Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
2 (2008)
PENSAMIENTO Revista de Investigacin e Informacin Filosfica
EDITORIAL
ARTCULOS
ROBERTO POLI Person and Value .......................................... 591-602
SUSUMU SHIMAZONO Individualization of Society and Religioni-
zation of Individuals: Resacralization in
Postmodernity (Second Modernity) ..... 603-619
PIOTR BYLICA God, Design, and Naturalism: Implications
y DARIUSZ SAGAN of Methodological Naturalism in Scien-
ce for Science-Religion Relation .......... 621-638
JAVIER LEACH Mathematics, Reason & Religion ............... 639-663
MIGUEL LORENTE PRAMO Some Relational Theories on the Structure
of Space-Time: Physics, Philosophy,
Theology ................................................... 665-691
PENSAMIENTO
FERNANDO LPEZ AGUILAR Quantum Neurology: A Key Within Physics
Toward the Knowledge of the Cons-
ciousness? ............................................... 693-713
MANUEL BJAR GALLEGO Physics, Consciousness and Transcen-
dence: The Physics of Roger Penrose
and David Bohm as Regards a Scien-
tific Explanation of the Human Mind
Open to Reality ........................................ 715-739
(El ndice sigue en la tercera pgina de cubierta The Index
continues in the inside of the back cover)
PENSAMIENTO
Vol. 64, nm. 242, serie especial nm. 2 (2008), pgs. 577-1136, ISSN 0031-4749 NI
S
V E R I TA S
ILLENS
S
P
* M *
A T RI TI
(Viene de la cubierta.)
EDICIN Y ADMINISTRACIN
IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO Gnesis de la vida desde la dinmica
procesual de la materia ....................... 741-770
EDICIN Y ADMINISTRACIN (suscripciones, pedidos, pagos, giros, etc.): PENSAMIENTO.
Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad Pontificia Comillas. C/ Universidad JOAN BERTRN A Darwinian Process: The Molecular
Comillas, 3.28049 Madrid. Telfono: 91 734 39 50. Fax: 91 734 45 70. E-mail: Evolution of Enzymes .......................... 771-782
revistas@pub.upcomillas.es. Hay un formulario de suscripcin en la pgina web.
MANUEL G. DONCEL Teologa de la evolucin (II): La llamada
Talones y giros postales deben dirigirse a: PENSAMIENTO. Servicio de Publicacio-
creadora trinitaria. Karl Schmitz-
nes de la Universidad Pontificia Comillas. C/ Universidad Comillas, 3.28049 Madrid.
Transferencias bancarias a: PENSAMIENTO. Servicio de Publicaciones de la Uni- Moormann, 1997 ................................... 783-814
versidad Pontificia Comillas, en: CAJA MADRID, C/ Blasco de Garay, 38.28015 Ma- JAVIER MONSERRAT Alfred N. Whitehead on Process Philo-
drid. C.C.: 2038-1760-89-6000482372. Cdigo IBAN: ES56-2038-1760-8960-0048-2372. sophy and Theology: Cosmos and Ke-
Cdigo SWIFT: CAHMESMM. nosis of Divinity ..................................... 815-845
SUSCRIPCIN.Precios para el ao 2008 (impuestos y transportes incluidos): MARTN SEVILLA RODRGUEZ Los orgenes del materialismo en India y
SUSCRIPCIN ANUAL: Espaa: 33,00 , 31,73 sin IVA.Europa: 62,50 , 60,10 sin Grecia: similitudes y diferencias ........ 847-864
IVA.Iberoamrica y frica: 70,00 .Otros pases: 76,00 .
ALFONSO GMEZ FERNNDEZ Nagarjuna y la dialctica del origen con-
NMERO SUELTO: Espaa: 13,40 , 13,93 con IVA.Europa: 22,70 , 23,60 con
dicionado ............................................... 865-887
IVA.Iberoamrica y frica: 26,00 .Otros pases: 26,00 .
JUAN MASI y MOE KUWANO El retorno a la unidad cuerpo-mente. En-
LIBROS PARA RECENSIN.Deben remitirse al Coordinador de Crtica de Libros, Ri-
cuentro de ascesis, terapia y filosofa
cardo Pinilla Burgos. C/ Universidad Comillas, 3.28049 Madrid.
en Japn ................................................ 889-902
MANUSCRITOS.Deben remitirse al Director.
MANUEL CABADA CASTRO Infinitud divina y visin mstica en Nico-
ls de Cusa ............................................ 903-930
GAMAL ABDEL-KARIM El sufismo y el Islam .................................. 931-946
RESERVADOS LOS DERECHOS
DE PROPIEDAD LITERARIA
SCAR CASTRO GARCA El yo interior. Reflexiones transdiscipli-
Queda prohibida la reproduccin
nares sobre la experiencia de lo nu-
total o parcial de esta revista minoso ................................................... 947-985
por cualquier procedimiento,
sin permiso escrito de la Editorial
ESTUDIOS, NOTAS, TEXTOS Y COMENTARIOS
IVN ORTEGA RODRGUEZ The Relevance of Jan Patockas Pheno-
menology in Questions of Science
and Religion .......................................... 987-1001
JOSEP PUIG MONTADA Farah. Ant.un: Active Reception of Euro-
Este nmero especial de PENSAMIENTO se publica pean Thought ........................................ 1003-1024
en colaboracin con la Ctedra CTR, J. SERAFN BJAR BACAS Cristianismo, Islam e Ilustracin. A pro-
dentro del Programa Ciencia, Tecnologa y tica-Social, psito del discurso de Benedicto XVI
de la Escuela Tcnica Superior de Ingeniera (ICAI) en la Universidad de Ratisbona ......... 1025-1042
de la Universidad Comillas Madrid y en desarrollo
JESS ROMERO MOIVAS La reformulacin de la dogmtica teol-
del Proyecto Sophia Iberia in Europe
gica desde la metafsica del devenir .. 1043-1086
PENSAMIENTO
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CONSEJO ASESOR
Juan Antonio Estrada (Universidad de Granada). Pedro Cerezo Galn (Universidad
de Granada). Juan Carlos Scannone (Universidad de El Salvador, Buenos Aires).
Ral Fornet-Betancourt (Universidad de Aachen, Bremen). Mauricio Beuchot (Universidad
Autnoma de Mxico). Rudolf Bernet (Universidad de Lovaina).
Laszlo Tengelyi (Universidad de Wupperthal). Salvi Turr (Universidad de Barcelona).
Gabriel Amengual (Universidad de las Islas Baleares). Manuel Garca Doncel (Universidad
Autnoma de Barcelona). Jos Gmez Caffarena (Universidad de Comillas).
Joao Jos Miranda Vila-Cha (Universidade Catlica Portuguesa). Alberto Rosa Rivero
(Universidad Autnoma de Madrid). Amalio Blanco Abarca (Universidad Autnoma
de Madrid). Jess Conill (Universidad de Valencia). Pedro Gmez Garca (Universidad
de Granada). Manuel Cabada Castro (Universidad Complutense, Madrid).
Adela Cortina (Universidad de Valencia). Juan Arana (Universidad de Sevilla). Pascual
Martnez-Freire (Universidad de Mlaga). Juan Miguel Palacios (Universidad
Complutense, Madrid). Antonio Pintor Ramos (Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca).
Vctor Gmez Pin (Universidad Autnoma de Barcelona). Francesc Torralba (Universitat
Ramon Llull, Barcelona). Carlos Alonso Bedate (Centro Biologa Molecular, CSIC, Madrid).
Jos Mara Guibert (Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao). Ana Rioja (Universidad
Complutense, Madrid). Rafael Ramn (Universidad Complutense, Madrid)
ISSN 0031-4749
Depsito legal: M. 919-1958
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EDITORIAL
THE CONTRIBUTION OF
SCIENCE/PHILOSOPHY/RELIGION
DIALOGUE TO
TRANSDISCIPLINARY
AND INTER-CONFESSIONAL
APPROACHES TOWARDS
A BETTER SOCIETY
Dr. Eric L. Weislogel
Executive Director & Vice-president
of the Metanexus Institute
for Science and Religion, Philadelphia
T
he publication of the second issue in the special series Ciencia, Filosofa y Religin (Science,
Philosophy & Religion) of the PENSAMIENTO magazine (July 2008) coincides with
the Metanexus World Conference 2008 to be held in Madrid at the Universidad Pontificia
Comillas. This event is the reason for this second issue in the series being devoted to the
Metanexus Institute. But if we focus on our magazines objectives and in particular the
Ciencia, Filosofa y Religin (Science, Philosophy & Religion) series, as well as the Science,
Technology and Religion chair within the Sophia Iberia project funded by the Templeton
Foundation and the Science, Technology and Social Ethics programme at the Escuela Tcnica
Superior de Ingeniera at U.P. Comillas, there is an obvious alignment with the objectives of
the Metanexus Institute. This means that we do not have to step outside our interests in
order to join together with the interests of the Metanexus Institute. In both cases, these are
interests aimed at encouraging ideas and nexus that lead to a better society and greater
human cohesion.
But what interests are we talking about? Broadly speaking, we are dealing with what the
Templeton Foundation has called the great issues and questions that have been present
throughout history and which are raised again today with perhaps even more force. Questions
that, as such, do not necessarily require an answer, but which encourage us to look towards
the ancient concerns of human beings: expanding knowledge to the essence of the universe,
the ultimate metaphysical foundations, the meaning of life, values, ethical, moral, personal
and social obligations and commitments, the search for and exercising of freedom, the value
of religions, ideological and worldview pluralism, solidarity, respect and tolerance, scientific,
intercultural and inter-religious dialogue, poverty and compassion for those who suffer,
PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749 PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), nm. 242, pp. 579-590
580 EDITORIAL
poverty, justice, the development of civilisation, etc. These are undoubtedly important issues,
which affect the moral conscience of people, groups of humans, nations and cultures.
However, are there answers to these important questions? Just by observing the world
stage of societies and cultures we can immediately see the huge variety of metaphysical beliefs,
religions and ideologies. This seems to show that the universe in which man lives and in which
he aims to understand his own self in order to live is disconcerting, dark and enigmatic.
It is like a polyhedron of infinite sides that reflect different images taken on in a creative way
by the different metaphysics, religions, ideologies, cultures and ways of life.
Despite so much factual diversity however, we, as humans, hope to fulfil one of humanitys
ancient desires: to base our lives on the idea of inter-human communion, to live as brothers
in society, to achieve perfect cohesion not only with our immediate fellows, but with the
universal human species. This instinctive drive to live with others is more deeply-rooted
and fundamental than the drive for aggression towards others. Suspicion and aggression
between humans probably resulted from a dysfunction that was already imbedded in
prehistoric times, an existential mistake, the mismanagement of co-existence. We have
already reflected on this topic in the editorial of issue no. 1 of this series (2007, no. 238 of
PENSAMIENTO) Contributing to social cohesion for a harmonious co-existence in an
ideal community.
joins us to other human beings. This could be one way of interpreting the concept of metanexus
(transcending networks) from the humanist and co-existing background of its social
commitment.
In chapter four of his most outstanding work, Die Phenomenologie des Geistes (The
Phenomenology of Spirit), Hegel brilliantly formulated the ultimate meaning of history: to
reach a collective state (Spirit) where the I is We and the We is I. He understood the path
towards this inter-human communion (towards this careful balance between the individual
and the communal). He called it mutual recognition (gegenseitliche Anerkennung). Only
when people engage in mutual recognition of each other as free men is communion-
based existence possible. Only then are respect, tolerance, true appreciation, compassion,
mutual enrichment and peace between people of different metaphysics, ideologies, cultures
and religions possible.
Human diversity is shown in the different metaphysical possibilities. But not only in
metaphysical terms, as diversity is also shown in many other ways. The metaphysical element
is essential, because it affects a human beings most deeply-rooted senses. It is true that in
our society, some people have very little sensitivity for and interest in metaphysical issues;
but they are a minority. In fact, we make a distinction between atheists, agnostics, theists
and religious people (members of organised religious groups). There is still a lot of aggression
between these different groups (although in the past, there was even more): between atheists
and theists, between atheists and theists and religious people, between different religious
groups, etc. This multi-directional aggression is, at the end of the day, the result of a lack of
understanding between the different groups, contempt, a lack of tolerance and inter-human
mutual recognition.
How can we overcome these tensions and inter-human misunderstandings? In other
words: how can we create links that enable mutual recognition and progress towards
increasing inter-human communion? Here is where we need to express our strong belief
that science is currently emerging as a powerful factor in inter-human community and
cohesion. There are obviously other possible cohesion factors; but science is emerging today
as a special force. Science has been and is an effective cognitive tool for the technological
control of the world. But today, it is also emerging as a powerful social factor in metaphysical
cohesion. Why?
Sciences emerging role is a result of its own nature. 1) It creates highly reliable and
rigorous knowledge (although it is always hypothetical and subject to critical review). 2) This
information is created with the guarantee of levels of objectivity that can easily be agreed
upon, although it is sometimes debateable. 3) Science has a deep understanding of decisive
aspects of ontology and the universes procedural dynamic. 4) Due to its own method however,
it doesnt enter into the ultimate metaphysical knowledge of what is real. 5) It is growing in
social prestige because of its methodical rigor, because of its use of technology, its in-depth
information about the world and because of its metaphysical neutrality.
Although science is therefore not metaphysics, it provides results that should be considered
by metaphysics (philosophy). It is incorrect to use science in itself to provide metaphysical
results. Science is metaphysically neutral. It is only philosophical reasoning (from another
legitimate knowledge discipline, but not scientific) that discusses scientific results with a
view to metaphysics. The inevitable consequence of sciences current prestige is that
metaphysics, ideologies, religions, cultures and ways of life, etc. look for reinterpretation in
light of the image of the world expressed through modern science. Atheists and agnostics
use science to argue (but this is now philosophy) their metaphysical stance. The big religions
do the same: Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, etc. They all want to
emphasise their ancient beliefs in light of scientific knowledge, because they know that they
cannot present a view of the universe that conflicts with science. When reinterpreting
themselves using science however, they should use what we called before creative freedom,
which initially creates and constantly updates respective existential traditions.
Those who look to science for clarification (atheists, agnostics, religions, etc.) are therefore
within traditions that demonstrate different diversity. But science represents a compact
body of knowledge that is metaphysically neutral (although with many obscurities and
uncertainties that form a part of the same image of the world in science). We could describe
what is happening by saying that, from an existential diversity point of view, a modern
creative effort has been made towards convergence in science. Different origins flow together
in the neutral field of science and there the most varied metaphysical traditions meet. In
this situation, it is almost inevitable that we see science as a wonderful communications
hub where metaphysical streams from different origins converge, but which through
science are able to link with the streams (or motorways) that lead to the heart of other
metaphysics. Differences can be connected through science and here they form the link that
allows the metaphysical pulse of other humans to be felt. Science is therefore a neutral
territory that enables communication links between metaphysics, ideologies, religions
and cultures to be formed. The path towards inter-human community and cohesion could
be opened up through convergence in science.
The question, then, has primarily a twofold aspect: 1) What is the image of matter, of
the universe, of life and of man from the perspective of science? 2) What consequences does
this image have for our metaphysical knowledge of reality? Yet there is also a third aspect:
3) What nexus or modes of communication do this image and these metaphysical
consequences leave open between the diverse metaphysical systems and religions?
We have already said that science is metaphysically neutral; but it produces kinds of
knowledge that must be considered by metaphysics, and constructed in a philosophical
discourse. When all is said and done, science as much as metaphysics (i.e., ideologies,
religions, cultures, etc.) aspires to know the same reality. It is therefore correct for
metaphysics to turn to science, so the latter can help shed light upon its idea of reality. But
those points which interest metaphysics about science are those crucial fields in which
science draws close to the ultimate, the metaphysical, the ground, the final and absolute
explanation of the universe.
Metaphysics interprets in a certain manner the ultimate: atheism, agnosticism and
religions effectively have their own metaphysics. In general, all metaphysical systems have
a humanist idea of man, as a personal being who creates his history by means of free
decisions. Religions, in addition, believe that there exists transphenomenologically (i.e.,
beyond our immediate phenomenological experience through the internal and external
senses) a mysteric reality that will welcome human life after death and that, for almost all
religions, responds to a God understood as creator-ground. Nevertheless, does the image of
matter, the universe, life and man from the perspective of science permit us to think that
our humanist idea of man is legitimate? Does it permit us to think that the existence of a
metaphysical mystery or of a ground-creator God is plausible? Let us think about what
would happen if science effectively demonstrated or almost demonstrated the existence
or non-existence of God. The consequences this would have for agnostics, atheists, theists,
or religious persons are evident. It is certainly a fact that there is an open discussion between
them for the purpose of arguing that the results of science support one particular metaphysics
more than another. But what is really the case? To what kind of evaluation of metaphysics
is science leading? To respond to these questions we should first demarcate the realms
involved in the answer.
For this, were we to commence by establishing the concept of the metaphysical field
of science, we would define it as those sensitive zones in which the results of science have
a special implication (special consequences) for metaphysics. They are zones where science
reaches its limits, so that the answer to the questions that science itself raises cannot be
provided by the scientific method; consequently, it connects with philosophy and metaphysical
argumentation.
Here we highlight three metaphysical fields of science which we consider most
important, although they are not the only ones. They are important by their very nature and
because, in fact, they have been posed throughout history as well as today. These three
metaphysical fields of science are the following: first, the problem about the consistency
and stability of the universe, second, the problem about the causes of the physical and
biological orders, and third, the problem about the origin and nature of animal and human
psychism.
Science always begins with facts. Thus, the phenomenological experience of our body
and of the objective world confirms the existence of a system-of-real-things as a dynamic
structure of interdependent events. A cell, a living organism, a rock, a planet, the solar system,
a galaxy, the universe, etc., are real as structures, as systems of interdependent events.
The expectation of human reason from science (as it was from philosophy in the beginning)
is that this existent real system exists in fact because it can exist. So the universe can
exist, it is expected to possess some properties. 1) Its dynamic contents should maintain in
time a systemic relation and interdependence (consistency). 2) This consistency should be
stable in time (reason postulates dynamic stability only, but not staticity). 3) Consequently,
reason postulates that the consistent and stable reality is sufficient, i.e., it is absolute in
the sense that it needs nothing other than itself to maintain its dynamic consistency and
stability in the course of time. 4) This sufficiency would involve attributing to existent reality
the necessity of maintaining itself: since if it ceases to exist at some point in the past,
present or future, it could no longer justify its actual existence.
Nevertheless, the real manner by which the universe is made and described in science
makes it difficult to understand how these rational expectations can be met. Thus, the
problem about its consistency and stability is posed. The gravitational universe of Newton
and Einstein made a stable, consistent, and eternal universe intelligible. But new
unquestionable empirical facts supported the Big Bang theory, the the standard cosmological
model and the standard model of physics (particles). It was not easy to attribute consistency
and stability to a universe that seems to have begun at a particular moment in time and that
seems to be directed to a future heat death. Science reacted by constructing theories
(hypotheses and suppositions) about other models of the universe that assumed the big bang
but presented a dynamic consistency and stability. We cite Hawkings oscillation model,
and above all, the bubble universe and of multi-universes (multiverses) theories. The string
and super-string theory would also offer theoretical support to the multi-universes theories,
since it presents a complex supposition about the germinal ontology of matter that would
explain how and why multi-universes could have been produced. In any case, science today
poses the problem of how to explain the consistency and stability of the universe.
Undoubtedly, all these are related to one of the principal metaphysical fields of science,
since it seems that the universe actually makes it difficult to explain its own consistency and
stability. In other words, given how the universe presents itself, it becomes difficult to
understand how it can be self-sufficient insofar as its own existing reality is concerned.
This problematic leads science to engage in metaphysical suppositions.
The problem about the causes of the physical and biological orders
Science confirms the existence of a dynamic and evolving universe, the product of the
organization of matter through an evolution process in time. Expansive energy, particles,
atoms, celestial bodies, physical objects, living beings emerged in the primordial genesis
of matter. And it is a fact that the evolution process produced an organized universe: the
physical order and the more complex biological order. Science therefore asks about the
causes that made the production of these orders possible, as confirmed by empirical
experience.
Science initially searched for the response in one direction, expecting the real properties
of matter (its ontology) to be the causes of the physical and biological orders. Within a
Darwinian scheme, physical ontology (physical laws), chaos, chance, and necessity would
explain why our world was organized in this manner. However, the physical laws and
circumstances of the evolution process led science to understand that the world at certain
moments could have evolved in different directions. For example: Variables that could have
had some or other qualitative values could have influenced significantly the organization of
universes different from ours. Thus it is confirmed that the universe has an anthropic
construction (a precise manner among many others of being constructed making life
and the human being possible).
When looking for the causes of this anthropic construct, science posed the possibility
of the so-called anthropic principle, interpreted in a weak or strong sense. But whether
another cause we should call design, aside from the ontology of matter, should be admitted
is the question. It is related to the multi-universes theory, since within a Darwinian
cosmology one can explain the random production of the surprising anthropic properties
of the universes physical and biological orders without recourse to any design.
In any case, the problem regarding the causes of the physical and biological orders is
undoubtedly one of the metaphysical fields discussed in science. A metaphysical design
of evolution could perhaps be attributed to a divine designer-mind. In turn, the design would
pose the problem about how to conceive the manner by which God a radice would have
designed a universe that is simultaneously anthropic (directed to man) and autonomous
(evolving by itself without the need for a God-of-gaps).
The existence of the physical universe and life is surprising. Even more surprising perhaps
is the existence of human and animal psychism. The existence of the capacity to sense
the physical world and life itself is baffling. Limited to superior animals and man,
psychic experience as a fact is usually called the experience of consciousness. Consciousness,
psyche, or the human mind produced history, society, and science itself. Psychism is a
phenomenological experience that, as such, should be described. Various authors agree on
emphasizing three of its phenomenological features: the unity of the subject (mind) as an
information-response system, the indeterminacy or openness of responses (freedom in man)
and the field or holistic nature of psychic experience. As subjects, we sense by means
of the senses the unitary field experience of our body as a totality, and, at the same time,
our immersion in the world, above all, in the fields of light that link our ontology to the
external ontology of the cosmos.
Science should explain all natural phenomena; thus, it cannot ignore the epistemological
necessity of understanding the causes of psychism. In principle, the expectation of science
is monist, since it seeks to explain psychism by means of its physical and biological causes.
First, the physical world was organized; from the physical world emerged the biological
world; within this physico-biological world, psychism slowly emerged. The unity of evolution
leads science to suppose that life and the human/animal psyche (consciousness) were
constructed from a physical support that made them possible within the evolution of the
universe.
For many centuries, this strange psychic experience has been related to the world of
spirit, different from the purely physical or material world, that would connect us to a
metaphysically transcendent dimension. From the time of the Renaissance, modern science
has also tried to explain psychism, although not always successfully, as we will see. In any
case, science and philosophy are engaged with an old theme whose modern version is the
so-called theories of mind and consciousness.
The interaction and dialogue of metaphysics and religions with science cannot be
understood independently of the paradigm that dominated science for many years (and has
not been completely surpassed yet). We refer to the reductionist paradigm grounded on a
mechanicist-determinist image of the physical world (applicable also to the biological and
human world). Science explained the consistency and stability of the world from the
perspective of mechanicism-determinism; and because of reductionism, the same perspective
was employed to explain the physical and biological orders, as well as psychism, consciousness,
and man. But are mechanicism-determinism and reductionism the correct scientific
paradigm? Are they necessary for science? Do they explain everything or do they provide
only part of the explanation?
Reductionism makes it easy to understand the difficulties that metaphysics and religion
had for many years in their dialogue with science. However, to understand the current
parameters of the science-metaphysics-religion dialogue, it is necessary to note that the
reductionist paradigm is not absolute, and that science is actually moving towards a new
paradigm, to which I will refer later. This new paradigm makes it possible for metaphysics
and religions to find a powerful and enriching light in science. Consequently, what we said
earlier is now made possible: that the confluence in science creates meta-nexus, the
transdisciplinary nexus of communication with metaphysics and religions.
Reductionism effectively did not make the creation of these meta-nexus possible because
it did not even make the metaphysics-religion nexus with science possible. Born from classical
mechanism, reductionism explained entire reality as action-reaction systems (or classical
cause-effect systems). Its consideration of external interactions (by friction or tangential
contact) was limited to independent and autonomous entities some separated from
others that acted according to four natural forces (gravitational, electromagnetic, strong
and weak nuclear). Reductionism was reduced to consider only the existence of a
world organized by what we today call fermionic matter: particles (protons, neutrons,
electrons, etc.) or autonomous vibratory fields whose wave function makes their unity in
quantum coherence difficult, maintaining their differentiation and producing the
organization of objects that we find in the macroscopic world of classical mechanics. This
manner of thinking produced a biology that is reductionistic and mechanicist-deterministic,
and a robotic image of man expressed concretely in current computational theories of man
(following the strong metaphor of the computer) or in new versions of neural determinism.
Reductionism also had epistemological consequences: a dogmatic science, a science of
absolute and unquestionable truths, reflecting a natural objective world of determination
and mechanicism.
What, then, is the new paradigm of science? It is important to have a very clear idea
about its profile, since it establishes the kind of science that should be promoted for the
science-metaphysics-religion dialogue to be viable. First, let us look at the identikit of this
new paradigm. Second, the nexus that connects it with the metaphysical and the religious.
Third, the intercommunication nexus opened between metaphysics and religions that make
a greater communion and interhuman cohesion possible.
1) It assumes that the explanation of the world physical, biological, and human
should be made according to a mechanicist-determinist image. Today no one seeks to deny
the fact that the determination and interaction among fermionic objects explain a large
part of our macroscopic and microscopic experience. Determination makes possible physical
objects and living beings, as well as time and space that make our freely constructed personal
biography possible. Genetic heredity and the stability of species would not be possible without
the rigid determination of the genetic code.
2) But the new paradigm insists on things that were already known from the time
quantum mechanics was born in the twenties. The individual and differentiated type of
fermionic matter that produced the world is not only real. Quantum mechanics presents
a microphysical world different from the classical world (although the macroscopic-classical
world is always born from the microphysical-quantum world). New and strange phenomena
are confirmed in this quantum world: 1) quantum coherence; 2) quantum superposition;
3) indetermination; 4) action-at-a-distance (EPR effects).
3) Thus, the physical world is not only classical, but also quantum. It was born from
the big bang as a field of radiation; although the differentiated objects of the mecano-classical
world were produced, the physical world also contains unitary fields of matter in holistic
states where differentiation disappears in particles; this happens in bosonic matter, and can
even happen in fermionic matter, although with great difficulty. These holistic states can
also interact at a distance (EPR effects). And in the microphysical world, an important role
is played by an indeterministic causality related to quantum superposition that extends
to the classical macrophysical world, which is partly indeterminate because of the effects
of a chaotic, statistical, and probabilistic flow.
4) Living beings are explained not only by means of classical causality (for example,
in the embrio-genetic development beginning with DNA) because life made possible, within
the classical living body, the emergence of quantum states of matter that possess quantum
coherence, quantum superposition, indetermination, and interaction-at-a-distance (EPR).
Living beings thus appear as the coordination between the classical world (differentiation,
determinism) and the quantum world (holism, indetermination). In this way, the new
paradigm can provide a physical support more intelligible than that of reductionism
to explain the phenomenological properties of animal and human psychism, like experiential
holism and behavioral indetermination (freedom).
5) Especially with reference to man, neurology also explains the nature of mind as a
functional complementarity between classical neural patterns (Edelman) and networks of
quantum states (quantum neurology).
6) Cosmology speculates about the origin of the universe by coming up with hypotheses
concerning the germinal state of matter much beyond Planks Era. In this hypothesis fits,
among other hypotheses, the strings and super-strings theory. In any case, the universe of
the new paradigm is no longer the deterministic system of Einstein and Newton, but a
process born from the big bang and produced in time by the equilibrium between
determination and chaotic, probabilistic, and statistical indetermination.
7) Finally, the new paradigm overcomes the dogmatism of positivist epistemology
and already moves within the Popperian and post-Popperian framework. Science does not
expound absolute truths, but only systems of hypotheses and conjectures about the world.
Science today is more modest than in the 19th century: It is aware that the universe is an
enigma, and that it should refer to philosophy the responses to certain questions that it
cannot respond by means of its own methodology.
Consequently, the new paradigm is also monist, like reductionism. The origin of
everything is matter, but it has a richer idea of matter that allows one to understand how
the evolution process made possible the emergence of different modes of being real,
although produced from the ontology of matter itself. It is therefore a monistic paradigm,
specifically, an emergentist-monist paradigm.
Atheism, agnosticism, theism, and religions (a form of theism) pertain to the metaphysical.
Reductionism could hardly connect with the metaphysical, and where reductionism persists,
the metaphysical remains unconnected. But the new paradigm offers an image of the
universe, life, and man that profoundly enriches the metaphysical.
1) It makes possible a phenomenologically describable humanistic image of man
coherent with personal and social experience. Man is not a robot, but a free and personal
being that responsibly constructs his own biography. Deterministic robotism could not
even make atheism and agnosticism possible as metaphysical positions.
2) It presents an enigmatic image of the universe, employing an epistemology that
insists on the interpretative and provisional character of scientific conjectures. It thus leaves
an opening for philosophical reason to construct diverse hypotheses and conjectures about
the enigmatic ultimate nature of things.
3) It makes possible, without imposing, a philosophical interpretation (thus, no longer
scientific) of the enigma of the universe according to an agnostic or atheistic metaphysics.
4) It also makes possible, without imposing, a philosophical interpretation according
to a theistic, and thus, religious, metaphysics. It therefore allows conjectures about the
existence of a mysteric transcendent reality or the existence of a transcendent creator-
God.
5) The proposal and discussion of various types of metaphysics (atheism, agnosticism,
theism, and religions) is always referred to the previously explained metaphysical fields:
the problems about the consistency and stability of the universe, the causes of the physical
and biological orders, and the origin and nature of psychism (consciousness). Theism, for
example, grounds on these metaphysical fields its argument about the plausibility of
the existence of God (God as fundament, as designer, as holistic ground of the world of the
psyche).
6) The holistic orientation of the new paradigm of science has a special importance
for theism and religions. The evolution of matter produced a world of differentiated entities:
it is the classical macroscopic world. But holism shows that the depth ontology of matter
and of the universe is unitary and undifferentiated, responding to an ontology that makes
possible the sensibility-consciousness present in animals and man. This sensitive holistic
ontology of universe-matter undoubtedly makes more plausible the philosophical conjecture
about the divine ontology as the omnipresent and ultimate ground of the universe, along
the lines similar, for example, to the pan-en-theism of Arthur Peacocke.
As we were saying, the profound aspiration of humanity on its way toward a better society
has always been to achieve inter-human communion and social unity. For this, respect
for individual, metaphysical, and religious freedom is essential. A society in which some
think that others are in error or that they should be where in fact they are not, or worse,
if persons attribute to each other dishonest moral attitudes, in no way is this a society in
communion or in inter-human unity. The attitude of religious groups which harshly judge
atheism, or of atheistic groups which mercilessly attack everything that seems religious (as
is the case with Dawkins or Dennett) is lamentable. No less lamentable is the attitude, so
common in the past, of religions which harshly criticize each other and of religions that
attempt to impose themselves on others.
As we have said, the new paradigm of science allows the creation of a series of
metanexus which permits human respect for the freedom of each person. One learns to
see metaphysical diversity not as a hindrance to, but as assuming and truly enriching
communion and existential cohesion. And in this sense we believe that the investigation
of those metanexus which from science unite metaphysics and religions is an important
and necessary contribution to a better society: one that is tolerant, open to valuing the
existential richness of others, and not polemical.
But what are these nexus of intercommunication?
In the first place it is very important that the new paradigm presents with modesty the
image of a metaphysically enigmatic universe, which human reason (in science and
philosophy) endeavors to understand by means of hypotheses and conjectures open to critical
revision. For this, a nexus of respect is created between atheism, agnosticism, theism and
religions, because all understand that diverse metaphysical positions are the fruit of the free,
honest and legitimate creativity of each person. Now far from aggression and disdain and
from mockery as well communion and social unity are founded on a deep respect for the
person and for freedom. This is undoubtedly a better kind of society.
In the second place, theism and religions tend to understand each other inasmuch as
they all endeavor to be inspired by the image of the numinous and of the creator-God which
science makes plausible. It is the rational conjecture about God as fundament of the
universe, designer of its anthropic order and holistic ground of the depth ontology of the
world of the psyche.
Religious or mystical experience in diverse religions has always meant a sensation of
immersion of ones human spirit in the higher reality of God that embraces us from the
depths of the cosmos. Thus, mystical experience in the history of religions is an experience
of unity with the cosmos, i.e., an experience of ontological holism with divinity and with the
cosmos. Reductionism made this experience incomprehensible. But the holistic new
paradigm of science leads us to understand that, in effect, the omnipresent ontology of God
could embrace us from the depths of the holistic ontology of the universe. The new
paradigm thus makes extraordinarily plausible a religious experience in which different
religions converge and remain united. But we should also note that there is no reason for
atheism and agnosticism to fear that the holistic image of the universe imposes what is
strictly religious. Holism renders plausible the experience of God but does not impose it. In
other words, the scientific holism spoken today in the new paradigm is also compatible
with an atheist or agnostic interpretation.
Lastly, science permits new nexus of connection between traditional religions which
until now have been very distant. Religions turn to science to illuminate the idea of God in
their respective traditions, for the purpose of attempting to update their theologies. In doing
so, the gaze of diverse traditions is unified in the image of God which science makes possible.
A process of convergence, then, is produced through science which permits the identification
of points of similarity that unite all religions. The same happens in mystical religious
experience surprisingly common in diverse traditions which, as we were saying, becomes
extraordinarily plausible in the new holistic ontology of science. Religions learn from science
that they all possess an essential nucleus that unites them in a powerful fashion. They also
learn from science that there exists a differential nucleus thus leaving each religion in
its proper history and traditions, i.e., in its small print which profoundly enriches other
traditions. Religions may thus respect their own tradition while simultaneously being enriched
by the profound knowledge of other traditions.
This issue of Pensamiento offers valuable contributions to the process of the science-
religion dialogue, the general framework for which we have outlined. We have arranged its
contents in such a way that the articles, studies and profiles are placed in sections which
illuminate their content and interrelationship.
First, the propaedeutic section. The article by Poli marks the starting point: the human
person, open to values and in search of his authentic existence. Modern culture put into
crisis the personal value of the religious, but sociology today shows the rebirth of new
communal forms of religious authenticity (Shimazono). The role of methodological
naturalism in science is important in the crisis of the science-religion dialogue; this naturalism
plays a decisive role in science, and religion needs to learn to dialogue with it (Bylica/Sagan).
We believe that this is so, and that religion should admit a certain amount of mechanicism-
determinism as a means to explain the universe. In this process of dialogue religion should
pay attention to the manner by which science depends on logic (the mathematical, the
formal) so that metaphysical arguments can be valued in various scientific communities
(Leach).
We then present a psycho-physical and cosmological section. Lorente studies the cosmology
of space-time in light of physical theories which would explain its ontology, and the references
to God within those theories. M. Bejar ventures into an explanation of psychism starting
from connections between the thoughts of Bohm and Penrose. Finally, Lpez Aguilar discusses
the Hameroff-Penrose hypothesis as a proposal for a physical support of consciousness.
In one way or another, these different approaches facilitate an intensive understanding of
what we have called the holistic image of the universe in the new paradigm of physics.
Complementing this section, two commentaries on the characteristics of string theory (Leo
Smolin) and on the events beyond Plancks Era (Michael Heller) are provided in Profiles
in Science and Religion.
The third is the classical biology section: It deals with how the explanation of life in biology
presents an evolutive mechanicist-determinist dimension serving as a base from which one
already glimpses an opening to the free and religious human being (Nez de Castro y
Bertrn). In the fourth section, dedicated to a cosmo-biological synthesis, two authors of
unquestionable importance are introduced and considered: Schmitz-Moormann (Doncel),
who is essential today to interpret the work of Teilhard de Chardin, and Whitehead
(Monserrat). This section is complemented by two commentaries found in the Profiles: the
first, on the emergentism of Clayton; and the second, on Stuart Kauffman and his reference
to the quantum explanation of consciousness.
Then we proceed to the Hindu and Buddhist philosophies section, which permits us to
follow the connections between the new paradigm and oriental philosophy. M. Sevilla
shows the presence of materialism in Indian philosophies, and A. Gmez considers Hindu
and Buddhist ontology in depth. Masi-Kuwano show that the idea of mind-body unity is
present in some aspects of Japanese philosophy and psychology. The religious experience
section shows the mystical experience of union with God through an experience of the
cosmos: in the Christian experience of Nicholas of Cusa (Cabada), in Sufi mysticism (Gamal),
and in connection with diverse religious traditions from the point of view of mystic neurology
or neuro-theology (Castro). This section on the connection between mystical experience and
the holistic experience of the cosmos is complemented by two commentaries in the Profiles:
on the ecological thought of Rolston and the mysticism of St. Francis of Assisi.
Finally, the complementary studies section presents the figure of Jan Patocka (Or-
tega), Farah Antun (Puig), and the study of reason in Islam in light of the speech of Pope
Benedict XVI (Serafin). The final study by J. Romero considers theology from the dynamic
point of view of sociology, concluding with a proposal for a dynamic program that would
make possible a theology dynamically adapted to the development of concepts in history.
The journal Pensamiento dedicates this issue of the special series Science, Philosophy
and Religion (no. 242, 2008) to the concerns of Metanexus Institute, convoked in Madrid
in June 2008. The Institute is concerned with finding the meta-nexus that permit
communion and inter-human cohesion between individuals, groups, cultures, ideologies,
metaphysics and religions, both within nations and in the international forum. It is also
concerned with contributing to the nexus that make a better world.
Knowing and spreading these meta-nexus is essential for possible ways of building
human intercommunication through a transdisciplinary, multi-metaphysical and inter-
confessional dialogue. We have said that science is assuming today an emerging role with
regard to social cohesion. Today, to look to science is to shed light on ones own traditions
and, at the same time, to cultivate knowledge and respect for other traditions, metaphysics
and religions.
All metaphysical traditions and religions should consider what is the core of their beliefs
which unite and shed light upon the other traditions. We do not see God. Metaphysics and
religions live within the enigma of the universe, and each person lives courageously the hard
experience of life, of suffering, and the final orientation toward death (as Heidegger would
say), maintaining with integrity ones personal fidelity to a metaphysical or religious tradition.
From my point of view, when Christianity today looks at science from the perspective of its
own tradition, it should dynamically reformulate the essence of its theology, saying that our
belief in the revelation of God, given in the Mystery of the Death and Resurrection of Christ,
is the word of God that exhorts us to trust in the reality of a Deus absconditus who creates
an autonomous world, making our freedom possible, and in the reality of a Deus liberator
who saves within the context of the transcendent history personal and collective of all
people and human traditions.
Our journal Pensamiento invites everyone to commit themselves and to participate
from transdisciplinary, multi-metaphysical and interconfessional perspectives in the
task of looking at science in order to immerse oneself in the new paradigm, in order to
shed light from there on ones own traditions and to communicate to others in an enriching
manner the essence of ones metaphysical and religious traditions. Without doubt, this will
create among everyone appreciation, admiration, respect, tolerance and above all, mutual
edification.
JAVIER MONSERRAT
Director of Pensamiento
ABSTRACT: Preliminary to any adequate theory of the person is clarification of its ontological structure.
For this purpose, it is useful to draw a distinction among at least three different ontological aspects of
person, respectively corresponding to the dignity of life, to the acceptance or rejection of ethical values
and the dignity corresponding to the qualities of an authentically human biography. It is reasonable to
suppose that some of the traditional difficulties concerning the theory of the person depend on a failure
to distinguish among these different ontological aspects. This paper presents some of the intricacies
of the intermediate dimension of being a person, namely the idea of person as a subject with values,
an entity that may, with greater or lesser ability, accede to values and accept or reject them intentionally.
KEY WORDS: Person, value, emotion, Stein, Hartmann.
Persona y valor
RESUMEN: La clarificacin de su estructura ontolgica es previa a una teora adecuada de la persona.
Para esto es pertinente perfilar una distincin entre, al menos, tres aspectos de la persona ontolgica-
mente diferentes, respectivamente referidos a la dignidad de la vida, la aceptacin o rechazo de valo-
res ticos y la dignidad correspondiente a las cualidades de una biografa autnticamente humana. Es
razonable suponer que algunas de las dificultades tradicionales sobre la teora de la persona depen-
den de la falta de distincin entre estos diferentes aspectos ontolgicos. Este artculo presenta algu-
nas de las peculiaridades de la dimensin intermedia de ser una persona, a saber la idea de una per-
sona como un sujeto con valores, una entidad que puede con mayor o menor habilidad, acceder a
valores y aceptarlos o rechazarlos intencionalmente.
PALABRAS CLAVE: persona, valor, Stein, Hartmann.
1. INTRODUCTION
I define a person as a subject with values, an entity that may, with greater
or lesser ability, accede to values and accept them intentionally (For more detailed
treatment see Poli 2006a). Unfortunately, discussion on personhood suffers
from a serious lack of conceptualization. The necessary preliminary to any
adequate theory of the person is clarification of its ontological structure and of
the concepts that make up its content. I believe that it is heuristically useful for
this purpose to draw a distinction among at least three different aspects of
person, which for lack of a better terminology I shall call person1, person2 and
person3. These can be exemplified by referring to different thinkers who have
authoritatively expounded their characteristics. I shall therefore associate Peter
Singer with person1, Nicolai Hartmann and Edith Stein with person2 and John
Finnis and Martha Nussbaum with person3.
Given that these three aspects of person have essentially different ontological
natures, it is reasonable to suppose that some of the traditional difficulties
concerning the theory of the person depend on a failure to distinguish among them.
Each of the three types of person has value, but each of the values differs from the
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others. Person1 has the value corresponding to the dignity of a living being, while
person2 has the dignity corresponding to the acceptance or rejection of ethical
values, and person3 has the dignity corresponding to the qualities of an authentically
human biography. Person1 is structurally conditioned and pertains to the sphere
of biological reality; person2 is structurally conditioned and pertains to the sphere
of spiritual reality; person3 is structurally conditioned and pertains to the sphere
of social reality. All of us are born a person1; some of us become a person3. Being
a person1 is a matter of fact, it is intrinsic to our nature as living beings. The quality
of being a person1 is not acquired, but nor is it never lost. Being a person3 is instead
structurally fragile: one can become a person3 and one can cease to be one. A person3
can accede to a higher plane of reality, but then may be unable to remain at that
level, and may even choose or be compelled to leave it.
Possessing the dignity of a living being or having a biography are two different
aspects of the person as a subject with values. In this paper I shall focus on
person as the entity that may accede to values [i.e., to person2, leaving the analysis
of person1 and person3 for another occasion (Poli 2006a, 2008a, b)].
The connections between emotions and ethics have been widely investigated
in recent decades. Two arguments in particular have been put forward: (1) emotions
are important for correctly judging the ethical components of the situations in
which we find ourselves and then act on the basis of those judgements; (2) the
emotions are important because they activate the agents will, while the thought
alone of a duty is not sufficient to prompt action.
The interesting aspect of these and similar positions is that they view the
emotions as essentially instrumental elements or components. In the former
case, the emotions serve to make correct judgements; in the second they serve
for action. In both cases, the emotions function as instruments for performance
of something different.
If these positions were correct, it should be possible to judge morally sensitive
situations correctly and act appropriately with no emotional perception (Stark
2004, 360). At bottom, if this were the case, the ancient Stoic idea of proceeding
by annulling the emotions, or at least by reducing them to the minimum, may
be correct.
The alternative is to recognize that the emotions besides being good for
something or other also have intrinsic value. The idea is not a new one, because
there are explicit traces of it in Aristotle, but it is worth recalling here. For
theorists of the virtues, the emotions are not important just because they are
parts of a morally correct action; they are important because they have a value
independent of the value of the action. It is evident that there are appropriate
(correct) or inappropriate (incorrect) emotions even in situations where no action
is taken or more simply, which are so independently of action. Being distressed
by the pain of others or rejoicing at their happiness even when the situation
is structured so that we can do nothing about it are the two most obvious cases
of emotions that are correct independently of any possible action. Conversely,
rejoicing at the pain of others or feeling distressed at their happiness are obvious
cases of incorrect emotions.
The development of virtues entails the development of appropriate emotional
attitudes 1. The series of cognitive acts defined by Brentano presentations,
judgements, and acts of love and hate provide a good framework within which
to defend the thesis that emotions have intrinsic value. Brentanos third class of
intentional acts, that of acts of love and hate, has all the requisite characteristics.
These acts are not directed or instrumental to either the judgement (on which,
as we have seen, they depend and which in their turn influence) or action (which
may or may not ensue, according to the circumstances).
The joint development of a satisfactory theory of emotions and a satisfactory
theory of values should lead to recognition of the correspondence between
emotions and value responses. A situation cannot be simultaneously viewed as
agreeable and exciting. If one response is correct, the other cannot be 2.
1
Here I depart from Stark 2004. On p. 363 Stark refers to Anderson 1993 and repeats
her confusion between concrete particulars (persons, animals, communities and things)
and states of affairs. Stark and Anderson maintain that concrete particulars are objects of
our values, have intrinsic value and are the building blocks of value, while states of affairs
have extrinsic value, a value which depends on that of the concrete particulars contained in
them. But concrete particulars, precisely because they are concrete, for reasons of categorial
consistency cannot be parts of states of affairs. Moreover, it is imprecise to say that concrete
particulars are objects of our values. If anything, they are objects of our acts of valuation.
2
Hartmann 2003, p. 57, with reference to Hildebrand 1916. More recently, Feinberg has
sought to distinguish between what is deserved and the basis of desert, or the characteristic
of the person by virtue of which s/he deserves something. It would indeed be very interesting
to distinguish between the various bases of desert and what they make specifically deserved.
As Hurka 1998, p. 315, points out, for every virtue only some goods are appropriate rewards.
Husserls solution is that non-objectifying acts are founded acts, or acts which
must be grounded on other acts. If this is so, two different interpretations are
possible: according to the first, the object of non-objectifying objects is the object
of the underlying objectifying act; according to the second, the object of the non-
objectifying act is the underlying objectifying act (and only secondarily, so to
speak, its object).
Both interpretations have been defended (e.g. by Gigliotti 2004 and Benoist
2004). Whichever of them is correct, the objects of value are in any case founded
objects, or as the Meinongian school puts it, they are higher-order objects.
Both Brentano and Husserl defend the intentionality of mental acts, defining
it as directedness towards an object. But Husserl introduces an important distinction
not present in Brentano: that between empty intentional acts and filled
intentional acts. In the former case, the object is anticipated in the form of a typical
schema and may be only implicitly present to the agents awareness. In the latter
case, the object is given in concrete. The distinction is important because it
allows us to maintain the thesis that all intentional acts have correlates even when
we are not aware of such correlates or do not notice them.
To be pointed out is that the distinction among different types of act has
extended and enriched the traditional distinction between theoretical reason
and practical reason. These are no longer viewed as reified instances of distinct
faculties but rather, as we have seen, as the articulations of different families of
acts with specific forms of inner organization and dependency.
Thus far, I have presented the dependence of non-objectifying acts on objec-
tifying acts according to the univocal and linear format introduced by Brentano:
higher-level acts depend on in the sense of require lower-level acts. Husserl
views the matter in more sophisticated terms. He replaces Brentanos unilateral
dependence with a reciprocal multilateral dependence. Indeed, he talks of an
interweaving among the various types of act, and therefore of their reciprocal
co-determination. Husserls idea is probably that of a twofold constitution phase
in which the dependence of non-objectifying acts on objectifying acts is
accompanied by feedback from non-objectifying acts to objectifying ones. The
situation should therefore be viewed in dynamic terms. Hence, the two parts of
the problem consist in the following two theses. On the one hand, the evaluative
act, essentially because it constitutes the phenomenon of value, is founded on
the intellective act; on the other, the theoretical reason and the evaluative
reason are everywhere intertwined (Husserl 1988, p. 72).
4. EMOTIONAL ACTS
So far, so good. But we have only touched upon the problem of personhood.
In order to frame the problem of the person and its nature more precisely, we
must explore the level of emotional acts. In the architecture described thus far,
emotional acts are complex acts founded on other types of act. We now need a
more fine-gauge classification of emotional acts and their internal relations.
3
The scheme presented follows Edith Steins classification of egological acts. Hartmann
uses a very similar classification.
6. ARCHITECTONIC VALUES
Nobility is the value oriented to loftiness. Its opposite value not to be confused
with its opposite as disvalue is the common or ordinary. Fullness instead aims
at the fusion, coordination and synthesis of all values. Its opposite is the inability
to see values: a blindness to values, but not yet wickedness. Purity does not see
disvalues: it views everything positively as endowed with value (Hartmann 2003,
204 fgg).
7. PERSON-REALIZING VALUES
I call moral values values of virtue. This sharp distinction between values
of good and values of virtue remedies a major error committed by ancient ethics:
that of considering virtue to be a good, albeit a higher-level one 4. Three families
of virtues values can be distinguished: ancient values, Christian values, and
modern values. The first two families rotate around a central value: justice for
ancient ethics, love of ones neighbour for Christian ethics. Perhaps it would not
be too bold to claim that if modern ethics is to be authentic, it must organize
itself around love for the distant one.
With reference to ancient ethics, I would mention two significant aspects of
Platos virtues and the particular organization of Aristotles virtues. Platos four
virtues justice, wisdom, strength and control well sum up the character of
ancient ethics. Justice is defined as equality with those who are recognized and
accepted as equal. Wisdom the highest virtue governs the entire array of
values and actions. The wise recognize the value of what is endowed with value.
Strength transforms the vision into reality: merely seeing values is not enough;
also required is the moral strength to realize them. The final value, control,
consists in a sense of proportion and scale.
Aristotle defines virtues as the medians between two negative extremes.
Thus, courage is midway between recklessness and cowardice; generosity is
midway between extravagance and avarice; temperance is midway between self-
indulgence and insensitivity; and pride is midway between vanity and humility
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1106 a26-b28). If one does not interpret this middle way
among virtues correctly, one is almost forced to regard virtue as some kind of
golden mean. As Hartmann writes: This theory has always been subjected to
the mockery of critics. It appears only too ridiculous that the seriousness of
virtue should resolve itself into the triviality of a golden mean, that is, into a
mediocrity (Hartmann 2003, p. 254).
To understand Aristotles theory correctly, it should be borne in mind that
virtues may grow without losing their nature as values by doing so. In fact,
4
Hartmann 2003, p. 155. Brentanos distinction between acts and their correlates (as
objects of acts) provides the basis for the difference between ethical values (as modes of acts)
and values of goods (values of the objects of acts). By construction, therefore, the values of
goods are never ethical values. For details see Poli 2006a.
The person-realizing values are eminently values of good and bad. We know
at least some of the difficulties that hamper definition of good and bad. With
respect to the person, good and bad relate to each other like merit and guilt. This
means that for a person badness is not an error, a deficiency or a lack. A bad
person is not someone who lacks something. A bad person is just as much a
person as a good person. S/he is a person who has not chosen the good and bears
responsibility for it.
A clarification is now necessary. Perhaps the most important lesson that we
have learnt from Socrates is that human beings never choose the bad because
5
Hartmann 2003, p. 317. Da Re 1996, p. 188, points out that Hartmann does not mention
the typical bourgeois virtues of diligence, parsimony, etc.
it is bad. Even when they choose a disvalue, they do so because they think that
it is a value. Every purpose, qua purpose, is a value.
Socrates intuition is fundamental for ethical discourse because it allows
disvalue to be defined as the choice of the lesser value. Suppose that we must
choose between A and B. If A and B are comparable and the value of A is greater
than the value of B, we regard the choice of A as good and the choice of B as
bad. This elementary situation demonstrates the importance of Brentanos
analysis of the preference relation. On the other hand, the situations intrinsic
shortcoming is the assumption that values are comparable and therefore
organizable into a single hierarchy.
A final remark is relevant: if ethical good and evil are in the tendency toward
some purpose, then not only are the values of virtue involved, but the person-
constituting values also have a role to play, although it is a subordinate one. By
way of example, consider the difference between being narrow-minded and
broad-minded. To the extent that the subject chooses one of the two options,
s/he bears responsibility for it.
fulfil or violate values. The organization of the strata of reality reflects the law
of strength. Although there are conditions which limit the efficacy of the law, it
nevertheless performs a crucial role in organizing the strata 6.
The strata are also subject to a law of freedom whereby the higher level is
always free from the lower one. The higher level is defined with respect to a
novum which distinguishes it from the levels that precede it and function as its
bearers. As Hartmann puts it: the strength of the lower structure is only as
building stones, as material (Hartmann 2003, p. 448 and elsewhere).
The freedom relationship holds between values of person and values of goods,
as well as internally to them. Multiplicities of values organized in terms of strength
and height are also present in the contexts of values of person and values of
goods. These too, therefore, are organized in a way such that the higher level is
free from those beneath it.
The strength of a value indicates the gravity of its violation. The height of a
value expresses the merit deriving from its fulfilment. Offence and merit proceed
in parallel but are not identical.
Offending against life is a grave offence and has very little merit. More in
general, harm to material goods is more serious than harm to spiritual goods
(Hartmann 2003, p. 453). But fulfilment of spiritual goods, and ethical goods in
particular, is a merit much greater than the merit corresponding to respect for
more elementary goods.
Respect for more elementary goods is often the condition for acceding to
higher goods. Those who violate lower goods are wicked. But the reverse does
not hold: a person who violates higher goods, someone who fails to fulfil them,
is not on that account a bad man; his conduct threatens no one; it merely lacks
the higher moral content (Hartmann 2003, p. 440).
Structuring by levels is important not only because it furnishes us with the
tectonic laws governing values, but also because it provides us with criteria to
distinguish, at least in some cases, authentic values from bogus ones. If the
architecture of values is based on levels of dependence, then the authentic
elevation of value is also divided into levels; it develops through intrinsic stages
from the lower values to the higher ones. Although the situation may still lack
full theoretical analysis, it is well known in practice. A person whose behaviour
is oriented to a higher value, but does not simultaneously respect the values that
support it, is structurally discordant. The higher values to which s/he refers are
not credible. Loving with distrust or giving with cowardice are not authentically
virtuous behaviours (Hartmann 2003, p. 456). Values are constructed step by
step, proceeding from the most elementary levels upwards.
6
More thorough analysis should explicitly compare Hartmanns theory of the levels of
reality with other theories developed in recent years. For most recent developments see Poli
2006b,c,d. In my theory, the presence of bifurcations in the levels, interwoven levels, the
possibility of downwards causal effects from higher levels to lower ones and the forms of
anticipation that characterize all levels from the life level onwards, produce a theory very different
from Hartmanns. As a first approximation, however, it is convenient to maintain the latter.
I have discussed the two dimensions of strength and of height along which
values are organized. A third values-organizing component consists of proximity
relations among homogeneous types of value. I shall call a family of values an
atlas. The realm of values is therefore a series of atlases (which may have zones
in common) with different levels of strength and height. The latter characterizes
the structure of the atlas.
Many aspects of values are still obscure, because we do not know the dynamics
operating among the various atlases. Some dynamics depend on the person
subject to the value his/her age and maturity, for example other on historical
and social conditionings. Other dynamics are structural and depend on how the
atlases are arranged, and on their intrinsic strength 7.
In figurative terms, an atlas map can be viewed as an island. The set of atlases
forms an archipelago. The currents represent the forces that flow from one atlas
to its neighbour.
Unfortunately, we are still trying to draw the maps of individual values, and
we are not yet able to draw the overall map of the entire realm of values.
REFERENCES
7
Not to be confused with the strength of the values making up the map.
ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to analyze the implications flowing from adopting methodological
naturalism in science, with special emphasis on the relation between science and religion. Methodological
naturalism, denying supernatural and teleological explanations, influences the content of scientific
theories, and in practice leads to vision of science as compatible with ontological naturalism and in
opposition to theism. Ontological naturalism in turn justifies the acceptance of methodological naturalism
as the best method to know the reality. If we accept realistic interpretation of scientific theories, then
methodological naturalism conflicts science with religion. Theistic evolution does not seem to be a
proper way to reconcile Darwinism and methodological naturalism with theism. Many of such propositions
are boiled down to deism. Although evolution can be interpreted theistically, it is not the way in which
majority of modern scientists and respectable scientific institutions understand it.
KEY WORDS: methodological naturalism, ontological naturalism, evolutionary theory, theistic evolution,
teleology, randomness.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the implications flowing from adopting
of methodological naturalism in science, with special emphasis on the relation
between science and religion. We show that the naturalistic principle may lead
to acceptance of metaphysical naturalism and that, on the other hand, it is exactly
the ontological position that justifies the acceptance of methodological naturalism
as the best way to gain knowledge about the reality.
After presentation of the most important statements of methodological and
metaphysical naturalism and theism, we discuss some prospects on the relation
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between science and religion. At first we look at the problem from the point of
view of beliefs maintained by scientists and promoted by scientific institutions
and we analyze the concept according to which science is silent on religion.
Further, we discuss the relation of methodological naturalism and teleological
explanations. We also point at the importance of science in modern culture and
show why theistic evolution does not seem to be a proper way to reconcile
Darwinism and, more generally, methodological naturalism with theism.
Finally, we discuss the implications of methodological naturalism for the
issue of truth in science and its implications for science-religion relation. We
present an instrumentalist interpretation of science as a way of circumvent the
problem of its conflict with religion and we show the flaws of this approach. If
scientific theories are interpreted in realistic way, as the source of adequate
description of reality, then the conflict between naturalistic science and theistic
religions arises.
1
See e.g. WILLIAM LANE CRAIG and J. P. MORELAND, Preface, in: WILLIAM LANE CRAIG and
J. P. MORELAND (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, Routledge, London-New York, 2000,
p. xii [xi-xv]; DAVID RAY GRIFFIN, Religion and Scientific Naturalism. Overcoming the Conflicts,
New York, 2000, State University of New York Press, pp. 8, 11; DALLAS WILLARD, Knowledge
and naturalism, in: CRAIG and MORELAND (eds.), Naturalism, p. 30 [24-48]; PHILLIP E. JOHNSON,
Evolution as Dogma: The Establishment of Naturalism, in: ROBERT T. PENNOCK (ed.), Intelligent
Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological, and Scientific Perspectives, The
MIT Press, Cambridge-A Breadford Book, London, 2001, pp. 59-76.
2
NILES ELDREDGE, The Monkey Business: A Scientist Looks at Creationism, Washington
Square Press, New York, 1982, p. 82.
3
ELDREDGE, The Monkey Business, p. 87.
pertain to the material universe, and they are constrained to formulate those
ideas in ways that can be testable with empirical evidence detectable by our
senses. () [Science] does not rule out the existence of the supernatural; it
merely claims that it cannot () study the supernatural if indeed, the
supernatural exists 4.
Most scientists today require that science be carried out according to the
rule of methodological materialism: to explain the natural world scientifically,
scientists must restrict themselves only to material causes (to matter, energy,
and their interaction). There is a practical reason for this restriction: it works.
By continuing to seek natural explanations for how the world works, we have
been able to find them. If supernatural explanations are allowed, they will
discourage or at least delay the discovery of natural explanations, and we
will understand less about the universe 5.
4
NILES ELDREDGE, The Triumph of Evolution and the Failure of Creationism, W. H. Freeman
and Company, New York, 2001 (2000), p. 137.
5
EUGENIE C. SCOTT, Science and Religion, Christian Scholarship, and Theistic
Science: Some Comparisons, Reports of the National Center for Science Education, 1998,
vol. 18 (2), pp. 30-32, http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/articles/6149_science_and_religion_
chris_3_1_1998.asp (Last accessed: 18 Feb., 2008).
6
MICHAEL RUSE, Witness Testimony Sheet McLean v. Arkansas, in: MICHAEL RUSE, But
Is It Science? The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy, New York,
1996, Prometheus Books, p. 296 [287-306].
7
RUSE, Witness Testimony, p. 301.
permanently closed system of material causes and effects that can never be
influenced by anything outside of itself. () To speak of something as super-
natural is therefore [from the naturalistic position] to imply that it is imaginary
() 8. From the metaphysical naturalism perspective, to claim that a supernatural
being also exist is to say at the same time that the being has never intervened in
the workings of the world. Ontological naturalism is equivalent to atheistic
interpretation of the world.
Scientists relying on methodological naturalism principle do not claim to
prove that there is no God. For them referring to God as the Creator, however,
is to violate the Ockhams razor, because purely naturalistic forces seem to be
enough to explain the origin of universe, life and human beings, and the
scientifically built picture of the world is for scientists as just the true one. In
this sense the principle of methodological naturalism leads to ontological
naturalism. On the other hand, it is the metaphysical naturalism that provides
justification for naturalistic methodology of science understood as the way to
discover how the things really are.
There are some scientists who perceive metaphysical roots of methodological
naturalism and naturalistic scientific theories. One of them is Richard Lewontin,
prominent geneticist and evolutionist from Harvard University. Lewontin wrote:
We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its
constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of
health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for
unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a com-
mitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science
somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world,
but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material
causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce
material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying
to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow
a Divine Foot in the door. The Eminent Kant Scholar Lewis Beck used to say
that anyone who could believe in God could believe in anything. To appeal to
omnipotent deity is to allow that at any moment the regularities of nature may
be ruptured, that miracles may happen 9.
8
PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, Reason in the Balance: The Case against Naturalism in Science,
Law & Education, InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove, 1995, p. 38.
9
RICHARD LEWONTIN, Review: Carl Sagan, The Demon Haunted World: Science as a Candle
in the Dark, The New York Review of Books, 9 January 1997, pp. 28, 31.
10
See EDWARD J. LARSON and LARRY WITHAM, Scientists and Religion in America, Scientific
American, September 1999, no. 281, pp. 88-93.
11
GEORGE GAYLORD SIMPSON, Meaning of Evolution, rev. ed. 1967, Yale University Press,
New Haven, 1949, pp. 344-345.
12
DOUGLAS FUTUYMA, Science on Trial: The Case for Evolution, Pantheon Books, New York,
1983, pp. 12-13.
has no mind and no minds eye. It does not plan for the future. It has no vision,
no foresight, no sight at all. If it can be said to play the role of watchmaker in
nature, it is the blind watchmaker 13.
Let me summarize my views on what modern evolutionary biology tells us
loud and clear, and I must say that these are basically Darwins views. There are
no gods, no purposive forces of any kind. No life after death when I die, I am
absolutely certain that I am going to be completely dead! Thats going to be the
end of me. There is no ultimate foundation for ethics, no ultimate meaning in
life, and no free will for humans, either 14.
One could say that the polls and the above quotes shed light only on personal
beliefs of particular scientists. But let us look at official statements of public
educational and scientific institutions due to relation of theory of evolution and
religious beliefs. We find there a popular view that science and religion answer
different questions and refer to different domains of reality so we cannot say
about conflict between them. For example, in the official Position Statement of
the American National Association of Biology Teachers we can read that
[] evolutionary theory, indeed all of science, is necessarily silent on
religion and neither refutes nor supports the existence of a deity or deities 16.
13
RICHARD DAWKINS, The Blind Watchmaker, Longman Scientific & Technical, Harlow,
1986, p. 5. American edition of the book has a telling subtitle: Why the Evidence of Evolution
Reveals a Universe without Design.
14
WILLIAM PROVINE in: WILLIAM PROVINE and PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, Darwinism: Science or
Naturalistic Philosophy? Video Study Guide, Access Research Network, Colorado Springs, 2001
(1996), p. 33.
15
EDWARD O. WILSON, On Human Nature, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1978,
p. 192.
16
AMERICAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BIOLOGY TEACHERS, The American Biology Teacher,
January 1996, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 61-62 (quoted in: PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, Defeating Darwinism by
Opening Minds, InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove, 1997, p. 120).
17
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Science and Creationism: A View from the National Academy
of Sciences, Committee on Science and Creationism, Washington, 1984 (quoted in: JOHNSON,
Reason in the Balance, p. 190).
But is science really silent about religion if in the booklet of ANABT mentioned
above we read:
The diversity of life on earth is outcome of evolution: an unsupervised,
impersonal, unpredictable and natural process of temporal descent with
modification that is affected by natural selection, chance, historical contingencies
and changing environments 18.
18
AMERICAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BIOLOGY TEACHERS, The American Biology Teacher,
pp. 61-62 (quoted in: JOHNSON, Defeating Darwinism, p. 15).
19
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Science and Creationism: A View from the National Academy
of Sciences, Committee on Science and Creationism, 2nd ed., Washington, 1999,
http://books.nap.edu/html/creationism/ origin.html.
20
RICHARD DAWKINS, The Blind Watchmaker, Penguin, London, 1991, p. 6.
21
JOHNSON, Reason in the Balance, p. 76.
To show more clearly how different are theistic and naturalistic visions of
reality lets compare the last Goulds statement about lack of Gods manifestation
in nature with Romans 1:20: Ever since the creation of the world [Gods] eternal
power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been understood and
seen through the things he has made. Gould, as well as many scientists, deny
possibility of empirical evidence of design in nature. Such possibility was once
widely accepted in Western science and was crucial assumption of natural
theology. Its medieval formulation we find in Thomas Aquinas five arguments
for Gods existence. In XIX century popular version of natural theology was
William Paleys argument from design in nature. The contemporary science is
rooted in works of Charles Darwin. The problem situation of his research was
constituted by Paleys argument from design explaining the origin of living
structures by reference to a Creator. In the Origin of Species Darwin provided
naturalistic explanation to Paleys crucial examples. Darwin denied special
creation and any theistic and teleological interpretations of evolutionary theory.
Contemporarily teleological explanations justified in science are only those
understood as functional explanations. As Wesley Salmon puts it:
In evolutionary biology functional considerations play a crucial role,
and since the time of Darwin it has been appropriate to deny that such
appeals to functions involve the conscious purposes of a creator, or any other
sort of final causation 24.
Works of Darwin provided not only a new vision of history of life on earth but
also consolidated a special role of methodological naturalism in science. Let us
take a closer look at contemporary version of design argument presented by
advocates of intelligent design theory and its relation to methodological naturalism.
Some advocates of scientific legitimacy of the design argument point at two
elements of methodological naturalism: it not only rejects the possibility of
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Ever Since Darwin, Pelican, W. W. Norton, New York, 1977, p. 267.
22
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, In Praise of Charles Darwin, in: CHARLES L. HAMRUN (ed.), Darwins
23
25
KAZIMIERZ JODKOWSKI, Antynaturalizm teorii inteligentnego projektu (Anti-naturalism
of Intelligent Design Theory), Roczniki Filozoficzne 2006, vol. LIV, no. 2, p. 73 [63-76],
http://www.nauka-a-religia.uz.zgora.pl/index.php?action=tekst&id=110 (Last accessed:
18.02.2008).
26
See e.g. WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, Reinstating Design within Science, in: JOHN ANGUS
CAMPBELL and STEPHEN C. MEYER (eds.), Darwinism, Design and Public Education, Michigan
State University Press, East Lansing, 2003, pp. 408-414 [403-417].
operating in accordance with necessity and chance alone. One such a feature is
making a choice between different possibilities. On that basis one can establish,
for instance, whether an animal displays an intelligent behavior (regardless of
what animal intelligence is). Imagine that we introduce a rat into a complicated
maze in which there is only one way out and every wrong turn prevents the rat
to exit outside. If the rat exits successfully and hell repeat it every time when
introduced in the maze, then we could say that the rat indeed learned how to
exit the maze and we would not ascribe it to chance, let alone necessity 27. But
whether this type of inference could be applied to the problem of the origin of
body plans, biochemical structures and processes and the like is quite different
matter.
It seems, however, that even methodological naturalism in the sense of
naturalism-artificialism opposition is regarded as a necessary condition of a
theory to be scientific one (at least in disciplines not having interest in the results
of human activity one exception is SETI research program which aims to find
an extraterrestrial intelligence, but its proponents generally dont regard the
program as a proof that the design of nonhuman intelligence can be detected
also here on earth). Dembski rightly claims that by natural explanations scientists
dont have on mind simply to explain phenomena occurring in nature. Instead,
natural explanations involve only material causes: matter, energy, and their
interaction. In other words, in natural sciences merely unintelligent causes,
expressed in categories of chance and necessity, are acceptable. Dembski says,
however, that one cannot assume what must be demonstrated. How do we know
that only natural, i.e. unintelligent, causes were and/or are at work? Defining
science by a principle of methodological naturalism in the sense of naturalism-
artificialism opposition is to impose an artificial restriction on it and to a priori
exclude the possibility of the involvement of intelligence in the course of natural
history. In that case the one and only option is unintelligently guided, blind
(though maybe not Darwinian) evolution which in these circumstances is true
by definition it doesnt require support of evidence as we usually would expect
from science because we already know that some naturalistic theory is true 28.
Lets look at one example of such naturalistic thinking. In the booklet Science
and Creationism members of the National Academy of Sciences try to show the
superiority of the naturalistically based science over creationism. At one point
authors write: For those who are studying the origin of life, the question is no
longer whether life could have originated by chemical processes involving
nonbiological components. The question instead has become which of many
pathways might have been followed to produce the first cells 29. It is evident from
this quotation how a priori methodological assumptions eliminate the need to
27
DEMBSKI, Reinstating Design, pp. 411-414.
28
See WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, Expert Witness Report: The Scientific Status of Intelligent
Design, 29 March 2005, pp. 7-8 [1-51], http://www.designinference.com/documents/2005.09.
Expert_Report_Dembski.pdf (Last accessed: 19.02.2008).
29
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Science and Creationism, p. 6.
As Phillip E. Johnson puts it, Every culture must have a creation story as a
basis for things like philosophy, education and law. If we want to know how we
ought to lead our lives and relate to our fellow creatures, the place to begin is with
knowledge about how and why we came to be 30. For many centuries in Western
civilization such a creation story has been provided by religion. In the nineteenth
and twentieth century the source of creation story became science. In contemporary
culture it is the science that tells the rational story of creation, it is science that
tells how things really are. In the light of this view, Darwinian evolution is not
primarily important as a scientific theory but as a culturally dominant creation
story 31.
Of course, the description of reality provided by science based on methodological
naturalism uses language which ontology is free from notions referring to any
supernatural being acting in the history of universe and responsible for the origin
of life and human beings. According to this new creation story, all living creatures
evolved by unguided, material, purposeless process of random genetic mutations
and natural selection. From this perspective man is the result of a purposeless
and natural process that did not have him in mind.
And that is how Douglas Futuyma sees the dominant element of Western
civilization:
By coupling undirected, purposeless variation to the blind, uncaring process
of natural selection, Darwin made theological or spiritual explanations of the
life processes superfluous. Together with Marxs materialist theory of history
and society and Freuds attribution of human behavior to influences over which
we have little control, Darwins theory of evolution was a crucial plank in the
30
JOHNSON, Reason in the Balance, p. 12.
31
JOHNSON, Reason in the Balance, p. 12.
THEISTIC EVOLUTION
32
DOUGLAS FUTUYMA, Evolutionary Biology, 3rd ed., Sinauer Associates, Sunderland, 1998,
p. 3.
33
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History, Norton,
New York, 1989, p. 289.
divinely governed world chance must be somehow restricted, though it does not
mean that there cannot be some portion of genuine randomness. Nevertheless,
since Gods goal was to create human beings, some historical evolutionary pathways
had to be nonrandom (i.e. God intervened at some points of natural history)
inevitably leading to the development of humans. To be sure, God might have
predicted that some authentically random evolutionary pathway will produce
human beings and choose it as his way of creation. If that was the case, however,
the role of God would be limited only to deliberately choosing one pathway from
a large array of different possible evolutionary pathways and then he let it work
on its own. For example, Howard Van Till outlines the following reasoning arguing
that that even a genuine, and not restricted to one result only, randomness of biotic
evolution does not rule out purpose:
Suppose there were a perfectly honest gambling casino in which no game
was rigged every turn of the cards, every roll of dice, every cycle of the slot
machines, was authentically random. Does that rule out the possibility that
the outcome of the casino operation cannot possibly be the expression of some
preestablished purpose? Clearly not. In fact, the operators of the casino depend
on that very randomness in their computation of the payout rates to insure
that they will have gained a handsome profit at the end of the day. Now, if
human casino operators can employ random events to accomplish their
purposes, could God not do so on a scale far more grand in the formational
history of the creation? 34.
But there is a problem. In traditional sense, theism means that God actively
intervenes in the workings of nature, so the idea that God used a self-contained
evolutionary process to create humanity isnt the idea of theistic, but of deistic
evolution, where God merely establishes boundary conditions and set the process
in motion.
According to theistic evolutionists, after God created the world and gave it the
laws (also the laws of evolution) he had still constantly upheld the existence of the
universe and operated through the laws in undetectable way. As Johnson states,
Wise metaphysical naturalists will smile at these transparent devices () 35. He
would surely agree with Provine who explicitly evaluates such a position:
A widespread theological view now exists saying that God started off the
world, props it up and works through laws of nature, very subtly, so subtly that
its action is undetectable. But that kind of God is effectively no different to my
mind than atheism 36.
34
HOWARD J. VAN TILL, The Fully Gifted Creation, in: J. P. MORELAND and JOHN MARK
REYNOLDS (eds.), Three Views on Creation and Evolution, Zondervan, Grand Rapids. Mich.,
1999, p. 168 [161-218].
35
JOHNSON, Reason in the Balance, p. 101.
36
WILLIAM B. PROVINE, Progress in Evolution and Meaning of Life, in: MATTHEW N. NITECKI
(ed.), Evolutionary Progress, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988, p. 70.
37
Miracles Reported; Could Speed John Pauls Canonization, Catholic World News, 30
November 2005, http://www.cwnews.com/news/viewstory.cfm?recnum=41004 (Last accessed:
22.02.2008).
38
See POPE JOHN PAUL II, Message to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences: On Evolution,
22 October 1996, http://www.ewtn.com/library/PAPALDOC/JP961022.HTM (Last accessed:
24.02.2008).
39
MICHAEL RUSE and EDWARD O. WILSON, Evolution of Ethics, in: J. E. HUCHINGSON (ed.),
Religion and the Natural Sciences: The Range of Engagement, Harcourt Brace, Orlando, 1993
(quoted in: JEFFREY P. SCHLOSS, Evolutionary Accounts of Altruism & the Problem of Goodness
by Design, in: WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI (ed.), Mere Creation: Science, Faith & Intelligent Design,
InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove, Ill., 1998, p. 236 [236-261]).
time? It seems that one can be consistent theistic evolutionist only after crucial
reinterpretation of theistic doctrine or of evolutionary theory.
Consider the following remark made by a theoretical physicist and Nobel Prize
winner, Steven Weinberg: only way that any sort of science can proceed is to
assume that there is no divine intervention and to see how far one can get with
this assumption 40. It seems Weinberg suggests here that science could encounter
something that it wouldnt be able to explain and scientists will have to admit that
explanation of this is beyond the competence of science, but may be explained by
theology or philosophy. However, the methodological naturalist always could hope
that natural explanation, filling a gap in the scientific knowledge, will be found in
the future. In the framework of naturalistic science there exists no criterion
suggesting to scientists when they should abandon that hope. Nonnaturalistic
criterions, on the other hand, are ignored and recognized as unscientific. Such an
attitude could in turn lead to a situation when a scientist would prefer to place
credit in speculations lacking appropriate support of evidence. For example, the
advocate of such a position is the origin of life researcher Robert Shapiro:
Some future day may yet arrive when all reasonable chemical experiments
run to discover a probable origin for life have failed unequivocally. Further,
new geological evidence may indicate a sudden appearance of life on the earth.
Finally, we may have explored the universe and found no trace of life, or process
leading to life, elsewhere. In such a case, some scientist might choose to turn
to religion for an answer. Others, however, myself included, would attempt to
sort out the surviving less probable scientific explanations in the hope of
selecting one that was still more likely than the remainder 41.
40
STEVEN WEINBERG, Dreams of a Final Theory: The Search for the Fundamental Laws of
Nature, Pantheon, New York, 1992, p. 247.
41
ROBERT SHAPIRO, Origins: A Skeptics Guide to the Creation of Life on Earth, Summit
Books, New York, 1983, p. 130 (quoted in: MICHAEL J. BEHE, Darwins Black Box: The Biochemical
Challenge to Evolution, The Free Press, New York, 1996, p. 234).
CONCLUSIONS
42
WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, The Design Revolution: Answering the Toughest Questions about
Intelligent Design, InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove, Ill., 2004, p. 171.
ABSTRACT: This paper will study the relationship between mathematics and religion from the perspective
of reason and the role played by reason in human knowledge. Firstly, I will study the relationship between
reason, logic and mathematics. From this starting point, I will study the relationship between reason
and natural science and finally, I will draw some conclusions on the relationship between reason,
philosophy and theology. The relationship between mathematics, reason and religion will be studied
within the context of the global unity of human knowledge. This paper intends to explain how the pure
deductive reason is present in all human thinking. Mathematics and natural science share this universal
presence with metaphysics and religion. Pure deductive reasoning is somehow an absolute value that
transcends all aspects and levels of human knowledge, including metaphysical and religious knowledge.
Metaphysical and theological arguments need to be able to span different cultural communities. Pure
deductive reasoning is a kind of reasoning that can fully span communities and it forms a basis for inter-
disciplinary, inter-cultural and inter-religious communication.
KEY WORDS: mathematics, reason, pure deductive reason, logic, natural science, metaphysics, religin,
revelation.
INTRODUCTION
At first sight, it appears that mathematics and religion are two different and
unconnected topics; that the one has nothing to do with the other. History
however demonstrates how many thinkers have discovered different kinds of
relationship between mathematics and religion. We know that the Pythagoreans
gave certain mathematical structures a religious meaning 1. In the last few years,
1
PRIYA HEMENWAY, Divine Proportion: Phi In Art, Nature, and Science, Sterling Publishing
Company Inc., 2005, p. 56.
PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749 PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), nm. 242, pp. 639-663
640 J. LEACH, MATHEMATICS, REASON & RELIGION
2
RUSSELL W. HOWELL and W. JAMES BRADLEY (eds.), Mathematics in a Postmodern Age: A
Christian Perspective, Wm. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2001; JOHN BYL, The Divine Challenge:
on Matter, Mind, Math and Meaning, Banner of Truth Trust, 2004.
FIGURE 1
The first part of this paper will study the nature of mathematics and
mathematical logic as realities that fall within the hemisphere of reason, but
which are likewise bipolar. Mathematics also has two poles and two hemispheres
(Figure 2): the different kinds of logic responsible for providing internal coherence
to the many mathematical intuitions are in the rational mathematical hemisphere.
The other, more receptive, hemisphere contains mathematical intuitions, received
and taken in by the mathematician in a contemplative or passive way. Mathematical
intuitions begin to take on a structure when they become statements and axioms
in a mathematical language. There are also two hemispheres and two poles in
relation to logic (Figure 3). Pure deductive reason is at one extreme. At the other
extreme there are different logic-based intuitions and views that are also expressed
in logical statements and axioms, which in turn can be analysed in a standard way
from the pole of pure deductive reason. I will show how the pole of pure deductive
FIGURE 2
FIGURE 3
reason not only brings dynamic unity, clarity and objectivity to logic and
mathematics, but also how it brings dynamic unity, clarity and objectivity to the
rest of human knowledge. The dynamic unity and clarity demonstrated by the
pole of pure deductive reason cannot be separated from the plurality and complexity
inherent in the different kinds of experiences, intuitions, perceptions and feelings
required to produce all kinds of knowledge. I intend to show how in mathematics,
empirical science and theology, deductive reason interlinks a variety of fields where
there are many intuitions, perceptions, observations, views, feelings and emotions.
In summary, I will aim to show how the hemisphere of reason is based on a pole
or extreme of pure deductive reason, which in turn gives structure to a large
amount of human knowledge, both scientific and religious.
The second part of the paper will consider the rationality of empirical
knowledge. Empirical knowledge (Figure 4) also has two poles and two
hemispheres. The hemisphere of reason contains logic and mathematics. The
hemisphere of experience contains scientific observations. In the centre,
connecting both hemispheres, are scientific hypotheses, which will form the
basis of scientific and mathematical theories once they have been formulated
in a suitable language.
FIGURE 4
In the third part of the paper, I will consider the rationality of global religious
views. As a result of their own nature, global religious views need to be conveyed
and they therefore need to be reasonable. The quasi-absolute nature of the pole
of deductive reason has meant that at times, reason is seen to compete with and
antagonise religion, while at other times, reason has helped support different
religious views.
Firstly, we need to be aware that when we talk about reason, we are not always
saying the same thing; the meaning of the word varies. Reason has been linked
to language, to logic, to the mind, to the conscience, etc. Distinctions have also
been made between theoretical reason, which considers how things are, and
practical reason, whereby we justify our actions. In this paper, I will try to provide
a clear, simple and specific view of reason, focusing on mathematics. Before
dealing with reason from a mathematical point of view, I will provide a brief
summary of some aspects of reason that go beyond mathematics.
Reason and natural language. Mathematics is a formal language developed
in close connection with natural languages. Many different natural languages
uses concepts to convey perceptions and knowledge; the mind formulates qualities
in relation to the things it has perceived; and the mind structures its ideas in a
rational way linking concepts. As we will see, there are different kinds of rational
model, but mathematics plays a fundamental role in all these models when
demonstrating their rational nature.
Rational coherence and the human conscience. Human beings are also
characterised by having reached a high level of awareness. A human beings
conscience manages to create a whole sense of the world and of itself that
distinguishes the human condition from other living beings with a lower level
of awareness. The ability to reason is an essential characteristic that allows the
human conscience to reach a higher level of internal coherence in the way it
perceives the world. The ability to use thought and reasoning to capture the
internal coherence of what is perceived is a characteristic specific to the human
conscience. The critical rigor inherent in mathematics also demonstrates the
highest level of coherence that can be expressed in a rational way.
Theoretical reason and practical reason. Finally, we can draw a distinction
between two basic types of human reasoning; reasoning about how things are
or about how we should act. Theoretical reason is used to justify our certainty
and doubt about how things are. Practical reason is used when we justify our
actions.
Theoretical reasoning is linked to statements about how things are. These
statements are often called declaratives. For example, today it is raining is a
declarative statement that attributes the quality of rain to today; John is clever
is another declarative statement that asserts a quality belonging to John. Using
theoretical reasoning, we can deduce declarative statements from other
declarative statements. Theoretical reason analyses facts in an impersonal and
public way, facts which are in theory accessible to anyone. Natural and social
sciences use theoretical reason. Theoretical reason makes practical reason
possible. Before we decide to act in the world, we need to know how the world
is. Theoretical reason justifies our beliefs about the world, transcendence and
God. Practical reason justifies our actions in accordance with our beliefs.
Using practical reasoning we think about how we should act. Practical
reasoning is linked to normative statements. For example, you must eat to live
is a normative statement. Practical reason is used when we justify our actions.
Using practical reasoning we justify the options we take in situations where
several different options are open to us. Practical reason is about clarifying which
option is best. While theoretical reason aims to explain how things are, practical
reason aims to assess events adequately in order to determine which option is
best. Practical reason assesses and weighs up the facts from an individual and
group point of view depending on whether individual or group decisions need
to be made.
There are links between theoretical and practical reason and there can be no
contradiction between the two. Both theoretical and practical reasoning can be
The study of how mathematics uses theoretical reason will reveal to us the
deductive ability of reason, shared by both theoretical and practical reason. The
critical rigor inherent in mathematical reason will demonstrate fundamental
characteristics of the pole of pure deductive reason, which is located in one
extreme of mathematics and logic.
Logic, mathematics and language. We have considered the study of reason
as a study of one pole of human knowledge seen as a global unity. Let us focus
therefore on the hemisphere containing this pole of reason: this hemisphere
contains logic, mathematics and language. More specifically, lets firstly focus on
mathematics as the part of language that aims to logically describe and structure
mathematical intuitions. As we have said, we can see that there are also two poles
and two hemispheres in mathematics. In one mathematical hemisphere there is
logic and in the other, mathematical intuitions. In the middle, between the two
poles, there are mathematical axioms and statements (Figure 2). Not all
mathematics is pure logic. Logicism 4 dates back to the end of the 19th century
and the beginning of the 20th century and aimed to reduce mathematics to logic.
Logicism failed however and it was proved that mathematical knowledge cannot
be reduced to logic. Opposite the pole of logic in mathematics, there is a rich and
complex world of mathematical intuitions that cannot be reduced to logic. Unlike
empirical intuitions, mathematical intuitions are characterised by their simplicity
and clarity and this means that they can easily be structured in a logical way. In
fact, it is in relation to mathematical intuitions and within the context of the
study of mathematical logic that we find concepts and arguments that can clarify
our ideas about the rational extreme of logic, which we call pure deductive reason.
Deductive reason and logical intuition. If we look at Figure 2, we see that
mathematical logic is a part of mathematics within the mathematical ellipse in
the hemisphere of reason. But there is also an internal tension between two poles
in mathematical logic. Mathematical logic itself is not pure deductive reason.
In one pole of logic there is deductive reason and in the other logical intuitions
3
GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, Norms, Truth and Logic, in GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT,
Philosophical Papers I. Practical Reason, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983; trans. by CARLOS CABRERA
ALARCN, Normas, verdad y lgica, Fontamara, Mxico, 1997.
4
Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) & Bertrand Russell are the best known advocates of this
logistical movement.
(Figure 3). If mathematical logic were pure deductive reason, all logic would be
the same or certain logical questions could be narrowed down into others. But
not all logic is the same, not all logic accepts the same basic intuitions. The
principle of excluded middle for example is accepted by classical mathematical
logic, but not by constructivist logic 5. There is no reason why all logicians have
to accept the excluded middle principle 6. The excluded middle principle is based
on an intuition that is accepted by classical mathematics, which constitutes the
majority of mathematical statements and proofs, but which is not accepted by
constructivist mathematics. The excluded middle principle is a logical axiom
and is located between the pole of deductive reason and the pole of logical
intuitions (Figure 3).
Pure deductive reason. Pure deductive reason answers questions about the
reason for things: Why? Pure deductive reason does not assign this question a
specific object. The pure question about reason can be applied to any object of
knowledge. At the beginning of this paper, I considered the idea of knowledge
as a reality containing two extremes or poles and I have also said that this is not
a simple bipolar approach whereby everything can be explained using just these
two poles. By studying the hemisphere of reason, where we have placed logic,
mathematics and language, we have described a new polarities within logic and
mathematics that help us to clarify the concept of reason. The pole of pure
deductive reason with the question Why? is at one edge of the hemisphere of
reason and is applied to much logic and mathematics. But pure deductive reason
is not only applied to logic and mathematics; pure deductive reason is a pole of
all rational knowledge and by studying it we can also clarify other realities of
human knowledge and in particular, scientific, philosophical and religious views.
Up until this point, we have broadly discussed reason, mathematics and logic,
but without specifying in detail what we are referring to when we speak of
mathematics and logic. Below is a more detailed summary of what is meant by
mathematics. To do this, we need to look at the historical development of logic
and mathematics starting with important historical events and moments that
have caused cultural changes in the world of mathematics and which have
5
The principle of excluded middle asserts that given a statement A, A is either false or
true. Constructivist logic does not accept that one of the two possibilities A or not A is inevitably
true, only that the two possibilities cannot be true at the same time, as we would be faced with
a contradiction. Constructivist logicians can only assert A when A can be proved and can only
assert not A when not A can be proved, but if neither A nor not A can be proved, we cannot
assert: A or not A.
6
In order to understand these ideas it is important to distinguish between the excluded
middle principle that states that A or not A is true and the principle of no-contradiction that
states that A and not A cannot be both true.
resulted in the vision we have today of logic and mathematics. This historical
summary will help us to see how mathematics has changed and to discover the
role that mathematics has taken on over time in human knowledge and also how
mathematics has helped to clarify the role of reason in knowledge and, more
particularly, the role of pure deductive reason in knowledge. The relationship
between mathematics and empirical science has been a very important factor
in the historical development of mathematics. As well as its intrinsic value,
mathematics has become the basic tool used by natural sciences to express the
laws of nature. Defining scientific laws using mathematical statements has
provided them and scientific reasoning based on them with the highest level of
rigor and accuracy. But the aim of this paper was not to limit myself to just
mathematics and natural sciences. Further on, I will comment on the use of
pure deductive reason in metaphysics and theology using the way in which
reason is understood in mathematics. In this paper, I intend to show that the
rigor of mathematical reasoning is not only useful and necessary in natural
sciences, but also in metaphysics and theology.
Mathematics in different cultural and historical contexts. In line with both
the holistic and bipolar approach to knowledge that I considered at the beginning
of this paper, I will not describe mathematics as an isolated science to be studied
without relation to other subjects. From a holistic point of view of knowledge,
mathematics is not understood as an isolated subject. By studying the relationship
between mathematics and other kinds of knowledge throughout the different
historical and cultural moments experienced by mathematics, we will have a
better understanding of the true nature of mathematics. From a bipolar diversity
approach to knowledge, we are however able to isolate mathematics as part of
the hemisphere of reason and study it separately. During the first half of the
20th century, much thought was given to mathematics itself. The study of pure
mathematics, as considered during the first half of the 20th century, became so
independent that it tried to back up mathematics with mathematical methods.
The study of mathematics using mathematical methods is called metamathematics.
Metamathematical reflection has clarified very important issues about the nature
of mathematics. Before mathematics had developed sufficiently and was mature
and independent enough for metamathematics to be considered, there was an
historic process of growth and development that lasted centuries and which shone
much light on the nature of mathematics. Mathematics has grown and developed
over different periods throughout history. Historical analysis of the complex
development of mathematics helps us to gain a better understanding of what
mathematics is in itself and in relation to other knowledge.
Three historical periods of mathematics. I will highlight three historical
periods in the development of mathematics: 1. Pre-modern mathematics. Pre-
modern mathematics spanned a historical period that started when man learned
to count and measure for the first time up until the advent of modern science
around the beginning of the 17th century. 2. Modern mathematics. Science in the
modern age began a new stage in relation to mathematics. The mathematical
The pre-modern period stands out for two reasons: (a) During this period,
mathematics appears as a formal science. Mathematical formalisms are used
for the first time. (b) Although the origin of mathematical formalisms cannot
be separated from the use of these formalisms in trade, the measuring of fields
and in astronomy, the pre-modern period in mathematics is characterised by
the fact that mathematics was still not applied to physics as a structured science.
Thousands of years ago, human beings carried out formal mathematical reasoning.
The first historical evidence of signs, lines, knots and other symbols used to represent
numbers dates back around 50,000 years 7. This evidence proves the existence of
primitive mathematical reasoning. Similar formal reasoning has been applied for
thousands of years in different situations. Man began to use mathematical reasoning
when he started to represent the first numbers 1, 2, 3, etc., with different kinds of
formalisms and to convey these formalisms with words. When numbers were first
expressed vocally, different words were probably used to represent different objects.
The word two was not the same when used to mean two men or two horses for
example. In English, we still distinguish between: Team of horses, span of mules,
yoke of oxen, brace of partridge, pair of shoes, couple of days 8. Words became
standardised and abstract calculations began to made, such as three minus one
equals two, which could be used in different situations: if I have three apples and
I give two to somebody, then I will be left with one; the same will happen if I have
three fish and I give two to somebody.
Formal axiomatic methodologies appear in the pre-modern period of
mathematics. Euclids Elements (323 BC to 283 BC) is a geometric treatise that
introduces geometric statements that can be deduced from a small set of axioms.
Geometry that is deduced from the axioms in the Elements is currently called
Euclidean geometry. The deductive axiomatic method presented by Euclid in
the Elements is still the most common method in mathematics of deducing
statements using axioms. The deductive axiomatic method begins by defining
a set of axioms whose truth is obvious and using these axioms, other statements
7
HOWARD EVES, An Introduction to the History of Mathematics, Ed. Saunders College
Publishing, 1992, p. 9.
8
HOWARD EVES, An Introduction to the History of Mathematics, Ed. Saunders College
Publishing, 1992, p. 11.
9
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, 1011b25.
mathematical calculations led Galileo to assert that the earth was just another
planet. Galileo defended a mathematical explanation of the laws of nature:
Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which stands continuously
open to our gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one first learns to
comprehend the language and interpret the characters in which it is written. It is
written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles and
other geometrical figures, without which it is humanly impossible to understand
a single word of it; without these one is wandering about in a dark labyrinth 10.
10
GALILEO GALILEI, Opere, 4, 171 (translation into English as quoted by Machamer in the
Cambridge Companion to Galileo, p. 64f).
11
Laplace developed Newtons mechanics. Laplaces equations are important, as is his
partial differential equation.
predicted by Newtons laws, all phenomena could be predicted using the location
and momentum of the atoms making up material. Laplace explained his
determinist view by saying that if there were a demon that new the location and
momentum of all the atoms in the universe at any given moment, this demon
would be able to predict all future events using Newtons equations.
Wide variety of scientific disciplines. Throughout the modern period,
mathematics was applied to other sciences such as chemistry, biology, geology
and many branches of medicine. Units of measurement for volume, length, time,
intensity of electric current, temperature, light, etc. were established and
mathematics was incorporated into more and more areas of scientific knowledge.
12
GEORGE BOOLE, The mathematical analysis of logic, New York: Philosophical Library,
1948 (first published in 1847. Cambridge: Macmillan, Barclay, & Macmillan; London: George
Bell); GEORGE BOOLE, An Investigation of the Laws of Thought, Prometeus Books, New York,
2000 (first published in 1854).
only analyses language up to the level of atoms, without analysing electrons and
elementary particles.
The logic of predicates. The logic of predicates analyses the inside of atomic
statements. Inside atomic statements, the logic of predicates discovers quantifiers
that refer to a certain domain and predicates whose meaning is also interpreted
in a certain domain. The quantifiers required to express all mathematical statements
are the universal all () and the existential exists (). Aristotle had already
used universal and existential quantifiers as the basic elements of syllogisms. In
1879, Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) published Begriffsschrift 13 (Concept Script) with
the subtitle: a formal language of pure thought modelled upon that of arithmetic.
Begriffsschrift contains the first formal logical system to take on board all deductive
reasoning in mathematics. He introduced the quantifiers , and specific symbols
for logical relationships. Concept Script enabled logical inferences to be represented
as formal mechanical operations based only on the symbols themselves.
Semantics of mathematical language. The logic of predicates as formulated
by Frege offered syntactic foundations for mathematics. But these foundations
were still not specific, unlike the models referred to in mathematical language.
The objects referred to in mathematical statements that make the statement either
true or false were not specified. Georg Cantor (1845-1918) uniformly described
all mathematical objects as sets. A set is defined as a group of its elements, which
at the same time can be other sets or original elements. Cantor defined a set as
a collection into a whole of definite and separate objects of our intuition or our
thought. The idea of collection helped Cantor to express what mathematical
objects are in a uniform way: collections of elements. As a result of set theory,
mathematical logic acquired standard semantics. Mathematical logic could deal
with numbers, points on a map and the seconds in the day in the same way as
sets. All objects that can be dealt with by mathematics are collections of objects
and mathematics deals with them as collections of objects.
Paradoxes. The formal explanation of the entity of mathematical objects
using set theory came up against Russells paradox. According to Cantors
definition, if P is a well defined property, we can form a set of all elements with
the property P. Russells paradox is as follows: Q is a set containing all sets that
are not elements of themselves. Q is a set according to Cantors definition, as it
collects together in a whole objects that contain a property P. If Q is a set, we will
know whether Q is an element of Q or not. If however Q is an element of Q, we
have to conclude that Q is not an element of Q and if Q is not an element of Q,
we have to conclude that Q is an element of Q. To avoid Russells paradox,
restrictions were placed on the cases when a well defined property defined a set.
A well defined property can only define a subset of a set. With this restricted
definition, all mathematical objects can be constructed avoiding Russells paradox.
13
GOTTLOB FREGE, Begriffsschrift: eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des
reinen Denkens, Halle, 1879.
14
DAVID HILBERT (1926), ber das Unendliche, Mathematische Annalen, 95: 161-90.
Lecture given Mnster, 4 June 1925.
rigor does not require the excluded middle axiom to be accepted. The excluded
middle axiom can be accepted and classical mathematical logic developed or it
can be rejected and constructive mathematical logic can be developed whereby
we can assert that A is true or false only when we can effectively prove that A is
true or we can effectively prove that A is false. L. E. J. Brouwer (1881-1966) is
considered to be the founder of intuitionism 15, which is a type of constructivism.
Constructivism does not accept the excluded middle logical axiom.
There is a gap between the formal world of mathematics and the real world
of empirical science. This gap leaves a number of questions unanswered: What
is the relationship between mathematics and the real world? What does a
mathematician discover outside his mind when he has a mathematical intuition?
Some mathematicians believe that the objects Hilbert called signs, and about
which the mathematician felt direct intuition, really exist in a platonic world.
But what is this platonic world? Where is this platonic world? What relationship
is there between the platonic world and the real world? What is perceived by a
mathematician when he senses that there is a number called one and another
number called two and that the number two follows the number one in the same
way as the number three follows the number two?
Mathematical theories help to represent empirical observations. The use of
mathematics to formulate empirical knowledge is a characteristic of modern
science. Mathematics ability to formulate physical, biological and neuroscientific
theories, etc. shows that mathematical intuition is not completely alien to empirical
science; that the abstract objects in mathematics somehow exist in the real empirical
world. We can only claim to fully understand and know about an empirical science
when we are able to translate its statements into mathematical language.
Mathematical statements and proofs written in mathematical language can be
translated into any natural language. Mathematics is the most universal nucleus
of natural languages. When the theory of relativity was mathematically formulated
using Minkowskis mathematical theories 16 based on non-Euclidean geometry,
this theory could be explained with the same precision in a mathematical language,
regardless of the words, metaphors and statements about non-mathematical
symbols used in the empirical and physical explanation of this theory.
Mathematical formulation and technological application. The mathematical
formulation of theories enables them to be applied to technology. For example,
the precise and mechanical nature of the mathematical explanation of the theory
15
L. E. J. BROUWER, On the significance of the principle of excluded middle in mathematics,
especially in function theory, 1923.
16
S. WALTER, The non-Euclidean style of Minkowskian relativity. The Symbolic Universe,
J. Gray (ed.), Oxford University Press, 1999.
FIGURE 5
fact of existence in this world and they look to find answers to the questions
arising from these global realities.
Empirical science cannot answer metaphysical questions. Empirical science
provides hypotheses about methodical observations of an aspect or a part of
reality. Metaphysical statements must be linked in some way to each and every
one of our perceptions about reality, including all our emotions and feelings.
Metaphysical views and intuitions cannot be the logical conclusion of scientific
arguments. Metaphysical statements express views about the world as a whole.
The world as a whole and the worlds possible relationship with God cannot be
falsified by scientific experience.
But global metaphysical views and intuitions cannot be separated from other
experiences, intuitions and reasoning of human knowledge. There is a global
unity to human knowledge and metaphysical views and intuitions cannot break
this global unity. No individual human experience or expression is completely
alien to global views about the world and the universe. All mathematical intuitions,
all scientific observations and all human experiences can be integrated or not
into a global metaphysical view of the world. The history of human knowledge
is full of conflicts and consistency between scientific and human views and
intuitions and metaphysical and religious views of the world.
Metaphysical questions are inevitable. Asking metaphysical questions does
not depend on one kind of culture or another, nor does it depend on the level of
recognition achieved within a culture. Once we have stimulated our capacity to
ask questions of ourselves, the question about the worlds ultimate raison dtre
is inevitable. If someone does not want to consider this question, they are already
answering with their attitude. The answers we give to metaphysical questions
constitute our view of the world. For example, for some people the worlds
intelligibleness is only partial; for these people, there are traces of consistency
in the world, but the world is not always consistent. For Leibniz, world consistency
and intelligibleness was somehow complete and God created the best world
possible. Other people find enough of an answer to the question about the worlds
intelligibleness in the world itself, without referring to a God and creator
transcending the world. Finally, for others there is no philosophical reason of a
philosophical that can in any way explain the worlds intelligibleness. This final
stance is an agnostic view of metaphysics. This agnostic view recognises the
question about the worlds intelligibleness as valid, but does not believe that
any other view beyond the natural sciences can help provide an answer to
this question. Everyone can formulate metaphysical questions and the answers
to these questions can vary from one person to another. A global view of the
world can be agnostic or pantheistic when answers to the ultimate questions
about the universe are asked in the same world, or it can be theist when answers
to the ultimate existential question are looked for outside the universe, or it can
be atheistic when the possibility of finding an answer outside the universe is
rejected.
Metaphysical views are different from scientific views in terms of how they refer
to the world as a whole. Scientific views always refer to a part or an aspect of
the world. Scientific models represent an aspect of reality. They are like maps of
reality and a map does not reproduce reality, rather it represents it. A metaphysical
view however is a way of seeing reality as a whole. Empirical sciences are
inevitably disciplines as they refer to an aspect of the world. Metaphysics is
essentially trans-disciplinary, as it refers to the whole. Metaphysics questions
reality as a whole. For example, the question about why reality exists is a
metaphysical question not a physical one. Physics constructs models to interpret
the laws that govern reality, but it does not hold the answers to questions about
why these laws exist.
Metaphysical statements use symbols that refer to reality as a whole. Examples
of metaphysical symbols include words and symbols that represent beings in
general and the intelligibleness of beings in general. The symbols that represent
beings in general do not refer to any particular object, as they refer to all objects,
in the same way as when we discuss the intelligibleness of beings we do not refer
to any object, rather to the ability all objects have of being understood. The
difference between scientific metaphors and metaphysical symbols is that
metaphysical symbols refer in some way to the whole reality, whereas scientific
metaphors only refer to an aspect or part of reality. In the same way that each
scientific community has its own metaphors and symbols to represent its view
of reality, different philosophical communities also have their own symbols to
represent their view of reality.
Metaphysical views are the basis upon which religions act and are developed.
From the perspective of reason, which is the focus of this paper, all religions
provide answers to metaphysical questions in some way or another. But
metaphysical questions are not necessarily religious and the answers to these
questions are not necessarily of a religious nature. A metaphysical question
would be: Why is the world intelligible? This question is metaphysical because
it does not ask the reasons or causes behind how we understand the world, rather
why these reasons and causes exist. Metaphysical statements refer to views about
the world as a whole. Theological statements are metaphysical statements that
express views about the world in relation to God from religious foundations.
Religious communities use theological symbols to explain how God reveals
himself to human beings.
Man can understand religious symbols. Precisely because human beings are
capable of using metaphysical symbols to express their metaphysical views and
intuitions, they are also able to listen to religious words, statements and messages
about the world as a whole and about God as creator of the universe (Figure 6).
The Jewish, Christian and Islamic religions convey the message that God, creator
of the universe, is present in the world through his own revelation.
Deductive reason and philosophical and religious communication. The
different philosophical and theological formulations need to be conveyed between
the groups as they refer to the same world. These formulations need to become
cross-community. Structuring philosophical and religious formulations by pure
deductive reason is the most solid foundation and point of contact not only for
inter-disciplinary exchange between scientific communities and inter-cultural
exchange between different human communities, but also for inter-religious
exchange between different religious communities. Pure deductive reasoning is
somehow an absolute value that transcends all aspects and levels of human
knowledge, including metaphysical and religious knowledge. Metaphysical and
theological arguments need to be able to span communities. Pure deductive
reasoning is a kind of reasoning that can fully span communities and it forms
the basis for inter-disciplinary, inter-cultural and inter-religious communication.
FIGURE 6
and the pure deductive reason and mathematical logic is the area of human
knowledge with a clearest use of pure deductive reason.
CONCLUSION
and religion. They are two very different presences. Reason is actively present;
structuring, organising and clarifying etc. Religion is present in a more
contemplative way that I have called metaphysical. Metaphysics is understood
to mean a radical and basic view of the world where everything matters,
everything is included, looking for a rational answer to the question about reality
and realities as a whole. Of all the sciences, it is mathematical logic that most
clearly and precisely uses reason. There is a paradoxical relation between
metaphysics and mathematical logic.
Pure deductive reasoning is somehow an absolute value that transcends all
aspects and levels of human knowledge, including metaphysical and religious
knowledge. Structuring philosophical and religious formulations by pure
deductive reason is the most solid foundation and point of contact not only for
inter-disciplinary exchange between scientific communities and inter-cultural
exchange between different human communities, but also for inter-religious
exchange between different religious communities. Metaphysical and theological
arguments need to be able to span different cultural communities. Pure deductive
reasoning is a kind of reasoning that can fully span communities and it forms
the basis for inter-disciplinary, inter-cultural and inter-religious communication.
Metaphysics is the basis upon which religious views are developed.
Metaphysical man is ready and able to receive religious revelations. But
metaphysical man is neither just nor inevitably a cultured academic. Metaphysical
man is open to questions about the meaning of life, the meaning of existence
and the universe.
ABSTRACT: The contents of this paper are centred on the dialogue between the experimental and positive
Sciences and Theology. This dialogue should be based on the principle that both parts have to assume
the existence of undemonstrated axioms that are necessary for obtaining their respective valid conclusions.
Besides, all interlocutors have to accept the submission of their arguments to the scrutiny of the general
scientific method. The relationship between Neurology and Theology is centred on the dichotomy established
in the dilemma summarized in whether the conscious acts of the human being are exclusively generated
via physical states or are due to an essence within its anthropology that originates the will to do them.
Although I do believe in the second branch of this dichotomy, the research of the correlations between
physical states of the brain and the consciousness actions are the main goal of my analysis. The fundamentals
of Classical Neurology lie in the assumption that the neuronal system is a complex electronic lattice in
such a way that the procedures and developments carried out in it should be similar to those performed
in a classical computer. After an analysis of the difficulties of this model in the interpretation of the ontological
consciousness properties, I give the basis of the brain study from a Quantum Physics point of view presenting
both the known proposal of the Hameroff-Penrose and new proposals based on coherent collective states.
The possibility of the survival of quantum coherence of these many-body states to temperatures higher
than that of the human body is the main objection posed by the classical neurologists to the availability of
Quantum Neurology. The description of two different ways of attaining these many-body coherent states
allows us to understand the reasons for this possible survival, this being the main contribution of this work.
KEY WORDS: emergentism in the human soul, brain and self, classical versus quantum neurology,
microtubules and tubulins, coherence and collective coherent states, excitonic model of microtubules.
Biexcitonic model.
PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749 PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), nm. 242, pp. 693-713
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694 F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE?
1. PREFACE
2. PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND
We will begin with the inspiration arising from the mottos and goals of the
general project of the institutionalized Science-Theology dialogue. What are the
key points and roots of our common origin? What are the main essential elements
of personhood, self, soul and mind of the human being? Can a physical conception
of the human person be valid as a self without soul? All these principles are in
the frontispiece of the international Metanexus projects. We have to accept in
order to initiate this dialogue the weak anthropic principle, although one might
be sceptical and present resilience to assume it as a true principle. In addition,
it is convenient also to assume the strong anthropic one, the so-called meganthropic
principle, although, obviously this may be yet received with much more coldness.
These two dialogue bases imply that the whole design containing the conditions
F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE? 695
for the raising of the human race already existed in the constituting primordial
elements in the universe zero time, this being defined as the emergency of human
existence. The requirement of this design is necessary in the basis of the anthropic
principle and necessary and sufficient in the case of meganthropic one. The direct
interpretation of the emergency as a philosophical category would condition a
certain self-transcendency of matter that would generate new ontological entities
due to inextricable complexity laws. In virtue of those laws and the continuous
evolution of the pristine matter components, the existence of man becomes
conceived, by non theist philosophies, without requiring either any direct inter-
vention or creationism of a Prime Creator. These philosophical positions give an
autonomy and self-immanence to the energy-matter dualism plus the primordial
laws which could be capability of evolution. The belief of creative action of this
Prime Creator is reserved for the appearance and existence of the primordial
elements and the fundamental four interactions, i.e. the starting point of
development of the Universe. On the other hand, a complementary interpretation
of the emergentism (emergentness) should be the acceptance of the anthropic
principles as responsible for the formation of the necessary structural coupling
among the constitutive elements of the starting cosmic soup. This implies the
erection of successive intermediate structures and conglomerates so that step by
step and by the evolution principle, the final result is the present human race. In
a virtual straight line that followed the development of the reality according to
the complexity laws emerge, the physical hot cosmic soup would be considered
the most simple starting point. Physically, this evolution would be triggered by
cooling and expanding the primordial soup, which is formed by gluons, photons
and quarks, these being the initial elemental particles. The gradual cooling plus
the activation of the four fundamental elemental particle interactions (gravitational,
electromagnetic, electroweak and strong nuclear) generated the successive
interparticle couplings. In first place was the hadrogenesis with the formation of
the protons and neutrons which are constructed with three quarks. This allows
the atogenesis (or generation of the atoms) by the combination of hadrons and
the most stable leptons, the familiar electrons, which for cooling and evolution
arrived up to the molecule formation. Then, the complexity chemical laws activated
their mechanisms for achieving by means of the matter consolidation processes,
the appearance of the macromolecules that are formed by atoms and this sets
the bases for the following important and critical step with the genesis of the
replicating structures, the cells. The association of cells constitutes the organs
and at the final of a large generative chain, the mammalians appear. Then a new
critical transition occurs by following the evolution process of these mammalian
animals: the human race arises and the irrational Zoology science is then extended
and raised to the rational animal Psychology.
The most accepted ideas within of non theist development of the universe
are those arising from the so-called Darwinian evolution. These ideas advocate
that this universe evolution development is produced without the meddling of
a Supreme Designer, and are more or less accepted as philosophical starting
696 F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE?
hypotheses for using in the challenge of opinions even from a theist cosmogony
point of view. Maybe, this acceptance should be considered as a rational effort
and a sign of willingness from the theist cosmogony believers in order to facilitate
the dialectic with other materialist perspectives. As a consequence, we should
accept as truth that the starting primordial interactions plus the chain of befallen
complexity laws produce the whole evolution. This is equivalent to accept that
from the initial single physical reality of the cosmic hot soup and as a consequence
of the random evolution, the human race appears in the world without interfering
of any supreme Architect as a consequence of a simple and random evolution.
The possible darkness of this acceptance reasoning is clarified with, and justified
by, the implementation of the anthropic principles within the philosophical
categories, which define the concept of emergence within the matter evolutionism.
In any case, the theist philosophical position of the universe creationism plus
the acceptance of an autonomous performance of the matter evolution without
intromission of God would seem to imply that the primordial physics laws should
not be modified in this evolution progress, since any change in these laws only
could be attributed either to God or to the matter immanence itself. This self-
transcendence of the matter could be unacceptable for the theist positions because
a certain competition between God and matter evolution would seem to be
established.
Before this evolutionary straight line a question immediately arose: is there the
possibility of either a correspondence nexus or a causality rule between the simplest
stage of the physical reality with the final anthropic consequence, the conscious
human being? It seems that the more probable answer to this question is no,
because the interplay of the huge amount of intermediate complexity laws hinders
a direct relation between the first and last phases of reality evolution. However,
there is an opinion stream in accepting that it is possible to find correlations
between the Physics phenomenology in the brain with their psychological
manifestation. In a certain sense, this would seem an attempt to achieve the
structure and performance of the human soul, i.e. what are the quantum states
that define the human soul actions? These states do appear when the soul acts,
but their appearance is conditioned by these acts and, in contrast, the inverse
proposition does not seem correct.
We have not deliberately taken into account as a philosophical starting position,
the existence of the Prime Creator intervention in the evolution of matter within
the cosmology, since we assume the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the dualism
energy-matter in its cooling process across the time. Therefore, it seems to require
that one should abandon the idea of any supernatural element existence, at least
as that philosophical supposition and hypothesis, which transcends to the dualism
energy-matter in the description of conscious knowledge, sentiments and emotions.
Maybe, we should attempt to explain the rational functions by means of a clear
correlation between well defined states when these sentiments, emotions and
knowledge arise and are developed in the human being. A principle that would
give support and induce legitimacy as a valid assertion of these correlations should
F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE? 697
The belief in the existence of the human soul can be justified from an exclusively
rational point of view. It is conceived as an individual human property with a
strong sense of social communion and whose provenance and nature are divine.
This human property subsists on the observation, judgement and influence of
God over the human beings. Therefore these God actions give the true essence
of the soul to men and women, anthropologically complementing them by means
of a finite participation of the Divine image and nature. However, it is difficult
to justify, if one accepts the monism principle, the idea of a human soul as an
immaterial new substance, independent on the human physical body and
hypostatically included in its human nature. For this reason, it is difficult to
accept that this non material soul feature is independent of the continuous Divine
action, especially if one is coherent and consistent with the another idea, above
mentioned, that the energy-matter evolution is attained without any interfering
of the Prime Creator. It is also complicate to believe in, and justify, a spirituality
arising from the energy-matter evolution in virtue of the emergentism principle
and whose explanation has to have coherence without considering a theist human
anthropology. It would imply that the matter evolution should generate new
ontological substances yielding a certain immanence and self-transcendence of
this matter. We can illustrate this complex and debatable point by means of a
metaphor, which can be limited in presenting analogies with the real case but
can serve for explaining this real case in a better way. If one inspects any universal
painting from a rigorous Chemical-Physics study, we can analyze and observe
all atomic and molecular components of both the canvas and the oils used in its
confection, and this can be carried in a similar way by a possible observation of
the microscopic and nanoscopic components of our brain. However, this study
even being totally complete does not give the whole information of the work of
art. The spectators of this work observe another thing which is independent of
its atomic and molecular components, they appreciate its beauty which generates
in them sentiments and emotions that are not included in the Physical Chemical
analysis. This observation is the cause of the true new feature of its nature: in a
metaphoric sense, its soul. Consequently, we can argue, by using the art analogy,
that a complete analysis of the physical brain phenomenology does not ensure
us the global knowledge of the human nature and its spirituality. It is the existence
of the Prime Observant Creator Who confers to the human ontology a new
dimension, the dimension of the human soul. This divine influence produces in
the generic man the will and the stimulation to look for perfection by means of
the self-improvement. This is a radical idea that can be epitomized by saying that
if God does not exist, the human soul either, thus, the mind, consciousness and
deep self are submerged and contained in the brain.
698 F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE?
The belief of many people is that the human soul is linked to Gods existence
and therefore the impulse that induces self-improvement for man may not lie
in his brain. Nevertheless, the Theology-Science dialogue ought to imply that
the theist supporters of the universe existence should accept that the conscious
acts can be also analyzed from a non theist cosmologic development point of
view. As a consequence, descriptions of the consciousness actions should be
given and analyzed independently of the existence (or inexistence) of the soul.
It is possible that given the unconscious knowledge and assimilation of the
infinitum in the popular imaginary, a certain personal relationship of the non
believer with the supposedly infinitum universe can exist. This complex feeling
is named ultimateness. This situation can confer a pantheist spiritual sense
that should not be confused with the human soul spirituality, which is a highlight
of the immanent, omnipotent and omniscient being that we named God. However,
this mutual relationship, universe-man, can be satisfactory for the non believer
and well cultivated mind.
Important lines of thought have arisen around the relation between the brain
and the mind, soul and deep self within Philosophy and Psychology. A shining
example, though too conjectural, is the so-called supervenience between brain
and mind. A summary of this concept, re-introduced by Nancey Murphy, professor
of Philosophy in Pasadena University, California, the mental actions supervene
to the brain dynamic if and only if for all action in the first, at least, there is
another in the second. Several grades of supervenience are recognized according
to algebraic category, univocal or biunivocal, of this correspondence. Actually,
it is accepted as a possibility that a given mental action can be determined by the
dynamic of several neuronal states. This brilliant and not refutable concept is
vague and imprecise since the useful point would be the determination of which
several neuronal states are predetermined by a given mind action. This fact,
empirically shown, could allow either to ratify or to rectify the terms of the
supervenience that as a philosophical concept can be important, but its value, in
my opinion, is limited from a scientific point of view. Another concept relating
the ontological self to the brain is the mereologic reductiveness. The meaning of
this concept deals with the possibility of reducing the properties of the whole of
the self by means of the analysis of the properties of its parts: brain, mind, soul,
etc. This rare concept presents certain similarities with the grammatical figure
of the Spanish sincdoque that our students know or should know without
requiring high level studies of phenomenological research and Psychology. It is
interesting to emphasize that when a fact result to be unexplainable, there is a
tendency to look for either a concept or principle whose contents attempt to hide
the incapacity for understanding, describing and analyzing issues from an
evolutionary and scientific point of view. These imposed concepts and principles
allow us to hide our vacuum of arguments arising from a lack of explanatory
clearness.
This extensive and, in my opinion, necessary preamble is confectioned in order
to incardinate the contents of Quantum Neurology within the general context of
the dialectic between Theology and the experimental Sciences. This introduction
F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE? 699
can be epitomized saying that there are difficulties in obtaining the knowledge of
the consciousness intrinsic sense of the rational beings by means of exclusively
physical methodologies, but the great interest of the issue is worthy of the intent.
However, the global nature of man does not end with the understanding of this
physical study, because the will and the search for self-perfectionism are outside
this analysis since it depends on the existence of the human soul and this, in turn,
depends on the existence of God. On the other hand, the most complicated tasks
in the physical interpretation of the conscious events are in understanding how
the knowledge arising from, and developed by, human intuition can be determined
with states of brain. This complexity and difficulty is due to these states arising
from mental actions can not be algorithmically developed. Nevertheless, they have
to be described by means of a mathematical treatment which is a logic expression
of a physical model and therefore, contradictorily, they should proceed from an
algorithm. However, even considering these complications, there exists the intuition
that we can establish unequivocal correlations between these mental actions with
determined brain states whose understanding allows us to scientifically concrete
and evaluate the philosophical concept of supervenience. And this can be
undertaken without requiring assistance to psychological and philosophical
arguments different from those arising from the temporal evolution of physical
brain states corresponding to the different mental actions. The construction,
explanation and analysis of these correlations are the main keys and cornerstone
of Quantum Neurology.
The state of art of Quantum Neurology is too primitive and its development is
yet initial. Recently, several works have been published about the determined
quantum states concerning processes of exterior signal communication [Scholoffeen
et al. (2005) and Engel et al. (2007)]. In these works, the authors pretend to give
experimental proof of properties that are too simple about signal communication
in systems that present analogies with the neuronal transmission. These experiments
are too early and they foretell a long theoretical and experimental course whose
culmination is the achievement of results that serve for tests of theories about the
physical models of consciousness and shed new light on all these issues.
Nevertheless, the scanty knowledge of the physical perspective of consciousness
should be stimulating for the physicists and it should not be a reason for desisting
from further study.
In physics there are two scenarios for developing the different theories which
analyze the material systems. In some cases both theories arrive at apparent
contradictions and sometimes these contradictions are not apparent but totally
essential. These theories are the so called Classical Physics and Quantum Physics.
Classical Physics sets its fundamentals in the determinism of its main laws,
which allow the calculation of physical magnitudes in function of the space-
700 F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE?
temporal evolution of the system components that are macroscopic bodies and/or
corpuscles. This evolution becomes fixed by equations in such a way that known
the initial conditions, one can know precisely and evaluate without uncertainty
where and how each component of the system will progress in the space-time
dimension. Quantum Physics operates with a different philosophy. The basic
point of this theory lies in the system states defined each by its corresponding
wavefunction. These wavefunctions are calculated by deterministic equations,
either the Schrdinger equation in the non relativistic case or the Dirac equation
in the relativistic one. The physics reality becomes defined by means of a complete
set of physics variables whose values are probabilistically obtained. These variables
have not, in general, a given value; when one of these variables is measured in the
system, it can only attain a value corresponding to an eigenvalue that corresponds
to an eigenstate belonging to the spectra of the cited variable. In addition,
any state that is not eigenstate is strongly disturbed and modified when any
measurement is made, and it is transformed into a different state. Consequently,
the really important value of the infinite non-eigenstates of system is the average
probabilistic value, which proportions certain knowledge of the reality independent
of the experimental measurements.
Since the inception of the Physics Neurology, Classical Physics was used for
understanding some neuronal processes, and more recently Quantum Physics
is initiating its long process of implementation in this discipline. The main aim
for including the QP in this study of Neurology is the possible assimilation of a
microscopic measurement with the conscious knowledge of this system. At the
present time, both physical theories contribute in developing the Physics
Neurology; the association of both theories yields often complementary
conclusions from their reasonings, and in other cases, this association is converted
into competition since their propositions are contradictory solutions and
discrepant aphorisms.
Nowadays, a strong controversy is raised between both contending parts of
the Physics in proving what is the most appropriate physical theory for explaining
both the conscious acts and the external signal transmissions in terms of neuronal
states The development of Neurology from the Classical Physics lies in the idea
that the nervous systems, in general, and brains, in particular, are similar to
classical computers that manipulate information with input data and draw results
as an electronic chip. The information transmission is carried up by means of
either chemical transmitters, such as the glutamate of acetylcholine, serotonine,
noraldrenaline, etc., or electrical transmitters whose functions are established
between presynaptic and postsynaptics membranes. The electrical transmission
of signals becomes a study of electric networks named neuronal lattices, which
is performed within the electronic analysis of intelligent webs. As a consequence,
the classical model of Neurology is physicalist and reductionist, since the mental
actions could be deterministically defined by the electric signal transmission
inside an electric lattice, complex but simply an electric circuit. This classical
model presents philosophical difficulties due to the structural complexity of the
F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE? 701
brain whose actions can not often be described via mathematical algorithms,
therefore, it is doubtful that its performance can be modelled with the deter-
ministic laws of the Classical Physics. In addition, there are several reasons
within the internal coherence of Classical Physics that hinder the acceptance of
this theory, at least exclusively, as a suitable scenario for explaining the brain
performance. One of these reasons which may not be the most important
objection but is the easiest argument to understand, is that the electromagnetic
communication in the neuronal lattices should be produced without existing
interneuronal electric contacts among synapses, implying an EM transmission
with infinite impedances, this giving rise to an Alzheimer disease brain. This
objection is clearly and easily annulled within the Quantum Mechanics, since
the key for solving this difficulty lies in the fact that the intersynapses com-
munication is carried up by tunnel effects among contiguous synapses. This
criticism of Classical Theory and the possibility that the EM propagation is
due to either the tunnel or Josephson effects, which we will summarize later,
are sufficiently robust arguments to attempt the analysis of the excitation
transmission in the brain performance within these quantum models. In any
case, even considering the assumption, hard to accept, that the deterministic
classic theory is more appropriate for explaining the brain phenomenology, the
quantum effects can not be forgotten, since they should be taken into account
in the charge behaviours of the proteins that compose the neuron cytoskeletons.
702 F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE?
proteins travel across its hole supplying an appropriate dielectric behaviour that
favours the corresponding function in the global physical state. The microtubules
of each neuron cell are composed of around ten millions tubulins that are light
proteins, polypeptides even simple amino acids. The geometrical location of the
tubulins within the lateral surface of the microtubules is hexagonal and its
dimension is between four and eight nanometres. There are two kinds of tubulins
according to the sign of its total charge: the positive charge tubulins, henceforth,
we will name them alpha-tubulins and those whose charge is negative beta. The
gravity centres of two adjacent tubulins are split around four nanometres. These
constituent elements of the microtubules and the neuron cells that are the main
responsible of the generation of the physical states can associate forming pairs
that are called dimmers. Each tubulin has a spatial nanometric dimension and
is the most single quantum state that presents the features of a qubit (quantum
bit of a quantum computer). Consequently, the associated tubulins forming
dimmers are biqubits that, in turn, are two particle system quantum states.
F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE? 703
philosophies within the Classical and Quantum Physics of the tubulins is the
well-known Schrdingers cat example. This example serves for distinguishing
between the standard bits and the quantum qubits. In a normal global state of
a neuron or neuron set, each tubulin is in a different one-body state, i.e. each
tubulin contain different A and B values and thus, the neuron is in an incoherent
random state which does not contain and not store any computable information.
The external excitations (stimulations) produce nervous streams that are
transmitted towards brain, which starts a process that becomes represented by
a quantum state in the tubulins. In principle, the individual states are different
in each tubulin and the global many-tubulin state is then incoherent. The brain
acts as an observer of the global state and this observation is equivalent to a
measurement process in it. This process leads to the collapse of each tubulin
wavefunction which implies the selection of a eigenstate of each tubulin
corresponding to the eigenvalue which is the result of this measurement. When
this selected state is simultaneously equal in the tubulins of a neuron, the global
state of this cell coherently oscillates. The obtained coherence allows the
information storing of the external excitations, since a correlation between the
nervous streams produced by the external signal and the coherent global state
is established. The internal coherent global state can be transmitted to the network
of connected neurons by means of a Josephson-like effect similar to that occurring
in superconductor-insulating-superconductor devices. There is multiple nature
and structure for the dynamic reasons that are able to undo the quantum
superposition of the individual tubulin states and that impel the election of a
given eigenstate, either alpha or beta. As a continuation, we will give some of
these reasons that are extended in the section of proposals in this paper.
In September of 2007 at the Madrid Sophia-Iberia congress, several concepts
from a philosophical point of view were placed in discussion with a clear symbolic
and metaphoric sense in order to understand the behaviour of matter from a
non experimental point of view. The most striking ideas were those concerning
the existence of two kinds of matter, bosonic and fermionic, whose different
structure and properties have certain similarities with those of the same physical
denomination. The fermionic matter was defined, in this occasion, as the matter
composed of individual and separable elements so that the properties of the
whole should be considered as the sum of those of their components. In contrast,
the bosonic matter was described as a global and inseparable bulk whose
properties are those of the whole in itself. Obviously, the physical definition is
much more precise referring to the elementary particles. The fermionic particles
such as electron, proton, neutron, electronic and muonic neutrinos, etc, are
defined as those particles that occupy an individual state (one-body state) and,
in addition, each of these states contains only one particle. On the other hand,
the bosonic particles such as photon, phonon, gluon, graviton, exciton, magnon,
etc., can share any arbitrary (even infinite) number of these particles in the same
state. Furthermore, other two properties distinguish the fermionic from bosonic
particles: i) the first are those that suffer interactions among themselves and the
second are messengers and transmitters of these interactions, ii) the fermions
704 F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE?
have a half integer spin and the bosons have an integer spin (the spin is the
internal angular moment which is the total angular moment in the repose
reference system). The property of different spin value for each kind of particle
is equivalent to that of different state occupation according to the spin-statistic
principle.
Another important phenomenology arises from the associations of even
numbers of fermions whose resulting entities are bosons: each two half integer
spin particles joined via an attractive interaction generate a new bosonic
composite particle. An indefinite number of these new particles can occupy the
same state and thus the global many body state of either one or several neuron
cells is coherent in itself. Two examples of global coherent states are, on one
hand, the case of superconductors based on electron pairs, the so-called Cooper
pairs, and on the other hand, the cases of some Bose-Einstein condensate whose
elemental pair components are excitons formed by electron-positron (hole) pairs.
It seems that the mental and brain actions arise from the appearance of global
coherent states that evolve in the neuronal lattices. We say seems since there
is yet not a conclusive and apodictic theory that confirms and ratifies this point.
The storing and reproduction properties of these global states are due to the
easy intersynapses transmission of external signals via tunnel and Josephson
effects. Moreover, these states become perfectly characterized with the internal
parameters required in their construction. However, the issue that the global
coherence implemented within the neuron lattice can be representative of
assigned mental/brain actions present difficulties that do not invalidate the
theory but three serious objections should be previously answered before a future
and possible consolidation of this assertion.
i) The dynamics in the brain are almost exclusively provided by electrons in
such a way that the inclusion of the Quantum Neurology within the Electronic
Physics discipline is legitimated, and these particles are fermions. As a consequence,
in order to build up the coherence with global states, the coupling of either electron-
electron or electron-hole pairs is necessary. As it is well known, the interactions
among electron are repulsive and those existing between electrons and positrons
though are attractive, the excitation of an electron from the valence band to the
conduction band is necessary. Therefore, in both cases there are difficulties, not
impossibilities, for obtaining pairs. The remedy for attaining the coherent global
state via pair couplings (either e-e or e-h) is in the interaction between the tubulin
system and the environment. This interaction is mediated by the circulation of
water, lipids and polipeptides inside the microtubule hole yielding a dielectric
medium in which the coupling of two tubulins (or pair coupling ) is then favoured.
These dimmers have a bosonic spin character and then the coherent states can be
transmitted among synapses of the neuronal lattice. The theoretical and
experimental problem is to know how the dimmers can be formed, this question
being a point that presents similarities from a physical point of view with the
antiferromagetic dimmers construction via Rostoker-Kittel-Kasuya-Yosida (RKKY)
exchange interaction. The antiferromagnetic lattices acquire the appropriate
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706 F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE?
the physical scenario for Neurology. In contrast, the group led by Hameroff, who
joined Penrose proposed the orchestrated objective reduction model (see Hameroff-
Penrose 1996) for the consciousness physical definition, defends, with good
arguments but not totally conclusive, that microfilaments and hydrophobic liquids
produce an environment with a dielectric and plasma medium in the intertubulin
space. The interaction between this environment and neuronal tubulins allows
the maintenance of the coherent states up to higher temperatures than that of
the human body. Concretely, these authors with their model justify that the
dielectric medium modifies the dipole-dipole interaction among alpha-beta pairs
in such a way that a quantum protectorate of the coherent state is created allowing
the isolation of the tubulins implicated in this quantum system. In other words,
the cerebral medium inundated by proteins and other macromolecules screens
to the neurons of the thermal noise. The semantic term quantum protectorate
was introduced by the 1998 Physics Nobel Prize, Laughlin in the Quantum
fractional Hall effect (Laughlin 1999); according to this author, some coherent
states can be built by means of the interaction with determined magnetic fields
so that these states can be maintained up to high temperatures with procedures
similar to the optic pumping of the laser state. Some new technical subjects
such as the magnetoencephalography applied to the cerebral diagnostic uses the
existence of certain magnetic behaviour of the brain, which implies that
the neuronal magnetic behaviour might have the conditions for the appearance
of a quantum protectorate that preserves the coherence up to high temperatures.
In any case, the criticism of Tegmarks group is a robust idea that should induce
reflexion to the quantum neurologists in order to dispel the existing doubts
about the applicability of Quantum Mechanics to the physical knowledge of
consciousness.
The aim of the following sections is to present both some known and other
novel solutions to the existing problems concerning the applicability of the
Quantum Theory to the cerebral processes exposed in the former section.
7. KNOWN PROPOSALS
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708 F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE?
8. OUR PROPOSALS
F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE? 709
can occupy the same state. The occupation of states is governed by the minimal
energy principle and therefore all will occupy the state with null linear moment.
In other words, the total energy of the microtubule system formed by the alpha-
beta dimmers is decreased by the attractive energy of the binding potential of the
excitons (here excitons and dimmers are two equivalent words). The microtubule
global state is, obviously, coherent because when these excitons start to be moved
before either an electric or magnetic fields, all dimmers move with the same
linear moment a kinetic energy. Hence, the resulting global many-body state is
formed by bosons and therefore, it is a coherent Bose-Einsten condensate.
On one hand, an external signal produces an electric excitation which implies
a wave of linear moment and kinetic energy changes within the coherent BE
condensate. The resulting many-body state presents a new set of quantum
numbers. Then this excitation remains labelled by the new and modified BEC
state, a correlation existing between an external signal and the physical change
of the resulting modified condensate. The tunnel effect is responsible for the
intercommunication across the intersynaptic gaps. This effect is not the normal
tunnel crossover of electrons between conductors through an insulating layer,
but the transmission of a many-body coherent BEC state that pass by the dielectric
medium existing among synapses of different neuron cells. This anomalous
tunnel effect is more similar to the superconducting Josephson one than that
arising from the metal-insulating-metal devices.
The existence of an electric field between the device electron exit element and
that of electron input can favour both the strength of the normal tunnel and
Josephson effects. However, the coherent BEC state is built up with excitons whose
total charge per composite particle is null and therefore the electric field is not
necessary (it is useless) for favouring the intersynapses crossover. This fact implies
that the transmission of coherent state among synapses of different neurons is
due to the Josephson-like effects rather than the normal tunnel because the strength
of this later quantum effect is zero for null electric field charge acceleration, in
contrast to the Josephson intensity that can be different from zero for a null electric
field. Moreover the transmission of the coherent BE condensate oscillates between
synapses even for continuous field, this being an additional experimental fact
that gives support to the Josephson channel. The existence of this oscillating
transmissions, perfectly characterized by means of fixed quantum numbers
corresponding to a coherent BE condensate propitiated by a external signal is the
fact that can allow the establishment of a correlation between a conscious mental
action described by the BEC state and the corresponding cited signal that provoked
it. This correlation serves for attributing the recorded BEC to the information
arising from the external signal, this attribution being established in an unconscious
and automatic way. An example that could shed light and illuminate this crucial
point, which has analogies with the photosynthetic function of the green vegetable
world is the optic image construction by the interaction between the electromagnetic
radiation to visible frequencies and the ocular cells of the retina. The EM interaction
produces an optic excitation in these sensible ocular cells similar to excitons which
are transmitted by means of nervous streams toward the brain, generating in it a
710 F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE?
coherent state whose association with the cited exterior EM field gives us the idea
of the exterior optical image.
Obviously, a quantitative evaluation of these processes should be carried up
for obtaining a true analysis from a physical point of view. In order to satisfy
this objective, it is necessary to calculate the energy and linear moment of the
ground many-body state formed before and after the presence of the exterior
stimuli as well as the possible excitations of the total neuronal system. This
requires a quantitative study which can only be analyzed from the quantum field
theories, and whose technical details will be published in a specialized journal.
The tubulin dimmers, named tubulin pairs too, as mentioned in former sections,
constitute dipoles which are Wigners excitons from a Condensed Matter theory
point of view. These dipoles, as it is well known, interact between themselves via
dipole-dipole interaction, forming exciton pairs, i. e. the so-called biexcitons.
These biexcitons are also bosons since they are constructed of two composite
particles of integer spin, and therefore each biexciton is a new complex bosonic
particle, equivalent to a hydrogen molecule. The interesting question is when the
microtubule global state will prefer the existence of either single excitons or
biexcitons. This preference will depend on whether the interaction electron-
positron is more or less stronger than the Van der Walls-like interaction existing
between two hydrogen atoms (equivalent here to a pair of excitons). The natural
selection will depend on which one demands less energy between the two
possibilities: the energy arising from the global state only formed by excitons or
that from a many-body state built up by biexcitons. Another important and decisive
point in the above cited selection model, apart from the minimal energy reason
is: what global state model presents more straightforwardness in the intersynapses
and interneuronal transmission of the resulting coherent many-body state?
Obviously, nature will choose the condition for one of the two models of ground
state according to the balance of influences in each case between the two
phenomena: minimal energy and Josephson interneuronal transmission.
The dipole system developed in the microtubules based on the tubulin pairs
presents similarities to a Hopfield lattice (see Behrman 2006) and whose dynamic
is similar to certain antiferromagnetic classical lattices that can be solved via Isings
models. These models are particular cases within the Heisenberg exchange
interaction issue. As it is well known, characteristic features of the brain,
experimentally ratified in multiple and several experiences, are its plasticity and
its capability of self-transformation before successive neuronal actions. These
features will allow us to consider this plastic organ as a ferroelectric system with
hysteretic behaviours similar to a dielectric with the permanent dipoles, also named
electrete. The hysteresis cycle implies that the external agent stimuli would produce
multivalued responses in the brain, this fact having a clear psychological meaning
in the tiredness and boredom produced in the brain before repetition of the same
stimulation. This effect presented in the brain is similar to that of an elastic string
F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE? 711
712 F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE?
imbalance of total energy yielded via the electron-hole potential versus the Van
der Walls-like interaction among single excitons in a similar way as the hydrogen
atoms are joined for constituting the hydrogen molecules. Even one can argue
that these two models could coexist in either simultaneous or successive neuronal
actions. The selection of any model will depend on which is the experimental
data that have to be explained.
The fundamentals of this paper are, on one hand, the insertion of Neurology
in the dialectic between the experimental sciences and Theology, and on the
other hand, the analysis of mental actions from the perspective of Quantum
Physics. The bases of thought in the assertions of this paper should be found in
establishing correlations between the mental conscious actions of the human
self and determined states generated in the complex neuronal system. But it is
difficult to explain the will and the spirit of self-improvement implemented in
the human consciousness. These human virtues are inspired and induced by the
spiritual impulse of the human soul whose existence can only be justified by the
transcendent existence of the Prime Creator and do not seem likely to be
predetermined by any brain state, neither quantic nor classic. However, we look
for correlations of the mental actions produced by the consciousness with
phenomenology occurred in the brain. Another important point established in
this work is the dynamics of the brain, which can not be explained by means of
the deterministic laws of Classical Physics. Moreover, there are sufficient reasons
and certain experimental data that give support to fact that the coherence of
some many-body states within the tubulin system is the main cause and better
representation of these mental actions. The analysis and discovery of the
correlations between the different coherent states and mental functions as well
as the representation in the brain of the exterior signals will allow a scientific
valuation of the interesting philosophical concept of the supervenience. The
teleological study of these correlations by means of general theories avoiding
the ad hoc simple models is the objective in Quantum Neurology, this being
my Physical research in progress. Probably, this task will be difficult to be
completed in all its terms, since some mental actions arising from no
algorithmically procedures can not be represented by known coherent states
and their analysis can depend on other, at the present time, unknown brain
phenomena. The challenge of the discovering of the methodology for these
situations can inspire fascinating issues which make worthwhile the spending
of efforts in their research. On the other hand, I want to express my personal
opinion that our human anthropology is dependent on the existence of the Great
Architect, but, in order to maintain the dialogue between Science and Theology,
the belief in this principle does not preclude our philosophical acceptance of
non theist principles and argumentations that explain the meaning of our own
nature.
F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE? 713
11. REFERENCES
PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS
AND TRANSCENDENCE
The physics of Roger Penrose and David Bohm
as regards a scientific explanation
of the human mind open to reality
MANUEL BJAR GALLEGO
Universidad Pontificia Comillas (CTR Chair), Madrid
ABSTRACT: The works of David Bohm and Roger Penrose per se represent a major contribution to the
study of physics and consciousness. It is not an easy task to engage in rigorous analysis of one of the
most profound philosophical-scientific problems; namely explaining the nature of consciousness. This
article explores the global vision that emerges from Bohm and Penroses approach to physics and
consciousness. It focuses on examining the way in which their respective physical-metaphysical proposals
can be bound together in a general model, thus shedding more light on the phenomenological characteristics
of consciousness. The philosophical consequences of this model are closer in many respects to the
experience of transcendence as described in religious works. What emerges is a unitary image of man in
the cosmos that harmonises notions of mind and matter, open to a transcendent connection between the
conscious subject and reality.
KEY WORDS: mind, determinism, emergentism, intuition, holism, microtubules, quantum gravity.
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tes, Kant, Hegel and Husserl. At the beginning of the twenty-first century
consciousness remains an enigma. From classical dualism of body-soul and
positive-materialist reductionism we now move towards a new paradigm that,
without becoming engulfed in an attempt to explain reality from fundamental
material bases, seeks to provide a scientific understanding of psychism within
a evolutionary and unitary framework in which structures, the morphology and
function of which are irreducible to the material properties of other physical
regimes, emerge, that is say emergentism.
As the physical properties of the quantum regime cannot be understood through
Classical-Mechanist epistemology, we maintain in this article that the phenomenon
of consciousness has proven a problem in the history of thought as the emergent
properties of the quantum regime of matter have been long relegated to the margins.
Roger Penrose and David Bohm are pioneers in the discussion of the physical
problem of consciousness. Their illuminating contributions open out ingenious
avenues of thought from which to approach the problem of consciousness by
adopting an epistemology that closely resembles emergentism in their in-depth
exploration of pyschophysical, global, unitary and coherent reality. This article
ends with a consideration of the transcendent dimension of man, in the light of
the Bohm-Penrose physical model of consciousness, which lends support to a
rational interpretation of religious phenomenon.
The physical study of matter makes way for biophysical analysis in biological
structures. Historically, consciousness has been seen as a problem as a scientific
approach to the phenomenon has not been discovered. We cannot take a sample
of consciousness, dye it and examine it using a microscope or on a microscope
slide. Nor can we give a full account of it by examining its constituent physical
particles in detail. Faced with these seemingly insurmountable difficulties,
dualists have opted to consider the nature of consciousness as a soul that is
essentially distinct from matter thereby initiating a strand of thought parallel
to that of material scientific thought. Such contributions can be evaluated from
the standpoint of rationality, logic and internal coherence but they can never be
assessed scientifically, as they have positioned themselves in an epistemology
outside scientific praxis. Science can provide alternative explanations but it
cannot refute dualist affirmations, as they are based on a spiritual principle that
is orthogonal to material empiricism.
A scientific approach to the study of consciousness does not necessarily require
a physical reduction ab initio of consciousness to particles and fundamental
interactions, as physical science per se understands that the fundamental element
depends on the energy level involved. Consciousness is manifested at a psychic
level, in which the collective dynamics of a group of biophysical systems capable
of functioning psychically is the most important element. Breaking down this
psychic architecture in biophysical systems and then into physical constituents
does not provide us with any clues about the nature and functioning of
consciousness. The dualists would argue that a reductionist dissection of this kind
neglects the fundamental psychic principle. In order words such approach would
fail to discover the matter of consciousness. In the same way that life cannot be
broken down to amino acids as vital elements, consciousness cannot be reduced
to a basic material element of consciousness. Scientific research into consciousness
requires accepting the emergent nature of the properties of matter. Physical matter
is capable of organising itself until the properties of the living matter emerge and,
at a higher cooperation level, produce the emergent psychic properties manifest
in higher animals. Matter produces consciousness as a result of global cooperation,
which cannot be explained from an exacerbated corpuscular atomism. Indeed, it
would not be a scientific option if these emergent properties of matter were not
supported by phenomenological approaches.
The phenomenon of consciousness is manifested in living beings endowed
with a complex psychic system, stemming from the biophysical development of
matter. Conscious states are produced by a psychic subject with a living material
body, which is sufficiently well organised and evolved to feel, perceive and
interpret reality. In other words, a material organism that feels the energetic
pressure of the physical environment. Focusing on this physical side of the
phenomenology of consciousness implies testing the rational hypotheses followed
in order to explain what is observed, pursuant to scientific laws, and proposing
an explanatory model based on existing scientific theories. For this purpose, we
describe below the physical phenomenology of consciousness outlined by Bohm
and Penrose, highlighting several psychophysical correlations guiding physical
1
Cf. R. PENROSE, The Emperors New Mind (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989).
2
Cf. R. PENROSE, Shadows of the Mind (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994).
3
Cf. D. BOHM, The Undivided Universe (London, Routledge, 1993).
a system based on environmental conditions. Akin to all local theory, its equations
pre-dict the future evolution of the Universe and retro-dict the past based on
explicit environmental conditions. No distinction is drawn between the past and
the future because there is no temporal flow. Everything is in a vast space of
phases that describes every possible physical condition of matter, that is, the
combination of all physical events. This phase space is a structure that lacks
dynamism. It does not grow or alter. It is always the same, without a temporal
arrow. So, how can consciousness of time be explained in a geometric structure
without temporal flow? Consciousness requires a physical support for the
asymmetric experience of time.
ii) Classical-quantum transition and the conscious observer. Alongside
Relativity, the Quantum Field Theory is one of the mainstays of modern physics.
Relativity is the theory of time and gravity whereas Quantum Theory describes
the other physical interactions that govern the microcosm: electromagnetism,
strong and weak nuclear force. Despite the descriptive force of these two theories
they are incompatible and there appears to be no way of uniting them. At present,
no theory of gravity exists that integrates quantum effects: gravity and quantum
theories are still irreconcilable. This is a lacuna on the border between classical
gravity and quantum theories; that is to say, no quantum gravity theory has been
developed yet to explain how the classical-quantum transition occurs between
the indetermination of quantum field systems and classical realization of ordinary
conscious experience.
In phenomenological terms, consciousness is manifest in living beings with
an appropriate psychism, which are part of the physical world halfway up the
scale between the quantum microcosm and macrocosm dominated by gravitatory
interaction. Psychic experience is found in animals with an evolved nervous
system governed by a brain, capable of perceiving the physical pressure of the
environment and of producing mental images in psychophysical correspondence.
This psychophysical connectivity is displayed in the correlations between psychic
states and physical states. Psychic conditions have repercussions on the
biophysical conditions, a state of stress causes stomach pains, and vice versa,
tooth ache conditions the state of mind. This phenomenological evidence leads
to the existence of interdependency between psychic and physical elements.
The study of the mind should not be separated from the study of physics. The
problem of the mind involves explaining why physics does not explain the mental
reality if it is manifested as an intrinsic property of the physical world. Determinist
laws of Classical Mechanics describe the physical regime of ordinary experience.
Newtonian mechanics, which is so powerful in determining the future behaviour
of gravitatory systems, has not borne fruit in its attempt to solve the problem of
the mind. Its determinist epistemology collides headlong with the phenomenological
indeterminism characteristic of conscious experience. As there is psychophysical
evidence, neither classical nor quantum deterministic physics, cannot reach a
scientific resolution of the problem so Penrose adopts a heuristic view that permits
a new approach. The indetermination of the classical-quantum transition, the
phenomenon halfway between large and small elements) and the problem of
physics (a science with two irreconcilable pillars) are simply part of the same
basic problem: the physical explanation of the mind on the threshold of the
micro and the macrocosm. Penrose starts the aforementioned study with the
hope of resolving the psychophysical problem from a complete theory of gravity
that unitarily explains the universe: macroscopic or microscopic, physical or
psychic. This theory would necessarily solve both problems. The difficulties in
developing quantum gravity, a physical theory with temporal asymmetry or a
physical explanation of the mind halfway between the large and the small, are
inherent in approaching the same basic problem sectorially. The problems of
physics and the problem of the mind constitute the same basic question, requiring
advances in physics and neuroscience in order for them to achieve fruitful
qualitative development.
In broad terms David Bohm agrees with the psychophysical problems posed
by Penrose in relation to the problem of consciousness: temporal experience,
conscious perception and the consciousness as a phenomenon on the threshold
of the macroscopic and the microscopic. While Penrose lays the stress on the
formal problems of physics in contrast to the phenomenon of the conscious, Bohm
concentrates on the underlying physical/metaphysical questions 4. Bohm is also
fully aware of the confrontation between Relativity and Quantum theory in the
spaces where their application as experimental physical theories is put under
strain. He highlights the head-on collision between relativist theory, which
represents a continuous, local and causal space-time order and quantum theory,
which establishes a discontinuous, non-local threshold without a causal explanation.
While Relativity establishes a leapless space-time fabric in which each object is
influenced exclusively by causes that act locally as disturbance at below the speed
of light speeds, Quantum Theory lacks a well-defined substrate that allows for the
existence of quantum leaps and remote instantaneous interactions that break with
the relativist localness. This purely physical problem is translated into a
psychophysical problem linking technical issues of physics with the psychic
experience of the conscious subject. The following psychophysical problem can
be traced in the works of Bohm 5.
i) Conscious perception and relativist space-time. The sum total of
perceptions of reality does not lead to the existence of blocks of matter, which
are individually separated and independent; rather to a profound reality that is
unique and continuous, in which a variety of individual objects emerge, ordered
in their totality. In his book The Special Theory of Relativity 6, Bohm includes an
4
Cf. D. BOHM, Wholeness and the Implicate Order (London, Routledge, 1980).
5
Cf. L. NICHOL (ed.), The Essential David Bohm (London, Routledge, 2002).
6
Cf. D. BOHM, The Special Theory of Relativity (London, Routledge, 1965).
7
Cf. D. BOHM, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (London, Routledge, 1957).
8
Cf. P. R. HOLLAND, The quantum theory of motion: an account of the Broglie-Bohm causal
interpretation of quantum mechanics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993).
9
Cf. D. BOHM, A suggested interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of hidden
variables, Physical Review, 85 (1952), 166-180.
unitary image of reality, and of the observable physical world in general, contrast
sharply with the dynamic nature of the energetic quantum content as described
in physics. How does classical stability emerge from such a chaotic quantum
order? How is the stability of the conscious perception possible in underlying
quantum dynamism?
This question led Bohm to explore in greater depth the study of the physical/
metaphysical properties of subquantum ontology. According to Bohm the essential
foundation of nature is its unceasing activity. Every motion and everything is
created through motion: matter, life and psychism (sensations, perceptions,
thoughts etc.). Nothing of a material nature can exist outside this creative activity
called holomovement: the movement of the whole. As a consequence, life and
psychism are not explained through abstractions of the whole. The multiple explicit
manifestations of matter simply represent the different outcomes of unfolding a
single implicate order that is infinitely connected. In Bohms holistic framework,
the implicate order, which is essentially dynamic, is a metaphysical substratum
that enables us to explain coherently the psychophysical unity based on the
movement of the whole. The physical world remains in direct relation with the
movement of the underlying universal order. Physical objects are structures arising
in the implicate order, which are dissolved again in the same. In this holistic
framework, things are merely abstractions of an indivisible whole; the essence of
which is movement. If consciousness emerges from this whole as the total sum of
physical phenomena, then it must draw on the quantum ontology that sustains
reality and submit itself to processes of classical realization that stabilise
perceptions, in accordance with the stability of the macroscopic physical order.
10
Cf. S. R. HAMEROFF and R. PENROSE, Orchestrated Reduction of Quantum Coherence
in Brain Microtubules: A Model for Consciousness, in S. R. HAMEROFF, A. W. KASNIAK and A. C.
SCOTT (eds.), Toward a science of consciousness I, 507-542, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1996.
11
S. R. HAMEROFF, Ultimate Computing. Biomolecular Consciousness and NanoTechnology,
Tucson, Personal edition, 2003.
12
Cf. J. TUSZYNSKI (ed.), The emerging physics of consciousness (Springer-Verlag, Berlin,
Heildelberg, 2006).
13
Cf. R. PENROSE, Gravity and state vector reduction, in R. PENROSE and C. J. ISHAM (eds.),
Quantum Concepts in Space and Time, New York, Oxford University Press.
microtubules means that the physical information from the environment can
be processed until the realization of a neuronal engram correlated with
phenomenological psychic experience. This quantum-classical transition between
the preconscious and conscious state is mediated by the MAPs, which originate
an objective reduction orchestrated from gravitational disturbance. The brain
therefore operates in a quantum and unconscious way most of the time until
the MAPs induce a process of decoherence when quantum uncertainty has been
resolved. Then the brain can produce a psychic image of the reality it perceives
physically.
14
Cf. M. BJAR, Conciencia, creatividad y libertad: sobre la naturaleza creativa libre de
la conciencia en la correspondencia entre David Bohm y Charles Biederman, Pensamiento
(in press).
15
Cf. D. BOHM and B. J. HILEY, The undivided universe (London, Routledge, 1993).
coherence would be resolved, in order words, those that resonate with greatest
intensity, in line with the main characteristics of the conscious state: unity and
coherence.
Thus, for instance, in visual perception, the super quantum potential energy
that operates in the electromagnetic field establishes the relative position of the
MAPs from certain microtubules, which begins to generate compatible states of
quantum macro-coherence. The resulting quantum coherence wave, constituted
by microtubules distributed throughout the body, reaches a maximum level of
coherence and saturates: psychism cannot generate a more coherent quantum
state due to its psychobiophysical limitations, and it initiates the decoherence
phase induced by the MAPs until it forms the classical conscious state. Psychism
is ordered according the quantum information received from the environment.
It organises itself to receive directly the encoded information in the light received
from the wholeness of the physical environment and consequently produces a
conscious holographic image.
If ordinary conscious perceptions per se are sufficiently complex to merit
lengthy explanations in existing models, insights add extra speculative content.
However, they also have a place in the BPH model. They can be explained in the
BPH models as direct input from the informational reality at ordering levels well
above standard levels, which spurs psychism to seek a wave with a high degree
of quantum coherence. In the intuition or insight the action of the external
energetic-informative block is so intense that the marred psychic control forces
pre-established by thought become negligible. As a consequence, psychism does
not saturate as easily. The previous schemes of thought remain dysfunctional
and psychism is forced to seek psychic coherence faced with the intensely coherent
reality that imposes itself. The MAPs, still constrained by biophysical limitations,
are freed from psychic impositions and perform their function with greater
faithfulness to external reality.
To a large extent, Bohms conscious direct perception requires energy of
maximum order whose light constructs the conscious reflex image in psychism.
The action of the cosmic mind over psychism would operate directly on the
microtubules, independently from the MAPs, and transmit their coherence
directly on the microtubules binding them in a non-local connection. The non-
local connection system of microtubules would represent the explained reality
closest to the implicate dimension of maximum coherence. In the final analysis,
the decoherence of the MAPs must take place in order for the subject to be
conscious of the cosmic experience. The MAPs, then, represent the essential
psychic element that grants individuality to the conscious subject and
differentiates it from the rest of the whole. Without the objective reduction
orchestrated by the MAPs the subject would be subsumed in the cosmic mind
and reduced to a quantum cellular automaton of ordinary perception.
Consciousness, therefore, represents the holistic, unitary and coherent image,
which emerges after the quantum processing of the direct dump of external
information on psychism.
4. CONCLUSION
with the cosmic mind, the closest to identification with the essential cosmic
content that creates, unfolds and rebinds. The image offered to us by a scientific-
philosophical reflection of an emergentist nature, shows consciousness as a
window wide open to the essential content of reality. For man the universe is a
conscious physical system, in which he is capable of questioning its raison dtre
and playing an active role in rebinding himself with the essence thereof.
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QU ES LA VIDA?
1
OANA IFTIME, Life sciences, apophatism and Bioethics, en European Journal of Scien-
ce and Theology, 2, 2006, pp. 21-46.
2
Citado por NGEL MARTN MUNICIO, Discurso inaugural del Ao Acadmico 1980-1981,
Ciencia y Aristobiologa, Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Fsicas y Naturales, Madrid, 1980,
p. 23. Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus (4 de febrero de 1776-16 de febrero de 1837) naci en
Bremen (Alemania). Estudi medicina en Gttingen, donde se doctor en 1796; en 1802 publi-
ca el libro Biologie oder Philosophie der lebenden Natur, por lo que es considerado, junto con
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, uno de los primeros en acuar el trmino Biologa.
3
TIENNE GILSON, De Aristteles a Darwin, y vuelta. Ensayo sobre algunas cuestiones de la
Biofilosofa, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1976. Un tercio de los tratados conocidos como el Corpus
aristotelicum son escritos sobre Biologa: Sobre el alma, De la generacin y corrupcin, De las
partes de los animales y la Historia de los animales. Cf. ALFREDO MARCOS, Aristteles y otros ani-
males. Una lectura filosfica de la Biologa aristotlica, PPU, Barcelona, 1996.
4
Pueden verse algunas definiciones de la vida en la obra de GIOVANNI BLANDINO, S.J., Pro-
blemas y Teoras sobre la Naturaleza de la Vida, Editorial Razn y Fe, Madrid, 1964, pp. 42-43.
5
EDWIN SCHRDINGER, Qu es la vida?, Tusquets, Barcelona, 1983.
6
SAN AGUSTN, Confessiones, Libro XI, Cap. XIV: Quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me
quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio: Qu es el tiempo? Si nadie me lo pregunta,
lo s; si quisiera explicarlo al que me pregunta, no lo s.
fatismo 7 del que nos habla Oana Iftime es inherente a la condicin del ser vivo;
este es el punto en el que la vida escapa a la ciencia 8.
A lo largo de la historia del pensamiento muchos filsofos y hombres de cien-
cia han intentado darnos un atisbo de respuesta 9 a esta pregunta: Qu es la
vida?, puesto que como seres vivos, nos inquieta la pregunta; al fin, la respuesta
es parte del concete a ti mismo 10. Sin embargo, podemos afirmar que a pesar
de los innumerables descubrimientos de la Biologa Molecular en la segunda
mitad del siglo XX y comienzos del siglo XXI; a pesar de que conocemos el cdi-
go gentico universal en el que est cifrada la herencia; a pesar de que conoce-
mos el genoma de muchas especies de microorganismos, vegetales y animales,
e incluso del hombre; a pesar de que tenemos muchas certezas que nos dan las
ciencias experimentales de la vida, son muchas ms nuestras aporas, ignoran-
cias e incertidumbres sobre aquello que constituye la vida. El concepto ser vivien-
te pasa por la propia experiencia. Todos tenemos experiencia de lo que es estar
vivo y de la no vida, la muerte. Todos sabemos distinguir entre una escultura y
un ser humano vivo que nos mira con sus ojos brillantes, entre el len de bron-
ce que custodia la entrada del Congreso de los Diputados y el viejo len que dor-
mita o juega en el zoolgico.
Durante mis largos aos de dedicacin a la enseanza y a la investigacin he
procurado, en la medida de mis posibilidades, responderme a la pregunta sobre
la naturaleza de la vida, en aquella parcela (la Enzimologa) que era objeto de
mi dedicacin diaria en la docencia, el trabajo experimental y la reflexin filo-
sfica. Un gran compaero y amigo, el Profesor Jos Antonio Lozano de la Uni-
versidad de Murcia, me pidi que prologara un manual de Bioqumica 11. Se me
invit a qu hiciera una reflexin sobre la naturaleza de la vida y cmo la Bio-
qumica y la Biologa Molecular pueden ayudarnos a comprender: Qu es la
vida?; recuerdo que en aquel tiempo intent en pocas palabras dar mi visin y
se me ocurri el siguiente cuento:
Haba una vez un violn que oy cantar a un ruiseor. El pajarillo produ-
ca registros inauditos para el violn: gorjeos, trinos, floreos agudos y alegres.
El violn tuvo envidia y quiso cantar como el ruiseor; al ver que no poda imi-
tarlo, le pregunt: T, de qu estas hecho?. El pajarillo le respondi: Y
7
Neologismo deducido por la autora del adjetivo apoftico; referido en Teologa a la
Teologa apoftica, como la va negativa para el conocimiento de Dios.
8
OANA IFTIME, op. cit. (nota 1). La vida es un concepto abstracto, difcil de definir, pero
de fcil comprensin, puesto que estamos en contacto muy directo con los seres vivos empe-
zando por nosotros mismos. JOS VLCHEZ, El don de la vida, Descle de Brouwer, Bilbao,
2007, p. 13.
9
Puede verse la obra clsica: E. M. RADL, Historia de las ideas biolgicas: I. Hasta el
siglo XIX, y II. Desde Lamarck y Cuvier, Introduccin de JOS MARA LPEZ PIERO, Alianza Uni-
versidad, Madrid, 1988.
10
Nosce te ipsum, MARCO TULIO CICERN, Tusculanes disputationes, 1, 52.
11
JOS ANTONIO LOZANO, J. D. GALINDO, J. C. GARCA-BORRN, J. H. MARTNEZ-LIARTE, R. PEA-
FIEL y F. SOLANO, Bioqumica para ciencias de la salud, Editorial Interamericana McGraw-Hill,
Madrid, 1995; IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, Prlogo, pp. XI-XIII.
t?. El violn, que haba tocado delante de reyes manejado por las manos ms
virtuosas de la poca, se molest por la insolencia del ruiseor y le respondi:
Yo estoy hecho de la ms fina haya alemana, mis cuerdas estn bien templa-
das, tengo sesenta y nueve piezas, y no hay dinero para pagar el arco que obtie-
ne mis notas timbradas y brillantes. El ruiseor sigui cantando, el da era
soleado y tena ganas de mostrar al viento primaveral que en un rincn del
bosque entre brezos y jarales se puede or el mejor concierto. El violn insis-
ti: Pero de qu ests hecho?. Entonces el ruiseor le contest: Yo tengo
el alma de la msica. Y comenz a volar.
Posiblemente los cuentos nos puedan sugerir mucho ms que una seria refle-
xin sobre las caractersticas fundamentales de los organismos vivos, compa-
rados con los que llamamos inanimados. Tambin aqu nos puede ser fcil pasar
del mito al logos. El ruiseor del cuento en qu se diferenciaba del Stradiva-
rius? Espontneamente responderamos: El ruiseor estaba vivo. Diramos
que el pajarillo en todas sus manifestaciones era un torrente de vitalidad y poda
cantar y volar por s mismo. Sin embargo, el violn necesitaba de unas manos
hbiles que fueran capaces de sacar de sus cuerdas las timbradas notas. Tam-
bin cuentan que cuando Miguel ngel termin de esculpir el Moiss, admira-
do de su propia obra, le tir el martillo y le dijo: Parla, cane. Sabemos que el
Moiss de Miguel ngel nunca habl y que el Stradivarius del cuento tampoco
pudo cantar por s mismo, como hizo el ruiseor a la vez que arranc el vuelo.
El ruiseor poda cantar, volar, picotear, aparearse, construir un nido, cuidar
de las cras y, tal vez, una pedrada de un chiquillo o un ave rapaz podra acabar
con su vida.
Quiz la diferencia ms fundamental entre los organismos vivos y lo no vivos
sea sta: los seres vivos reaccionan como una unidad, como un todo, como el
pajarillo que ech a volar. As pues, desde un punto de vista descriptivo, en pri-
mera aproximacin, podramos decir que un ser vivo, desde una bacteria, pasan-
do por todo el reino vegetal y animal hasta el hombre, se comporta: como una
unidad de estructuras y funciones jerrquicamente integradas en todas sus mani-
festaciones, tendiendo siempre a conservar su estructura.
Ahora bien, para tener un discurso coherente que nos describa todas las mani-
festaciones que observamos en los organismos vivos necesitamos delimitar una
serie de categoras, que conformen un nuevo paradigma de comprensin en una
nueva racionalidad; racionalidad que llamaremos sistmica evolutiva, contra-
puesta a la racionalidad lineal mecanicista, que ha servido a la ciencia de ins-
trumento para el conocimiento del Universo desde el siglo XVII 12. La racionali-
12
HENRYK SKOLIMOWSKI, Problemas de racionalidad en biologa, en Estudios sobre la
Filosofa de la Biologa, F. J. AYALA y T. DOBZHANSKY (eds.), Editorial Ariel, S.A., Mtodos, Bar-
celona, 1983, pp. 267-291.
13
EDGAR MORIN, La Mthode, I, La Nature de la Nature, ditions de Seuil, Paris, 1977, y
II, La vie de la Vie, ditions de Seuil, Paris, 1980.
14
IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, Las categoras del discurso biolgico, en Evolucionismo y
cultura, A. DOU (ed.), Biblioteca Fomento Social, Mensajero, Bilbao, 1983, pp. 17-55.
15
LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY, Teora general de los sistemas, Fondo de Cultura Econmica,
Mxico, Ediciones F. C. E. Espaa, Madrid, 1976, p. xvi.
16
IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, Ciencia y Post-utopa, en Despus de las utopas, A. DOU
(ed.), Publicaciones de la Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, 1993, pp. 17-52.
as una funcin nunca viene determinada por una estructura particular, sino
por el contexto de la organizacin y del medio en el que dicha estructura se
encuentra sumergida 17; el control jerrquico es una de las caractersticas esen-
ciales y diferenciales de las manifestaciones de la materia viviente.
Si volvemos al pajarillo del cuento, podemos decir que el ruiseor era un sis-
tema: toda su anatoma y todos sus rganos los podemos considerar como ele-
mentos estructurales y funcionales, jerrquicamente organizados para construir
ese todo: el pajarillo que proclamaba alegremente su territorio en un da pri-
maveral. Pero el mismo pjaro y su canto no pueden entenderse sin otro siste-
ma, el de su pareja con la que intentaba nidificar y la pareja tampoco podemos
comprenderla sino dentro del ecosistema del bosque y el bosque lo debemos
considerar dentro del ecosistema general, el planeta Tierra. La organizacin
jerrquica de los conjuntos sistmicos implica que pueden considerarse mlti-
ples niveles en la estructura de un sistema, de tal manera que el fenmeno obser-
vado depender de la escala de observacin a la que se le someta; es muy cita-
da la sentencia del fsico Charles Eugne Guye quien afirmaba: la escala crea
el fenmeno. De la misma manera, en el orden funcional pueden observarse
tambin mltiples niveles de organizacin. A este respecto nos dice Fritjof Capra:
En el marco mecanicista de la ciencia cartesiana hay estructuras fundamen-
tales y luego hay fuerzas y mecanismos a travs de los cuales estas interactan
dando lugar a procesos. En la ciencia sistmica cada estructura es vista como
la manifestacin de procesos subyacentes. El pensamiento sistmico siempre
es pensamiento procesual 18.
As en el mismo pajarillo del cuento podemos considerar diferentes niveles
de organizacin estructural: partculas subatmicas que forman tomos, to-
mos que se enlazan para formar biomolculas, macromolculas que se entrete-
jen para dar las estructuras celulares, como membranas y otros orgnulos que
constituyen una clula, clulas que forman los tejidos y rganos que se entrela-
zan dinmicamente tanto en la estructura como en la funcionalidad de donde
resulta ese todo, el pajarillo que canta, picotea, y vuela por s mismo. Tambin
el violn del cuento, en s mismo, es un sistema estructurado y organizado en
sus piezas pero por una finalidad externa a s mismo que le impuso el luthier y
adems nunca pudo cantar por s mismo; el violn no estaba no vivo, le faltaba
esa respuesta integral, creadora y juguetona que tan descaradamente manifes-
taba el pajarillo. El violn era una parte que, junto con la friccin del arco y los
giles dedos comandados por el cerebro del violinista, podra forma una unidad
jerrquica superior y entonces cantar un solo en una sala de concierto, pero en
17
Sobre la jerarquizacin en los sistemas puede verse: H. H. PATTEE, El problema de la
jerarqua Biolgica, en C. H. WADDINGTON y OTROS, Hacia una Biologa terica, Alianza Uni-
versidad, Madrid, 1976, pp. 531-555.
18
FRITJOF CAPRA, La trama de la vida. Una nueva perspectiva de los sistemas vivos, Edito-
rial Anagrama, Coleccin Argumentos, Barcelona, 1998, p. 62. Puede verse tambin: MICHEL
WEBER, La vie de la nature selon le dernier Whitehead, en Les tudes Philosophiques, n. 3,
2006, pp. 395-408.
EL PENSAMIENTO PROCESUAL
19
ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD, Modos de pensamiento, Taller de ediciones Josefina Betancor,
Madrid, 1973, p. 104.
20
Ibidem, p. 104.
21
Ibidem, p. 105.
Los filsofos que parten del primer verso nos dieron la metafsica de la subs-
tancia, y los que parten del segundo desarrollan la metafsica del fluir 23. El
telogo Hans Kng nos ha hecho caer en la cuenta de la similitud de la ontolo-
ga procesual de Whitehead y de la metafsica de fondo que subyace al pensa-
miento de Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Hans Kng, en su libro Existe Dios? afir-
ma: como Teilhard en Teologa, Whitehead se preocupa en Filosofa por
mantener estrecha conexin con el pensamiento de las ciencias naturales moder-
nas. Tambin l entiende la naturaleza entera como un proceso gigantesco en el
que un nmero infinito de unidades mnimas () entra en activa relacin con
otras, y todas ellas se desarrollan juntas en pequeos procesos igualmente infi-
nitos en nmero 24. El jesuita francs habla de una metafsica del unire 25, como
22
Ibidem, p. 115.
23
ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD, Proceso y realidad, Editorial Losada, Buenos Aires, traduccin
de J. Rovira Armengol, 1956, pp. 284-285. El texto ingls del poema citado por Whitehead es:
Abide with me; Fast falls the eventide, citado por ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD, Process and Reality.
An essay in Cosmology, Cambridge at the University Press, Cambridge, 1929, p. 296. Ver el
siguiente texto de Guillermo Armengol: Sin embargo, un fluir de eventos microfsicos cons-
titua y daba cierta estabilidad en el tiempo a los objetos macrofsicos, aunque tambin abier-
tos en su interior a la evolucin y transformacin continua. Para Whitehead era evidente que
la fsica de comienzos del siglo XX describa un mundo que flua por eventos inestables, que
se relacionaban entre s por prehensiones fsicas para constituir entidades actuales, como socie-
dades de eventos organizados, que se transformaban dinmicamente en un proceso continuo
[Whitehead y la imagen de Dios desde la Ciencia. Alfred North Whitehead y la filosofa del
proceso, en Pensamiento, vol. 63, n. 238 (Serie especial, n. 1), 2007, pp. 801-806].
24
H. KNG, Existe Dios? Respuesta al Problema de Dios en nuestro tiempo, Ediciones Cris-
tiandad, Madrid, 1979, pp. 249-250; la cursiva es nuestra.
25
Sustituyamos, por ejemplo, una Metafsica del Esse por una Metafsica del Unire
Qu ocurre entonces? En la Metafsica del Esse el Acto puro, una vez planteado, agota todo
lo que hay de absoluto y necesario en el Ser; y ya no hay nada que justifique, hgase lo que se
haga, la existencia del ser participado. Por el contrario, en una Metafsica de la Unin, es con-
cebible, que supuesta la realizacin de la unidad divina inmanente, sea an posible un grado
de unificacin absoluta. PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, Como yo creo, Taurus Ediciones, Madrid,
1970, p. 196.
26
JOSEPH A. BRACKEN, S.J., Christianity and Process Thought. Spirituality for a changing
world, Templeton Foundation Press, Philadelphia, 2006, p. xviii.
27
Process Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/process-philosophy
28
FRITJOF CAPRA, op. cit. (nota 18), p. 63.
29
Modification of a paradigm, entrevista a PHILIP CLAYTON por MATT DONELLI, en Scien-
ce and Theology News, March 2006, pp. 21-22. JEFFREY GOLDSTEIN, La idea de emergencia, en
www.galatel.webcindario.com/index.htm
PHILIP CLAYTON en su libro Mind and emergence: from quantum to consciousness (Oxford
University Press, 2004) desarrolla un argumento complejo y polifactico para una visin del
mundo basada en la llamada emergencia fuerte: sistemas nuevos y complejos pueden llegar
a la existencia con sus propias estructuras, leyes y mecanismos causales. Clayton admite que
este concepto de emergencia supone cuatro elementos: monismo ontolgico, la emergencia
de nuevas propiedades, la irreductibilidad de lo emergente a niveles ms bajos y a interac-
ciones y, por ltimo, la influencia causal del todo sobre las partes. TAEDE A. SMEDES, Review
of Mind and Emergence, en Ars disputandi, vol. 5, 2005. No admitira personalmente el monis-
mo ontolgico, puede concebirse un emergentismo no monista.
30
JOHN H. HAUGHT, Is Nature enough? Meaning and Truth in the Age of Science, Cambrid-
ge University Press, 2006, pp. 77-97.
31
JOHN POLKINGHORNE, Explorar la realidad. La interrelacin ciencia y religin, Editorial Sal
Terrae, Presencia Teolgica, Santander, 2007, p. 28.
geno. Las propiedades de una protena no son sin ms deducibles de las pro-
piedades conocidas de los aminocidos que las constituyen. Se cumple siempre
que el todo es ms que la suma de las partes. En los seres que llamamos vivos
las propiedades de la clula, como unidad viviente no son deducibles de las carac-
tersticas de las biomolculas de que estn compuestas; igualmente, las propie-
dades de los organismos pluricelulares no son deducibles de las propiedades de
las clulas de que estn constituidos. Las propiedades del todo no estn deter-
minadas por las propiedades de las partes. En biologa y bioqumica, la emer-
gencia cubre los dominios desde los tomos hasta los organismos. Algunos de
los grandes periodos de la historia natural pueden describir niveles de emer-
gencia: la aparicin de la vida, la aparicin de la experiencia sensorial, de la con-
ciencia y de la reflexin moral 32. Podramos decir que las propiedades de un
ecosistema estn siempre referidas al conjunto de todos los elementos estruc-
turales y funcionales que lo componen, pero no al anlisis de cada uno de ellos.
A este propsito F. Capra nos dice:
El gran shock para la ciencia del siglo XXI ha sido la constatacin de que
los sistemas no pueden ser comprendidos desde el anlisis. Las propiedades de
las partculas no son propiedades intrnsecas, sino que slo pueden ser com-
prendidas en el contexto de un conjunto mayor. En consecuencia, la relacin
entre las partes y el todo ha quedado invertida. En el planteamiento sistmico
las propiedades de las partes slo pueden comprenderse desde la organizacin
del conjunto, por lo tanto, el pensamiento sistmico no se encuentra en los com-
ponentes bsicos, sino en los principios esenciales de organizacin. El pensa-
miento sistmico es contextual, en contrapartida con el analtico. Anlisis sig-
nifica aislar algo para estudiarlo y comprenderlo, mientras que el pensamiento
sistmico encuadra este algo dentro de un contexto todo superior 33.
32
HAROLD MOROWITZ, In defense of emergence. Emergence is quickly becoming a strong
alternative to reductionism, en Science and Theology News, July/August, 2006, p. 6.
33
FRITJOF CAPRA, La trama de la vida. Una nueva perspectiva de los sistemas vivos, op. cit.
(nota 18), p. 49.
funciones que no dependen de la historia del sistema, es decir, del camino por
el que se ha alcanzado un estado determinado del sistema, sino de las variables
del sistema; estas funciones de estado son la energa, la energa libre, la ental-
pa y la entropa. La Termodinmica clsica se refiere siempre a sistemas ais-
lados en los que no hay intercambio de materia, energa o informacin con el
medio.
El ser vivo, en cambio, se nos presenta como un sistema abierto en continuo
intercambio de materia, energa e informacin con el medio en el cual se desa-
rrolla. No sucede meramente, afirma Hans Jonas, que la conservacin del sis-
tema se lleve a cabo en su actividad, sino que depende de esta ltima. La acti-
vidad consiste en conservarse mediante la renovacin de los estados de equilibrio
a los que la dependencia del entorno no permite que duren largo tiempo, por
tanto la conservacin como continua elaboracin, es el contenido del funciona-
miento del sistema, y con ello el sentido de su existencia 34. La energa puede
ser intercambiada bien en forma de calor (Qi), bien en forma de energa radian-
te (hv) bien en forma de trabajo (Wi), mecnico, elctrico, etc. Supongamos una
levadura que fermenta glucosa a anhdrido carbnico (CO2) y etanol; desde el
punto de vista termodinmico, no es fcil estudiar el conjunto de las reaccio-
nes, a no ser que operemos con cajas negras y encerremos dentro de un bloque
todas las reacciones que van desde un mol de glucosa a dos moles de anhdrido
carbnico y dos moles de etanol 35.
Ante la continua llegada de materia, energa e informacin, el organismo vivo
reacciona como un todo. As, el universo est constituido por redes dinmicas
de procesos interrelacionados en el que ninguna de las propiedades de ningu-
na parte de la red es fundamental; todas se derivan de las propiedades de las
dems partes y la consistencia total de las interrelaciones determina la estruc-
tura de la red 36. El intercambio de materia, energa e informacin de un orga-
nismo vivo con su medio constituye el metabolismo. El pajarillo del cuento es
un sistema abierto; picoteaba granos de semillas con los que se alimentaba, dige-
ra los granos, asimilaba sus componentes bioqumicos esenciales, reciba la
energa radiante del sol primaveral, consuma energa al volar y sus pequeos
msculos pectorales convertan la energa qumica ligada a la molcula de ade-
nosn trifosfato (ATP) en el grcil movimiento de sus alas. Su canto era una seal
informativa que lanzaba al medio proclamando su territorio, y l, a su vez, oa
el canto de otros congneres que avisaban de su presencia.
Desde el punto de vista qumico podemos distinguir dos tipos esenciales de
reacciones que tienen lugar dentro de las clulas: las reacciones anablicas, por
las que la clula construye a partir de sillares elementales las biomolculas y son
reacciones generalmente reductoras; por otra parte, las reacciones catablicas
o reacciones degradativas son reacciones oxidativas y la clula aprovecha la
34
HANS JONAS, El principio Vida, Hacia una biologa filosfica, Editorial Trotta, Madrid,
2000, p. 104.
35
IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, Enzimologa, Ediciones Pirmide, Madrid, 2001, pp. 26-39.
36
FRITJOF CAPRA, op. cit. (nota 18), p. 59.
37
La entropa se denota por el smbolo S (de shift, cambio en ingls).
38
E. M. RADL, Historia de las ideas biolgicas. II, Desde Lamarck y Cuvier, op. cit. (nota 9),
pp. 66-70. Puede verse: A. ALBARRACN TEULN, La teora celular. Historia de un paradigma, Alian-
za Editorial, Madrid, 1983.
39
P. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, El fenmeno humano, Taurus Ediciones, Madrid, 1971, p. 99.
40
La moderna Biologa Celular fundida con la Biologa Molecular y Bioinformtica, dis-
ciplinas que Teilhard no pudo conocer, encenderan el entusiasmo innato de Teilhard de Char-
din.
41
BRUCE ALBERTS, DENNIS BARY, JULIAN LEWIS, MARTIN RAFF, KEITH ROBERTS y JAMES D. WAT-
SON, Molecular Biology of the cell, 3. ed., Garland Publishing Inc., New York-London, 1994,
pp. 863-910.
42
HANS JONAS, El principio vida, op. cit. (nota 34), p. 18.
43
JOS FERRATER MORA, Diccionario de Filosofa, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1981; Entra-
da sentido, Tomo IV, p. 2992. JOS GMEZ CAFFARENA, Semntica del trmino sentido, en
Papeles del Seminario: Racionalidad cientfica y conviccin creyente, Instituto Fe y Seculari-
dad, Memoria Acadmica 1979-1980, A. G. Luis Prez, Madrid, 1980, pp. 71-81.
44
MICHEL WEBER, La vie de la nature selon le dernier Whitehead, op. cit. (nota 18).
turas de todos los sistemas presentes en el universo por esta propiedad que lla-
maremos teleonoma 45. La finalidad, teleologa interna de los organismos vivos,
podemos verla en los varios niveles de organizacin. Aparece un tlos en las
estructuras macromoleculares, en los ajustes finos de la conformacin espacial
de una protena, en las interacciones de los complejos macromoleculares: pro-
tena-protena y protena-lpidos, en los mosaicos lpido-proteicos que forman
las membranas, en las interacciones de protenas con los cidos nucleicos. Hay,
as mismo, un tlos en la estructura y funcionalidad de una clula, en las inte-
racciones celulares que constituyen un organismo pluricelular, en el desarrollo
epigentico a partir del cigoto, en la organognesis y funcionamiento de los rga-
nos, en el comportamiento de los organismos, como el canto del pajarillo pro-
clamando el territorio e invitando a la hembra a la anidacin, en la construc-
cin del nido y en la interdependencia de los componentes (seres vivos y medio)
de un ecosistema. El mismo Jacques Monod en su citada obra El azar y la nece-
sidad afirma:
1. Los organismos vivos son seres dotados de un proyecto que representan
en sus estructuras y lo llevan a cabo en sus actuaciones.
2. Esta propiedad a la que Monod llama teleonoma, y no teleologa, los
distingue de todos los otros seres presentes en el universo.
3. La teleonoma es condicin necesaria pero no suficiente, puesto que no
propone criterios objetivos para distinguir a los seres vivos de otros arte-
factos producidos por la actividad del hombre.
Franois Jacob, que comparti con Monod el Premio Nobel en su obra Lgi-
ca de lo viviente, afirma que es necesario perder el pudor de que habla Monod 46:
ya hace tiempo que el bilogo se ve enfrentado a la teleologa como una mujer
de la que no puede prescindir, pero con la que no quiere ser visto en pblico. El
concepto de programa da ahora el estatuto legal a esta relacin oculta 47. El por-
qu algunos bilogos han huido del trmino finalidad o teleologa, puede enten-
derse por el predominio casi exclusivo en la ciencia de la racionalidad fsica,
que monopolizaba para s el carcter de cientfico, y sobre todo por el temor de
que, tras la explicaciones teleolgicas, pudieran entrar en el discurso cientfico
elementos ajenos a la construccin de la ciencia 48.
45
JACQUES MONOD, Le hasard et la ncessit. Essai sur la philosophie naturelle de la biolo-
gie moderne, ditions du Seuil, Paris, 1964, p. 25; IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, Azar, finalidad y
trascendencia: una visin post-monodiana de la vida, en Descifrar la vida. Ensayos de Histo-
ria de la Biologa, J. CASADESS (ed.), Universidad de Sevilla, 1994, pp. 337-352.
46
JACQUES MONOD, La teleonoma es la palabra que puede utilizarse, si, por cierto reca-
to, se quiere evitar hablar de finalidad. No obstante todo sucede como si los seres vivos estu-
viesen estructurados, organizados y condicionados de cara un fin: la supervivencia del indi-
viduo y sobre todo de la especie, en Leccin inaugural (viernes, 3 de noviembre de 1967),
Cuadernos Anagrama, n. 40, pp. 10-43.
47
FRANOIS JACOB, La lgica de lo viviente. Una historia de la herencia, Editorial Laia, Bar-
celona, 1973, p. 17.
48
HENRYK SKOLIMOWSKI, Problemas de racionalidad en biologa, op. cit. (nota 12).
Francisco Jos Ayala ha insistido a lo largo de toda su obra, cmo las expli-
caciones teleolgicas constituyen la distincin ms fundamental entre la racio-
nalidad fsica y la racionalidad biolgica 50. Para Ayala hay tres fenmenos para
los cuales sera legtima la explicacin teleolgica:
1. Cuando un estado final es anticipado por un agente.
2. Los mecanismos autorreguladores por los que un sistema abierto man-
tiene una propiedad a pesar de las fluctuaciones del medio.
3. Las estructuras anatmicas y fisiolgicas designadas para cumplimen-
tar una funcin.
49
ERNEST NAGEL, La estructura de la Ciencia. Problemas de la lgica de la investigacin cien-
tfica, Paidos Studio Bsico, Barcelona, 1981, pp. 365-403.
50
La obra de Francisco Jos Ayala ha sido ampliamente estudiada por DIEGO CANO ESPI-
NOSA en su Tesis Doctoral: Epistemologa del discurso biolgico de Francisco J. Ayala, Departa-
mento de Filosofa, Facultad de Filosofa y Letras, Universidad de Mlaga, 2002. Del mismo
autor, Autonoma y no reduccionismo de la Biologa en el pensamiento biofilosfico de Fran-
cisco Jos Ayala, en Pensamiento (en prensa). Pueden consultarse las siguientes obras de
FRANCISCO JOS AYALA: Teleological explanations in evolutionary Biology, en Philosophy of
Science, 37, 1970, pp. 1-15; Biology as an autonomous Science, en American Scientist, 56,
1968, pp. 207-221; Comments on Methodology in the Physical, Biological and Social Scien-
ces, en Global Systems Dynamics, E. O. ATTINGER (ed.), S. Skarger, Basel, 1970, pp. 28-33.
Puede consultarse tambin: IGNACIO DE CASTRO, La teleologa: polisemia de un trmino, en
La mediacin de la Filosofa en la construccin de la Biotica, FRANCESC ABEL y CAMINO CAN
(eds.), Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, 1993, pp. 27-39.
que le era profundamente grato escuchar lo dicho por Asa Gray sobre la teleo-
loga, y que era Gray el hombre ms indicado para darse cuenta 51. La ausencia
de finalidad o teleologa no se limita a la teleologa interna (teleologa instru-
mental o funcional o teleonoma) 52, sino que tambin en el puro darwinismo se
niega desde la ciencia toda posibilidad de una teleologa externa o teleologa
histrica que dara cuenta de los procesos selectivos generadores de sistemas
ms evolucionados.
A este respecto es muy interesante la correspondencia entre dos genetistas
famosos: Theodosius Dobzhansky y John Greene 53. Una vez ms se comprueba
que las posturas ante el problema del progreso evolutivo y del sentido de la evo-
lucin dependen mayormente de la sensibilidad, convicciones previas y opcio-
nes personales, que de argumentos racionales. Uno de los problemas que se plan-
te ms agudamente en la correspondencia entre los dos amigos fue el problema
del uso de concepciones finalistas o de la teleologa en los escritos evolucionis-
tas. Greene como buen positivista confesaba que estaba desconcertado, pas-
mado y perturbado (baffled, astounded and perturbed) por el vocabulario usado
por Dobzhansky. De hecho Dobzhansky usaba trminos como fin, ensayo y error,
creatividad y mejora (purpose, trials and errors, creativity e improvement), car-
gados de una fuerte connotacin finalista, puesto que algunos procesos evolu-
tivos suponen la aparicin de algo nuevo lo que hemos llamado emergencia; en
segundo lugar, tienen una coherencia interna ya que mantienen y hacen avan-
zar la vida y finalmente pueden, de hecho, tener como resultado un xito o un
fracaso. A lo largo de la correspondencia se puede comprobar que el desacuer-
do es fruto de dos sensibilidades: desde una mentalidad positivista se comprende
la postura de John Greene, desde los presupuesto de otra racionalidad, la racio-
nalidad biolgica, se comprende la postura de Dobzhansky.
El pajarillo del cuento ejecutaba acciones que van encaminadas a un fin y
aunque las juzguemos con una fuerte carga antropolgica ya deca Teilhard
que no tenemos otro punto de mira que el hombre 54, no podemos dudar que
el canto proclamando un territorio tiene una finalidad, la de buscar pareja para
anidar. La construccin de un nido es una actividad teleolgica: prev de algu-
51
Citado por TIENNE GILSON, De Aristteles a Darwin, y vuelta, op. cit. (nota 3), p. 195.
52
ALFREDO MARCOS, Teleologa y Teleonoma en las ciencias de la vida, en Dilogo Filo-
sfico, 11, 1992, 42-57. Pittendrigh us el trmino teleonoma por vez primera en 1958, como
una reaccin a la polisemia del trmino teleologa, segn sus palabras: parece desafortuna-
do resucitar el trmino teleologa y creo que se ha abusado de l.
53
Correspondencia de JOHN GRRENE y THEODOSIUS DOBZHANZKY, publicada en Biology and
Philosophy, 11, 1196, n. 4, pp. 445-491. Puede verse IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, Evolucin y
sentido en la correspondencia de Theodosius Dobzhansky, en La nueva alianza de
las Ciencias y la Filosofa, A. BLANCH (ed.), Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, 2001,
pp. 109-114.
54
En primer lugar y de una manera subjetiva, resultamos ser inevitablemente centro de
perspectiva en relacin con nosotros mismos. () Quiralo o no, desde ese momento el Hom-
bre vuelve a encontrarse a s mismo y se contempla en todo lo que observa. PIERRE TEILHARD
DE CHARDIN, El fenmeno humano, op. cit. (nota 39), pp. 43-44.
55
RAFAEL GIRALDO, 50 aos del descubrimiento de la doble hlice del DNA, en Razn y
Fe, 248, n. 1259-1260, 2003, pp. 185-195. Tres artculos de la revista Nature podemos decir que
fueron el punto de arranque de la nueva revolucin: J. D. WATSON y F. H. C. CRICK, A structu-
re for deoxyribonucleic acid, en Nature, 171, 1953, pp. 737-738; M. H. F. WILKINS et al., Mole-
cular structure of deoxypentose nucleic acids, en Nature, 171, 1953, pp. 738-740; R. E. FRAN-
KLIN y R. G. GOSLING, Molecular configuration in sodium thymonucleate, en Nature, 171, 1953,
pp. 740-741. Pueden encontrarse copias facsmiles de los tres artculos en Nature, 421, 2003,
pp. 397-401. Sobre el genoma humano puede consultarse: IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, Anlisis
antropolgico del Proyecto Genoma Humano, en Genes y Mquinas. Aspectos ticos y socia-
les de las Biotecnologas de la informacin, ANTONIO DIGUEZ y JOS M. ATENCIA (coods.), Uni-
versidad de Mlaga, Thema, 2006, pp. 229-276.
56
MARGARITA SALAS, Historia de la Biosntesis de Protenas, en Historia de la Bioqumi-
ca, Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Fsicas y Naturales, Madrid, 1985, pp. 143-155; J. D.
WATSON y J. TOOZE, The DNA story, A documentary history of gene cloning, Freeman and Com-
pany, San Francisco, 1981; JUAN-RAMN LACADENA CALERO, Historia nobelada de la Gentica:
concepto y mtodo, Instituto de Espaa, Real Academia de Farmacia, Madrid, 1995.
57
En primera aproximacin nos referimos al genoma como: Conjunto de los genes de
un individuo o de una especie, contenido en un juego haploide de cromosomas, en Diccio-
nario de la Lengua Espaola, Real Academia Espaola, 22. ed. IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, Refle-
xiones ticas en torno a la Declaracin Universal sobre el Genoma Humano, en La Moral cris-
tiana como propuesta, F. J. ALARCOS (ed.), San Pablo, Madrid, 2004, pp. 477- 510; El Proyecto
Genoma Humano, discurso bioqumico y discurso antropolgico, en La Fe interpelada, Jor-
nadas de Estudio y Dilogo entre Profesores Universitarios, El Paular, 2-5 de junio de 1992,
Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, 1993, pp. 29-48.
vea la luz la secuencia completa de las bases adenina (A), timina (T), guanina
(G) y citosina (C) del genoma humano con una fiabilidad de ms del 99,9%.
Como ha escrito recientemente Francis Collins la era genmica es ahora una
realidad y ha comenzado una revolucin en la investigacin biolgica 58.En
Septiembre del ao 2005 la revista Nature publicaba el primer borrador de la
secuencia del genoma del chimpanc (Pan troglodytes), el primate ms cercano
evolutivamente a Homo sapiens 59. El trmino genoma significa en general: el
conjunto de la informacin gentica de un organismo. El trmino genoma fue
originariamente usado para referirse al conjunto haploide de cromosomas en
un organismo eucariota, ms el pequeo cromosoma mitocondrial. Tal como
se ha venido usando el trmino genoma desde el comienzo del Proyecto Geno-
ma Humano se refiere tanto: 1) al mapa fsico de la localizacin de los genes en
los cromosomas; 2) como a la secuencia completa de pares de bases del DNA;
recordemos que el DNA es una doble cadena y que las bases adenina y timina
se emparejan mediante dos puentes de hidrgeno (A = T) y las bases guanina y
citosina se emparejan mediante tres puentes de hidrgeno (G C). Es decir, el
genoma debe ser entendido en su doble aspecto, como material gentico y como
informacin gentica y conjunto de genes que constituyen una especie biolgica
determinada como puede ser el Homo sapiens 60. Estaran de acuerdo todos los
bilogos moleculares en definir funcionalmente un gen como un segmento de
DNA que contiene informacin biolgica y que, por tanto, codifica para la sn-
tesis de los diferentes tipos de RNA y/o una cadena polipeptdica. Esta defini-
cin muy usada hoy da tiene el peligro de dejar fuera de la definicin de gen
las secuencias de DNA cuya funcin no es codificar para la sntesis de RNAs o
protenas, sino de servir de reguladores de la transcripcin del DNA, como son
los segmentos del DNA antecedentes al inicio de un gen a los que se une la enzi-
ma RNA polimerasa para iniciar la transcripcin.
Sabemos que el genoma humano est compuesto por unos 3.200 millones de
pares de nucletidos y que consta aproximadamente de 25.000 genes en el sen-
tido de marcos abiertos de lectura (ORF) o secuencias delimitadas por un codn
de iniciacin y un codn de terminacin. Podemos preguntarnos qu parte del
genoma corresponde a genes estructurales con informacin, y qu parte del geno-
ma corresponde a secuencias relacionadas con genes. Las secuencias con infor-
macin de los genes estructurales representan aproximadamente 48 Mpb, es
decir, el 1,5% de todo el genoma. Las secuencias relacionadas con genes repre-
sentan el 36% de todo el genoma con una extensin de 1152 Mpb. El resto del
genoma 2000 Mpb (62,5%) es conocido como DNA intragnico 61. No conocemos
58
FRANCIS S. COLLINS, ERIC D. GREEN, ALAN E. GUTTMACHER y MARK S. GUYER, A vision for
the future of genomic research, Nature, 422, 2003, pp. 835-847.
59
The chimpanzee sequencing and analysis Consortium, Initial sequence of the chim-
panzee genome and comparison with the human genome, Nature, 437, 2005, pp. 69-87.
60
A. D. SMITH y otros (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 260.
61
T. A. BROWN, Genomes, 2. ed., John Wiley and Sons Inc., New York, 2002, p. 23.
cul sea la funcin fisiolgica de esta gran cantidad de DNA, cerca de dos tercios
a los que no se les ve, por ahora, que contengan ninguna misin en el genoma o
en el desarrollo del organismo. Puede ser que esta porcin notable del genoma
tenga una funcin tan sutil que al presente se nos escape.
Podemos, pues, referirnos al genoma de un ser vivo y, por tanto, del hombre
como el fundamento de corporeidad, en el sentido de que en el genoma est con-
tenida toda la informacin de lo que ha de ser este determinado organismo a lo
largo de su desarrollo epigentico. El genoma diploide se establece en la unin
de los dos proncleos, el masculino y el femenino en la formacin del cigoto
durante el proceso de fecundacin que ms adelante se describir. La constitu-
cin del nuevo genoma por la unin de los dos genomas haploides, materno y
paterno, es, pues, condicin necesaria para la constitucin del nuevo individuo.
Puede, pues, afirmarse que el nuevo programa se constituye en el proceso de la
fecundacin. En los organismos pluricelulares todas las clulas que van for-
mando el nuevo individuo en su desarrollo ontogentico contienen el mismo
programa escrito en la secuencias de bases de los cidos desoxirribonucleicos
(DNA). La implementacin del programa a lo largo del desarrollo tiene lugar
mediante la respuesta de las capacidades contenidas en el genoma a las seales
recibidas en el entorno del organismo que se est desarrollando. No podemos
olvidar que una de las caractersticas del organismo vivo es la de responder como
un todo al conjunto de seales recibidas que pueden ser iones, nutrientes, cam-
bios energticos del entorno e informacin tanto qumica (accin de una hor-
mona en un receptor de membrana), como fsica (respuesta a una radiacin,
como puede ser la luz solar); esta respuesta del genoma a las interacciones
ambientales constituye el desarrollo epigentico que estudiaremos a continua-
cin. Aunque cada clula del organismo adulto contiene todo el genoma, sin
embargo ese genoma est programado para expresarse como un tipo celular
determinado y no son capaces estas clulas programadas de desarrollar un indi-
viduo completo; las clulas del organismo han perdido la totipotencia. Encon-
tramos la totipotencia solamente en las clulas de los meristemos de las plan-
tas, blastmeros de los mamferos (clulas de las primeras divisiones celulares
en los embriones de los mamferos) y en el cigoto, la clula totipotente por anto-
nomasia. As pues, aunque el genoma es condicin necesaria para el desarrollo
de un nuevo organismo, no es condicin suficiente, necesita desplegarse en el
proceso de desarrollo epigentico.
Sin embargo, podemos afirmar, con las salvedades arriba sealadas, que
cuando un nuevo genoma es constituido en la singamia, como es el caso del
cigoto, nos encontramos con un nuevo individuo de la especie biolgica a estu-
diar que se ir desarrollando epigenticamente, como sistema abierto, en el con-
tinuo intercambio de materia, energa e informacin. Si comparamos al geno-
ma con un programa informtico diramos que el programa debe implementarse
en el tiempo para desplegar todo el contenido del programa; igualmente si com-
paramos el genoma con la partitura de una sinfona, diramos que para or la
sinfona es imprescindible la interpretacin instrumental de la partitura.
LA EPIGNESIS
62
C. H. WADDINGTON, Las ideas bsicas de la Biologa, en C. D. WADDINGTON y otros,
Hacia una Biologa terica, op. cit. (nota 17), p. 27.
63
GIOVANNI BLANDINO, S.J., Problemas y Teoras sobre la Naturaleza de la Vida, op. cit.
(nota 4), pp. 33-36. Puede verse: E. M. RADL, Historias de las Ideas Biolgicas, op. cit. (nota 9),
tomo I, pp. 241-249. Puede consultarse: CHRISTIAN KUMMER, Philosophie der organischen Ent-
wicklung, Kon-Wissenchaften in Philosophischer Perspektive Texte 2, Verlag W. Kohlham-
mer Gmbh, Stuttgart Berlin Kln, 1996.
El desarrollo epigentico se lleva a cabo, pues, por interaccin del DNA con
el medio en respuesta a las seales recibidas, seales autocrinas, paracrinas,
endocrinas y ectocrinas. Toda interaccin de los genes con el entorno deter-
mina el fenotipo. Segn Waddington, desacreditado durante cuarenta aos, este
trmino reencuentra un vivo inters y evoluciona. En filosofa de la Biologa
designa toda variabilidad estructural del sistema (por tanto, de complejidad) feno-
tpica, sin variacin del genoma. La Biologa molecular lo limita a las variacio-
nes heredables reversibles de la expresin gnica sin mutaciones en la secuen-
cia del DNA 64. La epignesis representa, por tanto, el proceso mediante el cual
el organismo se va adaptando a su entorno y expresando su programa a partir
de sus propias capacidades 65. Las reglas que gobiernan la regulacin fisiolgi-
ca y celular, y los niveles ms elevados de organizacin no residen en el geno-
ma sino en las redes interactivas epigenticas que organizan las respuestas gen-
micas a las seales del medio a lo largo del desarrollo 66.
La complejidad biolgica, ese tercer abismo de la complejidad del que habla-
ba Teilhard de Chardin 67, depende menos del nmero de genes y mucho ms de
cmo esos genes se expresan a lo largo del desarrollo debido a los mecanismos
epigenticos. Como ejemplo de lo que acabamos de decir est el hecho de nues-
tra diferenciacin con los primates superiores. Muy recientemente se ha termi-
nado de secuenciar el genoma del chimpanc. Dentro de los segmentos codifi-
cantes de DNA para protenas las diferencias con el genoma humano son
aproximadamente de 1,06%. Como afirma T. A. Brown: esto es solamente parte
del problema, porque muchas de las diferencias claves yacen en los cambios suti-
les en los patrones de expresin gnica que estn implicados en el proceso de
desarrollo y en la especificacin e interconexiones dentro del sistema nervioso 68.
As, pues, los estudios en epigentica nos estn revelando otro nivel de informa-
cin gentica en el interior de los cromosomas mucho ms maleable que la infor-
macin lineal contenida en la secuencia de bases del DNA. En efecto, la infor-
macin del DNA no consiste en un texto lineal esttico, sino que por el contrario
es una compleja mquina bioqumica que opera en un espacio tridimensional y
consta de distintos elementos dinmicos que interaccionan entre s 69. Hoy da
64
PHILIPPE DALLEUR, Fcondit de la notion bord des formes vivantes chez Thom, en
Revue Philosophique de Louven, 104 (2), 2006, pp. 312-346.
65
MIKHAIL SPIVAKOV y AMANDA G. FISHER, Epigenetic signatures of stem-cell identity, en
Nature reviews Genetics, 8, 2007, pp. 263-271.
66
RICHARD STROHMAN, Epigenesis: The missing Beat in Biotechnology?, en Biotechno-
logy, 12, 1994, pp. 156-163.
67
PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, El grupo zoolgico humano, Taurus, 5. ed., Madrid, 1967,
p. 37.
68
T. A. BROWN, Genomes, op. cit. (nota 61), p. 480; IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, La Biofiloso-
fa de Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, en Pensamiento, vol. 61, n. 230, 2005, pp. 231-252; Teilhard
de Chardin: el hombre de Ciencia y el hombre de Fe, Cuadernos de Fe y Cultura, Universidad Ibe-
roamerica, Iteso, Mxico, 2006.
69
W. WAYT GIBBS, El nacimiento de la epigentica, en Investigacin y Ciencia, abril
2004, pp. 17-23.
conocemos tambin que adems de la informacin del DNA que da lugar a pro-
tenas, hay un segundo plano de informacin en el DNA que se transcribe en RNA
activos que alteran el comportamiento de los genes codificadores lo que ha veni-
do en llamarse el genoma oculto 70; el DNA redundante que antao se desech por
ignorarse su funcin, podra convertirse en el fundamento de la complejidad
humana. Por otra parte, conocemos tambin que el silenciamiento de algunos
genes es de capital importancia para explicar los cambios fenotpicos que se dan
a lo largo del desarrollo en hermanos gemelos monocigticos.
Los dos mecanismos bioqumicos mejor conocidos para explicar la epigne-
sis son: en primer lugar, la metilacin de citosinas en el DNA de las clulas ger-
minales 71 y en el embrin temprano; y, en segundo lugar, en la acetilacin 72 o
metilacin 73 de las histonas (H2A, H2B, H3 y H4), protenas que junto con el
DNA forman los nucleosomas que componen los cromosomas. De esta manera
la epignesis guarda mayor relacin con la historia del individuo, la ontogne-
sis, que con la historia de la especie, la filognesis.
As, pues, la construccin de un ser vivo es un proceso dinmico de auto-
construccin, que no tiene un determinismo fijista o preformista 74. La infor-
macin no est fijada de antemano. En efecto, la informacin no est prede-
terminada en la secuencia de nucletidos del genoma heredado de los progenitores,
al modo como est fijada de antemano, por ejemplo en los planos de la cons-
truccin de un edificio. Las configuraciones de los materiales no son estables, ni
estticas sino activas porque contienen informacin gentica, esta se amplifica,
se retroalimenta y se regula 75. La informacin se implementa a lo largo de la
ontognesis.
Recientemente el profesor Diego Gracia ha defendido la llamada informa-
cin extragentica. Refirindose al proceso que va desde la informacin geno-
tpica a la informacin fenotpica, afirma: Es un proceso complejo en el que
intervienen distintas informaciones, unas genticas, pero otras claramente extra-
genticas. Cuando las ltimas no hacen acto de presencia, el fenotipo se altera,
70
W. WAYT GIBBS, El genoma oculto, en Investigacin y Ciencia, enero 2004, pp. 7-13.
71
PETER L. JONES, GERT C. JAN VEENSTRA y PAUL A. WADE et al., Methylated DNA and MeCP2
recruit histone deacytylase to repress transcription, en Nature Genetics, 19, 1998, pp. 187-
191; EN LI, The mojo of methylation, en Nature Genetics, 23, 1999, 5-6.
72
J. BLAND, About Gender: Epigenesis, 2003; http://www.gender,org.uk/abou/38aepgen.htm.
MARA ELENA TORRES PADILLA, ANDREW J. BANNISTER, PAUL J. BURD, TONY KOUZARIDES y MAGDALENA
ZERNICKA-GOETZ, Dynamic distribution of the replacement histone H3.3 in the mouse oocyte
and preimplantation embryos, en International Journal of Developmental Biology, 50, 2006,
pp. 451-461.
73
KATHERINE L. ARNEY, SIQIN BAO, ANDREW J. BANNISTER, TONY KOUZARIDES y AZIM SURANI,
Histone methylation defines epigenitic asymmetry in the mouse zygote, en International
Journal of Developmental Biology, 46, 2002, pp. 317-320.
74
NATALIA LPEZ MORATALLA y MARA J. IRABURU ELIZALDE, Los quince primeros das de una
vida humana, EUNSA, Pamplona, 2004, p. 42.
75
NATALIA LPEZ MORATALLA, Indeterminacin biolgica y alma humana, en Sobre el
alma, ALFONSO PREZ LABORDA (ed.), Facultad de Teologa San Dmaso, Collectanea Matriten-
sia, Madrid, 2005, pp. 119-162.
76
DIEGO GRACIA, Como arqueros al blanco. Estudios de biotica, edicin de Jos Lzaro,
Triacastela, Madrid, 2004, pp. 370-371. Del mismo autor, El estatuto de las clulas madre
embrionarias, en Gen-tica, CARLOS ALONSO y FEDERICO MAYOR (coords.), Editorial Ariel, Bar-
celona, 2003, pp. 67-93.
77
Ibidem, p. 374.
78
Las confusiones en este tema, por otra parte tan delicado, son difciles de deshacer si
no se desmonta primero la equivocacin de percibir el comienzo de la fecundacin como si
fuera una chistera de prestidigitador, de la que, poco a poco sale todo cuando estaba oculta-
mente encerrado all antes. JUAN MASI CLAVEL, S.J., Tertulias de biotica. Manejar la vida, cui-
dar de las personas, Sal Terrae, Santander, 2005, p. 115.
VIVIR ES EVOLUCIONAR
Hemos visto que todo viviente debe ser considerado como un proceso. El ser
vivo, como todo proceso, no puede ser definido atemporalmente. El viviente lo
definimos desde el tiempo y depender de la escala de observacin del tiempo
que utilicemos la consideracin total del proceso concreto. Consecuentemente
depender de la ventana temporal que apliquemos al ser vivo, el que veamos
nicamente su reactividad inmediata a los estmulos, al que llamaremos tiem-
po metablico. La consideracin del devenir del organismo desde su comienzo
hasta su fin nos definir su tiempo ontogentico. Si consideramos poblaciones
79
NATALIA LPEZ MORATALLA y MARA J. IRABURU ELIZALDE, Los quince primeros das de una
vida humana, op. cit. (nota 74), p. 43.
80
NATALIA LPEZ MORATALLA, Indeterminacin biolgica y alma humana, op. cit. (nota 75),
p. 145.
81
Sobre las escalas temporales en Biologa puede consultarse: C. H. WADDINGTON, La natu-
raleza de la vida, Editorial Norte y Sur, La Aventura de la Ciencia, Madrid, 1963, pp. 36-37.
Sobre las teoras evolutivas puede verse: MIGUEL DE RENZI, El neodarwinismo y las crticas
impuestas a su reduccionismo radical por la paleontologa y la Biologa del desarrollo, en
Evolucionismo y Cultura, op. cit. (nota 14), p. 80. ALFREDO MARCOS, Sobre el concepto de espe-
cie en Biologa, en La mediacin de la Filosofa en la construccin de la Biotica, op. cit.
(nota 50), pp. 41-60.
82
Citado por NATALIA LPEZ MORATALLA, La dinmica de la evolucin humana. Ms con
menos, EUNSA, Pamplona, 2007, p. 52.
83
Un ao antes de abandonar su puesto en el Economist, Spencer comenz a publicar
unos Principios de Psicologa, posteriormente incorporados a su sistema, en los que, con ante-
rioridad a la formulacin por Darwin de su doctrina de la seleccin natural (1859), concibi
la idea de una interpretacin general de la realidad a base del principio de evolucin. JOS
FERRATER MORA, Diccionario de Filosofa, tomo IV, op. cit. (nota 43), p. 3107.
84
TIENNE GILSON, De Aristteles a Darwin, y vuelta, op. cit. (nota 3), p.117.
85
Ibidem, p. 122.
trico son hechos nicos y, por tanto, irrepetibles, aunque nadie duda de que
ambos acontecimientos tuvieron lugar. Son verdades cuyo estatuto epistemo-
lgico es diferente a las verdades de la Fsica. Los vestigios de la civilizacin
romana nos hablan de la historia del Imperio. Los relatos de la batalla de las
Navas de Tolosa narrados por los protagonistas de la misma, las huellas arque-
olgicas encontradas en el lugar de la batalla, nos confirman el hecho que tuvo
lugar el 16 de julio de 1212 entre los ejrcitos cristianos y los almohades capi-
taneados por Miramamoln. Igualmente, las huellas fsiles, pertenecientes a
organismos que vivieron en el pasado, nos permiten construir la historia filo-
gentica de los organismos actuales. Pero es ms, las tcnicas modernas de
secuenciacin de los genomas y protenas de los seres vivos actuales, permiten
ver las homologas, diferencias y puntos de divergencia, a escala molecular, de
los organismos vivos y reconstruir desde este corte sincrnico la diacrona del
proceso evolutivo.
La evolucin es, pues, un hecho histrico; todo est en continuo cambio y
devenir. Otro aspecto, muy distinto, es considerar las diversas teoras que en la
actualidad nos explican cmo ha podido acontecer el hecho evolutivo. Para res-
ponder a la segunda cuestin: cmo ha tenido lugar el hecho evolutivo?, se han
propuestos varias teoras. Lamarckismo y darwinismo aparecen como dos gran-
des conjuntos de explicacin. Lamarck crey en la herencia de los caracteres
adquiridos. Teora no confirmada por la experiencia. Darwin acudi a la criba
de la seleccin natural de las variedades, a semejanza de la seleccin artificial
tan en boga entre los horticultores centroeuropeos del siglo XIX. Darwin no cono-
ci la obra de Gregorio Mendel, por lo tanto le falt el apoyo conceptual de la
gentica para explicar las variaciones encontradas en los seres vivos. El neo-
darwinismo conserva el concepto de seleccin natural como mecanismo cerni-
dor o criba de todas las posibles mutaciones al azar. El neodarwinismo ha sido
capaz de sintetizar el hecho evolutivo y la gentica como ciencia explicativa de
la herencia.
Hans Jonas en la Introduccin a su libro El principio vida sintetiza una serie
de caractersticas que para l describen lo que es la vida:
Entregada a s misma y en completa dependencia de su propio rendi-
miento, para cuya prestacin est sin embargo en manos de condiciones que
no puede controlar y que se le pueden negar; dependiente por tanto del favor
o disfavor de la realidad externa; expuesta al mundo, contra el cual y simult-
neamente a travs del cual tiene que ir afirmndose; independizada de la cau-
salidad del mundo a la vez que sometida a ella; habiendo salido de la identi-
dad de la materia y necesitada de ella; libre, pero dependiente, aislada, si bien
precisada de contacto; buscando el contacto, amenazada de destruccin por
l, y no menos amenazada por la carencia del mismo; puesta en peligro por
todos los lados, tanto por el poder, como por la fragilidad del mundo, y situa-
da en la ms floja de las cuerdas entre uno y otro riesgo; fcilmente perturba-
ble en su proceso, que sin embargo no debe detenerse nunca; vulnerable en su
reparto organizado de funciones, que slo es eficaz en su totalidad; en su cen-
tro mortalmente atacable y en su temporalidad expuesta en cualquier instan-
te al final; as es cmo la forma viva lleva su atrevida existencia particular en
86
HANS JONAS, El principio vida, op. cit. (nota 34), p. 18.
ABSTRACT: New concepts as ambiguity, promiscuity and plasticity have allowed getting a deeper insight
in the mechanism of the Darwinian process implied in the molecular evolution of enzymes. Directed
evolution in the laboratory collapses the time scale for evolution from millions of years to months or even
weeks due that the key processes: mutations, recombination, screening or selection are carefully controlled
by the experimenter. In order to get a more meaningful vision a more enlarged scientific background is
presented. The philosophical reflections focus on the increasing information in the evolution process,
which goes beyond the dualism matter-spirit, and on the successive emergences. Finally some ethical
and theological reflections are proposed.
KEY WORDS: darwinian process, enzyme promiscuity, molecular evolution, information, emergence,
biotechnology, creation, intelligent design.
1. INTRODUCTION
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can be found in the survival of paper documents or ancient ships for long periods
under water, which can be explained by the fact that the glycosidic bonds of
cellulose are very resistant to hydrolysis in the absence of cellulases that catalyse
their hydrolysis [1].
The enzymes are proteins, which are very complex macromolecules. From a
structural point of view, four levels of complexity can be distinguished: primary,
secondary, tertiary and quaternary structures. The primary structure describes
the sequence in which amino acids have joined together to form the polypeptide.
For instance, with twenty natural amino acids, in a small protein with 100 amino
acids there are 20100 possibilities, which mean an astronomical amount. Only
few sequences have been used by nature. Hydrogen bonds between different
parts of the peptide chain backbone determine the secondary structure, -helices
and -sheets being the most important three-dimensional conformations. Tertiary
structure describes the way in which the secondary structure is packed to form
regions of defined three-dimensional shape. Finally, these subunits may associate
in a more complex system. It is the quaternary structure. The folding of a protein
plays an important role in its functional behaviour. It must be emphasized that
it is not straightforward to deduce the three dimensional structure of the protein
from the knowledge of its sequence of amino acids. In fact, this goal has been
only reached in proteins with a small number of amino acid residues. There are
so many local minima in the energy conformation space that prevent to reach
the global one.
Moreover, it would be even more difficult to relate the structure of the protein
and the function. Optimizing the enzymatic function is a much more subtle
problem, since mutations of residues in the active centre, that presumably could
improve the efficiency of the enzyme, can decrease the stability of the full protein.
Enzymes have evolved under selective pressure to both maintain the stability of
the overall structure and the biochemical function. Two opposed trends, on one
hand enzymes fold into compact structures; on the other hand they must also
be active to catalyze chemical reactions. The active site of an enzyme is highly
strained because is designed to develop favourable interactions with the transition
state of the catalyzed reactions. This strain diminishes the stability of the global
structure of the enzyme and thus a trade-off between stability and function can
be established [2].
Enzymes must be of the adequate shape in order to exhibit specificity:
they must be able to recognize and bind the correct substrate. However, an
enzymes structure must also be flexible in order to reach a complementary
shape of a particular substrate and of its transformations. Furthermore, for
an efficient catalysis the dynamic of the protein must be coupled to the dynamic
of the reaction. Overall, they push the reactants to reactive conformations and
stabilize preferentially the transition state [3]. One can to state that enzymes
are more efficient machines than any machine designed by man. A feeling of
admiration fulfils the researcher and, if he is a believer of a creator God, of
adoration.
2. ENZYME EVOLVABILITY
vestige of its progenitor which are likely to have existed for many millions of years.
Interestingly, no naturally occurring substrate has been identified for PTE [9].
All these previous examples of promiscuity illustrate the enzyme evolvability,
which means that enzymes are not dead ends but their efficiency can be enhanced
or new catalytic activities derived from existing enzymes. Enzymes exhibit a
remarkable evolutionary adaptability.
The enzymes favour, in a deterministic way, particular reactions inside a reaction
network. A new function means an increase of catalytic space and an increase of
complexity in the cell. It can be done in a chaotic form or in ordered one. As it has
been frequently emphasized the life is at the edge of chaos. Nevertheless, what it
is surprising in the self-organization of matter is to lead to stable systems able to
reproduce in heritance.
3. DARWINIAN PROCESSES
4. PROTEIN ENGINEERING
used directed evolution to generate molecules with novel properties starting from
natural enzymes. Evolution, normally applied to animals and plants, requires the
generation of variants and differential propagation of those with favourable features.
Biologists and chemists have recently begun to use evolutionary strategies to tailor
the properties of individual molecules instead of the whole organisms. Random
mutations or recombination, can, in many cases, be done efficiently, leading in
this way the molecular evolution in the laboratory. The successful variants can be
identified either by screening or by selection. While screening requires an active
search of all variants, selection is based on the exclusive survival of organisms
containing the desired variants of the protein mimicking the true Darwinian
evolution. This is an iterative process that requires, before starting new iterations
of the process, the favourable variants to be amplified by clonation. The challenge
is to collapse the time scale for evolution from millions of years to months or even
weeks. Evolution does not work towards any particular direction, nor is there a
goal; the underlying processes occur spontaneously during reproduction and
survival. In contrast, the laboratory evolution experiments often have a defined
goal, and the key processes (mutation, recombination, and screening or selection)
are carefully controlled by the experimenter. The general techniques of directed
evolution mimic natural evolution processes such as random mutagenesis and
sexual recombination [13]. Thus, new proteins with new desired functions can be
derived through mutations of few residues or recombining fragments swapped
between two parent sequences. In this last technique it is possible to explore distant
regions of sequence space, while this is not generally possible using random
mutations [14]. In both cases these techniques allow to engineer enzymes without
understanding them in great detail.
Another option is the rational design approach that consists in direct mutation
of residues on selected specific positions of proteins [15]. The selection of residues
to be mutated is deduced from X-ray diffraction structures of the complex between
the protein and a stable molecule (an inhibitor, a transition state analogue, a
Michaelis complex, an intermediate or a product). Moreover, information of the
molecular mechanism of the chemical reaction is required. Mutation of few amino
acids can render an important change in the active site of the enzyme, while
structure of the full protein remains almost invariant. As a consequence, significant
catalytic effects can be derived. However, the lack of knowledge on the relationship
between amino acid sequence, protein structure and function, together with the
extreme sensitivity of catalytic activity to seemingly modest structural perturbation,
make redesign of an enzyme in the laboratory so difficult. In this strategy, a
computational study of the catalytic function of the protein can provide the
information needed to design successful mutations directed to a particular
purpose [16, 17].
It is interesting to note that while rational design is usually focused on
mutations close to the active site, directed evolution are based on random
mutations that, most of the times, belong to regions of the protein far from the
active site. So, both strategies can be satisfactorily combined to get an improved
function. Once a gene with a new function at low level has been obtained by
rational design, it may be optimized by directed evolution.
The starting point in biological catalysts design not necessary must be a pre-
existing enzyme. In particular, almost three decades ago, immune-globulin
proteins have been used to produce Catalytic Antibodies [18]. Catalytic activity
has also been introduced sometime in inert protein scaffolds [19].
The first question to be addressed would be, what is the connexion between
molecular evolution of enzymes and human evolution? Molecular evolution of
enzymes is part of human evolution. In particular, it has been shown in this
chapter that Cytochrome P450 evolution allows the elimination of new therapeutic
drugs, mainly in human liver. Furthermore, in other cases evolution can take
place in bacteria, affecting human life. -lactamases evolution in pathogenic
bacteria explains the existence of antibiotic resistance, a serious clinical problem.
But the evolution of enzymes in bacteria has sometimes a beneficial impact, as
it happens with the apparition of a new enzyme; the phosphotriesterase (PTE).
Organophosphate triesters have been widely used as insecticides for the last 60
years. Although toxic to humans, bacteria have evolved ways of degrading these
compounds so that they do not accumulate in the environment.
Evolution is a well established scientific theory. As Dobzhansky pointed out
in 1973, nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution [20].
Natural selection is the key factor proposed by Darwin to explain the complex
organization and functionality of living beings [21]. Nevertheless, the mechanism
through which this job is carried out it is not clear at all. There is a big gap
between the microscopic mutations of genome and the macroscopic changes in
the phenotype. Molecular evolution of enzymes allows getting a deeper insight
in the mechanism through which mutations in genome can translate in new
enzymes. The promiscuous activity of some enzymes catalyzing secondary
reactions is the key concept. It has been suggested that this promiscuity provides
a raw starting point for the evolution of enzymes, as a new duplicated gene
presenting low activity would provide to start for adaptive evolution [4]. Some
neutral mutations with respect to the primary activity may increase the secondary
one, in such a way that the threshold for being improved under selective pressure
is reached. This property is known as plasticity. A last remark, promiscuity refers
exclusively to catalytic functions. Nevertheless, many enzymes have been found
to moonlight, it means to serve additional functions that are generally not
enzymatic, but rather structural or regulatory [22]. The active site of an enzyme
represents only a small part o its surface. Thus, there is ample opportunity to
use other parts of the protein for other functions, which may be optimized by a
similar mechanism.
too expensive for large-scale use in the countries where it is needed most. To reduce
the cost Keaslings group has used synthetic biology to engineer microorganisms
to produce artemisinin from renewable resources [28].
As it has been mentioned before, in the cell a complex network of interactions
and reactions goes on in an ordered way. This is only the starting point of
life evolution, being the emergence of sensibility in advanced organisms and
of intelligence in complex neuronal systems the main steps of this wonderful
process.
Gene modifications in order to get new enzymes are only examples of the
present biotechnology. The projects of artificial life, of organisms modified
genetically or of gene modifications in humans with therapeutic goals or other
purposes are also biotechnology activities, which arise at present exciting ethical
debates. As contribution to these debates I should like to do some personal
reflections. First of all, when one perturbs a complex system, one is never sure
of the results. It means that there is always some risk. Risk is part of the adventure
of life and the amount of tolerable risk in human action is function of the
conservative or progressive mentality of each person. Nevertheless, it must be
remarked that in the present growth of human population the most conservative
position may imply the most risky one. In a responsible attitude on the tolerable
risk, the first ethical duty is to increase the basic research in order to minimise
the surprises.
In the perspective of evolution theory, as the one adopted in the present paper,
the vision of a fixed nature is not compatible. The man as the arrows of the
evolution, in Hefners expression created co-creator [30], has the responsibility
to lead the process. Our task is to make God present in the world, by transforming
it. This engagement is not playing God but properly playing human. To see as
sacred every thing belongs to an ancient attitude far away from the present
scientific and technical one. Looking to gene modifications of the man genome,
a special responsible attitude is required, but if this patrimony for the following
generation may be improved, there is a duty to do it. Finally, if one is not an
expert in biotechnology problems, there is a prudent position to be careful taking
part in the ethical debate.
Creativity of life, of nature or of man, as pointed out in this chapter on the
molecular evolution of enzymes, suggests a central theological topic, a creator
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[18] E. KEINAN (ed.), Catalytic Antibodies, Wiley-VCH Verlag, Weinheim, 2005.
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[27] E. E. SZATHMARY, M. SANTOS and CH. FERNANDO, Top Curr. Chem. 259 (2005) 167-211.
[28] J. KIRBY, D. W. ROMANINI, E. M. PARADISE and J. D. KEASLING, FEBS Journal 275 (2008)
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[29] P. TEILHARD, Hymne de luniverse, ditions du Seuil, Paris, 1961.
[30] P. HEFNER, in Cosmos as creation: Theology and Science in consonance, ed. Ted
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[31] F. S. COLLINS, Cmo habla Dios?, Ediciones Temas de Hoy, S.A., Madrid, 2007.
[32] F. J. AYALA, Darwin y el diseo inteligente, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 2007.
RESUMEN: Continuamos presentando la trada de intuiciones valiosas para elaborar una teologa de
la creacin en evolucin [ver PENSAMIENTO, vol. 63 (2007), pp. 605-636]. Presentamos la intuicin
del bilogo y telogo catlico alemn Karl Schmitz-Moormann, publicada pstumamente en 1997. Ins-
pirado por Teilhard y su metafsica de la unin, introduce su concepto de uni-totalidad, y observa
tales uni-totalidades a lo largo del progreso evolutivo, desde las partculas subatmicas hasta las agru-
paciones humanas. Observa la diversidad de unin, explicada por interaccin nuclear o por amor inter-
personal. Ve por analoga nuestro Dios tri-uno como la Uni-totalidad suprema unida por amor, a la que
se acercan las uni-totalidades creadas, como autnticos vestigios trinitarios. Y en el centro de su
intuicin ve la creacin continua evolutiva como la respuesta a una llamada creadora, una llamada
del Creador tri-uno que invita a la nada (absoluta o relativa) a acercarse hacia su riqueza de ser, sin for-
zar a nadie, slo invitando a unirse a los elementos prximos de cada nivel. Esta accin, no imperati-
va, sino amorosa por la que est llegando a ser toda la creacin nos descubre un Creador que est
tambin realizndose en suprema unin amorosa, segn habra de describirse en una metafsica del
llegar-a-ser. La creacin progresiva de informacin acerca tambin a la omnisciencia divina, y la de la
libertad posibilita responder amorosamente a la invitacin de la llamada creadora. Ofrecemos los tex-
tos ms autnticos de Schmitz-Moormann e investigamos su origen. Esta intuicin sobre la llamada
creadora enriquece teolgicamente la de Karl Rahner sobre la accin trascendental que sostiene la
autotrascendencia activa, y ser ulteriormente enriquecida por la de Denis Edwards, que la ve como
accin propia del Espritu dentro de una ontologa relacional.
PALABRAS CLAVE: K. Schmitz-Moormann, P. Teilhard, metafsica de la unin, uni-totalidad, Uni-tota-
lidad suprema, metafsica del llegar-a-ser (gignontologa), llamada creadora, vestigios trinitarios, crea-
cin de informacin, creacin de libertad.
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1
La edicin alemana, SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1997a, est prologada en Cambridge Mass., a
19 de mayo de 1996, y la inglesa, SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1997b, en Princeton, a 27 de octubre de
1996. Falleca en Princeton el 30 de octubre de 1996.
2
SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 2005.
3
Citaremos los apartados en la forma n.m, siendo n el nmero del captulo de la edi-
cin espaola o inglesa, y m el nmero del apartado (que en la edicin inglesa no consta). En
la edicin alemana ese apartado corresponde al explcitamente numerado como n-1.m, ya que
en ella se ha suprimido el captulo introductorio.
4
SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1997a, p. 33.
anlogos a esos estadios previos entre los primates, tal como los descubre la
moderna etologa, entre los animales superiores e inferiores, hasta los unicelu-
lares eucariontes y las bacterias. Y va subrayando en todos ellos cmo se com-
portan frente a su mundo ambiente como unidades y totalidades centra-
das, por ms que el radio de accin en ese universo ambiente vaya reducindose
ms y ms en la medida que disminuye su horizonte de percepcin. Su visin
retrospectiva contina con las macromolculas que poseen tambin una uni-
dad estructural y actan en su reducido mundo ambiente, por ejemplo como
enzimas, y sigue con las simples molculas y tomos y partculas y quarks.
Todos ellos actan, al menos por contacto, con un radio de accin prctica-
mente nulo. Y concluye: Nuestra mirada retrospectiva nos ha hecho conocer
unidad y totalidad (Einheit und Ganzheit) como una caracterstica que ha
de adscribirse a todas las realidades que nos salen al encuentro en la historia de
la evolucin. Si bien esta caracterstica seala todo cuanto ha evolucionado, hay
sin embargo niveles cualitativamente diferenciables de uni-totalidad (Ein-
Ganzheit) 5. As introduce Schmitz-Moormann su neologismo uni-totalidad,
para designar con ms concisin esa caracterstica filosfica, que acaba de deno-
minar unidad y totalidad 6.
Este concepto de uni-totalidad es ampliamente aclarado en el 2.6: La
unificacin como caracterstica general del proceso evolutivo. Sigue en ella ese
proceso de unificacin en su orden cronolgico, a partir de la sopa inicial de
quarks y gluones. Explica en detalle cmo los quarks se unen para formar pro-
tones y neutrones. Neutrones y protones se unen para formar ncleos, que se
pueden unir a electrones para formar tomos. Los tomos se unen para formar
molculas sencillas, que se observan por todo el universo, y que a su vez se con-
vierten en elementos que formarn las macromolculas.
Subraya cmo en ese proceso se da verdadera emergencia de novedad: Por
ejemplo, la unin de dos tomos de hidrgeno y un tomo de oxgeno forma
una molcula de agua. A este nivel se hace evidente que la nueva entidad no
surge de una causa sus elementos que contena lo nuevo de una manera
oculta. Ms bien los elementos se unen para formar una entidad totalmente sin-
gular y nueva que no se encontraba contenida en los elementos. Los elementos
son ciertamente un requisito necesario (conditio sine qua non) para que emer-
ja la nueva realidad, pero ellos no la contienen. Lo ms aparece aqu surgiendo
de lo menos. Lo ms llega-a-ser en la unin. Y puesto que aqu se trata de obje-
tos bien observables, podemos entender aqu ms claramente el proceso del lle-
gar-a-ser como un proceso de unin 7.
5
Ibdem, p. 39.
6
Es lstima que en la versin inglesa, SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1997b, haya desaparecido total-
mente ese importante trmino filosfico, que es traducido all simplemente por unity o
union. La versin espaola SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 2005, recupera el trmino del texto alemn,
y lo traduce suavemente por totalidad unida (pp. 83ss).
7
Traducimos como llegar-a-ser el alemn werden (verbo no auxiliar o sustantivo),
que como veremos el propio Schmitz-Moormann nota con orgullo que en alemn es una pala-
bra simple.
Indica cmo en ese proceso de unin van apareciendo distintos tipos de liga-
dura estudiados por las ciencias, pero subraya que tales ligaduras tampoco expli-
can la riqueza de ser resultante de la unin: Se podra pensar que la unin de
elementos en nuevas unidades es del mismo tipo en los diferentes niveles de lle-
gar-a-ser, pero resulta que la ligadura entre los elementos puede ser de muy
diversos tipos. Los gluones, las fuerzas que ligan a los quarks en el protn y el
neutrn, se describen de un modo diferente a las fuerzas electromagnticas que
ligan los electrones al ncleo. Los tomos se ligan para formar nuevas unida-
des mediante fuerzas descritas generalmente como ligaduras inicas, covalen-
tes, o de puente de hidrgeno. Sin embargo, se ha de tener presente que la des-
cripcin cientfica del modo en que se ligan estos elementos no proporciona
ninguna explicacin definitiva de la unidad interna que se manifiesta en ellos.
La descripcin de las fuerzas de ligadura no explica la unidad ms de lo que los
tornillos y tuercas de una mquina explican la unidad de sta. Deben existir
medios de conexin como condicin necesaria para que se forme una uni-tota-
lidad; de lo contrario la nueva unidad podra ser considerada como un mila-
gro sobrenatural. Sin embargo, estas partes elementales y estas fuerzas no expli-
can la totalidad de la unidad recin creada. El todo es ms que la suma de sus
partes. ste manifiesta nuevas propiedades que no pueden sospecharse cuando
estudiamos las partes. Este fenmeno se hace ms evidente an, cuando encon-
tramos de nuevo esos elementos primitivos a un nivel superior de la evolucin.
Nadie podra predecir jams que un tomo de carbono desempeara el papel
que realmente desempea dentro del cerebro para el pensamiento humano.
A continuacin va presentando las uni-totalidades, cada vez ms claras del
mundo biolgico: virus o estructuras similares, bacterias y otros procariontes,
clulas eucariticas fruto de endosimbiosis, y organismos pluricelulares. Subra-
ya su enorme complejidad creciente, y cmo la evolucin biolgica puede des-
cribirse bajo el aspecto de una unificacin progresiva responsable de la emer-
gencia de novedad. Pero sobre todo subraya el que, por ms que experimentamos
esas realidades como uni-totalidades, no podemos decir qu es lo que confor-
ma su unidad: Esta laguna de nuestro conocimiento sobre los medios por los
que las realidades individuales quedan ligadas y lo que conforma su unidad,
poda en los elementos simples como tomos y molculas quedar todava borro-
sa, pero en los seres vivos se hace cada vez ms evidente. En los seres vivos el
principio de unidad se denomina alma, una entidad desconocida para la cien-
cia. El hecho de que la mayor parte de los idiomas utilicen esta palabra, expre-
sa claramente la universal experiencia humana de la uni-totalidad como ms
que la suma de sus partes. Y concluye mencionando que la vida misma evo-
luciona hacia seres centrados cada vez ms claramente conscientes y finalmente
autoconscientes, los cuales, a su vez, pueden llegar-a-ser elementos de estruc-
turas ms elevadas.
Subraya por fin que la unin no destruye la identidad de los elementos impli-
cados en la uni-totalidad: El tomo de carbono sigue siendo un tomo de car-
bono incluso cuando est integrado en una neurona del cerebro humano. La
unin no es pues una especie de fusin que elimina la identidad de los elemen-
que se unen, pero sin ser idntico a ellos. Por lo tanto, podemos afirmar: a tra-
vs de la unin llega a la existencia ms ser. Cuanto ms unido est algo en s
mismo formando una uni-totalidad, ms se realiza como ser. La formula-
cin teilhardiana,
plus esse (ser ms) =
= plus a pluribus uniri (estar ms unido, a partir de ms elementos), o bien
= plus plura unire (unir ms, ms elementos) 8,
da en el clavo. Desde esta perspectiva, ser no es ya el concepto ms general
que podemos concebir; ms bien se ha convertido en algo definible. El ser es
realizado y como se deca antes conservado en el ser mediante la unin.
En el universo, donde esta unin resulta ms evidente es en los seres vivos. La
uni-totalidad de cada uno de ellos, que fsicamente es un sistema abierto con
una necesidad constante de consumo energtico, decae fcilmente. Por con-
siguiente, en el universo no hay una cantidad constante de ser, como exige
para la energa el primer principio de la termodinmica. En el mundo evolu-
tivo, el ser se crea mediante la unin de elementos.
Hace ver inmediatamente que esta metafsica nada tiene que ver con un
monismo materialista, pero que supone un drstico cambio cosmovisional:
Los modos de unin remiten a niveles de ser, desde el nivel atmico al nivel
humano o personal. El aspecto material es secundario. En la metafsica clsi-
ca del ser, el principio que representa a la materialidad se puede reducir a la
materia primera, que es pura potencia 9. Este principio pasivo de la potenciali-
dad se opone al principio activo, la forma substancial, y no se debe confundir
con una nocin al menos dentro de esa metafsica errnea de materialis-
mo, en el que el ser se identifica con la materia. En esa concepcin materia-
lista, el ser se reduce a las partculas elementales ms primitivas. En un mundo
estrictamente materialista no habra emergencia alguna de ser a travs de la
unin, mientras que, en la metafsica de la unin, el principio de potencialidad
se concretiza en los elementos que son el requisito (la conditio sine qua non)
para la formacin de unidad ms elevada. El ser se identifica aqu con la uni-
ficacin 10. La ruptura lingstica de esta formulacin, que identifica el ser con
la unificacin que nunca llega a concluirse sino que ha de seguirse realizando
siempre de nuevo, es una indicacin del cambio radical de cosmovisin, cuan-
do abandonamos el mundo esttico, para entrar en el mundo evolutivo del lle-
gar-a-ser.
Nota la dificultad en describir mediante este proceso de unificacin el pri-
mer instante de esa creacin continua: En nuestra reflexin sobre el proceso
de llegar-a-ser mediante la unin, hemos excluido conscientemente la cuestin
del comienzo de la creacin. Esta cuestin, o bien nos llevara en una regressio
8
TEILHARD, uvres VI, p. 208, n. 1; versin espaola, p. 168, n. 26 (confusamente tra-
ducida).
9
Esta idea de materia describe un estado de no existencia, mientras que la materia con-
creta, como Toms de Aquino afirm, es ya materia formada (informada). [Nota de K. S.-M.]
10
Traducimos el alemn Einswerdung por unificacin, en el sentido de el hacerse,
o llegar-a-ser uno.
11
Trmino, introducido por G. Soehngen en Bonn, que hace referencia al pensamiento
del propio Toms de Aquino, como opuesto a los intrpretes escolsticos. [Nota de K. S.-M.,
adaptada.]
12
Vase nuestra seccin 1.4.
Esta suprema unin ha de realizarse entre elementos que sean (al menos)
personales, lo cual pone serias dificultades dentro de un monotesmo estricto
como el de las tradiciones juda e islmica: Esto hace que se nos plantee la
cuestin del nivel supremo de esta unin divina. Segn nuestra experiencia, el
nivel ms elevado de unin entre elementos se da cuando los seres humanos se
unen a un nivel personal con otras personas, formando una unidad que tras-
ciende al individuo. Se podra incluso decir que el individuo se hace persona en
gran parte unindose personalmente con otras personas 13. Si Dios existe unin-
dose, los elementos de esa unin no pueden ser infrapersonales. Dios, como
constituyente de la suprema Uni-totalidad, como el supremo Ser que se realiza
en una unin, tiene que ser (al menos) una Unin de personas. Esto deja al mono-
testa estricto sumido en un dilema: o Dios carece de la cualidad de ser perso-
na, o Dios necesita crear otras personas, la humanidad, para unirse a ellas. La
primera respuesta hara de Dios un ser no-personal al que no cabe hablar, por
ser inaccesible a la comunicacin personal: esta respuesta no resultara acep-
table dentro de la tradicin judeocristiana o islmica. La segunda respuesta
hara a Dios dependiente de la creacin divina; el Creador tendra necesidad de
su creacin. Obviamente, esta idea no resulta compatible con la idea tradicio-
nal del Dios trascendente y libre, el Ser Supremo, que las tres religiones men-
cionadas confiesan.
Pero esta suprema unin personal es bien coherente con el Dios tri-uno de
la tradicin cristiana: El Dios de la tradicin cristiana, el Dios tri-uno, existe
en la constante realizacin de la unin de tres personas. Dios aparece as como
el Arquetipo (Urbild), en semejanza al cual toda la creacin llega a la existen-
cia. Puesto que por toda la eternidad realiza este acto supremo de unin perso-
nal en la Trinidad, Dios no necesita al mundo.
El amor, la esencia divina, es la fuerza constitutiva de Dios y, por analoga,
del proceso evolutivo: La fuerza que une, especialmente la fuerza que une a las
personas, es el amor. Dios existe en perfecta unin, podramos decir, porque
Dios es amor (1 Jn 1,4). Ese texto bblico adquiere un significado ms profun-
do en el horizonte de una metafsica de la unin, porque hasta ahora el amor se
ha concebido principalmente como una accin moral. Si nuestra comprensin
de la creacin de Dios y de su dimensin revelatoria es correcta, el amor se con-
vierte en la fuerza constitutiva de la vida de Dios. El amor de Dios es el puro
acto de la unin. Esto se refleja en su creacin convirtindose el amor en la fuer-
za constitutiva, en la fuerza conductora del proceso evolutivo de una unin pro-
gresiva.
Schmitz-Moormann concluye este rico captulo ponderando el papel inspi-
rador de las ciencias para la teologa: Lo que se ha dicho de forma teolgica
no constituye una visin cientfica del mundo. Es ms bien lo que aparece cuan-
do a este mismo mundo conocido y descrito por el saber humano, tratamos de
regresiva. Para la idea de la persona, cf. BUBER, 1958; GUARDINI, 1937; MOUNIER, 1948. [Nota de
K. S.-M.]
verlo con los ojos de la fe como creacin de Dios. En esta visin a los telogos
no les resulta extrao el mundo del saber humano y de las ciencias de la natu-
raleza; ms bien, se ha convertido en una fuente de intuicin teolgica. La per-
cepcin teolgica del mundo como creacin no est en contradiccin con el
mundo que los cientficos ven, aunque es posible que algunos, como cientficos
y/o como agnsticos, no quieran aceptar ste o cualquier otro punto de vista
fundado en la fe.
14
Permtaseme el neologismo (del griego ggnon ggnontos, el que llega-a-ser, en vez de
n ntos, el que es) que Schmitz-Moormann introducir ms tarde en la dura forma hbrida:
fierologa (del latn fieri, llegar-a-ser).
15
Podra resultar til recordar que Kant fue incapaz de pensar en ningn tipo de deve-
nir evolutivo (KANT, Gesammelte Werke, 8:54). [Nota de K. S.-M.]
16
La nada relativa es, por ejemplo, el tomo en relacin a la molcula, que comparada
con el tomo tiene un plus de ser, de realidad. [Nota de K. S.-M.]
17
Ya que la metafsica de la unin carece de un lenguaje plenamente desarrollado, no
podemos evitar retomar a menudo el lenguaje de la metafsica del ser. En la mayora de los
idiomas ni siquiera disponemos de un trmino apropiado para hablar del llegar-a-ser (sino
trminos compuestos devenir, become, o pasivos fieri, ggnomai). No as en la len-
gua alemana (werden), acuada en su pasado metafsico. [Nota de K. S.-M., adaptada a la
traduccin.]
dos del llegar-a-ser. Todo cuanto existe, existe mientras y en tanto que sus ele-
mentos estn unidos. En la unin y mediante ella el proceso del llegar-a-ser pro-
duce nuevos niveles de ser, es decir, nuevos niveles de semejanza con Dios. Aun-
que, segn el principio de la teologa negativa, no podemos sacar conclusiones
sobre la realidad divina a partir de lo que sabemos sobre las creaturas, sin embar-
go al menos no resulta absurdo que, con respecto a la realidad de Dios, ponga-
mos en cuestin la posibilidad de hablar sobre el ser sin pensar y considerar lo
que sabemos acerca del ser en la creacin de Dios. Podemos hablar del ser de
Dios sin saber algo del ser de las creaturas? Evidentemente no, pues todo lo que
hablamos del ser est basado sobre nuestra experiencia del ser en la creacin,
de la que nosotros somos una parte. Si la definicin teilhardiana del ser es correc-
ta (vase 2.7 ms arriba) y yo opino que lo es, entonces esta definicin
posee al menos cierta importancia para el discurso humano acerca del ser de
Dios. El camino que abre esa definicin para hablar de Dios est al menos tan
justificado si la definicin de esse es correcta, como la clsica costumbre de
atribuir ser a Dios. Puesto que ya no vivimos en un mundo esttico del ser, tene-
mos que intentar entender cmo centellea la reverberacin de Dios en el mundo
del llegar-a-ser. Puesto que reconocemos el proceso del llegar-a-ser en la crea-
cin como un proceso de unin impulsado por la llamada creadora del amor
divino, podramos preguntarnos si existe en Dios una analoga a este proceso
bsico de la creacin.
18
WHITEHEAD, 1929, p. 343 [nota de K. S.-M.]; trad. esp., p. 307.
19
Ver nota 14 anteriormente.
20
Schmitz-Moormann dice que los telogos medievales le recuerdan a bachilleres que
lo saben todo, que an no han llegado a sondear los lmites de su conocimiento y la infinitud
de su ignorancia.
cada persona participa completamente de las otras 21. Podramos afirmar tam-
bin que, ms all de toda comprensin humana, las tres personas divinas se
diferencian tanto ms como personas cuanto ms profundamente se unen en el
amor.
Comenta a continuacin lo reducido del fruto obtenido dentro de esta nueva
metafsica de la unin, justificndolo con lo reducido de la explicacin anterior
dentro de la metafsica del ser, y con lo incipiente del nuevo lenguaje. Resume
ese fruto en la imagen de un Dios que trasciende la creacin y no la necesita
para existir. E insina los recientes estudios sobre el papel de cada una de las
personas respecto a la creacin, adems del papel del Hijo descrito en el himno
de la carta a los Colosenses (Col 1,16-17).
21
Uno podra sentirse tentado a decir que cada una participa completamente de la esen-
cia de las otras, pero eso sera sucumbir al lenguaje de la ontologa, lo cual intentamos evitar.
[Nota de K. S.-M.]
22
RAHNER, Escritos IV, p.117. [Nota de K. S.-M., adaptada.]
23
Forzar a las personas a que se unan de acuerdo con el slogan de la Revolucin Fran-
cesa (Libert, galit, Fraternit ou la Mort) no es fomentar la unin, sino fomentar la indi-
vidualizacin, convertir a las personas en cifras annimas. [Nota de K. S.-M.]
24
Captulo 5, al final. [Nota de K. S.-M.]
hacia s a una creacin que un da llegar a ser capaz de responder con amor a
la llamada creadora de Dios. Y Dios acepta no slo el precio de un universo lleno
de desechos, sino tambin el precio, an ms agobiante, del mal. Por una parte,
es razonable que no pueda haber una evolucin libre sin ciertos males inevita-
bles como la muerte, ni sin otros males en principio evitables pero estads-
ticamente posibles y probables. Cuando las cosas pueden ir mal, ms tarde o
ms temprano irn mal. Slo en un mundo esttico y estrictamente determi-
nado se podra evitar el mal. Enfermedades, accidentes y muertes prematuras
son parte del precio. No cabe duda de que perturba nuestra sensibilidad y nues-
tra exigencia de felicidad ver que el Creador acepte este precio, pero no existe
forma alguna racionalmente imaginable de que la evolucin de la libertad se
lleve a cabo sin el mal creciente que sta conlleva. An as nos espanta aban-
donar el bello cuadro infantil de un mundo bien ordenado en el que se tena cui-
dado de todo, y nos resulta muy difcil aceptar que Dios est dispuesto a pagar
el precio de la aparicin del mal a todos los niveles de la evolucin para que la
libertad pudiera alcanzar el nivel de la libertad humana.
Y prosigue su argumento, hasta mostrar que Dios est dispuesto a pagar
como precio de la libertad humana el ms impensable de los males, la muerte
en cruz de su Hijo: Por otra parte, esta dificultad para comprender la presen-
cia del mal en la creacin divina no es nueva. La teologa clsica trataba el pro-
blema como mysterium iniquitatis. Hoy podemos ver la relacin inevitable entre
la estructura de la creacin orientada hacia la libertad y la aparicin del mal.
El precio que el Creador estaba dispuesto a pagar por el llegar-a-ser de la liber-
tad puede parecer extremadamente elevado. Quiz el misterio se encuentre ante
todo en el hecho de que este mundo, como un mundo libre que responde a la
llamada creadora del Amor, sea tan importante para el Creador, que ste acep-
t el ms impensable de los males: que el Hijo de Dios, el Logos, se convirtiese
en hombre y muriese en la cruz la ms horrible de las muertes. Quienquiera que
intente resolver el problema del mal, al menos si esto ocurre en una perspecti-
va cristiana, tendra que meditar el misterio de la cruz, el precio mximo paga-
do para que la libertad humana pudiese existir 25. Esto puede indicar cun alta-
mente valora Dios la realidad de la libertad.
La llamada creadora interviene indirectamente en la unin creadora. Esto
permite a Schmitz-Moormann razonar que, a nivel humano, Dios llama a la
unin amorosa a travs del prjimo, y espera una respuesta de amor al prjimo
(que Dios acepta como amor a l, segn la parbola del juicio final). Esta misma
llamada indirecta, el envo de profetas, cobra un sentido profundo en la encar-
nacin de su Hijo a una humanidad extraviada, y constituye la base de una
moderna cristologa: El gran misterio de la creacin no residira tanto en el
viejo dilema del Dios predestinante y el libre albedro humano, sino en el amor
Esto nos conduce a la temtica de la cristologa, la cual parece necesitar una revisin
25
global para que muestre a Cristo como el Redentor o, por usar un trmino ms adecuado,
como el Salvador y Consumador de este universo. [Nota de K. S.-M.]
de Dios que se abstiene de imponer un orden que evite el mal, para que las crea-
turas lleguen-a-ser libres y puedan amar a Dios. Si la interpretacin propuesta
no resulta equivocada, esta libertad realizada en los seres humanos necesita el
apoyo constante de la llamada creadora y amorosa de Dios. Como en todos los
niveles de evolucin, la llamada llega a travs del prjimo a cada individuo huma-
no, el cual puede responder a esta llamada a amar a Dios mediante el amor al
prjimo, mediante la unin amorosa con el prjimo (cf. Mt 25,30-45). Dios no
llama al individuo humano directamente hacia s como Dios imponindose y
avasallndolo. Dios ms bien se hace presente a travs de otros seres humanos:
enva profetas. En un sentido muy profundo, en completa coherencia con su
intencin creadora, l, el Logos, la Palabra de Dios, se hace hombre, dejando a
los seres humanos la libertad para amarle o rechazarle 26. La llamada creadora
del amor divino, que llama hacia s a todo a partir de la nada por el camino de
la evolucin mediante la unin creadora, sostiene la creacin a todos los nive-
les, por lejos que sta pueda haberse extraviado: el Creador no le quita nunca la
sustentadora llamada del amor. Los seres humanos no son una excepcin: exis-
ten, como todo lo dems, porque son mantenidos en la existencia mediante la
llamada amorosa del Creador. Los seres humanos pueden rechazarla, pueden
buscarse slo a s mismos: an as, Dios no aparta su amorosa llamada, que ha
de ser respondida mediante el amor.
Insiste en que esa llamada creadora es invitacin amorosa y no imposicin
omnipotente, por lo que resulta ser lo que denominamos gracia: La creacin,
que existe slo porque es llamada con amor por el Creador, alcanza en el ser
humano la capacidad de responder o rechazar el ofrecimiento divino del amor.
En el nivel humano se hace as evidente que el poder creador que trabaja en el
universo, no es tanto la voluntad omnipotente del Creador, como la gracia de
Dios que penetra el universo entero. Todo en este universo se mantiene en la
existencia mediante la gracia de Dios, mediante su amor.
Concluye nuestro documento notando que ese carcter gracioso de la llama-
da creadora se refleja en la creacin entera a travs de la nueva calificacin del
Creador como infinitamente paciente (cf. nuestra seccin 1.4), incluso en su invi-
tacin al pecador a que responda con amor: El amor de Dios es infinitamente
paciente, tal como se ha documentado mediante la lenta respuesta del universo:
Dios nunca aparta su amor creador. Ni tampoco aparta Dios su gracia de nin-
gn ser humano. ste puede rehusar el amar a Dios, el amar a su prjimo, pero
el ofrecimiento divino del amor, de la gracia, nunca le ser retirado. Incluso el
pecador, el ser humano que rechaza a Dios, puede en cualquier momento aga-
rrarse libremente a ese amor pacientemente ofrecido, que impregna el universo
entero. En un sentido muy preciso podemos decir: la creacin entera es gracia.
Y la creacin, que ha llegado a ser capax Dei en la humanidad, est llamada a
responder con amor al Creador, adorando ese eterno Amor.
26
Este aspecto de una cristologa futura necesita un mayor desarrollo.
Podramos decir que ese contexto fue toda su vida intelectual. Pero distin-
gamos, por claridad, entre unos precedentes previos a la idea concreta de la lla-
mada creadora, y las primeras menciones de esta idea.
2.1. Precedentes
27
SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1969 y 1970.
28
TEILHARD: Luvre Scientifique, Tagebcher y Journal. Schmitz-Moormann recordar
al final de su vida, que la lectura de esos diarios le convenci de que Teilhard era un telogo,
por ms que l pretenda negarlo: SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1995, p. 125.
29
SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1986.
30
Vanse las actas del congreso: ANDERSON Y PEACOCKE (eds.), 1987.
31
Ibdem, pp. 121-131.
32
Ibdem, pp. 162-169. La primera de esas ideas es especialmente interesante para nues-
tro tema. Aunque sea muy concisamente (cinco lneas), testifica el inters de Schmitz-Moor-
38
K. S.-M. da aqu en nota las definiciones del plus esse y la frase la unin diferen-
cia, con la referencia vaga vase Teilhard para ms detalles.
39
Cf. K. SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1969. [Nota de K. S.-M., inserta en el texto.]
gloria, esto significara autoimponerse y forzar lo que Dios por lo visto quiere
dejar libre. Por consiguiente Dios nunca llama hacia s (calls forth) a ninguna
cosa desde un nivel que no sea el de esa cosa. Dios habla a los seres humanos
como los padres hablan a los nios pequeos en su propio lenguaje. El
amor acepta al otro como es, sin autoimponerse 40. Dios estaba siempre encu-
bierto cuando hablaba a los humanos: el Antiguo Testamento deja esto claro.
Hay una nube, un fuego, una voz, un ngel, pero nunca una presencia que del
todo se impone. La llamada creadora (the creative call) de Dios parece ser siem-
pre una llamada indirecta, que viene en una forma humana.Aunque la Encar-
nacin no puede ser deducida del proceso de llamar Dios hacia s (Gods calling
forth) a la creacin, tiene un profundo sentido que, cuando las creaturas de
Dios podan libremente amar, la Palabra de Dios se hiciese presente entre los
humanos en la forma de un humano, pidiendo ser amado por aquellos que hab-
an sido creados.
Como vemos, la idea de la llamada creadora estaba clara en la mente de
Smith-Moormann ya en mayo de 1991, y parece haber llegado a ella en el pro-
ceso de dar sentido a la creacin y a la libertad humana, y sobre todo en el de
presentar la encarnacin como un nuevo acto de esa misma creacin.
El segundo documento de 1992 es un librito alemn, Creacin y evolucin:
Nuevos planteamientos para el dilogo entre las ciencias y la teologa, editado y
mayoritariamente redactado por l 41. Este librito viene a recoger las actas de
dos congresos distintos celebrados en la Academia Catlica de Baviera, esta-
blecida en Munich. La mayor parte de su contenido corresponde a las jornadas
sobre Teora de la evolucin y fe en la creacin (los das 5 y 6 de octubre de
1991), promovidas por la conocida carta de Juan Pablo II a George V. Coyne,
S.J., en 1988, que se publica por primera vez en alemn al final del librito. Sus
cinco conferencias sobre cosmologa, biologa evolutiva, historia de la tensin
darwiniana, interpretacin bblica y la de Schmitz-Moormann sobre Posibili-
dades y perspectivas de la fe en la creacin en un mundo evolutivo, siendo
interesantes, no llegan a dar una elaboracin teolgica positiva. Pero una tal
elaboracin se vio necesaria, y se organiz para ella un da de estudio (el 1 de
febrero de 1992), a cargo de Schmitz-Moormann, que pronunci las tres con-
ferencias. La primera es ms bien introductoria, pero las otras dos retoman, con
mucha ms extensin, los temas de los dos ensayos que haba presentado en
Chicago ocho meses antes, y en las que acabamos de comentar las menciones
de la accin creadora.
La segunda conferencia, El mundo evolutivo: Creacin de Dios, afirma
hacia el final: El Dios trinitario es el arquetipo de la unin suprema que toda
la creacin parece imitar. Y su ltimo prrafo menciona as la accin creado-
ra: El amor del Dios trinitario, que no necesita el mundo, puede sin embargo
libremente y a partir del amor graciosamente ofrecido, llamar al mundo a que
40
K. S.-M. cita ya aqu a Martin Buber, Romano Guardini y Emmanuel Mounier.
41
SCHMITZ-MOORMANN (ed.), 1992c.
llegue-a-ser (die Welt ins werden rufen). Pero este llegar-a-ser mismo se pre-
senta como proceso de la unin, y sta se presenta en ltimo trmino a los ojos
de la fe como un suceso soportado por la fuerza del amor. La creacin evoluti-
va aparece as esencialmente como hacindose a partir del amor de Dios y sopor-
tada en su hacerse por ese mismo amor de Dios 42.
La ltima conferencia, Evolucin y redencin, menciona repetidamente la
llamada creadora. Cinco veces para indicar que esta llamada no es impositiva
ni directa: El amor no avasalla, no se impone. Por consiguiente Dios, que es el
amor, tampoco crea una mquina que funcione segn leyes deterministas, ms
bien llama al mundo a partir de la nada hacia s (ruft er die Welt aus dem Nichts
zu sich), para que pueda encontrarle con amor. La llamada de Dios (Der
Ruf Gottes), que llama al mundo a partir de la nada hacia s (der die Welt aus
dem Nichts hervorruft) no es tampoco una llamada impositiva. Nada indica que
las cosas surgieran bajo una llamada directa de Dios (unter einem direkten Anruf
Gottes) como si la llamada creadora (der Schpferruf) fuera una llamada que
obliga a la creacin primordial a dirigirse directamente a Dios. El amor como
principio creador permite esperar algo muy distinto, a saber, que se dirija a los
diversos seres al nivel en que ellos existen. Dios no llama a nadie directamente
hacia s, sino slo a travs de los elementos prximos. Dios se hace presente al
tomo en cierta manera como tomo, a la molcula como molcula, a la clula
como clula, al ser vivo como ser vivo, al ser humano como ser humano 43.
Y en esa misma conferencia menciona an la llamada creadora seis veces
ms en relacin a la respuesta libre de la creacin y a la presentacin de la encar-
nacin: La realidad de la creacin evolutiva orientada a la libertad, permite
sospechar que Dios llama hacia s la creacin (Gott die Schpfung zu sich ruft)
para que le responda amando en libertad. Sin embargo, como ya hemos deja-
do claro, Dios no fuerza a la creacin, sino que deja percibir su llamada a unir-
se amorosamente (seinem Anruf zur liebenden Vereinigung) a partir del
correspondiente elemento prximo. Se hace tomo al tomo, molcula a la mol-
cula, clula a la clula, ser vivo al ser vivo. Es evidente que su presencia se con-
figura de una manera distinta en cada caso, que la llamada de Dios (der Anruf
Gottes) que sale del interior de las cosas, es perceptible de maneras distintas.
Ahora bien, si esta representacin de la manera de actuar del Dios creador en
la creacin e correcta, Dios habla a los hombres en forma humana: primero
a travs de otros hombres, pero definitivamente viniendo a este mundo en su
Hijo: As que, en la encarnacin, la actividad creadora de Dios llega a una pri-
mera plenitud de la llamada creadora (des Schpferanrufs) a la realidad libre
y personal llegada-a-ser por evolucin, plenitud que en cierta manera repre-
senta la quintaesencia del proceso creador. En el hombre Jess, el Hijo de Dios,
llama Dios a los hombres hacia s (ruft Gott die Menschen zu sich). Dios, en
defensa de la libertad de una respuesta amorosa de la creacin a su llamada
42
Ibdem, pp. 115-130; especialmente p. 130.
43
Ibdem, pp. 131-148; especialmente pp. 137-138.
BIBLIOGRAFA
ANDERSON, S., y PEACOCKE, A. R. (eds.): Evolution and Creation: A European Perspective (ESS-
SAT, 1986), Aarhus University Press, 1987 (especialmente pp. 121-131 y 162-169).
BUBER, MARTIN (1958): Ich und Du, Gerlingen; trad. esp.: Yo y t, Madrid, 1995, Caparrs
Editores.
GUARDINI, ROMANO (1937): Welt und Person, Nrnberg, Werkbund Verlag; trad. esp.: Mundo
y persona, Madrid, 2000, Encuentro Ediciones.
MOUNIER, EMMANUEL (1948): Le Personnalisme, Paris, Seuil; trad. esp.: El personalismo,
Madrid, 1997, Accin Cultural Cristiana.
SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, KARL (1969): Die Erbsnde, berholte Vorstellung-Bleibender Glaube,
Olten/Freiburg, Walter-Verlag.
(1970): Teilhard thologien, tudes Teilhardiennes 3, 63-69.
(1986) (ed.): Teilhard de Chardin in der Discusin, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buch-
gesellschaft.
(1987): On the Evolution of Human Freedom, Zygon 22, 443-458.
(1991): Can Theology Be Done ignoring Science, Bulletin Jesuits in Science 7, 12-16.
44
Ibdem, pp. 145-147.
45
TRENNERT-HELWIG, 1993, recensionada por Philipp Heffner en el mismo volumen del
artculo: Zygon 30 (1995), pp. 146-149.
ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD
ON PROCESS PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY
Cosmos and Kenosis of Divinity
JAVIER MONSERRAT
Universidad Autnoma de Madrid
ABSTRACT: The modern dialogue between religion and science has to take into account the process
philosophy and theology. Science, for the authors in this movement, is the thoughts of Whitehead: a science
of the first half of the 20th century, understood according to a certain philosophy of process proposed by
Whitehead (which is not only science but a risky, complex and subtle philosophy based on science). In
this article we are only referring to one of the episodes in the philosophy of process: that which is characterised
by Alfred Whitehead and some of his followers in the creation of the philosophy-theology of process in the
Anglo-Saxon, and especially American world. Our intention is to present an evaluation and discussion that
is oriented towards what we feel is important: the discussion of his cosmology and theology of kenosis.
However, in order to do this we need to make our points of view fit in with a line of thought that makes
reference to his metaphysics and philosophy of religion. Whitehead does not question the world at this
ultimate level of primary causality (in its absoluteness and necessity) given that the world is eternal: that
is absolute and necessary. Whiteheads problem is that of explaining the system of secondary causes,
because they do not seem to constitute a system that is sufficient but rather introduce the reference of
God and an element of the world that contributes to what the world is from the inside. God, for Whitehead,
is also not responsible for Evil because he does not create the world; on the contrary, he is subject to the
conditions established in the same world and tries to overcome it and guide it to perfection. Kenosis or
divine auto-limitation, for Whitehead, is only partial because a large part of divine limitation is imposed by
the nature of the eternal world (not created) of which God form a part.
KEY WORDS: Whitehead, process philosophy, process theology, divine self-limitation, cosmic process,
whiteheadian metaphysics, concept of God, kenosis.
PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749 PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), nm. 242, pp. 815-845
12_JavierMONSERRAT.qxd:Maqueta.qxd 27/6/08 07:52 Pgina 816
INTRODUCTION
The philosophy of process was born out of the ideas of the English physicist
and philosopher Alfred Whitehead (1861-1947), soon after he settled in Harvard
University. His philosophy is already a philosophy of process. However, the birth
of this philosophy as a real philosophical movement is connected with a group
of his disciples, among whom Charles Hartshorne is, with out any doubt, the
most relevant. The importance of this philosophical-theological movement covers
a period from the 1950s until it is consolidated in the 1970s; in these years it is
identified with the Chicago school and the journal Process Studies is founded.
At the end of the 1960s and also in the 70s, there was also a theological movement
that was known as theology of secularization or as the death of God that was
influenced by the theology of process. However, these movements should not
be confused with the theology of process, even though they have many similarities
although perhaps a different sensibility and respond to a group of similar
problems with respect to the meaning of religion in modern times. From those
founding years, there has been the constant presence of the philosophy-theology
of process in Anglo-Saxon theology, principally in America. There still exists
today an orthodox movement of this philosophy-theology that is linked by the
lines of thought of its principal authors: A. N. Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne,
John B. Cobb, David Ray Griffin y W. H. Vanstone. In any case, the process
philosophy and theology is constantly considered to be one of the principal
protagonists in the current dialogue between science and religion.
can cause insensitivity to the present, paying too much attention to the modern
threatens an insensitivity to the opposite: a disconnection with the essence of
tradition and the core values of Christianity that are present in the faith of
Christian churches in the past and the present (and not only of the catholic
church).
Theology from science. The process theology has tried to be a theology from
science. This can be understood, as science is one of the essential characteristics
of modern times. Thinking about Christianity from the point of view of modernity
requires that it be approached from the perspective of science. Therefore science,
for the authors in this movement, is the thoughts of Whitehead: a science of the
first half of the 20th century, understood according to a certain philosophy of
process proposed by Whitehead (which is not only science but a risky, complex
and subtle philosophy based on science). The philosophy-theology of process
should be understood as an image of the cosmos, of man and of God which is
made possible by modern science.
The dialogue between science and religion. Theology based on science, throughout
the 20th century, has been a point of reference for the dialogue between science and
religion. Whoever promotes, from other perspectives, the modern dialogue between
religion and science has to take into account the process philosophy. Many examples
can be found. For example, Ian Barbour identifies with many processual
assumptions, although he is critical of others: his work is a well-considered and
critical connection of the Christian tradition. Other authors such as Peacocke and
Polkinghorne are explicitly removed from process but discuss and nuance its
assumptions; at their base, some of their positions, in fact, have a certain relation
to viewpoints that are derived from the influence of the philosophy-theology of
process. In fact, many current opinions about divine omniscience and omnipotence
which can be seen in authors such as George Ellis, W. Stoeger or George Coyne
with out any doubt, have their origin in the process philosophy and theology.
Devine self-limitation and kenosis. The themes of self-limitation and the kenosis
of divinity can be found in the philosophy of Whitehead. It is about self-limitation
or perhaps, even better, as a divine limitation in the world that effects
omnipotence and omniscience. Nevertheless, these ideas have been assumed by
the theology of process in order to justify the inaction of God against Evil and
go even farther than that. God does not resolve the problem of Evil because God
has a limited ability to intervene in things that happen in the world; he is not
responsible for things that happen inevitably. Therefore it is not only about a
divine self-limitation against human freedom but rather a limitation that goes
much deeper and much more radical than that imposed on God by reality. As
we will see, this is one of the most radical and problematic points of traditional
Christian theology. Nevertheless, this theology of process is with out a doubt
religious: it has been the founding, in out times, of an understandable belief
in a God that is personal and creates a feeling of a community of faith in Christian
churches. This theological perspective has understood and taken seriously the
Precedents and initial context. The cosmos or universe is not a static reality
but rather a dynamic universal process. In contrast to the static and stable, this
philosophy confirms processual transformation as the essence of the universe.
In contrast to the classical metaphysics that had followed preferentially in the
footsteps of Parmenides (the stable Parmenidian being transformed into the
eidos of Plato and then to Aristotelian form while action is only attributed
to matter) an alternative conception is being considered in the line of Heraclitus
which establishes the process and is some way action as the metaphysical
essence of the universe. As a consequence, there is no doubt that the history of
philosophy (as well as science) allows for the finding of numerous antecedents
to the philosophy of process: we have mentioned Heraclitus but we could also
cite modern authors such as Henri Louis Bergson, Charles Sanders Peirce,
William James or John Dewey. In reality, it is science that gives a processual
(this is the real term and should be used previously) description and itself
constitutes the most important manifestation of processual thought. This is what
Whitehead understood and as a consequence had the desire to construct a
processual metaphysics that was in agreement with science.
However, as mentioned before, in this article we are only referring to one of
the episodes in the philosophy of process: that which is characterised by Alfred
Whitehead and some of his followers in the creation of the philosophy-theology
of process in the Anglo-Saxon, and especially American world. In reality, theology
has been the true place where Whiteheads ideas (which were not theological
but rather philosophical) have had the most impact: these have been theologies
that have valued and cultivated their philosophy and have extended it to establish
a hermeneutical outlook that allows for the understanding of human life and
for the construction of a new theology that could explain Christianity in a way
that could be understood from modern culture (principally from modern science).
Lastly, Whitehead constructed a metaphysics of process because he understood
that modern science described the world as a process: his metaphysics of process
was, as a consequence, the only metaphysics that sciences allowed. It was the
metaphysics of science that the modern world needed and Whitehead consciously
wanted to shape.
Alfred North Whitehead. Whitehead was born in 1861 (died in 1947) and his
scientific career began while at university as a mathematician oriented towards
physics. He was a lecturer in mathematics in Cambridge until 1911; in mathematics
and physics in London until 1924, when he moved to Harvard as a professor of
philosophy. His first period stands out for his collaborations with Bertrand Russell;
above all in the Principia Mathematica (3 volumes, 1910-1913) where the logical
foundations of mathematical reasoning are justified. However, the first works that
introduce us to his nascent philosophy, come later on: The Organisation of Thought
(1917), An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge (1919) y The
Concept of Nature (1920). One of his most important books, Science and the Modern
World, SMW (1925), was written during his time as a professor at Harvard. It is
the first book where references to God appear, although it is in a strictly
metaphysical context as a reference to divine limitation. Whitehead, nevertheless,
thought that the most fruitful way to gain access to God was through the religious
experience of humanity. This was treated later on in his Religion and Making (1926).
But it was with the Gifford Lectures in 1927-28 that he derived the preparations
for his main work, which was published under the title: Process and Reality, PR,
(1929). In it, he explains his processual metaphysics in complete detail: not as
pure science or objective description but as a metaphysic cosmology that always
refers to a subject, a privileged witness to the flowing process of reality. This is
what is now known as organic philosophy (philosophy of organism).
Four more books, which were written in the same period or before, are also
important in order to interpret and compliment Process and Reality. In the
Function of Reason (1929) the role of reason in the process of evolution and
culture are explained more simply. Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect (1927) is
a wide-ranging epistemological refection, from primordial perception to higher
representational processes. His work Adventures of Ideas, AI (1933), in which he
studies how ideas drive social evolution and create human values, is also very
important. Modes of Thought, MT (1938), his last book, in which he offers a
general presentation of his philosophy that more revealing, less technical and
accessible is probably one of his most important works 1.
1
I will cite Whiteheads works following the acronyms found in the text, like SMW for
Science and Modern World. Works not cited in the course of the article do not have their own
acronyms. I will put inside parentheses either the page of the edition used or the corresponding
part or chapter, the latter being difficult to identify because of the various available editions.
Charles Hartshorne. With out a doubt, Charles Hartshorne was the other great
theological student of Whiteheads. It is probable, that without his support in
the beginning and his efforts to appropriately extend the consequences that were
implicit in Whiteheads philosophy to theology, the process philosophy and
theology would not have been born. Because of this, it is fair to say that the
American philosophy-theology of process began with Hartshorne just as much
as with Whitehead.
Apparently, Hartshorne (1897-2000) had already finished his PhD and had
already developed, to a large degree, his personal ideas, when in 1925, he began
to hear Whiteheads lectures at Harvard and began to teach with him. From 1923
to 1925 he had a fellowship in Germany where he could have heard lectures from
Husserl or Heidegger, but they did not interest him so much. He did however
have interest in C.S Peirce whose Collected Papers were edited by Weiss and
Hartshorne. We can imagine that Hartshorne found, in the positions of Whitehead,
a way to deepen his own intuitions on gestation. As the years past, his identification
with Whiteheads metaphysics grew as can be seen by his explicit recognition of
related works and the acceptance of the same terminology.
Despite this, while Whitehead preferred to orient himself toward the
metaphysics of science, Hartshorne oriented towards the philosophy of religion
and theology; which explains how each ones work mutually compliments the
others. Hartshorne was always a professor of philosophy; in Chicago, between
1928 and 1955; nevertheless, he drew his main influence from the School of
Divinity. Ever since, Chicago has been a centre of the process theology and future
home of the journal Zygon. From 1955 to 1962 he worked at Emory University
and form 1962 to his death he was at the University of Texas in Austin, as emeritus
professor. Although Hartshorne himself recognised his influence in theology,
he felt himself as more of a philosopher or philosopher of religion.
His body of work is made up of 22 books, all with different significance. We
will mention several of them with the purpose of gaining access to his most
meaningful works and at the same time reaching a unified vision of the beginnings
of his philosophy (theology). Mans Vision of God (1941) y The Divine Relativity
(1948) represent the first criticisms of the unmoving nature and omnipotence
of divinity in classic metaphysics through the perspective of his neoclassic
metaphysics (this is what he called it based on Whiteheads metaphysics of process).
In The Logic of Perfection (1962), he defends the ontological argument of Saint
Anselm (which is studied later in another monographic work: Anselms Discovery,
1967) and offers a global synthesis of his processual metaphysics. His evident link
with Whitehead is professed in Whiteheads Philosophy (1972). The following is a
list of books that clarify his ideas during the last part of his life: A Natural Theology
for Our Time (1967), Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (1970), Aquinas
to Whitehead (1976), Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (1984), The
Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne (1991) and the last book he wrote, three years
before his death, The Zero Fallacy and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics
(1997).
The ideas of Whitehead had a much wider influence than people under
his direct tutelage. This can be seen in academic theses (that of Charles
Hartshorne being of note) and published works in America and other countries
from the 1930s up to and including the 1960s and 70s. In order to follow
what these scholars have offered, it is necessary to describe their specific
bibliographies.
The schools in Chicago and Claremont, CA. The profound influence that
Whitehead and Hartshorne had over the theology professors in the Divinity
School of the University of Chicago is one of the decisive factors that confirmed
the prestige of the philosophy-theology of process in America. Nevertheless, the
Chicago school already existed, even before Whiteheads arrival at Harvard. It
would have enriched many of the contents of the philosophy and theology of
modern Christianity 2.
Mathematics and physics: the image of the world in science. For a large part
of Whiteheads life, he was centred exclusively on the study of science. His
dedication to metaphysics came later: it began to develop in the 1920s and
reached its zenith with his arrival in America as a professor of philosophy at
Harvard and the publication of his two fundamental books (Science and Modern
World, SMW, 1925, y Process and Reality, PR, 1929). It is clear that when he
began with metaphysics, he already had the image of the modern world in his
2
From the variety of cited authors and schools, we see that process philosophy-theology
is much more than the literal interpretation that Whithead gives it. It is actually a philosophico-
theological school of thought constituted by various authors united by common principles,
but who differ in terms of the significant influence of their personalities. Hartshorne, Cobb,
Vanstone and Griffin are the principal personalities of this school. Process philosophy-theology
has three strong points: 1) Seeking to be in harmony with modern science by means of an
evolutive metaphysics of process grounded on Whithead. 2) Explaining the problem of evil by
admitting the limitation of divine power and omniscience, thus liberating God from the moral
responsibility of not being a responsible creator and considering him rather as a companion
who contributes to controlling and overcoming evil. Whitehead also considered God as such,
but his ideas about it were not fully developed. 3) Presenting moral principles founded on a
naturalist enthusiasm inserted in the experience of life as something positive, thus overcoming
some Christian groups morals that are rigid and in some manner quasi-manichean.
Whitehead did not contribute much to this last point, unlike later authors like Cobb or Griffin.
Aside from these three points, we also consider as significant Whiteheads contributions to
the theology of kenosis, which we will discuss after presenting his thought. One can say that,
in the course of the 20th century, the theology of kenosis has found in process theology one of
its principal supports.
mind. Whats more, it gives the impression that the critical factor that causes
him to crossover into metaphysics is the idea that science had turned traditional
metaphysics head over heals and that is was necessary to create an new
metaphysics that was congruent with it. It was is his 1925 work (SMW) that he
says that science demands a transformation of the world in order to make it
modern: it is science that makes the world modern requiring both a metaphysics
and religion that are modern.
In SMW, he presents the scientific image that conditions the philosophy of
Whitehead. One should keep in mind that the matrix mechanics of Heisenberg
and the wave mechanics of Schrdinger are formulated between 1924 and 1925,
the same time as this work. Upon writing PR in the following years, until 1929,
he had time to follow the deliberation of quantum mechanics during his most
creative years: it was however still a preliminary period when, for example, they
only new of the existence of the proton and electron (the existence of the neutron
was not even experimentally proven). Nevertheless, upon reading chapter VIII of
SMW about quantum mechanics (throughout the history of the development of
scientific concepts analyzed in previous chapters) we understand that, for
Whitehead, it was enough, given that science had worked well enough up until
1925 to reach a precise intuition about the nature of the physical world that would
be confirmed in the future development of science up until present times.
Physical reality (SMW, chapter VIII) consisted of a corpuscular material that
was made up from individuality, discontinuity, distance and interactions between
things (that could be described by mechanics); but this corpuscular matter was
at the same time a wave (that demanded a field physics in the framework of
physical continuity). Primordial microphysical events (e.g. the electron in its
quantum orbit) could not be attributed to a stable temporal identity. Nevertheless,
the flow of microphysical events constituted and gave certain stability in time
to macrophysical objects. These objects were nevertheless open, in their interior,
to continual development and transformation. For Whitehead, it was obvious
that the physics of the beginnings of the 20th century describes a world in flux
with unstable events that interacted with each other by way of physical
prehensions in order to construct real entities in the same way that societies of
organized events dynamically transformed a continuous process.
Metaphysics. The 19th century had introduced a perspective that was radically
new to the understanding of the world: the evolutionary point of view. Classical
metaphysics and philosophy (up until Kant) responded to the world in a
constructed state; evolution, in turn, imposed the view of a dynamic world
continually in process. To understand the general properties of this new world
described by science, the first philosophy: graeco-scholastic or cartesian-
mechanistic metaphysics was not enough. Many thinkers noticed this trend.
Because of this, the philosophy of the end of the 19th and beginning of the
20th centuries was full of attempts to create a new metaphysics; the metaphysics
of a new image of the world born out of science. One of the trends of this new
philosophy was made up of vitalism. In effect, the world up until this point was
Method. So, now, how is metaphysics constructed? There are two different
questions: how a normal person would create it (where does an intuitive
metaphysics come from) and how a philosopher would create it. Science is
created through effort that is rational, organized systematic and quantative.
Metaphysics, however, cannot be constructed like that. Bergson said that
metaphysics was the fruit of intuition: it was an intuition of the profound
nature of vital movement by way of immediate experience. It is intuition that
perceives life as duration of a continuous future (in a similar way to William
James current of conscience). Whitehead also thought that metaphysics was
born out of intuition. However, he thought it was an intuition based on experience.
Alix Parmentier 3 has convincingly systematized his metaphysics and his defence
of an intuitive access to it through experience; he has even studied the description
of those contents of immediate experience that Whitehead considered essential
for gaining access to metaphysics (Parmentier, o.c., 141ss). Human experience
is one form of prehension; man has an apprehension perspective of the world,
and feels a part of the world because of this prehension that anchors it in a world
that transcends his own existence (Adventures of Ideas, AI, 1933, 293). Going up
against the conventional abstractions of the epistemology in use at the time, in
order to express the concrete fact of experience and prehension, Whitehead uses
the term feeling which has the merit of implying the double meaning of subjective
form and apprehension of an object avoiding the disjecta membra that comes
out of abstraction. It will be seen that this sentient-apprehension, when it is seen
as understanding, is not limited to the use of the five senses. Whitehead tells us
that the living organ of experience is the living body in its entirety, being itself
continuous with the rest of nature (AI, 1933, 290; Parmentier, 160).
Experience is not arrived at through data (as is said in modern epistemology)
but rather through sentient-prehensions that unifies the body at one with nature.
What, then, is the bodily experience that is at the base of human existence and
of metaphysics? Whitehead specifies that: a) it is the experience of the insertion
of our body into a nature that is forms part of; b) it is the experience of our bodily
unit; c) finally, it is the experience of the fine coordination between our bodies
and its experiences, in the sense that we understand as a unifying function of
a plurality of things that are distinct from ourselves (Science and Modern World,
SMW, 1926, 210, referenced by Parmentier). This unity with the world as a
functional dimension of our own bodies is for us, the fundamental experience 4.
3
PARMENTIER, ALIX, La Philosophie de Whitehead et le Probleme de Dieu, Bibliotque des
Archives de Philosophie, Beauchesne, Paris, 1968. We think this is one of the books whose
645 pages offer a broad, profound, and correct presentation of Whiteheads synthetic vision.
4
Whiteheads phenomenology of psychic experience presents extraordinarily interesting
features: the unity of consciousness and a holistic experience connecting the experience of ones
body to an external field of reality. In this way, his sentient focus, also emphasized correctly
by Parmentier, also has clear similarities with the sentient philosophy of X. Zubiri and,
generally, with the importance of sensation and emotion in modern neurology (cf. Damasio).
5
The connections with James J. Gibson and his theory concerning direct experience and
ecological optics are also clear. Whiteheads holistic thought is along the same line, and
expressed by concepts such as occasion for experience, prehension, concrescence, and the
like. Whiteheads holism is not only physical, but is simultaneously psycho-bio-physical.
Evolution is a holistic process culminating in man.
Whitehead, is an open process without limit in which all the entities of the
universe are set out in a unitary process of growing convergence. The universe
is then a unitary all. This is where the individuality of classical metaphysics
breaks down and where every entity lives its connection with the unity of all
and produces its effects over it. This is how Whiteheads own organic (vitalist)
metaphysics manifests itself.
Prehension. Concrescence describes a genetic process in which multiple things
in the universe organically unify. Prehension is a term that describes the
activity of each of the actual entities when they make a concretion or unit with
other entities. The unity of the universe is constructed by way of the prehension
of entities upon others. It is the active essence of the actual entity: to be dynamic
in a process that configures the concrescent unit with other entities. A) The
process of the union of entities to others or prehension is on one hand physical,
given that it makes up a relational union between diverse actual entities. B) On
the other hand, it is also an occasion of experience; that is to say, a pulsation
of actuality (a term probably inspired by William James) or a drop of
experience. Therefore, for Whitehead, by attributing everything to prehension,
including the most primordial and primitive actual entities, the quality of
experience continues to move within an evident panpsychist concept. This
prehensive dynamics as an occasion or event of experience is a necessary
metaphysical consideration for a unitary vision of the universe. Without it, a
metaphysics that understood the harmony between human and animal life as
processes of experience open to the universe as a unitarily lived environment
(in the style of Gibson) would not be possible. Terminal psychic experience is
possible because actual entities are always produced (a radice) by a germinal
occasion or event of experience.
Representative apprehension and feeling. Nevertheless, the occasion of
experience, attributed by Whitehead to all actual entities in their prehensive
dynamic, should not be confused with given and eventual representative and
cognitive apprehension in the higher animal and of course in the human world.
The general concept of prehension does not include, therefore, consciousness,
thought or knowledge (nor the psychic subject derived of these). Knowledge
can be thought of as a higher a-prehension or con-prehension that unifies
complex groups of actual entities that mutually imply and modify one another.
However, the perception of knowledge is founded in the germinal primordial
prehensive unification; it is already perceptive, a complex occasion of
experience. So, for Whitehead, all knowledge is formed in a non-cognitive
prehension united with the primordial actual entities.
Prehension is to sense sensation. It is the operation by which the prehended
produces and effect in the subjectivity of the actual entity. Experience, which is
the same as sensing, is likewise a state of affective tonality (to notice) produced
for what is prehended (object or data) in the actual entity that prehends (active
subject of concrescence). Whitehead therefore is not Kantian: it is not the subject
that constitutes experience but rather the experience (sensation) that constitutes
God is the guide of the realization of the eternal objects (formal) in the
concrescence of the actual entities 6.
God is, therefore, that fundamental entity that allows for the transformation
from potentiality to actuality, including ontological potentiality (the first
argument) or as formal potentiality, eternal objects (second argument). God as
the foundation of the possible transformation of formal potentiality into actuality
appears to us as primordial nature (like for example the mental pole of God).
At the same time, considered as the foundation of the produced transformation
form ontological potentiality to physical actuality in time, we would be referring
to the consequent nature of God (its physical pole).
According to the conception of Whitehead, God is eternal like the world
(reality is finite and limited but lacks a beginning and an end). However, God
does not form part of the world because its fundamental functions are always
alleged to be the ontological basis of the world; a ground where actual
entities assume their temporal role. God is, in this sense, above time or in a non-
temporal condition that makes the space-time of the world possible by way of
its formal and ontological being. God is the foundation of the world without
being a part of it.
God as an unexplained but necessary explanation. The world of actual entities,
in the first metaphysics of Whitehead, is insufficient to explain what they
have produced by themselves in the process of concrescence in the history of
the universe. They are insufficient and need to have reference to a fundamental
basis, understood to be God, which contains, representatively, the universe of
formal possibilities (mental pole) and ontologically, the universe of the physical
possibilities of concrescence in the enriching evolution of the universe (physical
pole). Therefore Whitehead thinks in a similar way to traditional theist philosophy:
the world is insufficient to give reason to itself and it is necessary to postulate
the existence of God as the basis of being. To metaphysically conceive of the
world and go toward its ultimate fundamental roots, we arrive at the ultimate
limitation, which is God. There is nothing beyond that limit; it is the last thing,
ontologically stable and without time which confers to the world a basis. This
6
Note that Whiteheads arguments are worthy of attention. The first is congruent with
something that modern physics has noticed from many perspectives. Quantic flow the
appearance and disappearance of particles assumes an ontological background as reference,
which is currently called quantic vacuum. Whitehead understands this ontological
background as necessary, and identifies it with divine reality; in contrast, modern science
limits itself to the hypothesis about an impersonal background from the fluctuations of which
emerges reality. Whiteheads presupposition that God is the ontological background is also
justified because the organization of the world in its concrescence process should be regulated
by eternal objects that could only be in Gods mind. With the same presupposition, modern
science sees things differently: It is the nature itself of matter that, according to its ontological
properties, blindly determines the rational structure which gradually, through an evolutive
Darwinian process, shapes the complex structure of the world. Modern science thus explains
the process as autonomous: God or a soul of the world that guides the natural process is
not necessary for science. We will refer to these extremes later.
basis, God, is the beginning of determination and the concrete nature of nature
but is not in itself derived from anything. It is the last in the sense that it is
necessary to postulate metaphysically of an entity that is the basis for and
determines unstable events without itself being founded or determined. We refer
to God as being necessary; as the necessary principle to base the world (the
real and the formal).
God is, then, the fundamental explanatory factor. Nevertheless, at the same
time, God is not a possible as a rational explanatory object. It is the ultimate
irrationality that rationally explains the universe. In a famous quote from the
last page of chapter eleven of SMW, we are told in a slightly cryptic way: God is
the ultimate limitation, and His existence is the ultimate irrationality God is not
concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality. No reason can be given for
the nature of God, because that nature is the ground of rationality (SMW, cap. XI).
How can we understand what divine irrationality means? My personal
interpretation is the following: The world, in the previous sense, is not self
sufficient or absolute: it must be based on an entity that is neither concrete or
determinable from a subsequent dimension: it must be the last, the ontological
basis, sufficient and non-temporal: we can infer that it is the basis and we can
attribute to it necessity (the necessary permanence in being once we know that
it exists). However, this entity that is the basis for the rationality of the world is
not, in turn by itself rational because we cannot explain it. We know that God
exists but not how or why. We cannot speak rationally about the ultimate limit.
We cannot say, for example, that God is that whose essence is to necessarily
exist; we do not know what God is like or what its essence is. The world, for
Whitehead tells us that god should exist and as the basis for being we consider
it necessary.
But if the world does not bring us to God but rather to another explanatory
entity (like for example, a pure world, without God), we should also postulate
the need for that entity. Nevertheless, classical questions such as why does
something exist instead of nothing? do not have a rational answer and belong
to the last realm of the irrational (what we can not explain) of which Whitehead
tries to explain 7.
This is the interpretation that is also offered by Alix Parmentier. As can be
seen from the following quote: Whitehead, at the same time affirms the need
7
I emphasize in the text some considerations about the metaphysics of the natural mind
that I deem important. 1) Human reason primarily seeks to explain empirical facts by situating
them within a reference system considered as sufficient, self-sufficient, or absolute from
the viewpoint of maintaining its own existence. 2) The attribution of necessity is produced in
a second moment: whatever is established as absolute (pure world or God) should be
considered as necessary. 3) Thus, reason, in principle, could attribute necessity both to God
and to a pure world without God. In our opinion, the principle of some schools of classical
metaphysics is not acceptable, since it considers necessity as attributable only to God. These
considerations are essential in order to understand that man, situated in the interior of an
enigmatic universe, remains equally open to a God-creator hypothesis and to a pure-world-
without-God hypothesis.
for human intelligence to be guided, to establish the existence of God and the
impossibility to find a way to form a concept (of God). We can metaphysically
discover that God exists (and this is the ultimate requirement of human intelligence
and its grandeur) but we cannot know what it is. We can know its existence but
not its determination (Parmentier, 491ss). He also observes that to put God as
the beginning of necessary determination does not imply that we should give him
a reason: it is the ultimate limitation, that it is not possible to give a reason it
escapes all rationality that is on top of it and is able to explain it. From there,
God does not allow itself to be deduced (Parmentier, 492) and it is the ultimate
irrational that is necessary in order to confer rationality to the world.
The primordial nature of God. The primordial nature of God is considered to
be the basis of absolute universal potentiality. Nevertheless, as pure potentiality,
God does not yet have any real physical entity; as a consequence, God does not
have consciousness, it is unconscious. It is really difficult to see Whiteheads
point of view. It is clear, if we think that God, although eternal and non-temporal,
does not have identity apart from the world: it is realized through the actual
identities that make concrete and real being and the formal possibilities based
in the formal and ontological potentiality of divinity. The evolutionary process
of the universe comes up through the basic potentialities that are sustained by
divinity. The ontological rise, the new perfection in the creation of the eternal
objects as well as the subjective aspiration (feeling) of all the actual entities make
God (both ontologically and formally) the object of desire in the universal process.
The consequent nature of god. It is not possible to understand Whitehead if
God is attributed a primordial nature that maintains an existence at the margin
of its consequent nature. God eternally keeps primordial nature and consequent
nature like an untiring base of the world. The distinction that a philosopher
makes when describing the does not suppose a real distinction between them
(God has never existed as pure primordial nature at the margin of its consequent
nature).
Enjuto Bernal 8 explains the nature of Whiteheads God in similar terms to
other authors (e.g. Alix Parmentier). God created the world by way of his
primordial nature, although we should not interpret create here in its classical
sense: it is more akin to make possible. The continuing process of creation that
is given in the temporal world, made possible by the principle of divine
materialization, makes it possible to continue the enrichment of that phase of
Divinity (153). God then, from the perspective of eternity, is based on the actual
entities in concrescence: only in them the transfer from potentiality to actuality
is produced and God does not have an actual being apart from the world. This
physical actualization of God is given through the world, in both actual entities
and their process: it does not have another form of physical actualization and
only in it does it come to make its formal and ontological potentialities concrete.
8
ENJUTO BERNAL, JORGE, La filosofa de Alfred North Whitehead, Tecnos, Madrid, 1967.
These are made actual by way of the impulse that God offers to the process of
the world. God therefore does not create the world: god and the world have
always existed. However, the work of God brings the best out of the world and
tries to act over it to make it perfect 9.
Through this consequent nature, God prehends each and every one of the
actual entities. They are able to be distinguished because God is not another
element in the world but rather its formal and ontological basis. God is a personal
being, actualized from and by the actual entities. Whenever Whitehead speaks
of God, it seems that he is talking about a personal being that somehow responds
to what everyone calls God and gives meaning to religion. But its consequent
nature is incomplete, new born and processual, actual and conscious, constant
and eternal, without beginning or end; God is in process by way of the process
of the world. However, because of the process of the world, God is open to the
potential realm of its primordial nature; potentiality that only by way of
consequent nature makes god real and conscious as such.
The superjective nature of God. Whitehead considers that the vision of the
universe, in order for it to be congruent, attributes a pole of subjective experience
or feeling to all actual entities. When we refer to lower actual entities, we cannot
attribute to them the condition of being a psychic being (and a fortiori
consciousness). However, they should possess a certain primordial feeling or
experience. From this ontological condition of the actual entities, the complex
psychic experience in biology and humanity can be derived. Whitehead is to some
degree panpsychist. The experience is united with the physical construction of
the actual entities and to the process of the prehensions that integrate one another
in the universes unitary process of concrescence. A feeling of satisfaction, fruition
or ontological enjoyment can be attributed to this experiential pole of process.
Because the process is a realization of ontological and formal potentialities that
are founded by Divinity, the process is a fruition of Divinity. Life, whether it
is known or not by the one living it, is a fruition of the divine.
9
In our opinion, the idea that God is not a creator and should be conceived as the soul
of the world, understood in a more or less platonic sense, is one of the principal weaknesses
of Whiteheads thought. 1) In the first place, such idea makes it difficult for traditional Christian
theology, whether Catholic or Protestant, to accept his metaphysics. 2) Furthermore, this idea
of God entails a mode of understanding divine kenosis that is basically insufficient. The divine
limitation before the world is not a full self-limitation because it is imposed by a cosmos
that is eternal like God and that imposes the constrictions (to which God is subject) of its own
ontology. It is true that, for Whitehead, this God that is subject to the world seeks to relate
with man not by imposition but by persuasion. But there is a manner of understanding kenosis
that is richer than presenting the creation of an autonomous world that presupposes Gods
absolute self-limitation before human freedom and history. In our opinion, which we will
explain later, one should speak of an epistemological kenosis (the creation of an autonomous
world where God creates freedom by not imposing himself on human knowing) rather than
an ontological kenosis (which presupposes the real loss of Gods omnipotence and
omniscience). The development of process philosophy-theology towards a new understanding
of God and kenosis would be necessary for its full integration in the mainstream Christian
Churches.
Applying God to the subjective nature of the world, given that God makes it
happen by way of its consequent nature in the physical pole of the actual
entities, results in God taking on the global subjectivity present in the process
of the world and creating it from that. This is, for Whitehead, the superjective
nature of God. That in which Divinity takes on the fruition created in the totality
of the process. With respect to whether God is one thing or another, rather than
the base of all things, it can also be said that this divine feeling is integrated
within the pure formal and ontological potentiality present in divinity; it is
universal subjectivity physically constituted in the real process of the world and
the opening to the horizon to the next enrichment by way of the process of
concrescence. In this superjective nature of god, which opens everything and all
has a real presence; all subjective individual experience is assumed or integrated.
This is what happens with human beings and it is one of the ways to approach
the problem of immortality from the perspective of Whiteheads philosophy.
Theistic metaphysics as an option for congruence. It is important to note that
Whitehead constantly rejected the idea that his metaphysics could be something
like the object of a demonstration. It seems that Whitehead only attributed a
certain proven value to the ontological argument (that which Hartshorne later
gave so much importance) and even then, it was not so clear. So then, what value
should we attribute to his primary metaphysics? One must admit that it is the
work of reason and therefore should be presented as a rational option for
congruence to fit into the world. Man intuits that the process that weighs him
down responds to this metaphysical framework: it is congruent, rational and
illuminating but it cannot be demonstrated. Because of this, we can say, in line
with Whitehead, that it has even more value when man can freely place himself
in this congruence. It is a congruence that is assumed but cannot be demonstrated.
It is what happens with philosophical viewpoints given that demonstrations are
things of science, and even then it is difficult.
The God that comes from the teachings of Christ is instead of a Despot-God,
a Loving God that works for love and persuasion. Instead of Motor-immobile,
a Loving God that endures the suffering of the world. In place of a Moralistic
God, a loving God that saved the present immediacy by way of constantly
assuming it within its own harmony. God is the Eros that communicates with
every actual entity, freely and without imposing its subjective tendency, its finality
and the ideal of its pure realization (primordial nature). God is that which receives
the reaction of the physical world and transforms, upon accepting it, all suffering
(consequent nature). God is that whose loving immanence penetrates the
immediacy of all experience; the end of which his providence orders all, is an
immediate fruition (superjective nature) (Parmentier, 453-54).
For Whitehead, the traditional Greco-roman Christian theology assumes the
metaphysics of an absolute being that is all powerful and omniscient, the only
source of all being, immutable, existing independently and indifferent before all
relation with the world. This idea of God that has subsisted up till now must be
substituted by the idea of a God of process, inside the bounds of time and space,
that gives space for a better reinterpretation of the same Christianity; that is to
say, of the teachings of Christ.
Divine persuasion. The idea that God does not works upon the world in a
coercive way but rather through persuasion, is a meaningful formulation of
which Whitehead constantly repeated in the theology of process. This discovery
makes him realize that God works by way of persuasion which is one of the
greatest advancements in the history of religious thought; it is the advance that
pretends to break away from the classical philosophy-theology of Christianity,
which in its grand theological systems always worked within the framework of
god as a dominator that always imposed by way of reason and moral order and
as such constituted a coercive principle that dominated the lives of individuals.
We can see this idea in many of his works, but above all others in Adventures of
ideas. The continuous action of God is to move, from within, the concrescient
opening of beings towards the achievement of their formal and ontological
growth: it is an action that is persuasive, loving and gentle because it does not
interfere with or put conditions on the freedom of movement of nature and only
comes from itself, although under the impulse of a divine force that is persuasive
and not coercive which tries to bring the world to better itself. The action of God
is the victory of persuasion over force. This is the way of thought that introduced
Whitehead to the philosophy of Plato, but he thought it should constitute one
of the axes of the modern reform of religion.
Evil and the divine limitation of omnipotence and omniscience. The God of
Whitehead is not a creator: this is the type of God that belongs to classical
Christianity and should be rejected. Whiteheads metaphysics does not have a
divine being that lives transcendently apart from the world and that decides to
create at a certain time. For Whitehead, the Christian God is the God-Foundation
of a world that is understood as eternal. God and the world, the process, are what
they are and he did not create them. He is, therefore, not responsible for the
process of the world. God is the foundation that makes the formal and ontological
process possible and moves it forward towards good, towards the optimal.
However, God is not the designer nor creator of process. God must abide by what
is: he is not omnipotent to interfere, without limit, with process. God is only the
ultimate limitation necessary and the beginning of the concrescence of process.
Whats more, in the same way, he is not omniscient with respect to the final
development of the process, given that it depends on itself and its own impulses
and in ultimate terms, its freedom. The God of Whitehead is a God limited by
the world, and in this sense, cannot be characterized as self limited given that
he is not the creator of designer of his own limits. Evil, then, is inherent in the
universe in the sense that disorder and disorientation of process can be derived
from order, harmony and the good of process by way of its own autonomous and
free dynamic. God, in some sense, suffers evil in the same way that actual entities
do, by seeing the impulse towards good blocked. God, immersed in process (by
way of its primordial, superjective and consequent nature) is not responsible for
Evil but rather the fellow sufferer that understands, the faithful friend that suffers
as we do, who accompanies us and who understands us.
Whitehead as a religious thinker. The way in which God is, in effect, justified
and described in Whiteheads metaphysics can arouse doubts. There are doubts
as to whether the God that is described is a personal being and also as to whether
the personal life of man is individually saved in an afterlife. There is no doubt,
however, as to what Whitehead believes with respect to congruence, within his
system, of a personal God that assumes and saves for eternity the survival of all
personal life. He is conscious of it being argued in a new form of religion, more
appropriate for the modern world, but definitely a way of religion that assumes
the original form of human religion that has always been and in all cultures.
Whatever Whitehead is according to Parmentier he is a religious thinker.
There are three main reasons that we consider sufficient to make this claim. For
him, the universe would not now how to exist without God (although God did
not create it ex nihilo); without God, the reality that would exist would be
unintelligible. A metaphysics without God would be contradictory. He has seen
that the religious attitude was a fundamental dimension of man; a dimension
without which man would not know how to be himself. He has seen that the
essential part of religious attitude was adoration. Evidently, this adoration, for
Whitehead, is not directed at a creator in the strong sense of the term; whats
left is nothing less than that man, for Whitehead, could not exist without God
and that the recognition of this relationship is translated as adoration and the
adoration of love. He has understood that the religious attitude was not intrinsic
in metaphysics but rather that there not only could be but should be cooperation
between religious intuition and speculative intelligence. Underlining this has
nothing to do with wanting to assimilate Whitehead into Thomism or even into
the teachings of Aristotle or wanting to make him a believer of orthodoxy. He
would not even be allowed to his system of though into a church or the traditional
philosophy of Catholicism (Parmentier, 537).
The complex adventure of ideas, proposed by Whitehead has been the object
of enthusiastic evaluations from these, the philosophy-theology of process was
born and negative critical judgements, as much from the perspective of classical
protestant theology (for example the Church of England) as from catholic
theology. However, before evaluating the theological aspects it is convenient to
consider Whitehead from a purely scientific and philosophical perspective.
ether and today it might be called quantum vacuum (remember the concept
of implied order in the heterodoxical philosophy of physics of David Bohm).
This background field, that is purely physical and impersonal, this offers the
ontological resources that are necessary for the evolution, apparition and
disappearance of particles, order, novelty, creativity and ontological ascent of
the universe. However, how is the universe born out of the primordial ontology
of the universe? We can know things, but we do not know the last theory. String
theory and superstrings are an example of the huge speculative effort of modern
theoretical physics to conceive of the primordial properties of matter that
beyond the era of Plank generate the universe and produce both quantum
mechanics and classic relativist mechanics.
Formal sufficiency of the universe. Modern science also explains why evolutionary
processes have moulded complex formal structures (what Whitehead called eternal
objects). The reasons that have driven their evolution in the way that science has
shown depend on the very same ontology as that of matter. Matter, in effect,
presents certain properties by default that are measureable as constants and
variables that respond to certain values; from there, their progressive organization
is born and the laws of this organization respond. The laws are, therefore, the
description of the factual result of evolution: they are not a previous presupposition.
In this way, matter has gone on producing forms that do not depend on a quasi-
platonic world of eternal objects but rather they bud from the same dynamic
of structural organization in function of their primordial properties. Form and
structure is born from ontological material. However, man, because of reason (as
it is explained in epistemology), being inspired by the structures that have already
been produced, can imagine other possible forms and structures. This is how
formal sciences are definitively born as products of the human mind; they do not
reflect an intuition of eternal objects (in the platonic style of Whitehead) but rather
they are an imaginative product constructed by human reason that is inspired by
real structures.
The evolutionary-processual sufficiency of the universe. In any case, modern
science offers a description of the universe as a consistent and congruent system
in itself like the structure of dynamic interactions in space and time. For modern
science, it is very difficult to introduce God as an immediate and precise factor
of intelligibility for the universe. To put God into the world is to put him in a
secular context where science builds its explanations without the need for theism.
in the same way that Aristotle needed the unmoving motor. In reality, the God
of Aristotle like that of Whitehead is a part of a universe that is eternal in itself.
This theistic reasoning distinct from that of classical Christianity prompts
certain considerations. These will follow below.
Problems of Whiteheads metaphysics. Classical metaphysics considers the
world to be contingent; that is to say it is not sufficient, absolute nor necessary.
In order to justify its point of view, Christian metaphysics has a modern dialogue
with science. It takes into account facts like the origin of the universe, its
development in time towards the future, its eventual consistency and stability
as a system, the rationality of its design, etc. The universe does not seem to have
in and of itself, as it is constructed, absoluteness or sufficiency. Because of this,
it makes sense to place them in a transcendent reality in the universe. A reality
that should have sufficiency, absoluteness and necessity, as well as the ability
to found and produce the universe through creation attributed to it. This classical
metaphysics therefore understands that God, as said by scholars, is not found
in secondary causes but rather as the primary cause; this is when ultimate
absoluteness and necessity are searched for within a proper philosophical, not
only scientific, discourse. Because of this, the world is a system of coherent
secondary causes that present a functional autonomy and sufficiency. The
universe, once created, works by itself; without a God that needs to correct
errors. In this way, classical theistic arguments float on the metaphysical edges
of science.
Whitehead in turn, does not question the world at this ultimate level of
primary causality (in its absoluteness and necessity) given that the world is
eternal: that is absolute and necessary. Whiteheads problem is that of explaining
the system of secondary causes, because they do not seem to constitute a
system that is sufficient but rather introduce the reference of God and an element
of the world that contributes to what the world is from the inside.
Here is an example to understand the idea better, although we are aware that
is presents it in a simplified way. Consider a complex device (a computer, a car, etc.).
Classical metaphysics does not question whether this device functions
autonomously in a congruent and sufficient way, as it is presented here. It would
question these things in ways that science could not answer: their undefined
persistence in time, their origin, their ration design, etc., focusing on the problem
of their ultimate absoluteness and necessity. In turn, Whitehead would take for
granted that this device is absolute necessary and eternal in time. Because of this,
he would not ultimately question the sufficiency of the world. Nevertheless, his
argumentation would say that this device does not show an intelligible function
if the existence of a God that forms part of its internal ontology is postulated.
According to our image, God would be necessary for the functioning of the device
whether it be a computer, a car or whatever.
Whiteheads way of thinking, according to my understanding, presents many
difficulties. A) The first is that today, science shows its ability to explain how
and why the universe has evolved from the initial properties of matter. Science
Assuming that God exists and is real, for both Catholic and Protestant Christian
theology, it would be the fundamental reality and origin of being that
transcends the universe and to which we attribute creation. Therefore, God
would have created the universe that our reason understands (in science and
philosophy). The universe, according to this, is presented as an enigmatic universe
that (from the point of view of science and philosophy) permits arguments that
make the atheist hypothesis, without God, credible (as well as being agnostic).
Therefore, if god exists, it has created a universe in which his existence is not
evident (given that atheism is possible). Therefore, God, the creator, has not
rationally imposed its presence in the world (although there are arguments
that make his existence rationally credible). Therefore God the creator has
renounced the creation of a theocentric world, in which his existence is imposed
by evidence: God has been hidden (kenosis) 10.
10
I defended many years ago the importance of a theology of kenosis as a means to re-
think Christianity within a scientifically modern world. My article entitled Kenosis: Towards
a New Theology of Science is found in Pensamiento, vol. 63, n 238 (Science, Philosophy and
Religion, Special Series, n 1, 2007), pp. 637-658. The explanation of how I understand kenosis
in this article can complement the comprehension of the value I give to the thought of Whitehead
and his theology of kenosis.
The theology of kenosis can be reconciled with the classical idea of God in
Christianity. The real God should be thought of as omnipotent and omniscient
(including the knowledge of the previsions of probabilistic, statistical, and chaotic
development of an autonomous universe created in time). God should be
understood as a foundation of the universe in the modern panentheistic sense
(Arthur Peacocke). God created the autonomous universe that, from the point of
view of human understanding, appears enigmatic and by which man should decide
the path of his life by way of a free and personal commitment. The kenosis of God
in creation is not ontological (because god never looses his omnipotence) but
rather epistemological (because he creates an enigmatic world for human
understanding). The Christian God is the God which trough kenosis (not having
imposed its presence) creates a universe that makes human freedom possible.
One of the things that Whiteheads thinking has given has been the rethinking
of kenosis and the auto-limitation of God in the world. God, insists Whitehead,
does not seek to impose himself but rather seeks a relationship with man based
in offering, friendship and persuasion. In addition, his idea of the union of the
world with God has allowed for the presentation of a positive vision of morality,
based on the enthusiasm of natural experience. God, for Whitehead, is also not
responsible for Evil because he does not create the world; on the contrary, he is
subject to the conditions established in the same world and tries to overcome it
and guide it to perfection. Kenosis or divine auto-limitation, for Whitehead, is
only partial because a large part of divine limitation is imposed by the nature
of the eternal world (not created) of which God form a part. If we consider
Whitehead from the point of view of his possible harmony with classical Christian
theology (both catholic and protestant), the most important problem is the idea
of a non-creator God, limited by a conditional and eternal universe. In our
opinion, not only is it difficult to find a balance between this soul of the world
God and science and philosophy but also with theology and the traditional
religious experience. In our understanding, this is the crucial point that the
theology of process must revise and develop (by trying to avoid, shall we say,
being confined within its own scholasticism). If it develops, the theology of
process would not only be compatible with traditional Christian theology but
would mean an unquestionable enrichment for this theory both in the essential
idea of Christianity as freedom and in substantial questions of moral theology
and in theology related to Evil in personal life and in history.
RESUMEN: Comparando fuentes para la historia del primitivo materialismo indio y griego, el autor sea-
la las similitudes y diferencias que pueden apreciarse dentro de las caractersticas generales de ambas
tendencias filosficas.
PALABRAS CLAVE: filosofa india, filosofa griega, historia del materialismo, Carvaka, lokayatas, Aristi-
po de Cirene, Teodoro el Ateo, Epicuro.
1
FRAUWALLNER, E., History of Indian Philosophy, I (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1953 [first
Indian edition, 1973]), 215-226; WARDER, A. K., A Course in Indian Philosophy (Motilal Banar-
sidass, Delhi, 1998), 32-39, 119-123; vid. SEVILLA RODRGUEZ, M., Los materialistas indios en el
cdigo de Manu: Pensamiento 60 (2004) 137-143; La etiologa del materialista indio Carvaka en
el Mahabharata: Pensamiento 62 (2006) 321-328. El materialismo indio es conocido en los tex-
tos con el trmino snscrito lokayata y a sus seguidores se les conoce como lokayatas o lokayatikas
(dirigidos al mundo: loka-ayata-?). Otro trmino con el que son conocidos es el de nastikas,
ya que consideran que nada trascendente existe; nastika es un derivado nominal de nasti, con-
traccin de na asti no es, no existe. Tambin se les denomina como carvakas por referencia
a un primitivo fundador no divino de tal corriente de pensamiento, conocido como Carvaka
(la letra c nota una africada palatal sorda, como el dgrafo ch en espaol, en la transcripcin
de la escritura devanagar).
2
Vase CHATTOPADHYAYA, D., Carvaka / Lokayata. An Anthology of Source Materials and
Some Recent Studies (South Asia Books, New Delhi, 1994), para las fuentes.
3
Una de tales fuentes es la obra dramtica Prabodhacandrodaya, de Kr.s.n.a Misra, siglo XI,
vid. NAMBIAR, S. K., Prabodhacandrodaya of Kr.s.n.a Misra (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1971), 1,
en la que los materialistas indios aparecen ridiculizados por el autor, tal como ocurre con
PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749 PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), nm. 242, pp. 847-864
13_MartinSEVILLA.qxd:Maqueta.qxd 17/10/08 10:34 Pgina 848
Scrates en Las nubes de Aristfanes; vase CHATTOPADHYAYA, D., Lokayata, A Study in Ancient
Indian Materialism (Peoples Publishing House, New Delhi, 1959), 10.
4
Los suras fueron originariamente espritus buenos que posteriormente se rebelaron
contra los dioses y se convirtieron en demonios.
5
El sacerdote capelln de los dioses.
6
Tambin llamados en consecuancia barhaspatyas, seguidores de Br.haspati, por refe-
rencia al origen mtico de la misma.
7
MLLER, F. M., The Upanishads, vols. I y XV, of The Sacred Books of the East (The Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1900, 1884 [reprinted by Motilal Banarsidass, 1965]), LXVII.
8
Es inevitable recordar aqu a Empdocles, pero aunque ste y su maestro Parmnides
puedan ser considerados materialistas en cuanto que tenan al Ser como material, aceptan
sin embargo rasgos del orfismo o pitagorismo como la transmigracin de las almas, lo que
los materialistas indios rechazan principalmente.
9
CHATTOPADHYAYA (1994): 266.
10
DIGENES LAERCIO, Vidas de filsofos, X,137; SEXTO EMPRICO, Compendio de pirronismo,
III,194; CICERN, Sobre los fundamentos del bien y el mal, I,30.
11
Esto es, no aceptan que pueda haber conclusin de un silogismo que tenga como pre-
misa mayor una proposicin del tipo de todo lo que tiene humo tiene fuego, cf. SEVILLA
RODRGUEZ, M., Sexto Emprico y los materialistas indios: el problema de la induccin: Archivum
XLIV-XLV 2 (1994-1995) 71-80.
12
Citaremos en primer lugar textos snscritos de la obra dramtica Prabodhacandrodaya,
de Kr.s.n.a Misra, siglo XI, Segundo Acto.
13
Todos los textos que se citarn a continuacin, tanto snscritos como griegos, han sido
traducidos por el autor de este trabajo.
14
Granengao o Mahamoha es hijo de Manas, Pensamiento, y de Pravr. tti, Activi-
dad. Padre e hijo han sometido al padre y abuelo de ambos, Purus.a, el Hombre, por medio
de engaos, y como gran aliado de Mahamoha se encuentra Carvaka, el materialista, cf.
NAMBIAR: 4-5.
.
15
Edicin de COWELL, E. B. - GOUGH, A. E., Sarvadarsanasangraha of Madhavacarya, Trans-
lated by - and Edited by K. L. Joshi (Parimal Publications, Delhi, 1882 [reimpresin, 1986]).
El ttulo podra traducirse como Compendio de todos los sistemas: es una obra que recoge
las principales caractersticas de los sistemas de pensamiento indio y parece haber sido com-
puesta en el siglo XIV. En ella se dedica al pensamiento materialista indio un captulo, el pri-
mero, que aunque corto en extensin constituye un pequeo resumen de las ideas que debie-
ron haber conformado tal movimiento desde sus comienzos.
Epicuro (342/1-271/0 a.C.) elabora todo un complejo proceso para explicar cmo
se produce el conocimiento. Pero en la base estn igualmente las sensaciones:
I N,FJ06H *, JX8@H ?B48@(\.,F2"4 6" B?F"< J< ?<VD(,4"<s ?Nr ?<
J? *@>".`:,<" <V(@:,<q , * :Zs BV<J" 6D4F\"H 6" J"D"P0 yH FJ"4
:,FJVq + :VP BVF"4H J"H "F2ZF,F4<s @P >,4H @*r H NH "J<
*4,R,F2"4 BDH J\ B@4@b:,<@H J< <"(T(< 6D\<H 19.
Es necesario llegar a la conclusin de que la ltima referencia es lo que exis-
te y toda la evidencia a la que remitimos las cosas que opinamos. Si no, todo
estar lleno de confusin y desorden. Si rechazas todas las sensaciones no ten-
drs ni aquellas que te sirven de referencia para juzgar las que dices que son
falsas (Digenes Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, X,146) 20.
5. EN EL MBITO DE LA FSICA
16
Texto griego citado de la edicin de GIANNANTONI, G., Socratis et socraticorum reliquiae,
II (Bibliopolis, Napoli, 1990), 93.
17
Texto griego citado de la edicin de HICKS, R. D., Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent
Philosophers, I (The Loeb Classical Library, London, 1925).
18
Texto latino citado de la edicin de AX, W., De natura deorum (B. G. Teubner, Stutt-
gart, 1933).
19
Texto griego citado de la edicin de HICKS, R. D., Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent
Philosophers, II (The Loeb Classical Library, London, 1925).
20
Vase tambin Lucrecio, Sobre la naturaleza de la realidad, IV, 478-499.
Y tambin en Prabodhacandrodaya:
yan n#sty eva tad asti vastv iti m[{# jalpadbhir ev#stikair
v#c#lair bahubhis tu satyavacaso nindy#1 k[t# n#stik#1 |
ha8 ho pa^yata tattvato yadi puna^ chinn#d ito var{ma<#8
d[{}a1 ki8 pari<#mar pitaciter j3va1 p[thak kair api || 17 ||
atra catv#ri bh t#ni bh miv#ryanal#nil#1 | caturbhya1 khalu bh tebhya^ caitan-
yam upaj#yate | ki<v#dibhya1 sametebhyo dravyebhyo mada^aktivat |
Los creyentes, muchos y charlatanes, que parlotean con falsedad que una
cosa que no existe, existe,
culpabilizan a los ateos, que dicen la verdad.
Oid, miradlo con realismo: si de nuevo se ha ido por la destruccin de los
cuerpos,
alguien ha visto un alma personal separadamente? [estrofa 17]
A este respecto hay cuatro elementos: tierra, agua, fuego y viento, de los cua-
tro elementos se origina como una consecuencia el pensamiento, como la capa-
cidad de embriagar [se origina] de sustancias reunidas, fermentos, etc..
El hombre no sera en ltimo trmino otra cosa que un agregado de los cua-
tro elementos primordiales, de los que, como un subproducto, surgira la facul-
tad de pensar. Llama la atencin el hecho de sealar como a los ltimos cons-
tituyentes de las cosas, los cuatro elementos: tierra, agua, fuego, aire, en
coincidencia con los FJ@4P," de Empdocles, de cuya mezcla las cosas surgen
y en su muerte a ellos vuelven 23.
21
El materialismo.
22
Los elementos.
23
DIELS, H. - KRANZ, W., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, I (Weidmannsche Verlag-
sbuchhandlung, Berlin, 1952), 287-288 [Lehre 28]: @J@H * J? :< FT:"J46? FJ@4P," B@4,
JXJJ"D", BD 6" XD" 6" *TD 6" (0y<, \*4" :< ?<J", B8Z2,4 * 6" 84(`J0J4 :,J"$V88@<J"
6"J? J< Fb(6D4F4< 6" *4V6D4F4<...
24
Vase CICERN, Sobre la naturaleza de los dioses, I,26,73; DIGENES LAERCIO, Vidas de fil-
sofos, X,8.
25
CHATTOPADHYAYA (1994): 266.
26
Vase Mattavilasa Prahasana, Edited and Translated by UNNI, N. P. (Nag Publishers, Delhi,
1998 [primera edicin de 1974]), 6-7; LOCKWOOD, M. - VISHNU BHAT, A., Metatheater and Sanskrit
Drama (Tambaram Research Associates, Madras, 1995), Part Two 3-9; Bhagavadajjukam in
K iya am, by PAULOSE, K. G. (New Bharatiya Book Corporation, Delhi, 2000), 95-106.
27
Tal es mi interpretacin, aunque este texto no ha sido sealado anteriormente, salvo
error, como una de las fuentes para el materialismo indio, cf. CHATTOPADHYAYA (1994).
6. EN EL MBITO DE LA TICA
Los materialistas indios establecen el placer como el fin al que debe aspirar
el hombre. Explcitamente consideraron el placer relacionado con el sexo y el
placer proporcionado por la riqueza. As aparece en las fuentes, no imparciales
tal como se indic anteriormente, ya que todas ellas son textos pertenecientes
al resto de las escuelas filosficas y religiosas, que tenan al materialismo como
enemigo comn.
Desconocemos, por tanto, si los materialistas elaboraron una teora del placer
que distinguiera con mayor precisin diferentes tipos de placer o alguna otra carac-
terizacin asociada a este fin tico. S parece en todo caso que admitieron como
28
Sin duda referencia a los lokayatas o materialistas.
29
Es el discpulo.
un balance por el que deba buscarse el placer aunque llevara aparejado algn
dolor, considerando implcitamente que tal dolor deba ser cuantitativamente
menor que el placer alcanzado. Por otra parte, tal como puede apreciarse, no plan-
tean un fin tico que tenga como referencia una vida ultraterrena. Rechazan la
existencia del alma, tal como se ha visto, y, por tanto, un mundo al que pudiera
acceder tras la muerte. Veamos los textos, primero en Prabodhacandrodaya:
Mah#moha1: (vicintya | sa^l#gham) arthak#mau puru{#rthau | m[tyur ev#pavarga1 |
tad etad asmad abhipr#y#nubandhin# v#caspatin# pra<3ya c#rv#k#ya samarpitam |
tena ca ^i{yopa^i{yadv#re<#smi8 l loke bahul3k[ta8 tantram |
Granengao: (despus de reflexionar, con jactancia) Los fines del hombre son
la riqueza y el deseo amoroso. La muerte es la nica liberacin final. Esto
mismo, tras haberlo establecido, fue transmitido por Vacaspati 30 a Carvaka,
asociado a mis intenciones. Y por Carvaka el sistema ha sido propagado en
este mundo por medio de sus discpulos y los discpulos de sus discpulos.
Y a continuacin en Sarvadar^anasa9graha:
pr#ye<a sarvapr#<inas t#vat
y#vaj j3va8 sukha8 j3ven n#sti m[tyor agocara1 |
bhasm3bh tasya dehasya punar #gamana8 kuta1 ||
iti lokag#th#m anurundh#n# n3tik#ma^#str#nus#re<a arthak#mau eva puru{#rthau
manyam#n#1 p#ralaukikam artham apahnuv#n#1 c#rv#kamatam anuvartam#n#
ev#nubh yante | a9gan#dy#li9gan#dijanya8 sukham eva puru{#rtha1 |
En general a todos los seres vivos se les ve seguir nicamente las ideas de
Carvaka, ya que rindindose a los versos populares:
Mientras hay vida, vive placenteramente:
nadie escapa a la muerte.
Reducido a cenizas tu cuerpo,
de dnde volver de nuevo?
consideran que los fines del hombre son nicamente la riqueza y el amor, segn
las enseanzas sobre la conducta y el deseo amoroso, y rechazan que exista
un fin relacionado con el otro mundo. El fin del hombre es nicamente el pla-
cer que resulta de los abrazos, etc., a las mujeres, etc..
30
Seor de la Palabra, epteto especialmenre referido a Br.haspati, seor de la elocuen-
cia, preceptor de los dioses.
31
Hay cuatro vidyas o ciencias, 1. tray, el triple Veda; 2. anvks.ik, lgica y metafsica;
3. dan.d.anti, la ciencia de gobernar; 4. vartta, artes prcticas, tales como la agricultura, comer-
cio, medicina, etc.; cf. MONIER-WILLIAMS, M., A Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford, 1899) sub voce vidya.
32
The Kaut.ilya Arthasastra, Part I, Edited by KANGLE, R. P. (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi,
1969), 1.2.4-5.
El placer humano, nacido del contacto con los objetos de los sentidos,
debe ser rechazado
porque va acompaado de dolor, as reflexionan los tontos.
Quin, que busque su bienestar, quiere rechazar un arroz rico en granos
blanqusimos
porque estn mezclados con los desperdicios?
35
Rito fnebre en honor y para beneficio de parientes muertos, a los que llegaran los
alimentos ofrendados en el sacrificio.
No parece que este dato se encuentre en ninguna otra fuente, por lo que debe-
ra ser tomado con cautela. Pero no resulta sorprendente que los materialistas,
opuestos a la religin y a la casta detentadora de su administracin, los brahma-
nes, llevaran su crtica racional a otros aspectos de la sociedad en la que vivan,
como el orden social establecido de las cuatro castas 36.
Dicho pasaje contina con un dato an ms sorprendente, si no ha de pen-
sarse en una exageracin adjudicada a los materialistas por el autor de la obra
dramtica:
yo{eya8 vasu c#parasya tad amu8 bheda8 na vidmo vayam |
hi8 s#y#m athav# yathe{}agamane str3<#8 parasvagrahe
k#ry#k#ryavic#ra<# hi yad ni{pauru{#1 kurvate || 18 ||
Esta mujer es de otro y esa riqueza es de otro, nosotros no entendemos
esa diferencia.
Pues dudan sobre lo que debe y no debe hacerse si hay dao,
o si ha de haber sexo a placer con mujeres
y coger los bienes de otro, los que no tienen virilidad.
36
La sociedad aparece dividida en las cuatro castas de los brahman.a o brahmanes, la
casta superior de los sacerdotes; los ks.atriya, la casta guerrera aristocrtica; los vaisya, hom-
bres libres agricultores y ganaderos, comerciantes, artesanos, etc.; y los sudra, la casta infe-
rior constituida por siervos de las otras tres.
Y tambin:
tad uktam
ty#jya8 sukha8 vi{ayasa9gama janma pu8 s#8
du1khopas[{}am iti m rkhavic#ra<ai{# |
vr3h3 jih#sati sitottamata<*ul#*hy#n
ko n#ma bhos tu{aka<opahit#n hit#rth3 ||
Por eso se ha dicho:
Pez semejante al gobio, pero que habita en charcas rocosas de la costa; cf. WENTWORTH
38
THOMPSON, D A., A Glossary of Greek Fishes (Oxford University Press, London, 1947), 32-33.
Por esta razn, muy probablemente, Aristipo se refiere a la mayor facilidad para cogerlo con
la comparacin aludida.
El placer humano, nacido del contacto con los objetos de los sentidos,
debe ser rechazado
porque va acompaado de dolor, as reflexionan los tontos.
Quin, que busque su bienestar, quiere rechazar un arroz rico en
granos blanqusimos
porque estn mezclados con los desperdicios?.
Otro punto de encuentro de los cirenaicos con los materialistas indios sera
el reconocimiento de que el placer es bueno con independencia de la accin o
conducta que lo posibilite. Recordemos a los materialistas indios:
yo{eya8 vasu c#parasya tad amu8 bheda8 na vidmo vayam |
hi8 s#y#m athav# yathe{}agamane str3<#8 parasvagrahe
k#ry#k#ryavic#ra<# hi yad ni{pauru{#1 kurvate || 18 ||
Esta mujer es de otro y esa riqueza es de otro, nosotros no entendemos
esa diferencia.
Pues dudan sobre lo que debe y no debe hacerse si hay dao,
o si ha de haber sexo a placer con mujeres
y coger los bienes de otro, los que no tienen virilidad.
Epicuro tiene algo que decir tambin al respecto, coincidiendo en que nin-
guna clase de placer es en s mismo malo, pero s evitable por el posible dolor
que acarrea:
?*,:\" *@< 6"2z "LJ 6"6<q 88? J? J4<< *@<< B@40J46?
B@88"B8"F\@LH ?B4NXD,4 J?H P8ZF,4H J< *@<<
Ningn placer es malo por s mismo, pero las causas productivas de algunos
placeres ocasionan molestias mucho ms grandes que los placeres (Digenes
Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, X,141).
Por su parte Epicuro, como es bien sabido, considera tambin el placer como
el fin tico:
J`J, (?D *@<0 yH PD,\"< P@:,<s J"< ?6 J@ : B"D,<"4 J< *@<<
8(:,<q J"< * : 8(:,<s @6XJ4 J0
yH *@<0
yH *,`:,2". 6" *4? J@J@
J< *@<< DP< 6" JX8@H 8X(@:,< ,<"4 J@ :"6"D\TH .0
y<q J"bJ0< (?D
("2< BDJ@< 6" FL((,<46< (T:,<s 6" B J"bJ0H 6"J"DP`:,2"
BVF0H "DXF,TH 6" NL(0 yH 6" ?B J"bJ0< 6"J"<J:,< H 6"<`<4 J
BV2,4 B?< ("2< 6D\<@<J,H
Sentimos necesidad del placer cuando nos dolemos por no tener placer y cuan-
do no nos dolemos ya no sentimos necesidad del placer. Y por ello decimos que
el placer es principio y fin de una vida feliz. En efecto, hemos reconocido al pla-
cer como el bien primero y congnito; por l nos guiamos para toda eleccin y
rechazo y a l volvemos cuando juzgamos todo bien tomando como referencia
lo que sentimos (Digenes Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, X,128-129).
Al igual que ya sus antecesores, los cirenaicos, considera tambin que la feli-
cidad, sin embargo, se obtiene con un clculo del placer:
6" ?B, BDJ@< ("2< J@J@ 6" Fb:NLJ@<s *4? J@J@ 6" @ B?F"<
*@<< "D@b:,2"s 88z FJ4< J, B@88?H *@<?H B,D$"\<@:,<s J"<
B8,@< :< J *LFP,DH ?6 J@bJT< B0J"4q 6" B@88?H 8(0*`<"H *@<<
6D,\JJ@LH <@:\.@:,<s ?B,4*?< :,\.T< :< *@< B"D"6@8@L2 B@8?< PD`<@<
B@:,\<"F4 J?H 8(0*`<"H
Y puesto que el placer es el bien primero y congnito, no elegimos en conse-
cuencia cualquier placer, sino que algunas veces dejamos a un lado muchos
placeres, cuando de stos sigue mayor molestia para nosotros. Y pensamos
que muchos dolores son mejores que placeres, cuando nos acompaa un pla-
cer ms grande tras haber resistido mucho tiempo los dolores (Digenes Laer-
cio, Vidas de filsofos, X,129).
7. CONCLUSIONES
cio como necesario para la existencia de los seres es otro punto de coincidencia
entre el filsofo griego y una corriente dentro del materialismo indio.
IV) El fin tico es el placer, tanto en unos como en otros. Todos conside-
ran ms o menos explcitamente que la vida feliz debe consistir en la eleccin
del placer siempre que ste no sea superado por un dolor que lleve aparejado
como consecuencia. Entre los materialistas griegos hay un anlisis de los dife-
rentes tipos de placer que no se encuentra en los materialistas indios. Y a su vez
en stos se encuentra una crtica al sistema social y religioso establecido que no
encuentra parangn en los materialistas griegos.
PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749 PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), nm. 242, pp. 865-887
14_AlfonsoGOMEZ.qxd:Maqueta.qxd 26/6/08 12:03 Pgina 866
1
NAGARJUNA, Fundamentos de la va media, introduccin, notas y traduccin del snscri-
to de Juan Arnau Navarro, Ediciones Siruela, Madrid, 2004. Los datos y leyendas sobre la vida
de Nagarjuna los hemos tomado de la introduccin a esta obra.
2
RAYMOND RUYER, Revue de Metaphysique et Morale, vol. 66, 1961, pp. 1-34.
3
Vase JOS FERRATER MORA, Diccionario de Filosofa, Editorial Alianza, Madrid, 1984.
Voz Dialctica, p. 797.
4
Naturalmente, este trmino resulta extemporneo aplicado a Platn. Como es sabido,
toda la terminologa de las ideas innatas (y el problema de su existencia) procede de la filo-
sofa moderna en el contexto de la polmica entre racionalismo y empirismo. No obstante, la
concepcin de unas ideas que son patrimonio del alma y que no proceden de la experiencia a
travs de los sentidos, est plenamente presente en Platn y, de hecho, constituye la raz fun-
damental de su teora de las ideas. A falta de otro adjetivo para designar con una sola palabra
esta idea, utilizo innato entrecomillado.
trata de la dialctica como deduccin racional para discriminar las ideas, para
distinguir unas de otras y para establecer sus relaciones. Dado que en la filoso-
fa de Platn las ideas constituyen la autntica realidad, la dialctica accede as
al rango de ciencia de la realidad en cuanto tal. Tenemos, pues, dos ideas de la
dialctica en Platn. La dialctica como mtodo y la dialctica como ciencia de
la realidad.
Si pasamos a Aristteles, tambin encontramos dos sentidos da la dialcti-
ca 5, que coinciden, ambos, en degradarla del elevado pedestal en el que Platn
la haba situado. En primer lugar, para Aristteles, la dialctica es una forma
no demostrativa de conocimiento, un conocimiento basado en un razonamien-
to meramente inductivo o probable. Frente al conocimiento universal y nece-
sario, verdaderamente cientfico, aparece una segunda forma de conocimiento,
inferior con relacin a aqul: el conocimiento dialctico, que tendr sentido en
aquellos campos en el que el primero no sea posible. Pero, en segundo lugar, la
dialctica adquiere un sentido decididamente peyorativo en algunos pasajes de
la obra de Aristteles: se trata ahora de un saber no meramente probable, sino
de lo aparentemente tomado como real; esto es, de un pseudo-saber, como es el
caso del razonamiento erstico cuyas premisas no son probables, sino que sola-
mente lo parecen, siendo, en realidad, falsas. Tenemos, pues, dos sentidos de la
dialctica en Aristteles: la dialctica como saber probable y la dialctica como
falso saber.
Dejando a un lado los debates escolsticos acerca de la dialctica, presididos
en gran parte por las ideas aristotlicas, el siguiente autor que nos interesa par-
ticularmente es Kant. Con l se inicia una concepcin de la dialctica como saber
eminentemente crtico (y no slo un pseudo-saber). Tal es, como veremos, la
idea kantiana de la dialctica trascendental. Pero tambin en Kant cabe distin-
guir, al menos, dos sentidos de la dialctica 6. Dialctica es, en primer lugar, para
Kant, la lgica general (se trata de un sentido menos conocido que el citado
antes, pero presente tambin en la obra de Kant). Como afirma el filsofo de
Knigsberg, la lgica general en cuanto rgano, es una lgica de la apariencia,
una lgica dialctica, pues nada ensea sobre el contenido del conocimiento y
slo se limita a exponer las condiciones formales de la conformidad del cono-
cimiento con el entendimiento (KrV B86). En segundo lugar, naturalmente,
tenemos la Dialctica trascendental, esto es, la crtica del tipo de apariencias
que no proceden de la lgica ni de la experiencia, sino de la razn en tanto inten-
ta traspasar los lmites impuestos por la esttica y la analtica trascendentales
a la experiencia posible. En tales casos, la razn intenta conocer por s sola y
segn sus propios principios, el mundo, el alma y Dios, cayendo inevitablemente
en errores e ilusiones. De este modo, la dialctica trascendental es, al mismo
tiempo, la crtica de un pseudo-saber (al mostrar las contradicciones que encie-
rra el intento de la razn pura) y un saber crtico (en tanto explica que estas con-
5
J. FERRATER MORA, op. cit., p. 797.
6
Para esta distincin, vase J. F. MORA, op. cit., p. 799.
7
J. FERRATER MORA, op. cit., p. 800.
8
J. FERRATER MORA, op. cit., p. 803.
2. FILOSOFAS DE LA VACUIDAD
9
Para esta diferencia ver: VV.AA., Diccionario de la sabidura oriental (Budismo, Hin-
duismo, Taosmo, Zaen), traduccin del alemn de Julio Valderrama, Paids, Barcelona, 1993.
Voz Snyata, p. 343.
10
Ibdem, p. 343.
condicionado, y en funcin de sta entiende el vaco: las cosas son vacas por-
que surgen de modo condicionado. La realidad ltima del universo, para el
mahdhyamaka, es snyata, que se caracteriza como cese de la multiplicidad.
As, en el marco de esta doctrina, el trmino vaco significa que ninguna
forma de multiplicidad, ninguna formulacin conceptual o verbal, ni an la
de no-ser, se adecua a la Realidad as denominada. La snyata es el presu-
puesto necesario tanto para la aparicin como para la desaparicin de los entes
y condicin de posibilidad para liberarse del samsra. El yogacara, finalmen-
te, mantiene que las cosas son vacas porque surgen de la Mente (citta). En esta
doctrina, la Mente csmica se identifica con la snyata, lo que constituye una
muy peculiar forma de idealismo.
Conviene precisar que estas doctrinas mahaynicas no son, aunque pudiera
parecerlo a un lector occidental, la expresin de un nihilismo metafsico. La
extensin del concepto de vaco a la totalidad de los fenmenos no significa que
las cosas no existan, sino slo que constituyen fenmeno, apariencia. Todos los
dharmas carecen de subsistencia propia, de sustancia durable, no son ms que
puro fenmeno: no existen fuera del vaco 11. Pero, por ello mismo, recproca-
mente, s existen (aunque slo sea transitoriamente) en ste. El mahayana est
tan lejos de constituir un nihilismo, que equipara la snyata al Absoluto, por-
que est exenta de dualidad y de toda forma emprica.
Tambin en el taosmo, como dijimos, el concepto de vaco desempea un
papel fundamental. Para esta doctrina, el Dao (el camino o principio que cons-
tituye todas las cosas) es inefable, porque el lenguaje es delimitacin, forma que
forja lmites. El Dao, como el vaco, es informe e indeterminado pero, parad-
jicamente, es la fuente de todas las determinaciones y de todas las formas. El
Dao, como el vaco, no es una realidad apresable de forma concreta, directa, lin-
gstica. El captulo XLV del Tao te king lo enuncia poticamente. El Dao que
puede expresarse no es el Dao permanente, el nombre que puede nombrarse no
es el nombre permanente. En tal sentido, el captulo LVIII denomina al Dao
forma de lo informe. Vemos, pues, esta peculiar y paradjica relacin entre
forma, vaco y realidad fundamental o absoluta, que observbamos en el budis-
mo mahayana, tambin en el taosmo. De forma an ms manifiesta, el captu-
lo XLVIII identifica el Dao con el vaco creativo: El Dao es vaco, mas su efi-
ciencia nunca se agota. Es un abismo, parece raz de todos los seres. El vaco
(kung) se relaciona con wu (no hay tal o cual cosa), lo que supone, por
tanto, negacin. En chino, wu es lo opuesto a yu, que sirve para expresar
la afirmacin de existencia. Por tanto, la idea de vaco est ligada, en la lengua
china, a la de negacin, como demuestra que wu sea tambin un sinnimo de
vaco (y as se traduzca a veces). Sin embargo, esto no excluye que, para el taos-
mo, el vaco sea considerado algo creativo como fuente o fundamento de todas
las formas, exactamente lo que es el Dao. As, el captulo LIV del Tao te king,
tras referirse al Dao (por su carcter generador) como el umbral de la hembra
11
Ibdem, p. 343.
misteriosa, afirma que es la raz del cielo y de la Tierra (es decir, de todos
los seres).
En definitiva, vemos que la sabidura oriental se configura como un pensar
de la vacuidad. En estas doctrinas, el vaco se convierte en un concepto central
de sus visiones del mundo, un concepto con significacin ontolgica, pues se
sita en la raz misma de los seres, como su realidad ms fundamental. Se trata
de un vaco que ya no est yuxtapuesto a los seres concretos, a las realidades
materiales, como ha acontecido normalmente con el concepto de vaco cuan-
do se ha pensado en la tradicin occidental (p. ej., en el atomismo de Dem-
crito). Por el contrario, para el pensamiento oriental, el vaco est nsito en las
realidades que nos rodean, constituye su nica naturaleza propia. Las cosas
mismas en su naturaleza ms profunda son impermanentes, insustanciales,
vacas. Y, sin embargo, este vaco, esta insuficiencia, es la que permite el juego
transitorio de las formas. La filosofa occidental se constituye, desde la obra
de Parmnides y de Platn, en Ontologa, en teora o saber del ser, del ente.
Frente a ella, la sabidura oriental es, ya casi desde sus inicios, una reflexin
sobre esa peculiar forma de no-ser que es el vaco. Por ello, el pensar occiden-
tal se ha caracterizado, fundamentalmente, por los conceptos que denotan ple-
nitud y perfeccin (ser, esencia, forma, cosmos, Idea, ) y por los principios
de ordenacin racional de lo existente (razn suficiente, identidad, teleologa,
). Cuando este modo de pensar ha buscado modelos del acontecer fsico, los
ha elaborado con conceptos ntidos y con distinciones tajantes (como lo lleno
y lo vaco en el atomismo de Leucipo y Demcrito). Frente a la luminosa cla-
ridad del discurso occidental del ente, el pensamiento oriental fluidifica los
conceptos, tiende a borrar las fronteras, se expresa en mximas y principios
paradjicos. Porque slo con conceptos sutiles y con ideas paradjicas puede
llegar a apresar la realidad que intenta conocer. En este mbito de pensamiento
se sita la obra de Nagarjuna.
12
NAGARJUNA, op. cit., p. 61.
13
Ibdem, p. 63.
14
Esta observacin procede de David R, Loy. En Nagarjuna, op. cit., p. 61, nota 15. La
implicacin de dos mviles por la citada proposicin se debe a la necesidad de que no sea una
tautologa. Para que tenga un significado no tautolgico es preciso que el sujeto signifique
algo distinto de lo que designa el predicado. Y es por ello que debe tener sentido hablar de un
mvil incluso cuando est en reposo. Lo que, no obstante, resulta paradjico.
15
Ibdem, nota 34, p. 77.
16
Ibdem, p. 11.
17
Ibdem, nota 80, p. 111.
18
Ibdem, p. 107. El texto citado representa exactamente la estrofa primera del captulo X.
19
Ibdem, nota 77, p. 109.
22
Ibdem, estrofas 1, 2, 3, 6 y 7 del captulo VII, pp. 87 y 89.
23
Ibdem, estrofa 14 del captulo VII, p. 91. En general, para todo lo que sigue, ver las
pp. 87-95.
24
Ibdem, nota 58, p. 93.
25
Ibdem, estrofa 34 del captulo VII, p. 95. Se trata de la estrofa que cierra este decisi-
vo captulo y, en cierta manera, resume su conclusin fundamental.
26
Ibdem, estrofas 1 y 2, captulo XV, p. 125.
27
Ibdem, estrofas 3 y 4, captulo XV, p. 125.
Ibdem, nota 99, p. 125. Arnau cita los pargrafos 551 y 552 de la obra pstuma de
29
30
IGNACIO GMEZ DE LIAO, Nagarjuna y el escepticismo griego, en I. G. DE LIAO - M.
CAVALL - A. VLEZ - M. CATENA, Hinduismo y budismo. Introduccin filosfica (Conferencias en
la Facultad de Filosofa de la UCM), Editorial Etnos, Madrid, 1999, p. 29.
31
Ibdem, pp. 31-33.
32
Ibdem, pp. 334-336.
Dado que la filosofa de Nagarjuna defiende, sin duda alguna, estas tesis, no
puede considerarse un escepticismo. Debe observarse que, incluso al margen de
estas ideas filosficas, no podra considerarse una doctrina escptica en sentido
estricto pues, en cualquier caso, presupone las verdades fundamentales del budis-
mo (como las Cuatro Nobles Verdades). Tampoco se trata de un nihilismo, no
estamos ante una filosofa de la nada, del puro no-ser (aunque, una vez ms, su
posicin est prxima al nihilismo, como lo est el escepticismo, pero sin iden-
tificarse con ninguno de los dos). Y ello en virtud, al menos, de dos razones: en
primer lugar, porque rechaza la inexistencia, el puro no-ser (tanto como recha-
za la afirmacin del ser): la verdadera realidad no es, para Nagarjuna, ni ser ni
no-ser, sino algo distinto; en segundo lugar, porque la vacuidad (que tan central
es en su pensamiento) debe entenderse como mera designacin, y no como un
absoluto, lo que supone que el vaco no es la mera nada, sino la existencia rela-
33
NAGARJUNA, op. cit., p. 117.
34
NAGARJUNA, op. cit., p. 119.
37
ROCHARD H. ROBINSON, Some logical aspects of Nagarjunas system, en Philosophy
East and West, vol. 6, 1957. Citado por Juan Navarro Arnau en: NAGARJUNA, op. cit., pp. 177 y
179, nota 184.
EL RETORNO A LA UNIDAD
CUERPO-MENTE
Encuentro de ascesis, terapia y filosofa en Japn
JUAN MASI CLAVEL
Sophia University (Tokyo) / St. Thomas University (Osaka)
MOE KUWANO
Universidad Ramon Llull (Barcelona)
RESUMEN: Los autores han escogido tres personas representativas cuyo pensamiento apunta el cami-
no de retorno hacia la unidad bsica mente-cuerpo en el ser humano, a travs de la integracin del
poder de lo inconsciente en la conciencia: Chih-i (538-597), un monje budista chino; Yasuo Yuasa (1925-
2005), un filsofo japons; y Haruchika Noguchi (1911-1976), un japons que desarroll una terapia
centrada en la interrelacin mente-cuerpo. Los tres coinciden en acentuar la espiritualidad, filosofa y
teraputica sobre el fundamento y el uso del flujo de energa que ha sido descrito en la tradicin chino-
japonesa por medio de la nocin de Ki. Estas tradiciones orientales, en la confluencia de espiritualidad,
filosofa y teraputica son al mismo tiempo una contribucin y un desafio al pensamiento occidental,
al replantear las preguntas en torno al Yo, la Identidad y la Personalidad desde un contexto interdisci-
plinar e intercultural.
PALABRAS CLAVE: cuerpo-mente, filosofa oriental, teraputica, Ki.
PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749 PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), nm. 242, pp. 889-902
15_JuanMASIA.qxd:Maqueta.qxd 27/6/08 07:55 Pgina 890
1
Para la traduccin espaola, elegimos el ttulo de Pararse a contemplar (Sgueme, Sala-
manca, 2006).
2
SUSUMU SHIMAZONO, From salvation to spirituality, Trans Pacific Press, Melbourne,
2004, 275.
3
YASUO YUASA, Obras, ed. Hakua, Tokyo, desde 1999, 12 vols.
4
Y. YUASA, Filosofa moderna japonesa y pensamiento existencial, Sbunsha, Tokyo, 1970.
5
Id., 377.
6
El nacimiento de los dioses. Los mitos japoneses desde la perspectiva de historia del pen-
samiento, en 1972; El mundo espiritual de la antigedad japonesa, en 1980; La conciencia reli-
giosa japonesa, en 1982, y La profundidad de la cultura oriental, en 1982.
7
Jung y el cristianismo, en 1978; Jung y el espritu europeo, en 1979.
8
D. E. SHANER, S. NAGATOMO e Y. YUASA, Science and Comparative Philosophy, Brill, Lei-
den, 1989.
9
Y. YUASA, El cuerpo: Perspectiva oriental sobre cuerpo y mente, 1977 (trad. ingl. por Naga-
tomo Shigenori y Th. P. Kasulis, The Body, State Uniersity of New York Press, Albany, 1987;
El KI, la espiritualidad y el cuerpo (Ki, shugyo, shintai), ed. Hirakawa, Tokyo, 1986; Qu es el
KI? La energa que emana del cuerpo.
10
Y. YUASA, Sobre el cuerpo. Teoras orientales sobre cuerpo-mente (Shintairon. Tyteki
shinshinron to gendai), Kodansha, Tokyo, 1990 (citamos por esta edicin actualizada), 44-47
y 89-92.
11
Ibid., 67.
12
Ibid., 289.
13
Ibid., 95.
14
Ibid., 73.
occidental sobre Nishida. Pero, al mismo tiempo, subraya que en la parte esen-
cial de su pensamiento se detecta un sentimiento de extraeza o malestar ante
ese mundo occidental por el que se estaba dejando influir tanto. La moderni-
dad de Nishida se pone de manifiesto, segn Yuasa, en su preocupacin fun-
damental por el problema del yo, por su descubrimiento, su consolidacin y su
revisin crtica. Pero esta toma de conciencia se realiza a nivel de esa experien-
cia originaria de unidad que Nishida llamaba el lugar de la Nada o pensar
desde el background 15, desde el teln de fondo, sin dejarse absorber por el obje-
to ni encerrarse en la superficie del sujeto, sino retrotrayndose o sumergin-
dose, a travs del cuerpo, hacia el fondo de la conciencia. A esta actitud la deno-
mina Yuasa trascender hacia dentro, en vez de hacia fuera. Es posible esa
actitud por la presencia de un ethos tradicional japons, por debajo de las ter-
minologas importadas de la filosofa moderna europea. No se afirma con fuer-
za ese yo para salir a conquistar el mundo, sino que se coloca ms bien en una
actitud de receptividad.
A Yuasa le atraa, como a Watsuji 16, el ideal husserliano de ecumene y logos.
Un ideal de ecumene, como convergencia europea de pueblos ms all de las
propias fronteras; un ideal de logos, como convergencia de pareceres en un marco
de dilogo razonado y razonable. Pero Yuasa tema que el ideal de ecumene se
quedase en cosmopolitismo superficial y que el ideal de logos se quedase en olvi-
do del pathos, del cuerpo y del paisaje. Es significativo que Watsuji se interesa-
ra mucho, como tambin Nishida, por Bergson, y que Yuasa se sintiera muy
atrado por Merleu-Ponty. Ambos, Watsuji y Yuasa, suspiraban desde Oriente
por la Europa del logos y la ecumene, pero teman perder races orientales de
contacto con el cuerpo, el paisaje, la tierra o el Todo. Cuando Watsuji lee a Hei-
degger, trata de compensar el nfasis en la temporalidad acentuando ms el
espacio. Cuando Yuasa estudia a los fenomenlogos existenciales europeos, no
oculta su simpata por los que, como Merleau-Ponty, resaltan la importancia
del cuerpo y la percepcin.
Yuasa reflexiona en la citada obra sobre el cuerpo acerca de los recursos de las
tradiciones orientales para ayudar a la persona a retornar a la unidad originaria
corpreo-espiritual. Estaba convencido de que el enigma de la unidad dual o iden-
tidad bipolar del cuerpo-espritu (shinshin) seguir en un atolladero mientras
no dispongamos para pensarla de otros esquemas que no sean ni dualistas ni
monistas. La filosofa, dice Yuasa, ha descuidado durante mucho tiempo el plan-
teamiento radical de este tema, porque no acababa de soltar lastre de una histo-
ria de debates sobre cmo explicar la relacin mutua de un cuerpo y una mente,
pero sin cuestionar a fondo la razn de presuponer su separacin. Hoy, comen-
zando por las neurociencias, los mismos datos empricos nos obligan a repensar
el tema cambiando de paradigma para enfocarlo.
15
KITAR NISHIDA, Pensar desde la Nada, trad. de J. Haidar y J. Masi, con un estudio de
J. Masi, Sgueme, Salamanca, 2006.
16
TETSUR WATSUJI, Antropologa del paisaje, trad. de J. Masi, A. Mataix y J. Haidar, Sgue-
me, Salamanca, 2006.
17
S. SHIMAZONO, From salvation to spirituality, 286-290.
Ibid., 288-289.
18
H. NOGUCHI, El Ki, principio de vida saludable (Ki, kenk seikatsu no genri), Zenseisha,
19
20
H. NOGUCHI, La eficacia teraputica del resfriado (Kaze no ky), Zenseisha, Tokyo, 1962,
p. 204.
lo que el cuerpo hace por s mismo espontneamente. Hay que aadir que en
estos ejercicios, mientras el cuerpo se relaja, se intenta dejar la mente en vaco
o en blanco. Todo este tipo de entrenamientos relacionados con el sistema extra-
piramidal, adems de fomentar la sensibilidad y receptividad, ayudan positiva-
mente a recuperar la salud y a mantenerse en equilibrio de cuerpo y mente.
En japons se dice a menudo Ki wa kokoro, expresin del refranero cotidia-
no que traduciramos como el Ki es el sentimiento o el Ki es el corazn.
Noguchi comenta este dicho precisando que el Ki no son propiamente los sen-
timientos mismos, sino que sera ms exacto decir que los sentimientos se mue-
ven al comps del movimiento del Ki. El movimiento del cuerpo tambin depen-
de, segn este doctor, de cmo fluye el Ki. Se trata de un esfuerzo o una energa
que hace vivir a la persona y orienta el cultivo de su crecimiento personal. Pero
el Ki no es perceptible por los sentidos. Su existencia precede a todo aquello que
captamos materialmente. Noguchi, al reflexionar sobre este hecho, identifica el
flujo del Ki como esfuerzo vital. El flujo del Ki, segn la manera de utilizarlo,
puede activar el esfuerzo inconsciente que anima cada cuerpo humano. La prc-
tica teraputica iniciada por Noguchi pretende reorientar ese flujo y recuperar
su impulso originario. Por eso se denomina mtodo para arreglar el cuerpo
(seitaih). Consiste bsicamente en reajustar el sistema del flujo del Ki para recu-
perar la salud.
En este mtodo teraputico hay tres practicas principales: 1) el ejercicio fsi-
co para activar el Ki (katsugen undoo); 2) la transmisin interpersonal del Ki
(yuki), y 3) el autocultivo mediante el Ki (gyki).
Katsugen und son una serie de ejercicios corporales, cuya finalidad es desa-
rrollar un movimiento espontneo (principalmente del citado eje cuello-colum-
na vertebral-pelvis) que activara el poder del Ki, influyendo positivamente en
la salud 21. Significa literalmente movimiento en el origen de la vida, y se expli-
ca como movimiento regenerador, un movimiento corporal espontneo y natu-
ral. Al inducirlo, se trata de suspender momentneamente la accin del sistema
voluntario y dejar que el organismo trabaje solo, sin darle rdenes que ejecutar,
de forma que, poco a poco, ste se normalice buscando reestablecer el equilibrio
perdido. Es un movimiento corporal, una especie de gimnasia involuntaria e
inconsciente, que hace que el cuerpo se mueva libremente en un estado recepti-
vo. La base terica de estas prcticas es la unidad e inseparabilidad de cuerpo y
mente, que se descubre precisamente como consecuencia de la activacin del
flujo de energa vital del Ki. Es algo que resulta difcil de comprender cuando se
quiere trazar la lnea ntida de separacin entre lo consciente y lo inconsciente,
ya que el Ki se sita en la zona difuminada entre ambos niveles. No podemos
inducir artificialmente lo involuntario, pero s podemos poner voluntariamente
las condiciones para que aflore a la superficie.
Un segundo ejercicio es la transmisin del Ki, llamada yuki. Consiste en
enviar el flujo del ki al cuerpo de la otra persona para provocar el nimo o
21
H. NOGUCHI, Introduccin al mtodo Seitai (Seita nymon), 34-40.
esfuerzo que favorezca su salud. El efecto del yuki puede activar el movimiento
inconsciente del cuerpo mutuamente mediante la transmisin del Ki a la otra
persona.
El tercer ejercicio se denomina Gyki y tiene el carcter de cultivo personal;
consiste en enviar el Ki a la columna vertebral para facilitar la concentracin de
la mente. Como consecuencia, surgir la energa dentro del cuerpo y se recupe-
rar tanto la salud corporal como la mental. La conjugacin de estos tres ejerci-
cios desemboca en una puesta entre parntesis de los sistemas neuro-motores
voluntarios para dar luz verde a lo involuntario. Por eso no se prescribe en forma
de manual un determinado movimiento exclusivamente, sino se hace por dar va
libre a la espontaneidad corporal y dejar que el cuerpo acte y reaccione por s
mismo. Incluso aplicar a estos mtodos la nocin misma de terapia es inexacto,
ya que no se trata de una intervencin desde fuera, sino de confiar en la capaci-
dad natural autoteraputica del propio cuerpo. Acompaamos as consciente-
mente la espontaneidad inconsciente de la vida. El cuerpo tiende por s mismo
a reorientarse cada vez que se desva. Hay que dejarle que lo haga sin imponer-
le unilateralmente una tcnica de rehabilitacin. La orientacin la lleva dentro
de s mismo y su ruta la definen los meridianos del Ki, cuyos puntos estimula la
acupuntura tradicional.
Noguchi sostiene que la salud es consecuencia de cmo usa uno el propio
cuerpo. Para mantener la salud hay que controlar, dice, el movimiento del pro-
pio cuerpo, as como el Ki, que acta desde dentro del mismo cuerpo. Lo tres
ejercicios citados ayudan a conducir el movimiento del cuerpo, reorientndolo
correctamente, y a activar el poder positivo del Ki para mantener la salud y el
equilibrio interior, recuperando el equilibrio de cuerpo y mente.
No nos podemos extender aqu en introducir los detalles del mtodo de
Noguchi. Lo que nos interesaba subrayar, sobre todo, era que esa prctica se
apoya en una concepcin natural de la medicina y una filosofa de la unidad
corpreo-espiritual del ser humano, tal como la expone el mismo Noguchi en
su introduccin al mtodo descubierto e iniciado por l. El cuerpo y la mente
son inseparables La capacidad adaptativa-reactiva del cuerpo humano es lo
que nos hace vivir La clave de esta fuerza vital y vitalizadora es el flujo de
energa del Ki 22.
22
H. NOGUCHI, Fundamentos del mtodo Seitai (Seitah no Kiso), Zenseisha, Tokyo,
1977, 36-41.
RESUMEN: Nicols de Cusa, desde su modo unitario, filosfico y teolgico a un tiempo, de pensar, no
dej de abordar la cuestin de lo mstico en relacin con la temtica de la infinitud, tan central en l.
Tal cuestin constituye el eje de las reflexiones de su escrito De visione Dei, dedicado y enviado a los
monjes benedictinos de Tegernsee, y de la comunicacin epistolar que mantiene asimismo con stos.
El Cusano profundiza aqu en el ver (un ver de Dios y del hombre en mutua y dispar relacin). Es la
infinitud divina la que hace que la divinidad se convierta en el Cusano, en la invisibilidad de lo visible.
En este artculo se analizan la conexin del pensamiento del Cusano con la teologa mstica del Pseu-
do-Dionisio Areopagita, la relacin entre conocimiento y afectividad en la dimensin mstica en el con-
texto de las discusiones de su poca al respecto y, en general, el entronque de la concepcin mstica
del Cusano con su propia sistemtica filosfica y con su visin cristiana del mundo.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Nicols de Cusa, infinitud, mstica.
PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749 PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), nm. 242, pp. 903-930
16_ManuelCABADA.qxd:Maqueta.qxd 26/6/08 12:05 Pgina 904
de lo mstico tiene en l. Cf. ALOIS MARIA HAAS, Deum mistice videre in caligine coincidencie.
Zum Verhltnis Nikolaus von Kues zur Mystik (Basel / Frankfurt, Verl. Helbing & Lichtenhahn,
1989), 9-11. Recientemente ha vuelto a insistir Bernard McGinn sobre que el lugar de Nicols
de Cusa en la historia de la mstica cristiana no ha sido an plenamente apreciado (B. MCGINN,
Nicolas de Cues sur la vision de Dieu, en La naissance de Dieu dans lme chez Eckhart et Nico-
las de Cues, ed. Marie-Anne Vannier, Pars, Cerf, 2006, p. 158).
2
Cf. W. BEIERWALTES, Mystische Elemente im Denken des Cusanus, en Deutsche Mys-
tik im abendlndischen Zusammenhang, Kolloquium Kloster Fischingen, 1998 (hrsg. von W.
Haug u. W. Schneider-Lastin), Tbingen, Max Niemeyer, 2000, 426.
3
B. McGinn indica acerca del De visione Dei que, si se lo relaciona o compara con otros
modos de formulacin de lo mstico de su poca, es ms que un simple resumen de lo que
ha sido dicho antes del mismo, es una nueva creacin (MCGINN, o.c., 158).
4
Tal como indica Alois M. Haas, en relacin con este primario ver de Dios en el Cusa-
no: El ver de Dios precede siempre al ver humano, de tal manera que el hombre mirado por
Dios ha de tener en todo momento el sentimiento de que l es el exclusivamente escogido por
tal mirada (HAAS, Deum, 32). Sobre la centralidad de la reflexin acerca de este ver en el
De visione Dei comenta W. A. Euler que el entrelazamiento del ver divino y del, por ste posi-
bilitado, ver de Dios por parte del hombre es el gran tema de todo el escrito (WALTER A. EULER,
Die beiden Schriften De pace fidei und De visione Dei aus dem Jahre 1453, en Mitteilungen
und Forschungsbeitrge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft, Trier, Paulinus Verl., 1995, 196).
5
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, VIII (NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Philosophisch-Theologische
Schriften, ed. L. Gabriel, Wien, Herder, 1964ss, III, 126).
6
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, IX (D., Philosophisch, III, 128). Cf. NIKOLAUS VON
KUES, De visione Dei, IV (D., Philosophisch, III, 104); D., o.c., XII (D., Philosophisch, III:
142, 144).
7
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, IX (D., Philosophisch, III, 130).
8
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, V (D., Philosophisch, III, 110).
9
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, VIII (D., Philosophisch, III, 122).
10
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, IV (D., Philosophisch, III, 104).
11
W. Beierwaltes ha puesto bien de relieve esta especificidad de la mstica cusaniana como
especulativa en el sentido de que se basa toda ella en el ver, lo que se muestra en el len-
guaje mismo utilizado por el Cusano al respecto: videre, visio, visus y sus sinnimos contem-
plari, inspicere, intuitus, intuitio, intueri, speculari, speculatio, theoria, theorizare, etc. Cf. BEIER-
WALTES, Mystische, 440.
ver y ser visto coinciden, verse a s mismo es ser visto por s mismo, ver las cria-
turas es ser visto en las criaturas. Lo mismo ocurre si se trata de la creacin,
pues en Dios la creacin es visin. El crear, el ver, el entender, el querer, el
medir, el hacer, el operar y similares atributos que asignamos a Dios han de ser
considerados como denominaciones del crculo infinito. No es, por tanto, ms
absurdo decir que Dios se crea a s mismo y todas las cosas que decir que Dios
se ve a s mismo y todas las cosas, y que crear todas las cosas es crearse en todas.
Si bien las palabras humanas, al estar referidas a las cosas finitas, no son aptas
para la divinidad 12.
12
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Complementum theologicum, XIV (D., Philosophisch, III, 700-702).
13
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XII (D., Philosophisch, III, 142).
14
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, X (D., Philosophisch, III, 134).
15
Como se dice en un escrito de la ltima poca: veo ms verdaderamente a Dios que
al mundo (NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Trialogus de possest: D., Philosophisch, II, 348). Cf. D., o.c.,
II: 350, 352.
16
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Compendium, I (D., Philosophisch, II, 684).
17
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, IX (D., Philosophisch, III, 132). Con fecha del 14
de septiembre de 1453 (es decir, un par de meses antes de la aparicin del De visione Dei, del
que proceden estas expresiones sobre la imposibilidad) se diriga el Cusano a los monjes de
Tegernsee instruyndoles sobre la mutua implicacin dialctica entre afirmacin y nega-
cin, etc., en la dimensin de la teologa mstica, haciendo paralelamente referencia a que la
aceptacin de la imposibilidad, ms all de la mera y simple racionalidad, es necesaria
para el acceso a lo mstico: sta es la secretsima teologa, a la que ninguno de los filsofos
ha tenido acceso ni puede acceder mientras se mantenga en pie el comn principio de toda
la filosofa, el de la no coincidencia de dos contradictorios. Le es necesario, por tanto, al que
ejerce la teologa mstica [mistice theolo(g)izantem] arrojarse a la obscuridad, yendo ms all
de toda razn e inteligencia, abandonndose incluso a s mismo; y encontrar cmo aquello
que la razn juzga como imposible, a saber, ser y no ser al mismo tiempo, es la misma nece-
sidad; ms an, si no se viese una obscuridad y densidad tan grande de imposibilidad, no exis-
tira la suma necesidad, la cual no est en contradiccin con tal imposibilidad; ya que la impo-
sibilidad es la misma necesidad verdadera (E. VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour de la docte ignorance.
Une controverse sur la thologie mystique au XV sicle, Mnster, Aschendorffsche Verlags-
buchhandlung, 1915, 114-115). Me permito indicar que esta obra de E. Vansteenberghe, si
bien actualmente de difcil adquisicin, es de gran inters para conocer el pensamiento del
Cusano en torno a la problemtica de la teologa mstica, dado que en ella se incluyen casi
El Cusano no hace aqu sino aplicar al conocimiento del Dios infinito la para-
djica norma o sentencia que, algunos aos antes, formulaba en el Idiota de
sapientia: La ms alta sabidura es sta: saber alcanzar lo inalcanzable de modo
inalcanzable [quomodo attingitur inattingibile inattingibiliter] 18. Y esto no
es sino un modo ms de expresar lo que constitua, diez aos antes ya, el tema
central y el ttulo de su conocido escrito De docta ignorantia.
Se percibe as cmo la docta ignorancia del Cusano est estrechamente
vinculada con el ver de su teologa mstica, puesto que se trata aqu de ver
al Dios invisible, al Dios considerado por el Cusano como la invisibilidad de lo
visible 19. Y si su docta ignorancia fue combatida por Johannes Wenck, el
Cusano le replicar en su Apologia doctae ignorantiae (1449), haciendo referen-
cia justamente a que, frente al gnero de ciencia que hace gala de la con-
frontacin y de la mera pugna o victoria verbal, la docta ignorancia, por
el contrario, se dirige hacia la tranquila intuicin de la mente [per vacationem
in mentis visionem tendit]. Ahora bien, sta es precisamente para el Cusano la
pretensin de su teologa mstica, la de conducirnos a la sosegada visin
del Dios invisible. En palabras suyas: la teologa mstica conduce al descan-
so [vacationem] y al silencio, en donde est la visin, que se nos concede, del
Dios invisible 20.
Se trata, como se dir algo ms adelante en este mismo escrito, de experi-
mentar y sostener la admiracin 21 que se desprende de esta dialctica oculta en
la realidad de las cosas, que aparecen o se muestran como imagen del Dios
invisible y por medio de las cuales se avanza de modo incomprensible hacia lo
incomprensible [incomprehensibiliter ad incomprenhensibilem pergit]. Es esta
experiencial y especulativa paradoja la que caracteriza el modo del ver huma-
no, intelectual e incomprensible a un tiempo, en relacin con quien es en s
mismo la mxima inteligibilidad o la verdad absoluta. As nos lo viene a decir
seguidamente el Cusano con su habitual agudeza y profundidad:
Si de algn modo se ha de acceder a la misma [la verdad absoluta], es
necesario que ello ocurra en un cierto modo de incomprensible intuicin, a la
manera de un rapto momentneo, tal como intuimos de manera momentnea
e incomprensible con el ojo corporal el resplandor del sol; no es que el sol no
sea en mximo grado visible, ya que su luz se adentra en los ojos por su pro-
pio poder, sino que por su eminente visibilidad es comprensiblemente invisi-
ble. De la misma manera Dios, que es la verdad, la cual es el objeto del enten-
cuarenta textos de la mutua correspondencia (del ao 1451 al 1456) entre el Cusano y los mon-
jes benedictinos Kaspar Aindorffer y Bernhard von Waging, abad y prior respectivamente del
citado monasterio de Tegernsee.
18
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Idiota de sapientia, I (D., Philosophisch, III, 426).
19
Qu es Dios sino la invisibilidad de lo visible? (NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Trialogus de pos-
sest: D., Philosophisch, II, 354).
20
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Apologia doctae ignorantiae (D., Philosophisch, I, 534).
21
Pues como dice aqu el Cusano, uno es conducido al estupor al admirar el infinito
que est en todas las cosas comprensibles como en un espejo y enigma (NIKOLAUS VON KUES,
Apologia doctae ignorantiae: D., Philosophisch, I, 542).
Por lo dems, la concepcin de lo mstico por parte del Cusano debe, como
es fcil advertir, buena parte de sus intuiciones bsicas a los escritos del Pseu-
do-Dionisio. Es bien sabido el influjo de ste en pensadores como Escoto Eri-
gena o Eckhart, predecesores del Cusano; pero no es menor tal influjo en el pro-
pio Cusano.
En efecto, en su escrito sobre la Teologa mstica, tan breve en su extensin
como amplio en su influencia histrica, el Pseudo-Dionisio, hace una y otra vez
alusin a este modo especial de acceso a lo divino por medio de la superacin
de todo cuanto es sensible, conceptual o intelectivo, y por el adentramiento en
las tinieblas luminosas de la divinidad. Porque sta, en cuanto causa de todo,
no es palabra ni pensamiento, no se puede nombrar ni entender; acerca de la
misma no hay conocimiento intelectual, ni ciencia; no hay palabras para ella,
ni nombre, ni conocimiento 24. Una vez abandonado, pues, todo ello, es preci-
so elevarse hasta el rayo supraesencial de las divinas tinieblas 25, y poder as
ver esa tiniebla supraesencial que toda la luz de las cosas no deja ver 26. Y ello
significa penetrar en las tinieblas realmente misteriosas del no-saber, abis-
22
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Apologia doctae ignorantiae (D., Philosophisch, I, 542). Poste-
riormente, en el De visione Dei, se aludir todava en un contexto similar a la ceguera u obs-
curidad procedente del exceso de luz, utilizndose tambin el smil del sol: De la excelencia
de la luz del sol proviene la obscuridad en el ojo (NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, VI: D.,
Philosophisch, III, 116). Es esto algo que el Cusano intentar posteriormente comunicarles
tambin a sus oyentes en el sermn del 28 de agosto de 1456, al decirles que Dios es incog-
noscible por su infinita cognoscibilidad de la misma manera que la luz, que, siendo de por s
visible, es a nuestros ojos invisible por su excesiva luminosidad (NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia,
Hamburg, Meiner, 1932ss, XIX, 236).
23
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, VI (D., Philosophisch, III, 114-116).
24
PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, Obras Completas (Madrid, B.A.C., 2002), 251-252.
25
PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, o.c., 245.
26
PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, o.c., 248.
27
PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, o.c., 247.
28
PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, o.c., 249.
29
PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, o.c., 248.
30
PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, o.c., 258.
31
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 114. Cf. D., o.c., 113-115.
32
Como es sabido, el Pseudo-Dionisio cierra su Teologa mstica afirmando que la Causa
perfecta y nica de todas las cosas est por encima de toda afirmacin, y tambin la trascen-
dencia de quien est sencillamente libre de todo est por encima de toda negacin y ms all
de todo (PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, o.c., 252).
33
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 114-115. En el sermn pronunciado, algunos aos despus,
en Brixen el da de Navidad de 1456 el Cusano se referir a la teologa mstica diciendo acer-
ca de la misma que por ella entramos de manera negativa [negative] en la obscuridad en la
que est Dios, negando [abnegando] en l toda cosa conocida o nombrable (NICOLAI DE CUSA,
Opera Omnia, XIX, 380). Ahora bien, algunos prrafos despus en esta misma alocucin nos
dir que tal negacin [abnegatio] de la teologa mstica implica afirmacin, aunque sta
sea una afirmacin latente, ya que cuando decimos, por ejemplo, que Dios es innombra-
ble, negamos en l todo lo nombrable, afirmando ocultamente que l est por encima de todas
las cosas nombrables (NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 383-384).
34
Sobre la importancia y las implicaciones de la idea de infinitud en relacin con el
problema de Dios me permito aludir a M. CABADA CASTRO, El Dios que da que pensar. Acceso
filosfico-antropolgico a la divinidad (Madrid, B.A.C., 1999), 345-381.
35
Cf. NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Trialogus de possest (D., Philosophisch, II, 340).
36
Cf. NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, X (D., Philosophisch, III, 142).
37
Cf. NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XIII (D., Philosophisch, III, 152).
38
Cf. NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De docta ignorantia, Lib. I, V (D., Philosophisch, I, 210).
39
Cf. NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XII (D., Philosophisch, III, 144). T, Dios mo,
eres la misma infinitud absoluta (D., De visione Dei, XIII: D., Philosophisch, III, 148).
40
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XII (D., Philosophisch, III, 144).
41
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Complementum theologicum, XII (D., Philosophisch, III, 696).
42
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Idiota de mente, XII (D., Philosophisch, III, 586).
43
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Trialogus de possest (D., Philosophisch, II, 314).
44
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Trialogus de possest (D., Philosophisch, II, 316). La caracteriza-
cin de Dios en este escrito de 1460 como la misma infinitud puede observarse igualmen-
te y en el mismo sentido en el otro escrito de la misma poca Cribratio Alkorani (1460-1461),
en donde el Cusano (en su anlisis de la doctrina del Corn) afirma acerca de Dios en cuan-
to principio lo siguiente: Desde esta consideracin es totalmente infinito [penitus infini-
tum] y sin trmino, incomprensible e inefable. Entonces ciertamente, al exceder todo senti-
do, todo entendimiento, todo nombre y cualquier cosa nombrable, no es denominado ni uno,
ni trino, ni bueno, ni sabio, ni padre, ni hijo ni espritu santo, ni nada de cuanto pueda ser
dicho o pensado, tal como lo sostiene Dionisio Areopagita, ya que l excede y antecede infi-
nitamente todos estos nombres. Permanece as escondido a los ojos de todos los sabios y no
es l conocido por ninguna criatura sino slo por s mismo; y acerca de l slo conocemos
esto, que es la misma infinitud [ipsa infinitas], que est infinitamente por encima de todo
entendimiento creado. De este modo, al no poder propiamente afirmarse ni decirse acerca del
mismo cosa alguna que l no la sobrepase, lo admiramos, contemplamos y adoramos en silen-
cio (NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, VIII, 74). Con anterioridad a estos escritos, en el De pace
fidei (redactado en 1453, es decir, en el mismo ao del De visione Dei), escriba ya: Dios, en
cuanto creador, es trino y uno; en cuanto infinito, no es ni trino ni uno ni nada de cuanto
puede ser dicho. Pues los nombres que se atribuyen a Dios son tomados de las criaturas, sien-
do l en s mismo inefable y estando por encima de todo cuanto podra ser nombrado o dicho
(NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De pace fidei VII: D., Philosophisch, III, 730). Cf. WILLIAM J. HOYE, Die
mystische Theologie des Nikolaus Cusanus (Freiburg, Herder, 2004), 47. En este sentido, viene
a decir con razn A. M. Haas que la primordialidad de la infinitud en Dios relativiza y uni-
fica en s misma incluso otros modos cusanianos de caracterizacin del mismo: Cuando el
Cusano dice que en Dios coinciden las contradicciones o que Dios est ms all de las con-
tradicciones, en ambos casos se hace referencia a la infinitud absoluta, que es una y simple
(HAAS, Deum, 39).
45
Puesto que eres infinito, eres la misma [ipsa] infinitud (NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visio-
ne Dei, XIII: D., Philosophisch, III, 150). En uno de sus todava inditos Sermones dice en
igual sentido Nicols de Cusa: Dios es la infinitud (Infinitas est deus). Cf. HOYE, Die mys-
tische, 173, n. 136.
46
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Trialogus de possest (D., Philosophisch, II, 356).
47
Et michi visum fuit quod tota ista mistica theologia sit intrare ipsam infinitatem abso-
lutam, dicit enim infinitas contradictoriorum coincidenciam, scilicet finem sine fine; et nemo
potest Deum mistice videre nisi in caligine coincidencie, que est infinitas (VANSTEENBERGHE,
Autour, 115-116). En relacin con la conexin establecida aqu por el Cusano entre la teo-
loga mstica y la obscuridad de la coincidencia de los contradictorios, haca l tambin la
siguiente anotacin en su ejemplar de la obra de Alberto Magno sobre el Pseudo-Dionisio:
Parece que Alberto y casi todos tienen el defecto de tener siempre miedo a entrar en la obs-
curidad, que consiste en la admisin de los contradictorios, ya que la razn rehuye esto y teme
entrar en ella y, en consecuencia, al evitar la obscuridad, no alcanza la visin del invisible
(Cf. NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 380).
48
Como la infinitud absoluta de Dios implica inefabilidad, el Cusano podr rela-
cionar tambin explcitamente con esta ltima su teologa mstica, tal como se muestra en
el ttulo mismo del primer captulo del libro segundo de su escrito posterior Cribratio Alkora-
ni (1460-1461): Acerca de la teologa mstica, segn la cual Dios es inefable (NICOLAI DE CUSA,
Opera Omnia, VIII, 72).
49
BEIERWALTES, Mystische, 433. Algunos aos ms tarde insistir todava W. J. Hoye en
la importancia en el Cusano de la infinitud en relacin con las bases mismas de su teologa
mstica: Convencido como est el Cusano de que existe un fundamento originario para todo,
l lo encuentra en la infinitud. La infinitud, que es absolutizada por l de una manera nueva
y radical, es el concepto clave de su teologa mstica. Sobre ella se asienta la coincidencia de
los opuestos. Su doctrina acerca la docta ignorantia depende igualmente del concepto de infi-
nitud (HOYE, Die mystische, 76). Hoye indica asimismo que en esto, es decir, en la rele-
vancia de la infinitud para la comprensin de la teologa mstica cusaniana, existe una clara
diferencia entre sta y la Teologa mstica del Pseudo-Dionisio (Cf. HOYE, Die mystische, 51).
50
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XII (D., Philosophisch, III, 144). Las formulacio-
nes de creador creante y creador creable hacen referencia al modo de expresarse al res-
pecto el Erigena en su Periph. I, 12 (PL 122, 453C-454D). Pueden verse las expresiones eriu-
genianas en la reciente traduccin castellana: JUAN ESCOTO ERIGENA, Sobre las naturalezas
(Periphyseon) (Pamplona, EUNSA, 2007), 95-97.
51
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XII (D., Philosophisch, III, 142).
52
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, IX (D., Philosophisch, III, 132). Ver tambin NIKO-
LAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XV (D., Philosophisch, III, 158). Para Beierwaltes la exigen-
cia cusaniana de vencer al excelso espritu de la razn viene a significar que el pensamiento
ha de superarse a s mismo en cuanto productor de un concepto que podra conducir a una
deficiente comprensin de la unidad de Dios como una conjuncin de objetos o como una
continuacin de los mismos en la coincidencia (BEIERWALTES, Mystische, 431-432). El mismo
Beierwaltes aludir, por otra parte, a que la idea cusaniana de que la infinitud divina est ms
all de la dimensin de los opuestos o contradictorios depende de ideas similares de Proclo y
del Pseudo-Dionisio. Cf. BEIERWALTES, o.c., 431.
53
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, X (D., Philosophisch, III, 134). La divinidad est
as ms all de la complicacin o de la explicacin, de la conjuncin o de la disyun-
cin: Cuando te veo, Dios mo, en el paraso rodeado por la muralla de la coincidencia de
los opuestos, veo que no te comportas de manera complicativa o explicativa, disyuntiva o copu-
lativa. Pues tanto la disyuncin como la conjuncin son la muralla de la coincidencia, ms
all de la cual existes t desvinculado [absolutus] de todo cuanto puede ser dicho o pensado
(NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XI: D., Philosophisch, III, 140).
54
BEIERWALTES, Mystische, 431. Ello no obsta, sin embargo, como el mismo Beierwal-
tes con razn seala, a que la coincidentia oppositorum deba ser considerada, sin embar-
go, como necesario paso previo para el acceso a la infinitas absoluta, de tal manera que por
ello no es posible acceder a la visin del In-finito sin realizar el paso, de manera intensiva y
conceptualizadora, a travs del pensamiento de la coincidencia de los opuestos o contradic-
torios, porque ste [el In-finito] es precisamente el ser complicativo que est por encima de
oposicin y contradiccin (D., o.c., 432). Esta es la razn por la que el mismo Beierwaltes
mantiene que existe una estrecha conexin, en lo que a la infinitud absoluta divina del Cusa-
no se refiere, entre los conceptos de infinitud y coincidencia de los opuestos: la infini-
tas escribe est constitutivamente ligada con la formacin de este concepto [el de la coin-
cidencia de los opuestos], es por decirlo as su idea (D., o.c., 429).
55
Dado que ahora predomina la corriente aristotlica que considera como hereja la
coincidencia de los opuestos, siendo as que en su admisin consiste el inicio del ascenso a la
teologa mstica, a los formados en tal corriente les resulta totalmente absurda esta va. La
rechazan, pues, totalmente como algo contrario a sus propsitos. De modo que sera casi un
milagro algo as como un cambio de escuela el que rechazasen a Aristteles para as ascen-
der ms alto (NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Apologia doctae ignorantiae: D., Philosophisch, I, 530).
56
Existe todava una va para buscar a Dios dentro de ti mismo, que consiste en des-
prenderse de toda limitacin (NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De quaerendo Deum, V: D., Philosophisch,
II, 602).
57
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De quaerendo Deum, V (D., Philosophisch, II, 604).
58
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Trialogus de possest (D., Philosophisch, II, 284-286).
59
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XVI (D., Philosophisch, III, 164-166). Las cursi-
vas son mas.
Seguramente este smil venatorio est todava de algn modo presente cuan-
do diez aos ms tarde, el mismo ao de su muerte, aplica otra metfora simi-
lar, la del caminante, a la necesaria previa visin de Dios por parte de la mente
humana para que sta pueda ponerse en movimiento y dirigirse hacia l. Es
decir, para que ella pueda moverse hacia el Dios infinito es necesario que pueda
ver de lejos hacia dnde tiende, como el caminante ve con antelacin el trmi-
no de su movimiento para poder dirigir sus pasos hacia el trmino deseado 63.
Pues, tal como dice seguidamente el Cusano: Si la mente no pudiera ver desde
lejos el trmino de su descanso y deseo, de su alegra y felicidad, cmo habra
de correr hacia su comprensin? 64.
Por lo dems, uno de los temas a los que el Cusano hubo de prestar atencin
en el contexto de la comprensin de la dimensin mstica es el del modo como
60
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, VII (D., Philosophisch, III, 120).
61
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XXV (D., Philosophisch, III, 218).
62
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 121-122.
63
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De apice theoriae (D., Philosophisch, II, 372).
64
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De apice theoriae (D., Philosophisch, II, 372).
65
El abad de Tegernsee, el muniqus Kaspar Ainforffer (1402-1461), fue designado abad
de Tegernsee en 1426 (con apenas 24 aos de edad) y ejerci su cargo durante 35 aos hasta
su muerte. Cf. VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 17; HAAS, Deum, 11-12, 26.
66
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 110. Aindorffer alude seguidamente a Hugo de Balma (fina-
les del siglo XIII) y a Juan Gerson (1363-1429), denominado aqu nicamente como cance-
llarius novus (canciller de la Universidad de Pars). Sobre las divergentes opiniones de
ambos autores (Hugo de Balma y Gerson) respecto de la relacin del entendimiento o del
conocimiento con el afecto o el amor en la teologa mstica puede verse HAAS, Deum, 11-14.
67
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 111-112.
68
Cf. VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 29; HAAS, Deum, 11-12, 29.
69
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 115. Respecto ya de la frmula concreta, que procede del
Pseudo-Dionisio, del ignote consurgere (de la ascensin ignorante o del elevarse de modo
ignoto), el Cusano la interpretar consecuentemente como algo referido, no al afecto, sino
a la facultad cognoscitiva (en relacin objetiva con la cusaniana docta ignorancia): El
elevarse de modo ignoto [Ignote consurgere] no puede decirse sino de la capacidad intelec-
tual, ya que el afecto no se eleva de modo ignoto [ignote], puesto que ni siquiera lo hace de
modo conociente [scienter] a no ser que reciba del entendimiento el saber. El saber y el no
saber se refieren al entendimiento, no a la voluntad, de la misma manera que el bien y el mal
se refieren a la voluntad, no al entendimiento (ibd.).
El hecho es, sin embargo, que Vicente de Aggsbach, aun despus de la apa-
ricin del De visione Dei, continu por su cuenta con su enfrentamiento con
Nicols de Cusa, motivado ya ms, al parecer, por acontecimientos relaciona-
dos con la poltica eclesial o institucional y los consecuentes resentimientos que
por razones intrnsecas o estrictamente tericas respecto de la cuestin misma
de la comprensin de la teologa mstica 70.
El 18 de marzo de 1454, seis meses despus de la carta precedente, el Cusa-
no volver a ponerse de nuevo en contacto con los benedictinos del monasterio
de Tegernsee en carta dirigida ahora a Bernhard von Waging (1472), entre los
aos 1452 y 1465 prior de dicho monasterio (siendo abad del mismo el ya men-
cionado Kaspar Aindorffer) 71. Obviamente, el Cusano seguir insistiendo, en
relacin con el proceso del ascenso a la divinidad, en la mutua implicacin entre
conocer y amar, de modo que, a tenor de ello, conocer es amar y amar es
conocer [cognoscere sit amare, et amare cognoscere]. En este sentido, escri-
bir aqu en el contexto de la bsqueda humana de lo divino:
Dios, que est sobre lo bueno y lo verdadero, que es la fuerza de lo bueno
y de lo verdadero, no es alcanzado tal como l es sino superando todo cuanto
es entendido y amado, aunque no podamos realizar nuestro acercamiento a l
sino buscando [querendo]. Ahora bien, no existe un buscar sin entender ni
amar. Amamos el bien y buscamos (saber) qu es lo que amamos, y sin embar-
go, como dice Agustn, no buscaramos si ignorsemos totalmente. Pues no
hay amor del bien sin algn conocimiento [notitia] del mismo; y no existe cono-
cimiento sin amor 72.
Ahora bien, y en relacin con las ltimas palabras del precedente texto, creo
conveniente aadir que parece darse en el Cusano efectivamente una progresi-
70
Vase lo que escribe Vicente de Aggsbach en 1454 (un ao, por tanto, despus de la
publicacin del escrito De visione Dei) sobre Nicols de Cusa, con el teln de fondo del paso
de ste, dos dcadas antes, del partido de los conciliaristas al de los partidarios del Papa duran-
te el Concilio de Basilea: El Cusano se opuso al Espritu Santo y se opone a l hoy todava.
Pues el Espritu Santo reuni el concilio de Basilea, y el Cusano, no contento con haberlo
hecho saltar por los aires, no deja de justificar lo que l ha hecho contra la iglesia [] Este
autor es grande en figura, en entusiasmo, en saber y en elocuencia, en prebendas, abundan-
te en riquezas y ha hecho carrera. Ahora seguramente quiere crearse, con la publicacin de
nuevas doctrinas, un halo de santidad. Quiera el Seor protegerme a m y a todo fiel de la
reciente doctrina venida del extranjero (Cf. HAAS, Deum, 30-31).
71
Sobre la entusiasta aceptacin de Bernhard von Waging de las ideas del Cusano acer-
ca de la mstica y, en especial, de la ntima relacin entre la docta ignorancia y la teologa
mstica cusanianas puede verse HAAS, Deum, 26-27.
72
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 134-135. El pasaje de Agustn al que hace aqu referencia
el Cusano podra ser el siguiente: Pero quin ama lo que ignora? Se puede conocer una cosa
y no amarla; pero pregunto: es posible amar lo que se desconoce? Y si esto no es posible,
nadie ama a Dios antes de conocerlo. Y qu es conocer a Dios, sino contemplarlo con la mente
y percibirlo firmemente? No es Dios cuerpo para que se le busque con los ojos de la carne
(AGUSTN, De Trin. 8, 4, 6). En carta posterior al mismo Bernhard von Waging de 28 de julio
de 1455 le indicar el Cusano a ste que quienes afirman que el afecto es llevado o movido
hacia algo totalmente desconocido estn en contra de Aristteles, Toms de Aquino y todos
los telogos (Cf. VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 159-160).
Pero ser sobre todo dos aos despus, en el verano de 1456, cuando en dos
sermones pronunciados por l en su dicesis de Brixen, al margen, se podra
decir, de las discusiones ms tcnicas en torno a la teologa mstica, har refe-
rencia a la ahora privilegiada posicin del amor por encima en cierto modo del
conocimiento intelectual.
En el primer texto, del 31 de julio de 1456, va a poner de relieve la coinci-
dencia entre conocimiento intelectual y amor de Dios, frente a una recortada
o dualista comprensin del principio tradicional de que nada es amado si pre-
viamente no es conocido, que no hara justicia al protagonismo o primordia-
lidad del deseo o del amor en la dinmica del espritu humano. He aqu el texto
cusaniano:
73
BEIERWALTES, Mystische, 441.
74
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 122.
No es cierto que los que buscan conocer [quaerentes scire] aman a la ver-
dad que buscan? Ahora bien, si amas a aquella a la que buscas, amas lo que
ignoras y no lo ignoras puesto que lo buscas. Ama, en consecuencia, a la ver-
dad de todo corazn [] y encontrars a Dios, al que ama tu alma. Pues Dios
es la verdad. Por lo tanto, el modo de aprehender la ciencia de la verdad, es
decir, de aprehender a Dios con la mente intelectual consiste en acceder al
mismo con el espritu del deseo o del amor. Cuando se dice que nada desco-
nocido es amado se dice algo verdadero, a no ser que haya coincidencia entre
lo verdadero y lo bueno. Pues el amor [Caritas], que es Dios, en tanto es enten-
dido en cuanto es amado y en tanto es conocido por el amor [a caritate] en
cuanto es amado, y el que ama en tanto conoce en cuanto ama. Advierte, por
tanto, la coincidencia 75.
Pero esta especie de imperativo categrico del amor como camino al cono-
cimiento es reforzado de nuevo por l desde un punto de vista algo diferente,
slo un mes despus, en su alocucin del 28 de agosto de 1456. En ella, de un
modo que parece rememorar previas reflexiones en torno tambin al tema del
amor plasmadas por Agustn (no por causalidad el sermn es pronunciado en
el da de su festividad), el Cusano pondr de relieve que existe una manera de
acceder al conocimiento del Dios-amor, la cual consiste en la experiencia
del amor al prjimo, toda vez que en este amor natural se experimenta y se
vive dicho al modo anselmiano por el Cusano lo mejor que cabe pensar
y desear. Tal experiencia nos conduce, pues, al conocimiento y amor de Dios,
en cuanto fuente de la misma. De manera que sera a travs del amor huma-
no, a modo de imagen y semejanza, como se accede al conocimiento de
Dios. Vase cmo se expresa el Cusano:
Advirtamos tambin que por el amor llegamos al conocimiento de Dios.
Aunque nada es amado si no es conocido, sin embargo Dios [] es cognosci-
ble por semejanza. Pues todo aquello que era desconocido se convierte por seme-
janza en conocido, del mismo modo que un rostro desconocido se convierte en
conocido por su imagen visual. Ahora bien, sabemos que Dios es amor. Y el
amor al prjimo es semejanza del amor. Accedemos, en consecuencia, por medio
del amor, a manera de imagen y semejanza, al conocimiento de Dios [] El
amor natural muestra que no hay nada ms deseable que el amor. Porque si
desaparece el amor y la concordia, todo se viene abajo. Si no hay amor ni con-
tento [delectatio], toda la vida sensible viene a asentarse en la tristeza y en la
muerte y fracasa. Aquello, pues, que proporciona vida con alegra y contento
es el amor, ms dulce o mejor que el cual nada puede ser pensado. En conse-
cuencia, la fuente de un bien tan grande, de la que mana la vida y el movimiento
de la alegra y del contento, supera todo sentido y es el descanso de todo movi-
miento y algo mejor que cuanto pueda ser pensado 76.
Una vez analizado todo lo anterior, parece quedar suficientemente claro que
el Cusano se mueve siempre, a pesar de todo, aun hablando del amor y de su
primordial experiencia conducente al conocimiento de Dios, en el plano te-
75
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 210.
76
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 236-237.
77
K. REINHARDT - H. SCHWAETZER, Mystik und Kirchenreform bei Nikolaus von Kues, en
Die Kirchenkritik der Mystiker. Prophetie und Gotteserfahrung. Bd. 2: Frhe Neuzeit (hrsg. von
M. Delgado - G. Fuchs), Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer, 2005, 40.
78
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 122. El propio Cusano conclua una carta anterior (del 22 de
septiembre de 1452) al mismo abad de Tegernsee, relacionada con la aludida problemtica del
conocimiento y del afecto en la teologa mstica, de la siguiente manera: Uno puede mos-
trar a otros el camino que conoce como verdadero por haberlo odo, aun sin haber caminado
por l; lo har sin embargo de manera ms segura [certius] quien, vindolo, camin por l. Lo
que yo haya escrito o dicho ser ms inseguro [incertius], pues no he saboreado todava cun
suave es el Seor [quoniam suavis est dominus] (VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 113). La expresin
gustad y ved cun suave es el Seor pertenece, como es sabido, al Salmo 34 (33).
79
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei (D., Philosophisch, III, 94).
Para completar este recorrido por los anlisis cusanianos acerca de la teolo-
ga mstica, es decir, acerca del conocimiento humano de la divinidad ms all
de un mero conocimiento inicial, afirmativo, pero ms ac tambin de otros
modos ms elevados de conocimiento, aludir brevemente a algunas pertinen-
tes consideraciones del Cusano.
Tres aos despus de dar a conocer en el De visione Dei su concepcin gene-
ral acerca del acceso mstico a la divinidad, en su sermn de la festividad del
80
Puede leerse a este respecto el ya citado escrito de EULER, Die beiden Schriften De pace
fidei und De visione Dei aus dem Jahre 1453.
81
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De pace fidei I (D., Philosophisch, III, 710).
82
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De pace fidei I (D., Philosophisch, III, 710).
83
Cf. NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 382-383.
84
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 383.
85
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 384.
86
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 383.
87
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 384.
88
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 384-385.
89
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 385.
90
Cf. NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XVII, 145-147.
91
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XVII, 147-148. El Cusano considera a Cristo, el hom-
bre-Dios, como aquello a lo que aspira no slo todo ser humano, sino tambin, en cuanto le
es posible, la creacin entera: Toda criatura aade aqu desea ser del modo mejor que
puede. Y esto no puede ser sino en el hombre que incluya [complicante] todas las naturale-
zas inferiores en su naturaleza intelectual y que sea adems Dios (NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera
Omnia, XVII, 149).
92
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XVII, 145.
93
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 379-380.
94
El Cusano no poda menos de tener presente lo que el Pseudo-Dionisio haba escrito
en su carta tercera a Gayo: Pues [Cristo] es misterio incluso despus de su revelacin o,
hablando con ms propiedad, incluso en la revelacin. Y este misterio de Jess, efectivamen-
te, permanece oculto, y no hay palabras ni entendimiento alguno que lo descubran, sino que
incluso si se habla de l permanece inefable, y aunque se lo quiera entender queda incom-
prensible (PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, o.c., 256).
EL SUFISMO Y EL ISLAM
GAMAL ABDEL-KARIM
Universidad de El Cairo
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
RESUMEN: La experiencia suf es el encuentro con la verdad absoluta, y esa verdad no puede convertir-
se en feudo ni monopolio de nadie y para nadie, y tampoco est limitada a una cultura, raza o creencia
concreta. La doctrina del sufismo consiste en que el hombre se entrega voluntariamente en cuerpo y alma
a Dios. Estos ascetas y msticos sufes lo hacen, unos en solitario y otros en retiros colectivos de asocia-
ciones msticas llamadas turuq, como miembros seguidores de un maestro (Shaykh) que les permita lle-
var una vida normal y austera compatible con determinadas normas y prcticas ascticas de acuerdo con
el criterio de cada tariqa (camino inicitico mstico). As, el sufismo se convirti en el Islam perfecto, bajo
la direccin de sus maestros y guas espirituales (shuyukh) experimentados y en asociaciones piadosas
donde se impartan enseanzas y prcticas sufes. En la experiencia mstica del sufismo llega la religiosi-
dad rabe-musulmana a su perfeccin: en el ella el ser humano se entrega a Dios, se libera del engao
de lo inmediato y se siente unido a Dios en el universo como inmensa luz que manifiesta su grandeza.
PALABRAS CLAVE: sufismo, espiritualidad rabe-musulmana, asctica islmica, mstica islmica, Islam,
Corn, vida interior, experiencia csmica interior.
PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749 PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), nm. 242, pp. 931-946
17_GamalABDEL.qxd:Maqueta.qxd 26/6/08 12:06 Pgina 932
INTRODUCCIN
1
Es el sentido alegrico de una gran parte de las asociaciones o turuq, defensoras del
sentido oculto y secreto, mstico-espiritual, que se encierra y esconde bajo la corteza de la
letra recurriendo a este recurso que les permita introducir en el trono del Islam sus ideas
religiosas y sus teoras filosficas como la mutazala; vase TITUS BURCKHARDT, Esoterismo Isl-
mico, Madrid, 1980, p. 15; GAMAL ABDEL-KARIM, Ciencia del Islam desde los orgenes hasta hoy,
ed. La Fundacin del Sur, Madrid, 2005, p. 169, y CRISTBAL CUEVAS, El pensamiento islmi-
co, pp. 183-212.
2
RAFAEL RAMN GUERRERO, Filosofa y Mstica en el Islam. Avicena e Ibn Tufayl, UCM,
Madrid.
3
IBN JALDUN, El Muqadima, ed. Al-dar al Tunisiyya, tomo II, Tnez, 1984.
QU ES EL SUFISMO?
El sufismo es una doctrina mstica, pero cules sus ncleos y pilares? Los
sufes en general, y unos grupos musulmanes sufes en particular, dijeron que
somos la luz, el saber y el amor divino 4. Sin embargo, otros sufes musulma-
nes dijeron: arrepentimiento, abstinencia, renuncia, pobreza, paciencia, con-
fianza en Dios y satisfaccin, pudiendo ir acompaados adems de diversos
estados psicolgicos segn Nicholson, son: la meditacin, cercana a Dios,
amor, miedo, esperanza, anhelos, inquietud, tranquilidad, contemplacin y cer-
teza 5. El que aspire a ser suf que aparte de s la envidia, la codicia, el odio y
sea capaz de explorar los misterios de la infinitud interior y de soportar una
rigurosa iniciacin bajo la supervisin de un igual, por lo que se le considera un
viajero mstico (slik) que debe atravesar varias y numerosas y lentas etapas ini-
citicas o jornadas (maqamt) a lo largo de una vida o un camino (tariqa) antes
de alcanzar la autoanulacin absoluta del yo (fana) con la finalidad de encon-
trarse y unirse con su amor divino, Dios 6.
4
R. A. NICHOLSON, The Mystics of Islam, Londres, 1914-66, pp. 3 y ss. y 10 y ss.; Studies
in Islamic Misticism, Londres, 1921; The idea of personality in Sufism, Lahore, 1964, y Poetas
y msticos del Islam, Mxico, 1943.
5
Vase ABDEL-KARIM AL-QUSHAYRI (Qushar) en su obra Risla, El Cairo, 1948, y TITUS
BURCKHARDT, Esoterismo
6
ANWAR G. CHEJNE, Historia de la Espaa musulmana, versin castellana, ed. Ctedra,
Madrid, 1980, pp. 292 y ss.
7
Ibid., pp. 294 y ss.
8
HASAN SDIQ, Races de la fitna en los grupos islmicos desde la poca del profeta hasta el
asesinato de El Sadat, El Cairo, 1991, y GAMAL ABDEL-KARIM, Ciencia del Islam, p. 103.
9
MIGUEL CRUZ HERNNDEZ, La filosofa rabe, Rev. de Occidente, Madrid, 1963, pp. 10 y ss.
10
Ibid., p. 11.
EL SUFISMO EN EL ISLAM
El sufismo es otro pensamiento del Islam practicado en el siglo VIII por unos
grupos que optaron por resolver sus problemas alejndose de las estructuras for-
males de las religiones y esencias tradicionales intermediarias, tratando de acer-
carse a Dios por diferentes caminos y vas msticas ms reales y puras, con pro-
fundidad, abandonando totalmente la vida mundana y su materialismo dominante
y la adulteracin de la verdad. El sufismo es una riqueza espiritual indisociable
de la cultura islmica; en definitiva, es el cultivo del espritu, del alma, el ansia
de saber y la utilizacin de la razn como instrumento para conocer a Dios. Este
sufismo tard mucho tiempo en adquirir derechos de ciudadana y reconoci-
miento por parte de los religiosos ortodoxos tradicionales y pensadores musul-
manes, ya que era considerado por algunos de ellos como hereja (zandaqa) 11.
Su relacin con la religin y derecho est basada en la cultura de la ley, ya
que los criterios acerca del sufismo (tasauwwaf) varan de un autor a otro, bien
sea a favor o en contra, alabado o descalificado 12. Sin embargo, muchos pien-
san que es una de las formas del conocimiento de la ley religiosa revelada y exter-
na (shara) nacida en el Islam porque reposa sobre la prctica estricta de la pie-
dad, de la fe exclusiva en Dios, de la renuncia a las vanidades del mundo y sus
placeres, a las riquezas. El suf, en el momento de retiro y abandono est lejos
del mundo ruidoso para consagrarse a la contemplacin y rechazar el gusto por
los bienes terrenales, gusto que era frecuente entre los primeros musulmanes
del siglo VIII en adelante. A partir de entonces, estos sufes desarrollaron un modo
de conocimiento mstico particular: el xtasis, encaminado a pasar de un grado
a otro hasta alcanzar la Unin definitiva con Dios 13. Se trata de una experien-
cia interior enriquecedora e intransferible que no est al alcance de todos.
El sufismo islmico como seala Muhammad Shakor es la base del amor
divino respetuoso y tolerante con todas las creencias, y cuya nica y verdadera
11
MUHAMMAD SHAKOR, Cultura islmica. Breviario suf, ed. Simbad, Madrid, 1984.
12
Ibid., p. 51.
13
Es la reconciliacin entre la ortodoxia y el sufismo, anlisis y concepto interpretativo
por el gran jurista, filsofo y suf Algacel (1058-1111), autor de muchas obras, entre las que
destaca: La incoherencia de los filsofos y la vivificacin de los saberes religiosos,Muhammad
Shakor, Cultura islmica, pp. 58 y ss.
Ibid.
14
Para conocer las funciones de estas asociaciones y turuq y sus normas, vase la obra
15
17
Es decir, que el suf descansa en la creencia de que cuando se pierde a s mismo se
encuentra en el YO universal, en el interior de su alma o, dicho en lenguaje religioso, que el
xtasis (wugd) ofrece la nica manera para que el alma posee la capacidad de comunicar direc-
tamente con Dios y unirse a l. Vase la obra de NICHOLSON, Poetas y Msticos del Islam, p. 88.
18
Es el sabor o el gusto mstico, se trata de una percepcin interna del suf (amor divino).
19
HASAN SDIQ, Races de la fitna, El Cairo, 1991, pp. 19 y ss.
goce o sabor (dq) no era acorde con las normas y directrices de la religiosidad
musulmana por ser contrario a la ley revelada y a los preceptos y pilares del Islam,
en opinin de Hasan Sdiq 20. Pero, a pesar de la dura crtica, ataques y oposicin
a la doctrina suf y su aplicacin, observamos que en sucesivas pocas, este fen-
meno suf y la enseanza de sus maestros sufes adquieren cada vez ms apoyo y
sigue en aumento. Sin embargo, crticos del sufismo alegan esta tendencia y su
xito a la ignorancia de algunos sufes y su interpretacin de la religin, su mane-
ra de presentarla y entenderla, teniendo en cuenta que sus convicciones y reali-
zaciones siguen vigentes desde hace mil aos. De este modo, se llenaban los hoga-
res musulmanes de elementos sufes, que para algunos se escondan bajo esta
incorrecta y exagerada tendencia y su mala aplicacin de los ritos, doctrinas, aso-
ciaciones o turuq (caminos y vas msticas), manifestndose los unos contra los
otros en cuanto al sistema y mtodo de actuacin y prctica se refiere.
El sufismo no es un sistema de reglas y ciencias, sino una doctrina de la uni-
cidad, un pensamiento monotesta nico, de base espiritual y moral que denun-
cia y advierte la imperfeccin del mundo aparencial, por lo que el suf debe
cerrar los ojos a todo lo mundano e imperfecto, contemplndose slo en el ms
all de toda perfeccin (R. A. Nicholson, Poetas y msticos del Islam, Mxico,
1945, p. 53). La meta de los sufes consiste en la identificacin con la realidad
divina en la bsqueda de la verdadera realidad (alhaqq) que es Dios, luz de los
cielos y de la tierra (Corn, XXIV, 35).
20
CRISTBAL CUEVAS, El pensamiento islmico, p. 191.
21
Ibid.
22
Los discpulos de este maestro suf son los que introdujeron el canto y la msica, como
mtodo intensificador del alma y su emocin religiosa.
LA DOCTRINA SUF
23
NICHOLSON, The Mystics of Islam, Londres, 1914, pp. 10 y ss.
24
IBN JALDUN, al-Muqaddima, pp. 76 y ss.
enorme en pleno siglo X como uno de los instrumentos vitales que expres cla-
ramente la parte espiritual de esta civilizacin y present un sufismo que se dis-
tingui de los dems sufes y msticos occidentales por sus caractersticas pro-
pias, puras, reales y convincentes, entre los que destacaba el empeo de sus
grandes personalidades y sabios para distinguir y aportar la iluminacin suf
(ilhm) de la revelacin proftica recibida, y agregan Hasan Sadq y otros isla-
mlogos que el sufismo no posea legalidad para tener carcter legislativo den-
tro del Islam y sus fuentes. Este fue, por una parte, el intento constante de los
occidentales para ligar o relacionar el sufismo con la jurisprudencia islmica.
Por otra parte, el sufismo arabo-musulmn tuvo su papel en el resurgimiento
de la literatura rabe, en general, y de la musulmana en particular, por lo que
es necesario distinguir entre el estudio del sufismo y su aportacin epistemol-
gica, a lo largo de sus pocas de esplendor encabezado por sus figuras ms rele-
vantes como Abu-l-Qasim Ibn Muhammad al-Yunayd al-Bagdad (m. 919), al-
Sarry, Abul-Qasim Abdel-Karim al-Qushar (o Qushayri, m. 1087), Abu Hamid
Muhammad Ibn Ahmad al-Gacel (m. 1127), Muhy-l-Din Ibn Arabi de Murcia.
Todos ellos estudiosos del sufismo en sus pocas de decadencia, cuando se apar-
t del camino recto del Islam y sus principios y finalidades, debido a las cir-
cunstancias de su europeizacin u occidentalizacin y su culturizacin en la
poca de la ausencia, del descuido y despreocupacin por la verdadera cultura
rabe-islmica. La realidad suf es una excelente experiencia vivida y un cono-
cimiento intuitivo para llegar a Dios a travs de una mstica de base espiritual,
sin apartarse nunca de la revelacin, razn por la que el sufismo perdi su esen-
cia y unidad.
Titus Burckardt califica y explica el sufismo como el aspecto esotrico o inte-
rior del Islam cuando en realidad el sufismo no es ms que el aspecto asctico
de cualquier religin desde el punto de vista espiritual y religioso en cuanto a
su significado inmediato, que es el conocimiento ms profundo y directo de lo
eterno y la unin con Dios, sin intermediarios, sentido puro eterno de la divi-
nidad para liberarse de la vida material musulmana. As se entiende el sufismo
como el espritu o el corazn del Islam, que es parecido al corazn, que es, a su
vez, el centro vital del cuerpo humano y sede de su esencia en donde todo con-
verge 25.
El sufismo est extrado de manera constante y necesaria del Corn y las
enseanzas del profeta, ya que los primeros sufes se expresaban en un lengua-
je muy cercano al Corn y sus expresiones llevan en s mismas lo esencial de la
doctrina 26. Al tiempo, no hay que olvidar que hubo contactos entre los prime-
ros sufes y el monaquismo de los contemplativos cristianos de Oriente, a juz-
gar por la historia del suf Ibn Asma (m. 777) de Balj (Juristn-Turquistn) y
como explica Abdel-Karim al-Guil, continuador de Ibn Arab de Murcia, en su
25
NICHOLSON, El sufismo islmico, obra traducida al rabe por Abu-l-ula, El Cairo, 1969,
p. 104.
26
NAGUI HUSAYN GODA, El conocimiento del sufismo (versin rabe), ed. Dar-el-Guil, Bei-
rut, 1992.
Se expresan de forma muy natural con los diversos caminos (turuq) como la
Qadriyya, Daraqawiyya, la Chadiliyya, al-Rifaiyya como un crculo exterior de
carcter popular de esencia intelectual. Cada maestro, como autoridad espiri-
tual, tiene su mtodo para que sea aplicado, y conforme a las aptitudes de una
determinada categora de hombres dotados para la vida espiritual. Son dife-
rentes caminos, vas msticas sufes y maestros que corresponden a las diferen-
tes vocaciones dentro del sufismo, que para algunos no es el movimiento, sino
el signo interior de una tendencia, de una doctrina, pero no de una teologa o
filosofa (pensamiento humano y no divino).
Al-Suhraward (m. 1167) aconseja al verdadero adepto al sufismo que reali-
ce cada ao un retiro de cuarenta das dedicando la mayora de su tiempo a la
oracin, al ayuno y arrepentimiento, pidiendo perdn por los pecados cometi-
dos durante toda su vida, recitando constantemente el nombre de Dios en voz
alta, y cuando se canse de la recitacin debe hacerla pronuncindola con el cora-
zn para que el nombre de Dios quede grabado en su alma. La oracin, el canto,
la soledad, la abstinencia son algunas de las prcticas habituales del suf en las
asociaciones privadas cuyas enseanzas se transmiten de generacin en gene-
racin, inspiradas por Dios, y que forman un cuerpo doctrinal que puede cons-
tar de una serie de reglas de conducta y normas rituales para su tica y cum-
plimiento 27.
Un rasgo distintivo del sufismo es el equilibrio entre el amor y el conoci-
miento, teniendo en cuenta que la actitud religiosa, punto de partida de toda
espiritualidad islmica, es el lenguaje y la embriaguez del amor que superan el
pensamiento, ya que ste amor (belleza interior) se desmarca de cualquier dis-
crepancia mental o intelectual 28.
27
TITUS BURCKARDT, Esoterismo islmico, Madrid, 1980, pp. 15 y ss.
28
Ibid., p. 17.
CONCLUSIN
29
C. A. NALLINO, El poema mstico, de Ibn al Farid.
30
Segn CRISTBAL CUEVAS, El pensamiento islmico, p. 183.
Este pensador no vea otra solucin para salvar a la humanidad si no era vol-
ver al espritu a travs del misticismo que es el sufismo real puro y sincero,
en la profundidad del corazn humano, donde se encuentra el hombre orienta-
do en su esencia, hacia lo intangible: Dios.
Tanto Andr Malreaux como el egipcio Hasan Sdiq afirman que el univer-
so, segn la visin suf, tiene dos dimensiones, o mejor dos caras: una variable
y mvil, y otra, firme e invariable. Tengamos en cuenta que especular slo con
la parte variable experimentada fue el gran error que cometi la ciencia moder-
na que condujo a una visin del universo, global y laica, y a la prdida de su
dimensin sagrada, y, por consiguiente, a la prdida del ser humano a pesar de
lo realizado en cuanto al avance cientfico y la tecnologa. En la poca moder-
na se ha perdido el significado de la existencia.
EL YO INTERIOR.
REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES
SOBRE LA EXPERIENCIA DE LO NUMINOSO
SCAR CASTRO GARCA
Universidad Autnoma de Barcelona
RESUMEN: En estos tiempos en que el espritu cientfico describe y delimita con definiciones tcni-
cas muy concretas las explicaciones cientficas, cuando se trata de explicar temas fronterizos exis-
ten dificultades semnticas y no se repara en mixtificaciones. Aparece una nueva conexin interdis-
ciplinar entre las ciencias de la mente y las ciencias del espritu, abordndose el estudio de los
fenmenos msticos como cuestin fundamental para plantear el problema de la existencia de Dios.
Las respuestas de los neurobilogos se centran en ofrecer explicaciones estmulo-respuesta, pero
no comprenden por qu ocurre por autoinduccin. Tampoco hay explicacin de la experiencia per-
sonal, cuando en un proceso mstico el individuo tiene diferentes manifestaciones de su individuali-
dad: el ego, la mismidad, el yo, la ipseidad, etc. No son lo mismo y deben exponerse en una analti-
ca comparativa. Lo que se pretende aqu es ofrecer un programa transdisciplinar de estudio de la
experiencia personal, en cuanto es fundamento para el estudio de lo numinoso segn el trmino
de Rudolf Otto, o de aquello que siempre ha fundamentado la experiencia mstica, desde que el
hombre es homo religiosus. Expondr dos de los puntos cruciales de un programa transdisciplinar.
A) Primero el estudio de semntica comparativa de los diferentes conceptos del yo, alma, espritu y
conciencia desde las principales fuentes tradicionales. Viendo as tanto las similitudes como las dife-
rencias, ontolgicas y fenomenolgicas. B) Segundo, expongo un breve repaso de la reciente histo-
ria de la neuroteologa. Veremos los modelos explicativos de los diversos programas de estudio neu-
robiolgico de los fenmenos msticos. Todo esto para concluir con una propuesta nueva, tanto
epistmica como hermenutica, de la pregunta por la experiencia personal de lo numinoso, plante-
ada en un marco cientfico transdisciplinar.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Ipseidad, lo numinoso, Purusha, theosis, Adam Kadmon, ayin, sunyata, al-insn
al-kmil, wahdat al wujd, cortex prefrontal ventromedial, monoamino oxidasa, area de asociacin y
de orientacin, lo ntimo, enaccin, oikeiosis, anagoga.
The Interior I:
Transdisciplinary Reflections on the Experience of the Numinous
ABSTRACT: In these times when the scientific ethos describes and delimits scientific explanations with
very concrete technical definitions, there exist semantic difficulties not remedied by mystifications
whenever one tries to explain boundary themes. A new interdisciplinary connection between the sciences
of the mind and the sciences of the spirit appears dealing with the study of mystical phenomena as a
fundamental question in posing the problem about the existence of God. The response of neurobiologists
center on offering stimulus-response explanations, but do not include why stimulus-response occurs
because of self-induction. Neither is there any explanation of personal experience, when the individual
in a mystic process has different manifestations of his individuality: the ego, self, I, selfhood, etc. They
are not the same, and they should be explained in a comparative analysis. This article aims to offer a
transdisciplinary program about the study of personal experience as foundation for a study of the
numinous following Rudolf Otto or that which has always been the foundation of mystical experience
from the time man became homo religiosus. I will elaborate two of the crucial points of a transdisciplinary
program: First, a study of the comparative semantics of the different concepts of I, soul, spirit, and
consciousness by using the principal traditional sources, thus allowing the consideration of similarities
and differences from ontological and phenomenological perspectives. Second, I will present a brief
review of the recent history of neurotheology, offering the explanatory models of different programs of
neurobiological study on mystical phenomena. The article concludes with a new epistemological and
PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749 PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), nm. 242, pp. 947-985
18_OscarCASTRO.qxd:Maqueta.qxd 26/6/08 12:06 Pgina 948
hermeneutical proposal concerning the question about the personal experience of the numinous within
a scientific interdisciplinary framework.
KEY WORDS: Selfhood, the numinous, Purusha, theosis, Adam Kadmon, ayin, sunyata, al-insn al-
kmil, wahdat al wujd, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, monoamine oxidase, association and orienta-
tion areas, the private, enaction, oikeiosis, anagogy.
INTRODUCCIN
1
SALAS, DARO, Moral para el siglo XXI, Ed. Xistral, Madrid, 1998.
2
ANDRESEN, JENSINE - FORMAN, ROBERT K. C., Methodological Pluralism in the Study of
Religion: How the Study of Consciousness and Mapping Spiritual Experiences can Reshape
Religious Methodology, in Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 7, n. 11-12, November-
December 2000, pp. 7-17, Imprint Academic.
3
MORIN, E., Introduccin al pensamiento complejo, Editorial Gedisa, Mxico, 2004. Ori-
ginal: Introduction la pense complexe, ESPF diteur, Paris, 1990. MORIN, E., El Mtodo III.
El conocimiento del conocimiento, Ediciones Ctedra, Madrid, 1999. Original: La Mthode III.
La conaissance de la connaissance, ditions du Seuil, Paris, 1986.
4
VARELA, F. J., Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem,
Journal of Consciousness Studies, Special Issues on the Hard Problems, J. Shear (ed.), June
1996.
5
HAMEROFF, S. - PENROSE, R., Orchestrated Reduction Of Quantum Coherence In Brain
Microtubules: A Model For Consciousness?, en Toward a Science of Consciousness - The First
Tucson Discussions and Debates, eds. Hameroff, S. R. - Kaszniak, A. W. - Scott, A. C., Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 507-540 (1996); HAGAN, S. - HAMEROFF, S. - TUSZYNSKI, J., Quantum
Computation in Brain Microtubules? Decoherence and Biological Feasibility, en Physical
reviews E, 2002, 65:061901; WOLF, N. J. - HAMEROFF, S., A Quantum Approach To Visual Cons-
ciousnes, en Trends in Cognitive Science, vol. 5, n. 11, November 2001.
2.1. En el hinduismo
6
CASTRO, SCAR, Aspectos biosemiticos de la conciencia: en bsqueda de los signos de la
vida y su referencia a la conciencia como principio teleonmico: Pensamiento, vol. 62, n. 234,
2006, pp. 471-504.
7
PANNIKKAR, RAIMON, The Vedic Experience, All India Books, Pondicherry (India), 1977.
8
PANNIKKAR, RAIMON, LHinduisme, en Les intucions fonamentals de les grans religions,
VV.AA., Ed. Cruilla, Col. Cristianisme i Cultura, Barcelona, 1991.
En los textos sagrados hindes, encontramos mencin del yo, por ejem-
plo, en la Brihadarankaya Upanishad, como el Purusha 9:
1. En el principio slo exista el Ser, en la forma de una persona [purus-
ha]. Aqulla mir a su alrededor y no vio nada excepto su propio Ser. Lo pri-
mero que dijo fue: Yo soy; as fue como, pronunciando su nombre, se con-
virti en yo. Por consiguiente, si a un hombre se le pregunta, lo primero que
dice es: Yo soy, y luego pronuncia el otro nombre que pueda tener, y pues-
to que antes de esto [purva], l (el Ser) quem [ush] todos los seres perver-
sos, as fue como se convirti en persona [pur-usha]. En verdad, quien esto
conoce, quema todo aquello que intenta anteponrsele.
(Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, Primer Adhaya, Cuarto Brahmana)
9
PANNIKKAR, RAIMON, El Cristo desconocido del Hinduismo, para una Cristofana Ecum-
nica. Un encuentro entre Oriente y Occidente, Grupo Libro, Coleccin Parasos Perdidos, Madrid
(Spain), 1994.
2.2. En el cristianismo
El alma judeo-cristiana 10, sentida como parte del ser humano, est hecha de
los cuatro elementos: agua, tierra (para formar el fango del gnesis), fuego (para
la coccin) y aire (para su secado). El quinto elemento, que pertenece a Yahveh-
Elohim, es la Ruah, el Espritu o Aliento de Dios. Por eso, el asiento del Esp-
ritu es el Reino de los Cielos, realizado aqu en la tierra, pero no pertenece a
este mundo (Jn 18, 36). Pero vemos que tiene una identidad reconocida en la
Chandoya Upanishad 3,14 cuando dice: Ese es mi Atman, ms pequeo que
un grano () de mostaza (), ms grande que la tierra () que los cielos ()
que estos mundos:
El Reino de los Cielos es semejante a un grano de mostaza que, toma uno,
sembr en su campo; y con ser la ms pequea de todas las semillas; mas cuan-
do crece es mayor que las hortalizas, y se hace rbol, de modo que van las aves
del cielo y anidan en sus ramas.
(Mt 13, 31-32)
10
Las Escrituras Sagradas: Bible. Hebrew and English, The Bible Society in Israel. Jeru-
salem 1997. The Greek New Testament, Bible Society United. 1975. ROBINSON, J. M. - HOFFMANN,
P. - KLOPPENBORG, J. S., El Documento Q. Edition in greek and spanish with parallels from the
Gospels of Mark and Thomas, Ediciones Sgueme, Salamanca, 2002; PIERO, A. - MONTSERRAT
TORRENTS, J. - GARCA BAZN, F., Textos Gnsticos. Biblioteca de Nag Hammadi II. Evangelios,
hechos, cartas, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 1999.
Que quedaron tambin reflejadas en Mt 16, 24-25; Lc 9, 23-24 ;Lc, 14, 27; Lc
17, 33; Mc 8, 34-37, o en Jn 12, 25-26 y Jn 13, 20. stos pasajes son tomados
como discursos apostlicos, puesto que su exigencia tiene una recompensa o
una finalidad:
En verdad os digo que hay algunos de los que estn aqu los cuales no pro-
barn la muerte hasta que vean al Hijo del Hombre [Cristo] viniendo en su
reino [de Dios].
(Mt 16, 28)
Porque los que son movidos por el Espritu de Dios, stos son hijos de
Dios () El Espritu mismo da testimonio a nuestro espritu de que somos
hijos de Dios.
(Rn 8, 14,16)
2.3. En el judasmo
ilimitada extensin, formando un universo diez veces mayor. En medio del bri-
llo insoportable de ein sof or, la luz ilimitada, visualizaron la cabeza de
Adam Kadmon, el Hombre Ideal o el Modelo Ideal de Hombre, el pri-
mero de cuatro Adanes que se revelan en los cuatro Mundos (o sistema Olamot,
es decir, multiversos) de estatura espiritual descendente. El cuarto Adn sobre
el cuarto Mundo, nuestra tierra, marca el comienzo de nuestra humanidad, para
luego convertirse en la actual humanidad. En otras palabras, en cada uno de los
cuatro mundos, un dcuplo rbol de Vida se revela junto con el Modelo Ideal
de Hombre y se reviste a s mismo en muchsimas formas materiales. El cuar-
to mundo, por fin, es capaz de sustentar los reinos mineral, vegetal y animal; y
sobre este mundo, tambin a la humanidad; originalmente, desde la existencia
asexual, despus como andrgino, y ahora como hombre y mujer 11.
Tal como lo explica el Rab Najmn De Breslov 12, todos los multiversos que
Dios cre son slo pantallas que filtran la poderosa radiacin de su Luz Infini-
ta. Llamamos a estos filtros de maneras diferentes Nombres Divinos, Sefirot,
Mundos, Universos, Dimensiones, o en su conjunto, la Dimensin Espiritual.
Pero por qu necesitamos un sistema de canales, una dimensin espiritual,
entre nosotros y el infinito? Por qu no podemos relacionarnos directamente
con Dios? Najmn De Breslov compara al ser humano con una lmpara que
quiere conectarse a un reactor atmico. A menos que no quiera desintegrarse,
necesitar de una estacin reductora del potencial elctrico que pueda utilizar-
se para no quedar daado.
Intuiciones similares han sido expuestas en todas las tradiciones, incluso en
la mitologa griega con la desintegracin de Smele ante la completa manifes-
tacin de Zeus en su peticin, y que del fruto de su unin sexual-mstica-sacri-
ficante, nace Dionisos.
Dentro del misticismo judo existen varios puntos de vista sobre experien-
cias humanas relacionadas lo divino. Devekut, significa pegndose a Dios.
La comunin con Dios, es un principio y la experiencia general; pero entre los
estudiosos hay opiniones diferentes sobre cmo es posible esta ntima comu-
nin. Gershom Scholem 13 escribe, que incluso en un marco exttico de la mente
el mstico judo casi invariablemente retiene un sentido de la distancia entre el
Creador y su criatura; slo en casos sumamente raros ese xtasis significa la
unin real con Dios. Pero Idel, Jacobs y Halevi, entre otros, proponen una visin
alternativa en las descripciones de la unin mstica en la kabbalah, donde se
logra la unin completa con Dios.
Segn Daniel Matt 14 los estados de vacuidad o ayin no pueden conocerse
por el pensamiento, pero pueden experimentarse directamente; en esta expe-
11
SCHOLEM, GERSHOM GERHARD, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, Schoken Books, New
York, 1995, p. 202.
12
NAJMN DE BRESLOV, Anatoma del Alma, Breslov Research Institute, Jerusalem, p. 17.
13
SCHOLEM, G., Jewish mysticism, London: Thames and Hudson, 1990, pp. 122-123.
14
MATT, D., Ayin: The concept of nothingness in Jewish mysticism, en ROBERT FORMAN
(ed.), The problem of pure consciousnes, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 121-159.
2.4. En el Budismo
15
FORTUNE, D., Kabbalaen (in Danish), Copenhagen: Sankt Ansgars Forlag, 1995.
16
MATT, D., op. cit., pp. 139-140.
17
MATT, D., op. cit., pp. 139-140.
18
Yidam es una palabra que no tiene traduccin occidental, pero es frecuentemente tra-
ducida como deidad de meditacin, aunque es ms preciso traducirlo como aspecto bdico.
El Yidam es utilizado como un mtodo de transformacin hacia la completa iluminacin. Los
Yidams son tanto una forma especfica de un Buda, as como la naturaleza bsica o potencial
del estudiante para volverse un Buda. El estudiante medita en las caractersticas resaltantes
del Yidam hasta que realiza una completa unin con ste. El Yidam, que puede ser tanto mas-
culino como femenino, puede corresponder al aspecto bdico personal, lo que esto significa
es que la naturaleza del Yidam corresponde al temperamente psicolgico y las cualidades de
cada adepto. Wikipedia.
2.5. En el sufismo
19
NASR, SEYYED HOSSEIN, Sufismo vivo, Editorial Herder, Barcelona, 1984, p. 59.
20
NASR, SEYYED HOSSEIN, op. cit., p. 60.
21
NASR, SEYYED HOSSEIN, op. cit., p. 41.
3. NEUROFILOSOFA
Pero es con Sir John Eccles y Karl Popper donde por primera vez el yo se
contrapone al cerebro en el sentido dual y reflexivo de estar enfrente de. Es
el yo y su sede (el cerebro) como referencias platnicas / semi-cartesianas
que manifiestan su dualismo en los mundos de Popper. Ambos 22 aprueban
una postura interaccionista en la que el yo est identificado con la mente,
y sta se sita por encima de las condiciones materiales, interactuando con el
cerebro. Popper afirma la existencia de la causacin descendente (top down)
22
POPPER, K. - ECCLES, J., The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism, Berlin:
Springer Verlag, 1977.
23
SINGER, W., Synchronization of cortical activity and its putative role in information pro-
cessing and learning: Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 1993, pp. 349-375.
24
LLINS, R., El cerebro y el mito del yo, Belacqua de Ediciones, Barcelona, 2003.
25
CHANGEUX, J. P. - RICOEUR, P., La naturaleza y la norma. Lo que nos hace pensar, Fondo
de Cultura Econmica, Mxico, 2001.
26
CHANGEUX, J. P. - RICOEUR, P., op. cit., p. 46.
27
CHANGEUX, J. P. - RICOEUR, P., op. cit., p. 52.
28
EDELMAN, G., Biologie de la conscience, Editions Odile Jacob, Paris, 1992.
29
CHANGEUX, J. P. - RICOEUR, P., op. cit., p. 112.
30
HARRIS, SAM - SHETH, SAMEER A. - COHEN, MARK S., Functional Neuroimaging of Belief,
Disbelief, and Uncertainty, American Neurological Association, 2007 Dec., pp. 141-147.
31
GOEL, VINOD - DOLAN, RAYMOND J., Social regulation of affective experience of humor,
J. Cogn. Neurosci., 2007 Sep., 19 (9): 1574-80. Para revisar otros artculos asociados con las
creencias, ver los mismos autores: GOEL, VINOD - DOLAN, RAYMOND J., Explaining modulation
of reasoning by belief, Cognition, 2003 Feb., 87; GOEL, VINOD - DOLAN, RAYMOND J., Recipro-
cal neural response within lateral and ventral medial prefrontal cortex during hot and cold
reasoning, Neuroimage, 2003 Dec., 20 (4).
dentes para la deteccin del engao, y para el control del efecto placebo, vg. en
el estudio de drogas. Pero, sobretodo, para entender que una creencia es un jui-
cio de valor que no se distingue de un juicio de razonamiento lgico.
Pero esto no supone una conversin, un cambio en el yo, aunque nos es
til para acercarnos ms a la epistemologa cognitiva. No nos ofrece una des-
cripcin de una experiencia numinosa, en tanto que experiencia. Sin embargo,
nos podr ser til para detectar juicios apodcticos. Es algo que averiguare-
mos pronto. Pero, sobretodo nos sirve para detectar la intolerancia en la con-
ducta. Pone de manifiesto el gran desvo que han sufrido muchas religiones al
no apoyar la experiencia numinosa, al entenderla tambin como una experien-
cia de Fe (stricto sensu).
Harris expone en su libro The End of Faith 32 que las instituciones religiosas
han preferido ir ms por el camino de una aglutinacin de fieles devotos y cre-
yentes en dogmas que de experimentadores de experiencias espirituales numi-
nosas. La tesis es que bsicamente no se respetan las creencias de los dems; lo
que realmente convence o no son los motivos que se aportan para las creencias;
o sea, las argumentaciones y sus pruebas. Es una postura de la doxa y de la
episteme que no lleva a la fronesis. Lo nico que no comparto con Harris
es la mezcolanza entre la palabra fe y la palabra creencia, y que no com-
prende de forma significativa sus diferencias. Aunque si comparto que uno pueda
ser ateo y tambin ser espiritual notica y ticamente.
32
HARRIS, S., The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason, W. W. Norton,
New York, 2004.
33
HAMER, D., The God Gene: How Faith is Hardwired into our Genes, Doubleday, New
York, 2004.
34
HEDDEN, TREY - KETAY, SARA - ARON, ARTHUR - MARKUS, HAZEL ROSE - GABRIELI, JOHN D. E.,
Cultural Influences on Neural Substrates of Attentional Control, Psychological Science, 19
(1), 2008 Jan., pp. 12-17.
35
Las imgenes presentadas consistan en diagramas consecutivos en los que haba una
lnea vertical dentro de una caja. A los participantes se les mostr una serie de estos dibujos
para que emitieran su juicio de percepcin en funcin de dos reglas: una de ellas les exiga
ignorar el contexto y definir la longitud de la lnea sin tener en cuenta el tamao de los cua-
drados (juicio absoluto). La otra regla consista en tener en cuenta el contexto, y comparar las
proporciones de las lneas con los cuadrados en los que estaban (juicio relativo) (ver:
www.tendencias21.net/La-cultura-rige-tambien-la-actividad-del-cerebro_a2035.html).
En su libro Why God wont go away. Brain Sciene and Biology of Belief 37, New-
berg y DAquili, de la Universidad de Pennsylvania, sealaban en primer lugar
una zona cerebral (seccin posterior del lbulo parietal) a la que nombran rea
de Orientacin y Asociacin (OAA), fundamental en la orientacin fsica del
espacio, en la consideracin de ngulos y distancias; siendo de suma impor-
tancia en su desarrollo para los pilotos de aviones y aeroplanos.
Qu ocurre si el OAA no recibe informacin para activarse? Si no hay infor-
macin que fluya a travs de los sentidos, el rea de Orientacin y Asociacin
no es capaz de encontrar fronteras. Entonces, dnde se encuentra el lmite fsi-
co del Self y del mundo exterior? No existe. En ese caso el cerebro no tiene otra
opcin que percibir que el yo es interminable e ntimamente ligado a todo de
forma inevitable.
Es cierto que pueden existir lesiones en el OAA que provoquen esta expe-
riencia. Pero, qu ocurre cuando es una experiencia autoinducida por uno
mismo a travs de un serio trabajo de largos aos de meditacin? O quiz pro-
venientes de muchas horas de oracin, como aparecera en los datos del estu-
dio realizado por Newberg y DAquili. Estas experiencias seran las que podr-
an llamarse de identificacin transpersonal, segn la escala de Hamer.
Newberg y DAquili consideran que existen cuatro reas de asociacin
que manifiestan un protagonismo especial en las experiencias religiosas pro-
fundas:
rea de Asociacin Visual.
rea de Orientacin y Asociacin.
36
He de dar las gracias al libro de RAMN MARIA NOGUS, Deus, creences i neurones. Un
acostament cientfic a la religi, Fragmenta Editorial, Barcelona, 2007, por lo clarificador de
sus notas respecto a ambos autores citados.
37
NEWBERG, ANDREW M. - DAQUILLI, EUGENE G., Why God wont go away. Brain Sciene and
Biology of Belief, Ballantine Books, Nova York, 2001.
38
PERSINGER, M. A., Religious and mystical experiences as artifacts of temporal lobe
function: A general hypothesis, Perceptual and Motor Skills, 57, pp. 1255-1262, 1983.
39
NEWBERG, ANDREW M. - DAQUILLI EUGENE G., The Mystical Mind, Fortress Press, Min-
neapolis, 1999.
40
BEAUREGARD, MARIO - PAQUETTE, VICENT, Neural Correlates of a Mystical Experience in
Carmelite Nuns, Neuroscience Letters, 405 (2006) 186-190.
ciones (el recuerdo social y el mstico), descubriendo las reas del cerebro que
se activaban con ms fuerza durante la experiencia mstica.
De este modo descubrieron que en el recuerdo de la Unio Mystica coope-
raban la corteza orbitofrontal central, el lado derecho de la corteza temporal
media, los lbulos parietales inferior y superior derechos, la corteza izquierda
prefrontal media o la corteza cingulada anterior izquierda, entre otras.
Es as como la memoria espiritual (que en este caso es memoria a largo plazo
de un peak experience) vigoriza varias regiones cerebrales en esos instantes,
como por ejemplo el ncleo caudado, que es la regin del centro del cerebro
relacionada con el aprendizaje, la memoria o el enamoramiento. Otras zonas
activadas son la corteza insular o nsula, relacionada con las emociones y sen-
timientos (posible conectiva con el amor incondicional), y el lbulo parietal dere-
cho (relacionado con la OAA y la sensacin de ilimitacin del self, explicado
anteriormente por Newberg y DAquilli). Para la experiencia de aniquilacin
del ego, para la alteracin corporal y para la sensacin unitaria del s mismo
con el mundo (o unidad indiferenciada).
Asegura Beauregard que los estados msticos se producen gracias a una com-
pleja red neuronal distribuida por todo el cerebro. No obstante, ambos cientfi-
cos siempre han dejado claro que no es lo mismo el recuerdo de una experien-
cia mstica que la experiencia en tiempo real. De hecho, de todos los ensayos
con monjas de la orden Carmelita tan slo se han recogido 15 de los 32 items o
niveles de experiencias msticas segn la valoracin o clasificacin aportada por
Ralph W. Hood 41. Esto ha sido deliberado ya que la estrategia del experimento
era en parte ver la diferencia entre un estado mstico real y un estado recorda-
do. Pero como decan las monjas al inicio de las pruebas: la experiencia de Dios
no es sobrevenida a nuestra voluntad.
Es cierto entonces que el papel de la memoria asociativa est relacionado
con los recuerdos emocionales. Tanto el miedo y como la felicidad son facto-
res imprescindibles para la excitacin emocional y la supervivencia; y en
ello juegan un papel fundamental los factores de recuerdo. La amgdala baso-
lateral es la parte del cerebro que se cree responsable de los recuerdos emo-
cionales, segn han determinado Mark Mayford, Leon G. Reijmers y colegas 42
de The Scripps Research Institute de La Jolla, California. Es interesante cono-
cer no slo la localizacin de los correlatos neuronales de la memoria aso-
ciativa, sino tambin saber que sin miedo no es posible sobrevivir, aunque
adolezcamos de felicidad. Ahora bien tambin es muy interesante darnos cuen-
ta de que la memoria de la felicidad vivida provoca nuevos niveles de recrea-
cin de la felicidad vivida en tiempo real (the remembered present de Edelman).
Y es un factor volitivo para el aprendizaje de la regulacin de la memoria
afectiva.
41
HOOD, RALPH W., Jr., The Construction and Preliminary Validation of a Measure of
Reported Mystical Experience, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 14: 29-41, 1975.
42
REIJMERS, L. G. - PERKINS, B. L. - MATSUO, N. - MAYFORD, M., Localization of a stable
neural correlate of associative memory, Science 317: 1230, 2007.
Son las mismas neuronas activadas durante el aprendizaje las que se reac-
tivan durante recuerdo por la memoria? Utilizando el miedo condicionado en
ratones, un modelo de comportamiento de trastorno de estrs postraumtico,
constatamos que las mismas neuronas activadas durante el aprendizaje se reac-
tivaron cuando el animal temeroso record el evento. Tambin se utiliz este
enfoque en el estudio de la extincin; se trata de un proceso utilizado en el tra-
tamiento de las fobias cuando los recuerdos se debilitan por la exposicin repe-
tida a un estmulo relevante. Result que las neuronas antes activadas por el
estmulo miedo ya no se activaban tras la extincin. Este hallazgo sugiere, por
tanto, que la extincin borra o interfiere algunos componentes neurales de la
memoria original.
Ahora bien, quin es el que recuerda, el cerebro o el yo? Existe un yo
en el ratn que recuerda, asocia, olvida o aprende? Es el proceso de individua-
lizacin biolgica del ratn un reflejo de los procesos jerrquicos de individua-
lizacin fenotpicos hasta llegar a los procesos de individuacin 43 humanos?
Para llegar a esa experiencia numinosa de s mismo, que los estoicos llama-
ron oikeiosis debemos antes de ello enfrentarnos con nuestros miedos.
Es importante el estudio realizado por David Dunning y Emily Balcetis de la
Cornell University de Ithaca, N.Y. En l han dado con la clave de que no todo lo
que tomamos como real es real 44. Los participantes de un examen de auto-pre-
diccin sobrestimaron la probabilidad de que las conductas deseables (los pre-
juicios) dependeran de consideraciones imparciales en sus predicciones. En
general se tom un auto-conocimiento modificado por auto-percepciones dis-
torsionadas, donde el prejuicio no dejaba ver la realidad tal cual era. Exista una
ceguera atencional que no permita tener una informacin completa de noso-
tros mismos. Era una informacin sesgada fruto de una manipulacin de la
informacin de nosotros mismos que no interesaba.
Los miedos reprimidos son factores que impiden percibir la realidad de uno
mismo. Philippe Goldin y James Gross, de la Universidad de Standford publi-
caron un artculo en la revista Biological Psychiatry, donde la estrategia de recon-
sideracin cognitiva (pensar sobre lo que est pasando) tendra un impacto tem-
prano en el proceso de generacin emocional; por otra parte, la represin
expresiva (evitar que se note lo que estamos sintiendo) sera una estrategia de
comportamiento cuyo impacto sera tardo, dentro del proceso de generacin
43
El proceso de individuacin se define desde la psicologa junguiana como un proceso
de transformacin del ego en el S-mismo, la naturaleza ntima del individuo. Es la oikeio-
sis. sta hace que el ser vivo se experimente o se perciba como perteneciente a s mismo y
que l tienda al desarrollo de su naturaleza peculiar.
44
EPLEY, N. - DUNNING, D., The mixed blessings of self-knowledge in behavioral predic-
tion: Enhanced discrimination but exacerbated bias, Personality and Social Psychology Bulle-
tin, 32, pp. 641-655, 2006.
45
GOLDIN, PHILIPPE R. - MCRAEA, K. - RAMELA, W. - GROSS, JAMES J., The Neural Bases of
Emotion Regulation: Reappraisal and Suppression of Negative Emotion, Biological Psychiatry,
vol. 63, Issue 6, 15 March 2008, pp. 577-586.
46
LUTZ, A. - GREISCHAR, LL. - RAWLINGS NB, RICARD, M. - DAVIDSON, R. J., Long-term medi-
tators self-induce high-amplitude gamma synchrony during mental practice, Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, 101: 16369-73, 2004.
47
Para conocer ms con profundidad ver del neurlogo Paul Whalen: WHALEN, P. J. - SHIN,
L. M. - MCINERNEY, S. C. - FISCHER, H. - WRIGHT, C. I. - RAUCH, S. L., A functional MRI study of
human amygdala responses to facial expressions of fear vs. anger, Emotion, 2001, 1:70-83;
SOMERVILLE, L. H. - KIM, H. - JOHNSTONE, T. - ALEXANDER, A. - WHALEN, P. J., Human amygdala res-
ponse during presentation of happy and neutral faces: Correlations with state anxiety, Biolo-
gical Psychiatry, 2004, 55:897-903; WHALEN, P. J - KAGAN, J. - COOK, R. G. - DAVIS, F. C. - KIM, H. -
POLIS, S. - MCLAREN, D. G. - SOMERVILLE, L. H. - MCLEAN, A. A. - MAXWELL, J. S. - JOHNSTONE, T.,
Human amygdala responsivity to masked fearful eye whites, Science, 2004, 306:2061. Y tam-
bin Paul Eckman: BARTLETT, M. S. - HAGER, J. C. - EKMAN, P. - SEJNOWSKI, T. J., Measuring facial
expressions by computer image analysis, Psychophysiology, 36, 253-263, 1999; RUCH, W. - EKMAN,
P., The expressive pattern of laughter, in A. W. KASZNIAK (ed.), Emotion qualia, and cons-
ciousness, Word Scientific Publisher, Tokyo, 426-443, 2001; LEVENSON, R. W. - EKMAN, P., Dif-
ficulty does not account for emotion-specific heart rate changes in the directed facial action
task, Psychophysiology, 39 397-405, 2002; TSIAMYRTZIS, P. - DOWDALL, J. - SHASTRI, D. - PAVLIDIS, I.
T. - FRANK, M. G. - EKMAN, P., Imaging Facial Physiology for the Detection of Deceit, Interna-
tional Journal of Computer Vision, 71 (2), 197-214, 2005.
pero registrables. En lamas muy duchos en meditacin result que sonidos que
nos alteran a todos, o sustos, no les perturban ni en sus micro-expresiones.
Otro ejemplo fue la capacidad de coherencia sincrnica registrada en los
cerebros de grandes meditadores. Dicha sincrona, registrada con cascos de 256
electrodos en la cabeza de los monjes, se contrast con la de noveles en medi-
tacin. Los datos registrados por la red de sensores en los monjes budistas fue-
ron impresionantes. La amplitud de las ondas gamma recogidas en algunos de
los monjes son las mayores de la historia registradas en un contexto no patol-
gico, entre 25 y 42 Hz. Muy por encima de los noveles que registraron una baja
sincrona con una actividad oscilatoria lenta (entre 4 y 13 Hz.). Esta alta ampli-
tud de frecuencia gamma, est asociada con la capacidad de prestar atencin y
aprendizaje. Se registraron bilateralmente sobre la regin parietotemporal y el
mediofrontal. Cuando los meditadores dispersaron el punto de atencin de su
concentracin hacia una meditacin sin objeto (llevndola a la compasin) se
gener en sus percepciones una experiencia de amor incondicional que no slo
ampli la sincrona en banda gamma como un fenmeno en red de asambleas
neurales, sino que reflej un aumento en la precisin temporal de las interac-
ciones talamocorticales y corticales. El estado de transicin no es inmediato y
requiere entre 5 y 15 s. De este modo qued reflejado un cambio de calidad de
instante en instante, de un alto estado de conciencia a otro.
Estos datos sugieren que el entrenamiento mental involucra mecanismos de
integracin temporal, y puede inducir a corto plazo y a largo plazo cambios neu-
ronales 48. Es lo que se ha llegado a observar por imgenes de resonancia mag-
ntica funcional (fRMI) para indicar que el cultivo de la compasin y de la bon-
dad se aprende del mismo modo que se aprende a tocar un instrumento musical
o dominar un deporte.
En otro experimento se escogi a 16 monjes tibetanos y practicantes laicos
con un curriculum de ms de 10.000 horas de prctica en meditacin y otros 16
que, sin formacin previa, fueron instruidos en los fundamentos de la medita-
cin sobre la compasin, dos semanas antes de escanear sus cerebros. A cada
uno de los 32 sujetos se les coloc en el escner de fMRI en el UW-Madison Wais-
man Center for Brain Imaging, que dirige Davidson, y se le pidi comenzar la
meditacin de la compasin o abstenerse de ella. En cada estado, los sujetos
fueron expuestos a sonidos y vocalizaciones humanas negativas y positivas dise-
adas para evocar respuestas de empata, as como vocalizaciones neutrales:
sonidos de una mujer afligida, un beb rindose o el ruido de fondo de un res-
taurante.
La hiptesis principal fue que la preocupacin por los dems cultivada median-
te esta forma de meditacin mejora el procesamiento afectivo, en particular en
respuesta a los sonidos de angustia, y que esa respuesta emocional a los soni-
dos es modulada por el grado de formacin de la meditacin. La presentacin
48
LUTZ, A. - BREFCZYNSKI-LEWIS, J. - JOHNSTONE, T. - DAVIDSON, R. J., Regulation of the neu-
ral circuitry of emotion by compassion meditation: Effects of meditative expertise, PLoS
ONE, 2008 Mar 26;3(3): e1897.
Morin sostiene que no puede haber una relacin directa entre los aspectos
neurolgicos del cerebro y los aspectos psquicos y espirituales, si no es ponien-
do en funcionamiento conjuntamente el principio de emergencia, el principio
49
MORIN, EDGAR, El mtodo III. El conocimiento del conocimiento, Ediciones Ctedra,
Madrid, 1999, pp. 89-90.
50
RUNEHOV, A. L. C., Neuroscientific Explanations of Religious Experience are Not free
from Cultural Aspects, Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science, n. 2,
January 2008, pp. 141-156; RUNEHOV, A. L. C., Sacred or Neural? The Potential of Neuroscience to
Explain Religious Experience, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht: Gttingen, Germany, 2007; RUNEHOV,
A. L. C., A Neuro-psychological Explanation of Religious Experience?, Studies in Science and
Theology, Grman, U. - Drees, W. B. - Meisinger, H. (eds.), vol. 9, 59-68, 2004; RUNEHOV, A. L. C.,
A Being or To Be? Philosophical Thoughts about Future Research on Neuroscience and Reli-
gions and the Need for Interdisciplinarity, European Journal of Science and Theology, vol. 2,
n. 1 (March), 55-66, 2006.
51
RODRGUEZ, E. - GEORGE, N. - LACHAUX, J. P. - MARTINERIE, J. - RENAULT, B. - VARELA, F. J.,
Perceptions shadow: long-distance synchronization of human brain activity, Nature 397,
430-433 (4), February 1999.
52
Este tema ha sido motivo de ms de mil aos de debate entre las escuelas budistas
(Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Yogashara y Madhyamaka). La Vaibhashika es la nica que admi-
te la percepcin es un caso de representacin refleja. Las otras escuelas mantienen la idea que
se trata de un proceso ms activo en el que el namba (aspecto) desempea un papel orga-
nizador subjetivo.
53
GOLEMAN, D., Emociones Destructivas. Como entenderlas y superarlas, Ed. Kairs, Bar-
celona, 2003.
54
Mutatis mutandis, es interesante relacionarlo con algo que en lingstica no existe,
y es la primera persona del singular del imperativo. Sera algo as como camino yo, voy
yo, oigo yo; etc., es decir, formado con un verbo (logos) indicativo en formula de auto-
imposicin volitiva. Es una forma verbal que no tiene sentido, ya que es una orden impe-
rativa que ofrece uno a s mismo y que no hace uso verbal. Pero es una orden mental. Es
decir, en un estado de observador-observado, desdoblado internamente (segn el mtodo
de George I. Gurdjieff), uno puede darse esa orden imperativa como observado, es decir,
objetivado. En ese estado uno mismo es sujeto y objeto en una autoobservacin y en un
recuerdo de s que provoca un vaco entre s mismo donde no hay dilogo interior, sino una
autocontemplacin volitiva y una quietud de pensamiento insubordinado. Es entonces donde
se da la orden silenciosa de la primera persona del singular del imperativo omitido, en pura
qeoria anagogika.
55
Es segn la Stoa la Megalopsiquis condensada en el Hegemonikon. El Hegemo-
nikon es lo que da unidad a toda la vida psquica humana, la fuente de la vida del alma y del
To Krzysztof Sitarz
1
I want to express my gratitude to the Fundacin Ramn Areces [Ramn Areces Foundation] for
its support to this research program on the philosophy of Jan Patocka at the Universidad Pontificia Comillas.
This research is being carried out under the guide of Professor Dr. Miguel Garca-Bar, within the context
of a research program on the philosophical foundations of the idea of solidarity. This article can be considered
as a result of the research so far accomplished. All the possible defects are exclusively my responsibility.
PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749 PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), nm. 242, pp. 987-1001
19_IvanORTEGA.qxd:Maqueta.qxd 26/6/08 12:07 Pgina 988
INTRODUCTION
In the last years, Patockas thought has been given its due place in philosophical and
political discussions, and he has been acknowledged as one of the great thinkers of the
20th century. Within phenomenological circles, his idea of an asubjective phenomenology
and his theory of the movements of existence are closely and thoroughly studied. Likewise,
his ethical and political thought has been attentively studied, in so far as it can give ideas
about how to propose ideals for public life in increasingly pluralistic societies. Patockas
relevance lies also in that his thought is a philosophy of resistance to the oppressor, where
intellectual and vital quest for the truth defies the established powers. Patockas thought
is also a praxis of resistance to oppression. Patocka in fact was an intellectual and a moral
example for Czech dissidents, especially for Vclav Havel, whose ideas are to a good
extend inspired in Patockas thought.
Our aim in this article is to show how Patockas thought is also relevant in the fields
of science and religion, even if Patocka himself did not deal with these topics. However,
the complexity of his thought allows us to find in him some clues for contemporary debates
on issues of science and religion. With this, we also show one of the best characteristics
of philosophical theories, namely that they open new possibilities which could even be
unknown to the one who first thought them.
This article consists of two parts. The first one consists of a basic presentation of
Patockas philosophy in the points which are essential to the aims of this article. We will
not deal then with his philosophy of history and the ethical consequences of his thought.
Instead, we will speak of Patockas asubjective phenomenology and his conception of the
world and human existence in it. In the second part we will show how Patockas thought
can be used in some scientific and religious issues such as the mind-body problem, the
value of scientific research or the problems of a theistic (or atheistic) worldview.
As we have indicated, Patocka accepts that the phenomenological method is the best
indicated to carry out a radical philosophical research. However, Patocka does not fully
accept Husserls understanding of phenomenology as a sort of idealism. This idealism
claimed to take exact account of knowledge and rationality, and with it the very disclosure
of being, by describing the process of Constitution of the world to consciousness.
This idealism is distinct from other versions in that the world is not simply taken as
a creation of the mind. The world and its objects do appear as having their own entity,
and neatly distinct from consciousness, to which notwithstanding they appear. This
consciousness is also transcendental intersubjectivity, as Husserl says in the fifth of his
Cartesian Meditations. Intersubjectivity is a phenomenological datum, the world can only
appear within horizons shared by the different conscious subjets, in such a way that the
world is a common world.
Patocka knows well that transcendental phenomenology is not equivalent to classic
idealism, and even less to solipsism. Nevertheless Patocka, along with many of Husserls
disciples, thinks that this idealism does not correspond to the original impulse of
phenomenology. Patocka considers that if we hold to the original intention, that is to say,
to the fundamental principle of taking what is given in exactly the measure that it is given 2,
then we cannot defend an idealistic philosophy, however different from other idealisms
it may be. Patocka states that Husserls phenomenology ends being idealistic because of
theoretical presuppositions which cause the introduction of non-phenomenological
constructions in the analysis.
According to Patocka, Husserl misses his own discovery of appearing as such. The
study of phenomenon discloses the primordial fact of appearing. Before any thought,
action or evaluation, something appears to me. However, Husserl assumes that analyzing
the phenomenon as such is the analysis of appearing to me, to a subject full of contents
whose existence and certitude is guaranteed by the self-evidence of the cogito. In Husserl,
then, the study of the phenomenon is not that of appearing in its originality, but an ontology
of subjectivity. With this, we abandon the field of appearing and we confound it with the
realm of what appears, repeating the same mistake as Plato and Descartes 3.
The central point in Patockas critique is, in our view, the consideration of the subject
which is necessarily given in phenomenological analysis. To Husserl, this subject includes
all his acts. Everything that can be related to consciousness, to what is lived, is absolutely
given in the analysis of the Cartesian cogito in its certitude. On this basis, it can be stated
that the phenomenon is ultimately founded on such subjectivity. To Patocka, it is not
this full subjectivity that is given in phenomenological analysis, but only a subjective
pole to which appearing is referred but upon which it is not founded 4. Appearing has
its own entity 5 and a thorough phenomenological analysis must study it in itself. Patocka
criticizes that Husserl keeps the prejudice of the evidence of conscience as a unitarian
entity. In his consideration of the first data, Husserl went beyond what was actually given
by these data. The problem is not the undoubtfulness of the very act of living, but that
along with it, the conscience as a sort of unity encompassing all its noments is taken
for self-evident. This unity is not individual conscience, but transcendental conscience,
namely the ultimate horizon to which all that appears is referred. Thus, conscience is
taken as a sort of absolute entity to be analysed in reflection, in the realm of the inmanent 6.
2
This is the principle of all principles. See Ideen zu einer reinen Phnomenologie und phnomenologi-
schen philosophie, Erstes Buch, Husserliana III/1, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, p. 43.
3
See JUAN MANUEL GARRIDO, Appearing as Such in Patockas A-Subjective Phenomenology, in
Philosophy Today, De Paul University, 51:2 (2007) 121-136. Patockas critique of husserlian subjectivism
can be found in the following essays: JAN PATOCKA, Der Subjektivismus des Husserlschen und die Mglichkeit
einer asubjektiven Phnomenologie, and Der Subjektivismus des Husserlschen und die Forderung
einer asubjektiven Phnomenologie, in KLAUS NELLEN, JIR NEMEC and ILJA SRUBAR (eds.), Die Bewegung
der menschlichen Existenz, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1991, pp. 267-285 and 286-309. [Spanish translation: El
subjetivismo de la fenomenologa husserliana y la posibilidad de una fenomenologa asubjetiva and El
subjetivismo de la fenomenologa husserliana y la exigencia de una fenomenologa asubjetiva, in AGUSTN
SERRANO DE HARO (ed.), El movimiento de la existencia humana, translated by Agustn Serrano de Haro and
Teresa Padilla, Encuentro, Madrid, 2004, pp. 93-112 and 113-136.]
4
See for example [poch et rduction] in Papiers Phnomnologiques, translated by Erika Abrams,
Grenoble, Jerme Millon, 1995, pp. 163-210, especially p. 169. This text must not be confounded with the
essay Epoche und Reduktion (quoted below, note 8) of which this one is a draft version considerably
longer than the final essay.
5
We write this term between quotation marks to indicate that appearing must not be taken as an
entity in the ontological sense, as if it were a real object. As we will see, appearing has to be considered as
distinct from what appears, as a non-real sphere though, as we shall see, it discloses the world.
6
Understood as what is given by itself, as opposed to simple the structural elements. This
distinction is described in EDMUND HUSSERL, Die Idee der Phnomenologie. Fnf Vorlesungen, Meiner,
Hamburg, 1986.
In other words, when in Husserl life is affirmed 7 as self-evident, it is not only about
the current act of living, the present evidence of being alive and conscious, but also all
the determinations which we find in our living. They are all taken as equally self evident,
and with this it is also assumed the evidence of the terrain: conscience as a Unitarian
entity or pre-entity. This is for Patocka a result of the introduction of theoretical theses
foreign to the strictly phenomenological research starting from the first data, which
proceeds only assuming what can be inferred from those first data.
The subjectivist presupposition prevents Husserl from carrying out the phenomenological
epoch in a fully radical way 8. poch consists of interrupting the belief in the real existence
of the world and its objects, not eliminating the contents as such, but leaving them in
their pure appearing. Epoche is not doubting the existence of the world; this belief, which
certainly supports everyday life as a basic thesis, simply ceases to be posed, and this in
order that all that is present to us can show itself under a different light. With this, a whole
new field of research is opened, which is claimed to give account of the most fundamental
principles that sustain every science and every knowledge, as well as every act in our life
in the world.
Husserls use of poch is however not radical enough, says Patocka. The interruption
is not applied to consciousness, understood as a whole unity, a unitarian entity. To
Husserl, explains Patocka, if we interrupted the thesis of the existence of consciousness,
then there would no longer be an absolute terrain from which and on the grounds of
which the constitution of the world could be studied with guaranties 9.
This limitation of poch is due to Husserls subjectivistic prejudice, which takes
subjectivity as absolutely given with all its contents. Thus, phenomenon, referred as it is
to subjectivity, is necessarily founded on and constituded by it. To be firmly grounded,
all the phenomena need to be referred to absolute subjectivity. The phenomenological
analysis must, then, clarify how phenomena are founded on subjectivity; it must redirect,
reduce them to their subjective foundation. The main aim of phenomenology is,
consequently, reduction. Therefore, poch is only a secondary tool subordinated to
reduction. Otherwise the phenomena (and with them the world) would not be reduced
and phenomenology would have no sense at all.
On the contrary, Patocka thinks that epoche can be universally and radically applied,
and that this does not paralyse philosophical research. Radical poch discloses the pure
structure of appearing as such and reveal that the true discovery of phenomenology is
appearing and not its purported foundation. poch, and not reduction, is the main concept
in phenomenology. Furthermore, a radical use of epoche leads to a new, and for Patocka
more accurate, understanding of existence in the world, of knowledge, and especially, as
we will see below, of the configuration of rationality in an always unachieved teleology
towards truth, which always remains as a goal.
7
Life is always understood as conscious life, in the broad sense of being affected and/or referred
to an object. This refers to a broad extent of experiences, the ones classically described as those of the
senses and of the intellect.
8
This is the main idea of the text Epoche und Reduktion in Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz,
pp. 415-423. (Spanish translation: Epoj y reduccin, in El movimiento de la existencia humana,
pp. 241-250.)
9
See Ibidem, p. 249.
Liberated, then, from subjectivist prejudice, Patocka thinks that poch can and must
be universally used, and this makes us study the subject as constituted within a world in
which the subject appears as rooted. At the same time, this subjectivity rooted in the
world lives in a natural world, the world of everyday life, shared with others. Therefore,
it can be said that radical poch leads us to affirm a quite particular way of being in the
world. This particular way consists of being rooted in the world as an apriori to subjectivity,
and, at the same time, existing in a natural world that appears to a subjective horizon.
Once we have indicated the general pattern of how Patocka, to our understanding,
presents human existence in the world, we will see in more detail how his theses are
developed. We are first going to deal with the appearance of the world as a previous
totality, and then we will explain the configuration of the natural world according to
Patocka 13. In the description of Patockas theory of the configuration of the natural world,
10
See ANA CECILIA SANTOS, Die Lehre des Erscheinens bei Jan Patocka: drei Probleme, in Studia
Phaenomenologica. Romanian Journal for Phenomenology VII (2007) pp. 303-329, especially the pp. 304
and 310-14.
11
A problem in Patockas conceptualization is the double status of subjectivity as a pole of appearing
as such, to which the world is referred, and at the same time a part of what appears and a part of the world.
We cannot deal with this problem in this paper. See ANA SANTOS, Vers une phnomnologie asubjective,
in RENAUD BARBARAS (ed.), Jan Patocka: phnomnologie asubjective et existence, Paris, Mimesis, 2007, pp. 49-
71, especially pp. 67-69.
12
Epoch und Reduktion, p. 420; Epoj y reduccin, pp. 247-248. My italics.
13
The theme and scope of this paper does not allow us to enter into the complexities of Patockas
conceptualization of human existence and that to which it is opened. Karel Novotn shows that there can
be traced up to three conceptualizations. The first one points to Heidegger and takes the opening as the
understanding of Being and the opened as the entity in that it is the Being understood as in a certain
way. The second one refers to philosophy of corporality and considers the disclosure of the world as the
there will be also a description of the existential dynamism within the natural world.
Once we have explained the basic patockian notions of human existence within the world,
we will be able to indicate the ethical root in Patockas phenomenology.
As we have said above, radical epoche discloses the world as the a priori of subjectivity.
Appearing things are shown within horizons, internal and external 14. These horizons are
included the one in the other in such a way that they all can be finally included in an all-
encompassing horizon. This horizon is the world as an all-encompassing totality. In order
to explain how the world is disclosed as the totality of things included in an all-encompassing
horizon, Patocka makes use of the concept of Weltfge, taken from Eugen Fink 15.
What first of all appears to us in our perceptions, are limitations, that show the forms
in which things are placed. Limitations are, each one separately, contingent; however,
we cant eliminate a limitation without replacing it with another. Individual limitations,
then, are contingent, but limitation as such is not. If there are always necessarily limitations
when we perceive, then the idea of a totality which encompasses all limitations appears
as necessary. This is in fact for Patocka the kantian idea of absolute space or the finkean
concept of Weltfge 16.
This totality is necessarily one and all-encompassing, since if not we would have again
another limitation which could be integrated in a totality of a superior order and so on.
Nevertheless, the fact that an all-encompassing totality is an unavoidable horizon when
considering perception, does not involve that this totality actually exists. At most we could
say that it is impossible to think this totality as non-existent, but it does not mean that
this totality in fact exists. Patocka tries to solve this problem with the help of the mutual
foundation of the part and the whole. If we get to demonstrate the real existence of a part
of the totality, then we will have demonstrated the existence of the all-encompassing
totality. In other words, if a limitation of something is found as evidently existing, then
the totality that encompasses this limitation is also necessarily existing 17.
presentation of possibilities to an incorporated subject. These three conceptualizations are not mutually
exclusive; to the contrary, they all deal with human existence and its place in the world disclosed by
appearing. We will centre our attention in the conceptualization referred to Eugen Fink which, to our
understanding, gives the clearest exposition of the basic lines of the problem of appearing and world in
Jan Patocka. See KAREL NOVOTN, Louverture du monde phnomnologique: donation ou comprehension?
Sur le problme de lapparatre comme tel chez Jan Patocka, in RENAUD BARBARAS (ed.), Jan Patocka.
Phnomnologie asubjective et existence, pp. 9-25.
14
See for example: [Leons sur la corporit] in Papiers Phnomnologiques, pp. 53-116, especially
pp. 63-70.
15
Universo y mundo del hombre. Observaciones a un planteamiento cosmolgico contemporneo,
in El movimiento de la existencia humana, pp. 85-92. For the original text in German, see Weltganzes und
Menschenwelt, in BEIERWALTES and SCHRADER (hrsg.), Weltaspekte der Philosophie. Festschrift fr R.Berlinger,
Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1972. Also in Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, pp. 257-264.
16
See Ibidem, pp. 85-86.
17
It should be noted that here Patocka passes from phenomenology to philosophical
phenomenology. The former deals with appearing as such, in its pure appearing, the latter tries to draw
metaphysical conclusions from phenomenology. The problem of appearing and the world is, then, a
problem in which phenomenology and philosophical phenomenology are implicated. It can be asked
whether phenomenology and philosophical phenomenology can be really separated. Patocka himself, at
the end of his life, thought that asubjective phenomenology needed an ontology. In our opinion, considering
appearing as such leads to consider the world, and this last consideration cannot be coherently made
without questioning what is disclosed as the world and whether it really exists.
In order to demonstrate the existence of such a part, Patocka seeks to show the
asubjective self-disclosure and self-attestation of a part of the world in its appearing in
our perception. In our perception there must be the presentation of something identifiable
as a form, as something within limits, and this without our subjectivity playing any active
role (which would once again raise the problem of idealism and actual existence of the
world out of us). This is possible, according to Patocka, by virtue of an asubjective
phenomenology in which what appears gives account of itself exclusively from itself:
For any totality, whether it be an ulterior collection of parts, or a previous totality,
the mutual foundation of the part and the whole is, however, valid; they are mutually
presupposed. Therefore, if there is no direct access in experience to the whole, it is enough
to know of it as such whole in order to have a right to affirm the meaning of part as
independent from the subject. Such a right seems to be able to be shown in an asubjective
phenomenology of perception that does not need to acknowledge the limit of perceptive
auto-donation in immanence which takes place in apodictic self-perception, and that
considers the meaning of perception, through twisted paths, as founded in the strictly
worldly phenomena, and not in the subjective ones 18.
Thus, the world appears to us as separate and independent from subjectivity. However,
we also know that the world appears as the natural world within which we carry out
our everyday life. Patocka makes a careful analysis of the structure of the natural
world, as well as of the existential dynamism deployed within it. It is in the careful considera-
tion of these analyses where we can see the ethical impulse within Patockas first
philosophy.
Patocka studies the natural world from the points of view of its structure and of
existential dynamism. The study of the structure of the natural world leads to the analysis
of the referents, the study of existential dynamism leads to Patockas theory of the three
movements of human existence.
18
Ibidem, p. 87. These twisted paths are not specified here. These are ways in which appearing as
such reveals itself as constituting a web of references where subjectivity is one of the poles of this autonomous
realm, but not its founder or constituter. The phenomenon shows to us and in this showing it is
disclosed as a structure referred to us, but to which we are also caught and by which we are in a certain
way co-constituted. Patocka tries repeatedly to explore this self-attestation of appearing as a non-
subjective realm. See for example Epoch et reduction. Manuscript de travail, in Papiers Phnomnologiques,
Grenoble, Jrme Millon, 1995, pp. 163-210.
19
JAN PATOCKA, The natural World and Phenomenology, in ERAZIM KOHK, Jan Patocka. Philosophy
and selected writings, The University of Chicago Press, 1989, pp. 239-273, especially pp. 255-257.
20
Ibidem, p. 255.
21
Loc. cit.
The earth is not the only referent. Together with the essentially near referent of the
earth, we find another referent correlative to this, which is essentially distant, the heavens:
There is, however, yet another referent, one that is essentially distant, intangible,
unmanageable by bodily touch, no matter how present it appears a referent to which
all that is essentially beyond reach belongs the heavens, the light, the heavenly lights
and bodies, all that encloses our horizon without closing it in, all that constitutes the
outside as something that constantly encloses us in an interior 22.
This so structured natural world is also radically shared with others. In our ordinary
life we are referred to the Others in a space inhabited by me and others. In fact, Patocka
states that we are in rapport with the world through the rapport with the others. The other,
in fact, is made apparent and patent before myself, since the individual always perceives
himself as within a meaningful situation in which the self is already referred to, and
appealed by, the other. This essential contact with others in the natural world is what gives
reality and density to life in the world:
Contact with the others is the very center of our world, endowing it with its most
intrinsic content, but also its most important meaning, perhaps even all its meaning. It
is only contact with others that constitutes the proper context in which man lives; our
sense contact with present reality, or in-tuition, gains its central significance by bestowing
a mark of its immediate persuasiveness on the reality of the others 23.
22
The natural world and phenomenology, p. 256. The italics are Patockas.
23
The natural world and phenomenology, p. 258. The italics are Patockas.
24
Patocka understands movement as the realization of human existence through the appropriation
of possibilities. Patocka recuperates Aristotles notion of movement as the actualization of an essence and
modifies it in an existencial sense, in such a way that the actualization of human essence is not that of a
preexisting one which discloses itself, but of an essence which is being built in each appropriation of
possibilities. Patockas main work on this subject has not yet been translated to any commonly accessible
language: Aristotels, jeho predchudci a dedicov [Aristotle, his predecessors and his successors], Praha,
Nakladatelstv Ceskoslovensk Akademie Ved, 1964. This book has a french abstract which, to our knowledge,
has not been either translated or republished: pp. 389-403.
25
For the study of corporality in Patocka, see Leons sur la corporit, in Papiers Phnomnologiques,
translated by Erika Abrams, Grenoble, Jerme Millon, 1995, pp. 53-116; Body, Community, Language,
World, translated by Erazim Kohk, Peru (Illinois-USA), 1998.
26
The natural world and phenomenology, p. 255.
27
The natural world and phenomenology, p. 260.
The movement of rootedness has a strong connection with the movement of defence.
This second movement consists of working to obtain what is necessary for subsistence,
and to maintain the order which allows the acceptance of life and the movement of
rootedness. The individual, who has been accepted into life, has to join the others in the
task of working so that the conditions of the acceptance can be maintained. In this
movement the world as exteriority is disclosed:
The other as well as, in the natural, inevitable mutual bonding, the others is
what covers us, thanks to whose help the earth can first become the earth for me, the
sky the sky the others are our original home. A home, that sinking of roots, is not,
however, possible of itself and for itself. A home is a place where the sinking of roots
among things takes place, that is, where needs are met, through the mediation of others.
What is needed, though, must be procured, secured and that takes place only partially
in the home the activity of procuring what is needed, work, entails an outside, the
work place, the domain of objectivity 28.
Finally, the movement of truth is the confrontation with finitude and the question
for the meaning of such a finite existence. When someone assumes his finitude, he
confronts his existence and he is situated explicitly in front of the world as a totality. In
this situation, the individual is in a position from which the question for himself and his
life can be posed. This assumption of finitude and this questioning for the meaning of
existence has for Patocka clear moral connotations. In the movement of truth, the human
being accepts his finitude as well as the responsibility for his existence. Each one is then
responsible for the choices he makes and for the subsequent shape he gives to his life
and being. This moral dimension of the movement of truth is essential to the ethical and
political dimensions of Patockas thought, and is especially essential to the understanding
of the ethical root and impulse already present in Patockas first philosophy.
Ibidem, p. 260.
28
make us draw these conclusions about human existence and the world.
At first sight, it is not evident that Patockas considerations may have relevant
consequences as far as scientific or religious issues are concerned. However, Jan Patockas
philosophy is richer than it seems, and his views can provide us with intellectual tools
to approach some contemporary problems of science and religion. Jan Patocka himself
never dealt with these topics but, as it usually happens with great thinkers, his thought
enshrines potentialities unaware to the author but which we can infer.
We will limit ourselves here to indicate certain problems to which Patockas thought
gives the possibility of a new insight. We will deal at the first place with the consequences
in scientific issues like the mind-body problem (based on prof. James Menschs
considerations). Secondly, we will speak of the religious question of how to think revelation
and the world.
2.1. Jan Patocka and Science (I): the unity of the world and its exploration.
The value of scientific research
As we have seen, Jan Patocka rejects husserlian transcendentalism and states the co-
originality of subjectivity and the world as they are given in the phenomenon, understood
as appearing as such. This co-originality is given in the phenomenon itself but on the
metaphysical level Patocka goes one step further and states the primacy of the world as
the a priori of subjectivity. The world is present to subjectivity as the all-encompassing
totality which is never given as an actual whole. The world is always richer than the present
phenomenon (even if implicitly the whole is hinted in the form of an all-encompassing
horizon) and so we are permanently open to new aspects of the world.
Two characteristics stand out: the unity of the world (including the subject in itself)
and its openness. These two traits are of fundamental importance as far as the value of
scientific research is concerned. Scientific exploration can be thought to have an important
role in the discovery of the one world by the subject, especially if we compare with the
consequences of all idealism, which have the tendency, in my opinion, to devaluate science
in the name of the inclusion in the all-encompassing and absolute subjectivity.
Thus, by virtue of the phenomenon we are left before a world which is continually
opening itself in new possibilities. The world is then, according to this conception, a totality
which is never exhausted by our actual knowledge. It is certainly known as a totality
because of the givenness of the all-encompassing horizon, but not because of our actual
knowledge of every entity in the world. This means that the world is always open to
exploration. To our knowledge, Patocka does not specify much about the sort of exploration
can be carried out. Presumably, this is because he had other aims and felt no need to
explore this subject.
Although Patocka did not seem to indicate the different sorts of exploration of the
world, this classification is one that we can do without contradiction with the basic lines
of his thought. Thus, we can distinguish at least two types of exploration. On one hand
there is, obviously, the nave exploration that we can make in our ordinary lives with
the tools provided by our senses. On the other hand, weve got the scientific exploration,
carried out with the methodological and technical tools of modern science and technology.
Even if the question of the relationship between these two sorts of exploration remains
open, we can see that nothing speaks a priori against the specific value of scientific
exploration. It may be objected that classical subjectivist phenomenology also gives value
to modern science. Nevertheless, in transcendental phenomenology the epistemic value
of science is clearly subordinated to subjectivity, whereas in Patockas asubjective
phenomenology there is no transcendental subject posed as the absolute terrain of
appearing. Patockas phenomenology leaves us before a phenomenon where the world
is co-original with the subject as a never-exhausted totality which is always to be explored.
Patockas phenomenology, then, provides us with a general metaphysical view that accepts
and includes the exploration and results of modern science. This very acceptation and
assumption is also the key to avoiding scientism, since the never-ending richness of the
world in its appearing prevents us from accepting dogmatically any particular view as
the definitive one, even if it is one issued from modern sciences or even if it is the
affirmation of the exclusivity of the scientific approach.
Another crucial issue for which Patockas thought can provide us with intellectual tools
is the mind-body problem 30. Once again, Patocka did not explicitly mention the topic, which
was not so relevant in intellectual debates at that time. However, his phenomenological
and metaphysical views allows us to consider the problem of the relationship in such a way
that we can conceptualize the mental or spiritual as having its own entity and
autonomy with regard to material causal reality, at the same time that we avoid ontological
dualism. Let us have a closer look.
In order to explain the relevance of Patockas thought in the mind-body problem, we
need to focus our attention on the problem of experience as such and in the way Jan
Patocka dealt with it. As Mensch states, experience has been one of the central philosophical
problems in the history of Philosophy, especially in modern times. This problem consists
specifically of how to take account of experience as such, that is to say, how do we have
to explain to ourselves the very fact of having an experience, with its inevitable element
of interiority and immateriality (at least in the phenomenological description). The
explanation of experience as such becomes a problem because experience occurs in an
finite existent individual who is integrated in a world dominated by causal relations which
can be fully explained from an impersonal perspective, centred on the third person. This
perspective necessarily does not consider experience in its inner character and takes
everything under its sight as caught in a net of cause-effect relations fully explainable
within deterministic laws. The problem of experience is, then, the problem of explaining
the very fact of grasping something in its very inner aspect of assuming in ones
interiority and knowing it, an explanation which, however, must take into account the
fact that this experience is of someone integrated in a causal world. The problem of
experience show in all its complexity the mind-body problem, that is to say, the problem
30
In this point I follow Professor James Mensch, from the San Francis Xavier University in Antigonish
(Nova Scotia, Canada). He took part in the International Conference Jan Patocka (1907-1977) with the paper
Patockas Asubjective Phenomenology, Artificial Intelligence and the Mind-Body Problem. This paper
will soon be published in the periodical Focus Pragensis (presumably during the year 2008). It can be found
on-line in this address: http://people.stfx.ca/jmensch/Patocka%20and%20Artificial%20Intelligence.doc (the
menu of texts can be found on this page: http://people.stfx.ca/jmensch/Papers_You_Can_Download.html).
Our brief rapport is based on the text distributed to the attendants to the Conferences. All the possible
interpretation mistakes are however my own responsibility.
2.3. Jan Patocka and Religion (I): the manifestation of the world and Revelation
31
In any case, we can take the theme of appearing as such and explore its potentialities for thinking
the mind-body problem.
32
Here I follow the above quoted article of JUAN MANUEL GARRIDO, Appearing as such in Patockas
A-Subjective Phenomenology, especially the p. 136.
disclosed by appearing, whatever the relationship in the ontological order) and this
appearing leads us to affirm the world as an a priori of subjectivity. The affirmation of
the primacy of appearing has a serious metaphysical consequence which can be better
exposed if we compare Patockas thesis about the primacy of appearing with Heideggers
one about the primacy of being in its self-hiding disclosure. To Heidegger, as it is well
known, the appearing of any entity necessarily presupposes the previous disclosure of
being, a disclosure that is inevitably accompanied by a self-hiding of being. Any appearing
is then, according to Heidegger, a necessarily incomplete one since the foundation is never
fully revealed. We are not going to analyse in detail this thesis but this succinct description
enables us to see the fundamental difference with Patockas view. In Patocka there is a
primacy of appearing, it is appearing what first discloses itself and opens the way to the
world. This does not mean of course that everything is revealed by appearing. As we have
already seen, the disclosure of the world is never complete. Nevertheless, there is an
essential difference between these two views. To Heidegger, there is a hiding in manifestation
itself, and thus, we may say, a certain source of mistrust concerning the revelation of
being. In the core of reality there is a self-hiding. To Patocka, to the contrary, manifestation
is, in its inner structure, essentially transparent. The never-exhausting richness of the
world is in no way in Patocka the result of the self-hiding of being but of the richness of
manifestation itself 33. Another important point is that manifestation, although autonomous,
can only happen to human beings. Human beings are not the source of appearing (at
most a necessary presupposition) but they are the place of appearing 34.
These two theses, the primacy of appearing as transparent manifesting and humanity
as the place of appearing, are of fundamental importance when considering the possibility
of a religious revelation in the world. It is also relevant when thinking the eventual place
of the human being in such a revelation. The relevance of Patockas thought in this subject
touches the fields of both philosophy and theology. From a strictly philosophical point
of view, Patockas theses state a world which, in its very manifestation, is open to be
considered as a revelation. From a theological (and especially apologetically) standpoint,
Patockas views provide us with a metaphysical basis to defend the reasonability of a
religious faith based upon a Revelation from the divine.
2.4. Jan Patocka and Religion (II): the possibilities of theism and atheism
Finally, Jan Patockas philosophy gives us hints for considering the possibility
of a theistic or atheistic worldview. In our opinion, Patockas phenomenology provides us
with a philosophical bases for both positions. His philosophy is, in our view, agnostic,
in that it does not say anything about the problem of God. It is true that we can detect
christian elements in his positions, like the consideration of the world as revealing
itself 35 and the thesis that human existence is constituted to transcend its own
33
It is true that in some occasions Patocka seems to accept Patockas view (like, for instance in his
seminars about the problem of Europe). However, these statements are in a context in which Patocka is
explaining other heideggerian concepts which he accepts. This is the case, for example, of the concept of
Gestell, which Patocka takes to explain contemporary crisis. In his explanation, Patocka explains the self-
disclosure and hiding of being. However, Patockas own views about appearing in many other writings
make us sustain the interpretative thesis that Patocka does not accept Heideggers position on manifestation.
34
This point is also briefly but extraordinarily exposed by Juan Manuel Garrido in his already quoted
article.
35
See once again JUAN MANUEL GARRIDO, Appearing as such in Patockas A-Subjective Phenomenology.
finitude 36. However, these statements do not necessarily involve the affirmation of a theistic
thesis, which is never explicitly posed. It is also true that in his philosophy of history
Christianity is seriously considered as a socio-political formation which gave shape in a
certain historical phase to the ideal of life within the truth. Nevertheless, the consideration
of a socio-political phenomenon is not the same as considering it from a strictly religious
perspective which, to our knowledge, is not present in Patocka.
In our view, Patockas phenomenology enables us to hold both a theistic and an
atheistic worldview. This means also that Patockas philosophy leaves space for human
freedom on this topic. We are not forced to hold a theistic or atheistic position if we
accept Patockas metaphysical considerations about appearing and the world. Patockas
considerations speak about a phenomenon whose analysis leaves us before appearing as
such. The analysis of appearing as such in its structure discloses the world as an original
proto-structure necessarily presupposed by the structure of the phenomenon itself. This
movement by virtue of which we analyse the phenomenon and stand before the world
as a totality is the movement of transcending the given. The discovery of the world is the
result, then, of an essential capability of transcendence present within the very dynamism
of human existence. Jan Patockas thought clearly and unambiguously affirms the reality
of transcendence in human life. To Patocka, the human being is not enclosed within his
instincts or interests (which in his view correspond to the first and second movement)
but he keeps within himself the capability of transcending them. However, from this
transcendence does not necessarily follow a transcendent. Patockas phenomenology
leaves us before the world as a totality. We can endlessly explore this totality, but nothing
forces us a priori to pose the existence of God. The unending richness of the world can
be that of an autonomous self-sustained world and human transcendence can be opened
to the spectacle of a self-disclosing world 37. On the other hand, this atheistic worldview
is not an inevitable consequence. Human existence could discover in the world an absolute
foundation or a personal interpellation from transcendence. In any case, what is most
important on our opinion is that neither possibility is excluded. This means that the
human being is intelectually free to explore the world, hold a theistic or atheistic (or
agnostic) worldview, of keeping or changing it and of discussing it. This consequence on
the metaphysical level of the worldview is of fundamental importance on the political
level. If the disclosure of the world does not force us to hold a particular position concerning
the problem of God, then there is no reason to impose any particular view 38. This political
consequence goes beyond the field of religious tolerance. If the world is a totality which
is never fully comprehended, then no particular worldview can be imposed 39.
36
A good exposition of this topic (though unfortunately not easy to find) can be found in Filip Karfk,
Das Unendlichwerden durch die Endlichkeit. Die Transzendenz und die Bewegung der Hingabe den
Anderen bei Jan Patocka, Documents of the CTS (CTS 98/04), Center for Theoretical Studies and Center
for Phenomenological Research, April 1998.
37
It should be noted that this atheistic worldview would not be a scientist or deterministic one (at
least, it would not be necessarily so). The autonomous world to which we would be open would always be
richer than what could be comprehended by our knowledge and would always be open to further research.
It goes without saying that a theistic world view would similarly be open to research.
38
We leave aside the fact that, in our view, the necessity of respect would also be obvious even if this
metaphysical openness were not present. This would make us enter in the fields of political theory and
we would go beyond the limits of this paper. The political consequence that we want to express here is to
be seen as an a fortiori argument in favour of religious tolerance.
39
Once again, this is a metaphysical a fortiori argument.
3. FINAL REMARKS
The aim of this article has been to show the potentialities present in Patockas thought
in fields relevant to science and religion. Our intention has been to invite scholars to take
Patockas phenomenology into account when discussing religious or scientific issues. It
has not been our aim to analyse these topics in detail, but to present the basic lines in
which Patockas positions can be relevant. As we have said, Patocka never dealt with this
topic and thus it does not immediately draw the attention of those who do research in
fields related to science and religion. However, we hope that this paper has shown that
his thought deserves attention.
FARAH
. ANT. N: ACTIVE RECEPTION
OF EUROPEAN THOUGHT
JOSEP PUIG MONTADA
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
ABSTRACT: Farah. Ant.n (1874-1922) was a playwright and a journalist and in both activities he was
socially and politically motivated. He always aimed at a laic state. In the beginning he believed it could
comprise those lands of the Ottoman Empire from Istanbul to Cairo, later he focused in Egypt, although
he may never have abandoned the first idea. He disseminated his ideas through his journal al-Jmia.
His social concerns shaped his views of such a state and its people. Farah. Ant.n read, translated, and
explained European writers. His choices point to these concerns, namely on natural goodness and nat-
ural freedom (Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, Jean Jacques Rousseau), on religious freedom and freedom
of conscience (Lev Tolstoy), on public instruction (Jules Simon). His ideal society should have an open
approach to religion, inspired by A. Comte and, in particular, by E. Renan and his works, some of which
he translated. His attitude toward Nietzsche was double-sided: He could not accept his moral doctrines
but he felt attracted by his doctrine of power of will that supposedly had brought the United States to
their magnificence and that could help the Arab countries to reach a new age. However those values
as represented by the French liberal tradition were more decisive.
KEY WORDS: Farah. Ant.n (1874-1922), journal al-Jmia, League, modern translations into Arabic.
Farah
. Ant.n y la recepcin activa del pensamiento europeo
RESUMEN: Farah. Ant.n (1874-1922) fue autor teatral y periodista, comprometido social y polticamente
en las dos actividades. Su ideal era un estado laico, y en un principio crea que este estado podra com-
prender los territorios del Imperio Otomano, extendidos desde Estambul hasta El Cairo, pero luego se
centr en Egipto, aunque es probable que nunca abandonase el primer objetivo. Difundi sus ideas
sobre todo a travs de la revista al-Gmia, La liga. Sus inquietudes sociales influan en cmo deba
ser este estado y sus gentes. Farah. Ant.n lea, traduca e interpretaba escritores europeos. La elec-
cin de los escritores refleja sus inquietudes, sea acerca de la bondad y libertad naturales (Bernardin
de Saint-Pierre, Jean Jacques Rousseau), de la libertad religiosa, y de conciencia (Lev Tolstoy), o de la
educacin pblica (Jules Simon). La sociedad ideal aceptara religin en una forma abierta, y se inspi-
raba en los escritos de Ernest Renan, varios de los cuales tradujo al rabe. Su relacin con F. Nietsche
fue ambivalente. Farah. Ant.n rechazaba sus doctrinas morales pero se senta atrado por su fe en el
poder de la voluntad, doctrina que le pareca haba llevado a los Estados Unidos de Amrica a su esplen-
dor y que ayudara a los pases rabes a alcanzarlo tambin. Sin embargo, los valores representados
por la tradicin liberal francesa resultaban ms importantes.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Farah. Ant.n (1874-1922), revista al-Gmia, La liga, traducciones modernas al
rabe.
1
In the XIX century, almost 200 journals appeared in Egypt. ABDELGHANI AHMED-BIOUD, 3200 revues
et journaux arabes, de 1800 1965, Paris: Bib. Nationale, 1969. IBRHM ABDUH, Tat.awwur as. -s. ih.fa al-
Mis.rya, 1798-1981, 4th ed., Cairo: Muassasat Sijill al-Arab, 1982. Cf. also ELIAS HANNA ELIA, La presse arabe,
Paris: Maisonneuve-Larose, 1993.
PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749 PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), nm. 242, pp. 1003-1024
20_JosepPUIG.qxd:Maqueta.qxd 26/6/08 12:08 Pgina 1004
began. Individuals were able to be creative in this environment; the purpose of this article
is to study one of them, Farah. Ant.n. He was a novelist, playwright and journalist, but
the scope of this article is limited to his activity as main editor of the journal Al-Jmia.
The limitation has the advantage of dealing with authors and works that F. Ant.n explicitly
read, interpreted, and often translated. In this way, I shall try to show how F. Ant. n
created his own intellectual world, and how this world changed under the influence of
the authors he read, explained and translated.
Farah. Ant.n was born in Tripoli, Lebanon, in 1874 to a family that belonged to the
Greek Orthodox Church 2. From 12 to 16 years old, he was at the Kiftn boarding school,
the Orthodox monastery situated in the hills above Tripoli. In 1908, when F. Ant.n lived
in New York he would leave his dark room in Brookline and walk to the gardens of Coney
Island to have a glimpse of his days at Kiftn.
The natural beauty of Kiftn, the school days, the students, the very history of Kift. n,
I have postponed the talk about all this until the moment comes, and when I shall write
the history of my life, it will be its opening chapter (J5: 1 [1906], p. 81).
Farah. Ant.n acknowledged the great influence that Kiftn exerted on him. He recalls
the centers tolerance. The president of the school was a Protestant, the director, a Maronite,
the teacher of Arabic language and literature, a Muslim, the administrator, a Maronite.
Although the school belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church, only one teacher was
Orthodox, and the faculty was as diverse as the sum of its students.
At Kiftn he learned Turkish, English, and above all French whose literature fascinated
him. His formal education was limited to this period. Afterwards, he would be a self-
taught person. His lack of preparation in science would cause most of his popularizing
work to be rather weak. However, in literature or philosophy, the consequences of his
auto didactical training would not be negative. Insofar as he was reading new authors
and appreciating them, he was also writing articles on them, and throughout the issues
of the journal we can follow his intellectual development.
The Ottoman Lebanon could not offer to the gifted F. Ant.n the opportunities needed
to develop his talent. So, as many educated Syrians and Lebanese did, he decided to
immigrate to Egypt, a country that was flourishing and offered opportunities to Arab
professionals from many fields. Journalism was one of the growing fields and F. Ant.n
would be one of its pioneers in the Arab world. Journalism did not have its present
orientation. Instead, it had an educational orientation, and was a way of disseminating
knowledge and literature.
In 1897 he moved to Alexandria and joined the newspaper Al-Ahrm which was founded
in 1876 by Bishra Taql. On March 15, 1899 he launched the journal Al-Jmia
al-Uthmniyya (The Ottoman league), but after a few months he changed its title to
simply Al-Jmia. He might have realized that his Egyptian readers were not very keen
of being reunited under Ottoman rule but it does not mean that he abandoned his
Ottomanism. Let us remind, for instance, that as late as in January 1910 he celebrated
the newly proclaimed Ottoman constitution (J7: 2, pp. 67-78).
2
For his biography, see DONALD M. REID, with indication of sources in The Odyssey of Farah. Ant.n.
A Syrian Christians Quest for Secularism (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica Inc, 1975), p. 3, footnote 1.
J. PUIG, FARAH
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The journal went on irregularly until October 1904. After almost two years of silence,
F. Ant.n published it again in New York, where he had moved following other Syrian
Christian immigrants who were his potential readers. The American experience failed
and F. Ant.n returned to Egypt where he published the last issues of the journal in 1909,
in Cairo. He suspended it the following year, but remained active mainly as a playwright
until his death on June 6, 1922.
The pages of the journal were mainly his writing. His sister Rosa and his brother-in-
law Niql H . addd, were the other main contributors, more Niql than Rosa. In the
journal Farah. Ant.n would publish articles on the most various subjects, from politics
to technical inventions, and published his own novels too. His sources were mainly French
periodicals: Answering a reader in 1903, F. Ant. n says that he had been reading Tan,
Dbat, Le matin, Le Figaro, Laurore, Le gaulois, La revue de Paris, La revue des revues,
and sometimes La revue des deux mondes (J4: 4, 1903, p. 296), but the structure of Al-
Jmia and the latter is strikingly similar. Another one of his sources were encyclopedias,
as La Grande Encyclopdie 3.
What interests us here is the dimension his journal as disseminating instrument
of Western modern thought, which was either explicated by philosophers or wrapped
up in literary works. From his days at Kiftn on, Farah. Ant. n was an avid reader of
French literature, and very interested in French secular thinkers. In his journal he wrote
about French authors as well as he published his own translations of French master
works.
3
Inventaire raisonn des sciences, des lettres, et des arts, a 31-volume encyclopedia published in Paris
from 1886 to 1902 by H. Lamirault, and later by the Socit anonyme de la grande encyclopdie. F. Ant.n
quotes it as one of his sources in Ibn Rushd wa-falsafatu-hu (Alexandria, January 1, 1903), p. viii.
4
Paris: A. Cadot, 1855, 19 vol. in-8.
Later (October 1906), when Al-Jmia was published in New York, he would translate
Dumas again, namely, the first part of Kean ou dsordre et genie, a drama (Jmia 5: 8,
pp. 318-322).
Farah. Ant. n shared the enthusiasm of many Arab intellectuals for the French
revolution. He found some similarity between the Ottoman Empire of his time and France
before the Revolution 5. Therefore the subject should interest the politically motivated
readers and, in any case, Dumas narrative would add enough adventure to attract all
kind of readers. As for his enthusiasm for the French revolution, F. Ant.n would give it
up over the years, but he always would retain the fascination of the events.
Other French writers translated by F. Ant.n in the journal were Jean de la Bruyre
(1645-1696), and Jacques Henri Bernardin de Saint Pierre (1737-1814). Victor Hugo
(1802-1885) was the focus of a long article in Al-Jmia of March 1902 (J3: 7, pp. 429-
452) which included a translation of his poem Napoleon I 6, and a poem by A. Shawq,
but no further text of Hugo was published in the journal.
De la Bruyre is the author of Les caractres (1687) which is made of observations
about the society of his lifetime and criticizes the royal court, the nobility, the clergy and
even the king. His observations are expressed by short sentences, like aphorisms. F. Ant.n
translated some of them and published in two sections of the journal called Strong food
for the stomach (J1:1, 1:2).
The December 1900 issue (Jmia, 2: 9, pp. 505-533) opened with an article entitled
Where do we find the truth, and how we do find it, or The Indian Hut. La chaumire
indienne The Indian Hut is a work of Bernardin de Saint-Pierre published in 1790 by
Didot le Jeune in Paris. F. Ant.n explains that Napoleon loved the novel so much that
he would ask B. de Saint-Pierre when he would write a second Indian Hut. He gives
us the translation of the first chapter.
About thirty years ago, a society of learned Englishmen was founded at London
who undertook to go to the different parts of the world in search of all such scientific
information, as might serve to enlighten mankind or contribute to their happiness.
The novel criticizes the academies and learned societies. The scientist sent to India
to find solution to some scientific problems eventually meets a good-hearted pariah who
lives isolated from the world, but happy in company of his wife and a cat. More chapters
of the novel were published in 2: 10, pp. 577-588, although not the entire novel. In the
August 1901 issue (3: 1, p. 48), F. Ant.n offered the novel in form of a book as a present
to subscribers.
One year later, Al-Jmia in August 1902, F. Ant.n announced a new project in Arabic
language in order to satisfy the need for good and pleasant literature in this language.
His project consisted of translating the best quality French philosophical novels of belles-
lettres (J3: 9, p. 602). Each issue of Al-Jmia would deliver parts of a novel, starting
5
When the translation was printed for the second time, he wrote an introduction explaining why he
chose the book. English translation in RIF KHR, Al-fikr al-arab al-h.adth: thr ath-Thawra al-Faransya
f tawjh as-siys wa-l-ijtim, translated as: Modern Arab thought: Channels of the French revolution to the
Arab East (Princeton, N.J.: Kingston Press, 1983), pp. 172-175.
By T. anius Abd al-Muh.arrir, first published in the journal Al-Bas.r.
6
J. PUIG, FARAH
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with Paul et Virginie of Bernardin de Saint-Pierre (written 1788). The novel records the
fate of a child of nature corrupted by the false sentimentality that prevailed at the time
among the upper classes of France.
F. Ant. n then writes about the life of Bernardin de Saint-Pierre and prints two
drawings, one of his, and the other of Jean Jacques Rousseau. He comments: We have
put in this section the drawing of Bernardin de Saint-Pierre at the side of the one of
Master Jean Jacques Rousseau (J3: 9, p. 607) and tells us a story. B. de Saint-Pierre and
Rousseau were walking and B. de Saint-Pierre asked him Are you Saint-Preux? who
was the preceptor of Julie dEtanges, the female protagonist of Rousseaus Julie ou La
Nouvelle Hlose, roman pistolaire (1761). Rousseau answered Not exactly, but I wish
I were Saint-Preux. F. Ant.n wonders if someone would have asked B. de Saint-Pierre
Are you the old man who tells the story of Paul and Virginie? would he have answered
in similar terms.
F. Ant.ns translation of Paul et Virginie appeared as an annex to the December 1902
issue (3: 10-11-12), which also contained the last part of La comtesse de Charny of Dumas.
As an introduction he wrote on the counter page:
In the European languages, there are such writings that their wise men, philosophers
and scholars compose to enlighten the minds, to refine the intellects, and to improve the
moral characters, which are their most famous compositions (Alexandria, September 10,
1902).
Since such works have great influence in the education of the European nations, he
feels his duty is to translate them into Arabic. He defines Paul et Virginie as a literary,
philosophical, and naturalist novel with which he started his project to give to the Arab
readers a new genre, the novel, and a secular doctrine. The novel was independently
published in Alexandria, on September 10, 1902, so that F. Ant.ncould reveal its reception;
he devoted pages 654-665 of the same third volume (December 1902) to Poets of Egypt
and readers of Al-Jmia between Paul and Virginia. The truth of Viriginia.
The effort of Al-Jmia to translate French literature, he reflects, has not been futile
and the readers of the Arabic translation of Paul et Virginie had appreciated its value. The
readers sent letters and telegrams to the journal congratulating F. Ant.n for the publication
of the book; he thought that the poets should express their feelings too. Thus, he asked
several poets to write classical poems. Ah.mad al-Kshif (1878-1948) 7 of Qurshya, Ah.mad
Muh. arram (1877-1945) 8 of Dalanjt and Mus.t.afa Lut.f al-Manfalt. (1876-1924) 9, all
three renowned poets, sent him poems inspired by the novel.
If Ant.n printed the portraits of Bernardin de Saint-Pierre and Jean J. Rousseau
together, his admiration for both of them was comparable. On his way to the United
States in 1906, he disembarked in Marseille, traversed France and embarked in Le Havre,
and visited different places.
On the train I was like wonder-struck, I moved from one window to the other and
said: This is Gods Paradise on earth. At times I tried to forget myself on the train, and
once twenty hours elapsed while I was looking at the country, like a panorama displayed
in front of me to the infinite (J5: 1, p. 35).
F. Ant.n visited Chambry in the French Alps and he describes the visit as one of the
most important events of his trip. What moved him to visit the place was his profound
7
Diwan, Cairo, 1987.
8
Diwan, Cairo, 1963.
9
An-Naz.art, Cairo: Mat.baat al-Rah.mnyah, 1923.
admiration for Rousseau (1712-1778), which he shared with Tolstoy (J5:1, p. 36). For
15 years he had wanted to go to Chambry, the place where Rousseau met Madame
Franoise-Louise de Warens, a French Catholic baroness thirteen years his elder who
would later become his lover 10. Rousseau who had been born in Calvinist Geneva in 1712,
came to Chambry in 1732. Under the protection of Madame de Warens, Rousseau
converted to Catholicism, but his view that man is good by nature conflicted with the
doctrine of original sin and his theology of nature led to the condemnation of the book
in both Calvinist Geneva and Catholic Paris.
Rousseau left Chambry for Paris in 1741. In 1754, he returned to Geneva where he
reconverted to Calvinism. After spending two years in England, with help of D. Hume,
Rousseau went back to France in 1767, and died in Paris in 1172. Among his works there
is his autobiography, Les confessions, composed of 12 books; books I-VI were published
in 1782, and books VII-XII, in 1789.
F. Ant.n tells us (J5:1, p. 36) that he had read Les confessions and that he was longing
to see the place where Rousseau and Madame de Warens had dwelled, the house of Les
Charmettes, situated in a forest valley south of Chambry. Rousseau said of the house:
Ici commence le court bonheur de ma vie; ici, viennent les paisibles, mais rapides
moments qui mont donn le droit de dire que jai vcu (Livre VI, 1736). F. Ant.n writes
in Al-Jmia about Chambry, about the love story of Rousseau and Madame de Warens
and about her influence on Rousseau and describes his visit to the place full of religious
devotion:
I arrived in Chambry at midnight, I spent the rest of the night in the Htel de la
poste, and since I set my foot on the earth of Chambry I started to feel the fever of Jean
Jacques pervading my joints. I told to myself: Tomorrow Ill see the house where Jean
Jacques slept, Ill have the shadow of the trees that gave him shadow, Ill tread the earth
that he treaded, and Ill hear the singing of the birds and the sound of the creeks that he
heard (J5:1, p. 41).
F. Ant.n visited Les Charmettes early in the morning; when he walked the doorstep,
he felt a shivering in his body, and greeted Rousseau in his imagination: Jean Jacques,
here is some one among thousand or a million people harmed by your principles, he
comes to complain you. For 15 years I have wished to visit you and here I am in your
house. He visited the house reliving in his imagination the life of Rousseau in the rooms,
and then he looked at the visitors book, where he added his name and the comment on
my way heading to America.
F. Ant.n was impressed by the personality of Madame de Warens, and the passionate
love between her and Rousseau, but he was also interested in Rousseaus teachings, and
he had in mind to translate his works (J5: 1, p. 37). However, F. Ant.n did not translate
any of Rousseaus texts; maybe he knew that the readers would not like his pedagogical
novels. No doubt they preferred more adventure, as in Dumass historical novels, o
romantic love, as in Bernardin de Saint-Pierres Paul et Virginie.
10
Mmoires de madame de Warens et de Claude Anet, pour servir de suite aux Confessions de J. J.
Rousseau, Chambry, 1786.
J. PUIG, FARAH
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a drawing of Tolstoy with the title The famous philosopher Tolstoy whom the Russian
Holy Synod excommunicated this year (Jmia 2: 7, p. 369).
Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy (1828-1910) is not only one of the greatest of all novelists,
particularly noted for his masterpieces War and Peace and Anna Karenina but also a moral
philosopher. In the 1880s Tolstoy wrote also philosophical works such as A Confession
and What I Believe, which was banned in 1884. His troubles with the Synod of the Orthodox
Church intensified in 1889, after publishing The Kreutzer Sonata, which portrays an intense
conflict between sexual desire and moral constraint 11. Tolstoy was forced to write Epilogue
to The Kreutzer Sonata in 1890 in order to explain his unorthodox views. However, the
prosecution continued. After he published Resurrection in 1899, he was excommunicated
for the first time. Al-Jmia informed that to this purpose Joannicius archbishop of Klin
sent a letter to all the bishops of Russia on March 31, 1900. The decree of the Synod for
the second excommunication was issued on February 24, 1901 12.
F. Ant.n devoted to Tolstoy an article which begins pointing out the development of
Russia in recent times (October 1900) and the flourishing of scientists and philosophers.
In the forefront of them is Count Tolstoy in whom the Russian soul has risen to the
degrees of wisdom and has proven that the rise of the Russians is true, not superficial,
and apparent, like it is in the Oriental countries (J2: 7, p. 370).
For F. Ant.n the Russian soul has yet to be discovered, enormous forces are hidden
in its profound bents, and this soul has brought out the figure of Tolstoy. F. Ant.n gives
a short biography of Tolstoy, summarizes his views on religion, society and fine arts, and
underlines his pacifism, either on the subject of the Transvaal war or on that of the
redemption of Alsace, surrendered by France to Prussia after the 1870 war.
F. Ant.n supported the cause of the Boers and their leader Kruger, against the British
invasion, and mentioned that the Boers sent a delegation to the United States. Tolstoy,
who sympathized with the Boers, was asked to send a telegram wishing them success
and F. Ant.n comments:
Tolstoy gave this weird answer: I cannot wish the Boer delegation to be successful
because their success depends on the intervention of the United States, and their
intervention will drag war between them and England. If I call on the Boers to be free,
it will be like calling on ending a war by means of another one (J2: 7, p. 372).
F. Ant.n does not disclose us his sources of information, usually French journals, but
he read only French, and since he translated the letter, which Andrei Vasilevich Laptev
[ ] sent to Tolstoy from Baku on October 6, 1899 and the
answer which Tolstoy wrote, therefore his ultimate source of information was this booklet:
propos de Rsurrection, lettre dA. V. Laptev et rponse du Cte. Lon Tolsto. Traduit
sur les manuscrits originaux par Paul Boyer et Charles Salomon, Paris: Perrin, 1900 13.
11
Jmia of June 1903 reported in an article The Kreutzer Sonata that the journal Manz.ir had
published an Arabic translation by Rafawl Sadah in 1902 (J4: 4, pp. 256-257).
12
The text of the first excommunication was published in J2: 7 (1901), pp. 379-380, and the second
in J2: 10 (1901), pp. 648-652, the latter was accompanied by letters of protest, of his friends and his wife
Countess Sophia, who sent a letter to the Synode on March 11, 1901.
F. Ant. n added that Reuter, the news agency, had named him main instigator of the revolution
against the Czar, p. 651.
13
Paul Jean Marie Boyer (1864-1949) and Charles Salomon (1862-1936) are well known French Slavic
scholars. Solomon met Tolstoy in 1893, and he later introduced Boyer to him, who wrote about his visits
to Tolstoy in Yasnaya Polyana (1901 and 1902), cf. Chez Tolsto. Entretiens Iasnaa Poliana, Paris: Institut
dtudes slaves, 1950.
F. Ant.n considered the letter as well as the answer weird too and exclaimed, the
weirdest is that Tolstoy borrowed from Laptev the main ideas for his famous novel
Resurrection (Al-Bath, J2: 7, p. 378). He added an extract of the excommunication decree
(pp. 379-380) and finished his article regretting the resultant conflict between philosophy
and religion because philosophers and men of religion are leaders of other people who
fell in perplexity when they both dispute.
F. Ant.n found Tolstoy mistaken in his exaggerate avowal Do not fight violence
with violence, and blamed him for bringing doubts and despair among the neediest.
Nevertheless, those who excommunicated Tolstoy were wrong because persecution
strengthens philosophers in their claims and principles. Moreover, freedom of thinking
is one of mans natural rights (J2: 7, p. 380).
When F. Ant.n wrote the article for the October issue, he had not read any of Tosltoys
books, maybe some fragments, but he soon acquired a copy of Resurrection. In less than
a week he read its 593 pages in small print (J2: 9, p. 534). He gives the information in
the December issue and the indication about the number of pages shows that he was
reading the French translation by Thodore de Wyzewa, Paris: Perrin, 1900.
Resurrection (1899) is the last of Tolstoys major novels. It tells the story of Nekhlyudov,
a nobleman, and his attempt to redeem the suffering that he inflicted on Katusha, a peasant
girl who ends up a prisoner in Siberia. Resurrection is at the same time a panoramic
description of social life in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century, reflecting its authors
outrage at the social injustices of the world in which he lived.
F. Ant.n summarized the novel, translated some selected fragments, and spoke about
his feelings on the moral as well as on the social issues of the novel. He insisted that the
injustices denounced by Tolstoy were not confined to the Russian society, but were universal.
He finally thanked Tolstoy for three reasons: His book caused Ant.n to write the article
which he considers his best until now; it made him live in his spiritual company as long
as he was writing the article; and it prompted him to write summaries of the best books
(J2: 9, p. 553).
Thus his predilection for Tolstoy was related not only to moral, but also to social
concerns that they both shared. Such concerns were also present in the life and works
of the second Russian author translated by F. Ant. n, Maxim Gorky (1868-1936) who
wrote stories of tramps and social outcasts. F. Ant.n partially translated his short story
Malva 14. Malva, the name of the restless wife of a fisherman, seeks out love from every
man she meets. Vassili is a peasant who left his village to earn a little money to support
his wife and children. For a while he sends small sums of money home, but gradually
the village and the old life fade away. He ceases to think of them. His son Iakov seeks
him and work for himself for a season. Later, he falls, like the others, under the spell of
Malva. Ant.ns translation appeared in J7:1 (1909) 60-64 and J7: 2 (1910) 121-128, but
was incomplete because they were the last pages of Al-Jmia.
14
MAKSIM GORKIJ ( ), Malva [La vieille Izerguille], Paris: Librairie universelle,
ca. 1906.
J. PUIG, FARAH
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Nql Fayyd. and Najb Nasm T . ard., and had been performed at the Russian Consulate
in Beirut for three evenings. The translators complimented al-Jmia with a free copy
(2: 6, p. 360). Zk Mbr worked on the translation and adaptation of theater plays. Like
F. Ant.n, he worked for the actor Salma al-H . ijz (1855-1917) and his troupe and, for
15
The text goes on affirming that Bacon is the author of Shakespeares works. We also
read that Bacon advised the Egyptians how to reform the country, or that he learned
Arabic and read the Thousand and One Nights. The forgery goes so far as to give the call
15
JACOB M. LANDAU, Studies in the Arab Theater and Cinema (Philadephi: U Penn, 1958), pp. 70-72.
16
ATIA ABUL NAGA, Les sources franaises du thtre gyptien (1870-1939) (Alger: SNED, 1972), pp. 235-
237.
number of the book: 1056 gm 356 lif. Maybe the falsifier did not know that there was
a printed catalogue of the library already at that time 17.
In this article I rarely deal with authors whose works F. Ant.n did not read. One of
them is John Ruskin, the English Romantic writer and painter (1819-1900). F. Ant. n
devoted a study of him in Al-Jmia of January 1901, entitled The famous John Ruskin
invites men to love nature and beauty, in which he included a poem by Ab Tammm
H. abb ibn Aws, at. -T
. (IX cent.) on the spring season (J2: 10 [1901], pp. 561-572). The
article is mainly a biography of Ruskin and news on the spring festival in England. Ruskin
was a prolific writer 18, but F. Ant. n may have not read any of his works, and his
information came from French journals as the Revue des deux mondes.
17
Fihrist al-kutub al-arabyah al-mah.fz.ah bi-l-Kutubkhanah al-Khidwyah, 7 vols., Cairo: Mat.baat
Uthmn Abd al-Razzq, 1301/1883-1308/1890. It is organized first by subjects, and then by titles following
the order of the alifate; books have a general number nimra ummya, and a particular number, nimra
khus.s.ya.
Since the subject seems to be history, I searched the section and found a lithographic print under the
closest call number: 23112 general and 1056 particular, vol. 5, p. 58. The print includes three travel accounts,
or rih.la: At-ta rf by Ibn Khladn (d. 1406), Al-wsit.a by Ah. mad Shidyq (1804-1887), and the rih.la of
H. asan Tawfq to Berlin.
18
E. T. COOK - A. WEDDERBURN (eds.), 39 vols., London: G. Allen; New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.,
1903-1912.
J. PUIG, FARAH
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sanctuary. Some years ago, I translated his book Woman in the XX Century (J4: 5 [August
1903], pp. 265-266).
Jules Simon was very pleased to give him permission to publish the translation, which
was partially printed in the journal. The first section of the book is entitled The True
Reform 19 and F. Ant.n refers to it at the very beginning of the journal, in March 1899.
Simon called on the women of the XX century to restore the family, which the women
of the two former generations had let fall down; to this purpose, woman had mainly to
relay on education, elle doit compter surtout sur lducation, instrument de toutes les
reformes sociales.
In his opening article, F. Ant.n insisted that true reform of any country is based on
education, which develops in two fields, family and school. School education stands on
family education, which is the womans responsibility; therefore she lays the foundations
on which the social virtues are built. He then linked the argument to the purpose of his
journal, the reform of the Ottoman and Egyptian nation, meaning a literary and political
reform.
F. Ant. n found guidance in the book and published many parts of it. Al-Jmia of
August 1899 mentioned Qsim Amn as author of The liberation of Woman (1: 10, p. 182)
and devoted an article to him in which he used information coming from La femme du
vingtime sicle 20. In the June 1, 1900 issue, he translated extracts of the health section
of (J2: 3, p. 174-176) 21. In October 1900, F. Ant.n said he was translating from an article
in which [Simon] criticized the education of girls in France (J2: 7, p. 407) and which
was a section of the same book 22. The issues November 1900 (J2: 9, pp. 470-480) 23, and
January 1901 (2: 10, pp. 592-602) 24, printed longer translations from La femme. There
are only some quotations in (J1: 21-22 [1900], pp. 514-515) that he says come from Lcole
butt I could not identify them yet.
In 1899 when Qsim Amn (1865-1908) published the Liberation of Woman 25, the
mainstream of the Egyptian public opinion attacked him fiercely, and in 1900 he had to
write The New Woman no explain his position and defend himself. However, Al-Jmia
was an exception. In the previously mentioned January 1901 issue, F. Ant.n included an
article entitled Views of the philosopher of al-Jmia and of Qsim Amn on woman
which begins:
After we read the book Liberation of Woman by Qsim Amn, magistrate at the
Appellate Court in the capital, with the great attention it deserves and after we summarized
it in the section Education and instruction of this volume, we held it useful to translate
for the readers of Al-Jmia, as well for those in Egypt and in Syria who seriously care
about this issue, the view of the philosopher of Al-Jmia, we mean Jules Simon, who
does not lack behind at all in his sound judgment and exact insight. Some words that
Qsim Amn says in his book have reminded us of the testimony of this philosopher,
namely, the saying that the causes for the weakness of the Muslim nations are reducible
19
La vraie rforme, in JULES SIMON - GUSTAVE SIMON, La femme du vingtime sicle, 3 ed. (Paris:
Calmann Levy, 1892), pp. 1-16.
20
La femme, Les programmes, pp. 243-246.
21
La femme, La mre et la nourrice, pp. 317-320.
22
La femme, Les programmes, pp. 249-255.
23
La femme, La carrire, pp. 292-307.
24
La femme, Le mariage, fragments, pp. 126-127, 135-136, 118-119; Le salon, fragments, 20-23,
24, 25, 26-27, 31; La femme avocat, summarized, 81-92; Le dsert Paris, sumarized, 173-187.
25
Tah.rr al-mara. English transl. Samiha Sidhom Peterson, The American University in Cairo Press,
1992.
to three, either to geography, religion or family. Then he refutes geography and religion
as causes, and credits the universal cause to family (J2: 1, p. 592).
As he says, he reviewed Qsim Amns book Al-mara al-jadda in the same issue (2: 1
[1901] pp. 626-640), and reproduced many fragments. There F. Ant.n refers to Descartes,
as the founder of modern philosophy, and to his directive Do not believe anything of
which you do not possess certainty to reject the old doctrine of truth based on authority.
For F. Ant. n, Qsim Amn proceeded in a similar way to Descartes insofar as he
approached the old Muslim civilization not to imitate it, but to weight it with the scales
of reason (J2: 1, p. 627). This is a very different approach from Jules Simon, but F. Ant.n
looked for the coincidences. He did not affirm that Q. Amn had read Descartes and
Al-mara al-jadda does not make any reference but he was right in pointing to the
common features that unbiased reasoning shows in any research.
Ernest Renan was born at Trguier on February 28, 1823 26. A brilliant student, he
had started an ecclesiastical career which he abandoned in 1845. He continued his
education at the Sorbonne and at the Collge de France, becoming a renowned philologist.
Early in 1847 he took the Volney prize awarded by the Institut de France on comparative
philology for the manuscript of the General History of Semitic Languages 27. In 1852, Renan
took his degree of Docteur-s-lettres and published his two thesis, the Latin one being
De philosophia peripatetica apud Syros, and the French one being Averros et laverrosme 28.
Averros et laverrosme is primarily a philological work. Every assertion is founded
on a text. Renan searched for the texts and translated them, and most of them were
manuscripts and early printed books. Averros et laverrosme is also a paramount of
methodical work. Renan explains the life and doctrines of Averroes. He describes the role
of the Jewish translators, his reception in the West, the Scholastic reaction to his doctrines,
the development of the legend of Averroes, and the revival of Averroism in northern Italy
through the 17th century. Renan knows how to bind art and history when he deals with
the paintings of Averroes and Aquinas in the 14th century. Renans statements had to be
impartial, but the pages of the book do not hide his horror of fanaticism and his love for
freedom of thought.
Archaeological expeditions to the Near East and further studies in Semitics led Renan
to a concept of religious studies that would later be known as comparative religion. The
result of this approach was La vie de Jsus published on June 24, 1863 29, in which he
portrayed Christ as a historical phenomenon. Renan affirmed that Jesus was entirely
human and never performed miracles. The Catholic Church reacted with rage and Renans
foes smeared him with all kind of calumnies. However, the book enjoyed great popularity,
which increased with the years. Constructive criticism was also heard; for instance, Ernest
Havet wrote a positive review and praised Renan historical criticism in Revue des deux
mondes 30, a journal known to Antn.
26
Bibliography on Ernest Renan is extremely aboundant; the journal tudes Renaniennes, published
since 1970 by the Socit dtudes renaniennes, contains updated information.
27
Published some years later, Histoire gnrale et systme compar des langues smitiques, Paris: Impr.
impriale, 1855.
28
Both thesis appeared at Paris: A. Durand, 1852.
29
Life of Jesus, Paris: M. Lvy frres, 1863.
30
Lvangile et lhistoire, Revue des deux mondes, 46 (August 1, 1863), pp. 564-596.
J. PUIG, FARAH
. ANT
. N: ACTIVE RECEPTION OF EUROPEAN THOUGHT 1015
The Life of Jesus was the opening volume of the History of the Origins of Christianity
(1863-1883) 31. Three years later The Apostles appeared, to which he subsequently added
The Gospels and the Second Christian Generation, Saint Paul, The Antichrist, The Christian
Church and Marcus Aurelius. They were all noteworthy volumes, but none will reach the
popularity level of the Life of Jesus.
Until his death on October 2, 1892, Renan continued his research on religious history.
His later works include the five volumes of the History of the People of Israel (1888-1896,
the last two appeared posthumously). Since he was convinced that Civilization is the
result of the alternate collaboration of Greece, Judea and Rome, he ought to have begun
with the History of the People of Israel and made the Life of Jesus its continuation but he
placed first what he felt as first in his existential longing for rational explanation of
Christianity.
F. Ant.n could easily have heard of Renan but he did not write about him until 1901.
Al-Jmia of September 1901 32 opens with a photograph of Ernest Renan and devotes
him an essay entitled
The philosopher Ernest Renan. The famous historian and Orientalist, author of the
book Life of Jesus.
F. Ant.n begins the essay (J3: 2, pp. 74- 86) with the statement In todays world there
are two strong movements, the first is Islam, the second is Christianity. He immediately
explains the differences: The Islamic movement wants to improve the condition of the
believers by means of religion, while the Christian movement is characterized by some
groups who want to restrict the power of the clergy, rijl ad-dn, and confine their activity
to the places of prayer. But the Christian movement has a negative aspect, he continues.
In the last two years, the masses, al-amma, in countries like Portugal, Spain, Belgium,
France and Russia have assaulted and humiliated the priests, something unacceptable
among civilized countries because it violates personal freedom. The case is most distressing
in France, because it is the country of those writers and philosophers who opposed to
the clergy and kept it within its borders, like Voltaire, Diderot and Renan did (J3: 1, p. 74).
Ant. ns introduction to the life and works of E. Renan is a very simplifying one,
presenting him only as a defender of secularization. As usual, he does not inform us of
the sources for his article, but he tells us that he has a copy of Life of Jesus, and that the
book was in its 25th edition at the time. He describes the reactions after the publication
as hot and cold springs swooping on Renan. The hot springs were, of course, the
insults and calumnies of the priests and ecclesiastical circles.
The cold springs swooped on from the Jews all over the world because this book
traces back to them the world civilization, affirms that Christianity comes from them
although if it is said that its highest culture does not derive from theirs. With them, all
materialist scholars in Europe and all writers who do not profess any religion agreed
with satisfaction on the subject of the book (J3: 1 [1901] p. 78).
F. Ant.n adds a summary of the book, paying attention to Renans dedicatory preface
to his sister Henriette, and the introductions to following editions. The next issue of Al-
Jmia (J3: 2) starts with selected translations from the book itself. When it comes to
31
Histoire des origines du christianisme. Renans works were all published in uvres compltes, d.
dfinitive tablie par Henriette Psichari. Paris: Calmann-Lvy, 1948-1961; Vie de Jsus in vol. 4, pp. 11-427.
32
Al-Jmia of August 1901 had already mentioned the name of Renan. In an article Curiosities of
the bears eyes it quotes a work that he calls Refutation of the excesses of the materialists and he ascribes
to Renan.
Renans description of Nazareth, he remarks that the town has changed since 30 years
ago; now there are new buildings, more inhabitants and Jewish and German agricultural
firms have transformed many of our wastelands into prosperous gardens (J3: 3 [1901],
p. 161).
The readers became interested in the text. In the issue of December 1901, F. Ant.n
published some of the many letters he says had received from readers who supported
Renans views (J3: 5, pp. 327-330). The letters came from different places, even from
America. One Syrian reader who signed ad Servant of humankind disagreed with Renan
and affirmed the existence of miracles (J3: 9 [1902], pp. 620-623).
The translation of many pages of the book continued to the January 1902 issue (J 3: 6),
and then he added a text, Reason for translating this book into Arabic (J3: 6, [1902]
pp. 385-387). There is a question, he says, that the readers have asked, namely, whether
Christianity has preserved all the principles which its Lawgiver came to plant on earth.
F. Ant.n reminds of the social changes introduced by Christianity. Then he makes clear
to those readers that some things in any religion have to change by law of nature, but
there are essentials, which cannot be changed, they are the pillars of the building. F. Ant.n
counts among them the sermon of the Lord on the mountain, serving God with truth
and spirit, loving the little people, doing good to everybody. He not only answers the
question but also explains the moral cause for translating the book into Arabic to
remind of the virtues and principles preached by the Son of Man.
In March 1902, he dealt again with the issue (J3: 7, pp. 453-455), and synthesized the
two reasons for translating the book, to be exact, of many of its parts. First he wanted to
make the reader of Arabic acquainted with one of the most important social movements
of history, and second, he wanted to remind everybody of the Evangelical virtues. But
he added a third one: in reading the book, people became aware that interreligious
understanding is possible.
When F. Ant.n wrote the preliminary article on E. Renan, he obviously had not read
any of his books. After reading Life of Jesus and translating a good deal of it into Arabic,
his views changed. Renan was no longer a secularist writer, he was a religious one who
grasped the essence of Christianity, and F. Ant.n agreed with him.
Three following issues of Al-Jmia in the year 1902 contained translations of Renans
The Apostles 33, 3: 7, of March, 3: 8 of June, and 3: 10-12 of December; the last summary
of The Apostles came in Al-Jmia 4: 1 (1903), and began with the paragraph Christian
and Modern Socialism. The American edition of Al-Jmia still had place for a partial
translation of Saint Paul (J6: 1 [February 1908], pp. 21-24). He was speaking in Renans
voice, and this could be the reason why we do not know of any movement by the Greek
Orthodox Church in Egypt against him.
The subject of the early development of Christianity was no longer relevant to F. Ant.n,
but the discovery of Renan led him to discover his other books, and one became decisive
for his interpretation of Islam and Christianity, namely Averros et lAverrosme.
The article History of Averroes and his philosophy. The greatest philosopher of Islam
appeared in the June 1902 issue (J3: 8, pp. 517-540). In order to compose it, F. Ant.n
probably used various sources. One of them is known because, in the same issue, he
added another entry Coming back to Averroes (J3: 8, pp. 568-572) where he referred
to the acquisition of Renans full-size book of 486 pages. From the indication, we gather
that F. Ant.n had bought a copy of the third, revised and enlarged edition, Paris: Michel
33
uvres compltes, vol. 4, pp. 433-702.
J. PUIG, FARAH
. ANT
. N: ACTIVE RECEPTION OF EUROPEAN THOUGHT 1017
Lvy frres, 1866. He reproduced parts of the Arabic appendix the notices of Ibn al-
Abbr, al-Ans.r and Ibn Ab Us.aybia on Averroes in this entry.
In the main article, F. Ant. n begins with a question on justice in the universe. He
criticizes those who claim that there is no law but that life is a harsh struggle between
men, the stronger prevails and the weak falls down (Let us remember that he opposed
Darwin and the evolutionist theory). No victory, according to them, is for justice and
virtue, and violence imposes the triumph of evil. However, F. Ant.n joints to those who
have another view, namely, that true triumph is neither the matter of one hour, nor of
one day; victorious is the man whose memory lasts forever. He mentions Socrates and
quotes Plotinus to the purpose and, as usual provides no references. In this way, F. Ant.n
leads us to his goal, because the further example that he produces as evidence is that of
Averroes:
His contemporaries charged him with non-belief, they prohibited his books, they
demeaned him, and they deported him. Nevertheless, what does all this mean to the
intelligent and wise man who looks for the substances of the things, not for their accidents?
Will Averroes not forget all those little humiliations, if he can see from his eternal place
what humankind today says about him, in Arabic and in other languages? (J3: 8 [1902],
p. 518).
F. Ant.n expounded on the teachings of Averroes and relied heavily on Renans book,
but he emphasized the image of Averroes as a victim of Muslim bigotry. No wonder, the
article triggered a debate with the Mufti of Egypt Muh.ammad Abduh (1849-1905) 34.
M. Rashd Rid., a friend of F. Ant.n, who was the editor of the Islamic journal Al-Manr,
brought the article to the attention of Muh.ammad Abduh, who wrote a counter for Al-
Manr. In his turn, F. Ant.n wrote a reply (J3: 9, [1902], pp. 626-639); Muh.ammad Abduh
published his views through of Al-Manr 35. F. Ant. n eventually printed a book of the
debate, with some changes, called Averroes and his Philosophy 36. He dedicated the book
to the Eastern intellectuals, in Islam, Christianity and other religions. The subject in
dispute was no longer the philosophy of Averroes but the conflict between philosophers
and theologians, and how Islam and Christianity faced it.
Donald Reid points to a disadvantage with which F. Ant. n entered the debate 37.
M. Abduh mastered the Islamic classics, and F. Ant.n not. He seldom gives the sources
for his writings but on page viii of the book Averroes and his Philosophy, he cites: Renans
Averros et laverrosme, Salomon Munks Mlanges de philosophie juive et arabe, La grande
encyclopdie, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, by al-Ghazl, The Incoherence of The
Incoherence, and The Decisive Treatise, both by Averroes, some notices found in Arabic
34
Among the many authors who have dealt with the debate, may I point out three:
M. RASHD RID. , Tarkh al-ustdh al-Imm al-Shaykh Muh.ammad Abdh: wa-f-hi tafs.l srati-hi, wa-
khuls.at srat mqiz. al-Sharq al-h.akm wa-l-Islm Jaml al-Dn al-Afghn, vol. 1 (Cairo: Mat.baat al-Manr,
1324-1350 H [1906-1931]. 2nd ed. Dr al-Fad.lah, 2003), pp. 805-816.
GEORGE C. ANAWATI, Lorthodoxie dIbn Rushd (Averros) la lumire de la polmique Farah. Ant.n
et le cheikh Muh.ammad Abduh, in Institut Franais dArchologie Orientale. Livre du Centenaire, 1880-
1980 (Cairo, 1980), pp. 341-354.
ANKE VON KGELGEN, Averroes und die arabische Moderne. Anstze zu einer Neubegrndung des Rationalismus
im Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1994), pp. 77-98.
35
Al-Manr: majalla shahrya tabh.athu f falsafat al-dn wa-shun al-ijtim wa-al-umrn, vol. 5, Cairo,
1902: Al-faylasf Ibn Rushd, pp. 361-280; Al-id..tihd f n-nas.ranya wa-l-islm, pp. 401-434; Al-islm
wa-n-nas.ranya maa l-ilm wa-l-madanya, pp. 441-465, pp. 481-501, pp. 521-545, and pp. 561-577.
36
Ibn Rushd wa-falsafatu-hu, Alexandria, January 1, 1903.
37
The Odyssey, p. 82.
F. Ant.ns translation is very accurate and reads as elegant Arabic. He closes the article
justifying its publication for two reasons. First, because of the language. He considers
the style of Renan especially good, and adds that eloquence expresses good nature, internal
and external (h.asan fit.r). He praises the French language and he defends the art of
translation too. Those who blame the Arabic language should recognize that the deficiency
in style lies in the bad Arabic, not on the incapacity of Arabic.
Second, because of his philosophy. F. Ant.n mentions the words Renan wished to
have inscribed on his tomb He loved truth, and affirms that Renans aim was the quest
for pure truth, by means of intellectual forces, not depending on the witnesses of books
and people (J4: 6-7-8 [1903], p. 314).
F. Ant.n prays to Athena too, and reminds her of the Phoenicians who helped construct
Greek civilization: oh Athena! in your veins there is some Oriental blood. He asks for
her help to improve our science and characters, and he particularly asks for the spirit
of absolute tolerance, of which the great apostle was your friend Renan.
This article is, in fact, the last one devoted to Renan 43, and his choice of the Prayer
on the Acropolis says much. By the hand of Renan he discovered the scholarly reading
of Christian history and by the hand of Renan he discovered Islamic philosophy. He
sympathized with Renans superiority feelings toward Islam but he moved in an Islamic
world, and the misstep would bring trouble to him and his journal.
38
He may refer to Marcus Joseph Mller, editor of three works of Averroes: Philosophie und Theologie
von Averroes, Mnchen, G. Franz: 1859, and translator of them into German: Philosophie und Theologie
von Averroes, aus dem Arabischen bersetzt von Marcus Joseph Mller, Mnchen: G. Franz, 1875.
39
1876. Dialogues philosophiques, uvres compltes, vol. 1, pp. 545-632.
40
1888. Drames philosophiques, uvres compltes, vol. 3, pp. 375-435.
41
1892. Feuilles dtaches, uvres compltes, vol. 2, pp. 937-1182.
42
1899. Prire sur lAcropole, uvres compltes, vol. 2, pp. 752-59. English by Eugene Vinavar and
T. B. L. Webster, Manchester University Press, 1934.
43
Jmia, 6: 1 (New York, February 1908), pp. 21-22.
J. PUIG, FARAH
. ANT
. N: ACTIVE RECEPTION OF EUROPEAN THOUGHT 1019
No other thinker had so much influence on F. Ant.n as Renan. He read Auguste Comte
(1798-1857) too and here again the issue arises what he really read. Comte is considered
the founder of sociology. He formulated the so-called Law of three phases according to
which society has gone through three phases: Theological, Metaphysical, and Positive. In
the last one, society recognizes only knowledge that is based on data obtained by exact
perception and experimentation. In the second part of his life (1846-1857), Comte organized
a religious movement, a religion of humankind, religion de lhumanit, the pillars of
which were altruism, order and progress.
Al-Jmia of February 1903, published an article with following heading The
philosopher Auguste Comte, founder of the philosophy of Positivism and creator of the
religion of humankind and added that the article was published on the occasion of the
recent death of Comtes successor as supreme leader of the religion de lhumanit (J4: 1,
pp. 15-21). The successor was Pierre Lafitte (1825-1903), and F. Ant.n wrote a few lines
on him too.
F. Ant.n saw the benefit of Positivism in the hallowing of humankind and the absolute
respect of human individual (J4: 1, p. 21). He was not really influenced by Comte,
although his novel Religion, Science and Property, or the Three Cities 44 shows some
reminiscences of the theory of the three phases.
Moving from Alexandria to New York meant also a change more in the content than
in the form of the journal. F. Ant.n was still dependent of French sources but his choices
changed. He translated A. Dumas again but now he chose Kean ou dsordre et gnie (1836) 45,
a play paying tribute to the theatrical art and exalting the passion of being an actor.
Back to Cairo, he published an article entitled Difficulty of social issues (J7: 1 [1909],
pp. 19-28). The publisher Khall S . diq had complimented him with a copy of the Arabic
translation of Gustave Le Bons La psychologie des foules 46 which had come out in November
1909. Le Bon was a social psychologist and considered himself the founder of crowd
psychology. He introduced the notion of collective soul, but his views were rather negative:
Little adapted to reasoning, crowds, on the contrary, are quick to act, and he stressed
the role of propaganda, which he considered a rational technique for managing groups.
The translator was Sad Ah.mad Fath. Zaghll (ca. 1850-1927), leader of the nationalist
political party, the Wafd party. For the Egyptian masses, Sad Zaghl would be their
national leader, the zam al-umma, in the struggle against the British occupation of the
country. F. Ant.n opened his article with a free quotation of Platos Republic: the happiest
nation is the nation ruled by learned men and philosophers. He appreciated the translation
work of S. Zaghll in spite of his intense political activity, but he censured him for not
expressing his own views about the book that he translated.
F. Ant.n had spent some time in Paris and attended political meetings, for instance,
he mentions that he had listened to discourses by Gustave Herv (Brest 1871-Paris 1944),
whom he described as the leader of the insurgent socialists. He went to listen to him
because.
He exerted influence on the peoples of Europe with his weird principles which he
spread and many people followed him. If they were implemented, the present society
44
Al-dn wa-l-ilm wa-l-ml aw al-mudun al-thalth, Alexandria, 1903.
45
Translated as Edmud Kean: or the genius and the libertine, London: Vickers, 1847.
46
Paris: F. Alcan, 1895; in 1908 the 13th edition was on sale. English translation, The Crowd: A Study
of the Popular Mind, London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1896.
would be destroyed and a new society would be established, God alone knows the results
(J7:1, p. 20).
F. Ant.n believed that these principles, like those of Marx, Bebel, Jaurs caused le
Bon to write his book as a refutation against them. Le Bon never mentioned these names,
although he openly disdained any workers organization. He did not want to be ruled by
the crowds but wanted to control them. Thus F. Ant.n could accept neither Hervs
nor Le Bons ideas. He summarized the book and criticized it because it runs against the
principles of the present civilization, because all these organizations are helpful to the
weak in society. F. Ant.n reminded Jules Simons Political Freedom 47 and his views on
political organizations, and wondered:
Therefore, who speaks the truth? Dr. Le Bon or the experienced statesman and
famous philosopher Jules Simon who never flattered the people when expressing his
independent views, neither saying nor acting? (J: 1, pp. 26-27).
F. Ant.n was very harsh in his criticism and accused Le Bon of composing his book
in order to intimidate the French government and make it more submissive to the interests
of the capital owners. He added that the ongoing war between workers and property
owners which we partially related few years ago in our book Religion, Science and
Property required the righteous thinker to take stand, and he pleaded to take stand for
the weak (J7: 2, p. 28).
F. Ant.n always depended on French sources, which he never quoted. When he wrote
on Friedrich Nietzsche, whom he calls Frederic following the French spelling, he read
him in French. He made a critical notice in J5: 4 (September 1906), pp. 149-150, as a
digression within an article on J. al-Afghns ideology. There he said that he had been
working on Nietzsche for the last two years and he considered that the doctrine of Nietzsche
had brought Germany into its present supremacy, but he criticized him for his extreme
views on religion, for calling religions a web of superstitions and hoaxes.
After publishing a selection of aphorisms in J5: 4 (September 1906) 48, pp. 173-174,
and after a short article in J6: 1 (February 1908), pp. 16-17 49, F. Ant.n wrote a not so
short article, in Al-Jmia 6: 3 (April 1908), pp. 57-64, in which he aimed at expounding
only the key concepts of his philosophy and he translated some passages. The translated
passages appear under the heading Nietzsche flunks Socrates and Greek wisdom. They
belong to the chapter Das Problem des Sokrates, in Gtzen-Dmmerung, Twilight of
the Idols that begins Throughout the ages the wisest of men have passed the same
judgment on life: it is worthless; F. Ant.n likely used the French translation by Henri
Albert 50.
47
La libert politique, 3 ed., Paris: Hachette, 1867.
48
Aphorisms like Principle of self-love: Love yourself and then love everybody, Maxims and Arrows,
9 or I searched for great men but found only the apes of their ideals, ibid. 39. F. Ant.n could have gathered
them from pages of Twilight of the Idols or maybe he knew the selection and translation by HENRI LICHTENBERGER:
Aphorismes et fragments choisis, Paris: F. Alcan, 1899.
49
Readers asked F. Ant.n to write on Nietzsche but he warns them that his thoughts are but an odd
mixture of right and wrong, of sane and insane.
50
Le crpuscule des idoles: Le Cas Wagner: Nietzsche contre Wagner: LAntchrist / Frdric Nietzsche;
traduits par Henri Albert, Paris: Mercure de France, 1899.
J. PUIG, FARAH
. ANT
. N: ACTIVE RECEPTION OF EUROPEAN THOUGHT 1021
In a later article, he stresses the influence of Nietzsche on the ideas of men and remarks:
He tried to destroy the majority of the old principles, either good or corrupt (Jmia,
6: 4, [May 1908], pp. 81-86). As usual, F. Ant.n does not even quote the book of Nietzsche,
from which he translates the fragments. They are taken from Roving expeditions of an
inopportune philosopher, another chapter of Twilight of the Idols, the longest fragment
has the heading Whether we are became more moral.
Nietzsche attacked Renan in the second of his expeditions in the Twilight of the
Idols as he attacked Darwin in the 14th. F. Ant.n translated both expeditions and the
epilogue beginning And as regards my long sickness, do I not owe to it unutterably more
than to my health? of Nietzsche contra Wagner (J6: 5 [June 1908], pp. 125-128).
Nietzsche attacked Renan for being half-hearted, for trying to be both Christian and
freethinker, and said to him you continue to be a Christian, a Roman Catholic, and even
a priest, in your intestines!. F. Ant.n published the text with no particular comments.
Does it mean that he accepted Nietzsches ideas?
F. Ant.n appended his last novel Al-lam al-jadd The New World to the periodical
from September 15, 1906 onwards. He wanted to contrast the Roman and Jewish
civilizations in the novel, in which the pagan Cicero expressed views that reflect Nietzsches
doctrine. Ciceros new world is the world where the powerful and the wholesome will
dominate. But the hero of the novel is Magdalena who is the prey of the powerful and
wealthy. Years later, in 1913, he wrote Mis.r al-jadda wa-Mis.r al-qadma Modern Egypt,
Old Egypt: Fud Bey, the hero of New Egypt, is a man of strong power of will and, at
the same time, a defender of virtue and family values.
F. Ant. n might admire Nietzsche but he was never convinced. There is one place
where he seemingly sounded more enthusiastic: he composed a long poem entitled
The qasida on the mountain (Poetry in scientific way). Between Nietzsche and Tolstoy.
In the center of the glories of the United States (J6: 8 [1908], pp. 212-218). The poem
begins:
Stop over on the mountains, do not stop over in the valley if you want to see these
glories.
Ride the steam-driven trains to go there, the age of the she-camels has past, and so
the shouting of the camel driver.
The breeding camels are extinct, and the remains of the deserted encampment are
wiped out, you do not find any one bewailing them or leading to them.
Ask the trains to fly, do not say slowly, because you travel with my beloved heart.
Time is money, and this is time to rush, not time to be effeminate and to be asleep.
This is time of determined will, which fights any resistance by way of jihad.
The classical Arabic qasida always begins bewailing the rests of the camp and mourns
the caravan leaving the place with the beloved. F. Ant.n derides the nostalgic attitude
and calls for modernity. He introduces Nietzsche and his will to power, in the popularized
version as he understood him. We read later:
The old has died, wrap it with the linen for the grave! For us it has neither return
nor place to return.
The earth needs will, determination and energy, not the delusion of the religion and
prophecy.
With will, the raving of the country ascends and it is the rise of any civilization and
of any country.
This is Nietzsches language, and Nietzsche was straightening the bent and the twisted
according to some people, but I leave my opinion about Nietzsche untouched until the
appointed time.
In the continuation of the poem, F. Ant. n takes a stand against Nietzsche, who
frightened him with this discourse but he found relief in a book, Resurrection of Tolstoy,
that Ant n had with him. Ant.n reprimands him:
Oh! Nietzsche! (the philosopher spoke) I have listened to your strange discourse,
now you listen to me.
Do you believe that what you have spoken is a new science? No, you know it very well.
It is an old thing. You would not have said it, if you had been wakeful, and if you
had not shut your eyes.
Go into the woods where men still live like freely grazing cattle.
There you find the men who follow the laws of Nietzsche according to all his principles.
They have no law (shar) except the company of power, fear and feud.
F. Ant.n uses an ambiguous term, shar, than means law as well as religion, because
of religious law. Then he came down from the mountain and ended the poem with a
hemistich he is not sure if it is by al-Buh.tur (IX cent.) or Ab Tammm: the stream
is an enemy of the higher place.
The poem expresses his deception with Nietzsche but also his distancing from the
United States, insofar as he relates them to Nietzsches philosophy. F. Ant.n admired the
magnificence of the land and the achievements of its industrious people and he appreciated
the kindness of people who get together without malice and hatred. However he preferred
the lower place and he would soon leave the United States. Volume 7 of Al-Jmia would
appear in Egypt again, although it would comprise only two issues.
Nevertheless, Nietzsche retained Ant.ns interest and he wrote about his philosophy
an article called Return to Nietzsches philosophy, and to the History of Renan in J7: 1
(1909), pp. 42-46. 7:2 (1910), pp. 101-105. He acknowledged to have read five books of
Nietzsche and one on Nietzsche, En lisant Nietzsche, by mile Faguet (1847-1916) and
in addition, he knew of the publication of La Vie de Frdric Nietzsche by Daniel Halvy
(1872-1962). He names also two of the five Nietzsches books which he had read: Ecce
homo (1908) 51 and Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-85) 52.
In the article, F. Ant.n mainly translated fragments of the latter book. He commented
that the principles of this man comprise many truths necessary for life. The children of
the East should read them to make themselves strong (J7: 1, p. 42). He wanted to take
from Nietzsche whatever was useful to Orientals to build up a new personality (khalq
jadd) and to leave out what did not have a place in the East, he was not going to translate
anything that Nietzsche said on religion and moral (al-adyn wa-l-adt). F. Ant.n saw
in Nietzsche a source of inspiration for the renewal and progress of the Orient, how
amazing may it sound.
While the novels and theater plays of F. Ant.n often show his concern for social issues,
his selection and reception of western thinkers and essayists show us a more diverse image.
His backing of the French revolution stirred him to translate two works of Alexandre Dumas,
Ange Pitou and La comtesse de Charny, and although he soon abandoned revolutionary
ideas, he always felt sympathy with that time. In the beginning, the journal was called The
Ecce Homo, suivi des Posies. Traduit par Henri Albert, 4th ed., Paris, Mercure de France, 1909.
51
F. Ant.n was reading the French translation by Henri Albert: Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra, un livre
52
pour tous et pour personne, Paris: Socit du Mercure de France, which reached its 16th edition in 1908.
J. PUIG, FARAH
. ANT
. N: ACTIVE RECEPTION OF EUROPEAN THOUGHT 1023
Ottoman league and F. Ant. n had in mind the Ottoman Empire when he spoke of
revolution. When he moved to New York, he was a citizen of that empire stretching from
Istanbul to Libya and he was never outspoken against belonging to it.
However, his concern was not only politics. He soon translated Bernardin de Saint-
Pierre, who was influenced by Rousseau, and was moved by other interests. Innocent love,
natural goodness, non confessional deism were beliefs which he discovered and embraced.
His approach to Tolstoy was also characterized by his concern for moral values, which
are independent from religious orthodoxy, if sometimes not the opposite. Freedom of
conscience within ones official religion was an essential value. While he defended Tolstoy
against the condemnation by the Russian Church, he also defended the right of any member
of a religious community to think freely without being ousted from it.
Jules Simon and Ernest Renan are the two major figures with the most impact on his
thinking. Simon reinforced his faith in education and coached him in his views of moderate
reform, especially concerning women. Public education was seen by both as the keystone
to reform and develop a country.
Renan reinforced his Christian faith, towards himself and towards the surrounding
Muslim world, adopting it in liberal terms. Thanks to Renan he discovered Averroes and
that philosophy had flourished in the Arab world. The debate with Muh.ammad Abduh
brought him much dissatisfaction and many nuisances although both of them stood
intellectually closer together than did Abduh to his mentor al-Afghn. Although the
debate contributed to the revival of philosophy in the Arab world, F. Ant.n would be left
to be a minor player, because he was a Christian.
Later on, F. Ant.n set aside the conflictive issue of Islam and Christianity and addressed
his readers on issues such as moral conduct and national pride. His nuanced rejection
of Nietzsche and his predilection for Tolstoy as seen in the poem above illustrate his
concern for defending virtue. His literary works always had a pedagogical purpose and,
in the introduction to his play Ibn ash-shab Son of the people in the journal, he reminded
readers:
I do not approve novels (riwyt) built on passion and love without giving a useful
lesson to the people. But I escape from it as I have done in all my novels because I
understand that the writer who deserves this name must fear poisoning the souls of the
readers through corrupting passion and cold love, on which most of the novels are built
(J5: 1 [NY 1906], p. 64).
Nationalism as an issue gained import in his works and I have stressed his interest
in Nietzsche as ideological source of new energy to an Eastern nation. He was already
in New York and he wrote an article entitled Voice from far away after the incident of
Dinshawi (or Danishway) 53. The incident increased national sentiment in Egypt. F. Ant.n
distinguished between religious and national fanaticism, and while he censured the
former, he approved the latter (ta as.s.ub jins), and greeted it as a thread to string the
nation (J5: 5 [September 15, 1906], pp. 183-191). The incident took place in Egypt, but
this nation referred not only to Egypt, but to the Ottoman and Egyptian nation.
53
The Herald Tribune of June 15, 1906 reported: It appears that a party of officers were engaged in
pigeon-shooting near the village of Danshawi when a stray shot set fire to a haystack. This aroused the
fanaticism of the natives, who attacked the officers and attempted to disarm them by force. The result was
a serious collision with the natives, during which one officer was killed and others were wounded. A native
woman was shot dead.
It remains unclear what happened in Dinshawi, but a British officer was found dead. The British
response was disproportionate and cruel; four peasants were sentenced to death.
As F. Ant.n absorbed new sources, many of his ideas changed, but his main concerns
remained. His concern for educating people was as permanent as were his worries for
freethinking; thus, Jules Simon and Ernest Renan continued to be influential throughout
his life. New sources and his American experience oriented his thoughts toward nationalism,
but he could not shape the kind of nation he wanted. He wanted to create a great Oriental
nation educated, social and secular which the Arabic language would bring together
but reality imposed different national states and often a religious orientation.
Looking at the situation of the Arab world today we shall most likely think that his
project has completely failed. However, after some reflection, shadows and lights appear:
Translating Western literature into Arabic helped develop the modern language, and
to introduce literary genres such as the novel, the short story and the drama. F. Ant.n
and the journal contributed to this development, and to the creation of an environment
of open discussion and free expression.
Public education has become more common in the Near East and women have access
to its various levels. As for Ant.ns ideas about the positive influence of educated women
in raising their children, many practical instances support his views.
The shadowy side comes out when we consider the political fragmentation of the
Middle East. Steps towards unity are more rhetorical than factual and Ant.n could not
have imagined that Arab countries would lead wars against each other. But, no doubt,
his views on religion and the secular state have been ignored the most. The upsurge of
Islamist movements retards the slow evolution towards state forms based on universal
rational principles which seemed to be in accordance with his project. Here we should
refer to F. Ant.ns novel Religion, Science and Property, or the Three Cities, in which he
proposed a utopian society based on the principles of equality, fraternity, and moderate
socialism as the solution to conflicts existing in Western societies. Maybe An n should
have thought that similar conflicts could arise in Arab societies too, and that a more
realistic proposal was needed.
Entanglement in religious arguments does not occur for any one reason; it is often is
caused by social conflicts. In any case, it is something that F. Ant.n could scarcely foresee.
Although his reform project suffered a backslash, it has not vanished, and its revival may
be initiated by reforming society in a more realistic way than the one he proposed in
Religion, Science and Property, or the Three Cities but in the same spirit.
RESUMEN: En septiembre del 2006, el papa Benedicto XVI pronunci una leccin magistral en la Uni-
versidad de Ratisbona, de la que aos atrs haba sido profesor. En ella, ensayaba un tentativo de
encuentro entre fe y razn a partir de la entrada, llevado a cabo en el primer siglo de nuestra era, del
cristianismo en el contexto de la filosofa helnica. Pero el principal motivo de la repercusin mundial
de dicho discurso fue la citacin de un texto donde se apuntaba la relacin entre violencia y religin
islmica. En el presente artculo descodificamos la pretensin del papa a partir de tres categoras cla-
ves: cristianismo, islam e ilustracin.
PALABRAS CLAVE: cristianismo, islam, ilustracin, Benedicto XVI.
I. STATUS QUESTIONIS
1
Tenemos la intuicin de que el texto de la polmica, aun siendo marginal en el conjunto de la refle-
xin, tal como hemos afirmado, tiene una meditada intencionalidad. Si no fuera as no se comprende muy
bien que su ubicacin en el conjunto d la impresin de un cierto forzamiento. De hecho, los musul-
manes que han comentado la conferencia del papa han subrayado este dato. As, Aref A. Nayed afirma que
no est claro en qu sentido el dilogo del Palelogo haya hecho venir a la mente a Benedicto XVI todo
esto, en www.webislam.com.
PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749 PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), nm. 242, pp. 1025-1042
21_SerafinBEJAR.qxd:Maqueta.qxd 26/6/08 12:10 Pgina 1026
trame tambin lo que Mahoma ha trado de nuevo, y encontrars solamente cosas malas
e inhumanas, como su disposicin de difundir por medio de la espada la fe que predi-
caba. No obstante, nos parece significativo citar el prrafo completo en el que la cita se
inserta para contextualizar tal afirmacin:
En el sptimo coloquio, editado por el profesor Khoury, el emperador toca el tema
de la yihad, la guerra santa. Seguramente el emperador saba que en la sura 2,256 est
escrito: Ninguna constriccin en las cosas de fe. Segn dice una parte de los expertos,
es probablemente una de las suras del perodo inicial, en el que Mahoma mismo an no
tena poder y estaba amenazado. Pero, naturalmente, el emperador conoca tambin las
disposiciones, desarrolladas sucesivamente y fijadas en el Corn, acerca de la guerra
santa. Sin detenerse en detalles, como la diferencia de trato entre los que poseen el
Libro y los incrdulos, con una brusquedad que nos sorprende, brusquedad que
para nosotros resulta inaceptable, se dirige a su interlocutor llanamente con la pregun-
ta central sobre la relacin entre religin y violencia en general, diciendo: Mustrame
tambin lo que Mahoma ha trado de nuevo, y encontrars solamente cosas malas e
inhumanas, como su disposicin de difundir por medio de la espada la fe que predica-
ba. El emperador, despus de pronunciarse de un modo tan duro, explica luego minu-
ciosamente las razones por las cuales la difusin de la fe mediante la violencia es algo
insensato. La violencia est en contraste con la naturaleza de Dios y la naturaleza del
alma. Dios no se complace con la sangre dice; no actuar segn la razn es contra-
rio a la naturaleza de Dios. La fe es fruto del alma, no del cuerpo. Por tanto, quien quie-
re llevar a otra persona a la fe necesita la capacidad de hablar bien y de razonar correc-
tamente, y no recurrir a la violencia ni a las amenazas Para convencer a un alma
racional no hay que recurrir al propio brazo ni a instrumentos contundentes ni a nin-
gn otro medio con el que se pueda amenazar de muerte a una persona 2.
De esta manera, el papa cifra el contenido del dilogo entre cristianos y musulma-
nes, cada uno dentro de sus propias tradiciones, en la bsqueda de soluciones adecua-
das a lo que considera las verdaderas conquistas de la Ilustracin; concretamente en este
discurso de Navidad seala los derechos del hombre y especialmente la libertad de la fe
y de su ejercicio. As, Benedicto XVI est mostrando su inters por ubicar el dilogo no
tanto en el campo teolgico de lo interreligioso, cuanto en el escenario preteolgico de
2
Cf. texto oficial en www.vatican.va, Discurso del Santo Padre en la universidad de Ratisbona. Fe,
razn y universidad. Recuerdos y reflexiones, martes 12 de septiembre de 2006.
3
Cf. texto oficial en www.vatican.va, Discurso del Santo Padre Benedicto XVI a los cardenales, arzo-
bispos, obispos y prelados superiores de la curia romana, viernes 22 de diciembre de 2006.
La conferencia del papa, despus de la referencia marginal al Islam que hemos apun-
tado, intenta retratar el momento de encuentro entre la fe bblica y el pensamiento grie-
go, en lo que podemos considerar la primera gran inculturacin del cristianismo ms
all de la connaturalizad que le era inherente en contexto semita. En efecto, la parfra-
sis del primer versculo del libro del Gnesis en el prlogo de S. Juan hace una identifi-
cacin no carente de consecuencias para la historia posterior: Jesucristo es el Logos de
Dios (En el principio ya exista el Logos). De esta manera, el papa llega a afirmar cmo
S. Juan nos ha brindado la palabra conclusiva sobre el concepto bblico de Dios, la pala-
bra con la que todos los caminos de la fe bblica, a menudo arduos y tortuosos, alcan-
zan su meta, encuentran su sntesis 6. As, atendiendo a la naturaleza ntima de la fe cris-
tiana y de la filosofa helnica se llega a una fusin donde se evidencia cmo el encuentro
entre mensaje bblico y el pensamiento griego no era una simple casualidad 7.
4
Cf. S. KHALIL SAMIR, Cmo Joseph Ratzinger ve al Islam, en www.sintesis.blogspot.com, Benedicto XVI
y el Islam. Estas dificultades eran sealadas por el cardenal Ratzinger en una conversacin con Peter See-
wald donde afirmaba: el Islam no es una realidad uniforme. No cuenta con una autoridad uniforme, y
por eso el dilogo con el Islam slo puede llevarse a cabo con determinados grupos Islamicos. Nadie puede
hablar en nombre de todo el Islam, que no tiene un magisterio doctrinal comn, en J. RATZINGER, La sal
de la tierra. Quin es y cmo piensa Benedicto XVI, Madrid, 52005, 264.
5
A este ltimo respecto cf. www.lanacion.com.ar/704223 el intercambio de ponencias entre J. Haber-
mas y J. Ratzinger a principios del 2004 en la Academia Catlica de Baviera en Munich con el tema Las
bases morales prepolticas del Estado liberal.
6
Fe, razn y universidad, 3.
7
Ibd.
En este contexto es donde hemos de situar la aportacin filosfica de I. Kant 12, que
nos ayudar a comprender la reduccin de Dios a mero fundamento de la moral. El
punto de partida de la filosofa kantiana lo podemos tomar de sus cuatro famosas pre-
8
Ibd., 4.
9
As, por ejemplo, en el anlisis de las diversas causas que dan lugar a la modernidad entendida
como magnitud polifactica hay que otorgar especial relieve a la ruptura de la unidad eclesial que tiene
lugar con la Reforma. sta pone de manifiesto el fracaso de la religin como elemento de cohesin social,
de modo que ahora hay que buscar el consenso de la razn, nico lugar verdaderamente comn a los hom-
bres. Esta nueva poca, que tiene como pilares ejecutores la burguesa y la mentalidad cientfica, es el ini-
cio de la prdida de toda funcin social de la religin. Para esta reflexin, cf. W. KASPER, El Dios de Jesu-
cristo, Salamanca, 1985, 19ss.
10
O. GONZLEZ DE CARDEDAL, La entraa del cristianismo, Salamanca, 21998, 210. Hay que matizar que
el concepto de naturaleza propio de la Ilustracin difiere en relacin al usado en el mundo griego. En
lneas generales, y simplificando mucho, se pasa de la idea de invariabilidad, identidad, bsqueda en lo
mudable de lo que no vara a un concepto que expresa las leyes o reglas de los fenmenos. En este sen-
tido, cf. J. ORTEGA Y GASSET, Historia como sistema, Madrid, 1971, 30-40.
11
O. GONZLEZ DE CARDEDAL, La entraa, 211.
12
Para esta reflexin, cf. J. ALFARO, De la cuestin del hombre a la cuestin de Dios, Salamanca, 1988,
29-33, y J. GMEZ CAFFARENA, La filosofa de la religin de I. Kant, en M. FRAIJ (ed.), Filosofa de la reli-
gin. Estudios y textos, Madrid, 1994, 179-205.
13
GONZLEZ DE CARDEDAL, La entraa, 211.
14
Cf. Fe, razn y universidad, 5.
15
Cf. J. MARTN VELASCO, El encuentro con Dios, Madrid, 1995, 130-134.
16
J. ALFARO, De la cuestin, 31.
17
Cf. J. GMEZ CAFFARENA, La filosofa, 183. En palabras del propio Kant: Pero no es imposible repre-
sentarnos (segn todas nuestras facultades racionales) que se unan por solas causas naturales estas dos
exigencias del fin final que nos propone la ley moral, de modo adecuado a la idea de dicho fin. De modo
que no concuerda el concepto de la necesidad prctica de un tal fin mediante la aplicacin de nuestras
fuerzas con el concepto terico de la posibilidad fsica de realizacin del mismo, si no enlazamos con nues-
tra libertad ninguna otra causalidad (de un medio) que la de la Naturaleza [] Por consiguiente, tenemos
que admitir una causa moral del mundo (un Creador) para proponernos un fin final segn leyes morales,
en I. KANT, Crtica del juicio, Apndice, 87: La prueba moral de la existencia de Dios, V, 450. El texto est
tomado de J. GMEZ CAFFARENA, La filosofa, 203.
18
GONZLEZ DE CARDEDAL, La entraa, 211.
19
Ibd.
20
Cf. O. GONZLEZ DE CARDEDAL, Cristologa, Madrid, 2001, 329s., y La entraa, 214s. La carta de ciu-
dadana de esta nueva comprensin de la religin la podemos encontrar en la obra kantiana La religin
dentro de los lmites de la mera razn, donde considera la relacin entre religin revelada y racional como
de crculos concntricos; el ms interno de los cuales respondera a la fe religiosa pura. De esta manera,
ve como posible, aunque lo considera difcil y pretencioso, deducir apriorsticamente lo correspondiente
a tal religin pura. El lugar de inters del filsofo, por tanto, ser el crculo ms amplio correspondiente
a la religin natural, desde la cual visitar sucesivamente el crculo ms interno de la religin revelada
para mostrar cmo el cristianismo es la idea de religin tipo que se puede fundar en la razn, confirin-
dole as un estatuto natural.
21
Fe, razn y universidad, 4.
22
Slo el tipo de certeza que deriva de la sinergia entre matemticas y mtodo emprico puede con-
siderarse cientfica, en Fe, razn y universidad, 5.
Hemos visto cmo el dilogo que el papa propone en referencia al Islam se ubica en
el mbito preteolgico de lo cultural. En efecto, tanto el cristianismo como el Islam deben
reconocer el contexto en que estn hoy situados, es decir, deben asumir los retos funda-
mentales que el programa de emancipacin y mayora de edad ilustrado lanz a sendas
religiones. Por esta razn, hemos comenzado nuestra reflexin estableciendo la relacin
histrica entre Cristianismo e Ilustracin y subrayando el problema fundamental que la
autonoma de la razn moderna plantea a nuestra fe: la validez universal del hecho his-
trico-concreto Jess de Nazaret. Ahora toca clarificar las relaciones histricas entre
Islam e Ilustracin teniendo en cuenta que en ninguna parte del mundo Islmico de los
siglos XVII y XVIII [] se puso en marcha un cambio de paradigma hacia la Modernidad
semejante al acontecido en Occidente 25.
23
GONZLEZ DE CARDEDAL, La entraa, 385.
24
G. E. LESSING, Sobre la demostracin en espritu y fuerza, en A. ANDREU RODRIGO (ed.), Escritos
filosficos y teolgicos, Madrid, 1982, 448s. Debemos reconocer cmo, an en forma de rechazo, Lessing
ha comprendido perfectamente la pretensin escandalosa del cristianismo que R. Guardini describa como
sigue: La doctrina cristiana afirma, en efecto, que por la humanizacin del Hijo de Dios, por su muerte
y su resurreccin, por el misterio de la fe y de la gracia, toda la creacin se ha visto exhortada a abando-
nar su aparente concrecin objetiva y a situarse, como bajo una norma decisiva, bajo la determinacin de
una realidad personal, a saber: bajo la persona de Jesucristo. Ello constituye, desde el punto de vista lgi-
co, una paradoja, ya que parece hacer problemtica la misma realidad concreta de la persona. Incluso el
sentimiento personal se rebela contra ello. Someterse, en efecto, a una ley general cierta bien natural,
mental o moral no es difcil para el hombre, el cual siente que al hacerlo as contina siendo l mismo,
e incluso que el reconocimiento de una ley semejante puede convertirse en una accin personal. A la pre-
tensin, en cambio, de reconocer a otra persona como ley suprema de toda la esfera religiosa y, por tanto,
de la propia existencia, el hombre reacciona en sentido violentamente negativo, en La esencia del cristia-
nismo, Madrid, 1959, 21.
25
H. KNG, El Islam. Historia, presente, futuro, Madrid, 2006, 461.
De esta manera, se hace urgente una serena meditacin sobre este punto que, como
ya hemos apuntado, es el reto fundamental que se presenta a la religin islmica, es decir,
un necesario cambio de paradigma que permita adecuar la esencia de su fe a la altura
del tiempo. Justamente, al igual que el judasmo y el cristianismo, el Islam vive en esta
fase de transicin de la historia mundial un conflicto fundamental entre tradicin e inno-
vacin, y todava est por ver cmo se dirime tal conflicto y que solucin final encuen-
tra 26. As pues, el Islam debe ser receptivo a un interlocutor que ejerce con adultez el
uso de una racionalidad que nos ana a creyentes e increyentes y debe percibir las inquie-
tudes de tal interlocutor moderno no como amenaza, sino como oportunidad de expo-
ner significativamente su fe en un contexto plural. Por ello en su conferencia, Benedic-
to XVI extraa como enseanza fundamental del Palelogo la afirmacin decisiva de que
no actuar segn la razn es contrario a la naturaleza de Dios 27 y lanzaba, como inquie-
tud fundamental del interlocutor ilustrado con respecto a la religin Islmica, el pro-
blema de la violencia. Por tanto, la pregunta que queremos esclarecer es si la violencia
en el Islam es fruto de una cristalizacin histrico-concreta, tal como ha acontecido repe-
tidas veces en referencia al cristianismo, o puede ser introyectada en su misma esencia.
O de otro modo, si la verdadera esencia del verdadero Islam acontece en diferentes for-
mas histricas 28, el uso de la violencia: ha sido una concrecin histrica errnea de su
esencia o slo una explicitacin de la misma?
Toda religin debe atender a un doble nivel: su esencia y las distintas formas, hist-
ricamente condicionadas, a las que da lugar. Ahora bien, la esencia slo se manifiesta en
la forma cambiante y no siempre es sencillo establecer qu pertenece a un nivel o a otro.
Por ello, en la reflexin que sigue, como telogos cristianos, queremos lanzar una serie
de preguntas que ataen fundamentalmente a la esencia del Islam, convencidos de que
el telogo tiene como tarea trascender los determinantes histricos para conectar la fe
con su entraa ms pura y genuina. De esta manera, y en referencia al problema de la
violencia en el Islam, vamos a exponer tres puntos clave: la interpretacin del Corn, la
pregunta sobre los orgenes y el problema de la teocracia en relacin a los sistemas demo-
crticos contemporneos.
26
Ibd., 42.
27
Fe, razn y universidad, 2.
28
H. KNG, El Islam, 39.
29
Constatamos que dicho trmino no significa guerra santa, sino esfuerzo en el camino de Dios.
30
El Corn est compuesto por 114 secciones llamadas suras o azoras que, a su vez, se dividen en
versculos llamados aleyas; en total 6.666 versculos.
31
Cf. SANDRO MAGISTER, Dos estudiosos musulmanes comentan la leccin papal en Ratisbona, en
www.chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it.
32
Ibd.
33
Cf. R. BLACHRE, Le Coran, Pars, 1980, 11-19. En esta lnea tambin, cf. J. CORTS, El Corn, Bar-
celona, 1986, 33, y J. L. SNCHEZ NOGALES, Cristianismo e Islam. Frontera y encuentro, Madrid, 1998, 48.
equivocacin, habra interpretado la insinuacin del papa de una falsa posicin Isl-
mica que fue sostenida slo por motivo de una temporal falta de poder 34.
Pues bien, si esto es as y la segunda sura pertenece al cuarto perodo, la interpreta-
cin que se hace de la misma puede variar. De esta manera, en la Fatwa sobre las decla-
raciones del papa Benedicto XVI de Abdalqadir As-Sufi, publicada por la mezquita del
Albaicn de Granada, se afirma que la azora segunda est abrogada por aquella de la
espada (47,4) que, perteneciente tambin al perodo de Medina, es, sin embargo, ms
reciente. En esta sura, se afirma:
Cuando sostengis, pues, un encuentro con los infieles, descargad los golpes en el
cuello hasta someterles. Entonces, atadlos fuertemente. Luego, devolvedles la libertad,
de gracia o mediante rescate para que cese la guerra. Es as como debis hacer. Si Dios
quisiera, se defendera de ellos, pero quiere probaros a unos por medio de otros. No deja-
r que se pierdan las obras de los que hayan cado por Dios 35.
En la edicin del Corn preparada por Julio Corts, que es la que estamos citando en
castellano, el editor afirma que habla el ngel Gabriel a Mahoma. Estas aleyas consti-
tuyen, segn la tradicin que ha prevalecido, la primera revelacin que recibi Maho-
ma, con la que comienza su profetismo, en el monte Hira, en la inmediaciones de la Meca,
hacia el ao 610 38. Esta veneracin al libro que, como afirma la sura 97, se hizo des-
cender del cielo la noche del Destino, nos puede llevar a la bsqueda de la especificidad
del Islam en relacin al propio cristianismo. As pues, si parafraseando el prlogo de
S. Juan podemos decir que la Palabra de Dios se hizo carne en Jesucristo (cf. Jn 1,14), el
34
AREF ALI NAYED, en www.webislam.com.
35
SHAYKH DR. ABDALQADIR AS-SUFI, Fatwa sobre las declaraciones del Papa Benedicto XVI en Alemania,
en www.cislamica.org/pensamiento.
36
Para la reflexin que sigue, cf. J. L. SNCHEZ NOGALES, Cristianismo e Islam, 47-56, y H. KNG, El
Islam, 80-98 y 578-596.
37
J. L. SNCHEZ NOGALES, Cristianismo e Islam, 47.
38
J. CORTS, El Corn, 732.
Islam afirmara que la Palabra de Dios se ha hecho libro. Desde esta clave, podemos
entender que para los musulmanes el Corn posea atributos divinos. En efecto, se trata
de un libro lingsticamente perfecto, es un libro singular, inimitable e insuperable, de
modo que el profeta no necesita ningn milagro porque el Corn mismo ya lo es, es intra-
ducible y para entenderlo bien hay que saber el rabe puro, de modo que es la ms anti-
gua obra rabe en prosa que ha legitimado dicha lengua como sagrada y litrgica, y, por
ltimo, es un libro inenarrable y absolutamente fidedigno.
Este ltimo atributo divino es especialmente significativo para el tema que nos ocupa.
En efecto, si el Corn fue transmitido palabra por palabra, esto es precisamente lo que
entendemos por el concepto de revelacin en sentido dictafnico, est libre de todo error
y de toda contradiccin. As, en la sura 4:82 podemos leer: No meditan en el Corn? Si
hubiera sido de otro que de Dios, habran encontrado en l numerosas contradicciones.
De esta manera, se hace perfectamente claro a un interlocutor atento la dificultad para
introducir cualquier instrumento hermenutico en la lectura del Corn. Es ms, la con-
sideracin hacia el libro sagrado llega a tal extremo que la escuela teolgica asar, fun-
dada en el siglo IX y considerada la escolstica ms ortodoxa del Islam, hace una inter-
pretacin tan esencialista de los atributos divinos, frente a la interpretacin alegrica de
la escuela ms abierta denominada mutazil, que llega a afirmar que el Corn es increa-
do, palabra eterna de Dios, atributo eterno. Esta reflexin, lgicamente, pone en eviden-
cia la dificultad de articular el rgido monotesmo islmico con la afirmacin de dos incre-
ados: Al y el Corn. No obstante, los asares hacen tal afirmacin de un modo fidesta 39
sin encontrar contradiccin ninguna y llegando a afirmar que los atributos de Dios exis-
ten tal y como son expuestos por el Corn, es decir, Dios tendra rostro, dos manos, etc.,
aunque no en sentido humano 40. Como conclusin de lo expuesto:
La teora Islmica de la revelacin empieza por no reconocer mediacin alguna
entre el acontecimiento revelador en s y la objetivacin textual de la revelacin. La orto-
doxia musulmana absolutiza la letra del texto sagrado cornico como la Palabra misma
de Dios, sin mediacin, recitada por Mahoma, sello de los profetas, que abroga toda
profeca anterior restituyendo las desviaciones-falsificaciones por la recitacin en len-
gua rabe clara del libro celeste al dictado del ngel Gabriel. Esta teora mecanicista o
dictafnica de la revelacin no reconoce a Mahoma como verdadero autor humano del
Corn, sino como mero recitador de un dictado procedente de un libro celeste escrito
en rabe claro que contiene la mismsima Palabra de Dios increada 41.
Por tanto, y en relacin a la interpretacin del Corn, sigue quedando como pro-
blema para el mundo islmico la pregunta por la contingencia histrica de su libro
sagrado. En efecto, el Corn es un libro inspirado por Dios que al mismo tiempo sigue
siendo inspirador; o de otra manera, se trata de un testimonio religioso del siglo VII que
sigue siendo esencial para millones de personas en el siglo XXI. Si esto es as, se hace
del todo necesario plantear la pregunta acerca de los condicionantes histricos, socia-
les y religiosos de dicho documento para que pueda ser trasladado al presente y siga
inspirando vida a millones de creyentes, pero a la altura del tiempo. En este sentido,
es importante hacer notar que no se trata de un libro cado del cielo porque ms bien
le fue comunicado al profeta en el corazn, despus fue anunciado por Mahoma y slo
39
Sin duda que aqu podemos ver un reflejo de lo expresado por Benedicto XVI en su conferencia a
propsito de la dificultad del Islam para la aplicacin de la analoga al hacer un subrayado tan categri-
co de la trascendencia divina. Cf. Fe, razn, universidad, 2.
40
Cf. J. L. SNCHEZ NOGALES, Cristianismo e Islam, 89ss.
41
Ibd., 198.
ms tarde, tras la muerte del profeta, recopiladas sus enseanzas y plasmadas por escri-
to hasta llegar a la edicin cannica del Corn unificado del califa Utmn entre los
aos 644-656. De ah que, en contexto actual, se haga especialmente urgente una refle-
xin acerca de cmo hay que entender el Corn y se aplique para ello una rigurosa ex-
gesis cornica 42.
42
Cf. B. FORTE, La esencia del cristianismo, Salamanca, 2002, 35-39.
43
Fe, razn y universidad, 2.
44
Para esta reconstruccin de los orgenes, cf. H. KNG, El Islam, 118-151, y SNCHEZ NOGALES, Cris-
tianismo e Islam, 36-43.
As, y ubicado en Medina, el carisma y la fuerza del profeta logra unificar a todas las
tribus y acallar los conflictos, dando lugar a la comunidad o confederacin de Medina
como ncleo de la ulterior gran comunidad musulmana. La esencia de esta nueva comu-
nidad vendr determinada por la comunin en un mismo fundamento religioso. De esta
manera, se puede constatar un cambio de roles fundamental para la comprensin de la
figura de Mahoma que bien podra ser tematizado como el paso del profeta al hombre
de estado, del carismtico itinerante al general del ejrcito.
La nueva comunidad requiere unas tareas de organizacin interna o poltica interior
y de legitimacin ad extra o poltica exterior. Esta ltima va a suponer la organizacin
de una fuerte proteccin militar que ser la sea ms reconocible de la nueva comuni-
dad islmica y que tendr como objetivos inmediatos la lucha encarnizada contra los
quraises, los ataques por sorpresa a las caravanas meques, como fuente de ingresos, y
la fortificacin defensiva de la ciudad ante las amenazas de posibles desquites del ene-
migo. Poco a poco, y a medida que avanza el poder de la nueva comunidad y sus triun-
fos blicos, la ciudad de La Meca ser el gran objetivo a batir:
Al principio se trata de batidas contra intereses quraises que cuentan con el bene-
plcito y la colaboracin de Muhammad [] Pero estas batidas, que fundamentalmen-
te responden a razones econmicas, pronto se convierten en una guerra de fe que se
lleva a cabo contra estos infieles de La Meca! por orden divina, o sea, en un com-
batir en el camino de Dios 45.
Evidentemente, este repaso a los orgenes del Islam, con el profeta an en vida, est
necesitado de una contextualizacin que ubique tales acciones belicosas en el horizon-
te de comprensin de la Arabia del siglo VII, donde no existe an el concepto de derechos
humanos y donde los mtodos brutales de guerra son la prctica comn. De hecho, Maho-
ma no se atribuy a s mismo tales xitos polticos y militares, sino siempre a Dios: Si
Dios os auxilia, no habr nadie que pueda venceros. Pero, si os abandona, quin podr
auxiliaros fuera de l? Que los creyentes confen en Dios! (3:160) Al mismo tiempo, el
profeta, que comparta una antropologa rabe sostenida ms en lo colectivo que en lo
individual, tena la pretensin de cambiar a mejor aquella sociedad sobre los cimientos
de una cosmovisin donde no exista distincin entre lo poltico y lo religioso. Por ello,
la umma creada por Mahoma deba tener una dimensin inevitablemente blica si se
esperaba su continuidad e institucionalizacin en un contexto como el descrito. Tam-
bin es necesario apuntar que el profeta tuvo una enorme disposicin a la reconciliacin
una vez conquistada La Meca e instaurada en ella la capital de toda la comunidad musul-
mana unificada.
No obstante, tambin es comprensible una cierta inquietud ante los orgenes; sobre
todo atendiendo a la relacin entre religin y violencia en contexto ilustrado. En efecto,
el telogo cristiano, que reconoce la importancia decisiva de la figura del profeta para la
historia universal de las religiones, no puede dejar de hacer determinadas preguntas cr-
ticas en relacin a la persona y obra de Mahoma. Concretamente, no puede ser la vida
misma del profeta una justificacin de ciertas prcticas violentas o derivarse de ella con
facilidad determinadas acciones belicosas? En este sentido, somos conscientes de que el
trmino yihad de ninguna manera quiere decir guerra santa, trmino que no aparece
ni una sola vez en el Corn, sino esfuerzo en el camino de Dios. Pero, al mismo tiem-
po, ciertos pasajes del Corn parecen afirmar que Dios no slo permite, sino que puede
llegar a exigir un violento afanarse en esos caminos de Dios. De esta manera, el telogo
45
H. KNG, El Islam, 140s.
cristiano no puede dejar de pensar en el contraste que la figura de Mahoma tiene en rela-
cin a la persona de Jesucristo. En palabras de H. Kng:
A posteriori, la pregunta de si Muhammmad tena o no otras opciones apenas es
relevante. Lo que s resulta relevante es que, mientras que el maestro de Nazaret se opuso
por principio a la guerra y al empleo de violencia y opt por la no violencia y la paz, el
profeta de La Meca y Medina admiti de antemano el uso de la violencia y de la guerra
como medios para la consecucin de sus objetivos, sobre todo para asegurar a la nueva
comunidad una existencia pacfica 46.
Siguiendo esta argumentacin, el mismo H. Kng reconoce que es preciso que los
musulmanes reconozcan de manera ms inequvoca que ni siquiera el Profeta era moral-
mente perfecto 47. En efecto, su desconfianza ante los judos como un posible grupo de
oposicin que produjo depuraciones y masacres, su excesivo apego a las leyes no escri-
tas de la antigua sociedad rabe, el hecho de no respetar las reglas de guerra que eran
por todos reconocidas, al menos en dos casos y en referencia a la prohibicin de lanzar
ataques en los tiempos sagrados y a la prohibicin de la tala de palmeras 48 son ele-
mentos que podran ayudar a establecer una distancia crtica con unos mtodos que, en
absoluto, pueden ser aceptados hoy da por ms que pertenezcan a la praxis histrica
del Profeta.
Este sucinto repaso a la historia de los orgenes del Islam nos ha hecho descubrir
cmo la nueva religin vincula indisolublemente la soberana religiosa y el poder polti-
co como fundamento de la unidad de Arabia. De esta manera, se hace patente otro ele-
mento de problematicidad, especialmente significativo en el contexto ilustrado, que hace
referencia a la teocracia como sistema poltico inherente al Islam. En efecto, la comu-
nidad Islmica es ambas cosas a la vez: comunidad religiosa y comunidad poltica, ciu-
dad de Dios. Pues no existe separacin entre el Estado y la religin. Ambas realidades
estn amalgamadas en una indisoluble unidad 49. Por esta razn, no es de extraar las
46
H. KNG, El Islam, 649. En este mismo sentido, es significativa una frase de Pascal que reza: Si
Mahoma escogi el camino del xito humano, Jesucristo eligi el de fracasar humanamente; Mahoma mata,
Jess se deja matar, en Pensamientos, ed. Brunschvicg, 601. Es interesante hacer notar cmo en una Carta
abierta a su Santidad el papa Benedicto XVI que treinta y un especialistas dirigen al papa como comentario
a su conferencia, se hace referencia al uso de la violencia por parte de Cristo: Por otra parte, es notable
que Manuel II Paleologus diga que la violencia va en contra de la naturaleza de Dios, cuando Cristo mismo
us la violencia contra los mercaderes y cambistas del templo, y dijo: No pensis que he venido a traer la paz
a la tierra; no he venido a traer paz, sino una espada (Mt 10:34-36). Cuando Dios ahog al Faran, esta-
ba yendo contra Su propia Naturaleza? Tal vez el emperador quera decir que la crueldad, la brutalidad y
la agresin se oponen a la Voluntad de Dios, en cuyo caso la ley clsica y tradicional de la yihad en el Islam
suscribira sus palabras por completo, en www.duaatalislam.com/pope_letter_spanish.pdf, 3. Precisamente,
tales afirmaciones de este grupo de especialistas refuerzan la idea de la necesaria exgesis de los textos
sagrados, tanto cristianos como musulmanes, para evitar todo riesgo de fundamentalismo.
47
H. KNG, El Islam, 146.
48
La tala de palmeras, que necesitaban dcadas para crecer de nuevo, era una prohibicin expresa
de los hombres del desierto, por todos respetada y establecida como regla del arte rabe de guerrear. As,
en el ao 625, dentro del proceso de depuraciones y masacres de los judos que se haban negado a ser
miembros de la confederacin musulmana, Mahoma, violando esta ley, manda talar las palmeras de la
tribu juda de nadir. Posteriormente, encontramos en el Corn una justificacin religiosa de tal accin en
la sura 59:5: Cuando talabais una palmera o la dejabais en pie, lo hacais con permiso de Dios y para con-
fundir a los perversos.
49
H. KNG, El Islam, 187.
reservas y cautelas de este papa cuando, en la entrevista de Peter Seewald que ya hemos
citado, al ser preguntado por las relaciones cristianismo e Islam responde:
El Islam, efectivamente, tiene estructuras para la convivencia social, para la pol-
tica, para la religin, totalmente diferentes. Cuando hoy en da se discute en Occidente
la posibilidad de establecer facultades de teologa Islmica, o presentar el Islam como
corporacin de derecho pblico, se presupone que todas las religiones estn estructu-
radas de igual forma; que todas se adaptan a un mismo sistema democrtico con sus
ordenamientos jurdicos y con los espacios libres propios de ese ordenamiento. Pero la
esencia misma del Islam lo contradice. Porque el islamismo no admite, en absoluto, esa
separacin de los mbitos poltico y religioso, que, desde el principio, caracteriza al cris-
tianismo. El Corn es una ley religiosa que regula la totalidad de la vida poltica y social
Islmica, y de ah se sigue que todo el ordenamiento de vida, en general, sea como dice
el Islam. La sharah configura la sociedad desde el principio hasta el final 50.
En este texto del papa hay un concepto necesitado de clarificacin y que se presenta
esencial para entender la problemtica que intentamos exponer: sharah 51. Este elemen-
to central del Islam es un trmino tcnico que designa la ley cannica Islmica. Los fun-
damentalistas piensan que el Corn es la constitucin del mundo. Ahora bien, existe el
problema de que, aun cuando el Corn contiene mandamientos y normas, stos son poco
numerosos. De ah la necesidad reconocida en el mundo Islmico de una concrecin de
dichos mandamientos de modo que se abarque la totalidad de la vida del hombre, sin
dejar ninguna de sus dimensiones fuera del mbito de influencia del elemento religioso.
Las fuentes de la sharah son cinco. La primera, como es obvio, es el mismo Corn.
Ciertamente, donde el Libro sagrado seala un mandamiento o norma, la obligacin es
absoluta. Pero, tal como hemos apuntado, el hecho de que el Corn no entre en excesi-
vos detalles ni descienda a casos concretos, ms que en contadas ocasiones, obliga a bus-
car luz en otras fuentes. Por ello, la segunda fuente que conforma la sharah es la sunna
como conjunto de dichos y hechos de Mahoma y su manera de proceder segn resulta
del testimonio de los ashab, sus contemporneos y compaeros 52. Aqu nos encontra-
mos con la tradicin entendida como categora religiosa, al igual que en el cristianismo.
La tercera fuente es el qiyas o deduccin por analoga que, ante nuevas problemticas
que no estn recogidas en el Corn ni en la sunna, partiendo de casos semejantes, se
intenta establecer legislacin por analoga. La cuarta fuente es el iyma como consenti-
miento o consenso universal de la comunidad que no puede estar toda ella de acuerdo
en el error. Y, en quinto y ltimo lugar, el iytihad que supone el esfuerzo de sacar el dere-
cho de las cuatro fuentes citadas y que da lugar a las distintas escuelas jurdicas que com-
ponen el Islam. De esta manera, se hace patente cmo la sharah es una ley total que no
deja espacio alguno de sombra en la vida del hombre que pueda sustraerse a la lumino-
sidad del Dios nico. Una ley que nos presenta un universo homogneo donde todo es
comprendido desde la ptica islmica.
As pues, el fenmeno de la globalizacin ha puesto de manifiesto un problema de no
pequeas dimensiones, precisamente porque ahora el interlocutor para un posible di-
logo cultural y religioso no se encuentra en la distancia, sino en la propia casa. De esta
manera, son usuales los desajustes que el creciente nmero de creyentes musulmanes,
ciudadanos de las sociedades de derecho, crean en el seno de nuestras democracias. Se
hace patente aqu, una vez ms, cmo la religin islmica est necesitada de confronta-
50
J. RATZINGER, La sal de la tierra, 264s.
51
Para la reflexin que sigue, cf. J. L. SNCHEZ NOGALES, Cristianismo e Islam, 67-88.
52
F. M. PAREJA, Islamologa, II, Madrid, 1952-54, 511.
cin, en el sentido positivo de la palabra, con una ilustracin que ha aportado para la
configuracin de las sociedades occidentales la separacin entre Iglesia y Estado, la divi-
sin de poderes (legislativo, ejecutivo y judicial), la declaracin universal de los derechos
humanos en definitiva, una articulacin pluralista que debe tener su sustento ltimo
en la tolerancia 53.
De esta forma, y como citbamos al comienzo de esta reflexin, es una preocupa-
cin especialmente patente en la reflexin del papa el tema de los derechos humanos y,
especficamente, la aportacin de las religiones a su implantacin prctica en el mundo.
Cuando en 1948 la asamblea plenaria de las Naciones Unidas aprob la Declaracin
Universal de los Derechos Humanos, hubo una oposicin de principio, al igual que ocu-
rri con la Iglesia, de parte musulmana. El motivo de tal oposicin era doble: la Decla-
racin no apuntaba que tales derechos eran un don de Dios y el reconocimiento del
derecho al cambio de religin se viva como un desprecio al Corn. Desde entonces,
algunas importantes organizaciones islmicas han intentado una articulacin del Islam
y los derechos humanos pero integrando tales derechos en el sistema existente de la sha-
rah. Especialmente significativa es la Declaracin del Cairo sobre los Derechos Huma-
nos en el Islam 54 que la Organizacin de la Conferencia Islmica acept en 1990 y que,
aun no siendo vinculante desde el punto de vista jurdico, s posee un gran peso polti-
co. No obstante, en esta declaracin, cualquier observador crtico constata las tensio-
nes existentes entre derechos humanos y sharah y descubre que se han obviado aque-
llos derechos que no se dejan integrar si ms en la ley Islmica. As, por ejemplo, en el
artculo quinto, en referencia al matrimonio, no se contempla la no discriminacin por
motivos religiosos; o, en el artculo dcimo, se concede al Islam un status privilegiado
al considerarlo una religin de naturaleza incorrupta, estrechando el derecho recono-
cido a un legtimo cambio de religin. No es de extraar, por tanto, que el papa comen-
te en la entrevista mencionada:
En el ordenamiento vital del Islam hay una totalidad que abarca absolutamente
todo, con planteamientos muy distintos a los nuestros. Hay un claro sometimiento de
la mujer al varn, y, en su concepcin de la vida, existe un sistema ordenado de dere-
cho penal, que continuamente se contrapone a nuestro concepto de sociedad moderna.
A ese respecto interesa distinguir claramente que no se trata de una confesin religiosa
como tantas otras, pues no se inserta en los espacios libres de una sociedad pluralista.
Si se entiende as, cosa que sucede con cierta frecuencia, se estara juzgando al Islam
como un modelo cristiano y no segn su propia naturaleza 55.
IV. CONCLUSIN
53
Cf. H. KNG, El Islam, 457-484.
54
Cf. www.humanrights.harvard.edu/documents/regionaldocs/cairo-dec.htm.
55
J. RATZINGER, La sal de la tierra, 265.
da, con el ejercicio del recto uso de la razn; precisamente porque nuestra razn, don
del creador a todo hombre, puede ser el nico mbito donde creyentes e increyentes
podemos encontrarnos. De esta manera, las preguntas que se hacen al Islam no tienen
que ser entendidas como ataque o sospecha, sino como una contribucin esperanzada
para esclarecer su propia credibilidad como religin que confiesa al Dios nico, miseri-
cordioso y compasivo.
No obstante, s nos gustara conscientemente apuntar la condicin demasiado
moderna de nuestro papa actual. En efecto, aunque es cierto que el discurso analizado
est plagado de invitaciones a una ampliacin del concepto de razn y de su uso, sin
embargo, la naturaleza de la leccin de Ratisbona sigue siendo en exceso ilustrada. El
matrimonio celebrado entre la razn y la fe con la incursin del cristianismo primitivo
en contexto helnico nos parece de tal solemnidad que, precisamente por eso, puede pre-
sentar algunos elementos que estn necesitados de una clarificacin y profundizacin
ulteriores:
San Juan nos ha brindado la palabra conclusiva sobre el concepto bblico de Dios,
la palabra con la que todos los caminos de la fe bblica, a menudo arduos y tortuosos,
alcanzan su meta, encuentran su sntesis. En el principio exista el logos, y el logos es
Dios, nos dice el evangelista. El encuentro entre el mensaje bblico y el pensamiento grie-
go no era una simple casualidad 56.
56
Fe, razn y universidad, 2s.
57
Ibd., 4.
seguimos, a menudo, con todo derecho, la dinmica y la gramtica de las pulsiones, los
sueos, los traumas? 58.
Por ello, intuimos que un dilogo fructfero con otras culturas y con otras religiones
exige hoy una reconfiguracin de un concepto de razn que est an muy determinado
por la historia del desarrollo del pensamiento en occidente. Un concepto de razn que
reconozca humildemente que el paso del mito al logos siempre se est haciendo porque
el mito es ya ilustracin; la ilustracin recae en mitologa 59.
58
http://www.ksta.de/html/artikel/1162473077791.shtml.
59
M. HORKHEIMERT - TH. W. ADORNO, Dialctica de la Ilustracin. Fragmentos filosficos, Madrid,
4
2001, 56.
RESUMEN: Este artculo tiene dos objetivos fundamentales: en primer lugar, defender la necesidad de
que la teora social se site dentro del dilogo entre las ciencias y la teologa. Por ello se muestra el
caso concreto de convergencia que se puede dar entre las ciencias, la filosofa, la teora social y la teo-
loga bajo la nueva ontologa fluida o metafsica del devenir. En segundo lugar, tras la presentacin de
la ontologa de la fluidez social y de la metafsica del devenir, se apuesta por una reformulacin de la
dogmtica teolgica desde ese paradigma ms dinmico y evolutivo propio de las ciencias y la filoso-
fa modernas, menos esttico y fijista que el paradigma griego que hasta ahora ha servido de apoya-
tura filosfica a las construcciones teolgicas.
PALABRAS CLAVE: metafsica del devenir, teologa dogmtica, ontologa de la fluidez social, dilogo
teologa-ciencias.
1
En espaol el anlisis ms sistemtico y, a la vez, paralelo entre los tres grandes autores (llamados
por Polkinghorne cientficos-telogos) son los estudios de Javier Monserrat (2004, 2005a y 2005b). En
ellos es sintomtico la ausencia de referencias a teoras sociales en los tres autores.
PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749 PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), nm. 242, pp. 1043-1086
22_JesusROMERO.qxd:Maqueta.qxd 27/6/08 07:56 Pgina 1044
2
Como quiera que sea, dada la asimetra original entre la distincin ontolgica y epistemolgica,
las alteraciones ontolgicas del par naturaleza/cultura tienen consecuencias epistemolgicas: gradual-
mente, todas las ciencias sern concebidas como ciencias sociales. Hoy en da, la distincin entre natu-
raleza y cultura es el resultado de la inercia (Santos, 2003: 94).
3
Philiph Hefner de Chicago presenta el homo sapiens como un punto nodal en que confluyen y
coexisten dos corrientes de informacin que, lejos de oponerse, establecen una simbiosis de genes y cul-
tura, que no ha de romperse contraponiendo genes egostas a cultura altruista (Doncel, 2003: 32).
religiones, etc.), y de hecho nuestras imgenes del mundo (incluso las aparentemente
ms naturales) son siempre co-construcciones de naturaleza y cultura.
Por todo ello, cuesta entender la razn de por qu el prestigioso movimiento interna-
cional de dilogo entre la teologa y las ciencias excluye sistemticamente las teoras socia-
les. Parece que la nica utilidad de las ciencias sociales para la teologa sean las simples y
superficiales encuestas acerca de la evolucin de las prcticas religiosas y el debate acer-
ca de la secularizacin. Esta visin es miope y produce un verdadero sesgo intelectual y
terico en la interrelacin entre la teologa y las cosmovisiones cientficas. Como si el ser
humano fuera un ser abierto nicamente a las realidades cosmolgicas, biolgicas y micro-
fsicas y ciego a la cotidianidad de su entorno social. Sin embargo, ya William I. Thomas
afirmaba: if men [sic people] define things a real, they are real in their consequences. La
vida de las personas se configura y re-configura siempre en apertura a la realidad natural
y a la realidad social; los modos de actuacin divina (que tanto preocupan a los tericos
del dilogo teologa-ciencias) 4 tambin se reflejan en las estructuras sociales y en el modo
de comprender las relaciones inter-humanas y los vnculos humanos con la trascendencia
y con la realidad natural. La ontologa social es tan necesaria para la teologa como la onto-
loga natural o la ontologa filosfica.
De este modo, continuamos defendiendo la insercin de la teora social entre el
speakers club del dilogo teologa-ciencias. Si ese artculo arriba citado lo dedicamos a
un tema de fondo, genrico, de este dilogo, reflejando el inters de un socilogo como
Durkheim en plantear las relaciones entre la Ciencia y la Religin desde un enfoque socio-
lgico, en este segundo pretendemos centrarnos en el anlisis de una convergencia teri-
ca entre la teora social, la ciencia natural, la metafsica y la teologa: todos ellos estn
comenzando a edificar la disparidad de sus teoras sobre una ontologa de fondo que tiene
una clave de bveda comn: la fluidez y el devenir. A este respecto, es importante aclarar
algo: no partimos de un supuesto sistema metafsico a priori que establezca desde arriba
una ontologa comn a todas las esferas del ser, eliminando las posibles variaciones intrn-
secas a cada regin o capa; sino que ms bien, partimos de un regionalismo ontolgico
que considera que en cada una de esas esferas pueden existir diferentes ontologas no sub-
sumidas por una sola metafsica deducible a priori. No obstante, lo que ponemos de mani-
fiesto es que en la actualidad algunas de esas regiones (la de la realidad fsica, la de la rea-
lidad social y la propiamente metafsica) estn construyndose bajo una ontologa comn
basada en la fluidez y el devenir. Lo cual nos permite pensar que quiz se pueda construir
un sistema que integre en todas esas regiones una misma ontologa, dando la posibilidad
de convergencias tericas y, sobre todo, de nuevas implicaciones teolgicas.
Pero nuestra preocupacin no es simplemente la de mostrar esa convergencia, sino
que vamos ms all de las cuestiones puramente ontolgicas y abogamos por una refor-
mulacin de la dogmtica teolgica que tome en cuenta, precisamente, el nuevo fondo
ontolgico, alejado, pues, de esa metafsica griega ms esencialista, fijista y estatista que,
desde nuestro punto de vista, hace ms difcil de actualizar el cristianismo en dilogo
con nuestro mundo moderno 5.
Para desarrollar las dos vertientes u objetivos de este artculo, comenzamos hacien-
do en el epgrafe segundo una breve referencia a los fundamentos de la nueva ontologa
4
La grandiosa obra en cuatro volmenes, ya clsica, editada conjuntamente por el Observatorio Vati-
cano y por el CTNS de Berkeley, tiene como subttulo e hilo conductor de sus investigaciones las Scien-
tific Perspectives on Divine Action.
5
Esta tesis de la excesiva (y ya anacrnica) helenizacin de la teologa no es, por supuesto, nada
moderna.
En la teora social los nuevos planteamientos empricos y especulativos han dado lugar
a una ontologa de la fluidez social, frente al estatismo basado en el orden social de las
clsicas teoras sociales, as como una comprensin antropolgica menos antropocntri-
ca y en continuidad tambin con aspectos que antes se consideraban que quedaban fuera
de la comprensin del ser humano. No obstante, la propuesta que se presenta a conti-
nuacin no es unnimemente aceptada en sociologa. Simplemente la hemos querido pre-
sentar como ejemplo de un posible punto de encuentro, quiz puramente intuitivo e ima-
ginativo, entre la sociologa, las ciencias naturales y la teologa. Pero antes de presentar
la ontologa de la fluidez social, vamos a hacer una breve referencia a la ontologa social
clsica.
a Outhwaite (2006) podemos distinguir tres ontologas tradicionales con sus correspon-
dientes conceptos de sociedad: el realismo emprico, el idealismo trascendental y el rea-
lismo trascendental. El realismo emprico ofrece una clara eleccin. Bien la sociedad es
una entidad holstica, en analoga a un organismo biolgico (ej., el sociologismo de Dur-
kehim), o la sociedad es un concepto pre-cientfico y sin sentido que no es necesario
en el estudio de los fenmenos sociales particulares y necesariamente individuales (ej.,
el individualismo de Weber). Para el idealismo trascendental, la sociedad es un principio
abstracto de sociacin (Vergesellschaftung), localizado a menudo en las percepciones
de sus miembros (ej., el kantismo social de Simmel). Finalmente, el realismo trascen-
dental ve la sociedad a la vez como una condicin y como un resultado de la accin repro-
ducida continuamente, puesto que toma en serio el poder configurador de las rela-
ciones sociales, algo que no hace el idealismo.
Vamos a hacer tres precisiones a estas ontologas:
1) Las tres (con excepcin de la weberiana) son realistas y esencialistas, puesto que
tratan de localizar una naturaleza permanente que identifique la estructura fija
y consolidada de la sociedad. De hecho, a este respecto es muy sugerente com-
probar que toda la sociologa clsica confirma la dualidad entre esttica y din-
mica, o entre lo que permanece y lo que cambia en la sociedad (estructura y cam-
bio). Esta dicotoma ha sido considerada por Sztompka (2004) como el pecado
original de la sociologa y reproduce, de algn modo, la metafsica fijista que
analizaremos despus. Hay cambios ms o menos grandes, cambios del sistema
o cambios en el sistema, pero la estructura ltima de la sociedad permanece fija.
El devenir no roza la profundidad ontolgica del ser de la sociedad. La sociedad
es siempre. Aunque se produzcan cambios, el cambio no es constitutivo de
la ontologa social. Lo real es el ser, lo que permanece, la estructura, y el cambio
es un estado transitorio de no-ser entre los dos momentos intersticiales del cons-
truir-destruir-reconstruir. Lo que caracteriza a la sociedad es la perma-
nencia frente al cambio y de lo que se trata es de reconstruir las leyes ontolgi-
cas que regulan el cambio para ayudar a la construccin del orden social. Esta
visin se da tanto en el funcionalismo positivista de Durkheim, como en el mar-
xismo revolucionario de Marx. En ambos, el cambio est supeditado a la bs-
queda del orden, y la sociedad tiende a un estado fijo de perfeccionamiento.
2) A estas ontologas realistas hay que sumar la ms reciente ontologa constructi-
vista 6, y que tanto se ha extendido desde los aos setenta en la todas las ramas
de la sociologa. Para el constructivismo sociolgico (que sigue presa del dua-
lismo estructura-cambio) la realidad social que conocemos no tiene por qu ser
la nica, puesto que no hay nada natural en ella, sino que ha sido construi-
da por el ser humano. La sociedad se produce y reproduce a travs de acciones
humanas y la configuracin resultante de la sociedad no obedece a ninguna esen-
cia o naturaleza ontolgica y necesaria de esa misma sociedad construida. Lo
importante no es el ser objetivo de las cosas (la estructura), sino el sentido sub-
6
La tensin constitutiva que se dio en la sociologa del siglo XX entre la sociologa marxista y la anti-
marxista (estructural-funcionalista) se resquebraja a partir de 1968, coincidiendo con fenmenos histri-
cos y tericos capitales. Autores como Blau, Berger y Luckmann, Garfinkel, Schutz, Blumer, etc., inau-
guran nuevas corrientes que colocan de nuevo el actor en el centro de anlisis y a la cultura y la construccin
social de la realidad (constructivismo) como procesos determinantes. Estamos, pues, ante el equivalente
en ciencia social del giro lingstico o hermenutico de la filosofa que ocurre por los mismos aos
(Lamo de Espinosa, 2001: 37-38).
jetivo que los seres humanos proyectan sobre la sociedad (sentido, accin). Gar-
ca Selgas afirma (2003: 28): El problema [del constructivismo] empieza cuan-
do queremos indagar en los procedimientos por los que se llevara a cabo esa
construccin y vemos que tienden a ser de orden simblico o formal en la mayo-
ra de los casos, o preguntamos quin realiza la construccin y aparece algn
tipo de sujeto no construido y perfectamente real, o cuestionamos si hay lmites
a esa construccin y parece que no hay cosa alguna, humana o no humana, que
se le resista.
3) Finalmente, tanto las ontologas esencialistas como la constructivista no slo
comparten la dicotoma entre estructura-cambio, sino que adems reproducen
esa otra dualidad propia de la modernidad que Latour ha puesto de manifiesto
(1997 y 1992): aquella que se da entre lo natural y lo cultural, entre lo biolgico
y lo social, entre lo tcnico y lo humano, entre lo masculino y lo femenino. Esto
implica que lo real es lo que permanece en la sociedad, pero lo social y lo cultu-
ral se definen en tajante oposicin a la realidad natural y biolgica, que se exclu-
yen mutuamente. Tanto las ontologas esencialistas como las constructivistas
separan en dicotomas excluyentes la indisoluble realidad que quiere defender
la nueva ontologa de la fluidez social y la Teora del Actor-Red.
De todo lo dicho, hay que retener varias cosas: 1. Que toda teora social se funda en
una ontologa social determinada y por ello es necesario adentrarse en estas cuestiones.
2. Que la ontologa social clsica, a pesar de sus variedades, era fundamentalmente esen-
cialista. 3. Que en los aos setenta nace, por oposicin al esencialismo, el constructi-
vismo. 4. Que tanto los esencialistas como los constructivistas dan preeminencia al ser
frente al devenir, y que establecen dicotomas excluyentes que impiden una visin unida
de lo social y lo natural.
7
En Espaa el mximo exponente de esta ontologa es el profesor Garca Selgas de la Universidad
Complutense.
8
Esta caracterizacin de la ontologa es congruente con la propia teora de la fluidez social. Sin
embargo, mis dudas se refieren al hecho de si de lo que Garca Selgas habla es de una terica ontolgi-
ca o ms bien ntica. Lo que no se termina de ver con claridad es si la fluidez alcanza el ser (ontolo-
ga) y, por tanto, la ontologa social no puede ser histrica, sino necesaria, puesto que lo caracterstico del
En cualquier caso, varios son los fenmenos histricos que hacen pensar que esta
tendencia a la fluidificacin es real. No podemos entrar aqu en el detalle pormenori-
zado de cada uno de esos fenmenos (que, adems, son bien conocidos por su relacin
con el proceso de la globalizacin) y slo nos entretendremos en el ltimo, por ser el que
tiene ms convergencia con la problemtica cientfico-teolgica:
Paso del capitalismo industrial o fordista al capitalismo financiero o de acumu-
lacin flexible.
Las nuevas teoras sobre la fluidez laboral y los nuevos modos de trabajar ms fle-
xibles.
Los enormes flujos migratorios y la porosidad intercultural e interreligiosa.
La emancipacin de la mujer y, sobre todo, las nuevas concepciones acerca de la
diversidad de gneros, con cierta fluidificacin entre ellos.
La individualizacin de nuestras sociedades y la inestabilidad de las identidades
colectivas y personales.
La masiva presencia de la tecnologa con la consiguiente interconexin mundial,
la fluidez en las comunicaciones y la facilitacin de la virtualidad en la vida coti-
diana.
Estos son algunos de los sntomas socio-histricos que han comenzado a convulsio-
nar el paradigma ontolgico tradicional de la teora social. As, Garca Selgas afirmaba:
Todos esos procesos me llevaban a afirmar que la fluidez se haba ido erigiendo en forma
constituyente de la existencia social, que lo social es hoy fluidez (2006: 17) 9. Todos esos
fenmenos mostraban, en definitiva, que las instituciones sociales, las identidades y, en
suma, lo social, no gozaban de la estabilidad reflejada en la clsica teora social. Ade-
ms, son procesos que se suceden simultnea e interrelacionadamente y que se retroa-
limentan mutuamente. No obstante, me gustara referirme a uno slo de esos procesos
por ser quiz el ms cercano a los telogos y filsofos implicados en el dilogo entre las
ciencias y la teologa: me refiero a la fuerte influencia de la tecnologa y su capacidad
reestructuradora de la sociedad.
Ms abajo se pondr de manifiesto que la teora del cambio social se ha visto refor-
mulada debido a estos nuevos contextos histricos, en lo que se da preeminencia a la
innovacin frente a la permanencia. No cabe duda de que esa nueva reformulacin del
cambio social y de la ontologa subyacente tiene que ver no slo con procesos tecnol-
gico-materiales, sino tambin identitarios, psquicos, ideolgicos, culturales, etc. En este
sentido, nos alejamos de cualquier presupuesto determinista (material-tecnolgico) 10 que
privilegie unilateral y monocausalmente el papel de la tecnologa en estos procesos flui-
dificadores.
ser en todo tiempo y lugar es su carcter fluido y, por ello, ms devenir que ser. O si el alcance de la teo-
ra de la fluidez slo se refiere a, por as llamarlos, los entes sociales (nticos) que por su contextuali-
zacin histrica tienen una apariencia fluida, aunque no de suyo, sino por las circunstancias contin-
gentes propias de nuestro tiempo. Las afirmaciones del autor son equvocas: por un lado afirma que la
fluidez es una forma de existencia social histricamente delimitada (plano ntico); a rengln seguido sugie-
re que ello no implica que se pueda detectar esa fluidez en espacios-tiempos pasados (se movera en un
plano ontolgico?); para terminar sentenciando que la fluidez no es para nosotros un rasgo necesario o
esencial de nuestras sociedades, no fue necesaria y puede dejar de serlo (2006: 20).
9
Un poco ms adelante afirmaba: de aqu, por ejemplo, que pasemos a hablar de la fluidificacin
(como fenmeno histrico) a hablar de la fluidez como condicin existencial bsica de lo social (Ibd.).
10
No es posible desarrollar aqu la complejidad de los procesos dialcticos, contextuales e incluso
no-separables, que se dan entre los cambios tecnolgicos y los contextos socio-culturales adyacentes. Remi-
timos a Romero Moivas, 2008.
No cabe duda de que, en el caso paradigmtico del telfono mvil (con la cada vez
ms asentada convergencia de mvil e Internet), contribuyen a crear esa fluidez entre
mbitos, categoras y relaciones, al tiempo que son utilizados para gestionar las conse-
cuencias de dicha fluidez, y son tambin protagonistas de muchas de las tensiones que
dicha coexistencia origina (Lasn Daz, 2006: 155) 13. Y as, el mvil constituye un sm-
11
Bijker propone, frente a concepciones de la vulnerabilidad, objetivas e independientes del contex-
to, que este concepto es socialmente construido y es relacional: Vulnerability is a constructivist concept
in the sense that it does not describe a context-independent and intrinsic quality of the system (2006: 59).
12
Communal solidarities appear to be seriously if not terminally undermined by processes of
dislocation, reconstruction and acceleration, experienced in communities as irresistible external pressu-
res. [] In modern society, communities are bound to be more permeable, more interpenetrative, more
voluntaristic and less stable than their predecessors (Beeson, 2003: 105).
13
Tecnologa nmada, mvil inmutable, contacto permanente, continuidad en la accesibilidad a los
dems, a la informacin, a las oportunidades que puedan surgir, fluidez entre escritura y oralidad, entre
bolo clave de la sociedad actual definida por las ciencias sociales desde la fluidez y la
movilidad como una de sus caractersticas fundamentales (Cabrera 2006: 92). La tec-
nologa actual, pues, permite dar razn de ese nuevo modo de existencia liquido-fluido
propio de la nueva teora social.
presencia y ausencia; flujos de conversaciones, de mensajes, de gestos, de interacciones; fluidez entre espa-
cios, mbitos, relaciones, cuya coexistencia se intensifica gracias al mvil (Ibd.).
14
Garca Selgas (2003: 18) afirma que el modelo de la ontologa de la fluidez social se enfrenta con
los dos modelos dominantes en sociologa, que l identifica como sustancialista y formalista. l los
define as: Modelo sustancialista (materialista), de Aristteles a la eleccin racional (J. Elster, por ejem-
plo), que encuentra un soporte slido de la realidad social en algn tipo de naturaleza (la del individuo, pe.),
de esencia (la racionalidad, el progreso, la comunidad, etc.) o de ley necesaria de desarrollo (de lucha de
clases, de acumulacin de capital, etc.). [] Modelo formalista (estructuralista), de E. Durkheim y G. Sim-
mel a N. Luhmann, que ha querido ver la solidez de lo social en la forma o estructura que lo constituye. Lo
social se convierte as en la estructura o forma (posiciones, oposiciones, distinciones, etc.) de las relaciones
que condicionan los comportamientos humanos.
15
Aunque desde otro punto de vista (la definicin del moderno concepto de riesgo, tambin fun-
damental en la actual teora social) se pone de manifiesto el carcter central que en la Sociologa suele
ocupar lo normal, la norma, frente a lo cual se erige la categora de desviacin social tpica en el
pensamiento social: La tecnologa del riesgo permite entonces definir las normas e identificar las dife-
rencias con respecto a las normas, diferencias que se llegan a definir como riesgos. El riesgo cobra el
significado de anomalas o de inadaptacin. El anormal es aquel que se diferencia demasiado de la norma
(media) del grupo y por consiguiente representa para este una amenaza, un peligro, un riesgo (Leflai-
ve, 2004: 207).
16
Como se ve, la terminologa de la teora social moderna se asemeja mucho a la propuesta por la
filosofa del proceso de Whitehead. Ambos proponen dos ontologas ms procesuales, evolutivas, cam-
biantes, que sustancialistas, fijistas y estticas. Whitehead trata de entender la ontologa de la realidad.
Su punto de partida no es la constatacin de objetos o entidades estables, sino una referencia al evento
(su terminologa vara: acontecimiento, ocasin actual) (Monserrat, 2004: 54).
17
Los recientes e interdisciplinares anlisis de Julio L. Martnez (2007) tambin estn atravesados
de la idea de que lo ms importante es tomar estas definiciones a la luz de un concepto no esencialista y
naturalista de la cultura en virtud del cual las culturas seran realidades perfectamente definidas, cohe-
rentes y homogneas, ntidamente diferenciadas unas de otras. El culturalismo esencialista exacerba y
fosiliza las diferencias y produce, bien rechazo de la diversidad (formas contemporneas de racismo), o
yuxtaposicin de guetos culturales que desemboca en multiculturalismo relativista (p. 36). Y al final del
libro vuelve a reiterar: la propuesta intercultural considera la cultura propia no como una esencia fija
que se debe preservar de la influencia perniciosa de novedades, sino como una realidad dinmica, per-
meable a los efectos de la interaccin e incluso del conflicto con lo diferente (p. 596).
18
[ANT] is as much an ontology or a metaphysics, as a sociology (Latour, 1998: 2).
19
This, then, is the crucial analytical move made by actor-network writers: the suggestion that the
social is nothing other than patterned networks de heterogeneous materials (Law, 1992: 381). Esta unin
de actor y red, dialctica, y por tanto alejada de la idea de que los actors son simples puntos nodales de
una red que parmenecen inalterados, es puesta de manifiesto energicamente por Latour (1998: 11): There
is not a net and an actor laying down the net, but there is an actor whose definition of the world outlines,
traces, delineate, limn, describe, shadow forth, inscroll, file, list, record, mark, or tag a trajectory that is
called a network. No net exists independently of the very act of tracing it, and no tracing is done by an
actor exterior to the net. A network is not a thing but the recorded movement of a thing.
20
I could argue (as have sociologists such as Steve Woolgar and psychologist of technology like
Sherry Turkle) that the dividing line between people and machines (and for that matter animals) is sub-
ject to negotiation and changes. Thus it is easily shown that machines (and animals) gain and lose attri-
butes such as independence, intelligence and personal responsibility. And, conversely, that people take on
and lose the attributes of machines and animals (Law, 1992).
21
En cualquier caso, Law se apresura a negar cualquier tipo de implicacin tica sobre esta antropo-
loga: To say that there is no fundamental difference between people and objects is an analytical stance, not
an ethical position. And to say this does not mean that we have to treat the people in our lives as machines.
22
Una antropologa tan actual y potente como la de Manuel Cabada Castro que pretende un acceso a
la divinidad desde esa estructura antropolgica humana constituida por el amar, el querer, la libertad, la bs-
queda del sentido, etc., podra salir beneficiada desde un punto de vista filosfico, si en vez de considerar
estos atributos humanos desde una perspectiva estructural lo hiciera desde este enfoque reticular, con-
siderando que el amor, el querer, etc., son cuestiones humanas que se dirimen no en una soledad esencialis-
ta, sino en una continua reformulacin y reconstruccin dentro de una red de elementos heterogneos, inclui-
dos materiales. No obstante, aunque Manuel Cabada no estuviese de acuerdo con este enfoque, lo que est
claro es que su antropologa est mucho ms cerca de la antropologa de la ANT (dinmica, fluida y en deve-
nir) que de la tradicional antropologa sustancialista escolstica. Cf. Cabada, 1999, y Romero Moivas, 2007.
23
Scheler parece tambin cercano a esta concepcin antropolgica, quiz debido a su afirmacin de
la indefinibilidad [Undefinierbarkeit] del hombre, frente a la concepcin fijista que pretende definirlo como
esencia: [Segn Scheler] un doble frente hay que hacer, segn esto: primero, contra todas las teoras meta-
fsicas de la sustancia psquica o de un yo entendido como sustancia-cosa (res cogitans), y luego, contra toda
interpretacin del concepto del yo de la psicologa. Expresamente se presenta la teora de Scheler sobre la
persona cual centro de actos como una prosecucin de la tendencia kantiana contra la metafsica sustan-
cialista del alma que se manifiesta en la crtica de la psicologa racional. El ncleo de la existencia espiri-
tual personal del hombre no es una sustancia con ciertas facultades y disposiciones, no es una cosa que
se altera y cuyas propiedades cambian en el tiempo; la identidad de la persona no reside en modo alguno
por detrs ni por encima de sus actos, en un sustrato permanente, sino que existe y vive solamente en
los actos y en la dileccin cualitativa de su puro y mismo tornarse distinta (Heimsoeth, 1966: 361).
24
La frase de Tertuliano (aunque utilizada para justificar lo ms sagrado en la Iglesia de los aps-
toles) es representativa de lo dicho: Id verius quod prius, id prius quod [ab initio].
25
En la tabla pitagrica de los contrarios el movimiento est en el lado de lo ilimitado y del mal.
Su metafsica de los nmeros, aunque segn todas las apariencias naci de los procesos de movimiento
astronmico y msico, tiene abiertamente la tendencia a lo esttico y geomtrico, a la forma fija (Heim-
soeth, 1974: 134)
26
Una necia tradicin de fines de la Antigedad ha querido estigmatizarlo [a Herclito] como el
pesimista, el filsofo llorn, porque haba hablado con poderoso sentimiento del devenir y del fenecer,
de la inconstancia de todo lo real y de la imposibilidad de remontar por segunda vez el mismo ro; porque
vea en la guerra y la discordia la madre de todas las cosas (Heimsoeth, 1974: 135).
igual, rgido, en eterno reposo, es, una vez ms, una rplica contra Heraclito que no
concibe el ser sino como devenir, distincin y multiplicidad, pero no como algo esta-
ble y universal (Hirschberger, 1997, I: 57). As, mientras que para Herclito trans-
formndose descansa el ser, por el contrario para Parmnides solo el ser inmutable y
rgido tiene verdadera realidad, frente al movimiento que es pura ilusin. Y justamen-
te ser el sistema metafsico parmenidiano el que influir decisivamente en los filso-
fos posteriores.
Esta metafsica que concibe el ser esttico y esencialmente acabado como el funda-
mento de la realidad real ser afirmada por los dos grandes metafsicos griegos. Ni Pla-
tn ni Aristteles fueron capaces de intuir la enorme trascendencia de una metafsica
que tomara en serio el devenir, el movimiento y la vida por s mismos y sin ningn
para qu (como haran luego el maestro Eckhart, en un sentido, y Fichte en otro). Por
el contrario, para Platn el devenir y la pluralidad quedan reducidos al mbito de lo sen-
sible, en tanto que esta multiplicidad encuentra su asidero firme en la inmovilidad est-
tica de las formas eternas. Y el estagirita no escapar a esta visin del movimiento pro-
pia de su maestro, a pesar de que la transformacin y la vida representan para l un papel
relevante en su sistema del universo:
El fluir como vida propia, que corre por s misma, es una imagen ajena a Aristteles.
Todo proceso supone un para qu; es solo un trnsito hacia algo esttico. No puede
haber, por ende, en esencia, un movimiento infinito, sino que todo movimiento tiene su
fin y sus lmites. El movimiento, ya sea el cambio de lugar de una piedra, o la vida de un
animal, o la actividad del hombre, es una realizacin de lo no realizado, la realizacin
de lo posible, en cuanto es aun meramente posible, un trnsito de la materia, que puede
serlo todo, a la forma, que es. El devenir se extingue necesariamente en la realizacin del
fin que le es impuesto cada vez. Por eso donde no hay materia tampoco hay movimiento.
[] La vida no es, por tanto, algo esencial en s mismo, algo primitivo, sino slo un trn-
sito hacia el ser, solo una afeccin (pavqo~) del ser (Heimsoeth, 1974: 137 y 138).
Muy sintomtico a este respecto sobre los fines y lo limitado es que Aristteles (y
tambin Platn, aunque ms discretamente) se opone a la existencia del Infinito, preci-
samente porque para l el lmite es lo que adquiere relevancia y superioridad sobre lo
ilimitado, siendo este ltimo, por tanto, incognoscible 27. En cierto modo, no podemos
dejar de pensar que el miedo que an muchos telogos y metafsicos manifiestan a la hora
de pensar el ser como devenir y la posibilidad de un Infinito en acto (con todas las con-
secuencias no fijistas que una ontologa tal implicara) se debe a la dificultad, que ya se
trasluce en el debate Heraclito-Aristteles, a no poder encerrar y captar en un concep-
to al mismo ser, y en definitiva haciendo de este no tanto una profundidad insondable,
sino un concepto que, en cuanto tal, no deja de ser finito y, por tanto, fijo y esttico 28:
27
Ahora bien, el talante filosfico de Aristteles es el de un implacable y dialctico conceptualiza-
dor de las realidades concretas que se le ofrecen a la observacin y a la reflexin. Desde este punto de vista,
lo que del modo que fuere parezca sustraerse a ello y, por tanto, a la capacidad ordenadora y conceptua-
lizadora del intelecto, corre el evidente riesgo de ser considerado como falso o inexistente. En ello se sita
naturalmente Aristteles en continuidad con determinadas corrientes de reflexin anteriores a l, en las
que el lmite viene a adquirir relevancia y superioridad sobre lo ilimitado o infinito en el acercamiento
cognoscitivo a la comprensin de la realidad (Cabada Castro, 2007: 112).
28
As opina tambin Heimsoeth (1974: 133) cuando afirma: El pensamiento ha buscado en todos
los tiempos la sustancia en este sentido, lo persistente, lo que se puede comprender y no se disipa cuando
la mano apretada de la ratio quiere sujetarlo. [] La razn salva la dificultad, tratando de concebir lo
mudable como una mera modificacin exterior, por decirlo as, de lo eterno e indestructible, de la sus-
tancia []. La divisa es: de la nada no sale nada y lo que no existe no puede dejar de ser. Pero con esto
no se resuelve en realidad el enigma, sino que se le desplaza simplemente a otro plano.
Esta realidad es lo que llamamos ser, algo, por tanto, que no puede consistir en un mero
concepto, sino que es, ms bien, origen y causa de todo concepto, de toda la indefinida
conceptualizacin, que es la vida misma de la mente (Cabada Castro, 1975: 66). Tomar
seriamente el ser como ese origen y causa de la dinmica del pensamiento, es en cier-
to modo considerar que es un Infinito en acto que por su inagotable riqueza no puede
ser subjetivizado y, en este sentido, no se deja ser fijado por el pensamiento huma-
no, puesto que es pura dinamicidad y devenir, infinitud inagotable de riqueza ontolgi-
ca. No obstante, este esquema metafsico no casaba con los planteamientos aristotlicos,
que son los que serviran de fundamentacin a la teologa cristiana y a la ciencia occi-
dental, haciendo del ser una plenitud ya cerrada y acabada, esttica y fija, que per-
manece desde el origen siempre ah, esperando a que la mente humana la aprehenda
y manifieste su verdad en el juicio como adecuacin esttica entre la mente y la rea-
lidad.
En cualquier caso, la filosofa griega utilizar esta preeminencia del ser sobre el deve-
nir para fundamentar la posibilidad de una ciencia verdadera (episteme) por contrapo-
sicin a la opinin vulgar y cambiante (doxa). En este sentido, los tres grandes filsofos
griegos se oponen al relativismo que pareca 29 brotar de la metafsica del devenir hera-
clitiana: Si todo fluye y nada permanece ha afirmado Aristteles contra Heraclito
no puede darse una ciencia ni una verdad (Met. A, 6; M, 4). Naturalmente, nuestros con-
ceptos y nuestros juicios son estables, son esquemas. Pero si todo fluye, se nos escapar
de entre los dedos aquello que tratamos de aprisionar por medio de nuestros conceptos,
y esto sern palabras hueras, pues no les corresponder ninguna realidad (Hirschber-
ger, I: 54).
Un sistema as concebido chocaba frontalmente con la concepcin judeo-cristiana de
un Dios que es vida. El estatismo del universo griego se derrumba con la llegada del con-
cepto de creacin; y el Dios inmvil, perfecto, actus purus se presenta incompatible con
un Dios histrico, providente, que acompaa al hombre y a la creacin entera en su deve-
nir y que, incluso, se ha hecho carne en Jess de Nazaret. De este modo, la revelacin no
es dada de una vez para siempre sino que se despliega en un proceso histrico y csmi-
co. Sin embargo, no obstante todo el desarrollo patrstico en este sentido, nunca son
superados completamente el cosmos antiguo, con todos los rasgos estticos que le eran
inherentes, y el contraste antiguo entre la perfeccin espiritual de lo inmvil, no solo de
lo eterno e imperecedero, y el devenir como signo de imperfeccin (Heimsoeth, 1974:
144) (curiosamente siempre vinculado a la materia, que parece todava ser considerada
como ontolgicamente inferior y enfrentada al espritu). No debe olvidarse que la mayor
sistematizacin teolgico-metafsica, la de Toms de Aquino, es deudora del sustancia-
lismo aristotlico y de su concepcin del movimiento como trnsito de la mera posibili-
dad a la realizacin, no obstante las matizaciones que los tomistas quieran introducir afir-
mando que el acto y la potencia no son principios constitutivos sino complementarios.
Esta concepcin aristotlico-tomista fue dominante en la escolstica dificultando hasta
hace poco cualquier dilogo fructfero de la teologa con la filosofa y la ciencia moder-
29
En efecto, dejamos de lado lo que realmente quiso decir Heraclito en el conjunto de su filoso-
fia: It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that Heraclitus meant to teach that there is nothing which
changes, for this is contradicted by the rest of his philosophy. Nor is the proclamation of change even the
most important and significant feature of his philosophy. [] Heraclituss original contribution to philo-
sophy is to be found elsewhere: it consists in the conception of unity in diversity, difference in unity. []
For Heraclitus, then Reality is One; but it is many at the same time and that not merely accidentally,
but essentially (Copleston, 1962 I-I: 54 y 55).
nas 30. Habr que esperar a la audacia de Duns Escoto, el maestro Eckhart y, sobre todo,
Nicols de Cusa, para poder vislumbrar una va alternativa para comprender el uni-
verso, el devenir y la apertura pneumtica a la novedad, la vida y el movimiento infinito,
que nos llevarn desde Bruno hasta Leibniz, el primer Kant y los idealistas alemanas,
Fichte, Schelling y Hegel, desembocando en Nieztsche y en la nueva metafsica-teologa
del devenir.
No obstante, hasta entonces ser dominante una triple concepcin del ser que, aun
procediendo de la especulacin metafsica, influir notablemente en la teologa, y an
hoy es fuente de confrontacin entre la ortodoxia y la (supuesta) heterodoxia: 1. El ser
es ser fijo: con ello se negaba casi cualquier tipo de evolucin que pudiera alcanzar una
dimensin propiamente ontolgica y no simplemente accidental. 2. El ser es ser espiri-
tual y no material: se produce una escisin irresoluble de origen platnico entre lo mate-
rial y lo espiritual, considerndose, adems, que lo primero es inferior a lo segundo. Este
dualismo aun remanente en la teologa y prcticamente eliminado de la filosofa y de
la ciencia influy decisivamente sobre la cosmologa y la antropologa, y adems pro-
pici un desinters por supuesto, no pretendido inicialmente sobre la historicidad
frente a una intemporal y superior eternidad. 3. El ser es ser homogneo: con esta lti-
ma tesis se cay en un sustancialismo y esencialismo cerrado al cambio y la promis-
cuidad ontolgica, a la fluidez y la porosidad propia de la experiencia real de las per-
sonas e incluso de la materia.
30
En el aspecto propiamente religioso o teolgico esta visin ahog sobremanera la penumatolo-
ga y el dinamismo y apertura hacia lo siempre novedoso propio del cristianismo, encerrndolo en una
visin ms dogmatista y esencialista de la revelacin. La breve digresin teolgica de Heimsoeth (1974:
145-146) en su repaso metafsico me parece, en ese sentido, bien afinada: Tampoco el motivo histrico-
filosfico triunfa propiamente sobre la creencia en lo dado de una vez para siempre. [] Pero siempre se
opone y permanece invicta la conviccin, nacida del sentimiento antiguo del universo, de que la verdad,
religiosa y filosfica, no nos es lograda en un proceso, sino que existe conclusa hace largo tiempo, y solo
se trata de conservarla y aprovecharla. Todas las verdades de la salvacin, en la medida en que pueden ser
asequibles al hombre en esta vida, se consideran reveladas de una vez para siempre en la Sagrada Escri-
tura y en las enseanzas de los padres de la Iglesia. Del mismo modo segn la profunda conviccin fun-
damental que determina tan esencialmente toda la ciencia medieval y tambin la pone obstculos tan gra-
ves todo lo esencial del conocimiento filosfico natural ha sido descubierto de una vez para siempre por
los hroes de la ciencia antigua.
mera oportunidad de accin para la conciencia, Schelling conecta con Bruno y preten-
de aplicar ese dinamismo absoluto a la naturaleza como prehistoria dinmica de la con-
ciencia. En tanto que Hegel, como nadie antes que l, considerar la propia historia como
categora metafsica fundamental, introduciendo lo concreto y lo histrico (aunque slo
como momentos del despliegue del Espritu Absoluto) dentro de su sistema metafsico.
Este modo de comprender el fundamento dinmico del universo ha llegado en la
metafsica moderna de la mano de E. de Hartmann e, incluso, del ltimo Scheler. No
obstante, a nosotros nos interesa sobre todo poner de manifiesto que este movimiento
que se inicia especialmente en el maestro Eckhart nos permite establecer un dilogo
mucho ms fecundo entre la teologa y las ciencias cosmolgicas, fsicas y biolgicas. No
deja de ser cierto que a menudo los libros de divulgacin cientfica estn ya teidos de
consideraciones filosficas que pueden dar lugar a interpretaciones metafsicas distin-
tas (el caso de la mecnica cuntica es paradigmtico), desde el ms absoluto atesmo-
materialista hasta propuestas espiritualistas-exticas (cf., por ejemplo: Arsuaga y Mar-
tnez, 2001; Mayr, 1998; Monod, 1993; Davies, 1986a y 1986b; Einstein e Infeld, 1984;
Ferris, 1990; Feynmann, 1998; Gonzlez de Alba, 2000; Heisenberg, 1972; Ortoli y Pha-
rabod, 1985; Hooft, 2001; Rae, 1988; Yndurain, 2006). No obstante, a pesar de la dispa-
ridad de interpretaciones, nos parece que cosmlogos, fsicos y bilogos estn en su
mayor parte dentro del paradigma que aqu hemos llamado de la metafsica del devenir
o de la ontologa fluida. Es decir, parece haber una convergencia en la interpretacin de
una mega-historia cosmo-fisio-bio-antropolgica en la que las potencialidades y dina-
mismos pasan a primer plano frente a lo esttico y lo fijado.
En este sentido, el concepto de materia ha perdido muchas de sus significaciones pasi-
vas e inertes. La estructura de la materia parece sin lugar a dudas atmica, constituida
por electrones, neutrinos y quarks y sus interacciones mutuas, y ello implica que todos
los procesos fsicos y las configuraciones csmicas que vemos han surgido del dinamis-
mo entre unas pocas partculas o ladrillos constituyentes. Junto a ello, las investigaciones
de Prigogine acerca de las estructuras disipativas 31 y de la autoorganizacin de la mate-
ria en puntos alejados del equilibrio, nos parecen situarla ms cerca de la metafsica del
devenir y de la concepcin del Cusano y de Bruno de la materia, que de la metafsica aris-
totlico-escolstica y de la materia pasiva 32. No es casualidad que Zubiri uno de los
pocos filsofos y telogos de mediados de siglo que se tom el trabajo de estudiar seria y
rigurosamente la ciencia de su tiempo y de discutir con los padres fundadores de esa nueva
ciencia considerara que la realidad tiene de suyo un momento activo que consiste en
dar de s: el dinamismo consiste fundamentalmente en que cada realidad, precisamente
ella, en s misma y por s misma es activa, y que por consiguiente las estructuras son estruc-
turas de actividad, y en su virtud lo que llamamos realidad no est constituido simple-
mente por notas en cierto modo estticas. La realidad es dinmica y activa por s misma
y no en virtud de unas potencias que emergen de ella (Zubiri, 1989: 65) 33.
31
Suelen caracterizarse como propiedades de las estructuras disipativas las siguientes: versatilidad
creativa, interaccin sinrgica entre sus componentes, estabilidad estructural, autoorganizacin, variabi-
lidad evolutiva, cognicin adaptativa, memoria determinativa, tamao crtico, climanen (no-linealidad,
ruptura de simetra, puntos de bifurcacin, complementariedad entre azar y necesidad).
32
La materia puede, por tanto, encontrarse en dos fases diferentes: la inerte y la clinmica. La
materia inerte compone (pasivamente) las estructuras del equilibrio; la materia clinmica compone y engen-
dra (activamente) las estructuras disipativas (Hidalgo, 1991: 96).
33
Tampoco es casualidad que justamente todas esas reflexiones le lleven al final de su vida (y por la
influencia del telogo dominico Boismard acerca de la resurreccin) a afirmar que el espritu surge por
elevacin de la materia (conclusin que nosotros desarrollaremos ms abajo con Siewerth y Rahner, y
Del mismo modo que el telogo dominico Claude Geffr (2006: 27) afirmaba para el
caso del dilogo interreligioso, que no basta aadir a una dogmtica tradicional que
permanezca inmutable dos nuevos captulos consagrados a la teologa de la increencia
y del ecumenismo, sino que se trata, de hecho, de reinterpretar algunos enunciados
del cristianismo a la luz de una experiencia histrica indita 36, as tambin una nueva
tambin eliminando como hace Zubiri el dualismo): Boismard logra convencerle de que las definiciones
dogmticas de la Iglesia catlica no obligan a mantener la idea del alma. La nocin de sustancialidad y la
tesis de la pervivencia del alma desparecen definitivamente de la filosofa de Zubiri. [] En cuanto a su
gnesis, se atreve a afirmar sin remilgos que el alma surge por elevacin de la materia (Corominas y
Vicens, 2006: 661).
34
Con la cuestin de la evolucin tambin ocurre lo mismos que en las otras ciencias. Hay hechos
incontrovertibles, pero las interpretaciones filosficas son dispares. Adems, se agrava con el hecho de
que la evolucin desde el punto de vista cientfico tiene cuestiones importantes sin resolver que diversifi-
can las propias interpretaciones cientficas. No obstante, eso no mengua que todos estn de acuerdo en
que existe, de hecho, un proceso evolutivo.
35
Puede verse una larga recensin hecha por m de este libro de Schmitz-Moormann en: Actualidad
bibliogrfica de filosofa y teologa 85 (2006) 14-19.
36
Tambin afirma: Une thologie responsable, cest une thologie qui prend en compte les dimen-
sions historiques nouvelles de lintelligence de la foi (Ibd.).
teologa a la altura de los tiempos, que pretenda un dilogo sincero y honesto con la cul-
tura, la ciencia y la filosofa modernas con la intencin de dar un mensaje ltimo de
esperanza a las personas de nuestra poca histrica, debe ser capaz de repensar y refor-
mular muchos aspectos de su quehacer teolgico y de su doctrina desde los nuevos pre-
supuestos ontolgicos y metafsicos que se desprenden de las ciencias fsico-naturales y
sociales, y que tienen como principal paradigma una imagen ms dinmica, vital y evo-
lutiva del mundo csmico, biolgico y antropolgico. Esto exige nuevos planteamientos
teorticos que hagan posible, a travs de la reformulacin de algunos captulos de la dog-
mtica teolgica, nuevas sntesis teolgicas y filosficas que den cuenta de la vivencia
cristiana dentro de esta nueva concepcin de la realidad. No deja de ser significativo que
ya el Concilio Vaticano II percibiera la importancia de la bsqueda de nuevas sntesis
teolgicas a este respecto: El gnero humano pasa as de una concepcin ms bien est-
tica del orden csmico, a otra ms dinmica y evolutiva: de donde surge una tan grande
complejidad de problemas que est exigiendo la bsqueda de nuevos anlisis y nuevas
sntesis (GS 5; la cursiva es ma).
La cuestin es si verdaderamente la teologa dogmtica (dejamos de lado la teologa
fundamental por su menores repercusiones sobre las sntesis doctrinales) ha tomado en
serio ese encargo conciliar. Desde mi punto de vista, y sin grandes anlisis estadsticos,
se puede afirmar que no, que la mayor parte de la teologa sigue encerrada en s misma
y a penas es capaz de reformular viejas ideas a la luz de las nuevas propuestas cientfi-
co-filosficas 37. La realidad es que la mayor parte de los manuales de teologa presentan
una profusin de citas de la patrstica, de la escolstica y de otros telogos modernos
(algo, evidentemente, no slo lgico, sino claramente necesario), pero eso implica una
imagen de la teologa como un sistema auto-referencial en el que la dogmtica se diri-
me desde dentro y para dentro, ajeno a la savia nueva que procede de la filosofa no-cris-
tiana y de las ciencias naturales y sociales 38.
Es en este contexto en el que surge el amplio movimiento internacional de dilogo
entre la teologa y las ciencias, y, como consecuencia de ello, aparece la llamada teolo-
ga de la ciencia:
Frente a estas teologas de corte fundamentalista aparecen esfuerzos persona-
les y colectivos que buscan un dilogo y un encuentro que superen los aparentes con-
flictos entre las ciencias profanas y la religin. Estas teologas pretenden una refle-
xin constructiva encaminada a tender puentes entre las culturas cientficas
emergentes y las formulaciones de las convicciones de la fe. Estos intentos de dilo-
37
Si uno se para a analizar cuantos de los telogos (no digo ya sacerdotes) que se dedican exclusi-
vamente a la ejercitacin teolgica tienen verdadero conocimiento (e inters) en las nuevas ciencias y filo-
sofas, nos haremos una idea del enclaustramiento dogmtico del pensar teolgico. Por eso, antes de todo
esto habra que ser honestos y repensar el sentido, alcance y significado de la teologa, y sus conexiones
acadmicas, humanas y sociales con el mundo en el que se desarrolla. Desde mi punto de vista, a pesar de
que algunas ideas no son ya aplicables a nuestro momento histrico, siguen siendo extremadamente ilu-
minadoras las reflexiones sobre las responsabilidades de la teologa en Espaa que el joven y liberal Ole-
gario Gonzlez de Cardedal, con enorme arriesgo personal, llev a cabo en el contexto inmediatamente
posconciliar. Desde entonces muchas cosas han mejorado, pero otras siguen en situacin pre-conciliar y
con pocas esperanza de cambio Cf. Gonzlez de Cardedal, 1970, especialmente la parte III, Responsa-
bilidades de la teologa en Espaa (pp. 337-450).
38
Curiosamente, muchos, por no decir la mayora, de estos escritos [en los que se establece el di-
logo entre la teologa y las ciencias] estn escritos por cientficos que muestran su inters y preocupacin
por la cuestin religiosa. Personalmente, he podido comprobar la existencia de este inters por temas reli-
giosos entre cientficos, y no tanto el inters correlativo entre telogos por los problemas cientficos
(A. Udas, citado en Sequeiros, 2006: 72).
Esta nueva teologa de la ciencia (Monserrat, 2007) es una disciplina til pero a la vez
insuficiente y engaosa. La utilidad se evidencia en la clara necesidad de que exista un
dilogo sistemtico entre las nuevas orientaciones cientficas y las construcciones teo-
lgicas, para que la teologa no quede superada en su desenvolvimiento histrico por no
haber sido capaz de integrar las nuevas cosmovisiones cientficas y filosficas con su
mensaje evanglico. No obstante, en la prctica se ha producido una situacin de facto
(que no es, desde luego, de iure) que en realidad est dando pocos frutos teolgico-ecle-
siales: me refiero a que la teologa de la ciencia se ha constituido en una suerte de sub-
disciplina especial que se desarrolla al margen del grueso de la dogmtica. Esto tiene
consecuencias importantes, porque lo que ocurre es que el enorme y fructfero esfuerzo
de telogos y cientficos dedicados a ese mutuo dilogo, no ha llegado (y muy posible-
mente no llegar) a la mayor parte de la produccin teolgica general. De esta manera
se ha producido una situacin paradjica: un grupo minoritario de telogos crean cons-
trucciones teolgicas modernizadas y en consonancia y dilogo con las ciencias; pero,
por otra parte, el resto de la teologa (incluida, pues, la doctrina magisterial) se sigue
auto-reproduciendo en eso que hemos llamado un sistema auto-referencial cerrado
que en el mejor de los casos desconoce completamente la ricas y variadas teologas de
ese otro grupo minoritario, y en el peor las censuran o las persiguen por no ajustarse
a la oficialidad teolgica que permanece ciega a las nuevas cosmovisiones cientfico-
metafsicas. En este sentido, y como ya apuntbamos para el caso del ecumenismo y del
dilogo interreligioso con Geffr, no se trata de crear subdisciplinas o captulos distin-
tos dentro del sistema cerrado e inalterable de la dogmtica. Sino que ms bien se exige
una reformulacin de algunos temas importantes de esas disciplinas (creacin, trinidad,
cristologa, antropologa, escatologa, etc.) desde la nueva luz que arroja la ciencia y la
filosofa modernas. De otro modo, no tendra sentido una teologa de la ciencia ms que
como esfuerzo personal de telogos aislados que pretenden una revitalizacin del pen-
sar teolgico pero que no llega a calar en la Iglesia 39. Este es el reto junto a una hones-
ta teologa del dilogo interreligioso de la teologa del siglo XXI. Y de su logro depende
la renovacin eclesial, espiritual y evanglica que grandes sectores cristianos estn exi-
giendo.
Por este motivo, y a modo de breves indicaciones sin pretensin de exhaustividad, a
continuacin explotaremos algunas de las posibilidades que se abren a la teologa (muchas
de ellas ya iniciadas hace tiempo) si se toma en serio la metafsica del devenir. Porque
no debe olvidarse que no es posible un dilogo entre la teologa y las ciencias si no es con
la mediacin ineludible de la filosofa, puesto que de otro modo se pueden incurrir en acti-
tudes apologticas o en la construccin de parches circunstanciales que no tomen en
serio el hecho de que tanto la construccin teolgica como la cientfica estn sustenta-
39
Esto, por supuesto, sera legtimo, pero no tendra mucho sentido si, cmo se afirma, la Iglesia,
en cuanto pueblo de Dios y comunidad de fe, es el sujeto de la teologa. La fe no es algo que afecte de una
manera aislada e individual a la persona, sino que reclama esencialmente comunin, comunidad, ecle-
sialidad (Cordovilla, 2007: 92). No es posible una renovacin eclesial-institucional como venimos exi-
giendo, sino no se revitaliza la teologa y la dogmtica desde nuevos presupuestos histrico-cientficos; y
la teologa no se situar a la altura de los tiempos si no integra en su entero edificio esa savia nueva que
procede de la teologa de la ciencia y de la metafsica.
das en una previa metafsica. Por este motivo, sin un primigenio, riguroso y correcto
planteamiento filosfico de fondo no es factible ni la teologa de la ciencia, ni la refor-
mulacin de la dogmtica a la luz de la ciencia.
40
Debo a Manuel Cabada no slo sus estudios sobre Siewerth (que seguir aqu), sino la intuicin
fundamental que me ha transmitido en conversaciones recientes acerca de la precedencia del anli-
sis metafsico de las relaciones infinito-finito sobre cualquier anlisis de la naturaleza de la materia (que
slo puede ser subsiguiente). Creo que su postura (que yo asumo y tratar de explicitar) cobra mucho sen-
tido en el orden en que tratar la cuestin, primero Siewerth y luego Rahner.
41
Cobra aqu todo su sentido la concepcin siewerthiana de la nada como produccin intelectiva
de la razn, incluso la de Dios, que le permite en decisin haca si, poder crear lo otro de s: Para Sie-
werth la comprensin de s mismo del ser en su positividad lleva implcita en s misma la produccin
intelectiva de la nada. La nada surge o resulta del ser en cuanto ser, no, por tanto, de su posible con-
crecin finita. Si la produccin de la nada estuviera ligada a la finitud en cuanto tal, resultara que el
Infinito, al no poder producir la nada, ni podra hacer surgir de s mismo lo no-infinito, es decir, la
realidad concreta finita, ni l mismo se podra entender a s mismo como no-finito en sentido estricto
(Cabada, 1991: 11-12).
infinito, sino que su propia estructura ontolgica es ya ms que algo puramente finito,
es semejanza del Absoluto 42:
El ser de la razn y el de las cosas en tanto en cuanto estn en el conocimiento huma-
no, no es nunca sustancia inmediata finita, sino que es luz activa, procedente de lo divi-
no, portando en s la seal de su origen primigenio, inteligiblemente formada y en uni-
dad con su procedencia divina [] Todo ser [Wesen] est, por tanto, infinitamente
cualificado en cuanto cognoscente o cognoscible. La finitud del espritu es ya, pues, desde
su inicio finitud infinita o la vida en la eternidad que se transparenta a travs de las for-
mas del tiempo. Es, por tanto, absurdo hablar de un espritu finito en el sentido de una
delimitacin o separacin respecto de toda infinitud absoluta divina. Se trata ms bien
de la infinitud del fundamento mismo absoluto de la verdad en el que el espritu vive su
vida cognoscitiva, porque l [el espritu] recibe su ser de ella y en cuanto creado perma-
nece ms esencialmente ligado a su causa creadora que a s mismo (Siewerth, citado en
Ibd.: 180).
Este texto insuperable nos muestra ya la deriva que puede tomar esta conceptuali-
zacin concreta de las relaciones Infinito-finito, hacia la ontologa de la materia y sus
consecuencias antropolgicas. El propio Siewerth es consciente de las implicaciones que
su concepcin dinmica de la realidad procedente, precisamente, de su metafsica pue-
den tener para una explicacin ontolgica adecuada del proceso evolutivo del cosmos
y de la vida desde la posibilitacin del surgimiento de una nueva y ms elevada infor-
macin en la naturaleza a travs de lo que l denomina la profundidad, grvida de for-
mas [formenschwangere], del ser (Ibd.: 180). El dinamismo y el carcter de proceso
del cosmos en su propio ser finito deriva, precisamente, de esa relacin especial de una
realidad creada que, por proceder de una decisin de Dios hacia s mismo 43, dota a la
materia de una espontaneidad que se encuentra muy lejos de las concepciones de una
materia pasiva, inerte, degrada ontolgicamente y que, por ello, necesitara una conti-
nua intervencin sobrenatural y milagrosa de Dios para dotarla de dinamismo y de valor
divino. Muy lejos de esto ltimo (que an subyace, como veremos, en la base de buena
parte de la antropologa teolgica), Siewerth considera y creo que este texto tiene seme-
janzas con la autotrascendencia activa de Rahner (cf. infra) que la historia evolu-
tiva de la naturaleza es verdaderamente una progresiva estratificacin desde abajo, una
epignesis [Epigenese] continua, en la que de hecho no aparece nada que no haya sur-
gido y nacido de la naturaleza, habilitando al fundamento de la misma para una nueva
profundidad, y sin embargo ello no puede ser pensado sin la profundidad conformado-
ra del ser y de Dios (cit. en Ibd.: 186).
De este modo, se confirma la intuicin cabadiana de que es necesaria una previa dilu-
cidacin metafsica de las relaciones Infinito-finito para poder arrojar algo de luz sobre
la temtica de la materia, sin que esto signifique, por supuesto, ningn tipo de cons-
truccin metafsica a priori o deductiva, sino muy al contrario, teniendo en cuenta los
42
Se pueden establecer claras referencias con el pensamiento de Hegel (cf. Cabada, 1972 y 2004) en
tanto que para l, precisamente, lo finito en cuanto toma conciencia de su finitud automticamente la
supera. Por eso dice Hegel que las cosas finitas estn rotas (gebrochen). Explica Pannenberg (1992: 27)
a este respecto ms desde una perspectiva gnoseolgica-subsiguiente que presupone la ontolgica-previa:
Ahora bien, lo otro mediante cuya limitacin lo finito es lo que es, es a su vez o bien otro finito o lo otro
de lo finito en cuanto tal, es decir, lo infinito. Ambas cosas estn ya dadas con el lmite incluido en el con-
cepto de lo finito.
43
Es necesario notar que con ello no se cae en ningn tipo de acosmismo metafsico, puesto que
Siewerth defiende, precisamente, que esta decisin de Dios para s, es la que da la mayor positividad a la
realidad creada.
datos de las ciencias empricas. Precisamente, en continuidad con lo dicho hasta ahora,
podemos introducir las reflexiones filosficas, con sus ramificaciones teolgicas, de Rah-
ner sobre el concepto de autotrascendencia activa 44.
Este concepto rahneriano 45 surge como preocupacin, precisamente, por iniciar un
intento de reflexin teolgico-metafsica acorde con los datos de aquel momento acer-
ca del proceso de hominizacin. Era necesario para ello establecer un anlisis que refor-
mulase, en cierto modo, la tradicional concepcin del espritu y la materia, puesto que
segn el magisterio eclesial el primero es distinto de la segunda y no puede derivarse
de ella. Ahora bien, este claro dualismo ontolgico que adems es problemtico
dificulta la comprensin teolgica de las realidades creadas, que son siempre corpora-
les o materiales, y adems supone callejones sin salida para la teologa o exigen con-
cepciones mgicas, milagrosas y, a menudo, devaluadoras de las realidades creadas. Es
evidente que existe cierta inderivabilidad del espritu desde la materia debido a una
doble prioridad lgica y ontolgica del primero frente a la segunda. No obstante, esta
inderivabilidad no es conceptualizada de modo correcto dentro del magisterio eclesial,
puesto que la Iglesia la funda en una dicotoma cuasi-absoluta entre materia y espri-
tu 46. Con ello, la nica conclusin razonable que se desprendera sera la de la inter-
vencin sobrenatural continua (y categorial) de Dios sobre una suerte de materia iner-
te y muerta a la que se aadira lo espiritual como un aadido postizo. Para refutar
esta suerte de dualismo Rahner recurre a la mostracin del parentesco o unidad de la
materia y el espritu desde varios frentes teorticos 47, concluyendo la referencia mutua
del uno hacia la otra.
En realidad, el problema que tiene Rahner ante sus ojos es una cuestin que an est
dando lugar a dificultades teolgico-filosficas: [El problema] para Rahner se plantea
al contrastar la evolucin humana con el dogma catlico de la creacin inmediata del
alma espiritual. Como indica la encclica Humani generis (1950, Denz. 2327), ese dogma
no interfiere con un evolucionismo moderado en cuanto investiga sobre el origen del
cuerpo humano. Como se ve, esta visin estrecha del magisterio reproduce continua-
mente dificultades tanto desde el punto de vista de la unidad esencial del ser humano,
como de la intervencin intramundana de Dios 48. Es para evitar este conjunto de pro-
blemas, para lo que Rahner introduce su concepto de la autosuperacin o autotras-
cendencia activa, que pretende hablar de una causalidad trascendental y no categorial
de Dios, en la que la divinidad juega el papel de horizonte o sobre-qu que fundamenta
trascendentalmente (y como desde dentro) el movimiento auto-superante del espritu
44
Seguimos aqu el completo anlisis que desarrolla Doncel, 2007.
45
Aparece en: La hominizacin en cuanto cuestin teolgica, en la obra conjunta con Overhage
acerca del El problema de la hominizacin (1961).
46
De hecho, su postura es tan poco refinada y estrecha metafsicamente, que cualquier intento como
este que estamos proponiendo es susceptible de una condena automtica por materialismo.
47
Tales frentes o mbitos son: la metafsica trascendental, la metafsica tomista, la teologa cristia-
na, la creacin del mundo, la consumacin escatolgica del mundo y la encarnacin del Verbo.
48
Doncel (Ibd.: 611) resume as las tres principales dificultades de esa visin tradicional: Las difi-
cultades metafsicas provienen de introducir a Dios en la cadena cerrada de causas segundas, hacindole
intervenir demirgicamente en el mundo en vez de mantener creativamente al mundo. Las dificulta-
des teolgicas provienen de convertir la sobriedad profana de la naturaleza y su historia en un suceso mara-
villoso, un verdadero milagro, y ponerla as al nivel de la historia salvfica, caracterizada por ese contac-
to personal de la inmediatez divina. Y las dificultades cientficas provienen de que para su metodologa eso
constituye un escndalo a evitar con todo empeo. Y con razn, pues la causalidad divina, por ser tal, est
siempre representada en su accin natural intramundana por una causa creada, que es la que le toca des-
cribir a las ciencias.
De este modo, se evita esa injerencia categorial de Dios, porque en realidad el espri-
tu finito se supera a s mismo: es decir, hay verdadera superacin y esa superacin es
llevada a cabo por el propio sujeto finito, aunque producida por ese movimiento tras-
cendental de Dios que lo pone en movimiento, lo funda y lo sostiene, sin quedar l mismo
reducido a ese mismo poner en movimiento 49. En este mismo sentido, Bela Weissmahr
(1986: 109), que sigue muy de cerca a Rahner en el mtodo trascendental, pone de mani-
fiesto con claras resonancias rahnerianas este mismo supuesto metafsico:
Cierto tambin que la realidad incondicionada slo puede hacer comprensible el
incremento del ser autooperado por los entes finitos, si dicha realidad se distingue radi-
calmente de stos, sin ser frente a los mismos otro ente. Pues en el caso de que se identi-
ficar sin ms con stos, la plenitud de perfeccin estara ya en el contenido ontolgico
de los entes finitos y ya no podra hallarse de que stos se superan a s mismos realmente
y no solo en apariencia. [] Pero simultneamente el ser de la realidad absoluta debe
ser de tal modo que no est simplemente fuera del ser de los entes finitos. Pues si el abso-
luto no perteneciera de una manera inequvoca, imposible de determinar pero real, al
ser de los entes finitos, es decir, que si a pesar de su diversidad no fuera el fundamento
interno y constitutivo del ser de los entes finitos, no se comprendera cmo de lo menos
por s mismo puede resultar un ms, ni cmo el ente finito puede superarse a s mismo.
El mundo es, as, creacin de Dios, pero (como ya vimos en Teilhard, Schmitz-Moor-
mann y Edwards, que tambin reformulan, a su modo, la teologa de la creacin desde
la metafsica del devenir) es una creacin que dota a la materia de las virtualidades y
potencialidades propias del espritu. Porque, en realidad, no hay una materia inerte, pasi-
va y mala y un espritu vivo, activo y bueno. La concepcin cientfica de la materia que
pusimos de manifiesto en el epgrafe anterior, es producto, precisamente, de que como
dijeran Siewerth o Hegel desde la metafsica la realidad creada est ya desde siempre
transida por lo Infinito. No hay, por lo tanto, una suerte de impostacin posterior de lo
espiritual sobre lo material, porque de hecho la materia finita est ya espiritualizada
(Rahner habla de la materia como de espritu congelado) 50 y lleva en su seno ese hori-
49
Esta superacin perfectiva no es determinacin pasivamente recibida por el sujeto, no es un ser-
perfeccionado por el Ser absoluto, porque ste de tal forma es fundamento primigenio de ese automovi-
miento, que constituye un momento interno del movimiento mismo. Pero tampoco se trata de un reali-
zarse del Ser absoluto, porque ste, como momento interno al movimiento, permanece al mismo tiempo
libre e inalcanzado, por encima del movimiento. Mueve sin ser movido (Doncel, Ibd.: 616).
50
Nos parece que esta concepcin rahneriana tiene semejanzas con la idea de Schelling de la natu-
raleza como un yo sin yos o como espritu visible o como sujeto-objeto objetivo, y sin pantesmos
de ningn tipo. Este nuevo idealismo de la Naturaleza ensea que la Naturaleza, devenir del espritu, es
ella misma espritu en devenir. La Naturaleza, considerada como el conjunto de las cosas externas per-
ceptibles por los sentidos, es la mera realidad de lo material; pero la Naturaleza, en su unidad y produc-
tividad determinantes de cada cosa particular (natura naturans) es vida ideal, anloga a la inmanencia de
la formacin del yo. [] La idea metafsica inicial del yo absoluto ha de tener sus consecuencias para la
Naturaleza sin yos, infrahumana, que se despliega en los objetos o productos de forma corprea sensi-
ble. Tambin la Naturaleza, lo visible es (en s mismo, como este ente real) espritu; la Naturaleza es esp-
ritu visible. Un yo todava sin yos, un sujeto todava absorto en lo objetivo, por decirlo as, ha de actuar
y ser determinante en las producciones reales de la Naturaleza, un sujeto-objeto objetivo, no el sujeto-
objeto subjetivo de la teora fichteana de la conciencia (Heimsoeth, 1966: 27).
51
Algunos, como Ruiz de la Pea (1992), parecen todava negar este axioma.
52
Adems, esto dificulta enormemente la concepcin cristiana de la resurreccin, basada no en una
supuesta inmortalidad del alma, sino en la verdadera muerte de la persona que ser recreada en una
nueva creacin que depende no de una propiedad intrnseca al alma, sino de la infinita fidelidad de Dios
mismo que prometi nuestra perduracin por su amor.
hecho, se quiere significar 53 cuando se habla de alma, quiz desde lenguajes poticos, litr-
gicos o espirituales-cultuales, pero surgen verdaderos problemas precisamente por el las-
tre griego y la falta de un desarrollo metafsico diferente que continuamente se cuela
por la puerta de atrs cuando se trata de elaborar construcciones tericas en un len-
guaje metafsico o teolgico 54. Por este motivo, es por lo que nos parece mucho ms opor-
tuno hablar de persona como esa realidad creada en la que las virtualidades espiri-
tuales ya implicadas en la materia autosuperante han hecho surgir, no un alma en unidad
sustancial con un cuerpo, sino una realidad dinmica, no esttica, cf. infra en la que
lo corporal es ya de suyo (y, por tanto, no simple epifenmeno marginal) apertura espi-
ritual a la trascendencia, en grados y cualidades mayores que en cualquier otra realidad
material. Sea lo que fuera del concepto de alma o de persona, lo que queremos poner
de manifiesto especialmente aqu, es que su creacin por parte de Dios no implica una
actuacin inmediata de Dios, sino que es un tipo de creacin que se ajusta a la causa-
lidad autosuperante explicada ms arriba para el caso del surgimiento del espritu en
general desde la materia:
La creacin del alma [o, en nuestra terminologa, de la persona entendida en
el sentido arriba indicado] concebida as como un caso ms (aunque eminentemente
singular) de realizacin autosuperante, pierde todo el aspecto escandaloso de irrupcin
divina en el mundo milagrosa y categorial. Esa accin de Dios no es categorial, porque
nada produce que no produzcan las causas segundas, no acta junto a, sino en la
accin misma autosuperante del agente finito. La trascendentalidad de la accin de Dios
en el mundo no ha de concebirse como un mero soportar estticamente el mundo, sino
como un fundamentarlo en su realizarse autosuperante. Y aunque estas autosupera-
ciones se den necesariamente en puntos espacio-temporales de la historia, esto no sig-
nifica que la accin divina que las posibilita est como tal categorialmente localizada
en ellos (Doncel, 2007: 618).
53
Diciendo que el hombre es alma (y no slo cuerpo), se quiere decir: a) que el hombre vale ms
que cualquier otra realidad mundana; b) que es capaz de sustentar un dilogo salvfico con Dios (Ruiz
de la Pea, 1989: 153).
54
Es curioso que Polkinghorne parezca hacerse un lo precisamente por hablar del concepto de
alma en lenguaje divulgativo, a pesar de ser un claro detractor del dualismo. As, mientras que en un
libro mucho ms riguroso cientfica y teolgicamente afirma (2007a: 44): Cuando se lee a Eccles, se sien-
te a menudo que una de sus motivaciones para creer en el dualismo es que a l le parece que es el nico
modo de salvaguardar la realidad de lo mental y lo espiritual, frente al ataque cido de un reductivismo
fsico. Afortundamente, yo creo que hay otro enfoque que puede alcanzar ese deseable fin. [] La pode-
mos etiquetar como monismo de aspecto dual. Hay slo una sustancia en el mundo (no dos la mate-
rial y la mental), pero puede darse en dos estados opuestos (las fases material y mental, que dira un fsi-
co), lo cual explica nuestra percepcin de la diferencia entre mente y materia. No obstante, en un libro
ms divulgativo (2007b: 65-66), aunque tambin rechaza el dualismo, sigue empleando la palabra alma
con los problemas que ello conlleva: Adoptar una visin psicosomtica [la que l defiende] del hombre
exige reflexionar con cuidado sobre cmo entender la naturaleza del alma humana. Este concepto tiene
una importancia central en la teologa la cual atribuye al alma el papel de portadora de la esencia intrn-
seca de la personalidad individual; del yo verdadero, podramos decir. Aunque la antropologa teolgi-
ca no pueda renunciar a este uso del lenguaje del alma, s debe ser capaz de liberarse el lastre de una heren-
cia pasada que conceba sta con la ayuda de categoras platnicas. A esta afirmacin hay una cosa
fundamental que objetar; y es que Polkinghorne al decir que el alma es el portador de la personalidad indi-
vidual o yo verdadero, est sin darse cuenta dejando de lado la profunda implicacin que para nuestro yo
verdadero tiene el cuerpo, y, como vimos en la antropologa de la ANT, todas las relaciones somticas y
extrasomticas que la persona establece con su entorno animal, natural y tecnolgico, y la co-construc-
cion mutua entre esos elementos. En este sentido, el concepto de alma nos parece, por eso, problemtico
para una construccin rigurosamente filosfico-teolgica de la antropologa que pretenda una clara uni-
dad personal, porque siempre, aunque no sea de modo consciente, se va a terminar por identificar con el
yo verdadero slo lo anmico, dificultando la introduccin de todo lo dems en el concepto de persona.
En este prrafo se condensan una serie de cuestiones que no se pueden tratar aqu.
Por ello, nos vamos a contentar con reflexionar sobre la pertinencia o no de esa distin-
cin que expresa Ladaria entre condicin creatural y condicin supracreatural. Desde
mi punto de vista, no parece necesaria una tal dicotoma entre el hombre natural y el hom-
bre elevado sobrenaturalmente. No es simplemente que no conozcamos a ningn hom-
bre en su desnuda condicin natural y que, por ello, nos resulte imposible definir al
hombre natural. Es que no tenemos por qu pensar que exista tal dicotoma. La gratuidad
de Dios, la gracia, no tiene por qu pensarse como un aadido a una condicin previa-
mente natural que no la poseyera. No podemos pensar en un hombre natural sin la gra-
cia ya en l. No se trata de dos momentos, de dos escalones en la creacin del ser del hom-
bre. Qu sentido podra tener afirmar la creacin de un hombre que desde el principio
fue a imagen y semejanza de su creador pero que no estuviera ya agraciado desde el mismo
momento en que recibe el ser de Dios? El hombre no puede ser primero simplemente refe-
rencia ontolgica a Dios y posteriormente elevacin relacional con ese mismo Dios. Sino
que desde que recibe el ser, el hombre est ya elevado e invitado a la relacin con Dios.
La gratuidad no est en el hecho de que Dios quisiera agraciar al hombre para permi-
tirle entrar en relacin con l, despus de haberle creado sin esa posibilidad. De hecho,
dentro de la propuesta teolgica de Schmitz-Moormann (cf. supra) se sugera que es pre-
cisamente esa llamada de Dios la que interpela al proceso csmico a dar de s, en impul-
so, para responder a esa llamada, cosa que ocurre en el ser humano. En este sentido, debe-
ramos pensar que la gratuidad est en que Dios, sin necesitarlo, ha creado desde esa
potencialidad autosuperante una criatura que expresamente va a estar dirigida a una rela-
cin sobrenatural con l. Teolgicamente es una pura abstraccin (y en este sentido un
presupuesto ontolgico innecesario) introducir distinciones entre creaturalidad y supra-
creaturalidad, puesto que, adems, tienen poco fundamento bblico 55. Habra que pen-
55
Desde un punto de vista evolutivo-paleoantropolgico tampoco se puede establecer con seguridad
en qu momento de la flecha evolutiva se podra hablar del surgimiento de un homo religiosus, entre otras
sar que Dios quiso crear a un hombre ya elevado para una relacin personal con l por-
que es lo que, de hecho, vemos 56. Con ello no se elimina la gratuidad, porque Dios no tiene
necesidad de crear a un tal ente-personal, sino que lo hizo por amor desbordante. Por ello,
Ladaria 57 (frente, por ejemplo, a Buber o Levinas) no puede considerar que el ser huma-
no sea esencialmente relacionalidad personal con otros. En efecto, tanto Buber (1948)
como Levinas justifican esa esencial relacionalidad de la persona en la primigenia rela-
cionalidad del hombre hacia Dios. Pero desde el momento en el que Ladaria considera
que es necesario un plus ontologico de gracia para mantener una relacin yo-t con
Dios, se sigue lgicamente para l que nuestro ser y nuestro ser personal no se identifican
y que, por lo tanto, no somos referencia pura a un t. De este modo, se hace inviable fun-
damentar ontologicamente su ser-relacin con otros. Nos parece, en este sentido, que la
distincin obedece ms bien a un prejuicio teolgico impostado para salvar una suerte de
gratuidad de Dios, que desde una teologa del devenir queda igualmente salvada sin inter-
calar determinaciones aadidas subsiguientes de carcter sobrenatural.
Por supuesto, esto no impide que en la cuestin de la revelacin, podamos distinguir
con Rahner un doble nivel:
Ms all de esta revelacin natural, que propiamente es la donacin de Dios como
pregunta (no, como respuesta), existe tambin la autntica revelacin de Dios (que, dicho
sea de paso, tiene un fuerte contenido dinmico, en tanto que Jess nos deja el Espri-
tu para que vaya desvelndonos el misterio divino). sta no est dada simplemente con
el ser espiritual del hombre como trascendencia, sino que tiene carcter de suceso, es
dialogstica (Rahner, 1979: 208).
Pero este doble escaln de la revelacin presupone ya un ser humano desde siempre
sobrenaturalizado o elevado a la comunicacin con Dios, capaz, por tanto, de or la palabra
y acogerla desde dentro de su propia naturaleza ontolgica 58. Cuestin a parte es la eleva-
cin escatolgica a la beatitud, que de hecho no es parte del problema general y primigenio
del hombre natural y sobrenatural. Por ello, creemos que en la antropologa teolgica
no es necesario crear ese supuesto hombre natural (o como dira Ladaria: creatural), por-
que lo que experimentamos es un hombre siempre sobrenatural (o supracreatural).
cosas porque nuestra visin teolgica de la creacin desde la metafsica del devenir vista desde Siewerth,
Rahner y Schmitz-Moormann y junto con nuestro rechazo de la creacin inmediata del alma, nos hace inne-
cesario establecer una suerte de momento creativo puntual o de elevacin sobrenatural en la especie homo.
Precisamente, porque la religin (en el sentido de relacin personal con Dios, aparte de cualquier tipo de
revelacin o de positivacin) aparecera dentro de ese horizonte trascendental autosuperante sostenido tras-
cendentalmente por Dios pero no creada categorialmente por l.
56
Nada de esto elimina la posibilidad y absoluta legitimidad del ateismo, puesto que esa presencia
de Dios en la estructura ontolgico-trascendental del ser humano no es evidente en s misma. Bien por lo
que Monserrat (2007) llama una knosis epistemolgica de Dios, bien sencillamente por el exceso onto-
lgico del Infinito sobre el espritu finito.
57
Tambin Guardini parece caer dentro de esta misma situacin que Ladaria respecto a la esencia-
lidad de la relacionalidad personal del ser humano. Cf. Guardini, 2000.
58
La autocomunicacin de Dios revelando su esencia ntima supone que el hombre en virtud de su
naturaleza concreta es capaz de acoger el mensaje y la palabra de Dios. Ahora bien, para ser capaz de ello,
tiene que poseer en virtud de su naturaleza racional la capacidad de conocer a Dios (Weissmahr, 1986: 186).
revelacin de Dios no deja de ser limitada y no puede excluir, por principio, otras arti-
culaciones posibles sobre las que la revelacin no dice nada, o que por su ropaje hist-
rico permite otras vas de profundizacin terica y de ejercitacin existencial. Por eso, y
aunque parezca poca cosa, aqu nos vamos a contentar con sealar alguna de esas cues-
tiones que permiten una reformulacin ms acorde con la metafsica del devenir, pero
con la conciencia de que son eso, tentativas, tanto las de unos como las de otros. La pri-
mera cuestin decisiva, desde mi punto de vista, es dotar a la comprensin de la natu-
raleza de Dios de dinamismo, de vida, y alejarlo definitivamente de algunos de los asi-
deros ontolgicos del concepto esttico de la divinidad propio del mundo griego. Y es
que el concepto trinitario de Dios del cristianismo es absolutamente rico en matices de
este tipo, porque implica que Dios posee autofecundidad y actividad, y se debera enten-
der el carcter relacional de Dios como justamente el que da sentido a su posible atri-
buto de sustancia y no al revs. La vida y el dinamismo trinitario es de una importan-
cia enorme si queremos construir una teologa dinmica y no esttica: Dios no es, por
tanto, una substancia esttica u opaca, sino espiritual, dinmica, transparente y viva
(Rovira Belloso 1998: 589). As, trascendiendo la pura reflexin metafsica de Siewerth,
nos encontramos desde la revelacin la necesidad de comprender el dinamismo inhe-
rente a Dios y, como consecuencia, del poder autocreador de su creacin. Desde aqu se
hace necesario repensar atributos como la omnipotencia o la omnisciencia. En efecto,
la relacionalidad constitutiva en el interior de Dios la ha sacado hacia fuera en su crea-
cin del mundo considerada como Gleichnis Gottes, y desde ese momento ya no es
posible entender a Dios aparte de su creacin, y a sta aparte de su fundamento 59. Por
este motivo, tiene poco sentido no ya teolgico, sino propiamente religioso, seguir empe-
ados en conceptualizar a Dios principalmente con esos atributos dificultando temas
como el de la libertad humana porque es un atributo abstracto que se desarrolla al
margen de la relacionalidad dinmica propia entre Dios y creacin (ser humano). No
puede haber omnipotencia y omnisciencia frente a la libertad creada, porque esa omni-
potencia no existe al margen de la creacin. De hecho, nos parece mucho ms fructfe-
ro como mostramos antes, el concepto de Dios como Infinitud, precisamente porque per-
mite una comprensin del dinamismo infinito del mundo mucho ms acorde con la
ciencia y la filosofa modernas, y sin menoscabar la libertad de la creacin.
La segunda cuestin, unida a la anterior, se refiere a la necesidad de incluir una suer-
te de polo temporal en la naturaleza de Dios. Esta es una cuestin compleja desde el punto
de vista filosfico, porque nos parece imposible pensar a Dios transido por la temporali-
dad y la mutabilidad, afectado por el dolor y el sufrimiento, debido a que el mundo grie-
go consideraba, precisamente, que la suma perfeccin era la inmovilidad e inmutabilidad
porque eso implicaba plenitud ontolgica. No obstante, es un dato que se nos impone por
revelacin y que es necesario integrar en las construcciones teolgicas 60, puesto que el
dato bblico es firme al presentarnos a un Dios afectado, preocupado e interesado por su
creacin. El actus purus de la metafsica no sirve para comprender al Dios revelado en
los profetas y en Cristo. El Dios bblico es dinamicidad hacia dentro y hacia fuera. Y este
segundo aspecto es capital dentro de una teologa que quiera tomar en serio el devenir y
59
Al afirmar que es imagen de Dios estamos integrando el misterio de aquel en el de ste, y ope-
rando una relativizacin de ambos conceptos, no en el sentido ontolgico de que cada uno sea dependiente
del otro, sino en el sentido de una imposibilidad de comprensin histrica del uno sin el otro (Gonzlez
de Cardedal, 1967: 59).
60
Por supuesto, esto tambin tiene consecuencias desabsolutizadoras para las configuraciones ecle-
siales concretas, como se puede adivinar.
la historicidad y comprender a Dios no slo frente al tiempo, sino en y dentro del tiem-
po, sin negar una suerte de segundo polo de eternidad (Polkinghorne) 61.
Finalmente, dentro del mbito propiamente cristolgico, nos parece necesario desa-
rrollar una imagen ms dinmica de la persona de Jesucristo 62, que es precisamente el
lugar de la revelacin (dinmica) trinitaria (Rovira Belloso, 1998: 387). Es pues impor-
tante, sin negar las reflexiones ms propiamente ontolgicas del modo de unin de divi-
nidad y humanidad en Cristo, poner de manifiesto que el cristianismo que Jess nos
muestra en los evangelios es una existencia dinmica y relacional con el Padre desde el
Espritu. Y ello tiene consecuencias importantes para temas clave dentro de la cristolo-
ga, como la necesidad de pensar el desvelamiento de la autoconciencia de Cristo de modo
dinmico y no esttico. En efecto, no se niega en Jess la existencia de la autoconcien-
cia filial, mesinica y escatolgica que ha quedado plasmada, no tanto en los pasajes
(muy pocos) en los que explcitamente Jess imparti alguna doctrina cristolgica sobre
s mismo utilizando para s ciertos ttulos cristolgicos; ms bien el dato fundamen-
tal es la cristologa que subyace en, con y bajo el anuncio, la doctrina y los hechos del
Jess histrico, punto de partida de cualquier cristologa eclesial posterior (cf. Fuller,
1979: 107-146). Dicho esto, se comprende que hablar de un progresivo desvelamiento
auto-reflexivo de la conciencia de Jess no es negar que tal conciencia existiera, ni tam-
poco que no fuera constitutiva en el sentido de momento interno de la unin hipos-
ttica como determinacin fundante de Cristo, pero lo cierto es que tal fundamen-
talidad originante hace imposible elevarla del todo a palabra y para lograrlo es esencial
el tiempo, el hacer, el existir (Gonzlez de Cardedal, 2001: 470). Es decir, hay una intrn-
seca historicidad en el proceso a travs del cual Cristo hace explcita esa determinacin
fundante y originaria en la que ha vivido desde siempre: esa conciencia se realiza en
Jess de manera histrica y progrediente, en marcha hacia su misin y estando siempre
determinada por esa misin (Ibd.). De hecho, de esta asuncin humana de Dios por
parte de la conciencia Cristo depende que se pueda hablar de una verdadera revelacin 63.
Por este motivo, resulta confusa la afirmacin de Amato (1998: 443) de que en Jess se
da una certeza pacfica de su identidad. Evidentemente, la conciencia en tanto que fun-
dante y originaria no tiene un comienzo reconocible en el tiempo, pero si lo que quiere
61
La filosofa y la teologa del proceso han tratado de integrar esta temporalidad en el concepto de
Dios. Por otra parte, la teologa del Dios crucificado de Moltmann es paradigmtica a este respecto. En
Espaa, me parece que las dos bellsimas cristologas de Jon Sobrino (1991 y 1999) (muy influidas por ese
Dios crucificado) son un gran exponente de este tomar en serio el devenir incluso en Dios. No es cierto
que Sobrino niegue la divinidad de Jess de Nazaret, lo que ocurre es que su inters principal es mostrar
que ese supuesto Dios impasible del mundo griego queda superado por un Dios que se hace humano y que
nos muestra en la humanidad de Jess la parcialidad indiscutible de Dios hacia el pobre y el oprimido.
Desde mi punto de vista, lo que pretende Sobrino es mostrar que la humanidad de un Jess cercano a los
pobres es la humanidad que caracteriza a Dios, y no la de un Dios Rey o un Dios Omnipotente fundados
en una cristologa de la exaltacin de Cristo; por eso da preeminencia a la imagen de un Jess humano
ms acorde con un Dios humilde y kentico, frente a la preponderancia en la historia de la teologa de un
Jess Divino, Rey y Seor. Por supuesto, todo ello tiene conexiones con los tipos de eclesiologa vincula-
dos a un Jess siervo o a un Jess triunfante. Pero nunca Sobrino niega la divinidad de Jess.
62
Esta visin dinmica indaga en la propia estructura de la realidad humana de Jess para descu-
brir la posibilidad, conveniencia y ordenacin intrnsecas a un trascendimiento, existencia en el otro y
constitucin desde la relacin con l, como lo ms absolutamente propio del espritu humano, en cuanto
realidad abierta, y de la persona constituyndose en alteridad (Gonzlez de Cardedal, 2001: 456).
63
Hay revelacin de Dios en la medida en que se da comprensin humana de Dios por parte de
Jess; en la medida en que l va asumiendo conceptual y reflejamente esa filiacin en que, como solar per-
manente, vive arraigado, y es que la vida de Jess, su proyecto propio y el destino que le fue conferido
tienen densidad reveladora en cuanto pasan por su conciencia (Gonzlez de Cardedal, 1993: 371 y 372).
decir el telogo salesiano es que se da casi de modo mgico una identificacin refle-
xiva plena desde siempre en la conciencia de Jess, parece estar, de nuevo, situando la
historicidad y el devenir fuera de la humanidad de Cristo, y haciendo problemticas afir-
maciones bblicas en las que se muestra un proceso de maduracin, incluso salpicado
por las llamadas tentaciones, en cuya superacin tambin est de modo implcito ese
carcter procesual del encuentro pleno y reflexivo de Jess consigo mismo.
Y junto a ello, tambin es importante comprender la muerte de Cristo no como un
diseo esttico prefijado por Dios, como una suerte de necesidad expiatoria exigida san-
grientamente por l. Al contrario, es ms claro pensar que el dinamismo de la vida de
Jess y su fidelidad al Padre y a su vocacin le llevaron a la muerte, que externamente
fue un asesinato pero que la conciencia de Jess supo trascender el hecho histrico exter-
no y transmutarlo en un momento necesario de carcter salvfico y servicial 64.
64
Jesus [] did not seek death; he did not go up to Jerusalem in order to die; but he did pursue,
with inflexible devotion, a way of truth that inevitably led him to death, and he did not seek to escape
(Moule, 1978: 109).
65
Slo quienes se han alejado de la fe o algunos ilusionistas que creen tenerla piensan que dicha fe
es un seguro a todo riego, que el creyente sabe a ciencia cierta por dnde pasa la fidelidad a Dios, que bas-
tara con obedecer al magisterio eclesistico o a la voluntad de Dios (que, por definicin, se supone siem-
pre clara y accesible) para salir de las sombras e incertidumbres del juicio moral (p. 79).
(p. 145). Y todo ello, precisamente, porque no se puede concebir una antropologa sus-
tancialista que pensara a la persona como estticamente definida por una suerte de alma
fija que negara la mutabilidad intrnseca al yo 66.
En segundo lugar, el devenir y la historicidad tienen consecuencias esenciales para
la eclesiologa y para la configuracin institucional concreta de la Iglesia 67. Del mismo
modo que en Valadier, tambin en esta ocasin la asuncin plena y en todas sus conse-
cuencias de la encarnacin es la que permite al telogo dominico Geffr (2006) afirmar
que ninguna configuracin histrica del cristianismo o de la Iglesia puede ser absoluta
y, por ello, no puede identificarse sin ms las formas y estructuras de la Iglesia histri-
ca con el misterio de Dios en Cristo, que siempre lo trasciende. Ni les christianismes
historiques, ni les glises que les hommes voient ne sont absolus. Seule est absolue la
rvlation finale qui concide avec lavnement du Royaume de Dieu (p. 37) 68. De aqu
se deduce la necesidad de desabsolutizar esas configuraciones concretas 69, lo cual no
slo tiene bellas repercusiones en el interior de la Iglesia, sino que tambin permite una
honesta y dialogante teologa del pluralismo interreligioso 70. Por ello, no es fcil hablar
de la Iglesia en su positividad histrica, porque sta no puede ser ignorada ni absoluti-
zada. Ella, a su vez, remite ms all de s misma, y vale no tanto por su consistencia cuan-
to por su transparencia. Su valor es aquello que por ella se dice, ms que lo que ella
misma dice (Gonzlez de Cardedal, 1989: 163). Efectivamente, siempre habr que plan-
tearse qu estructuras, configuraciones y positivizaciones concretas en la Iglesia son sus-
citadoras del evangelio en su pura transparencia o cuales jugaron un papel histrico en
un determinado momento pero ahora son ms opacas que transparentes y, por tanto,
habr que reformar o eliminar. En esta reconfiguracin eclesial es fundamental tener en
cuenta la marginacin de la mujer. No slo las telogas feministas denuncian esta situa-
cin injusta. Muchos apostamos por una solucin institucional urgente a este problema.
66
La idea de un yo esttico y permanente como condicin de la unidad de la conciencia experien-
cial es, por tanto, una construccin idealizada, aducida para justificar la existencia de una base unitaria
para la descripcin cientfica del mundo en el sentido de las ciencias experimentales modernas seculari-
zadas. [] la teora de una subjetividad trascendental no est tampoco legitimada para suponer, en con-
tradiccin con los hechos y a propsito del proceso de formacin de los individuos en el que surge pri-
meramente y alcanza estabilidad la instancia yoica, que haya ya desde el principio un yo esttico y
permanente, que posibilita el surgimiento de una conciencia de la unidad del mundo y la adquisicin del
lenguaje (Pannenberg, 1999: 51 y 52).
67
Est por hacer an la tarea de aplicar las premisas de la ontologa de la fluidez social a la propia
institucionalizacin eclesistica.
68
On ne peut donc confondre luniversalit du Christ comme Verbe incarn et luniversalit du chris-
tianisme comme religion historique (p. 54). La plnitude de la Rvlation en Jsus-Christ est eschato-
logique (p. 67). En dautres termes, aucune manifestation historique de Dieu, mme lvnement Jsus
de Nazareth, ne peut tre absolutise (p. 69).
69
Dentro de este marco desabsolutizador de las configuraciones histricas, me parece cuestin fun-
damental el desarrollo de una verdadera hermenutica magisterial que a veces es vista con temor por el
magisterio, mientras que la hermenutica bblica es ya un presupuesto asentado de toda la teologa moder-
na. Sesbo es uno de los telogos importantes que ms est insistiendo en esta cuestin, apelando a la
necesidad de considerar de modo paralelo los textos bblicos y los magisteriales. Cf. Sesbo, 2006. Den-
tro de esta hermenutica magisterial es de capital importancia el captulo dedicado a la hermenutica con-
ciliar: cf. Rovira Belloso, 2000: 162-166.
70
No es azaroso el hecho de que la mayor parte de las actuales y provocadoras a la vez que hones-
tas teologas del dilogo interreligioso, acudan a esa relativizacin de las estructuras y las formulacio-
nes y pongan en guardia ante los peligros del absolutismo catlico, siempre asumiendo la historicidad
caracterstica del cristianismo por la encarnacin del verbo. Adems, la pneumatologa es la clave fun-
damental para entender que el soplo del Espritu no puede ser controlado por ninguna autoridad reli-
giosa.
71
[Algunos creyentes] han actuado como si su fe les procurase soluciones evidentes, inmutables,
transhistricas, a muchos problemas que los creyentes, lo mismo que los humanistas, slo pueden resol-
ver por medio de una penosa investigacin de una marcha titubeante en el seno de situaciones histricas
movibles (Schillebeeckx, 1968: 73).
72
Es lo que Rovira Belloso (2000: 172-188) llama la mediacin socio-analtica de la teologa, que
explica con detalle, asumiendo algunas posturas, matizando otras y rechazando otras, pero todo ello desde
una palabra muy agradecida y honesta hacia aquellos que han defendido esta mediacin desde la Teolo-
ga de la Liberacin, con sus limitaciones y errores, pero con honestidad y radicalidad evanglica.
73
Por supuesto, esta desigualdad social se reproduca en el interior de la Iglesia y quedaba justifi-
cada del mismo modo. Tras el Concilio Vaticano II (en el que la eclesiologa del Pueblo de Dios est en el
centro, frente a lo autoritario y lo jurdico de la eclesiologa pre-conciliar de raigambre tridentina) pala-
bras como las siguientes de Po X daan los odos: La Iglesia es, por su propia esencia, una sociedad desi-
gual, es decir una sociedad que incluye a dos categoras de personas: los pastores y el rebao, los que ocu-
pan en un rango de diferentes grados de la jerarqua y la multitud de los fieles. Y estas categoras son de
tal forma distintas entre s, que nicamente en la Jerarqua reside el derecho y la autoridad necesarias para
promover y dirigir a todos los miembros al fin de la sociedad. En cuanto al pueblo, no tiene otro derecho
que el de dejarse conducir y, como rebao fiel, seguir dcilmente a sus pastores (cursivas mas).
rreccin de Cristo 74. Por ello, en la tradicin bblica (tanto veterotestamentaria como
neotestamentaria) existe una tensin permanente y constitutiva entre liberacin (hist-
rica) y salvacin (escatolgica). Tensin que se manifiesta justamente en el anuncio del
Reino, que es a la vez una realidad histrica iniciada por el propio Jess, pero que solo
conseguir consumacin escatolgica al fin de los tiempos. Pero en los textos bblicos
no se pretende una desvalorizacin de la liberacin frente a la salvacin, sino que ms
bien la liberacin que inaugura Cristo es el signo real de que nos est reservada una sal-
vacin definitiva escatolgica. La excesiva escatologizacin del Reino de Dios puede dar
lugar a una actitud pasiva frente al mundo, algo que no ocurri en Cristo, puesto que
l identifica los signos de ese Reino futuro con signos que l ya estaba haciendo pre-
sente en la tierra 75.
A este respecto, el segundo punto a considerar es la escatologa, pero slo desde un
ngulo que interesa aqu especialmente para poner de manifiesto la riqueza teolgica de
una metafsica del devenir: me refiero especialmente al tema de en qu consistir la vida
eterna: en una contemplacin intelectual esttica o en una vida amorosa y voluntarista
dinmica. Filosficamente, desde el mundo griego ya se plante esta cuestin y se desa-
rroll a lo largo de toda la historia de la filosofa occidental. Y lo ms curioso es que las
respuestas teolgicas concretas (que carecen todas ellas de carcter apodctico) que se
han dado han tenido como apoyatura terica una concreta metafsica: bien la del pri-
mado del intelecto (normalmente vinculadas a metafsicas ms estticas y fijistas), bien
la del primado de la voluntad (las ms de las veces fundadas en metafsicas dinmicas y
no-fijistas). As, es conocida la absoluta preeminencia que concede el mundo griego al
conocimiento y al intelecto frente a la voluntad. Esto es lo que explica que la escatolo-
ga griega siempre est atravesada por la afirmacin de la posesin intelectual de las ver-
dades eternas, y por ello: todo el sentido de la vida, toda verdadera aspiracin inteli-
gente se reduce esencialmente a la tranquila posesin del conocimiento del ser, en tanto
que no hay para el hombre dicha tan alta, ventura tan profunda como la posesin de
las formas eternas en el puro conocimiento racional (Heimsoeth, 1974: 205). Este modo
de ver las cosas alcanza su cima en el neoplatonismo de Plotino. No obstante, con la apa-
ricin del cristianismo comienza a decaer el optimismo intelectualista y surge con fuer-
za un nuevo modo de comprender las relaciones de la voluntad con el intelecto. Pero a
pesar de los esfuerzos de la patrstica, en la mayora de los casos se sigue bajo el prima-
do del intelecto como ocurra en el mundo griego. Y no ser hasta Agustn que el pri-
mado de la voluntad adquiera peso terico especfico, aunque tambin l caer en la rbi-
ta de la escatologa griega: Pero la coronacin de todo es tambin en San Agustn el
ideal antiguo de la pura contemplacin. Por encima de la dicha de la unin voluntaria,
de la comunin con el amor eterno, la escatologa de San Agustn aspira al estado de
reposo y anegacin en la eterna verdad y belleza (Ibd.: 213). En cualquier caso, la
influencia de Agustn ser decisiva y sus ideas influirn en Escoto Ergena, San Ansel-
mo y Abelardo, aunque todos ellos terminaban por ceder al peso de la influencia griega
74
No conozco libro ms liberador para los cristianos que nos sentamos contrariados con esa teo-
loga que estaba ya tan asentada en la sociedad, que el de JOS MARA CASTILLO, Espiritualidad para insatis-
fechos (2007), donde el soplo del Espritu es agraciante, liberador, feliz y humano, y apuesta siempre por
la vida.
75
Por eso puede resultar peligrosa una lectura unilateral del siguiente prrafo de Blondel (1966: 193):
siempre estamos dispuestos a calcular para maana el reino de Dios en la tierra; ilusin carnal que es nece-
sario evitar a todo trance, porque engendra impaciencia y violencia, decepcin y desaliento, por no decir
abdicacin y traicin. El filsofo francs parece olvidar las contrapartidas: miseria y explotacin, desespe-
ranza y sufrimiento, resignacin y opresin, utopa y fidelidad al proyecto humanizador de Cristo.
76
La felicidad, segn Santo Toms, no descansa en el acto de la voluntad. Esta, en efecto, no puede
ser nuestro fin, pues tiende siempre a lo querido, mientras por otra parte todo ser halla su descanso ni-
camente en el fin. Solo el intelecto proporciona el ltimo fin y la dicha de la posesin perfecta. Ultima
hominis salus est ut secundum intellectivam partem perficiatur contemplatione virtutis purae (Heimsoeth,
1974: 216).
dad a la hora de dar testimonio del evangelio, ya que sta proviene simplemente de nues-
tra obligacin de testificar la verdad tal como la hemos encontrado. Ni tampoco es dis-
minuir la importancia de las decisiones que tomamos en esta vida. Cada alejamiento de
Dios har que el camino de vuelta sea ms duro. [] Pero habr quienes rechacen el
perdn y la purificacin divinos para siempre, o al final se salvarn todos (incluso Hitler
y Stalin)? [] No puedo creer que Dios extinguir para siempre su ofrecimiento amo-
roso de misericordia, pero tampoco creo que har caso omiso de que la libertad huma-
na le rechace.
77
El cristianismo se comprende no como un sistema arquitectnico de verdades salvficas, sino
como la comunicacin de la vida divina dentro del mundo (Boff, 1993).
78
[La filosofa] ser la misma vida tomando conciencia y direccin de s misma [] (Blondel,
1967: 56).
79
Nous avons tendance en effet parler de la science et de la philosophie en gnral comme des-
sences immuables et ternelles. Or, le fait est quelles sont en changement constant et par suite que le
problme de leurs rapports change sans cesse de forme. Il nest plus ce quil tait au temps dAristote, pas
mme ce quil tait il y a cinquante ans. Il sera autre demain (Jolivet, 1958: 61).
80
Todo parece indicar que entre el arcaico mundo greco-escolstico y el moderno mundo de la cien-
cia, la cultura y las sociedades modernas media una enorme distancia. Lo sensato es pensar que ha llega-
do ya para la Iglesia catlica el momento de cambiar de paradigma: es mucho pedir despus de veinte
siglos de persistencia en el paradigma griego? (Monserrat, 2005: 267 y 268).
sin social y que no cuestiona crticamente las consecuencias de sus propias afirmacio-
nes. Ahora bien, cul es la instancia capaz de juzgar que un determinado movimiento
filosfico o teolgico o una exigencia social mayoritaria de una sociedad democrtica es
simplemente una moda y no un verdadero y necesario cambio de paradigma? En este
sentido, el magisterio no tiene ni legitimidad eclesial ni autoridad cientfica para pro-
nunciarse al respecto. De hecho, debera ser la propia comunidad cientfica la que esta-
blezca los criterios de validacin internos que permitan discernir el valor de las nuevas
propuestas teolgicas y filosficas. No puede existir una instancia carismtica que, fuera
del circuito cientfico, pretenda constituirse en criterio ltimo y supremo de las nuevas
reformulaciones teolgicas, puesto que no se trata de discutir acerca del depositum fidei,
sino de la creacin de nuevos lenguajes, formulas y categoras intelectuales que permi-
tan la comprensin del evangelio en nuevos universos simblicos. A este respecto, no
debe olvidarse la afirmacin del ahora cardenal Walter Kasper, en su Introduccin a la
fe: No hay a penas un solo descubrimiento cientfico importante y moderno que no haya
sido condenado o mirado con recelo en alguna ocasin por una u otra de las Iglesias.
Y, por supuesto, no slo novedades en el campo de las ciencias fsico-naturales, sino tam-
bin y sobre todo en la metafsica, en las ciencias humanas y en la propia teologa. Por
este motivo, no se puede ocultar la inevitable tensin que este hecho produce entre la
teologa y el magisterio, y que muchos telogos tratan de maquillar con bonitas dialc-
ticas verbales 81, pero que dejan intacto el problema. Porque ocurre que se est haciendo
tan duro vivir realmente la eclesialidad propia de la teologa y del telogo, que cada vez
ms los telogos viven en una suerte de mundo interior de ostracismo por miedo a las
condenas y las censuras oficiales, y slo algunos pocos deciden hacer pblico su disen-
so, mientras que la mayora comienzan a perder precisamente esa necesaria insercin
de la ejercitacin teolgica dentro de la Iglesia, viviendo esquizofrnicamente, con opi-
niones propias silenciadas y con manifestaciones externas falseadas, en un doloroso
mundo interior 82. De ah que muchos tengamos la intuicin fundada de que cada vez
ms se repite aquello que C. G. Valls contaba en su Querida Iglesia (citado en Moral,
2007: 398), acerca de la tpica situacin de un profesor de teologa: Yo digo una cosa
en los apuntes fotocopiados que van a Roma. Otra cosa en clase donde la palabra habla-
da nunca compromete tanto como la escrita. Otra en pequeos grupos con mayor fami-
liaridad y confianza. Y otra al fin al hablar de t a t con amigos Cuatro niveles de una
sola verdad. Me mortifica, pero no me queda otro remedio si quiero subsistir. Y todos
hacemos lo mismo. Esta situacin no deja de ser absurdamente inhumana y anti-evan-
glica. No hay aqu un la verdad os har libres, sino ms bien la necesidad de ocultar
los nuevos pensamientos teolgicos con la nica intencin de subsistir dentro de la ofi-
cialidad y, ms an, de dar una falsa impresin de homogeneidad doctrinal y teolgica.
Sea lo que fuere de ello, lo cierto es que el cristianismo necesita urgentemente refor-
mular su mensaje dentro de los universos simblicos modernos. Del mismo modo que
la metafsica del siglo XX se alej y rechaz las grandes construcciones deductivas y a priori
que pretendan dar cuenta de toda la realidad de una vez por todas, as tambin la teo-
81
Me parece que sin tener que recurrir a otros autores que a muchos les pareceran sospechosos,
una buena aproximacin valiente y sin maquillajes, es la que hace Rovira Belloso en el Manual de la BAC
(2000: 274-291, El telogo en la Iglesia y ante el magisterio).
82
Son muchos los ejemplos que tenemos de esta situacin penosa de dolor y sufrimiento de telo-
gos y filsofos que han sufrido y sufren el desgarro interior producido por la incomprensin por parte de
las burocracias eclesiales. Para evitar citar a autores modernos, slo citar el caso paradigmtico de Con-
gar como telogo (2004) y de Zubiri como filsofo (sobre todo, por la crisis modernista) (Corominas y
Vicens, 2006).
loga tiene que ser capaz de caminar desde abajo y en comunin con las mujeres y hom-
bres de su tiempo, escapando a visiones totalizadoras que niegan que pueda haber algo
nuevo bajo el sol. Y, sobre todo, desde la humildad y la conciencia de que nadie es po-
seedor absoluto de la verdad, y que el pluralismo y la relatividad de nuestros conoci-
mientos, no son sinnimo de indiferentismo ni relativismo. Se impone la exigencia de
una imaginacin creadora, a travs de la cual los telogos estn en condiciones de poder
ensayar modos de responder a los retos intelectuales del presente, y dar cabida a len-
guajes y universos simblicos que sugieran ms que la metafsica griega. En este senti-
do, uno de mis grandes encuentros ha sido el libro de Gonzlez de Cardedal, Cuatro poe-
tas desde la otra ladera (1996), que con magistral pluma evoca una cristologa potica, y
desde mi punto de vista, mucho ms sugerente para el seguimiento dinmico y amoro-
so a Cristo, que los sesudos y estticos manuales de cristologa.
Pero todo ello debe hacerse desde la libre intrepidez intelectual del telogo que se arries-
ga, porque el telogo est llamado a consagrarse a la verdad y a la santidad de la inte-
ligencia. l tendr que estar dispuesto a arriesgar su carrera civil y eclesistica, el pres-
tigio social y meditico, en aras de la verdad. Una verdad que no es la suya y que nunca
pretender haberla alcanzado ya desde su inteligencia o su voluntad (Cordovilla, 2007:
98). Evidentemente, son muchos los telogos de la ciencia en los que se ana esta ima-
ginacin creadora con la libre intrepidez intelectual; pero ya dijimos que a menudo corren
el riesgo de que sus aportaciones queden reducidas a su propio mbito acadmico sin
repercusin eclesial. Tambin son muchos los filsofos y telogos sistemticos que estn
trabajando en esa reformulacin, y que en Espaa, por ejemplo, son conocidos por todos.
No obstante, quisiera simplemente citar por ser menos conocido, el ltimo y reciente
libro del salesiano Jos Luis Moral (2007), cuyo ttulo es significativo: Ciudadanos y cris-
tianos. Reconstruccin de la Teologa Pastoral como Teologa de las Praxis Cristiana, que
es un valiente esfuerzo por hablar sin tapujos de la difcil situacin actual de la teologa
y su necesaria reconstruccin (nosotros hemos hablado de reformulacin) desde un nuevo
paradigma, y sobre todo de poner de manifiesto que la recepcin del Concilio Vatica-
no II ha quedado truncada. Este libro, a pesar de no haber sido citado en este trabajo
con la profusin que debera, ha sido el impulso ltimo para poner yo en palabra escri-
ta mi deseo de una verdadera reformulacin de la teologa, en mi caso, desde la metaf-
sica del devenir.
Pero todo esto no son ms que simples propuestas, y ninguno de los que pretende-
mos esta renovacin, exigimos absolutez ni definitividad a nuestros planteamientos. Sino
que justamente por asumir la historicidad, el devenir, la fluidez y el dinamismo inhe-
rente a la realidad creada, apostamos por una continua reconstruccin y profundizacin
teolgica y filosfica, pero siempre hecha desde los universos simblicos comprensibles
para la humanidad de nuestro tiempo. Eso s, hace mucho que algunos tenemos claro
que todo conocimiento (y especialmente el teolgico) tiene que estar al servicio de la libe-
racin de las personas, de la construccin de un mundo ms justo, de denuncia de las
estructuras injustas y opresoras. A nosotros nos impact mucho leer recientemente la
afirmacin que el fallecido socilogo y telogo Hugo Assmann escribiera hace ms de
treinta aos:
Si la situacin histrica de dependencia y dominacin de dos tercios de la huma-
nidad, con sus treinta millones anuales de muertos de hambre y desnutricin, no se con-
vierte en el punto de partida de cualquier teologa cristiana hoy, aun en los pases ricos
y dominadores, la teologa no podr situar y concretar histricamente sus temas fun-
damentales. Sus preguntas no sern preguntas reales. Pasarn al lado del hombre real
Por eso, como observaba un participante del encuentro de Buenos Aires, es necesario
salvar a la teologa de su cinismo. Porque realmente frente a los problemas del mundo
de hoy muchos escritos de teologa se reducen al cinismo.
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JAVIER MONSERRAT
Universidad Autnoma de Madrid
The winner of the Templeton Prize 2008 was announced during a press conference at
the United Nations Church Centre in New York on 17 March this year. The Prize was
awarded to Michael Heller for his work over more than forty years and his shrewd and
often surprising insights regarding our concepts of the origin and cause of the universe.
Heller is a professor of philosophy, although he trained in the fields of mathematics, physics
and cosmology, as well as in philosophy and theology. His contributions pertain, in many
senses, strictly to the field of physics, although they are theoretical rather than experimental.
Indeed, they are more proposals of speculative mathematical-formal models and have been
published in many prestigious international physics journals. But the heart of Hellers
concerns always points towards the philosophy or metaphysics of the universe, where the
fundaments of reality relate the ontological roots of the universe to the ontology of the
Divinity and the act of creation. One may or may not agree with Hellers speculations, may
view them as more or less plausible and consider their formal construction to be either
laudable or poor, but anyone who reads his work cannot help but gain the impression of
following the arguments and affirmations of an extraordinarily well-informed, precise and
deep-thinking physicist-philosopher.
One significant circumstance in Hellers life was his relationship with Pope John Paul II, which
was established even before Cardinal Karol Wojtyla acceded to the pontificate. In private meetings
with Heller and other Polish scientists, John Paul II often reflected on the implications of key scientific
questions on theology. It seems (since officially, we can obviously affirm nothing) that Heller is the
author of the letter John Paul II sent in 1996 to George Coyne, the then director of the Vatican
Observatory. This letter, later published on the STR Chair website, is one of the most explicit and
open theological documents ever signed by John Paul II. In it, the Pope echoed the need for a theory
inspired in the world of science, just as a theology inspired in Aristotles teachings was developed
during the Middle Ages.
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He was not granted a passport until 1977. Once he was free to leave the country, he was appointed
visiting professor at the Catholic University of Louvains Institute of Astrophysics and Geophysics,
in Belgium, and also carried out research at the Oxford University Institute of Astrophysics and the
physics and astronomy department of the University of Leicester. In 1985 he joined the teaching staff
of the Pontifical Academy of Theology in Krakow, where he has engaged in a wide range of teaching
activities over the last twenty years.
In 1986 he began collaborating with the Vatican Observatory in Castel Gandolfo, where he worked
with the Jesuits George Coyne and William Stoeger, repeatedly mentioned in trends of religions. He
also made contact with the Vatican Observatory Research Group at the Steward Observatory at the
University of Arizona, Tucson, and is the co-author of a book with Coyne. Some of his other works
in English were also published by the Vatican Observatory.
Hellers biography reflects the dramatic nature of the tormented history of 20th century Europe.
His father, an engineer by profession, sabotaged the chemical facility in which he worked in order
to prevent it from being used by the German troops during the Second World War. Fleeing from
repercussions, the family lived in Ukraine, Siberia and Southern Russia, before finally returning to
Poland. Hellers decision to devote his life to science was frustrated and severely limited for decades
due to the oppression of the communist regime. Only the protection of the Polish Church enabled
him to pursue his scientific and philosophical vocation, which recently culminated in his being
awarded the Templeton Prize.
PUBLICATIONS
The statement issued by the Templeton Foundation accompanying the announcement of the 2008
prize-winner described Hellers oeuvre as prodigious, encompassing thirty books (some in English,
the majority in Polish) and around 400 papers, consisting of both research and, mainly, dissemination.
Here, we will refer to the four books in English that, for now at least, provide a feasible point of access
for getting to know the work of this great academic.
Theoretical Foundations of Cosmology (World Scientific, 1992) is a technical cosmological work
examining the mathematical models which underpin theoretical physics and cosmology. In Some
Mathematical Physics for Philosophers (Pontifical Council for Culture, Gregorian University, 2005),
Heller provides philosophers with a structuralist vision of the theory of relativity and quantum
mechanics.
His other two English-language works relate both new physics and cosmology with the question
of God, religion and theology. These works are: The New Physics and a New Theology (Vatican
Observatory Publications, 1996) and also Creative Tension: Essays on Science and Religion (Templeton
Foundation Press, 2003). We will base our overview of Hellers personality and work on both these
two books and the documentation included on the website templetonprize.org, about the author.
People often say that physics is a science of matter or of the material world, but while most
books on theoretical physics contain lots of mathematics, few mention anything about matter. This
is because physics develops by constructing mathematical models of the world and then by confronting
them with empirical results. One may say that the world, as viewed by modern physics, is constructed
not out of matter but rather out of mathematics. But mathematics is a science of structures.
Of course, mathematics deals also with much more complex structures, for instance, vector
spaces, algebras, Euclidean or Riemannian spaces and so on. And physicists take some of these
structures and interpret them as structures of the world. For instance, they say that the space-time
of our world is a four-dimensional Riemannian space. This is a very powerful method; it sees the
world through the glasses of structures. In this sense, physics is not a science of matter but rather
a science of structures. This view is called structuralist philosophy of physics. I not only develop it
in my philosophical papers, but also try to do science and teach it in the spirit of this philosophy
(Heller, Reflections on Key Books and Publications, templetonprize.org).
Here we see with absolute clarity the perspective that enables us to assess the nature and meaning
of Hellers physical-philosophical thought: his analysis and understanding of physical theories of
matter and the universe is always a reflection on the mathematical models applied to provide an
ontological view of reality. This structuralist approach to scientific theories is not something unique
to Heller, but rather has a long history in the epistemology of science. We need go no further than
empiriocriticism, Pierre Duhem or Poincar, or Wolfgang Stegmller in the nineteen-seventies.
However, it is an approach that was assimilated by Heller, and which illuminates his way of probing
the philosophical problems of physics.
His early studies, focusing mainly on the theory of relativity, provided him with access to an
example of structuralism: Einsteins relativity identified using Riemannian geometries which enabled
him to make the world fit and describe it. Prompted by the mathematical logic of relativist models,
Heller began exploring the issue of singularities (anticipated in the mathematical form of the relativist
model). However, when reason reaches the limits of Plancks era and attempts to cross Plancks
threshold in time and space (1033 cm), entering the original limits of the singularity in which the
big bang occurred, the question arises as to the type of real situation in which all this was possible.
And asking about a real situation is, in physics, the same as asking about the mathematical (structural)
models which enable us to understand it.
The question is then, what type of physical situation existed in Plancks era, from which our real
world emerged. This, as it is accessible to us now, corresponds on the one hand to the classical-
relativist mechanics (macrocosmos) encompassed in a Riemannian geometric mathematical model,
and on the other to the quantum mechanics (microcosmos) encompassed in a non-geometrical
mathematical model (Hilbert space), with primordially statistical and probabilistic traits. In ordinary
physics, relativity and quantum mechanics have both become parallel correct explanatory dimensions
of the macroscopic and microphysical (respectively) physical reality.
However, when entering Plancks era, both relativist and quantum perspectives necessarily become
confused, since there is no physical reality that can be known by either of these approaches. The only
physical theory capable then of responding to the situation existing in Plancks era must be quantum-
relativist; hence the vital importance of current research into quantum gravity. As Heller observes,
the problem of this quantum-relativist merging is that the mathematical model of relativity is geometric,
while the quantum model is not. Hence the difficulty in finding a single conception that encompasses
mathematical models of different natures (relativist and quantum).
Some relativity theorists have in fact proposed diverse ways of explaining the geometrical nature
of the singularity (in physical terms, the big bang) and the birth of the relativist space-time until the
end of Plancks era. Heller offers an in-depth analysis of these different theoretical proposals. He does
not appear to study the superstring theory here in any great depth (although he doubtless does so in
other parts of his extensive oeuvre), but we should remember that Magic Theory is also a formal
mathematical speculation designed to explain, based on its eleven dimensions or variables, how our
space-time world emerged though Plancks era.
Here is where the fundamental idea provided by Heller fits in. It is an evidently speculative idea
(as indeed is the superstring theory) that suggests that in Plancks era, relativist and quantum approaches
may coincide and be understood from a higher level of abstraction represented by the mathematical
model of a non-commutative geometry. This new geometry, constructed recently by some authors,
is not a space-time geometry, but rather a space without points or seconds which would, according
to Heller, enable the emergence of both classic-relativist space-time and the special form of quantum
space-time.
The primordial reality modelled by this non-commutative geometry would therefore be non-
local, non-temporal, on the sidelines of the space-time we know and dynamic, rather than static.
There would be different states and operators between one state and another, but no space-time; in
other words, there would be a kind of superimposed simultaneity. In some way, in this primordial
reality modelled by the non-commutative geometry, in which the classical-relativist and quantum
worlds could be reconciled, many of the quantum properties to which we now have experimental
access though a series of observables would become valid.
It is clear that Heller likes this idea, since as a theologian and someone engaging in a moment
of second order speculation, this model seems to suggest certain parallels with the idea of a God
existing beyond the space-time which is, nevertheless, dynamic. This God would not be eternal (i.e.
with infinite time), but rather simply something different, non-temporal, existing beyond the space-
time, where the superimposition of states and simultaneity would prevail.
Furthermore, the idea of God suggested by this non-commutative geometry is used by Heller
to discuss some of the principles of process theology (Whitehead), namely, the idea of God as a non-
creator Demiurge subjected to the space-time of the real classical world. For Heller, it is erroneous
to claim that God should be subject to the space-time in order to be a dynamic, living God, connected
to the events of the world. The non-commutative geometry model enables him to conceive a type of
reality outside the space-time, which is nevertheless dynamic. In this sense, the model proposed by
Heller responds more to the traditional idea of a transcendent God who is also the creative origin,
the fundament of being, out of whom the space-time of the created world emerges.
We should not forget that there is also another speculative aspect regarding the ultimate origins
and foundations of the physical reality. We talk of a singularity (within the framework of the
mathematical model of relativity) which translated into a real big bang that actually occurred as a
physical event. But, what existed before the big bang? Today, there is much debate and speculation
around the idea that the singularity of our universe is just one of an infinite number of singularities
occurring in a meta-space or eternal fundamental universe constituted perhaps by a quantum
vacuum, by a sea of energy, by Bohms implicate order or by a primordial ether (although not in
the Newtonian sense) from which infinite multiverses are generated. In each of these scenarios,
the emerging universe responds to a set of values in keeping with the structure of variables conceived
(also using speculative-mathematical methods) by the superstring theory.
Heller is obviously opposed to these speculations about multiverses and string theory. He proposes
instead an alternative speculation which he believes is more realistic and, in his opinion, more in
keeping with theology: his speculation deals with a universe which, in moving towards its primordial
foundations, transforms into a non-space-time dimension which ends up connecting to the transcendent
reality of an atemporal God beyond any possible geometric singularities and the big bang.
According to Heller, we can speculate that, rather than an artificial instrument used in relation to
classic singularities in general relativity, non-commutative geometry is, in fact, something which reflects
the structure of the era of quantum gravity. The fact that the operators in Hilbert space (the typical
mathematical objects of quantum mechanics) respond to the true essence of a non-commutative description
of singularities may suggest that said singularities have a certain knowledge of quantum effects. The
tempting hypothesis is that the era of quantum gravity exists under Plancks threshold, modelled by a
non-commutative geometry and, as a result, absolutely non-local. In this era there is neither space nor
time in the usual sense. Only when the universe passes over Plancks threshold is there a transition phase
to commutative geometry, and it is during this transition that ordinary space-time emerges, along with
its frontiers or singular limits (singularities) (Creative Tension, 92-93).
Singularities are formed during the transition process over Plancks threshold, when space-time
emerges from a non-commutative geometry. This process can be explained in the following way.
Normally, we think of Plancks era as something hidden in the prehistory of the universe, when its
typical scale was around 1033 cm. However, Plancks era can in fact be seen even now if we delve
deeper and deeper into the structure of the world, until we reach the 1033 cm threshold. Upon crossing
this threshold, we find ourselves in Plancks stratum, with its non-commutative regime. At this
basic level under Plancks scale, all states exist equally, and there is no difference between singular
and non-singular ones. Only the macroscopic observer, located in space-time (and therefore beyond
Plancks threshold), can say that their universe began in a singularity in a finite past, and may
possibly finish in a final singularity in a finite future (Creative Tension, 93).
The non-commutative perspective provides a natural explanation for all non-local phenomena.
Since the fundamental level is totally non-local, it is hardly surprising that certain quantum phenomena
(such as the EPR experiment) that occur at this level have non-local effects; they are like the tip of the
iceberg of this non-local non-commutativity which remains present despite the transitional phase to
ordinary physics. In order to explain the horizon problem [the astrophysical fact that very distant parts
of the universe that have not had any physical contact nevertheless have exactly the same values for
certain parameters], Heller believes we should adopt a different approach and regard fundamental
non-commutativity as being located at the beginning, in the pre-Planck era. This hypothesis supposes
that this era was totally global; it would not, therefore, be at all surprising if, when passing over Plancks
threshold, the universe preserved certain global characteristics even in those places that never (after
Plancks threshold) came into causal contact with each other (Creative Tension, 115).
The second order speculative reflection (the first order one would be scientific only) is for Heller
the philosophical-metaphysical-theological one. It is here that the logic of his explanatory hypothesis
of the non-commutative geometry prompts him to reinterpret certain classic themes of philosophy-
theology, such as: the idea of time, or to be more precise, space-time, in God; the application of this
to the traditional idea of creation (continuous creation from eternity, as foreseen by Saint Thomas);
the concept of causality and the first cause; the way in which chance, probability and statistics can
be understood as elements of the creative design of a divinity beyond the space-time; the classic
themes of divine omnipotence and omniscience in the debate with process philosophy-theology
(Whitehead); and the classic theme of the meaning of the actions of God in the world, among others.
understand why its ontology makes it necessary. Returning to Leibnizs question, which Heller
mentions in the text quoted above, we cannot know why the universe exists or does not exist, or
why God exists or does not exist. The only thing reason and science can do is try to understand the
basis of the sufficiency of the universe that does in fact exist and which contains us, and eo ipso,
attribute the need to it.
This is exactly what Leo Smolin says in reference to Leibnizs question why is there something
rather than nothing?, in a text cited by Heller himself, in which he says that he does not really
understand how science, despite all its progress, can ever help us understand questions of this kind.
At the end of the day, perhaps room should be left for mysticism. However, mysticism is not
metaphysics, and this, he says, is all he is trying to eliminate (Creative Tension, 160).
Indeed, if reason could only attribute need to God, then the existence of God would be rationally
certain (in other words, it would be a metaphysical certainty as the Thomist school would say).
Atheism would not be feasible for reason. Is this what Heller thinks? The truth is that he seems
somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, we have texts like the one cited above. But on the other,
he also says that sciences greatest contribution to theology is the fact that it makes us understand
that the universe is a Mystery. And here, we wholeheartedly agree with him.
It is a mystery that some try to clarify with freely assumed atheist hypotheses. But it is also a
mystery susceptible to others, such as Heller, suggesting freely assumed possible hypotheses and
speculations that demonstrate the verisimilitude of the hypothesis that it was created by a personal
divine being, the fundament of being.
GUILLERMO ARMENGOL
Universidad Comillas de Madrid
Holmes Rolston III is an American philosopher who trained as a physicist and mathematician
and who has spent his academic life in the philosophy department of Colorado State University.
The son of a Presbyterian minister, he himself is also a pastor in the Presbyterian Church,
despite deciding to dedicate his life to academia. Although retired, he still remains intellectually
active. Among the many prizes and accolades he has won throughout his career, the Templeton
Prize in 2003 was the one which, without doubt, most served to popularise his name and work.
Holmes Rolston graduated in physics and mathematics from Davidson College, Charlotte, N.C.,
before studying theology at the Union Seminary in Virginia. Later, in 1958, he earned a PhD in
theology from Edinburgh University, Scotland, and finally, several years later, earned a second
doctorate in philosophy of science from Pittsburgh University. He was then invited to work at the
philosophy department of Colorado State University, where he was appointed a full professor in 1976.
His contributions were not always highly valued by the scientific community, and indeed, some of
his key manuscripts were initially rejected by important publishing houses. However, full recognition
arrived when he was invited to give the Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh in 1997-1998.
When examining Rolstons intellectual contribution to science, we should remember that he is
known as the father of environmental ethics. Rolston himself has observed that it turned out that the
direction in which I wanted to go, and in which I went for two decades, ended up being the direction
in which the world started to move. His work coincided with the rise of environmental issues, and in
this field he ended up becoming one of the most important authors of American philosophy.
For Rolston, the ethical discovery of nature is philosophical, but it is a philosophy that accepts
science and which is based on the intrinsic values of nature itself. Nevertheless, as a theologian,
Rolston has also described the theological logic that enables us to recognise not only the ethic value,
but also the sacred value of nature. Rolstons work then, merges, quite independently, the logic of
philosophy, which accepts and applies ethical rules to science and technology, and the logic of
theology, which projects onto nature the perspective of faith which accepts philosophy and science,
but which views nature with a kind of sacred respect which steers human behaviour towards new
ethical-ecological dimensions.
Rolston gained a certain level of recognition for the first time in 1975, when he published his
paper Is there an Ecological Ethic? The paper explored some of the ideas that Rolston has striven to
combat for years, namely the existence of a value-free nature, with no intrinsic value in itself, since
all ethical valuation depends always on a connection with humans. Rolston, on the other hand,
believes that natural ethics does not always depend on mankind.
Nature itself possesses ethical values that any ethical being (i.e. man) should respect for themselves,
regardless of their repercussions on human life. Soil, plants, animals, species and ecosystems hold,
for Rolston, a value in themselves, regardless of and separate from human issues. This value constitutes
ethical principles that impose themselves on human conduct.
Some of his most important works include Philosophy Gone Wild (1986), Environmental Ethics
(1988) and Conserving Natural Value (1994). In other works he explores the ethical-theological view
of the natural world, with this being his own individual contribution to the science-religion debate,
understood on the basis of the convergence of philosophy and theology in ecological ethics. Here,
we will be looking at Science and Religion: A Critical Survey (1987) and Genes, Genesis and God
(1999), in connection with the Gifford Lectures of 1997-1998.
Rolston intuitively explains his approach to the debate on science and religion. Other approaches,
he says, have either based themselves on religion and tried to reach out to science, or have based
themselves on science and have tried to reach out to religion. However, they have always tried to
make peace between the warring parties. Rolston, on the other hand, aims to prompt both science
and religion to make their peace with nature, and to come together in nature itself.
Science has always seen nature as a medium, something neutral with no intrinsic ethical value;
for its part, monotheist theology has always seen nature as something fallen owing to human sin.
For Rolston, if both science and religion were to change their view of nature, they could also lessen
the secular gap that separates them, thus reaching a convergence between the philosophical ethics
of reason and the sacred ethics of theology.
Rolston believes that religion should naturalise itself in that it should return to the sacred
experience of nature. For Rolston, all religious experience is a numinous experience of nature. This
experience may explain the prehistoric origin of religion, and is therefore the form that religious
experience has gradually taken in our genes (and which is in keeping with current empirical results
on the existence of what is today known as the mystic brain).
One must also get religion naturalised, not so much in the sense of explaining it (away)
naturalistically, as of explaining the numinous encounter with manifest nature. Biology does generate
religion: the phenomenon of life evokes a religious response whether or not a functional human
society is at issue. Nature is the first mystery to be encountered, and society comes later, much
later, after one learns evolutionary history (Genes, Genesis and God, Cambridge University Press,
1999, 294).
As human beings with mind, we are here and therefore need a unified recounting of the history
of the Earth that has brought us to where we are today.
A PROLIFIC EARTH
The first numinous experience of an ethical and sacred Earth is its fertility. The idea of a surprising,
fertile Earth that produces life. Fertility, Rolston says, is exactly what is evoked by religious faith.
The Earths prolific fertility, fruitfulness or generative capacity is what most needs to be explained
in the spectacular unfolding of life in which we ourselves are immersed. We should remember,
Rolston reminds us, that Natures root idea is that of giving birth (p. 226).
We need to explain the unfolding, the generative processes. We need to find out how possibilities
are updated, how spaces and deep sources of creativity become possible. In this genesis, more regularly
comes out of less. Sometimes, it even comes out of nothing; or in other words, out of somewhere
where nothing similar ever existed before. Information is superimposed onto matter and energy, as
the key to the vital regeneration of life. It is a pregnant Earth. We know the meaning of pregnant in
child-bearing women; it is the period during which life information is transferred via DNA from one
generation to another. However, we need to rethink where and how this information arises on Earth.
Virtually all biologists are religious, in the deepest sense of the term, even if it is a religion without
revelation. We discern something sublime, in the sense that it inspires awe, because there is something
sublime (in the etymological sense of the term), something which takes us to the limits of our
understanding, and mysteriously even beyond (p. 297).
In this prolific process of the Earth in which more seems to emerge from less, nature proceeds
unbendingly: it is the logic of the selfish gene in which progress towards life is built over death. If
this progress which tramples on the past is seen as a sin, then nature becomes prolific on the basis
of sin. Making headway by cutting off others, aborting possibilities, in the midst of death, burdens
the dynamics of life with the weight of transgression or sin. This dramatic quality of moving forward
sinfully (in the widest sense of the term) on the basis of negation, is one of the unmistakable traits
of the natural world.
However, in beings endowed with sensibility, this move forward also occurs in the midst of
suffering. History, Rolston says, is the history of the evolution of suffering. Genes do not suffer;
organisms with genes do not need to suffer, but those with neurons do. Life is unquestionably prolific,
and is therefore as undeniably pathetic (from the Greek pathos) as if its logic were exactly that of
pathos. Fertility is closely linked to struggle (p. 303).
Suffering, Rolston believes, is a torturous fact, but the first thing we learn is that suffering is
the downside of sentience, the sentient experience, consciousness, pleasure, intention, all excitation
of subjectivity that is so strangely generated from pure objectivity. Rocks, he says, do not suffer, but
the substratum of the rocks has organised itself into animals whose experience produces pain and
pleasure, and into men whose existence includes anxiety and affliction (p. 303).
Not only because of this dramatic quality of moving forward in sin through negation, but also
because of its progress through the affliction of suffering, nature is prolific and creates life along a
dramatic road that Rolston describes as cruciform, alluding to both the cross, the essence of
Christianity, and to the core of the experience of other religious traditions, such as Buddhism.
Man forms part of nature through his experience of existing in a prolific nature. This fertility is
so great that it seems to give the false impression that, in its advance, nature becomes supernature,
as if it were beyond itself, or as if more had emerged from less. Rolston defends an emergence in
which the natural dynamics produce new ways of being (which lead to the human spirit); but this
process towards more is always based on previous stages, and at the end of the day, on matter-
energy. The future (more, supernatural) is possible because it already existed in the past-present
(less, natural).
According to Rolston, believing in God is, for many, like putting the supernatural beyond the
natural. But no theory can establish a complementary link between God and nature while an
unresolved dualism exists between the natural and the supernatural (Science and Religion. A Critical
Survey, p. 298). Everything is in everything. In this sense, the dignity of the spirit already exists in
the nature of matter-energy. Thus, the ethical discourse for respecting human dignity and autonomy
is, at this level, the same ethical discourse for respecting the dignity and autonomy of natural
processes.
However, at the end of the day, Rolston also offers a religious interpretation of the process which
constitutes an even more powerful foundation for ecological ethics. God is the ultimate supernatural
conclusion, but at the same time, the origin of the whole process, the foundation existing in nature.
All this has an unmistakable Teilhardian flavour based on the concepts of alpha and omega. Indeed,
Teilhard is continually present in Rolstons work.
God is, at a certain level and order of magnitude, beyond the states of quantum superimposition,
beyond the ambital ether of space-time and beyond the anthropic order. God is the supernature from
which nature is frozen. In this sense, God as a fundament comes before what comes after matter,
life, mind, spirit and becomes gradually manifest (by being omnipresent) in the superb evolutionary
sequence in which more and more supernature emerges in nature.
According to Rolston, the universe and the Earth are both God in the form of history. The form
of an explanation of this kind would be more fitting for nature than the best scientific explanations
based on mere laws. It could reach the level of our senses which goes beyond pure cause. It could
reach the sense of the Presence of God, of the Divine You existing in the mundane That (p. 305).
Rolston then, believes that the coherent image of God from the perspective of science is that of
a panentheist God, compatible with orthodox Christianity, which constitutes the non-local
background of the universe and produces nature through creation. Thus, spiritual (supernatural)
divine ontology would emerge through the evolutionary process right up to the appearance of man.
Rolston believes that in Christian theism, Jesus is the living parabola of God. Unlike those who
say that suffering is always too painful to be divine, Christianity presupposes a free life dedicated
to love, leading towards a mysterious end, although it detects in suffering the endless power of God.
Through the cross, Christians enter into communion with this normative power in redemptive
suffering. They join with Christ, who thus dramatically shows that he commands divine energy in
always emerging levels.
What in principle seems an annoying anomaly which contradicts the claim that God is
omnipresent, i.e. the scandalous history of a peasant abandoned by God and crucified, thus becomes
key evidence of the presence of God. The Creator, Rolston believes, is always present, perfecting his
creation through suffering.
Jesus on the cross is a painful God. The hypothesis of God offers the only viable explanation for
the emergence of Jesus in the world. God is both Author and Actor in this exciting story. Jesus loves
with perfection in perfect freedom. And he dies as a testimony to the power of love through suffering
(pp. 326-327).
Through ecology, Rolston strives to understand theologia crucis, or the logic of God on the cross,
i.e. what God is trying to tell us through Christ. His perspective belongs to the Christian tradition:
the evangelical logion take up your cross and follow me is a succinct summing up of Rolstons
theology of the cross. Evolution is cruciform and being a Christian means accepting the cross of
suffering and letting oneself be moved by the impulse towards the supernatural, that in turn leads
to God.
It is, without doubt, an aspect of the message of the cross that is unmistakably Christian.
Nevertheless, the message of the cross also has other important aspects that Rolston does not
consider. The cross shows that God does not impose his presence on the universe, but rather gives
man his freedom, a freedom that is evident in a world in which life, and even ecological ethics, may
be understood without God.
MIGUEL LORENTE
Universidad de Oviedo
Durante tres siglos, a partir de los Principia de Newton en 1687, los avances de las
ciencias fsicas se han ido consolidando no slo experimentalmente, sino sobre todo teri-
camente, de manera que el conocimiento de la naturaleza por el hombre se ha profundiza-
do como nunca en la historia de la humanidad. Se pueden clasificar los grandes descubri-
mientos en perodos de veinticinco aos, desde 1780, entre los que podemos contar las
fuerzas elctricas y magnticas, las propiedades microscpicas de la materia descritas por
la mecnica cuntica y las macroscpicas que estudia la teora de la relatividad, as como
las fuerzas nucleares fuerte y dbil que producen las interacciones entre las partculas ele-
mentales. Con esto llegamos a 1970 en que se produce un equilibrio entre experimento y
teora por medio de un modelo que unificaba las fuerzas conocidas (exceptuando la gravi-
tatoria) y que se llam el modelo standard. Pero el exigente control de la especulacin por
el experimento en el modelo standard dio lugar en los ltimos aos a portentosas propuestas
tericas que especulaban arriesgadamente sobre la gnesis de la estructura microfsica de
la materia.
Durante siglos la fsica terica ha estado complementada con la fsica experimental. A partir de
1970 irrumpe la teora de supercuerdas que pretende solucionar los problemas que afectan a la cien-
cia (unificacin de partculas y fuerzas, paradojas de a mecnica cuntica y gravedad cuntica), pero
que no dispone de una tcnica adecuada para su comprobacin experimental. El optimismo que aco-
gi la nueva teora se desvanece. Lee Smolin hace un balance de los treinta ltimos aos en su libro
The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, the Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next, que
l ha vivido, primero como defensor y luego como promotor de alternativas.
Hasta los aos setenta la fsica terica y experimental haban ido paralelas, apoyndose mutua-
mente, pero pronto empezaron las perplejidades. La fsica terico-experimental no careca de pro-
blemas y el modelo standard distaba de ser un modo perfecto. No se haba encontrado, en efecto,
una teora que unificase los hadrones y los leptones. Lo mismo suceda adems con las fuerzas cono-
cidas, y los clculos perturbativos de algunas interacciones entre ellas se hacan infinitos.
[Queremos anticipar a los lectores de este artculo que hemos optado por resumir el pensa-
miento de Smoln cindonos a los trminos tcnicos para tener mayor exactitud. Esto facilitar la
lectura de quienes conozcan el mundo de la fsica terica. Para los otros lectores se presentarn
dificultades, pero aun as alcanzarn una comprensin intuitiva ms real de las cuestiones tratadas
por la teora de cuerdas y las dificultades cientficas que Smolin propone.]
En 1970 tuvo lugar la primera revolucin de la teora de cuerdas, que solucionaba todos los pro-
blemas mencionados: se unificaban las partculas y las fuerzas, al mismo tiempo que se eliminaban
los infinitos. Pero la nueva hiptesis no encontraba los experimentos apropiados para alcanzar el
rango de teora confirmada. En principio, es legtimo en la ciencia proponer teoras, aunque estas
sean especulativas; lo que ocurre es que las buenas teoras cientficas deben permitir, de una u otra
manera su confrontacin con la experiencia.
1098 M. LORENTE, LEE SMOLIN HACE UNA CRTICA CONSTRUCTIVA DE LA TEORA DEL TODO
Pero han pasado tres dcadas y las pruebas experimentales siguen sin aparecer (al menos con
los medios de que dispone hoy da la tcnica experimental). Se multiplican los modelos pero faltan
nuevos conceptos, como ha sucedido con otras revoluciones cientficas. Lo que se consideraba la la
ciencia del todo empieza a convertirse en una ilusin que no explica nada. D. Gross, premio Nobel
de Fsica por su trabajo en el modelo standard, se convirti en un formidable luchador de la teora
de cuerdas, pero recientemente ha dicho: No sabemos de qu estamos hablando. Y B. Greene aade:
Los investigadores piensan que nuestra formulacin de la teora de cuerdas no posee el ncleo de
fundamentos que encontramos en otros grandes descubrimientos.
Esta situacin de la Fsica, que ha acabado en un camino sin salida, ha motivado a Lee Smolin
a escribir el libro The Trouble with Physics. The Rise of String Theory, the Fall of a Science and What
comes Next (Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 2006). Smolin es la persona indicada para hacer la cr-
tica de los ltimos treinta aos de la fsica y en particular de la teora de cuerdas. Ha sido un par-
tidario decidido de la teora de cuerdas, pero tras aos de reflexin objetiva parece haber llegado a
consecuencias inevitables que ha tenido la valenta de exponer.
Smolin estudia Fsica en la Universidad de Harvard, donde obtiene el ttulo de Doctor. Ha sido
profesor de Fsica terica en las Universidades de Princeton, Yale y Pennsylvania State, y ahora en
el Instituto Perimeter de Toronto, del que ha sido uno de sus fundadores. Sus ms de un centenar
de artculos cientficos reflejan su trayectoria, que va desde la teora de supercuerdas a los spin
networks de Penrose y la teora loop quantum gravity de Ashtekar. Sus tres libros, The Life of the
Cosmos, Three Roads to Quantum Gravity y The Trouble with Physics, reflejan tambin de forma
autobiogrfica su trayectoria ideolgica, desde un cultivador de la teora de supercuerdas hasta el
desengao por esta teora y la bsqueda de alternativas.
El libro de Smolin no es slo un libro de historia que expone acontecimientos de los ltimos
treinta aos, sino tambin un libro programtico que trata de analizar la teora de cuerdas y sus
alternativas, con unos principios que todas deben cumplir. Estos principios se postulan al comien-
zo de libro para que ayuden a hacer la crtica de los intentos que se han hecho en estos treinta lti-
mos aos y permitan pensar en el futuro. Smolin los llama problemas, pero en realidad son prin-
cipios o condiciones necesarias que toda nueva teora debe cumplir:
Problema 1 (Principio de la gravedad cuntica): Consistira en unificar la teora de la relati-
vidad y la mecnica cuntica en una sola teora. Esto implica que la nueva teora ha de ser
independiente del espacio-tiempo contenedor o que ste tenga un caracter dinmico.
Problema 2 (Problema fundamental de la mecnica cuntica): Resolver las paradojas de la
mecnica cuntica de manera que sta tenga sentido. Por ejemplo, la nueva teora debe ser
realista, o sea, que sea independiente del observador y del aparato de medida.
Problema 3 (Problema de unificacin de las partculas y fuerzas): Unificar todas las partcu-
las elementales (todas las familias de quarks y leptones), as como todas las fuerzas conoci-
das (gravitatorias, electromagnticas, nucleares fuertes y dbiles).
Problema 4 (Problema de las constantes universales): Explicar por qu las constantes fsi-
cas que aparecen en el modelo standard tienen valores determinados.
Problema 5 (Materia y energa oscura): Explicar qu es la materia oscura y la energa oscu-
ra; o, si estas no existiesen, por qu la gravedad se modificara tanto a gran escala.
A continuacin Smolin hace un breve resumen de la historia que ha llevado a la teora de super-
cuerdas.
En 1968 G. Veneziano propone un modelo para describir las interacciones entre las partculas
elementales. Considera a las partculas como cintas de goma, que se estiran cuando reciben ener-
ga y se encogen cuando la pierden. Pronto se cambi la imagen de bandas de goma por la de cuer-
M. LORENTE, LEE SMOLIN HACE UNA CRTICA CONSTRUCTIVA DE LA TEORA DEL TODO 1099
das vibrantes, de modo que a cada partcula corresponda un modo de vibracin de esta cuerda.
Este modelo era consistente con la mecnica cuntica y la teora de la relatividad si el espacio con-
tenedor tena 26 dimensiones; pero tena la limitacin de que solo admita bosones y de que per-
mita taquiones (con velocidad mayor que la de la luz).
En 1979 P. Ramond descubre una nueva simetra (las simetras sirven para diferenciar las part-
culas en bosones y fermiones), de tal modo que la nueva simetra, llamada supersimetra, aplicada a
las cuerdas unificaba los dos tipos de partculas, y rebajaba el nmero de dimensiones de 26 a 10 y
adems no contena taquiones. Por otro lado, al unirse una cuerda por sus extremos daba lugar a una
fuerza que dependa de la tensin y del movimiento de la cuerda. Si la cuerda era abierta se produca
la fuerza gravitatoria, si era cerrada, las dems fuerzas. Por consiguiente, las cuerdas supersimtricas
o supercuerdas unificaban todas las partculas y las fuerzas conocidas.
En 1984 Schwarz y Green descubren una propiedad en la teora de supercuerdas que suscita el
inters de la comunidad cientfica. Los clculos perturbativos para las interacciones entre dos cuer-
das eran finitos hasta el segundo orden. Y en 1992 Mandelstam prueba que los desarrollos pertur-
bativos eran finitos, trmino a trmino, lo cual produjo la sensacin que se haba conseguido una
teora definitiva, una autntica revolucin cientfica.
Pero quedaban muchos problemas por resolver: al pasar del modelo standard, con muchas cons-
tantes sin determinar, a la teora de supercuerdas con una sola constante, pero con mayor nmero
de dimensiones, se encontraban soluciones diferentes que daban lugar a diferentes teoras. En par-
ticular se haban encontrado cinco soluciones diferentes que conducan a cinco teoras de super-
cuerdas.
En 1995 Witten en una famosa conferencia en la Universidad de Los ngeles prueba que se pue-
den unificar, dos a dos, las cinco teoras de supercuerdas utilizando la T-dualidad (que se produce
cuando una cuerda se enrosca alrededor del crculo formado por la dimensin extra compactifica-
da) o por la S-dualidad (cuando una teora tiene una constante de acoplamiento igual a la inversa
del la constante de acoplamiento de la segunda teora). En la misma conferencia Witten consigui
probar que si se ampliaba el espacio-tiempo a once dimensiones, las cinco teoras de supercuerdas
eran idnticas, y adems estas teoras de supercuerdas se podan hacer derivar de una teora fun-
damental que l llam M-teora (Magic-theory), pero que no especific en qu consista.
Empez la carrera para descubrir la M-teora. Uno de los oyentes, Polchinski, present a los pocos
meses una nueva teora basada en objetos elementales de dos dimensiones (recurdese que la cuer-
da es un objeto de una dimensin) que el llam D-branas (abreviatura de membrana). Se puede pro-
bar que las fluctuaciones de las branas lleva directamente a la M-teora.
En 1997 Maldacena presenta una nueva dualidad entre las teoras de supercuerdas, ms atre-
vida que la T-dualidad y la S-dualidad. En ella se identifica una teora de supercuerdas de dimen-
sin 4 con una teora gauge de dimensin 3 (recurdese que una teora gauge sirve para determi-
nar un objeto por el conjunto de simetras y consigue diferenciar los objetos que poseen las mismas
simetras por un mecanismo llamado ruptura de simetras).
En 1998 se descubre la energa oscura del universo, cuyo efecto produca una aceleracin posi-
tiva en la expansin del universo. Produca los mismos efectos que la constante cosmolgica de
signo positivo (Einstein propuso por primera vez la constante cosmolgica para evitar la expansin
y describir un universo esttico). Los experimentos recientes haban encontrado un valor muy peque-
o para la constante cosmolgica. Las teoras de supercuerdas tienen que tener en cuenta este valor
para conseguir que ser realistas y no ser rechazadas. Segn este criterio se pueden considerar cua-
tro situaciones de teoras de supercuerdas:
1. Cuerdas que se mueven en un espacio fijo de dimensin 10 con trminos perturbativos fini-
tos hasta de segundo orden. La constante cosmolgica es nula.
1100 M. LORENTE, LEE SMOLIN HACE UNA CRTICA CONSTRUCTIVA DE LA TEORA DEL TODO
2. Teora de cuerdas que son idnticas a las teoras gauge con una dimensin menor, siguien-
do el criterio de Maldacena. La constante cosmolgica es negativa.
3. Existe un sinnmero de teoras de supercuerdas que se mueven en un espacio-tiempo din-
mico donde la constante cosmolgica puede ser positiva.
4. Existe una teora de dimensin 26, sin fermiones, llamada la cuerda bosnica, pero esta
teora admite taquiones, que hace a la teora poco consistente.
Todas estas teoras se podran deducir de una teora fundamental llamada M-teora, cuya for-
mulacin ms exacta desconocemos.
Despus de haber recorrido los principales avances que han conseguido las teoras de super-
cuerdas, es hora de hacer un balance de dichas teoras con respecto a los cinco grandes problemas
que pone Smolin al comienzo del libro:
Problema 1: La teora de supercuerdas no unifica la mecnica cuntica y la teora de la rela-
tividad, porque las ecuaciones de esta ltima son independientes del espacio-tiempo de refe-
rencia (como dicen los matemticos las leyes de la fsica son invariantes bajo difeomor-
fismos).
Problema 2: La teora de supercuerdas no dice nada sobre una teora fundamental que resuel-
va las paradojas de la mecnica cuntica.
Problema 3: La teora de supercuerdas unifican todas las partculas conocidas (bosones y
fermiones), as como todas las fuerzas y las partculas gauge portadoras de las fuerzas (gra-
vitones, fotones, gluones y partculas W) que son producidas por vibraciones de las cuerdas.
Problema 4: La teora de supercuerdas no puede explicar los valores de los parmetros que
aparecen en el modelo standard solamente a partir de los valores constantes arbitrarios que
poseen las supercuerdas (tensin y constante de acoplamiento).
Problema 5: La teora de supercuerdas no explica qu es la materia y la energa oscura. Los
axiones se podran identificar con la materia oscura, pero esta identificacin no se puede
deducir de la teora de supercuerdas.
Hemos visto las dificultades tericas que tienen la teora de supercuerdas y su falta de compro-
bacin experimental. Smolin ha propuesto algunas de las teoras alternativas, sin renunciar a nada,
a la espera de que nuevas experiencias vengan a confirmar alguna de las alternativas o las mismas
teoras de supercuerdas.
Una de las alternativas comienza por criticar la teora de la relatividad de Einstein. Segn esta
teora, en sistemas inerciales se mueven con la velocidad de la luz, dos observadores lo veran con
la misma velocidad y si un observador ve un objeto movindose con velocidad menor que la de la
luz, el otro observador lo ver tambin con menor velocidad. En 1999 Amelino-Camelia aplica esta
situacin a las distancias, y en particular a la longitud de Planck. Si un objeto tiene la longitud de
Planck, dos observadores en sistemas de referencia en sistemas de referencia equivalentes vern el
objeto con la misma longitud, y si el objeto es mayor que la longitud de Planck, los dos observado-
res la vern con longitud mayor. Esto significa que en el orden de magnitud de la longitud de Planck
no rigen las leyes de la teora de la relatividad especial, por lo cual Amelino-Camelia llam a esta
teora doble relatividad especial. En realidad lo que se propona en esta teora eran las leyes cl-
sicas para valores muy alejados de la constante de Planck y las leyes cunticas para valores muy
prximos a la constante de Planck.
Otras alternativas provienen de modelos que son independientes del espacio-tiempo contene-
dor, de modelos de espacio y tiempo discretos y de modelos que se basan en el principio de causa-
lidad. Estas tres propiedades han dado origen a la causal dynamical triangulation de Ambjorn y
Loll y los causal sets de Sorkin que son modelos muy consistentes de gravedad cuntica, en los
M. LORENTE, LEE SMOLIN HACE UNA CRTICA CONSTRUCTIVA DE LA TEORA DEL TODO 1101
cuales el espacio-tiempo emerge como consecuencia de las relaciones entre los sucesos ms ele-
mentales.
Tambin Penrose en 1961 presenta su modelo de los spin networks que es discreto y relacio-
nal, donde el espacio-tiempo emerge como consecuencia de las combinaciones de los spines que
cumplen las leyes de la mecnica cuntica. Aunque este modelo se podra identificar con causal
sets discretos de Sorkin, Penrose lo ampla a la teora de los twistors que se mueven en un espa-
cio-tiempo complejo para admitir las transformaciones de los vectores de posicin (discreto) y
momento (continuo). La teora de los twistor ha sido continuada por numerosos matemticos y fsi-
cos, porque ofrece un marco riguroso donde describir todos los campos y partculas conocidos inclu-
yendo la relatividad general.
Otra teora alternativa ha sido la geometra no conmutativa de A. Connes, segn la cual las
magnitudes fsicas y matemticas no conmutan (AB no es igual a BA). Es una teora que unifica las
funciones algebraicas y geomtricas de manera que se deduce inmediatamente el modelo standard.
La teora que ms se ha enfrentado como alternativa a las supercuerdas es loop quantum gra-
vity que fue propuesta por Ashtekar en 1986. En ella prob que la teora de la relatividad general se
poda expresar como una teora gauge con solo introducir unas nuevas variables.
Cuando tratamos de describir las lneas del campo gauge no necesitamos de un espacio-tiem-
po contenedor, sino que las lneas de campo definen la geometra del espacio. Esta geometra est
definida por un grafo (conexiones entre vrtices y aristas), que evolucionan a nuevas estructuras,
de las que emerge la estructura subyacente del espacio-tiempo. Por otra parte como las conexiones
en un grafo pueden ser muy complicadas, dependiendo del tipo de lazos que se construyen entre
las aristas que unen dos vrtices, esta diversidad de lazos da lugar a las diferentes familias de par-
tculas elementales, como recientemente han demostrado 2006 e Bilson-Thompson, Markopoulou
y Smolin.
Segn Hofmann y Winkler, las predicciones de la teora loop quantum gravity podrn obser-
varse experimentalmente en las oscilaciones de la radiacin de fondo.
El libro de Smolin acaba con unos captulos dedicados a los aspectos sociolgicos y filosficos
de la teora de supercuerdas. Los peligros de esta teora son patentes. Han invadido las Universi-
dades y Centros de investigacin de todo el mundo, de modo que los investigadores jvenes que no
quieran trabajar en dicha teora tienen cerrado prcticamente el camino a dichos centros. Smolin
ha resumido la postura de las comunidades de supercuerdas con estos rasgos:
1. Considerable autosuficiencia y conciencia de pertenecer a una lite.
2. Comunidades monolticas con gran uniformidad de opiniones sobre cuestiones abiertas,
generalmente impuestas por los que constituyen la jerarqua de la comunidad.
3. Sentido de identificacin con el grupo parecido a la pertenencia de una comunidad reli-
giosa o partido poltico.
4. Sentido de frontera entre el grupo y otros expertos.
5. Gran desinters por las ideas y personas que no son del grupo.
6. Una confianza excesiva en interpretar positivamente los resultados e incluso aceptarlos
exclusivamente porque son credos por la mayora.
7. Una falta de percepcin del riesgo que conlleva una nueva teora.
Smolin defiende que el xito de una comunidad cientfica no es solamente por la adherencia a
una teora, sino por la adherencia a una tica. Smolin resume en dos principios esta tica:
1. Si un resultado puede ser decidido por personas de buena fe, despus de aplicar argu-
mentos razonables con la evidencia pblica disponible, entonces tiene que ser aceptada
como tal.
1102 M. LORENTE, LEE SMOLIN HACE UNA CRTICA CONSTRUCTIVA DE LA TEORA DEL TODO
2. Por otra parte, si los argumentos racionales tomados de la evidencia pblicamente dispo-
nible, no consiguen poner de acuerdo a las personas de buena voluntad, la sociedad tiene
que permitir y animar a la gente a sacar conclusiones diversas.
JAVIER MONSERRAT
Universidad Autnoma de Madrid
Stuart Kauffman has and continues to be one of the most eminent thinkers in the
development of modern evolutionary biology. His theories on the self-organisation of matter
have served to complement the ordinary explanation offered by Darwinism and complexity
theories. In a recent contribution to the journal Zygon, dated 22 October 2006, Kauffman
admits the possibility of accepting quantum factors in the emergence of life, at the same
time as offering a self-creative and sacred image of nature, which is nevertheless different
from traditional theism.
Stuart Alan Kauffman takes a stance against recent trends in the philosophy of biology. On
the one hand, he offers an opinion regarding the recent controversy on theism-atheism arising
out of the works of Dawkins and Dennett. Kauffman sticks to his previous position, refusing to
believe in a transcendent God. However, he qualifies this position by defending his belief in a
sacred world that should underpin our search for meaning. The world of complexity is not
reductionism, but rather a major self-creative and emergent step towards superior levels of reality.
This natural self-creativity prompts in us an attitude of reverence, respect and mystery. On the
other hand, however, Kauffman has also taken an important step forward by accepting the role
of quantum causality in the origin of life. In this sense, his authority reinforces heuristic speculations
which attempt to explain life in terms of a quantum, emergentist and non-reductionist physical
underpinning.
Today, Kauffmans works are some of the most important in the field of biological self-organisation
processes within the framework of complexity theories. His interdisciplinary training may perhaps
explain the shear breath of his questions, and the ambitiousness of his answers. His analyses touch
upon physics, biology, psychology, neurology and even philosophy, and his thinking directly affects
the existing neo-Darwinist paradigm, not to deny it, but rather to complement it. The causes which
produced life would depend on the ontology of the matter whose ontological properties prompted
self-movement towards organised complexity. These properties are particularly evident in the genetic
process and in the genetic networks already studied by other authors.
Stuart Kauffman was born in 1939. In 1960 he earned degrees in philosophy and physics from
Dartmouth College, before moving to Oxford, where he continued to study philosophy, expanding
his scope to include psychology and biology. Finally, he studied medicine at the University of
California in 1968 and a short time later, decided to focus his professional activities exclusively
on research. He carried out genetic research at the University of Chicago and, from 1975 to 1995,
lectured in biochemistry in Pennsylvania. He has also remained in contact with other research
institutes, such as the Complex Systems Institute in Santa Fe. Today, an emeritus professor at
the University of Pennsylvania, he works at the University of Calgary, Alberta, where he directs a
number of institutes on biological complexity. He has also been a NASA consultant since the year
2000.
His cornerstone work is Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution (1993).
Some time later, in 1995, he published At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-
Organization and Complexity. Finally, in the year 2000, he brought out his last work: Investigations,
in which he explored the same themes in more depth. In a paper published in 2006 under the title
Beyond Reductionism: Reinventing the Sacred, he offers a series of new ideas which we shall comment
on here.
How can one understand Kauffmans work? What causes does he propose to explain the
emergence of complex biological systems? Is there really irreducibility between different emergent
levels? In what sense can we talk about emergent novelties? How are they related to systemics and
complexity? Kauffmans stance is anti-reductionist; he believes that reality cannot emerge from the
mere evolution of linear systems. For Kauffman, the emergence of novelty stems from continuity
and the systemic interaction of matter. New systems produce new forms of reality. In this sense,
Kauffmans work fits into the traditional framework of emergence theory.
A good overview of Kauffmans contributions to the field can be found in a research paper on
his work by Alfredo Prez, published by the University of Madrid. This paper states that: The question
is from where did the useful variation on which selection acts come from? [Margullis, 2000]. This
is the problem that Kauffman aims to resolve. Furthermore, regarding the problem of the origin of
life, one of the dominant trends sustains that life could not have existed until the appearance of a
primitive genetic system, and said primitive genetic system was the result of chance. If the weight
of the argument on the origin of life rests on the formation of a primitive genetic system created as
the result of a random conjunction of different elements under certain conditions, then the emergence
of life becomes an enormously improbable event. These problems are the ones that steer Kauffmans
research, and can be expressed through the following questions: How can we convincingly explain
the fact of the emergence and evolution of life? How can we explain the order found in complex
adaptive systems? For Kauffman, the key lies in bearing in mind the self-organisational capacity of
complex systems (p. 8).
Kauffmans contributions are historically based on the results obtained by Watson, Crick and
Walkins. For these authors, the molecular structure of nucleic acids and the transfer of information
between different organisms are essential factors. Thus, molecular structure transmits the hereditary
genetic information required for the stability of the species.
Some time later, in 1965, the researchers Franois Jacob, Jacques Monod and Andr Lwoff were
awarded the Nobel Prize in Medicine. Their research improved our understanding of the genetic
control of enzymes, the synthesis of viruses, cellular differentiation and ontogenesis. It was then
that the synthesis of a protein in the cytoplasm by the gene transcribed from DNA by RNA (ribonucleic
acid) was understood. The so-called messenger RNA was found to control protein synthesis through
its genetic code.
In 1977, the Russian-Belgian researcher Ilya Prigogine was awarded a Nobel Prize for his
discovery of the characteristics that make order arise from far-from-equilibrium systems (when
the particles of the system move randomly in total disorder). The order generated by fluctuations
is a mechanism which produces self-organisation, an essential phenomenon for the formation of
dissipative structures. Small variations in a systems fluctuations do not affect its stability; however,
if they become larger, these fluctuations make the system unstable and push it to the edge of
chaos. It is then that self-organisation arises, thus enabling the system to stabilise itself in a
different ordered state.
Through situations of instability, fluctuations push systems towards totally new, stable, although
also fluctuating, structures. The stability of biological systems is therefore dynamic and fluctuating,
and forms the basis of the evolution of living systems in search of new ways of organising themselves
in order to ensure adaptive stability. Prigogines model has since been successfully applied to research
aiming to understand the causes that prompted the evolution of living entities.
These ideas were soon developed by new research into the physics of chaos and its application
to living systems. Basically, what these areas of research revealed is that life was not only produced
by selection, but also by the primordial nature of matter and living matter (let us also remember
the auto-poietic systems of Varela and Maturana). According to Darwinist principles, natural selection
acts on the structures of ordered systems that have already been produced by evolution. Evolution
selects only those ordered structures that have already been tried and tested by nature in accordance
with ontological principles, prior to selection itself.
In order to explain Kauffmans point of view, we shall use the overview that the author himself
provides in a recent paper entitled Beyond Reductionism: Reinventing the Sacred (2006). As mentioned
earlier, Kauffmans position is in line with the emergence approach, at least in relation to its basic
concepts regarding the origin of life.
Reductionism has been the general perspective of science over recent years. Roughly,
reductionism is the view that, as Nobel Laureate Stephen Weinberg eloquently puts it, the explanatory
arrows always point downwards. This downward-looking perspective leads us to explain everything
on the basis of the elementary particles that make up the primordial substratum of the universe. A
series of simple laws for this primordial matter would constitute the dream of the final theory,
whose existence Weinberg has indeed postulated.
Kauffman underlines the increasing doubts among many scientists regarding the adequacy of
reductionism and mentions two Nobel Laureates, Philip Anderson and Robert Laughlin. Nevertheless,
today, it is in string theory that reductionists seek that final theory, and seem to be going from
strength to strength.
But it is precisely in the province of string theory itself, that doubts are arising says Kauffman.
The early hope was that a single string theory would be found that would explain quantum gravity
and all the known particles and forces. Such a single string theory would be the answer to Weinbergs
dream of a final theory. But at present, it appears that there are as many as 10 to the 500th power
string theories. Hope for a single theory is fast fading and a number of high energy physicists are
abandoning reductionism in the sense of finding such a single theory. Thus, Leonard Susskind, in
the Cosmic Landscape, suggests a multiverse of pocket universes, each with a randomly chosen
string theory, and a landscape over these pocket universes with respect to those whose laws are
life friendly. As a critical side note, part of Susskinds move is an attempt to explain the roughly 23
physical constants in physics like the speed of light, the ratio of electron to proton mass, and so on.
No one knows where these constants come from or how to explain them. Weinberg himself uttered
the A word anthropic.
In short, concludes Kauffman, many, but not all physicists, are giving up on the adequacy of
reductionism alone as a scientific principle to explain the properties of the world. In its stead a new
scientific world view is just starting to come into view: Emergence.
Kauffmans scientific work focuses on the most solid, mechanical and physical-chemical
foundations causally involved in the origin of life. However, he has been against reductionism right
from the start. His stance is more in line with emergence, a theoretical framework which is today
becoming increasingly popular, and which is being espoused by more and more physicists and
biologists who are abandoning reductionism as a doctrine of the past.
Kauffmans emergence is not dualism, but rather systemic monism that justifies the emergence
of novelty when the continuity of the evolutionary process (based on the physical world) combines
with the evolutionary genesis of new systemic structures that produce ontological novelties.
His emergence is systemic and ontological. Kauffman himself says that the ontological view (in
emergence) is that new entities with their own properties and causal powers arise and are part of
the furniture of the universe.
How did life arise? We do not really know, although in Kauffmans opinion, certain theories do
exist, even if none have yet been definitively established. The first is based on the properties of DNA
and RNA, their helical structure and reduplicative capacity. The second is based on the recently-
discovered properties of RNA, not only for carrying information, but also for acting as enzymes,
speeding up chemical reactions in the cytoplasm. The third theory is based on the chemical structure
of lipids, which experimental research has shown to be capable of growing and dividing. These
processes may form part of the origin of life.
The fourth theory is that proposed by Kauffman himself, and defended by Freeman Dyson, and
may also describe the events occurring in the origin of life. It rests on the observation that cellular
life is based on collective processes of autocatalysis, where catalysis is the acceleration of the speed
of reaction. No molecule can catalyse its own formation. However, a system of molecules may
maintain interactive systemic relations that, together, control the regularity, stability and replication
of a system that would thus be autocatalytic. These systems, along with lipid chemistry, may have
created the basic replicative stability of the living systems in which the subsequent function of DNA
and RNA would have been possible.
Does the appearance of these systems, i.e. life, represent an emergence in relation to the physical
world? Kauffmans answer is yes. Darwins natural selection acts on already emerged biological
entities, capable of self reproduction and heritable variation. This, says Kauffman, seems clearly
to be ontological emergence, not reducible to physics. In short, Darwins natural selection is a
new law operating on the level of self reproducing entities with heritable variation, regardless of
the physical underpinning. In contrast to Weinbergs claim, here the explanatory arrows point
upward.
Life is not only a level of emergence not reducible to physics due to the novelty of its self
reproducing structures with heritable variability thanks to Darwinist selection, but also due to the
supposition of agency (the capacity to select directed actions).
In many of his works, Kauffman asks about the minimum properties a physical system must
have in order to be considered an agent. A minimal molecular agent is a system which can reproduce
itself and carry out at least one work cycle in the thermodynamic sense. A bacterium, swimming
up a glucose gradient, and performing work cycles, is an agent, and glucose has value and meaning
for the bacterium, without assuming consciousness. Of course, it is natural selection that has achieved
this coupling. But teleological language has to start somewhere, and I am willing to place it at the
start of life. Either here, or later in the evolutionary pathways, meaning and value arise in the
biosphere. They too are ontologically emergent. As we will see, the evolutionary appearance of
sensation-consciousness also plays a key role in this emergence.
However, the fact is that consciousness has also arisen in living organisms. We are, in fact,
conscious, states Kauffman. That is, we have experiences of the world. The philosophers call these
qualia. For years, philosophers of mind have tried to argue that such experiences are ghosts in the
machine. This is just false. We are, in fact, conscious. Whatever explains consciousness, it is clearly
ontologically emergent.
However, how can we explain the fact of this emergence? At the end of the day, the aim is to
explain the causes of emergence, i.e. the causes (or real facts) that explain why in the animal world
and in ourselves, the emergence of consciousness arose evolutionarily (and before sensibility).
Kauffman refers to three different answers to this question; however, we do not know with any
certainty which (if any) is correct. The first response is the dualist one. The author refers to Saint
Augustine, Schroedinger and Tibetan Buddhism. The second answer, which is the predominant
view among cognitive scientists today, reduces the question to complex computer programmes. At
heart, this is nothing more than the modern continuation of reductionism. The third answer, which
is the one Kauffman himself espouses, refers to consciousness in a quantum medium produced by
evolution in biological structures.
With this, Kauffman aligns himself with the general framework of quantum neurology, coming
close (although he does not mention them in the text we are analysing here) to both the hypothesis
posed by Hameroff-Penrose and the possibility of the existence of other quantum phenomena in
living cellular tissue.
The third view of mind and consciousness, says Kaufmann, which I tentatively favour, is that
it is related to quantum behaviour. The standard physicists answer is that quantum effects cannot
occur at body temperature.
However, recent theorems in quantum computing, and facts about cells cast doubt on this
conclusion. The theorems show that, if measurements are made and work is done on a quantum
computer, its qubits can remain quantum coherent when they should decohere towards classical
behaviour. Thus, if work is done on a system, parts of it may remain quantum coherent at body
temperature in principle. But cells do thermodynamic work and might be able to carry out such
measurements and work to maintain some variables quantum coherent. Second, cells are crowded
by proteins and other molecules, and the water between these molecules is largely ordered, not like
an ordinary liquid. This may permit quantum coherence physically in cells. No one knows. It seems
worth investigation in its own right. Meanwhile, my approximate theory is that mind is acausal,
quantum mechanics is acausal on the familiar Born interpretation of the Schroedinger equation (to
the grief of Einstein), that consciousness is due to a special state where a system is persistently
poised between quantum and classical behaviour, that the emergence of classical behaviour in the
mind-brain system, perhaps by decoherence, is the mind making something actual happen in the
physical world, and big jump that consciousness itself consists in this quantum coherent state
as lived by the organism. This is a long jump, but not impossible. I dont even think it is stupider
than other theories of consciousness, and may be true. Whatever the case, consciousness is
ontologically emergent in this universe.
These interesting considerations by a person of the stature of Stuart Kauffman reveal certain
trends that are well worth highlighting:
1) His qualified positive assessment of the hypotheses of quantum neurology is indicative of
a growing tendency to admit that this heuristic line is the best constructed (within its obscurity)
and the one most able to explain the physical medium in which the sensibility-consciousness which
emerged during the evolutionary process exists. Earlier we mentioned Margullis, who asked where
did the useful variation on which selection acts come from? Here, the answer would be: from the
emergence of quantum states which supported sensation (probably in the unicellular world, perhaps
with the appearance of the cytoskeleton and microtubules); subsequently, selection made more
efficient sensitive systems possible in pursuit of optimum survival.
2) Kauffman understands perfectly that any assessment of quantum neurology is a mere
question of science, and as such, is philosophically neutral. This is compatible with his atheist
stance, in the sense of not leaning towards the acceptance of a personal God. Valuing the
contributions of quantum neurology is merely the consequence of scientific honesty, which prompts
us to try and explain the real phenomenological experience of our consciousness, or in other
words, of that which constitutes society and human history. Kauffman is not concerned that
accepting the relevance of quantum neurology hypotheses constitutes eo ipso an acceptance of
theism.
3) Even from his decidedly atheist viewpoint, Kauffman steers his anti-reductionist and
emergence stance towards a way of understanding our feelings of reverence towards a creative
universe that he describes as sacred. His approach to the mysterious sacredness of nature is
reminiscent of Einsteins hotly debated religiousness.
God is the most powerful symbol we have created. The Spaniards in the New World built their
churches on the holy sites of those they vanquished. Notre Dame sits on a Druid holy site. Shall we
use the God word? It is our choice. Mine is a tentative yes. I want God to mean the vast ceaseless
creativity of the only universe we know of, ours. What do we gain by using the God word? I suspect
a great deal, for the word carries with it awe and reverence. If we can transfer that awe and reverence,
not to the transcendental Abrahamic God of my Israelite tribe long ago, but to the stunning reality
that confronts us, we will grant permission for a renewed spirituality, and awe, reverence and
responsibility for all that lives, for the planet.
4) This sacred emergence in the face of a nature that, surprisingly, points upward and which
demands superior explanatory criteria that arise from the evolutionary creativity of the universe
itself, demonstrates the increasing trend towards taking very seriously attempts aimed at overcoming
reductionism. Although Kauffman does not make the jump from this sacred nature to the hypothesis
sustained by religious traditions of a transcendent God, modern theism is much more comfortable
with the atheist sacredness of Kaufman than with the reductionist robotism of the ancien rgime
of science. Theism is but the opening up of the last superior level that explains the ontological origin
of life, sensibility and consciousness in the physical universe.
JAVIER LEACH
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
In his book Mind & Emergence, Philip Clayton explores the relationship between the
emergentist vision of the human mind and the question of transcendence. The ongoing
explosion of scientific knowledge in the 21st century will tempt many to conclude that no
knowledge can exist beyond the boundaries of natural science, only opinion and sentiment.
The debate presented by Clayton regarding emergence aims to offer one (although not the
only) way of demonstrating that the equation between knowledge and natural science is far
from exact. Our perception of there being any true knowledge when the issues at hand go
beyond that which can be empirically proven by science may be tenuous. There are certain
areas of knowledge, over and above the strict dividing line established by physics and biology,
which remain open and which influence life.
The debate on key issues is now more urgent than ever as the human mind continues, in the
era of science, to expand not only the limits of its knowledge, but also its knowledge of those limits
themselves, refusing to be dominated by tradition, force or absolute authority. This domination
may stem from philosophy, theology or religious traditions, or alternatively from the imposition
of political correctness in science, all of which limit the critical freedom of individuals use of
reason. Philip Clayton (Philip Clayton, Mind & Emergence, from quantum to consciousness. Oxford
University Press, 2004) aims to develop a Christian theology in constructive dialogue with
metaphysics, modern philosophy and science. This task has prompted Clayton to write about the
theory of knowledge, the history of philosophy and theology, the philosophy of science, physics,
evolutionary biology and neuroscience, comparative theology and constructive metaphysics. As
a theologian, Clayton embraces panentheism and has his own dialogue-based and pluralist view
of process theology.
He rejects Dawkins scientism, without falling into the trap of fundamentalism. Claytons moderate
stance opens up a series of complex and interesting questions within the field of science and religion,
and steers clear of the full-on fight between warring factions. Philip Clayton is Ingraham Professor
of Theology at Claremont School of Theology and Professor of Religion and Philosophy at Claremont
University.
In the first part of his book, Mind & Emergence, Philip Clayton defends strong emergence as the
most appropriate description of what occurs in the evolutionary process of the universe.
Supporters of strong emergence maintain that evolution has gradually produced new
and different ontological levels in the cosmos, and that each of these new levels is
characterised by its own laws, regularities and causal forces.
Those who defend weak emergence, on the other hand, insist that when new
evolutionary levels appear, the causal processes of the first evolutionary level of physics
remain in play. Although new emergent categories, such as, for example, protein
synthesis, hunger or the desire to be accepted, may overcome the behaviour of other
structures from lower levels, they are not, in themselves, considered new types of
causes.
(Philip Clayton cites, among others, Samuel Alexander as a staunch defender of weak
emergence and C. D. Broad as a supporter of strong emergence).
In his book, Mind and Emergence, Clayton defends strong emergence against the inadequacy of
both physicalism and dualism. For Clayton, both physicalism and dualism overlook a crucial part
of reality.
Claytons emergence is plural in nature. Consciousness is not the only emerging level. Indeed,
to a certain extent, it is simply one of a long series of steps which characterise the evolutionary
process. The human mind and consciousness represent a particularly interesting and complex
evolutionary level, which encompasses humanitys whole intellectual, cultural, artistic and religious
existence. However, consciousness does not represent any one single, absolutely new manifestation
in the history of evolution; indeed, conscious phenomena share important similarities with other
emerging realities that appeared in much earlier stages of said history.
The thesis of Mind & Emergence is that the days of forced dilemma between physicalism
and dualism are over
A fairly common but nevertheless false point of view, in Claytons opinion, is that there are only
two basic ways of interpreting the world: the physicalist world-picture, and the dualist one. This
erroneous belief is rooted in the confrontation between Newtonian physics and the metaphysical systems
comprising Greek, Christian and medieval elements, which still remained dominant in the 17th century.
For Clayton, the current philosophical view of the world has three roots. The first is the revolution
provoked in metaphysics by Kant, and sustained by German idealism and process philosophy. The
second is the revolution provoked in the theory of knowledge by non-objectivist epistemologies, the
contextual philosophies of science and the limits inherent to knowledge which were discovered
within the different branches of science itself. And finally, the third root is the current debate on
the dualism-physicalism dichotomy. In his book, Clayton focuses on this third root of philosophical
debate, which is the consequence of the revolution provoked by evolutionary science.
Some of the theses of Claytons emergentist vision are:
(1) Ontological monism: at the end of the day, reality is made up of a single basic type of
matter. However, for Clayton, ontological monism does not mean that the entities postulated
by physics represent the entire inventory of everything which exists. Therefore, for Clayton,
emergentism is monist, but not physicist.
(2) The irreducibility of emergence: emergent properties cannot be reduced to phenomena
which occur at a lower level. An important question for the theory of emergence is that of
when we can say that a new level emerges. Traditionally, life and mind have been taken
as genuine levels of emergence. But emergence cannot be reduced to these two indisputable
levels, since there may also be a considerable number of other emergence levels. In a recent
book, the Yale biophysicist Harol Morowitz identified no less than 28 different levels of
emergence from the big bang to the present day.
(3) Downward causality: the downward causality of an emergent structure onto its constituting
parts diverges from the standard philosophical treatment of causality in modern science.
This concept of downward causality is a key point of Claytons discussion of strong emergence.
The theory of emergence is not just disguised dualism; rather, it requires certain modifications
to both theism and traditional theologies
The theory of emergence is not just disguised dualism, since it recognises that consciousness is,
to a certain extent, nothing more than another level of emergence. The theory of emergence has
its own logic, and requires certain modifications to traditional theism and traditional theologies.
Clayton identifies eight characteristics of emergence:
(1) Monism: there is a single primordial reality from which all other realities have evolved.
(2) Hierarchical complexity: the world is hierarchically structured.
(3) Emergentist monism: more complex units appear, formed on the basis of other, more
simple ones.
(4) Non-uniform emergence: diverse levels of emergence can be identified which are drastically
different from each other.
(5) Cross-cutting emergence patterns: the majority of emergence leaps share some similar
characteristics.
(6) Downward causality: new emergent objects appear as new causes which act on objects at
a lower level.
(7) Emergent pluralism: downward causality does not imply dualism, but rather pluralism
(Clayton cites Morowitz, who proposes at least 28 levels of emergence).
(8) The mind as an emergent element: Claytons proposal is that there is a two-way interaction
between mind and matter, i.e. from mind to matter and from matter to mind.
What are the links between metaphysics and mind? Clayton offers four different metaphysical
approaches from which to tackle the problem of the emergence of the mind.
1. Physicalist approach: the mind appeared from matter. According to the physicalist hypothesis,
the appearance of the mind was a happy coincidence. We do not hold beliefs about freedom, values,
rationality and conscious choices because there are (physicalist) reasons for doing so, but rather
because holding them helps us in some aspects of our personal or social life.
2. Contingent emergence: according to this approach, mental causation exists in nature and
physicalism is false. There are different emergent levels in the evolutionary process, but emergence
is a product of evolution that has no metaphysical consequences. According to this approach, the
evolutionary process involves no conscious design or choice.
3. Necessary emergence: emergence is a necessary consequence, but its inevitability can be
explained in a naturalist manner. Scientific reasons exist which delimit the possible results of
evolution. However, these factors do not necessarily prove the existence of an intelligent designer.
Scientists who believe in the necessary delimitation of the evolutionary process, within certain
parameters, comprise theists, atheists and agnostics. This distinguishes them from those who defend
the concept of an intelligent design, who use the scientific data of evolutionary process delimitation
to prove the existence of God. For Clayton, the degree of contingency involved in the evolutionary
process does not prove the existence of God. Thus, one may, for scientific reasons, believe that
evolution is severely delimited from a scientific point of view, and yet remain agnostic.
4. Emergence open to the existence of an intelligent and transcendent being: i.e. the belief that
the universe was created by an intelligent being who wanted the universe to be just as it is. Clayton
calls this way of seeing things theism, and calls the being in which all theists believe God. The novelty
here is that until recently, theists believed that God must have predetermined the result of the world
process, similarly to Laplaces demon. Laplace, with his Newtonian vision, believed that a demon
could know the precise location and momentum of every atom in the universe at any moment.
According to his theory, the demon would therefore be capable of predicting the state of things in
the future, by creating the right particles in the right place at the right time, since both past and future
were predetermined. Given the limitations of the current scientific way of understanding emergence,
we do not know how much control the theist God has over emergence. Perhaps the divine agent
established the physical conditions at the beginning of evolution, so as to ensure that life developed
first, followed by conscious life as the result of a physical necessity. Or alternatively, perhaps God
simply provided an ongoing creative impulse towards conscious life, without determining which type
of life would appear. Arthur Peacocke has provocatively written that God is a composer who writes
the general outline of the piece, but then leaves the musicians to finish developing it. The theologist
Philip Hefner has introduced the idea that human beings are created co-creators who collaborate
with God in his creative work. Alfred North Whitehead defends a correlational model between man
and God, which includes the idea of a divine lure that coincides with the idea of emergence.
DIVINE ACTION
For Clayton, it is impossible to defend miracles in such a way so as not to contradict physics;
however, there is a way of viewing the causal action of God that avoids said conflict: God acts at a
quantum level (assuming that quantum events are ontologically indeterminate), causing the wave
function to collapse in one direction or another, while still maintaining the total distribution of
probability. In this case, no laws are broken. The problem is that we do not, and indeed cannot,
know what actions are taken by God at this level. The physical approach also poses another problem:
if the mental level is anomalous, in the sense that it is not governed by physical laws, then God has
no way of influencing it, although he could make one thought more probable than another.
Miracles may be possible through a suppression of natural laws by God. However, this statement
is not a solution to the problem of divine action. One may believe this at a specific subjective level,
but one would still have to deny the objective level of physical laws.
The problem changes when dealing with human action. In the case of human thought and its
resulting actions, there are no laws which completely determine the decision-making process.
Needless to say, given the structure of the brain, an individuals life history and his or her environment,
some responses are bound to be much more likely than others. But to what extent is divine action
similar to mental causes, assuming these are understood as emergent elements? Given that human
actions are by nature unpredictable, there are no determining conditions that are broken when
divine force acts upon them.
Here, emergentists encounter a dilemma: emergentist theory may help defend the concept of
divine action, but only if the divine is constructed as a new emergent level in the evolutionary process.
Samuel Alexander defends this point of view. For Alexander, God is not a pre-existent being, but
rather a new type of property, the deity, which appears after a certain degree of complexification.
Looking back over history and seeing how God acts in human minds, two basic strategies can
be identified. Each seeks to find a way to interrelate (among others) three levels of causality: physical
causes, mental causes and divine causes. The first strategy constructs human beings in accordance
with the model of the divine person (or persons); i.e. the biblical model of the creation of man in
Gods image. In this case, the interaction between man and God is not problematic at all, because
both share the same nature. However, this interaction has its price: it states that the human spirit
is different in nature from the physical world, which renders the mind-body interaction impossible.
This solution is known as anthropology of the supernatural soul.
The second approach can be described as the naturalist vision of the human person, and sees
the human person as a phenomenon that occurs naturally in the world. Here, both dualism and its
associated epistemic and ontological problems appear in the relationship between human and divine
causality.
Physics is where we most clearly observe behaviour governed by laws, and there, nothing leads
us to believe that said laws are prompted by intention. Of course, the fact that a downward divine
action is physically undetectable, does not make it impossible. Human actions, on the other hand,
are prompted by intention and are justified by reasoning. While human science does not demand
the presence of a transcendent agent, it does, however, leave room for one. Furthermore, the reference
to a transcendent agent is natural when human beings start wondering about ultimate causes.
In the study presented in this book, Clayton espouses a school of thought (as an example, see
Claytons work with Paul Davis) that is fairly widespread today in modern science: moving beyond
physicalism (the reductionist science) and dualism (the traditional anthropology in many religious
and theological cosmovisions), emergentism is seen as the best constructed and most easily acceptable
supposition. However, in order to make any headway with this supposition, both reductionist and
religious traditions need to adopt new stances: reductionism needs to move away from its mechanicist-
determinist narrowness and theologies need to reformulate themselves on the basis of ontological
monism. What theologies respond to these new needs for congruence with modern science? Clayton,
as mentioned earlier, defends process philosophy-theology, but does not seem to be at all radical in
his way of understanding those areas in which this theology has most trouble reconciling itself with
the traditional orthodox doctrine of the Christian Churches (i.e. the idea of God the creator or the
way in which we understand divine omnipotence and omniscience).
GUILLERMO ARMENGOL
Universidad Comillas de Madrid
Un artculo de Glenn Statile en The Global Spiral nos ofrece la ocasin de plantear un tema
de actualidad cientfica que esconde la discusin de fondo sobre la tendencia de la fsica te-
rica en los prximos aos. Es evidente que la teora de cuerdas ha representado en los lti-
mos treinta aos una aventura cientfica extraordinaria que muestra algo que ya era claro
para los epistemlogos de la ciencia: que sta no consiste slo en experimentos sino en cons-
truccin de teoras. La teorizacin es no slo legtima, sino esencial e insustituible en la cien-
cia. El cansancio hacia la teora de cuerdas se debe, ante todo, a la dificultad en hallar evi-
dencias empricas que permitan someterla a prueba, de acuerdo con los mtodos experimentales
ordinarios de la ciencia. Pero, en todo caso, pensamos que debemos defender y esta es al
parecer la posicin que sostiene tambin Glenn Statile la legitimidad y necesidad no slo
cientfica, sino incluso metafsica de una especulacin teortica (u otra similar) del orden de
lo que ha sido la teora de cuerdas.
Quiz alguien pudo pensar que cuando Frank Sinatra hace unos aos cantaba que sostena el
mundo sobre una cuerda, apoyaba uno de los proyectos tericos ms importantes de la fsica de
los ltimos veinte aos del siglo XX. Lo ms probable es que Sinatra no conociera la existencia de
la teora de cuerdas. Sin embargo, s es un hecho que la doctrina polticamente correcta de las lti-
mas dcadas ha credo que nuestro mundo, en efecto, se sostiene en unos eventos primordiales que
conocemos como cuerdas o supercuerdas. Sin embargo, una ola de recientes crticas a estos
complejos supuestos tericos, nos obliga a preguntarnos, ha comenzado ya la decadencia de la
teora de supercuerdas?
Glenn Statile pertenece a la St. John University de Nueva York. Su campo de especializacin
es la historia y filosofa de la ciencia; en esta perspectiva se ha introducido en la reflexin sobre rela-
ciones entre la ciencia y la religin, entrando en contacto con el Metanexus Institute for Science and
Religion de Philadelphia, editor de The Global Spiral. En su reciente artculo The Majesty and Misery
of String Theory, Statile se hace eco de las recientes crticas a la teora de cuerdas, pero defiende la
posicin de que, ms all de estas crticas, por descontado respetables, esta teora es legtima, aun-
que quiz por su falta de falsabilidad experimental pueda considerarse la conveniencia o no de lla-
marla cientfica. En nuestra opinin, la especulacin terica forma parte intrnseca de la ciencia,
ya que sta no es slo investigacin puramente emprica. Primero, no tenemos pruebas de que la
teora de cuerdas no sea en ltimo trmino correcta y en el futuro en alguna manera constatable.
Segundo, plantearse un proyecto del orden de la teora de cuerdas es necesario para la ciencia y su
importancia va incluso ms all de lo cientfico para proyectarse tambin sobre lo metafsico y lo
religioso.
En nuestra opinin, la opinin de Statile es matizada, permite acceder al problema de fondo
que hoy se plantea y es digna de comentario, aunque en algunos aspectos deba ser tambin discu-
tida. Nosotros creemos que, en efecto, la teora de cuerdas ha nacido de una necesidad teortica de
la ciencia. Las preguntas que la han hecho nacer tienen sentido; pero si se llega a considerarla una
respuesta inviable, sera necesario especular sobre las alternativas de repuesto. Sera muy difcil
que esas nuevas alternativas u otros campos de la fsica no hicieran uso, en alguna manera, de
una parte sustancial de la especulacin producida en teora de supercuerdas (sobre todo matem-
tica) que, en este sentido, no habra resultado histricamente intil.
Para Statile es quiz una actitud excesivamente crtica y poco elegante decir hoy que la teora
de cuerdas es una teora desorientada que camina hacia no se sabe donde. Es verdad que podra ser
un cuento desmesurado con un complicado argumento matemtico ya casi inasequible. Pero podra
ser tambin un intento justificado por hallar la esencia de la realidad material en sus niveles ms
profundos y primigenios; es decir, los bloques bsicos de la naturaleza en su proceso germinal pri-
migenio. Un intento, en definitiva, de proponer una teora sobre aquellos eventos primordiales que
sucedieron en dimensiones microfsicas mucho ms all de la era de Plank; es decir, en aquellos
niveles en que la realidad nace como vibraciones primigenias que hubieran producido ms adelante
las primeras formas corpuscular-ondulatorias ya en alguna manera detectables en el mundo ase-
quible a la investigacin cientfica ordinaria, respaldada por evidencias empricas controlables.
Por otra parte, las hiptesis y conjeturas primordiales de la teora de cuerdas o mejor, el con-
junto de diferentes teoras de cuerdas existentes han conducido a establecer complejas propues-
tas tericas sobre las variables y dimensiones que seran necesarias para describir este nacimiento
y evolucin de las vibraciones primordiales. Al atribuir valores cuantitativos a esta compleja estruc-
tura de dimensiones fsicas, concebidas tericamente, la teora de cuerdas ha conducido a exten-
derse hacia la llamada Magic-Theory (teora M) en que se unificaran todas las teoras y se especu-
lara, para muchos exticamente y ms all del sentido comn, con la existencia paralela de mltiples
universos causalmente separados y aislados del nuestro. Es sabido que la actual teora de multi-
versos tiene en su referencia a la teora de cuerdas uno de sus apoyos especulativos ms firmes. Sin
embargo, para muchos se ha ido cayendo en una especulacin desmedida y pintoresca que nos intro-
duce en la imaginacin de mundos inverosmiles cuya existencia es difcil de aceptar.
De esta manera, sin esperanzas de hallar comprobaciones empricas y en deriva hacia ese derro-
tero especulativo hacia mundos inverosmiles, la teora de cuerdas, despus de treinta aos de
esforzado trabajo y de imponer la ley de lo polticamente correcto, parece haber entrado en una
nueva situacin en que le crecen los enanos por todas partes. Algunos creen que David Hume
hubiera recomendado que la teora de cuerdas fuera arrojada a las llamas, junto con otros dudosos
y excesivamente teatrales dolos de la razn (mind).
Podemos aventurarnos a decir, afirma Statile, que la teora de cuerdas es al mismo tiempo
miserable y majestuosa como teora de la realidad material. Miserable, en el sentido de llena de
deficiencias, por su falta de confirmacin experimental y por su imaginacin desbordada que roza
para muchos la frontera hacia lo inverosmil. Majestuosa por su impresionante ambicin de cons-
tituir una reconstruccin racional completa de la gnesis de la realidad material. Pero para Statile
esta majestuosidad podra tener, ms all de lo cientfico, incluso una proyeccin metafsica ms
profunda.
Si la teora de cuerdas fuera en alguna manera capaz superar sus muchos problemas, enton-
ces para los creyentes religiosos su verdadera majestuosidad consistira no meramente en su capa-
cidad explicativa en relacin a la realidad material, ni en su exitosa unificacin de todas las fuer-
zas naturales incluyendo la gravedad, sino en que podra constituir posiblemente una profunda
seal material hacia una realidad que no es de este mundo. Sin embargo, aun sabiendo que la teo-
ra de cuerdas puede ofrecer soluciones cientficas a problemas cientficos, todos sabemos tambin
que ninguna teora puramente cientfica puede nunca ofrecer nada que se acerque a un slido fun-
damento metafsico. Statile entiende, pues, que la reflexin que lleva la teora de cuerdas hacia la
metafsica no es ciencia sino filosofa.
Para Statile, por tanto, est claro que la teora de cuerdas por s misma no permite extraer con-
secuencias metafsicas que pertenecen a otro tipo de discurso. Las consideraciones de Statile, que
expondremos ms adelante, se internan en esa reflexin que, ms all de lo puramente cientfico,
se introduce en lo metafsico y lo religioso.
Mi intencin en este ensayo es la de mediar entre ambas caras de la moneda de la teora de
cuerdas, la miserable y la de su posibilidad de ser majestuosa. Primeramente tomar partido por
aquellos que mantienen que la teora de cuerdas no merece el status de una teora cientfica, pero,
en segundo lugar, pondr en consideracin las credenciales de la teora de cuerdas en relacin con
el mbito de la religin.
Edward Witten fue uno de los grandes maestros de la revolucin de las cuerdas en sus prime-
ros tiempos. Hace ya veinte aos hizo la sugerencia de que la teora de cuerdas era futurista, vin-
dolos como una especulacin del siglo XXI que accidentalmente trataba de gestionar su entrada en
la ciencia a destiempo. Ni siquiera la matemtica necesaria para la teora de cuerdas haba sido
inventada en el tiempo de su nacimiento. Naci adems de forma muy distinta a la teora de la rela-
tividad, sin una idea clara del modelo de realidad que deba describir matemticamente.
Mientras que Einstein aplic la geometra no-eucldea de Riemann para dar expresin a su
intuicin previa de una equivalencia fsica entre aceleracin y gravedad, la teora de cuerdas fue
introducida como una teora matemtica todava en busca de una intuicin fsica anloga a la que
haba guiado a Einstein, nos dice Statile.
La matemtica es ciertamente un poderoso instrumento para la descripcin del mundo. Pero una
cosa es la matemtica, otra el mundo fsico y otra la capacidad de la matemtica para modelizarlo.
En el caso de la teora de cuerdas el escepticismo surge muy pronto para todo aquel que busca corro-
borar los fantasmas intoxicadores de la imaginacin matemtica, nos dice Statile.
ga. La equivalencia materia-energa no debera ser entendida, pues, como una equivalencia cuali-
tativa. Statile cree poder citar a Brian Green para decir que las cuerdas energticas seran funda-
mentales para la materia, pero no seran ellas mismas materiales.
Statile recuerda finalmente que los filsofos presocrticos aportaron ya la idea de que la mate-
rialidad no es suficiente para explicar la existencia del mundo material. La primera crtica filos-
fica seria del materialismo fue por descontado Anaximandro que sostuvo que el Apeiron inmaterial
era la ltima fuente de la realidad material. Incluso los mismos ultra-materialistas filsofos ato-
mistas deban suponer la existencia de un vaco real, aunque inmaterial, en el que los tomos po-
dan tener marco suficiente en el que colisionar. En obras como Philosophical Problems of Quan-
tum Physics y Physics and Philosophy, Werner Heisenberg insisti en documentar sus dudas sobre
el carcter material de las partculas elementales. La teora de cuerdas, por tanto, pone de mani-
fiesto el error de la creencia fundamentalista del materialismo acerca de que nada existe fuera de
la materia y de sus diversas manifestaciones. Hace aos que Gilbert Ryle intent argir a favor del
materialismo al negar el supuesto de un fantasma en la mquina. Si la teora de cuerdas prevale-
ciera eventualmente, entonces esta negacin podra mostrarse como falsa, no precisamente porque
no haya ningn fantasma, sino porque, en ltimo trmino, no habra ninguna mquina.
Las reflexiones de Statile se hacen eco, en efecto, de la actual discusin sobre la teora de cuer-
das. Son un buen hilo conductor para entender cules son los problemas que hoy afectan a una teo-
ra tan compleja. Sin embargo, la dificultad misma de valorarla y emitir un dictamen crtico, as
como las opiniones de Statile, nos llevan a concluir con algunas observaciones:
1) La ciencia debe explicar, o sea, conocer las causas que han llevado al universo fsico de nues-
tra experiencia. Se ha explicado hasta ahora por teoras no unificadas como la relativista y la cunti-
ca. Si los supuestos considerados en el modelo cosmolgico estndar sobre la naturaleza del big
bang (fundados en una argumentacin emprica y contrastables en alguna manera) no bastan para
explicar cmo naci el universo (armonizando lo relativista y lo cuntico) la ciencia debe especular y
establecer hiptesis sobre la gnesis de un universo cuntico-relativista. La dificultad en constrastar
hiptesis tan especulativas no les quita legitimidad como ciencia terica. Si el macroconstructo espe-
culativo-terico de la teora de cuerdas no gustara (quiz por su dificilsima o imposible contras-
tabilidad, por su intrnseca complejidad, o por sus supuestos inverosmiles), habra que buscarle alter-
nativas mejor construidas y, sobre todo, ms simples (twistors de Penrose, loop quantum gravity, u
otras que puedan proponerse).
2) No creemos apropiada la argumentacin de Statile cuando dice que las cuerdas nos llevar-
an a una realidad que no es de este mundo, o que las cuerdas no son cosas materiales. Ya en la fsi-
ca de principios de siglo XX estaba claro que la realidad fsica se manifestaba de dos maneras: como
cuerpos (digamos materia) y radiacin (fenmenos de campo, calor, electromagnetismo, luz).
Ambos fenmenos, que la mecnica cuntica unific en la dualidad corpsculo-onda, forman parte
de este mundo y de la realidad fsica. La radiacin, aunque no sea cuerpo material, puede encap-
sularse y producir partculas-cuerpos (as sucede en los instantes posteriores al big bang, tal como
reconstruye el modelo cosmolgico estndar). Creemos que esto mismo debera aplicarse a las hipo-
tticas supercuerdas. La vibracin, incluso en los germinales supuestos de la teora de cuerdas, sera
materializable y formara parte de los constituyentes reales de este mundo fsico. Otra cosa es que
los fenmenos de campo, como la coherencia cuntica, se consideren hoy ms aptos para expli-
car la naturaleza del psiquismo. Pero el psiquismo sera de este mundo y tendra propiedades deri-
vadas de la ontologa de la materia corpuscular-ondulatoria de este mundo.
3) Parece correcto advertir que al entender el universo a partir de ciertos eventos vibratorios
(no corpusculares), bien en la teora de cuerdas o en la teora cuntica ordinaria, se contempla su
gnesis y su disolucin. Al estar construida la estructura consistente del universo sobre esta estruc-
tura finsima de eventos inconsistentes (que en su orden primigenio ms pequeo seran las cuer-
das) parece necesario que la teora necesite un fondo de referencia (del que brotan y en el que se
diluyen) estas vibraciones en un campo que van construyendo el universo ordenado. Este fondo o
campo fsico real se ha entendido bajo las ms variadas formas conceptuales: peiron (Anaxi-
mandro, que menciona Statile), vaco cuntico, fondo de energa, ter, espacio, orden implcito, etc.
Este fondo se conceptua como realidad fsica, material en germen (porque genera las vibraciones
que producen la materia ferminica del mundo diferenciado y estable de los cuerpos), y pertenece
para la ciencia fsica a este mundo. Pero es comprensible que, la argumentacin filosfica testa
(no cientfica) relacione e interprete esta ontologa fsica de fondo con la ontologa divina. En este
sentido es comprensible que la nueva ontologa de la fsica haga al pensamiento testa ms veros-
mil la existencia de esa realidad fundante trascendente e inmanente (panentenista) que llamamos
Dios.
4) Si la teora de cuerdas acabara por confirmarse y debiramos pensar que el universo de ha
formado a partir de un fondo fsico en el que han ido producindose alteraciones vibratorias que
han dado origen puntual a indefinibles multiuniversos (universos burbuja), esta concepcin de las
cosas sera tambin conciliable con un pensamiento testa, aunque es claro que la hiptesis atesta
sera tambin obviamente posible. La fsica entendera, en el atesmo, que ese fondo de energa
del que brotan los multiuniversos sera pura realidad fsica. Pero el tesmo, pues, podra enten-
der alternativamente, dentro de su interpretacin, que el diseo que conduce al hombre es el dise-
o antrpico de la produccin de multiuniversos, tal como parece concebir Susskind. Pero si la
realidad fsica fuera en efecto obra de una Divinidad creadora, siempre parecera ms fcil, apli-
cando el criterio de la navaja de Ockam, que Dios hubiera creado un universo nico cuyas cons-
tantes y variables respondieran por diseo al ajuste preciso necesario para producir un universo
antrpico que produce al hombre (o sea, el nuestro). Sin embargo, aunque el universo creado fuera
nico en realidad, sin embargo, el hombre racional desde el interior de ese universo, podra con-
cebir hipottica y especulativamente la existencia posible de multiuniversos (cuya existencia real
nunca llegara a probarse porque en realidad no existen).
Se trata del canto de un hombre que durante toda su vida luch para lograr un poco ms de fra-
ternidad entre sus conciudadanos y para que se hiciera visible la humanidad de Dios. Francisco
aprendi a contemplar los seres vivos y las cosas de una forma ingenua, sencilla, fraterna. Dej de
verlos desde el ngulo de su valor comercial, como se haca en su tiempo y se sigue haciendo en
gran parte hoy, para considerarlos criaturas de Dios y, por tanto, dignos de inters por s mismos.
Francisco cant para mostrarles a los hombres la tierra fraternal, liberada del dominio del dinero
y de toda servidumbre.
Todas las biografas ms antiguas de Francisco coinciden en destacar la estrecha unin que
estableca con todas las personas y todas las cosas. Pero este torbellino de fraternidad no naci de
un modo intemporal, sino que coincide con la revolucin social que se estaba produciendo en su
tiempo y con la revolucin personal que supuso su encuentro con los pobres y los leprosos. En este
sentido, se cuenta que pas tres aos dedicado a atenderlos a la vez que restauraba la capilla de San
Damin, hasta que un 24 de febrero, festividad de San Matas, escuch el evangelio de la misin de
los Doce (Mt. 10,5-10) y comprendi que Dios no le peda que restaurara iglesias ruinosas, sino la
Iglesia viva y sus ruinas humanas Y el Seor le dio hermanos, con los que fund su primera fra-
ternidad. Era la primavera de 1208.
Francisco ampli su fraternidad fuera de los lmites de lo humano para llegar al mundo de los ani-
males y al mundo de los vegetales. Todas las biografas escritas en los aos siguientes a su muerte des-
tacan unnimemente la amigable unin que Francisco estableca con todas las criaturas. La fraterni-
dad en Francisco no slo se humaniza, sino que se hace universal. Son mltiples los detalles que se
nos han transmitido sobre cmo Francisco viva esta fraternidad: en su trato con las plantas, con los
animales, etc. As, sus bigrafos sealan que andaba sobre las piedras en atencin a Aqul que se haba
llamado piedra a s mismo; recoga las babosas de los caminos para que no fueran pisadas por la gente;
daba miel y vino a las abejas en el invierno para que no muriesen de fro y de hambre. Con su enor-
me optimismo, prest al mundo un servicio inapreciable que los poetas y dems hombres tendremos
siempre que agradecer. Y esto, en una poca en la que especialmente los ctaros haban despertado
las sombras del maniquesmo, considerando intrnsecamente mala a la materia.
LA FRATERNIDAD CSMICA
material, sino tambin a la inmaterial pero existente y, por tanto, tambin hermana. Como veamos
al principio, la demostracin ms elevada de ese sentido de fraternidad csmica lo podemos observar
en el Cntico de la criaturas. En este cntico, Leonardo Boff ha querido ver, sobre todo, una snte-
sis afortunada entre ecologa interior y ecologa exterior. Su estructura revela el encuentro de la uni-
dad global, entrecruzndose dos lneas: una vertical en la que se dirige a Dios y otra horizontal en la
que estima que, si por nuestra minoridad no podemos hablar directamente con Dios, s podemos hacer-
lo con las criaturas en las que Francisco ve la presencia de Dios, considerndolas sacramentos de Dios.
As, la primera estrofa va dirigida directamente a Dios y las siguientes tambin a Dios, pero por medio
de las criaturas, organizadas en parejas masculinas-femeninas: el sol y la luna, el viento y el agua, el
fuego y la tierra. El Dios al que Francisco se dirige es un Dios pequeo a pesar de su magnitud; no es
un Dios lejano, sino que es un Dios cercano. Sin embargo, en su minoridad, Francisco percibe que no
puede cantar directamente a Dios; por eso lo hace a travs de las criaturas. As canta al hermano sol
al que lo considera seor, pero como tambin ha sido creado por Dios, no deja de ser hermano. Y lo
mismo a la luna, al viento, al agua, al fuego y a la Tierra, considerada por Francisco como madre, pero
que por haber sido creada por Dios es tambin hermana. Finalmente, la hermana muerte corporal, a
la que no teme, sino que la considera una hermana que viene a abrirle las puertas de la eternidad. Por
eso, Francisco se abraza a la muerte porque es una hermana, portadora de una vida ms amplia e
inmortal. No hay por qu temer; poda abrazarla. Francisco acaba su vida reconcilindose as con la
muerte.
Simplificando mucho las cosas, podramos decir que lo que fundamenta el concepto y la vivencia
de la fraternidad en Francisco es su imagen de Dios y su imagen del hombre y, especialmente, la rela-
cin entre ambas. Francisco no fue un telogo ni mucho menos. l se consideraba un iletrado; por
eso nunca pretendi ejercer de telogo. Sin embargo, es interesante destacar que el Dios de Francis-
co es un Dios Padre, un Dios cercano, el abba de Jess. Es un Dios dbil y pequeo, pero que asu-
mi nuestra condicin para mostrar la grandeza de la condicin humana. Es un Dios Padre creador
de todas las cosas, a las que ama porque las ha creado buenas, como podemos leer en Sab. 11. Por
otra parte, se ha dicho que la antropologa de Francisco est cargada de dimensiones teolgicas, por
la cercana que encuentra entre el hombre y Dios o entre Dios y el hombre. Para Francisco, el hom-
bre es fundamentalmente un hermano, sobre todo un hermano menor, siervo y al vez corts, libre por-
que es pobre, alegre con la alegra de sentirse en comunin con la creacin, compasivo y misericor-
dioso, etc.
Como decamos antes, la crisis ecolgica nos concierne a todos, por lo que necesita la partici-
pacin de todos. Y la mejor forma de participacin es una democracia. En esta democracia ecol-
gico-social, los ciudadanos no son solamente los seres humanos, sino todos los seres que compo-
nen el mundo: una biocracia y una cosmocracia. Esto significa que todos los seres de la natu-
raleza son ciudadanos, sujetos de derechos, dignos de respeto y de admiracin.
El filsofo francs J. Maritain y otros muchos han considerado que Francisco es el precursor de
una nueva democracia universal de tipo socio-csmica; no se trata de una democracia en la que todas
las personas humanas son iguales y sin jerarquas, sino de una democracia csmica, que incluye den-
tro de s como ciudadanos no slo a los hombres, sino tambin a los animales, las plantas, el agua, el
sol, la luna y las estrellas. Todos estos ciudadanos de la nueva democracia csmica participan de nues-
tra convivencia, tienen derecho a vivir y deben ser plenamente respetados. Esta democracia csmica
es una democracia biocentralizada, es decir, centrada slo en la vida y en la naturaleza. Ahora bien,
como la naturaleza es el equilibrio entre la vida y la muerte, tambin debe ser incluida la muerte. Eso
es lo que hizo Francisco en su tiempo: su democracia incluye todas las formas de vida e incluso la pro-
pia muerte. Cuando llamaba hermanos a los animales y a las plantas, al sol, la luna y las estrellas y
hasta a la muerte, no estaba sentando las bases de esta nueva democracia csmica?
La cultura moderna parece situar al hombre por encima de las cosas para poseerlas y domi-
narlas. Este antropocentrismo se ha considerado como el resultado de una lectura arrogante de los
textos bblicos. Sin embargo, Francisco vivi otra manera de ser en el mundo. Francisco no define
al ser humano por lo que lo diferencia de los dems seres, sino por lo que tiene de comn con ellos.
Se pone al lado de todas las cosas y de todas las criaturas para amarlas y convivir con ellas como
hermanos y hermanas en una casa comn. Todas las cosas las consider animadas y personaliza-
das; l descubri intuitivamente lo que hoy conocemos por la ciencia: que todos los seres vivos
somos hermanos porque tenemos el mismo cdigo gentico. Para Francisco, todos con-vivimos en
la misma casa paterna y materna, con un profundo respeto hacia todas las diversidades, especial-
mente con los ms dbiles.
La ecologa de la mente, tambin llamada ecologa profunda, trata de despertar en las personas
su espritu de escucha. Por eso, una de las misiones del ser humano es descifrar el mensaje que nos
transmiten todos los seres del universo y celebrarlo. A partir de la ecologa interior, el universo deja
de ser una entidad neutral para convertirse en algo que concierne al ser humano. El universo se
dirige hacia el ser humano, lo mismo que el ser humano se vuelve hacia el universo de donde pro-
cede. Ambos nos pertenecemos mutuamente. Nos une un vnculo de fraternidad que Francisco ya
intuy en su tiempo. No podemos considerarnos como seres separados de la Tierra; somos hijos de
la Tierra, somos la misma Tierra que se hace autoconsciente.
Francisco vivi esta experiencia de un modo profundo. Su gran aportacin para su tiempo fue
considerar que todas las cosas de la creacin son hermanas porque proceden del mismo Padre. Fran-
cisco personaliz todas sus relaciones al considerar a todos los seres del universo como sacramen-
tos de la presencia de Dios. Hoy da se acepta que esta sacramentalidad no debe considerarse slo
en direccin vertical de Dios-universo, sino tambin en la horizontal de Dios-proceso evolutivo cos-
mognico. Esto lleva consigo el mantener abierta la sacramentalidad hacia las nuevas formas de
manifestacin del misterio de Dios. La fe de Francisco le llev a vivir intensamente la experiencia
religiosa del origen comn de todas las cosas. De esta manera experiment cmo Dios muestra su
presencia en cada ser y en su historia. Para l, Dios est presente en el cosmos y el cosmos est pre-
sente en Dios.
Diversos filsofos y telogos del siglo XX (Whitehead, Ogden, Griffin, etc.) han dejado de poner
a Dios y al mundo frente a frente, para considerar a Dios dentro del proceso del mundo y al mundo
dentro del proceso de Dios, de tal manera que todo lo que ocurre en el mundo le afecta a Dios de
alguna forma. El Creador rodea siempre a la criatura y al revs, aunque cada uno conserva su iden-
tidad. As, la distincin sirve a la comunin. Dios no se identifica con el proceso csmico, pero s
en el proceso csmico. Y a la inversa, el universo no se identifica con Dios, pero se identifica en Dios.
Francisco se adelant a esta manera de pensar ya en el siglo XIII, puesto que vea a Dios en todas
las cosas, en todas las circunstancias. Comenz a verlo en los pobres, en los leprosos, en las plantas
y los animales, en el hermano sol, etc., hasta llegar a ver a Dios en la hermana muerte. Francisco se
adelant en la reconciliacin entre el hombre y la naturaleza que hoy se exige en diferentes foros.
Francisco reconcili con su experiencia de vida al hombre con toda la creacin. Por eso se le ha
considerado como el paradigma de homo reconcilatus. De hecho, cuando el Concilio Vaticano II
seala que: el hombre, hecho nueva criatura, puede y debe amar las cosas creadas por Dios, por-
que de Dios las recibe, y las mira y las respeta como salidas de sus manos (GS, 37) est teniendo
plenamente presente el cmo Francisco vio y am a todas las criaturas.
Esta visin franciscana de la naturaleza y Dios es lo que hoy se quiere expresar con la palabra
panentesmo. No se trata de caer en el pantesmo, sino de admitir el panentesmo. Para el pan-
tesmo, Dios es todo y todo es Dios. El cristianismo no puede aceptar esta visin pantesta porque
eso significara hacer a Dios igual que el universo, confundir el Creador con la criatura. Dios y el
universo son diferentes, pero estn abiertos uno al otro en una perfecta comunin. Para el panen-
tesmo, Dios est en todas las cosas y a la inversa; eso significa que podemos ver a Dios en las pie-
dras, en los animales, en las plantas, en el sol, etc., como ya hizo Francisco en el siglo XIII. Francis-
co vive y experimenta la presencia de Dios en todas las cosas; encontr a Dios en s mismo y en
todas las criaturas, considerndolas como sacramentos reveladores de Dios. La creacin entera es
el gran sacramento de Dios.
En este sentido (como en otros muchos), Francisco puede considerarse un precursor de P. Teil-
hard de Chardin. En la ltima pgina de su diario escrita el da 7 de abril de 1955, el Jueves Santo
antes de su muerte, este jesuita recoga como sntesis de su credo la frase: Dios todo en todas las
cosas (1Cor. 15,28). Esa era la expresin bblica del misterio de los misterios: pleromizar a Dios,
como l deca. Pleromizar ser la consecucin final del momento en que Dios y la creacin se unan
en una totalidad sin confusin.
CONCLUSIN
BIBLIOGRAFA
RESEAS
ARTIGAS, M., Ciencia y Religin. Conceptos sonas. Basta pensar en dos diccionarios de
fundamentales (EUNSA, Pamplona, tipo enciclopdico que se han publicado en
2007). 422 pp. ISBN: 978-84-313- los ltimos aos: el editado en Roma en
2490-2. 2002 por Giuseppe Tanzella Nitti (Univer-
sidad de la Santa Croce) y Alberto Strumia
En estos ltimos aos es muy numero-
(Universidad de Bari), y el editado en Nueva
sa la produccin de ensayos, investigacio-
York en 2003 por J. Wentzel Vrede van
nes, comentarios y textos sobre Ciencia y
Huyssteen (Princeton). Dentro de una lnea
Religin. Basta con consultar el nmero
teolgica conservadora, el autor intenta (a
especial de nuestra revista Pensamiento.
veces con demasiada buena voluntad)
Ciencia, Filosofa y Religin [vol. 63,
armonizar el pensamiento neotomista con
nm. 238, 2007] y ste para tener una idea
los retos que a la religin supone muchos
del movimiento emergente en el mundo
cientfico, filosfico y teolgico sobre el di- de los planteamientos de las ciencias de la
logo y los conflictos entre el pensamiento naturaleza y de las ciencias sociales. Maria-
cientfico y la experiencia religiosa. El pre- no Artigas acab este libro muy poco antes
sente volumen contiene 26 conceptos orde- de su fallecimiento y ofrece una madura
nados por orden alfabtico relativos a la sntesis de su pensamiento disperso a lo
problemtica Ciencia-Religin. Posible- largo de 30 aos de trabajo en muchas
mente falten conceptos fundamentales y a publicaciones, 18 libros y numerosos folle-
otros se les da ms relevancia de lo que tos y artculos.L. SEQUEIROS.
merecen en realidad. De alguna manera, es
el testamento filosfico pstumo del pro- HAUGHT, J. F., Christianity and Science.
fesor Mariano Artigas (1938-2006), que ha Toward a Theology of Nature (Orbis
dedicado muchos aos de su vida a la refle- Books, New York, 2007). 208 pp. ISBN:
xin y el debate sobre estos temas desde la 978-1-57075-740-2. 23 15 cm.
Universidad de Navarra. Doctor en Cien-
cias Fsicas y en Filosofa, fue el primer Como apunta Peter C. Phan en el pr-
Decano de la Facultad Eclesistica de Filo- logo de este ensayo, las relaciones entre las
sofa y profesor ordinario de Filosofa de la ciencias y el cristianismo se sitan en estos
Ciencia y de la Naturaleza en la Universi- momentos en un punto caliente de enten-
dad de Navarra desde 1987. Fue honrado dimiento. Despus de varios siglos de in-
con el premio Europa de la Universidad de comprensin mutua, cuando no de exclu-
Navarra en el ao 2002. Recibi varias ayu- sin, son muy abundantes las reflexiones
das de investigacin de la Fundacin Tem- publicadas en el mundo anglosajn y
pleton de los Estados Unidos. El mismo sobre todo en sectores ms abiertos del
autor reconoce en el prlogo que no ha pre- pensamiento protestante sobre la opor-
tendido escribir un diccionario en el senti- tunidad, necesidad y posibilidad de dilo-
do habitual. Ello hubiera requerido ms go. El profesor John F. Haught es colabo-
tiempo y la colaboracin de muchas per- rador de la Universidad de Georgetown en
1128 RESEAS
temas de Ciencia y Religin, dentro del cen- ser humano dentro de ella. Abordado
tro teolgico de Woodstock. Haught resal- desde el punto de vista de la sociologa y
ta la importancia de Pierre Teilhard de de la psicologa, este ensayo se pregunta
Chardin en ese intento de reencuentro entre por el origen de la religiosidad en la natu-
la lectura materialista y cientfica de la rea- raleza humana. Los relatos de los pueblos
lidad natural y la lectura teolgica de esa sin religin demuestran a juicio de
misma realidad. No se contraponen como Hume que la religiosidad ni se funda-
enemigos irreconciliables, sino que hay menta en la razn humana ni pertenece a
fronteras comunes en las que ambas se la originaria capacidad emocional del ser
encuentran, contactan, repiensan juntas y humano. Para Hume, la religin brota de
reelaboran los conceptos en categoras una reaccin psicolgica como un senti-
comprensibles para una cultura laica. El miento de temor de los humanos hacia la
matrimonio entre ciencia y cristianismo naturaleza. Desde este punto de vista, la
no es, pues, un matrimonio de convenien- religin aparece como un elemento con-
cia, apunta el prlogo. El ensayo se estruc- tingente del desarrollo psicosocial. La his-
tura en diez captulos que abordan la his- toria de las religiones muestra un ritmo de
toria pasada y las oportunidades actuales abstraccin en la construccin social de
de diez aspectos de las relaciones entre las las religiones, desde el politesmo inicial
ciencias y el cristianismo. Desde la ciencia al monotesmo. Pero segn Hume esto no
y la esperanza cristiana a la verdad de la se debe a una racionalidad progresiva de
ciencia y la verdad de la fe, pasando por la las religiones, sino que es consecuencia de
ciencia y el misterio, la ciencia y la revela- los complejos mecanismos psicolgicos
cin, la evolucin y la providencia divina, que organizan la relacin de los humanos
la cosmologa y la creacin, etc. El inten- con lo que llaman Dios. El Dios del
to de responder teolgicamente a los retos Hume est muy lejos de los humanos y es
de las ciencias modernas (lo que hoy se tan omnipotente que cae en el fatalismo y
suele definir como Teologa de la Ciencia) en la negacin de la autonoma del hom-
implica la reelaboracin de conceptos cl- bre religioso. Acompaado de un excelen-
sicos acuados en unos moldes filosficos te estudio preliminar, una bibliografa
que hoy son inadecuados y expresarlos en extensa y clarificadoras notas a pie de pgi-
otras categoras diferentes. Una completa na, este ensayo es una valiosa contribu-
bibliografa y un ndice temtico detallado cin al conocimiento en los pases de len-
completan este volumen que desearamos gua espaola del pensamiento de Hume.
ver pronto publicado en castellano.L. SE- L. SEQUEIROS.
QUEIROS.
RESEAS 1129
1130 RESEAS
RESEAS 1131
1132 RESEAS
entre Isaac Newton, la causalidad y la mente. En la tercera parte (El fin de nues-
accin divina. El volumen se estructura en tra exploracin) dedica cinco captulos a
tres partes: en la primera (La bsqueda apuntar las lneas de futuro de una nueva
espiritual en el nuevo mundo de la cien- manera de abordar la Teologa. El volu-
cia) se incluyen dos captulos sobre los men se completa con la reproduccin del
desafos de la ciencia a la Teologa y cu- artculo del profesor Javier Monserrat,
les seran los nuevos caminos de la Teolo- Ciencia, bioqumica y pan-en-tesmo en
ga como respuesta a los retos de la Cien- Arthur Peacocke, publicado en nuestra
cia. En la segunda parte (Exploracin revista Pensamiento (vol. 61, 229 [2005]
desde la Ciencia hacia Dios) dedica cua- 59-76), que es imprescindible para enten-
tro captulos a la reflexin interdisciplinar der en su justa dimensin los contenidos
sobre el mundo cientfica y teolgica- de este trabajo.L. SEQUEIROS.
PENSAMIENTO
Special Series: Science, Philosophy and Religion
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Opens a new area of international communication
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concerning the thematic Science, Philosophy and Religion
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BIBLIOGRAFA
Reseas ........................................................................................................... 1127-1132
ARTIGAS, M., Ciencia y Religin. Conceptos fundamentales, 1127.HAUGHT, J. F.,
Christianity and Science. Toward a Theology of Nature, 1127.HUME, DAVID, His-
toria natural de la religin, 1128.POLKINGHORNE, J., La fe de un fsico. Reflexio-
nes teolgicas de un pensador ascendente, 1128.TORRUBIA, JOSEPH, Aparato para
la Historia Natural Espaola, 1129.GARCA DONCEL, M. - ROMERO, JOSEP M. (eds.),
Actualitat de Teilhard de Chardin, 1131.PEACOCKE, A., Los caminos de la Ciencia
hacia Dios. El final de toda nuestra exploracin, 1131.