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Asia Program

Policy Brief
January 12, 2010

Summary: East Asia, which has only


What are the transatlantic lessons for East
engaged in serious institution- Asian institution-building?
building over the past two decades,
is today home to a crowded, multi-
layered landscape of regional by Akiko Fukushima1
organizations. While initially
suspicious of adopting European
models for regional cooperative The process of building regional Dearth of regional institutions
institutions, Asia has now become institutions in Asia often uses European
more open to such concepts. How- models not for the purposes of emulation, Postwar Asian regionalism dates back to
ever, important differences remain but as a yardstick. With Asia a latecomer to the founding of the Association of South-
in the way in which Asia adopts—and institutionalized regional cooperation, it east Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 and
adapts—its institutional architecture has naturally looked to Europe, where the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
over the coming decades. substantive regional institution-build- (SEATO) that existed from 1954 to 1977.
ing has been taking place for six decades. While ASEAN could not gather steam
In East Asia, this process dates back only during the Cold War, it sits in the driver’s
20 years. Yet, Asian institutions have since seat of regionalism in today’s Asia, as
grown so numerous that there now exists illustrated by the “ASEAN plus” institutions.
a crowded, multi-layered landscape, which SEATO, meanwhile, did not become the
has led to complaints and calls for limits on effective security mechanism it was
the number of institutions. originally intended to be. The organization’s
undoing was its inability to help prevent
Nevertheless, proposals continue to be or end the Vietnam War, although its
made for Track 1, Track 1.5, and Track 2 limitations had become clear soon after its
regional mechanisms, as illustrated by creation.
Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s
pitch for the creation of an Asia-Pacific The reasons for the dearth of regional
community (APc) and Japanese Prime institutions in Asia were several. First, the
Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s proposal for an region was far more diverse than Europe in
East Asia community (EAc). With Asian terms of history, culture, and political sys-
attitudes toward integration changing, tems. Second, there was no bonding mecha-
regional leaders and officials are taking nism such as a common enemy to engender
a fresh look at the European model of regional unity and collective action, the
cooperation, even as Asia charts its own territorial actors instead being skeptical of
course—one grounded in the historical one another. Third, the Asian countries that
and developmental diversity of the region’s had attained independence after the Second
constituent states. World War were neither willing to yield
1744 R Street NW sovereignty for the sake of regional coop-
Washington, DC 20009 eration, nor accept the intervention of other
T 1 202 745 3950 states in the region in the name of humani-
F 1 202 265 1662
E info@gmfus.org
1
Akiko Fukushima is currently senior fellow of the Japan Foundation. She is also visiting scholar at the Joint Research Institute for
Peace and Culture at Aoyama Gakuin University in Tokyo, Japan. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of GMF.
Asia Program

Policy Brief
tarian assistance or human rights. Fourth, the economic measures” (CBMs), in the European context, was considered exces-
disparity in the region blurred any perception of cooperation sively formal and intrusive in Asia. This is because while CBMs
having collective merit. Fifth, prewar encounters with spheres of originated in an environment characterized by clearly identified
influence and colonization made countries skeptical about regional adversaries in Europe, Asian nations did not have clear-cut enemies,
integration and collaboration. instead sharing a raft of complex mutual feelings and concerns.
Alternative terms to CBMs were suggested that were believed to be
It was only in the 1980s, when most of the countries in Asia had more appropriate for Asia, including “mutual reassurance measures”
adopted democratic principles and achieved sustained levels of and “trust-building measures.”
economic growth, that Asia was in a position to embark upon
regional institution-building. Moreover, from the late 1980s to the When the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) was launched in 1996 to
end of the 1990s, brisk advances in economic regionalism in Europe strengthen relations between the two regions, the Asian members,
and the Americas served as a wake-up call that Asia needed regional buoyed by their phenomenal economic growth, stressed that Asia
institutions to provide a collective voice at international forums, was an equal—not inferior—partner of Europe. Asian rejection of
such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This the European model for regionalism thus continued.
was also the period when the end to Cold War confrontation paved
the way for further cooperation, and ASEAN’s importance as a sub- Transpacific relations
regional institution was demonstrated by its role in the Cambodian
peace process. Another factor was the rise of China, with which In post-Second World War Europe, Washington led in the creation
Asian countries wanted to engage as the era of containment began of NATO and supported the establishment of regional institu-
drawing to an end. tions that did not include the United States, such as the European
Community. However, Washington had been skeptical of, if not
As a manifestation of the above changes, the first region-wide against, the evolution of regionalism in Asia. Even though it had
Track 1 institution, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) taken the initiative in creating SEATO, it was disillusioned with
forum, was launched in November 1989—coincidentally, the same what it perceived to be the potential for security cooperation in the
month that the Berlin Wall collapsed. The successful launch of Asia-Pacific. Rather than develop a NATO-like security institution,
APEC and subsequent regional cooperation made Asian actors feel it opted for a hub-and-spoke combination of bilateral alliances with
more comfortable with regionalism, even as the suspicions gener- countries like Japan, South Korea, and Australia.
ated by China and others led to the launch of a nascent security
dialogue within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The United States’ reluctance for exclusively Asian institutions
was made manifestly clear in 1990, when then-Malaysian Prime
By this time, Europe was in a position to share its experiences in Minister Mahathir Mohamad proposed the creation of the East
regionalism with Asia, having successfully built and developed Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), with ASEAN, China, Japan, and the
numerous institutions, including the European Community (EC), Republic of Korea as members. Washington strongly criticized the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Conference proposal, arguing that such an institution would divide the Pacific
on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Nevertheless, Asia powers. Then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker famously said
rejected the European model. during his visit to Japan in November 1991 that an EAEC would
“draw a line down the Pacific.” The idea did not take off because the
Rejection of European model United States objected and some ASEAN members did not support
the proposal, although this Asian grouping was eventually realized
In July 1990, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans suggested as the Asian side of ASEM, and subsequently as the ASEAN+3.
that regional security issues should be addressed by creating an
Asian version of the CSCE. In the same month, Canadian Minister Since the United States accepts that Europe has both NATO and
of Foreign Affairs Joe Clark also proposed that a CSCE-like orga- the European Union, Asian leaders have staked a similar claim
nization be formed in Asia. Both proposals were rejected by Asian to regional institutions that both include and exclude the United
nations on the grounds that the security situation in Europe differed States. U.S. opposition to East Asian regional institution-making
from that in Asia and was, therefore, not a suitable template. Asian peaked during the launch, in 2005, of the East Asia Summit (EAS), a
officials maintained that even the term “confidence-building grouping made up of ASEAN members, China, Japan, the Republic

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Asia Program

Policy Brief
of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India. The run-up to the EAS more, Asia has invigorated trilateral cooperation or mini-lateral-
featured a region-wide debate over whether regionalism in Asia ism—through Japan–China–ROK, Japan–ROK–U.S., Japan–Chi-
should be based on the geographical footprint of East Asia, exclud- na–U.S. and Japan–Australia–U.S. talks. This has given impetus
ing the United States, or of the Asia-Pacific, including the United to reinvigorating APEC, since Japan will host the Leaders Meeting
States. in 2010, and the United States will in 2011. Although ARF lacks
teeth, its avenue for security cooperation is augmented by the Track
EAS also featured intra-Asian competition between China and 2 process of the Shangri-La Dialogue as well as other proposals,
Japan over which country would set the terms of Asian regionalism, including the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+)
defined in part by how inclusive or exclusive new regional institu- conferences that have been floated for regional security cooperation
tions would be. When the summit was proposed, Sino-Japanese beyond the hub-and-spoke structure.
relations were colored by nationalist debates arising from the
Japanese prime minister’s visits to the controversial Yasukuni ASEAN is exploring how it might both remain at the helm in East
Shrine. In the context of Sino-Japanese tension, the media gave the Asia and enhance its convening power in Asia-Pacific cooperation.
impression that Japan was taking the lead for an inclusive East Asia The grouping has been the focal point of regionalism since dia-
Summit, in part to dilute Chinese influence, whereas China logues with non-ASEAN partners commenced in the 1980s, because
preferred a smaller ASEAN+3 grouping that could let it exercise it provides an anxiety-neutral environment in which the region’s
more control. While Japan and China were competing over these players feel comfortable. This has led to the creation of the numer-
institutions, ASEAN seized the opportunity and grabbed the ous “ASEAN plus” mechanisms prevailing today. Furthermore,
initiative in both ASEAN+3 and the EAS, supporting the wider ASEAN benefits from its 2007 Charter, which stresses the central-
grouping while claiming the right of Southeast Asian states—not ity of intra-regional cooperation. Cognizant that diverse interests
East Asia’s great powers—to chair the summit. and levels of power among its members sometimes cause divides,
ASEAN plans to launch economic, politico-security, and social-cul-
Following President Barack Obama’s inauguration in January 2009, tural communities in order to strengthen cooperation, thus solidify-
his administration identified Asia as a priority for U.S. diplomacy. ing its position. ASEAN is therefore very cautious in responding to
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Japan, Indonesia, the the new proposals such as the APc and EAc, and stresses how much
Republic of Korea and China on her first overseas trip. In addition, it has strived to promote regional cooperation in East Asia.
Clinton did not miss the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference and
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting, which her European models as references for Asia
predecessor had only infrequently attended. At the 2009 ARF meet-
ing, Clinton signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in In the wake of these changes, Asia has moved away from its previous
Southeast Asia, which previous administrations had resisted since it outright rejection of the European model and its perceived incom-
came into force in 1976, and which was one of the preconditions for patibility, instead gravitating toward the acceptance of a similar,
the United States to participate in the EAS. This represents a shift to- if less developed, regional institutionalism as a benchmark or a
ward greater U.S. accommodation regarding East Asian regionalism yardstick.
and, in turn, has led Asian leaders to consider inviting the United
States to participate in future summits. One reason for this is that Asia has learned from European regional
institutions as it has explored possible regional architectures, includ-
Meanwhile, the Australian prime minister’s June 2008 proposal that ing functional cooperation. Another reason is that Asia has reached
a single regional institution, the Asia-Pacific community, be created, the stage of operationalizing—rather than just debating—ideas for
and the Japanese prime minister’s September 2009 proposal for an cooperation, from which it has derived tangible results during times
East Asia community generated further debate on future regional of financial crisis, pandemics, natural disasters and other events that
architecture. Both leaders have alluded to European models for benefit from cooperative efforts. Third, Asia has come to feel greater
regional cooperation in their proposals for Asia. affinity with Europe as the European Union has expanded its mem-
bership and embraced diversity, even while it struggles with its own
Mainstream thinking in Asia today does not support choosing one institutional reforms. Fourth, Asia is not ready to sacrifice a part of
regional mechanism from among the existing institutions—includ- its sovereignty for the sake of regionalism, illustrated by the use in
ing APEC, ARF, ASEAN+3, EAS and the Six Party Talks. What is Asia of a lower-case initial letter “c” for the word “community” in

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Asia Program

Policy Brief
the context of the Asia-Pacific community (APc) and the East Asia
community (EAc). About GMF’s Asia Program

The German Marshall Fund’s Asia Program addresses the implications


Thus, while European cooperation has taken the form of an insti-
of Asia’s rise for the West—in particular, how Asia’s resurgence will im-
tutional model, such cooperation in Asia is a network model, as
pact the foreign policy, economic, and domestic challenges and choices
exemplified by the Chiang Mai Initiative. Nevertheless, as rule-based
facing the transatlantic allies—through a combination of convening,
cooperation develops, Asia increasingly shows signs of becoming a
writing, strategic grants, study tours, fellowships, partnerships with
hybrid of the two models, with more rules to be created to govern
other GMF programs, and partnerships with other institutions. Led by
regional cooperation in future.
Senior Fellow for Asia Daniel Twining and Transatlantic Fellow Andrew
Small, the program’s initiatives include the Stockholm China Forum
Asia has been learning from European and transatlantic regional
and India Forum, seminars and other activities in Japan, a Japanese
institutions, and at the same time building and reinvigorating East
fellowship program, Asia-related panels at GMF’s flagship events at
Asian and Asia-Pacific regional platforms. Against the backdrop of
Brussels and Halifax, and a paper series on transatlantic approaches to
globalization, Asia needs to push on with its regional cooperation if
wider Asia and on deepening cooperation between democratic Asia and
it is to generate the synergy from which it can benefit and produce
the West. For more information see http://www.gmfus.org/asia.
international public goods. Like Europe, Asia should encourage
institutional Darwinism, which allows those institutions that prove
About GMF
most effective to develop and survive. Gone are the strident denials
that the European model offers practical lessons. Asia continues to
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a
learn from European experiences how to be effective and efficient
nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution
in building a regional architecture for peace and prosperity in the
dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding
21st century. What really counts for Asia is the process by which it
between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting
achieves regional cooperation and builds regional architecture, since
individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by
this is the means by which regional antipathy can be changed to
convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes,
empathy.
and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can
address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF
supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to
.
Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both
sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington,
DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels,
Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.

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