approximated as a current drawn by the total line capacitance
and sends it to its peers (TX is transmitted to the peers; RX is
under the average line voltage. The former is known and
received from the peers):
becomes a user setting. The latter can be calculated from the
measured line terminal voltages. i TX = i MEASURED i C (17a)
With reference to Fig. 14, the line capacitance can be and calculates the line differential current as:
represented by a lumped parameter model at each terminal of
i DIF = i TX + i RX (17b)
the line that allows the line current differential relay to
measure the voltage. Using Fig. 14 as an example, the differential current is
calculated as follows:
i DIF = ( i MEASURED1 i C1 ) + ( i MEASURED2 i C2 ) +
(18a)
( iMEASURED3 iC3 )
or
i DIF = i MEASURED1 + i MEASURED2 + i MEASURED3
(18b)
Fig. 14. Lumped parameter three-terminal line. ( iC1 + iC2 + iC3 )
or
d
i C _ TOTAL = CTOTAL vAVERAGE (15a) i DIF = i MEASURED1 + i MEASURED2 + i MEASURED3 iC _ TOTAL (18c)
dt
The share of the charging current estimated at a given
terminal may not equal the actual charging current supplied by
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 43

this terminal. The open line end is the ultimate casethe


actual current supplied by the open terminal is zero, while this

v1, kV
terminal estimates its share of the total charging current based
on the voltage at the open end, provided line-side VTs are
installed. At the same time, the closed terminal underestimates
its share. When added up in the differential calculations, all
the estimates of the charging current will, however, match the
actual total charging current of the line.
In general, for a line with N terminals performing charging

iC1, A
current compensation, each terminal uses 1/N of the total line
capacitance and its own voltage to estimate its share of the
charging current.
C. Three-Phase Implementation
As indicated by (15), the charging current is calculated as a Fig. 15. Sample line energization: Terminal 1 voltage and the calculated
derivative of the voltage signal, assuming known capacitance share of the charging current.
of the line. Fig. 16 shows the voltage and the calculated share of the
A microprocessor-based relay uses digital filtering to charging current for the second terminal. Again, the actual
calculate the time derivative. current supplied by this terminal is zero.
In general, the following equation is used to calculate the
phase-charging currents:
i A C AA CAB CAC vA
v2, kV
d
i
B = CBA CBB CBC v B (19)
dt
i C CCA CCB CCC vC
C

For fully transposed lines, the matrix is symmetrical and is


composed of the self- and mutual capacitances calculated from
the zero- and positive-sequence susceptances of the line.
For nontransposed lines, the matrix is not symmetrical, and
iC2, A

extra settings (in addition to the zero- and positive-sequence


susceptances) are required to determine the matrix and
perform accurate compensation.
Data required for the compensation are typically available
from the commissioning records of the protected line. Fig. 16. Sample line energization: Terminal 2 voltage and the calculated
Symmetrical components of the charging current are share of the charging current.
compensated for automatically by compensating the phase Fig. 17 shows the voltage and the calculated share of the
currents using (19). charging current for the third terminal. Note that this terminal
Equation (19) is the time domain implementation of the supplies the actual charging current, and its calculated share is
method. Not only the fundamental frequency component but only about one-third of the actual current.
also the instantaneous values of the differential current are
compensated. This allows for various algorithms that respond
to signal features other than the fundamental frequency
component to work well.
Note that the implementation method (19) works well
under a variety of system conditions: energization, faults,
open-pole conditions, and so on.
D. A Simulation Example
Fig. 15 through Fig. 17 illustrate a case of energizing a
three-terminal 275 kV line, with a total length of
300 kilometers and the steady-state positive-sequence
charging current of 230 A. The line is energized from the third
terminal.
Fig. 15 shows the voltage and the calculated share of the
Fig. 17. Sample line energization: Terminal 3 voltage and the calculated
charging current for the first terminal. Note that the actual share of the charging current.
charging current drawn from this terminal is zero (open
breaker).
44

Fig. 18 compares the actual and calculated charging E. Charging Current Compensation and Alpha Plane
currents. The actual charging current is the current measured The operating point on the Alpha Plane is derived from the
at the energizing terminal (Terminal 3, in this example). The differential and restraining auxiliary terms, as explained in
calculated current is the total of the charging current shares Section VII.
calculated at each of the line terminals. By reducing the differential signal, the charging current
compensation shifts the Alpha Plane operating point toward
the blocking position. In an ultimate case of removing all the
iC (actual), A

1000

0 charging current, it yields the operating point of 1180 on


1000
the Alpha Plane. This is not only the desired effect, but it
happens without the knowledge of how the actual charging
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 current divides between the terminals of the line.
During internal faults, the charging current compensation
increases the differential signal by not allowing its inductive
iC (calculated), A

1000
component to be reduced by the capacitive charging current.
0 This compensation shifts the operating point on the Alpha
1000 Plane away from the blocking region as expected.
As a result, the differential elements (phase elements, in
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
time, s particular) can be set more sensitively when the charging
Fig. 18. Sample line energization: actual and calculated charging currents.
current compensation is enabled.
An interesting design question arises regarding adding the
To illustrate the effect and accuracy of the compensation, calculated charging current to the restraint terms. On the
Fig. 19 compares the differential currents without and with surface, this is yet another current that feeds into differential
compensation. The differential current without compensation calculations and as such should be included in the restraining
is the current measured at the energizing terminal. The terms that normally mirror the differential calculations. In this
differential current with compensation is the current calculated case, however, the proper design choice is not to include the
following (17). Note that a vast portion of the charging current calculated charging current in the restraint terms for the
is removed from the differential signal, and the remainder is of following reasons.
higher frequencies and will be further suppressed by the relay The actual charging current is measured by the relays and
filtering algorithms. already contributes to the restraint terms. The calculated
charging current is the countermeasure and should not be
included, or else the charging current would be counted twice
iDIFA, A

in the restraining terms.


In order to illustrate this issue, consider the case of line
energization shown in Fig. 15 to Fig. 17. The actual charging
current is measured at the third terminal and, in steady state,
produces about 230 A of phase restraint current. At the same
iDIFB, A

time, the compensated charging current is near zero. These


values yield an operating point of 1180 on the Alpha Plane,
or a solid blocking indication.
This shows that the charging current compensation allows
the trip equations to restrain properly rather than to block via
iDIFC, A

an elevated pickup setting.


F. Accuracy of Compensation
The applied compensation method uses a lumped
Fig. 19. Sample line energization: differential current without (solid line) parameter model to estimate and subtract the line-charging
and with (dashed line) charging current compensation. current. This lumped model represents actual transmission
lines well for frequencies up to a few hundred hertz.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 45

Fig. 20 presents a frequency response of an admittance of a


sample overhead line for several different line lengths,
superimposed on the lumped parameter model. As we can see,
the actual line and the lumped parameter model can differ
considerably at higher frequencies, particularly for long lines
(and it is long lines that benefit most from the compensation).
Fig. 21. Extra restraint term from the high-frequency spectrum in the
differential current.

The desired approach is simply to remove the charging


current for frequencies near the fundamental frequency
because these frequencies affect the transient and steady-state
response of the relay, while providing an extra restraint
derived from higher frequencies in the differential signal.
G. Treatment of Line Reactors
Long lines that benefit from the charging current
compensation feature of the relay often have shunt reactors
installed inside the protection zone bounded by the location of
the CTs connecting the line current differential scheme. The
capacitive current of the line and the inductive current of the
reactors do not cancel transiently as far as fast protection is
concerned. The transient nature (frequency response) is
different between an inductor and a capacitor, their positive-
Fig. 20. Frequency response (admittance) of the actual line and the lumped to zero-sequence reactance ratios can be different, and reactor
parameter model.
saturation makes the inductance nonlinear. In addition,
In theory, we may develop a more accurate model of the reactors are switched on and off as a part of voltage/reactive
line (compared with the C dv/dt) and implement it in a line power control in the power system and can be operated in an
current differential relay. The following are the disadvantages unbalanced way (one or two phases).
of this approach: In order to keep protection applications simple, the reactor
The behavior of long transmission lines at higher current is typically taken out of the measuring zone by
frequencies is difficult to model without considerable paralleling its CTs with the line CTs. At any given time, the
amounts of data. There are differences between line may or may not be compensated, but the relay always
overhead transmission lines and cables. Mixed lines measures the entire charging current and compensates for it.
with some cable and overhead sections are difficult to With reference to Fig. 22, when applying the line-charging
cover. Line geometry, skin effects, and zero-sequence current compensation, the line differential zone excludes both
resistance have impact on the model. This approach the reactors and the charging current itself.
would put extra burden on the user.
The frequency response of the VTs would have to be iCT-1
iC
factored in, making the problem even more complex. Differential zone
The under-/overcompensated higher frequency components
are not used for protection purposes and therefore do not have
to be measured correctly. Instead, they are noise impacting iCT-2 iREACTOR
other measurements and must be dealt with as such using
known protection approaches, if they cannot be eliminated
easily in a practical way.
One way to deal with the under-/overcompensated high-
frequency charging current components is to produce an extra Fig. 22. Line reactors and line capacitance are removed from the differential
restraint from the high-frequency spectrum in the differential protection zone.
signal. With reference to Fig. 21, a high-pass filter is applied H. Immunity to VT Problems
to extract high-frequency components from the instantaneous
Charging current compensation makes the line current
differential signal, and a root-mean-square (rms) measurement
differential function partially dependent on availability of the
is used to boost the fundamental frequency restraint. In this
voltage sources and exposes it to problems with the voltage
way, if the high-frequency component affects measurements
signals. This is not a best solution, and the dependence on
of the differential signal, it also automatically increases the
voltage should be remedied as much as possible.
corresponding restraint term. As a result, the equivalent Alpha
The proposed scheme uses an extra bit in the
Plane is kept secure.
communications payload to signal if the terminal actually
46

performs the compensation (charging current compensation in This scheme makes the charging current compensation
progress, CCC). feature more immune to problems with VTs. In a way,
A relay at a given terminal may not calculate and subtract individual relays in the line current differential system work as
its share of the charging current for the following reasons: remote backup voltage sources for each other. If all voltages
VTs are not installed or not wired to the relay; a problem is are lost, the relay automatically desensitizes to ensure security
detected with the VTs (loss of potential), and the charging and continues working with currents only.
current compensation logic suspends compensation based on
this voltage; or bus-side VTs are used while the line breaker is IX. IN-LINE TRANSFORMERS
opened, and the logic suspends usage of this voltage as not
A. Introduction
representative for the line.
Each set of received currents is either compensated or not In some applications, a line and a transformer are installed
as per the accompanying CCC flag. Each receiving terminal without a breaker in between to separate the two pieces of
therefore knows how many terminals actually subtract their equipment (see Fig. 23). This is often driven by economics,
share of the charging current and can calculate its own share particularly in cases when the line is not tapped or
of compensation in order to make up for the full charging multiterminal, and the transformer does not feed any other
current of the line. loads. Thus, installing a separating breaker does not add any
In this way, the system works with a variable number of operational flexibility. The lack of a separating breaker puts
compensating terminals and is partially immune to the loss of both the line and the transformer into the same trip zone,
one or more sets of VTs. regardless of which element actually requires isolation from
Consider the following examples. the rest of the system.
It is still beneficial to apply two measuring zones in this
1) Example 1 case, as shown in Fig. 23a, even if they both trip both the line
Assume a three-terminal application and one terminal with and the transformer. By using relays designed for a given type
no voltage source. The relay with no voltage does not of apparatus, we maximize the overall performance of the
compensate its currents and permanently sends CCC = 0 to the protection system, sensitivity to transformer faults in
other peers. Each of the receiving peers sees that the said particular.
terminal does not compensate, and there are a total of two
(a)
terminals that do compensate. As a result, each of them will
apply a multiplier of 1/2 in their equations for the share of the
charging current. In this way, the charging current is
compensated fully, using an average of the two terminal Communications
87 channel 87
voltages that are available to the line current differential 87 L L
system. Note that the terminal with no voltage still works with T
DTT
a fully compensated differential current.
2) Example 2 (b)
Assume a three-terminal application and one terminal with
a bus-side voltage. Normally, each terminal performs the
compensation by applying the multiplier of 1/3 and asserting
the CCC bit. At the moment the terminal that uses a bus-side 87 Communications channel 87
L+T L+T
voltage detects any pole open, it deasserts its CCC flag and
ceases to compensate its current. The other two terminals Fig. 23. Transformer and line protectionindividual (a) and combined (b)
recognize that from the received CCC flag, switch their measuring zones.
multipliers from 1/3 to 1/2, and the compensation continues,
There is a trend, however, to combine the two measuring
using the two voltages that are representative of the line
zones in a line current differential relay with an in-line
voltage profile.
transformer feature, as shown in Fig. 23b. This approach
3) Example 3 simplifies the application because fewer relays, less wiring,
Continue the second example, and assume that and less labor are required.
subsequently one of the other terminals detects loss of This section elaborates on the relay design to support in-
potential. It deasserts the CCC flag and stops compensating its line transformers.
outgoing current. The only terminal with a healthy voltage
B. Transformer Protection Using the Alpha Plane Differential
now knows that the second peer lost the compensation and
Element
switches its multiplier from 1/2 to 1. In this way, the
compensation is done with the single voltage that is still Being a differential principle, the Alpha Plane technique
available. As such, it will be less accurate but still useful. The can provide short-circuit protection for power transformers.
other two terminals still receive CCC = 1 from the last First, the local currents are compensated for transformer
terminal capable of compensation and know that the line connections to follow the art of transformer differential
differential current is fully compensated. protection. Commonly referred to as ratio (tap) matching,
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 47

zero-sequence removal, and vector group compensation, the For example, the line terminal associated with the delta
differential current equations actually match ampere-turns for winding in this example performs the following operations to
a healthy transformer. For example, for a delta/wye obtain its instantaneous currents for transmission:
transformer, the following equations describe the differential i A = k i A (22a)
signal:
i B = k i B (22b)
1
i DIF(1) = k i A + k Y ( i YA i YB ) (20a) i C = k i C (22c)
3
1 while the terminal associated with the wye winding obtains its
i DIF( 2 ) = k i B + k Y ( i YB i YC ) (20b) terminal currents using the following equations:
3
1
1 iA = k Y ( i YA i YB ) (23a)
i DIF( 3) = k i C + k Y ( i YC i YA ) (20c) 3
3
1
The taps, k and kY, are based on the CT and transformer iB = k Y ( i YB i YC ) (23b)
ratios, and indices 1, 2, and 3 refer to the loops of the 3
differential function. 1
The restraining terms are created as mirror equations to the iC = k Y ( i YC i YA ) (23c)
3
differential terms (20):
After operations (22) and (23), the resulting currents can be
1
i RST (1) = k i A + k Y i YA i YB (21a) processed as if there were no in-line transformer. In particular:
3 The charging current is subtracted after being
1 compensated for transformer connections.
i RST ( 2 ) = k i B + k Y i YB i YC (21b) The phase and sequence restraint terms are calculated.
3
The partial differential and restraint terms are created
1 based on the number of local currents.
i RST ( 3) = k i C + k Y i YC i YA (21c)
3 The partial differential and restraint terms are sent,
For a general case on an N-winding transformer, the received, and aligned.
differential and restraining signals are sums of ratio-matched The total line differential and restraint terms are
and vector-compensated winding currents. The above calculated.
observation leads to a simple relay implementation of At this point, the nature of transformer differential
compensating the individual currents for transformer protection needs to be recognized by addressing the inrush and
connections based on the position of the current with respect overexcitation phenomena.
to the various transformer windings and running the regular Inrush and overexcitation harmonic blocking are naturally
line current differential communications and processing performed by measuring the second and fifth harmonics in the
algorithms based on the transformer-compensated currents differential current and comparing them with user thresholds.
(Fig. 24). Cross-phase blocking or the fourth harmonic can be used,
depending on the design and user preferences [4] [6].
Harmonic restraint is also easy to implement using the
generalized Alpha Plane principle of Section VII. The
harmonics of interest in the differential current (second,
Local terminal currents

fourth, and fifth) are added to the fundamental frequency


restraint terms using appropriate multipliers as per the

Transmit and align

principles of harmonic restraint.


Subsequently, the generalized Alpha Plane calculations are
executed. If the restraint terms are increased sufficiently by
the harmonics in the differential signal, the boosted restraint
shifts the Alpha Plane toward the blocking point and restrains
the differential function during inrush conditions.
In order to provide adequate transformer protection, the
blocking region of the Alpha Plane needs to be set smaller in
applications with in-line transformers as compared with
Fig. 24. Compensating currents for transformer connections in a line current applications for transmission lines.
differential scheme.
48

C. 87LQ and Sensitivity to Transformer Faults


87L-1
The negative-sequence transformer differential function VY
IW IX
(87TQ) has proven to be very sensitive and capable of
detecting turn-to-turn faults [4].
The 87LQ function works naturally with in-line
IW
transformers within the implementation described above. It
87L-3
can be set sensitively because of the external fault detection
IX VY
logic.
The 87LQ function provides good sensitivity to turn-to-
turn transformer faults and high-resistance line faults. As a
IW IX
result, the combined transformer and line protection VY
87L-2
application using the presented approach can be considered
adequate.
D. Application Considerations
A separate transformer relay may still be a better option to
IW
provide other transformer functions, such as overexcitation, 87L-1
thermal, or restricted earth fault protection. For smaller- and VY IX
medium-sized transformers, these functions may not be
required or may be provided in a nonredundant fashion using IW
the second protection system. 87L-3
If the line generates considerable charging current (cables, IX VY
for example), the line capacitance may affect harmonics in the
differential current and cause some problems related to VY IW
87L-2
harmonic blocking or restraining. The charging current
IX
compensation feature remedies the problem, but nonetheless,
care should be taken when considering in-line transformer
applications with considerable line-charging current.
Using dual CT input relays capable of multiterminal
applications may provide protection for combinations of lines,
transformers, or small buses, as illustrated in Fig. 25. For
cases where two relays are located in the same substation, it is
IW IW
not necessary to equip all relays with two communications
87L-1 87L-2
channelsone of two relays in the same substation is
VY IX IX VY
equipped with a communications link toward the remote relay,
and the other relay as well as the remote relay can operate in
the slave mode in order to save one communications channel
between the two stations.

VY IX
87L-3
IW

Fig. 25. Sample applications with in-line transformers.

X. SPEED OF OPERATION
The following delays limit the operating speed of a line
current differential relay:
Internal relay data latencies
Algorithm delay
Channel delay
Relay designers have no control over the last component.
Direct fiber connections add negligible delay to the scheme.
Multiplexed channels can add a delay in the range of a few
milliseconds to tens of milliseconds, depending primarily on
the number of devices passing the data between the relays and,
to a degree, on the length of the fiber path linking the
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 49

multiplexers or modems. Selection of a communications differential protection is feasible in the proposed scheme
channel in terms of the worst-case latency is one of the because the key signals are available as samples. In a
engineering steps needed to fulfill the required fault clearance differential scheme, most of the transients cancel in the
time. operating signal, and therefore it is secure to make trip
Internal relay data latency adds to the trip time as well. decisions based on less than a full cycle of data. CT saturation
This includes collecting and passing samples from the A/D may cause problems, but this issue is addressed by fast and
converter, processing the local data for transmission, reliable EFD logic. If the EFD asserts, the high-speed path is
assembling outgoing packets, accepting incoming packets, inhibited.
aligning the data, processing the global differential As a result of careful design, the relay architecture
calculations, and asserting the outputs. Modern relay minimizes data latencies. The applied protection algorithms
platforms optimize the above processes for speed. The are fast under internal fault conditions because they are
presented solution sends and receives packets every restrained in a way that does not penalize speed. Overall, the
3 milliseconds, allowing for lower relay latencies and faster presented solution provides for subcycle trip times if used
operation. with fast communications channels.
The algorithm time refers to the length of a data window
that must be available before a trip decision can be made. It XI. DATA HANDLING AND SYNCHRONIZATION
should not be mistaken for the length of the filter data
A. Introduction
windowsit is simply a point in time when enough
information is available to make a reliable trip decision. Proper data handling and synchronization are the
In this respect, the 87LQ and 87LG functions are very fast. foundation on which a line current differential relay is built.
Even when using full-cycle filters, these functions assert their This is as important as the protection algorithms and logic. A
outputs in a fraction of a cycle (see Fig. 26, for example). This careful design is required because this part of the relay relates
short response time is because they are not biased by the load to the channel and associated third-party equipment that are
current prior to the fault. Owing to the proper restraining often only under limited control of protection engineers.
techniques, the external fault detection logic, and the charging The following requirements apply to the data handling and
current compensation, these functions can be operated at their synchronization subsystem:
natural speed without introducing much intentional delay for Unified packet structure and near-identical processing
security purposes. for the channel-based synchronization and the external
time reference synchronization methods.
10 IARST
Minimum requirement for extra payload to
IADIF, IARST, A

communicate sequence numbers, time stamps, and


5 IADIF other timing and data-tagging information.
Security under and fast recovery from lost packets and
0
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 channel brownout conditions.
3.5
3 IQRST
Immunity to step changes and variations in channel
IQDIF
delay.
IQDIF, IQRST, A

2.5
2 Ability to work with channels having a total round trip
1.5 delay of 80 milliseconds or less.
1
0.5
Accuracy of data alignment better than about 1.0
0 electrical degree (this yields a spurious differential
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
current of less than 1 percent of the through current).
1 Quick startup, in the order of a few tens to few
kMAG (87LQ)

0.5 Set point:


hundreds of milliseconds, without the need for clock
Radius = 5 synchronization or similar mechanisms.
0
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
In applications with external time reference, ability to
200
measure actual channel delays independently in the
transmit and receive directions.
kANG (87LQ)

150
100 Set point: The presented solution is based on estimating the clock
50 Stability angle = 140 offset and compensating the data time stamps for this offset.
0 The sent current data are time-stamped according to the time
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
87LQ PKP of the relay that took the data. This time is synchronized to an
87LQ
7 ms
external source (typically GPS) if such an external source is
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 available. Otherwise, the relay time is freewheeling, and the
time, s
time difference between any two relays may drift.
Fig. 26. Operation of the 87LQ function for a 100 AG fault. The line current differential system measures the clock
In addition, the 87LP element uses a high-speed element in offset and augments the time stamps to express both the local
parallel with the full-cycle filtered path. The high-speed and the remote data in the same consistent time.
50

Under the channel-based synchronization method, the time Relay 1 Relay 2


offset is truly measured. Because the estimated offset changes
Data
very slowly, heavy averaging of the raw measurements is
applied, allowing the scheme to ride through a temporary
channel loss, corrupted packets, channel switching, and other tDATA
tTX
impairments. t0

Under the external time reference method, the clock offset


is known and equals zero.
When configured to use the channel-based synchronization
t3 tCH tTX in Relay 1 time = t1
method, the system measures the clock offset and uses it even = tDATA in Relay 2 time
tH
if the two relays are synchronized to an external time tDATA
tTX tTX
reference and the calculations return the clock offset of zero. t2
The method does not depend on the availability or precision of tH, tDATA
the external time source, even if the latter is connected and tCH

available, unless an explicit user setting mandates using the


t3
external time reference synchronization method.
When compared to a method that forces synchronization of
the relay sampling clocks, the approach presented in this paper
is both simpler and more robust. By estimating a slowly Fig. 27. Illustration of the channel-based synchronization method.
changing parameter (the clock offset), the scheme applies The packet arrives at Relay 2 after the unknown channel
averaging and benefits from the resulting advantages. By not delay time (few milliseconds to tens of milliseconds). Relay 2
having to synchronize sampling clocks, the scheme can be captures the packet arrival time t1 using its own local clock.
naturally extended on multiterminal applications and allow a This clock is asynchronous from the clock of Relay 1. Time t1
mixed synchronization mode in which some data are is required to measure the message hold time (turnaround
synchronized based on symmetrical channels and some are time) at Relay 2 in order to facilitate the ping-pong algorithm
synchronized externally. The latter approach limits exposure for estimation of the channel delay.
of the scheme to problems with the external time reference. Some time afterwards, Relay 2 has collected three fresh
This section explains the two synchronization methods in samples of its own currents and is ready to send them to
more detail and discusses fallback strategies for the loss of the Relay 1. Again, precisely tTX after the newest sample has been
external time reference. taken, a message is launched by Relay 2 to Relay 1. The
B. Channel-Based Synchronization message goes out at time t2. The hold time tH = t2 t1 is
included in the payload of the message. This time is known in
Refer to Fig. 27. In the presented design, Relay 1 collects
advance because the message is started after a constant delay
three fresh current samples for transmission, forms the packet,
tTX from the newest sample in the packet, and the current
and at time t0, precisely tTX after the newest sample was taken,
samples are located at known points in time. Therefore, the
sends the packet out. The packet is marked with a sequence
hold time can be precalculated at some point after capturing t1
number to identify it at the time of usage. The time t0 is
and be conveniently put in the packet ahead of the
captured by Relay 1 using its own local time. An explicit time
transmission time. Relay 2 returns the message sequence
stamping for the outgoing message can be used, or the t0 time
number, letting Relay 1 know that the hold time returned to
can be derived from the time stamp of the newest sample in
Relay 1 was for the message that originated at t0.
the packet and the tTX design constant.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 51

In its packet, Relay 2 includes a time stamp for the current The clock offset value is used to correct the remote time
samples tDATA (assume the time stamp of the newest sample in stamp into the local time:
the set of three). In a practical implementation, the packet t DATA(@ relay1) = t DATA + t OFFSET (29)
sequence number and this time stamp can be the same
number. C. External Time Reference-Based Synchronization
Relay 1 receives the packet after the channel delay (few Refer to Fig. 28. With both relays synchronized to the same
milliseconds to tens of milliseconds). It captures the time of external time source, their local times are mutually
reception as t3 using its own clock. From the sequence number synchronized. The relays take samples at the same points in
received, Relay 1 knows this is a reply to the message sent out time (relative to the top of a second) and assign the same time
at time t0. stamps to the simultaneously taken data. The data are
At this point, Relay 1 can finish the key calculations related therefore used by the scheme directly based on the time
to channel delay, clock offset, and data alignment. stamps, applying the same equations as in the channel-based
Assuming symmetrical channel delay, the one-way channel synchronization mode, except for the clock offset not
delay is: calculated, but known:
( t3 t0 ) tH t OFFSET 0 (30)
t CH = (24)
2
Note that the difference between t3 and t0 is the time Relay 1 Relay 2
elapsed at the local relay, and the hold time is the time
measured by the remote relay and communicated back Data

explicitly. Therefore, (24) makes sense even though its


components were derived from two asynchronously running tDATA
tTX
clocks. t0
Backdating t3 by the channel delay time, we get the tCH-TX
transmission time at Relay 2 expressed in the local time of t1 t1
Relay 1:
t 2(@ relay1) = t 3 t CH (25) tH

tDATA
Backdating further by the known delay in transmitting a tTX tTX
t2
t2
packet after capturing the data, we obtain the data time stamp
expressed in time of Relay 1:
t DATA(@ relay1) = t 3 t CH t TX (26) tH, tDATA
tCH-RX
The data time stamp expressed in Relay 2 time is included
in the packet. This allows calculating of the time offset (i.e.,
the difference in time between the two relays):
t3
t OFFSET = t DATA(@ relay1) t DATA = ...
(27)
... = t 3 t CH t TX t DATA
Fig. 28. Illustration of the external time reference-based synchronization
Positive values of the offset time mean the local clock method.
(Relay 1) is leading the remote clock; negative offset means
The rest of the scheme works the same way as in the
the remote clock is ahead.
channel-based synchronization mode. In particular, the
Inserting (24) into (27) gives the following key equation:
message transmit and receive times are captured, and the hold
1
( t 0 + t 3 + t H ) t TX t DATA
time is communicated.
t OFFSET = (28)
2 These values have a different usage, however. They allow
Note that the clock offset value is a very stable number the relay to characterize the communications channel as
because it reflects a difference between clocks of the two follows.
relays, regardless of data latency and therefore regardless of The channel delay in the receive direction at Relay 1 is
the channel delay at any given moment. This number may calculated as:
change at a rate of a few parts per million, depending on the t CH RX = t 3 t 2 = t 3 ( t DATA + t TX ) (31)
stability of the oscillators used in the relay hardware.
Therefore, it is both possible and recommended to average the The channel delay in the transmit direction at Relay 1 is
relay clock offset given by (28) over a number of calculated as:
measurements. This allows riding through channel t CH TX = t 3 t 0 t H t CH RX (32)
impairments and increases accuracy by letting the rounding-up The two channel times are made available to the user for
errors and jitter average out. alarming and overall channel monitoring.
52

Also, these channel measurements can be used to control source does not recover after some time, the danger of
the response of the differential system to the loss of the the clocks drifting apart increases, and the scheme
external time reference, as discussed later. needs to take other steps, as explained below.
In applications with only some channels being
D. Sources of External Time Reference
asymmetrical, the line current differential system can
Historically, the common time reference has been provided mark the asymmetrical channels that lost a time
via an IRIG-B connection from a GPS-synchronized reference at either end as unavailable. With enough
substation clock. This dependency on time reference used to remaining connections between the relays, a master-
create some concerns for protection applications in terms of slave operation may be possible, retaining the
relying on extra equipment and exposing the differential functionality of the system at the expense of slightly
system to the failure modes thereof. The failure points delayed tripping at the slave sites.
included the connection between the relay and the clock,
The 87L function can disable itself automatically if
including copper-to-fiber conversion, if any, the clock itself,
any of the required time references are lost.
its cabling and antenna, and finally the broadcast of the GPS
The 87L function can desensitize itself to a degree if
signal itself.
any of the required time references are lost.
Availability of the GPS signal concerned some users,
If the used channel was symmetrical just prior to
particularly outside of North America, while the GPS
losing the external time reference, the line current
infrastructure that was originally designed for military use
differential system may switch to the channel-based
migrated into civilian applications. Presently, GPS
synchronization mode. This mode continues
applications are so widely spread that the long-term viability
indefinitely, assuming the channel stays symmetrical
of GPS is not questioned anymore.
until the time reference recovers. Or this mode can
Still, good protection solutions utilize as little equipment
stay in place until the total (round trip) channel time
and connections as possible in order to maximize availability
changes, signifying the fact that the channel has been
and remove unnecessary failure modes.
switched and may become asymmetrical as a result of
In this respect, it is worth noticing that terrestrial wide-area
the switching.
systems emerged recently that provide for precise timing
independently from the GPS time. One solution uses the Similarly, if the channel displayed a stable limited
internal precise timing of a SONET system to serve common asymmetry prior to losing the time reference, this
time at individual multiplexer nodes. Normally, this common asymmetry can be used to predict the worst-case
time is synchronized to GPS via an array of receivers placed at measurement errors and put in place appropriate
different geographical locations, but if all GPS receivers are protection countermeasures (stability angle setting for
lost or the GPS system itself becomes unavailable, the the Alpha Plane). The channel may switch into
common wide-area time continues to be generated internally channel-based synchronization, applying enough
by the SONET system [1]. protection countermeasures to fight the possible
This enhances the availability of line current differential spurious differential current. This situation may
schemes operating in the external time reference continue indefinitely or until the total channel time
synchronization mode. changes, signifying channel switching and possible
Even with this improvement, we need to consider a failure increase in asymmetry.
mode of losing the time reference because of problems with Similarly to the above option, the worst-case channel
connections for the timing signal (IRIG-B or IEEE 1588 via asymmetry can be tracked and stored in the relay. This
Ethernet). worst-case asymmetry can be used to calculate secure
87L settings, and the system can switch to channel-
E. Fallback Strategies for Loss of External Time Reference based synchronization upon losing the external time
In the external time reference mode, the line current reference. The initial value of the worst-case
differential system loses synchronization if the external time asymmetry is a user estimate, but during the life of the
reference is lost for an asymmetrical channel. installation, channels with common time references at
Misoperation is not an option, and the complete loss of both ends can be characterized by the relays for the
protection is not a preferred solution. Therefore, a fallback worst-case asymmetry.
strategy should be considered in order to provide security and
some protection functionality under such a contingency. XII. CONCLUSIONS
The following options could be considered: This paper outlines general design directions for a next
The 87L function can be left as is for a certain period generation line current differential protection scheme.
of time after losing the common time reference. It will Regarding synchronization and data alignment, the
take some time for the internal relay clocks to drift presented solution is unified for the channel-based and the
apart, and the system will stay synchronized at least external time reference-based synchronization methods. By
for few seconds. During that time, the clock offset not forcing the sampling clocks to sample synchronously, the
remains zero even if one of the relays does not presented solution works naturally and is more robust in
synchronize to the common time. If the external time multiterminal applications.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 53

A terrestrial, GPS-independent time source was introduced, [6] K. Behrendt, N. Fischer, and C. Labuschagne, Considerations for Using
Harmonic Blocking and Harmonic Restraint Techniques on Transformer
making line current differential applications with
Differential Relays, proceedings of the 33rd Annual Western Protective
asymmetrical channels safer and more dependable. Relay Conference, Spokane, WA, October 2006.
A number of fallback strategies were presented to allow the
system to ride through the temporary loss of the timing source. XIV. BIOGRAPHIES
A reliable Alpha Plane restraining technique was proposed
Henry (Hank) Miller has a BSEE and a BEE from The Ohio State University
for multiterminal applications with any number of local and a BA degree in philosophy from The Pontifical College Josephinum. He
current inputs to the relays. The size and structure of the is a registered professional engineer in the state of Ohio and holds a patent for
communications payload are independent from the number of a substation steel design. Hank has over 31 years of utility experience in
station and line protection and control. Hank is currently working as a staff
terminals or the number of local currents in the system, engineer and supervisor in the protection control asset engineering group of
making the implementation simple and thus the solution more American Electric Power (AEP) with responsibilities for developing
robust. protection and control standards and application guides and supporting the
relay setting project work. With John Burger, he shares the responsibility for
The system works with high-fidelity current information, ensuring that devices new to the AEP system are protected and controlled
allowing a fast external fault detection logic as well as properly. Hank is a member of the IEEE.
harmonic measurements for in-line transformer applications.
The combination of the high-performance external fault John Burger has a BSEE from Case Institute of Technology and an MSEE
from Fairleigh Dickinson University. He is a registered professional engineer
detection logic capable of detecting external faults based on as in the states of Ohio and New Jersey. John has over 35 years experience in
little as 3 milliseconds of unsaturated current waveforms and station and line relay protection and control. He has worked for American
the proper restraining techniques makes the relay both very Electric Power (AEP), primarily in the protection and control group, for the
secure and fast. As in the case of modern bus or transformer last 29 years. John is currently serving as a staff engineer and supervisor in
the protection control asset engineering group, with responsibilities for
relays, application of the external fault detection relaxes CT developing protection and control standards and application guides and
requirements considerably and simplifies application by supporting the relay setting project work.
eliminating a cumbersome analysis of suitability of the He shares the responsibility for ensuring that devices new to the AEP system
applied CTs and settings. are protected and controlled properly with Hank Miller. John is a Senior
The presented solution applies the Alpha Plane differential Member of the IEEE, past chairman of the Columbus Chapter of the PES, a
member of the IEEE Power System Relay Main Committee, Substation and
trip equations, carrying forward all tried-and-true advantages Communications Subcommittees and chairman of Working Group H6. He is
of this approach, but enhances the original concept to also currently serving as Chairman of the UCA International Users Group,
multiterminal applications and allows for harmonic restraining providing technical support for IEC 61850.
of the Alpha Plane to facilitate in-line transformer protection.
Normann Fischer received a Higher Diploma in Technology, with honors,
Line-charging current compensation was incorporated, from Witwatersrand Technikon, Johannesburg in 1988, a BSEE, with honors,
enhancing security during line energization and improving from the University of Cape Town in 1993, and an MSEE from the University
sensitivity to internal faults. A novel concept of dynamic of Idaho in 2005. He joined Eskom as a protection technician in 1984 and was
a senior design engineer in Eskoms protection design department for three
selection of voltage sources for the compensation was years. He then joined IST Energy as a senior design engineer in 1996. In
introduced, minimizing dependence of the scheme on VTs. 1999, he joined Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. as a power
Communications packets and data handling internal to the engineer in the research and development division. Normann was a registered
professional engineer in South Africa and a member of the South Africa
relays were designed for low latencies. Combined with high- Institute of Electrical Engineers. He is currently a member of IEEE and
speed performance of the applied protection equations, this ASEE.
enables subcycle trip times in applications with fast
communications channels. Bogdan Kasztenny is a principal systems engineer in the research and
development division of Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. He has 20
years of experience in protection and control, including his ten-year academic
XIII. REFERENCES career at Wroclaw University of Technology, Poland, Southern Illinois
[1] K. Fodero, C. Huntley, and D. Whitehead, Wide-Area Time University, and Texas A&M University. He also has ten years of industrial
Synchronization for Protection, proceedings of the 36th Annual experience with General Electric, where he developed, promoted, and
Western Protective Relay Conference, Spokane, WA, October 2009. supported many protection and control products.
[2] J. Roberts, D. Tziouvaras, G. Benmouyal, and H. Altuve, The Effect of Bogdan is an IEEE Fellow, Senior Fulbright Fellow, Canadian member of
Multiprinciple Line Protection on Dependability and Security, CIGRE Study Committee B5, and an Adjunct Professor at the University of
proceedings of the 55th Annual Georgia Tech Protective Relaying Western Ontario. He has authored about 200 technical papers and holds 16
Conference, Atlanta, GA, May 2001. patents. He is active in the Power System Relaying Committee of the IEEE
[3] A. Guzmn, C. Labuschagne, and B.-L. Qin, Reliable Busbar and and is a registered professional engineer in the province of Ontario.
Breaker Failure Protection With Advanced Zone Selection,
proceedings of the 31st Annual Western Protective Relay Conference,
Spokane, WA, October 2004.
[4] A. Guzmn, N. Fischer, and C. Labuschagne, Improvements in
Transformer Protection and Control, proceedings of the 62nd Annual
Conference for Protective Relay Engineers, College Station, TX, March
2009.
[5] G. Benmouyal, The Trajectories of Line Current Differential Faults in
the Alpha Plane, proceedings of the 32nd Annual Western Protective
Relay Conference, Spokane, WA, October 2005.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 55

Smarter Time Sync: Applying the IEEE PC37.238 Standard to


Power System Applications
Christoph Brunner Galina S. Antonova
it4power ABB Inc.
christoph.brunner@it4power.com galina.s.antonova@ca.abb.com

Keywords: IEEE 1588, precise time synchronization, There are basically two solutions for this problem. The first is
IEC 61850, process bus, synchrophasors. the approach of a constant acquisition delay. In that case, the
delay from the acquisition of the sampled value (the moment,
Abstract where the value is sampled at its source) until the reception in
the data sink (e.g. the protection equipment) needs to be
Synchronization plays an important role for many functions constant and known with a jitter below the required accuracy.
of the electric power systems. The PC37.238 draft standard The receiving unit can then put the values in a time relation to
specifies precise time distribution for power system each other based on the reception time and the known delay.
applications. As the standard is nearing completion, its usage
for specific applications needs to be better understood. This The second approach is to use synchronized or time related
paper explains how this new time distribution applies to the sampling. All units performing sampling are globally
most demanding applications, namely synchrophasors and synchronized with the required accuracy. The samples are
IEC 61850 process bus. either taken all at the same time or the samples are tagged
with a timestamp indicating their sampling time. Only this
1 Introduction approach can deal with variable communication delays that
are inevitable when using a network topology for the
Synchronization requirements for power system applications communication. IEC 61850 has therefore chosen this second
differ significantly. Some applications require relative approach. According to the concepts of IEC 61850, the
synchronization (synchronization of merging units), others samples are all taken at the same time and each sample is
need traceability to universal time coordinated (UTC) either identified by a number that provides the time reference. The
locally or over a wide area (event recorders, synchrophasors). approach is illustrated in Figure 1.
Synchronization of sampled analogue values and
measurements used for protection is critical and demands
high security and dependability.
n-1 n
1.1 Timing requirements for IEC 61850 process bus
IEC 61850 introduced the concept known as process bus to n-4 n-3 n-2 n-3 n-2
n-2 n-1 n
substation automation systems. Although not necessarily a n-4

separate communication bus, the concept introduces the n-4 n-3

possibility of connecting process equipment, such as


n-1 n
switchgear and sensors, directly via a digital interface to the
rest of the system. Subscriber
Publisher

Such approach offers many benefits to the user, for example


simplified engineering and commissioning and a reduction of
copper wiring within a substation. As an overall benefit, life Figure 1. The approach to transmit sampled values
cycle costs are expected to be reduced. The approach however
presents some challenges, which have so far prevented a wide The challenge here is to synchronize the devices performing
scale implementation of this process bus. the sampling with an accuracy in the range of 1 microsecond.
IEC 61850-9-2 that defines the mapping for the transmission
An important aspect while using sampled values of a power of the sampled values may use an external signal to
system is the phase relationship between the different synchronize the devices. In today's prototype
measured signals, in particular between current and voltage. implementations [7], a one pulse per second (1 PPS) signal is
For some applications the accuracy in the time domain needs used to synchronize the devices. This requires in addition to
to be in the range of 1 microsecond. That means, when the communication network a physically separate
samples are acquired by different devices, the relation synchronization network. Such an additional synchronization
between the time bases must be with an inaccuracy of less network is of course a source of failure. However, not all
than 1 microsecond. functions depend on these high synchronization requirements.
Mission critical functions do not need information from many
56

different acquisition points. With elaborated system Synchrophasor measurements are normally relative to UTC
architectures the dependency of the critical functions on the time, and their precision greatly depends on time
synchronization network can be removed. The drawback of synchronization accuracy. Note that these measurements can
such approach is that this limits the benefits from a process be collected over small or very large geographical area, and
bus implementation. measurements from remote devices need to be correlated for
system analysis and protection decisions. Time sources and
1.2 Timing requirements for synchrophasors time distribution must be reliable, available and accessible by
PMU devices in the whole system.
Phasors have been commonly used for representations of
periodic signals in computations and power system analysis. Accuracy limits for the synchrophasor measurements, as
The use of synchrophasors was first specified in defined in [6] shall not exceed 1% Total Vector Error (TVE).
IEEE 1344-1995 Standard for Synchrophasors for Power This translates to a maximum time error of
Systems, which after a revision became IEEE C37.118-2005. 26 microseconds for 60 Hz system and
This standard is currently being revised and harmonized with 31 microseconds for 50 Hz system. To provide
IEC 61850. synchrophasor measurements with specified measurement
accuracy, much tighter requirements are placed on system
Synchrophasor, as defined in [6], is the estimate of magnitude time synchronization. It has been generally agreed that
and instantaneous phase angle of a signal relative to the
1 microsecond time accuracy of UTC is desired at device
cosine function at nominal system frequency synchronized to inputs to achieve the specified measurement accuracy of
UTC time. UTC second rollovers coincide with rising edges 1% TVE.
of 1 PPS signal. These are used for estimations of 0 degrees
and -90 degrees synchrophasors. Synchrophasor definition is
Both IEC 61850 process bus and IEEE C37.118
illustrated on Figure 2.
synchrophasors require reliable and available time
synchronization with down to 1 microsecond time
v(t) = 2 V cos (0 t + ) accuracy. Both currently use separate synchronization
networks and 1 PPS signals.
v
Start of the second This paper describes how time synchronization requirements
for IEC 61850 process bus and IEEE C37.118
2V synchrophasors, outlined in this section, can be met using the
PC37.238 draft standard. A basic description of the new time
t distribution mechanism is provided in Section 2. Section 3
V 0 describes the use of PC37.238 draft standard for
synchrophasor and IEC 61850 process bus applications,
v
including known challenges and issues.
Start of the second

2 IEEE 1588 and Power Profile


2V
IEEE Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization
t
Protocol for Networked Measurement and Control System
was initially released in 2002 and revised in 2008 [1]. The
standard describes a protocol for distributing time with sub-
microsecond time accuracy over various communication
Figure 2. Synchrophasor definition technologies, such as Ethernet, UDP/IP, DeviceNet, etc. The
key advantages of this standard are that timing can be
Phasor measurement units (PMUs) estimate synchrophasor distributed over the same network as application data, and
values and transmit them in a defined data frame serially or time accuracies generally not achievable by other time
over an Ethernet network. If desired, this data can be merged distribution protocols become possible.
with data from other PMUs using Phasor Data
Concentrator(s) (PDCs). 2.1 IEEE 1588 Profiles

Synchrophasors provide real-time information on power The second version of the IEEE 1588 Standard specifies
system currents and voltages, and can be used for various many new features of the Precision Time Protocol (PTP),
applications, including local or wide area monitoring, mandatory and optional, including conceptually new devices
synchrocheck and protection functions. A major statement on (transparent clocks), new message formats, etc. Development
the usefulness of synchrophasors is the 2003 blackout of this version was driven by five main industries: test and
synchrophasor data collected over Eastern US area that measurement, telecom, industrial automation, power and
clearly indicated faulty conditions, which, if timely analyzed, military. As a result, it was impossible to specify a single set
could have prevented this major outage. of interoperable functions, as requirements for these
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 57

industries differ significantly. To address this challenge a Group to develop IEEE 1588 power profile. The PSRC
concept of IEEE 1588 profile was introduced, as a clearly H7/Sub C7 Working Group functions in close co-ordination
defined subset of protocol features, the use of which will meet with IEC TC57 WG10 and other committees with similar
specific industry requirements. Two default profiles are interests. The group develops PC37.238 Draft Standard for
defined in the Annex J of the second version of the IEEE Use of IEEE Std. 1588 in Power System Applications [5].
1588 Standard [4]. Industries are expected to define their own The PC37.238/D5.5 is completed and released for IEEE
profiles to address specific requirements of their applications. Sponsor ballot, which will close on November 21, 2010.
Comment resolution and recirculation ballot will follow prior
IEEE 1588 profile development work was launched for to the final approval. During standards development profile
different industries. Among the most developed profiles are interoperability tests, called plug-fests, were conducted [3].
the LAN eXtensions for Instrumentation (LXI) profile for test The profile as well has been evaluated for the IEEE 1588
and measurements [12], the profile for time-sensitive Testbed project [9].
application in bridged local area networks, specified in
P802.1AS/D7.2 [15], and the power profile, specified in PSRC WG H7/Sub C7 plans to write a summary paper on the
PC37.238/D5.5 [5]. Other profiles are being developed for PC37.238 standard that will describe in detail the selected
telecom and Internet communities under ITU-T and IETF IEEE 1588 features and their justification. The paragraphs
respectfully [8, 16]. Four paragraphs below provide more below provide a summary of the supported features plus why
information about IEEE 1588 profiles, and clause 2.2 and how the PC37.238 draft standard can be used for power
describes IEEE 1588 power profile in more detail. system applications, namely synchrophasors and IEC 61850
process bus.
The LXI profile was developed to address the needs of test
and measurement community (these applications may require Main Function
nanosecond and sub-nanosecond levels of time accuracy). It PC37.238 specifies how to distribute time from a device that
is interesting to note that this profile uses IEEE 1588 is synchronized to universal time (e.g. to UTC via GPS) to
management messages for configuration, status and control. devices that require time to support their application functions
The LXI consortium also developed comprehensive (e.g. IEDs with line differential protection, phasor
documented test procedures, a big effort that should be measurement units, merging units, digital event recorders).
acknowledged.
Devices
IEEE 1588 profile for time-sensitive applications in bridged A device that is synchronized to the universal time is called a
Local Area Networks is being developed by the Audio/Video grandmaster clock. Devices that can only receive time from
Bridging Task force of the IEEE 802.1, the main standards grandmaster clock are called slaves or slave-only clocks.
body of the IEEE 802.3/Ethernet standards. The initial Network devices that interconnect grandmaster and slave
applications included time synchronization for home theatre clocks are called transparent clocks, these are usually
and audio / video entertainment systems. The latest version of Ethernet switches.
this profile is specified in the P802.1AS / D7.2 Draft
Standard, which passed the initial IEEE ballot and is Performance requirements
undergoing comment resolution before the final approval. The Normative performance requirements are specified in
profile defines a Simple Network Management Protocol PC37.238 Annex B. As depicted in Figure 3 time at a slave
(SNMP) Management Information Database (MIB) for device connected to grandmaster clock over 16 network hops
configuration, status and control. shall be within +/-1 microsecond from grandmaster time, with
an out-of-range probability of 10-4. Note that all devices,
IEEE 1588 profile for telecom industry is being developed including intermediate nodes have to support PC37.238.
under ITU-T Study Group 15. An approach with separate
frequency profile and phase profile has been chosen, where
GPS
the frequency profile is being defined first. Results of these
800 ns
developments, including use cases, performance metrics
200 ns
analysis, etc can be found in ITU-T G.8261 [8].
Hop 1 Hop 2 Hop 3 ... Hop 15 Hop 16
Time
The Internet community has also launched IEEE 1588 profile Switch Switch Switch IED
Source
development in TICTOC group, where various PTP protocol 50 ns
mappings, including mapping into Multiprotocol Label
Switching (MPLS) have been discussed [16] 1 s time accuracy with 10 4 probability of failure

2.2 IEEE 1588 Power Profile


Figure 3. PC37.238 performance requirements
The IEEE Power System Relaying Committee (PSRC) and
Substation Committee (SUB), both operating under the IEEE
Power and Energy Society (PES) formed a joined Working
58

Operation Switch with Transparent clock


Time is distributed using Sync messages that contain the time Switch Fabric
Grandmaster clock Slave clock
at the grandmaster at the instant a given Sync message was Store and Forward
Queues
issued. A best grandmaster selection is performed using PTP PTP
Announce messages. Path delay measurements are preformed MAC MAC MAC MAC
using PDelay messages. MII
Cable delay Residence time Cable delay
MII

PHY PHY PHY PHY


Mapping
All PC37.238 messages are mapped directly into Timestamp Pont

Layer 2 / Ethernet frames and are transmitted over Ethernet Figure 4. Compensation for variable delay sources
cables (fibre or copper). Multicast Destination MAC address
and IEEE 802.1Q VLAN tags are used for per-VLAN traffic Variable delay introduced by communication protocol stack
separation, if desired. (1) is avoided by timestamping Sync messages just before
they are transmitted into physical media. Timestamp point is
Best grandmaster selection and redundancy between Media Access Control (MAC) block and Physical
For redundancy there should be two or three devices capable interface, typically called PHY at the Media Independent
of being grandmasters. These devices are called grandmaster- Interface (MII), in case of 100Mb/s Ethernet. Some PC37.238
capable clocks. On start-up, failure or planned maintenance devices can support on-the-fly timestamping, i.e. inserting
outage, an automatic selection of the best master is performed the precise actual grandmaster time while Sync message is
that results in one device being a systems grandmaster. being transmitted over MII interface. Other devices may
Selection of the grandmaster is based on device support two-step operation mode with a Follow_up message
qualifications, including achievable clock accuracy. transmitted right after Sync message. Follow_up message
contains the precise grandmaster time when its associated
Grandmaster identification Sync messages was transmitted over grandmasters MII
A feature unique to PC37.238 is the addition of an extension interface.
to communicate grandmaster identification. This information
helps to minimize the effects of transient states, when Two other variable delay sources are dealt with using peer-to-
distribute time is not traceable, on synchronization and peer transparent clock functionality. These devices are
operation. It communicates to applications if data they require typically Ethernet switches that measure cable delay and
used the time from the same grandmaster. residence time then provide these in a special field, called
CorrectionField, to the end devices, so that they can add these
Local Time delays to the received grandmaster time before adjusting their
Local time extension is also provided, as some applications clocks.
may require this, e.g. for reporting (not operation) functions.
Cable delay (2) is measured using peer-to-peer delay
Management measurement mechanism. It uses PDelay message exchange
A PC37.238 SNMP MIB is defined for device configuration to measure the delay on each point-to-point link. Point-to-
and status information. MIB support is mandatory only for point delay measurements enable faster convergence times
grandmaster-capable devices. upon grandmaster changes, as cable delays are measured for
all links, including those blocked by Spanning Tree Protocols,
Smart features regardless of whether the link is currently on time distribution
Time accuracy in sub-microsecond range can be achieved path or not. Cable delay correction is very important as each
because of the following smart features offered by 100m copper link introduces approximately 500ns delay,
IEEE 1588 and supported by PC37.238 draft standard: which is half of the full time accuracy budget of
1 microsecond.
(1) Correction for variable delays in the protocol stack
(2) Correction for cable delay Transparent clocks, which are Ethernet switches supporting
(3) Correction for residence time in intermediate devices PC37.238, also measure residence time, the time that Sync
message carrying grandmaster time actually spends inside the
All three above remove sources of non-deterministic latency, switch. This time is variable and depends on traffic loads that
making more precise time synchronization possible. Figure 4 lead to varying store-and-forward queuing delays.
illustrates these features. Transparent clock and residence time concepts are shown in
Figure 4.

The above features make the IEEE 1588 power profile


specified in PC37.238 draft standard different from other
IEEE 1588 profiles. Comparison between PC37.238 and the
P802.1AS, a profile for time-sensitive application for bridged
local area networks is given in [10].
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 59

3 The use of PC37.238 for power applications connected to the IEC 61850 communication or in the case of
intelligent switchgear, the electronics may be directly
The PC37.238 draft standard was developed with included in the switchgear. IEC 61850 GOOSE messages can
requirements of power applications in mind. Time be used to transmit a trip signal from the protection relay to
synchronization can now be performed using the same the circuit breaker.
communication network that provides data exchange for the
applications. This eliminates the need for a physically With IEC 61850 sampled value transmission, it is possible to
separate synchronization network. This new time distribution replace the analog signals from CTs (current transformers)
mechanism also delivers the time quality and traceability to and VTs (voltage transformers) with serial communication.
universal time information required by core applications. This Instrument transformers based on new technologies like
information is made available via management parameters, optical sensors can directly be equipped with a
and can be mapped directly into parameters, specific to a communication interface according to IEC 61850. However,
given application. The mapping of these parameters is also conventional instrument transformers may be connected
specified in PC37.238/D5.5 Annex C [5]. Finally, local time to a communication network using a merging unit as a
and grandmaster identification are provided. The later was communication interface. A merging unit can transmit the
added specifically to minimize the effect of transient states sampled values of the three voltages and the three currents in
when distributed time is not traceable to absolute time on one communication message. The concept of a merging unit
synchronization and operation, as well as to support system is shown in Figure 6.
separation into operation islands. Two sections below
describe the use of PC37.238 draft standard for IEC 61850
process bus and IEEE C37.118 applications.
Line
Protection
3.1 IEC 61850 process bus
IEC 61850-9-2

The standard IEC 61850 "Communication networks and Logical Device


Merging Unit
systems in substations" has been published by IEC between
2003 and 2005. The purpose of IEC 61850 is, to provide all LNPCTR
LN PCTR
LN TVTR
the necessary specifications required to achieve LNPCTR
PCTR
LN
LN TCTR
interoperability between the equipment of an integrated
substation automation system.

Figure 5 shows an example of a substation automation system


(SAS) with a process bus connection. With a traditional
approach, copper wires connect the process equipment with
Figure 6. Concept of a merging unit
the bay level devices. These copper wires are used, e.g. to
connect the trip output from the protection equipment with
Note that despite of the term process bus, it does not
the trip coil of the circuit breaker, the position indications of
necessarily imply a separate communication network. It is
the different switches with the bay controllers or the analogue
perfectly possible to combine the communication between
signals from the current and voltage transformers with the
station level and bay level devices (typically called station
protection relay.
bus) with the process bus communication as this is shown in
the example of Figure 7.
Control Center HMI, Station
controller

Router Control Center HMI Engineering

Station bus
Router
Bay Relay Relay Bay Relay Relay
Controller X1 X2 Controller X1 X2

Process bus

Intelligent Intelligent
CT/VT CT/VT
Switchgear Switchgear
Bay Relay RelayRelay Bay Relay Relay
Relay
Controller X1 X2 Y Controller X1 X2 Y

Figure 5. SAS architecture with a process bus connection


Switchgear with CT/VT Switchgear with CT/VT
Switchgear with CT/VT Switchgear with CT/VT
Breaker IED Breaker IED
IEC 61850 supports the possibility, that these connections can IED withwith
IED IED IED with
with IED
IED
be realised using a communication network. Switchgear may
be connected with distributed remote I/O units that are Figure 7. Possible architecture with process bus connection
60

A communication-based process connection provides Different topologies for process bus are evaluated in [11].
besides the reduction of copper wires some additional Two examples of a topology are shown in Figure 8 and
advantages. The wiring between the IEDs interfacing the Figure 9. The topology of the communication network
process (merging units, remote I/Os) and the process may be follows typically the topology of the substation. That means
done and tested during manufacturing. In other words, instead that devices that belong to one bay typically are grouped
of handling many wired connections during engineering, together.
commissioning and testing, only a few communication
connections could be tested at a factory.

Further, with the serial communication defined in IEC 61850 BP


a stream of digitized samples replaces the analogue signal.
The representation of the values is independent from any
specific properties of the instrument transformer. The values
are transmitted with the data type integer or real. In the case
of the real representation, the actual process value from the P P P P P P
power system without any scaling or rating is transmitted. In
C C C
the case of the integer representation, the value is scaled; the
scaling parameters are included in the data model so that any MU MU MU MU MU MU
Bay 1 Bay 2 Bay 3
receiver can calculate the actual process value. As a
consequence, the bay level equipment does not need to handle
issues like the rated values and the ratio of the transformers. Figure 8. Topology with a non-redundant star network

Challenges for implementing an IEC 61850 process bus are In Figure 8, a topology without redundant network on station
covered in [2]. These include the real time behaviour, bus level is shown. In order to have the main 1 and main 2
reliability, transient behaviour of a merging unit and time protection functions independent, there is a main 1 system
synchronization. The time synchronization issue is described shown in blue consisting of a merging unit (MU), a protection
in [2] as follows. relay (P) and a switch, and an independent main 2 system
shown in red with its own protection relay, merging unit and
- Time Synchronization: One of the challenging topics is switch. The bay controller (C) is connected to one of the two
the accurate synchronization of the data sources switches. The station level connection is non-redundant star
providing the sampled values. The communication network.
network used to transmit the sampled values does not
support a constant or predictable transmission delay. Figure 9 is a topology that includes a redundant
Therefore, the mechanism chosen assumes a communication network for the station bus. While the
synchronized sampling at the source. All devices sample protection system with main 1 and main 2, consisting of the
at the same time and add a reference to the sampling merging unit and the relay, is redundant as such, the bay
time. With the help of that reference, the application controller is now connected to two independent ring
using the sampled data can correlate the samples received networks.
from multiple sources. Depending on the application and
the requirements concerning acceptable phase errors, the
BP
required synchronization accuracy may be as accurate as
1 microsecond.

Once the profile for time synchronization is completed, most


of these challenges will be resolved. What remains is the
verification of the transient behaviour of a merging unit. This
is discussed within IEC TC38 WG37, which is developing the P C P P C P P C P
IEC 61869-9.
MU Bay 1 MU MU Bay 2 MU MU Bay 3 MU
When using a process bus connection supported with time
synchronization over the network, more flexibility with
regard to the allocation of functions into devices and the Figure 9. Topology with a redundant ring network
network topology will be available that fulfil the different
requirements of the application. Requirements of smaller An important aspect to be considered in a substation
substations with a single protection system will be different to automation system is as well the degradation of the system in
the requirements of a larger substation with a main 1 and case of failures. Not all of the functions are mission critical
main 2 protection systems. some however must always be available as well in a degraded
system. This aspect needs to be considered when introducing
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 61

time synchronization. Figure 10 is an example that illustrates value. During transient states while distributed time is not
the different requirements for time synchronization. traceable to the absolute time, the knowledge of which
grandmaster a merging unit is synchronized to can help to
Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4
minimize the effect of such change on synchronization and
zone1 zone1 zone1 zone1
operation. For example, decisions that are based on sampled
MU1b MU2b MU3b MU4b
zone3 values coming from different merging units, if these are
C1 P1 C2 P2 C3 P3 C4 P4 synchronized to different grandmasters not traceable to
absolute time, could be avoided or delayed until
synchronization to the same grandmaster or a traceable time
MU1a MU2a MU3a MU4a is re-established.
zone2
Busbar
PC37.238 draft standard provides mechanisms for mapping
PB its local time accuracy and traceability to the global time
source into IEC 61850 parameters, such as timestamps for all
Figure 10. Synchronization requirements IED data, SmpSync attribute for global / local time synch, etc.
This is described in PC37.238 / D5.5 Annex C [5].
- The line protection function P1 needs information from
MU1a. The only synchronization requirement that exists 3.2 IEEE C37.238 Synchrophasors
here is internal to the IED MU1a the samples from the
three currents and three voltages need to be synchronized Synchrophasor measurements provide instantaneous
to each other. magnitude and angle information relative to UTC for power
- The control function C1 needs information from MU1a system currents and voltages. Measurements for zero
and MU1b to perform the synchrocheck functionality and sequence, positive and negative sequence values can be
the two merging units need to be synchronized. This is supported, if desired. Synchrophasor data is assembled by
indicated as synchronization Zone 1. PMU devices into a defined frame format, and transmitted to
- For the example, it is assumed that Feeder 3 and Feeder 4 control centre possible via PDC(s) for further forwarding,
are connected to two power lines that run in parallel. In archiving or control actions.
that case, the protection IEDs P3 and P4 implement an
additional function called parallel line compensation. An overview of a phasor measurement system is shown in
That function needs information from both merging units Figure 11. It shows multiple PMUs and PDCs, and a control
MU3a and MU4a. These merging units need to be centre that receives synchrophasor data and uses it for real
synchronized which is indicated as Zone 2. time monitoring, control and archiving.
- The differential busbar protection function PB needs
information from all four merging units MU1b to MU4b.
GPS Satellite Time Synchronization
These merging units need to be synchronized which is
indicated as Zone 3. Power System

These specific requirements were addressed by the developers PMU PMU


of the PC37.238 draft standard. The proposed mechanism
provides time distribution with time accuracy in the range of Streaming synchrophasor
data on the network to the
+/- 1 microsecond. The same communication network PDC for archiving . . .
(Ethernet) now can be used for data exchange and time PMU
PMU PMU
synchronization. Redundancy of time source and the ability to
form operational islands upon grandmaster change, fault or ETHERNET
maintenance have also been considered.
APPLICATIONS
. . . data display
One of the interesting subjects to be verified is transient PDC/Server PDC/Server and real time
behaviour of the Merging units, in particular with respect to control actions

sample synchronization. This topic requires more analysis,


and recommendations. As the transient behaviour of merging Figure 11. Overview of phasor measurement system
units is in the scope of IEC TC37 WG37 group, it would be
beneficial to discuss it in that community. Possible ideas Since time synchronization to absolute time, UTC, plays such
evolve around frequency synchronization by slewing, re- an important role, it is discussed in more detail below.
establishing a common time for sample number 0, etc.
Time synchronization via Global Positioning System (GPS)
PC37.238 draft standard also specifies a mechanism to as depicted, is a very common mechanism. There has been
distribute grandmaster identification along with the time much discussion on the reliability of GPS satellites and the
quality information. If grandmaster time is locked to UTC need to improve it [13].
with a given accuracy, grandmaster identification adds little
62

Another time distribution mechanism typically used in power For the PC37.238 time distribution, timestamp as well is the
substations is IRIG-B and 1 PPS signals. These require time of an event (the measurement for the PMU case), but the
separate wiring for synchronization purposes only, which event is the message transmission. Thus, timestamp of the
could be avoided if time is distributed on the same network PC37.238 Sync message is the time when this message was
with synchrophasor data. sent by the grandmaster, i.e. grandmaster time at that
moment. In PC37.238 world timestamps contain the actual
Figure 12 shows a typical PMU with embedded GPS receiver, absolute time, which is conceptually different, but similar to
like those depicted in Figure 13. This device has an Ethernet the test and measurement approach, if one considers
link for transmitting synchrophasor data (but not for time transmission of a synchronization message as an
synchronization). A serial interface may also be used, but its event/measurement point.
use is deprecated, and considered a legacy. The device can
also have an IRIG-B input for synchronizing to an external Further clarifications should be given to other function
source. potentially expected from the PC37.238 draft standard, such
as how frequently (multiple times in a given power cycle) and
when synchrophasor measurements shall be taken, etc. The
GPS Antenna PC37.238 draft standard does not provide any specification
for these; neither do IRIG-B and GPS. The scope of these
protocols is limited to time distribution function.
Binary I/O
Alarms to SCADA One more remark should be made in respect to PC37.238
Local Control functionality and 1 PPS signal. This signal may be provided
for testing purposes, but vendors are not required to support
Ethernet Link
Analog Inputs it. It is possible, however, to generate such signal internally
2 3 Voltage based on precise time provided by the PC37.238 protocol
4 3 Currents
IRIG-B
using the UTC second rollover. Vendors adding PC37.238
Data Concentrator Input support to their PMU devices should be aware of this.
Remote access Time Sync

Once a common understanding on functionality is reached per


Figure 12. Typical standalone PMU device the initial comments above, technical details on the usage of
PC37.238 for the PMUs are discussed below.
Lets now consider time distribution over Ethernet link, as
specified in the PC37.238 draft standard, to explain what PC37.238 specifies a time distribution mechanism over
value it will bring for the PMU devices. Ethernet links that can deliver time with 1 microsecond
time accuracy to the inputs of end devices. This means that
There has been a lot of confusion in the synchrophasor the same Ethernet network can be used for synchrophasor
community regarding the PC37.238 functionality. A common data and time distribution. As the result, IRIG-B wiring /
understanding is essential for the acceptance and adoption of interfaces become unnecessary, as shown in Figure 13.
the new time distribution mechanism. The authors would like
to clarify the PC37.238 functionality and attempt to explain it
in terms familiar to the PMU experts to bridge any GPS Antenna
interpretation gaps there might be.

First, it should be explained that the PC37.238 draft standard Binary I/O
only specifies time distribution mechanism. It is similar to Alarms to SCADA
IRIG-B, which provides time codes, GPS and Network Time Local Control

Protocol (NTP) in this respect. Ethernet Link


Analog Inputs
Data Concentrator 2 3 Voltage
IRIG-B time codes are functionally similar to the PC37.238 4 3 Currents
Remote access
timestamps. The term timestamp should be explained IRIG-B
Time Sync Input
separately as it seems to cause a lot of confusion.
Time Sync

In test and measurement world, and for PMU devices, the


timestamp contains time of the actual measurement that is Figure 13. Replacement of IRIG-B interface
taken at PMUs analogue input. This is well understood, as
well as the fact that this time has nothing in common with the As well, the need for a GPS receiver in each PMU unit can be
time of the data transmission for this measurement (except eliminated, thus reducing the cost, implementation and
that data transmission is delayed from time of the commissioning efforts, as illustrated in Figure 14.
measurement by the measurement latency).
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 63

It should be noted that for achieving a time accuracy in the power applications, e.g. synchrophasors and IEC 61850
range of 1 microsecond, all devices in the network process bus. Reaching such understanding will raise industry
infrastructure that interconnect time source(s) and PMUs have awareness on the applicability of the profile; it will speed up
to support the PC37.238 draft standard. This means that and widen its acceptance and adoption.
Ethernet switches must be peer-to-peer transparent clocks that
measure their residence time and cable delay. For a direct
connection to a time source over short distances cable delay References
measurements and corrections are optional, this simplifies
implementations of slave-only devices, but also limits their [1] Ch. Brunner The impact of IEC 61850 on protection,
usability. IET DPSP Glasgow, April 2008.
[2] Ch. Brunner "Will IEEE 1588 Finally Leverage the
IEC 61850 Process Bus, IET DPSP, Manchester,
GPS Satellite Time Synchronization
March 30, 2010.
Power System [3] G. Antonova First IEEE PSRC WG H7 C7 Plug-fest,
PAC World Magazine, March 2010,
GM http://www.pacw.org/fileadmin/doc/MarchIssue2010/in
PMU PMU
dustry_reports_march_2010.pdf.
Streaming synchrophasor
data on the network to the [4] IEEE Std. 1588-2008 IEEE Standard for Precision
IEEE 1588 Time
PDC for archiving . . . Clock Synchronization Protocol for Networked
PMU
Synchronization
PMU Measurement and Control Systems, August 24, 2008.
PMU
[5] PC37.238/D5.5 Draft Standard for Use of IEEE 1588
ETHERNET Precision Time Protocol in Power System Applications,
APPLICATIONS
September 15, 2010.
. . . data display [6] IEEE Std. C37.118 2005 IEEE Standard for
PDC/Server PDC/Server and real time
control actions Synchrophasors for Power Systems.
[7] Implementation guideline for digital interface to
instrument transformers using IEC 61850-9-2, UCA
Figure 14. Replacement of GPS modules international users group (www.ucainternational.org).
[8] ITU-T G.8621 Timing and synchronization aspects in
For the timing parameters required for encapsulation into packet networks
IEEE C37.118 data frames, the PC37.238 mechanism provide http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-G/recommendation.asp?lang=e
all of these. The PC37.238/D5.5 Annex C describes the n&parent=T-REC-G.8261
mapping between PC37.238 local clock accuracy and IEEE [9] J. Amelot, et al An IEEE 1588 Time Synchronization
C37.118 time quality nibble [5]. Most importantly PMUs Testbed for Assessing Power Distribution Requirements,
need to know if the time received is in fact traceable to UTC. ISPCS 2010 New Hampshire, September 2010.
This information is provided in PC37.238 TimeTraceable [10] J.C. Tournier, K. Weber Differences and Similarities
flag. Note that physical connection (Ethernet) may still be between the Audio Video Bridges and Power System
functional, but grandmaster (time source) may not be Profiles for IEEE 1588, ISPCS 2010, New Hampshire,
traceable to UTC anymore. In this case no valid September 2010.
synchrophasor measurements can be performed. Bit 13 in [11] J.C. Tournier, T. Werner A Quantitative Evaluation of
synchrophasor STAT word indicates whether PMU time is IEC 61850 Process Bus Architectures.
locked to UTC (as opposed to just having valid timing input [12] LXI IEEE 1588 Profile, Draft 2, April 26, 2008.
or not). [13] K. Fodero, etc Secure, Wide-Area Time
Synchronization, WPRC 2009, Spokane, October 2009.
Although traceability to UTC time is the most important for [14] M. Goraj, R. Moore First Practical Experience with
PMU applications, the knowledge of grandmaster IEEE 1588 High Precision Time Synchronization In
identification, provided by the PC37.238 mechanism can be High Voltage Substation with IEC 61850 Process Bus,
useful during transient states as well. PAC World Conference, Dublin, June 2010.
[15] P802.1AS/D7.2 Draft Standard for Local and
The local time information provided by the PC37.238 Metropolitan area Networks Timing and
protocol can be useful for applications requiring local time, Synchronization for Time-Sensitive Applications in
including day-light savings adjustments. Bridged Local Area Networks, August 18, 2010.
[16] TICTOC Transporting PTP messages (1588) over
4 Conclusion MPLS networks, September 22, 2010
http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-davari-tictoc-
IEEE 1588 Power profile is specified in the PC37.238 draft 1588overmpls-00.txt
standard as a mechanism for precise time distribution. While
approval of this standard is under way an effort should be
made to understand better how it can be applied to specific
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 65

An Experimental Analysis of High-Speed-Distance


Protection
Cezary Dzienis Matthias Kereit Jrg Blumschein Michael Claus
E D EA D E D EA D E D EA D E D EA PRO
Siemens AG Siemens AG Siemens AG Siemens AG
Berlin, Germany Berlin, Germany Berlin, Germany Nrnberg, Germany
cezary.dzienis@siemens.com matthias.kereit@siemens.com joerg.blumschein@siemens.com michael.claus@siemens.com

AbstractIn this paper the High-Speed-Distance Protection called High-Speed-Distance (HSD). The procedure is based on
algorithm will be discussed. The principle of this novel function is delta-quantities which reflect the electrical state change in the
based on the so called dynamic delta-quantities resulting from network due to the short circuit event [5]. The paper will
splitting the electrical circuit after a short circuit event by means discuss the theoretical background of the method. Detailed
of the superposition technique. Due to fact that the estimation of discussion of the sensitivity of the function will be carried out
the fault localization takes place in a time domain, the algorithm as well. The method was successfully implemented in a
presents a good alternative to the conventional distance prototype device, and the response of the algorithm to different
protection, where response speed of the relay plays an important fault types will be presented. The test version of the algorithm
role (high voltage network). The test results of the High-Speed-
was successfully tested on a complex hardware network model.
Distance will be discussed and application areas of this function
Thus, the acquired results of the algorithm responses are
presented.
representative and comparable with a practical application.
Keywords: Protection System, High-Speed-Distance, Loop
Selector, Directional Element, Distance Element, Testing the II. BACKGROUND OF THE METHOD
Distance Protection
A. Theoretical Consideration
I. INTRODUCTION As already mentioned, the electrical fault at the line is a
The electrical short circuit is one of the most dangerous dangerous event that results from rapid, undesirable change in
phenomena in power systems. It results in system instability the physical network structure with a significant impact on the
and, in the worst case, outage. Therefore, it is imperative that energy transmission in entire system. Because of that, such
short circuits be selectively eliminated from the system phenomenon should be recognized as quickly as possible and
operation. This task is taken over by the protection devices [1]- then the faulty network area eliminated from system operation.
[2]. Especially in high voltage networks, stability must be To do so the conventional distance protection has been
ensured by fast protection systems, which allow for detection designed, the task of which is to measure the impedance of the
and clearance of the faults in as short a time as possible. Since fault contained in the electrical loop and to compare it with the
the high voltage networks often distribute energy over impedance settings that define the operation range of the
hundreds of kilometers, the most popular fault detection protection. In order to calculate impedance the following
instrument for this voltage level is the so called distance simplified expression, based on Figure 1, can be applied:
protection. Amongst others, its significant advantage is that it f cos [u A ] + j f sin [u A ] ,
can be installed at any network node and can work aZ L =
f cos [i A ] + j f sin [i A ] (1)
autonomously to protect or be responsible for a specific
network line. The communication with other devices is not where aZL is the fault impedance fcos, and fsin are the cos and
necessary here. The principle of the common distance sin filters respectively. The response time of the (1) depends on
protection is to measure short circuit impedance in the the filter length. Therefore, time performance of this method is
electrical loop containing the fault and, based on this limited mostly by the applied filter length. Normally the
information, the protection device should decide if the short calculation technique to determine the short circuit impedance
circuit is localized in so called protected zones applied with the can require more samples than those contained in the half cycle
settings [1]-[3]. The impedance measurement process has a interval of the fundamental period of the system. Depending on
negative influence on the tripping time and thereby on the the short circuit location and conditions before short circuit
system operation [4]. In this article a further method for the occurred, the number of samples required is sometimes more
short circuit distance estimation will be presented. The than those in one or two fundamental cycles [4]. Therefore,
estimation of the fault location takes place by analyzing the another method with better performance can be applied.
samples. As a result of the estimative nature with regard to the Namely, by analyzing the situation before and after the fault
fault location contained in the described method, it can attain event, the exact fault localization can be carried out without
significantly faster operation compared with conventional needing to determine the short circuit impedance. This method
distance protection. Therefore, this computation technique is is based on so called delta-quantities. The principle of the
66

method can be considered based on the simplified single phase


system given in Figure 1. In this case the fault is represented as
the closing of the switch K. The protected line exists between
points A and B with line impedance of ZL. The system is
supplied by two sources ES,A and ES,B with certain short circuit
power characterized by the source impedances ZS,A and ZS,B.
The fault is placed in such a way that the calculated impedance
from measurement point A equals aZL and from point B equals Figure 3. Schematical representation of the electrical circuit in the form of
(1-a)ZL. Since the distance protection is an autonomous device the delta-quantities
that does not need communication with another end, the
consideration can be performed from just one point, e.g. A The curves of the calculated currents and voltages for given
only. From the superposition principle applied to linear circuits are presented in Figure 4. The pre-fault quantities
networks, the electrical system from Figure 1 after closing up,A(t), ip,A(t) are still constant in reference to magnitude and
switch K, can be split into two networks as given in Figure 2 phase. However delta-quantities reflect the voltage and current
and Figure 3. This is possible if the closing of switch K is changes in comparison to the previous network state. Therefore
modeled as a series connection of two equivalent voltage strong changes can be observed. Additionally, an angle of
sources uK with opposite sign and if the magnitude equals the about 90 (short circuit impedance angle) between these
voltage at the location of the short circuit before the short quantities appears. This is due to the fact that the short circuit
circuit occurred [5]-[6]. loop has a strong inductive component. As can be seen from
the equivalent circuit in Figure 2, the localization of the fault
can not be carried out. The gathered quantities from this circuit
do not generate a new contribution to the network operation.
They still carry information according to the load conditions.
On the other hand, the delta-quantities resulting from the
equivalent circuit in Figure 3 deliver completely new
information resulting from the short circuit impact. They can
be used for detection of the fault position in the network [6]-
Figure 1. Schematical representation of electrical circuit structure change [7].
after fault on the line

The network in Figure 2 reflects system operation as if short


circuit didnt happen. It defines the so called pre-fault
conditions. The equivalent voltage uK doesnt influence the
voltages and currents in this network because this equivalent
voltage equals the potential at the location of the short circuit.
Figure 3 represents the system operation accompanying the
short circuit event. In this case the equivalent voltage source uK
has significant influence on the voltages and currents in the
considered system (fault condition). Since other active
elements are short circuited and applied in the previous
network system (Figure 2) only this source produces the
currents and voltages. Appling the superposition method to
these two circuits the following equation can be arranged [7]:
u A (t ) = u p , A (t ) + u f , A (t ) Figure 4. Electrical quantites during fault event: a) voltage and current
, before and after short circuit; b) voltage and current without short circuit; c)
i A (t ) = i p , A (t ) + i f , A (t ) (2) delta-voltage and delta-current.

where uA(t), iA(t) are measured voltage and current at point A. The calculation of the pre-fault currents ip,A(t), pre-fault
The up,A(t) and ip,A(t) are quantities which reflect pre-fault voltages up,A(t), delta-voltages uf,A(t) and delta-currents
conditions. The uf,A(t) , if,A(t) delta-quantities represent fault if,A(t) can be carried out if the network structure and its
conditions with decoupling of the load flow. parameters are known. In a normal case, only the measured
values after and before short circuit are available. Therefore the
relevant delta-quantities can be approximated based on fault
and pre-fault values of iA(t) and uA(t) as expressed in (3):
u f , A (t ) u A (t ) u A (t T ) ,
i f , A (t ) i A (t ) i A (t T ) (3)

where T is the fundamental period. The uA(t-T) and iA(t-T) are


Figure 2. Schematical representation of an electrical circuit in the form of close to pre-fault quantities up,A(t) and ip,A(t). It is assumed here
the pre-fault quantities that behavior of the network, before short circuit happened, is
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 67

not disturbed. Otherwise this approximation is afflicted with [ ] [ ]


f cos u A, f + j f sin u A, f ,
Z =
relatively significant errors. To avoid the error for frequency [ ] [ ]
f cos i A, f + j f sin i A, f (4)
deviation a more complicated approximation technique for
creating delta-quantities must be realized. where Z is the impedance acquired from delta-quantities. Z
equals to ZS,A (negative impedance) if the fault is in a forward
B. High-Speed-Distance Function direction or ZS,B+ZL (positive impedance) if the fault is
Three particular modules create the High-Speed-Distance localized in a reverse direction. Since the calculation of the
protection function. These are: loop selector, directional impedance Z doesnt bring any advantages in comparison to
element and distance element. In addition, the other functions the method of the conventional distance protection (the
must be implemented that have the task to stabilize the function response speed depends still on the filter length), only
due to disturbances or diverse non-conformed network states. impedance sign must be predicted. The prediction is based on
The cases where the stabilization rules are needed and also the assumption of the so called replica impedance ZR [8]-[9]
justified will be presented in section III. that should be close to the back source impedance ZS,A.
Equation (5) shows the acquiring process of the delta-voltages
Based on the delta-quantities the faulty loop can be selected. in a schematic way:
Particularly, such selection takes place by analyzing the delta-
currents and delta-voltages. Investigations of the delta-phase- u f = u f , A
,
to-phase quantities for both current and voltage are very useful u R = Z R D i f , A (5)
for this task as well. For example, based on the delta-phase-to-
phase currents it can be very easily differentiated between where ZR is assumed replica impedance. A denotes the
single and multiple pole faults, and the phases in which the measurement point in the system (station A). The expression is
fault occurred can be detected. The following statement results valid for single phase representation of the system given in
from such consideration: for a single-phase fault the delta- Figure 1. The calculation should take place in the time domain
current for healthy phases is close to zero; if the double phase in which the ZR is replaced by the differential operator in form
fault appears then the delta-phase-to-phase current in unhealthy of (LRd/dt + RR). The acquired quantities create the trajectories,
phases is much larger than other phase-to-phase delta-currents; which for forward fault are placed in quadrants II and IV of the
in case of the three phase fault all phase-to-phase delta currents uR, uf plane. Also, the trajectory circulates in a positive
are equal to each other. Since the loop selector must decide in a clockwise direction. For reverse fault, the trajectory is localized
short time which loop is defective, the confirmation of the in quadrants I and III. It rotates in a negative clockwise
faulty loop must be carried out. This can be realized by means direction. The usage of the replica impedance ZR allows for
of the delta-voltages, graphically shown in Figure 5. transformation of the delta-current if in such way that
occurred trajectories from both delta-voltages uR, uf are very
well defined. If only delta-voltage uf with delta-current if are
taken into consideration, the computed trajectory is placed in
all quadrants and the fault direction can be detected based on
recognizing the rotation sense and position trajectory in the
initial condition (fault begin). Since the fault quantities include
the distortion or, e.g., DC components this is definitely not a
secure instrument [7].

Figure 5. Loop selection based on the delta-voltage

For example, if a single pole fault appears the voltage breaks


down in the defective phase and the ratio between the delta-
voltage in the defective phase to the delta-phase-to-phase Figure 6. Trajectories and curves of the directional element based on delta-
voltage in the healthy phases is high. In the case of a quanities
recognized two-pole short circuit the ratio between the
unhealthy phase-to-phase and the non-defective phase is The possible trajectories for these two fault directions are
investigated. If this ratio is high the phase-to-phase loop is presented in Figure 6. Generally they have approximately an
confirmed. For three-phase faults the ratios between phase-to- elliptical shape that results from differences between assumed
phase voltages are equal to each other. Such a two step loop replica impedance ZR and real appeared impedance calculated
selector creates a very robust element. Analyzing delta- in the form of delta-impedance Z. If the angle of the assumed
quantities, it can be concluded that the calculated impedance replica impedance ZR is close to the angle of delta impedance
according to (1) allows for detection of the direction of the Z the ellipse form aspires to be a straight line. If additional
fault: magnitudes of both impedances are the same, a straight line
68

with the slope of 45 appears. Since in the range of small delta- capacitive then the curve develops in the defective opposite
quantities, high uncertainty appears, (e.g. mostly measurement direction. This results from the fact that, the assumed model for
error) the so called dead-zone must be introduced. It delta-voltage calculation is not matched with the physical
contributes certain limitation to the method that can be condition in the network. Since the source impedance is
annulled if the delta-voltages are simply filtered by an integral inductive and the line impedance, also by series compensated
function in the following way [8]-[10]: line, is inductive as well, the direction calculation can be

interpreted as a stable method. In the normal case (three phase
F ( ) = u f (t ) uR (t ) dt . (6)
system) delta-voltages are calculated for the defective
0 phase/phases. As a result, a directional element is activated for
the faulty loop only. The six loops are not calculated in
If the function F() is negative (for =1) then forward fault parallel. Which loop is activated, depends on the signal from
will be concluded. For the reverse fault a positive integral the loop selector, shortly described above. For the phase-to-
function F() (for =2) should appear. The uncertainty of the phase defective loops the delta-voltages uf and uR are created
method is then reflected by the non directional area as from phase-to-phase voltages and currents respectively. For the
presented in Figure 6. Depending on the availability of the fault phase-earth loops, the delta-voltages uf and uR are built from
quantities after short circuit, the given threshold for reverse or phase-to-earth voltages and phase currents respectively. Since
forward fault recognition can vary. The replica impedance ZR the loop in the phase-earth mesh is inductive, the earth current
is the main factor that has impact on the sensitivity of this with appropriate influence of the replica zero-sequence
direction estimation method. Thereby two components play impedance Z0 is not taken into account because it
central role: there is magnitude and angle of the replica insignificantly influences the directional element algorithm
impedance ZR. The magnitude can contribute so called under- (see general consideration in Figure 7 and Figure 8). Besides
function only, e.g. if the chosen magnitude for replica this replica zero-sequence impedance Z0 is unknown and
impedance is too low. However, significant deviation of the similar to the common line replica impedance ZR must be
angle from the real delta-impedance Z can introduce over- assumed. It can be an additional error source. The mutual
function. The influence is presented in Figure 7 and Figure 8. coupling also has low influence on the directional element,
because during this effect the loop character is still inductive
Integral [-]
and consideration from Figure 7 and 8 can be applied.
0
Source replica impedance angle 86
The calculation of the fault localization is based on the
-0.2
comparable analysis of the equivalent voltage uK at the location
-0.4

-0.6
of the short circuit. Since this location is unknown, the
-0.8
reference voltage uref must be calculated. This voltage results
-1 from the theoretical voltage at the end of the protected zone as
0 0
4 20
10 if the fault would appear exactly at end of the protected zone.
8 30
12 50
40 Hereby, the protected zone is characterized by high-speed-
60
Sample number [-] 16
80
70
Source impedance angle [] distance impedance (HSD) ZHSD, particularly lower then the
20 90
line impedance ZL. Applying Kirchhoffs laws for equivalent
Figure 7. Sensitivity of the direction method for a different replica circuit resulting from the superposition principle (Figure 2), the
impedance angle reference voltage uref can be expressed as follows (7):
u ref = u p , A Z HSD D i p , A , (7)
Integral [-]
2
where ZHSD is the differential operator in form of (LHSDd/dt +
Source replica impedance angle 86
1.5 RHSD). Usage of this differential operator allows for calculation
1 of the reference voltage uref in the time domain. The index A
0.5
0
denotes the measurement point in the network (in this case the
-0.5
-30
station A). It must be noted here that all computations must be
-1
0 -24 preformed in the time domain. In the normal case, formula 7
4 -18
8
-12
must be fitted into an appropriate defective electrical loop that
Sample number [-] 12 Source impedance angle []
16 -6 is annunciated by the phase selector. Hereby the differences in
20 0
equation between single-pole short circuit to earth and multiple
Figure 8. Sensitivity of the direction method for a different replica pole phase faults appear. Expression 7 presents the
impedance angle simplification that is valid for the single-phase system if,
additionally, the earth line impedance is equal to zero. For
It was assumed here that the replica impedance ZR has a double-phase and three-phase faults the phase-to-phase loop is
constant angle of 86. Also, the forward fault was simulated in selected and calculation takes place on phase-to-phase
a network with a different angle of reverse source impedance. quantities for voltage and current respectively. When the
The angle of this impedance varied between 90 (inductive) phase-earth loop is selected, the appropriate phase-to-earth
and -30 (capacitive). It can be noted that even if angle voltage with suitable phase current and earth current is
deviation is big, the integral curve has correct tendency. Only involved in the calculations. In such case the expressions from
the oscillated form can be observed. If the source impedance is 7 and 8 must be completed with the zero-sequence
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 69

compensation factor that reflects non-homogeneity between by the source impedance in reverse direction ZS,A and radius as
phase and earth impedances. Since the selector chooses one the sum of the source impedance ZS,A and HSD-impedance
loop only, only one loop is calculated by the distance element. ZHSD. Since the fault impedance Zf is placed in quadrant I of
The equivalent voltage at the end of the high-speed-distance the complex plane, only the characteristic in quadrant I is
zone can be also calculated from delta-quantities (see section applicable. Depending on the source impedance ZS,A, the
II) like (8): distance characteristic can vary in R direction (real axis). The
reach in direction of the line impedance ZL is always constant.
u HSD = u f , A + Z HSD D i f , A . (8) Therefore, the best performance of the HSD-algorithm is
obtained if a metal short circuit without transition resistance
In order to detect where the fault is localized, comparison appears.
between these two voltages, uref and uHSD, must be carried out.
Thereby, the following conclusions can be made:
- if uHSD > uref then the equivalent source uK must be
situated in the zone ZHSD, (internal fault)
- if uHSD < uref then the equivalent source uK must be
situated outside zone ZHSD (external, forward or
reverse fault)
- if uHSD = uref then the equivalent source uK is situated
exactly at the zone ZHSD (fault at zone limit)
In order to achieve good stability of the distance element with
good time performance the calculation of the voltages uHSD and
uref is realized by means to of the average rectified values.
These values are obtained in the moved constant window with
the length of the half of fundamental period. Since the building Figure 9. Distance characteristic for the forward fault (HSD-method)
of the average rectified value for the voltage ukHSD is not
always possible, the missing samples of the voltage ukHSD are Similar considerations can be carried out for the reverse faults.
replaced by samples of the uref. This happens only for the short The mathematical equation for description of the voltage in
time after fault. Additionally, the dynamic pick-up form of UK and UHSD quantities is given in (11):
characteristic for distance element is applied, that introduces U K = U f , A I f , A Z f
stabilization in case of disturbances which can be amplified by .
the derivation element in expression 7 and 8. = I f , A ( Z f + Z L + Z S , B )
The sensitivity investigation of the distance prediction method U HSD = U f , A + I f , A Z HSD (11)
based on delta-quantities can be performed using the complex = I f , A ( Z L + Z S , B Z HSD )
static values. At first the situation of the fault in forward
direction will be considered. From a measurement point of If we compare the magnitudes of both voltages UK and UHSD
view the complex equivalent voltage source can be computed with each other and assume that the line impedance ZL is
as given in (9). For this task the equivalent circuit from Figure approximately equal to HSD-impedance ZHSD the following
3 should be applied: expression is can be written:
U K = U f , A + I f , A Z f = I f , A ( Z S , A + Z f ) U ref U K U HSD
, .
U HSD = U f , A + I f , A Z HSD = I f , A ( Z S , A + Z HSD ) (9) 2 (12)
( RS , B + R L + R f ) + ( X S , B + X L + X f ) Z S , B
2 2

where Zf is the short circuit impedance. Since this short circuit


Also in this case the circle characteristic is obtained. The radius
impedance is unknown, the theoretical equivalent voltage UHSD
of the circle equals the magnitude of the source impedance ZS,B
can be computed like in (8), but on complex values. As can be
and the circle is shifted as a sum of the line and source
easy noted, if the fault impedance is lower then HSD
impedance. From this characteristic it can be observed that the
impedance (fault in the zone), the voltage UHSD is higher than
fault impedance Zf cannot reach the inside of the circle (fault in
voltage UK. On the other hand, voltage UK is approximately
HSD zone), so that no over-function for reverse fault should
equal to the Uref computed from the equivalent circuit in Figure
appear. It can be expected that that HSD algorithm behaves
2. Additionally, usage of voltages UK and UHSD allows for
very stable for these fault types. The next conclusion is that the
computation of the HSD-characteristic (10):
distance element includes the properties of the directional
U ref U K U HSD element. As a result of that the more stable directionality of the
, HSD-function is guaranteed. Since the HSD protection method
2 (10)
( R S , A + R f ) 2 + ( X S , A + X f ) 2 ( Z S , A + Z HSD ) is based on the time domain calculation, its distance estimation
algorithm can exhibit some uncertainties in reference to the
where RS,A and XS,A are parameters of the source impedance. Rf static characteristics from Figure 9 and Figure 10. It can
and Xf are resistance and reactance measured at the short especially occur, if the comparison is carried out with a low
circuit location. A circle results from this equation, see Figure number of samples. The potential problems are discussed in
9 for which the following interpretation can be applied: the next section.
HSD-pick up characteristic is a circle with the center created
70

Figure 10. Distance characteristic for the reverse fault (HSD-method)

Figure 12. Results of performance test


III. TEST SYSTEM AND TEST RESULTS
According to the considerations from section II, for the In Figure 12 the trip times of the HSD-algorithm, for different
loop selector, directional element, distance element and other fault types and fault localizations on the line, were presented. It
supported methods, the discrete simulation models in can be observed that the tripping times, measured with an
Matlab/Simulink were developed. Based on simulation results electronic device relay, are between 5ms and 20ms. These
acquired from the real time hardware model, the expanded tripping times reflects the real response time of the algorithm
models were appropriately optimized so that the desired with measurement uncertainty of about 1ms. For the initiated
balance between performance and stability of the entire HSD- faults under 30% of the line length, the HSD-algorithm needs
function was achieved. These models were implemented into a significantly lower than half of the fundamental period to trip.
digital protection device and suitably fitted at its structure. The The faults from 50% up to 100% of the line length can be
function was tested according to its behavior for different tripped also in fast time, namely under single fundamental
network states (mostly faults) and according to its integration period. Deviation of the tripping times for the same fault types
level in a digital device. The test results are described in this results particularly from the fault initiation angle. The best
section. The model on which the tests were performed is a performance of the algorithm can be achieved if this angle
scaled physical network of 500kV high voltage system. Scaling equals the line angle. Besides if disturbances appear, the
of the parameters took place with the commonly used tripping time is much higher. Analyzing the tripping times it
secondary values. The advantage of such a scaled network can be noted that the HSD-function offers definitely better
against the RTDS network model, is that many of the different performance according to tripping time than a conventional
electro-magnetic effects can be included. In order to guarantee distance element based on impedance calculation. Hereby it
the real time simulation for the big network structure, an RTDS must be said that HSD is designed to trip clear interpretable
system uses strongly simplified models. Thereby some possible faults on the line. Therefore, this function should operate in
interesting phenomena (mostly with non-linear background) for cooperation with conventional distance elements that allow for
protection tests can not be taken into account. tripping of the faults with high complexity. The usage of the
HSD-function can be definitely confirmed if it responds only
when forward fault appears on the protected line. Therefore the
algorithm was tested according to potential over-functions.
Hereby, the following faults outside the protected zone were
initiated on the model: reverse faults, faults on the limit of the
HSD zone, faults on a parallel line, faults during week in-feed,
external faults during frequency deviations as well as external
)

faults with significant disturbance content. In order to show the


XL
54

(66
kM

kM
(6

92
4X

intensity of the tests according to the over-function two cases


L)

were graphically presented. In Figure 13 the forward fault


outside the zone with significant disturbance content was
plotted. For the fast distance function (HSD) based on time
domain calculation, the appeared disturbances during short
Figure 11. Test system for protection systems
circuit event can be especially dangerous, because the signal
processing is limited to a very short pre-processing filter,
Tested devices were placed at the line D12, and the following
mostly anti-aliasing filter only. Since for the distance
tests were performed:
estimation procedure a derivative operator is applied, the
performance test disturbances can be amplified and therefore an overreach of the
over-function test distance function can appear. This eventually effect can be
evolving faults test recognized in Figure 13. The voltage curve uHSD acquired from
power swing test delta-quantities exhibits strong deviation from the fundamental
special practice relevant tests component of 50Hz sinus wave. For some samples this curve
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 71

exceeds the reference voltage uref. Hereby it can be suggested faults can happen, the HSD-function was programmed in such
that the fault is inside the HSD-zone and a defective trip can way that its operation during these fault types is possible as
happen. Based on this example it can be concluded that well. The performance of the method according to the tripping
prevention of the overreach effect during the disturbances is a time is also very good. This is shown in Figure 15. The
big challenge for the HSD-function. transferring of the reverse to forward fault was simulated. In
most cases the tripping time took place in less than half of the
fundamental period. The only time the HSD-algorithm didnt
trip after 20ms was for the evolving fault BCN. This is due to
the occurred condition according to the earth current.
Moreover, the other fault transferring possibilities were tested
like: internal to internal and internal to external fault with
different delay times. The HSD-function operates very stable
and no over-function is detected.

Figure 13. External Fault at >100% line length with significant disturbances
content

Figure 15. Results of the evolving fault tests

The interesting case of the fault transferring from external to


internal during the same phase is presented in Figure 16. At
first the reverse fault was initiated and after 20ms the forward
fault was started. After reverse fault, the directional element
recognized reverse fault and the distance element was not
activated. Nevertheless the distance element exhibits also
Figure 14. Reverse fault with significant disurbance content
correct directionality. The uHSD curve is lower than reference
In Figure 14 disturbance problems for the reverse fault are voltage uref. After forward fault with a delay of 20ms the
shown. This is a more complex situation than the overreach voltage curve uHSD exceeds the reference voltage uref and a
effect in the case of the forward fault. Because of significant single pole trip happens. From this consideration it can be
disturbances defective direction of the short circuit can be concluded that the HSD-function can be used for clearance of
detected. Since for reverse fault close to the measurement point evolving faults as well. Excellent performance according to the
the voltage breaks completely down (significant delta voltage tripping time and stability of the HSD-function enlarges its
quantities) and additionally the short circuit current is strongly application area to these fault types. This is very important
disturbed, the directionality of the distance element can not be because generally the tripping time of the conventional
guaranteed any more. Then the mis-operation of the HSD- distance protection is a little bit higher for the evolving faults
function can happen. Such potential effect of the disturbances than for the simple faults. The power swing phenomenon is
impact is presented in Figure 14. The reference voltage uref is relative frequently occurring state in the power system.
exceeded repeatedly by the voltage uHSD. In order to stabilize Detailed tests were performed for this phenomenon as well.
the response of the algorithm in case of the disturbances, a Three important reactions must be expected from HSD to make
special method was developed that detects the distortions in a it applicable as distance protection: no over-function during a
short time and either blocks the HSD-function completely or pure power swing, no over-function during an external fault
introduces an appropriate stabilization threshold. This depends that is combined with a power swing and, a reproducible trip
on the force of the disturbances. The method is based on the for an internal fault during a power swing. After numerous
investigation of the function monotony in an available tests it could be observed that HSD-function didnt exhibit
calculation window. The disturbance detection method over-function also during extremely high power swing
combined with the main HSD function creates a very stable frequency, over 10Hz. The appropriate reaction of HSD during
high speed distance protection. Therefore, usage of the HSD is power swing for internal fault is presented in Figure 17. Before
also confirmed in a network with significant disturbance short circuit happened the significant delta-quantities for
content. Since in the high voltage networks, so called evolving voltage and current already appear, which result from power
swing phenomenon. This has naturally a negative influence on
72

HSD-function operation, because this method is based on over-function of the HSD-method. Therefore switching
delta-quantities. However, during the strong short circuit more operation in the network can be dangerous for time based
affected delta-quantities are created that contribute to detection distance protection. Many such diverse dynamic and static
of the fault direction and its localization. This is shown in network states were simulated and no over-function of HSD-
Figure 17. After fault the voltage uHSD is higher than uref. algorithm was detected. Therefore, this function can be
Therefore, it is correctly concluded as an internal fault. In order confirmed as stable. Disturbed operation of the measurement
to avoid the mis-operation of HSD-function during power system, in addition to an undesired network state, can influence
swing some stabilization rules were designed for this network negatively the HSD-algorithm and contribute to mis-operation.
state as well. It should be noted here that effects can appear that These disturbances regarding measurement problem include
are similar to those of faults during disturbances. Since lower CT saturation, CT broken or fuse failure. Extensive tests were
frequency components appear during a power swing, the carried out in the range of these phenomena and proper HSD-
stabilization algorithm has a more static form. Moreover the reactions were recognized.
relevant states of different networks were simulated and the
reaction of the HSD-algorithm was investigated. These IV. SUMMARY
network states include switching on fault, external and internal
fault clearance, frequency deviation, weak in-feed, etc. In this paper the High-Speed-Distance protection function was
discussed in detail. The theoretical background of the method,
its sensitivity investigation as well as test results were
presented. As can be concluded, this time based distance
function is characterized by very good time performance and
robustness. Also, the application range of the method is huge.
It spreads from the simple faults through evolving faults to
more complex faults during, e.g., power swing. Nevertheless,
the HSD-algorithm should operate in combination with
conventional distance protection because its under-function
reaction can not be excluded. The HSD-algorithm exhibits
under-function reaction particularly when very complex faults
appear or if there is a strong deviation from the conformed
network operation before the fault occurred. Therefore, HSD
Figure 16. Evolving fault during the same phase AN reverse to AN forward can not completely replace conventional distance protection,
but it can operate as secure support for conventional distance
protection.
REFERENCES
[1] H. Ungrad, W. Winkler and A. Wiszniewski, Protection techniques in
electrical energy systems, Marcel Dekker, INC New York 1995.
[2] A. G. Phadke and S. H. Horowitz, Power System Relaying, Wiley
Inc., 1995.
[3] G. Ziegler, Numerical distance protection: principles and applications,
Publicis Corporate Publishing, 3rd edition 2008.
[4] H.-J. Herrmann, Digitale Schutztechnik: Grundlagen, Software,
Ausfhrungsbeispiele, VDE-Verlag GMBH, Berlin, Offenbach 1997.
[5] M. Vitins, A fundamental concept for high speed relaying, , IEEE
Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol. 100, No. 1. pp. 163-
173, January 1981.
Figure 17. Internal fault during power swing [6] M. Chamia and S. Liberman, Ultra high speed realy for EHV/UHV
transmission lines development, design and application, , IEEE
Each of these mentioned effects can have a negative influence Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol. 97, No. 6. pp. 2104-
on HSD-function. Therefore during implementation numerous 2112, Nov/Dec 1978.
stabilization and plausibility rules for detection of non [7] F. Engler, O.E Lanz, M. Hanggli and G. Bacchini, Transient signals
and their processing in an ultra high-speed-directional relay for
conformed network operation were designed and successfully EHV/UHV transmission line protection, IEEE Transactions on Power
tested. The importance of such tests can be considered based Apparatus and Systems, vol. 104, No. 6. pp. 1463-1473, June 1985.
on the analysis of external fault clearance process. After [8] G. Benmouyal and S. Chano, Characterization of the phase and
external fault the HSD-algorithm is picked up. Because the amplitude comparators in UHS directional relays, IEEE Transactions
fault is not in the protected zone no reaction is expected. on Power Systems, vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 646-653, May 1997.
Through the external fault clearance in a short amount of time, [9] G. Benmouyal, Amplitude-independent comparators for UHS
from HSD point of view, conditions similar to those of a directional relays, Developments in Power System Protection,
Conference Pubplication IEE, no. 434, pp. 78-82, 25-27th March 1997.
normal fault occur. The voltage will be recovered and current
will drop rapidly down, so that big delta-quantities for these [10] K. S. Prakash, O.P Malik and G.S Hope, Amplitude comparator based
algortihm for directional comparison protection of transmission lines,
values appear. Additionally during fault clearance, relative big IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 2032-2041,
disturbances can be recognized, which can contribute to an October 1989.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 73

Medicin de la Impedancia de Lnea y Tierra para una Estimacin Correcta del


Factor de Tierra (K0) en Lneas de Transmisin y Mejora de la Confiabilidad de la
Proteccin de Distancia

Miguel Gutirrez, OMICRON Electronics, USA


Michael Krugger, OMICRON Electronics Gmbh, Austria

RESUMEN

Dentro de los factores de


incertidumbre que afectan la relevadores de proteccin. Cuando
localizacin de la falla y por ocurre una falla en la lnea, ya sea
consiguiente la confiabilidad de la entre fases o a tierra, tiene que ser
operacin de la proteccin de despejada en forma selectiva, rpida
distancia se encuentra el factor de y precisa. La selectividad significa que
tierra. Aunque hay varios programas slo ser desconectada la lnea donde
de clculo bastante sofisticados para ocurra realmente la falla.
la estimacin de los parmetros de
lnea, la gran incertidumbre que Existen dos mtodos bsicos para
introduce principalmente la conseguir selectividad en las lneas de
impedancia de tierra conllevan en transmisin la proteccin diferencial
algunos casos a imprecisas de lnea y la de distancia. El primero
estimaciones del factor K0. Una mala es el mejor, pero requiere de un
estimacin de K0 puede conducir a la gasto mayor, ya que los relevadores
proteccin de distancia a problemas en ambos extremos deben poder
de sobrealcance o subalcance. comunicarse uno con otro. Debido a
estos costos en muchas lneas se
En este trabajo se analiza plenamente usan los relevadores de proteccin de
un nuevo mtodo para medir las distancia.
impedancias de lnea y tierra que
determina K0 por medio de inyeccin Uno de los ms importantes ajustes
de corrientes bajas a una frecuencia de un relevador de proteccin de
fuera de la nominal. Los valores de distancia es la Impedancia de
impedancia de lnea y tierra son Secuencia Positiva, la cual es la mitad
interpolados de las mediciones de la impedancia compleja de los
realizadas en la lnea a frecuencia no circuitos de fase a fase (Figura 1).
nominales. Esto garantiza que el
ruido del sistema no va a afectar la
estimacin de los parmetros.

I NTRODUCCI N
Para proteger lneas areas o cables
de potencia son necesarios los
74

Figura 1. Circuito de Impedancia extremos (Figura 3) continua


entre dos fases recibiendo energa de una lnea si los
relevadores 3 y 4 disparan.
Cuando una falla ocurre los
relevadores de distancia en ambos
extremos miden la impedancia. Si la
impedancia es (tpicamente) menor al
80% 90% de la impedancia total de
la lnea entonces abrirn la lnea lo Figura 3. Relevadores con alcance
ms pronto posible (Zona 1), porque ptimo de zona 1
es seguro que la falla es interna. Pero
si la impedancia es mayor los Si los alcances de impedancia o los
relevadores actuarn con un retardo factores K de un relevador no son
(Zona 2), para dar la oportunidad a hechos correctamente, ocurrirn
otro relevador que se encuentre ms subalcances o sobrealcances de zona
cerca de la falla para despejarla Figura 4.
antes.

En fallas de una ms fases a tierra,


la impedancia del circuito de falla es
diferente (Figura 2). Porque la
impedancia de la red de tierra o ms
bien del circuito a tierra, es diferente,
un factor de ajuste en los relevadores Figura 4. Relevadores con
da la relacin entre la impedancia de sobrealcance de zona 1
la lnea y la de tierra. Este factor es
llamado Factor de compensacin a En el ejemplo anterior tres
tierra o simplemente factor K, como relevadores ven la falla en zona 1 y
ya se ha mencionado antes. disparan, una segunda lnea est
muerta. El cliente es dejado sin
suministro de energa sin razn.
Adems del dao al cliente que se
queda sin energa, el riesgo de perder
la estabilidad del sistema comienza
tambin a incrementarse por estos
disparos en falso.

Figura 2. Circuito de Impedancia de DESARROLLO:


una falla monofsica a tierra
DETERMINACION DEL FACTOR K
Si los ajustes del relevador son Desafortunadamente el factor K no
hechos correctamente un cliente que existe. Hay varias formas de
est siendo alimentado desde los dos obtenerlo, aqu discutiremos las tres
formas ms comunes para calcularlo.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 75

Para todos los casos hay que imaginaria y redefinimos la relacin


considerarlos como constantes de la obtenemos la tercera forma:
lnea, en general independiente de la
longitud. Estos expresan la relacin
de la impedancia del circuito fase a
fase y de las tres fases a tierra. La
mitad de un circuito fase a fase (por El ngulo de la lnea es obtenido de la
ejemplo la impedancia de una lnea) relacin XL/ RL como sigue:
es referido como la Impedancia de
Secuencia Positiva Z1; tres veces la
impedancia de un circuito de las tres
fases a tierra es referido como la
Impedancia de Secuencia Cero Z0. Los relevadores de proteccin utilizan
algoritmos que hacen uso de estos
Una forma comn es la relacin diferentes factores K para convertir
compleja de la Impedancia de todas las fallas de fase a tierra, de tal
Secuencia Cero y la Impedancia de manera que estas puedan ser
Secuencia Positiva. evaluadas como fallas de fase a fase.

CALCULO DE LOS FACTORES K

Hasta ahora los intentos para medir


Como Z1; es la impedancia de una las impedancias de lnea y los factores
lnea es llamada tambin ZL. K haban sido muy difciles. Para
comnmente. obtener estos datos se han estado
haciendo clculos manualmente, o
por medio de herramientas de
software como PowerFactory de
La impedancia de tierra ZE; puede ser DIgSILENT, PSS de Shaw PTI or CAPE
calculada de la I mpedancia de de Electrocon.
Secuencia Cero como sigue:
Los parmetros necesarios para
calcular la impedancia de la lnea son
muchos.

Otra forma de expresar est relacin Se requiere la configuracin


sera: geomtrica (Figura 5):
Altura sobre la tierra y la distancia
horizontal de cada conductor de fase
y el cable de tierra
Valor promedio de las catenarias a
Si convertimos las impedancias lo largo de la lnea
complejas ZE y ZL en sus partes real e
Se deben conocer tambin varios
parmetros elctricos
76

5HVLVWLYLGDGGHOWHUUHQR nominal. Se han llevado a cabo


Resistencia de todos los mediciones en lneas de hasta 270 km
conductores de longitud. En la figura 6 se muestra
una foto de un equipo disponible en
el mercado para realizar estas
mediciones.

Se realizan siete mediciones por


sistema, tres para cada combinacin
de circuitos entre fases, tres para
cada fase a tierra y una para las tres
Figura 5. Geometra de las lneas fases a tierra. Aunque existe
areas redundancia en las mediciones, esto
nos da confiabilidad por que nos
Construccin de los conductores permite hacer comprobaciones
Dimetro de los conductores cruzadas de los resultados y el clculo
de los factores K para cada fase. A
Pudiera darse el caso de que se primera vista parece extrao, pero
reemplaz en una porcin de la lnea especialmente en lneas cortas no
un tramo de los conductores por otro siempre se tiene cuidado de que la
de diferente material o dimetro o lnea sea simtrica, lo que posibilita
slo fue reemplazado en una de las diferentes valores para cada una de
fases y no fue documentado. La las fases. Conociendo este problema
influencia de la resistividad del podemos reajustar los factores K para
terreno y la medicin exacta de la evitar sobre-alcances de zonas.
distancia entre los cables y la tierra
son muy difciles de determinar a lo
largo de toda la lnea (especialmente
en lneas largas donde la geografa es
muy variada).

MEDICION DEL FACTOR K


Comparado con los clculos, la
medicin de los parmetros de la Figura 6. Equipo para medicin de la
lnea incuyendo el factor K es impedancia de Lnea.
relativamente simple hoy en da.
Los resultados pueden ser exportados
La medicin es realizada con a Microsoft Excel lo que permite un
corrientes de entre 1 y 100 A. fcil reprocesamiento de los
dependiendo de la longitud de la resultados, adems los resultados son
lnea. El usar una frecuencia selectiva presentados en un formato mediante
durante la prueba nos permite el cual pueden ser usados
realizar la medicin con una corriente directamente para ajustar el relevador
de una fraccin de la corriente (Figura 7).
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 77

corriente de prueba seleccionada fue


de 10 A.

En la figura 9 se muestran los


resultados de la impedancia medida a
frecuencias diferentes de la nominal.

Figura 7. Resultados finales de las


mediciones

CASO REAL

Una medicin en una lnea con una


longitud total de 22 km fue
desarrollada en junio de 2004 en una Figura 9. Mediciones de impedancia
empresa de energa que vende ms contra frecuencia
de 180,000 GWh de energa elctrica
por ao a sus clientes. Lo ms interesante fue la
comparacin de los resultados
medidos contra los ajustes del
relevador.

Figura 10. Ajustes del relevador


comparados con los resultados de la
medicin.

Figura 8. Primera torre de los 22 km Las Impedancias de Secuencia


de lnea en 400 kV Positiva son casi idnticas, pero la
Impedancia de Secuencia Cero
El motivo de la prueba fue un disparo muestra una desviacin de 48%. Otra
en falso que estaba sujeto a reevaluacin de los clculos
investigacin. demostr, que el tipo de cables de
tierra usados, no fue introducido
La medicin completa fue hecha en correctamente en el sistema, una vez
menos de una hora porque la la lnea corregido los clculos fueron muy
no poda estar fuera de servicio por similares comparados con las
un largo perodo. Las mediciones mediciones de la secuencia cero.
fueron realizadas sin problemas; la
78

El clculo incorrecto no haba sido IEEE Vigsima reunin de Verano de


cuestionado antes de que ocurriera el Potencia, RVP 2007. Mxico.
disparo en falso, hasta que el error
fue encontrado. La compaa se 2-Dierks, 2004, Different
convenci, que si realizaba Representation of the earth
mediciones en diferentes lneas de su Impedance Matching in Distance
sistema, podran corregir errores en Protection Relays Performance,
los ajustes de sus protecciones de Proceedings Southern Africam Power
distancia y as evitar disparos System Protection Conference 2004,
innecesarios, lo cual redundara en la Eskom Enterprises.
confiabilidad de su sistema y
obviamente en grandes beneficios 3- Th. Hensler, R Kaufmann, U.
para la empresa y mejora en la Klapper, M. Krger, Z Schreiner, 2003
calidad del servicio prestado a sus Portable Testing Device
clientes.
4- S. Kaiser, 2004, "Different
Representation of the Earth
CONCLUSI ONES Impedance Matching in Distance
En nuestros das debido a la alta Protection Relays". Proceedings
carga a las que son sometidas las OMICRON User Conference Germany
lneas de transmisin la medicin del 2004"
factor K puede significar la diferencia
entre una correcta operacin de la
proteccin o la salida de varias lneas CURRI CULUM VI TAE:
y todo lo que esto representa. Las
mediciones que se han realizado
muestran que por varias razones los Miguel Gutirrez Recibi su
clculos presentan resultados bachillerato en electrnica y su
errneos. Adems las mediciones y Licenciatura en sistemas de potencia
los clculos pueden ser comparados de la Universidad de Costa Rica en
para mejorar los ajustes y asegurar la 1985 y 1988 respectivamente. El
selectividad y la rapidez al despejar tiene ms de 25 aos de experiencia
una falla. La medicin de la en el rea de proteccin de sistemas
impedancia de lnea y el factor K son elctricos, control y comunicacin.
muy importantes para una correcta Desde 1999 trabaja con OMICRON
operacin del relevador de proteccin Electronics (E.E.U.U.) como ingeniero
de distancia. aplicacin para el rea de Amrica
Latina. l es miembro del IEEE.
REFERENCI AS:
Michael Krger es manager de la
1- L. Barrios, A. Jarquin, "Medicin de lnea de productos de prueba primaria
las Impedancias de Secuencia Positiva con OMICRON electronics GmbH,
y Cero en Lneas de Alta Tensin", Austria. Estudi ingeniera elctrica
en la Universidad de Aachen (RWTH)
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 79

y la Universidad de Kaiserslautern
donde se gradu en el ao 1976. En
1990 recibi doctorado en la
Universidad de Viena, Austria.
Michael Krugger tiene ms de 28 aos
de experiencia en ingeniera de
potencia especialmente en ingeniera
de alta tensin y diagnstico de
aislamiento. El es miembro del VDE
e IEEE.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 81

Empleo de Nomogramas para Localizacin de


Fallas en Redes de Distribucin
Abel Gonzlez Gmez Alexis Martnez del Sol Roberto Meja Preciado Jorge Javier Mier Garca

Resumen En el p resente t rabajo s e p ropone el e mpleo localizar una falla son por lo general mucho mayores que para
de nomogramas para la localizacin de fallas en redes de lneas de distribucin.[5, 9-10]
distribucin u tilizando v alores d e d istancia a la f alla,
calculados mediante e l al goritmo d e T akagi y val ores d e Adems de esto, estas lneas tienen caractersticas cmo
distancia a la falla, simulados para tres clases de redes de homogeneidad, topologa, etc. que las hacen susceptibles de
igual topologa pero de diferente co nstitucin. Se muestra soluciones relativamente sencillas y econmicas en trminos
cmo es posible mediante el e mpleo de estos nomogramas de recursos de medicin y de capacidad de cmputo. En esta
obtener una estimacin adecuada de la distancia a l a falla clase entran los algoritmos de reactancia como el de Takagi[2]
a pesar de que el algoritmo de Takagi da valores errneos con los cuales es posible obtener precisiones por debajo del
de localizacin. 2% de error siempre que se realice una adecuada estimacin
de los fasores de tensin y corriente involucrados en la falla.
Palabras clave Localizacin de fallas, redes de distribucin.
Otros algoritmos de reactancia que emplean medicin en
I. INTRODUCCIN ambos extremos de la lnea, sincronizadas o no, proveen
mayor nivel de precisin siempre que se cuente con la
El empleo de tcnicas de localizacin de fallas en centros de
posibilidad de utilizarlos.
gestin de la distribucin es una necesidad impuesta en la
actualidad por el desarrollo de las clases de estrategias de
Adicionalmente en este entorno se han empleado otras
gestin utilizadas para el desarrollo de las llamadas redes
clases de mtodos tales como:
inteligentes o Smart Grid. Trminos como continuidad del
servicio, calidad del servicio, fiabilidad etc juegan un
1. Redes neuronales artificiales.
importante rol en la interpretacin que se hace hoy del papel
2. Mtodos de onda viajera.
de los sistemas de provisin de energa elctrica lo que
3. Mtodos de componentes de alta frecuencia.
implica mejorar la precisin de los mtodos de localizacin de
4. Algoritmos Genticos.
fallas aplicados en redes de distribucin ya que hace ms fcil
el trabajo de deteccin y eliminacin de las fallas al disminuir
Para los sistemas de distribucin sin embargo no se han
el tiempo empleado para estas tareas. [1]
encontrado todava soluciones suficientemente generales que
permitan de manera fcil e intuitiva obtener la localizacin de
Numerosas tcnicas han sido propuestas en la literatura a
la falla. Esto se debe a mltiples razones como: [9, 11-12]
lo largo de los aos para resolver la problemtica de la
localizacin de fallas en sistemas elctricos de potencia.[2] [3-
1. La falta de homogeneidad de las lneas de
8]La mayora de estas tcnicas se enfocan en la localizacin
distribucin.
de fallas para lneas de transmisin de energa. Esto se debe a
2. La clase de topologa de las redes de distribucin que
que los grandes niveles de potencia transportados por estas
provoca en muchos casos la existencia de lazos los
lneas hacen que las fallas en las mimas tengan consecuencias
cuales crean conocidos problemas para localizadores
graves sobre la estabilidad del sistema y por lo general son
que empleen informacin de un solo terminal de la
capaces de afectar a grandes grupos de consumidores. Por otro
lnea.
lado las distancias a recorrer en lneas de transmisin para
3. La existencia de cargas variables entre los
localizadores de fallas y el lugar de ocurrencia de las
mismas.
Gmez Gonzlez Abel, labora en Arteche Medicin y Tecnologa, S.A.
de C.V. Industria Mecnica Mxico (e-mail: abgonzalez@arteche.com.mx) 4. El hecho de que los localizadores no estn ubicados
Martnez del Sol Alexis labora en Arteche Centro de Tecnologa, A.I.E directamente sobre las lneas sino comnmente sobre
Derio Bidea, 2, 48100 Mungia, (Bizkaia), Espaa (e-mail: amds@arteche.es) alimentadores lo cual dificulta la evaluacin de las
Meja Preciado Roberto, labora en Arteche Medicin y Tecnologa, S.A. contribuciones de corriente de falla.
de C.V. Industria Mecnica 2173, Zapopan, 45132, Jal. Mxico (e-mail:
rmejia@arteche.com.mx) 5. La relativamente alta influencia que ejerce la
Mier Garca Jorge Javier, labora en Arteche Medicin y Tecnologa, S.A. resistencia de falla y la clase de aterramiento en este
de C.V. Industria Mecnica (e-mail: jmier@arteche.com.mx) tipo de redes sobre los valores de corrientes y tensin
de cortocircuito.
82

6. La imposibilidad de disponer en gran cantidad de Este perfil de reactancia se obtuvo mediante la realizacin
casos de valores de corriente directamente de la rama de un estudio paramtrico de simulacin de tres circuitos de
fallada, etc. igual topologa pero de diferentes valores de impedancia las
7. En contraste con los sistemas de transmisin las lneas cuales se muestran en la TABLA 1.
de distribucin alimentan cargas relativamente
pequeas por lo que disponen de poca capacidad de En el estudio se simularon, utilizando SimPowerSystems
medicin y/o instrumentacin limitada en la mayora cortocircuitos, monofsicos, bifsicos, bifsicos a tierra y
de los casos a medidores de tensin y corriente, trifsicos cada 100 metros a lo largo de cada una de las lneas.
relevadores de proteccin de sobrecorriente de bajas En total durante el desarrollo del trabajo se generaron y
prestaciones y otros como restauradores, analizaron 18000 casos de estudio diferentes.
seccionalizadores y fusibles conectados aguas abajo.

Esto ha provocado que se empleen tcnicas disimiles de Xvs Distancia Linea Mixta CC3F
relativamente poca complejidad y efectividad tales como:

a. Restauracin por conmutacin.


b. Restauracin usando operaciones de restauradores
c. Indicacin usando fusibles y operacin de
indicadores de paso de falla.
d. Revisin de cables cados, llamadas de clientes,
mapas
e. Indicaciones de relevadores
f. Oliendo cables quemados

Sin embargo la desregulacin de muchos mercados


energticos que implica la competencia de las diferentes
empresas elctricas por incrementar la disponibilidad del
Figura 2 Reactancia vs Distancia Lnea Mixta
suministro hace que se le preste mayor atencin a este
problema especialmente en la ltima dcada.
Como se puede ver en esta clase de circuitos existen
valores de impedancia varios para distancias iguales respecto
Por otro lado las caractersticas de los sistemas de
al origen del circuito de distribucin bajo estudio, o valores de
distribucin, mencionadas ms arriba, dificultan la unicidad de
reactancia diferentes para la misma distancia. Esta es la razn
enfoque para la solucin de este problema. Por esto es que se
por la cual se obtienen mltiples valores de distancia cuando
encuentran en la literatura gran cantidad de mtodos diferentes
se emplean mtodos de reactancia como el de Takagi para
para la localizacin de fallas en lneas de distribucin. Estos
obtener la localizacin de las fallas en esta clase de circuitos.
pueden ser clasificados en los siguientes grupos:
Adicionalmente la forma de los diagramas de reactancia
cambia ante cambios de la carga, insercin en ciertos puntos
1. Algoritmos basados en el clculo de la impedancia del
de la red unidades de generacin distribuida o para diferentes
lazo de falla.
sistemas de aterramiento de las redes.
2. Aplicacin de mtodos de inteligencia artificial tales
como redes neuronales, sistemas neuro-fuzzy y
Un circuito topolgicamente idntico al anterior pero con
algoritmos genticos.
diferencias en las caractersticas de los cables o lneas
3. Mtodos estadsticos.
conectadas presentar una diferente grfica de reactancia
4. Mtodos hbridos.
contra distancia como se muestra en las Figura 3 y 4:

II. GRAFICAS DE REACTANCIA Ttulo del grfico


Para una red radial como la presentada en la FIGURA 1 la
distribucin de reactancia vista desde el punto 0 para
cortocircuitos a lo largo de toda la lnea es la mostrada en la
FIGURA 2.

Figura 1 Red de Distribucin Radial Figura 3 Reactancia vs Distancia Lnea Area


X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 83

Ttulo del grfico

Distancia Real
Takagi

Figura 4 Reactancia vs Distancia Lnea Subterrnea Figura 6 Distancia a la Falla y Takagi CC3F. Lnea Mixta

Las razones para las diferencias entre las formas de las


curvas de reactancia contra distancia observadas en las figuras
anteriores pueden ser atribuidas a los datos de impedancia y
tamao de las lneas que se muestran en la tabla siguiente en la
que se muestran las resistencias y reactancias por kilmetro de
las lneas y el tamao de los tramos en kilmetros.

Tabla 1 Tamao de tramo e Impedancia por kilmetro Distancia Real

Lnea Area Lnea Mixta Lnea Subterrnea Takagi


De A R X d R X d R X d
0 1 10,00 0,20 0,36 6,00 0,12 0,40 2,00 0,06 0,11
1 1A 4,50 0,42 0,39 2,00 0,13 0,11 0,30 0,13 0,11
1A 1A1 1,00 0,42 0,39 2,00 0,21 0,12 0,20 0,21 0,12
1A 1A2 2,00 0,61 0,39 3,00 0,61 0,39 0,30 0,13 0,11
Figura 7 Distancia a la Falla y Takagi. CC3F Lnea
Subterrnea
1 2 5,00 0,20 0,36 4,50 0,08 0,10 2,00 0,08 0,10
2 2A 3,50 0,61 0,39 3,50 0,21 0,12 0,40 0,21 0,12 Los errores cometidos por la aplicacin del mtodo de
2 3 8,00 0,12 0,31 6,00 0,20 0,36 2,00 0,08 0,10 Takagi a estos casos se muestran en la Figura 8
3 3A 0,70 0,21 0,12 1,00 0,21 0,12 0,20 0,21 0,12
3A 3B 3,00 0,61 0,39 3,00 0,21 0,12 0,30 0,21 0,12
3A 3C 1,30 0,35 0,38 1,30 0,25 0,12 0,20 0,25 0,12 Error vs Distancia Linea Aerea
Error vs Distancia Lnea Mixta
3 4 5,00 0,61 0,39 4,50 0,13 0,11 2,00 0,13 0,11
Error vs Distancia Lnea Subterranea

III. APLICACIN DEL ALGORITMO DE TAKAGI


La aplicacin del algoritmo de Takagi permite obtener
valores de distancias a la falla que se muestran en las Figuras
5, 6 y 7:

Figura 8 Error vs. Distancia. Algoritmo de Takagi

En general se puede ver con la aplicacin del algoritmo de


Takagi a este tipo de lneas se obtienen altos niveles de error
el cual de manera general incrementa al incrementar la
Distancia Real
distancia a la cual sucede la falla. Una mayor homogeneidad
Takagi de la lnea trae como consecuencia una curva de error ms
suave lo cual indica que una mejor parametrizacin del
algoritmo pudiera permitir la obtencin de niveles de exactitud
mayores.

Es posible utilizar los resultados incorrectos del algoritmo


Figura 5 Distancia a la Falla y Takagi CC3F. Lnea Area
de Takagi incluso cuando los niveles de error son altos, para la
84

localizacin de fallas siempre y cuando los niveles de El empleo de estas grficas permite, a pesar de los errores
precisin de la aplicacin del algoritmo se mantengan propios del algoritmo de Takagi vistos en el epgrafe anterior,
constantes. Esto se ver en la prxima seccin. obtener estimaciones adecuadas de la distancia a la falla.

V. CONCLUSIONES
IV. USO DE NOMOGRAMAS La aplicabilidad de los algoritmos de reactancia a redes de
Aplicando el algoritmo de Takagi, para obtener la distancia distribucin se restringe a sistemas de baja complejidad.
a la falla en los circuitos de distribucin mostrados
anteriormente es posible obtener las grficas de distancia La mltiple localizacin o mltiple estimacin de lugar de
calculada contra distancia real a la falla mostradas en las falla es un problema de los mtodos de impedancia o distancia
Figuras 9, 10 y 11. con medicin desde una sola punta aplicados a redes de
distribucin y no puede ser eliminado a no ser que se disponga
de informacin adicional.
Distancia Calculada vs Distancia Real CC3F
Linea Area El empleo de nomogramas permite obtener localizacin de
fallas en redes de distribucin con niveles de exactitud
aceptables a pesar de los errores de los algoritmos de
reactancia a partir de los cuales se generan dichos grficos
siempre y cuando la precisin del .del algoritmo de reactancia
se mantenga constante.

VI. BIBLIOGRAFA
[1] Y. Zhang and M. Prica, "Toward Smarter Current Relays for Power
Grids," in IEEE PES General Meetin, Montreal, Canada, 2006, p. 8.
[2] T. Takagi, et al., "Development of a New Type Fault Locator Using
the One Terminal Fault-Voltage and Current Data," IEEE
Figura 9 Nomograma Lnea Area Proceedings on Power apparatus and Systems, vol. PAS 101, p. 7,
August, 1982 1982.
[3] D. Novosel, et al., "Unsynchronized two-terminal fault location
estimation," IEEE Trans. on Power Delivery, pp. 130-138, 1996.
Distancia Real vs Calculada Lnea Mixta CC3F [4] M. M. Saha, et al., "Review of fault location techniques for
distribution systems," presented at the Power Systems and
Communications Infrastructures for the Future, Beijing, 2002.
[5] T. Bouthiba. FAULT LOCATION IN EHV TRANSMISSION
LINES USING ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS.
[6] A. S. Bretas, et al., "A BP neural network based technique for HIF
detection and location on distribution systems with distributed
generation," presented at the Proceedings of the 2006 international
conference on Intelligent computing: Part II, Kunming, China, 2006.
[7] M. Kezunovi, et al., "A Novel Method for Transmission Network
Fault Location Using Genetic Algorithms and Sparse Field
Recordings," in IEEE PES Summer Meeting, ed, 2002.
[8] S. Vasilic and M. Kezunovic, "New Design of a Neural Network
Algorithm for Detecting and Classifying Transmission Line Faults,"
in IEEE PES Transmission and Distribution Conf, ed, 2001.
[9] M. M. Saha, et al., Fault Location on Power Networks, 1st ed.
Figura 10 Nomograma Lnea Mixta London: Springer, 2010.
[10] A. Gopalakrishnan, et al., "Fault Location Using Distributed
Parameter Transmission Line Model," IEEE Trans. on Power
Distancia Calculada vs Distancia Real CC Delivery, pp. 1169-1174, 2000.
[11] IEEE, "C37.114-2004 - IEEE Guide for Determining Fault Location
Trifsico Lnea Subterrnea on AC Transmission and Distribution Lines," ed, 2004.
[12] J. J. Mora Flores, "Localizacion de faltas en sistemas de distribucin
de energa elctrica usando metodos basados en el modelo y mtodos
basados en el conocimiento," PhD Doctoral, Escola Politcnica
Superior, Universitat de Girona, Girona, 2006.

VII. BIOGRAFAS
Abel Gonzlez Gmez, naci en Santa Clara, Cuba.
Ingeniero Electricista, egresado de la Universidad
Central de Las Villas, Cuba en 1996. Master en
Sistemas Elctricos en 2000 por la Universidad
Central de Las Villas. Labor como profesor de la
Facultad de Ingeniera Elctrica de dicha Universidad
Figura 11 Nomograma Lnea Mixta y como Ingeniero de Control en la Empresa de
Telecomunicaciones de Cuba.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 85

Desde el ao 2010 se desempea como Ingeniero de Diseo en la empresa Roberto M eja P reciado naci en Guadalajara,
Arteche Medicin y Tecnologa S.A. de C.V. Su rea de investigacin est Mxico en 1961. Recibi el grado de ingeniero
relacionada con el anlisis de la operacin, control y proteccin de sistemas electrnico en la Universidad ITESO de Guadalajara
elctricos de potencia y el desarrollo de software de aplicacin en 1982. Entre 1982 y 1989 trabaj en diferentes
empresas relacionadas al ramo de computacin. A
Alexis Martnez del Sol naci en Cienfuegos Cuba partir de 1989 se ha dedicado al desarrollo de equipos
en 1964. Recibi el grado de Doctor en Ciencias de medicin y control para subestaciones.
Tcnicas en la Universidad Central de Las Villas,
Cuba en 1997. En el perodo de 1987 -1999 trabaj Desde el ao de 2005 labora en Arteche Medicin y Tecnologa, S.A. de C.V.
en la Facultad de Ingeniera Elctrica de la y es integrante del grupo de investigacin, desarrollo e innovacin de la
Universidad Central de Las Villas donde fue profesor empresa. Su rea de investigacin est relacionada con el diseo electrnico,
Asistente y Jefe del departamento de Electroenerg- anlisis de la operacin, control y proteccin de sistemas elctricos de
tica. potencia y el desarrollo de software de aplicacin
De 1999- 200 fue Profesor Investigador Titular C del Departamento de
Ingeniera Mecnica Elctrica de la Universidad de Guadalajara. A partir del Jorge Javier Mier G arca naci en Bez, Placetas,
ao 2005 se vinculo al desarrollo de investigaciones cientficas en la empresa Cuba. Recibi el grado de Doctor en Ciencias
Arteche Medicin y Tecnologa S.A. de C.V. y durante los aos 2007-2010 Tcnicas en la Universidad Central de Las Villas,
fue su Director General. Actualmente es el Director de Proteccin, Control y Cuba en 2002. En el perodo de 1988 2005 trabaj
Medicin del Grupo Arteche. Su rea de investigacin est relacionada con el en la Facultad de Ingeniera Elctrica de la
anlisis de la operacin, control y proteccin de sistemas elctricos de Universidad Central de Las Villas donde fue profesor
potencia y el desarrollo de software de aplicacin. Fue Miembro del Sistema Asistente y Miembro del Tribunal Nacional de
Nacional de Investigadores (Nivel I) del 2004-2007 Grados Cientfico.
Desde el ao 2006 labora en la empresa Arteche, Medicin y Tecnologa S.A.
de C.V. y actualmente es Gerente de Diseo. Su rea de investigacin esta
relacionada con el anlisis de la operacin, control y proteccin de sistemas
elctricos de potencia y el desarrollo de software de aplicacin.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 87

Real-Time Multiterminal Fault Location


System for Transmission Networks
Yanfeng Gong, Mangapathirao Mynam, Armando Guzmn, and Gabriel Benmouyal,
Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc.
Boris Shulim, Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc.

AbstractFault location information is critical for operating Two-end fault location methods minimize these errors.
and maintaining transmission networks. Some of the challenges Reference [3] describes a two-end method based on negative-
in calculating accurate fault location include fault resistance, sequence quantities that can be implemented within line
zero-sequence mutual coupling, load, system nonhomogeneity,
and transmission lines composed of multiple sections with
protection relays using the relay programming abilities.
considerably different characteristics. This paper presents a fully Reference [4] describes an implementation of this algorithm
automated real-time fault location system that provides accurate using two line relays with relay-to-relay communication to
fault location information for multiple transmission lines and calculate the fault location in real time.
makes the results available to system operators and maintenance Variable fault resistance introduces errors in fault location
personnel. The system is capable of the following: estimation; accurate time stamping of the measurements aids
Retrieves all triggered event reports from relays and in minimizing these errors when using two-end methods.
digital fault recorders (DFRs) automatically. With these
Synchrophasor technology is promising; however,
reports, the system identifies the faulted transmission
line(s) within the transmission network. available message rates make using this technology
Determines the fault type and calculates the fault challenging, especially in applications with fast fault-clearing
location and fault resistance using multiterminal fault times.
location methods for different types of power lines, Alternative traveling wave fault location technology is
including overhead lines, underground cables, and available and provides good results, but deployment has been
composite lines that include both overhead line and limited to extra-high-voltage applications because of its high
underground cable sections. cost. One of the objectives of the system proposed in this
Uses fault location methods that are accurate under fault paper is to provide an economical solution using relays that
resistance, parallel-line mutual coupling, system perform line protection functions.
nonhomogeneity, and load. While present two-end fault location methods provide good
Supports event reports with a fixed sampling rate or a results in applications where the X/R ratio of the line is
variable sampling rate that is a multiple of the power constant, they are not suitable for lines with multiple sections.
system operating frequency.
These sections have different impedance characteristics,
Supports event reports generated by relays and DFRs especially for applications that combine overhead lines and
connected to an IRIG-B time source.
underground cables. This paper presents a method that is
This paper compares fault location results calculated from
field event reports and reports that are obtained from models of based on the negative-sequence voltage profile along the line
real power systems with actual fault locations. and is suitable for composite lines.
We use field and laboratory cases where the fault location
I. INTRODUCTION is known to determine the accuracy of the proposed method.
Fault location in protective relays has been available for The field case shows that the fault location estimation is off by
over 20 years. These relays use impedance-based fault 475 feet in a 26.3-mile composite line application.
location algorithms, typically from one terminal of the We introduce a real-time fault location system that uses
transmission line [1] [2]. While these relays have been very line protection relays and displays fault location information at
useful in locating the majority of faults, the following the control center within 1 minute after the fault occurrence
conditions can affect their fault location accuracy: when using Ethernet-based communication. The fault location
system automatically retrieves event reports from relays after
High-resistance faults
a fault occurs. The system accommodates event reports with
Heavy load conditions
both fixed and variable sampling rates.
Zero-sequence mutual coupling
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. (ORU) plans to deploy
this system in its transmission network and communicate the
fault location results to the ORU Energy Control Center.
88

II. EXISTING MULTITERMINAL FAULT LOCATION METHODS IX IY


VX VTAP VY
Section X Section Y
Two-end-based algorithms offer significant advantages in
fault location accuracy compared with single-end fault
location algorithms. These algorithms are not affected by fault
Relay X Relay Y
resistance, load, and zero-sequence mutual coupling. Fig. 1 Section Z
shows the circuit model of a two-bus system with a fault at
Relay Z
m distance from Terminal X.
IZ

VZ

Fig. 2. Three-terminal line with a fault on Section X.


Fig. 1. Circuit model of a two-bus system with a fault at m distance from
Terminal X.
The two-end impedance-based fault location algorithms
discussed above assume that power lines are homogeneous
Some two-end impedance-based fault location algorithms with a constant X/R ratio. This assumption introduces errors
use voltage and current measurements from both terminals of for nonhomogeneous lines with overhead sections having
the transmission line to estimate the distance to the fault, m, in different line impedances or a combination of underground
per unit, according to (1). cable and overhead line sections. This paper describes a new
VX VY + I Y ZL fault location method for homogeneous and nonhomogeneous
m= (1)
( IX + I Y ) ZL lines.

VX and IX correspond to the voltage and current phasors at III. CONSIDERATIONS FOR VARIABLE FAULT RESISTANCE
Terminal X. VY and IY correspond to the phasors at
Variable fault resistance affects the voltages and currents
Terminal Y. These phasors can be obtained from symmetrical
that the relays at each terminal measure. Fig. 3 shows the sum
or Clarke components or phase quantities. ZL is the line
of the local and remote residual currents (total residual
impedance. We can compensate ZL in (1) according to the
current) and the estimated fault resistance for a B-phase-to-
distributed parameter line model to accommodate long
ground fault. The total residual current is approximately equal
transmission lines [1].
to the total fault current at the fault location. The fault
Alignment of local and remote measurements is critical for
occurred on a 400 kV transmission line with a line length of
obtaining accurate fault location using two-end-based
225 kilometers; wildfires close to the transmission line caused
algorithms for faults with variable resistance. Methods based
the fault condition. Observe that the fault current starts with a
on (1) are sensitive to the errors in measurement alignment.
peak value lower than 828 A that increases to a peak value of
Reference [3] describes a two-end method that uses only
3,860 A in 4 cycles at a rate of 758 A per cycle. The
negative-sequence quantities and solves a second-order
corresponding resistance that we calculate according to (2)
polynomial equation to estimate the distance to the fault.
changes at the beginning of the fault and settles to
These quantities include local current and voltage
approximately 3 after 4 cycles [1].
measurements, as well as remote source impedance and
current magnitudes. Reference [5] presents a method that uses V I + VYB IXBk0 ZL1I YBk0 IXBk0
an iterative process to estimate a factor that compensates the R F = real XB YBk0 (2)
error in alignment and then solves the distance to the fault. ( IXBk0 + IYBk0 )2
Reference [6] uses time-synchronized phasor where:
measurements for multiterminal-based fault location.
I XBk0 = IXB + k 0 I XR
However, most phasor measurement units (PMUs) offer a
maximum data transfer rate of 60 messages per second. Fast I YBk0 = IYB + k 0 I YR
clearing times reduce the available fault data, making the ZL0 ZL1
k0 =
synchrophasor-based fault location calculation challenging. 3ZL1
We can use two-end methods to calculate fault location on
VXB is the B-phase voltage at Terminal X.
three-terminal lines by reducing the three-terminal network to
a two-terminal network [3]. Fig. 2 shows a typical VYB is the B-phase voltage at Terminal Y.
three-terminal line. For a fault on Section X, the voltages at IXB is the B-phase current at Terminal X.
the tap (VTAP) calculated from Terminal Y and Terminal Z are IYB is the B-phase current at Terminal Y.
equal, and the voltage calculated from Terminal X is different IXR is the residual current at Terminal X.
from the voltages calculated from the other two terminals. IYR is the residual current at Terminal Y.
Based on this concept, Section X can be identified. ZL1 is the positive-sequence line impedance.
ZL0 is the zero-sequence line impedance.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 89

The estimated fault location based on the negative-


sequence network is not affected by zero-sequence mutual
coupling and errors in zero-sequence line impedance.
Accurate zero-sequence line impedances are often difficult to
obtain. For underground cables in particular, the actual zero-
A

sequence impedance depends on the bonding method of the


shield and the cable configuration [8].
Another benefit of using negative-sequence quantities is
that the line-charging currents have negligible impact on the
accuracy of the fault location estimation because the negative-
sequence voltage is significantly lower than the positive-
sequence voltage along the transmission line.
The proposed method uses the profile of the estimated
negative-sequence voltage magnitude along the transmission

line to determine the fault location. This method identifies the


faulted line section and estimates the distance to the fault in
this section.
A. Identification of the Faulted Line Section
We estimate negative-sequence voltage at each junction
Fig. 3. Fault current and resistance for a phase-to-ground fault on a
225-kilometer, 400 kV line. between line sections twice, starting from each line terminal,
in order to construct two negative-sequence voltage profiles.
Without proper event report alignment, the rapid change of Therefore, for each line section, there are two calculated
fault resistance in Fig. 3 at the start of the fault can cause voltages for the left junction and two calculated voltages for
additional errors when estimating fault location in the right junction. The intersection point of the two voltage
transmission line applications with fast fault-clearing times. magnitude profiles calculated from each terminal is the
Accurate time stamping of the measurements improves event negative-sequence voltage magnitude at the fault location.
report alignment and minimizes errors caused by variable fault For a power transmission line that consists of
resistance. N homogeneous line sections, the negative-sequence voltages
at the junctions of line section k can be calculated using (3)
IV. NEW FAULT LOCATION METHOD through (6). The left terminal of the line is denoted as
Most faults on power transmission lines are unbalanced Terminal X, and the right terminal of the line is denoted as
faults. The common characteristic of unbalanced faults is that Terminal Y.
there are negative-sequence currents and voltages available for k 1
the fault location calculation. This method uses an existing V2k _ L _ X = V2meas _ X i =1 Z1i I2meas _ X (3)
algorithm to distinguish between unbalanced and balanced
V2k _ R _ X = V2meas_ X i =1 Z1i I2meas _ X
k
faults [7]. Fig. 4b illustrates the negative-sequence network of (4)
the transmission line with the three line sections shown in
V2k _ L _ Y = V2meas _ Y i = k Z1i I2meas _ Y
N
Fig. 4a. The fault is on Section 2; m is the distance to the fault (5)
in per unit of the section length, as measured from Junction D.
V2k _ R _ Y = V2meas _ Y i = k +1 Z1i I2meas _ Y
N
(6)
where:
V2meas_X, I2meas_X, V2meas_Y, and I2meas_Y are the negative-
sequence voltage and current measurements from the
Terminal X and Terminal Y relays, respectively.
Z1i is the positive-sequence impedance of line section i,
which is the same as the negative-sequence impedance.
V2k_L_X is the negative-sequence voltage at the left
junction of line section k that is calculated from
Terminal X.
V2k_R_X is the negative-sequence voltage at the right
junction of line section k that is calculated from
Terminal X.
V2k_L_Y is the negative-sequence voltage at the left
junction of line section k that is calculated from
Fig. 4. (a) Transmission line with three line sections. (b) Negative-sequence
Terminal Y.
network of the transmission line for a fault on Section 2.
90

V2k_R_Y is the negative-sequence voltage at the right C. Fault Location for Three-Phase Faults
junction of line section k that is calculated from For three-phase faults, we calculate the positive-sequence
Terminal Y. impedance to the fault, Ztotal, from either terminal using
Fig. 5 illustrates the negative-sequence voltage magnitude positive-sequence voltage, V1, and current, I1, according
profiles from Terminal X and Terminal Y of the transmission to (10). The algorithm identifies the faulted line section, k,
line shown in Fig. 4. Because the two voltage profiles using (11). Equation (12) determines the total distance to the
intersect at the fault location, the negative-sequence voltages fault, L, where Lengthi is the length of line section i.
at the junctions of the faulted line section meet the two criteria
V1
stated in (7) and (8). Ztotal = (10)
I1
V2k _ L _ X V2k _ L _ Y (7) k 1
i =1 Z1i Ztotal < i =1 Z1i
k
(11)
V2k _ R _ Y < V2k _ R _ X (8) k 1
k 1 Ztotal i =1 Z1i
L = i =1 Length i + Length k (12)
Z1k

V. TEST RESULTS AND FIELD EVENT CASE STUDY


This section discusses the test results and accuracy of the
fault location estimation on a 26.3-mile, 230 kV transmission
Magnitude

line. As shown in Fig. 7, this composite, nonhomogeneous


line has two overhead sections and two underground cable
sections. Table I lists the parameters of each line section. We
used fault event reports from simulations and a field event to
demonstrate the accuracy of the proposed fault location
algorithm.
Fig. 5. Negative-sequence voltage magnitude profile along the transmission
line for a fault on Section 2.

B. Estimation of the Distance to the Fault on the Faulted


Line Section for Unbalanced Faults
After the algorithm identifies the faulted line section, the Fig. 7. Nonhomogeneous 230 kV transmission line.
algorithm estimates the distance to the fault on the
homogeneous line section. Fig. 6 shows the equivalent circuit TABLE I
TRANSMISSION LINE SECTION PARAMETERS
of the faulted line section. The equivalent negative-sequence
voltage sources, V2k_L_X and V2k_R_Y, are the voltages Line Positive-Sequence Zero-Sequence Length
calculated using (3) and (6) for the faulted line section. Section Impedance () Impedance () (miles)
Section 1 0.9522 + j10.5536 8.4111 + j38.4107 19.0
Section 2 0.0291 + j0.4973 0.4840 + j2.6186 2.9
Section 3 0.1957 + j1.5024 1.5235 + j6.7395 4.0
Section 4 0.0026 + j0.0635 0.0661 + j0.2883 0.4

A. Test System Setup and Simulation Results


We modeled the power system that includes the
Fig. 6. Equivalent negative-sequence network for a fault on the faulted
line section. transmission line shown in Fig. 7 in the Real Time Digital
Simulator (RTDS) that runs an Electromagnetic Transients
The voltage magnitudes at the fault location calculated Program (EMTP) simulation. Two digital line protection
from the two junctions should be equal to each other, relays measure voltages and currents at both line terminals via
according to (9). The algorithm solves (9) for the the RTDS analog interface. These relays are configured to
distance-to-fault value, m. This approach minimizes errors protect the transmission line using a pilot protection scheme.
because of data misalignment. The relays use a demodulated IRIG-B signal as a time source.
V2k _ L _ X m Z1k I2X = V2k _ R _ Y (1 m ) Z1k I2Y (9)
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 91

The breaker statuses and trip signals are exchanged among 0.025
the RTDS and relays via the digital I/O interface, as Fig. 8
illustrates. The system setup emulates the real-time, closed- LG Fault
0.02
loop controlled power system. LL Fault

Absolute Error in Miles


LLG Fault
0.015
3P Fault

0.01

0.005

0
5.7 13.3 20.16

Fault Location in Miles

Fig. 9. Fault location errors at different locations with RF = 0.


Fig. 8. Closed-loop test system includes RTDS and the two line relays.

We simulated all fault types (line-to-ground, line-to-line,


line-to-line-to-ground, and three-phase) at 5.7, 13.3, and
20.16 miles from Terminal X to verify the accuracy of the

Absolute Error in Miles


proposed algorithm. The first two locations are on the first
overhead section (Section 1), and the third location is on the
first underground cable section (Section 2). For each fault, we
collected three types of event reports from both terminals:
relay-generated event reports with fixed sampling rates of
8,000 samples per second, relay-generated event reports with
operating frequency-based sampling rates of 8 samples per
power system cycle, and RTDS-generated event reports with
fixed sampling rates of 4,000 samples per second. Fault
location estimation using RTDS-generated event reports
illustrates the theoretical performance of the algorithm. We
use relay event reports to estimate the fault location to include
Fig. 10. Fault location errors with different fault resistances.
the effects of relay measurement errors.
Fig. 9 shows the absolute error in fault location estimation
using RTDS-generated event reports for each fault type with
Absolute Error in Miles

zero fault resistance at different locations. The largest error is


0.02 miles (106 feet), which is 0.07 percent of the total line
length. Fig. 10 shows the absolute error in fault location
estimation using the RTDS-generated event reports for line-to-
ground faults with fault resistance varying from 0 to 100 at
the fault locations discussed above. The results show that the
largest error is 0.04 miles (212 feet), and the fault resistance
has minimal impact on the fault location estimation.
Fig. 11 shows the performance of the proposed method
compared with the single-end fault location method and the
Fig. 11. Fault location error of different methods using relay event reports
existing two-end fault location method using relay-generated with fixed sampling rates for line-to-ground faults at 20.16 miles from
fixed sampling event reports. The single-end fault location Terminal X.
method and existing two-end fault location method use only
For the single-end method, relays at both terminals
the total impedance of the composite line to estimate fault
reported a fault location value. We selected the value with the
location. We obtained these event reports from simulated line-
lowest error for comparison. Fig. 11 shows that the proposed
to-ground faults with fault resistance varying from 0 to 100
method consistently provides better fault location estimation
at 20.16 miles from Terminal X.
than the traditional two-terminal and single-end methods on
composite transmission lines.
92

Fig. 12 compares fault location errors using event reports


from relays with fixed and power system operating frequency-
dependent sampling rates. The results show that these two

A
sampling methods have similar performance.
Absolute Error in Miles

kV
Fig. 14. Current and voltage measurements of the relay at Terminal Y.

Fig. 15 shows the negative-sequence voltage profiles


calculated from both line terminals. The intersection of the
two voltage profiles indicates the location of the fault. The
Fig. 12. Fault location errors using fixed sampling and operating frequency- new method provides a more accurate fault location than the
based sampling event reports for line-to-ground faults at 20.16 miles. existing methods (see Table II).
B. Field Event Case Study 70
The transmission line described in Section V had an actual 60
Negative-Sequence Voltage Voltage Profile From
single-line-to-ground fault. Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 show the relay
Terminal X
recorded current and voltage measurements for the B-phase- Voltage Profile From
Magnitude in kV

to-ground fault. The proposed method estimated the fault 40 Terminal Y


location at 18.91 miles from Terminal X. The actual fault
location from line inspection was at the junction point
between the first overhead line section and the first cable 20
section, which is 19.0 miles from Terminal Y.
Table II lists the absolute errors in fault location estimation
reported by the proposed method, line relays at both ends, and 0
Miles 19.0 21.9 Terminal Y
the traditional two-end method. Terminal X (0.0)
(26.3)

TABLE II Fig. 15. Negative-sequence voltage profiles for the B-phase-to-ground fault.
ABSOLUTE ERRORS OF THE ESTIMATED FAULT LOCATION IN MILES

New Traditional Two- Relay at Left Relay at Right VI. AUTOMATED FAULT LOCATION SYSTEM
Method Terminal Method Terminal Terminal
Most of the existing multiterminal fault location methods
0.09 2.18 3.91 4.25 are mainly for post-event analysis. To perform this analysis,
we need to collect event reports from all line terminals, align
these data, and estimate the fault location, which is time-
consuming and inefficient. The automated fault location
system (AFLS) that we present in this paper can monitor
A

hundreds of transmission lines in the utility and provide fault


location information in real time without human intervention.
The AFLS includes protective relays connected to an IRIG-B
time source and fault location software running on a computer.
This software automatically retrieves event reports from the
relays, calculates the fault location, and presents the results to
kV

the user. Fig. 16 shows the AFLS architecture to monitor three


lines of a power system. This architecture uses Ethernet-based
communication between the protective relays and the
computer running the fault location software. The software
accommodates serial and Ethernet communications.
Fig. 13. Current and voltage measurements of the relay at Terminal X.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 93

Fig. 17. Fault location information display.

D. System Latency
The AFLS latency depends on the event retrieval time and
fault location computation time. The event retrieval time
depends on the communications medium between the
computer and the relays. For serial communication, the event
retrieval time is a function of the data transfer rate and the file
size. Typically, event retrieval times are in the order of 1 to
Fig. 16. AFLS monitoring three transmission lines. 3 minutes. For Ethernet-based communication, event retrieval
times are in the order of seconds. The computer performs fault
A. System Configuration location calculations in less than 1 second. For systems with
The initial system configuration requires specifying the Ethernet communication, the overall system latency is less
number of terminals of the monitored line, the number of than 1 minute.
sections, the section impedances, the communications
parameters of the relays, and the association of the relay with VII. AFLS DEPLOYMENT
the corresponding line terminal. After the system is
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. (ORU) proposed the
configured, it does not require additional user intervention.
installation of fault-locating equipment at transmission line
The software also accommodates line terminals with dual
terminals in order to implement the two-end fault location
breakers and compensates for shunt reactors based on their
system as part of the ORU Smart Grid Project. The majority
impedances.
of ORU 345/138 kV transmission lines are overhead
B. Fault Record Retrieval and Archiving conductors, and some of them are underground cables. These
The user can configure the fault location software to transmission lines are relatively short, approximately 9 to
retrieve event reports from the protective relays via event- 10 miles; however, the lines are not easily accessible for
driven or polling mechanisms. When using the event-driven inspection during faults due to difficult terrain. Therefore, a
mechanism, the software initiates the retrieval process tool to precisely calculate the fault location is important for
immediately upon receiving a message from the relay every quick restoration of the faulted transmission line.
time a new event is triggered. When using the polling The algorithm presented in this paper for fault location on
mechanism, the software polls the relays for new events transmission lines using a two-ended technique, as per ORU
periodically at user-defined intervals and retrieves the new design requirements, was tested, and the results are within
event reports. Compared to the polling mechanism, the event- 1.5 percent accuracy. Based on successful testing results,
driven mechanism offers lower latency and minimum ORU allocated funding to implement this fault location
communications traffic. The software stores the retrieved technique on critical transmission lines.
event reports with filenames consisting of the device name ORU is planning to use relays with fixed sampling rates
and event trigger time stamp. and accurate time stamping for fault locating. These relays can
have up to six sets of three-phase current and two sets of
C. Fault Location Calculation and Results Display three-phase voltage inputs. Thus, the relays can monitor
After successfully retrieving all of the event reports for a multiple lines within a substation.
particular fault, the fault location software automatically ORU is in the process of implementing its first double-
indentifies the faulted line, estimates the fault location, and ended fault location system. This system will include relays at
displays the results. Fig. 17 shows the display of the fault each terminal of the transmission line and will communicate
location information. This display can be available at the with a workstation located at the ORU Energy Control Center
control center. The reported fault location information via serial communication over optical fiber. The workstation
includes the line name, reference terminal, distance to the will process the fault data recorded by relays. The results,
fault, fault type, and time of the fault. The software can also including calculated fault location, will be emailed to the
send the fault location information to maintenance personnel system operator.
via email.
94

VIII. CONCLUSION [8] J. Vargas, A. Guzmn, and J. Robles, Underground/Submarine Cable


Protection Using a Negative-Sequence Directional Comparison
This paper presents an automated fault location system for Scheme, proceedings of the 26th Annual Western Protective Relay
transmission networks. The system uses a new multi-end fault Conference, Spokane, WA, October 1999.
location algorithm that is suitable for composite transmission
lines. The fault location algorithm and the automated system XI. BIOGRAPHIES
have the following characteristics: Yanfeng Gong received his BSEE from Wuhan University, China, in 1998,
The algorithm uses the negative-sequence voltage his MSEE from Michigan Technological University in 2002, and his PhD in
electrical engineering from Mississippi State University in 2005. He is
profile along the transmission line to identify the currently working as a research engineer at Schweitzer Engineering
faulted section, makes a network reduction, and Laboratories, Inc., in Pullman, Washington. He is a member of IEEE.
estimates the fault location.
A field case validates the accuracy of the algorithm for Mangapathirao Mynam received his MSEE from the University of Idaho in
2003 and his BE in electrical and electronics engineering from Andhra
a phase-to-ground fault on a 26.3-mile 230 kV University College of Engineering, India, in 2000. He joined Schweitzer
composite line. In this case, the fault location Engineering Laboratories, Inc. (SEL) in 2003 as an associate protection
estimation is off by 475 feet. engineer in the engineering services division. He is presently working as a
lead research engineer in SEL research and development. He was selected to
After the user configures the system, the system participate in the U.S. National Academy of Engineering (NAE) 15th Annual
reports fault location information in less than 1 minute U.S. Frontiers of Engineering Symposium. He is a member of IEEE.
when using Ethernet-based communication without
human intervention. Armando Guzmn received his BSEE with honors from Guadalajara
Autonomous University (UAG), Mexico. He received a diploma in fiber-
The system works with existing protective relays to optics engineering from Monterrey Institute of Technology and Advanced
provide an economical real-time fault location Studies (ITESM), Mexico, and his MSEE from the University of Idaho, USA.
solution. He served as regional supervisor of the Protection Department in the Western
Transmission Region of the Federal Electricity Commission (the Mexican
Event reports with accurate time stamps improve electrical utility company) in Guadalajara, Mexico, for 13 years. He lectured
multiterminal fault location accuracy, particularly for at UAG and the University of Idaho in power system protection and power
faults with varying fault resistance. system stability. Since 1993, he has been with Schweitzer Engineering
Laboratories, Inc., in Pullman, Washington, where he is a research
engineering manager. He holds numerous patents in power system protection
IX. ACKNOWLEDGMENT and metering. He is a senior member of IEEE.
The authors would like to thank Tariq Rahman of San
Gabriel Benmouyal, P.E., received his BASc in electrical engineering and
Diego Gas and Electric for providing the line parameters and his MASc in control engineering from Ecole Polytechnique, Universit de
fault event reports of the field case presented in this paper. Montral, Canada, in 1968 and 1970. In 1969, he joined Hydro-Qubec as an
instrumentation and control specialist. He worked on different projects in the
fields of substation control systems and dispatching centers. In 1978, he
X. REFERENCES joined IREQ, where his main fields of activity were the application of
[1] E. O. Schweitzer, III, Evaluation and Development of Transmission microprocessors and digital techniques for substations and generating station
Line Fault-Locating Techniques Which Use Sinusoidal Steady-State control and protection systems. In 1997, he joined Schweitzer Engineering
Information, proceedings of the 9th Annual Western Protective Relay Laboratories, Inc., as a principal research engineer. Gabriel is an IEEE senior
Conference, Spokane, WA, October 1982. member and a registered professional engineer in the Province of Qubec and
has served on the Power System Relaying Committee since May 1989. He
[2] T. Takagi, Y. Yamakoshi, M. Yamaura, R. Kondow, and
holds over six patents and is the author or coauthor of several papers in the
T. Matsushima, Development of a New Type Fault Locator Using the
fields of signal processing and power network protection and control.
One-Terminal Voltage and Current Data, IEEE Transactions on Power
Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-101, Issue 8, August 1982,
pp. 28922898. Boris Shulim is a principal transmission relay protection and system planning
engineer for Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. (ORU) in Spring Valley,
[3] D. A. Tziouvaras, J. Roberts, and G. Benmouyal, New Multi-Ended New York. Boris is a graduate of Polytechnic Institute of Kishinev, Russia.
Fault Location Design for Two- or Three-Terminal Lines, proceedings Since 1985, he has been employed by ORU. His responsibilities have
of the 7th International Conference on Developments in Power System included the application and design of protective relay systems, coordination
Protection, Amsterdam, Netherlands, April 2001. and settings studies, and the analysis of relay performance during system
[4] K. Zimmerman and D. Costello, Impedance-Based Fault Location disturbances. Boris has extensive experience with field troubleshooting and
Experience, proceedings of the 31st Annual Western Protective Relay relay and control testing. He is a professional engineer in the state of
Conference, Spokane, WA, October 2004. New York.
[5] D. Novosel, D. G. Hart, E. Udren, and J. Garitty, Unsynchronized
Two-Terminal Fault Location Estimation, IEEE Transactions on
Power Delivery, Vol. 11, Issue 1, January 1996.
[6] S. Lopez, J. Gomez, R. Cimadevilla, and O. Bolado, Synchrophasor
Applications of the National Electric System Operator of Spain,
proceedings of the 34th Annual Western Protective Relay Conference,
Spokane, WA, October 2007.
[7] A. Guzmn, V. Mynam, and G. Zweigle, Backup Transmission Line
Protection for Ground Faults and Power Swing Detection Using
Synchrophasors, proceedings of the 34th Annual Western Protective
Relay Conference, Spokane, WA, October 2007.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 95

Proteccin de Lneas de Transmisin de doble Circuito con


Relevadores de Sobre-Corriente
Adriel Njera Guevara1, David Sebastin Baltazar1
adrielng@hotmail.com dsebasti@ipn.mx
1
Instituto Politcnico Nacional, SEPI ESIME ZAC Programa de Posgrado en Ingeniera Elctrica
Telfono (55) 5234-5678 Fax (55)5 345-6789

Resumen En e ste a rtculo s e muestran el ef ecto q ue que garanticen la dependabilidad y la seguridad del sistema
presentan e l a coplamiento mutuo de l as l neas de de proteccin [1].
transmisin de do ble c ircuito c on bus es c omunes e n l a
proteccin d e s obre co rriente. T ambin s e p resenta u n En el presente artculo se analiza el efecto que tiene el
ejemplo del ajuste y coordinacin de dicha proteccin en acoplamiento mutuo en los relevadores de sobre-corriente.
lneas acopladas magnticamente.
En las lneas de transmisin de doble circuito y que
Palabras Clave Lnea d e Tr ansmisin, P roteccin, adems converjan en las mismas instalaciones, deben de
Relevador d e s obre-corriente, p roteccin d ireccional, hacerse consideraciones especiales como es el caso de los
acoplamiento mutuo, i mpedancia d e s ecuencia cer o acoplamientos mutuos de secuencia cero, as como las
mutua. inversiones de las corrientes en caso de falla. La reactancia
mutua provoca una variacin en la reactancia de secuencia
Abstract In this article they are the effect that presents positiva entre un 3% a un 5%, as mismo los acoplamientos
the mutual c oupling of t he l ines of transmission of mutuos provocan sobre corrientes de secuencia cero y la
double circuit with buses common in the protection of on aparicin de impedancias mutuas de secuencia cero que
current. Also one appears an example of the adjustment llegan a afectar entre un 50% y un 70% de la impedancia de
and c oordination o f t his p rotection i n c onnected l ines secuencia cero de la lnea [2]. Entonces l no tomar en
magnetically. cuenta estos factores ha ocasionado un sin nmero de
disparos incorrectos, por esta razn es necesario realizar un
Keywords Transmission L ine, P rotection, rel ay o n- anlisis que conlleve a proponer ajustes que garanticen la
current, directional pr otection, m utual coupling, operacin correcta de los relevadores instalados en las lneas
impedance of mutual sequence zero. de transmisin en paralelo.

I. INTRODUCCIN II. RELEVADOR DIRECCIONAL DE SOBRE-


CORRIENTE
Las lneas de transmisin constituyen el elemento
principal que sirven para transportar la energa elctrica de
un lugar a otro. stas se pueden clasificar segn su longitud Para que un relevador direccional de sobrecorriente
en lneas largas, medianas o cortas o tambin por su tipo de pueda discriminar la direccin de la falla requiere valores de
configuracin en lneas radiales, anilladas o paralelas. En la corriente y voltaje, esta caracterstica de direccionalidad
actualidad en lo que respecta a la configuracin de las lneas normalmente se emplea en lneas anilladas o paralelas.
en paralelo es ms comn utilizar este tipo de configuracin
ya que se refuerzan los enlaces y se proporciona un En los sistemas radiales la utilizacin de los elementos
aumento en la cantidad de energa elctrica que se transmite direccionales de sobrecorriente es prcticamente
y al mismo tiempo brinda una mayor confiabilidad al innecesaria, esto porque la aportacin de corriente de falla
sistema elctrico. de la carga hacia el punto de falla en el alimentador es
prcticamente despreciable.
Para proteger las lneas de transmisin se deben de tomar
en cuenta las caractersticas de las lneas como son su En general se sabe que un elemento direccional clsico
longitud y su configuracin, ya que el clculo de los ajustes responde al desfasamiento de la corriente y el voltaje de fase
y la coordinacin de las protecciones vara entre una que entra al relevador, para las fallas que se presentan sobre
configuracin y otra, a medida que varios enlaces se unen la lnea protegida para fallas hacia delante la corriente se
para formar una red. Se debe de tener en cuenta que en caso atrasa con respecto al voltaje, es decir que el ngulo entre la
de falla existirn un mayor nmero de aportaciones que tensin y la corriente corresponden al ngulo de impedancia
deben ser consideradas en los ajustes de los relevadores para del lazo de la falla.
96

Si una falla llega a presentarse en la lnea adyacente (fallas del par mnimo es alcanzado para todas las fallas, pero
hacia atrs) el ngulo del voltaje permanece casi sin cambios llevado a la prctica en el momento en el que alguno de los
y el ngulo de la corriente cambia alrededor de 180, esta interruptores asociado al bus comn abre, se presenta el
informacin es utilizada por el elemento direccional para efecto como si se tuviera una fuente de secuencia cero
discriminar entre fallas hacia delante y hacia atrs como se aislada afectando los elementos direccionales de secuencia
muestra en la figura 1. La entrada de voltaje acta como cero. l problema anterior puede resolverse utilizando los
referencia del ngulo de desfasamiento y es denominado elementos de secuencia negativa, los cuales tienen una
como voltaje de polarizacin del relevador, as mismo la aplicacin comn en las instalaciones donde se tienen
seal de corriente contiene la informacin para determinar la transformadores de potencial conectados en delta abierta o
ubicacin de la falla y es denominada como cantidad de bien donde se tienen transformadores de potencial
operacin del relevador. disponibles en el lado opuesto de un banco de
transformacin con conexin estrella-delta.

La componente de secuencia negativa se caracteriza por su


disponibilidad y confiabilidad en la cantidad de
polarizacin, as que mientras los voltajes y corrientes de
Figura 1 Fasores de Voltaje y Corriente para determinar la direccin de la
secuencia cero no siempre estn disponibles, los de
falla secuencia negativa siempre lo estn.

En este artculo se da un nfasis especial en la proteccin Se puede decir que es indistintamente del tipo de elemento
direccional de sobrecorriente para fallas a tierra (67N), en direccional que se use y de su conexin, el elemento de
este tipo de fallas todas las cantidades de secuencia estn sobrecorriente siempre responde a la corriente residual 3I0
presentes, por lo tanto pueden utilizarse estas componentes [1 ].
para la polarizacin del elemento direccional. En algunos
casos se utilizan las cantidades de secuencia cero debido a Actualmente las protecciones digitales integran la
que son relativamente fciles de obtener, la corriente informacin del voltaje y la corriente, realizando los
residual que se obtiene de tres transformadores de corriente clculos de los elementos direccionales y evaluando los
conectados en estrella representa la corriente de secuencia datos, a fin de adoptar la decisin direccional correcta, es
cero. decir que los relevadores modernos permiten utilizar
mltiples elementos direccionales, segn las condiciones del
As mismo la tensin que se obtiene de tres transformadores sistema.
de potencial con el primario conectado en estrella aterrizada
y el secundario en conexin delta abierta representa una Estas razones conducen a elegir elementos de secuencia
tensin de secuencia cero. Tanto la corriente de secuencia negativa para la polarizacin del elemento direccional
cero como la tensin de secuencia cero, pueden ser debido a que dichos elementos no son sensibles a la
utilizadas como cantidad de polarizacin para un elemento impedancia de acoplamiento mutuo de secuencia cero para
direccional de secuencia cero. topologas de lneas paralelas, inclusive con aquellas que
poseen fuentes de impedancia de secuencia cero aisladas.
Como se mencion anteriormente el comportamiento de las
fallas depende de la configuracin que tengan las lneas, por El elemento que actan para fallas a tierra es el 51N que
ejemplo para lneas paralelas en un doble circuito, los corresponde al elemento residual de sobre-corriente y se
efectos de acoplamientos mutuos con una alta impedancia define con las siguientes caractersticas:
de secuencia cero y que adems tengan fuentes de secuencia
aislada como es el caso de lneas con un solo bus en comn, 51NC.- Tipo de curva del elemento residual de sobre-
afectan directamente a los elementos direccionales de corriente, en la figura 2 se muestra el tipo de curva utilizada
secuencia cero y por lo tanto el relevador puede dar una en los ajustes de las lneas ANG1 y ANG2.
mala operacin, en las siguientes secciones se har una 51NTD.- Tiempo de dial del elemento de sobrecorriente.
mencin puntual sobre el efecto de los acoplamientos 51NP.- Pickup del elemento de sobre-corriente.
mutuos. Entre otros datos de ajuste del relevador se deben colocar
los valores de relacin de transformacin de corriente
Sin embargo, cuando se habla de lneas paralelas que poseen (CTR), relacin de transformacin de voltaje (PTR). Para
buses comunes en ambos extremos de la lnea como es el ajustar los elementos que brindan la direccionalidad del
caso del articulo, se ha demostrado que los elementos relevador se deben ingresar los datos de: ngulo de torque
direccionales polarizados con secuencia cero no producen mximo de la lnea (MTA) y la sensibilidad con un valor
una declaracin incorrecta de la direccin de la falla para proporcional al pickup del elemento sobre-corriente 51P
ste tipo de configuraciones, esto suponiendo que el umbral siendo 4 A<51pp<12.6 A
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 97

El caso anterior no es el nico que se presenta ya que


existen diversos y estos se muestran en las figuras
siguientes:

Figura 4 Acoplamiento mutuo con un solo extremo comn

Figura 5 Acoplamiento mutuo sin ningn extremo comn

Figura 2 Curva Inversa Relevador SEL 1 [7]

III.- LINEAS CON ACOPLAMIENTO MUTUO

La Impedancia de secuencia cero mutua se presenta


cuando existen dos o ms lneas en paralelo, ya sea en la Figura 6 Acoplamiento mutuo y apertura inicial en un extremo con el otro
misma torre o en adyacentes. Esta impedancia permite cerrado.
calcular la cada de voltaje de secuencia cero que se
presentara en una lnea, debido a la circulacin de corriente
de secuencia cero por la otra lnea [3]. La expresin de
clculo es:

=
V01 Z 01 I 01 + Z 0 m I 02 (1)

Donde V01, Z01 e I01 son el voltaje, impedancia y


corriente de secuencia cero respectivamente, en el circuito 1
donde ocurre la falla, Zom es la impedancia de secuencia Figura 7 Mltiples acoplamientos
cero mutua e I02 es la corriente de secuencia cero por el
circuito 2. En la figura 3 se muestra el caso donde se tienen En la figura 4 se tienen el acoplamiento mutuo en lneas en
dos lneas acopladas con dos buses en comn. paralelo pero en las cuales nicamente se tienen un bus en
comn, en la figura 5 se tienen el acoplamiento mutuo pero
en este caso no se tienen ningn bus en comn, para este
caso las lneas pueden estar al mismo nivel de tensin o a
diferente nivel de tensin. En la figura 6 se tienen el
acoplamiento mutuo pero un extremo de la lnea se
encuentra abierta mientras que el otro extremo se encuentra
cerrado.
Figura 3 Acoplamiento mutuo con extremos comunes
98

En el ltimo caso (figura 7) cada lnea de transmisin estar Otra situacin que requiere se tome en cuenta son los
acoplada con las otras dos en parte de su trayecto y no en efectos de acoplamientos mutuos cuando una de las lneas
todo. Estos acoplamientos tambin se pueden presentar entre paralelas esta fuera de servicio y aterrizada en ambos
lneas de diferente nivel de tensin, como es el caso de extremos, en caso de existir una falla a tierra en la lnea que
lneas en paralelo, en un camino comn de lneas, o el poco est en servicio esta puede inducir una corriente en el
frecuente caso de circuitos con diferente nivel de tensin en circuito aterrizado del alimentador, causando una seal de
una misma torre. En los dos ltimos casos hay una dificultad compensacin mutua engaosa.
prctica para llevar las seales necesarias que permitan
incorporar las corrientes de secuencia cero mutuas a los La corriente producida por el acoplamiento mutuo vara
rels. inversamente con la distancia de separacin de las lneas y
directamente con el voltaje que llevan las mismas. [5]

IV EFECTO DEL ACOPLAMIENTO MUTUO DE V. EFECTO DEL ACOPLAMIENTO MUTUO EN LA


SECUENCIA CERO EN LNEAS DE TRANSMISIN DE PROTECCIN DIRECCIONAL DE SOBRECORRIENTE.
DOBLE CIRCUITO.
A menudo este tipo de relevadores se emplean como
El comportamiento de los relevadores de protecciones se proteccin de respaldo en las lneas de transmisin y ofrecen
analiza en trminos de las componentes de secuencia. una buena cobertura en fallas de alta impedancia cuando se
aplican como esquema de comparacin direccional. Para
fallas hacia el extremo remoto de la lnea el acoplamiento
mutuo puede causar una reduccin en la corriente disponible
de secuencia cero en ambas lneas. Esto tendr un efecto en
la sensibilidad del elemento de tierra y el ajuste del pickup
debe ser modificado. Por otro lado, un disparo secuencial en
una lnea fallada puede causar la operacin de la proteccin
de la lnea sana. Para una falla de fase a tierra cerca de un
extremo de la lnea, dicho extremo abrir primero y el
extremo remoto posteriormente. Esto puede inducir una gran
Figura 8 Acoplamiento mutuo en lneas de doble circuito [8] cantidad de corriente de secuencia cero en la lnea adyacente
sana durante el periodo de transicin donde slo un extremo
Los efectos de acoplamientos entre alimentadores paralelos ha abierto y se mantiene alimentando la corriente de falla a
en las componentes de secuencia positiva y negativa, travs del extremo remoto. Esto puede provocar que un
usualmente son muy pequeos y pueden despreciarse. elemento de tierra opere, entonces el ajuste del elemento
sobrecorriente debe considerar las situaciones mencionadas
Sin embargo el efecto del acoplamiento mutuo en la de manera cuidadosa.
secuencia cero, es considerable llegando a afectar entre un
50% y un 70% de la impedancia de secuencia cero de la El efecto de un circuito paralelo abierto y aterrizado en
lnea. El resultado de los acoplamientos mutuos trae consigo ambos extremos tendr como consecuencia una gran
sobre-corrientes de secuencia cero y esto trae consigo la corriente para fallas en el extremo remoto y necesita
aparicin de impedancias mutuas de secuencia cero [4]. En considerarse cuando se determina el ajuste de la proteccin
algunas ocasiones esta impedancia de secuencia cero puede del relevador de sobrecorriente.
resultar en una operacin incorrecta de la direccionalidad
del relevador para fallas a tierra. Cuando se presenta una Efecto d e l os disparos s ecuenciales e i nversin d e
falla de fase a tierra en algunas ocasiones sucede que para corriente
lneas del mismo nivel de voltaje donde existan impedancias
mutuas de secuencia cero provoquen una operacin errnea Cuando una falla es librada secuencialmente en uno de los
del relevador de fallas a tierra. circuitos de una lnea de circuitos dobles con fuentes de
generacin en ambos extremos, la corriente en la lnea sana
Cuando ocurre una falla a tierra en un circuito, el voltaje puede invertirse en un periodo de tiempo y esto puede
aplicado al otro circuito incluye un voltaje inducido provocar disparos por permisivos de sobrealcance o
proporcional a la corriente de secuencia cero en el otro bloqueos de comunicacin que se utilizan en los esquemas
circuito sano. Cuando los parmetros de las lneas paralelas de distancia. Bajo condiciones de carga (el mismo caso que
son similares para una falla externa provocar que los en condiciones de fallas externas) la diferencia de corrientes
efectos de acoplamientos mutuos se cancelen unos a otros entre ambos circuitos es mnima, mientras que despus de
compartiendo las corrientes de secuencia cero para fallas que ocurra una falla ocurra en una de las lneas, la diferencia
remotas. de corriente es significativamente grande en la lnea sana y
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 99

la lnea fallada. Cuando existe una diferencia grande en las En las siguientes figuras se muestra las mismas condiciones
fuentes de ambos extremos, la magnitud de la corriente en que la simulacin anterior solo que ahora se considera el
ambas lneas del lado de la fuente dbil es similar. Los acoplamiento mutuo.
relevadores de sobrecorriente de tierra se ve afectado por los
acoplamientos con condiciones de secuencia cero y los
ajustes de Pick up deben calcularse bajo condiciones de
operacin diferentes [6].

V SIMULACIN Y PRUEBAS

A continuacin se muestran las simulaciones hechas en el


programa ASPEN ON LINER, partiendo de un estado en el
que no existe el efecto de acoplamientos mutuos y
posteriormente se harn con efecto de dichos acoplamientos.
Figura 11 Tiempos de operacin de los relevadores direccionales de
La impedancia de secuencia cero mutua considerado en este sobrecorriente con efecto mutuo
tiene el valor siguiente en PU:

Z0M=0.11074+j0.27506

Primer caso de acoplamientos mutuos Fallas al extremo


remoto.

Para este caso se simulara falla monofsica a tierra al 2% del


extremo remoto de las lneas ANG1 y ANG2, estas
simulaciones se harn sin considerar el efecto del
acoplamiento mutuo y posteriormente considerando el
acoplamiento mutuo. Las figuras que se mostraran a
continuacin representan una red parcial.
Figura 12 Aportacin de corrientes de secuencia cero con acoplamiento
mutuo

De las figuras 9 y 11 se observa que cuando se toma en


cuenta el acoplamiento mutuo de las lneas se tienen un
aumento en el tiempo de operacin de las protecciones, esto
se debe a que se tiene una reduccin de la corriente de
secuencia cero como se observa al compara las figuras 10 y
12.
Segundo caso de acoplamientos mutuos Falla interna con
enlaces cerrados
Figura 9 Tiempos de operacin de los relevadores direccionales de
sobrecorriente sin efecto mutuo Para este caso se simulo una falla monofsica al 2% de la
lnea ANG2 con ambas lneas en servicio. Las primeras
simulaciones se harn sin considerar el acoplamiento mutuo
y posteriormente se harn considerando el acoplamiento
mutuo.

Figura 13 Tiempos de operacin de los relevadores direccionales de


Figura 10 Aportacin de corrientes de secuencia cero sin acoplamiento sobrecorriente sin efecto mutuo
mutuo
100

procedimiento de los criterios de ajuste que se mencionan a


continuacin.

Para el clculo del 67N debe tenerse en cuenta el


compromiso del esquema que es operar para fallas dentro de
la propia lnea y respaldar hasta donde sea posible, esto ser
inherente al clculo y deber quedar definido en las
conclusiones del propio estudio.

El ajuste del pickup se obtiene de calcular fallas a tierra en


los extremos de las lneas adyacentes al bus delantero con el
interruptor abierto en el bus remoto, con el objeto de
Figura 14 Aportacin de corrientes de secuencia cero sin acoplamiento conocer en cada caso la aportacin de la corriente de 3I0 que
mutuo
pasa por el relevador y as seleccionar el pickup de corriente
A continuacin se muestran los tiempos y corrientes de que garantice una sensibilidad adecuada para la deteccin de
secuencia cero pero tomando en cuenta el acoplamiento las fallas a respaldar. El valor de ajuste de pickup ser a
mutuo. criterio entre el 30% y 50% del valor mnimo encontrado en
el clculo. En algunos casos esto no ser posible por lo que
se deber mencionar en el estudio. Para el clculo de la
palanca se simula la falla a tierra en el bus adyacente para
seleccionar el valor de la palanca que proporcione un tiempo
de operacin entre 0.4-0.5 seg. aproximadamente, suficiente
para coordinar con el relevador 67N delantero que deber
operar en un tiempo de 0.1 a 0.2 seg para fallas en
terminales con mxima aportacin, as como con la zona 1
del relevador de distancia a tierra. El clculo deber
efectuarse a la salida de las lneas adyacentes con interruptor
Figura 15 Tiempos de operacin de los relevadores direccionales de
sobrecorriente con efecto mutuo
abierto en el otro extremo, considerando inclusive la
contingencia ms probable y seleccionando la mxima
aportacin.

Para realizar el ajuste del relevador direccional de


sobrecorriente se calculan las aportaciones obtenidas del
programa ASPEN ON LINER simulando fallas a tierra de
las lneas LAT, QMD y MZL y se selecciona la lnea que
tenga menor aportacin de corriente 3I0 para garantizar la
sensibilidad de la proteccin.

En la siguiente figura se muestra las lneas adyacentes a las


lneas ANG2 e ANG1.

Figura 16 Aportacin de corrientes de secuencia cero sin acoplamiento


mutuo
Para este segundo caso puede observarse que el efecto del
acoplamiento mutuo al presentarse una falla interna se
refleja en un incremento de los tiempos de operacin de los
relevadores de sobrecorriente, teniendo un aumento de 60ms
en la lnea ANG2 y un aumento de 80ms en la lnea ANG1.

VI. CRITERIOS DE AJUSTE Y COORDINACION DE LA


Figura 17 lneas adyacentes a las lneas ANG2 e ANG1.
PROTECCION DIRECCIONAL DE SOBRECORRIENTE

Para seleccionar el ajuste y la coordinacin del relevador


direccional de sobrecorriente es necesario seguir el
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 101

En la tabla siguiente se muestran las aportaciones de IV. CONCLUSIONES


corriente.
La configuracin de las lneas en paralelo que tienen el
mismo derecho de va se ven afectadas por el fenmeno de
ANG1 ANG2 Linea Adyacente acoplamiento electromagntico, esto se refleja en un
Amperes Amperes Amperes incremento en la impedancia de secuencia cero y en una
172 172 LAT disminucin de la corriente de secuencia cero, lo que puede
171 171 QMD ocasionar que el relevador direccional de sobrecorriente
170 170 MZL tenga una operacin incorrecta en la direccionalidad para
fallas a tierra. El acoplamiento de secuencia positiva y
Para el clculo del pickup de la lnea se usa la corriente ms negativa son valores pequeos por lo que estas no influyen
pequea que aportan las lneas adyacentes. en el ajuste y coordinacin de las protecciones.

I=170 (0.3) =51 amp Para que se tenga un funcionamiento adecuado de la


Ipickup= I/RTC= 51amp / 160= 0.318 amp proteccin se debe de tomar en cuenta el acoplamiento
mutuo de las lneas, ya que si no se toma en cuenta se
tendran operaciones incorrectas en dichas protecciones ya
que el acoplamiento mutuo genera un incremento en el
tiempo de operacin de los relevadores direccionales de
sobrecorriente [ver figuras 9,11,13 y 17], por lo anterior se
hace necesario considerar el acoplamiento mutuo al
momento de realizar el ajuste y coordinacin de las
protecciones.

Por otra parte, para seleccionar el pickup adecuado se hace


necesario conocer la aportacin de 3I0 de las lneas
adyacentes, esto con la finalidad de garantizar la
sensibilidad de la proteccin para que opere correctamente.

REFERENCIAS
[1] P. M. Anderson Power System Protection John Wiley, 1998.

[2] Stanley H. Horowitz Power System Relaying. John Wiley, 1991.

[3] Russell Mason The Artic and Science of Protection Relaying.


Jhon Wiley 1956
[4] AIEE Committee Report, Protection of Multiterminal and Tapped
Lines Trans. AIEE,80 April 1961, pp. 55-65
[5] Wheeler, S.A., Influence of Mutual Coupling Between Parallel
Circuits on the Setting of Distance Protection, Proc. IEE, 117, (2),
1970, pp. 439-444
[6] Popovic L.M A practical method for evaluation of ground current
distribution on double circuit parallel lines IEE Transactions on
Volume 10, Issue 1, Jan 1995 page 187-193
[7] Y.G. Paithankan Transmission Network Protection Theory and
Practice. Marcel Dekkel Inc.
[8] Alstom Protective Relaying Application Guide
Figura 18 Tiempos de operacin y coordinacin de los elementos
direccionales de sobrecorriente y proteccin temporizada de sobrecorriente
de neutro del banco con simulacin de falla en el bus adyacente ala L.T.s
IP-PC e ITP93060PIC.

En la figura 18 se observa que para una falla en el bus


adyacente de las lneas analizadas los relevadores
direccionales de sobrecorriente operan en un tiempo de
550ms. As mismo el elemento temporizado de
sobrecorriente de neutro respaldara para esta falla en un
tiempo de 1.26s garantizando con estos tiempos que para esa
falla operen las protecciones primarias y las de respaldo de
la propia lnea.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 103

METODOLOGA PARA EL ANLISIS DE PERTURBACIONES EN SISTEMAS DE POTENCIA MEDIANTE


ATPDRAW CASO DE PUENTE ABIERTO EN LA LNEA ESMERALDA YUMBO 2 A 230kV

Diego Alejandro Tejada Arango Sadul Segundo Urbaez Gonzalez

Analista Anlisis Operativo Especialista Operacin Red


Anlisis Operativo Anlisis Operativo
Direccin Gestin de la Operacin Direccin Gestin de la Operacin
ISA-Colombia ISA-Colombia
dtejada@isa.com.co surbaez@isa.com.co

RESUMEN. Este documento presenta el anlisis, Causa Porcentaje


la metodologa, simulacin y experiencia de Acercamiento Conductores 0.7%
anlisis postoperativo de Interconexin Elctrica Alta Vegetacin 2.1%
S.A. (ISA) asociada a una falla en un circuito a 230
kV compensado serie por un puente abierto que Cada de rbol 0.3%
ocasion indisponibilidad del circuito fallado por No Establecida 33.3%
casi 24 horas. Este artculo hace especial nfasis Otros 2.5%
en la localizacin de la falla y metodologa de Total -
simulacin para la caracterizacin desde el punto Fuente: Elaboracin Propia
de vista elctrico del evento. Nota: La causa no establecida, representa fallas que son
de naturaleza fugaz y con caractersticas iguales a las
PALABRAS CLAVES. Interconexin Elctrica S.A. causadas por descarga atmosfrica,
(ISA), Sistema de transmisin Nacional (STN), Tabla 1. Estadstica de fallas 2001 - 2010
ATPDraw, fallas longitudinales, recierre,
registrador de fallas, compensacin serie, Sistema Como se aprecia en la Tabla 1, las fallas
de Informacin de Descargas (SID), anlisis de asociadas a ruptura de conductores y daos en
fallas. bajantes han representado del orden de 0,6% del
total de fallas. El anlisis, caracterizacin y
INTRODUCCIN.
simulacin de este tipo de fallas es de especial
Las redes de transmisin de un sistema de
potencia, estn constantemente expuestos a fallas inters y para ello en este artculo se describe y
ocasionadas por descargas atmosfricas, analiza el evento del 26/12/2010 en el circuito
vegetacin, acercamientos con circuitos de otros Esmeralda Yumbo 2 a 230kV, el cual tuvo como
niveles de tensin, entre otros. Por su parte, las causa de la falla, un puente abierto en la fase C de
fallas ms comunes en las lneas de transmisin la torre 321.
son los cortos circuitos a tierra y entre fases, como
lo son fallas monofsicas, trifsicas, bifsicas a 1. DESCRIPCIN DEL EVENTO
tierra y bifsicas aisladas. Sin embargo, ante el El 26/12/2010 a las 18:33 se present el disparo
envejecimiento de las redes de transmisin ms al del circuito Esmeralda - Yumbo 2 a 230 kV con 130
incremento del flujo de potencia a travs de ellas, MW ante falla en el circuito y operacin de sus
comienzan a ser ms comunes fallas del tipo protecciones principales, ver Figura 1. La falla se
longitudinal, como conductores rotos (que localiz en la torre 321 a 16.51 km desde Yumbo
tradicionalmente han sido ms comunes en niveles por un puente abierto en la fase C del circuito, en
de distribucin). En la Tabla 1se presenta una la Figura 2 se presenta el registro fotogrfico de la
estadstica de las fallas en circuitos de transmisin falla mediante la inspeccin area realizada por
presentadas en el perodo 2001 - 2010 en la red de ISA.La lnea tiene una compensacin serie a 6 km
ISA. de la subestacin Yumbo, en las instalaciones de
la subestacin San Marcos 230kV, la cual qued
Causa Porcentaje por by-pass a raz de la falla en el circuito.
Descarga Atmosfrica 47.2%
Derribamiento de Torres 11.8%
Quema o Fuego Bajo la Lnea 1.6%
Dao en Conductor - Bajante 0.6%
104

Como se mencion en numerales anteriores, la


falla se produjo por un puente abierto en la fase C
de la torre 321. En la torre fallada la fase C est
en la parte superior y la fase B en la intermedia
(ver Figura 2), al abrirse el puente de la fase C, se
hizo contacto con la fase B y produjo la falla entre
las fases del circuito. Se produjo el disparo de
ambos extremos por recierre en falla en Esmeralda
y falla en tiempo de reclamo en Yumbo. La
compensacin serie se fue a by-pass (cierre del
interruptor 2CS10), luego se realiz intento
decierre desde Yumbo el cual fue exitoso, luego se
realiz intento de cierre manual desde Esmeralda
el cual fue no exitoso por falla en las fases B y C,
cuando se realiz estecierre desde Esmeralda, en
Yumbo se detect la falla slo en la fase B y la
baha realiz recierre monofsico exitoso en
Yumbo. Ambos cierres manuales se realizaron
con la compensacin serie en by-pass. Debido a
este rechazo en la energizacin, se procedi a
revisar la localizacin de la falla e inspeccin del
circuito.
Fuente: ISA-Sistema de Transmisin Nacional 2.1 RELES INSTALADOS PARA PROTECCION DEL
CIRCUITO
Figura 1. Diagrama unifilar
Para la proteccin del circuito se tienen
instalados en ambos extremos de la lnea, rels
PXLN y LFDC ambos del fabricante Alsthom. El
rel PXLN es un rel con principio de operacin
distancia y como particularidad para la proteccin
de esta lnea su zona 1 fue temporizada 120ms,
con el fin de prevenir disparos indeseados ante
fallas externas, que presenten incursiones
transitorias en la zona 1 del rel. El rel LFDC es
de un principio de operacin por cantidades
superimpuestas (V, I).

2.2 ANLISIS DE LOS REGISTROS DE FALLA EN


ESMERALDA
En la baha de lnea de Esmeralda 230 kV campo
a Yumbo 2 se detect Falla en la fase C en el rel
LFDC (no se detect falla en la fase B, la tensin
de fase no disminuy y la corriente no aument lo
suficiente como para que los deltas generaran
disparo de la fase B) el rel PXLN present
omisin de actuacin en la primera falla lo cual es
normal porque la zona 1 est temporizada 120ms.
La falla fue aclarada por el interruptorL250, con
apertura de la fase C a los 77 ms y con recierre a
Fuente: Inspeccin de la lnea realizada por ISA los 802 ms (tiempo muerto: 725 ms, una vez
realizado el recierre se present nuevamente falla
Figura 2. Fotografa de la causa de la falla
en la fase C a los 805 ms, aclarada por el
interruptor L250, con apertura de las fases ABC a
los 872 ms por orden del rel LFDC y del PXLN
por su funcin de cierre en falla, ver Figura 3.
2. ANALISIS DEL EVENTO ESMERALDA
YUMBO 2
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 105

Figura 5. Anlisis de la tensin durante el ciclo de


recierre monofsico

2.3 ANLISIS DE LOS REGISTROS DE FALLA EN


YUMBO
En la baha de Yumbo 230 kV campo a Esmeralda
2 se detect falla en las fases B y C en el rel
Fuente: Registrador de Fallas en Esmeralda LFDC, el rel PXLN present omisin de actuacin
en la primera falla lo cual es normal porque la zona
Figura 3. Oscilografa del evento en Esmeralda 1 est temporizada 120ms. La falla fue aclarada
por el interruptor L190, con apertura de las fases
De este registro es importante destacar dos ABC a los 70 ms y con recierre trifsico Barra Viva
aspectos para detectar la apertura de la fase C en Lnea Muerta a los 663 ms (tiempo muerto: 593
algn punto de la lnea. Primero, la corriente de ms). Una vez realizado el recierre se present
prefalla de la fase C es capacitiva, lo que indica nuevamente falla en la fase B a los 805 ms
que ya no haba flujo de potencia por esta fase en (despus del recierre del otro extremo) el rel
el circuito, ver Figura 4. Segundo, la tensin de la LFDC dispar nuevamente, la segunda falla fue
fase C durante el ciclo de recierre monofsico es aclarada por el interruptor L190, con apertura de
igual al de la fase B, lo cual indica la unin de las fases ABC a los 867 ms, ver Figura 6.
ambas fases, ver Figura 5.

Fuente: Registrador de Fallas en Yumbo

Figura 6. Oscilografa del evento en Yumbo

Al igual que para el extremo de Esmeralda, para el


extremo de Yumbo tambin vale la pena destacar
de los registros de la falla la corriente de prefalla
en la fase C, la cual tambin indicada apertura del
conductor antes de la falla, ver Figura 4.

Fuente: Registrador de Fallas en Esmeralda

Figura 4. Anlisis de la corriente de prefalla

Fuente: Registrador de Fallas en Yumbo

Figura 7. Anlisis de la corriente de prefalla

2.4 ANLISIS DEL TIPO DE FALLA


Se analiz la falla desde ambos extremos,
mostrando que por la caracterstica de la falla, sta
fue bifsica en un extremo y monofsica en el
Fuente: Registrador de Fallas en Esmeralda otro. Ahora bien, una pregunta que surge en el
momento del anlisis es si la falla fue bifsica a
106

tierra o bifsica aislada. Una duda que se


presenta al observar que las corrientes en las
fases falladas son de magnitudes muy diferentes y
ngulos de fase tambin diferentes de 180.

Con el fin de entender un poco mejor el tipo de


falla se procedi a realizar una sincronizacin de
los registros de ambos extremos y mediante el
anlisis fasorial, en el momento de la falla, poder
determinar el tipo de falla presentada. En la Figura
8, se muestra como los fasores de corriente de las
fases B en ambos extremos de la lnea suman el Fuente: Elaboracin Propia
valor negativo del fasor de corriente de la fase C
en el extremo donde la falla se present de Figura 8. Anlisis fasorial de las corrientes de falla
manera bifsica. Esto nos lleva a lanzar la
hiptesis de que la falla fue bifsica aislada de
tierra, esta hiptesis ser validad mediante la Se procedi a validar la localizacin de la falla con
simulacin del evento en el ATPDraw en el el registro de la corriente capacitiva desde el
numeral 4 del presente artculo. extremo de Yumbo. Este mtodo de localizacin
est basado en que para una lnea de transmisin
2.5 ANLISIS DE LA LOCALIZACIN DE LA en estado estable a frecuencia industrial la
FALLA magnitud de la corriente capacitiva de la lnea es
La longitud total del circuito es de 193.3 km, la directamente proporcional a la longitud de la lnea.
localizacin de la falla desde Esmeralda dada por Para el caso de una fase abierta la corriente
la proteccin principal de la lnea fue 100.4km. capacitiva corresponder a los kilmetros desde la
subestacin hasta el punto donde se encuentra
abierta la fase.
Para nuestro caso particular del circuito Esmeralda
Yumbo 2, al energizar desde Yumbo el registro
mostr que las fases sanas (A y B) tena una
corriente de 88.9Amp capacitivos y que la fase
afectada (C) tena una corriente de 8.74Amp
capacitivos, ver Figura 9. Haciendo una regla de
tres (si para 193.3km son 88.9km, para 8.74Amp
sern 20km) se determin que la localizacin de la
falla era alrededor de 20km desde Yumbo. El rea
de mantenimiento determin que la falla estaba en
la torre 321 a 16.51km desde Yumbo (error de
3.49km en la localizacin mediante este mtodo).

A pesar de ser una falla sin resistencia de falla, por


sus caractersticas elctricas, puede verse que se
produce un alto error en el clculo de la
localizacin si empleamos mtodos de localizacin
basados en la impedancia de la lnea.

En Yumbo la localizacin con el Registrador de


Fallas fue un valor entre 29.9km y 42km desde
esta subestacin utilizando el loop fase B a tierra.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 107

X1) de las zonas del sistema que no se


modelaran en detalle.
4. Al tener todos los datos necesarios, se
representa en el software ATPDraw cada uno
de los dispositivos (Lneas, Transformadores,
Reactores, Condensadores, etc.) que se
encuentran dentro de la zona donde ocurri la
falla y son relevantes en el anlisis del evento.
5. Al tener modelado el sistema (sin la falla), se
debe sintonizar el modelo con los valores de
prefalla (Tensiones y Corrientes) entregados
por los registros de los Registradores de falla y
rels.
6. Al tener sintonizado el sistema seleccionamos
el punto real donde ocurri la falla en el
modelo, en caso de ser en una lnea de
transmisin, utilizar la distancia entregada por
el localizador de fallas como una primera
Fuente: Elaboracin Propia
aproximacin.
Figura 9. Magnitudes de la corriente capacitiva 7. Por medio de los registros se debe visualizar el
tipo de falla que ocurri en el evento. En caso
3. MODELO DE SIMULACIONEN ATPDRAW de no estar muy claro en el registro, se debe
Con el anlisis del evento presentado en los realizar una sensibilizacin, aplicando
numerales anteriores, se procedi a corroborar el diferentes fallas al modelo hasta encontrar la
comportamiento de la falla mediante una que represente las formas de ondas del
simulacin en ATPDraw. Para el modelado de registro durante la falla (la falla se ubicar de
cualquier sistema elctrico existen procedimientos acuerdo al tem anterior).
dentro del proceso de generacin de un caso de 8. Al tener el tipo de falla, por medio de los
simulacin y que en todos los casos en que se interruptores del sistema modelado
quiera reproducir un evento deben ser aplicados representaremos la secuencia de apertura y
de una u otra forma. Por esta razn, se proponen cierre de cada uno de los interruptores que
los siguientes puntos importantes para todo intervienen en el evento.
proceso de modeladode fallas en sistemas de 9. Luego se simula en el programa y se observa
potencias: que los aportes de corrientes sean
consecuentes con los aportes vistos en el
1. Se debe visualizar el punto donde ocurri la registro, en caso contrario, mover el punto de
falla y a partir de eso determinar que partes de falla.
todo el sistema se modelaran de forma 10. Dentro del proceso de sintonizacin de la falla,
detallada y cules de manera simplificada. existen ciertos parmetros que pueden ser
2. Obtener los datos necesarios para la variados, entre los cuales estn la ubicacin
representacin en ATPDraw de los dispositivos de la falla, impedancia de la falla y los valores
que sern modelados. En caso de no de secuencia cero.
conseguir estos datos, utilizar datos tpicos o
datos de un dispositivo similar.
3. Por medio de un Software de simulacin de De acuerdo a la metodologa expuesta, a
sistemas de potencia (para el caso de ISA continuacin se presentan los parmetros de
Power Factory DIgSILENT) obtener los datos modelado para el caso del evento de la lnea
de los equivalentes de Thevenin (R0, X0, R1 y Esmeralda Yumbo 2.
108

3.1 EQUIVALENTES DE CORTO CIRCUITO 11la configuracin del modelo creado en ATPDraw
Para los equivalentes de corto circuito se para la simulacin.
emplearon los elementos LINESY_3 (para modelo
de las redes de secuencia) y ACSOURCE (para la Parmetro Lnea Esmeralda Yumbo 2
fuente de tensin trifsica), ver Figura 10. Longitud [km] 193.3
Ao de entrada 1971
R0 [ohm/km] 0.4013
X0 [ohm/km] 1.3275
B0 [S/km] 2.1592
R1 [ohm/km] 0.0547
X1 [ohm/km] 0.4618
B1 [S/km] 3.4880
Fuente: XM Parmetros Tcnicos (PARATEC)

Tabla 3. Parmetros de la lnea de transmisin.


Fuente: Elaboracin Propia

Figura 10. Elementos usados en los equivalentes

Los parmetros de secuencia (R0, X0, R1, X1)


empleados para la simulacin se obtuvieron a
partir de los niveles de corto circuito trifsico y
monofsico de cada subestacin. La tensin de
prefalla lnea-neutro se obtuvo de los registros del
evento. Los parmetros obtenidos se presentan
en la Tabla 2.
Fuente: Elaboracin Propia
Parmetro S/E Esmeralda S/E Yumbo
Figura 11. Modelo de lnea usado en ATPDraw
Icc 3f [kA] 13.48 10.39 3.3 COMPENSACIN SERIE
Icc 1f [kA] 13.15 11.48 Para la simulacin de la compensacin serie de la
R0 [ohm] 1.306 0.979 lnea, se emple un modelo simplificado
X0 [ohm] 9.863 8.048 condensador ms interruptor de by-pass, ver
R1 [ohm] 0.817 0.902 Figura 12.
X1 [ohm] 9.279 12.044
Vprefalla [kV] 131 130
Fuente: Elaboracin Propia

Tabla 2. Parmetros para los equivalentes.

3.2 LNEA DE TRANSMISIN


La lnea de transmisin Esmeralda Yumbo 2 a
230kV est en una estructura decircuito doble con
un diseo de torre Normalizada Clase II, la Fuente: Elaboracin Propia
configuracin esvertical, con un conductor de fase
Figura 12. Modelo empleado para la compensacin
AAAC 1200 61/0 y un cable de guarda: serie
ALUMOWELDAW 7 NUM9 7/0. En la Tabla 3 se Este condensador serie, compensa la lnea en un
presentan los parmetros de la lnea y en la Figura 50%, tiene una capacidad de 3x22Mvar, tensin
nominal de 31.5kV y tiene para su proteccin un
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 109

spark gap, un varistor y un interruptor. Para esta


simulacin slo se model el interruptor debido a
que producto de la energa producida en el varistor
hizo que la compensacin rpidamente se fuera a
by-pass (cierre del interruptor) y la compensacin
no tuviera ms efecto en la falla.

3.4 MODELO PARA LA SIMULACION


Con todos los parmetros de entrada descritos en
los numerales anteriores y los datos obtenidos del
anlisis de la falla, se cre el modelo de simulacin
en ATPDraw, presentado en la Figura 13:

Fuente: Elaboracin Propia

Figura 14. Tensiones en el extremo de Esmeralda

Fuente: Elaboracin Propia

Figura 13. Modelo realizado en ATPDraw

4. SIMULACIONES DEL EVENTO CON


ATPDRAW
Con los elementos del numeral 3 y la informacin
de los tiempos de operacin reales del evento del
numeral 2, se procedieron a realizar las
simulaciones con el ATPDraw. Para confirmar la
hiptesis de una falla bifsica aislada de tierra, se
procedi a realizar este tipo de falla en el modelo y
a validar los valores de simulacin respecto a los
valores reales de los registros de falla. A
continuacin en la Figura 14, Figura 15, Figura 16
y Figura 17, se presenta una comparacin de los
resultados y algunos valores de especial inters
para realizar una comparacin, la primera grfica
siempre ser asociada al registro real y la segunda Fuente: Elaboracin Propia
al resultado de la simulacin.
Figura 15. Tensiones en el extremo de Yumbo
110

Fuente: Elaboracin Propia

Figura 18. Comparacin de las corrientes de falla

De acuerdo con los resultados anteriores, una


comparacin entre los resultados entregados por la
simulacin y los valores reales dados por el
registrador de fallas, se puede concluir que
definitivamente la falla que ocurri durante el
evento fue bifsica aislada de tierra, debido a que
representa con fidelidad las formas de ondas y
valores de tensin y corriente en la simulacin
realizada en ATPDraw.

Fuente: Elaboracin Propia

Figura 16. Corrientes en el extremo de Esmeralda 5. CONCLUSIONES Y RECOMENDACIONES

Las fallas asociadas a apertura de puentes o


ruptura de conductores representan un gran
reto para los ingenieros de operacin, debido a
que para este tipo de fallas los mtodos de
localizacin por impedancia pueden generar
errores que afectan la disponibilidad de la
lnea, en este artculo adems de presentar
una caracterizacin de la falla ocurrida en el
circuito Esmeralda Yumbo 2, se realiz
nfasis en la localizacin de falla mediante
corriente capacitiva, el cual para el caso de
ISA ha generado inspecciones en la lnea con
este tipo de fallas ms efectivas que los
mtodos de localizacin por impedancia.

En los sistemas de potencia ocurren diferente


tipo de fallas a diario, sin embargo fallas como
la presentada en este artculo son poco
comunes, an cuando el envejecimiento de las
redes y el incremento del flujo flujos de
potencia, hacen ms propenso los circuitos a
este tipo de falla. Con lo cual las simulaciones
Fuente: Elaboracin Propia para su caracterizacin cobra relevancia en la
operacin del sistema de potencia.
Figura 17. Corrientes en el extremo de Yumbo

En la Figura 18, se presenta una comparacin de En este artculo hemos planteado una
las corrientes de falla punto a punto entre la metodologa para la caracterizacin de la falla
simulacin y el registro real de falla. mediante el programa de simulacin ATPDraw
con resultados satisfactorios.

La caracterizacin de la falla mediante el


ATPDraw comprob que se trataba deuna falla
bifsica aislada, en la cual las corrientes de
falla no tuvieron el comportamiento tpico de
este tipo de fallas (igual magnitud, desfase de
180), lo cual representa un reto para las
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 111

protecciones elctricas.Por esta razn se Santander- 1998. Empleado de Interconexin


recomienda incluir este tipo fallas dentro de las Elctrica S.A E.S.P desde 1997, donde ha
pruebas a rels de proteccin. desempeado los cargos de Analista de Operacin
y actualmente desempea el cargo de Especialista
6. REFERENCIAS de Operacin de la Direccin Gestin de la
operacin de la Subgerencia Tcnica de
[1] DOMMEL H. W., "Emtp Rule Book", Can/Am Interconexin Elctrica S.A E.S.P
EMTP User Group, 1995
[2] DOMMEL H. W., "Electromagnetic
Transients Program Manual (EMTP Theory
Book)", Portland, OR: Bonneville Power
Administration, 1986
[3] FURNAS, "Transitorios Elctricos E
Coordenao De Isolamento", 1987
[4] HIDALEN H. K., "Graphical Preprocessor
To ATP", 2008
[5] MARTNEZ J. A., GUSTAVSEN B.,
DURBAK D., "Parameter Determination For
Modeling System TransientsPart I:
Overhead Lines", IEEE Transactions On
Power Delivery, VOL. 20, NO. 3, JULY 2005,
pp. 2038-2044
[6] ISA, Registro De Falla De La Subestacin
Esmeralda. 26/12/2010.
[7] ISA, Registro De Falla De La Subestacin
Yumbo. 26/12/2010.
[8] ISA, Metodologapara el mejoramiento del
proceso anlisis de perturbaciones mediante
la incorporacin de herramientas de
simulacin de sistemas de potencia para el
equipo de anlisis operativo de ISA. 2007.

Diego Alejandro Tejada Arango

Naci en Medelln, Colombia. Se gradu de


Ingeniera Elctrica en la Universidad Nacional de
Colombia sede Medelln y como Especialista en
Transmisin y Distribucin de Energa Elctrica en
la Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana.
Ha trabajado en la Universidad de Antioquia como
profesor en simulacin de sistemas de potencia, en
Ingeniera Especializada S.A. como ingeniero
consultor y actualmente se desempea como
Analista Operativo en Interconexin Elctrica S.A.
Sus campos de trabajo incluyen los estudios
elctricos en sistemas de potencia y su planeacin.

Sadul Segundo Urbaez Gonzalez

Naci en Fonseca, Colombia. Se gradu de


Ingeniera Elctrica en la Universidad Industrial de
Santander (UIS) -Bucaramanga, Colombia, en
1994, y termin sus estudios de maestra en
Potencia Elctrica en La Universidad Industrial de
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 1113

Protecting Distribution Feeders


for Simultaneous Faults
Jorge Betanzos Manuel and Hctor E. Lemus Zavala, Comisin Federal de Electricidad, Mexico
Eliseo Alczar Ramrez, David Snchez Escobedo, and Hctor J. Altuve, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc.

AbstractOverhead distribution systems may experience analyze the operation of a protection scheme for an actual
faults involving more than one feeder. During simultaneous fault involving two feeders of the Oaxaca Uno Substation
faults, the transformer low-voltage-side overcurrent relay located in Oaxaca de Jurez, Oaxaca, Mexico.
measures a current greater than the current measured by faulted
feeder relays. Therefore, the transformer relay may trip faster
than faulted feeder relays. Transformer relay misoperation II. SIMULTANEOUS FAULTS
affects service availability in circuits not involved with the fault. The need to improve service availability has increased the
In this paper, we describe the causes of simultaneous faults on complexity of distribution network topology. Disconnect
distribution feeders and discuss overcurrent protection
switches allow transferring loads to alternate sources under
coordination problems caused by these faults. We then propose
low-cost protection schemes using multifunction relays with emergency conditions. Limitations on the rights of way make
communications and logic programming abilities. We summarize it necessary to use multicircuit overhead lines or single-circuit
the operation experience of 19 simultaneous fault protection lines that run close to each other. As a result, simultaneous
schemes installed in several substations of two Comisin Federal faults involving more than one circuit are becoming quite
de Electricidad (CFE) distribution divisions in Mexico. Finally, common. Typical causes of simultaneous faults include:
we analyze the operation of a protection scheme for an actual
simultaneous fault.
Multicircuit lines or lines sharing the same right of
way
I. INTRODUCTION Switching operations
Thunderstorms
In radial distribution substations, feeder relays typically
Fig. 1 shows a distribution system with four feeders and
include instantaneous and inverse-time overcurrent elements.
normally open (NO) disconnect switches between adjacent
The transformer low-voltage-side relay provides backup for
feeders.
feeder faults and typically includes inverse-time overcurrent
elements. Utilities normally use automatic reclosing of B1
Feeder 1
T
overhead feeder breakers. The transformer low-voltage-side
breaker lacks automatic reclosing. S1 (NC)
S12 (NO)

T
For feeder faults, the faulted feeder relay and transformer B2
Feeder 2
T
relay measure practically the same current. The feeder relays BT
are set to operate faster than the transformer low-voltage-side S2 (NC)
T

B3 S23 (NO)
relay to trip only the faulted feeder. However, for Feeder 3
T
simultaneous feeder faults, the current measured by the
S3 (NC)
transformer relay is greater than the current measured by each
T

B4 S34 (NO)
faulted feeder relay. The transformer relay may operate faster Feeder 4
T
than the faulted feeder relay and undesirably trip the
S4 (NC)
transformer low-voltage-side breaker. Transformer breaker
misoperation affects service to the loads of healthy feeders. Fig. 1. Operation of tie disconnect switches may cause simultaneous faults
Given the growing incidence of simultaneous faults, in distribution systems.
Comisin Federal de Electricidad (CFE), the Mexican national
Under normal conditions, the system shown in Fig. 1
electric utility, decided to apply simultaneous fault protection
operates radially. For a permanent fault on Feeder 2 between
schemes in distribution substations several years ago. For
Breaker B2 and the normally closed (NC) Disconnect
example, the CFE Southeastern Distribution Division has
Switch S2, Breaker B2 trips and recloses to lockout. Operation
18 schemes in operation, and the CFE Jalisco Distribution
personnel open Disconnect Switch S2 to isolate the fault and
Division recently commissioned one scheme.
then close either Disconnect Switch S12 or Disconnect Switch
In this paper, we discuss the overcurrent protection
S23 to restore service to the Feeder 2 load connected beyond
coordination problems caused by simultaneous faults. We
Disconnect Switch S2. When remote access to motor-operated
describe two types of simultaneous fault protection schemes
disconnect (MOD) switches is available, the system operator
for distribution substations and summarize the operation
can send control commands to MOD switches from the
experience of the schemes installed in several substations of
distribution system dispatch center, in which case, service
the CFE distribution divisions mentioned above. Finally, we
114

restoration may take minutes. When remote access is not plus load currents from unfaulted feeders. The relay of each
available, the system operator dispatches field personnel to faulted feeder measures only the feeder fault current. Hence,
manually perform the switching operations, in which case, the transformer relay inverse-time overcurrent element may
service restoration may take hours. trip faster than or simultaneously with the feeder relay
Because switching operations are infrequent events, it is inverse-time overcurrent element. Transformer relay
necessary to periodically close and open the NO disconnect misoperation for simultaneous feeder faults disconnects the
switches as a preventive maintenance operation. This faulted and healthy feeders. All of the loads fed by the
operation may cause a simultaneous fault in two ways: transformer lose service for permanent or temporary faults,
The disconnect switch fails during the test. because the transformer low-voltage-side breaker lacks
A feeder fault occurs while the disconnect switch is automatic reclosing. Operation personnel must travel to the
closed. substation to manually reclose the transformer breaker, in
which case, service restoration may take hours, even for a
III. RELAY COORDINATION PROBLEMS temporary fault.
For a feeder fault in a radial distribution system, the
transformer low-voltage-side overcurrent relay and the faulted
feeder overcurrent relay measure practically the same current
(see Fig. 2).

Fig. 2. For a feeder fault, the transformer relay and faulted feeder relay
measure practically the same current.

Fig. 3 shows an example of coordination between the


inverse-time overcurrent elements of the transformer and
feeder relays. For feeder faults, the inverse-time overcurrent
elements must coordinate for all possible fault current values.
The typical coordination time interval (CTI) is 0.2 to
0.4 seconds. When both elements have the same type of time- Fig. 3. Coordination of inverse-time overcurrent elements for feeder faults.
current curve, the minimum separation between the curves
occurs for the maximum fault current value. In the
coordination example shown in Fig. 3, the curve separation
equals a CTI of 0.3 seconds for a maximum fault current of
6,750 A. The transformer relay overcurrent element must also
protect the transformer against through faults. Hence, the
time-current curve of the transformer relay overcurrent
element must be located between the feeder relay overcurrent
element curve and the transformer through-fault capability
curve, as shown in Fig. 3. The transformer relay actually
measures the sum of all feeder currents, including load. If load
is high enough, the transformer relay settings (pickup or time
dial) must be increased. The examples shown in Fig. 3, Fig. 5,
and Fig. 6 assume light load conditions.
For a simultaneous fault involving two or more feeders (see
Fig. 4. For a simultaneous fault, the transformer relay measures a current
Fig. 4), the transformer low-voltage-side relay measures the greater than the current measured by each faulted feeder relay.
total fault current (sum of the currents on all faulted feeders)
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 115

Fig. 5 illustrates a protection coordination problem for the feeder instantaneous overcurrent elements are set to 3,000 A.
simultaneous fault shown in Fig. 4. We assume that the feeder For a 6,750 A simultaneous fault causing currents of 3,375 A
inverse-time overcurrent elements have identical time-current in both faulted feeders, the feeder relays trip instantaneously,
curves, and we disregard load currents for simplicity. For a and the transformer inverse-time overcurrent element does not
6,750 A simultaneous fault causing equal currents in both operate.
feeders, IT = 6,750 A and I1 = I2 = 3,375 A. The operating time
of each feeder inverse-time overcurrent element is
0.42 seconds. The operating time of the transformer inverse-
time overcurrent element is 0.6 seconds. The operating time
margin is 0.6 0.42 = 0.18 seconds (smaller than the CTI).
The transformer relay may misoperate for this fault.

Fig. 6. Feeder instantaneous overcurrent elements ensure coordination only


for simultaneous faults that they can detect.

However, for line-end faults or resistive faults, feeder


currents can be smaller than the pickup setting of the feeder
instantaneous overcurrent elements. A coordination problem
may occur, because only the feeder inverse-time elements
Fig. 5. The transformer relay inverse-time overcurrent element misoperates detect the fault. In the Fig. 6 example, for a 5,000 A
for a simultaneous fault involving two feeders. simultaneous fault causing currents of 2,500 A in both faulted
Feeder currents can be different for a simultaneous fault. feeders, the operating time of the feeder inverse-time
For example, a fault may result in IT = 6,750 A, overcurrent elements is 0.49 seconds. The operating time of
I1 = 4,850 A, and I2 = 1,900 A. For this fault, the operating the transformer inverse-time overcurrent element is
times are 0.35 seconds for the Feeder 1 relay, 0.6 seconds for 0.62 seconds. The operating time margin is
the Feeder 2 relay, and 0.6 seconds for the transformer relay 0.62 0.49 = 0.13 seconds. The transformer relay may
(see Fig. 5). Operating time margins are misoperate for this fault.
0.6 0.35 = 0.25 seconds for the Feeder 1 relay and
0.6 0.6 = 0 seconds for the Feeder 2 relay. The transformer IV. PROTECTION SCHEMES FOR SIMULTANEOUS FAULTS
relay may misoperate for this fault. In this example, the A solution to the coordination problem for simultaneous
Feeder 1 breaker trips first, causing the Feeder 2 current to feeder faults is to detect the simultaneous fault condition and
increase (this feeder now carries the total fault current). The accelerate tripping of the faulted feeder relays to preserve
Feeder 2 relay will actually trip in less than 0.6 seconds, but coordination. A small time delay (typically 3 to 6 cycles)
not fast enough to prevent transformer breaker misoperation. provides security for inrush feeder currents caused by cold-
Feeder overcurrent relays typically include instantaneous load restoration. Two types of schemes are possible:
overcurrent elements. The transformer and feeder overcurrent Distributed
relays coordinate well for simultaneous faults that cause Centralized
feeder currents greater than the pickup setting of the feeder
instantaneous overcurrent elements. In Fig. 6, for example, the
116

In distributed schemes, the simultaneous fault protection detectors) to identify the faulted feeders. Pickup current
logic resides in the faulted feeder relays. In centralized settings of the 51P and 51G fault detectors should be equal to
schemes, the logic may reside in the transformer relay or logic the settings of the phase and ground inverse-time overcurrent
processor. In any scheme, the devices must have elements of the corresponding feeders. For a simultaneous
communications and logic programming abilities. fault involving Feeder 1 and Feeder 2 (see Fig. 4), the 51P
Simultaneous fault protection schemes require and/or 51G fault detectors of the Feeder 1 relay and Feeder 2
communication between the devices. Fig. 7 shows two relay operate, and OR Gate 1 asserts. Each relay sends the OR
methods of communication between the devices used in the gate output bit to one of the adjacent relays, and this
scheme. The method shown in Fig. 7 (a) consists of wiring a information is sequentially communicated to all of the feeder
relay output contact to a logic input of a relay or logic relays. In the Feeder 1 and Feeder 2 relays, the OR Gate 2 and
processor. An advantage of this method is that relays from AND gate assert to declare a simultaneous fault (bit SV1
different manufacturers can be used in the scheme with no asserts). After a security delay (TPU), the timer asserts bit
additional equipment. The other method, shown in Fig. 7 (b), SV1T. A typical TPU setting is 3 to 6 cycles. The timer reset
uses direct digital communication between devices over time (TDO) must be greater than the total fault-clearing time.
copper wire or fiber-optic cable. An advantage of this method A typical TDO setting is 9 cycles. The bit SV1T assertion
is that the relays and logic processor may continuously initiates the feeder breaker tripping. The almost instantaneous
monitor the communications channel condition and issue an breaker operation at the faulted feeders guarantees
alarm in case of problems. This method can be applied with coordination with the transformer low-voltage-side relay.
relays from different manufacturers by adding remote I/O The faulted feeder relays also initiate reclosing of the
modules to the scheme. faulted feeder breakers. The reclosing times of breakers in
double-circuit lines should be different so that they reclose
sequentially. If the first feeder breaker recloses successfully,
the second feeder breaker is allowed to reclose. For permanent
OUT101 IN101 faults, the first feeder breaker recloses and trips again, and the
Transmit

Receive

Copper
first feeder relay issues a reclosing-blocking signal to the
Relay Output Relay Logic second feeder relay to prevent reclosing of the second feeder
Contact Input
breaker onto a fault.
Relay 1 Relay 2 The simultaneous fault protection scheme clears faults in
(a) 3 to 6 cycles plus the breaker operating time. The fault-
clearing time is comparable to instantaneous tripping, even for
faults that fall out of the reach of the feeder relay
instantaneous overcurrent elements. In addition, this logic
discriminates between single and simultaneous faults and
TMB1A RMB1A issues an alarm for simultaneous faults (not shown in Fig. 8).
Transmit

Receive

Copper
or The alarm helps operation personnel to quickly and safely
Relay Relay
Transmitted Bit Optical Received Bit restore service to the loads.
Fiber
The logic of the distributed scheme using hardwired
Relay 1 Relay 2
connections is similar to the logic shown in Fig. 8. This
(b)
scheme requires wiring the output contact of each feeder relay
Fig. 7. Two methods of communication between the devices include to the logic inputs of all other feeder relays. The resulting
(a) wiring a relay output contact to a logic input of another device and (b) scheme is more complex and less reliable than the scheme in
direct digital communication between the devices over copper wire or fiber-
optic cable. Fig. 8. In addition, the relays cannot supervise the condition of
the copper wires.
Fig. 8 depicts the logic diagram of a distributed scheme for The distributed simultaneous fault protection scheme is
four feeders using direct digital communication. Feeder relays easy to apply as an enhancement to existing installations.
communicate via copper wires or fiber-optic cable in a looped When existing relays have logic programming abilities,
scheme, and each feeder relay communicates with two implementing the scheme requires only wiring and relay
adjacent feeder relays. The scheme uses phase (51P) and programming.
ground (51G) instantaneous overcurrent elements (fault
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 117

A B C D

RMB1A

RMB2A

RMB3A

RMB4A
Phase
Fault 51P Reclose
79RI
Detector Initiate
1 TPU
SV1 SV1T
Ground TDO
Fault 51G 2 To Tripping
TR
Detector Logic

TMB1A

TMB2A

TMB3A

TMB4A
Feeder 1 Relay

RMB1A

RMB2A

RMB3A

RMB4A
Phase
Fault 51P Reclose
79RI
Detector Initiate
1 TPU
SV1 SV1T
Ground TDO
Fault 51G 2 To Tripping
TR
Detector Logic
TMB1A

TMB2A

TMB3A

TMB4A

Feeder 2 Relay
RMB1A

RMB2A

RMB3A

RMB4A

Phase
Fault 51P Reclose
79RI
Detector Initiate
1 TPU
SV1 SV1T
Ground TDO
Fault 51G 2 To Tripping
TR
Detector Logic
TMB1A

TMB2A

TMB3A

TMB4A

Feeder 3 Relay
RMB1A

RMB2A

RMB3A

RMB4A

Phase
Fault 51P Reclose
79RI
Detector Initiate
TPU
1 SV1 SV1T
Ground TDO
Fault 51G 2
TR
To Tripping
Detector Logic
TMB1A

TMB2A

TMB3A

TMB4A

Feeder 4 Relay

A B C D

Fig. 8. Logic diagram of a distributed simultaneous fault protection scheme using direct digital relay-to-relay communication.
118

Phase
Timer 1
Fault 51P 79RI Reclose
Detector Initiate
TPU
TMB1A R1P1 SV1 SV1T T1P1 RMB1A
1
Ground TDO
Fault 51G 1 To Tripping
TR
Detector Logic

Feeder 1 Relay Feeder 1 Relay

Phase
Fault 51P Timer 2 Reclose
79RI
Detector Initiate
TPU
TMB1A R1P2 SV2 SV2T T1P2 RMB1A
2
Ground TDO
Fault 51G 2 To Tripping
TR
Detector Logic

Feeder 2 Relay Feeder 2 Relay

Phase
Timer 3
Fault 51P 79RI Reclose
Detector Initiate
TPU
TMB1A R1P3 SV3 SV3T T1P3 RMB1A
3
Ground TDO
Fault 51G 3 To Tripping
TR
Detector Logic

Feeder 3 Relay Feeder 3 Relay

Phase
Timer 4 Reclose
Fault 51P 79RI
Detector Initiate
TPU
TMB1A R1P4 SV4 SV4T T1P4 RMB1A
4
Ground TDO
Fault 51G 4 To Tripping
TR
Detector Logic

Feeder 4 Relay Transformer Relay or Logic Processor Feeder 4 Relay

Fig. 9. Logic diagram of a centralized simultaneous fault protection scheme using direct digital communication between the devices.

Fig. 9 depicts the logic diagram of a centralized scheme for The centralized simultaneous fault protection scheme
four feeders using direct digital communication between the concentrates all fault information in one device. This device
devices. Feeder relays communicate radially with the may provide sequential event reporting, which facilitates fault
transformer relay or logic processor via copper wires or fiber- analysis. When the scheme uses a logic processor, the
optic cables. For a simultaneous fault involving Feeder 1 and processor can provide additional functions, such as fast bus
Feeder 2 (see Fig. 4), the fault detectors 51P and/or 51G and tripping, breaker failure protection, and automatic restoration
the OR gate of these relays assert. Each relay transmits bit of unfaulted transformers [1].
TMB1A to the transformer relay or logic processor, where
received bits R1P1 and R1P2 assert. As a result, OR Gate 1, V. FIELD OPERATION EXPERIENCE
OR Gate 2, AND Gate 1, and AND Gate 2 assert in the Table I summarizes the simultaneous fault protection
transformer relay or logic processor. After a security delay, schemes operating in the CFE Southeastern Distribution
Timer 1 asserts bit SV1T, and Timer 2 asserts bit SV2T. The Division and the CFE Jalisco Distribution Division. The first
transformer relay or logic processor then transmits bit T1P1 to scheme was commissioned in 2003.
the Feeder 1 relay and bit T1P2 to the Feeder 2 relay to initiate
TABLE I
tripping and sequential reclosing of the faulted feeder SIMULTANEOUS FAULT PROTECTION SCHEMES
breakers. OPERATING IN TWO CFE DISTRIBUTION DIVISIONS
The logic of a centralized scheme using hardwired
Southeastern Jalisco
connections is similar to the scheme shown in Fig. 9. Scheme Type Distribution Distribution Total
However, the scheme is more complex and less reliable, Division Division
because two copper wires run between each feeder relay and
Distributed 17 0 17
the transformer relay or logic processor. In addition, the relays
cannot supervise the condition of the copper wires. Centralized 1 1 2
Total 18 1 19
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 119

Fig. 10. Simplified one-line diagram of the Oaxaca Uno Substation.

These schemes have operated correctly for all distribution feeders OAX-4010 and OAX-4020. The fault
46 simultaneous faults that have occurred on feeders of both current contributions were 2,001 A on the OAX-4010 feeder
distribution divisions. The causes of the faults are as follows: and 823 A on the OAX-4020 feeder. The prefault demands
Faults in double-circuit lines: 20 were 5.9 MVA on the OAX-4010 feeder, 6.8 MVA on the
Thunderstorms: 19 OAX-4020 feeder, and 28.9 MVA on the transformer.
Faults during circuit-looped operation: 7 From the sequential event report of the OAX-4010 feeder
No scheme misoperations have occurred for faults relay (see Fig. 11), we conclude the following:
involving only one feeder, cold load pickup conditions, or The phase fault detector 51P operated at
other abnormal conditions. 20:29:16.918 hours.
The feeder relay transmitted fault detection
VI. EXAMPLE OF SCHEME OPERATION FOR AN ACTUAL FAULT information (bit TMB1A asserted) to the logic
processor at 20:29:16.918 hours.
A. Scheme Operation Analysis
The feeder relay received a tripping command (bit
The Oaxaca Uno Substation (see Fig. 10), located in the RMB1A asserted) from the logic processor at
city of Oaxaca de Jurez, state of Oaxaca, Mexico, has a 20:29:17.051 hours.
12/16/20 MVA, 115/13.8 kV transformer and an
The feeder relay sent a trip signal to the breaker (bit
18/24/30 MVA, 115/13.8 kV transformer. Each transformer
TRIP asserted) at 20:29:17.055 hours.
feeds four radial feeders. This substation has a centralized
The breaker opened (bit 52A deasserted) at
simultaneous fault protection scheme using a protection
20:29:17.130 hours. Breaker operating time is
processor and direct digital communication between the
75 milliseconds (4.5 cycles).
devices.
The sequential event report of the OAX-4020 feeder relay
During a severe thunderstorm on May 18, 2009, a
is almost identical to the report shown in Fig. 11.
temporary phase-to-phase simultaneous fault occurred on
120

Declared a simultaneous fault involving the


OAX-4020 feeder (bit SV6 asserted) at
20:29:16.953 hours.
Sent a tripping signal to the OAX-4010 feeder relay
(bit T1P1 asserted) at 20:29:17.053 hours when the
timer expired (bit SV5T asserted). Timer pickup
setting is 100 milliseconds (6 cycles).
Sent a tripping signal to the OAX-4020 feeder relay
(bit T1P2 asserted) at 20:29:17.053 hours when the
timer expired (bit SV6T asserted). Timer pickup
setting is 100 milliseconds (6 cycles).

Fig. 11. Sequential event report of the OAX-4010 feeder relay.


Fig. 12. Sequential event report of the logic processor.
From the sequential event report of the logic processor
(Fig. 12), we conclude that the processor: From the oscillogram recorded by the OAX-4010 feeder
Received fault detection information from the relay (Fig. 13), we conclude the following:
OAX-4010 feeder relay (bit R1P1 asserted) at The fault started on Cycle 3.0.
20:29:16.941 hours. The phase fault detector 51P operated on Cycle 3.75.
Received fault detection information from the The feeder relay closed its contact (OUT 12 asserted)
OAX-4020 feeder relay (bit R1P2 asserted) at on Cycle 12.
20:29:16.953 hours. The scheme operating time was 9 cycles.
Declared a simultaneous fault involving the The total fault-clearing time was 13.5 cycles (given a
OAX-4010 feeder (bit SV5 asserted) at 4.5-cycle breaker operating time).
20:29:16.953 hours. The oscillogram recorded by the OAX-4020 feeder relay is
almost identical to the oscillogram shown in Fig. 13.

Fig. 13. Oscillogram recorded by the OAX-4010 feeder relay.


X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 121

B. Cost Analysis IX. BIOGRAPHIES


For the actual temporary fault discussed previously, the Jorge Betanzos Manuel received his BSEE degree in Electrical and
simultaneous fault protection scheme avoided transformer Industrial Engineering from the Oaxaca Technological Institute in 1983. He
joined Comisin Federal de Electricidad (CFE) in 1984 as a construction
breaker misoperation, and the faulted feeder breakers supervisor in the Southeastern Distribution Division (SDD). From 1986 until
successfully reclosed. 1993, he was a protection, control, and metering engineer at the Istmo and
This fault could have caused the transformer low-voltage- Malpaso Transmission Zones of the CFE Southeastern Transmission Region.
From 1993 until 1997, Mr. Betanzos was head of the Protection Office of the
side breaker to misoperate if the Oaxaca Uno Substation Oaxaca Distribution Zone. From 1997 until 2000, he was head of the Office
lacked a simultaneous fault protection scheme. Transformer for High-Voltage Network Studies of the SDD Planning Department. Since
breaker misoperation would have caused all transformer loads 2000, Mr. Betanzos has worked as head of the Protection Department of the
CFE SDD. He leads projects on power quality monitoring and modernizing
to lose service. Operation personnel would have had to travel protection, control, and metering panels in the CFE SDD.
to the substation to manually reclose the transformer breaker.
Assuming a transformer breaker misoperation for this fault, Hctor E. Lemus Zavala received his BSEE degree in Electromechanical
we can determine the cost of nonserved energy. When the Engineering from the University of Guadalajara, Mexico. In 1999, he joined
Comisin Federal de Electricidad (CFE), where he was supervisor of the
fault occurred, the transformer load was 28.9 MVA, or Jalisco Distribution Division (JDD). Since 2007, he has worked as head of the
27.455 MW at a 0.95 power factor. If service restoration time Protection Office of the CFE JDD in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico. His
equals 1 hour, the amount of nonserved energy is 27,455 kWh. activities include supervision, maintenance, improvement, and commissioning
of protection and control systems for distribution substations. He was a
Assuming an energy price of Mex$1.09/kWh, the cost of member of the Committee of Distribution Protection Specialists and the
nonserved energy is Mex$29,926. If the cost of personnel Permanent Protection Committee (CFE Transmission). Mr. Lemus is currently
travelling to the substation equals Mex$2,600, the total a member of the Regional Protection Committee of the CFE Operation
economic loss resulting from one fault that causes transformer Division.
breaker misoperation is Mex$32,526 (equivalent to
Eliseo Alczar Ramrez received his BSEE degree from the Oaxaca
US$2,502). The actual economic loss may be higher if the Technological Institute in 1998. From 1999 until 2001, he was head of the
utility has to pay penalties for service interruption. Protection, Control, and Metering Department in the Southeastern
Distribution Division (SDD) of Comisin Federal de Electricidad (CFE) in
Tehuantepec, Mexico. From 2001 until 2004, he was head of the Protection
VII. CONCLUSIONS Office of the CFE SDD. During this time, he was engaged in activities of
From the results presented in this paper, we conclude: supervision, maintenance, improvement, and commissioning of protection,
control, and metering systems. His expertise includes fault analysis, short-
Causes of simultaneous faults involving two or more circuit studies, protection coordination, and protection system design. In April
overhead distribution feeders include multicircuit lines 2004, Mr. Alczar joined Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. (SEL),
or lines sharing the same right of way, switching where he is currently a protection engineering supervisor in San Luis Potos,
Mexico. His activities include protection, control, and metering system design
operations, and thunderstorms. and commissioning, as well as technical support and training on SEL products
Simultaneous faults may cause misoperation of the for engineers from utilities and industrial plants.
time-delayed overcurrent elements of the transformer
low-voltage-side relay. David Snchez Escobedo received his BSEE degree in 1994 from the
University of Guanajuato, Mexico, and his M.Sc. degree in 2005 from the
Simultaneous fault protection schemes prevent University of Guadalajara, Mexico. From 1994 until 1998, he was head of the
transformer low-voltage-side breaker misoperations. Protection and Metering Office in the Western Transmission Area of
These schemes improve service quality by avoiding Comisin Federal de Electricidad (CFE) in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.
Mr. Snchez served on the faculty of the Autonomous University of
unnecessary service interruptions to the unfaulted Guadalajara in 1998. From 1998 until 2000, he worked for INELAP-PQE in
feeders. Guadalajara, Mexico, as a protection system design engineer. In September
In distributed schemes, the simultaneous fault 2000, Mr. Snchez joined Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc., where
he is currently the electrical engineering manager in San Luis Potos, Mexico.
protection logic resides in the feeder relays; in He has authored and coauthored several technical papers.
centralized schemes, the logic resides in the
transformer low-voltage-side relay or logic processor. Hctor J. Altuve received his BSEE degree in 1969 from the Central
The CFE Southeastern Distribution Division and the University of Las Villas in Santa Clara, Cuba, and his Ph.D. in 1981 from
Kiev Polytechnic Institute in Kiev, Ukraine. From 1969 until 1993, Dr. Altuve
CFE Jalisco Distribution Division have served on the faculty of the Electrical Engineering School at the Central
19 simultaneous fault protection schemes in operation; University of Las Villas. From 1993 to 2000, he served as professor of the
these schemes have correctly cleared all Graduate Doctoral Program in the Mechanical and Electrical Engineering
School at the Autonomous University of Nuevo Len in Monterrey, Mexico.
46 simultaneous faults. No scheme misoperations have In 1999 through 2000, he was the Schweitzer Visiting Professor in the
occurred so far. Department of Electrical Engineering at Washington State University.
Dr. Altuve joined Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. in January 2001,
where he is currently a distinguished engineer and director of technology for
VIII. REFERENCE Latin America. He has authored and coauthored more than 100 technical
[1] D. Snchez, E. Alczar, O. Mrquez, H. Altuve, and A. Martnez, papers and holds three patents. His main research interests are in power
Multifunction Relays and Protection Logic Processors in Distribution system protection, control, and monitoring. Dr. Altuve is an IEEE senior
Substation Applications. Available: http://www.selinc.com. member and an IEEE Power Engineering Society distinguished lecturer.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 123

Communications for the Smart Grid


Mark Adamiak Peter Sanza
GE Digital Energy GE Energy
Multilin Nuclear

Abstract

As the smart grid drives into the main stream of the utility enterprise, it becomes incumbent on the industry to iden-
tify an architecture based on what is the smart grid, what are the communication pieces involved, and how do they
fit together. The pieces are the existing communication standards. The choice of a standard, however, is not a
random process. There is an engineering process for the selection of relevant standards and subsequent migration to
an Architecture. Such a process was funded by the Electric Power Research Institute and the output of this process
is the IntelliGrid architecture [1]. This paper examines the architecture process of identifying the system require-
ments and the subsequent process of linking the requirements with candidate standards. Finally, the standards al-
ready chosen by the NIST as Smart Grid standards are presented.

IntelliGrid Enterprise Activities


In all cases, an architecture must be based on the functions it is required to perform. In order to identify these func-
tions, a mechanism known as a Use Case was employed. A use case starts with a narrative that describes a specific
smart function in the environment of interest. Distillation of the use case identifies data items and their movement
through the environment under study. In the energy environment, there are multiple areas of interest. In order to
facilitate categorization of use cases, the energy environment was broken down into 6 primary business functions,
namely:: Market Operations, Transmission Operations, Distribution Operations, Primary Generation, Distributed
Energy Resources, and Customer Services. Over 400 potential use cases were identified and the most demanding of
there were elaborated in additional detail to construct a complete high-level set of requirements for the communica-
tions infrastructure. The requirements were further categorized as follows:

Communication configuration requirements, such as one-to-many, mobile, WAN, LAN, etc.


Quality of service and performance requirements, such as availability, response timing, data accuracy, etc.
Security requirements, such as authentication, access control, data integrity, confidentiality, non-
repudiation, etc.
Data management requirements, such as large databases, many databases particularly across organizational
boundaries, frequent updates, etc.
Constraints and concerns related to technologies, such as media bandwidth, address space, system compute
constraints, legacy interface, etc.
Network management requirements, such as health and diagnostics of infrastructure and equipment, remote
configuration, monitoring and control, etc.

As an example in this paper, the Demand Response use case is reviewed. The IntelliGrid Architecture considered
the Demand Response system as part of the Customer Services functional area. While it is clear that Demand Re-
sponse functionality operates within this domain, it is important to note that Demand Response is not an isolated
island of functionality. The entire premise of the IntelliGrid Architecture is that each of these envisioned applica-
tions must interact with other domains and functional areas within the Energy industry. Interoperability between and
among other Demand Response systems and other Energy industry applications can be seen as one of the key driv-
ers behind the IntelliGrid Architecture.

Given that a communication channel will exist into the home, commercial, or industrial electrical grid, the Intelli-
Grid Architecture identified a number of applications that directly touch the Demand Response system. The com-
124

plete list can be found on the IntelliGrid Architecture website, but Customer Domain specific functions are listed
here as follows[2]:

1. Automatic meter reading (AMR)


Sub-metering
Load Monitoring
Sub-contracted metering
Energy usage display
Demand profiles
Auto-pay / Pre-pay metering
Outage detection and isolation
Remote connect/disconnect
Measurement of customer outage minutes/hours
2. Customer trouble call management
3. Real-time Pricing (RTP)
Day ahead schedule
Hour ahead emergency condition
Automatic in-home load curtailment
Available by-pass mode
4. Load management
Direct Load Control under emergency conditions
DER Watt/VAR dispatch
5. Building/Home Energy Management Services
Building management
Building security
Customer remote access
Customer energy bidding
Load analysis
Equipment monitoring (e.g. clogged air filters, failed water heater element, etc.)
Occupancy based heating and lighting controls
Home insulation level analysis
6. Electric Car as Generation Source
7. Weather
In-home weather forecasts
In-home lightning and severe weather alert
Lightning location report

In addition, the customer communications infrastructure will enable other IntelliGrid cross domain activities such
as:

Feeder Voltage Optimization


Downed conductor detection
Faulted feeder isolation / feeder re-deployment
Distributed Energy control and isolation
Distribution based VAR support to transmission
Distribution SCADA
Micro-grid establishment / control

IntelliGrid Demand Response Environments


Each of the myriad interrelated functions defines its own set of detailed functional and non-functional requirements.
An architecture is not, however, intended to simply fulfill a patchwork of requirements. The architecture is not simp-
ly the union of the lists of detailed requirements for each function. Functions often have conflicting requirements
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 125

and a good architecture must be flexible enough to accommodate such incongruous anomalies. To realize this, the
IntelliGrid Architecture invented what were called Environments.

An IntelliGrid Architecture Environment is defined as an information environment, where the information exchang-
es of power system functions have essentially similar architectural requirements, including their configuration re-
quirements, quality of service requirements, security requirements, and data management requirements. These Envi-
ronments reflect the requirements of the information exchanges, not necessarily the location of the applications or
databases (although these may affect the information exchanges and therefore the environment). Since functions can
have multiple types of information exchanges, these functions often operate across multiple Environments.

The IntelliGrid Architecture defined twenty-one Environments that completely describe the communication re-
quirements for the information exchanges as shown in the following figure[3]:

Figure 1: IntelliGrid Environments


The IntelliGrid Architecture defines 21 Environments that span the entire Electric Energy Enterprise

Demand Response and all of the ancillary services it provides, enables, or directly touches, operates in several of
these environments. A brief synopsis of the relevant environments and typical applications follows[3]:
126

Environment 9: Control Centers to ESPs embodies the requirements for communica-


tions between utility control centers and Energy Service Providers or aggregators.
Typical applications in this environment include Real-time pricing negotiations, ag-
gregated customer metering and settlements as well as data mining for later use in
market operations. This is characterized as a business-to-business (B2B) environment
ESP
having very strict requirements for security and a contractual level of timeliness and
record keeping (and audit trails).

Environment 11: Control Center to Customers encompasses the requirements


for what has traditionally been termed commercial or industrial metering and
includes the requirements for any data exchange that goes directly between
control centers and customer sites. Typical applications include metering of
large customers, control of distributed energy resources, and load curtailment.
This is characterized as a B2B environment but involving operational rather
than financial data.

Environment 15: DER Monitoring and Control encompasses the communication re-
quirements between distributed energy resources and the organizations that must moni-
tor and operate them. Typical applications include an ESP aggregating data from or
operating multiple small generators including renewable power, small hydro, co-
generation or any other mini-grid. This may also include demand response and adjust-
ment of power quality. This environment is characterized by the fact that it is vital that
these message exchanges are not tampered with, monitored, or interfered with by unau-
thorized persons.

Environment 16: Intra-Customer Site defines requirements for communications that are local
to customer sites (residential, commercial, or industrial). Typical applications include a cus-
tomer printing processes online or offline in response to RTP, a customer locally managing a
distributed energy resources in response to external factors (environment, price, regulations,
etc.). Additionally this also includes building and home automation systems. This environ-
ment is characterized by critical data with local scope and limited impact on the overall power
grid. Data is real-time potentially peer-to-peer with application specific security.

Environment 17: Inter-Customer Sites captures requirements for communications


between customer sites (residential, commercial, or industrial). This is a relatively
new environment that is not widely deployed yet but would include typical appli-
cations such as coordination of customer loads (e.g. A/C or refrigeration compres-
sor startup) and mini-grid management. It is characterized by high security re-
quirements because data crosses organizational boundaries.

Environment 18: Customer to ESP. This environment encompasses the communication, dis-
tributed processing, security, and data management requirements for applications that exist
between ESPs, typically the distribution level energy utility, and the end-use point-of-sale
energy customers like residential homeowners and apartment dwellers. Typical applications
include automatic (or manual) meter reading, monitoring and control of DER, demand re-
ESP sponse and RTP. It is characterized by extremely large volumes of data with frequent config-
uration and topology changes to the communications network. Commands are often broadcast
due to the large number of end users but address space must be massively scalable.

IntelliGrid Requirements for Demand Response Implementations


Based upon the above Environments, the IntelliGrid Architecture proposes a base set of high level requirements for
Demand Response Systems that will also aid in achieving interoperability with other systems sharing the same infra-
structure. These requirements are categorized as follows [3]:
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 127

Configuration Requirements
Support interactions between a few "clients" and many "servers"
Support peer to peer interactions
Support interactions across widely distributed sites
Support the frequent change of configuration and/or location of end devices or sites
Support multi-cast or broadcast capabilities
Support interactions within a contained environment (e.g. substation or control center)

Quality of Service Requirements


Provide medium speed messaging on the order of 10 seconds
Support contractual timeliness (data must be available at a specific time or within a specific window of
time)
Support medium availability of information flows of 99.0+% (~3.5 days/year outage)

Security Requirements
Provide Identity Establishment Service (you are who you say you are)
Provide Authorization Service for Access Control (resolving a policy-based access control decision to en-
sure authorized entities have appropriate access rights and authorized access is not denied)
Provide Information Integrity Service (data has not been subject to unauthorized changes or these unauthor-
ized changes are detected)
Provide Confidentiality Service (only authorized access to information, protection against eavesdropping)
Provide Inter-Domain Security Service (support security requirements across organizational boundaries)
Provide Non-repudiation Service (cannot deny that interaction took place)
Provide Security Assurance Service (determine the level of security provided by another environment)
Provide Audit Service (responsible for producing records, which track security relevant events)
Provide Security Policy Service (concerned with the management of security policies)
Provide Path and Routing Quality of Security (being able to determine a secure communication path)
Provide Firewall Transversal
Provide Privacy Service (the ability to ensure person information is not disclosed)
Provide User Profile and User Management (combination of several other security services)
Provide Security Protocol mapping (the ability to convert from one protocol to another)
Provide Security Discovery (the ability to determine what security services are available for use)

Network and System Management Requirements


Provide Network Management (management of media, transport, and communication nodes)
Provide System Management (management of end devices and applications)
Support extensive data validation procedures

Data Management Requirements


Support the management of large volumes of data flows
Support extensive data validation procedures
Support keeping data consistent and synchronized across systems and/or databases
Support timely access to data by multiple different users
Support frequent changes in types of data exchanged
Support management of data whose types can vary significantly in different implementations
Support specific standardized or de facto object models of data
Provide discovery service (discovering available services and their characteristics)
Provide conversion and protocol mapping
Support the management of data across organizational boundaries
128

IntelliGrid Design Principles [4]


In order to design an architecture, one must have guiding principles as to how to identify the pieces of the archi-
tecture and how they are to be put together. The IntelliGrid architecture identifies several such principles described
below.

One of the most important system integration principles in IntelliGrid is the concept of Technology Independent
Architecture (TIA). TIA is technology neutral or technology agnostic. It can insure successful integration of the var-
ious utility enterprise applications without requiring changes to the applications internal operation. It can also
achieve high level of interoperability and interworkability with the built-in intelligence of auto-configuration and
self-discovery. Figure 2 illustrates the TIA framework.

Composite Data Mining


Portals Applications and Analysis

Utility
Local Legacy Field
Applications Devices
Common Services/Interfaces *

Discoverable
Information
Models

Wholesale and Networking


Retail Market and
Operations Computer
Hardware
* Includes: security,
object naming, ** Includes: domain
platform services Databases, Directories, Web Pages & Other File Types objects, security
(transactions, time, and Registries Documents (e.g. email, etc.) objects, managed
etc.) device objects, etc.

Figure 2 Technology Independent Architecture


The guiding principle of the IntelliGrid Architecture shows that Common Services, Common Information Models, and Generic
Interfaces enable scalable interoperability in a heterogeneous technology environment.

Three key information-modeling elements in TIA framework are,


Common Services These are atomic building blocks frequently required by the utility applications. Intel-
liGrid further breaks the common services down to four categories, namely system and network manage-
ment services, data management and exchange services, common platform services, common securi-
ty services.
Common Information Models These are common data that are exchanged between services and applica-
tions. This includes the suggested data format, data attributes and their relationships.
Generic Interfaces Generic Interfaces are used as the mechanism for exchanging Common Information
Model data between services. Generic Interfaces correspond to how data is exchanged. It specifies a set of
standard verbs such as get, set, report, which allows different applications to communicate with each
other.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 129

These common information-modeling elements are the key to achieving higher-level interoperability of power sys-
tem distributed information systems.

Common Services
Common Services are commonly defined functionality derived by identifying the crosscutting distributed infor-
mation requirements. Common Services allow components to be treated as black boxes. This facilitates greater flex-
ibility, as components are less dependent on how each works internally.

However, the use of Common Services does not by itself substantially reduce the complexity of dealing with differ-
ent platforms such as Java, .Net or Web Services. Also, Common Services do not necessarily deal with the disconti-
nuity of the meaning of data. Lastly, Common Services do not deal with the discontinuity caused by different data
access mechanisms such as read/write data or subscribe to data.

To overcome semantic heterogeneity a common information model is used as the common language that all services
use to communicate. To overcome platform heterogeneity, the generic interface is required. The generic interface
can be implemented on any platform. While the different implementations of the generic interface are not interoper-
able, off the shelf, the mapping from one platform specific implementation to another is simple and well known.

Common Information Models


In order to precisely describe the meaning of a set of terms, engineers often create an information model. An infor-
mation model describes a collection of related real world objects. An information model describes objects in terms
of classes, attributes and relationships and provides unique names and definitions to each object.

The EPRI/IEC Common Information Model (CIM) describes data typically used in the power system. The CIM con-
tains object types such as substations, breakers, and work orders as well as other data typically found in an EMS,
SCADA, DMS, or work, and asset management system. More recently, the CIM is being extended to include trans-
mission reservation and energy scheduling information. In general, the benefit of creating an information model
include:

Models give context to data improving understanding and productivity.


Models enable automation of setup and maintenance tasks.

Generic Interfaces
The mechanism used to exchange data is determined by an applications interface. However, the native interface
provided by an application is typically limited. For example, typically existing interfaces:

Do not expose data within the context of a common inter-application data model.
Do not provide a means to discover what business object instances are serviced by a particular component
instance other than a rudimentary listing of legacy IDs (tags) that cannot be viewed within the context of an
inter-application data model such as a power system network model.

Without a means to discover what data an application processes, plug and play is nearly impossible to achieve. To
address these impediments to plug and play and the need for a common exchange mechanism, Generic Interface is
introduced to specify how data are exchanged. The phrase Generic Interface is an umbrella term for four interfac-
es types:

An interface for mapping names to IDs and visa versa.


A request/reply oriented interface that supports browsing and querying randomly associated structured data
including schema (class) and instance information.
A publish/subscribe oriented interface that supports hierarchical browsing of schema and instance infor-
mation. This interface would typically be used as an API for publishing/subscribing to XML formatted
messages.
130

Applications use the generic interfaces to connect to each other directly or to an integration framework
such as a message bus or data warehouse. A technology neutral interface allows applications to be designed
independently of the capabilities of the underlying infrastructure.

Generic interfaces provide the following key functionality required for creation of a plug and play infrastructure:

Interfaces are generic and are independent of any application category and integration technology. This fa-
cilitates reusability of applications supporting these interfaces.
Interfaces support schema announcement/discovery The schemas are discoverable so that component
configuration can be done programmatically at run time. Programmatically exposing the schema of applica-
tion data eliminates a great deal of manual configuration.
Interfaces support business object namespace presentation Each component describes the business object
instances that it supports within the context of a common namespace shared among all applications such as
a power system network model like the EPRI Common Information Model (CIM). It is not enough to mere-
ly expose the application data schema, one must also expose what specific breakers, transformers, etc., that
an application operates on. This also eliminates manual configuration as well as provides a means for a
power system engineer to understand how enterprise data is organized and accessed.

IntelliGrid Recommended Implementation Technologies:


There are too many recommendations to capture in this project summary, but common themes can be identified as
follows[1]:

Harmonize the existing common services, information models, and interfaces, as well as create new stand-
ards where they are needed, so the power industry speaks a common communications language of nouns
and verbs that can be translated into different technologies. This is a key requirement for the higher levels
of system integration now emerging across the energy industry
Integrate security, systems, network management, and technical development (i.e. new technologies),
which have too often been considered separate tasks.
Unify technologies between power system automation networks, corporate networks, and inter-business
networks, again by linking them to common information models, services, and interfaces.
Remember that developing an industry-level architecture is a process not an end point. Requirements and
enabling technologies are constantly changing. Although the guiding principles should remain constant, in-
dividual solutions will change over time.

Based on the identified design principles, IntelliGrid makes a link from design guidelines to recommended technol-
ogies that best embody the stated principles and meet the identified requirements. IntelliGrid makes a point of rec-
ognizing that many needed technologies may not exist and encourages the identification and subsequent standardiza-
tion of such technologies. The list below is a first level summary of the primary recommended technologies for
the identified environments. The list is organized by functional layer. For the complete list of applicable technolo-
gies, please refer to the IntelliGrid.info website[3]:

Data Exchange:
IEC61850 Communication Networks and Systems in Substations
o Data Models
o Abstract Services
o Substation Configuration Language
ANSI C12.19 Metering Tables
AEIC Guidelines for Implementation of ANSI C12.19
IEC61970 Part 3 Common Information Model (CIM)
IEC61970 Part 4 Generic Interface Definition
IEC61968 SIDM System Interfaces for Distribution Management
IEC60870-6 Inter Control Center Protocol
IEC62325 on Framework for Energy Market Communications
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 131

NERC e-tagging
NAESB OASIS for Market Transactions
IEC62056 Data Exchange for Meter Reading, Tariff, and Load Control
Universal Description, Discovery, and Integration (UDDI)
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)
EbXML
XML Metadata Interchange (XMI)
Meta Object Facility (MOF)
Globally Unique Identifiers (GUID)
S/NTP (Simple/Network Time Protocol)
ANSI/ISO/IEC 9075 Structured Query Language (SQL)

Security
ISO/IEC 10164-8:1993 Security Audit Trail Function - Information technology - Open Systems Intercon-
nection - Systems Management - Security,
ISO/IEC 18014-1:2002 Time-Stamping Services - Information technology - Security Techniques - Part 1:
Framework - Security, Data Management
ISO/IEC 10181-7:1996 Security Audit and Alarms Framework - Information technology - Open Systems
Interconnection -- Security Frameworks for Open Systems - Security,
FIPS PUB 112 Password Usage - Security,
FIPS PUB 113 Computer Data Authentication - Security,
RFC 1510 The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (v5)
RFC 2196 Site Security Handbook - Security,
RFC 2401 Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol - Security,
RFC 2527 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Frame-
work - Security,

Transport:
TCP / Internet Protocol IPV4 / IPV6

Network Management:
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)

Physical/Data Link:
IEEE 802.x (LAN, WAN, WiFi, WiMax, Ethernet)
SONET
ATM

NIST Selected Smart Grid Standards Rev 1.0


As part of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, the North American Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) was mandated by Congress to coordinate a framework of protocols and model standards to achieve
interoperability of the Smart Grid. As part of this mandate, NIST has recently released the first set of accepted
standards for use in Smart Grid communications [5]. It is to be noted that this is a work in progress and is not exclu-
sionary. The list of these standards follows closely to the recommendations made by the IntelliGrid document. The
list of selected standards is as follows:

AMI-SEC System Security Requirements


ANSI C12.19/MC1219 Revenue Metering
BACnet ANSI ASHRAE 135-2008/ISO 16484-5 Building Automation
DNP3 - Substation and feeder device automation
IEC 60870-6 / TASE.2 - Inter-control center communications
132

IEC 61850 - Utility automation and protection


IEC 61968/61970 - Application level energy management system interfaces
IEC 62351 Parts 1-8 - Information security for power system control operations
IEEE C37.118 - Phasor measurement unit (PMU)communications
IEEE 1547 - Physical and electrical interconnections between utility and distributed generation (DG)
IEEE 1686-2007 - Security for intelligent electronic devices (IEDs)
NERC CIP 002-009 - Cyber security standards for the bulk power system
NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53, NIST SP 800-82 - Cyber security standards and guidelines for federal in-
formation systems, including those for the bulk power system
Open Automated Demand Response (Open ADR) - Price responsive and direct load control
OpenHAN - Home Area Network device communication, measurement, and control
ZigBee/HomePlug Smart Energy Profile - Home Area Network (HAN) Device Communications and Information
Model

This list will continue to grow as new standards are identified and as new standards are developed to meet the identi-
fied gaps in the existing standards.

Conclusion
The IntelliGrid Architecture provides a foundation for the operation of the Smart Grid and offers an optimized ap-
proach to build future visions. There are many long-term benefits to the energy industry that will be realized
through implementation of the IntelliGrid principles and recommended technologies. Clearly the IntelliGrid Archi-
tecture has profound ramifications for a broad range of advanced power systems applications. Careful planning of an
open and standards-based system designs will support integration of advanced systems thus realizing the IntelliGrid
vision for the Smart Grid of the future.

References
[1] Peter Sanza, Joe Hughes, et. al.; IntelliGrid Architecture Volume I User Guidelines and Recommendations
Final Report, 2004, Electricity Innovation Institute (E2I) Consortium for Electric Infrastructure to Support a
Digital Society (CEIDS); www.IntelliGrid.info.
[2] Peter Sanza, Joe Hughes, et. al.; IntelliGrid Architecture Volume II Appendix F Task 1 Enterprise Activities
Final Report, 2004, Electricity Innovation Institute (E2I) Consortium for Electric Infrastructure to Support a
Digital Society (CEIDS); www.IntelliGrid.info.
[3] Peter Sanza, Joe Hughes, et. al.; IntelliGrid Architecture Volume IV Appendix E Environments Final Re-
port, 2004, Electricity Innovation Institute (E2I) Consortium for Electric Infrastructure to Support a Digital
Society (CEIDS); www.IntelliGrid.info.
[4] Peter Sanza, Joe Hughes, et. al.; IntelliGrid Architecture Volume IV Technical Analysis Final Report, 2004,
Electricity Innovation Institute (E2I) Consortium for Electric Infrastructure to Support a Digital Society
(CEIDS); www.IntelliGrid.info.
[5] NIST Recognized Standards for inclusion in the Smart Grid Interoperability Standards Framework Release
1.0; www.nist.gov/smartgrid/standards.html
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 133

Wide Area Monitoring with Phasor Measurement Units


M. WACHE 1, H.-J. HERRMANN 2,
Siemens AG 1(GER), Siemens AG 2(GER),

(PMU). The integration of PMU functionality in protection


Abstract-- The stability of electric transmission networks is and bay control devices is discussed.
getting more attention in the last years all over the world.
Following several wide area supply interruptions for example in II. SYNCHROPHASOR MEASUREMENTS
Europe and North America, it is widely accepted that the electric
transmission networks have to be improved in capacity and Network stability can be endangered by various impacts, as
stability. shown in Figure 1. Heavy loads in weak networks, combined
The building of new lines is mostly not possible in a fast manner, with switching or loss of generation, may lead to inter-area
so measures to enhance the stability of existing networks are of oscillations. Overloaded transmission corridors can lead to
great interest. One well accepted method is the use of phasor voltage collapse. Overloaded meshed networks can end in
measurement data from widely spread positions in the electric cascading outages. All these events should be avoided
networks. Synchrophasors are vector measurements sent by whenever possible. A valuable support is given by the use of
phasor measurement units (PMUs) with a standardized protocol.
synchrophasor measurements, which extend significantly the
With a suitable software solution, the information coming from
the Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) does help the control
situational awareness in the control center compared to the
center engineers in getting awareness of the stability situation in much slower RMS values. In the following, an example for a
the whole network. This helps them to make the right decisions phasor data processing software is shown which helps the
even in critical situations. SIGUARD Phasor Data Processing control center operator in understanding the information of the
System is such a system which is presented and discussed. synchrophasor data measurements.
With SIGUARD PDP-System, it is possible to visualize the power
swings in a clear way so that the damping can be evaluated easily.
The geographic screen shows at a glance where the problems have
occurred. The SIGUARD PDP System is both an online tool
which continuously evaluates the PMU measurements and an
offline tool (selectable mode). In offline mode, critical events can
be evaluated with archive data without using a separate tool.
The phasor data values are collected from the PMUs using the
standard protocol IEEE C37.118 which is available in several
standard products on the market. SIGUARD PDP can be
connected to single PMUs and to Phasor Data Concentrators as
well. The application of the new system is shown with an
application example in the network of a major german
transmission utility.
The paper closes with an outlook to the status of integration of
PMU functions into protection and bay control devices. In this
chapter, the possible new functions are discussed which result
from higher integration in the devices, combined with new Figure 1: Application of Phasor Measurements
powerful communication

KEYWORDS-- Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU), III. PHASOR MEASUREMENT UNIT


synchrophasors, wide area monitoring, stability analysis,
integration into bay level Phasor Measurements are well known in power systems; this
type of measurement is used for example in distance
I. INTRODUCTION protection devices since a long time for decision of trip signal.
The quite new idea is to collect Phasor Measurements from
The use of synchrophasors to monitor and improve the
substations widely spread in the transmission network and
stability of electrical power systems is becoming more
monitor them on one single point to gain an overview about
important in the last years. The aim is to monitor the system
overall network stability situation. The devices which compute
state, to sharpen awareness for the system stability and to use
the Phasor measurements and then send them via a
the load limits of the lines correctly within the given system
standardized interface (IEEE C37.118) are called Phasor
limits, without extending the network. This paper presents the
Measurement Units (PMU). The PMU function can also be
application of a software for monitoring the synchrophasor
included in already existing hardware, as for example in
measurements coming from the Phasor Measurement Units
protection devices.
The use of Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) for Wide Area
Monitoring Application is widely discussed in conferences, see
134

for example [1]. The following applications have been part which collects the phasor data from the PMUs or from a
discussed previously: sub-PDC. The PMUs are widely spread in the power system to
- Verification of dynamic model: Comparison of simulated get a complete picture of the system state. The PDC controls
dynamic network data with measurements from PMUs (for an Archive for storage of data. It contains a system monitor for
example described in [5]) control of the communication connections, internal data flow
- Detection of subsynchronous oscillations and analysis of and valid PMU data. The HMI is working with online data
their damping directly from the PMUs or for analysis of disturbances or other
- Combining slow EMS data with synchro phasor events from the past also with offline data from archive.
measurements on control center level to identify significant
dynamic performance issues
- Improvement of state estimation with PMU data
- Increasing of Overhead Line Capacity
- Calculation of Voltage Stability Index
Application of PMU is mainly discussed in transmission
systems up to know, but the interest of the operators of
distribution systems is rapidly growing.
PMUs have to be provided with a highly accurate time
synchronization on GPS basis. Only with a precise time base,
the synchrophasor data from a large area is comparable and Figure 3: Structure of a Phasor Data Processing System
valid for information about the system state. The precision of a
PMU is expressed with the Total Vector Error TVE which is a The Phasor Data Processing System may have interfaces to the
measurement for the combined error of measurement and time following components:
precision of the device. To be compliant with the IEE C37.118 SCADA System. A SCADA System may improve its state
standard, a PMU may have a maximum TVE of 1%. estimation with the additional use of phasor measurements.
With the use of the highly precise PMU measurements which State estimation may become faster and more precise and
are transmitted at a rate of 10 to 50 Hz (for a 50 Hz system), convergence of calculations is improved.
not only slow load changes can be monitored but also fast and Wide Area Control System. This summarizes different types of
transient power swings. The area supervised by PMU systems with automated response to disturbances which are
measurements can be one single transmission line, but also a detected by using wide area measurements, for example
large geographic area like the UCTE network. synchrophasor measurements. For example capacitor banks are
controlled on base of results from PMU measurements.
IV. PHASOR DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM Wide Area Protection System. Under this headline the
This chapter is dealing with a synchrophasor based monitoring following applications are described:
software which gives support to the system operator for getting Voltage Stability protection
an overview on network stability situation. Power swing detection and starting of countermeasures
The phasor data processing software provides additional Supervision of coupling between large area networks
awareness for the wide area dynamic conditions in the These applications are in pilot phase and currently research
network. The gap between fast but local acting protection work is going on.
devices and slow acting control center applications as shown Additionally, there may be an exchange of PMU data with
in Fig. 2 is closed by the phasor data processing systems. other PDP systems to share synchrophasor data with
neighboured transmission system operators. This would be
done also via IEEE C37.118 protocol.
In the following, the HMI part of the Phasor Data Processing
System is described. The HMI has to support the control
center operator to gain awareness about critical situations and
to find the reason for problems. So it has to be intuitive and
simple. It has to fulfill the following requirements:
General indication about power system stability (ok / critical).
Online Configuration of the measurement view with respect to
selection of measurements, phasor or timebased view and
setting of the limits to be supervised
Figure 2 Wide Area Monitoring System in comparison to protection and Easy change between online and offline mode to be able for
SCADA quick analysis of archive data
Geographical representation of the network for quick detection
Figure 3 shows the structure of a Phasor Data Processing of problem zones
System. The Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC) is the central Data Export for customer specific analysis and reports
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 135

The following screenshots show how these requirements have easily reconfigured online if other measurements shall be
been fulfilled by the Phasor Data Processing System supervised. The archive is configured to one week so that
SIGUARD (all using simulated process data). Figure 4 critical occurences can be analyzed in offline mode. The
shows the general layout of the Main Screen of the System. It practical experiences will grow over the time, especially
is divided into four parts: waiting for ocurrances in the network to be analyzed. In ETG
Power System Status. Here a summary value for the status of conference intelligent networks in October 2009,
the supervised power system is shown. The nearer the curve is Dsseldorf, Germany, a first summary of experiences will be
coming to the limit, the more critical is the system stability presented.
status.
Geographical View. This view contains the overview over the
VI. INTEGRATION TRENDS IN BAY LEVEL
whole monitored network with all substations and lines. The
operator can see at once in which region the critical incidents Intelligent electronic devices (IED) for protection, control and
occur since the colour of substations and lines is changing measurement are characterized by a modularity and flexibility
depending on voltage (for substation colour) and current (for in hard- and firmware. The microprocessor allows multitasking
line colour). operation in real time for the different functions. The hardware
Data Area. This area in the center of the HMI is reserved for is freely scalable and can be adapted regarding the application
requirements. All this leads to a reduction of devices in the
Measurement charts (time based view or phasor view). The
field and reduces costs of the device hardware, in the cubicle
measurements are selected via drag and drop from the
manufacturing and finally in the wiring. The functionality is
configuration area. So this area is not a static predefined
activated via parameterization. This means the configuration
selection, it can be adapted at any time to the needs of the of the device (masking of the hardware regarding the
situation. application, selection of the needed functions) and the setting
Configuration Area. It contains the list of all measurements of the different functions. All these tasks are supported by
sent by the PMUs to the system. There are two types of powerful engineering tools.
measurements: Analogs (for example frequency, active and Figure 5 shows an example for a feeder. The IED has multiple
reactive power) and Phasors (Voltage, Current). If necessary current inputs for connecting to protection and measurement
also nose curves can be defined and offered for selection here. current transformers. The voltage should be connected on a
measuring voltage transformer with the required accuracy. Via
the engineering tool the device is completely parameterized.
This means the routing of the analog inputs and the masking of
functions to these inputs. Figure 5 illustrates two containers,
which include the necessary functions. All protection
functions, which are required by the application, are in the
container Protection. The container Measurements covers
the measurement functions and additionally the function
Phasor Measurement PMU. The IED is synchronized via
GPS or an equivalent synchronization method, e.g. according
IEEE 1588. The available serial interfaces allow a flexible
communication. A separate port can be used for
communication with a phasor data concentrator via IEEE
C37.118.

Figure 4: General Layout of HMI of SIGUARD Phasor Data Processing


System

The complete measurement data of selected time slices can


also be exported (csv format) and so the user is able to
perform analysis in specific tools and to create reports in
customer specific templates.

V. APPLICATION EXAMPLE
The first application of the SIGUARD system is running since
three months at a german TSO with 7 PMUs on 400 kV level,
distributed in the whole geographic area of the TSO. The
system is configured for supervision of voltage angles between
Figure 5: Integration of PMU functionality into a multifunctional IED
north and south area and for frequency supervision. It can be
136

[3] A.G. Phadke, J.S. Thorp: Synchronized Phasor Measurements and their
Applications, Springer Verlag 2008
A further progress is the local operation of PMU data. In
[4] C. Rehtanz, K. v. Sengbusch, T. Sezi, R. Simon.: Schutz- und
modern schemes, the IEDs are linked together and can berwachungskonzepte auf Basis zeitsynchroner Messungen,
exchange information in the substation or between substations. ETG/BDEW-Tutorial Schutz- und Leittechnik, Fulda, 11.-12. Nov.
The IEC61850 supports this via GOOSE mechanism. On the 2008 (in German)
other hand modern line differential relays have a powerful [5] CIGRE Session 2008 Paper C2-101: B. Ayuev, P. Erokhine, Y.
Kulikov: PMU Application for IPS/UPS Dynamic Performance
communication between the devices. The extended bandwidth Monitoring and Study
allows the transmission of additional information. In a cost [6] CIRED 2009 Prague 8-11 June 2009, Round Table 3b PMU and Wide
effective way, phasors can be transmitted from the remote line Area Measurements in Distribution Systems, Prof. Styczynski, Prof.
end via the protection data interface. Figure 6 illustrates the Sauvain, Dr. Buchholz, Dr. Wache
new possibilities.
As a decentralized solution (locally in a device), in a first step
the realization of monitoring functions can be implemented,
e.g. load angle supervision. An alarm can be given if the
stability limit will be reached. Another application is the
detection of a power swing and the realization of interrupting
the power system on predefined points or intelligent control
solutions. Especially the control solutions require interaction
between different parties. For example the access to the
control equipment of a power plant must be possible. Research
work is necessary particularly in the field of the intelligent
control with PMU data to find the right balance between what
is theoretically possible and practically feasible.

Figure 6: Local operation PMU data

VII. CONCLUSION
The phasor measurements are currently on their way from
theory to practical applications. Monitoring Software helps the
transmission system operators and the manufacturers to
understand dynamic behaviour of the transmission networks
and to create further applications with the goal to build wide
area control and wide area protection systems. The technical
evolution in device and communication technology gives a
good base for powerful support by the bay devices for the new
applications.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] CIGRE Session 2008, Special Report for Group C2 System Operation
and Control, by Special Reporters Paulo Gomes, Gerhard Krost, Rui
Pestana
[2] CIGRE Session 2008 Paper C2-112: T. Sezi, J. Warichet, B. Genet, J.-
C. Maun: Bringing New Vizualization Tools for the Detection and
Mitigation of Dynamic Phenomena in the Transmission System
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 137

Implementacin de la Smartgrid en Redes de


Distribucin Existentes

Aitor Arzuaga Rafael Quintanilla


ZIV R&D ZIV Grid Automation
Zamudio, Spain Zamudio, Spain
a.arzuaga@ziv.es r.quintanilla@ziv.es

La llegada de las Smartgrids a las redes de distribucin de energa Este cambio de paradigma conlleva cambios que no son
elctrica est dotando a las infraestructuras de un nivel de sencillos, y se basa en la utilizacin masiva de las tecnologas
tecnologa y modernizacin desconocido hasta el momento. Todo de informacin y comunicacin ya en uso desde hace tiempo
ello viene fruto de la necesidad de modernizar y dotar de en otros mbitos. Y la parte de distribucin de media y baja
inteligencia a la infraestructura para lograr las mejoras de tensin es la que ms inversin precisa para cumplir los
eficiencia y reduccin de emisiones de CO2, integracin de objetivos.
renovables, mejora de la calidad del suministro y gestin de
perfiles de carga. La introduccin de la Smartgrid en la red de distribucin
de media y baja tensin y centros de transformacin, con el
Todas estas innovaciones se estn poniendo en prctica en las objetivo de automatizar y supervisar la red, requiere la adicin
nuevas secciones de redes de distribucin elctrica en construccin de funciones adicionales a la infraestructura existente. Tal es
actualmente, donde toda la instalacin es nueva. Sin embargo, la el caso de los concentradores de datos de medida, funciones
mayora de la red de distribucin ya est ya desplegada, y si es de automatizacin, supervisin de MT/BT, comunicaciones,
preciso lograr los objetivos mencionados anteriormente, va a ser sensores, sistemas de alimentacin de respaldo Todas estas
preciso modernizarla completamente. Esto plantea un reto funciones son innovadoras, y estn en muchos casos en su
superlativo, debido a que estas infraestructuras son muy diversas y etapa de introduccin al mercado, o incluso en fase de
de diferentes pocas, no fueron concebidas para ser modernizadas
desarrollo.
en un futuro, han recibido histricamente poca inversin, en
muchos casos cuentan con un mantenimiento mnimo, y estn en Este artculo analiza el problema de la integracin de las
operacin. funciones de Smartgrid en los centros de transformacin de la
red de distribucin de MT/BT existentes, que son la gran
Este trabajo resume los aspectos ms importantes a tener en mayora de las redes y que estn actualmente en explotacin, y
cuenta al acometer un proyecto de modernizacin de red de que por tanto son los que presentan el principal problema de
distribucin existente con las funciones avanzadas ms habituales integracin por su casustica y diversidad.
en un sistema de Smartgrid, como son telegestin de contadores,
supervisin de red, automatizacin de media tensin y Los problemas que aparecen son completamente distintos
comunicaciones. a los que pueden ocurrir en un despliegue de un segmento de
red completamente nuevo, que seran bsicamente
I. INTRODUCCIN tecnolgicos. En este caso, estamos combinando el problema
de la novedad tecnolgica con el problema logstico de una
Estamos en el inicio de una nueva etapa en el sector de la red que est en operacin, es diversa, no est actualizada, no
distribucin de energa elctrica. En paralelo se estn cuenta con supervisin (ms que por parte de los propios
acometiendo despliegues de nuevas tecnologas y funciones en clientes), es una especie de museo viviente de la historia de
lo que se ha venido a llamar la Smartgrid. Adems el sector la empresa elctrica, y adems tiene un nivel de
se encuentra en un escenario convulso y de innovacin mantenimiento mnimo para seguir operando. Por todo ello, el
acelerada, fruto de los objetivos de reduccin de emisiones de tratamiento que requiere el problema es especfico.
CO2, la integracin de las fuentes de generacin distribuida,
los requisitos crecientes de calidad de suministro, los II. OBJETIVOS DE LA SMARTGRID
despliegues de contadores de energa inteligentes que
permiten gestionar la demanda, la llegada del vehculo El objetivo de la implantacin de la Smartgrid en la red de
elctrico todos estos factores no hacen sino acelerar la distribucin de MT y BT consiste en proporcionar a la
adopcin de la Smartgrid. empresa elctrica nuevos servicios y funciones de valor
aadido que le permitan mejorar la operatividad de su red y
138

bsicamente gestionar su negocio de forma ms eficiente [1]. por tanto una gestin real de la curva agregada de demanda,
A continuacin se destacan algunos de ellos: aplanando los picos de consumo que tan costosos son para el
sistema, y por tanto aumentando la eficiencia del sistema y
Implementar un sistema de telegestin de contadores reduciendo las emisiones de CO2 (por permitir un mejor
de clientes que permita una comunicacin aprovechamiento de las energas renovables) [2].
bidireccional y en tiempo real con el cliente, y por
tanto establecer modelos de gestin de demanda. La clave de los contadores inteligentes se basa en que
incorporan tecnologas de comunicaciones para un
Localizar de forma precisa las faltas producidas en la intercambio de datos bidireccional con el sistema central de
red de MT y analizar la respuesta y diagnstico que se medida, permitiendo por tanto recoger remotamente las
le pueda dar. lecturas de consumo, pero tambin por ejemplo efectuar una
Reducir los tiempos de respuesta a incidencias y por orden de desconexin remota del cliente. La tecnologa de
tanto mejorar los ratios de prestacin de servicio a los comunicacin empleada para conectar con los contadores
clientes. inteligentes puede ser diversa dependiendo de la topologa de
la red de distribucin y la densidad de clientes por
Mejorar la gestin de las instalaciones de distribucin, transformador. Las tecnologas utilizadas de forma ms usual
homogeneizando soluciones y actualizando son las siguientes:
inventarios.
Tecnologas PLC. Se utilizan principalmente en
Prolongar la vida de las instalaciones actuales en entornos urbanos, con contadores ubicados tanto en el
servicio por medio de sistemas de supervisin y interior como en el exterior de las viviendas de los
monitorizacin avanzados. clientes, y en los que la concentracin de clientes por
centro de transformacin es elevada. Esto es bastante
Estos resultados por si solos justifican sin duda el reto
comn en muchos pases europeos. Se distinguen las
planteado. Sin embargo, la magnitud de la tarea que es
tecnologas de primera generacin, de baja capacidad
necesario acometer es titnica. Se trata de redes que pueden
(SFSK y similares), y las de segunda generacin
consistir de millones de clientes, con decenas de miles de
(PRIME, G3, Meters&More), que permiten tasas de
centros de transformacin en operacin, y con un nivel de
transmisin mucho ms elevadas al utilizar
diversidad muy elevado.
modulaciones ms complejas. Adems, algunas como
A continuacin se detallan los aspectos funcionales PRIME [3] incorporan mecanismos de autodeteccin
contemplados en el despliegue de Smartgrid, centrndolo en de la mejor topologa de la red para que la misma se
las tres reas de aplicacin: baja tensin, media tensin y establezca de forma plug&play.
comunicaciones.
Radio mesh. Se utiliza en entornos residenciales de
III. FUNCIONALIDAD EN BAJA TENSIN densidad media o baja, cuando los contadores se
encuentran generalmente fuera de las viviendas de los
En baja tensin se concentran los puntos de suministro de clientes. Este es el caso en algunos pases de Amrica.
los clientes finales de la compaa elctrica, y es este hecho el
que est sirviendo de detonante para lanzar los proyectos de Tecnologa celular (GPRS), de aplicacin en entornos
Smartgrid y las inversiones que llevan asociadas. En efecto, en rurales de baja densidad de clientes, donde las otras
numerosos pases se estn poniendo en prctica medidas para tecnologas no logran una cobertura suficiente.
fomentar el despliegue de contadores inteligentes, que
permiten discriminar los patrones de consumo en distintos Clientes Smart meter
horarios y tarifas, transmitiendo seales de precio a los
clientes, y por tanto dando un primer paso necesario para
implementar sistemas activos de gestin de la demanda. PLC BT
Sin embargo, en una Smartgrid en una red de distribucin
existente se pueden implementar mltiples funciones
adicionales a los contadores inteligentes, que van a ser tratadas Centro Transformacin Concentrador
a continuacin.

A. Smart Meters
GPRS

PLC - MT
Los contadores que permiten las funcionalidades Fibra ptica
avanzadas de gestin de tarifas, cargas y clientes (tambin
conocidos como contadores inteligentes o smartmeters) son
actualmente el ncleo de todos los proyectos de Smartgrid. Es
a travs del contador que el cliente adquiere consciencia del
precio de la energa, y es a travs de la variacin dinmica del Oficinas Centrales - Sistema
precio que el cliente ser consciente de la variacin temporal
de los costes de la energa, lo que permitir establecer por
Figure 1. Comunicaciones como clave de los Smartmeters
tanto mecanismos de reaccin de los usuarios a los precios, y
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 139

Actualmente, tal como se puede ver en la figura 1, el centro de transformacin posee la informacin de la
consenso de la mayora de los proyectos de despliegue es que energa suministrada por ese centro en un intervalo de
ser necesaria una solucin mixta (PLC, radio, fibra, GPRS) tiempo determinado. Como a su vez va a recoger la
para llegar a un 100% de cobertura, dada la diversidad informacin de consumo de cada uno de los
existente en las redes de distribucin (y por tanto en las reas contadores de cliente que se conectan a dicho centro,
geogrficas de prestacin de servicio de la empresa elctrica). esto permite detectar las prdidas o posible fraude de
forma muy sencilla. En efecto, realizando el
Por tanto, en funcin de la arquitectura de comunicaciones sumatorio de las energas consumidas por todos los
utilizada, ser necesario un equipo especial en el centro de clientes, esto debe ser igual (con una mnima
transformacin, denominado concentrador de datos, que incertidumbre dada por la precisin de los equipos de
recoge (va PLC o radio) los datos de consumos y curvas de medida y las prdidas de la red de distribucin) a la
carga de cada uno de los contadores, y por otro lado recibe las energa suministrada por el centro. En el caso de que
rdenes desde el sistema central y las reenva hacia cada la diferencia supere un valor umbral, se pueden
contador. Este elemento fsico no se utiliza si los contadores establecer alarmas.
tienen acceso IP desde el sistema de medida (por ejemplo con
comunicaciones GPRS), aunque si puede existir un elemento Identificacin de lnea y fase a la que pertenece cada
lgico que realice la misma funcin de agregacin en el contador. Uno de los problemas ms comunes que se
sistema (concentrador virtual). La informacin entre el encuentran las compaas elctricas en las redes de
concentrador y el sistema central se puede intercambiar en distribucin es que no tienen ningn registro de en
mltiples formatos, siendo uno comnmente utilizado el qu lnea de salida o incluso fase est conectado cada
formato XML, utilizando protocolos basados en IP para la uno de los clientes, e incluso qu edificios se
transmisin (FTP,. HTTP, web services). alimentan a travs de un centro de transformacin
determinado. Una forma de solventarlo es provocar un
B. Otras funcionalidades avanzadas en baja tensin corte de tensin a cada una de las lneas y fases, de
Adems de los contadores inteligentes, existen mltiples forma que se sepa qu abonados quedan sin
funcionalidades adicionales que se pueden aadir en baja suministro. Sin embargo, en los nuevos sistemas de
tensin, incluso en redes existentes con las dificultades que smartmetering, al disponer de equipamiento
eso conlleva. A continuacin se detallan las ms inteligente en ambos extremos del enlace (centro y
representativas: abonado) se pueden establecer mecanismos que
permiten identificar la fase, e incluso la lnea, a la que
Monitorizacin de la red de BT. Al disponer de pertenece cada abonado. Esto es debido a que las
elementos de monitorizacin en la salida de baja seales de comunicacin por Powerline
tensin del transformador, se puede monitorizar la Communications (PLC) que intercambian pueden
tensin y corriente en la lnea de baja, y por tanto referenciarse temporalmente a los pasos por cero de
vigilar la calidad de onda, sobretensiones y huecos, cada una de las fases, o de la fase a la que est
armnicos y todos los parmetros significativos de la conectado el contador mediante un mecanismo
onda. Adems esta monitorizacin abre la puerta a la denominado zero crossing detection [4]
integracin de generacin distribuida (renovable), ya
que se establece el punto de control necesario en la IV. FUNCIONALIDAD EN MEDIA TENSIN
salida del transformador (y por tanto entrada en la red
de distribucin). Una vez de lanzado el despliegue, fruto de la necesidad de
instalar contadores inteligentes, y dado que ser preciso
Deteccin de desequilibrios entre fases. Al instalar equipamiento en el centro de transformacin, con las
monitorizar de manera independiente las tres fases del dificultades que ello conlleva, la pregunta natural que surge
suministro, resulta muy sencillo detectar el equilibrio es: qu ms funcionalidades se pueden aportar para la
o desequilibrio de la carga de las fases y as poder empresa elctrica, una vez de instalar equipamiento en el
tomar medidas correctoras que lleven a la centro? La respuesta evidente consiste en dotar al centro de
compensacin y equilibrado del transformador, para equipamiento que permita supervisar las magnitudes de media
reducir su stress y prdidas. tensin, y ejecutar acciones, integrado como un equipo de
remota o telecontrol ms del SCADA de la compaa.
Deteccin de averas. El elemento gestor de baja
tensin (concentrador de medidas), ubicado en el Para poder supervisar las magnitudes de media tensin es
centro de transformacin, posee un enlace de datos preciso poder captar las tensiones y corrientes presentes en las
activo con cada uno de los contadores de cliente que lneas de MT, respetando los aislamientos de seguridad. Por
cuelgan de dicho CT. Por tanto, un suceso como una ello se precisan sensores especficos, que pueden ser distintos
prdida de conexin con un contador o grupo de para cada tipo de celda, en funcin del tamao y modo de
contadores permitir lanzar una alarma de posible conexin que permita [5]. Este es uno de los mayores retos a
avera, antes incluso de que los clientes afectados lo la hora de implementar esta funcin en centros existentes. Las
notifiquen. tensiones se pueden recoger con divisores, bien resistivos o
capacitivos, que adapten la seal de MT. Las corrientes se
Deteccin de prdidas y fraude por balance de capturan con transformadores toroidales o bobinas de
energas. El equipo concentrador residente en el Rogowski, en funcin de la precisin requerida o el nivel de
140

dificultad que sea asumible en el montaje. Con divisores y (interruptores). Un ejemplo de mecanismo sencillo de
toroides es posible llegar a niveles de precisin del 1% automatizacin consiste en un aislamiento automtico
mejor en tensin, y similar en corriente. de una falta detectada, una vez detectado el paso de la
falta y su direccionalidad. Otro mecanismo de
Las remotas o equipos que supervisan y actan sobre los automatizacin ms complejo puede ser una
elementos de media tensin pueden ser capaces de comandar reposicin automtica del servicio tras el aislamiento
los interruptores que conectan el centro, y por tanto de quitar y de la falta.
reponer el servicio. Adems, ante el evento de una falta, tienen
que ser capaces de funcionar con normalidad, por lo que en Funciones de proteccin. Teniendo la informacin en
estos casos la alimentacin tiene que estar respaldada por un tiempo real de la forma de onda de tensiones en las
sistema de batera que garantice un periodo de funcionamiento tres fases, y corrientes en las fases y neutro, se pueden
durante un tiempo suficiente (varias horas) en ausencia de aplicar los algoritmos y funciones de proteccin que
alimentacin primaria. son de aplicacin en las lneas de salida de la
subestacin, por parte del rel que controla la
Las funcionalidades que se pueden implementar en media
cabecera.
tensin para una red de distribucin en funcionamiento son las
siguientes:
V. COMUNICACIONES
Supervisin de corrientes y tensiones de MT.
Evidentemente se pueden comprobar los niveles de A. Comunicaciones desde el CT hacia el despacho
distorsin, armnicos, huecos, sobretensiones, etc. que Uno de los elementos catalizadores de la revolucin en las
se producen en la lnea de media tensin. La redes de distribucin de energa elctrica son las
aplicacin ms inmediata es el control del flujo de comunicaciones. Para llevar la Smartgrid a todos los rincones
potencia en la lnea, de cara a controlar su capacidad, de la red de distribucin, es preciso ser capaz de dotar de
la del transformador del centro, y a optimizar el comunicaciones a los centros de transformacin existentes. En
funcionamiento del sistema. su gran mayora, dichos centros no estn comunicados
actualmente, ya que las empresas elctricas han restringido el
Deteccin de paso de falta. Al controlar en tiempo real acceso de comunicaciones a ciertos centros de reparto ms
el estado de las tensiones y corrientes, es posible importantes en la red de media tensin. Por el contrario, todas
realizar una deteccin de un paso de falta de forma las subestaciones de media y alta tensin estn comunicadas y
direccional (si ha pasado una falta por la lnea, y con telecontroladas.
qu sentido). As se puede saber en qu lugar est la
falta relativo a la posicin del centro de
transformacin en la lnea de MT. Si en el SCADA
central se recoge la informacin agregada para todos
los centros, se puede determinar de forma muy
sencilla la ubicacin fsica de la falta, entre dos
centros.

Figure 3. Arquitectura de red de comunicaciones

La red utilizada se basa en tecnologa IP, de forma que en


todos los casos se va a llegar a los centros de transformacin
(y a los equipos all instalados) desde cualquier punto de la red
de la empresa elctrica, por sus direcciones IP. Esto permite
Figure 2. Mecanismo de deteccin paso de falta (DPF) tener gran flexibilidad a la hora de utilizar equipamientos y
soluciones estndar, y a la vez garantizar estabilidad,
Automatizacin de la red. Un paso que se puede dar, escalabilidad y seguridad en el sistema.
una vez que se tiene la informacin de corrientes y El aspecto ms importante en el caso de la red de
tensiones en media tensin, pero a la vez se puede distribucin es que se debe llegar a un gran nmero de
disponer de salidas controladas con las que ejecutar instalaciones, y esto hace prcticamente imposible llegar con
mandos, es el de automatizar completamente el centro medios propios, tanto por dimensin (en muchos casos se trata
de transformacin y los elementos de conexin de decenas de miles de centros), como por cuestiones
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 141

econmicas. Por tanto esto supone una ruptura con la forma presta un operador de telecomunicaciones). En el caso
tradicional de comunicar con los nodos clave de la red y de las redes de distribucin ya existentes, puede
subestaciones, que en muchos casos se realiza con medios ocurrir que los centros de transformacin sean
propios para asegurar la disponibilidad. En el caso de la subterrneos. En ese caso la cobertura celular puede
Smartgrid, es necesario recurrir a medios externos para ser limitada, aun en entornos urbanos, y complicada
proporcionar el enlace de red de rea extensa (WAN). Esto de mejorar.
ampla las posibilidades de utilizacin disponibles.
ADSL. Sobre todo en los entornos urbanos, debido a
La siguiente tabla resume los requisitos de comunicacin la penetracin masiva de la banda ancha xDSL en los
requeridos para aplicaciones de Smartgrid, para diversas hogares, es posible que sea viable la instalacin de
aplicaciones: puntos de conexin ADSL en los centros de
Capacidad Latencia Disponibilidad
transformacin, contratados a una compaa de
Tipo telecomunicaciones. La disponibilidad y capacidad es
Requerida Requerida Requerida
ptima (velocidad de varios Mbps y latencias de
Vertical
Telemedida de (uplink ms Medio
pocos ms), a costa de unos costes de operacin
<5s Media-alta elevados. Adems la disponibilidad de equipamiento
contadores ancho (100Kbps)
banda) xDSL adecuado a las condiciones de utilizacin en
Bajo centros de transformacin es limitada. Esto hace que
Supervisin y Vertical, su utilizacin sea limitada, salvo que la criticidad de
(<50Kbps <1 s Alta
control de MT simtrico
) algn servicio lo justifique.
Automatizacin
Horizontal y
Alto Powerline Communications (PLC) sobre lneas de
vertical, <50ms Muy alta
de Distribucin
simtrica.
(>1Mbps) media tensin. Esta es una posibilidad muy interesante
para las compaas elctricas ya que posibilita la
Vertical comunicacin a travs de medios propios (las lneas
Medio
Gestin de (uplink ms
infraestructura ancho
(>200Kbp <1s Media de MT), de forma que los costes de operacin son
s) mnimos. Esta tecnologa se basa en la utilizacin de
banda)
modulaciones apropiadas a las caractersticas del
Tabla 1. Requisitos tcnicos de comunicaciones para diversos medio, como por ejemplo OFDM o Spread Spectrum
servicios en Smartgrid [6] [8], obteniendo velocidades dependientes del medio,
Como se puede observar en la tabla 1, a partir de los pero que pueden superar 1Mbps, con latencias en el
servicios que se implementen en la Smartgrid, las necesidades orden de 50ms. Los centros de transformacin que se
de comunicaciones sern distintas, y por tanto se requerirn agrupan a lo largo de la misma lnea de media tensin
arquitecturas de comunicaciones de distinto tipo, y con unos se convierten en celdas de una misma red de
costes de inversin y mantenimiento muy diferentes. Por otro comunicaciones, que comparte un medio comn. En
lado, como en todo proyecto real, un requisito bsico es que un punto de la celda se aade una salida WAN hacia
los costes de inversin de despliegue y mantenimiento sean lo el exterior (GPRS, fibra, ADSL) para completar la
ms reducidos posible. Ello hace que se tengan que conectividad. Las seales de comunicacin se acoplan
seleccionar entre las diversas tecnologas disponibles, y que no a las lneas de MT a travs de unos dispositivos de
haya una nica vlida para todas las ocasiones, sino que se acoplamiento que permiten salvaguardar el
emplean distintas soluciones tecnolgicas para cada tipo de aislamiento galvnico. La utilizacin de PLC sobre
centro de subestacin, en funcin de su relevancia en la red, MT en centros de transformacin existentes es
ubicacin, antigedad y servicios soportados en el mismo. compleja, ya que requiere de soluciones de
acoplamiento especficas en funcin de que las celdas
Las tecnologas que se emplean ms usualmente son las del centro sean de mampostera, de aire o de gas SF6
siguientes: [9].
Tecnologa celular (GPRS). La penetracin masiva de Satlite. Cuando no existe otro modo de
los telfonos mviles en la sociedad, con los servicios comunicacin, siempre se puede recurrir a servicios
avanzados de datos que llevan aparejados, ha de comunicacin de datos por satlite (como VSAT),
significado que los operadores han desplegado una red que permiten establecer enlaces con cobertura global
de comunicaciones prcticamente ubicua en todas las y una tasa de transmisin dependiente del contrato
zonas habitadas [7]. Al querer aumentar sus lneas de solicitado, pero que puede alcanzar los centenares de
negocio, proporcionan una oportunidad para Kbps Sus desventajas son que requieren la instalacin
aprovechar dicha capacidad para otras aplicaciones a de una infraestructura considerable (antenas), y los
las empresas, que puede ser aprovechada por la costes de operacin son elevados. Como las redes de
elctrica. En concreto, la presencia casi universal de la distribucin elctrica van, usualmente, ligadas a
tecnologa GPRS, que permite velocidades de hasta centros de poblacin humana, no suele ser preciso
80Kbps en el enlace descendente y 20Kbps en el recurrir a comunicaciones por satlite para
ascendente, proporciona un canal de comunicaciones comunicaciones en Smartgrid.
adecuado (tal vez algo escaso para algunas
aplicaciones) y razonablemente barato (el servicio lo
142

Radio. Algunas empresas elctricas poseen redes de aos no ha recibido el mismo nivel de inversiones que las
radio en bandas de frecuencia asignadas (canales VHF redes de transporte y distribucin en alta tensin, al ser su
o similar), para aplicaciones de telecontrol y criticidad para el sistema menor. Adicionalmente, las
monitorizacin. Dichas bandas se pueden utilizar instalaciones no estn telegestionadas ni supervisadas, ni se
tambin para las comunicaciones derivadas de la visitan cada poco tiempo como es el caso de las subestaciones.
Smartgrid, porque adems las condiciones de
Por otro lado, en casi todos los pases las compaas
propagacin y cobertura en esas partes del espectro es
elctricas han ido creciendo por fusiones o adquisiciones, de
muy buena. Sin embargo, requieren la construccin y
forma que la red de distribucin resultante es bastante
mantenimiento de la infraestructura por la propia
heterognea en cuanto a topologas y equipamientos. No solo
empresa elctrica, y la capacidad obtenida es baja
por provenir de organizaciones distintas, sino por provenir de
(pocos Kbps).
la misma organizacin pero en distinta poca. Ello hace que la
B. Comunicaciones dentro del CT variabilidad que se encuentra y para la que hay que estar
preparado sea enorme. Un primer paso inicial del proyecto
Otra parte clave del sistema de comunicaciones consiste en consiste en la seleccin previa de qu instalaciones o centros
la interconexin de todos los elementos inteligentes que son son susceptibles de ser actualizados con la nueva
instalados en el centro de transformacin. Los distintos funcionalidad, y cuales son simplemente demasiado antiguos y
servicios requeridos (telegestin de contadores, supervisin y precisan ser sustituidos completamente o dejados a un lado.
automatizacin de MT, servicios auxiliares) deben ser
concentrados en un equipo de comunicaciones que permita La conclusin a todo esto es que en muchos casos, cuando
enrutar el trfico hacia el despacho de control. se plantea el despliegue de la Smartgrid, la informacin que se
verifica al realizar un replanteo en cada uno de los centros
En la prctica, todos los elementos presentes en el centro difiere de la que figuraba en los archivos de la compaa
se conectan utilizando una red Ethernet en el propio centro. elctrica. Por ello aparecen errores, desajustes,
Las razones para hacerlo son mltiples: modificaciones, sorpresas que pueden complicar
Es una tecnologa madura, probada y barata, pero aun sobremanera el despliegue, pero con las que hay que convivir.
con una larga vida por delante. Es muy comn que celdas de gas se conviertan en aire y
viceversa, lo que puede requerir el empleo de sensores y
Sus prestaciones (100mbps) cubren de sobra todas las acoplamientos distintos a los inicialmente acopiados. Siempre
aplicaciones que puedan venir en un futuro a un merece la pena un replanteo previo, su coste queda
centro de transformacin. amortizado.
Se comporta perfectamente en entornos adversos Otro punto importante es el descargo en el que se realiza la
como puede ser un centro de transformacin. actualizacin del centro de transformacin con los nuevos
equipamientos. Habitualmente se pone todo el foco en el coste
Existe una multitud de equipamiento disponible de del equipamiento, pero el coste del descargo supone una parte
muchos proveedores distintos. importante del total, por lo que es preciso tener en cuenta su
Permite segmentar los distintos servicios de forma duracin. Por tanto la solucin de Smartgrid a utilizar
muy sencilla utilizando VLANs. (equipamientos, armarios) tiene que ser lo ms integrada
posible [10], de forma que se facilite el tiempo y la mecnica
Para salir del centro hacia el despacho, se puede construir de la instalacin. Asimismo, todo en el despliegue tiene que
una red a nivel 3 (con lo que hara falta un router, por ejemplo estar organizado de forma que se produzca una instalacin y
con tecnologa GPRS), o se puede construir una red a nivel 2 validacin rpida del centro.
(con lo que hara falta un bridge, por ejemplo con tecnologa
PLC de MT). Esto depende de la arquitectura elegida a nivel Adicionalmente, las dificultades que se encuentran en la
de celdas de CT, ya que, en ltimo caso, todas las instalacin son notables, ya que las infraestructuras de los
comunicaciones hacia el despacho se realizarn a nivel IP y centros no se disearon para que nuevos equipamientos
por tanto habr un router de comunicacin, bien sea a nivel de pudieran ser aadidos a posteriori. Por tanto los espacios
centro o de cabecera. disponibles son en muchas ocasiones mnimos, y es preciso
desarrollar equipos y sensores que se adapten especficamente
VI. INSTALACIN E INTERACCIN CON EL CENTRO DE a la diversidad de celdas y centros existentes en la red de
TRANSFORMACIN distribucin, que pueden ser bastantes.
A la hora de acometer el despliegue de un sistema de Por ltimo, no debe olvidarse que la red de distribucin es
Smartgrid en una red de distribucin existente y en operacin, muy distinta de una subestacin, en la que todos los elementos
en muchas ocasiones se pone todo el foco del proyecto en los estn probados y en perfecto orden de revista. En un centro de
aspectos tecnolgicos del mismo, y sin embargo toda la parte transformacin, es probable que por ejemplo un interruptor de
de despliegue es un problema logstico que no hay que un transformador no haya sido maniobrado en ms de diez
olvidar, y bastante complejo como se va a analizar a aos, y no existe ningn mecanismo que permita verificar su
continuacin. estado. Por tanto, pueden ocurrir situaciones como que el
interruptor falle a la hora de reponer el servicio tras el
La red de distribucin se puede considerar como la descargo. Este tipo de situaciones deben estar previstas. No
hermana pobre del sistema elctrico, ya que durante muchos
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 143

hay que perder de vista que las instalaciones pueden tener Es necesario planificar visitas a las instalaciones,
bastantes aos a sus espaldas. revisiones de los planes, actualizaciones, replanteos,
etc ya que a largo plazo son rentables.
VII. CONCLUSIONES Los gestores del proyecto y la direccin de la
A modo de resumen, para afrontar con garantas la empresa debe prepararse para la variabilidad e
implementacin de funcionalidades avanzadas de Smartgrid incidencias que pueden ocurrir en una red de
en una red de distribucin es til tener en cuenta las distribucin con decenas de aos de servicio.
siguientes conclusiones: Diferentes escenarios (por ejemplo zonas urbanas,
rurales, etc) requerirn de diferentes soluciones. En
La solucin de arquitectura de la Smartgrid debe ser las redes existentes no hay una solucin homognea
sencilla, al menos al comienzo. que sirva para todo un despliegue.
Hay que poner unos requisitos comunes al proyecto
que permitan actualizar de una misma forma el 90
95% de las instalaciones, para evitar caer en REFERENCIAS
personalizaciones excesivas para cada tipo de [1] R. Quintanilla, T. Yarza, Making the Smartgrid Real: a case study,
CIGRE SEAPAC Conference, 2011.
infraestructura de centro de transformacin.
[2] ESMIG, A guide to Smart Metering, Brussels, 2009.
Los requisitos funcionales y operacionales deben
[3] A. Arzuaga, I. Berganza, A. Sendin, M. Sharma, V. Varadarajan,
identificarse claramente antes del comienzo de los PRIME interoperability tests and results from field, IEEE Smartgrid
trabajos. Es imprescindible trazar una raya de Conference 2010.
separacin entre los requisitos necesarios y los [4] http://www.prime-alliance.org/
deseables. [5] J.A. Moreno, A. Arzuaga, C. Coca, Advanced Sensors for the
El foco del coste debe contemplar el sistema Smartgrid, CIRED Conference 2011, unpublished.
completo, teniendo en cuenta los costes de [6] A. Arzuaga, T. Arzuaga, J. Salat, Enabling Smartgrid
Communications over MV Lines, CIGRE SEAPAC Conference, 2011
instalacin, validacin y puesta en servicio,
[7] A. Arzuaga, T. Arzuaga, M. Zamalloa, Implementation of Telecontrol
adicionalmente a los costes de los equipamientos, ya Applications over GPRS Networks, PAC World Magazine, winter
que pueden ser una parte importante del total. 2010
Los servicios que se quieren implementar son los que [8] A. Arzuaga, T. Arzuaga, J. Salat, Enabling Smartgrid
determinan de forma ltima los requisitos de Communications over MV Lines, CIGRE SEAPAC Conference, 2011
capacidades de comunicaciones requeridos, y por [9] A. Arzuaga, T. Arzuaga, J. Salat, Enabling Smartgrid
tanto la arquitectura que se necesita. Communications over MV Lines, CIGRE SEAPAC Conference, 2011
Existe un compromiso necesario entre prestaciones [10] A. Arzuaga, J. Arriola, Z. Ojinaga, T. Arzuaga, M. Zamalloa,
Integrated solution for the Smartgrid, PAC World Conference 2011,
del sistema y coste de la solucin, que debe de unpublished..
afrontarse al inicio del sistema de forma que se
establezcan objetivos realistas (de presupuestos y
plazos) al proyecto.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 145

ESQUEMA DE PROTECCION Y CONTROL PARA LA INTERCONEXION en


13.8 KV, DEL PERMISIONARIO MEXICO-CARBON

Marco Antonio Ortiz Hernndez Luis Del ngel Diego


Pedro Martnez Lpez

Comisin Federal de Electricidad


Divisin Golfo Centro

Resumen: evita contaminacin por fuga de gas


SF6, aceite, etc.)
En la actualidad se ha presentado un Todo lo anterior se refleja en la misin y en la
incremento en la interconexin de generacin competitividad de la empresa.
de baja escala con diferentes esquemas, o
tambin conocida como generacin distribuida.

Los generadores pueden establecerse con Se conecta al sistema de Distribucin


diferentes esquemas de acuerdo al permiso mediante el circuito de media tensin PUO-
que le solicitan a la Secretaria de Energa: 4115, de la SE Puerto.

Cogenerador La S.E. Puerto pertenece ala


Auto abastecimiento Zona Tampico y se encuentra ubicada en el
Auto abastecimiento con venta corredor industrial de la Cd. de Altamira, con
de excedentes. tres lneas de transmisin con Voltaje Nominal
de 115 kv, un transformador de Potencia con
La instalacin de generacin en redes que han voltaje primario 115 kv voltaje secundario de
sido diseadas solo para abastecer clientes, 13.8 kv. con capacidad de 20 MVA y 4
provocando dificultades en la correcta alimentadores de media tensin. La figura 1
operacin de las protecciones instaladas. Esto Muestra el diagrama simplificado de la S.E.
conduce a la adecuacin de los esquemas de Puerto.
proteccin en los puntos de interconexin y en
las redes donde se conectan los nuevos
generadores.
PUO-73420 PUO-73140 PUO-73150

PUO-73428 PUO-73148 PUO-73158 PUO-77010

I. INTRODUCCION
PUO-72010 PUO-72018
DIAGRAMA UNIFILAR SIMPLIFICADO
Dentro de la Divisin Golfo Centro se tienen 30 MVA
115/13.8 KV
S.E. PUERTO
interconectados 23 permisionarios, con las
diferentes modalidades. PUO-42015 PUO-42018

Uno de los permisionarios es MEXICO


PUO-4118 PUO-4128 PUO-4138 PUO-4148

CARBON una empresa de la industria PUO-4115 PUO-4125 PUO-4135 PUO-4145

petroqumica, que como consecuencia de sus


procesos producen vapor, el cual utilizan para
Figura 1
generar energa para su auto abastecimiento y
venta a sus socios a travs de la red de CFE,
lo que se conoce como porteo de energa, por
lo que requiere sincronizar sus generadores
con el sistema y permanecer conectado.
II. DESARROLLO
146

Para la atencin de la Solicitud de conexin e Potencia activa instantnea trifsica de


interconexin del servicio, se revisan las salida (MW)
caractersticas de los equipos, se determinan Potencia reactiva instantnea trifsica
los requerimientos para la interconexin de de salida (MVAR)
acuerdo a la Ley del Servicio Pblico de Energa activa de salida (MWH)
Energa Elctrica y su Reglamento. Energa reactiva de salida (MVARH)
Corriente por fase
Requerimientos principales: Voltaje trifsico (promedio)
Frecuencia
Agregar a los Sistemas SCADA
los generadores y su En el punto de interconexin (para cada
trayectoria hasta el punto de interruptor lnea de llegada)
interconexin.
Salidas de control
Implementacin de los Mandos de interruptor (
esquemas de Proteccin en apertura / cierre )
para la correcta operacin del
sistema elctrico. Seales digitales
Posicin de interruptor de lnea
Adecuacin a los equipos de ( abierto/cerrado )
medicin. Posicin de cuchillas de lnea (
abierta/cerrada )
Agregar a los Sistemas SCADA los Seales analgicas
generadores y su trayectoria hasta el Potencia activa instantnea
punto de interconexin. trifsica de salida ( MW )
Potencia reactiva instantnea
trifsica de salida ( MVARr )
La instalacin de equipo de control que Corriente de lnea
cumpla con las caractersticas del equipo Voltaje trifsico ( promedio )
instalado en el rea de control (CENACE) o en
el centro de control mas cercano, (Centro de Seales digitales (alarmas de apoyo para
Control de Distribucin). supervisin)
Falla mecanismo
Baja presin SF6
Mecanismo descargado
Mecanismo bloqueado
Opero proteccin primaria
Opero proteccin de respaldo
Falta vcd circuito cierre
Falta vcd circuido disparo 1y 2

Implementacin de los esquemas de


Proteccin en para la correcta operacin
Figura 2 del sistema elctrico.
EL sistema de control remoto, debe Implementacin de los esquemas de
monitorear los siguientes parmetros: Proteccin en para la correcta operacin del
sistema elctrico, tanto en el punto de
Por cada interruptor de maquina interconexin como en el punto con esquema
de proteccin mas cercano sobre la red de
Seales digitales conexin.
Posicin de interruptor de unidad (
abierto/cerrado ) En este caso el punto mas cercano al punto de
interconexin es el interruptor PUO-4115. El
esquema asociado a este interruptor esta
Seales analgicas preparado con protecciones de sobrecorriente
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 147

las cuales son adecuadas solo para lneas con en la lnea, ya que al estar sincronizados los
operacin radial, es decir donde el flujo de generadores del permisionario con el Sistema
corriente en condiciones de carga normal y en se debe asegurar el disparo del punto de
condiciones de falla siempre es en el mismo interconexin, con tiempos de operacin
sentido. Figura 3 adecuados.

La primera adecuacin es en el Interruptor


PUO-4115 en S.E. Puerto. Con un esquema
de Proteccin de alimentador (PP), con
SE Puerto
PUO-4115 funciones de Proteccin de Sobrecorriente con
unidad direccional de secuencia positiva,
50/51 79
Flujo de corriente
negativa y cero, (67F/67N), Equipado con
funciones de bajo voltaje, alto voltaje,
Funciones de sincronismo , Alta Y Baja
La configuracin inicial del Frecuencia, recierre automtico, localizacin
circuito esta prevista para una de fallas, Oscilografa, Registro secuencial.
operacin radial.
Figura 5.

Figura 3
SE Puerto
PUO-4115
El equipo instalado en las instalaciones del
permisionario esta enfocado en controlar y
proteger sus equipos y sus generadores, 67/67N
59/27/25
adems no se tienen equipos que no estn
aprobados por el LAPEM en sus funciones de
T1 6 MVA
proteccin. 13.8/ 4.16kv
D-Y
G
Los equipos no estn enfocados a la Permisionario Mxico Carbn
proteccin del sistema al que se
interconectarn (SEN). Figura 4 Figura 5

SE Puerto
PUO-4115
La segunda adecuacin es en el Punto de
Punto de Interconexin
El permisionario no cuenta con
interconexin POSCO MEXICO, con la
50/51 79 equipo de proteccin para el instalacin de un Interruptor de Potencia con
sistema donde se interconecta
Lnea Subterrnea
Corriente Interruptiva 31 KA y Esquema de
Proteccin equipado con las siguientes
T1 6 MVA funciones de proteccin hacia la carga:
13.8/ 4.16kv
D-Y
Proteccin de Sobrecorriente con unidad
direccional de secuencia positiva, negativa y
G Permisionario Mxico Carbn
cero, (67F/67N), Equipado con funciones de
bajo voltaje, alto voltaje, Potencia inversa,
Funciones de sincronismo Alta Y Baja
Frecuencia, Oscilacin de Potencia, recierre
automtico, localizacin de fallas, Oscilografa,
Figura 4 Registro secuencial. Esquema de Proteccin
Equipado con las siguientes funciones hacia la
La operacin del circuito cambia por lo que lnea: Proteccin de Sobrecorriente con unidad
ser necesaria la adecuacin de los esquemas direccional de secuencia positiva, negativa y
de proteccin del punto de interconexin, para cero, (67F/67N), Equipado con funciones de
salvaguardar la integridad del personal que bajo voltaje, alto voltaje, Potencia inversa,
labore en la operacin y mantenimiento de la localizacin de fallas, Oscilografa, Registro
lnea de distribucin, la integridad del sistema secuencial. Figura 6.
elctrico y de los dems usuarios conectados
148

interconexin, se firma el contrato de


interconexin, y se le autoriza la entrada en
operacin comercial, el permisionario comenz
PUO-4115
su operacin comercial en diciembre del
SE Puerto
67/67N 2008.
59/27/2 67/67N
5 59/27/25
67/67N
59/27/25 Ya estando en operacin, en S.E. Mxico-
Carbn, el esquema de proteccin del lado
T1 6 MVA
primario del transformador, present una falla
13.8/ 4.16kv
D-Y
y el permisionario no dio la importancia
requerida para restablecer las funciones de
G
proteccin, y el da 26 de febrero del 2009 se
Permisionario Mxico Carbn
present una falla en una terminal del cable
subterrneo, esta evento nos dio la evidencia
del desplazamiento vectorial que se tiene en
una falla de fase a tierra en un sistema no
En tren el punto de interconexin del y el aterrizado. La conexin del transformador en
interruptor de lado primario existe una lnea su lado primario es en DELTA y este se
subterrnea de aproximadamente 350 metros comporta como un filtro de las corrientes de
por lo tanto adicionalmente se instal en el secuencia cero. Se provocaron sobre voltajes
lado primario del transformador un esquema en las fases no falladas, provocando daos en
de Sobrecorriente direccional de secuencia la instalacin del permisionario y la operacin
positiva, negativa y cero, y funciones de alto de las protecciones del lado secundario del
voltaje. En la figura 7 se muestran los transformador una vez que la falla evolucion
esquemas de proteccin. y se convirti en falla entre fases. A
continuacin se describe la secuencia del
evento y los efectos en el voltaje. Figura 8.

PUO-4115
SE Puerto

67/67N
59/27/25 67/67N PUO-4115
67/67N 59/27/25
59/27/25 SE Puerto 2.- Opera el punto de interconexin

67/67N 1.- Falla de fase a tierra en lnea


59/27/25
Oscilo grafa del relevador 3.- No dispara el interruptor del lado
T1 6 MVA del punto de interconexin primario y permanece alimentando
13.8/ 4.16kv la falla
D-Y
T1 6 MVA
13.8/ 4.16kv
D-Y

Permisionario Mxico Carbn G 4.- No operan los controles con protecci


Incluida en el Generador

Figura 7 G Permisionario Mxico Carbn

Figura 8
Las figuras 9 y 10, muestran los valores de
Adecuacin a los equipos de medicin. voltaje alcanzados mientras se mantuvo la
aportacin a la falla de los generadores del
Las adecuaciones a los equipos de medicin permisionario.
consisten en la instalacin de un medidor
principal y un medidor de respaldo en el punto
de interconexin, el medidor debe tener la
capacidad de medir energa activa y reactiva
en los cuatro cuadrantes, para determinar el
consumo y la aportacin del permisionario a la
red de CFE.

Despus de que el permisionario realiza las


adecuaciones y cumple con los requisitos de
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 149

PUO-73420 PUO-73140 PUO-73150

PUO-73428 PUO-73148 PUO-73158 PUO-77010


Oscilografa del relevador del punto de interconexin,
no existe corriente al estar abierto el equipo solo se
tienen las seales de voltaje
PUO-72010 PUO-72018

Concentrar estados de equipos involucrados


en la lgica de monitoreo para determinar la desconexin al
sistema de CFE.

PUO-42015 PUO-42018

PUO-4118 PUO-4128 PUO-4138 PUO-4148

PUO-4115 PUO-4125 PUO-4135 PUO-4145

Figura 11
Figura 9

PUO-72018
Fibra ptica
PUO-73148 (Canal principal)
Lgica
PUO-73158
de
PUO-73428 Procesador Procesador rel de
Lgico Radio Espectro Disperso Lgico
S.E. PUO S.E. MXC proteccin
PUO- 42018 (Canal respaldo) Cogenerador
PUO- 4118
S.E. MXC
PUO- 42015 Cogenerador

PUO- 4115

Monitores de estado de
interruptores a travs de
protocolo.
PUO-73140
PUO-73150 Enlace de comunicacin Disparo de interruptor de llegada a S.E. MXC
PUO-73420 por puertos seriales
PUO-72010
Sobre voltajes detectados por los relevadores del punto de interconexin, PUO-4115
el voltaje nominal de fase a tierra es de 7.9 KV, los voltajes detectados
de fase a tierra hasta 14.9 KV.

Como consecuencia dao de apartarrayos, cargadores de bateras y un


transformador de servicios propios en la instalacin del permisionario.

Figura 12

Figura 10
PUO-73420 PUO-73140 PUO-73150

Posterior al evento de disparo, el permisionario PUO-73428 PUO-73148 PUO-73158 PUO-77010

solicita apoyo y asesora a CFE para habilitar


funciones adicionales sobre los equipos e PUO-72010 PUO-72018 Procesador
Lgico
PUO

implementar un esquema que los conmute a


modo isla, al perderse la interconexin con el PUO-42015
PUO-42018
Procesador
Lgico

sistema de CFE.
MXC

PUO-4115 PUO-4118

67F, 67N, 59N, 25,


27, 32

Se evalan todos los posibles escenarios bajo MXC-4115

los cuales debe de enviarse la cogeneracin a Punto Interconexin CFE - MXC

modo isla y se propone concentrar los estados


de los interruptores y cuchillas involucrados en
un procesador lgico para transmitirlo al punto
de interconexin y posteriormente a la planta Figura 13
de cogeneracin para, mediante lgicas de
control, abrir el interruptor de llegada a la S.E.
MXC al momento de perderse el enlace CFE -
MXC. El arreglo se muestra en las figuras 11,
12 y 13. En la figura 14 se ilustra la operacin de la
transferencia de la seal al momento que se
150

pierde la interconexin del permisionario a V. BIBLIOGRAFIAS


travs de la apertura del interruptor PUO-
72010, que corresponde al lado primario del ING. MARCO A. ORTIZ
Transformador de la S.E. Puerto. HERNANDEZ

PUO-73420 PUO-73140 PUO-73150

PUO-73428 PUO-73148 PUO-73158 PUO-77010


Egresado del Instituto Tecnolgico de San Luis
Potos de la carrera de Ingeniera Industrial en
PUO-72010 PUO-72018 Procesador
Lgico
Elctrica.
PUO
Ingreso a C.F.E. en 1996 al Departamento
PUO-42015
PUO-42018
Procesador
Divisional de Proyectos y Construccin de la
Lgico
MXC Divisin Golfo Centro, con el puesto de
PUO-4115 PUO-4118

67F, 67N, 59N, 25,


Supervisor de Construccin C.
27, 32

MXC-4115
En 1997 se incorpora al Departamento
Punto Interconexin CFE - MXC
G
Divisional de Subestaciones y Lneas, como
profesionista en Entrenamiento de la Oficina
Figura 14 de Protecciones.
Con este arreglo complementario el En 1997 se le asigna la Jefatura de la Oficina
permisionario controla su generacin al de Protecciones de la Zona Victoria.
momento de perderse la interconexin, A partir de Septiembre del ao 2005, se
evitando problemticas en sus generadores desempea como Jefe de Oficina de
como rechazos de carga y fluctuaciones en el Protecciones, en el Departamento Divisional
voltaje y la frecuencia. de Subesbestaciones Y Lneas de la Divisin
Golfo Centro.
III. CONCLUSIONES
Telfono: (01-833) 226-2932 E-Mail
Es muy importante establecer y mantener los : marco .ortiz01@cfe.gob.mx
esquemas de proteccin y control de manera
conjunta con los permisionarios, para
salvaguardar la integridad del personal, las
instalaciones y la estabilidad del sistema ING. PEDRO MARTINEZ
elctrico. LOPEZ
A partir del 14 de Julio 2010 se cuenta con el
Procedimiento de Atencin a las Solicitudes de
Interconexin de Permisionarios a la Red del
Servicio Pblico de Energa Elctrica en el Egresado del Instituto Tecnolgico de Cd.
cual se establecen los requerimientos mnimos Madero en la carrera de Ingeniera Elctrica en
para la correcta operacin de los Potencia.
permisionarios y generacin distribuida. Ingreso a C.F.E. en 1992 al Depto. Divisional
de Proyectos y Construccin con el puesto de
IV. REFERENCIAS Supervisor de Construccin C.
En 1993 se incorpora al Depto. Divisional de
[1] Protective Realying. Principles and Subestaciones y Lneas, especficamente a la
Aplications. Third Editiion. J. Lewis Ofna. de Protecciones, fungiendo como
Blackburn. Ingeniero Sustituto.
En 1997 se le asigna la Jefatura de la Ofna. de
[2] Moderm Solutions for Proteccin. Protecciones de la Zona Tampico, puesto que
Control, and Monitoring of Electric Power desempea actualmente.
Systems.Hector J. Altuve Ferrer, Edmund
O. Schweitzer, III. Telfono: (01-833) 226-09-24
E-Mail : pedro.martinez02@cfe.gob.mx
[3] PAC Word Magazine, Summer 2008.
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 151

ING. LUIS DEL ANGEL DIEGO

Egresado del Instituto Tecnolgico de Cd.


Madero en la carrera de Ingeniera Electrnica
Ingreso a C.F.E. en 1998 al Depto. Divisional
de Comunicaciones y Control puesto de
Supervisor de Construccin C.
En 2001 se le asigna la Jefatura de la Ofna. de
Control al Depto. Divisional de
Comunicaciones y Control puesto que
desempea actualmente.

Telfono: (01-833) 241-33-26


E-Mail : luis.delangel@cfe.gob.mx
X Simposio Iberoamericano Sobre Proteccin de Sistemas Elctricos de Potencia 153

EL MANTENIMIENTO CENTRADO EN CONFIABILIDAD CON EL APOYO DE


LOS SISTEMAS DE PROTECCIONES DE LAS SUBESTACIONES DE
DISTRIBUCIN.

Jorge Betanzos Manuel Jos Carlos Lpez Valencia

Comisin Federal de Electricidad


Divisin Sureste- Zona Huajuapan.

Resumen: Monitoreo de Calidad de energa:


Sag/Swell, Armnicas
A nivel mundial, la industria est Monitoreo de alarmas y temperaturas
focalizada en aumentar la productividad sin de los transformadores de potencia
incrementar sus costos, lo que obliga a tanto en tiempo real como histricos
muchas compaas a luchar por optimizar Monitoreo de Tensin de servicios
sus niveles de produccin para permanecer propios, Tensin del banco de bateras,
competitivas. En este sentido, se requiere temperatura de casetas y tableros PCM
un sistema de monitoreo de tiempo real Reportes de arranques, disparos,
para realizar los estudios que nos permitan apertura/cierre de interruptores y
una mejor planeacin de los trabajos de corriente de fallas.
mantenimiento y mejoras a las
instalaciones, de tal forma que se Con esta informacin determinar cules son
minimicen las interrupciones y las prdidas las tareas de mantenimiento adecuadas para
de energa, para mantener el suministro cualquier activo fsico, con el objetivo principal
dentro de los parmetros determinados en de reducir el costo de mantenimiento, para
los contratos de suministro establecidos enfocarse en las funciones ms importantes
con los clientes y en los compromisos de de los sistemas, y evitando o quitando
servicio. acciones de mantenimiento que no son
estrictamente necesarias, algunos de los
Palabras Claves: MBC, Tiempo real. beneficios obtenidos son:
Reduccin del tiempo del
I. INTRODUCCION restablecimiento del suministro de
energa elctrica
El Mantenimiento Basado en la confiabilidad Seguridad del Personal (al evitar
(MBC) es el mantenimiento que se debe hacer traslados a las subestaciones.)
para que las instalaciones hagan lo que la Reduccin de la energa dejada de
empresa desea que hagan, para lo cual se vender.
implement un sistema de informacin que
Mayor productividad de los
permite definir los indicadores del desempeo
colaboradores de la empresa.
de las subestaciones, considerando la filosofa
Incremento del conocimiento de la
del Mantenimiento Centrado en Confiabilidad,
operacin del sistema elctrico.
a travs de los datos proporcionados por los
Dispositivos de Proteccin, Control y Medicin Impacto ambiental. Reduccin de la
instalados en las subestaciones de contaminacin (al evitar el traslado, se
Distribucin. reduce el consumo de combustible. Se
Algunos de los datos que nos proporcionan evita contaminacin por fuga de gas
son los siguientes: SF6, aceite, etc.)
Todo lo anterior se refleja en la misin y en la
competitividad de la empresa.
Monitoreo de estados y alarmas de
interruptores, Tableros PCM
Monitoreo en tiempo real de
mediciones por fase de voltajes,
corrientes, potencias y frecuencia
154

II. DESARROLLO Figura 1.0 Diagrama general del monitoreo en


tiempo real
El sistema de monitoreo en Tiempo real consta
de cuatro mdulos los cuales tienen las Como en cada subestacin se tiene instalado
siguientes funciones: un concentrador se crea un canal a nivel
superior el cual enva las mediciones de
Fuente de la informacin: la cual se obtiene de bancos y lneas a un concentrador zonal en el
los relevadores de proteccin, Medidores de cual podemos ver el comportamiento de las
calidad de energa y cuadros de alarmas: cargas de todos los transformadores y el flujo
de energas de las lneas de transmisin.
Enlace de I nformacin: Para poder tener las