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serie especial nm.

2 (2008)
PENSAMIENTO Revista de Investigacin e Informacin Filosfica

CIENCIA, FILOSOFA Y RELIGIN


Serie Especial

EDITORIAL

vol. 64 nm. 242


The contribution of science/philosophy/religion dialogue to transdisci-
plinary and inter-confessional approaches towards a better society. 579-590

ARTCULOS
ROBERTO POLI Person and Value .......................................... 591-602
SUSUMU SHIMAZONO Individualization of Society and Religioni-
zation of Individuals: Resacralization in
Postmodernity (Second Modernity) ..... 603-619
PIOTR BYLICA God, Design, and Naturalism: Implications
y DARIUSZ SAGAN of Methodological Naturalism in Scien-
ce for Science-Religion Relation .......... 621-638
JAVIER LEACH Mathematics, Reason & Religion ............... 639-663
MIGUEL LORENTE PRAMO Some Relational Theories on the Structure
of Space-Time: Physics, Philosophy,
Theology ................................................... 665-691

PENSAMIENTO
FERNANDO LPEZ AGUILAR Quantum Neurology: A Key Within Physics
Toward the Knowledge of the Cons-
ciousness? ............................................... 693-713
MANUEL BJAR GALLEGO Physics, Consciousness and Transcen-
dence: The Physics of Roger Penrose
and David Bohm as Regards a Scien-
tific Explanation of the Human Mind
Open to Reality ........................................ 715-739
(El ndice sigue en la tercera pgina de cubierta The Index
continues in the inside of the back cover)

PENSAMIENTO
Vol. 64, nm. 242, serie especial nm. 2 (2008), pgs. 577-1136, ISSN 0031-4749 NI
S
V E R I TA S

vol. 64 nm. 242


U

serie especial n. 2 (2008)


OM
TIFICIA

ILLENS

Nmero publicado en julio de 2008


ON

S
P

* M *
A T RI TI
(Viene de la cubierta.)

EDICIN Y ADMINISTRACIN
IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO Gnesis de la vida desde la dinmica
procesual de la materia ....................... 741-770
EDICIN Y ADMINISTRACIN (suscripciones, pedidos, pagos, giros, etc.): PENSAMIENTO.
Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad Pontificia Comillas. C/ Universidad JOAN BERTRN A Darwinian Process: The Molecular
Comillas, 3.28049 Madrid. Telfono: 91 734 39 50. Fax: 91 734 45 70. E-mail: Evolution of Enzymes .......................... 771-782
revistas@pub.upcomillas.es. Hay un formulario de suscripcin en la pgina web.
MANUEL G. DONCEL Teologa de la evolucin (II): La llamada
Talones y giros postales deben dirigirse a: PENSAMIENTO. Servicio de Publicacio-
creadora trinitaria. Karl Schmitz-
nes de la Universidad Pontificia Comillas. C/ Universidad Comillas, 3.28049 Madrid.
Transferencias bancarias a: PENSAMIENTO. Servicio de Publicaciones de la Uni- Moormann, 1997 ................................... 783-814
versidad Pontificia Comillas, en: CAJA MADRID, C/ Blasco de Garay, 38.28015 Ma- JAVIER MONSERRAT Alfred N. Whitehead on Process Philo-
drid. C.C.: 2038-1760-89-6000482372. Cdigo IBAN: ES56-2038-1760-8960-0048-2372. sophy and Theology: Cosmos and Ke-
Cdigo SWIFT: CAHMESMM. nosis of Divinity ..................................... 815-845
SUSCRIPCIN.Precios para el ao 2008 (impuestos y transportes incluidos): MARTN SEVILLA RODRGUEZ Los orgenes del materialismo en India y
SUSCRIPCIN ANUAL: Espaa: 33,00 , 31,73 sin IVA.Europa: 62,50 , 60,10 sin Grecia: similitudes y diferencias ........ 847-864
IVA.Iberoamrica y frica: 70,00 .Otros pases: 76,00 .
ALFONSO GMEZ FERNNDEZ Nagarjuna y la dialctica del origen con-
NMERO SUELTO: Espaa: 13,40 , 13,93 con IVA.Europa: 22,70 , 23,60 con
dicionado ............................................... 865-887
IVA.Iberoamrica y frica: 26,00 .Otros pases: 26,00 .
JUAN MASI y MOE KUWANO El retorno a la unidad cuerpo-mente. En-
LIBROS PARA RECENSIN.Deben remitirse al Coordinador de Crtica de Libros, Ri-
cuentro de ascesis, terapia y filosofa
cardo Pinilla Burgos. C/ Universidad Comillas, 3.28049 Madrid.
en Japn ................................................ 889-902
MANUSCRITOS.Deben remitirse al Director.
MANUEL CABADA CASTRO Infinitud divina y visin mstica en Nico-
ls de Cusa ............................................ 903-930
GAMAL ABDEL-KARIM El sufismo y el Islam .................................. 931-946
RESERVADOS LOS DERECHOS
DE PROPIEDAD LITERARIA
SCAR CASTRO GARCA El yo interior. Reflexiones transdiscipli-
Queda prohibida la reproduccin
nares sobre la experiencia de lo nu-
total o parcial de esta revista minoso ................................................... 947-985
por cualquier procedimiento,
sin permiso escrito de la Editorial
ESTUDIOS, NOTAS, TEXTOS Y COMENTARIOS
IVN ORTEGA RODRGUEZ The Relevance of Jan Patockas Pheno-
menology in Questions of Science
and Religion .......................................... 987-1001
JOSEP PUIG MONTADA Farah. Ant.un: Active Reception of Euro-
Este nmero especial de PENSAMIENTO se publica pean Thought ........................................ 1003-1024
en colaboracin con la Ctedra CTR, J. SERAFN BJAR BACAS Cristianismo, Islam e Ilustracin. A pro-
dentro del Programa Ciencia, Tecnologa y tica-Social, psito del discurso de Benedicto XVI
de la Escuela Tcnica Superior de Ingeniera (ICAI) en la Universidad de Ratisbona ......... 1025-1042
de la Universidad Comillas Madrid y en desarrollo
JESS ROMERO MOIVAS La reformulacin de la dogmtica teol-
del Proyecto Sophia Iberia in Europe
gica desde la metafsica del devenir .. 1043-1086

PERFILES EN CIENCIA Y RELIGIN


JAVIER MONSERRAT Mathematical Models Beyond Space
and Time: Michael Heller Reflects on
the Big Questions of Cosmology ...... 1087-1092

(El ndice contina en la pg. 1136)


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no: 91 540 61 98. E-mail: jmonserrat@res.upcomillas.es
CONSEJO DE REDACCIN: Juan Manuel Almarza (Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao), Carlos Beorlegui
(Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao), Alfonso Drake Diez de Rivera (Universidad Comillas, Madrid),
Josep M. Coll (Universitat Ramon Llull, Barcelona), Miguel Garca-Bar (Universidad Comi-
llas, Madrid), Leandro Sequeiros (Facultad de Teologa, Granada).
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E-mail: pensa.libros@chs.upcomillas.es. Envo de libros para recensin a: Ricardo Pinilla
Burgos. C/ Universidad Comillas, 3.28049 Madrid.

CONSEJO ASESOR
Juan Antonio Estrada (Universidad de Granada). Pedro Cerezo Galn (Universidad
de Granada). Juan Carlos Scannone (Universidad de El Salvador, Buenos Aires).
Ral Fornet-Betancourt (Universidad de Aachen, Bremen). Mauricio Beuchot (Universidad
Autnoma de Mxico). Rudolf Bernet (Universidad de Lovaina).
Laszlo Tengelyi (Universidad de Wupperthal). Salvi Turr (Universidad de Barcelona).
Gabriel Amengual (Universidad de las Islas Baleares). Manuel Garca Doncel (Universidad
Autnoma de Barcelona). Jos Gmez Caffarena (Universidad de Comillas).
Joao Jos Miranda Vila-Cha (Universidade Catlica Portuguesa). Alberto Rosa Rivero
(Universidad Autnoma de Madrid). Amalio Blanco Abarca (Universidad Autnoma
de Madrid). Jess Conill (Universidad de Valencia). Pedro Gmez Garca (Universidad
de Granada). Manuel Cabada Castro (Universidad Complutense, Madrid).
Adela Cortina (Universidad de Valencia). Juan Arana (Universidad de Sevilla). Pascual
Martnez-Freire (Universidad de Mlaga). Juan Miguel Palacios (Universidad
Complutense, Madrid). Antonio Pintor Ramos (Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca).
Vctor Gmez Pin (Universidad Autnoma de Barcelona). Francesc Torralba (Universitat
Ramon Llull, Barcelona). Carlos Alonso Bedate (Centro Biologa Molecular, CSIC, Madrid).
Jos Mara Guibert (Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao). Ana Rioja (Universidad
Complutense, Madrid). Rafael Ramn (Universidad Complutense, Madrid)

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EDITORIAL

THE CONTRIBUTION OF
SCIENCE/PHILOSOPHY/RELIGION
DIALOGUE TO
TRANSDISCIPLINARY
AND INTER-CONFESSIONAL
APPROACHES TOWARDS
A BETTER SOCIETY
Dr. Eric L. Weislogel
Executive Director & Vice-president
of the Metanexus Institute
for Science and Religion, Philadelphia

T
he publication of the second issue in the special series Ciencia, Filosofa y Religin (Science,
Philosophy & Religion) of the PENSAMIENTO magazine (July 2008) coincides with
the Metanexus World Conference 2008 to be held in Madrid at the Universidad Pontificia
Comillas. This event is the reason for this second issue in the series being devoted to the
Metanexus Institute. But if we focus on our magazines objectives and in particular the
Ciencia, Filosofa y Religin (Science, Philosophy & Religion) series, as well as the Science,
Technology and Religion chair within the Sophia Iberia project funded by the Templeton
Foundation and the Science, Technology and Social Ethics programme at the Escuela Tcnica
Superior de Ingeniera at U.P. Comillas, there is an obvious alignment with the objectives of
the Metanexus Institute. This means that we do not have to step outside our interests in
order to join together with the interests of the Metanexus Institute. In both cases, these are
interests aimed at encouraging ideas and nexus that lead to a better society and greater
human cohesion.
But what interests are we talking about? Broadly speaking, we are dealing with what the
Templeton Foundation has called the great issues and questions that have been present
throughout history and which are raised again today with perhaps even more force. Questions
that, as such, do not necessarily require an answer, but which encourage us to look towards
the ancient concerns of human beings: expanding knowledge to the essence of the universe,
the ultimate metaphysical foundations, the meaning of life, values, ethical, moral, personal
and social obligations and commitments, the search for and exercising of freedom, the value
of religions, ideological and worldview pluralism, solidarity, respect and tolerance, scientific,
intercultural and inter-religious dialogue, poverty and compassion for those who suffer,

PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749 PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), nm. 242, pp. 579-590
580 EDITORIAL

poverty, justice, the development of civilisation, etc. These are undoubtedly important issues,
which affect the moral conscience of people, groups of humans, nations and cultures.
However, are there answers to these important questions? Just by observing the world
stage of societies and cultures we can immediately see the huge variety of metaphysical beliefs,
religions and ideologies. This seems to show that the universe in which man lives and in which
he aims to understand his own self in order to live is disconcerting, dark and enigmatic.
It is like a polyhedron of infinite sides that reflect different images taken on in a creative way
by the different metaphysics, religions, ideologies, cultures and ways of life.
Despite so much factual diversity however, we, as humans, hope to fulfil one of humanitys
ancient desires: to base our lives on the idea of inter-human communion, to live as brothers
in society, to achieve perfect cohesion not only with our immediate fellows, but with the
universal human species. This instinctive drive to live with others is more deeply-rooted
and fundamental than the drive for aggression towards others. Suspicion and aggression
between humans probably resulted from a dysfunction that was already imbedded in
prehistoric times, an existential mistake, the mismanagement of co-existence. We have
already reflected on this topic in the editorial of issue no. 1 of this series (2007, no. 238 of
PENSAMIENTO) Contributing to social cohesion for a harmonious co-existence in an
ideal community.

THE LINKS THAT LEAD TO SOCIAL COHESION

The burning question is therefore how do we achieve inter-human communion? At


first glance, it seems that the already mentioned huge diversity of existential, personal and
communal designs is the main obstacle to social cohesion. We shouldnt forget that
diversity (difference) has often been the reason for conflict throughout history; at least
amongst people who continued to follow this ancient mismanagement of co-existence.
For this reason, there have always been, and continue to be, people who think that we must
overcome, or remove diversity in order to achieve co-existence: in other words, we must
strive for a shared universal design of existence (i.e. all Christians, all Muslims, all Buddhists,
all Agnostics, all Atheists, or all the same thing). We believe however that this kind of
standardisation is not only unfair, it is also impossible.
We strongly believe that existential diversity is a natural right which is not an obstacle
to achieving what we have called inter-human communion and social cohesion. Diversity
is an inevitable consequence of human freedom; creative freedom exercised in a complex,
dark and enigmatic universe. Diversity naturally arises in a dark world that appears to be
made for creativity. Metaphysical constructs, ideologies, religions, cultures, ways of life, etc.
are a wonderful product of creativity. It is therefore fantastic that people stick to their
traditions, both personal and communal. This attachment is based on the fact that these
traditions are the result of creative freedom and the fact that they continue to make creative
freedom possible. Moving towards inter-human communion does not require ones own
tradition to be rejected: it would be unfair and impossible for human cohesion to be
incompatible with diversity.
What is then this path towards inter-human communion? We believe that the answer
may be the following: to make use of creative freedom which exists in all human traditions
and existential designs in order to find the links (nexus) that connect them, so that
knowledge about these links shows us the way towards mutual understanding, towards
respect and towards mutual enrichment. In order to go beyond (meta) towards a utopian
future of increasing inter-human communion, we must first focus on the nexus that joins
us with other peoples, cultures, ideologies, religions and ways of life. Every one of us can be
true to our own traditions and existential design; but we can all be aware of the nexus that

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THE CONTRIBUTION OF SCIENCE/PHILOSOPHY/RELIGION DIALOGUE TO TRANSDISCIPLINARY 581

joins us to other human beings. This could be one way of interpreting the concept of metanexus
(transcending networks) from the humanist and co-existing background of its social
commitment.
In chapter four of his most outstanding work, Die Phenomenologie des Geistes (The
Phenomenology of Spirit), Hegel brilliantly formulated the ultimate meaning of history: to
reach a collective state (Spirit) where the I is We and the We is I. He understood the path
towards this inter-human communion (towards this careful balance between the individual
and the communal). He called it mutual recognition (gegenseitliche Anerkennung). Only
when people engage in mutual recognition of each other as free men is communion-
based existence possible. Only then are respect, tolerance, true appreciation, compassion,
mutual enrichment and peace between people of different metaphysics, ideologies, cultures
and religions possible.

SCIENCE AS THE LINK TO INTER-HUMAN COMMUNION

Human diversity is shown in the different metaphysical possibilities. But not only in
metaphysical terms, as diversity is also shown in many other ways. The metaphysical element
is essential, because it affects a human beings most deeply-rooted senses. It is true that in
our society, some people have very little sensitivity for and interest in metaphysical issues;
but they are a minority. In fact, we make a distinction between atheists, agnostics, theists
and religious people (members of organised religious groups). There is still a lot of aggression
between these different groups (although in the past, there was even more): between atheists
and theists, between atheists and theists and religious people, between different religious
groups, etc. This multi-directional aggression is, at the end of the day, the result of a lack of
understanding between the different groups, contempt, a lack of tolerance and inter-human
mutual recognition.
How can we overcome these tensions and inter-human misunderstandings? In other
words: how can we create links that enable mutual recognition and progress towards
increasing inter-human communion? Here is where we need to express our strong belief
that science is currently emerging as a powerful factor in inter-human community and
cohesion. There are obviously other possible cohesion factors; but science is emerging today
as a special force. Science has been and is an effective cognitive tool for the technological
control of the world. But today, it is also emerging as a powerful social factor in metaphysical
cohesion. Why?
Sciences emerging role is a result of its own nature. 1) It creates highly reliable and
rigorous knowledge (although it is always hypothetical and subject to critical review). 2) This
information is created with the guarantee of levels of objectivity that can easily be agreed
upon, although it is sometimes debateable. 3) Science has a deep understanding of decisive
aspects of ontology and the universes procedural dynamic. 4) Due to its own method however,
it doesnt enter into the ultimate metaphysical knowledge of what is real. 5) It is growing in
social prestige because of its methodical rigor, because of its use of technology, its in-depth
information about the world and because of its metaphysical neutrality.
Although science is therefore not metaphysics, it provides results that should be considered
by metaphysics (philosophy). It is incorrect to use science in itself to provide metaphysical
results. Science is metaphysically neutral. It is only philosophical reasoning (from another
legitimate knowledge discipline, but not scientific) that discusses scientific results with a
view to metaphysics. The inevitable consequence of sciences current prestige is that
metaphysics, ideologies, religions, cultures and ways of life, etc. look for reinterpretation in
light of the image of the world expressed through modern science. Atheists and agnostics
use science to argue (but this is now philosophy) their metaphysical stance. The big religions

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582 EDITORIAL

do the same: Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, etc. They all want to
emphasise their ancient beliefs in light of scientific knowledge, because they know that they
cannot present a view of the universe that conflicts with science. When reinterpreting
themselves using science however, they should use what we called before creative freedom,
which initially creates and constantly updates respective existential traditions.
Those who look to science for clarification (atheists, agnostics, religions, etc.) are therefore
within traditions that demonstrate different diversity. But science represents a compact
body of knowledge that is metaphysically neutral (although with many obscurities and
uncertainties that form a part of the same image of the world in science). We could describe
what is happening by saying that, from an existential diversity point of view, a modern
creative effort has been made towards convergence in science. Different origins flow together
in the neutral field of science and there the most varied metaphysical traditions meet. In
this situation, it is almost inevitable that we see science as a wonderful communications
hub where metaphysical streams from different origins converge, but which through
science are able to link with the streams (or motorways) that lead to the heart of other
metaphysics. Differences can be connected through science and here they form the link that
allows the metaphysical pulse of other humans to be felt. Science is therefore a neutral
territory that enables communication links between metaphysics, ideologies, religions
and cultures to be formed. The path towards inter-human community and cohesion could
be opened up through convergence in science.

THE METAPHYSICAL PROJECTION OF THE IMAGE OF THE WORLD IN SCIENCE

The question, then, has primarily a twofold aspect: 1) What is the image of matter, of
the universe, of life and of man from the perspective of science? 2) What consequences does
this image have for our metaphysical knowledge of reality? Yet there is also a third aspect:
3) What nexus or modes of communication do this image and these metaphysical
consequences leave open between the diverse metaphysical systems and religions?
We have already said that science is metaphysically neutral; but it produces kinds of
knowledge that must be considered by metaphysics, and constructed in a philosophical
discourse. When all is said and done, science as much as metaphysics (i.e., ideologies,
religions, cultures, etc.) aspires to know the same reality. It is therefore correct for
metaphysics to turn to science, so the latter can help shed light upon its idea of reality. But
those points which interest metaphysics about science are those crucial fields in which
science draws close to the ultimate, the metaphysical, the ground, the final and absolute
explanation of the universe.
Metaphysics interprets in a certain manner the ultimate: atheism, agnosticism and
religions effectively have their own metaphysics. In general, all metaphysical systems have
a humanist idea of man, as a personal being who creates his history by means of free
decisions. Religions, in addition, believe that there exists transphenomenologically (i.e.,
beyond our immediate phenomenological experience through the internal and external
senses) a mysteric reality that will welcome human life after death and that, for almost all
religions, responds to a God understood as creator-ground. Nevertheless, does the image of
matter, the universe, life and man from the perspective of science permit us to think that
our humanist idea of man is legitimate? Does it permit us to think that the existence of a
metaphysical mystery or of a ground-creator God is plausible? Let us think about what
would happen if science effectively demonstrated or almost demonstrated the existence
or non-existence of God. The consequences this would have for agnostics, atheists, theists,
or religious persons are evident. It is certainly a fact that there is an open discussion between
them for the purpose of arguing that the results of science support one particular metaphysics

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THE CONTRIBUTION OF SCIENCE/PHILOSOPHY/RELIGION DIALOGUE TO TRANSDISCIPLINARY 583

more than another. But what is really the case? To what kind of evaluation of metaphysics
is science leading? To respond to these questions we should first demarcate the realms
involved in the answer.
For this, were we to commence by establishing the concept of the metaphysical field
of science, we would define it as those sensitive zones in which the results of science have
a special implication (special consequences) for metaphysics. They are zones where science
reaches its limits, so that the answer to the questions that science itself raises cannot be
provided by the scientific method; consequently, it connects with philosophy and metaphysical
argumentation.
Here we highlight three metaphysical fields of science which we consider most
important, although they are not the only ones. They are important by their very nature and
because, in fact, they have been posed throughout history as well as today. These three
metaphysical fields of science are the following: first, the problem about the consistency
and stability of the universe, second, the problem about the causes of the physical and
biological orders, and third, the problem about the origin and nature of animal and human
psychism.

The problem about the consistency and stability of the universe

Science always begins with facts. Thus, the phenomenological experience of our body
and of the objective world confirms the existence of a system-of-real-things as a dynamic
structure of interdependent events. A cell, a living organism, a rock, a planet, the solar system,
a galaxy, the universe, etc., are real as structures, as systems of interdependent events.
The expectation of human reason from science (as it was from philosophy in the beginning)
is that this existent real system exists in fact because it can exist. So the universe can
exist, it is expected to possess some properties. 1) Its dynamic contents should maintain in
time a systemic relation and interdependence (consistency). 2) This consistency should be
stable in time (reason postulates dynamic stability only, but not staticity). 3) Consequently,
reason postulates that the consistent and stable reality is sufficient, i.e., it is absolute in
the sense that it needs nothing other than itself to maintain its dynamic consistency and
stability in the course of time. 4) This sufficiency would involve attributing to existent reality
the necessity of maintaining itself: since if it ceases to exist at some point in the past,
present or future, it could no longer justify its actual existence.
Nevertheless, the real manner by which the universe is made and described in science
makes it difficult to understand how these rational expectations can be met. Thus, the
problem about its consistency and stability is posed. The gravitational universe of Newton
and Einstein made a stable, consistent, and eternal universe intelligible. But new
unquestionable empirical facts supported the Big Bang theory, the the standard cosmological
model and the standard model of physics (particles). It was not easy to attribute consistency
and stability to a universe that seems to have begun at a particular moment in time and that
seems to be directed to a future heat death. Science reacted by constructing theories
(hypotheses and suppositions) about other models of the universe that assumed the big bang
but presented a dynamic consistency and stability. We cite Hawkings oscillation model,
and above all, the bubble universe and of multi-universes (multiverses) theories. The string
and super-string theory would also offer theoretical support to the multi-universes theories,
since it presents a complex supposition about the germinal ontology of matter that would
explain how and why multi-universes could have been produced. In any case, science today
poses the problem of how to explain the consistency and stability of the universe.
Undoubtedly, all these are related to one of the principal metaphysical fields of science,
since it seems that the universe actually makes it difficult to explain its own consistency and
stability. In other words, given how the universe presents itself, it becomes difficult to

PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), nm. 242 pp. 579-590


584 EDITORIAL

understand how it can be self-sufficient insofar as its own existing reality is concerned.
This problematic leads science to engage in metaphysical suppositions.

The problem about the causes of the physical and biological orders

Science confirms the existence of a dynamic and evolving universe, the product of the
organization of matter through an evolution process in time. Expansive energy, particles,
atoms, celestial bodies, physical objects, living beings emerged in the primordial genesis
of matter. And it is a fact that the evolution process produced an organized universe: the
physical order and the more complex biological order. Science therefore asks about the
causes that made the production of these orders possible, as confirmed by empirical
experience.
Science initially searched for the response in one direction, expecting the real properties
of matter (its ontology) to be the causes of the physical and biological orders. Within a
Darwinian scheme, physical ontology (physical laws), chaos, chance, and necessity would
explain why our world was organized in this manner. However, the physical laws and
circumstances of the evolution process led science to understand that the world at certain
moments could have evolved in different directions. For example: Variables that could have
had some or other qualitative values could have influenced significantly the organization of
universes different from ours. Thus it is confirmed that the universe has an anthropic
construction (a precise manner among many others of being constructed making life
and the human being possible).
When looking for the causes of this anthropic construct, science posed the possibility
of the so-called anthropic principle, interpreted in a weak or strong sense. But whether
another cause we should call design, aside from the ontology of matter, should be admitted
is the question. It is related to the multi-universes theory, since within a Darwinian
cosmology one can explain the random production of the surprising anthropic properties
of the universes physical and biological orders without recourse to any design.
In any case, the problem regarding the causes of the physical and biological orders is
undoubtedly one of the metaphysical fields discussed in science. A metaphysical design
of evolution could perhaps be attributed to a divine designer-mind. In turn, the design would
pose the problem about how to conceive the manner by which God a radice would have
designed a universe that is simultaneously anthropic (directed to man) and autonomous
(evolving by itself without the need for a God-of-gaps).

The problem about the origin and nature of psychism (consciousness)

The existence of the physical universe and life is surprising. Even more surprising perhaps
is the existence of human and animal psychism. The existence of the capacity to sense
the physical world and life itself is baffling. Limited to superior animals and man,
psychic experience as a fact is usually called the experience of consciousness. Consciousness,
psyche, or the human mind produced history, society, and science itself. Psychism is a
phenomenological experience that, as such, should be described. Various authors agree on
emphasizing three of its phenomenological features: the unity of the subject (mind) as an
information-response system, the indeterminacy or openness of responses (freedom in man)
and the field or holistic nature of psychic experience. As subjects, we sense by means
of the senses the unitary field experience of our body as a totality, and, at the same time,
our immersion in the world, above all, in the fields of light that link our ontology to the
external ontology of the cosmos.
Science should explain all natural phenomena; thus, it cannot ignore the epistemological
necessity of understanding the causes of psychism. In principle, the expectation of science

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is monist, since it seeks to explain psychism by means of its physical and biological causes.
First, the physical world was organized; from the physical world emerged the biological
world; within this physico-biological world, psychism slowly emerged. The unity of evolution
leads science to suppose that life and the human/animal psyche (consciousness) were
constructed from a physical support that made them possible within the evolution of the
universe.
For many centuries, this strange psychic experience has been related to the world of
spirit, different from the purely physical or material world, that would connect us to a
metaphysically transcendent dimension. From the time of the Renaissance, modern science
has also tried to explain psychism, although not always successfully, as we will see. In any
case, science and philosophy are engaged with an old theme whose modern version is the
so-called theories of mind and consciousness.

THE MECHANICIST-DETERMINIST PARADIGM AND THE REDUCTIONIST EXPLANATION

The interaction and dialogue of metaphysics and religions with science cannot be
understood independently of the paradigm that dominated science for many years (and has
not been completely surpassed yet). We refer to the reductionist paradigm grounded on a
mechanicist-determinist image of the physical world (applicable also to the biological and
human world). Science explained the consistency and stability of the world from the
perspective of mechanicism-determinism; and because of reductionism, the same perspective
was employed to explain the physical and biological orders, as well as psychism, consciousness,
and man. But are mechanicism-determinism and reductionism the correct scientific
paradigm? Are they necessary for science? Do they explain everything or do they provide
only part of the explanation?
Reductionism makes it easy to understand the difficulties that metaphysics and religion
had for many years in their dialogue with science. However, to understand the current
parameters of the science-metaphysics-religion dialogue, it is necessary to note that the
reductionist paradigm is not absolute, and that science is actually moving towards a new
paradigm, to which I will refer later. This new paradigm makes it possible for metaphysics
and religions to find a powerful and enriching light in science. Consequently, what we said
earlier is now made possible: that the confluence in science creates meta-nexus, the
transdisciplinary nexus of communication with metaphysics and religions.
Reductionism effectively did not make the creation of these meta-nexus possible because
it did not even make the metaphysics-religion nexus with science possible. Born from classical
mechanism, reductionism explained entire reality as action-reaction systems (or classical
cause-effect systems). Its consideration of external interactions (by friction or tangential
contact) was limited to independent and autonomous entities some separated from
others that acted according to four natural forces (gravitational, electromagnetic, strong
and weak nuclear). Reductionism was reduced to consider only the existence of a
world organized by what we today call fermionic matter: particles (protons, neutrons,
electrons, etc.) or autonomous vibratory fields whose wave function makes their unity in
quantum coherence difficult, maintaining their differentiation and producing the
organization of objects that we find in the macroscopic world of classical mechanics. This
manner of thinking produced a biology that is reductionistic and mechanicist-deterministic,
and a robotic image of man expressed concretely in current computational theories of man
(following the strong metaphor of the computer) or in new versions of neural determinism.
Reductionism also had epistemological consequences: a dogmatic science, a science of
absolute and unquestionable truths, reflecting a natural objective world of determination
and mechanicism.

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586 EDITORIAL

THE NEW PARADIGM OF SCIENCE AND THE SCIENCE-METAPHYSICS-RELIGION METANEXUS

What, then, is the new paradigm of science? It is important to have a very clear idea
about its profile, since it establishes the kind of science that should be promoted for the
science-metaphysics-religion dialogue to be viable. First, let us look at the identikit of this
new paradigm. Second, the nexus that connects it with the metaphysical and the religious.
Third, the intercommunication nexus opened between metaphysics and religions that make
a greater communion and interhuman cohesion possible.

The new paradigm of science

1) It assumes that the explanation of the world physical, biological, and human
should be made according to a mechanicist-determinist image. Today no one seeks to deny
the fact that the determination and interaction among fermionic objects explain a large
part of our macroscopic and microscopic experience. Determination makes possible physical
objects and living beings, as well as time and space that make our freely constructed personal
biography possible. Genetic heredity and the stability of species would not be possible without
the rigid determination of the genetic code.
2) But the new paradigm insists on things that were already known from the time
quantum mechanics was born in the twenties. The individual and differentiated type of
fermionic matter that produced the world is not only real. Quantum mechanics presents
a microphysical world different from the classical world (although the macroscopic-classical
world is always born from the microphysical-quantum world). New and strange phenomena
are confirmed in this quantum world: 1) quantum coherence; 2) quantum superposition;
3) indetermination; 4) action-at-a-distance (EPR effects).
3) Thus, the physical world is not only classical, but also quantum. It was born from
the big bang as a field of radiation; although the differentiated objects of the mecano-classical
world were produced, the physical world also contains unitary fields of matter in holistic
states where differentiation disappears in particles; this happens in bosonic matter, and can
even happen in fermionic matter, although with great difficulty. These holistic states can
also interact at a distance (EPR effects). And in the microphysical world, an important role
is played by an indeterministic causality related to quantum superposition that extends
to the classical macrophysical world, which is partly indeterminate because of the effects
of a chaotic, statistical, and probabilistic flow.
4) Living beings are explained not only by means of classical causality (for example,
in the embrio-genetic development beginning with DNA) because life made possible, within
the classical living body, the emergence of quantum states of matter that possess quantum
coherence, quantum superposition, indetermination, and interaction-at-a-distance (EPR).
Living beings thus appear as the coordination between the classical world (differentiation,
determinism) and the quantum world (holism, indetermination). In this way, the new
paradigm can provide a physical support more intelligible than that of reductionism
to explain the phenomenological properties of animal and human psychism, like experiential
holism and behavioral indetermination (freedom).
5) Especially with reference to man, neurology also explains the nature of mind as a
functional complementarity between classical neural patterns (Edelman) and networks of
quantum states (quantum neurology).
6) Cosmology speculates about the origin of the universe by coming up with hypotheses
concerning the germinal state of matter much beyond Planks Era. In this hypothesis fits,
among other hypotheses, the strings and super-strings theory. In any case, the universe of
the new paradigm is no longer the deterministic system of Einstein and Newton, but a

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process born from the big bang and produced in time by the equilibrium between
determination and chaotic, probabilistic, and statistical indetermination.
7) Finally, the new paradigm overcomes the dogmatism of positivist epistemology
and already moves within the Popperian and post-Popperian framework. Science does not
expound absolute truths, but only systems of hypotheses and conjectures about the world.
Science today is more modest than in the 19th century: It is aware that the universe is an
enigma, and that it should refer to philosophy the responses to certain questions that it
cannot respond by means of its own methodology.
Consequently, the new paradigm is also monist, like reductionism. The origin of
everything is matter, but it has a richer idea of matter that allows one to understand how
the evolution process made possible the emergence of different modes of being real,
although produced from the ontology of matter itself. It is therefore a monistic paradigm,
specifically, an emergentist-monist paradigm.

Nexus of the new paradigm with the metaphysical and religious

Atheism, agnosticism, theism, and religions (a form of theism) pertain to the metaphysical.
Reductionism could hardly connect with the metaphysical, and where reductionism persists,
the metaphysical remains unconnected. But the new paradigm offers an image of the
universe, life, and man that profoundly enriches the metaphysical.
1) It makes possible a phenomenologically describable humanistic image of man
coherent with personal and social experience. Man is not a robot, but a free and personal
being that responsibly constructs his own biography. Deterministic robotism could not
even make atheism and agnosticism possible as metaphysical positions.
2) It presents an enigmatic image of the universe, employing an epistemology that
insists on the interpretative and provisional character of scientific conjectures. It thus leaves
an opening for philosophical reason to construct diverse hypotheses and conjectures about
the enigmatic ultimate nature of things.
3) It makes possible, without imposing, a philosophical interpretation (thus, no longer
scientific) of the enigma of the universe according to an agnostic or atheistic metaphysics.
4) It also makes possible, without imposing, a philosophical interpretation according
to a theistic, and thus, religious, metaphysics. It therefore allows conjectures about the
existence of a mysteric transcendent reality or the existence of a transcendent creator-
God.
5) The proposal and discussion of various types of metaphysics (atheism, agnosticism,
theism, and religions) is always referred to the previously explained metaphysical fields:
the problems about the consistency and stability of the universe, the causes of the physical
and biological orders, and the origin and nature of psychism (consciousness). Theism, for
example, grounds on these metaphysical fields its argument about the plausibility of
the existence of God (God as fundament, as designer, as holistic ground of the world of the
psyche).
6) The holistic orientation of the new paradigm of science has a special importance
for theism and religions. The evolution of matter produced a world of differentiated entities:
it is the classical macroscopic world. But holism shows that the depth ontology of matter
and of the universe is unitary and undifferentiated, responding to an ontology that makes
possible the sensibility-consciousness present in animals and man. This sensitive holistic
ontology of universe-matter undoubtedly makes more plausible the philosophical conjecture
about the divine ontology as the omnipresent and ultimate ground of the universe, along
the lines similar, for example, to the pan-en-theism of Arthur Peacocke.

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588 EDITORIAL

Science as a nexus of intercommunication between metaphysics and religions

As we were saying, the profound aspiration of humanity on its way toward a better society
has always been to achieve inter-human communion and social unity. For this, respect
for individual, metaphysical, and religious freedom is essential. A society in which some
think that others are in error or that they should be where in fact they are not, or worse,
if persons attribute to each other dishonest moral attitudes, in no way is this a society in
communion or in inter-human unity. The attitude of religious groups which harshly judge
atheism, or of atheistic groups which mercilessly attack everything that seems religious (as
is the case with Dawkins or Dennett) is lamentable. No less lamentable is the attitude, so
common in the past, of religions which harshly criticize each other and of religions that
attempt to impose themselves on others.
As we have said, the new paradigm of science allows the creation of a series of
metanexus which permits human respect for the freedom of each person. One learns to
see metaphysical diversity not as a hindrance to, but as assuming and truly enriching
communion and existential cohesion. And in this sense we believe that the investigation
of those metanexus which from science unite metaphysics and religions is an important
and necessary contribution to a better society: one that is tolerant, open to valuing the
existential richness of others, and not polemical.
But what are these nexus of intercommunication?
In the first place it is very important that the new paradigm presents with modesty the
image of a metaphysically enigmatic universe, which human reason (in science and
philosophy) endeavors to understand by means of hypotheses and conjectures open to critical
revision. For this, a nexus of respect is created between atheism, agnosticism, theism and
religions, because all understand that diverse metaphysical positions are the fruit of the free,
honest and legitimate creativity of each person. Now far from aggression and disdain and
from mockery as well communion and social unity are founded on a deep respect for the
person and for freedom. This is undoubtedly a better kind of society.
In the second place, theism and religions tend to understand each other inasmuch as
they all endeavor to be inspired by the image of the numinous and of the creator-God which
science makes plausible. It is the rational conjecture about God as fundament of the
universe, designer of its anthropic order and holistic ground of the depth ontology of the
world of the psyche.
Religious or mystical experience in diverse religions has always meant a sensation of
immersion of ones human spirit in the higher reality of God that embraces us from the
depths of the cosmos. Thus, mystical experience in the history of religions is an experience
of unity with the cosmos, i.e., an experience of ontological holism with divinity and with the
cosmos. Reductionism made this experience incomprehensible. But the holistic new
paradigm of science leads us to understand that, in effect, the omnipresent ontology of God
could embrace us from the depths of the holistic ontology of the universe. The new
paradigm thus makes extraordinarily plausible a religious experience in which different
religions converge and remain united. But we should also note that there is no reason for
atheism and agnosticism to fear that the holistic image of the universe imposes what is
strictly religious. Holism renders plausible the experience of God but does not impose it. In
other words, the scientific holism spoken today in the new paradigm is also compatible
with an atheist or agnostic interpretation.
Lastly, science permits new nexus of connection between traditional religions which
until now have been very distant. Religions turn to science to illuminate the idea of God in
their respective traditions, for the purpose of attempting to update their theologies. In doing
so, the gaze of diverse traditions is unified in the image of God which science makes possible.
A process of convergence, then, is produced through science which permits the identification

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of points of similarity that unite all religions. The same happens in mystical religious
experience surprisingly common in diverse traditions which, as we were saying, becomes
extraordinarily plausible in the new holistic ontology of science. Religions learn from science
that they all possess an essential nucleus that unites them in a powerful fashion. They also
learn from science that there exists a differential nucleus thus leaving each religion in
its proper history and traditions, i.e., in its small print which profoundly enriches other
traditions. Religions may thus respect their own tradition while simultaneously being enriched
by the profound knowledge of other traditions.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS WE PRESENT

This issue of Pensamiento offers valuable contributions to the process of the science-
religion dialogue, the general framework for which we have outlined. We have arranged its
contents in such a way that the articles, studies and profiles are placed in sections which
illuminate their content and interrelationship.
First, the propaedeutic section. The article by Poli marks the starting point: the human
person, open to values and in search of his authentic existence. Modern culture put into
crisis the personal value of the religious, but sociology today shows the rebirth of new
communal forms of religious authenticity (Shimazono). The role of methodological
naturalism in science is important in the crisis of the science-religion dialogue; this naturalism
plays a decisive role in science, and religion needs to learn to dialogue with it (Bylica/Sagan).
We believe that this is so, and that religion should admit a certain amount of mechanicism-
determinism as a means to explain the universe. In this process of dialogue religion should
pay attention to the manner by which science depends on logic (the mathematical, the
formal) so that metaphysical arguments can be valued in various scientific communities
(Leach).
We then present a psycho-physical and cosmological section. Lorente studies the cosmology
of space-time in light of physical theories which would explain its ontology, and the references
to God within those theories. M. Bejar ventures into an explanation of psychism starting
from connections between the thoughts of Bohm and Penrose. Finally, Lpez Aguilar discusses
the Hameroff-Penrose hypothesis as a proposal for a physical support of consciousness.
In one way or another, these different approaches facilitate an intensive understanding of
what we have called the holistic image of the universe in the new paradigm of physics.
Complementing this section, two commentaries on the characteristics of string theory (Leo
Smolin) and on the events beyond Plancks Era (Michael Heller) are provided in Profiles
in Science and Religion.
The third is the classical biology section: It deals with how the explanation of life in biology
presents an evolutive mechanicist-determinist dimension serving as a base from which one
already glimpses an opening to the free and religious human being (Nez de Castro y
Bertrn). In the fourth section, dedicated to a cosmo-biological synthesis, two authors of
unquestionable importance are introduced and considered: Schmitz-Moormann (Doncel),
who is essential today to interpret the work of Teilhard de Chardin, and Whitehead
(Monserrat). This section is complemented by two commentaries found in the Profiles: the
first, on the emergentism of Clayton; and the second, on Stuart Kauffman and his reference
to the quantum explanation of consciousness.
Then we proceed to the Hindu and Buddhist philosophies section, which permits us to
follow the connections between the new paradigm and oriental philosophy. M. Sevilla
shows the presence of materialism in Indian philosophies, and A. Gmez considers Hindu
and Buddhist ontology in depth. Masi-Kuwano show that the idea of mind-body unity is
present in some aspects of Japanese philosophy and psychology. The religious experience

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590 EDITORIAL

section shows the mystical experience of union with God through an experience of the
cosmos: in the Christian experience of Nicholas of Cusa (Cabada), in Sufi mysticism (Gamal),
and in connection with diverse religious traditions from the point of view of mystic neurology
or neuro-theology (Castro). This section on the connection between mystical experience and
the holistic experience of the cosmos is complemented by two commentaries in the Profiles:
on the ecological thought of Rolston and the mysticism of St. Francis of Assisi.
Finally, the complementary studies section presents the figure of Jan Patocka (Or-
tega), Farah Antun (Puig), and the study of reason in Islam in light of the speech of Pope
Benedict XVI (Serafin). The final study by J. Romero considers theology from the dynamic
point of view of sociology, concluding with a proposal for a dynamic program that would
make possible a theology dynamically adapted to the development of concepts in history.

THE 2008 METANEXUS WORLD CONFERENCE IN MADRID

The journal Pensamiento dedicates this issue of the special series Science, Philosophy
and Religion (no. 242, 2008) to the concerns of Metanexus Institute, convoked in Madrid
in June 2008. The Institute is concerned with finding the meta-nexus that permit
communion and inter-human cohesion between individuals, groups, cultures, ideologies,
metaphysics and religions, both within nations and in the international forum. It is also
concerned with contributing to the nexus that make a better world.
Knowing and spreading these meta-nexus is essential for possible ways of building
human intercommunication through a transdisciplinary, multi-metaphysical and inter-
confessional dialogue. We have said that science is assuming today an emerging role with
regard to social cohesion. Today, to look to science is to shed light on ones own traditions
and, at the same time, to cultivate knowledge and respect for other traditions, metaphysics
and religions.
All metaphysical traditions and religions should consider what is the core of their beliefs
which unite and shed light upon the other traditions. We do not see God. Metaphysics and
religions live within the enigma of the universe, and each person lives courageously the hard
experience of life, of suffering, and the final orientation toward death (as Heidegger would
say), maintaining with integrity ones personal fidelity to a metaphysical or religious tradition.
From my point of view, when Christianity today looks at science from the perspective of its
own tradition, it should dynamically reformulate the essence of its theology, saying that our
belief in the revelation of God, given in the Mystery of the Death and Resurrection of Christ,
is the word of God that exhorts us to trust in the reality of a Deus absconditus who creates
an autonomous world, making our freedom possible, and in the reality of a Deus liberator
who saves within the context of the transcendent history personal and collective of all
people and human traditions.
Our journal Pensamiento invites everyone to commit themselves and to participate
from transdisciplinary, multi-metaphysical and interconfessional perspectives in the
task of looking at science in order to immerse oneself in the new paradigm, in order to
shed light from there on ones own traditions and to communicate to others in an enriching
manner the essence of ones metaphysical and religious traditions. Without doubt, this will
create among everyone appreciation, admiration, respect, tolerance and above all, mutual
edification.
JAVIER MONSERRAT
Director of Pensamiento

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PERSON AND VALUE


ROBERTO POLI
University of Trento and Mitteleuropa Foundation

ABSTRACT: Preliminary to any adequate theory of the person is clarification of its ontological structure.
For this purpose, it is useful to draw a distinction among at least three different ontological aspects of
person, respectively corresponding to the dignity of life, to the acceptance or rejection of ethical values
and the dignity corresponding to the qualities of an authentically human biography. It is reasonable to
suppose that some of the traditional difficulties concerning the theory of the person depend on a failure
to distinguish among these different ontological aspects. This paper presents some of the intricacies
of the intermediate dimension of being a person, namely the idea of person as a subject with values,
an entity that may, with greater or lesser ability, accede to values and accept or reject them intentionally.
KEY WORDS: Person, value, emotion, Stein, Hartmann.

Persona y valor
RESUMEN: La clarificacin de su estructura ontolgica es previa a una teora adecuada de la persona.
Para esto es pertinente perfilar una distincin entre, al menos, tres aspectos de la persona ontolgica-
mente diferentes, respectivamente referidos a la dignidad de la vida, la aceptacin o rechazo de valo-
res ticos y la dignidad correspondiente a las cualidades de una biografa autnticamente humana. Es
razonable suponer que algunas de las dificultades tradicionales sobre la teora de la persona depen-
den de la falta de distincin entre estos diferentes aspectos ontolgicos. Este artculo presenta algu-
nas de las peculiaridades de la dimensin intermedia de ser una persona, a saber la idea de una per-
sona como un sujeto con valores, una entidad que puede con mayor o menor habilidad, acceder a
valores y aceptarlos o rechazarlos intencionalmente.
PALABRAS CLAVE: persona, valor, Stein, Hartmann.

1. INTRODUCTION

I define a person as a subject with values, an entity that may, with greater
or lesser ability, accede to values and accept them intentionally (For more detailed
treatment see Poli 2006a). Unfortunately, discussion on personhood suffers
from a serious lack of conceptualization. The necessary preliminary to any
adequate theory of the person is clarification of its ontological structure and of
the concepts that make up its content. I believe that it is heuristically useful for
this purpose to draw a distinction among at least three different aspects of
person, which for lack of a better terminology I shall call person1, person2 and
person3. These can be exemplified by referring to different thinkers who have
authoritatively expounded their characteristics. I shall therefore associate Peter
Singer with person1, Nicolai Hartmann and Edith Stein with person2 and John
Finnis and Martha Nussbaum with person3.
Given that these three aspects of person have essentially different ontological
natures, it is reasonable to suppose that some of the traditional difficulties
concerning the theory of the person depend on a failure to distinguish among them.
Each of the three types of person has value, but each of the values differs from the

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592 R. POLI, PERSON AND VALUE

others. Person1 has the value corresponding to the dignity of a living being, while
person2 has the dignity corresponding to the acceptance or rejection of ethical
values, and person3 has the dignity corresponding to the qualities of an authentically
human biography. Person1 is structurally conditioned and pertains to the sphere
of biological reality; person2 is structurally conditioned and pertains to the sphere
of spiritual reality; person3 is structurally conditioned and pertains to the sphere
of social reality. All of us are born a person1; some of us become a person3. Being
a person1 is a matter of fact, it is intrinsic to our nature as living beings. The quality
of being a person1 is not acquired, but nor is it never lost. Being a person3 is instead
structurally fragile: one can become a person3 and one can cease to be one. A person3
can accede to a higher plane of reality, but then may be unable to remain at that
level, and may even choose or be compelled to leave it.
Possessing the dignity of a living being or having a biography are two different
aspects of the person as a subject with values. In this paper I shall focus on
person as the entity that may accede to values [i.e., to person2, leaving the analysis
of person1 and person3 for another occasion (Poli 2006a, 2008a, b)].

2. EMOTIONS AND VALUES

The connections between emotions and ethics have been widely investigated
in recent decades. Two arguments in particular have been put forward: (1) emotions
are important for correctly judging the ethical components of the situations in
which we find ourselves and then act on the basis of those judgements; (2) the
emotions are important because they activate the agents will, while the thought
alone of a duty is not sufficient to prompt action.
The interesting aspect of these and similar positions is that they view the
emotions as essentially instrumental elements or components. In the former
case, the emotions serve to make correct judgements; in the second they serve
for action. In both cases, the emotions function as instruments for performance
of something different.
If these positions were correct, it should be possible to judge morally sensitive
situations correctly and act appropriately with no emotional perception (Stark
2004, 360). At bottom, if this were the case, the ancient Stoic idea of proceeding
by annulling the emotions, or at least by reducing them to the minimum, may
be correct.
The alternative is to recognize that the emotions besides being good for
something or other also have intrinsic value. The idea is not a new one, because
there are explicit traces of it in Aristotle, but it is worth recalling here. For
theorists of the virtues, the emotions are not important just because they are
parts of a morally correct action; they are important because they have a value
independent of the value of the action. It is evident that there are appropriate
(correct) or inappropriate (incorrect) emotions even in situations where no action
is taken or more simply, which are so independently of action. Being distressed

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by the pain of others or rejoicing at their happiness even when the situation
is structured so that we can do nothing about it are the two most obvious cases
of emotions that are correct independently of any possible action. Conversely,
rejoicing at the pain of others or feeling distressed at their happiness are obvious
cases of incorrect emotions.
The development of virtues entails the development of appropriate emotional
attitudes 1. The series of cognitive acts defined by Brentano presentations,
judgements, and acts of love and hate provide a good framework within which
to defend the thesis that emotions have intrinsic value. Brentanos third class of
intentional acts, that of acts of love and hate, has all the requisite characteristics.
These acts are not directed or instrumental to either the judgement (on which,
as we have seen, they depend and which in their turn influence) or action (which
may or may not ensue, according to the circumstances).
The joint development of a satisfactory theory of emotions and a satisfactory
theory of values should lead to recognition of the correspondence between
emotions and value responses. A situation cannot be simultaneously viewed as
agreeable and exciting. If one response is correct, the other cannot be 2.

3. FROM BRENTANO TO HUSSERL

Brentanos distinction between acts of judgement and evaluative acts was


taken up by Husserl, with his distinction between objectifying acts and non-
objectifying acts. Objectifying acts are those which contribute to knowledge
about objects, whilst non-objectifying acts do not contribute to knowledge about
objects. As for Brentano evaluative acts presuppose acts of judgement, so for
Husserl non-objectifying acts presuppose objectifying acts. For Brentano and
Husserl, moreover, both cases involve intentional acts.
The problem that now arises is the apparent conflict between the thesis that
evaluative acts (Brentano) or non-objectifying acts (Husserl) are intentional acts,
i.e. acts which by definition are directed towards an object, and the thesis that
non-objectifying acts do not contribute to knowledge about objects.

1
Here I depart from Stark 2004. On p. 363 Stark refers to Anderson 1993 and repeats
her confusion between concrete particulars (persons, animals, communities and things)
and states of affairs. Stark and Anderson maintain that concrete particulars are objects of
our values, have intrinsic value and are the building blocks of value, while states of affairs
have extrinsic value, a value which depends on that of the concrete particulars contained in
them. But concrete particulars, precisely because they are concrete, for reasons of categorial
consistency cannot be parts of states of affairs. Moreover, it is imprecise to say that concrete
particulars are objects of our values. If anything, they are objects of our acts of valuation.
2
Hartmann 2003, p. 57, with reference to Hildebrand 1916. More recently, Feinberg has
sought to distinguish between what is deserved and the basis of desert, or the characteristic
of the person by virtue of which s/he deserves something. It would indeed be very interesting
to distinguish between the various bases of desert and what they make specifically deserved.
As Hurka 1998, p. 315, points out, for every virtue only some goods are appropriate rewards.

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594 R. POLI, PERSON AND VALUE

Husserls solution is that non-objectifying acts are founded acts, or acts which
must be grounded on other acts. If this is so, two different interpretations are
possible: according to the first, the object of non-objectifying objects is the object
of the underlying objectifying act; according to the second, the object of the non-
objectifying act is the underlying objectifying act (and only secondarily, so to
speak, its object).
Both interpretations have been defended (e.g. by Gigliotti 2004 and Benoist
2004). Whichever of them is correct, the objects of value are in any case founded
objects, or as the Meinongian school puts it, they are higher-order objects.
Both Brentano and Husserl defend the intentionality of mental acts, defining
it as directedness towards an object. But Husserl introduces an important distinction
not present in Brentano: that between empty intentional acts and filled
intentional acts. In the former case, the object is anticipated in the form of a typical
schema and may be only implicitly present to the agents awareness. In the latter
case, the object is given in concrete. The distinction is important because it
allows us to maintain the thesis that all intentional acts have correlates even when
we are not aware of such correlates or do not notice them.
To be pointed out is that the distinction among different types of act has
extended and enriched the traditional distinction between theoretical reason
and practical reason. These are no longer viewed as reified instances of distinct
faculties but rather, as we have seen, as the articulations of different families of
acts with specific forms of inner organization and dependency.
Thus far, I have presented the dependence of non-objectifying acts on objec-
tifying acts according to the univocal and linear format introduced by Brentano:
higher-level acts depend on in the sense of require lower-level acts. Husserl
views the matter in more sophisticated terms. He replaces Brentanos unilateral
dependence with a reciprocal multilateral dependence. Indeed, he talks of an
interweaving among the various types of act, and therefore of their reciprocal
co-determination. Husserls idea is probably that of a twofold constitution phase
in which the dependence of non-objectifying acts on objectifying acts is
accompanied by feedback from non-objectifying acts to objectifying ones. The
situation should therefore be viewed in dynamic terms. Hence, the two parts of
the problem consist in the following two theses. On the one hand, the evaluative
act, essentially because it constitutes the phenomenon of value, is founded on
the intellective act; on the other, the theoretical reason and the evaluative
reason are everywhere intertwined (Husserl 1988, p. 72).

4. EMOTIONAL ACTS

So far, so good. But we have only touched upon the problem of personhood.
In order to frame the problem of the person and its nature more precisely, we
must explore the level of emotional acts. In the architecture described thus far,
emotional acts are complex acts founded on other types of act. We now need a
more fine-gauge classification of emotional acts and their internal relations.

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Phenomenologists have discovered that for every level of the constitution of


living beings there are appropriate families of emotional acts which convey specific
contents. The lowest level is the organic one of life. I call it the level of the living.
The emotional acts relative to this level are the bodily feelings that inform us
about the state of our organism (the discomfort of being cold, the pleasure of
being warm), The second level is the vital one: I call it the level of moods.
This is the subjects mental level, and the information pertinent to it corresponds
to situations of joy, happiness, boredom, sadness, excitement, depression, and
so on. This still has nothing that to do with the person as the bearer of value,
which enters the scene only at the third level of constitution, the spiritual one.
Here, two different sets of values are associated with the person: the values that
constitute the person, and the values that the person decides to follow once s/he
has been constituted. The first set is well exemplified by the value of strength
of character: the person sees him/herself in the way in which s/he reacts to pain,
for example. We define a person as strong or weak according to how s/he responds
to life-situations. However, we have still not entered the realm of authentically
ethical values. A strong person may be bad, and a weak person may be good.
Besides the level of the constitution of the person, therefore, we must recognize
the further level of the persons ethical values. In this regard, the most important
decision is between good and evil, this being immediately followed by its
articulations in terms of virtues and vices 3.
Only now have we entered the realm of ethical values. Strictly speaking, the
emotional acts described by Brentano concern only this third class of emotional
acts. However, only by following the intricate layering of acts can we gain an
accurate idea of their complexity. In the next section I shall distinguish the values
that constitute the person (strength of character, for instance) from the directly
ethical values of the virtues.

5. THE VALUES THAT CONSTITUTE THE PERSON

The person is articulated along a number of dimensions, each of which is a


cline ranging from a positive extreme to a negative extreme, both obviously
understood in the ethical sense.
The first dimension varies from activity to passivity. By activity is meant
stance-taking or commitment; by passivity, indifference, inertia or apathy.
The second dimension ranges from the capacity to suffer to the incapacity to
suffer. The positive valence assigned to the capacity to suffer is signalled by the
patent negativity of the incapacity to suffer. The former consists of resistance
against the adversities of life, the characters tempering through suffering; the
latter consists of inner fragility.

3
The scheme presented follows Edith Steins classification of egological acts. Hartmann
uses a very similar classification.

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596 R. POLI, PERSON AND VALUE

The third dimension centres on the opposition between a persons strength


or weakness. Strength and activity are not synonymous: also passivity may be
strong. The stance-taking associated with activity may be strong or weak; and
inertia may be strong in the sense of stubborn.
The fourth dimension is anticipation: a more or less broad vision of the future
to which the person may accede. In this case, the opposition takes the common-
sense form of the difference between a broad and narrow outlook on the future.
The fifth dimension is the ability to select goals and to find the means with
which to achieve them. I call this ability purposefulness. The sixth and final
dimension, the one that sums up all the others, is freedom or free choice (Hartmann
2003, pp. 137-143. I have changed the order of the dimensions).
A person is therefore defined as active, capable of suffering, strong, anticipatory,
purposive, and free. These six characteristics influence each other in various ways.
Each characteristic consists of a continuum ranging from an extreme of value to
an extreme of disvalue. Each dimension also has points of breakdown where values
change directly into disvalues (different from disvalues as complements). Consider
the capacity to suffer. It is true that suffering tempers the character, so that the
person is able to achieve higher thresholds of value. However, if the suffering
exceeds the ability to withstand it, the person is destroyed and the suffering changes
directly into disvalue.
Note that all the values discussed are values of act. The person is constituted
in the acts that constitute her.
In ethical terms, the person thus constituted still tells us nothing, because s/he
can choose to do both good and evil. The person only enters the realm of values,
or correspondingly of disvalues, when s/he opts in favour of the good or the bad.

6. ARCHITECTONIC VALUES

Standing midway between person-constituting values and authentically moral


values are architectonic values. The family of architectonic values comprises
three values that can be better defined if the values space is conceived as a
territory which extends before the internal organ that sees values. With respect
to the multiplicity of values and disvalues that spread out before us, architectonic
valuation (a) chooses one single value (or a few interconnected values) and seeks
to take them to their maximum level; (b) chooses the greatest possible number
of values and seeks to synthesise them into an organic set; (c) ignores disvalues.
Other structurally coherent options are obviously possible. But militating in
favour of the three that I have mentioned is the fact that they are options which
moralists have long recognized, although they adopt a different reasoning to do
so. If they are given their traditional names, they are more easily recognized.
Value (1) is nobility, value (2) is fullness, and value (3) is purity. Although my
description is cruder than the usual ones, it has the merit of bringing out the
structural conditions.

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Nobility is the value oriented to loftiness. Its opposite value not to be confused
with its opposite as disvalue is the common or ordinary. Fullness instead aims
at the fusion, coordination and synthesis of all values. Its opposite is the inability
to see values: a blindness to values, but not yet wickedness. Purity does not see
disvalues: it views everything positively as endowed with value (Hartmann 2003,
204 fgg).

7. PERSON-REALIZING VALUES

I call moral values values of virtue. This sharp distinction between values
of good and values of virtue remedies a major error committed by ancient ethics:
that of considering virtue to be a good, albeit a higher-level one 4. Three families
of virtues values can be distinguished: ancient values, Christian values, and
modern values. The first two families rotate around a central value: justice for
ancient ethics, love of ones neighbour for Christian ethics. Perhaps it would not
be too bold to claim that if modern ethics is to be authentic, it must organize
itself around love for the distant one.
With reference to ancient ethics, I would mention two significant aspects of
Platos virtues and the particular organization of Aristotles virtues. Platos four
virtues justice, wisdom, strength and control well sum up the character of
ancient ethics. Justice is defined as equality with those who are recognized and
accepted as equal. Wisdom the highest virtue governs the entire array of
values and actions. The wise recognize the value of what is endowed with value.
Strength transforms the vision into reality: merely seeing values is not enough;
also required is the moral strength to realize them. The final value, control,
consists in a sense of proportion and scale.
Aristotle defines virtues as the medians between two negative extremes.
Thus, courage is midway between recklessness and cowardice; generosity is
midway between extravagance and avarice; temperance is midway between self-
indulgence and insensitivity; and pride is midway between vanity and humility
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1106 a26-b28). If one does not interpret this middle way
among virtues correctly, one is almost forced to regard virtue as some kind of
golden mean. As Hartmann writes: This theory has always been subjected to
the mockery of critics. It appears only too ridiculous that the seriousness of
virtue should resolve itself into the triviality of a golden mean, that is, into a
mediocrity (Hartmann 2003, p. 254).
To understand Aristotles theory correctly, it should be borne in mind that
virtues may grow without losing their nature as values by doing so. In fact,

4
Hartmann 2003, p. 155. Brentanos distinction between acts and their correlates (as
objects of acts) provides the basis for the difference between ethical values (as modes of acts)
and values of goods (values of the objects of acts). By construction, therefore, the values of
goods are never ethical values. For details see Poli 2006a.

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598 R. POLI, PERSON AND VALUE

temperance, strength, justice, taken as features of value, do not have upper


limits. The key is provided by Aristotle when he writes: Thus, according to its
substance or the definition stating its essence, virtue is a mean, but with respect
to the highest good and to excellence, it is an extreme (Nicomachean Ethics,
1107 a 6-8). In one sense, therefore, virtue is a mean, in another it is an extreme.
These two senses relate to two dimensions of the space of values: ontologically,
values are means between two disvalues, axiologically they are points of elevation
(Hartmann 2003, p. 256).
The second family of values of virtue centres on love for ones neighbour.
While justice may be external, love for ones neighbour is deeper-lying: it involves
the person more profoundly. The two central values of justice and love for ones
neighbour may conflict. Justice may be loveless, love may be unjust (Hartmann
2003, p. 271). Tied to love of ones neighbour are the virtues of sincerity, loyalty,
humility, and behaviour.
The third and final group is by far the most indeterminate; it may not even
be a real and proper group of virtues. It comprises the value of the personality,
personal love, love for the distant one and future-sightedness, responsibility
for future generations 5.
The value of the personality, unlike the other values mentioned thus far, is
not a general value. It can be understood as the individual ethos which each of
us must accomplish, but we may always fail to accomplish. Also personal love,
like the value of the personality, is oriented solely to the individual: it is the value
of a strictly personal relationship of joint accomplishment.
With love for the distant one and future-sightedness we return to general
values. The distinctive feature of these values is that we can expect nothing from
them in return. The discovery of love for the distant one was made by Nietzsche,
who called it thus in order to contrast it with love for ones neighbour (Nietzsche
1999).

8. VALUES OF GOOD AND BAD

The person-realizing values are eminently values of good and bad. We know
at least some of the difficulties that hamper definition of good and bad. With
respect to the person, good and bad relate to each other like merit and guilt. This
means that for a person badness is not an error, a deficiency or a lack. A bad
person is not someone who lacks something. A bad person is just as much a
person as a good person. S/he is a person who has not chosen the good and bears
responsibility for it.
A clarification is now necessary. Perhaps the most important lesson that we
have learnt from Socrates is that human beings never choose the bad because

5
Hartmann 2003, p. 317. Da Re 1996, p. 188, points out that Hartmann does not mention
the typical bourgeois virtues of diligence, parsimony, etc.

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it is bad. Even when they choose a disvalue, they do so because they think that
it is a value. Every purpose, qua purpose, is a value.
Socrates intuition is fundamental for ethical discourse because it allows
disvalue to be defined as the choice of the lesser value. Suppose that we must
choose between A and B. If A and B are comparable and the value of A is greater
than the value of B, we regard the choice of A as good and the choice of B as
bad. This elementary situation demonstrates the importance of Brentanos
analysis of the preference relation. On the other hand, the situations intrinsic
shortcoming is the assumption that values are comparable and therefore
organizable into a single hierarchy.
A final remark is relevant: if ethical good and evil are in the tendency toward
some purpose, then not only are the values of virtue involved, but the person-
constituting values also have a role to play, although it is a subordinate one. By
way of example, consider the difference between being narrow-minded and
broad-minded. To the extent that the subject chooses one of the two options,
s/he bears responsibility for it.

9. THE STRENGTH AND HEIGHT OF VALUES

I distinguish between two organizing principles of values: that of strength and


that of height. These two principles operate in opposite directions: the strongest
values are also the least high values, whilst the highest values are the least strong
ones. Usually, the lower values, the stronger ones, are also the simplest values;
the superior values are the most complex.
Values of goods are stronger than values of person, but they are not as high
as the latter.
The theory of values which uses the criteria of strength and height has
consequences which at first sight seem surprising, but prove to be correct when
considered carefully. The main consequence is this: from an ethical point of view,
violating a lower value is more serious than violating a higher value. On the other
hand, fulfilling a higher value has greater value than fulfilling a lower value:
sinning against lower values is ignominious, shameful, revolting, but their
fulfilment only reaches the level of decency, without rising above it. Offending
against higher values, by contrast, does indeed have the character of moral failure,
but nothing of the directly degrading, while fulfilment of these values may have
something uplifting, liberating, indeed thrilling about it (Hartmann 2003, p. 53).
By way of example: heroism warrants admiration, but a lack of heroism arouses
neither contempt nor indignation. On the other hand, whilst trustworthiness
warrants respect, a lack of trustworthiness warrants contempt or even
indignation (Hartmann 2003, p. 450).
The ultimate rationale for the principles of strength and height resides in the
general nature of the levels of reality. These principles therefore orient the entire
spectrum of the real and are not restricted to the particular case of actions which

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fulfil or violate values. The organization of the strata of reality reflects the law
of strength. Although there are conditions which limit the efficacy of the law, it
nevertheless performs a crucial role in organizing the strata 6.
The strata are also subject to a law of freedom whereby the higher level is
always free from the lower one. The higher level is defined with respect to a
novum which distinguishes it from the levels that precede it and function as its
bearers. As Hartmann puts it: the strength of the lower structure is only as
building stones, as material (Hartmann 2003, p. 448 and elsewhere).
The freedom relationship holds between values of person and values of goods,
as well as internally to them. Multiplicities of values organized in terms of strength
and height are also present in the contexts of values of person and values of
goods. These too, therefore, are organized in a way such that the higher level is
free from those beneath it.
The strength of a value indicates the gravity of its violation. The height of a
value expresses the merit deriving from its fulfilment. Offence and merit proceed
in parallel but are not identical.
Offending against life is a grave offence and has very little merit. More in
general, harm to material goods is more serious than harm to spiritual goods
(Hartmann 2003, p. 453). But fulfilment of spiritual goods, and ethical goods in
particular, is a merit much greater than the merit corresponding to respect for
more elementary goods.
Respect for more elementary goods is often the condition for acceding to
higher goods. Those who violate lower goods are wicked. But the reverse does
not hold: a person who violates higher goods, someone who fails to fulfil them,
is not on that account a bad man; his conduct threatens no one; it merely lacks
the higher moral content (Hartmann 2003, p. 440).
Structuring by levels is important not only because it furnishes us with the
tectonic laws governing values, but also because it provides us with criteria to
distinguish, at least in some cases, authentic values from bogus ones. If the
architecture of values is based on levels of dependence, then the authentic
elevation of value is also divided into levels; it develops through intrinsic stages
from the lower values to the higher ones. Although the situation may still lack
full theoretical analysis, it is well known in practice. A person whose behaviour
is oriented to a higher value, but does not simultaneously respect the values that
support it, is structurally discordant. The higher values to which s/he refers are
not credible. Loving with distrust or giving with cowardice are not authentically
virtuous behaviours (Hartmann 2003, p. 456). Values are constructed step by
step, proceeding from the most elementary levels upwards.

6
More thorough analysis should explicitly compare Hartmanns theory of the levels of
reality with other theories developed in recent years. For most recent developments see Poli
2006b,c,d. In my theory, the presence of bifurcations in the levels, interwoven levels, the
possibility of downwards causal effects from higher levels to lower ones and the forms of
anticipation that characterize all levels from the life level onwards, produce a theory very different
from Hartmanns. As a first approximation, however, it is convenient to maintain the latter.

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R. POLI, PERSON AND VALUE 601

10. ATLASES OF VALUES

I have discussed the two dimensions of strength and of height along which
values are organized. A third values-organizing component consists of proximity
relations among homogeneous types of value. I shall call a family of values an
atlas. The realm of values is therefore a series of atlases (which may have zones
in common) with different levels of strength and height. The latter characterizes
the structure of the atlas.
Many aspects of values are still obscure, because we do not know the dynamics
operating among the various atlases. Some dynamics depend on the person
subject to the value his/her age and maturity, for example other on historical
and social conditionings. Other dynamics are structural and depend on how the
atlases are arranged, and on their intrinsic strength 7.
In figurative terms, an atlas map can be viewed as an island. The set of atlases
forms an archipelago. The currents represent the forces that flow from one atlas
to its neighbour.
Unfortunately, we are still trying to draw the maps of individual values, and
we are not yet able to draw the overall map of the entire realm of values.

11. BETWEEN HOPE AND RESPONSIBILITY

The person-constituting values include stance-taking, commitment, anticipation


(meaning the persons broad or narrow outlook on the future), purposefulness
(the capacity to set goals and find the means to achieve them), and freedom. This
multidimensional network of values is structurally future-oriented. A person is
a forward-looking entity. Assuming responsibility for the future is constitutive
feature of the person: an inability to look forward debases and falsifies the person.
As we know, however, the person-constituting values are not yet ethical values.
Those that we have just seen are therefore the preconditions for ethical stance-
taking. This set of conditions find direct ethical supplementation in the third
group of values of virtue, which includes the values of love for the distant one
and future-sightedness, and therefore responsibility for future generations.
Apparently, we have reasons to start seeing good and bad as embedded in the
tendencies towards values and disvalues.

REFERENCES

ANDERSON, E. (1993): Value in Ethics and Economics, Harvard University Press,


Harvard.

7
Not to be confused with the strength of the values making up the map.

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BENOIST, J. (2004): La fenomenologia e i limiti delloggettivazione: il problema degli atti non


oggettivanti, in B. CENTI e G. GIGLIOTTI, a cura, Fenomenologia della ragion pratica. Letica
di Edmund Husserl, Bibliopolis, Napoli, pp. 151-176.
BRENTANO, F. (1969): The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, Routledge, London.
(1973): The Foundation and Construction of Ethics, Routledge, London.
DA RE, A. (1996): Tra antico e moderno. Nicolai Hartmann e letica materiale dei valori,
Guerini e associati, Milano.
GIGLIOTTI, G. (2004): Materia e forma della legge morale nellinterpretazione husserliana
del formalismo di Kant, in B. CENTI e G. GIGLIOTTI, a cura, Fenomenologia della ragion
pratica. Letica di Edmund Husserl, Bibliopolis, Napoli, pp. 13-114.
HARTMANN, N. (2003): Moral Values, Vol. 2 of Ethics, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick
and London.
HILDEBRAND, D. VON (1916): Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung, Jahrbuch fr Philosophie
und phnomenologische Furschung, 3.
HURKA, T. (1998): Two Kinds of Organic Unity, The Journal of Ethics, 2, pp. 299-320.
HUSSERL, E. (1988): Vorlesungen ber Ethik und Wertlehre, Kluwer, Dordrecht.
NIETZSCHE, F. (1999): Thus spake Zarathustra, Dover Publications, Mineola NY.
POLI, R. (2006a): Fra speranza e responsabilit. Introduzione alle strutture ontologiche
delletica, Polimetrica, Monza.
(2006b): First Steps in Experimental Phenomenology, in A. LOULA, R. GUDWIN, J.
QUEIROZ (eds.), Artificial Cognition Systems, Idea Group Publishing, Hersey, PA., pp.
358-386.
(2006c): Levels of Reality and the Psychological Stratum, Revue Internationale de
Philosophie, special issue on Ontology, 2006, 2, pp. 163-180.
(2007): Three obstructions: forms of causation, chronotopoids, and levels of reality,
Axiomathes, 16, pp. 1-18.
(2008a): Three Concepts of Person, forthcoming.
(2008b): On the Concept of Person: The Social Nature of Persons, forthcoming.
STARK, S. (2004): Emotions and the Ontology of Moral Value, The Journal of Value
Inquiry, 38, pp. 35 5-374.

Dipartimento di Sociologia e Richerca Sociale ROBERTO POLI


Piazza Venezia, 41
38100 Trento
roberto.poli@soc.unitn.it
http://www.mitteleuropafoundation.org

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

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GOD, DESIGN, AND NATURALISM:


IMPLICATIONS OF METHODOLOGICAL
NATURALISM IN SCIENCE
FOR SCIENCE-RELIGION RELATION
PIOTR BYLICA - DARIUSZ SAGAN
University of Zielona Gora, Polonia

ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to analyze the implications flowing from adopting methodological
naturalism in science, with special emphasis on the relation between science and religion. Methodological
naturalism, denying supernatural and teleological explanations, influences the content of scientific
theories, and in practice leads to vision of science as compatible with ontological naturalism and in
opposition to theism. Ontological naturalism in turn justifies the acceptance of methodological naturalism
as the best method to know the reality. If we accept realistic interpretation of scientific theories, then
methodological naturalism conflicts science with religion. Theistic evolution does not seem to be a
proper way to reconcile Darwinism and methodological naturalism with theism. Many of such propositions
are boiled down to deism. Although evolution can be interpreted theistically, it is not the way in which
majority of modern scientists and respectable scientific institutions understand it.
KEY WORDS: methodological naturalism, ontological naturalism, evolutionary theory, theistic evolution,
teleology, randomness.

Dios, diseo y naturalismo: Implicaciones del naturalismo metodolgico


en la ciencia para la relacin ciencia-religin
RESUMEN: El objetivo de este artculo es analizar las implicaciones derivadas de la aceptacin del
naturalismo metodolgico en la ciencia desde la perspectiva de la relacin entre la ciencia y la religin.
El naturalismo metodolgico, que niega explicaciones sobrenaturales y teleolgicas, influye en el con-
tenido de las teoras cientficas y en la prctica conduce a una visin de la ciencia como compatible
con el naturalismo ontolgico y en oposicin al tesmo. El naturalismo ontolgico por su parte justifica
la aceptacin del naturalismo metodolgico como el mejor mtodo para conocer la realidad. Si acep-
tamos una interpretacin realista de las teoras cientficas, entonces el naturalismo metodolgico hace
entrar en conflicto a la ciencia con la religin. La evolucin en sentido testa no parece ser una va ade-
cuada para reocnciliar el darwinismo y el naturalismo metodolgico con el tesmo. Muchos de sus enun-
ciados se reducen al desmo. Aunque la evolucin puede ser interpretada en perspectiva testa, esta
no es la forma en que la entienden la mayora de los cientficos modernos y de las instituciones cient-
ficas de prestigio.
PALABRAS CLAVE: naturalismo metodolgico, naturalismo ontolgico, teora de la evolucin, teora
testa de la evolucin, teleologa, probabilidad.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the implications flowing from adopting
of methodological naturalism in science, with special emphasis on the relation
between science and religion. We show that the naturalistic principle may lead
to acceptance of metaphysical naturalism and that, on the other hand, it is exactly
the ontological position that justifies the acceptance of methodological naturalism
as the best way to gain knowledge about the reality.
After presentation of the most important statements of methodological and
metaphysical naturalism and theism, we discuss some prospects on the relation

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622 P. BYLICA - D. SAGAN, GOD, DESIGN, AND NATURALISM

between science and religion. At first we look at the problem from the point of
view of beliefs maintained by scientists and promoted by scientific institutions
and we analyze the concept according to which science is silent on religion.
Further, we discuss the relation of methodological naturalism and teleological
explanations. We also point at the importance of science in modern culture and
show why theistic evolution does not seem to be a proper way to reconcile
Darwinism and, more generally, methodological naturalism with theism.
Finally, we discuss the implications of methodological naturalism for the
issue of truth in science and its implications for science-religion relation. We
present an instrumentalist interpretation of science as a way of circumvent the
problem of its conflict with religion and we show the flaws of this approach. If
scientific theories are interpreted in realistic way, as the source of adequate
description of reality, then the conflict between naturalistic science and theistic
religions arises.

METHODOLOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL NATURALISM AND THEIR RELATION TO THEISM

In this paper we are interested in the understanding of the concept of


naturalism which refers to methodological and metaphysical premises of
science.
The methodological naturalism is usually understood by scientists as a part
of the definition of science 1. We would like present two crucial characteristics
of this position. The first is well described by Niles Eldredge, one of the most
prominent evolutionists, and Eugenie C. Scott, the executive director of National
Center for Science Education:
If there is one rule, one criterion that makes an idea scientific, it is that it
must invoke naturalistic explanations for phenomena, and those explanations
must be testable solely by the criteria of our five senses 2.
() scientists are constrained to frame all their statements in naturalistic
terms simply to be able to test them 3.
Science is a way of knowing about the nature composition and behavior of
the natural, material world. () By its own rules, science cannot say anything
about the supernatural. Scientists are allowed to formulate solely ideas that

1
See e.g. WILLIAM LANE CRAIG and J. P. MORELAND, Preface, in: WILLIAM LANE CRAIG and
J. P. MORELAND (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, Routledge, London-New York, 2000,
p. xii [xi-xv]; DAVID RAY GRIFFIN, Religion and Scientific Naturalism. Overcoming the Conflicts,
New York, 2000, State University of New York Press, pp. 8, 11; DALLAS WILLARD, Knowledge
and naturalism, in: CRAIG and MORELAND (eds.), Naturalism, p. 30 [24-48]; PHILLIP E. JOHNSON,
Evolution as Dogma: The Establishment of Naturalism, in: ROBERT T. PENNOCK (ed.), Intelligent
Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological, and Scientific Perspectives, The
MIT Press, Cambridge-A Breadford Book, London, 2001, pp. 59-76.
2
NILES ELDREDGE, The Monkey Business: A Scientist Looks at Creationism, Washington
Square Press, New York, 1982, p. 82.
3
ELDREDGE, The Monkey Business, p. 87.

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pertain to the material universe, and they are constrained to formulate those
ideas in ways that can be testable with empirical evidence detectable by our
senses. () [Science] does not rule out the existence of the supernatural; it
merely claims that it cannot () study the supernatural if indeed, the
supernatural exists 4.
Most scientists today require that science be carried out according to the
rule of methodological materialism: to explain the natural world scientifically,
scientists must restrict themselves only to material causes (to matter, energy,
and their interaction). There is a practical reason for this restriction: it works.
By continuing to seek natural explanations for how the world works, we have
been able to find them. If supernatural explanations are allowed, they will
discourage or at least delay the discovery of natural explanations, and we
will understand less about the universe 5.

Methodological naturalism is conceived as a scientific principle, application


of which guarantees the empirical testability of scientific explanations. Science
cannot conduct empirical research on the nature, motives and the ways of Gods
(or any other supernatural beings) actions, even though its existence and the
fact that such research can be done on the ground of theology and philosophy
are not excluded. Methodological naturalism not only rejects the possibility of
scientific studies of supernatural, but it also limits the scientific explanations to
materialistic ones.
In another formulation, made by Michael Ruse, we find reference to the
nature of causes invoked in scientific explanations:
I believe that the first and the most important characteristic of science is
that it relies exclusively on blind, undirected natural laws and naturalistic
processes 6.
[] the most important characteristic of modern science is that it depends
entirely on the operation of blind, unchanging regularities in nature. We call
those regularities natural laws. Thus, scientists seek to understand the
empirical world by reference to natural law and naturalistic processes 7.

According to methodological naturalism scientists explain the natural world,


including people, in terms relating to objects and processes occurring in the
natural casual order. Any reference to something supernatural, transcendent or
to any teleological factor is denied and excluded from the range of science.
According to metaphysical (or ontological) naturalism, nature is the ultimate
reality, in other words: nature is all there is. Nature is understood here as a

4
NILES ELDREDGE, The Triumph of Evolution and the Failure of Creationism, W. H. Freeman
and Company, New York, 2001 (2000), p. 137.
5
EUGENIE C. SCOTT, Science and Religion, Christian Scholarship, and Theistic
Science: Some Comparisons, Reports of the National Center for Science Education, 1998,
vol. 18 (2), pp. 30-32, http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/articles/6149_science_and_religion_
chris_3_1_1998.asp (Last accessed: 18 Feb., 2008).
6
MICHAEL RUSE, Witness Testimony Sheet McLean v. Arkansas, in: MICHAEL RUSE, But
Is It Science? The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy, New York,
1996, Prometheus Books, p. 296 [287-306].
7
RUSE, Witness Testimony, p. 301.

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permanently closed system of material causes and effects that can never be
influenced by anything outside of itself. () To speak of something as super-
natural is therefore [from the naturalistic position] to imply that it is imaginary
() 8. From the metaphysical naturalism perspective, to claim that a supernatural
being also exist is to say at the same time that the being has never intervened in
the workings of the world. Ontological naturalism is equivalent to atheistic
interpretation of the world.
Scientists relying on methodological naturalism principle do not claim to
prove that there is no God. For them referring to God as the Creator, however,
is to violate the Ockhams razor, because purely naturalistic forces seem to be
enough to explain the origin of universe, life and human beings, and the
scientifically built picture of the world is for scientists as just the true one. In
this sense the principle of methodological naturalism leads to ontological
naturalism. On the other hand, it is the metaphysical naturalism that provides
justification for naturalistic methodology of science understood as the way to
discover how the things really are.
There are some scientists who perceive metaphysical roots of methodological
naturalism and naturalistic scientific theories. One of them is Richard Lewontin,
prominent geneticist and evolutionist from Harvard University. Lewontin wrote:
We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its
constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of
health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for
unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a com-
mitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science
somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world,
but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material
causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce
material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying
to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow
a Divine Foot in the door. The Eminent Kant Scholar Lewis Beck used to say
that anyone who could believe in God could believe in anything. To appeal to
omnipotent deity is to allow that at any moment the regularities of nature may
be ruptured, that miracles may happen 9.

Metaphysical naturalism is, of course, not in reconciliation with theism. By


theism we mean the view that there is some personal, omnipotent and omniscient
entity, i.e. God, who created the universe, life and human beings, and although
transcendent to nature he still takes an active role in the world. It is crucial to
distinguish this attitude from deism, according to which in the beginning God
established the laws of nature and thereafter left nature to its own devices. There
is no contradiction between deism and metaphysical naturalism so understood.

8
PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, Reason in the Balance: The Case against Naturalism in Science,
Law & Education, InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove, 1995, p. 38.
9
RICHARD LEWONTIN, Review: Carl Sagan, The Demon Haunted World: Science as a Candle
in the Dark, The New York Review of Books, 9 January 1997, pp. 28, 31.

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Of course, we cannot say that there is a logical contradiction between


methodological naturalism and the theistic doctrine. These approaches belong to
two different domains: epistemology and metaphysics. We can, however, analyze
the metaphysical implications of that methodological position. We can also refer
to the picture of reality which is provided by naturalistically based science and
consider whether there is a contradiction between these two ways of understanding
the reality or not.

IS SCIENCE SILENT ON RELIGION? SCIENTISTS AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS POSITION

There is no doubt that methodological naturalism is widely accepted among


scientists. But what about ontological naturalism? In 1996 and 1998 American
scientists were asked about their religious views 10. 90% of members of the elitist
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) declared themselves as non-believers. Among
the representatives of biological sciences the percentage amounted to 95%.
Among the rank-and-file scientists the degree of disbelief was smaller
(amounted to about 60%). It seems that these results confirm the James Leubas
thesis (who conducted similar polls in 1914 and 1933), stating that because of
extensive knowledge and greater experience the prominent scientists are less
willing to accept the possibility of supernatural phenomena. It is also necessary
to remember that members of NAS, established in 1863, chose their successors
by themselves. Thus, it is possible that this mechanism is responsible for
widespread acceptance of atheism among scientists, recognized as the most
prominent, that these polls have revealed.
In fact, all greatest authorities of contemporary Darwinism, such as Theo-
dosius Dobzhansky, George Gaylord Simpson, Ernst Mayr, Richard Dawkins,
Stephen Jay Gould and Douglas Futuyma, deny any divine intervention or
teleological explanation of creation of life and human beings. We can read for
example:
Man is the result of a purposeless and natural process that did not have
him in mind 11.
Some shrink from the conclusion that the human species was not designed,
has no purpose, and is the product of mere mechanical mechanisms but this
seems to be the message of evolution 12.
All appearances to the contrary, the only watchmaker in nature is the blind
forces of physics (). Natural selection, the blind, unconscious, automatic process
which Darwin discovered, and which we now know is the explanation for the
existence and apparently purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in mind. It

10
See EDWARD J. LARSON and LARRY WITHAM, Scientists and Religion in America, Scientific
American, September 1999, no. 281, pp. 88-93.
11
GEORGE GAYLORD SIMPSON, Meaning of Evolution, rev. ed. 1967, Yale University Press,
New Haven, 1949, pp. 344-345.
12
DOUGLAS FUTUYMA, Science on Trial: The Case for Evolution, Pantheon Books, New York,
1983, pp. 12-13.

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has no mind and no minds eye. It does not plan for the future. It has no vision,
no foresight, no sight at all. If it can be said to play the role of watchmaker in
nature, it is the blind watchmaker 13.
Let me summarize my views on what modern evolutionary biology tells us
loud and clear, and I must say that these are basically Darwins views. There are
no gods, no purposive forces of any kind. No life after death when I die, I am
absolutely certain that I am going to be completely dead! Thats going to be the
end of me. There is no ultimate foundation for ethics, no ultimate meaning in
life, and no free will for humans, either 14.

Another most prominent contemporary evolutionary biologist Edward. O.


Wilson assures that evolution is a new myth that will replace Christianity.
According to Wilson,
() the final decisive edge enjoyed by scientific naturalism will come from
its capacity to explain traditional religion, its chief competition, as a wholly
material phenomenon. Theology is not likely to survive as an independent
intellectual discipline 15.

One could say that the polls and the above quotes shed light only on personal
beliefs of particular scientists. But let us look at official statements of public
educational and scientific institutions due to relation of theory of evolution and
religious beliefs. We find there a popular view that science and religion answer
different questions and refer to different domains of reality so we cannot say
about conflict between them. For example, in the official Position Statement of
the American National Association of Biology Teachers we can read that
[] evolutionary theory, indeed all of science, is necessarily silent on
religion and neither refutes nor supports the existence of a deity or deities 16.

According to a pamphlet of National Academy of Sciences, Science and Crea-


tionism: A View from the National Academy of Sciences, it is
false () to think that theory of evolution represents on irreconcilable conflict
between religion and science. () A great many religious leaders accept
evolution on scientific grounds without relinquishing their belief in religious
principles 17.

13
RICHARD DAWKINS, The Blind Watchmaker, Longman Scientific & Technical, Harlow,
1986, p. 5. American edition of the book has a telling subtitle: Why the Evidence of Evolution
Reveals a Universe without Design.
14
WILLIAM PROVINE in: WILLIAM PROVINE and PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, Darwinism: Science or
Naturalistic Philosophy? Video Study Guide, Access Research Network, Colorado Springs, 2001
(1996), p. 33.
15
EDWARD O. WILSON, On Human Nature, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1978,
p. 192.
16
AMERICAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BIOLOGY TEACHERS, The American Biology Teacher,
January 1996, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 61-62 (quoted in: PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, Defeating Darwinism by
Opening Minds, InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove, 1997, p. 120).
17
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Science and Creationism: A View from the National Academy
of Sciences, Committee on Science and Creationism, Washington, 1984 (quoted in: JOHNSON,
Reason in the Balance, p. 190).

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But is science really silent about religion if in the booklet of ANABT mentioned
above we read:
The diversity of life on earth is outcome of evolution: an unsupervised,
impersonal, unpredictable and natural process of temporal descent with
modification that is affected by natural selection, chance, historical contingencies
and changing environments 18.

In another quotation from NAS we read:


Scientists seek to relate one natural phenomenon to another and to
recognize the causes and effects of phenomena. In this way, they have developed
explanations for the changing of the seasons, the movements of the sun and
stars, the structure of matter, the shaping of mountains and valleys, the changes
in the positions of continents over time, the history of life on Earth, and many
other natural occurrences. () it is the job of science to provide plausible
natural explanations for natural phenomena 19.

Naturalistic evolution indeed seems not to be in conflict with deism. But in


what sense the doctrine that our creator is an unsupervised, impersonal and blind
(as Dawkins argues) process is silent on doctrine saying that life and human beings
were created by personal, loving creature for some purpose? It is claimed here
that creation of life and man has naturalistic explanations. It means that those
events, so important for Christian theism, took place without any supernatural
intervention and dont require teleological explanation.
Scientists who successfully promote metaphysical naturalism in their popular
publications are, among others, Steven Weinberg, Stephen Hawking, Richard
Leakey, Stephen Jay Gould, Francis Crick and Richard Dawkins. Dawkins who
wrote that Darwins theory made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist 20
does not hide his antireligious attitude in his books. He stresses the philosophical
implications of theory of evolution characterizing its mechanism as blind
watchmaker. In his publications Dawkins makes it clear that there is no need to
appeal to supernatural Creator since natural abiogenesis of life and process of
natural selection and random mutations of DNA are enough to explain the diversity
and complexity of life. As the scientist who has done the most to further the public
understanding of science 21 in 1990 Dawkins received the Michael Faraday Award
from British Royal Society. Carl Sagan, also promoting metaphysical naturalism,
received in 1994 Public Welfare Medal from the National Academy of Sciences
for his contribution to public education. So in the eyes of the public it may look
like they speak in the name of SCIENCE.

18
AMERICAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BIOLOGY TEACHERS, The American Biology Teacher,
pp. 61-62 (quoted in: JOHNSON, Defeating Darwinism, p. 15).
19
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Science and Creationism: A View from the National Academy
of Sciences, Committee on Science and Creationism, 2nd ed., Washington, 1999,
http://books.nap.edu/html/creationism/ origin.html.
20
RICHARD DAWKINS, The Blind Watchmaker, Penguin, London, 1991, p. 6.
21
JOHNSON, Reason in the Balance, p. 76.

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628 P. BYLICA - D. SAGAN, GOD, DESIGN, AND NATURALISM

METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM AND TELEOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS

As we have seen, the concept of blind, naturalistic evolution seems to be


compatible with deism, but not with Christian theism. It is clearly seen by Gould,
who remarked: Before Darwin, we thought that a benevolent God had created
us 22. From the evolutionary point of view, however, the reality looks quite different:
No intervening spirit watches lovingly over the affairs of nature (though
Newtons clock-winding god might have set up the machinery at the beginning
of time and then let it run). No vital forces propel evolutionary change. And
whatever we think of God, his existence is not manifest in the products of
nature 23.

To show more clearly how different are theistic and naturalistic visions of
reality lets compare the last Goulds statement about lack of Gods manifestation
in nature with Romans 1:20: Ever since the creation of the world [Gods] eternal
power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been understood and
seen through the things he has made. Gould, as well as many scientists, deny
possibility of empirical evidence of design in nature. Such possibility was once
widely accepted in Western science and was crucial assumption of natural
theology. Its medieval formulation we find in Thomas Aquinas five arguments
for Gods existence. In XIX century popular version of natural theology was
William Paleys argument from design in nature. The contemporary science is
rooted in works of Charles Darwin. The problem situation of his research was
constituted by Paleys argument from design explaining the origin of living
structures by reference to a Creator. In the Origin of Species Darwin provided
naturalistic explanation to Paleys crucial examples. Darwin denied special
creation and any theistic and teleological interpretations of evolutionary theory.
Contemporarily teleological explanations justified in science are only those
understood as functional explanations. As Wesley Salmon puts it:
In evolutionary biology functional considerations play a crucial role,
and since the time of Darwin it has been appropriate to deny that such
appeals to functions involve the conscious purposes of a creator, or any other
sort of final causation 24.

Works of Darwin provided not only a new vision of history of life on earth but
also consolidated a special role of methodological naturalism in science. Let us
take a closer look at contemporary version of design argument presented by
advocates of intelligent design theory and its relation to methodological naturalism.
Some advocates of scientific legitimacy of the design argument point at two
elements of methodological naturalism: it not only rejects the possibility of

STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Ever Since Darwin, Pelican, W. W. Norton, New York, 1977, p. 267.
22

STEPHEN JAY GOULD, In Praise of Charles Darwin, in: CHARLES L. HAMRUN (ed.), Darwins
23

Legacy, Harper & Row, 1983, pp. 6-7.


24
WESLEY C. SALMON, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, University of Minnesota
Press, Michigan, 1989, pp. 31-32.

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scientific studies of supernatural, but it also limits the scientific explanations to


materialistic ones invoking solely categories of chance and necessity. While
adopting the principle of methodological naturalism in the first sense seems to
be indispensable and desirable in science, second understanding of the principle
is the subject of much controversy. It is because narrowing the possible scientific
explanations to materialistic ones is equivalent to eliminate from science theories
maintaining that some intelligent cause played or still plays an active role in the
origin and/or development of nature and its constituents, and that such an activity
can be investigated in accordance with methods of science.
Note that in quotation presented earlier Eugenie Scott discerns the practical
reasons for adopting the principle of methodological naturalism: it leads to
successes. Thereby Scott suggests that in some circumstances the principle could
be rejected. In the same spirit William A. Dembski, a proponent of intelligent
design theory (ID), which claims are anti-naturalistic in essence and concern
mainly the area of biology, indicates that if methodological naturalism is really
regarded as a working hypothesis that is successful, then scientists should be free
to reject it when it fails. But when design theorists are pointing out that there are
some reasons to reject methodological naturalism, the scientific status of their
theory is denied and the rationale for that is interpreting the principle as a necessary
condition of scientific theories. Critics of intelligent design claim that the theory
invokes supernatural explanations and thus violates the principle of methodological
naturalism. The problem is, however, that ID theory does nothing like that. Failure
of ID critics is in that they confuse the two different meanings of methodological
naturalism represented here by the words of Eldredge and Ruse. According to a
polish philosopher of science Kazimierz Jodkowski anti-naturalism of ID theory
is not due to naturalism-supernaturalism opposition (understanding presented
by Eldredge), but to opposition of naturalism and artificialism (understanding
presented by Ruse):
The first oppose natural to supernatural or extranatural causes. The second
oppose natural to artificial, purposeful and intelligent causes. () Intelligent
design theory maintains that impersonal and unintelligent causes do not suffice
to explain both origin of the life itself and subsequent evolution of diversity of
its forms 25.

Notice that acceptance of the second sense of methodological naturalism


implies acceptance of the first sense after all, exclusion of intelligent causes
entails rejection of supernatural causes. Thus, these two senses can be combined
as two ingredients of one meaning, as it is in the case of majority of modern
scientists, but they can be considered in separation as two different, independent
meanings acceptance of the first sense doesnt imply acceptance of the second.

25
KAZIMIERZ JODKOWSKI, Antynaturalizm teorii inteligentnego projektu (Anti-naturalism
of Intelligent Design Theory), Roczniki Filozoficzne 2006, vol. LIV, no. 2, p. 73 [63-76],
http://www.nauka-a-religia.uz.zgora.pl/index.php?action=tekst&id=110 (Last accessed:
18.02.2008).

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From the perspective of naturalism-supernaturalism opposition, ID theory


could be scientific, because its explanations arent inherently supernatural. Design
theorists dont identify the designer, at least not on scientific grounds. ID is
studying, first of all, the structures and phenomena in nature, which might be
the result of intelligent agency, but identity, motives and ways of action of the
designer arent the subject of inquiry (unless by support of additional information
it is possible). Design proponents hold that one can know whether given structure
or phenomenon was designed, independently of the knowledge about the
designers identity and regardless of whether he is natural or supernatural entity.
It follows that science might be able to study not only the results of natural
intelligent causes but effects of supernatural causes too in both cases these
results would be, after all, the part of natural world.
Consider the following example. In Mount Rushmore there are sculpted faces
of four American presidents. If these faces havent been sculpted by a human, but
by some supernatural being, we still would be able to conduct a scientific design
inference; one can find that no known natural, unintelligent process has the ability
to produce such structures and that they could be explained by application of our
knowledge about the results of intelligent agency. According to design theorists,
we infer intelligent agency from the features, so-called specificational patterns or
specifications, which are characteristic to signs left by such a type of activity,
coupled with high complexity of object or phenomenon in question 26. We have to
remember, however, that it is relatively easy to recognize design in the faces
sculpted in Mount Rushmore and in many other structures, but recognizing it
in biological systems seems not to be so simple at all and such a possibility is
disputable. Anyway, it shouldnt be doubted that empirical detection of intelligent
design in natural structures is theoretically possible, though it could be unfeasible
in practice.
Note, by the way, that at least to some extent we can detect design in biological
systems. We discern design, for instance, when we observe a cluster of trees
growing in even rows and even distances from each other. Our current knowledge
enables us to infer that such an arrangement of trees wasnt directed by some
natural law and it was too improbable to have been produced by chance. At the
same time, we are in possession of background information that people can
plant trees in such a way, so we can legitimately infer that this cluster of trees
was produced by intelligent agency, even if we hadnt saw the process of planting
itself. And it holds true even if this specific cluster of trees was produced by some
other intelligence than human one, for we infer design from the similarities of
signs leaved by it to effects produced by human intelligence.
It should be also noted that to detect intelligent agency we dont have to know
what exactly intelligence (human or any other) is. It suffices to know one or
more features that distinguish the activity of intelligent agents from processes

26
See e.g. WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, Reinstating Design within Science, in: JOHN ANGUS
CAMPBELL and STEPHEN C. MEYER (eds.), Darwinism, Design and Public Education, Michigan
State University Press, East Lansing, 2003, pp. 408-414 [403-417].

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operating in accordance with necessity and chance alone. One such a feature is
making a choice between different possibilities. On that basis one can establish,
for instance, whether an animal displays an intelligent behavior (regardless of
what animal intelligence is). Imagine that we introduce a rat into a complicated
maze in which there is only one way out and every wrong turn prevents the rat
to exit outside. If the rat exits successfully and hell repeat it every time when
introduced in the maze, then we could say that the rat indeed learned how to
exit the maze and we would not ascribe it to chance, let alone necessity 27. But
whether this type of inference could be applied to the problem of the origin of
body plans, biochemical structures and processes and the like is quite different
matter.
It seems, however, that even methodological naturalism in the sense of
naturalism-artificialism opposition is regarded as a necessary condition of a
theory to be scientific one (at least in disciplines not having interest in the results
of human activity one exception is SETI research program which aims to find
an extraterrestrial intelligence, but its proponents generally dont regard the
program as a proof that the design of nonhuman intelligence can be detected
also here on earth). Dembski rightly claims that by natural explanations scientists
dont have on mind simply to explain phenomena occurring in nature. Instead,
natural explanations involve only material causes: matter, energy, and their
interaction. In other words, in natural sciences merely unintelligent causes,
expressed in categories of chance and necessity, are acceptable. Dembski says,
however, that one cannot assume what must be demonstrated. How do we know
that only natural, i.e. unintelligent, causes were and/or are at work? Defining
science by a principle of methodological naturalism in the sense of naturalism-
artificialism opposition is to impose an artificial restriction on it and to a priori
exclude the possibility of the involvement of intelligence in the course of natural
history. In that case the one and only option is unintelligently guided, blind
(though maybe not Darwinian) evolution which in these circumstances is true
by definition it doesnt require support of evidence as we usually would expect
from science because we already know that some naturalistic theory is true 28.
Lets look at one example of such naturalistic thinking. In the booklet Science
and Creationism members of the National Academy of Sciences try to show the
superiority of the naturalistically based science over creationism. At one point
authors write: For those who are studying the origin of life, the question is no
longer whether life could have originated by chemical processes involving
nonbiological components. The question instead has become which of many
pathways might have been followed to produce the first cells 29. It is evident from
this quotation how a priori methodological assumptions eliminate the need to

27
DEMBSKI, Reinstating Design, pp. 411-414.
28
See WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, Expert Witness Report: The Scientific Status of Intelligent
Design, 29 March 2005, pp. 7-8 [1-51], http://www.designinference.com/documents/2005.09.
Expert_Report_Dembski.pdf (Last accessed: 19.02.2008).
29
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Science and Creationism, p. 6.

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indicate evidence showing that (most generally understood) naturalistic theories


are true, whereas nonnaturalistic theories seem to be false by definition. Although
it is unknown exactly which process produced first life, without invoking ap-
propriate evidence it is known that it was some natural process, and this
knowledge is gained thanks to adopting the principle of methodological
naturalism. Otherwise, how could we know that, since we dont know how?
Of course, there are cases when we could know that despite we dont know
how; namely, when we can observe such a phenomenon. For example, when
we shake a closed container filled with gas, the temperature of gas will increase.
We would know that this phenomenon have occurred but if we wouldnt be in
possession of the Boltzmanns kinetic theory, then we wouldnt know how
actually it happens to occur. However, the emergence of life from chemicals has
never been observed.

SCIENCE IN MODERN CULTURE

As Phillip E. Johnson puts it, Every culture must have a creation story as a
basis for things like philosophy, education and law. If we want to know how we
ought to lead our lives and relate to our fellow creatures, the place to begin is with
knowledge about how and why we came to be 30. For many centuries in Western
civilization such a creation story has been provided by religion. In the nineteenth
and twentieth century the source of creation story became science. In contemporary
culture it is the science that tells the rational story of creation, it is science that
tells how things really are. In the light of this view, Darwinian evolution is not
primarily important as a scientific theory but as a culturally dominant creation
story 31.
Of course, the description of reality provided by science based on methodological
naturalism uses language which ontology is free from notions referring to any
supernatural being acting in the history of universe and responsible for the origin
of life and human beings. According to this new creation story, all living creatures
evolved by unguided, material, purposeless process of random genetic mutations
and natural selection. From this perspective man is the result of a purposeless
and natural process that did not have him in mind.
And that is how Douglas Futuyma sees the dominant element of Western
civilization:
By coupling undirected, purposeless variation to the blind, uncaring process
of natural selection, Darwin made theological or spiritual explanations of the
life processes superfluous. Together with Marxs materialist theory of history
and society and Freuds attribution of human behavior to influences over which
we have little control, Darwins theory of evolution was a crucial plank in the

30
JOHNSON, Reason in the Balance, p. 12.
31
JOHNSON, Reason in the Balance, p. 12.

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platform of mechanism and materialism of much of science, in short that


has since been the stage of most Western thought 32.

THEISTIC EVOLUTION

In cultural context contemporary science has a strong connection with


metaphysical naturalism. The success of naturalistic understanding of science
and naturalism in contemporary culture is rooted in the scientific triumph of
Darwinism which rejects teleological interpretation of history of the development
of life on earth. In result, we obtain general opposition between religious and
scientific view of reality maintained in Western culture of our days.
Popular theological ways of neutralization of this conflict are concept of
theistic evolution and viewing science and religion as complementary domains
of knowledge. Both these ways involve a considerable reinterpretation of theistic
doctrine, because they reject the possibility that Gods action is empirically
discernible in the world of nature. Theistic evolution is meant to be a way of
reconciliation of Christian religion with Darwinism, and methodological
naturalism in general. According to this position God controls and guides the
process of evolution. Evolution is the Gods way of creation and if it is correctly
understood, it reveals the existence of Creator, his endless wisdom, goodness
and goals he gave to the creation. But there are some problems with this stance.
If God guides the evolution and is responsible for every event, then he is also
responsible for every evil.
He also seems to be a mischievous demon deceiving people by attaching
importance to his interventions to make them always look in the way we would
expect from naturalistic evolutionary process.
Lets refer again to Ockhams razor: if naturalistic explanations seem to be
adequate, then God is a redundant hypothesis.
Another problem for Christian theism is that it cannot resign from supernatural
explanation of such events like virgins conception, resurrection, multiplying of
bread, or changing water into wine. Should the biblical description be understood
only allegorically, like the first chapters of the Book of Genesis?
Evolution can be interpreted theistically, but it cannot be equivalent to a genuine
Darwinism. Consistent theistic evolution approach requires rejection of chance
playing such a crucial role in the current scientific theory of evolution. Creation
made by a reasonable God has to be far from random. Chance cannot have so
great power as to defeat Gods plan of creating humanity. But it appears it is exactly
the role chance plays in Darwinism: Replay the tape a million times () and I
doubt that anything like Homo sapiens would ever evolve again 33. Thus, in the

32
DOUGLAS FUTUYMA, Evolutionary Biology, 3rd ed., Sinauer Associates, Sunderland, 1998,
p. 3.
33
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History, Norton,
New York, 1989, p. 289.

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divinely governed world chance must be somehow restricted, though it does not
mean that there cannot be some portion of genuine randomness. Nevertheless,
since Gods goal was to create human beings, some historical evolutionary pathways
had to be nonrandom (i.e. God intervened at some points of natural history)
inevitably leading to the development of humans. To be sure, God might have
predicted that some authentically random evolutionary pathway will produce
human beings and choose it as his way of creation. If that was the case, however,
the role of God would be limited only to deliberately choosing one pathway from
a large array of different possible evolutionary pathways and then he let it work
on its own. For example, Howard Van Till outlines the following reasoning arguing
that that even a genuine, and not restricted to one result only, randomness of biotic
evolution does not rule out purpose:
Suppose there were a perfectly honest gambling casino in which no game
was rigged every turn of the cards, every roll of dice, every cycle of the slot
machines, was authentically random. Does that rule out the possibility that
the outcome of the casino operation cannot possibly be the expression of some
preestablished purpose? Clearly not. In fact, the operators of the casino depend
on that very randomness in their computation of the payout rates to insure
that they will have gained a handsome profit at the end of the day. Now, if
human casino operators can employ random events to accomplish their
purposes, could God not do so on a scale far more grand in the formational
history of the creation? 34.

But there is a problem. In traditional sense, theism means that God actively
intervenes in the workings of nature, so the idea that God used a self-contained
evolutionary process to create humanity isnt the idea of theistic, but of deistic
evolution, where God merely establishes boundary conditions and set the process
in motion.
According to theistic evolutionists, after God created the world and gave it the
laws (also the laws of evolution) he had still constantly upheld the existence of the
universe and operated through the laws in undetectable way. As Johnson states,
Wise metaphysical naturalists will smile at these transparent devices () 35. He
would surely agree with Provine who explicitly evaluates such a position:
A widespread theological view now exists saying that God started off the
world, props it up and works through laws of nature, very subtly, so subtly that
its action is undetectable. But that kind of God is effectively no different to my
mind than atheism 36.

By the way, we should also ask what implications do methodological naturalism


bears on the issue of canonization. If, from the perspective of theistic evolutionists,

34
HOWARD J. VAN TILL, The Fully Gifted Creation, in: J. P. MORELAND and JOHN MARK
REYNOLDS (eds.), Three Views on Creation and Evolution, Zondervan, Grand Rapids. Mich.,
1999, p. 168 [161-218].
35
JOHNSON, Reason in the Balance, p. 101.
36
WILLIAM B. PROVINE, Progress in Evolution and Meaning of Life, in: MATTHEW N. NITECKI
(ed.), Evolutionary Progress, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988, p. 70.

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science must proceed in accordance with the principle of methodological


naturalism and since Gods action is empirically undetectable, then God cannot
perform empirically discernible miracles (of course, in the usual meaning of the
term). But such miracles are the basis to proclaim someone a saint. Here, miracle
means something inexplicable by science and thereby violating the principle of
methodological naturalism. For example, one of evidences in the canonization
process of Pope John Paul II is a miracle of a sudden and complete cure of a
French nun who was dying of cancer; it happened after the members of her
community prayed for the intercession of the late Pope 37. Thus, either theistic
evolutionists will reject methodological naturalism or theyll eliminate the basis
for canonization.
Finally, we should remember that even if Catholics would accept that God
could have used evolution to create human body, the spiritual soul is always
created directly by God. It means that, as Pope John Paul II wrote, the passage
into the spiritual realm presents an ontological leap, a great ontological
discontinuity, and cannot be explained by science. The Pope stated that the
experience of metaphysical knowledge, of self-consciousness and self-awareness,
of moral conscience, of liberty, or of aesthetic and religious experience these
must be analyzed through philosophical reflection, while theology seeks to
clarify the ultimate meaning of the Creators designs 38. It turns out, however,
that naturalistic evolutionary theory explains these things in the framework of
science and without any reference to God. From evolutionary perspective,
religiously interpreted morality, ethics, and the like, are just delusions nothing
more than the means of survival. For example, Michael Ruse and Edward Wilson
claim that
As evolutionists, we see that no [ethical] justification of the traditional kind
is possible. Morality, or more strictly our belief in morality, is merely an adaptation
put in place to further our reproductive ends. Hence the basis of ethics does not
lie in Gods will. () In an important sense, ethics as we understand it is an
illusion fobbed off on us by our genes to get us to cooperate. It is without external
grounding. () Ethics is illusory inasmuch as it persuades us that it has an
objective reference. This is the crux of the biological position 39.

Regarding above considerations, we may ask: how one can be a Christian


theist and consistent evolutionist and methodological naturalist at the same

37
Miracles Reported; Could Speed John Pauls Canonization, Catholic World News, 30
November 2005, http://www.cwnews.com/news/viewstory.cfm?recnum=41004 (Last accessed:
22.02.2008).
38
See POPE JOHN PAUL II, Message to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences: On Evolution,
22 October 1996, http://www.ewtn.com/library/PAPALDOC/JP961022.HTM (Last accessed:
24.02.2008).
39
MICHAEL RUSE and EDWARD O. WILSON, Evolution of Ethics, in: J. E. HUCHINGSON (ed.),
Religion and the Natural Sciences: The Range of Engagement, Harcourt Brace, Orlando, 1993
(quoted in: JEFFREY P. SCHLOSS, Evolutionary Accounts of Altruism & the Problem of Goodness
by Design, in: WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI (ed.), Mere Creation: Science, Faith & Intelligent Design,
InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove, Ill., 1998, p. 236 [236-261]).

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time? It seems that one can be consistent theistic evolutionist only after crucial
reinterpretation of theistic doctrine or of evolutionary theory.

METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM AND THE TRUTH

Consider the following remark made by a theoretical physicist and Nobel Prize
winner, Steven Weinberg: only way that any sort of science can proceed is to
assume that there is no divine intervention and to see how far one can get with
this assumption 40. It seems Weinberg suggests here that science could encounter
something that it wouldnt be able to explain and scientists will have to admit that
explanation of this is beyond the competence of science, but may be explained by
theology or philosophy. However, the methodological naturalist always could hope
that natural explanation, filling a gap in the scientific knowledge, will be found in
the future. In the framework of naturalistic science there exists no criterion
suggesting to scientists when they should abandon that hope. Nonnaturalistic
criterions, on the other hand, are ignored and recognized as unscientific. Such an
attitude could in turn lead to a situation when a scientist would prefer to place
credit in speculations lacking appropriate support of evidence. For example, the
advocate of such a position is the origin of life researcher Robert Shapiro:
Some future day may yet arrive when all reasonable chemical experiments
run to discover a probable origin for life have failed unequivocally. Further,
new geological evidence may indicate a sudden appearance of life on the earth.
Finally, we may have explored the universe and found no trace of life, or process
leading to life, elsewhere. In such a case, some scientist might choose to turn
to religion for an answer. Others, however, myself included, would attempt to
sort out the surviving less probable scientific explanations in the hope of
selecting one that was still more likely than the remainder 41.

Loyalty to principle of methodological naturalism, interpreted as a necessary


condition of scientific theories, entails a requirement that scientists have to look
only for materialistic explanations. But in case when reality cannot be appropriately
described in such a way, this loyalty could lead to a common acceptance of a
false picture of the world at least in societies where science enjoys considerable
respect. If we acknowledge that scientists aim should be the attempt to develop
a theory describing the real world, i.e. a true theory of the natural world, then if
an intelligent agent has intervened and/or intervenes in nature and methodological
naturalism is recognized as a necessary condition of scientific theories, the picture
of the world provided by science so understood is inherently untrue. As Dembski
noted:

40
STEVEN WEINBERG, Dreams of a Final Theory: The Search for the Fundamental Laws of
Nature, Pantheon, New York, 1992, p. 247.
41
ROBERT SHAPIRO, Origins: A Skeptics Guide to the Creation of Life on Earth, Summit
Books, New York, 1983, p. 130 (quoted in: MICHAEL J. BEHE, Darwins Black Box: The Biochemical
Challenge to Evolution, The Free Press, New York, 1996, p. 234).

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P. BYLICA - D. SAGAN, GOD, DESIGN, AND NATURALISM 637

() methodological naturalism isnt saying that we have to encounter


empirical evidence of design in nature but we should stay open to it in case it
comes along. Rather, methodological naturalism insists that one is most logical,
most scientific, if one pretends such an empirical possibility is logically impos-
sible. Instead of holding methodological naturalism as a working hypothesis,
methodological naturalists hold it as a dogma 42.

It follows that if scientists would encounter some compelling evidence of design


in biological systems, being restricted by methodological naturalism, they would
have to ignore it and search for a natural, and therefore false, explanation. This
problem would vanish if methodological naturalism but merely in the sense of
naturalism-artificialism opposition will be treated only as a working hypothesis,
leading to successes in scientific practice, i.e. to finding natural explanations, and
not excluding teleological explanations by a convenient definition of science. But
in that case, science must allow theories incompatible with methodological
naturalism.
As to relation of science and religion, the prospect in which we surely cannot
say about conflict between them is the instrumentalist understanding of scientific
theories. According to this view, scientific theories are regarded only as tools to
organize our experience and tools are nor true nor false. They are valuable because
of their usefulness for technological progress or for making predictions simply
speaking, they make our lives much easier and safer. One problem concerning
instrumentalist understanding of scientific theories is that it isnt clear what is the
value of the theories about origin and past development of nature if not just the
correspondence with reality. After all, what we want to achieve studying course
of historical events if not the knowledge about the real events in a true history?
Naturalistic science and theistic religions are clearly in conflict if we adopt
a realistic interpretation of scientific theories and theistic doctrine, i.e. if we
accept that their claims refer to objective reality and describe how things really
are. In our culture, however, science is the source of adequate description of
reality. Nor metaphysical naturalists nor theistic evolutionists regard scientific
theories only as tools. In practice, methodological naturalism leads to acceptance
of metaphysical naturalism which, on the other hand, justifies the acceptance
of methodological naturalism as the best way to know the reality. Scientific
theories refer to reality and what they say is restricted by principle of
methodological naturalism. The naturalistic picture of the world given by science
is essentially different from the one given by religion. It is the reason why
methodological naturalism leads to conflict between science and religion.

CONCLUSIONS

We have reached the following conclusions: 1) in practice, methodological


naturalism leads to acceptance of ontological naturalism which in turn justifies

42
WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, The Design Revolution: Answering the Toughest Questions about
Intelligent Design, InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove, Ill., 2004, p. 171.

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638 P. BYLICA - D. SAGAN, GOD, DESIGN, AND NATURALISM

the acceptance of methodological naturalism as the best method to know the


reality; 2) if science is to be an enterprise devoted to seeking the truth about reality,
then methodological naturalism but only in the sense of naturalism-artificialism
opposition couldnt be regarded as the necessary condition of scientific theories;
3) if we accept realistic interpretation of scientific theories, then methodological
naturalism conflicts science with religion; and 4) theistic evolution does not seem
to be a proper way to reconcile Darwinism and, more generally, methodological
naturalism with theism. Evolution can be interpreted theistically, but it is not the
way in which majority of modern scientists and respectable scientific institutions
understand it.

University of Zielona Gora Piotr Bylica, Ph. D.


Institute of Philosophy Dariusz Sagan, M. A.
Chair of Logic and Philosophy of Science
Al. Wojska Polskiego 71 A
65-762 Zielona Gora
P.Bylica@ifil.uz.zgora.pl
darsag@wp.pl

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

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MATHEMATICS, REASON & RELIGION
JAVIER LEACH
Universidad Complutense de Madrid

ABSTRACT: This paper will study the relationship between mathematics and religion from the perspective
of reason and the role played by reason in human knowledge. Firstly, I will study the relationship between
reason, logic and mathematics. From this starting point, I will study the relationship between reason
and natural science and finally, I will draw some conclusions on the relationship between reason,
philosophy and theology. The relationship between mathematics, reason and religion will be studied
within the context of the global unity of human knowledge. This paper intends to explain how the pure
deductive reason is present in all human thinking. Mathematics and natural science share this universal
presence with metaphysics and religion. Pure deductive reasoning is somehow an absolute value that
transcends all aspects and levels of human knowledge, including metaphysical and religious knowledge.
Metaphysical and theological arguments need to be able to span different cultural communities. Pure
deductive reasoning is a kind of reasoning that can fully span communities and it forms a basis for inter-
disciplinary, inter-cultural and inter-religious communication.
KEY WORDS: mathematics, reason, pure deductive reason, logic, natural science, metaphysics, religin,
revelation.

Matemtica, Razn y Religin


RESUMEN: En este artculo voy a estudiar la interrelacin entre matemtica y religin desde el punto
de vista de la razn y del papel de sta en el conocimiento humano. En primer lugar estudiar la rela-
cin entre la razn, la lgica y la matemtica. Partiendo de ah estudiar la relacin entre la razn y las
ciencias de la naturaleza y por ltimo sacar conclusiones acerca de la relacin entre la razn, la filo-
sofa y la teologa. Estudiar la relacin entre matemticas, razn y religin dentro del contexto de la
unidad global del conocimiento humano. Este artculo pretende explicar la presencia y el rol de la pura
razn deductiva en el conocimiento humano. La matemtica y las ciencias de la naturaleza compar-
ten esa presencia universal con la metafsica y la religin. La pura razn deductiva es de algn modo
un valor absoluto que trasciende todos los aspectos y todos los niveles del conocimiento humano,
incluyendo el conocimiento metafsico y religioso. Los argumentos metafsicos y religiosos necesitan
ser capaces de alcanzar a las distintas comunidades culturales. La pura razn deductiva es capaz de
alcanzar a todas las comunidades y constituye una base para la comunicacin inter-disciplinar, inter-
cultural e inter-religiosa.
PALABRAS CLAVE: matemtica, razn, pura razn deductiva, lgica, ciencias de la naturaleza, meta-
fsica, religin, revelacin.

INTRODUCTION

At first sight, it appears that mathematics and religion are two different and
unconnected topics; that the one has nothing to do with the other. History
however demonstrates how many thinkers have discovered different kinds of
relationship between mathematics and religion. We know that the Pythagoreans
gave certain mathematical structures a religious meaning 1. In the last few years,

1
PRIYA HEMENWAY, Divine Proportion: Phi In Art, Nature, and Science, Sterling Publishing
Company Inc., 2005, p. 56.

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640 J. LEACH, MATHEMATICS, REASON & RELIGION

some interesting ideas have surfaced on the relationship between mathematics


and religion 2.
I will study the relationship between mathematics and religion from the
perspective of reason. The concept of reason has been used in various ways in
different contexts. Generally speaking, reason is linked to the human ability to
structure, assimilate and convey knowledge. Of all the sciences, it is mathematics
and logic that most clearly and precisely use reason. Developments in the last
150 years in both the fields of mathematics and logic have shown that we can
consider mathematical logic to be a part of mathematics. Through mathematics
and logic, reason has taken on great importance in scientific knowledge. But
reason is not only linked to mathematics and logic. As we will see throughout
this paper and in broad terms, reason is linked to the ability to structure and
make conveyable all kinds of human knowledge.
I will consider the relationship between mathematics, reason and religion within
the context of the global unity of human knowledge. Within the unitary and global
reality of human knowledge, I will aim to uncover the specific role played by
reason. Two poles or extremes can be identified within human knowledge. Using
a geometric image, human knowledge can be illustrated as a sphere or an ellipsoid
with two hemispheres and two poles. One of the hemispheres of knowledge unifies
reason and the other hemisphere contains multiple perceptions through which
knowledge receives new experiences and senses. Logic, mathematics and language
are inside the hemisphere of reason. In this hemisphere of reason, knowledge is
actively organised and can be conveyed. The other hemisphere of human knowledge
is the hemisphere of experiences, perceptions, observations, feelings and emotions.
In this hemisphere, called the hemisphere of experience or perception, knowledge
is receptive and increases with new perceptions. It is impossible to separate these
hemispheres without destroying the internal unity of knowledge. Without the
hemisphere of reason, human knowledge becomes obscure and cannot be conveyed.
Without the hemisphere of experience, knowledge becomes isolated and im-
poverished.
This paper will essentially study knowledge from the pole of reason, which
I will call the pole of pure deductive reason. I will consider the importance and
influence of this pole not only in relation to the areas or aspects of knowledge
within the hemisphere of reason that are directly under its influence, but also
in relation to the areas and aspects within the other hemisphere of knowledge
that depends more directly on experiences and perceptions. Finally, I will pay
special attention to the relationship between reason and experience in global
philosophical and religious intuition and views.
This paper will continuously bear in mind both the global unity of human
knowledge and the bipolar approach to this knowledge. It is important to
remember however that this is not a simple bipolar approach whereby the specific

2
RUSSELL W. HOWELL and W. JAMES BRADLEY (eds.), Mathematics in a Postmodern Age: A
Christian Perspective, Wm. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2001; JOHN BYL, The Divine Challenge:
on Matter, Mind, Math and Meaning, Banner of Truth Trust, 2004.

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J. LEACH, MATHEMATICS, REASON & RELIGION 641

characteristics inherent in each aspect of knowledge can be fully explained from


just two poles. The general bipolar nature of knowledge can also be seen in the
individual and specific areas of knowledge, such as mathematical knowledge or
logical knowledge, which are also bipolar. Although logic and mathematics are
areas of knowledge within the hemisphere of reason, we will also discover an
internal local bipolarity: one pole is more intuitive, receptive and somehow more
experiential and the other pole is more active and rational (Figure 1). This local
bipolarity of logic and mathematics will help us to clarify the internal nature of
the rationality inherent in logic and mathematics. This analysis of logical and
mathematical rationality will lead us to the final extreme of the pole of reason,
which I will call the pole of pure deductive reason. Pure deductive reason is
located at the edge of the hemisphere of reason and its ability to rationally clarify
and structure not only effects logic, mathematics and other realities that are
within the hemisphere of reason, such as natural languages, but also all human
knowledge as a whole and especially philosophical and religious knowledge.

FIGURE 1

The first part of this paper will study the nature of mathematics and
mathematical logic as realities that fall within the hemisphere of reason, but
which are likewise bipolar. Mathematics also has two poles and two hemispheres
(Figure 2): the different kinds of logic responsible for providing internal coherence
to the many mathematical intuitions are in the rational mathematical hemisphere.
The other, more receptive, hemisphere contains mathematical intuitions, received
and taken in by the mathematician in a contemplative or passive way. Mathematical
intuitions begin to take on a structure when they become statements and axioms
in a mathematical language. There are also two hemispheres and two poles in
relation to logic (Figure 3). Pure deductive reason is at one extreme. At the other
extreme there are different logic-based intuitions and views that are also expressed
in logical statements and axioms, which in turn can be analysed in a standard way
from the pole of pure deductive reason. I will show how the pole of pure deductive

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642 J. LEACH, MATHEMATICS, REASON & RELIGION

FIGURE 2

FIGURE 3

reason not only brings dynamic unity, clarity and objectivity to logic and
mathematics, but also how it brings dynamic unity, clarity and objectivity to the
rest of human knowledge. The dynamic unity and clarity demonstrated by the
pole of pure deductive reason cannot be separated from the plurality and complexity
inherent in the different kinds of experiences, intuitions, perceptions and feelings
required to produce all kinds of knowledge. I intend to show how in mathematics,
empirical science and theology, deductive reason interlinks a variety of fields where
there are many intuitions, perceptions, observations, views, feelings and emotions.
In summary, I will aim to show how the hemisphere of reason is based on a pole
or extreme of pure deductive reason, which in turn gives structure to a large
amount of human knowledge, both scientific and religious.

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J. LEACH, MATHEMATICS, REASON & RELIGION 643

The second part of the paper will consider the rationality of empirical
knowledge. Empirical knowledge (Figure 4) also has two poles and two
hemispheres. The hemisphere of reason contains logic and mathematics. The
hemisphere of experience contains scientific observations. In the centre,
connecting both hemispheres, are scientific hypotheses, which will form the
basis of scientific and mathematical theories once they have been formulated
in a suitable language.

FIGURE 4

In the third part of the paper, I will consider the rationality of global religious
views. As a result of their own nature, global religious views need to be conveyed
and they therefore need to be reasonable. The quasi-absolute nature of the pole
of deductive reason has meant that at times, reason is seen to compete with and
antagonise religion, while at other times, reason has helped support different
religious views.

1. THE HEMISPHERE OF REASON

Firstly, we need to be aware that when we talk about reason, we are not always
saying the same thing; the meaning of the word varies. Reason has been linked
to language, to logic, to the mind, to the conscience, etc. Distinctions have also
been made between theoretical reason, which considers how things are, and
practical reason, whereby we justify our actions. In this paper, I will try to provide
a clear, simple and specific view of reason, focusing on mathematics. Before
dealing with reason from a mathematical point of view, I will provide a brief
summary of some aspects of reason that go beyond mathematics.
Reason and natural language. Mathematics is a formal language developed
in close connection with natural languages. Many different natural languages

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644 J. LEACH, MATHEMATICS, REASON & RELIGION

have appeared in the context of different communities and cultures (English,


Chinese, Hindu, Arabic, Spanish, etc.). Distinctions can be made between different
natural languages as a result of their use of different words and sounds and
because they have different grammatical rules that refer to different syntax and
semantics. All the different syntax of natural languages however share a
relationship with the human race, a common reality among all men and women
that enables them to communicate with each other. Reason is an essential
characteristic of human communication and languages are the basic tool. Syntactic
analysis of languages shows how the rationality shared by the human condition
can be seen in syntactic and grammatical similarities between different natural
languages. These syntactic similarities demonstrate the unity of human reason.
The highest level of unity is shown in the most deeply rooted syntax, where the
same structures found in mathematical logic appear in different ways. For example,
the conjunctions y, pero, and, but, und, and aber convey in three
different languages and in two different ways the same conjunction used in
mathematical logic to connect two statements confirming that the two are true.
Another example uses the conjunctions o, or and oder, which convey in
three different languages the same logical disjunction, although here there is a
certain ambivalence in the natural languages: for example, in the sentence Juan
prays or smokes, the statement can be considered true both if Juan only prays
or only smokes, as well as if he does both at the same time. In the formal languages
used in mathematics, ambivalence is not allowed and in the first case an exclusive
disjunctive is used and in the second case, an inclusive disjunctive. However,
although there is no conjunction in Spanish used in an explicitly disjunctive
manner and no conjunction used in an explicitly exclusive way, in Spanish it is
easy to explain the disjunctions inclusive and exclusive use. This is the case in
all natural languages: although there is no explicit use of a logical mathematical
structure in natural language, we can always explain the meaning of logical
structures in mathematics in the natural language. The fact that we can explain
basic logical structures used in mathematics in any natural language enables us
to translate mathematical proofs into any language. To summarise, we can assert
that in mathematical logic is present the deeply-rooted rational unity of the
different natural languages.
Reason and the human mind. Reason has also been linked to the human
mind. The mind is the most specific phenomenon of human nature; in some
ways, mental activities could be considered to be the most specifically human
of activities. There is a wide-ranging, rich and lively debate around the qualities
that characterise the human mind; beyond this debate, we can assert that
rationality is a characteristic specific to the human mind. At the same time as
they are made up of feelings and emotions, activities of the human mind are
governed by basic rational structures that make them coherent and conveyable.
The human mind is able to construct rational models that represent reality and
to use these models to act in a reasonable way with other human beings, thus
changing reality. In order to construct these rational models, the human mind

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uses concepts to convey perceptions and knowledge; the mind formulates qualities
in relation to the things it has perceived; and the mind structures its ideas in a
rational way linking concepts. As we will see, there are different kinds of rational
model, but mathematics plays a fundamental role in all these models when
demonstrating their rational nature.
Rational coherence and the human conscience. Human beings are also
characterised by having reached a high level of awareness. A human beings
conscience manages to create a whole sense of the world and of itself that
distinguishes the human condition from other living beings with a lower level
of awareness. The ability to reason is an essential characteristic that allows the
human conscience to reach a higher level of internal coherence in the way it
perceives the world. The ability to use thought and reasoning to capture the
internal coherence of what is perceived is a characteristic specific to the human
conscience. The critical rigor inherent in mathematics also demonstrates the
highest level of coherence that can be expressed in a rational way.
Theoretical reason and practical reason. Finally, we can draw a distinction
between two basic types of human reasoning; reasoning about how things are
or about how we should act. Theoretical reason is used to justify our certainty
and doubt about how things are. Practical reason is used when we justify our
actions.
Theoretical reasoning is linked to statements about how things are. These
statements are often called declaratives. For example, today it is raining is a
declarative statement that attributes the quality of rain to today; John is clever
is another declarative statement that asserts a quality belonging to John. Using
theoretical reasoning, we can deduce declarative statements from other
declarative statements. Theoretical reason analyses facts in an impersonal and
public way, facts which are in theory accessible to anyone. Natural and social
sciences use theoretical reason. Theoretical reason makes practical reason
possible. Before we decide to act in the world, we need to know how the world
is. Theoretical reason justifies our beliefs about the world, transcendence and
God. Practical reason justifies our actions in accordance with our beliefs.
Using practical reasoning we think about how we should act. Practical
reasoning is linked to normative statements. For example, you must eat to live
is a normative statement. Practical reason is used when we justify our actions.
Using practical reasoning we justify the options we take in situations where
several different options are open to us. Practical reason is about clarifying which
option is best. While theoretical reason aims to explain how things are, practical
reason aims to assess events adequately in order to determine which option is
best. Practical reason assesses and weighs up the facts from an individual and
group point of view depending on whether individual or group decisions need
to be made.
There are links between theoretical and practical reason and there can be no
contradiction between the two. Both theoretical and practical reasoning can be

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646 J. LEACH, MATHEMATICS, REASON & RELIGION

formalised 3 and as a consequence, the critical rigor inherent in mathematics


can be applied to both. Although theoretical reason alone is not sufficient to
determine our actions and practical reason is also required, for methodological
reasons I will focus on theoretical reason in this paper, based on the use of
theoretical reason in mathematics.

2. MATHEMATICS AND THEORETICAL REASON

The study of how mathematics uses theoretical reason will reveal to us the
deductive ability of reason, shared by both theoretical and practical reason. The
critical rigor inherent in mathematical reason will demonstrate fundamental
characteristics of the pole of pure deductive reason, which is located in one
extreme of mathematics and logic.
Logic, mathematics and language. We have considered the study of reason
as a study of one pole of human knowledge seen as a global unity. Let us focus
therefore on the hemisphere containing this pole of reason: this hemisphere
contains logic, mathematics and language. More specifically, lets firstly focus on
mathematics as the part of language that aims to logically describe and structure
mathematical intuitions. As we have said, we can see that there are also two poles
and two hemispheres in mathematics. In one mathematical hemisphere there is
logic and in the other, mathematical intuitions. In the middle, between the two
poles, there are mathematical axioms and statements (Figure 2). Not all
mathematics is pure logic. Logicism 4 dates back to the end of the 19th century
and the beginning of the 20th century and aimed to reduce mathematics to logic.
Logicism failed however and it was proved that mathematical knowledge cannot
be reduced to logic. Opposite the pole of logic in mathematics, there is a rich and
complex world of mathematical intuitions that cannot be reduced to logic. Unlike
empirical intuitions, mathematical intuitions are characterised by their simplicity
and clarity and this means that they can easily be structured in a logical way. In
fact, it is in relation to mathematical intuitions and within the context of the
study of mathematical logic that we find concepts and arguments that can clarify
our ideas about the rational extreme of logic, which we call pure deductive reason.
Deductive reason and logical intuition. If we look at Figure 2, we see that
mathematical logic is a part of mathematics within the mathematical ellipse in
the hemisphere of reason. But there is also an internal tension between two poles
in mathematical logic. Mathematical logic itself is not pure deductive reason.
In one pole of logic there is deductive reason and in the other logical intuitions

3
GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, Norms, Truth and Logic, in GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT,
Philosophical Papers I. Practical Reason, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983; trans. by CARLOS CABRERA
ALARCN, Normas, verdad y lgica, Fontamara, Mxico, 1997.
4
Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) & Bertrand Russell are the best known advocates of this
logistical movement.

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(Figure 3). If mathematical logic were pure deductive reason, all logic would be
the same or certain logical questions could be narrowed down into others. But
not all logic is the same, not all logic accepts the same basic intuitions. The
principle of excluded middle for example is accepted by classical mathematical
logic, but not by constructivist logic 5. There is no reason why all logicians have
to accept the excluded middle principle 6. The excluded middle principle is based
on an intuition that is accepted by classical mathematics, which constitutes the
majority of mathematical statements and proofs, but which is not accepted by
constructivist mathematics. The excluded middle principle is a logical axiom
and is located between the pole of deductive reason and the pole of logical
intuitions (Figure 3).
Pure deductive reason. Pure deductive reason answers questions about the
reason for things: Why? Pure deductive reason does not assign this question a
specific object. The pure question about reason can be applied to any object of
knowledge. At the beginning of this paper, I considered the idea of knowledge
as a reality containing two extremes or poles and I have also said that this is not
a simple bipolar approach whereby everything can be explained using just these
two poles. By studying the hemisphere of reason, where we have placed logic,
mathematics and language, we have described a new polarities within logic and
mathematics that help us to clarify the concept of reason. The pole of pure
deductive reason with the question Why? is at one edge of the hemisphere of
reason and is applied to much logic and mathematics. But pure deductive reason
is not only applied to logic and mathematics; pure deductive reason is a pole of
all rational knowledge and by studying it we can also clarify other realities of
human knowledge and in particular, scientific, philosophical and religious views.

3. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MATHEMATICS

Up until this point, we have broadly discussed reason, mathematics and logic,
but without specifying in detail what we are referring to when we speak of
mathematics and logic. Below is a more detailed summary of what is meant by
mathematics. To do this, we need to look at the historical development of logic
and mathematics starting with important historical events and moments that
have caused cultural changes in the world of mathematics and which have

5
The principle of excluded middle asserts that given a statement A, A is either false or
true. Constructivist logic does not accept that one of the two possibilities A or not A is inevitably
true, only that the two possibilities cannot be true at the same time, as we would be faced with
a contradiction. Constructivist logicians can only assert A when A can be proved and can only
assert not A when not A can be proved, but if neither A nor not A can be proved, we cannot
assert: A or not A.
6
In order to understand these ideas it is important to distinguish between the excluded
middle principle that states that A or not A is true and the principle of no-contradiction that
states that A and not A cannot be both true.

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resulted in the vision we have today of logic and mathematics. This historical
summary will help us to see how mathematics has changed and to discover the
role that mathematics has taken on over time in human knowledge and also how
mathematics has helped to clarify the role of reason in knowledge and, more
particularly, the role of pure deductive reason in knowledge. The relationship
between mathematics and empirical science has been a very important factor
in the historical development of mathematics. As well as its intrinsic value,
mathematics has become the basic tool used by natural sciences to express the
laws of nature. Defining scientific laws using mathematical statements has
provided them and scientific reasoning based on them with the highest level of
rigor and accuracy. But the aim of this paper was not to limit myself to just
mathematics and natural sciences. Further on, I will comment on the use of
pure deductive reason in metaphysics and theology using the way in which
reason is understood in mathematics. In this paper, I intend to show that the
rigor of mathematical reasoning is not only useful and necessary in natural
sciences, but also in metaphysics and theology.
Mathematics in different cultural and historical contexts. In line with both
the holistic and bipolar approach to knowledge that I considered at the beginning
of this paper, I will not describe mathematics as an isolated science to be studied
without relation to other subjects. From a holistic point of view of knowledge,
mathematics is not understood as an isolated subject. By studying the relationship
between mathematics and other kinds of knowledge throughout the different
historical and cultural moments experienced by mathematics, we will have a
better understanding of the true nature of mathematics. From a bipolar diversity
approach to knowledge, we are however able to isolate mathematics as part of
the hemisphere of reason and study it separately. During the first half of the
20th century, much thought was given to mathematics itself. The study of pure
mathematics, as considered during the first half of the 20th century, became so
independent that it tried to back up mathematics with mathematical methods.
The study of mathematics using mathematical methods is called metamathematics.
Metamathematical reflection has clarified very important issues about the nature
of mathematics. Before mathematics had developed sufficiently and was mature
and independent enough for metamathematics to be considered, there was an
historic process of growth and development that lasted centuries and which shone
much light on the nature of mathematics. Mathematics has grown and developed
over different periods throughout history. Historical analysis of the complex
development of mathematics helps us to gain a better understanding of what
mathematics is in itself and in relation to other knowledge.
Three historical periods of mathematics. I will highlight three historical
periods in the development of mathematics: 1. Pre-modern mathematics. Pre-
modern mathematics spanned a historical period that started when man learned
to count and measure for the first time up until the advent of modern science
around the beginning of the 17th century. 2. Modern mathematics. Science in the
modern age began a new stage in relation to mathematics. The mathematical

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formulation of the empirical laws of nature is characteristic of modern science.


3. Post-modern mathematics. This third period is characterised by the formal
rigor of mathematics as an independent science capable of being founded in
itself (in part).

3.1. The pre-modern period

The pre-modern period stands out for two reasons: (a) During this period,
mathematics appears as a formal science. Mathematical formalisms are used
for the first time. (b) Although the origin of mathematical formalisms cannot
be separated from the use of these formalisms in trade, the measuring of fields
and in astronomy, the pre-modern period in mathematics is characterised by
the fact that mathematics was still not applied to physics as a structured science.

(a) The use of formalisms in the pre-modern period

Thousands of years ago, human beings carried out formal mathematical reasoning.
The first historical evidence of signs, lines, knots and other symbols used to represent
numbers dates back around 50,000 years 7. This evidence proves the existence of
primitive mathematical reasoning. Similar formal reasoning has been applied for
thousands of years in different situations. Man began to use mathematical reasoning
when he started to represent the first numbers 1, 2, 3, etc., with different kinds of
formalisms and to convey these formalisms with words. When numbers were first
expressed vocally, different words were probably used to represent different objects.
The word two was not the same when used to mean two men or two horses for
example. In English, we still distinguish between: Team of horses, span of mules,
yoke of oxen, brace of partridge, pair of shoes, couple of days 8. Words became
standardised and abstract calculations began to made, such as three minus one
equals two, which could be used in different situations: if I have three apples and
I give two to somebody, then I will be left with one; the same will happen if I have
three fish and I give two to somebody.
Formal axiomatic methodologies appear in the pre-modern period of
mathematics. Euclids Elements (323 BC to 283 BC) is a geometric treatise that
introduces geometric statements that can be deduced from a small set of axioms.
Geometry that is deduced from the axioms in the Elements is currently called
Euclidean geometry. The deductive axiomatic method presented by Euclid in
the Elements is still the most common method in mathematics of deducing
statements using axioms. The deductive axiomatic method begins by defining
a set of axioms whose truth is obvious and using these axioms, other statements

7
HOWARD EVES, An Introduction to the History of Mathematics, Ed. Saunders College
Publishing, 1992, p. 9.
8
HOWARD EVES, An Introduction to the History of Mathematics, Ed. Saunders College
Publishing, 1992, p. 11.

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in a theory can be deduced. Euclidean geometry forms part of the foundations


of current geometry studies. In the 19th century, Nikolai Ivanovich Lobachevski
(1792-1856) developed non-Euclidean based geometry for the first time.
Lobachevskis geometry was different from Euclids in that it accepted the first
four axioms in Euclids geometry, but rejected the fifth. Nowadays, Euclidean
and non-Euclidean geometry co-exist as two kinds of geometry that are deduced
using two different sets of axioms.
Mathematical axioms. Mathematical axioms are formal postulates that can
be accepted or rejected, but they cannot be falsified by an observation.
Mathematical axioms are accepted as true because they are perceived as such
by mathematical intuition, but there is no argument, regardless of intuition, that
requires an axiom to be accepted or rejected. For example, the appearance of
non-Euclidean geometry does not negate the validity of Euclidean geometry.
There is no empirical observation that confirms one kind of geometry and falsifies
the other. Mathematical axioms are independent of empirical observation. The
fundamental difference between mathematical axioms and scientific hypotheses
inherent in empirical science, is that mathematical axioms are accepted on
the basis of mathematical intuitions, whereas scientific hypotheses are induced
from experience and are confirmed by other new experiences and by their logical
coherence to other scientific hypotheses. As we will see however, although
mathematical axioms belong to a world that is autonomous and independent
of empirical observation, the mathematical theories deduced from them can be
applied to empirical explanations. Whereas traditional Euclidean geometry can
explain the empirical phenomena of Newtonian physics, Einsteins theory of
relativity is explained using non-Euclidean geometry.
Formal logic. In the pre-modern period, a formal methodology began to be
developed for logical arguments. Aristotle was the first philosopher to study the
formal laws of logic in a systematic way. In fact, the laws of logic suggested
by Aristotle, together with later contributions by stoic philosophers, are almost
the only systematic and scientific study of the laws of logical reasoning up until
the 19th century.
Formal logic and language syntax. Aristotle suggested a certain kind of formal
argument called syllogism. A syllogism contains two statements called premises,
which have a certain syntactic shape to them and a statement called a conclusion,
which also has a certain syntactic shape. The conclusion is only deduced from
the premises because of the syntactic shape of the premises and the conclusion.
Aristotles syllogisms and the stoic philosophers formal logic were based on the
syntactical shape of language. The development of formal logic after Aristotle
and the stoic philosophers was almost non-existent until the beginning of the
post-modern period of mathematics towards the middle of the 19th century.
Categorical logic. Aristotles logic is categorical in the sense that for Aristotle,
a statement about a fact is either true or false. Although we may not know
whether the statement is true of false when we make it, the statement is always

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objectively true or false. In other words, it is true or false regardless of whether


we know it or not. In Metaphysics 9 Aristotle defines truth as: To say of what is
that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is,
and of what is not that it is not, is true. According to this classical view of the
truth, a statement is true when we can form a correspondence between what is
asserted and the object about which we are asserting something. This classical
view of the truth is also called truth as correspondence, because it is based on
the correspondence between a statement and the object to which the statement
refers.
Truth as correspondence. The view of truth as correspondence characterised
mathematics up until the 20th century. Logical positivism took on this view
particularly in the first half of the 20th century. As we will see, this view of the
truth caused problems during the post-modern period in mathematics. The
problem lies in the fact that the definition of truth as a correspondence between
a statement and an object assumes that reality is made up of a set of objects
about which we can make a set of statements that will be true or not, according
to whether the statements correspond to the objects referred to or not. In other
words, this view of the truth as correspondence assumes that reality is made up
of a set of different and distinguishable objects.
And the assumption that reality is made up of a set of different and
distinguishable objects caused problems in the post-modern period for both
mathematical and empirical reasons.

(b) The division of mathematics and physics in the pre-modern period

Mathematics and physics. During the pre-modern period, the relationship


between mathematics and physics was still weak. Aristotles physics (384 BC to
322 BC) was very important in the pre-modern period. In fact, Aristotles physics
was taught in Europe until the 17th century. Aristotles physics does not study
the causes of physical phenomena using quantitative methods and mathematics,
as happens in modern physics. Based on a modern view of speculative, non-
empirical criteria, Aristotle distinguishes between four causes: material, formal,
efficient and final. The empirical and mathematical study of modern physics
has brought together these causes. Aristotles works were studied and spread
by Arabic philosophers like Avicena (980-1037), Avempace (1080-1138) and
Averroes (1126-1198). Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) incorporated Aristotles
philosophical beliefs into Christian theology. For purely speculative reasons,
Aristotle thought that the laws governing the movement of stars were different
from the laws governing the movement of earthly bodies.
Mathematics and reality. The first physicist to discredit Aristotle was Galileo
(1564-1642), based on modern scientific criteria. Empirical observations and

9
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, 1011b25.

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mathematical calculations led Galileo to assert that the earth was just another
planet. Galileo defended a mathematical explanation of the laws of nature:
Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which stands continuously
open to our gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one first learns to
comprehend the language and interpret the characters in which it is written. It is
written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles and
other geometrical figures, without which it is humanly impossible to understand
a single word of it; without these one is wandering about in a dark labyrinth 10.

3.2. The modern period

The modern period was characterised by the use of mathematics to describe


the scientific laws of nature. Mathematics was first used to describe the laws of
physics and later the quantitative mathematical methods that have crossed over
into other sciences such as chemistry, biology and sociology, etc.
Empirical hypotheses and mathematical axioms. Isaac Newton (1643-1727)
demonstrated that the mathematical laws governing mechanics are the same on
earth as those that govern celestial bodies. Newtons law of universal gravitation
can be applied to all bodies. The uniformity of this law is a scientific hypothesis.
Unlike Euclids mathematical axioms, the law of universal gravitation can be
falsified by subsequent observations and it was indeed falsified, as understood
by Newton, by observations explained using the laws of relativistic mechanics.
Rational optimism. Mathematics is a formal science and the laws expressed
through mathematics are mechanic and automatic. Alongside Newton, Gottfried
Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716) developed infinitesimal calculus with a possibly
clearer formal notation, which helped its development. Leibniz huge formal and
mathematical ability meant that he took modern optimism as far as possible,
being able to explain mathematically all of natures laws. Leibniz optimism led
him to express the principle of sufficient reason, which states that all events can
be explained. The principle of sufficient reason understood in mathematical
language represents the optimistic side of the mathematical representation of
the laws of nature. Formal optimism also led Leibniz to think that all debates
between two willing people could be resolved by formalizing the arguments.
Leibniz optimism led to a logical belief in the causal determinism of the laws
of nature. The narrowing down of causes to mathematics and mathematical
optimism led to an almost inevitable belief in causal determinism.
Causal determinism. Pierre-Simon Laplace 11 (1749-1827) believed in causal
determinism. Laplace believed that, just as astronomical phenomena could be

10
GALILEO GALILEI, Opere, 4, 171 (translation into English as quoted by Machamer in the
Cambridge Companion to Galileo, p. 64f).
11
Laplace developed Newtons mechanics. Laplaces equations are important, as is his
partial differential equation.

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predicted by Newtons laws, all phenomena could be predicted using the location
and momentum of the atoms making up material. Laplace explained his
determinist view by saying that if there were a demon that new the location and
momentum of all the atoms in the universe at any given moment, this demon
would be able to predict all future events using Newtons equations.
Wide variety of scientific disciplines. Throughout the modern period,
mathematics was applied to other sciences such as chemistry, biology, geology
and many branches of medicine. Units of measurement for volume, length, time,
intensity of electric current, temperature, light, etc. were established and
mathematics was incorporated into more and more areas of scientific knowledge.

3.3. The post-modern period

The most characteristic feature of mathematics in the post-modern period


is possibly the development of the deductive reason of logic.
The deductive reason of logic. Formal logic had not developed further since
Aristotle. The causal determinism of the modern period assumed that the causes
described by mathematical laws created a complete system of causes through
which each of its effects could be predicted. But this assumption was not proved.
Modern mathematicians did not understand the logical rules governing
mathematical language and the semantics of mathematics was not clear either.
Neither the semantics nor the syntax of the mathematical language was accurately
known.
Two levels of language analysis. A first level of analysis of classical
mathematical logic is the logic of propositions. A second and more subtle level
is the logic of predicates.
The logic of propositions. The logic of propositions was studied by the stoic
philosophers. George Boole (1815-1864) carried out the first full study on the logic
of propositions using formal algebraic methods 12. Propositional logic only analyses
mathematical statements up to the level of basic atomic propositions. An atomic
proposition is a mathematical statement that can be either true or false and is not
made up of other more simple atomic statements. Atomic propositions are
connected using syntactic connectives, thus forming molecular propositions.
And, or, only when are examples of syntactic connectives. For example,
John eats and Louise dances and John eats only when Louise dances are two
molecular propositions formed using the basic atomic propositions John eats
and Louise dances. From an atomic physics point of view, the logic of propositions

12
GEORGE BOOLE, The mathematical analysis of logic, New York: Philosophical Library,
1948 (first published in 1847. Cambridge: Macmillan, Barclay, & Macmillan; London: George
Bell); GEORGE BOOLE, An Investigation of the Laws of Thought, Prometeus Books, New York,
2000 (first published in 1854).

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only analyses language up to the level of atoms, without analysing electrons and
elementary particles.
The logic of predicates. The logic of predicates analyses the inside of atomic
statements. Inside atomic statements, the logic of predicates discovers quantifiers
that refer to a certain domain and predicates whose meaning is also interpreted
in a certain domain. The quantifiers required to express all mathematical statements
are the universal all () and the existential exists (). Aristotle had already
used universal and existential quantifiers as the basic elements of syllogisms. In
1879, Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) published Begriffsschrift 13 (Concept Script) with
the subtitle: a formal language of pure thought modelled upon that of arithmetic.
Begriffsschrift contains the first formal logical system to take on board all deductive
reasoning in mathematics. He introduced the quantifiers , and specific symbols
for logical relationships. Concept Script enabled logical inferences to be represented
as formal mechanical operations based only on the symbols themselves.
Semantics of mathematical language. The logic of predicates as formulated
by Frege offered syntactic foundations for mathematics. But these foundations
were still not specific, unlike the models referred to in mathematical language.
The objects referred to in mathematical statements that make the statement either
true or false were not specified. Georg Cantor (1845-1918) uniformly described
all mathematical objects as sets. A set is defined as a group of its elements, which
at the same time can be other sets or original elements. Cantor defined a set as
a collection into a whole of definite and separate objects of our intuition or our
thought. The idea of collection helped Cantor to express what mathematical
objects are in a uniform way: collections of elements. As a result of set theory,
mathematical logic acquired standard semantics. Mathematical logic could deal
with numbers, points on a map and the seconds in the day in the same way as
sets. All objects that can be dealt with by mathematics are collections of objects
and mathematics deals with them as collections of objects.
Paradoxes. The formal explanation of the entity of mathematical objects
using set theory came up against Russells paradox. According to Cantors
definition, if P is a well defined property, we can form a set of all elements with
the property P. Russells paradox is as follows: Q is a set containing all sets that
are not elements of themselves. Q is a set according to Cantors definition, as it
collects together in a whole objects that contain a property P. If Q is a set, we will
know whether Q is an element of Q or not. If however Q is an element of Q, we
have to conclude that Q is not an element of Q and if Q is not an element of Q,
we have to conclude that Q is an element of Q. To avoid Russells paradox,
restrictions were placed on the cases when a well defined property defined a set.
A well defined property can only define a subset of a set. With this restricted
definition, all mathematical objects can be constructed avoiding Russells paradox.

13
GOTTLOB FREGE, Begriffsschrift: eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des
reinen Denkens, Halle, 1879.

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The search for completeness. Avoiding mathematical paradoxes prevented


contradictions, but this did not go far enough to test the complete causal
determinism suggested by modern science. In 1920, David Hilbert (1862-1943)
aimed to prove that all mathematical statements can be deduced using a set of
axioms in a consistent way, in other words, without arriving at a contradiction.
For Hilbert, mathematical axioms were statements about signs whose meaning
is clear prior to all argument 14. 0 and 1 for example are signs and when an element
belongs to a set it is also a sign because its meaning is clear prior to all arguments.
An example of an axiom in set theory is the statement that says that if two sets
contain the same elements, then they are the same. By proving that all mathematics
could be consistently deduced using a set of axioms, which at the same time could
be mechanically built, Hilbert aimed to provide mathematics with complete
deductive reason. If Hilberts programme was successful, all mathematics could
be deduced with complete formal rigor using certain obvious axioms for
mathematical intuition.
Incomplete deductive reason. Kurt Gdel (1906-1978) proved that whenever
arithmetic axioms do not lead to a contradiction (i.e. a proposition of the A A
kind), there will be a proposition U, which is valid in arithmetic models but which
cannot be deduced in the arithmetic system. In other words, it cannot be effectively
deduced in the formal arithmetic system if U is deduced from axioms or not.
Therefore, we cannot decide if U belongs to the system or not. Gdel also proved
that if arithmetic is consistent, the formal statement that expresses arithmetic
consistency can not be proved within this arithmetic system. Gdels incomplete-
ness theorem proves that deductive reason applied to arithmetic proves the
incompleteness of any axiomatic arithmetic system.
Logical axioms. The failure of Hilberts programme led to a crisis in
mathematical logic, but the critical rigor of mathematical knowledge did not
suffer this crisis. It was precisely this critical rigor in the proving of Gdels
incompleteness theorem that led to the failure of Hilberts programme. The
failure of Hilberts programme showed that in mathematical logic there are not
only reason and critical rigor, but also logical axioms that are based on logical
intuitions. Classical logic accepted the principle of excluded middle, according
to which a statement is either true or false. This axiom coincides with the way
logic is commonly used in mathematical reasoning. In fact, one very common
type of argument in mathematics has always been the apagogical argument. An
apagogical argument implicitly assumes the principal of excluded middle, in
other words it implicitly assumes that A is either true or false. To argue that A
is true using an apagogical argument, we assume that A is false and if we can
demonstrate that this is a contradiction, then we have proved that A is false. The
failure of Hilberts programme questioned the excluded middle axiom. Critical

14
DAVID HILBERT (1926), ber das Unendliche, Mathematische Annalen, 95: 161-90.
Lecture given Mnster, 4 June 1925.

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656 J. LEACH, MATHEMATICS, REASON & RELIGION

rigor does not require the excluded middle axiom to be accepted. The excluded
middle axiom can be accepted and classical mathematical logic developed or it
can be rejected and constructive mathematical logic can be developed whereby
we can assert that A is true or false only when we can effectively prove that A is
true or we can effectively prove that A is false. L. E. J. Brouwer (1881-1966) is
considered to be the founder of intuitionism 15, which is a type of constructivism.
Constructivism does not accept the excluded middle logical axiom.

4. NATURAL SCIENCES AND DEDUCTIVE REASON

There is a gap between the formal world of mathematics and the real world
of empirical science. This gap leaves a number of questions unanswered: What
is the relationship between mathematics and the real world? What does a
mathematician discover outside his mind when he has a mathematical intuition?
Some mathematicians believe that the objects Hilbert called signs, and about
which the mathematician felt direct intuition, really exist in a platonic world.
But what is this platonic world? Where is this platonic world? What relationship
is there between the platonic world and the real world? What is perceived by a
mathematician when he senses that there is a number called one and another
number called two and that the number two follows the number one in the same
way as the number three follows the number two?
Mathematical theories help to represent empirical observations. The use of
mathematics to formulate empirical knowledge is a characteristic of modern
science. Mathematics ability to formulate physical, biological and neuroscientific
theories, etc. shows that mathematical intuition is not completely alien to empirical
science; that the abstract objects in mathematics somehow exist in the real empirical
world. We can only claim to fully understand and know about an empirical science
when we are able to translate its statements into mathematical language.
Mathematical statements and proofs written in mathematical language can be
translated into any natural language. Mathematics is the most universal nucleus
of natural languages. When the theory of relativity was mathematically formulated
using Minkowskis mathematical theories 16 based on non-Euclidean geometry,
this theory could be explained with the same precision in a mathematical language,
regardless of the words, metaphors and statements about non-mathematical
symbols used in the empirical and physical explanation of this theory.
Mathematical formulation and technological application. The mathematical
formulation of theories enables them to be applied to technology. For example,
the precise and mechanical nature of the mathematical explanation of the theory

15
L. E. J. BROUWER, On the significance of the principle of excluded middle in mathematics,
especially in function theory, 1923.
16
S. WALTER, The non-Euclidean style of Minkowskian relativity. The Symbolic Universe,
J. Gray (ed.), Oxford University Press, 1999.

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J. LEACH, MATHEMATICS, REASON & RELIGION 657

of relativity makes possible technological applications such as cathode rays,


particle accelerators and GPS systems. Formal mathematical language enables
descriptions of the mechanical processes used in machines and the instructions
given so that machines can work mechanically to be written. Communication
between man and machines is carried out using a formal mathematical language.
Mathematical proof is a mechanical process itself.
Mathematical theories cannot fully represent empirical observations. Minkowskis
mathematical theories are only mathematical theories and their meaning is purely
mathematical. The theory of relativity explains the physical behaviour of empirical
reality. Minkowskis theories do not in themselves explain the physical meaning
of the theory of relativity. Empirical sciences use empirical information and
mathematics does not have empirical information. There is a gap between the
information dealt with in the formal abstract world of mathematics and the
information from the real world of empirical science. Mathematical reasoning
manipulates the information from mathematical intuitions formulated using
mathematical axioms, whereas empirical science reasoning uses information from
scientific hypotheses prompted by observations of empirical reality (Figure 5).

FIGURE 5

The difference between the intuition of an abstract mathematical object and


a hypothetical induction using observations lies in the fact that the intuition of
abstract mathematical objects cannot be contradicted by empirical observation.
For example, Euclides fifth axiom hypothesis can be accepted or rejected, but
the decision to accept of reject it does not depend on empirical observations.
The acceptance or not of quantum physics hypotheses however does depend on
whether these hypotheses are contradicted or confirmed by new empirical

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658 J. LEACH, MATHEMATICS, REASON & RELIGION

observations. Empirical sciences are sciences open to empirical observation.


They are based on hypotheses that explain observed facts, but which can be
proved to be false by new observations.
The gap between the abstract world of mathematics and the empirical world
implies that natural science observations can only be partially explained using
a formal mathematical language. Empirical science needs to remain open to
possible new observations and to new hypotheses about these observations.
Mathematical signs and scientific metaphors. In order to explain the gap
between the world of mathematics and the empirical world, I will distinguish
between the formal signs used by the syntax of mathematical logic and the
metaphorical symbols used by the languages of natural science to represent observed
objects. Formal signs are linguistic objects that represent mathematical objects.
For example, +, <, 1, 2, 4, point, straight line, etc. are formal signs used to construct
mathematical statements, such as 2 + 2 = 4, or geometrical statements, such as
two points determine a straight line. Mathematical statements are true or false
in formal semantic models. For example, 2 + 2 = 4 is true in the structure of
natural numbers. Two points determine a straight line will be true in different
formal structures of Euclidean geometry.
Both mathematical statements and formal semantic models in mathematics
are descriptive. But they do not describe empirical experiences, rather mathematical
intuitions and mathematical axioms. The metaphorical symbols inherent in
empirical sciences are, on the other hand, linguistic objects whose meaning is
established using empirical models that represent the real world. For example,
volume, energy, life, mind, etc. are metaphorical symbols. The statement E = mc2
asserts, in the relativistic model, that volume and energy are interchangeable.
What do metaphorical symbols describe? Basic inductions using experience.
If we use mathematical reasoning, we are not able to deduce empirical
hypotheses from mathematical statements. Empirical hypotheses are induced
using methodical observations. New methodical observations can lead us to
confirm empirical hypotheses or to falsify them. When a scientific theory gets
to the point of a mathematic formulation, it becomes truly interdisciplinary.
Any scientist or scientific community can understand it.

5. METAPHYSICS, RELIGION AND DEDUCTIVE REASON

It is normal for human beings to ask metaphysical questions. It is normal


for human beings to ask why the world is understandable, why the real world
exists, why goodness exists and it is normal for human beings to have answers
to these questions. Just as it is normal for human beings to have a rational view
of the world, it is also normal for human beings to have a complete and global
metaphysical view of reality. Metaphysical views arise when someone, perhaps
together with a school of thought or perhaps in a particular cultural context,
becomes aware of their relationship with the worlds global reality and with the

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J. LEACH, MATHEMATICS, REASON & RELIGION 659

fact of existence in this world and they look to find answers to the questions
arising from these global realities.
Empirical science cannot answer metaphysical questions. Empirical science
provides hypotheses about methodical observations of an aspect or a part of
reality. Metaphysical statements must be linked in some way to each and every
one of our perceptions about reality, including all our emotions and feelings.
Metaphysical views and intuitions cannot be the logical conclusion of scientific
arguments. Metaphysical statements express views about the world as a whole.
The world as a whole and the worlds possible relationship with God cannot be
falsified by scientific experience.
But global metaphysical views and intuitions cannot be separated from other
experiences, intuitions and reasoning of human knowledge. There is a global
unity to human knowledge and metaphysical views and intuitions cannot break
this global unity. No individual human experience or expression is completely
alien to global views about the world and the universe. All mathematical intuitions,
all scientific observations and all human experiences can be integrated or not
into a global metaphysical view of the world. The history of human knowledge
is full of conflicts and consistency between scientific and human views and
intuitions and metaphysical and religious views of the world.
Metaphysical questions are inevitable. Asking metaphysical questions does
not depend on one kind of culture or another, nor does it depend on the level of
recognition achieved within a culture. Once we have stimulated our capacity to
ask questions of ourselves, the question about the worlds ultimate raison dtre
is inevitable. If someone does not want to consider this question, they are already
answering with their attitude. The answers we give to metaphysical questions
constitute our view of the world. For example, for some people the worlds
intelligibleness is only partial; for these people, there are traces of consistency
in the world, but the world is not always consistent. For Leibniz, world consistency
and intelligibleness was somehow complete and God created the best world
possible. Other people find enough of an answer to the question about the worlds
intelligibleness in the world itself, without referring to a God and creator
transcending the world. Finally, for others there is no philosophical reason of a
philosophical that can in any way explain the worlds intelligibleness. This final
stance is an agnostic view of metaphysics. This agnostic view recognises the
question about the worlds intelligibleness as valid, but does not believe that
any other view beyond the natural sciences can help provide an answer to
this question. Everyone can formulate metaphysical questions and the answers
to these questions can vary from one person to another. A global view of the
world can be agnostic or pantheistic when answers to the ultimate questions
about the universe are asked in the same world, or it can be theist when answers
to the ultimate existential question are looked for outside the universe, or it can
be atheistic when the possibility of finding an answer outside the universe is
rejected.

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660 J. LEACH, MATHEMATICS, REASON & RELIGION

Metaphysical views are different from scientific views in terms of how they refer
to the world as a whole. Scientific views always refer to a part or an aspect of
the world. Scientific models represent an aspect of reality. They are like maps of
reality and a map does not reproduce reality, rather it represents it. A metaphysical
view however is a way of seeing reality as a whole. Empirical sciences are
inevitably disciplines as they refer to an aspect of the world. Metaphysics is
essentially trans-disciplinary, as it refers to the whole. Metaphysics questions
reality as a whole. For example, the question about why reality exists is a
metaphysical question not a physical one. Physics constructs models to interpret
the laws that govern reality, but it does not hold the answers to questions about
why these laws exist.
Metaphysical statements use symbols that refer to reality as a whole. Examples
of metaphysical symbols include words and symbols that represent beings in
general and the intelligibleness of beings in general. The symbols that represent
beings in general do not refer to any particular object, as they refer to all objects,
in the same way as when we discuss the intelligibleness of beings we do not refer
to any object, rather to the ability all objects have of being understood. The
difference between scientific metaphors and metaphysical symbols is that
metaphysical symbols refer in some way to the whole reality, whereas scientific
metaphors only refer to an aspect or part of reality. In the same way that each
scientific community has its own metaphors and symbols to represent its view
of reality, different philosophical communities also have their own symbols to
represent their view of reality.
Metaphysical views are the basis upon which religions act and are developed.
From the perspective of reason, which is the focus of this paper, all religions
provide answers to metaphysical questions in some way or another. But
metaphysical questions are not necessarily religious and the answers to these
questions are not necessarily of a religious nature. A metaphysical question
would be: Why is the world intelligible? This question is metaphysical because
it does not ask the reasons or causes behind how we understand the world, rather
why these reasons and causes exist. Metaphysical statements refer to views about
the world as a whole. Theological statements are metaphysical statements that
express views about the world in relation to God from religious foundations.
Religious communities use theological symbols to explain how God reveals
himself to human beings.
Man can understand religious symbols. Precisely because human beings are
capable of using metaphysical symbols to express their metaphysical views and
intuitions, they are also able to listen to religious words, statements and messages
about the world as a whole and about God as creator of the universe (Figure 6).
The Jewish, Christian and Islamic religions convey the message that God, creator
of the universe, is present in the world through his own revelation.
Deductive reason and philosophical and religious communication. The
different philosophical and theological formulations need to be conveyed between

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J. LEACH, MATHEMATICS, REASON & RELIGION 661

the groups as they refer to the same world. These formulations need to become
cross-community. Structuring philosophical and religious formulations by pure
deductive reason is the most solid foundation and point of contact not only for
inter-disciplinary exchange between scientific communities and inter-cultural
exchange between different human communities, but also for inter-religious
exchange between different religious communities. Pure deductive reasoning is
somehow an absolute value that transcends all aspects and levels of human
knowledge, including metaphysical and religious knowledge. Metaphysical and
theological arguments need to be able to span communities. Pure deductive
reasoning is a kind of reasoning that can fully span communities and it forms
the basis for inter-disciplinary, inter-cultural and inter-religious communication.

6. METAPHYSICS AND RELIGIOUS REVELATION

The revelation of God (Figure 6) is at the centre of Christianity, Judaism and


Islam. The revelation of God answers questions presented to man by metaphysics:
the full meaning of life, the creation and existence of God and his revelation to
the world. By reasoning about empirical experiences, the meaning of life and
the need for religion, we do not deduce statements about the revelation of God.
In the revelation of God, he is present in the world through his word. The world
of God is linked to each and every thing in the world.

FIGURE 6

7. THE PARADOXICAL LINK BETWEEN MATHEMATICS, REASON AND RELIGION

Between mathematics, reason and metaphysics there is a paradoxical link.


On the one hand, mathematical logic and metaphysics are two opposite
dimensions of human knowledge with considerable differences between the two.
On the other hand, there are some deeply-rooted similarities between metaphysics

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662 J. LEACH, MATHEMATICS, REASON & RELIGION

and the pure deductive reason and mathematical logic is the area of human
knowledge with a clearest use of pure deductive reason.

Differences between mathematical logic and metaphysics:


1. Signs vs. Symbols: Mathematical logic employs signs with an objective
and defined meaning. Metaphysical propositions use symbols whose
meaning refers to reality as a whole and often to a transcendent God.
2. Conveyable vs. Indescribable: Whereas the propositions in mathematical
logic can be translated into all natural languages and can be conveyed to
anyone, many mystics have expressed their linguistic inability to convey
their metaphysical experience about the ultimate sense and meaning of
the world and also their relationship with God.
3. Contemplation vs. Control: Formal knowledge of the laws of nature allows
reality to be controlled from a technological point of view. In metaphysical
and religious views, understanding rests on a contemplative sense of
mystery.
4. Definition vs. Holism: Mathematical and logical statements refer to a
particular area of discussion. Metaphysical and religious propositions
refer to reality as a whole.
5. Complexity vs. Simplicity: Knowledge of mathematical logic is specific,
analytical and complex. Global metaphysical knowledge is man-made
and simple.

Paradoxically, pure deductive reason is:


1. Simple, because it does not change
2. Holistic, because deductive reasoning is applicable to any kind of
knowledge and is always the same in any place and at any time
3. Contemplative, because it does not depend on human activity.
4. Indescribable, because it is common to all languages.

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this paper, I suggested that although mathematics and


religion are at first glance very different and perhaps opposing realities,
historically there are many links between the two. The relationship between
mathematics and religion has often been opposing and conflicting and at other
times, the relationship has been a question of mutual influence and even
identification.
Throughout the paper, I have aimed to give information about the the nature
of reason. I have tried to describe the presence of reason in mathematics and
the presence of mathematics in all human thought, in particular through pure
deductive reason. Pure deductive reason is present in some way in all human
thinking. Pure deductive reason shares this universal presence with metaphysics

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J. LEACH, MATHEMATICS, REASON & RELIGION 663

and religion. They are two very different presences. Reason is actively present;
structuring, organising and clarifying etc. Religion is present in a more
contemplative way that I have called metaphysical. Metaphysics is understood
to mean a radical and basic view of the world where everything matters,
everything is included, looking for a rational answer to the question about reality
and realities as a whole. Of all the sciences, it is mathematical logic that most
clearly and precisely uses reason. There is a paradoxical relation between
metaphysics and mathematical logic.
Pure deductive reasoning is somehow an absolute value that transcends all
aspects and levels of human knowledge, including metaphysical and religious
knowledge. Structuring philosophical and religious formulations by pure
deductive reason is the most solid foundation and point of contact not only for
inter-disciplinary exchange between scientific communities and inter-cultural
exchange between different human communities, but also for inter-religious
exchange between different religious communities. Metaphysical and theological
arguments need to be able to span different cultural communities. Pure deductive
reasoning is a kind of reasoning that can fully span communities and it forms
the basis for inter-disciplinary, inter-cultural and inter-religious communication.
Metaphysics is the basis upon which religious views are developed.
Metaphysical man is ready and able to receive religious revelations. But
metaphysical man is neither just nor inevitably a cultured academic. Metaphysical
man is open to questions about the meaning of life, the meaning of existence
and the universe.

Universidad Complutense JAVIER LEACH


Facultad de Informtica
28040 Madrid
leach@sip.ucm.es

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

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QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN


PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE
OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS?
FERNANDO LPEZ AGUILAR
Universidad Autnoma de Barcelona

ABSTRACT: The contents of this paper are centred on the dialogue between the experimental and positive
Sciences and Theology. This dialogue should be based on the principle that both parts have to assume
the existence of undemonstrated axioms that are necessary for obtaining their respective valid conclusions.
Besides, all interlocutors have to accept the submission of their arguments to the scrutiny of the general
scientific method. The relationship between Neurology and Theology is centred on the dichotomy established
in the dilemma summarized in whether the conscious acts of the human being are exclusively generated
via physical states or are due to an essence within its anthropology that originates the will to do them.
Although I do believe in the second branch of this dichotomy, the research of the correlations between
physical states of the brain and the consciousness actions are the main goal of my analysis. The fundamentals
of Classical Neurology lie in the assumption that the neuronal system is a complex electronic lattice in
such a way that the procedures and developments carried out in it should be similar to those performed
in a classical computer. After an analysis of the difficulties of this model in the interpretation of the ontological
consciousness properties, I give the basis of the brain study from a Quantum Physics point of view presenting
both the known proposal of the Hameroff-Penrose and new proposals based on coherent collective states.
The possibility of the survival of quantum coherence of these many-body states to temperatures higher
than that of the human body is the main objection posed by the classical neurologists to the availability of
Quantum Neurology. The description of two different ways of attaining these many-body coherent states
allows us to understand the reasons for this possible survival, this being the main contribution of this work.
KEY WORDS: emergentism in the human soul, brain and self, classical versus quantum neurology,
microtubules and tubulins, coherence and collective coherent states, excitonic model of microtubules.
Biexcitonic model.

Neurologa cuntica: una clave fsica para el conocimiento


de la consciencia?
RESUMEN: La temtica de este trabajo est centrada en el dilogo entre la Teologa y las Ciencias posi-
tivas y experimentales. Las bases de este dilogo hay que encontrarlas en el hecho de que todos inter-
locutores deben aceptar que se puede llegar a conclusiones con sus respectivos modelos si y slo si
se aceptan unos principios axiomticos e indemostrables que dan soporte a dichos modelos. Adems
todos interlocutores deben utilizar en sus argumentos el mtodo cientfico general. La relacin entre
Teologa y Neurologa se centra en la dicotoma de si los actos conscientes se deben a determinados
estados del cerebro o existe una entidad inmaterial que genera la voluntad de realizarlos. Aunque creo
ms en la segunda parte de esta dicotoma, mi aportacin al dilogo estara en la bsqueda de corre-
laciones entre los actos de conciencia y determinados estados del sistema neuronal. Los fundamen-
tos de la Neurologa clsica radican en que el cerebro es como una red elctrica compleja que debe
analizarse como si se tratara de un ordenador electrnico clsico. Una vez expuestas las objeciones a
este modelo clsico de cerebro, propongo las bases del su estudio dentro de la Fsica Cuntica, expli-
cando la conocida propuesta de Hameroff y Penrose y nuevas propuestas posibles basadas en esta-
dos coherentes colectivos. La principal objecin de los neurlogos clsicos a la Neurologa Cuntica
es la imposibilidad de la supervivencia de la coherencia a temperaturas del cuerpo humano. La des-
cripcin de dos modelos de obtencin de estados coherentes permite entender por qu es posible esta
supervivencia, siendo ste el mayor logro de mi trabajo.
PALABRAS CLAVE: emergentismo y alma humana, cerebro y ego, neurologa clsica versus cuntica-
microtbulos y tubulines, coherencia y estados coherentes colectivos, modelo excitnico de los micro-
tbulos, modelo biexcitnico.

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694 F. LPEZ AGUILAR, QUANTUM NEUROLOGY: A KEY WITHIN PHYSICS TOWARD THE KNOWLEDGE?

1. PREFACE

The dialogue concerning the relationship between Theology and Experimental


Sciences in issues such as Cosmogony, Cosmology, Universe models and possible
multivers is clear. Ideas that immediately rise in this dialogue are the creationism
versus the matter immanence; thomist requirement of the Supreme Being versus
the reason why the matter-energy dualism and their laws of evolution are not
sufficient; the essential need of the existence (or not) of an Agent who gradually
implements the play rules within this dualism in front of the possibility that the
energy itself is the true creator according to a seminal monism, i.e. energy and
matter being two sides of the same coin in such a way that the spatial energy
accumulation is the essence of matter. All these questions converge in this
stimulating dialectic and the possible answers can illuminate all parts of the
dialogue which can serve to their mutual development analyzing both the
common points and the divergences. However, the fact of taking into account
the Neurology and Neurobiology in this face to face between Sciences and
Theology seems too widespread and complex since no religious text deals with
issues related to the neuronal system, brain, mind and/or human soul.
A deeper analysis in this theme allows the obtaining of clues and reasons for
establishing the possible controversy founded in the following question: what
are the states of brain matter which define the self and the will of this self from
a philosophical and theological perspective?
A golden rule of this dialogue for the sake of its efficacy is that both parts of
this confrontation should be considered in strictly equal starting conditions.
Moreover, both parts should recognize the existence of unproven and axiomatic
principles which are necessary for the development of their respective inference
rules in order to obtain valid conclusions. In addition, all interlocutors have to
accept that there exists no prevalence of any principle over others and all have
to submit their assertions to the scrutiny of the general scientific method.

2. PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND

We will begin with the inspiration arising from the mottos and goals of the
general project of the institutionalized Science-Theology dialogue. What are the
key points and roots of our common origin? What are the main essential elements
of personhood, self, soul and mind of the human being? Can a physical conception
of the human person be valid as a self without soul? All these principles are in
the frontispiece of the international Metanexus projects. We have to accept in
order to initiate this dialogue the weak anthropic principle, although one might
be sceptical and present resilience to assume it as a true principle. In addition,
it is convenient also to assume the strong anthropic one, the so-called meganthropic
principle, although, obviously this may be yet received with much more coldness.
These two dialogue bases imply that the whole design containing the conditions

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for the raising of the human race already existed in the constituting primordial
elements in the universe zero time, this being defined as the emergency of human
existence. The requirement of this design is necessary in the basis of the anthropic
principle and necessary and sufficient in the case of meganthropic one. The direct
interpretation of the emergency as a philosophical category would condition a
certain self-transcendency of matter that would generate new ontological entities
due to inextricable complexity laws. In virtue of those laws and the continuous
evolution of the pristine matter components, the existence of man becomes
conceived, by non theist philosophies, without requiring either any direct inter-
vention or creationism of a Prime Creator. These philosophical positions give an
autonomy and self-immanence to the energy-matter dualism plus the primordial
laws which could be capability of evolution. The belief of creative action of this
Prime Creator is reserved for the appearance and existence of the primordial
elements and the fundamental four interactions, i.e. the starting point of
development of the Universe. On the other hand, a complementary interpretation
of the emergentism (emergentness) should be the acceptance of the anthropic
principles as responsible for the formation of the necessary structural coupling
among the constitutive elements of the starting cosmic soup. This implies the
erection of successive intermediate structures and conglomerates so that step by
step and by the evolution principle, the final result is the present human race. In
a virtual straight line that followed the development of the reality according to
the complexity laws emerge, the physical hot cosmic soup would be considered
the most simple starting point. Physically, this evolution would be triggered by
cooling and expanding the primordial soup, which is formed by gluons, photons
and quarks, these being the initial elemental particles. The gradual cooling plus
the activation of the four fundamental elemental particle interactions (gravitational,
electromagnetic, electroweak and strong nuclear) generated the successive
interparticle couplings. In first place was the hadrogenesis with the formation of
the protons and neutrons which are constructed with three quarks. This allows
the atogenesis (or generation of the atoms) by the combination of hadrons and
the most stable leptons, the familiar electrons, which for cooling and evolution
arrived up to the molecule formation. Then, the complexity chemical laws activated
their mechanisms for achieving by means of the matter consolidation processes,
the appearance of the macromolecules that are formed by atoms and this sets
the bases for the following important and critical step with the genesis of the
replicating structures, the cells. The association of cells constitutes the organs
and at the final of a large generative chain, the mammalians appear. Then a new
critical transition occurs by following the evolution process of these mammalian
animals: the human race arises and the irrational Zoology science is then extended
and raised to the rational animal Psychology.
The most accepted ideas within of non theist development of the universe
are those arising from the so-called Darwinian evolution. These ideas advocate
that this universe evolution development is produced without the meddling of
a Supreme Designer, and are more or less accepted as philosophical starting

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hypotheses for using in the challenge of opinions even from a theist cosmogony
point of view. Maybe, this acceptance should be considered as a rational effort
and a sign of willingness from the theist cosmogony believers in order to facilitate
the dialectic with other materialist perspectives. As a consequence, we should
accept as truth that the starting primordial interactions plus the chain of befallen
complexity laws produce the whole evolution. This is equivalent to accept that
from the initial single physical reality of the cosmic hot soup and as a consequence
of the random evolution, the human race appears in the world without interfering
of any supreme Architect as a consequence of a simple and random evolution.
The possible darkness of this acceptance reasoning is clarified with, and justified
by, the implementation of the anthropic principles within the philosophical
categories, which define the concept of emergence within the matter evolutionism.
In any case, the theist philosophical position of the universe creationism plus
the acceptance of an autonomous performance of the matter evolution without
intromission of God would seem to imply that the primordial physics laws should
not be modified in this evolution progress, since any change in these laws only
could be attributed either to God or to the matter immanence itself. This self-
transcendence of the matter could be unacceptable for the theist positions because
a certain competition between God and matter evolution would seem to be
established.
Before this evolutionary straight line a question immediately arose: is there the
possibility of either a correspondence nexus or a causality rule between the simplest
stage of the physical reality with the final anthropic consequence, the conscious
human being? It seems that the more probable answer to this question is no,
because the interplay of the huge amount of intermediate complexity laws hinders
a direct relation between the first and last phases of reality evolution. However,
there is an opinion stream in accepting that it is possible to find correlations
between the Physics phenomenology in the brain with their psychological
manifestation. In a certain sense, this would seem an attempt to achieve the
structure and performance of the human soul, i.e. what are the quantum states
that define the human soul actions? These states do appear when the soul acts,
but their appearance is conditioned by these acts and, in contrast, the inverse
proposition does not seem correct.
We have not deliberately taken into account as a philosophical starting position,
the existence of the Prime Creator intervention in the evolution of matter within
the cosmology, since we assume the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the dualism
energy-matter in its cooling process across the time. Therefore, it seems to require
that one should abandon the idea of any supernatural element existence, at least
as that philosophical supposition and hypothesis, which transcends to the dualism
energy-matter in the description of conscious knowledge, sentiments and emotions.
Maybe, we should attempt to explain the rational functions by means of a clear
correlation between well defined states when these sentiments, emotions and
knowledge arise and are developed in the human being. A principle that would
give support and induce legitimacy as a valid assertion of these correlations should

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be the acceptance of the monism, which claims by an only ontological substance


constitutive for the human race.

3. BRAIN. MIND. SOUL. SELF

The belief in the existence of the human soul can be justified from an exclusively
rational point of view. It is conceived as an individual human property with a
strong sense of social communion and whose provenance and nature are divine.
This human property subsists on the observation, judgement and influence of
God over the human beings. Therefore these God actions give the true essence
of the soul to men and women, anthropologically complementing them by means
of a finite participation of the Divine image and nature. However, it is difficult
to justify, if one accepts the monism principle, the idea of a human soul as an
immaterial new substance, independent on the human physical body and
hypostatically included in its human nature. For this reason, it is difficult to
accept that this non material soul feature is independent of the continuous Divine
action, especially if one is coherent and consistent with the another idea, above
mentioned, that the energy-matter evolution is attained without any interfering
of the Prime Creator. It is also complicate to believe in, and justify, a spirituality
arising from the energy-matter evolution in virtue of the emergentism principle
and whose explanation has to have coherence without considering a theist human
anthropology. It would imply that the matter evolution should generate new
ontological substances yielding a certain immanence and self-transcendence of
this matter. We can illustrate this complex and debatable point by means of a
metaphor, which can be limited in presenting analogies with the real case but
can serve for explaining this real case in a better way. If one inspects any universal
painting from a rigorous Chemical-Physics study, we can analyze and observe
all atomic and molecular components of both the canvas and the oils used in its
confection, and this can be carried in a similar way by a possible observation of
the microscopic and nanoscopic components of our brain. However, this study
even being totally complete does not give the whole information of the work of
art. The spectators of this work observe another thing which is independent of
its atomic and molecular components, they appreciate its beauty which generates
in them sentiments and emotions that are not included in the Physical Chemical
analysis. This observation is the cause of the true new feature of its nature: in a
metaphoric sense, its soul. Consequently, we can argue, by using the art analogy,
that a complete analysis of the physical brain phenomenology does not ensure
us the global knowledge of the human nature and its spirituality. It is the existence
of the Prime Observant Creator Who confers to the human ontology a new
dimension, the dimension of the human soul. This divine influence produces in
the generic man the will and the stimulation to look for perfection by means of
the self-improvement. This is a radical idea that can be epitomized by saying that
if God does not exist, the human soul either, thus, the mind, consciousness and
deep self are submerged and contained in the brain.

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The belief of many people is that the human soul is linked to Gods existence
and therefore the impulse that induces self-improvement for man may not lie
in his brain. Nevertheless, the Theology-Science dialogue ought to imply that
the theist supporters of the universe existence should accept that the conscious
acts can be also analyzed from a non theist cosmologic development point of
view. As a consequence, descriptions of the consciousness actions should be
given and analyzed independently of the existence (or inexistence) of the soul.
It is possible that given the unconscious knowledge and assimilation of the
infinitum in the popular imaginary, a certain personal relationship of the non
believer with the supposedly infinitum universe can exist. This complex feeling
is named ultimateness. This situation can confer a pantheist spiritual sense
that should not be confused with the human soul spirituality, which is a highlight
of the immanent, omnipotent and omniscient being that we named God. However,
this mutual relationship, universe-man, can be satisfactory for the non believer
and well cultivated mind.
Important lines of thought have arisen around the relation between the brain
and the mind, soul and deep self within Philosophy and Psychology. A shining
example, though too conjectural, is the so-called supervenience between brain
and mind. A summary of this concept, re-introduced by Nancey Murphy, professor
of Philosophy in Pasadena University, California, the mental actions supervene
to the brain dynamic if and only if for all action in the first, at least, there is
another in the second. Several grades of supervenience are recognized according
to algebraic category, univocal or biunivocal, of this correspondence. Actually,
it is accepted as a possibility that a given mental action can be determined by the
dynamic of several neuronal states. This brilliant and not refutable concept is
vague and imprecise since the useful point would be the determination of which
several neuronal states are predetermined by a given mind action. This fact,
empirically shown, could allow either to ratify or to rectify the terms of the
supervenience that as a philosophical concept can be important, but its value, in
my opinion, is limited from a scientific point of view. Another concept relating
the ontological self to the brain is the mereologic reductiveness. The meaning of
this concept deals with the possibility of reducing the properties of the whole of
the self by means of the analysis of the properties of its parts: brain, mind, soul,
etc. This rare concept presents certain similarities with the grammatical figure
of the Spanish sincdoque that our students know or should know without
requiring high level studies of phenomenological research and Psychology. It is
interesting to emphasize that when a fact result to be unexplainable, there is a
tendency to look for either a concept or principle whose contents attempt to hide
the incapacity for understanding, describing and analyzing issues from an
evolutionary and scientific point of view. These imposed concepts and principles
allow us to hide our vacuum of arguments arising from a lack of explanatory
clearness.
This extensive and, in my opinion, necessary preamble is confectioned in order
to incardinate the contents of Quantum Neurology within the general context of
the dialectic between Theology and the experimental Sciences. This introduction

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can be epitomized saying that there are difficulties in obtaining the knowledge of
the consciousness intrinsic sense of the rational beings by means of exclusively
physical methodologies, but the great interest of the issue is worthy of the intent.
However, the global nature of man does not end with the understanding of this
physical study, because the will and the search for self-perfectionism are outside
this analysis since it depends on the existence of the human soul and this, in turn,
depends on the existence of God. On the other hand, the most complicated tasks
in the physical interpretation of the conscious events are in understanding how
the knowledge arising from, and developed by, human intuition can be determined
with states of brain. This complexity and difficulty is due to these states arising
from mental actions can not be algorithmically developed. Nevertheless, they have
to be described by means of a mathematical treatment which is a logic expression
of a physical model and therefore, contradictorily, they should proceed from an
algorithm. However, even considering these complications, there exists the intuition
that we can establish unequivocal correlations between these mental actions with
determined brain states whose understanding allows us to scientifically concrete
and evaluate the philosophical concept of supervenience. And this can be
undertaken without requiring assistance to psychological and philosophical
arguments different from those arising from the temporal evolution of physical
brain states corresponding to the different mental actions. The construction,
explanation and analysis of these correlations are the main keys and cornerstone
of Quantum Neurology.

4. CLASSICAL VERSUS QUANTUM NEUROLOGY

The state of art of Quantum Neurology is too primitive and its development is
yet initial. Recently, several works have been published about the determined
quantum states concerning processes of exterior signal communication [Scholoffeen
et al. (2005) and Engel et al. (2007)]. In these works, the authors pretend to give
experimental proof of properties that are too simple about signal communication
in systems that present analogies with the neuronal transmission. These experiments
are too early and they foretell a long theoretical and experimental course whose
culmination is the achievement of results that serve for tests of theories about the
physical models of consciousness and shed new light on all these issues.
Nevertheless, the scanty knowledge of the physical perspective of consciousness
should be stimulating for the physicists and it should not be a reason for desisting
from further study.
In physics there are two scenarios for developing the different theories which
analyze the material systems. In some cases both theories arrive at apparent
contradictions and sometimes these contradictions are not apparent but totally
essential. These theories are the so called Classical Physics and Quantum Physics.
Classical Physics sets its fundamentals in the determinism of its main laws,
which allow the calculation of physical magnitudes in function of the space-

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temporal evolution of the system components that are macroscopic bodies and/or
corpuscles. This evolution becomes fixed by equations in such a way that known
the initial conditions, one can know precisely and evaluate without uncertainty
where and how each component of the system will progress in the space-time
dimension. Quantum Physics operates with a different philosophy. The basic
point of this theory lies in the system states defined each by its corresponding
wavefunction. These wavefunctions are calculated by deterministic equations,
either the Schrdinger equation in the non relativistic case or the Dirac equation
in the relativistic one. The physics reality becomes defined by means of a complete
set of physics variables whose values are probabilistically obtained. These variables
have not, in general, a given value; when one of these variables is measured in the
system, it can only attain a value corresponding to an eigenvalue that corresponds
to an eigenstate belonging to the spectra of the cited variable. In addition,
any state that is not eigenstate is strongly disturbed and modified when any
measurement is made, and it is transformed into a different state. Consequently,
the really important value of the infinite non-eigenstates of system is the average
probabilistic value, which proportions certain knowledge of the reality independent
of the experimental measurements.
Since the inception of the Physics Neurology, Classical Physics was used for
understanding some neuronal processes, and more recently Quantum Physics
is initiating its long process of implementation in this discipline. The main aim
for including the QP in this study of Neurology is the possible assimilation of a
microscopic measurement with the conscious knowledge of this system. At the
present time, both physical theories contribute in developing the Physics
Neurology; the association of both theories yields often complementary
conclusions from their reasonings, and in other cases, this association is converted
into competition since their propositions are contradictory solutions and
discrepant aphorisms.
Nowadays, a strong controversy is raised between both contending parts of
the Physics in proving what is the most appropriate physical theory for explaining
both the conscious acts and the external signal transmissions in terms of neuronal
states The development of Neurology from the Classical Physics lies in the idea
that the nervous systems, in general, and brains, in particular, are similar to
classical computers that manipulate information with input data and draw results
as an electronic chip. The information transmission is carried up by means of
either chemical transmitters, such as the glutamate of acetylcholine, serotonine,
noraldrenaline, etc., or electrical transmitters whose functions are established
between presynaptic and postsynaptics membranes. The electrical transmission
of signals becomes a study of electric networks named neuronal lattices, which
is performed within the electronic analysis of intelligent webs. As a consequence,
the classical model of Neurology is physicalist and reductionist, since the mental
actions could be deterministically defined by the electric signal transmission
inside an electric lattice, complex but simply an electric circuit. This classical
model presents philosophical difficulties due to the structural complexity of the

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brain whose actions can not often be described via mathematical algorithms,
therefore, it is doubtful that its performance can be modelled with the deter-
ministic laws of the Classical Physics. In addition, there are several reasons
within the internal coherence of Classical Physics that hinder the acceptance of
this theory, at least exclusively, as a suitable scenario for explaining the brain
performance. One of these reasons which may not be the most important
objection but is the easiest argument to understand, is that the electromagnetic
communication in the neuronal lattices should be produced without existing
interneuronal electric contacts among synapses, implying an EM transmission
with infinite impedances, this giving rise to an Alzheimer disease brain. This
objection is clearly and easily annulled within the Quantum Mechanics, since
the key for solving this difficulty lies in the fact that the intersynapses com-
munication is carried up by tunnel effects among contiguous synapses. This
criticism of Classical Theory and the possibility that the EM propagation is
due to either the tunnel or Josephson effects, which we will summarize later,
are sufficiently robust arguments to attempt the analysis of the excitation
transmission in the brain performance within these quantum models. In any
case, even considering the assumption, hard to accept, that the deterministic
classic theory is more appropriate for explaining the brain phenomenology, the
quantum effects can not be forgotten, since they should be taken into account
in the charge behaviours of the proteins that compose the neuron cytoskeletons.

5. COMPONENTS OF THE SYSTEM. SUMMARY

The brain is a physics system constituted of a hundred Spanish trillion (10^26)


elemental particles named electrons whose dynamic is fundamentally governed
by electromagnetic interaction. These electrons belong to approximately ten
trillion atoms (10^25) which are grouped in a hundred thousand million (10^11)
neuronal cells. Each of these cells has around ten thousand synapses which are
the connections of the neurons where the adjoining cells get the nervous streams.
In addition, inside each neuron, the above cited cytoskeleton works as a structure
whose function is similar to that of a spine kind. This cytoskeleton is constituted
of filaments and microfilaments that provide the adequate environment for the
microtubules which are the true elements for the electrical activity inside the
neurons i.e. these microtubules are the transmitters of the nervous signals.
Therefore, these microtubules are the main responsible elements of the
transmission, storage and implementation of the brain actions. On the other
hand, it is necessary to take into account that the mental actions imply the
existence of physical states that can involve up to a hundred neuron cells
connected by synaptic connections.
Each microtubule is a hollow cylinder whose diameter of the bases has twenty
five nanometres and its length is around two hundred nanometres (each
nanometre is millionth of millimetre). Inside this cylinder, water, lipids and

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proteins travel across its hole supplying an appropriate dielectric behaviour that
favours the corresponding function in the global physical state. The microtubules
of each neuron cell are composed of around ten millions tubulins that are light
proteins, polypeptides even simple amino acids. The geometrical location of the
tubulins within the lateral surface of the microtubules is hexagonal and its
dimension is between four and eight nanometres. There are two kinds of tubulins
according to the sign of its total charge: the positive charge tubulins, henceforth,
we will name them alpha-tubulins and those whose charge is negative beta. The
gravity centres of two adjacent tubulins are split around four nanometres. These
constituent elements of the microtubules and the neuron cells that are the main
responsible of the generation of the physical states can associate forming pairs
that are called dimmers. Each tubulin has a spatial nanometric dimension and
is the most single quantum state that presents the features of a qubit (quantum
bit of a quantum computer). Consequently, the associated tubulins forming
dimmers are biqubits that, in turn, are two particle system quantum states.

6. QUANTUM MECHANICS OF TUBULINS

Each tubulin is a molecule, as cited above, generally a protein. Each dimmer


or tubulin pair constitutes a dipole with a well defined module of its dipolar
moment. The dipolar moment is a vector whose module is the product of the
positive charge with the distance between two contiguous tubulins. The dipole
moment vector of each tubulin pair fluctuates space-temporally in all possible
directions. The quantum physical interpretation of each tubulin is a two
dimensional Hilbert space whose basis contains two states corresponding to the
|1> and |0> classical bit states of the standard Computer Science. However, the
number of states for each tubulin can be infinite from a quantum physics point
of view, since the state of each tubulin can be defined by a superposition of
alpha and beta states, in such a way that a quantum state is defined by
|x>=A|alpha>+B|beta>, where A, B are complex numbers where the sum of the
squares of their modules is the unity. The meaning of these numbers within
Quantum Mechanics is related to the probability amplitude of that the |x>-state
in a given time can collapse in either the state |alpha> (the value |A|^2) or |beta>
(the value |B|^2). When this collapse is due to the environment interaction with
the corresponding |x>-state it is named einselection (see Zurek 2003). This
terminology refers to a genuine quantum theory action whose meaning is the
selection of a given eigenstate of a physical variable (magnitude). Each eigenstate
of a given physical magnitude has an associated eigenvalue which becomes
determined via a secular equation H|n>=a|n>, where H is the hermitic operator
defining the magnitude, |n> is the eigenstate and the a-parameter is the
corresponding eigenvalue. As a consequence, there are infinite possible states
for each tubulin and each given state is defined by its two complex numbers A
and B. An paradigmatic metaphor that allows the clarification of the different

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philosophies within the Classical and Quantum Physics of the tubulins is the
well-known Schrdingers cat example. This example serves for distinguishing
between the standard bits and the quantum qubits. In a normal global state of
a neuron or neuron set, each tubulin is in a different one-body state, i.e. each
tubulin contain different A and B values and thus, the neuron is in an incoherent
random state which does not contain and not store any computable information.
The external excitations (stimulations) produce nervous streams that are
transmitted towards brain, which starts a process that becomes represented by
a quantum state in the tubulins. In principle, the individual states are different
in each tubulin and the global many-tubulin state is then incoherent. The brain
acts as an observer of the global state and this observation is equivalent to a
measurement process in it. This process leads to the collapse of each tubulin
wavefunction which implies the selection of a eigenstate of each tubulin
corresponding to the eigenvalue which is the result of this measurement. When
this selected state is simultaneously equal in the tubulins of a neuron, the global
state of this cell coherently oscillates. The obtained coherence allows the
information storing of the external excitations, since a correlation between the
nervous streams produced by the external signal and the coherent global state
is established. The internal coherent global state can be transmitted to the network
of connected neurons by means of a Josephson-like effect similar to that occurring
in superconductor-insulating-superconductor devices. There is multiple nature
and structure for the dynamic reasons that are able to undo the quantum
superposition of the individual tubulin states and that impel the election of a
given eigenstate, either alpha or beta. As a continuation, we will give some of
these reasons that are extended in the section of proposals in this paper.
In September of 2007 at the Madrid Sophia-Iberia congress, several concepts
from a philosophical point of view were placed in discussion with a clear symbolic
and metaphoric sense in order to understand the behaviour of matter from a
non experimental point of view. The most striking ideas were those concerning
the existence of two kinds of matter, bosonic and fermionic, whose different
structure and properties have certain similarities with those of the same physical
denomination. The fermionic matter was defined, in this occasion, as the matter
composed of individual and separable elements so that the properties of the
whole should be considered as the sum of those of their components. In contrast,
the bosonic matter was described as a global and inseparable bulk whose
properties are those of the whole in itself. Obviously, the physical definition is
much more precise referring to the elementary particles. The fermionic particles
such as electron, proton, neutron, electronic and muonic neutrinos, etc, are
defined as those particles that occupy an individual state (one-body state) and,
in addition, each of these states contains only one particle. On the other hand,
the bosonic particles such as photon, phonon, gluon, graviton, exciton, magnon,
etc., can share any arbitrary (even infinite) number of these particles in the same
state. Furthermore, other two properties distinguish the fermionic from bosonic
particles: i) the first are those that suffer interactions among themselves and the
second are messengers and transmitters of these interactions, ii) the fermions

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have a half integer spin and the bosons have an integer spin (the spin is the
internal angular moment which is the total angular moment in the repose
reference system). The property of different spin value for each kind of particle
is equivalent to that of different state occupation according to the spin-statistic
principle.
Another important phenomenology arises from the associations of even
numbers of fermions whose resulting entities are bosons: each two half integer
spin particles joined via an attractive interaction generate a new bosonic
composite particle. An indefinite number of these new particles can occupy the
same state and thus the global many body state of either one or several neuron
cells is coherent in itself. Two examples of global coherent states are, on one
hand, the case of superconductors based on electron pairs, the so-called Cooper
pairs, and on the other hand, the cases of some Bose-Einstein condensate whose
elemental pair components are excitons formed by electron-positron (hole) pairs.
It seems that the mental and brain actions arise from the appearance of global
coherent states that evolve in the neuronal lattices. We say seems since there
is yet not a conclusive and apodictic theory that confirms and ratifies this point.
The storing and reproduction properties of these global states are due to the
easy intersynapses transmission of external signals via tunnel and Josephson
effects. Moreover, these states become perfectly characterized with the internal
parameters required in their construction. However, the issue that the global
coherence implemented within the neuron lattice can be representative of
assigned mental/brain actions present difficulties that do not invalidate the
theory but three serious objections should be previously answered before a future
and possible consolidation of this assertion.
i) The dynamics in the brain are almost exclusively provided by electrons in
such a way that the inclusion of the Quantum Neurology within the Electronic
Physics discipline is legitimated, and these particles are fermions. As a consequence,
in order to build up the coherence with global states, the coupling of either electron-
electron or electron-hole pairs is necessary. As it is well known, the interactions
among electron are repulsive and those existing between electrons and positrons
though are attractive, the excitation of an electron from the valence band to the
conduction band is necessary. Therefore, in both cases there are difficulties, not
impossibilities, for obtaining pairs. The remedy for attaining the coherent global
state via pair couplings (either e-e or e-h) is in the interaction between the tubulin
system and the environment. This interaction is mediated by the circulation of
water, lipids and polipeptides inside the microtubule hole yielding a dielectric
medium in which the coupling of two tubulins (or pair coupling ) is then favoured.
These dimmers have a bosonic spin character and then the coherent states can be
transmitted among synapses of the neuronal lattice. The theoretical and
experimental problem is to know how the dimmers can be formed, this question
being a point that presents similarities from a physical point of view with the
antiferromagetic dimmers construction via Rostoker-Kittel-Kasuya-Yosida (RKKY)
exchange interaction. The antiferromagnetic lattices acquire the appropriate

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conditions via the existence of a determined medium that is equivalent to the


cellular environment in the neuronal systems. The tubulins are submerged in a
medium containing proteins, lipids, water and peptides such as oxotina, serotonina,
noradrenalina, oxicetina, riboflavina, endoforfina, etc., which are responsible for
the microtubule bath that favours the evolution of tubulin dynamics. A large
biochemical experience has improved the neurological studies in such a way that
there is a huge amount of experimental data about which nourishment can aid to
the development of the performance of the brain and mind actions.
ii) The second problem is more complicated and is related to the quantum
coherence. This quantum property is extremely subtle and easy to break. The
possibility of obtaining coherent states is relatively easy and normal in electronic
many-body systems, but these usually have a very short half life and therefore,
their processed implementation and recording even in the appropriate brain
zone is not possible. A coherent state requires at least a thousandth of second
to attain a mental representation and this time is extraordinarily large for the
permanence of a coherent state. This is the reason for the requirement of catalytic
activators of the memory which fulfils the task of lengthening the half life of the
quantum coherent states in order to facilitate their recording. The analysis of
the macromolecules, proteins, amino acids, etc., that are necessary for favouring
the memorizing of mental and brain actions is an important point within the
biochemical and biophysical Neurology.
iii) The third problem constitutes the most important objection of the so-
called classical neurologists against Quantum Neurology. This is, maybe, the
strongest criticism and the most substantial discrepancy in the development of
Quantum Physics in the issue of coherence and the quantum coherent states
within Neurology. This objection is founded on the fact that the coherence of
neuron-neuron propagated states are constructed via internal interactions within
the brain. Consequently, this property should be maintained only at very low
temperatures: 125 C below zero would be the maximum temperature at which
this coherence is possible, this being, at least, the opinion of the quantum neurology
objectors. Temperature is the variable that implies the increase of the electronic
white noise whose strength grows with this variable from 273 C, which is the
absolute zero. In addition, the electronic noise at +36,5 C (average temperature
of the brain) presents a widespread of frequencies implying the existence of
interacting waves which generate an environment that interacting with the tubulin
states completely break the coherent global state. At the present time, a hard
debate between classical and quantum neurologists is based on whether the
coherence is or not possible for temperatures around 309 K. Two researcher
groups challenge the hegemony in this theme using these contradictory arguments.
Tegmaks group maintains that the correlation between the consciousness actions
and cerebral states can not be explained by quantum coherence and proposes
robust, not apodictic but well structured, arguments against the fact that this
quantum property can be held at these high temperatures. Therefore, this group
refutes Quantum Neurology as a possible theory for explaining the mental actions
and prefers to pay its attention to the neuronal classical lattices as solutions for

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the physical scenario for Neurology. In contrast, the group led by Hameroff, who
joined Penrose proposed the orchestrated objective reduction model (see Hameroff-
Penrose 1996) for the consciousness physical definition, defends, with good
arguments but not totally conclusive, that microfilaments and hydrophobic liquids
produce an environment with a dielectric and plasma medium in the intertubulin
space. The interaction between this environment and neuronal tubulins allows
the maintenance of the coherent states up to higher temperatures than that of
the human body. Concretely, these authors with their model justify that the
dielectric medium modifies the dipole-dipole interaction among alpha-beta pairs
in such a way that a quantum protectorate of the coherent state is created allowing
the isolation of the tubulins implicated in this quantum system. In other words,
the cerebral medium inundated by proteins and other macromolecules screens
to the neurons of the thermal noise. The semantic term quantum protectorate
was introduced by the 1998 Physics Nobel Prize, Laughlin in the Quantum
fractional Hall effect (Laughlin 1999); according to this author, some coherent
states can be built by means of the interaction with determined magnetic fields
so that these states can be maintained up to high temperatures with procedures
similar to the optic pumping of the laser state. Some new technical subjects
such as the magnetoencephalography applied to the cerebral diagnostic uses the
existence of certain magnetic behaviour of the brain, which implies that
the neuronal magnetic behaviour might have the conditions for the appearance
of a quantum protectorate that preserves the coherence up to high temperatures.
In any case, the criticism of Tegmarks group is a robust idea that should induce
reflexion to the quantum neurologists in order to dispel the existing doubts
about the applicability of Quantum Mechanics to the physical knowledge of
consciousness.
The aim of the following sections is to present both some known and other
novel solutions to the existing problems concerning the applicability of the
Quantum Theory to the cerebral processes exposed in the former section.

7. KNOWN PROPOSALS

Penrose and Hameroff in 1996 published the orchestrated objective reduction


model, which is founded in the genuine philosophy of the Quantum Mechanics,
using the superposition principle of those eigenstates which constitute a basis
of the Hilbert space. We start heuristically explaining some of the necessary
concepts of Quantum Mechanics required for understanding this model. In
Quantum Mechanics, the first step is the determination of those physical variables
whose measurements can lead us to the understanding of the reality in a better
way. Each variable, also named physical observable, has assigned a hermitical
linear operator using the correspondence principle with the Classical Physics.
Each observable, A, has a set of eigenstates {|x1>, |x2>,..|xn>} with its
corresponding eigenvalues {a1,a2,..an} which can be deduced via the above
cited secular equation: A|xi>=ai|xi>, where the i-index runs over 1,2,..n. In

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order to determine the physical reality we require a complete set of variables,


such as mentioned above, whose corresponding hermitical operators commute
and then, all these observables share the same set of eigenstates. Furthermore,
the commutation property of these sets of operators implies that the
corresponding variables can be simultaneously measured. Obviously, although
the eigenstates are the same for all complete sets of operators which commute,
each variable has different eigenvalues for the same eigenstates. For instance,
we suppose the complete set of variables A1, A2, An, and the corresponding
eigenvalues for a given eigenstate |x>, are a1, a2, ..,an, then, we can identify
the |x>-state with the corresponding eigenvalues (|x>=|a1,a2,.an>), in such a
way that a given variable of the complete set Ai satisfies the following equation:
Ai|a1,a2,.an>=ai|a1,a2,.an> . Then, if one measures the variables Ai in the
system when it is in the |x>-state, it will obtain the value ai and will achieve a
bit of reality. The eigenstate set constitutes a basis of the Hilbert space, and the
dimension of this vector space can be either finite or infinite. Classically (i. e.
from a Classical Physics point of view), only the states of the basis ought to exist,
however, from a quantum mechanics point of view, there are infinite states
which completely fulfil the Hilbert space. The mutation of the system from a
superposed state toward an eigenstate is equivalent to the conversion of a
quantum situation with total ignorance of the values of the observables to a clear
and deterministic realistic knowledge of them. Those states different from the
ones belonging to the basis are obtained by means of a linear superposition of
the type: |y>=c1|x1>+c2|x2>+c3|x3>+.cn|xn>,where the numbers c1,c2,c3,..,cn
are complex. Then, the square of the module of each number, for instance ci, is
interpreted as the probability that by measuring a given variable of the complete
set, we obtain the corresponding eigenvalue, ai, of this given eigenstate |xi>.
Moreover, the sum of all these |ci|s is equal to the unity, since it is the sum of
all probabilities corresponding to the possible classical states. When a given
variable measurement is carried up, the non existence of a value for this variable
in a superposed state implies the degree of ignorance that the observer, apparatus
or brain, has about the reality. This can be justified because the only values that
can be obtained in a measurement are the eigenvalues. In addition, if the |xi>-
states are located in different regions and these are defined by punctual particle
positions, the superposition implies that each particle has probabilities to
simultaneously be in different space positions. This fact has not any sense within
Classical and deterministic Physics. On the other hand, when the external signal
produces in the brain one of the superposed states, it perceives a conceptual
blurredness which is only dispelled when this superposition state is converted
into an eigenstate. Then, the corresponding eigenvalue, in contrast, is clearly
exempt of uncertainty and the correlation between the signal and the state is
converted in knowledge that can be reproduced and stored. Consequently, the
existence of a superposed state proportions no mental action and therefore, it
does not yield any recorded knowledge.
The application of these ideas to the case of a Hilbert space whose basis is
constituted of two tubulin eigenstates, alpha and beta, has already been explained

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in a former section.The quantum superposition implies the definition of an


infinite number of states of the type |x>= a|alpha>+b|beta>. All these states not
belonging to the basis of Hilbert space are modified when a measurement of
any observable is carried out in them. The cerebral mechanisms for which the
brain selects a determined state for confectioning the mental knowledge is yet
unknown and only conjectures can be established. The cornerstone idea of the
Penrose-Hameroff model is the attribution of this eigenselection to the difference
in the gravitational interaction of the mass corresponding to an eigenstate with
respect to the superposed state. Then, the minimal energy principle due to the
attractive sense of the gravitational energy difference induces the selection and
therefore conscious knowledge. The collapse of the wavefunction of a superposed
state by means of its objective reduction can be effective in a simultaneous way
in a determined set of tubulins and then the recording of this state implies the
conscious knowledge of the external signal which provoked the superposition.
This can be explained because the conscious brain actions produce the
wavefunction collapse, this point is clearly the key idea of the Penrose-Hameroff
model.

8. OUR PROPOSALS

8.1. Excitonic model

The Penrose-Hameroff model for the physical concept of the consciousness


is brilliant and fascinating but intuitive and conjectural and, to my knowledge,
is not justified by either any experimental reason or data obtained from any
measurement. The gravitational incidence in this point may be a smart argument
which can have theoretical intern charm and coherence but has the additional
difficulty that it theoretically adjoins the intervention of two theories, General
Relativity and Quantum mechanics which, at least at the present time, seem to
be incompatible.
In the first place, we describe the excitonic model, which presents certain
similarities with the photosynthetic conversion of the sun light for the green
vegetable world [see Engel et al. (2007)]. The charge density inside the tubulins
is such that a geometrical distribution of positive and negative unity charge
appears in the microtubules. This implies the existence of an alpha-beta state
lattice in the microtubules within each neuron cells. Each alpha-beta state pair
presents a strong attractive binding energy which allows us to treat these pairs
with a similar dynamics to hydrogen atoms. The positive-negative charge structure
has a clear image within the condensed matter theory and this is that of the
excitons, concretely, Wigners excitons. These excitonic structures are constituted
of two elemental quasiparticles, similar to an electron and a positron, whose
half integer spin is equal to . Therefore, the resulting excitons are composite
particles with integer spin (this can be either 1 or 0), and consequently, these
composite particles are bosons in such a way that an undefined number of them

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can occupy the same state. The occupation of states is governed by the minimal
energy principle and therefore all will occupy the state with null linear moment.
In other words, the total energy of the microtubule system formed by the alpha-
beta dimmers is decreased by the attractive energy of the binding potential of the
excitons (here excitons and dimmers are two equivalent words). The microtubule
global state is, obviously, coherent because when these excitons start to be moved
before either an electric or magnetic fields, all dimmers move with the same
linear moment a kinetic energy. Hence, the resulting global many-body state is
formed by bosons and therefore, it is a coherent Bose-Einsten condensate.
On one hand, an external signal produces an electric excitation which implies
a wave of linear moment and kinetic energy changes within the coherent BE
condensate. The resulting many-body state presents a new set of quantum
numbers. Then this excitation remains labelled by the new and modified BEC
state, a correlation existing between an external signal and the physical change
of the resulting modified condensate. The tunnel effect is responsible for the
intercommunication across the intersynaptic gaps. This effect is not the normal
tunnel crossover of electrons between conductors through an insulating layer,
but the transmission of a many-body coherent BEC state that pass by the dielectric
medium existing among synapses of different neuron cells. This anomalous
tunnel effect is more similar to the superconducting Josephson one than that
arising from the metal-insulating-metal devices.
The existence of an electric field between the device electron exit element and
that of electron input can favour both the strength of the normal tunnel and
Josephson effects. However, the coherent BEC state is built up with excitons whose
total charge per composite particle is null and therefore the electric field is not
necessary (it is useless) for favouring the intersynapses crossover. This fact implies
that the transmission of coherent state among synapses of different neurons is
due to the Josephson-like effects rather than the normal tunnel because the strength
of this later quantum effect is zero for null electric field charge acceleration, in
contrast to the Josephson intensity that can be different from zero for a null electric
field. Moreover the transmission of the coherent BE condensate oscillates between
synapses even for continuous field, this being an additional experimental fact
that gives support to the Josephson channel. The existence of this oscillating
transmissions, perfectly characterized by means of fixed quantum numbers
corresponding to a coherent BE condensate propitiated by a external signal is the
fact that can allow the establishment of a correlation between a conscious mental
action described by the BEC state and the corresponding cited signal that provoked
it. This correlation serves for attributing the recorded BEC to the information
arising from the external signal, this attribution being established in an unconscious
and automatic way. An example that could shed light and illuminate this crucial
point, which has analogies with the photosynthetic function of the green vegetable
world is the optic image construction by the interaction between the electromagnetic
radiation to visible frequencies and the ocular cells of the retina. The EM interaction
produces an optic excitation in these sensible ocular cells similar to excitons which
are transmitted by means of nervous streams toward the brain, generating in it a

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coherent state whose association with the cited exterior EM field gives us the idea
of the exterior optical image.
Obviously, a quantitative evaluation of these processes should be carried up
for obtaining a true analysis from a physical point of view. In order to satisfy
this objective, it is necessary to calculate the energy and linear moment of the
ground many-body state formed before and after the presence of the exterior
stimuli as well as the possible excitations of the total neuronal system. This
requires a quantitative study which can only be analyzed from the quantum field
theories, and whose technical details will be published in a specialized journal.

8.2. Dipole-dipole interaction: biexcitonic and interacting boson model

The tubulin dimmers, named tubulin pairs too, as mentioned in former sections,
constitute dipoles which are Wigners excitons from a Condensed Matter theory
point of view. These dipoles, as it is well known, interact between themselves via
dipole-dipole interaction, forming exciton pairs, i. e. the so-called biexcitons.
These biexcitons are also bosons since they are constructed of two composite
particles of integer spin, and therefore each biexciton is a new complex bosonic
particle, equivalent to a hydrogen molecule. The interesting question is when the
microtubule global state will prefer the existence of either single excitons or
biexcitons. This preference will depend on whether the interaction electron-
positron is more or less stronger than the Van der Walls-like interaction existing
between two hydrogen atoms (equivalent here to a pair of excitons). The natural
selection will depend on which one demands less energy between the two
possibilities: the energy arising from the global state only formed by excitons or
that from a many-body state built up by biexcitons. Another important and decisive
point in the above cited selection model, apart from the minimal energy reason
is: what global state model presents more straightforwardness in the intersynapses
and interneuronal transmission of the resulting coherent many-body state?
Obviously, nature will choose the condition for one of the two models of ground
state according to the balance of influences in each case between the two
phenomena: minimal energy and Josephson interneuronal transmission.
The dipole system developed in the microtubules based on the tubulin pairs
presents similarities to a Hopfield lattice (see Behrman 2006) and whose dynamic
is similar to certain antiferromagnetic classical lattices that can be solved via Isings
models. These models are particular cases within the Heisenberg exchange
interaction issue. As it is well known, characteristic features of the brain,
experimentally ratified in multiple and several experiences, are its plasticity and
its capability of self-transformation before successive neuronal actions. These
features will allow us to consider this plastic organ as a ferroelectric system with
hysteretic behaviours similar to a dielectric with the permanent dipoles, also named
electrete. The hysteresis cycle implies that the external agent stimuli would produce
multivalued responses in the brain, this fact having a clear psychological meaning
in the tiredness and boredom produced in the brain before repetition of the same
stimulation. This effect presented in the brain is similar to that of an elastic string

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when is successively forced and stretched inducing in it deformations. These


deformations are never equal for each stretching process due to the recording that
is produced in the material before the successive application of exterior forces.
The idea of the elastic behaviours of the neuronal system as well as the existence
of dielectric hysteresis cycles give support to the philosophical concept of the
supervenience since several phases of the neuronal hysteretic process would be
related to the same mental action. On the other hand, these elastic behaviours
similar to the ferro-antiferromagnetic and ferroelectric materials can justify the
biexcitonic model since these behaviours are consequence of the dipole-dipole
interaction which is only considered in this model and it is excluded in the single
excitonic one. Moreover, the dipole-dipole interaction can produce transitions
from ferroelectric to paraelectric phases, the temperature being the responsible
physical variable that induces the phase change. This change occurs at the transition
temperature that can be sufficiently high for ensuring the permanence of the
biexcitonic coherent state for temperatures higher than 309 K which is that of the
brain.
However, it is necessary to be careful in choosing a model for analyzing a
determined mental action and the choice will be conditioned by the experimental
clues of the corresponding states generated in the neuronal system. What are
the experiments that can shed light on this election? The answer to this question
is an interesting task which depends fundamentally on the experimental data,
and can serve to generate a syncretism between the Quantum Field Theory and
genuine Neurology. In any case, according to the available experimental data,
at the present time, it seems that the coherence states in their different possibilities
and phases are a correct way to deepen the relationship between these two areas
of knowledge.

9. COMMENTS ABOUT THE DIFFERENT MODELS

A general comment deserves the possible consistence of each of these three


models summarized in the former sections as well as the concurrence and
concomitance between all them for acting altogether. The physical sense of the
consciousness can require several directions of thought. In a first place, the
Penrose-Hameroff model stress the idea of the eigenselection of a superposed
quantum state for all one-body states in an orchestrated way as a simultaneousness
action arising from the gravitational incidence over these starting point states.
The experimental justification for this overwhelming idea does not seem easy to
give because even from a theoretical point of view it is difficult to reconcile the
general relativity, theory of the gravitational interaction, with the quantum field
theory, theory of the coherent states. The excitonic model is inserted within the
generation of the coherent states via pair coupling that in this case is due to the
electron-hole attractive interaction. This model is compatible with the biexcitonic
generation and the possible prevalence of any of the two models depends on the

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imbalance of total energy yielded via the electron-hole potential versus the Van
der Walls-like interaction among single excitons in a similar way as the hydrogen
atoms are joined for constituting the hydrogen molecules. Even one can argue
that these two models could coexist in either simultaneous or successive neuronal
actions. The selection of any model will depend on which is the experimental
data that have to be explained.

10. EPITOME AND LAST CONSIDERATIONS

The fundamentals of this paper are, on one hand, the insertion of Neurology
in the dialectic between the experimental sciences and Theology, and on the
other hand, the analysis of mental actions from the perspective of Quantum
Physics. The bases of thought in the assertions of this paper should be found in
establishing correlations between the mental conscious actions of the human
self and determined states generated in the complex neuronal system. But it is
difficult to explain the will and the spirit of self-improvement implemented in
the human consciousness. These human virtues are inspired and induced by the
spiritual impulse of the human soul whose existence can only be justified by the
transcendent existence of the Prime Creator and do not seem likely to be
predetermined by any brain state, neither quantic nor classic. However, we look
for correlations of the mental actions produced by the consciousness with
phenomenology occurred in the brain. Another important point established in
this work is the dynamics of the brain, which can not be explained by means of
the deterministic laws of Classical Physics. Moreover, there are sufficient reasons
and certain experimental data that give support to fact that the coherence of
some many-body states within the tubulin system is the main cause and better
representation of these mental actions. The analysis and discovery of the
correlations between the different coherent states and mental functions as well
as the representation in the brain of the exterior signals will allow a scientific
valuation of the interesting philosophical concept of the supervenience. The
teleological study of these correlations by means of general theories avoiding
the ad hoc simple models is the objective in Quantum Neurology, this being
my Physical research in progress. Probably, this task will be difficult to be
completed in all its terms, since some mental actions arising from no
algorithmically procedures can not be represented by known coherent states
and their analysis can depend on other, at the present time, unknown brain
phenomena. The challenge of the discovering of the methodology for these
situations can inspire fascinating issues which make worthwhile the spending
of efforts in their research. On the other hand, I want to express my personal
opinion that our human anthropology is dependent on the existence of the Great
Architect, but, in order to maintain the dialogue between Science and Theology,
the belief in this principle does not preclude our philosophical acceptance of
non theist principles and argumentations that explain the meaning of our own
nature.

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11. REFERENCES

1. TEGMARK, M.: Importance of quantum decoherence in brain process, Phys. Rev. E,


61, 4194 (2000).
2. HAGAN, S.; HAMEROFF, S. R., and TURZYNSKI, J. A.: Quantum computation in brain
minitubules: decoherence and biological feasibility, Phys. Rev. E, 65, 061901 (2002).
3. DRAGUHU, A.; TRAUB, R. A.; SCHMITZ, D., and JOFFERYS, J. G. R.: Electrical coupling
indelies high frequency oscillations in the hippocampus in vitro, Nature, 394, 189
(1998).
4. SCHOFFELEN, J. M.; OESTENVELD, R. O., and FRIES, P.: Neuronal coherence as a
mechanism of effective corticospinal interaction, Science 308, 111 (2005).
5. ENGEL, G. S.; CALGHOUM, T. R., and READ, E. L.: Evidence for wavelike energy transfer
though quantum coherence in photosynthetic systems, Nature, 446, 782 (2007).
6. OUYANG, M., and AWSCHALOM, D.: Coherent spin transfer between Molecularly Bridged
Quantum Dots, Science, 301, 1074 (2003).
7. TUSZYNSKI, J., and WOOLF, W.: The path ahead, in the The emerging Physics of
conciousness, pp. 1-24, Springer (2006).
8. HAMEROFF, S.: Consciousness Neurobiology and Quantum Mechanics, pp. 193-244,
Springer (2006).
9. BEHERA, L.; KAR, I., and ELITZUR, A. C.: Recurrent Quantum neural network and its
applications, pp. 337-348, Springer (2006).
10. BEHRMAN, E.; GADDAM, K.; STECK, J. E., and SKINNER, S. R.: Microtubules as a Quantum
Hopfield Network, pp. 351-369, Springer (2006).
11. CHO, M., et al.: Exciton analysis in 2d electronic spectroscopy, J. Phys. Chem., 109,
10542 (2005).
12. BRYNER, T.: Two dimensional spectroscopy of electron coupling in photosynthesis,
Nature, 434, 625 (2005).
13. MURPHY, N.: Supervenience and the downward efficacy of the mental: a non
reproductive Physicalist account of human action, in Neuroscience and the Person,
pp. 147-164, Vatican Observatory Publications and Centre for Theology and The
Natural Sciences (1999).
14. ZUREK, W. H.: Decoherence, einselection, and the quantum origins of the classical,
Rev. Mod. Phys., 75, 715 (2003).
15. HAMEROFF, S., and PENROSE, R.: Orchestrated reduction of quantum coherence in
brain microtubules: A model for consciousness, Math. and Comp. in Simul., 40,
453 (1996).
16. LAUGHLIN, R. B.: Nobel Lecture: Fractional quantization, Rev. Mod. Phys., 71, 863
(1999).

Universidad Autnoma de Barcelona FERNANDO LPEZ AGUILAR


08193 Barcelona
fernando.lopez@uab.es

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

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PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS
AND TRANSCENDENCE
The physics of Roger Penrose and David Bohm
as regards a scientific explanation
of the human mind open to reality
MANUEL BJAR GALLEGO
Universidad Pontificia Comillas (CTR Chair), Madrid

ABSTRACT: The works of David Bohm and Roger Penrose per se represent a major contribution to the
study of physics and consciousness. It is not an easy task to engage in rigorous analysis of one of the
most profound philosophical-scientific problems; namely explaining the nature of consciousness. This
article explores the global vision that emerges from Bohm and Penroses approach to physics and
consciousness. It focuses on examining the way in which their respective physical-metaphysical proposals
can be bound together in a general model, thus shedding more light on the phenomenological characteristics
of consciousness. The philosophical consequences of this model are closer in many respects to the
experience of transcendence as described in religious works. What emerges is a unitary image of man in
the cosmos that harmonises notions of mind and matter, open to a transcendent connection between the
conscious subject and reality.
KEY WORDS: mind, determinism, emergentism, intuition, holism, microtubules, quantum gravity.

Fsica, conciencia y transcendencia


RESUMEN: Las obras de David Bohm y Roger Penrose representan per se dos contribuciones de orden
mayor al estudio de la fsica y la conciencia. No es una tarea fcil abordar con rigor cientfico uno de los
ms profundos problemas cientfico-filosficos; a saber, la naturaleza de la conciencia. Este artculo explo-
ra la visin global que emerge desde el acercamiento de Bohm y Penrose a la fsica de la conciencia. Se
centra en el examen de la forma en que sus respectivas propuestas fsico-metafsicas pueden converger
conjuntamente en un modelo general, que pueda explicar mejor las caractersticas fenomenolgicas de
la conciencia. Las consecuencias filosficas de este modelo estn en muchos aspectos ms cercanas a
la experiencia de transcendencia tal como es descrita en las obras religiosas. Lo que emerge es una ima-
gen unitaria del hombre en el cosmos que armoniza una idea de mente y materia, abierta a una conexin
transcendente entre el sujeto consciente y la realidad.
PALABRAS CLAVE: mente, determinismo, emergentismo, intuicin, holismo, microtbulos, gravedad
cuntica.

Consciousness is a phenomenon and a problem. The phenomenon of


consciousness indisputably refers to man as a subject open, from both a psychic
and physical point of view, to reality. Equally, consciousness is a problem as we
are unable to explain this psychic, experiential and subjective phenomenon in
relation to the biophysical, experimental and objective environment in which it
is manifested. This is the so-called psychophysical problem of the mind-
consciousness. There is currently no clear solution to the problem of
consciousness; a conundrum that dates back to the origins of the history of
philosophy, despite attempts by eminent thinkers such as Aristotle, Descar-

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716 M. BJAR, PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE

tes, Kant, Hegel and Husserl. At the beginning of the twenty-first century
consciousness remains an enigma. From classical dualism of body-soul and
positive-materialist reductionism we now move towards a new paradigm that,
without becoming engulfed in an attempt to explain reality from fundamental
material bases, seeks to provide a scientific understanding of psychism within
a evolutionary and unitary framework in which structures, the morphology and
function of which are irreducible to the material properties of other physical
regimes, emerge, that is say emergentism.
As the physical properties of the quantum regime cannot be understood through
Classical-Mechanist epistemology, we maintain in this article that the phenomenon
of consciousness has proven a problem in the history of thought as the emergent
properties of the quantum regime of matter have been long relegated to the margins.
Roger Penrose and David Bohm are pioneers in the discussion of the physical
problem of consciousness. Their illuminating contributions open out ingenious
avenues of thought from which to approach the problem of consciousness by
adopting an epistemology that closely resembles emergentism in their in-depth
exploration of pyschophysical, global, unitary and coherent reality. This article
ends with a consideration of the transcendent dimension of man, in the light of
the Bohm-Penrose physical model of consciousness, which lends support to a
rational interpretation of religious phenomenon.

1. THE PHYSICAL DIMENSION OF THE PHENOMENON OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In contrast to a physical particle or a biophysical structure, consciousness is


more resistant to objectiveness and the rigours of experimentation. We cannot
measure its mass, length or charge as if it were an electron. When we study a cell
we can verify its weight and surface area, and even analyse the charge of the
respective ions involved in an osmotic process; but it is more interesting to examine
the functionality of its membrane, of its endoplasmatic structures or the genetic
material stored in its nucleus. The continual formation of the membrane, the
collective dynamics of the cytoplasm or the nuclear changes during cellular
division constitute biological processes governed by physical-chemical changes,
the functionality of which is more important than mere quantitative data on its
principal physical dimensions. At this level of sophistication of matter purely
physical properties are less important than the function performed by the total
matter organised in the cell. Even though physics has shown us that a cell is
composed of electrons and quarks, scientific study of the same is approached
from new material structures which, at a cellular level, are considered to be
fundamental. The biophysical properties of these structures differ qualitatively
from the physical attributes of the elemental particles and their functionality
cannot be explained by corpuscular mechanicism in a strict sense. Matter has
organised itself, reaching a level of cooperation that permits biophysical
functionality.

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The physical study of matter makes way for biophysical analysis in biological
structures. Historically, consciousness has been seen as a problem as a scientific
approach to the phenomenon has not been discovered. We cannot take a sample
of consciousness, dye it and examine it using a microscope or on a microscope
slide. Nor can we give a full account of it by examining its constituent physical
particles in detail. Faced with these seemingly insurmountable difficulties,
dualists have opted to consider the nature of consciousness as a soul that is
essentially distinct from matter thereby initiating a strand of thought parallel
to that of material scientific thought. Such contributions can be evaluated from
the standpoint of rationality, logic and internal coherence but they can never be
assessed scientifically, as they have positioned themselves in an epistemology
outside scientific praxis. Science can provide alternative explanations but it
cannot refute dualist affirmations, as they are based on a spiritual principle that
is orthogonal to material empiricism.
A scientific approach to the study of consciousness does not necessarily require
a physical reduction ab initio of consciousness to particles and fundamental
interactions, as physical science per se understands that the fundamental element
depends on the energy level involved. Consciousness is manifested at a psychic
level, in which the collective dynamics of a group of biophysical systems capable
of functioning psychically is the most important element. Breaking down this
psychic architecture in biophysical systems and then into physical constituents
does not provide us with any clues about the nature and functioning of
consciousness. The dualists would argue that a reductionist dissection of this kind
neglects the fundamental psychic principle. In order words such approach would
fail to discover the matter of consciousness. In the same way that life cannot be
broken down to amino acids as vital elements, consciousness cannot be reduced
to a basic material element of consciousness. Scientific research into consciousness
requires accepting the emergent nature of the properties of matter. Physical matter
is capable of organising itself until the properties of the living matter emerge and,
at a higher cooperation level, produce the emergent psychic properties manifest
in higher animals. Matter produces consciousness as a result of global cooperation,
which cannot be explained from an exacerbated corpuscular atomism. Indeed, it
would not be a scientific option if these emergent properties of matter were not
supported by phenomenological approaches.
The phenomenon of consciousness is manifested in living beings endowed
with a complex psychic system, stemming from the biophysical development of
matter. Conscious states are produced by a psychic subject with a living material
body, which is sufficiently well organised and evolved to feel, perceive and
interpret reality. In other words, a material organism that feels the energetic
pressure of the physical environment. Focusing on this physical side of the
phenomenology of consciousness implies testing the rational hypotheses followed
in order to explain what is observed, pursuant to scientific laws, and proposing
an explanatory model based on existing scientific theories. For this purpose, we
describe below the physical phenomenology of consciousness outlined by Bohm
and Penrose, highlighting several psychophysical correlations guiding physical

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research into animal psychism within an emergentist scientific paradigm. We


conclude discussion of this first point by formulating a phenomenological
hypothesis on the structural and functional unity of consciousness.

1.1. Physical phenomenology of consciousness in Roger Penrose

Any scientific explanation of a fact of nature such as consciousness requires


a detailed observation of its phenomenology, that is, the sum total of its inherent
characteristics. Thoroughgoing knowledge of phenomenology of the consciousness
is needed in order to identify the best course of action to take in order to build a
model to explain such a commonplace and enigmatic phenomenon. The richer
the phenomenological content of the consciousness is, the more fertile the scientific
explicandum will be and, as a result, the higher the probability will be of achieving
a general explicans free of epistemological bias (stemming from prioritising certain
phenomenological points over others). It is therefore advisable to outline the
phenomenology of the consciousness as perceived by a range of scientists from
the fields such as psychology, epistemology and neuroscience. Without losing
sight of the phenomenological nuances of these sciences, in this article we have
elected to focus on the physical phenomenology of consciousness; physics being
the paradigmatic science par excellence, as by concentrating on the physical
dimension of consciousness it is possible to evaluate the reasonableness of scientific
research that does not involve reductionism as an alternative to dualism.
The works of Roger Penrose, physicist-mathematician from the University
of Oxford who worked with Steven Hawking on black holes and quantum gravity,
address the physical phenomenology of consciousness on a number of occasions 1.
Throughout his works 2, amid arguments against reductionists and dualists, or
intercalated in the exposition of his physical model of the mind, we find
characteristics that define the phenomenon of the mind precisely as Penrose
sees it himself. Attributes of the physical nature of the mind abound in this
phenomenology. Hence Penroses approach to physical phenomenology is of
interest here, especially given the eminence of the author and the importance
of his publications.
The main phenomenological feature of consciousness highlighted by Penrose
is the psychophysical connectivity of the mind, closely linked to matter.
Consciousness is shown as a phenomenon exclusive to psychic subjects endowed
with an evolved living material structure. There is no phenomenological evidence
to alert us to the presence of a consciousness other than the psychobiophysical
structures that produce it. Consciousness emerges from matter and there is no
phenomenological consciousness without matter. But it does not follow that all
material reality is conscious. It is evident from the way in which matter is
manifested in the world that most matter is nonliving matter without psychic
activity. When we consider the phenomenon of consciousness, a psychobiological

1
Cf. R. PENROSE, The Emperors New Mind (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989).
2
Cf. R. PENROSE, Shadows of the Mind (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994).

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unity can be observed that defines a second phenomenological feature.


Consciousness manifests itself as the product of the psychic and biophysical
cooperation of specific biological structures grouped together in a unitary psychic
architecture governed by physical processes. There is no consciousness without
a nervous system, there is no brain without neurones, there are no neurones
without biological structures and there are no functional biostructures without
physical processes. Consciousness appears as a unitary psychobiophysical
phenomenon in which it is not possible to separate clearly psychic elements from
biological or physical ones. This psychobiophysical unity leads us to the third
phenomenological feature, which is highlighted through the high degree of
correspondence between the psychobiophysical structures of consciousness and
physical changes in the environment. By interacting with the physical environment
the psychobiophysical being becomes a psychic subject that feels conscious of
being an individual in a physical environment through the biophysical body. The
psychobiophysical subject perceives consciousness as a highly ordered state,
integral to his biophysical psychism, which enables him to go beyond stimulus-
response behaviourism, following less predictable behavioural patterns of a more
unitary and personalised nature.
These three phenomenological features together form the pyschobiophysical
structural unit of the conscious subject; notions shared in large part by David
Bohm, another eminent physicist whose ideas we outline next. It is worth noting
that Bohms approach here is less specific than Penroses as he stresses the
indeterminist, non-computability of consciousness. The conscious thought of
psychobiological subjects possesses higher qualities distinguishing it from the
computable processes of a computer. Although the psychobiophysical subject
issues a range of regular automatised responses in order to survive in the
environment (automatisms), the richness of conscious behaviour manifests other
phenomenological qualities that cannot be reduced to computable processes and
do not require specific responses for survival purposes such as affiliation with
beauty and truth (intuitionisms). Penrose refers to ethical judgements, aesthetic
activity or the search for the meaning of existence. He particularly stresses those
blissful moments when the mathematician finds a way of advancing his reasoning
effectively, intuitively, incapable of anticipating the advent of the same. During
such instants the past and the future overlap in a prolonged present, thus enabling
us to experience coherence and unity.

1.2. Physical phenomenology of consciousness in David Bohm

Following a different and complementary line to the phenomenology of


Penrose, David Bohm underlines the holistic nature (experiential, spatial and
temporal) of consciousness, departing from a psychobiophysical foundation,
resulting from the natural evolutionary development of primal matter affected
by physical and psychic activity. Bohm, an influential American physicist, chose
to address this issue and managed to tackle the problem of physical determinism
handed down by Albert Einstein with greater success. Bohm ended his days

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720 M. BJAR, PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE

working on the physical nature of consciousness at Birkbeck College (University


of London) 3. His phenomenological analysis centres on the holistic dimension
of consciousness.
Conscious perceptions are characterised by the unity between the observer-
subject and the object observed. By experiencing his own body the conscious
subject perceives his own psychocorporal unity. He perceives a single organic
whole not unconnected parts of his body. The fourth phenomenological feature
of this article explores how the conscious subject perceives his body as a non-
located sum of sensations, which are synthesised holistically in self-perception.
Perception of self entails the creation of a psychic identity or self-consciousness,
which opens out to the outer world. Movement through our environment is not
perceived as being remote controlled, but as an organic identity that moves
through the environment in a relatively autonomous way.
In line with Penrose, as self-perception is consolidated, the individual perceives
his body with greater precision and is capable of better directing his will through
the environment; thereby reaffirming himself as a conscious individual and the
possibility of anticipating in the mind actions that might occur later emerges.
The fifth phenomenological feature involves the free action of the conscious
individual, capable of anticipating future actions, thinking them over and taking
the decision at will. The sixth and seventh phenomenological features concern
the conscious subjects holistic experience of space and time. Holistic experience
of space is a highly significant remote perception, which consolidates the
indeterminism of the conscious individual and the freedom of his operations
referred to above in the fifth phenomenological feature. The conscious individual,
who perceives the space holistically, is predisposed to accent his temporal
sensibility. He is a free individual, capable of performing indeterminate actions
to break the shackles of a conditioned present and free himself to the possibility
of distinguishing the past from the future, in a phenomenological present in which
it is possible to anticipate events. Ordinary, spatial and temporal perceptions are
all always mediated by the subjects consciousness. However, we acknowledge
the existence of perceptions independent of the epistemological mediation of the
subject; these are direct perceptions: what Penrose calls intuition and Bohm refers
to as insight, and these make up the eighth phenomenological attribute of
consciousness.
The last five characteristics of phenomenological consciousness describe the
functional aspects of consciousness. Bohm places special emphasis on the eighth,
which he refers to as insight: the holistic experience of reality in which the
conscious individual passively receives its true meaning. Man is the psychic
individual most predisposed to experience direct perception or insight, thereby
becoming a fully cogniscent being, open to knowledge of reality. Just as
consciousness knows mediate reality as a psychobiophysical structural unit
similar to the environment, the mind opens directly to an understanding of the

3
Cf. D. BOHM, The Undivided Universe (London, Routledge, 1993).

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absolute in its transcendent dimension. This higher level of consciousness,


cognitive conscious psychism, is an extension of the material biophysical body
that becomes conscious of the global meaning of totality and experiences the
coherence and internal unity of the cosmos. Subject and object are bound together
in an eternal moment bestowing order, clarity and full openness on the mind.
In Bohms terms the individuals mind (conscious, free and observant) is bound
with the cosmic mind thus conferring meaning and freedom on the whole.
Despite the fact that such phenomenological experiences of harmony and unity
are less everyday than other simpler conscious perceptions, they are still
psychological verifications ascribed to several different effects, including mystical,
psychopathological, psychotropic effects. Nonetheless, they are experiences lived
by the conscious psychic subject, which must be explained scientifically.

1.3. The structural and functional unit of consciousness

The first three phenomenological aspects of consciousness that describe the


psychobiophysical morphological characteristics of the conscious being
correspond to the most primitive states of natural evolution. Living beings as
simple an amoeba possess a psychobiophysical structuring that is essential to
enable it to adjust its responses to environmental stimuli. As the configuration
of the nervous system advances, more intense levels of consciousness are displayed,
characterised by a holistic perception of the environment, which enhances the
survival of the individual enabling it to distance itself from the stimulus-response
adjustments of lower animals. For instance a dog possesses a psychobiophysical
architecture that is sufficiently developed to enable it to take decisions at will,
which are difficult to explain within a strictly behaviourist framework. Here we
are referring to the five functional aspects of consciousness. In man the
sophisticated psychobiophysical structures widely unfold their psychic potential
and predispose the conscious subject to seeing reality fully: both physically and
cognitively. Notwithstanding, consciousness is verified as a phenomenon of the
material reality that activates in one way or another its functional potential:
physical and psychic. In sum, the phenomenon of consciousness manifests itself
as a structural and functional unit the goal of which is to perceive reality (physically
and psychically), in other words, as the emergent product of psychobiophysical
cooperation aiming at full understanding of the whole.

2. THE PHYSICAL PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Phenomenologically speaking, consciousness is the emergent product of a


psychobiophysical process in matter. The conscious psychic subject has greater
capacity to perceive space holistically, foresee events and choose freely. The
harmony between its psychism and the physical world is so great that its perceives
intuitions that are key to survival. All these psychophysical relations comprise

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722 M. BJAR, PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE

the psychic explicandum to be explained by science. Driven by the set of


psychophysical phenomena of consciousness, physics needs to investigate
heuristic proposals that explain conscious psychism. Bohm and Penrose have
worked on such proposals based on analysis of the principal physics theories.
Each author has focused on an internal problem in physics to initiate
propedeutically speculative proposals that explain consciousness physically, that
is, an explicans that renders the phenomenology of the mind understandable in
a scientific framework. In both cases the research concludes that there is
something in physical theory per se that needs and, in turn, is projected towards
the phenomenon of the mind.

2.1. The psychic-physical problem according to Roger Penrose

Penroses formal approach to the problem of consciousness can be understood


based on the phenomenological description he provides, centring on indeterminist
aspects of the way in which it functions. Conscious thought, particularly non-
analytical mathematical reasoning, reveals behaviour by the consciousness that
it is difficult to understand from a strictly determinist position. In relation to the
phenomenological issue of the non-computability of consciousness, Penrose poses
the internal problems of physics, calling into question the completeness of the
science. He stresses the impossibility of constructing a complete physics theory
of the physical universe unless elements that explain conscious psychism are
included. He highlights three internal problems in physics: i) the temporal symmetry
of physical theories vs. the asymmetric perception of phenomenological time,
ii) the absence of a formal explanation of the classical-quantum transition vs. the
information that the conscious observer acquires after a measurement of the
quantum system, iii) General Relativity vs. Quantum Mechanics and its relation
with consciousness as a phenomenon between the macrocosm and the microcosm.
Penroses brilliant idea lies in disclosing that the central problem of physics coincides
fully with the problem of consciousness and, as a corollary, an explanation of
consciousness requires a complete physical theory that integrates non-computable
processes. We analyse below each of the psychophysical problems reviewed.
i) Temporal symmetry vs. asymmetric perception. The passing of time is a
profoundly human conscious experience. Man perceives the temporal flow from
past to future: he perceives how he grows older, he recalls past events and projects
future events etc. In sum, he orders his life according to a temporal arrow that
differentiates asymmetrically the inaccessible past from a future that he cannot
remember. This phenomenological experience of time is not covered by the
physical theory of time, namely, Relativity.
Since 1905 when Einstein presented the relativity of time measurements by
observers in relative movement, nobody has managed to explain the physics of
time better. The theory of Relativity, the prevalent theory of time, is a physical-
geometric construction that maintains a causal relation between events, without
differentiating the past from the future. Relativity determines the evolution of

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a system based on environmental conditions. Akin to all local theory, its equations
pre-dict the future evolution of the Universe and retro-dict the past based on
explicit environmental conditions. No distinction is drawn between the past and
the future because there is no temporal flow. Everything is in a vast space of
phases that describes every possible physical condition of matter, that is, the
combination of all physical events. This phase space is a structure that lacks
dynamism. It does not grow or alter. It is always the same, without a temporal
arrow. So, how can consciousness of time be explained in a geometric structure
without temporal flow? Consciousness requires a physical support for the
asymmetric experience of time.
ii) Classical-quantum transition and the conscious observer. Alongside
Relativity, the Quantum Field Theory is one of the mainstays of modern physics.
Relativity is the theory of time and gravity whereas Quantum Theory describes
the other physical interactions that govern the microcosm: electromagnetism,
strong and weak nuclear force. Despite the descriptive force of these two theories
they are incompatible and there appears to be no way of uniting them. At present,
no theory of gravity exists that integrates quantum effects: gravity and quantum
theories are still irreconcilable. This is a lacuna on the border between classical
gravity and quantum theories; that is to say, no quantum gravity theory has been
developed yet to explain how the classical-quantum transition occurs between
the indetermination of quantum field systems and classical realization of ordinary
conscious experience.
In phenomenological terms, consciousness is manifest in living beings with
an appropriate psychism, which are part of the physical world halfway up the
scale between the quantum microcosm and macrocosm dominated by gravitatory
interaction. Psychic experience is found in animals with an evolved nervous
system governed by a brain, capable of perceiving the physical pressure of the
environment and of producing mental images in psychophysical correspondence.
This psychophysical connectivity is displayed in the correlations between psychic
states and physical states. Psychic conditions have repercussions on the
biophysical conditions, a state of stress causes stomach pains, and vice versa,
tooth ache conditions the state of mind. This phenomenological evidence leads
to the existence of interdependency between psychic and physical elements.
The study of the mind should not be separated from the study of physics. The
problem of the mind involves explaining why physics does not explain the mental
reality if it is manifested as an intrinsic property of the physical world. Determinist
laws of Classical Mechanics describe the physical regime of ordinary experience.
Newtonian mechanics, which is so powerful in determining the future behaviour
of gravitatory systems, has not borne fruit in its attempt to solve the problem of
the mind. Its determinist epistemology collides headlong with the phenomenological
indeterminism characteristic of conscious experience. As there is psychophysical
evidence, neither classical nor quantum deterministic physics, cannot reach a
scientific resolution of the problem so Penrose adopts a heuristic view that permits
a new approach. The indetermination of the classical-quantum transition, the

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724 M. BJAR, PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE

source of much discussion in quantum physics, could be of interest when it comes


to understanding how the consciousness emerges from reality after the process
of information analysis of the environment through the senses. If this is not the
case, what alternatives do we have? Consciousness requires us to reconcile the
indeterminism experienced by the psychic subject and the epistemological
determinism of physical theories.
iii) Microcosm, macrocosm and the phenomenon of consciousness. The
human mind is capable of understanding the space-time structure, the foundation
of all material reality, of representing macroscopic physical objects (planets,
galaxies, the Cosmos etc.) and understanding the smallest structures of the
microcosm (electrons, neutrinos, quarks etc.). Physics explains both the large-
scale dynamics of the Universe (General Relativity) and the interactions between
basic particles (Quantum Field Theory), supported by a high level of experimental
evidence. Existing physical models are excellent at describing both macroscopic
and microscopic states but we lack a convincing physical explanation for the
psychic process that produces them in the human mind.
Man is halfway between the microcosm and the macrocosm. In phenome-
nological terms, consciousness is manifested in the psychic activity of biological
nervous systems coordinated by the brain. There is no evidence of conscious
beings without this psychobiophysical structure. The body does not appear to
be a mere recipient capable of storing a psychic entity like the soul as described
by the dualist school of thought. Nor can it be broken down into functional,
simple components without this being to the detriment of its richness and organic
unity. In contrast, experience reveals a unitary mind-body organism with
interrelated physical and psychic faculties. The psychic conditions of the
individual have an impact on his biophysical states (somatization) and vice versa:
toothache conditions state of mind. This phenomenological evidence leads to
the existence of interdependence between psychic and physical faculties.
Consciousness emerges from the physical world. Therefore rather than separate
the study of the mind from the study of physics, it should be integrated in the
scientific explicandum.
Consciousness is the borderline between the microcosm and the macrocosm.
The conscious being is a material psychic subject who lives in a natural
environment halfway between the cosmic and the microscopic. On a large scale,
the macroscopic universe appears to be dominated by collective, regular and
predictable dynamics. In contrast, on a small scale, the microscopic universe is
also dominated by collective dynamics, albeit less regular and more unpredictable.
The conscious subject lives on the border. As a corollary we can see consciousness
as a specific reality of a sector of nature in which the properties of the micro
and macrocosms play an important role.
Indeed Penrose has raised these ideas in his book The Large, The Small and
the Human Mind. The intense connectivity between psychic and the physical
faculties, combined with the absence of a physical theory to describe the universe
in a unified manner, lead Penrose to suspect that the problem of the mind (a

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phenomenon halfway between large and small elements) and the problem of
physics (a science with two irreconcilable pillars) are simply part of the same
basic problem: the physical explanation of the mind on the threshold of the
micro and the macrocosm. Penrose starts the aforementioned study with the
hope of resolving the psychophysical problem from a complete theory of gravity
that unitarily explains the universe: macroscopic or microscopic, physical or
psychic. This theory would necessarily solve both problems. The difficulties in
developing quantum gravity, a physical theory with temporal asymmetry or a
physical explanation of the mind halfway between the large and the small, are
inherent in approaching the same basic problem sectorially. The problems of
physics and the problem of the mind constitute the same basic question, requiring
advances in physics and neuroscience in order for them to achieve fruitful
qualitative development.

2.2. The psychic-physical problem according to David Bohm

In broad terms David Bohm agrees with the psychophysical problems posed
by Penrose in relation to the problem of consciousness: temporal experience,
conscious perception and the consciousness as a phenomenon on the threshold
of the macroscopic and the microscopic. While Penrose lays the stress on the
formal problems of physics in contrast to the phenomenon of the conscious, Bohm
concentrates on the underlying physical/metaphysical questions 4. Bohm is also
fully aware of the confrontation between Relativity and Quantum theory in the
spaces where their application as experimental physical theories is put under
strain. He highlights the head-on collision between relativist theory, which
represents a continuous, local and causal space-time order and quantum theory,
which establishes a discontinuous, non-local threshold without a causal explanation.
While Relativity establishes a leapless space-time fabric in which each object is
influenced exclusively by causes that act locally as disturbance at below the speed
of light speeds, Quantum Theory lacks a well-defined substrate that allows for the
existence of quantum leaps and remote instantaneous interactions that break with
the relativist localness. This purely physical problem is translated into a
psychophysical problem linking technical issues of physics with the psychic
experience of the conscious subject. The following psychophysical problem can
be traced in the works of Bohm 5.
i) Conscious perception and relativist space-time. The sum total of
perceptions of reality does not lead to the existence of blocks of matter, which
are individually separated and independent; rather to a profound reality that is
unique and continuous, in which a variety of individual objects emerge, ordered
in their totality. In his book The Special Theory of Relativity 6, Bohm includes an

4
Cf. D. BOHM, Wholeness and the Implicate Order (London, Routledge, 1980).
5
Cf. L. NICHOL (ed.), The Essential David Bohm (London, Routledge, 2002).
6
Cf. D. BOHM, The Special Theory of Relativity (London, Routledge, 1965).

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726 M. BJAR, PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE

appendix on physics and perception highlighting some of the conclusions of one


of the greatest psychologists of the twentieth century, Jean Piaget, drawn from
his studies on child psychology. Piaget contends that the structure of the knowledge
of a child differs greatly from the outcome of his later development in adult life.
An infant experiences and perceives in a virtually undifferentiated whole. Initially
the child simply possesses a series of reflexes that enable him to distinguish certain
smells, movements and pleasurable objects, which are essential to his survival.
Gradually the infant learns to follow objects with his eyes and recognise the
invariant shape thereof during movement. Through movement of objects and
handling of objects he discovers the basic properties of space in which each body
occupies a place, which can be modified as a result of movements in different
directions. Finally, the child is capable of representing the absent object by evoking
an image in his memory.
As he reaches maturity, man interprets his actions based on the mental
suppositions of his childhood, consolidated through his experience over time and
constantly corroborated intersubjectively through language, experience and
concepts. The adult has empowered to such an extent a particular way of perceiving
the physical world that he interprets it quickly according to these mental reflexes
without intelligence intervening. Objects from the physical world are represented
according to the individual perspective and knowledge of the observer. In general,
objects are ordered following a three-dimensional Euclidean geometry. Einsteins
theory generalizes Newtonian space-time concepts and therefore limits the
supposed universality of the system of evident perceptions in accordance with
the three dimensional Euclidean geometry of space adopted by Newton. Relativist
space-time geometry differs substantially from the standard geometry of perception
in which the objects of reality are ordered in Euclidean way.
Furthermore, there is a difference between the simultaneous observer-
observable nature of perception and the relativist laws of space-time. When we
look at the sky on a starry night we do no see a unique present of stars simultaneous
to the observer. The image perceived corresponds to the star of the observers
past which generated particles of light received through the retina in future time
for the star. The sensation of absolutely universal present of the observer is
contrary to the relativist suppositions on simultaneity. This simultaneity is the
consequence of the imperceptible time that light takes in communicating two
regions of ordinary life. The validity of the common sense of the experience of
absolute space and time is the consequence of the negligible time light takes
during an everyday process. The conscious idea of a singular temporal order that
permits us to order events in time in absolute terms and generate concepts of
past, present and future can only emerge under this physical low-speed regime
where life occurs. As soon as one leaves this domain of validity empirical security
disappears.
ii) The experience of free will and physical determinism. A strictly determinist
universe is far from compatible with the idea of free will perceived by conscious
beings. The mechanicist determinism of classical physics, either in its microscopic-

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M. BJAR, PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE 727

individual or macroscopic-statistical version, is a long way from being able to


explain phenomenological characteristics of consciousness such as intuition, the
ethical dimension or free will. The psychic experience of control over the body,
of governing it at will through the environment, and the sensation of being able
to decide by taking part in the natural dynamics of physical phenomena, contrasts
with the determinism prevalent in physical theories. The unitary evolution of a
quantum state and the dynamics of a relativist event are both strongly conditioned
by laws that predict in a determinant way a state or future event based on the
previous environmental conditions.
Bohm reviews the evolution of Newtons mechanics by centring on the problem
of determinism 7. Departing from the most deterministic Newtonian mechanics
proposed by Newton, Laplace and DAlambert, Bohm shows how in an
evolutionary sense physical theories do not concern themselves with determining
the conditions of speed and the position of the systems of many bodies, and
focus instead on statistical questions of wholeness, which suffice to describe
thermodynamic phenomena accurately. We refer to nineteenth century Statistical
Mechanics, in which determining the microscopic features was seen as critical
while ensuring that the rigour or accuracy of the statistic predictions was
maintained. The notion of statistical fluctuation did not sit well in a classical
epistemological framework, as there was not a corresponding objective material
entity. However, said thermodynamic fluctuations do exist in other physical
contexts and can be predicted statistically with a high level of experimental
accuracy. If this is so, as experiments have proven, it shows that the observable
macroscopic physical properties emerge from the action of the totality of the
physical constituents, regardless of the exact position and speed of each individual
particle in the system. The global dynamics are therefore more important than
individual ones. And hence the physical observables are products emergent from
an interaction of the whole in which the importance of the dominion of the
strictly corpuscular is diluted.
The canonical epistemology of quantum theory invalidates any reference to
causal laws that might predict well-determined results. Heisenbergs Principle
of Indetermination blocks the classical dream of being able to predict the future
of a physical system based its environmental conditions. It is not possible to
measure simultaneously with complete accuracy the position and speed of its
constituents. As a result it is necessary to disregard the classical concept of
trajectory in favour of the idea of quantum leaps. A quantum leap, the realization
of a state of quantum indetermination over a classical state, creates an opening
in physical indeterminism, which is more compatible with the psychic sensation
of freedom.
Physical indeterminism and the sensation of freedom depended on the
quantum fluctuations that realize classical states from quantum dynamism. The
epistemology of the Copenhagen School eschewed an interpretation of the causes

7
Cf. D. BOHM, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (London, Routledge, 1957).

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728 M. BJAR, PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE

of quantum indeterminism, maintaining an instrumental concept of the quantum


leap. It was Bohm, in line with De Broglies proposals 8, that put forward a causal,
physical-metaphysical explanation of the dynamic activity of the quantum void.
Both propose that matter evolves by virtue of its own energy driven by active
information transmitted via a quantum pilot wave. The matter has the capacity
to move (energy), controlled by means of potential energy which informs it how
it should activate itself. His 1952 interpretation 9 on the hidden variables that
regulate these processes mistakenly categorised Bohm as a determinist of the
Einstein school. Bohm, who accepts the validity of the Uncertainty Principle,
states that the result of an individual physical process is unpredictable in line
with Bohr and the positivists, but he argues that a (physical-metaphysical)
causal explanation of the processes that produce the classical realization of a
quantum system is plausible.
Bohm assumes the existence of subquantum variables that cause quantum
disturbance. Rather than coming from pure physics this hypothesis serves as
causal-ontological complement from which to gain a better understanding of
quantum phenomena. In this sense, the Heisenberg Principle is considered the
expression of the minimal degree of indetermination that is accessible in the
quantum order, but this level could be reduced (not eliminated) in a non-manifest
subquantum order, in other words, a metaphysical one. Bohm seeks to analyse
which aspects this subquantum dimension should possess in order to explain
the characteristics of the quantum world. This ontological concept is coherent
with the sensation of free will, as is the proposal of pure quantum fluctuations.
Notwithstanding Bohms idea on active information that directs the matter that
floats in a quantum chaos at will seems much more plausible as regards
accounting for freedom of choice.
iii) Stability of conscious experience and dynamism of the quantum content.
The Planck scale, in which quantum and relativist laws are expected to fail,
presupposes the existence of a single flowing motion in which quantum
disturbance is so high that it is impossible to conceive Einsteins gentle space
continuum. Instead it suggests that a new quantum space-time order would
emerge with a highly intensive flowing activity that would lead to the constant
formation and destruction of microstructures. This quantum space-time would
behaviour as a swarm of matter where space-time twists and turns in angular
shapes that in fold in on one another.
In phenomenological terms, states of consciousness appear as a holistic
experience. Conscious perception is not seen as an active point enclosed in the
brain but as the outcome of the organic coordination of the corporal whole. The
stability of consciousness in particular, which offers a stable, coherent and

8
Cf. P. R. HOLLAND, The quantum theory of motion: an account of the Broglie-Bohm causal
interpretation of quantum mechanics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993).
9
Cf. D. BOHM, A suggested interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of hidden
variables, Physical Review, 85 (1952), 166-180.

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M. BJAR, PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE 729

unitary image of reality, and of the observable physical world in general, contrast
sharply with the dynamic nature of the energetic quantum content as described
in physics. How does classical stability emerge from such a chaotic quantum
order? How is the stability of the conscious perception possible in underlying
quantum dynamism?
This question led Bohm to explore in greater depth the study of the physical/
metaphysical properties of subquantum ontology. According to Bohm the essential
foundation of nature is its unceasing activity. Every motion and everything is
created through motion: matter, life and psychism (sensations, perceptions,
thoughts etc.). Nothing of a material nature can exist outside this creative activity
called holomovement: the movement of the whole. As a consequence, life and
psychism are not explained through abstractions of the whole. The multiple explicit
manifestations of matter simply represent the different outcomes of unfolding a
single implicate order that is infinitely connected. In Bohms holistic framework,
the implicate order, which is essentially dynamic, is a metaphysical substratum
that enables us to explain coherently the psychophysical unity based on the
movement of the whole. The physical world remains in direct relation with the
movement of the underlying universal order. Physical objects are structures arising
in the implicate order, which are dissolved again in the same. In this holistic
framework, things are merely abstractions of an indivisible whole; the essence of
which is movement. If consciousness emerges from this whole as the total sum of
physical phenomena, then it must draw on the quantum ontology that sustains
reality and submit itself to processes of classical realization that stabilise
perceptions, in accordance with the stability of the macroscopic physical order.

2.3. Ontological and formal perspectives of the psychophysical problem

Up to this point we have emphasized the psychophysical, phenomenological


and formal correspondences between consciousness and the physical world.
Consciousness appears as a phenomenon affected by physical determining
factors, moreover, the internal problem of the unity and coherence of modern
physics reflects in many ways the physical problem of consciousness. For this
reason authors such as Penrose have sought to link the questions surrounding
physics and psychism in a single psychophysical problem of consciousness by
analysing the formal aspects of the incompatibilities of physics with the formal
characteristics of the phenomenon of consciousness. In pursuit of this goal,
Penrose seeks a complete theory of quantum gravity that necessarily integrates
the physical mechanisms of consciousness in order to be able to formulate a
unitary and coherent image of the physical and psychic universe as a whole. The
implementation of quantum rudiments in the biophysical being that produces
states of consciousness, represents an intellectual enterprise that intrinsically
links psychophysical matter and quantum gravity with the Big Bang. To some
extent, Penroses worldview anticipates the material psychophysical unity that
Bohm would explore in greater depth, at the risk of crossing from one side to
the other of the diffuse physical-metaphysical border.

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730 M. BJAR, PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE

In his in-depth exploration of the problem of consciousness, Bohm stresses


fully the ontological nature of matter in order to be able to understand
psychobiophysical reality. In Bohms thinking, the problem of consciousness
can be summed up to a large extent as a search for the causes that activate
physically and psychically the psychophysical potential energy of matter. The
underlying ontology is an incessant energetic activity with quantum properties,
as endorsed by fundamental physical results and theories. This underlying
metaphysical order is called the implicate order (enfolded), in contrast to the
total sum of physical phenomena that constitutes the explicate order (unfolded).
Bohm aims to explain the interrelation between the physical and psychic
phenomena of the explicate order, based on the ontological mind-matter unity
of the implicate order. The unfolding of this enfolded psychophysical wholeness
is produced globally in time to the holistic movement or holomovement as Bohm
calls it. Seeking to explain the causes of physical and psychic phenomena, as
well as their mutual psychophysical relationship, is an intellectual endeavour
that intrudes on metaphysical ground, armed with scientific data and theories.
This ontological venture, of a clearly holistic nature, complements the formal
proposal made by Penrose in order to understand the phenomenon of
consciousness in relation to the physical properties of material nature.

3. PHYSICAL EXPLANATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Given the phenomenologies of Bohm and Penroses consciousness, as well as


their respective studies of the internal problem of physics related to consciousness,
in this section we proceed to explain their respective explanatory models. Penrose
drew up his model in collaboration with the American anaestheisist Stuart
Hameroff 10. It involves the implementation of physical concepts in biological and
neurological systems that in coordination could explain consciousness as the
product of special psychobiophysical architecture 11. We will refer to this as the
Penrose-Hameroff model. In addition, we will outline the physical/metaphysical
contributions made by Bohm. These are intuitive ideas, of a marked holistic nature,
which shed light on the common nature of physical and psychic processes. Although
Bohm did not construct as detailed an explicit model as Penroses, his ideas are
particularly interesting and complementary to those of Penrose-Hameroff. Hence
we end by highlighting some of the key complementary ideas in a joint model
that it is better equipped to comprehend the total sum of phenomenological
characteristics of consciousness, namely the Bohm-Penrose-Hameroff (BPH)
model. The BPH model is a heuristic interpretation of consciousness, which draws

10
Cf. S. R. HAMEROFF and R. PENROSE, Orchestrated Reduction of Quantum Coherence
in Brain Microtubules: A Model for Consciousness, in S. R. HAMEROFF, A. W. KASNIAK and A. C.
SCOTT (eds.), Toward a science of consciousness I, 507-542, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1996.
11
S. R. HAMEROFF, Ultimate Computing. Biomolecular Consciousness and NanoTechnology,
Tucson, Personal edition, 2003.

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M. BJAR, PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE 731

on the observations and physical theories in Bohm and Penrose-Hameroffs


contributions and brings us closer to reaching an understanding of the mysterious
nature of psychophysical matter.

3.1. The Penrose-Hameroff model

From a mathematical point of view, Penroses motivation behind constructing


a physical-mathematical model of consciousness stems from the existence of non-
computable mathematical structures, which could serve as a formal structure to
explain the non-computational behaviour of the mind. His model is closely related
to the quantum space-time geometry based on a fundamental physical-
mathematical postulate, that is, the nullity of the Weyl tensor in the Big Bang.
The peculiar geometry of the Big Bang, the nullity of the Weyl tensor, permits us
to link the theory that describes space-time dynamics (General Relativity) with
the Second Law of Thermodynamics and explain both the high level of order of
the primitive physical universe and its temporally asymmetric nature.
From the Big Bang to the present day all physical processes have been evolving
towards more disordered states, thus enabling us to define a temporal arrow
that distinguishes objectively between today and yesterday. Penrose relates this
temporal asymmetry of physical evolution with an aspect of quantum theory
that lacks physical foundation: the temporally asymmetric reality of the non-
unitary reduction of the quantum state. The irreversible transition of the quantum
regime to the classical one involves a decrease in the entropy or disorder of the
physical system, caused by a sufficiently intense fluctuation in space-time
geometry. This gravitatory disturbance leads to an increase in the entropy that
offsets the decrease produced in the quantum-classical transition and generates
a global increase of the total entropy of the system, in accordance with the Second
Law. Thus, Penrose constructs a quantum-gravity theory of a thermodynamic
nature, which explains objectively the reduction of the quantum state as a physical
distinction of before and after. In sum, it provides a physical explanation of the
conscious temporality of physical events, based on a model depending on non-
computable quantum/gravitatory fluctuations.
Penrose aims to explain consciousness as the evolutionary outcome of the
physical geometry prior to the physical universe. After verifying the total sum
of phenomenological characteristics of consciousness, belonging to the structural
block, he seeks biophysical structures capable of producing coherent quantum
states. He enters the new field of quantum neurology in which formal elements
are integrated to provide a better explanation of the functional indeterminism
of consciousness. Departing from a Frhlichs study of states of quantum
coherence and particularly the work by Hameroff 12 on the analysis of neuronal
microtubules and associated proteins (MAPs), Penrose develops a neurological
quantum model of consciousness.

12
Cf. J. TUSZYNSKI (ed.), The emerging physics of consciousness (Springer-Verlag, Berlin,
Heildelberg, 2006).

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732 M. BJAR, PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE

Microtubules are self-assembling hollow crystalline cylinders, 25 nanometers


in diameter on the outside and 14 nanometers on the inside, found in the
cytoplasm of nearly all animal and vegetable cells. Each microtubule is a polymer
of globular proteins known as tubulins, 8 nanometers long and four nanometers
wide and deep. Each tubulin has two conformational states, being able to jump
from one state to another with ATP energy. Microtubules are hollow cylindrical
structures well isolated from the noisy thermal environment of the brain. The
structure, dimensions and sophisticated isolation of the microtubules make
them the principle biological element of the Penrose-Hameroff model of
consciousness. These characteristics permit the formation of collective quantum
states among the tubulins. During the pre-conscious state, the quantum
connection of the tubulins permits a quantum processing of sensorial
information, governed by unitary laws of Quantum Mechanics. This stage is
dominated by macroscopic quantum coherence phenomena that connect the
microtubule tubulins, or even microtubules, cytoskeletons or different regions
of the brain. During this pre-conscious phase the MAPs (microtubule-associated
proteins that bind their internal action with the cellular environment) locate
themselves in strategic position so as not to interrupt the coherent quantum
dynamics of the processing. Each MAP will occupy a node of the wave function
until objective quantum reduction occurs, caused by gravitatory disturbance
of these proteins.
The functional indeterminism of consciousness is explained based on the
movement of the MAPs which, when displaced from the wave function nodes,
disturb the system in a gravitatory sense inducing a quick transition of decoherence
in the microtubules, until the realization of the conscious classical state. Out of
all the possible quantum biophysical states during the processing phase, the
psychobiophysical system becomes the only conscious classical state, which
coincides with the start of a new quantum processing of information, followed
by a different conscious state. The reduction process of the state of quantum
superposition of the tubulins that produces the conscious state is directly related
to the non-local nature of the energy in General Relativity. The gravitatory energy
disturbance that initiates the collapse of quantum processing in a conscious state
after the MAPs move is not localised; it is phenomenon that, like a gravitatory
wave, that is delocalised throughout space favouring the appearance of non-local
interactions. This gravitatory distance breaks the temporal physical symmetry;
it produces an objective reduction in the quantum state and generates a temporal
arrow related to entropy and the information that can be obtained from a system,
mirroring what must have happened in the process of formation and creation of
physical structures after the Big Bang 13.
In synthesis, according to the Penrose-Hameroff model, consciousness is the
biophysical product of quantum cooperation between microtubules, which
connect distinct regions of the brain in a quantum way. The isolation of the

13
Cf. R. PENROSE, Gravity and state vector reduction, in R. PENROSE and C. J. ISHAM (eds.),
Quantum Concepts in Space and Time, New York, Oxford University Press.

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microtubules means that the physical information from the environment can
be processed until the realization of a neuronal engram correlated with
phenomenological psychic experience. This quantum-classical transition between
the preconscious and conscious state is mediated by the MAPs, which originate
an objective reduction orchestrated from gravitational disturbance. The brain
therefore operates in a quantum and unconscious way most of the time until
the MAPs induce a process of decoherence when quantum uncertainty has been
resolved. Then the brain can produce a psychic image of the reality it perceives
physically.

3.2. Bohms physical/metaphysical proposals

Interest in Bohms interpretation of the phenomenon of consciousness is


growing as more and more scholars become aware of the ontological problem
between space-time relativist physics and quantum physics. The physical
phenomena of quantum coherence and non-local action provide such unity to
the physical universe that they spurred Bohm in his search for a metaphysical
ontology to explain the surprising coherence of the physical order, as well as to
generalise the laws proposed by the physics in favour of a single holistic
physical/metaphysical connection. His work has focused on searching for an
ontological structure that causes psychophysical phenomena stemming from a
coordinated global movement: the holomovement that generates an unfolded
phenomenical order. In this holistic ontological structure, mind and matter form
an indivisible part of a single metaphysical reality of implicate orders with various
degrees of consciousness.
Bohm explains consciousness as another intrinsic property of this ontological
content that shows its psychophysical potential energy by unfolding in the
holomovement 14. Consciousness cannot be separated from the movement of
matter. It is another element of the universal dynamics of mind-matter. Mind-
matter of the psychophysical universe has been interlinked with the temporal
dimension of the explicate order, but its ontological nature is essentially
atemporal. Beyond the ordinary perception caused by the energy of the explicate
order, the psychic-material subject can transcend the temporality of the world
and become conscious of the universal wholeness after experiencing a direct
perception or insight caused by the action of the cosmic mind on psychism. The
psychic material subject is therefore open to envisaging the integral unity of
existence and discovering its real psychic identity in the transition of the
determinist thought mode to the intuitive consciousness mode.
Bohm introduces the concepts of super-potential energy and quantum
potential energy as physical-metaphysical links that concentrate energy to
synthesize particles from the implicate energy content and guide them thereby

14
Cf. M. BJAR, Conciencia, creatividad y libertad: sobre la naturaleza creativa libre de
la conciencia en la correspondencia entre David Bohm y Charles Biederman, Pensamiento
(in press).

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734 M. BJAR, PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE

permitting their association in macroparticles. Each particle is therefore the


explicate outcome of the joint action on a universal content of energy of quantum
potential energies. The quantum super-potential energy operates on the cosmic
sea of energy to generate a multidimensional implicate order that unfolds to
form a temporal phenomenical order of particles with three dimensions (strictly
spatial). The quantum potential energys action on these synthesised particles
from the implicate order explains the oscillating, field and potentially unitary
nature of the physical order: waves, fields, macro particles etc.
Consciousness is the emergent product after the quantum binding between
multiple neurones from different parts of the brain. The conscious experience
is a qualitatively novel phenomenon that emerges when the brain operates
holistically as if it were a single macro neuron 15. In this special quantum state
the brain is governed by the quantum potential energy, which maintains quantum
coherence. In Bohms terms the brain would behave like the implicate order:
dynamic, coherent and unitary. In this way, the brain could be affected by the
implicate cosmic order and would experience (beyond space-time) the action of
the cosmic mind, namely, insight. The quantum super-potential energy would
serve to undo the quantum coherence of the brain, making it operate classically
and producing the state of consciousness. In synthesis, Bohms model is best
described as metaphysics of the physical nature of consciousness which concerns
itself with applying the ontology of the cosmos to the individual mind. In our
view, these holistic intuitions are more fruitful in collaboration with the
biophysical structures of the Penrose-Hameroff model, constituting the so-called
Bohm-Penrose-Hameroff (BPH) model.

3.3. The Bohm-Penrose-Hameroff model

The biophysical explanation of consciousness in the Penrose-Hameroff model


is based on the coherence wave in the microtubules tubulins. This model can
be enriched by the physical/metaphysical ontology of Bohm, better suited to
explaining the holistic functional aspects of consciousness.
If the coherence wave in the microtubules is represented as a pair of
coordinated axes, the x-axis represents time and the y-axis the level of internal
quantum coherence or Bohms quantum potential energy. At any given time,
say zero time, the tubulins are in a classical state forming individual entities: a
classical system of multiple tubulins in classical interaction described by null
quantum potential energy. As time passes, a quantum interaction begins to take
place, supported by psychism in the implicate order, defined by a finite value of
the quantum potential energy. In a few tenths of a second, the quantum potential
energy has intensified to such an extent that the physical states of the tubulins
begin to acquire quantum properties, in other words, coherence superposition
states emerge.

15
Cf. D. BOHM and B. J. HILEY, The undivided universe (London, Routledge, 1993).

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As these individual quantum states are consolidated, the growing intensity


of the quantum potential energy leads to the interlinking of the tubulins quantum
states, which lose their identity to become a coherent microsystem capable of
processing in a quantum way the physical information gathered by the senses.
In less than half a second, the psychism reaches the highest degree of coherence
accessible biophysically and saturates: quantum potential energy is maintained
more or less constant. In this phase, psychism resembles the implicate order. It
is a mind-matter system with maximum internal coherence, limited by the
constraints of the biophysical matter itself. In other words, the quantum potential
energy saturates at a finite limit because the matter it is composed of is in
degenerate state in comparison to primordial matter, unaffected by entropy,
from the Big Bang. Thus the holistic intuitions of Bohm and Penroses geometric
proposals are connected in the Big Bang.
Unless another action mediates, the system would maintain its internal
coherence until the thermal chaos of the environment causes quantum
decoherence. Hence the chance ordinary quantum reduction of the phenomena
belonging to the physical world would occur. The action of the super quantum
potential energy prevents this thermal reduction and permits the orchestrated
gravitatory reduction. As the levels of quantum potential energy are saturated
in the psychobiophysical system, the super-quantum potential energy regulates
the displacement of the MAPs prior to the formation of the conscious state. The
active information from the super-quantum potential energy causes the MAPs
to move, resulting from the energy from the biophysical system, towards positions
that modify the internal gravitatory energy. The resulting increase of gravitatory
energy, above the elemental quantum of gravity, initiates the induced decoherence
phase that concludes with the formation of the conscious state. As a consequence,
psychism (Bohms individual mind) is connected to the temporal reality of a
world subject to constant change thus favouring a generalised increase of entropy.
The information produced by the psychic subject on perceiving consciously a
specific external reality, from the wide variety of virtual quantum realities that
exist during the quantum process of sensorial information, represents a decrease
in the entropy, offset by the increase in the gravitatory entropy in the quantum-
gravitatory collapse orchestrated by the MAPs. This serves to explain the temporal
experience of the psychic subject, which distinguishes the memory of the past
from the unpredictable nature of the future.
The psychic changes caused in the brain by these perceptions during a more
or less atemporal phase need temporal consciousness in order to be consolidated
as conscious experiences that are capable of modifying conduct or action.
Conscious experience, as we observe it, requires psychism to remain interlinked
with time. The temporal connection of the psyche reproduces the large-scale
primordial binding of the explained cosmic order, after the development of a
disturbance in the implicate order, consolidated by the super-quantum potential
energy. The functioning of psychism, constituted over time in an evolutionary
way, is regulated by the same guidelines that have existed since the Big Bang.

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736 M. BJAR, PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE

Just as the explained order of the psychophysical phenomena reached relative


independence from the implicate orders, consciousness needs to be partly
disconnected from the coherent integrity of underlying orders. The action of the
super-quantum potential energy is essential to cut short the coherent processing
of the brain and cause a state of individual and temporal knowledge that we call
consciousness. If the quantum-classical transition were random, temporal
continuity of the conscious subject would not be possible. Consciousness, therefore,
would not exist, only independent instants of pseudo-consciousness, that is,
spasms of consciousness, which are far from conscious experience. In conclusion,
the temporal binding of psychism is an essential element in order to understand
the conscious phenomenon constituted by individual subjects, the essence of
which persists over time.
The information encoded in the energy of the environment by the super-
quantum potential energy generates an implicate order structure in the psychism
of conscious beings. The action of this energy over the psychobiophysical body
starts the formation of a coherent quantum state among diverse microtubules
located in different cells distributed throughout the organism. This holistic structure
of microtubules functions as a resonator of the information received from the
environment. The active information from the environment, which indicates how
the field energy from the environment should be structured and guided, passes
directly to the global structure of the microtubules, which form conformational
states in line with said information; in other words, they are organised according
to the information received by the super-quantum potential energy. The conscious
image therefore comes directly from external reality in the psychism and is felt
holistically. The immediate outside world imposes itself on the microtubules as a
whole and these in turn copy the information received integrating it in the global
structure of microtubules integrated throughout the body. Consequently, the
conscious perception of reality acquires holographic properties. A spatially ordered
and continuous conscious image is formed, in which objects display mutual
coherence.
In the BPH model, the microtubules are biophysical resonators of the
quantum information. The resonance modes are limited in a microtubule; the
combination options between the vibration modes of all the microtubules of
the body are sufficiently broad to cover the extensive phenomenological register
of conscious states. Penroses model does not explain why a specific quantum
interconnection pattern is produced in the tubulins, although it does explore
how a coherent pattern is reduced by the action of the MAPs. In our proposal,
the MAPs must also play an important role in constituting a specific conscious
state. In one way or another, the MAPs should modify their position in line with
the active information received from the environment. The microtubules start
to look for possible states of mutual coherence, compatible with the relative
position of the MAPs, which are positioned in the wave nodes during the
quantum processing phase. Out of all the patterns from this reduced group of
possible quantum psychic states, the ones that reach the highest degree of

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M. BJAR, PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE 737

coherence would be resolved, in order words, those that resonate with greatest
intensity, in line with the main characteristics of the conscious state: unity and
coherence.
Thus, for instance, in visual perception, the super quantum potential energy
that operates in the electromagnetic field establishes the relative position of the
MAPs from certain microtubules, which begins to generate compatible states of
quantum macro-coherence. The resulting quantum coherence wave, constituted
by microtubules distributed throughout the body, reaches a maximum level of
coherence and saturates: psychism cannot generate a more coherent quantum
state due to its psychobiophysical limitations, and it initiates the decoherence
phase induced by the MAPs until it forms the classical conscious state. Psychism
is ordered according the quantum information received from the environment.
It organises itself to receive directly the encoded information in the light received
from the wholeness of the physical environment and consequently produces a
conscious holographic image.
If ordinary conscious perceptions per se are sufficiently complex to merit
lengthy explanations in existing models, insights add extra speculative content.
However, they also have a place in the BPH model. They can be explained in the
BPH models as direct input from the informational reality at ordering levels well
above standard levels, which spurs psychism to seek a wave with a high degree
of quantum coherence. In the intuition or insight the action of the external
energetic-informative block is so intense that the marred psychic control forces
pre-established by thought become negligible. As a consequence, psychism does
not saturate as easily. The previous schemes of thought remain dysfunctional
and psychism is forced to seek psychic coherence faced with the intensely coherent
reality that imposes itself. The MAPs, still constrained by biophysical limitations,
are freed from psychic impositions and perform their function with greater
faithfulness to external reality.
To a large extent, Bohms conscious direct perception requires energy of
maximum order whose light constructs the conscious reflex image in psychism.
The action of the cosmic mind over psychism would operate directly on the
microtubules, independently from the MAPs, and transmit their coherence
directly on the microtubules binding them in a non-local connection. The non-
local connection system of microtubules would represent the explained reality
closest to the implicate dimension of maximum coherence. In the final analysis,
the decoherence of the MAPs must take place in order for the subject to be
conscious of the cosmic experience. The MAPs, then, represent the essential
psychic element that grants individuality to the conscious subject and
differentiates it from the rest of the whole. Without the objective reduction
orchestrated by the MAPs the subject would be subsumed in the cosmic mind
and reduced to a quantum cellular automaton of ordinary perception.
Consciousness, therefore, represents the holistic, unitary and coherent image,
which emerges after the quantum processing of the direct dump of external
information on psychism.

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738 M. BJAR, PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE

4. CONCLUSION

The epistemological and metaphysical analysis of the BPH model enables us


to be aware of the ontological nature and meaning of the psychobiophysical
reality. The joint BPH model, characterised by an evolutionary-emergentist line
of the psychophysical material reality, offers us an ontological and functional
perspective of coherent consciousness with scientific phenomenology. The
metaphysics of the BPH model provides us with a more profound vision of the
human being as a participatory element of existence.
Consciousness is the main evolutionary element that provides unity to the
whole of creation. It is the clear result of an original cosmic consciousness
capable of recognising in its individual nature the very essence of the cosmos.
Just as we call the sum of psychobiophysical events that occur in a primordial
explained order the existential phenomenological cycle, we can say that conscious
individual knowledge of the cosmic consciousness is the conscious act that closes
a higher existential cycle from the explicate order to the energetic content of the
implicate orders: the existential hypercycle as personal conscious knowledge of
the cosmic essence of each psychic subject. The emergence of consciousness
marks a point of inflection in the development of the universe, as it enables us
to understand the holistic unity of the evolution of the psychobiophysical universe
and therefore become relatively independent from structural evolutionary
dynamics.
The ontological nature of consciousness is similar to that of other material
processes observed in the universe. The BPH model proposes a formation process
for consciousness based on the physical cooperation of the psychic architecture
of a living being. The conscious subject possesses matter that is capable of
manifesting physical and psychic activity. Physical, biological and psychic
evolution has produced a psychobiophysical being in which the psychophysical
echoes of a fundamental ontological reality resonate. The universe becomes
conscious and reveals itself as an active part of a unitary psychobiophysical
process. This is a creative universe (it produces conscious beings) and a revelatory
one (it unfolds the potential of matter), where structures emerge that are
ontologically akin to their fundamental essence. This essence unfolds and
originates the universe of matter, life and consciousness. Man, emergent in this
psychobiophysical universe, is capable of understanding and transcending this
through the experience of insight.
The ontological identification of man with the cosmos, as well as his ability
to transcend it thanks to the direct intervention of the cosmic mind, offers a
metaphysical perspective, stemming from a philosophical physical reflection
and scientific interest in understanding the phenomenon of consciousness. Man
is linked to the material essence of the cosmos by virtue of his psychobiophysical
constitution. At the point of maximum resonance with the cosmos he can reach
a direct perception of the wholeness of reality and bestow meaning on his
existence. This is the most intense rebinding with creation, the maximum tuning

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M. BJAR, PHYSICS, CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE 739

with the cosmic mind, the closest to identification with the essential cosmic
content that creates, unfolds and rebinds. The image offered to us by a scientific-
philosophical reflection of an emergentist nature, shows consciousness as a
window wide open to the essential content of reality. For man the universe is a
conscious physical system, in which he is capable of questioning its raison dtre
and playing an active role in rebinding himself with the essence thereof.

Ctedra Ciencia, Tecnologa y Religin MANUEL BJAR GALLEGO


Universidad Comillas
c/ Alberto Aguilera, 25
28015 Madrid
catedractr@icai.upcomillas.es

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

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GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA


PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA *
IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO
Universidad de Mlaga

RESUMEN: La Biologa no trata de la vida, sino de la descripcin fenomenolgica de los organismos


vivos; el estudio de la vida es propio de la Filosofa natural. Para tener un discurso coherente para des-
cribir un ser vivo necesitamos una serie de categoras: comprensin holstica, sistema, proceso, emer-
gencia de novedad, teleologa, epignesis y evolucin; matrices conceptuales que conforman una racio-
nalidad diferente a la racionalidad mecanicista predominante en la Fsica. El pensamiento sistmico es
siempre pensamiento procesual. La Filosofa del proceso es un buen instrumento intelectual para la
comprensin del viviente. Ninguna realidad es un hecho esttico; debemos pasar de la metafsica de
substancia (ser) a la metafsica del devenir. Las propiedades emergentes surgen a un cierto nivel de
complejidad. La explicacin del sistema no se encuentra en los componentes bsicos (anlisis), sino
en la organizacin jerrquica del mismo como una unidad, que posee una finalidad, un tlos. El geno-
ma es el programa que fundamenta la estructura y comportamiento del organismo, que se desarrolla
epigenticamente. Los organismos vivos son sistemas abiertos en continuo intercambio con el medio
de materia, energa e informacin. La clula es la unidad de anlisis elemental de los vivientes, tanto
microorganismos como vegetales o animales. Toda clula es una unidad dinmica y se encuentra siem-
pre en una fase del proceso de divisin celular. El tiempo es una categora esencial para la compren-
sin de todo organismo vivo; contemplada la serie de los vivientes a grandes escalas de tiempo, nos
lleva a la afirmacin de que vivir es evolucionar y de que nada en Biologa tiene sentido sino es a la luz
de la evolucin.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Biologa, Filosofa natural, vida, ser vivo, pensamiento sistmico, proceso, emer-
gencia, teleologa, epignesis, evolucin.

Genesis of life from the matter dynamic process


ABSTRACT: Biology does not deal with life, but the phenomenological description of living beings; the
life study belongs to the Natural Philosophy. For a coherent discussion in order to learn what a living
being is, several categories as: holistic comprehension, system, process, novelty emergence, teleology,
epigenesis and evolution are needed. In this way a different rationality, non-mechanicist, may be
constructed. The systemic thought is always a process thought. Therefore, the process philosophy is
good tool for understanding the living organisms. Reality is not static, but dynamic; we must pass from
the substance (being) metaphysics, to that of becoming. The novelty emergence is achieved from the
complexity. The system explanation is not found in the elements (analysis), but in the hierarchical
organization of the system as a whole, which has an internal teleology. Genome, which is epigenetically
developing, is the program that bases the structure and performances of organisms. The elemental
analysis unit for microorganisms, vegetables and animals, the cell, is a dynamic unity always in the
process of mitosis. Time scale is essential for the understanding of living organisms; if the living beings
series is observed in big time periods, we conclude that to live is to be in development and nothing in
Biology has meaning, but in the light of evolution.
KEY WORDS: Biology, Natural Philosophy, life, living being, systemic thought, process, emergence,
teleology, epigenesis, evolution.

* La mayor parte de la argumentacin y de los conceptos expuestos en este trabajo for-


man parte del captulo del libro De la dignidad del embrin. Reflexiones en torno a la vida
humana naciente, Ctedra de Biotica, Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, 2008.

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742 I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA

QU ES LA VIDA?

La Biologa como ciencia, no trata de la vida en s misma, el concepto vida


pertenece a la Filosofa natural; la Biologa, en cuanto ciencia experimental,
trata de las manifestaciones o fenmenos de los seres a los que llamamos orga-
nismos vivos 1. As lo entendieron Treviranus y Lamarck, quienes al comienzo
del siglo XIX acuaron el trmino Biologa para describir: todo lo que es comn
a vegetales y animales, como todos las facultades que son propias a estos seres
sin excepcin 2.
Definir la vida, poder responder a la pregunta: qu es la vida? ha sido una
cuestin ardua y compleja desde Aristteles hasta nuestros das 3; quiz el ca-
mino ms obvio, para responder a esta pregunta, sea la descripcin de los fe-
nmenos que manifiestan los organismos que llamamos vivos, en cuanto orga-
nismos vivos. Por eso muchas de las definiciones clsicas de la vida 4 son
fenomenolgicas, insistiendo en los rasgos que diferencian los seres vivos de
aquellos que son inanimados, como nacer, crecer, reproducirse y morir; estos
rasgos nos permitirn identificar los organismos vivos, no la vida misma. Qu
es la vida?. Se pregunt Edwin Schrdinger 5 en su famoso ciclo de conferen-
cias tenido en Dubln a comienzo de los aos cincuenta del siglo pasado. Schr-
dinger intent responder a la pregunta teniendo en cuenta las aporas que, desde
los supuestos de la Fsica moderna, la pregunta implicaba; segn algunos auto-
res las reflexiones de Schrdinger, supusieron el comienzo de la moderna Bio-
loga Molecular. Lo cierto es que tanto para Schrdinger, como para nosotros,
al intentar responder a la pregunta: qu es la vida?, partimos de nuestra pro-
pia experiencia; quiz remedando a San Agustn en el libro XI de las Confesio-
nes 6 nos atreveramos a decir: La vida, si no me lo preguntan, s lo que es, pero
si quiero explicar al que me lo pregunta, no lo s. Parece, pues, que este apo-

1
OANA IFTIME, Life sciences, apophatism and Bioethics, en European Journal of Scien-
ce and Theology, 2, 2006, pp. 21-46.
2
Citado por NGEL MARTN MUNICIO, Discurso inaugural del Ao Acadmico 1980-1981,
Ciencia y Aristobiologa, Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Fsicas y Naturales, Madrid, 1980,
p. 23. Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus (4 de febrero de 1776-16 de febrero de 1837) naci en
Bremen (Alemania). Estudi medicina en Gttingen, donde se doctor en 1796; en 1802 publi-
ca el libro Biologie oder Philosophie der lebenden Natur, por lo que es considerado, junto con
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, uno de los primeros en acuar el trmino Biologa.
3
TIENNE GILSON, De Aristteles a Darwin, y vuelta. Ensayo sobre algunas cuestiones de la
Biofilosofa, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1976. Un tercio de los tratados conocidos como el Corpus
aristotelicum son escritos sobre Biologa: Sobre el alma, De la generacin y corrupcin, De las
partes de los animales y la Historia de los animales. Cf. ALFREDO MARCOS, Aristteles y otros ani-
males. Una lectura filosfica de la Biologa aristotlica, PPU, Barcelona, 1996.
4
Pueden verse algunas definiciones de la vida en la obra de GIOVANNI BLANDINO, S.J., Pro-
blemas y Teoras sobre la Naturaleza de la Vida, Editorial Razn y Fe, Madrid, 1964, pp. 42-43.
5
EDWIN SCHRDINGER, Qu es la vida?, Tusquets, Barcelona, 1983.
6
SAN AGUSTN, Confessiones, Libro XI, Cap. XIV: Quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me
quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio: Qu es el tiempo? Si nadie me lo pregunta,
lo s; si quisiera explicarlo al que me pregunta, no lo s.

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I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA 743

fatismo 7 del que nos habla Oana Iftime es inherente a la condicin del ser vivo;
este es el punto en el que la vida escapa a la ciencia 8.
A lo largo de la historia del pensamiento muchos filsofos y hombres de cien-
cia han intentado darnos un atisbo de respuesta 9 a esta pregunta: Qu es la
vida?, puesto que como seres vivos, nos inquieta la pregunta; al fin, la respuesta
es parte del concete a ti mismo 10. Sin embargo, podemos afirmar que a pesar
de los innumerables descubrimientos de la Biologa Molecular en la segunda
mitad del siglo XX y comienzos del siglo XXI; a pesar de que conocemos el cdi-
go gentico universal en el que est cifrada la herencia; a pesar de que conoce-
mos el genoma de muchas especies de microorganismos, vegetales y animales,
e incluso del hombre; a pesar de que tenemos muchas certezas que nos dan las
ciencias experimentales de la vida, son muchas ms nuestras aporas, ignoran-
cias e incertidumbres sobre aquello que constituye la vida. El concepto ser vivien-
te pasa por la propia experiencia. Todos tenemos experiencia de lo que es estar
vivo y de la no vida, la muerte. Todos sabemos distinguir entre una escultura y
un ser humano vivo que nos mira con sus ojos brillantes, entre el len de bron-
ce que custodia la entrada del Congreso de los Diputados y el viejo len que dor-
mita o juega en el zoolgico.
Durante mis largos aos de dedicacin a la enseanza y a la investigacin he
procurado, en la medida de mis posibilidades, responderme a la pregunta sobre
la naturaleza de la vida, en aquella parcela (la Enzimologa) que era objeto de
mi dedicacin diaria en la docencia, el trabajo experimental y la reflexin filo-
sfica. Un gran compaero y amigo, el Profesor Jos Antonio Lozano de la Uni-
versidad de Murcia, me pidi que prologara un manual de Bioqumica 11. Se me
invit a qu hiciera una reflexin sobre la naturaleza de la vida y cmo la Bio-
qumica y la Biologa Molecular pueden ayudarnos a comprender: Qu es la
vida?; recuerdo que en aquel tiempo intent en pocas palabras dar mi visin y
se me ocurri el siguiente cuento:
Haba una vez un violn que oy cantar a un ruiseor. El pajarillo produ-
ca registros inauditos para el violn: gorjeos, trinos, floreos agudos y alegres.
El violn tuvo envidia y quiso cantar como el ruiseor; al ver que no poda imi-
tarlo, le pregunt: T, de qu estas hecho?. El pajarillo le respondi: Y

7
Neologismo deducido por la autora del adjetivo apoftico; referido en Teologa a la
Teologa apoftica, como la va negativa para el conocimiento de Dios.
8
OANA IFTIME, op. cit. (nota 1). La vida es un concepto abstracto, difcil de definir, pero
de fcil comprensin, puesto que estamos en contacto muy directo con los seres vivos empe-
zando por nosotros mismos. JOS VLCHEZ, El don de la vida, Descle de Brouwer, Bilbao,
2007, p. 13.
9
Puede verse la obra clsica: E. M. RADL, Historia de las ideas biolgicas: I. Hasta el
siglo XIX, y II. Desde Lamarck y Cuvier, Introduccin de JOS MARA LPEZ PIERO, Alianza Uni-
versidad, Madrid, 1988.
10
Nosce te ipsum, MARCO TULIO CICERN, Tusculanes disputationes, 1, 52.
11
JOS ANTONIO LOZANO, J. D. GALINDO, J. C. GARCA-BORRN, J. H. MARTNEZ-LIARTE, R. PEA-
FIEL y F. SOLANO, Bioqumica para ciencias de la salud, Editorial Interamericana McGraw-Hill,
Madrid, 1995; IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, Prlogo, pp. XI-XIII.

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744 I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA

t?. El violn, que haba tocado delante de reyes manejado por las manos ms
virtuosas de la poca, se molest por la insolencia del ruiseor y le respondi:
Yo estoy hecho de la ms fina haya alemana, mis cuerdas estn bien templa-
das, tengo sesenta y nueve piezas, y no hay dinero para pagar el arco que obtie-
ne mis notas timbradas y brillantes. El ruiseor sigui cantando, el da era
soleado y tena ganas de mostrar al viento primaveral que en un rincn del
bosque entre brezos y jarales se puede or el mejor concierto. El violn insis-
ti: Pero de qu ests hecho?. Entonces el ruiseor le contest: Yo tengo
el alma de la msica. Y comenz a volar.

Posiblemente los cuentos nos puedan sugerir mucho ms que una seria refle-
xin sobre las caractersticas fundamentales de los organismos vivos, compa-
rados con los que llamamos inanimados. Tambin aqu nos puede ser fcil pasar
del mito al logos. El ruiseor del cuento en qu se diferenciaba del Stradiva-
rius? Espontneamente responderamos: El ruiseor estaba vivo. Diramos
que el pajarillo en todas sus manifestaciones era un torrente de vitalidad y poda
cantar y volar por s mismo. Sin embargo, el violn necesitaba de unas manos
hbiles que fueran capaces de sacar de sus cuerdas las timbradas notas. Tam-
bin cuentan que cuando Miguel ngel termin de esculpir el Moiss, admira-
do de su propia obra, le tir el martillo y le dijo: Parla, cane. Sabemos que el
Moiss de Miguel ngel nunca habl y que el Stradivarius del cuento tampoco
pudo cantar por s mismo, como hizo el ruiseor a la vez que arranc el vuelo.
El ruiseor poda cantar, volar, picotear, aparearse, construir un nido, cuidar
de las cras y, tal vez, una pedrada de un chiquillo o un ave rapaz podra acabar
con su vida.
Quiz la diferencia ms fundamental entre los organismos vivos y lo no vivos
sea sta: los seres vivos reaccionan como una unidad, como un todo, como el
pajarillo que ech a volar. As pues, desde un punto de vista descriptivo, en pri-
mera aproximacin, podramos decir que un ser vivo, desde una bacteria, pasan-
do por todo el reino vegetal y animal hasta el hombre, se comporta: como una
unidad de estructuras y funciones jerrquicamente integradas en todas sus mani-
festaciones, tendiendo siempre a conservar su estructura.

LA RACIONALIDAD SISTMICA EVOLUTIVA

Ahora bien, para tener un discurso coherente que nos describa todas las mani-
festaciones que observamos en los organismos vivos necesitamos delimitar una
serie de categoras, que conformen un nuevo paradigma de comprensin en una
nueva racionalidad; racionalidad que llamaremos sistmica evolutiva, contra-
puesta a la racionalidad lineal mecanicista, que ha servido a la ciencia de ins-
trumento para el conocimiento del Universo desde el siglo XVII 12. La racionali-

12
HENRYK SKOLIMOWSKI, Problemas de racionalidad en biologa, en Estudios sobre la
Filosofa de la Biologa, F. J. AYALA y T. DOBZHANSKY (eds.), Editorial Ariel, S.A., Mtodos, Bar-
celona, 1983, pp. 267-291.

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I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA 745

dad sistmica interpreta al universo mediante un discurso no lineal, sino com-


plejo, en el que estn siempre presentes diferentes niveles de significacin, que
se relacionan entre s a partir de bucles interactivos 13, intentando de alguna
manera traducir en nuestro discurso la complejidad de la realidad. Las catego-
ras fundamentales de este discurso de comprensin de los organismos vivos
seran: comprensin holstica (o totalidad), sistema, proceso, emergencia de nove-
dad, cambio (evolucin), teleologa (ejecucin de acciones encaminadas a un fin)
y desarrollo epigentico. Para llegar, pues, a un discurso coherente sobre el ser
vivo necesitamos clarificar cules son los contenidos de estas matrices concep-
tuales que son necesarias para la descripcin de un organismo vivo 14. Ludwig
von Bertalanffy en la Teora general de sistemas afirma: En comparacin con
el proceder analtico de la Ciencia clsica, con resolucin en elementos com-
ponentes y causalidad lineal o unidireccional como categora bsica, la inves-
tigacin de totalidades organizadas de muchas variables requiere nuevas cate-
goras de interaccin, transaccin, organizacin, teleologa, etc., con lo cual
surgen muchos problemas para la epistemologa y los modelos y tcnicas mate-
mticos 15. Los organismos vivos son por excelencia esas totalidades organiza-
das de las que nos habla Bertalanffy.
Nos situamos, pues, muy lejos del universo mecanicista que concibi la Fsi-
ca clsica post-newtoniana apoyndose en la concepcin de un espacio absolu-
to e istropo, un tiempo absoluto y reversible, una causalidad eficiente determi-
nista y la postulacin de la ausencia de toda finalidad 16; racionalidad mecanicista
que ha dominado nuestra cultura occidental y ha conformado, en gran parte, el
mismo devenir de las sociedades modernas. Somos herederos de una cultura en
la que se ha dado un predominio analista, con la pretensin de que el anlisis
exhaustivo de las partes llevara a la comprensin del todo. La racionalidad sis-
tmica en cambio acta por aproximaciones, utilizando conceptos preados de
significacin, con gran apertura semntica y complementariedad comprensiva.
La misma palabra originaria sistema indica: conjunto estructurado de hechos y
acontecimientos, que relacionados ordenadamente entre s, contribuyen a un deter-
minado fin. La racionalidad sistmica supone un enfoque holstico de la realidad
a estudiar. Cualquier elemento estructural o funcional de un sistema no puede
entenderse sino en relacin con los otros elementos estructurales o funcionales
del mismo. Todo sistema es un todo, aunque no clausurado en s mismo, pues-
to que el sistema puede estar en continua interaccin con otros sistemas jerr-
quicamente relacionados, formando parte de un nuevo sistema de nivel superior,

13
EDGAR MORIN, La Mthode, I, La Nature de la Nature, ditions de Seuil, Paris, 1977, y
II, La vie de la Vie, ditions de Seuil, Paris, 1980.
14
IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, Las categoras del discurso biolgico, en Evolucionismo y
cultura, A. DOU (ed.), Biblioteca Fomento Social, Mensajero, Bilbao, 1983, pp. 17-55.
15
LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY, Teora general de los sistemas, Fondo de Cultura Econmica,
Mxico, Ediciones F. C. E. Espaa, Madrid, 1976, p. xvi.
16
IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, Ciencia y Post-utopa, en Despus de las utopas, A. DOU
(ed.), Publicaciones de la Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, 1993, pp. 17-52.

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746 I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA

as una funcin nunca viene determinada por una estructura particular, sino
por el contexto de la organizacin y del medio en el que dicha estructura se
encuentra sumergida 17; el control jerrquico es una de las caractersticas esen-
ciales y diferenciales de las manifestaciones de la materia viviente.
Si volvemos al pajarillo del cuento, podemos decir que el ruiseor era un sis-
tema: toda su anatoma y todos sus rganos los podemos considerar como ele-
mentos estructurales y funcionales, jerrquicamente organizados para construir
ese todo: el pajarillo que proclamaba alegremente su territorio en un da pri-
maveral. Pero el mismo pjaro y su canto no pueden entenderse sin otro siste-
ma, el de su pareja con la que intentaba nidificar y la pareja tampoco podemos
comprenderla sino dentro del ecosistema del bosque y el bosque lo debemos
considerar dentro del ecosistema general, el planeta Tierra. La organizacin
jerrquica de los conjuntos sistmicos implica que pueden considerarse mlti-
ples niveles en la estructura de un sistema, de tal manera que el fenmeno obser-
vado depender de la escala de observacin a la que se le someta; es muy cita-
da la sentencia del fsico Charles Eugne Guye quien afirmaba: la escala crea
el fenmeno. De la misma manera, en el orden funcional pueden observarse
tambin mltiples niveles de organizacin. A este respecto nos dice Fritjof Capra:
En el marco mecanicista de la ciencia cartesiana hay estructuras fundamen-
tales y luego hay fuerzas y mecanismos a travs de los cuales estas interactan
dando lugar a procesos. En la ciencia sistmica cada estructura es vista como
la manifestacin de procesos subyacentes. El pensamiento sistmico siempre
es pensamiento procesual 18.
As en el mismo pajarillo del cuento podemos considerar diferentes niveles
de organizacin estructural: partculas subatmicas que forman tomos, to-
mos que se enlazan para formar biomolculas, macromolculas que se entrete-
jen para dar las estructuras celulares, como membranas y otros orgnulos que
constituyen una clula, clulas que forman los tejidos y rganos que se entrela-
zan dinmicamente tanto en la estructura como en la funcionalidad de donde
resulta ese todo, el pajarillo que canta, picotea, y vuela por s mismo. Tambin
el violn del cuento, en s mismo, es un sistema estructurado y organizado en
sus piezas pero por una finalidad externa a s mismo que le impuso el luthier y
adems nunca pudo cantar por s mismo; el violn no estaba no vivo, le faltaba
esa respuesta integral, creadora y juguetona que tan descaradamente manifes-
taba el pajarillo. El violn era una parte que, junto con la friccin del arco y los
giles dedos comandados por el cerebro del violinista, podra forma una unidad
jerrquica superior y entonces cantar un solo en una sala de concierto, pero en

17
Sobre la jerarquizacin en los sistemas puede verse: H. H. PATTEE, El problema de la
jerarqua Biolgica, en C. H. WADDINGTON y OTROS, Hacia una Biologa terica, Alianza Uni-
versidad, Madrid, 1976, pp. 531-555.
18
FRITJOF CAPRA, La trama de la vida. Una nueva perspectiva de los sistemas vivos, Edito-
rial Anagrama, Coleccin Argumentos, Barcelona, 1998, p. 62. Puede verse tambin: MICHEL
WEBER, La vie de la nature selon le dernier Whitehead, en Les tudes Philosophiques, n. 3,
2006, pp. 395-408.

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I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA 747

ese momento el violn estara integrado en un sistema jerrquico superior com-


puesto por el violinista y su instrumento.

EL PENSAMIENTO PROCESUAL

En este punto del discurso, en el esfuerzo por entender qu es un organismo


vivo conviene aclarar el trmino proceso, tal como es entendido en la llamada
filosofa procesual. El pensamiento procesual parte de una cosmovisin din-
mica, frente a una visin esttica del ser. Todo sistema tiene, pues, una dimen-
sin temporal, tiene un antes y un despus inherente a su mismo ser y a su com-
portamiento. En la extensin temporal se realiza el proceso; el proceso es duracin
o coextensin en el tiempo sin ruptura de la continuidad.
En todo organismo vivo, desde los unicelulares a los pluricelulares, cuando
es analizado fenomenolgicamente en su extensin temporal, nos encontramos
con una continua sucesin de fases en las que no hay ningn tipo de cesura o
cambio cualitativo. Desde el punto de vista ontolgico, la relacin de una fase
con respecto a otra no es una relacin de potencia a acto, puesto que en cual-
quier momento de su ciclo vital se manifiesta actualmente todo el organismo
en su fase correspondiente.
La filosofa del proceso introduce el proceso frente al ser como referencia
ontolgica, lo dinmico frente a lo esttico. As pues, se puede definir el proce-
so como el resultado de un conjunto secuencialmente estructurado de sucesivos
estadios o fases en el que no existe solucin de continuidad. Todo proceso es com-
plejo y posee una estructura jerarquizada temporal coherente. Al ser todo pro-
ceso temporal y poder distinguir un comienzo y un fin, todo proceso es direc-
cional y tiene un tlos, una finalidad interna. La filosofa del proceso acepta
como categoras fundamentales para la comprensin de la realidad: el cambio,
la temporalidad, la actividad, la unidad, la continuidad, la totalidad, la relacin
con otros procesos, la emergencia de novedad y la teleologa interna o finalidad.
Segn Alfred N. Whitehead, la descripcin newtoniana de la materia abs-
trae la materia del tiempo. Concibe la materia en un instante. As lo hace la
descripcin de Descartes 19. Sin embargo, todos los hechos del universo slo
podemos concebirlos como una minuciosa seleccin de sus relaciones con
otros hechos o procesos. As los datos consisten en lo que ha sido, en lo que
poda haber sido y en lo que puede ser () Tales son los datos; y de estos datos
emerge un proceso en forma de transicin. Esta unidad del proceso es el espe-
cioso presente de la actualidad en cuestin 20. El mismo Whitehead dir que
ninguna actualidad es un hecho esttico. El carcter histrico del universo
pertenece a su esencia 21. Si interpretamos la realidad como proceso las actua-

19
ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD, Modos de pensamiento, Taller de ediciones Josefina Betancor,
Madrid, 1973, p. 104.
20
Ibidem, p. 104.
21
Ibidem, p. 105.

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748 I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA

lidades del presente estn derivando de sus caractersticas antecedentes y


confi riendo sus caractersticas al futuro: la inmediatez es la realizacin
de las potencialidades del pasado y es el almacn de las potencialidades del
futuro 22.
El organismo vivo podemos concebirlo como un proceso de desarrollo epi-
gentico (ms adelante reflexionaremos sobre la epignesis). La categora fun-
damental para la comprensin no ser entonces la substancia (lo que subyace a
los cambios) sino la fluencia, el devenir como consecuencia de los aconteci-
mientos. Whitehead en el captulo dedicado al proceso en su obra fundamental
Proceso y realidad nos habla de la experiencia integral humana: la afirmacin de
que todas las cosas fluyen. Para el filsofo britnico, elucidar el significado de
esta frase es la tarea de la Metafsica; tambin afirma l, existe la experiencia de
la permanencia de las cosas. Para Whitehead los dos primeros versos de un himno
famoso podran sintetizar las dos experiencias humanas:
Qudate conmigo;
rpida cae la tarde.

Los filsofos que parten del primer verso nos dieron la metafsica de la subs-
tancia, y los que parten del segundo desarrollan la metafsica del fluir 23. El
telogo Hans Kng nos ha hecho caer en la cuenta de la similitud de la ontolo-
ga procesual de Whitehead y de la metafsica de fondo que subyace al pensa-
miento de Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Hans Kng, en su libro Existe Dios? afir-
ma: como Teilhard en Teologa, Whitehead se preocupa en Filosofa por
mantener estrecha conexin con el pensamiento de las ciencias naturales moder-
nas. Tambin l entiende la naturaleza entera como un proceso gigantesco en el
que un nmero infinito de unidades mnimas () entra en activa relacin con
otras, y todas ellas se desarrollan juntas en pequeos procesos igualmente infi-
nitos en nmero 24. El jesuita francs habla de una metafsica del unire 25, como

22
Ibidem, p. 115.
23
ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD, Proceso y realidad, Editorial Losada, Buenos Aires, traduccin
de J. Rovira Armengol, 1956, pp. 284-285. El texto ingls del poema citado por Whitehead es:
Abide with me; Fast falls the eventide, citado por ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD, Process and Reality.
An essay in Cosmology, Cambridge at the University Press, Cambridge, 1929, p. 296. Ver el
siguiente texto de Guillermo Armengol: Sin embargo, un fluir de eventos microfsicos cons-
titua y daba cierta estabilidad en el tiempo a los objetos macrofsicos, aunque tambin abier-
tos en su interior a la evolucin y transformacin continua. Para Whitehead era evidente que
la fsica de comienzos del siglo XX describa un mundo que flua por eventos inestables, que
se relacionaban entre s por prehensiones fsicas para constituir entidades actuales, como socie-
dades de eventos organizados, que se transformaban dinmicamente en un proceso continuo
[Whitehead y la imagen de Dios desde la Ciencia. Alfred North Whitehead y la filosofa del
proceso, en Pensamiento, vol. 63, n. 238 (Serie especial, n. 1), 2007, pp. 801-806].
24
H. KNG, Existe Dios? Respuesta al Problema de Dios en nuestro tiempo, Ediciones Cris-
tiandad, Madrid, 1979, pp. 249-250; la cursiva es nuestra.
25
Sustituyamos, por ejemplo, una Metafsica del Esse por una Metafsica del Unire
Qu ocurre entonces? En la Metafsica del Esse el Acto puro, una vez planteado, agota todo
lo que hay de absoluto y necesario en el Ser; y ya no hay nada que justifique, hgase lo que se

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la expresin de su concepcin de toda la evolucin tendente al punto omega; es


decir, en lugar de una metafsica del ser, una metafsica del converger de todo
lo que est en devenir. Joseph A. Bracken a propsito de la Filosofa procesual
nos dice estas interesantes consideraciones: Le pido al lector que sea paciente
si inicialmente algunos conceptos bsicos de Whitehead le parecen ms bien
extraos, incluso estrafalarios. Desde mi propia experiencia le puedo decir, si
uno persevera en el esfuerzo de comprensin, la profunda lgica de esta apro-
ximacin a la realidad ir gradualmente hacindose clara. Esto enciende la ima-
ginacin y finalmente uno se encuentra a s mismo inesperadamente engan-
chado en el pensamiento de Whitehead. El fue sin duda uno de los ms originales
pensadores del siglo XX, alguien digno de hacer un esfuerzo extra de lectura y
de comprensin 26.
La filosofa procesual puede reducirse a estos puntos bsicos:
1. El cambio y el tiempo son las dos categoras principales para la com-
prensin metafsica de la realidad.
2. El proceso es la principal categora para la descripcin ontolgica de la
realidad. Los procesos son ms fundamentales que las cosas.
3. La mayor parte de los elementos del repertorio metafsico son com-
prendidos como procesos: las substancias materiales, los organismos
vivos, la naturaleza como un todo, incluso las personas.
4. La contingencia, la emergencia de novedad, la creatividad deben consi-
derarse categoras fundamentales para la comprensin metafsica. Para
la comprensin de la realidad procesual debe cambiarse el operari sequi-
tur esse (el operar sigue al ser), metafsica de la substancia, por el esse
sequitur operari (el ser sigue al obrar), metafsica del proceso, del de-
venir 27.

La filosofa del proceso juntamente con la teora general de sistemas puede


ser un buen instrumento intelectual para la comprensin del ser vivo en gene-
ral y, en particular, para comprender el desarrollo ontogentico de un organis-
mo. A este propsito Fritjof Capra afirma: La filosofa procesual de White-
head, el concepto de homeostasis de Cannon y el trabajo experimental sobre
metabolismo, ejercieron una fuerte influencia sobre Ludwig von Bertalanffy lle-
vndole a la formulacin de una nueva teora de los sistemas abiertos 28.

haga, la existencia del ser participado. Por el contrario, en una Metafsica de la Unin, es con-
cebible, que supuesta la realizacin de la unidad divina inmanente, sea an posible un grado
de unificacin absoluta. PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, Como yo creo, Taurus Ediciones, Madrid,
1970, p. 196.
26
JOSEPH A. BRACKEN, S.J., Christianity and Process Thought. Spirituality for a changing
world, Templeton Foundation Press, Philadelphia, 2006, p. xviii.
27
Process Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/process-philosophy
28
FRITJOF CAPRA, op. cit. (nota 18), p. 63.

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750 I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA

LAS PROPIEDADES EMERGENTES

Nos hemos referido a la emergencia de novedad como una de las categoras


fundamentales para la comprensin de los procesos. Llamamos propiedades
emergentes a aquellas que surgen a un cierto nivel de complejidad, pero que no se
dan en los niveles inferiores. Las propiedades emergentes brotan de las interre-
laciones de los elementos del sistema, aparecen a medida que el sistema evolu-
ciona con el tiempo y estn siempre referidas a la totalidad; estas propiedades
no pueden ser anticipadas o deducidas antes de que se hayan manifestado por
s mismas. La coherencia del proceso correlaciona los elementos separados de
nivel inferior a una unidad de nivel superior. El paradigma emergentista supo-
ne que la realidad no es esttica, sino dinmica en continuo cambio y desarro-
llo. La evolucin del proceso est produciendo continuamente realidades nue-
vas en los distintos niveles que conforman la totalidad. En estos diferentes niveles
de organizacin, aunque codependientes, cada uno de los mismos manifiesta
su propio patrn y distintas formas de causacin 29. Los emergentistas cuyo eslo-
gan podra ser: Ms es diferente se alzan contra los reduccionistas, para los
cuales el todo puede explicarse por la suma de las partes y la imagen del todo
real representa con fidelidad los constituyentes bsicos y puede dar razn del
todo a partir de sus elementos constituyentes 30. Por contraposicin, segn John
Polkinghorne: La emergencia fuerte correspondera, en cambio, a un caso en
el que un nuevo principio causal de una clase distintiva no presente en nive-
les de complejidad inferiores cobra actividad en un sistema complejo. Enton-
ces ms sera radicalmente diferente 31.
En el microcosmos las propiedades de los hadrones (protones y neutrones)
no son las propiedades de los quarks y gluones que los constituyen. Las pro-
piedades de los tomos no son deducibles de las caractersticas de las partcu-
las elementales (protones, neutrones y electrones). Las propiedades de las mol-
culas no son deducibles de las propiedades de los tomos. As, las propiedades
qumicas del agua no son deducibles de las propiedades del oxgeno y del hidr-

29
Modification of a paradigm, entrevista a PHILIP CLAYTON por MATT DONELLI, en Scien-
ce and Theology News, March 2006, pp. 21-22. JEFFREY GOLDSTEIN, La idea de emergencia, en
www.galatel.webcindario.com/index.htm
PHILIP CLAYTON en su libro Mind and emergence: from quantum to consciousness (Oxford
University Press, 2004) desarrolla un argumento complejo y polifactico para una visin del
mundo basada en la llamada emergencia fuerte: sistemas nuevos y complejos pueden llegar
a la existencia con sus propias estructuras, leyes y mecanismos causales. Clayton admite que
este concepto de emergencia supone cuatro elementos: monismo ontolgico, la emergencia
de nuevas propiedades, la irreductibilidad de lo emergente a niveles ms bajos y a interac-
ciones y, por ltimo, la influencia causal del todo sobre las partes. TAEDE A. SMEDES, Review
of Mind and Emergence, en Ars disputandi, vol. 5, 2005. No admitira personalmente el monis-
mo ontolgico, puede concebirse un emergentismo no monista.
30
JOHN H. HAUGHT, Is Nature enough? Meaning and Truth in the Age of Science, Cambrid-
ge University Press, 2006, pp. 77-97.
31
JOHN POLKINGHORNE, Explorar la realidad. La interrelacin ciencia y religin, Editorial Sal
Terrae, Presencia Teolgica, Santander, 2007, p. 28.

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geno. Las propiedades de una protena no son sin ms deducibles de las pro-
piedades conocidas de los aminocidos que las constituyen. Se cumple siempre
que el todo es ms que la suma de las partes. En los seres que llamamos vivos
las propiedades de la clula, como unidad viviente no son deducibles de las carac-
tersticas de las biomolculas de que estn compuestas; igualmente, las propie-
dades de los organismos pluricelulares no son deducibles de las propiedades de
las clulas de que estn constituidos. Las propiedades del todo no estn deter-
minadas por las propiedades de las partes. En biologa y bioqumica, la emer-
gencia cubre los dominios desde los tomos hasta los organismos. Algunos de
los grandes periodos de la historia natural pueden describir niveles de emer-
gencia: la aparicin de la vida, la aparicin de la experiencia sensorial, de la con-
ciencia y de la reflexin moral 32. Podramos decir que las propiedades de un
ecosistema estn siempre referidas al conjunto de todos los elementos estruc-
turales y funcionales que lo componen, pero no al anlisis de cada uno de ellos.
A este propsito F. Capra nos dice:
El gran shock para la ciencia del siglo XXI ha sido la constatacin de que
los sistemas no pueden ser comprendidos desde el anlisis. Las propiedades de
las partculas no son propiedades intrnsecas, sino que slo pueden ser com-
prendidas en el contexto de un conjunto mayor. En consecuencia, la relacin
entre las partes y el todo ha quedado invertida. En el planteamiento sistmico
las propiedades de las partes slo pueden comprenderse desde la organizacin
del conjunto, por lo tanto, el pensamiento sistmico no se encuentra en los com-
ponentes bsicos, sino en los principios esenciales de organizacin. El pensa-
miento sistmico es contextual, en contrapartida con el analtico. Anlisis sig-
nifica aislar algo para estudiarlo y comprenderlo, mientras que el pensamiento
sistmico encuadra este algo dentro de un contexto todo superior 33.

EL ORGANISMO VIVO COMO SISTEMA ABIERTO

De acuerdo con Capra: es el conjunto del sistema, al nivel de organizacin


analizado, el que nos har comprender las propiedades de sus elementos cons-
tituyentes. En esta visin procesual y sistmica consideramos los organismos
vivos como sistemas abiertos en continuo intercambio con el medio ambiente
de materia, energa e informacin. Esta informacin, no es una informacin gen-
tica, debe ser correctamente entendida siempre como informacin en orden a
desarrollar el programa inscrito en el DNA propio de la especie biolgica. La
Termodinmica clsica nace con la pretensin de explicar todos los intercam-
bios energticos que se dan en el mundo fsico, fundamentalmente la relacin
entre trabajo mecnico y calor, teniendo en cuenta las variables de presin, volu-
men y temperatura. Se definen de este modo una serie de funciones de estado,

32
HAROLD MOROWITZ, In defense of emergence. Emergence is quickly becoming a strong
alternative to reductionism, en Science and Theology News, July/August, 2006, p. 6.
33
FRITJOF CAPRA, La trama de la vida. Una nueva perspectiva de los sistemas vivos, op. cit.
(nota 18), p. 49.

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752 I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA

funciones que no dependen de la historia del sistema, es decir, del camino por
el que se ha alcanzado un estado determinado del sistema, sino de las variables
del sistema; estas funciones de estado son la energa, la energa libre, la ental-
pa y la entropa. La Termodinmica clsica se refiere siempre a sistemas ais-
lados en los que no hay intercambio de materia, energa o informacin con el
medio.
El ser vivo, en cambio, se nos presenta como un sistema abierto en continuo
intercambio de materia, energa e informacin con el medio en el cual se desa-
rrolla. No sucede meramente, afirma Hans Jonas, que la conservacin del sis-
tema se lleve a cabo en su actividad, sino que depende de esta ltima. La acti-
vidad consiste en conservarse mediante la renovacin de los estados de equilibrio
a los que la dependencia del entorno no permite que duren largo tiempo, por
tanto la conservacin como continua elaboracin, es el contenido del funciona-
miento del sistema, y con ello el sentido de su existencia 34. La energa puede
ser intercambiada bien en forma de calor (Qi), bien en forma de energa radian-
te (hv) bien en forma de trabajo (Wi), mecnico, elctrico, etc. Supongamos una
levadura que fermenta glucosa a anhdrido carbnico (CO2) y etanol; desde el
punto de vista termodinmico, no es fcil estudiar el conjunto de las reaccio-
nes, a no ser que operemos con cajas negras y encerremos dentro de un bloque
todas las reacciones que van desde un mol de glucosa a dos moles de anhdrido
carbnico y dos moles de etanol 35.
Ante la continua llegada de materia, energa e informacin, el organismo vivo
reacciona como un todo. As, el universo est constituido por redes dinmicas
de procesos interrelacionados en el que ninguna de las propiedades de ningu-
na parte de la red es fundamental; todas se derivan de las propiedades de las
dems partes y la consistencia total de las interrelaciones determina la estruc-
tura de la red 36. El intercambio de materia, energa e informacin de un orga-
nismo vivo con su medio constituye el metabolismo. El pajarillo del cuento es
un sistema abierto; picoteaba granos de semillas con los que se alimentaba, dige-
ra los granos, asimilaba sus componentes bioqumicos esenciales, reciba la
energa radiante del sol primaveral, consuma energa al volar y sus pequeos
msculos pectorales convertan la energa qumica ligada a la molcula de ade-
nosn trifosfato (ATP) en el grcil movimiento de sus alas. Su canto era una seal
informativa que lanzaba al medio proclamando su territorio, y l, a su vez, oa
el canto de otros congneres que avisaban de su presencia.
Desde el punto de vista qumico podemos distinguir dos tipos esenciales de
reacciones que tienen lugar dentro de las clulas: las reacciones anablicas, por
las que la clula construye a partir de sillares elementales las biomolculas y son
reacciones generalmente reductoras; por otra parte, las reacciones catablicas
o reacciones degradativas son reacciones oxidativas y la clula aprovecha la

34
HANS JONAS, El principio Vida, Hacia una biologa filosfica, Editorial Trotta, Madrid,
2000, p. 104.
35
IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, Enzimologa, Ediciones Pirmide, Madrid, 2001, pp. 26-39.
36
FRITJOF CAPRA, op. cit. (nota 18), p. 59.

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energa calorfica desprendida en forma de compuestos de alta energa y que


pueden ser utilizados inmediatamente como la molcula de ATP. Todas estas
reacciones dentro de la clula estn siempre fuera del equilibrio termodinmi-
co; el equilibrio termodinmico supondra la muerte celular. La Termodinmi-
ca clsica se fundamenta en los famosos tres principios. Estos principios son
leyes sacadas de la experiencia y del sentido comn. Por s mismos no tienen
base terica y, por tanto, no son deducibles, actan como primeros principios
que cumplen las condiciones de completitud, es decir, explicacin de todos los
fenmenos que caen bajo su mbito, consistencia interna, es decir, no hay con-
tradiccin entre ellos, independencia en su formulacin, y no son muy numero-
sos. Han sido bastante las formulaciones de los principios termodinmicos. El
primer principio es el principio de conservacin de la energa. El segundo prin-
cipio es el principio de aumento de entropa. El tercer principio nos da un punto
de partida: en el cero absoluto la entropa es cero.
El segundo principio de la Termodinmica nos dice que los sistemas aisla-
dos espontneamente cambian a situaciones de mayor homogeneidad o desor-
den. Nos habla, pues, de la direccin de los cambios en la naturaleza, cosa que
no tena en cuenta el primer principio. Tenemos la experiencia de que el calor
fluye de los cuerpos calientes a los cuerpos fros y no al contrario. No todo el
calor se puede convertir en trabajo, pues parte del calor queda ligado al siste-
ma por el mero hecho del cambio. La relacin entre este calor ligado al sistema
y la temperatura de la transformacin considerada del sistema nos define otra
funcin de estado, llamada, a semejanza de la entalpa y de la energa, entropa.
El trmino entropa proviene del griego (ejn trophv), y significa en el cambio 37.
En los sistemas aislados que sufren un cambio reversible espontneo la entro-
pa alcanzada es la mxima. En los sistemas abiertos debe tenerse en cuenta el
intercambio de entropa con el exterior. Podemos definir la entropa en el inte-
rior del sistema Si y la entropa en el exterior del sistema Se. En los organismos
vivos la disminucin entrpica en todos los cambios de organizacin molecu-
lar y, en general, en las reacciones anablicas se logra a consta de un aumento
de la entropa del medio, lo que hizo decir a Schrdinger en la dcada de los
cincuenta que los seres vivos se alimentaban de entropa negativa en su famo-
sa Conferencia ya citada: Qu es la vida? No es, pues, correcto decir que los
seres vivos no siguen las leyes de la Termodinmica y que escapan de la ten-
dencia general hacia el desorden o aumento de entropa.

EN BUSCA DE LA CLULA Y EL CICLO VITAL DE TODO ORGANISMO VIVO

La unidad de anlisis elemental de los organismos vivos es la clula. Todo


organismo vivo sin excepcin, desde la bacteria al ser humano est constituido
o por una sola clula, los organismos unicelulares, o por una asociacin de clu-

37
La entropa se denota por el smbolo S (de shift, cambio en ingls).

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754 I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA

las jerrquicamente estructuradas, organismos pluricelulares; ms an, estos


organismos pluricelulares de generacin sexuada, en un momento de su desa-
rrollo ontogentico, estn constituidos tambin por una sola clula: el cigoto.
El trmino cigoto proviene del griego zugwtov~, que significa lo unido. Desde el
punto de vista fenotpico el cigoto es una clula nica, formada por la unin del
vulo y el espermatozoide en el proceso de la fecundacin.
Teilhard de Chardin ha afirmado que solamente existe un modelo estructu-
ral para la vida; modelo que en virtud de la diversidad nunca se repite en su con-
crecin externa. El modelo a nivel fsico es la clula. La teora celular propues-
ta en 1839 por Th. Schwann en su tratado Las investigaciones microscpicas
sobre la coincidencia en la estructura de los animales y plantas, sigue todava
vigente y ha sido confirmada en todos los organismos vivos 38. La vida propia-
mente dicha sobre la superficie del planeta Tierra comenz cuando empez a
existir la primera clula. Teilhard de Chardin llamara a la clula el grano natu-
ral de vida, tal como el tomo es el grano natural de la Materia inorganizada 39.
Teilhard acusaba a los citlogos e histlogos de haber congelado a la clula para
su estudio 40. Cualquier tipo celular, tanto procariota como eucariota, es una uni-
dad dinmica procesual siempre en trance de divisin celular. La clula es, por
tanto, la unidad de constitucin de los organismos vivos pluricelulares en los
que, decamos anteriormente, se da una organizacin jerrquica. Pero la misma
clula no puede entenderse sino como un proceso, como una sucesin de fases
de su ciclo vital, conocidas como las fases G1, S, G2, M del ciclo celular 41. La
duracin de la fase G1 difiere de un tipo celular a otro; siempre cualquier clu-
la que analicemos se encuentra en una fase de su ciclo vital. Durante la fase G 1
la clula aumenta su tamao por la fabricacin de nuevas protenas. Esta fase
puede durar como hemos dicho un tiempo mayor. La clula detiene su activi-
dad reproductora, es la llamada fase G0 que se encuentra dentro de la fase G1;
durante esta fase la clula puede decidir tambin entrar en apoptosis o muerte
celular programada. Durante la fase S la clula duplica su DNA. Durante la Fase
G2 la clula se prepara para el proceso de divisin celular que tiene lugar duran-
te la fase M (mitosis). El paso de una fase a otra dentro de un proceso aconte-
ce sin ningn tipo de cesura. El que la clula pueda morir, o mejor dicho el que
todo ser vivo pueda morir, pertenece de modo inseparable a su misma esencia.
Hans Jonas nos dice: la vida es mortal no aunque, sino porque es vida; es mor-
tal en su ms originaria constitucin, pues ese modo de ser revocable, no garan-

38
E. M. RADL, Historia de las ideas biolgicas. II, Desde Lamarck y Cuvier, op. cit. (nota 9),
pp. 66-70. Puede verse: A. ALBARRACN TEULN, La teora celular. Historia de un paradigma, Alian-
za Editorial, Madrid, 1983.
39
P. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, El fenmeno humano, Taurus Ediciones, Madrid, 1971, p. 99.
40
La moderna Biologa Celular fundida con la Biologa Molecular y Bioinformtica, dis-
ciplinas que Teilhard no pudo conocer, encenderan el entusiasmo innato de Teilhard de Char-
din.
41
BRUCE ALBERTS, DENNIS BARY, JULIAN LEWIS, MARTIN RAFF, KEITH ROBERTS y JAMES D. WAT-
SON, Molecular Biology of the cell, 3. ed., Garland Publishing Inc., New York-London, 1994,
pp. 863-910.

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tizado, es la relacin entre forma y materia en la que descansa. Su realidad,


paradjica y en constante contradiccin con la naturaleza mecnica, es en el
fondo una continua crisis, cuyo control nunca es seguro y en todo momento no
es sino la continuacin de la propia crisis como tal 42.
Decamos que todos los organismos pluricelulares de reproduccin sexuada
en el primer momento de su existencia estn constituidos por una sola clula,
el cigoto, que nace de la fusin de los gametos masculino y femenino; comien-
za, as, con la fecundacin una nueva unidad estructural, una nueva vida, cons-
tituida por un nuevo genoma diploide. El nuevo organismo comienza un nuevo
ciclo vital a travs de su desarrollo epigentico, ciclo vital caracterstico para
cada especie biolgica, hasta llegar a la madurez sexual, con lo que el nuevo
organismo podr comenzar nuevos ciclos reproductivos en su descendencia.
El pajarillo del cuento comenz su existencia tambin cuando su progenitor
fecund a la hembra, despus sta puso el huevo; huevo que era una sola clu-
la envuelta en una gran cantidad de material nutritivo. Durante la incubacin
los padres le dieron calor y humedad, iniciando el desarrollo embrionario y la
consiguiente organognesis del pajarillo hasta la eclosin del huevo; luego fue
alimentado por los padres hasta que aprendi a volar y, por ltimo, lleg a la
madurez sexual. Al llegar la primavera el pajarillo comenz su canto buscando
pareja; cuando la hembra atrada por el canto del macho fue fecundada en el
apareamiento, posibilit el comienzo de otros nuevos ciclos vitales en otros tan-
tos pajarillos.

LA FINALIDAD EN LOS ORGANISMOS VIVOS

Todo proceso es direccional, presentndose consecuentemente la pregunta


por el sentido. El trmino sentido dice J. Ferrater Mora puede usarse para desig-
nar alguna tendencia o direccin que sigue una cosa o un proceso 43. Los seres
vivos, como organismos que son, deben ser comprendidos en la visin sistmi-
ca como totalidades organizadas jerrquicamente en las que aparece una fina-
lidad, un tlos interno 44. Jacques Monod en su libro El azar y la necesidad nos
ha hecho caer en la cuenta cmo la emergencia, la aparicin continua de nove-
dades no previsibles y la finalidad, a la que llam teleonoma, por pudor meta-
fsico, constituyen la trama sobre la que se teje la comprensin de los procesos
biolgicos. En lugar de rehusar esta nocin (como ciertos bilogos han inten-
tado hacer) es, por el contrario, indispensable reconocerla como esencial en la
definicin de los seres vivos. Diremos que se distinguen de todas las otras estruc-

42
HANS JONAS, El principio vida, op. cit. (nota 34), p. 18.
43
JOS FERRATER MORA, Diccionario de Filosofa, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1981; Entra-
da sentido, Tomo IV, p. 2992. JOS GMEZ CAFFARENA, Semntica del trmino sentido, en
Papeles del Seminario: Racionalidad cientfica y conviccin creyente, Instituto Fe y Seculari-
dad, Memoria Acadmica 1979-1980, A. G. Luis Prez, Madrid, 1980, pp. 71-81.
44
MICHEL WEBER, La vie de la nature selon le dernier Whitehead, op. cit. (nota 18).

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756 I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA

turas de todos los sistemas presentes en el universo por esta propiedad que lla-
maremos teleonoma 45. La finalidad, teleologa interna de los organismos vivos,
podemos verla en los varios niveles de organizacin. Aparece un tlos en las
estructuras macromoleculares, en los ajustes finos de la conformacin espacial
de una protena, en las interacciones de los complejos macromoleculares: pro-
tena-protena y protena-lpidos, en los mosaicos lpido-proteicos que forman
las membranas, en las interacciones de protenas con los cidos nucleicos. Hay,
as mismo, un tlos en la estructura y funcionalidad de una clula, en las inte-
racciones celulares que constituyen un organismo pluricelular, en el desarrollo
epigentico a partir del cigoto, en la organognesis y funcionamiento de los rga-
nos, en el comportamiento de los organismos, como el canto del pajarillo pro-
clamando el territorio e invitando a la hembra a la anidacin, en la construc-
cin del nido y en la interdependencia de los componentes (seres vivos y medio)
de un ecosistema. El mismo Jacques Monod en su citada obra El azar y la nece-
sidad afirma:
1. Los organismos vivos son seres dotados de un proyecto que representan
en sus estructuras y lo llevan a cabo en sus actuaciones.
2. Esta propiedad a la que Monod llama teleonoma, y no teleologa, los
distingue de todos los otros seres presentes en el universo.
3. La teleonoma es condicin necesaria pero no suficiente, puesto que no
propone criterios objetivos para distinguir a los seres vivos de otros arte-
factos producidos por la actividad del hombre.

Franois Jacob, que comparti con Monod el Premio Nobel en su obra Lgi-
ca de lo viviente, afirma que es necesario perder el pudor de que habla Monod 46:
ya hace tiempo que el bilogo se ve enfrentado a la teleologa como una mujer
de la que no puede prescindir, pero con la que no quiere ser visto en pblico. El
concepto de programa da ahora el estatuto legal a esta relacin oculta 47. El por-
qu algunos bilogos han huido del trmino finalidad o teleologa, puede enten-
derse por el predominio casi exclusivo en la ciencia de la racionalidad fsica,
que monopolizaba para s el carcter de cientfico, y sobre todo por el temor de
que, tras la explicaciones teleolgicas, pudieran entrar en el discurso cientfico
elementos ajenos a la construccin de la ciencia 48.

45
JACQUES MONOD, Le hasard et la ncessit. Essai sur la philosophie naturelle de la biolo-
gie moderne, ditions du Seuil, Paris, 1964, p. 25; IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, Azar, finalidad y
trascendencia: una visin post-monodiana de la vida, en Descifrar la vida. Ensayos de Histo-
ria de la Biologa, J. CASADESS (ed.), Universidad de Sevilla, 1994, pp. 337-352.
46
JACQUES MONOD, La teleonoma es la palabra que puede utilizarse, si, por cierto reca-
to, se quiere evitar hablar de finalidad. No obstante todo sucede como si los seres vivos estu-
viesen estructurados, organizados y condicionados de cara un fin: la supervivencia del indi-
viduo y sobre todo de la especie, en Leccin inaugural (viernes, 3 de noviembre de 1967),
Cuadernos Anagrama, n. 40, pp. 10-43.
47
FRANOIS JACOB, La lgica de lo viviente. Una historia de la herencia, Editorial Laia, Bar-
celona, 1973, p. 17.
48
HENRYK SKOLIMOWSKI, Problemas de racionalidad en biologa, op. cit. (nota 12).

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El epistemlogo Ernest Nagel en su monografa La estructura de la Ciencia 49


aborda muy claramente el problema de las explicaciones teleolgicas. Resumi-
mos brevemente su argumentacin:
1. Las explicaciones teleolgicas en Biologa son explicaciones funcionales
que no suponen propsitos intencionales.
2. Si las explicaciones teleolgicas pueden ser expresadas sin perder su con-
tenido en formulaciones no teleolgicas, entonces la pretendida equiva-
lencia debe afrontar una objecin clara: toda explicacin no finalista puede
ser reemplazada por formulaciones finalistas.
3. Luego debe haber alguna diferencia entre los enunciados teleolgicos y
los no finalistas.

Francisco Jos Ayala ha insistido a lo largo de toda su obra, cmo las expli-
caciones teleolgicas constituyen la distincin ms fundamental entre la racio-
nalidad fsica y la racionalidad biolgica 50. Para Ayala hay tres fenmenos para
los cuales sera legtima la explicacin teleolgica:
1. Cuando un estado final es anticipado por un agente.
2. Los mecanismos autorreguladores por los que un sistema abierto man-
tiene una propiedad a pesar de las fluctuaciones del medio.
3. Las estructuras anatmicas y fisiolgicas designadas para cumplimen-
tar una funcin.

Para los darwinistas es clave en sus explicaciones sobre la vida la ausencia


de toda finalidad en los seres vivos, en los organismos en particular y en el pro-
ceso evolutivo en general. Ocurre muchas veces que los epgonos de un autor
son mucho ms radicales que el autor mismo. Quisiera romper una lanza a favor
de la honestidad de C. Darwin, quien en su correspondencia con Asa Gray afir-
m expresamente lo contrario que aseveran los darwinistas ortodoxos. Asa Gray
public en la revista Nature un artculo (4 de junio de 1874) titulado sencilla-
mente: Charles Robert Darwin, en la que afirmaba que Darwin haba tenido
el mrito de unir la morfologa a la teleologa. Darwin respondi subrayando

49
ERNEST NAGEL, La estructura de la Ciencia. Problemas de la lgica de la investigacin cien-
tfica, Paidos Studio Bsico, Barcelona, 1981, pp. 365-403.
50
La obra de Francisco Jos Ayala ha sido ampliamente estudiada por DIEGO CANO ESPI-
NOSA en su Tesis Doctoral: Epistemologa del discurso biolgico de Francisco J. Ayala, Departa-
mento de Filosofa, Facultad de Filosofa y Letras, Universidad de Mlaga, 2002. Del mismo
autor, Autonoma y no reduccionismo de la Biologa en el pensamiento biofilosfico de Fran-
cisco Jos Ayala, en Pensamiento (en prensa). Pueden consultarse las siguientes obras de
FRANCISCO JOS AYALA: Teleological explanations in evolutionary Biology, en Philosophy of
Science, 37, 1970, pp. 1-15; Biology as an autonomous Science, en American Scientist, 56,
1968, pp. 207-221; Comments on Methodology in the Physical, Biological and Social Scien-
ces, en Global Systems Dynamics, E. O. ATTINGER (ed.), S. Skarger, Basel, 1970, pp. 28-33.
Puede consultarse tambin: IGNACIO DE CASTRO, La teleologa: polisemia de un trmino, en
La mediacin de la Filosofa en la construccin de la Biotica, FRANCESC ABEL y CAMINO CAN
(eds.), Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, 1993, pp. 27-39.

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758 I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA

que le era profundamente grato escuchar lo dicho por Asa Gray sobre la teleo-
loga, y que era Gray el hombre ms indicado para darse cuenta 51. La ausencia
de finalidad o teleologa no se limita a la teleologa interna (teleologa instru-
mental o funcional o teleonoma) 52, sino que tambin en el puro darwinismo se
niega desde la ciencia toda posibilidad de una teleologa externa o teleologa
histrica que dara cuenta de los procesos selectivos generadores de sistemas
ms evolucionados.
A este respecto es muy interesante la correspondencia entre dos genetistas
famosos: Theodosius Dobzhansky y John Greene 53. Una vez ms se comprueba
que las posturas ante el problema del progreso evolutivo y del sentido de la evo-
lucin dependen mayormente de la sensibilidad, convicciones previas y opcio-
nes personales, que de argumentos racionales. Uno de los problemas que se plan-
te ms agudamente en la correspondencia entre los dos amigos fue el problema
del uso de concepciones finalistas o de la teleologa en los escritos evolucionis-
tas. Greene como buen positivista confesaba que estaba desconcertado, pas-
mado y perturbado (baffled, astounded and perturbed) por el vocabulario usado
por Dobzhansky. De hecho Dobzhansky usaba trminos como fin, ensayo y error,
creatividad y mejora (purpose, trials and errors, creativity e improvement), car-
gados de una fuerte connotacin finalista, puesto que algunos procesos evolu-
tivos suponen la aparicin de algo nuevo lo que hemos llamado emergencia; en
segundo lugar, tienen una coherencia interna ya que mantienen y hacen avan-
zar la vida y finalmente pueden, de hecho, tener como resultado un xito o un
fracaso. A lo largo de la correspondencia se puede comprobar que el desacuer-
do es fruto de dos sensibilidades: desde una mentalidad positivista se comprende
la postura de John Greene, desde los presupuesto de otra racionalidad, la racio-
nalidad biolgica, se comprende la postura de Dobzhansky.
El pajarillo del cuento ejecutaba acciones que van encaminadas a un fin y
aunque las juzguemos con una fuerte carga antropolgica ya deca Teilhard
que no tenemos otro punto de mira que el hombre 54, no podemos dudar que
el canto proclamando un territorio tiene una finalidad, la de buscar pareja para
anidar. La construccin de un nido es una actividad teleolgica: prev de algu-

51
Citado por TIENNE GILSON, De Aristteles a Darwin, y vuelta, op. cit. (nota 3), p. 195.
52
ALFREDO MARCOS, Teleologa y Teleonoma en las ciencias de la vida, en Dilogo Filo-
sfico, 11, 1992, 42-57. Pittendrigh us el trmino teleonoma por vez primera en 1958, como
una reaccin a la polisemia del trmino teleologa, segn sus palabras: parece desafortuna-
do resucitar el trmino teleologa y creo que se ha abusado de l.
53
Correspondencia de JOHN GRRENE y THEODOSIUS DOBZHANZKY, publicada en Biology and
Philosophy, 11, 1196, n. 4, pp. 445-491. Puede verse IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, Evolucin y
sentido en la correspondencia de Theodosius Dobzhansky, en La nueva alianza de
las Ciencias y la Filosofa, A. BLANCH (ed.), Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, 2001,
pp. 109-114.
54
En primer lugar y de una manera subjetiva, resultamos ser inevitablemente centro de
perspectiva en relacin con nosotros mismos. () Quiralo o no, desde ese momento el Hom-
bre vuelve a encontrarse a s mismo y se contempla en todo lo que observa. PIERRE TEILHARD
DE CHARDIN, El fenmeno humano, op. cit. (nota 39), pp. 43-44.

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na manera la puesta de huevos, la incubacin y el cuidado de la prole en la fun-


cin generativa.

EL GENOMA FUNDAMENTA LA CORPOREIDAD Y COMPORTAMIENTO DEL VIVIENTE

El 25 de abril del ao 2003 se celebr el cincuenta aniversario de la publica-


cin por James Watson y Francis Crick del modelo de la doble hlice de los ci-
dos desoxirribonucleicos (DNA) 55. La hiptesis de trabajo del cristalgrafo ingls
Crick y del joven cientfico norteamericano Watson es, sin duda, una de las ms
fecundas de la ciencia contempornea. Casi un siglo fue necesario para diluci-
dar la estructura de los cidos nucleicos desde que fueron descubiertos en 1869
por Friedrich Miescher, mdico de Basilea, que trabajaba en Tbingen en el
laboratorio del gran fisilogo alemn Felix Hoppe-Seyler. A partir de la publi-
cacin del modelo de Watson y Crick se sucedieron una serie de descubrimien-
tos como la confirmacin por M. Meselson y F. W. Stahl de la duplicacin semi-
conservativa del DNA, el desciframiento del cdigo gentico por S. Ochoa, M. W.
Nirenberg y H. G. Khorana, el descubrimiento de las endonucleasas de restric-
cin por D. Nathans y H. O. Smith, y el mtodo enzimtico de secuenciacin
del DNA propuesto por Frederick Sanger, descubrimientos, que a la vez que vali-
daban el modelo, hicieron avanzar de manera espectacular en unos pocos aos
la Biologa Molecular 56.
En el ao 2001 se public el primer borrador del genoma 57 humano y en el
ao 2003, a los cincuenta aos de la publicacin del modelo de Watson y Crick,

55
RAFAEL GIRALDO, 50 aos del descubrimiento de la doble hlice del DNA, en Razn y
Fe, 248, n. 1259-1260, 2003, pp. 185-195. Tres artculos de la revista Nature podemos decir que
fueron el punto de arranque de la nueva revolucin: J. D. WATSON y F. H. C. CRICK, A structu-
re for deoxyribonucleic acid, en Nature, 171, 1953, pp. 737-738; M. H. F. WILKINS et al., Mole-
cular structure of deoxypentose nucleic acids, en Nature, 171, 1953, pp. 738-740; R. E. FRAN-
KLIN y R. G. GOSLING, Molecular configuration in sodium thymonucleate, en Nature, 171, 1953,
pp. 740-741. Pueden encontrarse copias facsmiles de los tres artculos en Nature, 421, 2003,
pp. 397-401. Sobre el genoma humano puede consultarse: IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, Anlisis
antropolgico del Proyecto Genoma Humano, en Genes y Mquinas. Aspectos ticos y socia-
les de las Biotecnologas de la informacin, ANTONIO DIGUEZ y JOS M. ATENCIA (coods.), Uni-
versidad de Mlaga, Thema, 2006, pp. 229-276.
56
MARGARITA SALAS, Historia de la Biosntesis de Protenas, en Historia de la Bioqumi-
ca, Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Fsicas y Naturales, Madrid, 1985, pp. 143-155; J. D.
WATSON y J. TOOZE, The DNA story, A documentary history of gene cloning, Freeman and Com-
pany, San Francisco, 1981; JUAN-RAMN LACADENA CALERO, Historia nobelada de la Gentica:
concepto y mtodo, Instituto de Espaa, Real Academia de Farmacia, Madrid, 1995.
57
En primera aproximacin nos referimos al genoma como: Conjunto de los genes de
un individuo o de una especie, contenido en un juego haploide de cromosomas, en Diccio-
nario de la Lengua Espaola, Real Academia Espaola, 22. ed. IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, Refle-
xiones ticas en torno a la Declaracin Universal sobre el Genoma Humano, en La Moral cris-
tiana como propuesta, F. J. ALARCOS (ed.), San Pablo, Madrid, 2004, pp. 477- 510; El Proyecto
Genoma Humano, discurso bioqumico y discurso antropolgico, en La Fe interpelada, Jor-
nadas de Estudio y Dilogo entre Profesores Universitarios, El Paular, 2-5 de junio de 1992,
Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, 1993, pp. 29-48.

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vea la luz la secuencia completa de las bases adenina (A), timina (T), guanina
(G) y citosina (C) del genoma humano con una fiabilidad de ms del 99,9%.
Como ha escrito recientemente Francis Collins la era genmica es ahora una
realidad y ha comenzado una revolucin en la investigacin biolgica 58.En
Septiembre del ao 2005 la revista Nature publicaba el primer borrador de la
secuencia del genoma del chimpanc (Pan troglodytes), el primate ms cercano
evolutivamente a Homo sapiens 59. El trmino genoma significa en general: el
conjunto de la informacin gentica de un organismo. El trmino genoma fue
originariamente usado para referirse al conjunto haploide de cromosomas en
un organismo eucariota, ms el pequeo cromosoma mitocondrial. Tal como
se ha venido usando el trmino genoma desde el comienzo del Proyecto Geno-
ma Humano se refiere tanto: 1) al mapa fsico de la localizacin de los genes en
los cromosomas; 2) como a la secuencia completa de pares de bases del DNA;
recordemos que el DNA es una doble cadena y que las bases adenina y timina
se emparejan mediante dos puentes de hidrgeno (A = T) y las bases guanina y
citosina se emparejan mediante tres puentes de hidrgeno (G C). Es decir, el
genoma debe ser entendido en su doble aspecto, como material gentico y como
informacin gentica y conjunto de genes que constituyen una especie biolgica
determinada como puede ser el Homo sapiens 60. Estaran de acuerdo todos los
bilogos moleculares en definir funcionalmente un gen como un segmento de
DNA que contiene informacin biolgica y que, por tanto, codifica para la sn-
tesis de los diferentes tipos de RNA y/o una cadena polipeptdica. Esta defini-
cin muy usada hoy da tiene el peligro de dejar fuera de la definicin de gen
las secuencias de DNA cuya funcin no es codificar para la sntesis de RNAs o
protenas, sino de servir de reguladores de la transcripcin del DNA, como son
los segmentos del DNA antecedentes al inicio de un gen a los que se une la enzi-
ma RNA polimerasa para iniciar la transcripcin.
Sabemos que el genoma humano est compuesto por unos 3.200 millones de
pares de nucletidos y que consta aproximadamente de 25.000 genes en el sen-
tido de marcos abiertos de lectura (ORF) o secuencias delimitadas por un codn
de iniciacin y un codn de terminacin. Podemos preguntarnos qu parte del
genoma corresponde a genes estructurales con informacin, y qu parte del geno-
ma corresponde a secuencias relacionadas con genes. Las secuencias con infor-
macin de los genes estructurales representan aproximadamente 48 Mpb, es
decir, el 1,5% de todo el genoma. Las secuencias relacionadas con genes repre-
sentan el 36% de todo el genoma con una extensin de 1152 Mpb. El resto del
genoma 2000 Mpb (62,5%) es conocido como DNA intragnico 61. No conocemos

58
FRANCIS S. COLLINS, ERIC D. GREEN, ALAN E. GUTTMACHER y MARK S. GUYER, A vision for
the future of genomic research, Nature, 422, 2003, pp. 835-847.
59
The chimpanzee sequencing and analysis Consortium, Initial sequence of the chim-
panzee genome and comparison with the human genome, Nature, 437, 2005, pp. 69-87.
60
A. D. SMITH y otros (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 260.
61
T. A. BROWN, Genomes, 2. ed., John Wiley and Sons Inc., New York, 2002, p. 23.

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cul sea la funcin fisiolgica de esta gran cantidad de DNA, cerca de dos tercios
a los que no se les ve, por ahora, que contengan ninguna misin en el genoma o
en el desarrollo del organismo. Puede ser que esta porcin notable del genoma
tenga una funcin tan sutil que al presente se nos escape.
Podemos, pues, referirnos al genoma de un ser vivo y, por tanto, del hombre
como el fundamento de corporeidad, en el sentido de que en el genoma est con-
tenida toda la informacin de lo que ha de ser este determinado organismo a lo
largo de su desarrollo epigentico. El genoma diploide se establece en la unin
de los dos proncleos, el masculino y el femenino en la formacin del cigoto
durante el proceso de fecundacin que ms adelante se describir. La constitu-
cin del nuevo genoma por la unin de los dos genomas haploides, materno y
paterno, es, pues, condicin necesaria para la constitucin del nuevo individuo.
Puede, pues, afirmarse que el nuevo programa se constituye en el proceso de la
fecundacin. En los organismos pluricelulares todas las clulas que van for-
mando el nuevo individuo en su desarrollo ontogentico contienen el mismo
programa escrito en la secuencias de bases de los cidos desoxirribonucleicos
(DNA). La implementacin del programa a lo largo del desarrollo tiene lugar
mediante la respuesta de las capacidades contenidas en el genoma a las seales
recibidas en el entorno del organismo que se est desarrollando. No podemos
olvidar que una de las caractersticas del organismo vivo es la de responder como
un todo al conjunto de seales recibidas que pueden ser iones, nutrientes, cam-
bios energticos del entorno e informacin tanto qumica (accin de una hor-
mona en un receptor de membrana), como fsica (respuesta a una radiacin,
como puede ser la luz solar); esta respuesta del genoma a las interacciones
ambientales constituye el desarrollo epigentico que estudiaremos a continua-
cin. Aunque cada clula del organismo adulto contiene todo el genoma, sin
embargo ese genoma est programado para expresarse como un tipo celular
determinado y no son capaces estas clulas programadas de desarrollar un indi-
viduo completo; las clulas del organismo han perdido la totipotencia. Encon-
tramos la totipotencia solamente en las clulas de los meristemos de las plan-
tas, blastmeros de los mamferos (clulas de las primeras divisiones celulares
en los embriones de los mamferos) y en el cigoto, la clula totipotente por anto-
nomasia. As pues, aunque el genoma es condicin necesaria para el desarrollo
de un nuevo organismo, no es condicin suficiente, necesita desplegarse en el
proceso de desarrollo epigentico.
Sin embargo, podemos afirmar, con las salvedades arriba sealadas, que
cuando un nuevo genoma es constituido en la singamia, como es el caso del
cigoto, nos encontramos con un nuevo individuo de la especie biolgica a estu-
diar que se ir desarrollando epigenticamente, como sistema abierto, en el con-
tinuo intercambio de materia, energa e informacin. Si comparamos al geno-
ma con un programa informtico diramos que el programa debe implementarse
en el tiempo para desplegar todo el contenido del programa; igualmente si com-
paramos el genoma con la partitura de una sinfona, diramos que para or la
sinfona es imprescindible la interpretacin instrumental de la partitura.

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762 I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA

El genoma es, pues, el fundamento de la corporeidad y, por tanto, de la diver-


sidad biolgica; pero, como decamos anteriormente, es condicin necesaria,
pero no suficiente. En cada momento del desarrollo ontogentico, cada clula
del nuevo organismo ir expresando un conjunto diferente de cidos ribonu-
cleicos mensajeros (mRNA) correspondientes a los genes que estn activos en
ese momento. As como el genoma es el mismo para todas las clulas de un orga-
nismo y no vara a lo largo del tiempo, salvo en el caso de una mutacin pun-
tual, en cambio el transcriptoma (conjunto de mRNA), as como el proteoma
(conjunto de protenas) son conjuntos dinmicos y dependen del momento vital
de cada clula; se da, por tanto, en el proteoma, as como en el transcriptoma
una interdependencia espacio-temporal, es decir, una influencia de la historia
vivida por cada organismo en su continua interaccin con el medio.
A pesar de que conocemos el genoma, es difcil que podamos conocer com-
pletamente el transcriptoma, puesto que este ir variando segn el momento de
desarrollo epigentico del organismo humano y ms complejo an ser cono-
cer las diferentes expresiones en el tiempo del genoma, es decir el proteoma de
un individuo. Sin embargo, s podemos afirmar que la corporeidad y la singu-
laridad de un organismo estn fundamentadas en su genoma, establecido en el
proceso de fecundacin; genoma que ir manifestndose en una secuencia tem-
poral en los sucesivos transcriptomas y, consecuentemente, proteomas que irn
constituyendo el nuevo organismo en su desarrollo temporal.

LA EPIGNESIS

La epignesis es el proceso de desarrollo de un individuo a partir de la clula


originaria o cigoto por la interaccin de los genes y su entorno. Fue C. H. Wad-
dington quien desenterr el vocablo usado por Aristteles, epignesis, aplicado
al desarrollo: Hace algunos aos (hacia 1947) introduje la palabra epigenti-
ca, derivada del trmino aristotlico epignesis, y que ha cado ms o menos
en desuso, como un nombre adecuado para la rama de la Biologa que estudia
interacciones causales entre los genes y sus productos, interacciones que dan el
ser al fenotipo 62. Mediante el desarrollo epigentico la estructura del organis-
mo en cuestin ir diferencindose y hacindose ms y ms compleja. Arist-
teles, luego de observar el desarrollo de los pollos, formul la teora de la epi-
gnesis. Esta teora sostena que un nuevo organismo se poda desarrollar
partiendo de una porcin de material viviente amorfo, mediante un proceso de
diferenciacin de sus partes 63.

62
C. H. WADDINGTON, Las ideas bsicas de la Biologa, en C. D. WADDINGTON y otros,
Hacia una Biologa terica, op. cit. (nota 17), p. 27.
63
GIOVANNI BLANDINO, S.J., Problemas y Teoras sobre la Naturaleza de la Vida, op. cit.
(nota 4), pp. 33-36. Puede verse: E. M. RADL, Historias de las Ideas Biolgicas, op. cit. (nota 9),
tomo I, pp. 241-249. Puede consultarse: CHRISTIAN KUMMER, Philosophie der organischen Ent-
wicklung, Kon-Wissenchaften in Philosophischer Perspektive Texte 2, Verlag W. Kohlham-
mer Gmbh, Stuttgart Berlin Kln, 1996.

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I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA 763

El desarrollo epigentico se lleva a cabo, pues, por interaccin del DNA con
el medio en respuesta a las seales recibidas, seales autocrinas, paracrinas,
endocrinas y ectocrinas. Toda interaccin de los genes con el entorno deter-
mina el fenotipo. Segn Waddington, desacreditado durante cuarenta aos, este
trmino reencuentra un vivo inters y evoluciona. En filosofa de la Biologa
designa toda variabilidad estructural del sistema (por tanto, de complejidad) feno-
tpica, sin variacin del genoma. La Biologa molecular lo limita a las variacio-
nes heredables reversibles de la expresin gnica sin mutaciones en la secuen-
cia del DNA 64. La epignesis representa, por tanto, el proceso mediante el cual
el organismo se va adaptando a su entorno y expresando su programa a partir
de sus propias capacidades 65. Las reglas que gobiernan la regulacin fisiolgi-
ca y celular, y los niveles ms elevados de organizacin no residen en el geno-
ma sino en las redes interactivas epigenticas que organizan las respuestas gen-
micas a las seales del medio a lo largo del desarrollo 66.
La complejidad biolgica, ese tercer abismo de la complejidad del que habla-
ba Teilhard de Chardin 67, depende menos del nmero de genes y mucho ms de
cmo esos genes se expresan a lo largo del desarrollo debido a los mecanismos
epigenticos. Como ejemplo de lo que acabamos de decir est el hecho de nues-
tra diferenciacin con los primates superiores. Muy recientemente se ha termi-
nado de secuenciar el genoma del chimpanc. Dentro de los segmentos codifi-
cantes de DNA para protenas las diferencias con el genoma humano son
aproximadamente de 1,06%. Como afirma T. A. Brown: esto es solamente parte
del problema, porque muchas de las diferencias claves yacen en los cambios suti-
les en los patrones de expresin gnica que estn implicados en el proceso de
desarrollo y en la especificacin e interconexiones dentro del sistema nervioso 68.
As, pues, los estudios en epigentica nos estn revelando otro nivel de informa-
cin gentica en el interior de los cromosomas mucho ms maleable que la infor-
macin lineal contenida en la secuencia de bases del DNA. En efecto, la infor-
macin del DNA no consiste en un texto lineal esttico, sino que por el contrario
es una compleja mquina bioqumica que opera en un espacio tridimensional y
consta de distintos elementos dinmicos que interaccionan entre s 69. Hoy da

64
PHILIPPE DALLEUR, Fcondit de la notion bord des formes vivantes chez Thom, en
Revue Philosophique de Louven, 104 (2), 2006, pp. 312-346.
65
MIKHAIL SPIVAKOV y AMANDA G. FISHER, Epigenetic signatures of stem-cell identity, en
Nature reviews Genetics, 8, 2007, pp. 263-271.
66
RICHARD STROHMAN, Epigenesis: The missing Beat in Biotechnology?, en Biotechno-
logy, 12, 1994, pp. 156-163.
67
PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, El grupo zoolgico humano, Taurus, 5. ed., Madrid, 1967,
p. 37.
68
T. A. BROWN, Genomes, op. cit. (nota 61), p. 480; IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO, La Biofiloso-
fa de Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, en Pensamiento, vol. 61, n. 230, 2005, pp. 231-252; Teilhard
de Chardin: el hombre de Ciencia y el hombre de Fe, Cuadernos de Fe y Cultura, Universidad Ibe-
roamerica, Iteso, Mxico, 2006.
69
W. WAYT GIBBS, El nacimiento de la epigentica, en Investigacin y Ciencia, abril
2004, pp. 17-23.

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764 I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA

conocemos tambin que adems de la informacin del DNA que da lugar a pro-
tenas, hay un segundo plano de informacin en el DNA que se transcribe en RNA
activos que alteran el comportamiento de los genes codificadores lo que ha veni-
do en llamarse el genoma oculto 70; el DNA redundante que antao se desech por
ignorarse su funcin, podra convertirse en el fundamento de la complejidad
humana. Por otra parte, conocemos tambin que el silenciamiento de algunos
genes es de capital importancia para explicar los cambios fenotpicos que se dan
a lo largo del desarrollo en hermanos gemelos monocigticos.
Los dos mecanismos bioqumicos mejor conocidos para explicar la epigne-
sis son: en primer lugar, la metilacin de citosinas en el DNA de las clulas ger-
minales 71 y en el embrin temprano; y, en segundo lugar, en la acetilacin 72 o
metilacin 73 de las histonas (H2A, H2B, H3 y H4), protenas que junto con el
DNA forman los nucleosomas que componen los cromosomas. De esta manera
la epignesis guarda mayor relacin con la historia del individuo, la ontogne-
sis, que con la historia de la especie, la filognesis.
As, pues, la construccin de un ser vivo es un proceso dinmico de auto-
construccin, que no tiene un determinismo fijista o preformista 74. La infor-
macin no est fijada de antemano. En efecto, la informacin no est prede-
terminada en la secuencia de nucletidos del genoma heredado de los progenitores,
al modo como est fijada de antemano, por ejemplo en los planos de la cons-
truccin de un edificio. Las configuraciones de los materiales no son estables, ni
estticas sino activas porque contienen informacin gentica, esta se amplifica,
se retroalimenta y se regula 75. La informacin se implementa a lo largo de la
ontognesis.
Recientemente el profesor Diego Gracia ha defendido la llamada informa-
cin extragentica. Refirindose al proceso que va desde la informacin geno-
tpica a la informacin fenotpica, afirma: Es un proceso complejo en el que
intervienen distintas informaciones, unas genticas, pero otras claramente extra-
genticas. Cuando las ltimas no hacen acto de presencia, el fenotipo se altera,

70
W. WAYT GIBBS, El genoma oculto, en Investigacin y Ciencia, enero 2004, pp. 7-13.
71
PETER L. JONES, GERT C. JAN VEENSTRA y PAUL A. WADE et al., Methylated DNA and MeCP2
recruit histone deacytylase to repress transcription, en Nature Genetics, 19, 1998, pp. 187-
191; EN LI, The mojo of methylation, en Nature Genetics, 23, 1999, 5-6.
72
J. BLAND, About Gender: Epigenesis, 2003; http://www.gender,org.uk/abou/38aepgen.htm.
MARA ELENA TORRES PADILLA, ANDREW J. BANNISTER, PAUL J. BURD, TONY KOUZARIDES y MAGDALENA
ZERNICKA-GOETZ, Dynamic distribution of the replacement histone H3.3 in the mouse oocyte
and preimplantation embryos, en International Journal of Developmental Biology, 50, 2006,
pp. 451-461.
73
KATHERINE L. ARNEY, SIQIN BAO, ANDREW J. BANNISTER, TONY KOUZARIDES y AZIM SURANI,
Histone methylation defines epigenitic asymmetry in the mouse zygote, en International
Journal of Developmental Biology, 46, 2002, pp. 317-320.
74
NATALIA LPEZ MORATALLA y MARA J. IRABURU ELIZALDE, Los quince primeros das de una
vida humana, EUNSA, Pamplona, 2004, p. 42.
75
NATALIA LPEZ MORATALLA, Indeterminacin biolgica y alma humana, en Sobre el
alma, ALFONSO PREZ LABORDA (ed.), Facultad de Teologa San Dmaso, Collectanea Matriten-
sia, Madrid, 2005, pp. 119-162.

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I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA 765

o simplemente resulta inviable. Esto quiere decir que ambas informaciones, la


gentica y la extragentica, son necesarias para la aparicin de un organismo
vivo y el defecto de una de las dos hace imposible el logro de la nueva realidad
biolgica 76. Segn Diego Gracia la negacin de la existencia de esa informa-
cin extragentica y la afirmacin de que la informacin gentica sera condi-
cin no slo necesaria sino tambin suficiente para constituir un nuevo ser vivo,
dara lugar a un nuevo preformismo distinto del antiguo, pero tambin deter-
minista. El profesor Diego Gracia asevera que para los bilogos epigenetistas
actuales el genoma es condicin necesaria y suficiente para el desarrollo del
organismo vivo. Llambamos preformacionistas, en ese sentido nuevo o dis-
tinto del clsico, a quienes consideran que el genoma tiene la informacin nece-
saria y suficiente para constituir un nuevo ser vivo 77. La Embriologa compa-
rada nos describe claramente el desarrollo embrionario de los animales, no
mamferos, como los ovparos en los que la informacin est toda ella conteni-
da en el huevo, y no reciben otras seales extragenticas que las correspondientes
al oxgeno, la temperatura y humedad del medio, como el huevo del que naci
el pajarillo del cuento que fue incubado por sus padres. En los mamferos pla-
centarios, s vamos a encontrar desde el comienzo de la vida del nuevo orga-
nismo un dilogo molecular entre la madre y el embrin. Este dilogo no corres-
ponde a una nueva informacin extragentica aadida al programa impreso en
el genoma, sino a la implementacin o desarrollo del programa mediante las
seales autocrinas, paracrinas, endocrinas y ectocrinas, seales que no son gen-
ticas, sino que median en el desarrollo epigentico.
La comprensin actual de la epigentica no consiste, como algunos han malen-
tendido, en volver a la antigua tesis del preformismo o del homnculo 78. La epi-
gentica nos lleva a una nueva comprensin del dinamismo interno de la imple-
mentacin del programa gentico por la interaccin con el medio en lo que van
a intervenir, como hemos indicado, factores autocrinos, seales que se produ-
cen dentro de una misma clula; factores paracrinos, seales que van de clula
a clula, siendo muy importante la topologa celular en el embrin para aclarar
las interacciones entre los blastmeros; factores endocrinos hormonas produ-
cidas por el mismo individuo en desarrollo, y factores ectocrinos provenientes
del exterior. En el caso de los mamferos tendr una gran importancia la inte-
rrelacin molecular con factores ectocrinos maternos, ya desde la fecundacin
en el oviducto y a travs de la placenta posteriormente a la anidacin. Decamos

76
DIEGO GRACIA, Como arqueros al blanco. Estudios de biotica, edicin de Jos Lzaro,
Triacastela, Madrid, 2004, pp. 370-371. Del mismo autor, El estatuto de las clulas madre
embrionarias, en Gen-tica, CARLOS ALONSO y FEDERICO MAYOR (coords.), Editorial Ariel, Bar-
celona, 2003, pp. 67-93.
77
Ibidem, p. 374.
78
Las confusiones en este tema, por otra parte tan delicado, son difciles de deshacer si
no se desmonta primero la equivocacin de percibir el comienzo de la fecundacin como si
fuera una chistera de prestidigitador, de la que, poco a poco sale todo cuando estaba oculta-
mente encerrado all antes. JUAN MASI CLAVEL, S.J., Tertulias de biotica. Manejar la vida, cui-
dar de las personas, Sal Terrae, Santander, 2005, p. 115.

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766 I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA

anteriormente que todo ser vivo es un sistema abierto en continuo intercambio


de materia, energa e informacin que va modulando la expresin del genoma
fundamento de la corporeidad. A diferencia de lo que sucede en la construc-
cin de un ser inerte o un artefacto, que sigue una actividad y un plan externo
a l mismo, el ser viviente se autoorganiza determinando su propia informa-
cin, disponiendo los elementos materiales para que el proceso vital contine 79.
El pajarillo del cuento se desarroll dentro del huevo en el nido que construye-
ron sus progenitores a partir del genoma que haba heredado, sus progenitores
le suministraron las condiciones de humedad y calor en el proceso de incuba-
cin; las clulas del embrin respiraban el oxgeno que permeaba a travs del
cascarn del huevo y creci como un individuo de la misma especie biolgica
que sus padres desplegando los mismos colores en sus plumas y la misma armo-
na en su canto con los mismos gorjeos, trinos y floreos que primavera tras pri-
mavera lo haban hecho sus antecesores.
La epignesis representa, por tanto, el proceso de sintonizacin final median-
te el cual cada individuo se va adaptando de forma eficiente a su entorno a par-
tir de las capacidades contenidas en su programa gentico. La aparicin de
nueva informacin con el proceso mismo, implica el refuerzo incesante de la infor-
macin del inicio: una informacin emergente no contenida en el genoma en la
situacin de partida, sino en su proceso de constitucin y desarrollo 80. Los sis-
temas ms evidentes de capacidad de aprendizaje molecular lo constituye el sis-
tema inmunitario y el sistema nervioso central. En el caso del sistema nervioso
central, esta capacidad de aprendizaje es de capital importancia, pues el nme-
ro de conexiones sinpticas en el cerebro humano supera con creces el nmero
de nucletidos del genoma; el nmero de pares de nucletidos es 3.200 millones,
el nmero de neuronas supera los 100.000 millones y el nmero de conexiones
sinpticas supera los 100 billones. Nos asomamos de nuevo al abismo de la com-
plejidad teilhardiano.

VIVIR ES EVOLUCIONAR

Hemos visto que todo viviente debe ser considerado como un proceso. El ser
vivo, como todo proceso, no puede ser definido atemporalmente. El viviente lo
definimos desde el tiempo y depender de la escala de observacin del tiempo
que utilicemos la consideracin total del proceso concreto. Consecuentemente
depender de la ventana temporal que apliquemos al ser vivo, el que veamos
nicamente su reactividad inmediata a los estmulos, al que llamaremos tiem-
po metablico. La consideracin del devenir del organismo desde su comienzo
hasta su fin nos definir su tiempo ontogentico. Si consideramos poblaciones

79
NATALIA LPEZ MORATALLA y MARA J. IRABURU ELIZALDE, Los quince primeros das de una
vida humana, op. cit. (nota 74), p. 43.
80
NATALIA LPEZ MORATALLA, Indeterminacin biolgica y alma humana, op. cit. (nota 75),
p. 145.

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I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA 767

de individuos y los mecanismos hereditarios en virtud de los cuales se transmi-


ten los caracteres genticos de padres a hijos, tendremos como resultado un
tiempo gentico. Por ltimo, en una escala cronolgica que abarque centenares
de generaciones, se registrarn los lentos procesos de cambio en los caracteres
de los individuos de una poblacin determinada, pudiendo hacer que esta pobla-
cin se escinda en dos grupos, no fecundos entre s, o especies biolgicas dife-
rentes 81. Es el tiempo filogentico o tiempo evolutivo.
Vivir es permanecer en un proceso continuo de cambio. Vivir es, pues, evo-
lucionar; el tiempo como categora biolgica es el tiempo de la evolucin. Sera
interesante antes de seguir adelante reflexionar sobre qu queremos decir cuan-
do decimos que vivir es evolucionar. La evolucin no es nada ms que la visin
humana en la escala temporal filogentica de esa continua emergencia de nove-
dad propia de todo viviente. Nada en Biologa tiene sentido si no es a la luz de
la evolucin deca Theodosius Dobzhansky 82. Desde el punto de vista etimol-
gico el trmino evolucin proviene de la raz latina evolvere que significa la
accin o efecto de desenvolverse, desarrollarse, desplegarse algo. La palabra evo-
lucin implica la idea de proceso gradual y ordenado a diferencia de revolucin
que indica ms bien despliegue sbito y posiblemente violento.
La historia del trmino evolucin aplicado a los fenmenos biolgicos tom
cuerpo de doctrina en el siglo XIX, cuando Charles Darwin la aplica al origen o
transformacin de las especies de vegetales y animales. El trmino evolucin,
tomado de la filosofa de Spencer 83, aparece en los escritos de Darwin en la sexta
edicin del Origen de las especies, publicada diez aos despus que la primera
(1859) 84. Podemos igualmente leer a Lamarck sin encontrar el trmino evolu-
cin. Probablemente Darwin, conociendo el trmino no quiso usarlo en las pri-
meras ediciones, porque en el pensamiento biolgico de la primera mitad del
siglo XIX, el trmino evolucin era usado en biologa del desarrollo, en contra-
posicin a los preformistas. Sin embargo, despus de la introduccin del tr-
mino por Darwin, han quedado fijados los trminos evolucin, para indicar el
origen de las diferentes especies y evolucionismo, para indicar la doctrina que
afirma que los diferentes organismos vivos proceden por cambios sucesivos de

81
Sobre las escalas temporales en Biologa puede consultarse: C. H. WADDINGTON, La natu-
raleza de la vida, Editorial Norte y Sur, La Aventura de la Ciencia, Madrid, 1963, pp. 36-37.
Sobre las teoras evolutivas puede verse: MIGUEL DE RENZI, El neodarwinismo y las crticas
impuestas a su reduccionismo radical por la paleontologa y la Biologa del desarrollo, en
Evolucionismo y Cultura, op. cit. (nota 14), p. 80. ALFREDO MARCOS, Sobre el concepto de espe-
cie en Biologa, en La mediacin de la Filosofa en la construccin de la Biotica, op. cit.
(nota 50), pp. 41-60.
82
Citado por NATALIA LPEZ MORATALLA, La dinmica de la evolucin humana. Ms con
menos, EUNSA, Pamplona, 2007, p. 52.
83
Un ao antes de abandonar su puesto en el Economist, Spencer comenz a publicar
unos Principios de Psicologa, posteriormente incorporados a su sistema, en los que, con ante-
rioridad a la formulacin por Darwin de su doctrina de la seleccin natural (1859), concibi
la idea de una interpretacin general de la realidad a base del principio de evolucin. JOS
FERRATER MORA, Diccionario de Filosofa, tomo IV, op. cit. (nota 43), p. 3107.
84
TIENNE GILSON, De Aristteles a Darwin, y vuelta, op. cit. (nota 3), p.117.

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768 I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA

otros organismos anteriores, en contraposicin al fijismo. Los trminos evolu-


cin y evolucionismo se refieren a los organismos vivientes y son usados, desde
entonces, como categoras biolgicas. tienne Gilson atina muy bien cuando
afirma: la verdad esencial que crea poner en evidencia Darwin era doble: pri-
mero que con el paso del tiempo las especies han cambiado; y segundo, que stas
se han modificado en virtud de un fenmeno general que l (Darwin) llamaba
la seleccin natural 85.
Es interesante hacer notar que fue el cambio de escala temporal, por influen-
cia del gelogo Charles Lyell, el que hizo ver a Charles Darwin el mundo con
los ojos de un bilogo desde el tiempo filogentico, o tiempo evolutivo. Mira-
das las poblaciones de individuos a escalas de tiempo gentico es muy difcil
asistir al maravilloso espectculo de la evolucin. Hemos de tomar la distan-
cia de las grandes escalas temporales, con la ayuda sobre todo de la Paleonto-
loga, para poder atisbar el proceso evolutivo tanto la anagnesis (o evolu-
cin dentro de la especie) como la cladognesis (o aparicin de una nueva
especie). Como muy bien apuntaba Bergson, el filosofo autor de lvolution
cratrice, la idea del evolucionismo se halla en germen en la clasificacin gene-
ral de los seres vivos llevada a cabo por los naturalistas. El naturalista aproxi-
ma entre s los organismos que se asemejan y luego divide el grupo en sub-
grupos, en el interior de los cuales es mayor an la semejanza, pero a los
naturalistas, desde Aristteles a Carlos Linneo, les falt mirar el universo con
una ventana temporal de centenares y miles de aos. No podemos olvidar que
hasta bien entrado el siglo XIX se calculaba que haban pasado unos seis mil
aos desde la creacin del mundo!
En el estudio de la evolucin hemos de distinguir dos facetas: en primer lugar,
el hecho biolgico en s mismo, que nos dice que todos los organismos vivos,
microorganismos, plantas y animales, proceden por evolucin de un tronco comn
desde que comenzara la vida sobre el planeta Tierra hace unos 3.500 millones de
aos. Hemos de considerar tambin antes de la aparicin de la vida una evolu-
cin qumica prebiolgica, proceso por el cual se fueron seleccionando las macro-
molculas, sillares fundamentales de los organismos vivos. Cmo pudo esto acon-
tecer es hoy da sujeto de numerosas investigaciones y se apuntan diferentes
teoras explicativas. En segundo lugar, hemos de estudiar las diferentes teoras
propuestas para explicar este hecho biolgico, hecho que tiene las caractersti-
cas de todo hecho histrico, siendo la ms relevante el ser irrepetible. Por otra
parte, una teora es un conjunto de doctrinas basadas en hiptesis falsables por
la experiencia, que tienen coherencia interna y que pueden dar explicacin de
los hechos observados; qu duda cabe que a escala pequea, en el laboratorio,
pueden producirse pasos evolutivos por seleccin natural.
En este sentido la evolucin hemos de afirmarla hoy da como un hecho his-
trico que pertenece a la historia natural, como fue un hecho histrico la cada
del Imperio romano o la batalla de las Navas de Tolosa. Como todo hecho his-

85
Ibidem, p. 122.

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trico son hechos nicos y, por tanto, irrepetibles, aunque nadie duda de que
ambos acontecimientos tuvieron lugar. Son verdades cuyo estatuto epistemo-
lgico es diferente a las verdades de la Fsica. Los vestigios de la civilizacin
romana nos hablan de la historia del Imperio. Los relatos de la batalla de las
Navas de Tolosa narrados por los protagonistas de la misma, las huellas arque-
olgicas encontradas en el lugar de la batalla, nos confirman el hecho que tuvo
lugar el 16 de julio de 1212 entre los ejrcitos cristianos y los almohades capi-
taneados por Miramamoln. Igualmente, las huellas fsiles, pertenecientes a
organismos que vivieron en el pasado, nos permiten construir la historia filo-
gentica de los organismos actuales. Pero es ms, las tcnicas modernas de
secuenciacin de los genomas y protenas de los seres vivos actuales, permiten
ver las homologas, diferencias y puntos de divergencia, a escala molecular, de
los organismos vivos y reconstruir desde este corte sincrnico la diacrona del
proceso evolutivo.
La evolucin es, pues, un hecho histrico; todo est en continuo cambio y
devenir. Otro aspecto, muy distinto, es considerar las diversas teoras que en la
actualidad nos explican cmo ha podido acontecer el hecho evolutivo. Para res-
ponder a la segunda cuestin: cmo ha tenido lugar el hecho evolutivo?, se han
propuestos varias teoras. Lamarckismo y darwinismo aparecen como dos gran-
des conjuntos de explicacin. Lamarck crey en la herencia de los caracteres
adquiridos. Teora no confirmada por la experiencia. Darwin acudi a la criba
de la seleccin natural de las variedades, a semejanza de la seleccin artificial
tan en boga entre los horticultores centroeuropeos del siglo XIX. Darwin no cono-
ci la obra de Gregorio Mendel, por lo tanto le falt el apoyo conceptual de la
gentica para explicar las variaciones encontradas en los seres vivos. El neo-
darwinismo conserva el concepto de seleccin natural como mecanismo cerni-
dor o criba de todas las posibles mutaciones al azar. El neodarwinismo ha sido
capaz de sintetizar el hecho evolutivo y la gentica como ciencia explicativa de
la herencia.
Hans Jonas en la Introduccin a su libro El principio vida sintetiza una serie
de caractersticas que para l describen lo que es la vida:
Entregada a s misma y en completa dependencia de su propio rendi-
miento, para cuya prestacin est sin embargo en manos de condiciones que
no puede controlar y que se le pueden negar; dependiente por tanto del favor
o disfavor de la realidad externa; expuesta al mundo, contra el cual y simult-
neamente a travs del cual tiene que ir afirmndose; independizada de la cau-
salidad del mundo a la vez que sometida a ella; habiendo salido de la identi-
dad de la materia y necesitada de ella; libre, pero dependiente, aislada, si bien
precisada de contacto; buscando el contacto, amenazada de destruccin por
l, y no menos amenazada por la carencia del mismo; puesta en peligro por
todos los lados, tanto por el poder, como por la fragilidad del mundo, y situa-
da en la ms floja de las cuerdas entre uno y otro riesgo; fcilmente perturba-
ble en su proceso, que sin embargo no debe detenerse nunca; vulnerable en su
reparto organizado de funciones, que slo es eficaz en su totalidad; en su cen-
tro mortalmente atacable y en su temporalidad expuesta en cualquier instan-
te al final; as es cmo la forma viva lleva su atrevida existencia particular en

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770 I. NEZ DE CASTRO, GNESIS DE LA VIDA DESDE LA DINMICA PROCESUAL DE LA MATERIA

la materia, paradjica, lbil, insegura, rodeada de peligros, finita, profunda-


mente hermanada con la muerte 86.

Como decamos al principio, no somos capaces de definir la vida. Cuando nos


enfrentamos a un organismo vivo un cierto apofatismo se apodera de nosotros,
pero s podemos, a pesar de lo elusiva que resulta la comprensin total de un
organismo vivo, describir aquellos rasgos que nos hacen distinguir el Moiss de
Miguel ngel, que nunca habl, de un pajarillo que canta y revolotea por el bos-
que. sta es la tarea de la Biofilosofa o Filosofa Natural de la vida en nuestro
tiempo.

c/ Virgen de las Flores, 23 IGNACIO NEZ DE CASTRO


29007 Mlaga (Spain)
ignacastro@prebesi.org

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

86
HANS JONAS, El principio vida, op. cit. (nota 34), p. 18.

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A DARWINIAN PROCESS: THE MOLECULAR


EVOLUTION OF ENZYMES
JOAN BERTRN
Universitat Autnoma de Barcelona

ABSTRACT: New concepts as ambiguity, promiscuity and plasticity have allowed getting a deeper insight
in the mechanism of the Darwinian process implied in the molecular evolution of enzymes. Directed
evolution in the laboratory collapses the time scale for evolution from millions of years to months or even
weeks due that the key processes: mutations, recombination, screening or selection are carefully controlled
by the experimenter. In order to get a more meaningful vision a more enlarged scientific background is
presented. The philosophical reflections focus on the increasing information in the evolution process,
which goes beyond the dualism matter-spirit, and on the successive emergences. Finally some ethical
and theological reflections are proposed.
KEY WORDS: darwinian process, enzyme promiscuity, molecular evolution, information, emergence,
biotechnology, creation, intelligent design.

Un proceso darwiniano: evolucin molecular de los enzimas


RESUMEN: Nuevos conceptos tales como ambigedad, promiscuidad y plasticidad han permitido
proponer una visin ms profunda del proceso Darwiniano que se da en la evolucin molecular de
las enzimas. La evolucin dirigida en el laboratorio recorta la escala temporal de la evolucin de millo-
nes de aos a meses o incluso semanas, debido a que los procesos claves: mutaciones, recombi-
nacin, ensayo individualizado o seleccin estn perfectamente controlados por el experimentador.
Para obtener una visin ms rica se presenta un panorama cientfico ms amplio. Las reflexiones filo-
sficas se centran en el aumento de informacin a travs de la evolucin, que supera el dualismo
materia-espritu, y en las sucesivas emergencias. Finalmente se proponen algunas reflexiones ticas
y teolgicas.
PALABRAS CLAVE: proceso darwiniano, promiscuidad de las enzimas, evolucin molecular, informa-
cin, emergencia, biotecnologa, creacin, diseo Inteligente.

1. INTRODUCTION

Molecular evolution emerged as a scientific field in the 1960s as researchers


from molecular biology, evolutionary biology and population genetics sought to
understand recent discoveries on the structure and function of nucleic acids and
proteins. Some of the key topics that spurred development in the field have been
the evolution of enzyme functions and the use of nucleic acid divergence as a
molecular clock to study species divergence. Here I focus on the topic: molecular
evolution of enzymes.
Enzymes speed up the rates of specific reactions, in such a way that they control
the processes in living beings. They display enormous reaction rate enhancement
in water at moderate pH values and mild pressures and temperatures, which
correspond to the standard physiological conditions of live organisms. In fact,
reactions with half times approaching the age of Earth are accelerated in many
orders of magnitude up to 1020, reaching time scales compatible with life. Examples

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can be found in the survival of paper documents or ancient ships for long periods
under water, which can be explained by the fact that the glycosidic bonds of
cellulose are very resistant to hydrolysis in the absence of cellulases that catalyse
their hydrolysis [1].
The enzymes are proteins, which are very complex macromolecules. From a
structural point of view, four levels of complexity can be distinguished: primary,
secondary, tertiary and quaternary structures. The primary structure describes
the sequence in which amino acids have joined together to form the polypeptide.
For instance, with twenty natural amino acids, in a small protein with 100 amino
acids there are 20100 possibilities, which mean an astronomical amount. Only
few sequences have been used by nature. Hydrogen bonds between different
parts of the peptide chain backbone determine the secondary structure, -helices
and -sheets being the most important three-dimensional conformations. Tertiary
structure describes the way in which the secondary structure is packed to form
regions of defined three-dimensional shape. Finally, these subunits may associate
in a more complex system. It is the quaternary structure. The folding of a protein
plays an important role in its functional behaviour. It must be emphasized that
it is not straightforward to deduce the three dimensional structure of the protein
from the knowledge of its sequence of amino acids. In fact, this goal has been
only reached in proteins with a small number of amino acid residues. There are
so many local minima in the energy conformation space that prevent to reach
the global one.
Moreover, it would be even more difficult to relate the structure of the protein
and the function. Optimizing the enzymatic function is a much more subtle
problem, since mutations of residues in the active centre, that presumably could
improve the efficiency of the enzyme, can decrease the stability of the full protein.
Enzymes have evolved under selective pressure to both maintain the stability of
the overall structure and the biochemical function. Two opposed trends, on one
hand enzymes fold into compact structures; on the other hand they must also
be active to catalyze chemical reactions. The active site of an enzyme is highly
strained because is designed to develop favourable interactions with the transition
state of the catalyzed reactions. This strain diminishes the stability of the global
structure of the enzyme and thus a trade-off between stability and function can
be established [2].
Enzymes must be of the adequate shape in order to exhibit specificity:
they must be able to recognize and bind the correct substrate. However, an
enzymes structure must also be flexible in order to reach a complementary
shape of a particular substrate and of its transformations. Furthermore, for
an efficient catalysis the dynamic of the protein must be coupled to the dynamic
of the reaction. Overall, they push the reactants to reactive conformations and
stabilize preferentially the transition state [3]. One can to state that enzymes
are more efficient machines than any machine designed by man. A feeling of
admiration fulfils the researcher and, if he is a believer of a creator God, of
adoration.

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2. ENZYME EVOLVABILITY

Evolvability, the capacity of evolutionary adaptability to external conditions,


together with reproduction, characterizes the living beings. In this section, this
feature of life will be stretched out to enzymes. A traditional view of enzymes holds
that their catalytic activities, while optimized by evolution, also represent highly
dead ends (one gene, one function). However, it has been recently suggested that
this paradigm, that has dominated thinking in this field, could be too simplistic.
In this sense, despite an enzyme is generally defined as a selective catalyst capable
of differentiate between different substrates and speed up the rate of a particular
chemical reaction, some enzymes have been found to present promiscuous activity,
accepting alternative substrates and catalyzing secondary reactions [4]. This
promiscuity provides a raw starting point for the evolution of enzymes, as a new
duplicated gene presenting low activity would provide a start for adaptative
evolution. In fact, new enzymatic functions can evolve in the period of years or
even months, as happened recently with new synthetic chemicals or drugs [5].
Promiscuity may be classified as substrate promiscuity (ambiguity), the enzyme
accepts structurally distinct substrates but catalyzes the same chemical reaction,
or catalytic promiscuity, the enzyme accepts different substrates and catalyzes
different overall reactions [6]. An example of the substrate promiscuity can be
illustrated with the Cytochrome P450 (CYP), a vast family of enzymes found in
almost all life forms. One of the most striking characteristics of some CYPs is
that individual enzymes can interact with numerous structurally diverse substrates.
This broad specificity usually serves by its obvious benefits playing an important
role in metabolism. In fact, it is thought that more than 90% of drugs and chemicals
oxidations in human are mediated by these promiscuous enzymes, probably based
on the fact that they are not restricted to a particular substrate. These enzymes
determine the bioavailability of drug molecules by converting them to more
soluble, often inactive products that are readily excreted [7].
Another example of substrate promiscuity is the existence of antibiotic
resistance mainly due to a family of enzymes called -lactamases. The ancestral
substrate of this enzyme was the penicillin but, after new generations of antibiotics
are introduced these enzymes have co-evolved, broadening their activity to ever
more elaborate antibiotics. -lactamases hydrolyze -lactam antibiotics ring and
thereby allow survival of pathogenic bacteria challenged by treatment with these
agents. Metallo--lactamase (MBLs), which contain one or two Zinc ions bound
in the active site, has become a severe clinical problem due to their especially
broad substrate spectra and potential for horizontal transfers [8].
An example of catalytic promiscuity can be found with an enzyme that belongs
to a new group of lactonases, the phosphotriesterase (PTE). It appeared on this
planet only several decades ago from a pre-existing hydrolase with promiscuous
activity to organophosphates. This system provides a powerful demonstration of
the evolvability of enzymes. It has evolved for the purpose of degradation of
synthetic insecticides introduced in the 20th century and may be considered as a

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774 J. BERTRN, A DARWINIAN PROCESS: THE MOLECULAR EVOLUTION OF ENZYMES

vestige of its progenitor which are likely to have existed for many millions of years.
Interestingly, no naturally occurring substrate has been identified for PTE [9].
All these previous examples of promiscuity illustrate the enzyme evolvability,
which means that enzymes are not dead ends but their efficiency can be enhanced
or new catalytic activities derived from existing enzymes. Enzymes exhibit a
remarkable evolutionary adaptability.
The enzymes favour, in a deterministic way, particular reactions inside a reaction
network. A new function means an increase of catalytic space and an increase of
complexity in the cell. It can be done in a chaotic form or in ordered one. As it has
been frequently emphasized the life is at the edge of chaos. Nevertheless, what it
is surprising in the self-organization of matter is to lead to stable systems able to
reproduce in heritance.

3. DARWINIAN PROCESSES

Natural selection is a key factor in organism evolution, but the particular


mechanism, by which it is carried out, is not well understood in the macroscopic
world of phenotype. More information is available at the microscopic level of
enzymes. It is widely accepted that many enzymes evolved from pre-existing
enzymes via gene duplication. According to previous studies, promiscuous activity
exhibit high plasticity as they can be readily increased by means of one or few
mutations, allowing reaching the threshold for being improved under selective
pressure. Instead, primary activity presents a large robustness against mutations,
frequently they are neutral mutations. Divergent evolution requires duplication
to free a gene from its previous functional constraints. Random drift will cause
an accumulation of mutations in duplicated genes, however, many of which will
be deleterious to structure and function, thus rendering the probability of obtaining
a new function extremely low, even in evolutionary terms. If random drift has
such low probability of generating a functional gene, how have enzymes evolved
to catalyze such a remarkable diversity of reactions? Perhaps enzymes that evolved
to catalyze one chemical transformation can, with some frequency, also catalyze
alternative reactions at a low level. Such alternative activities might then provide
the raw material for the evolution of new enzymes, as a newly duplicated gene
that has an activity near the threshold level required to provide a selective
advantage would have a head start towards being captured by adaptive evolution.
Before this, there was only a latent function [4].
As previously mentioned, several contemporary enzymes catalyze alternative
reactions distinct from their normal biological reactions. In some cases the
alternative reaction is similar to a reaction that is efficiently catalyzed by an
evolutionary related enzyme. Alternative activities could have played an important
role in the diversification of enzymes by providing a duplicated gene a head start
towards being captured by adaptive evolution. The alkaline phosphatase super-
family and the enolase superfamily will be presented as examples.

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The catalytic promiscuity, the ability of an enzyme to catalyze, at low level, a


reaction other than its cognate reaction that is maintained via selective pressure,
provides a unique opportunity to dissect the origin of enzymatic rate enhancement
via a comparative approach. The alkaline phosphatase (AP) superfamily is a
perfect system to use in making such comparison. Thus, AP family, which catalyzes
the hydrolysis of phosphate monoesters, presents promiscuous activities towards
sulphate monoesters, phosphate diesters and phosphite [10]. Starting from this
promiscuous activity, few mutations would be needed to reach a threshold value
that could provide a selective advantage, allowing natural selection to optimize
new enzymes in the superfamily. These observations explain the divergence of
superfamilies from a common ancestor. This could be the case of nucleotide
pyrophosphatase/phosphodiesterase (NPP), that present a highly common
structural features with AP but preferentially hydrolyzing phosphate diester [11].
Conservation of structural and catalytic features in the enolase superfamily
strongly suggests that enzymes of this superfamily arose via divergent evolution
from a common ancestor to accept different substrates and catalyze different
reactions. Divergent evolution of function in enolase superfamily presumably
begins with duplication of the gene encoding a progenitor so that the original
function can be retained as the mutations required for a new function to accumulate
in the copy. The progenitor would catalyze a different chemical reaction, although
it would employ the conserved catalytic strategy of using the Mg2+ cation to stabilize
an enediolate intermediate. Important questions to answer include (a) whether
the progenitor is promiscuous and already catalyzed the new function, (b) the
number and location of mutations required for the new function to provide a
selective advantage, and (c) the number and location of additional mutations
required to optimize catalysis [12].

4. PROTEIN ENGINEERING

Scientists have been always looking at Nature in order to find a source of


inspiration to mimic the great power and efficiency of its processes. One of these
astonish processes is the catalytic properties of the enzymes; very complex
molecular machines capable of enhancing the rate constant of chemical reactions.
One of their typical characteristic is evolvability. In fact, new enzymes or improved
ones may be obtained, as it has been done through many millions of years by
nature. It is important to point out that improving the efficiency of an enzyme
does not necessary means to increase the rate constant of the catalytic process;
it can be interesting to improve the robustness of the protein structure against
a wider range of temperatures and solvents. This target could be useful for certain
industrial purposes. The practical procedure to modify an existing enzyme is
the field of protein engineering.
One day, we shall be able to a priori design amino acid sequences that will fold
into proteins with desired functions. As this is not yet possible, scientists have

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776 J. BERTRN, A DARWINIAN PROCESS: THE MOLECULAR EVOLUTION OF ENZYMES

used directed evolution to generate molecules with novel properties starting from
natural enzymes. Evolution, normally applied to animals and plants, requires the
generation of variants and differential propagation of those with favourable features.
Biologists and chemists have recently begun to use evolutionary strategies to tailor
the properties of individual molecules instead of the whole organisms. Random
mutations or recombination, can, in many cases, be done efficiently, leading in
this way the molecular evolution in the laboratory. The successful variants can be
identified either by screening or by selection. While screening requires an active
search of all variants, selection is based on the exclusive survival of organisms
containing the desired variants of the protein mimicking the true Darwinian
evolution. This is an iterative process that requires, before starting new iterations
of the process, the favourable variants to be amplified by clonation. The challenge
is to collapse the time scale for evolution from millions of years to months or even
weeks. Evolution does not work towards any particular direction, nor is there a
goal; the underlying processes occur spontaneously during reproduction and
survival. In contrast, the laboratory evolution experiments often have a defined
goal, and the key processes (mutation, recombination, and screening or selection)
are carefully controlled by the experimenter. The general techniques of directed
evolution mimic natural evolution processes such as random mutagenesis and
sexual recombination [13]. Thus, new proteins with new desired functions can be
derived through mutations of few residues or recombining fragments swapped
between two parent sequences. In this last technique it is possible to explore distant
regions of sequence space, while this is not generally possible using random
mutations [14]. In both cases these techniques allow to engineer enzymes without
understanding them in great detail.
Another option is the rational design approach that consists in direct mutation
of residues on selected specific positions of proteins [15]. The selection of residues
to be mutated is deduced from X-ray diffraction structures of the complex between
the protein and a stable molecule (an inhibitor, a transition state analogue, a
Michaelis complex, an intermediate or a product). Moreover, information of the
molecular mechanism of the chemical reaction is required. Mutation of few amino
acids can render an important change in the active site of the enzyme, while
structure of the full protein remains almost invariant. As a consequence, significant
catalytic effects can be derived. However, the lack of knowledge on the relationship
between amino acid sequence, protein structure and function, together with the
extreme sensitivity of catalytic activity to seemingly modest structural perturbation,
make redesign of an enzyme in the laboratory so difficult. In this strategy, a
computational study of the catalytic function of the protein can provide the
information needed to design successful mutations directed to a particular
purpose [16, 17].
It is interesting to note that while rational design is usually focused on
mutations close to the active site, directed evolution are based on random
mutations that, most of the times, belong to regions of the protein far from the
active site. So, both strategies can be satisfactorily combined to get an improved

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function. Once a gene with a new function at low level has been obtained by
rational design, it may be optimized by directed evolution.
The starting point in biological catalysts design not necessary must be a pre-
existing enzyme. In particular, almost three decades ago, immune-globulin
proteins have been used to produce Catalytic Antibodies [18]. Catalytic activity
has also been introduced sometime in inert protein scaffolds [19].

5. REFLECTIONS ON MOLECULAR EVOLUTION OF ENZYMES

5.1. At scientific level

The first question to be addressed would be, what is the connexion between
molecular evolution of enzymes and human evolution? Molecular evolution of
enzymes is part of human evolution. In particular, it has been shown in this
chapter that Cytochrome P450 evolution allows the elimination of new therapeutic
drugs, mainly in human liver. Furthermore, in other cases evolution can take
place in bacteria, affecting human life. -lactamases evolution in pathogenic
bacteria explains the existence of antibiotic resistance, a serious clinical problem.
But the evolution of enzymes in bacteria has sometimes a beneficial impact, as
it happens with the apparition of a new enzyme; the phosphotriesterase (PTE).
Organophosphate triesters have been widely used as insecticides for the last 60
years. Although toxic to humans, bacteria have evolved ways of degrading these
compounds so that they do not accumulate in the environment.
Evolution is a well established scientific theory. As Dobzhansky pointed out
in 1973, nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution [20].
Natural selection is the key factor proposed by Darwin to explain the complex
organization and functionality of living beings [21]. Nevertheless, the mechanism
through which this job is carried out it is not clear at all. There is a big gap
between the microscopic mutations of genome and the macroscopic changes in
the phenotype. Molecular evolution of enzymes allows getting a deeper insight
in the mechanism through which mutations in genome can translate in new
enzymes. The promiscuous activity of some enzymes catalyzing secondary
reactions is the key concept. It has been suggested that this promiscuity provides
a raw starting point for the evolution of enzymes, as a new duplicated gene
presenting low activity would provide to start for adaptive evolution [4]. Some
neutral mutations with respect to the primary activity may increase the secondary
one, in such a way that the threshold for being improved under selective pressure
is reached. This property is known as plasticity. A last remark, promiscuity refers
exclusively to catalytic functions. Nevertheless, many enzymes have been found
to moonlight, it means to serve additional functions that are generally not
enzymatic, but rather structural or regulatory [22]. The active site of an enzyme
represents only a small part o its surface. Thus, there is ample opportunity to
use other parts of the protein for other functions, which may be optimized by a
similar mechanism.

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Emergence, the occurrence of unexpected characteristics in complex systems,


and creativity are the surprising looks of evolution. Natural selection by a selective
pressure explains, at least in part, this fact. Nevertheless, for some authors self-
organization of matter to an increased complexity is also required [23, 24]. The
profound power of self-organization in complex systems is not yet well
understood. The self-organization may be a prerequisite or the precondition of
evolvability itself, since it generates structures that can benefit from natural
selection. The particular topology of the fitness landscape of a function precedes
the evolution by natural selection of this function. Proteins are complex systems
with a characteristic structural and dynamic behaviour, that scientists have
started to understand. At present the connexion between amino acid sequence,
the three dimensional structure and the function has started to be understood,
in spite that it is not yet full clarified. That is why molecular evolution of enzymes
may be a favourable ground to get a deeper insight on the role of self-organization
and natural selection in evolution.
Directed evolution of proteins in laboratory allows testing many hypotheses on
molecular evolution of enzymes. As it has been previously mentioned, the challenge
is to collapse the time scale for evolution from millions of years to months or even
weeks. This is achieved controlling carefully the key processes: mutations,
recombination, screening and selection by the experimenter. Nevertheless, this is
not the main goal of the present effort. The real purpose is to get new robust
enzymes that allow catalyzing industrial processes leading to new products of
commercial interest. Biotechnology is one of the main fields of the current
technology and introduces ethical issues as it will be discussed in other section.
Here the present spectacular achievements must be emphasized. Genomics and
proteomics are deeply connected with each other at various levels. In this chapter
a proteomic topic, deeply connected with a genomic one, has been developed.
Both are technology-driven fields in exponential growth. Proteins are the most
complex macromolecules; a cell is the next step in the scale of complexity. Synthetic
genomics or genome engineering, from a fundamental alteration of gene content
in existing microbes up to creation of rationally designed and fully synthetic life
forms, is yet another addition to the postgenomic gallery. Franken cell is not a
new concept, what is definitely new is its migration from the world of fantasy to
the world of real. The first steps leading to this long-range goal has been given in
two different directions. The first one may be defined by the genome reduction
projects motivated by both academic and industrial interests with the most
fundamental questions of life at heart. It is a top-down approach searching the
minimal gene set needed for sustaining life in a defined environment [25]. The
second is a bottom-up approach in order to obtain artificial cells, starting with
the synthesis of various infrabiological systems, where the topic of the present
chapter is included. The main challenge now is to encapsulate the components in
a single cellular compartment and ensure that they will work in concert in a
controlled manner [26, 27]. Synthetic biology is a new and very active field of
research. One nice example is the synthesis of artemisinin, an efficient anti-malarial
drug. It is a natural compound found in some plants in northern China, but it is

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too expensive for large-scale use in the countries where it is needed most. To reduce
the cost Keaslings group has used synthetic biology to engineer microorganisms
to produce artemisinin from renewable resources [28].
As it has been mentioned before, in the cell a complex network of interactions
and reactions goes on in an ordered way. This is only the starting point of
life evolution, being the emergence of sensibility in advanced organisms and
of intelligence in complex neuronal systems the main steps of this wonderful
process.

5.2. At philosophical level

The evolutive functionality of enzymes in teleonomic order of organisms


allows arising some philosophical reflections. Enzyme selection introduces
information on the way in which dynamic systems may maintain its functional
stability in a determined environment. Furthermore, it supplies also an insight
on evolutive logic, following a blind Darwinian process. This logic will imply
structural changes which will cause the emergence of sensibility. In this way the
evolutive logic is building up an objective rationality which leads the emergence
of a psychical, conscientious and spiritual world shown in superior animals
including the human species, in such a way that evolution rationality may be
understood. These emergences appear to be not radical new things but as new
forms of being linked to new matter organization, in a continuous process.
Molecular evolution of enzymes, implying self-organization of matter and the
emergence of new functions, arises two philosophical issues: the spirituality of
matter and the problem of emergence itself. Enzymes recognize some specific
molecules and catalyze its transformation. It means a lot of information in its
structure and dynamics. As it has been mentioned before genomics and proteomics
are deeply connected. The whole information in living beings is coded in a
macromolecule, the ADN. This macromolecule plays a central role not only as
material support of information, but also in its transmission and development
in living beings. The concepts behind self-assembly have accustomed chemists
to the idea that molecules can be programmed to interact and come together in
very specific ways, and artificial replicating molecules have demonstrated the
principles by which chemical information can be transmitted and amplified.
Supramolecular chemistry has lead to the discovering of chemistry as an
information science. As supramolecular chemists and Nobel laureate Jean-Marie
Lehn stated for me, chemistry has a most important contribution to make to
the biggest question of all: how does self-organization arises and how does lead
the Universe to generate an entity able to reflect on its own origin. Information
is not a material reality but an immaterial one, going beyond the dualism matter-
spirit. The information is a quite different thing than the material support.
Nowadays, in a non dualistic conception of matter-spirit, causality can be seen
as transmission of information. This vision of spiritual dimension of matter is a
new version of what Pierre Teilhard de Chardin stated in a more poetic language
in the spiritual power of matter [29].

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780 J. BERTRN, A DARWINIAN PROCESS: THE MOLECULAR EVOLUTION OF ENZYMES

Emergence itself is a serious philosophical problem. Through evolution new


complex systems with new qualities appear and what is new must be explained.
The reductionism denies the existence of radical emergence and what is new
may be explained from properties of the components of the complex system.
Holism looks at the new properties of the whole system, which can not be
explained from the properties of parts. In this perspective there are problems to
explain where the new features come from. To talk about potentiality of the new
system in the old one or talk about its latent state before its apparition, may
seem to be a game of words. In a more dynamical conception of being probably
it is easier to find a more satisfactory philosophical explanation. Any way, the
scientific method tries, by definition, to explain complex systems from more
simple ones and, consequently it adopts a reductionism point of view. In
molecular evolution of enzymes an emergence of new functions, catalysis of new
reactions, is produced, but it cannot be asserted that this is a radical emergence.
Darwinian Theory is a gradual one, with natural selection going on as an effect
of selective pressure.

5.3. At ethical and theological levels

Gene modifications in order to get new enzymes are only examples of the
present biotechnology. The projects of artificial life, of organisms modified
genetically or of gene modifications in humans with therapeutic goals or other
purposes are also biotechnology activities, which arise at present exciting ethical
debates. As contribution to these debates I should like to do some personal
reflections. First of all, when one perturbs a complex system, one is never sure
of the results. It means that there is always some risk. Risk is part of the adventure
of life and the amount of tolerable risk in human action is function of the
conservative or progressive mentality of each person. Nevertheless, it must be
remarked that in the present growth of human population the most conservative
position may imply the most risky one. In a responsible attitude on the tolerable
risk, the first ethical duty is to increase the basic research in order to minimise
the surprises.
In the perspective of evolution theory, as the one adopted in the present paper,
the vision of a fixed nature is not compatible. The man as the arrows of the
evolution, in Hefners expression created co-creator [30], has the responsibility
to lead the process. Our task is to make God present in the world, by transforming
it. This engagement is not playing God but properly playing human. To see as
sacred every thing belongs to an ancient attitude far away from the present
scientific and technical one. Looking to gene modifications of the man genome,
a special responsible attitude is required, but if this patrimony for the following
generation may be improved, there is a duty to do it. Finally, if one is not an
expert in biotechnology problems, there is a prudent position to be careful taking
part in the ethical debate.
Creativity of life, of nature or of man, as pointed out in this chapter on the
molecular evolution of enzymes, suggests a central theological topic, a creator

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God. When people criticise creationism or intelligent design refer to literal


interpretation of Genesis text, known as young earth creationism, or a particular
theory of intelligent design, ID, which is at fashion in States the last years [31].
Believers do not question the creation of cosmos by God and his wonderful
design of the world pointing out to man apparition. As stated in the introduction,
the admiration of the researches for the rich complexity of nature becomes
adoration in the heart of the believer. In particular, Christian doctrine has been
rethought for the better in the light of Darwin. He has helped us to recover the
sense that Gods creative work is continuous. In Darwins time there were many
deists who took the heretical view that, though God has created things once for
all at the beginning, he was no longer actively involved in creation. Darwin helped
people to understand that creation is an ongoing project for God. Evolution is
a remarkable way for God to have brought species into being.
Ayala asserts that Intelligent Design theory, ID, is a bad science and a bad
theology [32]. The evolution is accepted to explain the origin of different species;
nevertheless there are irreducible complexities like: eye complexity, bacterial
flagellum, blood coagulation or immune system, which can not be explained by
evolution and require the direct intervention of an intelligent designer. These
irreducible complexities have not been proved and so, ID has no solid basis at
the scientific level. The Darwins fundamental discovery is that there is a process
that is creative although not conscious. It is a creative process because it causes
favourable mutations to combine and accumulate, yielding a great diversity of
organisms over eons of time. There is a design without designer. The existence
of mistakes, suffering, cruelty and sadism in evolution is consequence of the
nature of this process, and must not be assigned to God, as it happens in
Intelligent Design. For this reason Ayala thinks that this theory is also a bad
theology [32]. Science and religion are at different levels and between them it
may not be contradiction. Questions on the meaning and purpose of the universe
and life, on the relationship between humans and their Creator or on moral
values can not be answered by science. On the other hand, it is not the job of
the religion to supply scientific explanations of natural phenomena.

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c/ Bailn, 32, pral. 1. JUAN BERTRN RUSCA


08010 Barcelona
bertran@klingon.uab.es

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

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TEOLOGA DE LA EVOLUCIN (II):


LA LLAMADA CREADORA TRINITARIA.
KARL SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1997
MANUEL G. DONCEL
Universidad Autnoma de Barcelona

RESUMEN: Continuamos presentando la trada de intuiciones valiosas para elaborar una teologa de
la creacin en evolucin [ver PENSAMIENTO, vol. 63 (2007), pp. 605-636]. Presentamos la intuicin
del bilogo y telogo catlico alemn Karl Schmitz-Moormann, publicada pstumamente en 1997. Ins-
pirado por Teilhard y su metafsica de la unin, introduce su concepto de uni-totalidad, y observa
tales uni-totalidades a lo largo del progreso evolutivo, desde las partculas subatmicas hasta las agru-
paciones humanas. Observa la diversidad de unin, explicada por interaccin nuclear o por amor inter-
personal. Ve por analoga nuestro Dios tri-uno como la Uni-totalidad suprema unida por amor, a la que
se acercan las uni-totalidades creadas, como autnticos vestigios trinitarios. Y en el centro de su
intuicin ve la creacin continua evolutiva como la respuesta a una llamada creadora, una llamada
del Creador tri-uno que invita a la nada (absoluta o relativa) a acercarse hacia su riqueza de ser, sin for-
zar a nadie, slo invitando a unirse a los elementos prximos de cada nivel. Esta accin, no imperati-
va, sino amorosa por la que est llegando a ser toda la creacin nos descubre un Creador que est
tambin realizndose en suprema unin amorosa, segn habra de describirse en una metafsica del
llegar-a-ser. La creacin progresiva de informacin acerca tambin a la omnisciencia divina, y la de la
libertad posibilita responder amorosamente a la invitacin de la llamada creadora. Ofrecemos los tex-
tos ms autnticos de Schmitz-Moormann e investigamos su origen. Esta intuicin sobre la llamada
creadora enriquece teolgicamente la de Karl Rahner sobre la accin trascendental que sostiene la
autotrascendencia activa, y ser ulteriormente enriquecida por la de Denis Edwards, que la ve como
accin propia del Espritu dentro de una ontologa relacional.
PALABRAS CLAVE: K. Schmitz-Moormann, P. Teilhard, metafsica de la unin, uni-totalidad, Uni-tota-
lidad suprema, metafsica del llegar-a-ser (gignontologa), llamada creadora, vestigios trinitarios, crea-
cin de informacin, creacin de libertad.

Theology of Evolution (II):


Karl Schmitz-Moormann (1997) and the Trinitarian Creative Call
ABSTRACT: We continue the presentation of three sets of valuable insights for elaborating a theology
of creation in evolution [cf. PENSAMIENTO, vol. 63 (2007), pp. 605-636]. In this article, we focus on
the insights, published posthumously in 1997, of the Catholic German biologist and theologian Karl
Schmitz-Moormann. Inspired by Teilhard and his metaphysics of union, Schmitz-Moormann introduces
his concept of uni-totality and observes uni-totalities in the course of the process of evolution beginning
from sub-atomic particles to human groups. He observes the diversity of union, explained by nuclear
interaction or by interpersonal love. He analogously considers the triune God as the supreme Uni-totality
united by love, which created uni-totalities approximate as authentic trinitarian vestiges. His central
insight is to see continuous creative evolution as the response to a creative call by the triune Creator
who does not force but only invites nothingness (absolute or relative) to approach the richness of its
being by joining the next elements in every level. This non-imperative but loving action that allows entire
creation to come-to-be reveals to us a Creator that is also realizing himself in a supreme loving union
according to a metaphysics of coming-to-be. The progressive creation of information about divine
omniscience and freedom also allows a loving response to the invitation of the creative call. We offer
here the authentic texts of Schmitz-Moormann, and we also investigate their origin. His insight concerning
the creative call theologically enriches Karl Rahners insight about the transcendental action that
sustains active self-transcendence, which the insight of Denis Edward will later enrich, since he sees
active self-transcendence as the Spirits own action within a relational ontology.

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784 M. G. DONCEL, TEOLOGA DE LA EVOLUCIN: KARL SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1977

KEY WORDS: K. Schmitz-Moormann, Teilhard de Chardin, metaphysics of union, uni-totality, supreme


Uni-totality, metaphysics of coming-to-be (gignontology), creative call, trinitarian vestiges, creation of
information, creation of freedom.

LA LLAMADA CREADORA, DENTRO DE LA METAFSICA DE LA UNIN TEILHARDIANA

El contexto inmediato de esta intuicin de Karl Schmitz-Moormann (1928-


1996) es una reflexin global sobre la evolucin csmica y biolgica, investigada
por l como cientfico, y sobre la nueva concepcin metafsica que la realidad de
esa evolucin nos impone: especialmente la idea teilhardiana de que el ser se va
enriqueciendo por unin. Su inters de telogo era elaborar, dentro de ese con-
texto, un tratado sobre la creacin, que ciertamente compuso durante su estan-
cia investigadora en el Center for Theological Inquiry de Princeton (1995-1996).
Sin duda es en ese perodo creativo, al final de su vida, en el que hemos de situar
el conjunto de esa profunda intuicin teolgica: contemplar el acto de creacin
continua (uno en la eternidad de Dios y desplegado en el tiempo a travs de la evo-
lucin progresiva) como una llamada del Creador a la creacin, invitndola a
acercarse a la riqueza de su Ser trinitario, que est unindose en supremo amor.

1. LAS IDEAS CENTRALES DEL LIBRO BSICO DE SCHMITZ-MOORMANN (1997)

El manuscrito de ese tratado, redactado necesariamente en ingls, sabe-


mos que fue utilizado didcticamente en un curso de doctorado de la Lutheran
School of Theology de Chicago, y en otro curso de licenciatura en la Weston Jesuit
School of Theology de Cambridge, Massachusetts. Para este ltimo curso, el
manuscrito fue lingstica y didcticamente retocado en ingls, con la colabo-
racin de James F. Salmon, S.J. Fue tambin redactado de nuevo en alemn.
As surgieron las dos ediciones en alemn y en ingls, preparadas en 1996, poco
antes de su muerte, y aparecidas pstumamente en 1997 1. La edicin alemana
es algo ms breve: se ha suprimido en ella el captulo introductorio sobre La
teologa de la creacin como tarea permanente que ya en el siglo XIII se rea-
lizaba en el contexto de la ciencia aristotlica, y hoy ha de realizarse en el de la
visin evolutiva y se han suprimido tambin diversos elementos de inters
didctico como introduccin y resumen de cada captulo, figuras, apndices,
cuestionario final de autoevaluacin, bibliografa e ndice de personas y con-
ceptos. Por razn de completitud, la edicin espaola 2 se tradujo de la inglesa,
pero una vez maquetada para la imprenta, descubrimos que bastantes prrafos
podan quedar ms claros retocndolos segn la versin alemana, y as se hizo.

1
La edicin alemana, SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1997a, est prologada en Cambridge Mass., a
19 de mayo de 1996, y la inglesa, SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1997b, en Princeton, a 27 de octubre de
1996. Falleca en Princeton el 30 de octubre de 1996.
2
SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 2005.

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Esa obra pstuma constituye, pues, el documento impreso fundamental y


ltimo para estudiar esa intuicin de Schmitz-Moormann. A continuacin la
presentaremos en nueve fragmentos, siguiendo el orden del documento mismo.
En estos fragmentos presentaremos concisamente el contexto completo del libro
(prescindiendo del captulo introductorio, suprimido en la edicin alemana), y
entre comillas los prrafos fundamentales para nuestro estudio. Por ser ms
asequible, utilizaremos la numeracin de los captulos y apartados de la edicin
espaola 3, pero conste que todos los prrafos entrecomillados han sido pacien-
temente contrastados y modificados segn la edicin alemana, que es eviden-
temente obra exclusiva de Schmitz-Moormann y en muchas ocasiones, como lo
notaremos, resulta mucho ms precisa en su conceptualizacin filosfica. De
esos nueve fragmentos, tres corresponden al captulo 2: El concepto de uni-
totalidad en la emergencia evolutiva (2.5 y 2.6), La metafsica de la unin
teilhardiana (2.7), Dios como Uni-totalidad suprema (2.7), y seis al cap-
tulo 6: La creacin divina como llamada creadora (6.2), Hablar de Dios
en el lenguaje del llegar-a-ser (6.3), La Trinidad como suprema Unin amo-
rosa (6.3), Vestigios e imgenes trinitarios (6.3), Creacin de la informa-
cin (6.4) y Creacin de la libertad (6.5). Concluiremos con un breve estu-
dio sbre los orgenes y el contexto de esta intuicin.

1.1. El concepto de uni-totalidad en la emergencia evolutiva (2.5 y 2.6)

Tras indicar que su teologa de la creacin no pretende probar la existencia


de Dios, sino descubrir en nuestro mundo rasgos del Creador (2.1), y presen-
tar concisamente el cuadro de la evolucin csmica y biolgica (2.2), Schmitz-
Moormann comienza por rechazar la falacia cuantitativa (que lo ms impor-
tante del universo y de la vida es lo cuantitativamente ms abundante, 2.3), y
justifica que la nica clave razonable para entender el universo es partir del ser
humano. Parte, pues, de nuestra conciencia personal, en la que nos experi-
mentamos a nosotros mismos como un alguien, distinto del resto del mundo
aunque profundamente relacionado con l. Nos experimentamos como un cen-
tro unificado, que consta de numerosas partes, los miembros y capacidades que
nos constituyen. Y la cuestin es: Cmo se ha realizado esa unidad que expe-
rimentamos en nosotros? Fue creada como ser humano a partir de una mate-
ria prima como a partir de barro? O ha habido estadios previos del desa-
rrollo evolutivo que conducen a esa unidad? 4 (2.4).
A esta cuestin dedica el 2.5, La unidad y la creacin de unidad como aspec-
tos bsicos de la evolucin. Partiendo de los seres humanos va buscando seres

3
Citaremos los apartados en la forma n.m, siendo n el nmero del captulo de la edi-
cin espaola o inglesa, y m el nmero del apartado (que en la edicin inglesa no consta). En
la edicin alemana ese apartado corresponde al explcitamente numerado como n-1.m, ya que
en ella se ha suprimido el captulo introductorio.
4
SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1997a, p. 33.

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anlogos a esos estadios previos entre los primates, tal como los descubre la
moderna etologa, entre los animales superiores e inferiores, hasta los unicelu-
lares eucariontes y las bacterias. Y va subrayando en todos ellos cmo se com-
portan frente a su mundo ambiente como unidades y totalidades centra-
das, por ms que el radio de accin en ese universo ambiente vaya reducindose
ms y ms en la medida que disminuye su horizonte de percepcin. Su visin
retrospectiva contina con las macromolculas que poseen tambin una uni-
dad estructural y actan en su reducido mundo ambiente, por ejemplo como
enzimas, y sigue con las simples molculas y tomos y partculas y quarks.
Todos ellos actan, al menos por contacto, con un radio de accin prctica-
mente nulo. Y concluye: Nuestra mirada retrospectiva nos ha hecho conocer
unidad y totalidad (Einheit und Ganzheit) como una caracterstica que ha
de adscribirse a todas las realidades que nos salen al encuentro en la historia de
la evolucin. Si bien esta caracterstica seala todo cuanto ha evolucionado, hay
sin embargo niveles cualitativamente diferenciables de uni-totalidad (Ein-
Ganzheit) 5. As introduce Schmitz-Moormann su neologismo uni-totalidad,
para designar con ms concisin esa caracterstica filosfica, que acaba de deno-
minar unidad y totalidad 6.
Este concepto de uni-totalidad es ampliamente aclarado en el 2.6: La
unificacin como caracterstica general del proceso evolutivo. Sigue en ella ese
proceso de unificacin en su orden cronolgico, a partir de la sopa inicial de
quarks y gluones. Explica en detalle cmo los quarks se unen para formar pro-
tones y neutrones. Neutrones y protones se unen para formar ncleos, que se
pueden unir a electrones para formar tomos. Los tomos se unen para formar
molculas sencillas, que se observan por todo el universo, y que a su vez se con-
vierten en elementos que formarn las macromolculas.
Subraya cmo en ese proceso se da verdadera emergencia de novedad: Por
ejemplo, la unin de dos tomos de hidrgeno y un tomo de oxgeno forma
una molcula de agua. A este nivel se hace evidente que la nueva entidad no
surge de una causa sus elementos que contena lo nuevo de una manera
oculta. Ms bien los elementos se unen para formar una entidad totalmente sin-
gular y nueva que no se encontraba contenida en los elementos. Los elementos
son ciertamente un requisito necesario (conditio sine qua non) para que emer-
ja la nueva realidad, pero ellos no la contienen. Lo ms aparece aqu surgiendo
de lo menos. Lo ms llega-a-ser en la unin. Y puesto que aqu se trata de obje-
tos bien observables, podemos entender aqu ms claramente el proceso del lle-
gar-a-ser como un proceso de unin 7.

5
Ibdem, p. 39.
6
Es lstima que en la versin inglesa, SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1997b, haya desaparecido total-
mente ese importante trmino filosfico, que es traducido all simplemente por unity o
union. La versin espaola SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 2005, recupera el trmino del texto alemn,
y lo traduce suavemente por totalidad unida (pp. 83ss).
7
Traducimos como llegar-a-ser el alemn werden (verbo no auxiliar o sustantivo),
que como veremos el propio Schmitz-Moormann nota con orgullo que en alemn es una pala-
bra simple.

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Indica cmo en ese proceso de unin van apareciendo distintos tipos de liga-
dura estudiados por las ciencias, pero subraya que tales ligaduras tampoco expli-
can la riqueza de ser resultante de la unin: Se podra pensar que la unin de
elementos en nuevas unidades es del mismo tipo en los diferentes niveles de lle-
gar-a-ser, pero resulta que la ligadura entre los elementos puede ser de muy
diversos tipos. Los gluones, las fuerzas que ligan a los quarks en el protn y el
neutrn, se describen de un modo diferente a las fuerzas electromagnticas que
ligan los electrones al ncleo. Los tomos se ligan para formar nuevas unida-
des mediante fuerzas descritas generalmente como ligaduras inicas, covalen-
tes, o de puente de hidrgeno. Sin embargo, se ha de tener presente que la des-
cripcin cientfica del modo en que se ligan estos elementos no proporciona
ninguna explicacin definitiva de la unidad interna que se manifiesta en ellos.
La descripcin de las fuerzas de ligadura no explica la unidad ms de lo que los
tornillos y tuercas de una mquina explican la unidad de sta. Deben existir
medios de conexin como condicin necesaria para que se forme una uni-tota-
lidad; de lo contrario la nueva unidad podra ser considerada como un mila-
gro sobrenatural. Sin embargo, estas partes elementales y estas fuerzas no expli-
can la totalidad de la unidad recin creada. El todo es ms que la suma de sus
partes. ste manifiesta nuevas propiedades que no pueden sospecharse cuando
estudiamos las partes. Este fenmeno se hace ms evidente an, cuando encon-
tramos de nuevo esos elementos primitivos a un nivel superior de la evolucin.
Nadie podra predecir jams que un tomo de carbono desempeara el papel
que realmente desempea dentro del cerebro para el pensamiento humano.
A continuacin va presentando las uni-totalidades, cada vez ms claras del
mundo biolgico: virus o estructuras similares, bacterias y otros procariontes,
clulas eucariticas fruto de endosimbiosis, y organismos pluricelulares. Subra-
ya su enorme complejidad creciente, y cmo la evolucin biolgica puede des-
cribirse bajo el aspecto de una unificacin progresiva responsable de la emer-
gencia de novedad. Pero sobre todo subraya el que, por ms que experimentamos
esas realidades como uni-totalidades, no podemos decir qu es lo que confor-
ma su unidad: Esta laguna de nuestro conocimiento sobre los medios por los
que las realidades individuales quedan ligadas y lo que conforma su unidad,
poda en los elementos simples como tomos y molculas quedar todava borro-
sa, pero en los seres vivos se hace cada vez ms evidente. En los seres vivos el
principio de unidad se denomina alma, una entidad desconocida para la cien-
cia. El hecho de que la mayor parte de los idiomas utilicen esta palabra, expre-
sa claramente la universal experiencia humana de la uni-totalidad como ms
que la suma de sus partes. Y concluye mencionando que la vida misma evo-
luciona hacia seres centrados cada vez ms claramente conscientes y finalmente
autoconscientes, los cuales, a su vez, pueden llegar-a-ser elementos de estruc-
turas ms elevadas.
Subraya por fin que la unin no destruye la identidad de los elementos impli-
cados en la uni-totalidad: El tomo de carbono sigue siendo un tomo de car-
bono incluso cuando est integrado en una neurona del cerebro humano. La
unin no es pues una especie de fusin que elimina la identidad de los elemen-

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tos. Ms bien, esta unin potencia la identidad del elemento. Al integrarse en


una unidad ms elevada, al elemento se le abre un futuro que estando aislado
le quedaba cerrado: slo un tomo de carbono integrado en un aminocido
puede llegar-a-ser parte de una protena y finalmente una parte de la vida y el
pensamiento. Por tanto la unin no disuelve los elementos. Tal como Teilhard
de Chardin afirm a principios del siglo XX: la unin diferencia a los elementos
que se unen.
Y concluye la seccin resumiendo as su visin de la evolucin: Una pano-
rmica del proceso evolutivo del universo, desde el big-bang hasta hoy, pone,
pues, de manifiesto a la unin como un fenmeno que recorre todo ese proce-
so. Cierto que no constituye el nico aspecto de la evolucin, pero este fen-
meno se puede seguir a lo largo de toda la historia del universo, desde el inicio
hasta un punto en el que nosotros mismos aparecemos actualmente, como las
creaturas ms evolucionadas en el horizonte de nuestro conocimiento. Esto nos
lleva a la siguiente tesis: El proceso evolutivo se realiza mediante unin de ele-
mentos en uni-totalidades superiores, en las que algo nuevo llega a la existencia.
Pero se ve obligado a matizar inmediatamente su tesis, introduciendo expl-
citamente el carcter anlogo de los nuevos conceptos de unin y uni-tota-
lidad: Esta tesis general se tiene que matizar. Tal como hemos visto, los pro-
cesos de unificacin de elementos son de diversos tipos. Del mismo modo que
el concepto de ser, el trmino central de la metafsica clsica en un mundo
esttico, se utiliz como anlogo, en un mundo evolutivo el concepto de unin
se utiliza tambin como anlogo: obviamente, los medios y los grados de unin
alcanzados difieren entre s. La unidad de un tomo, al que no le atribuimos
ningn alma, difiere de la unidad de un ser vivo. Externamente se capta ya en
detalle esa diferencia en la uni-totalidad, en la misma diversidad de medios uti-
lizados para realizar concretamente la unidad. El universo aparece en su con-
junto como un proceso evolutivo de unin que da lugar a realidades siempre
nuevas a niveles cada vez ms elevados de ser, de uni-totalidad, un proceso que
parte de los elementos ms simples y alcanza el ms alto nivel al menos den-
tro de los lmites de nuestra experiencia en los seres humanos. Qu impli-
caciones conlleva este proceso de unin para los telogos?.

1.2. La metafsica de la unin teilhardiana (2.7)

Schmitz-Moormann dedica la primera parte de su siguiente apartado, La


unin, un aspecto del modo divino de crear, a exponer esta nueva metafsica.
Comienza citando a Teilhard de Chardin y su afirmacin de que Dios crea
mediante la unin, la cual armoniza con la tesis que acaba de formular. Pero
reconoce que hablar as de la creacin divina es una afirmacin claramente teo-
lgica, que cabra incluso completar con la idea de la autorrevelacin de Dios
en la creacin (ver, por ejemplo, Sal 104). Volviendo al nivel metafsico, comien-
za as su exposicin:
La creacin se nos hace visible como un proceso continuado bajo el aspec-
to bsico de la unin, que produce lo nuevo, como emergiendo de los elementos

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que se unen, pero sin ser idntico a ellos. Por lo tanto, podemos afirmar: a tra-
vs de la unin llega a la existencia ms ser. Cuanto ms unido est algo en s
mismo formando una uni-totalidad, ms se realiza como ser. La formula-
cin teilhardiana,
plus esse (ser ms) =
= plus a pluribus uniri (estar ms unido, a partir de ms elementos), o bien
= plus plura unire (unir ms, ms elementos) 8,
da en el clavo. Desde esta perspectiva, ser no es ya el concepto ms general
que podemos concebir; ms bien se ha convertido en algo definible. El ser es
realizado y como se deca antes conservado en el ser mediante la unin.
En el universo, donde esta unin resulta ms evidente es en los seres vivos. La
uni-totalidad de cada uno de ellos, que fsicamente es un sistema abierto con
una necesidad constante de consumo energtico, decae fcilmente. Por con-
siguiente, en el universo no hay una cantidad constante de ser, como exige
para la energa el primer principio de la termodinmica. En el mundo evolu-
tivo, el ser se crea mediante la unin de elementos.

Hace ver inmediatamente que esta metafsica nada tiene que ver con un
monismo materialista, pero que supone un drstico cambio cosmovisional:
Los modos de unin remiten a niveles de ser, desde el nivel atmico al nivel
humano o personal. El aspecto material es secundario. En la metafsica clsi-
ca del ser, el principio que representa a la materialidad se puede reducir a la
materia primera, que es pura potencia 9. Este principio pasivo de la potenciali-
dad se opone al principio activo, la forma substancial, y no se debe confundir
con una nocin al menos dentro de esa metafsica errnea de materialis-
mo, en el que el ser se identifica con la materia. En esa concepcin materia-
lista, el ser se reduce a las partculas elementales ms primitivas. En un mundo
estrictamente materialista no habra emergencia alguna de ser a travs de la
unin, mientras que, en la metafsica de la unin, el principio de potencialidad
se concretiza en los elementos que son el requisito (la conditio sine qua non)
para la formacin de unidad ms elevada. El ser se identifica aqu con la uni-
ficacin 10. La ruptura lingstica de esta formulacin, que identifica el ser con
la unificacin que nunca llega a concluirse sino que ha de seguirse realizando
siempre de nuevo, es una indicacin del cambio radical de cosmovisin, cuan-
do abandonamos el mundo esttico, para entrar en el mundo evolutivo del lle-
gar-a-ser.
Nota la dificultad en describir mediante este proceso de unificacin el pri-
mer instante de esa creacin continua: En nuestra reflexin sobre el proceso
de llegar-a-ser mediante la unin, hemos excluido conscientemente la cuestin
del comienzo de la creacin. Esta cuestin, o bien nos llevara en una regressio

8
TEILHARD, uvres VI, p. 208, n. 1; versin espaola, p. 168, n. 26 (confusamente tra-
ducida).
9
Esta idea de materia describe un estado de no existencia, mientras que la materia con-
creta, como Toms de Aquino afirm, es ya materia formada (informada). [Nota de K. S.-M.]
10
Traducimos el alemn Einswerdung por unificacin, en el sentido de el hacerse,
o llegar-a-ser uno.

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ad infinitum hasta el punto en que las preguntas no se pueden responder den-


tro del horizonte de nuestra experiencia, o bien nos precipitara en especula-
ciones descabelladas acerca de la singularidad csmica. Tales especulaciones
no nos llevaran a una mejor comprensin de cmo crea Dios, aunque algunos
puedan sentirse impresionados por un big-bang visualizado la gigante bola
de fuego como una expresin del Dios todopoderoso. La cuestin ms inte-
resante para el futuro del universo que se puede localizar en estos primeros
momentos, que de una manera muy derrochadora transformaron la energa ori-
ginal en partculas con masa, es el hecho de que la produccin de estos prime-
ros elementos simples pone en marcha el proceso de unin. La forma en que
Dios crea el mundo evolutivo resulta menos visible en los comienzos que ms
tarde, cuando la creacin a travs de la unin da lugar a niveles de ser siempre
nuevos y superiores.
Ve su metafsica de la unin como un intento aristotlico de comprender la
naturaleza que conoce, y aun la ve enraizada en el trascendental clsico de la
unidad: Podra parecer que esta comprensin de la realidad guarda una cier-
ta relacin con las intuiciones filosficas clsicas de Platn y Aristteles. Esto
es cierto porque la metafsica aristotlica tena como presupuesto su fsica. Sepa-
rada de la fsica que l conoca, su metafsica se convierte en una invencin con-
ceptual abstracta sin relacin con la realidad en la que viva. El intento que aqu
proponemos es ms bien una empresa aristotlica o tomasiana 11 que se esfuer-
za por comprender el mundo que conoce. Y encontramos al menos una afir-
macin paralela en la filosofa escolstica, que tiene sus races en la tradicin
platnica: la afirmacin de que la unin crea ser tiene su equivalente en uno de
los trascendentales, a saber, que omne ens est unum (todo ser es uno). Esto se
traduce a la metafsica de la unin por omne ens est unitum (todo ser es unido),
es decir, existe como ser que se est uniendo.
Concluye de aqu la universalidad y el carcter metafsico de la accin crea-
dora de Dios a travs de este proceso de unin: Esta afirmacin es aplicable a
todos los seres de este mundo que conocemos y que vemos en la fe como creacin
de Dios. Podemos decir que las creaturas de Dios entran en el ser en la medida en
que se unen a partir de elementos. Esto casi nos permite ver en accin al Creador
oculto. No existe ninguna intervencin en el proceso por parte de Dios, al menos
ninguna intervencin visible, mesurable. Es obvio que los caminos de Dios son
ms sutiles que los descritos en el relato de la creacin (Gn 1,1-2,3). Como dira
Teilhard, Dios acta desde el interior de las cosas, que las ciencias no pueden
alcanzar. Dios acta como inmanente al mundo. Volveremos sobre esta cuestin 12,
pero quisiramos retener aqu tan solo que la fe cristiana considera la inmanen-
cia de Dios como contrapunto de su absoluta trascendencia.

11
Trmino, introducido por G. Soehngen en Bonn, que hace referencia al pensamiento
del propio Toms de Aquino, como opuesto a los intrpretes escolsticos. [Nota de K. S.-M.,
adaptada.]
12
Vase nuestra seccin 1.4.

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1.3. Dios como Uni-totalidad Suprema (2.7)

A continuacin enfoca Schmitz-Moormann este nuevo tema, por el camino de


ver a Dios como el que posee en grado supremo las perfecciones de las creaturas,
especialmente las de un grado de ser superior: Sin embargo, la trascendencia de
Dios no le trasplanta a una total lejana del mundo; Dios es a la vez lejano y pr-
ximo. Como cristianos, hemos confesado tradicionalmente a Dios como el Ser
Supremo. As, los Padres de la Iglesia y la tradicin medieval ensearon que todas
las perfecciones se realizan y estn presentes en Dios. La idea misma de Dios, tal
como se expresa en el argumento ontolgico de la existencia de Dios, est aso-
ciada con esta presencia de todas las perfecciones en Dios. Esta asociacin con-
dujo a los pensadores medievales a la conclusin de que todo lo que existe posee
su ser en la medida en que se asemeja a Dios. No puede existir nada cuyo nivel de
ser, de perfeccin, sea totalmente ajeno a Dios. Por consiguiente, todo debe ser
semejante a Dios de algn modo. Puede que esta semejanza resulte tan dbil que
escape a la percepcin humana, que extinga el ser, la perfeccin del existente.
Cuanto ms plida es la semejanza, menor es el grado de ser. Los seres humanos,
que segn la tradicin fueron creados a imagen y semejanza de Dios (Gn 1,26),
se parecen a su Creador ms que las otras creaturas.
Este enfoque y la analoga del ser le llevan a pensar el ser supremo de Dios
como anlogo al ser de las creaturas que se realiza en la unin: Las compara-
ciones en la escala del ser caben dentro de la doctrina clsica de la analoga del
ser, la analogia entis. Si se aplica esta analoga a la metafsica de la unin,
podemos plantearnos la cuestin de si ser unido, es decir, existir en un estado
de unin continuamente realizada, se puede identificar con el propio ser de Dios.
Si el ser se define mediante la unin, tendremos que aceptar esta posibilidad
como una consecuencia necesaria de la definicin del ser en la divina creacin
que se realiza y evoluciona. Esto nos obligar a reconsiderar el significado del
discurso clsico sobre Dios como acto puro y ser absoluto. Estas afirmaciones
sobre Dios se hicieron en una poca en la que el mundo era esttico y no se crea
posible nada nuevo bajo el sol (Qo 1,9), y en la que se imaginaba a Dios como
el ser supremo e inmutable descansando en s mismo (Gn 2,3). En nuestro mundo
en el que, por el contrario, Dios se revela creando por unin, parece inevitable
la tarea de hallar en Dios mismo la analoga con su forma de crear. Si la analo-
gia entis es correcta y debe ser firmemente mantenida, resulta razonable pen-
sar a Dios no simplemente como el Ser Supremo, sino como el Ser Supremo
realizado siempre de nuevo en una suprema unin.
Este nuevo concepto de Ser Supremo slo puede verificarse teolgicamente,
por coherencia con nuestra fe en el Creador: Llegados a este punto ya no tene-
mos ninguna posibilidad de verificar nuestras afirmaciones por referencia a algu-
na informacin que puedan proporcionarnos el saber humano: nos encontramos
en el mundo de las especulaciones teolgicas. Nuestras afirmaciones slo pueden
verificarse por su coherencia con el contenido de la fe. Hablamos ahora como cris-
tianos que creen en el Creador. Si Dios se revela a travs de su creacin, Dios es
el Ser Supremo realizado y actualizado en el supremo y continuo acto de la unin.

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Esta suprema unin ha de realizarse entre elementos que sean (al menos)
personales, lo cual pone serias dificultades dentro de un monotesmo estricto
como el de las tradiciones juda e islmica: Esto hace que se nos plantee la
cuestin del nivel supremo de esta unin divina. Segn nuestra experiencia, el
nivel ms elevado de unin entre elementos se da cuando los seres humanos se
unen a un nivel personal con otras personas, formando una unidad que tras-
ciende al individuo. Se podra incluso decir que el individuo se hace persona en
gran parte unindose personalmente con otras personas 13. Si Dios existe unin-
dose, los elementos de esa unin no pueden ser infrapersonales. Dios, como
constituyente de la suprema Uni-totalidad, como el supremo Ser que se realiza
en una unin, tiene que ser (al menos) una Unin de personas. Esto deja al mono-
testa estricto sumido en un dilema: o Dios carece de la cualidad de ser perso-
na, o Dios necesita crear otras personas, la humanidad, para unirse a ellas. La
primera respuesta hara de Dios un ser no-personal al que no cabe hablar, por
ser inaccesible a la comunicacin personal: esta respuesta no resultara acep-
table dentro de la tradicin judeocristiana o islmica. La segunda respuesta
hara a Dios dependiente de la creacin divina; el Creador tendra necesidad de
su creacin. Obviamente, esta idea no resulta compatible con la idea tradicio-
nal del Dios trascendente y libre, el Ser Supremo, que las tres religiones men-
cionadas confiesan.
Pero esta suprema unin personal es bien coherente con el Dios tri-uno de
la tradicin cristiana: El Dios de la tradicin cristiana, el Dios tri-uno, existe
en la constante realizacin de la unin de tres personas. Dios aparece as como
el Arquetipo (Urbild), en semejanza al cual toda la creacin llega a la existen-
cia. Puesto que por toda la eternidad realiza este acto supremo de unin perso-
nal en la Trinidad, Dios no necesita al mundo.
El amor, la esencia divina, es la fuerza constitutiva de Dios y, por analoga,
del proceso evolutivo: La fuerza que une, especialmente la fuerza que une a las
personas, es el amor. Dios existe en perfecta unin, podramos decir, porque
Dios es amor (1 Jn 1,4). Ese texto bblico adquiere un significado ms profun-
do en el horizonte de una metafsica de la unin, porque hasta ahora el amor se
ha concebido principalmente como una accin moral. Si nuestra comprensin
de la creacin de Dios y de su dimensin revelatoria es correcta, el amor se con-
vierte en la fuerza constitutiva de la vida de Dios. El amor de Dios es el puro
acto de la unin. Esto se refleja en su creacin convirtindose el amor en la fuer-
za constitutiva, en la fuerza conductora del proceso evolutivo de una unin pro-
gresiva.
Schmitz-Moormann concluye este rico captulo ponderando el papel inspi-
rador de las ciencias para la teologa: Lo que se ha dicho de forma teolgica
no constituye una visin cientfica del mundo. Es ms bien lo que aparece cuan-
do a este mismo mundo conocido y descrito por el saber humano, tratamos de

Segn esta perspectiva la moderna, sobrestimacin del individuo es evidentemente


13

regresiva. Para la idea de la persona, cf. BUBER, 1958; GUARDINI, 1937; MOUNIER, 1948. [Nota de
K. S.-M.]

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verlo con los ojos de la fe como creacin de Dios. En esta visin a los telogos
no les resulta extrao el mundo del saber humano y de las ciencias de la natu-
raleza; ms bien, se ha convertido en una fuente de intuicin teolgica. La per-
cepcin teolgica del mundo como creacin no est en contradiccin con el
mundo que los cientficos ven, aunque es posible que algunos, como cientficos
y/o como agnsticos, no quieran aceptar ste o cualquier otro punto de vista
fundado en la fe.

1.4. La creacin divina como llamada creadora (6.2)

Tras estudiar en el captulo 2, segn acabamos de ver, la unin en relacin


con el enriquecimiento en el ser, Schmitz-Moormann dedica los tres captulos
siguientes a otros tres parmetros cualitativos, como l los llama, del progre-
so evolutivo. As, el captulo 3 est dedicado a la conciencia, que progresa con
la complejidad creciente, segn otra temtica tambin profundamente teilhar-
diana. Los captulos 4 y 5 los dedica respectivamente al progreso de la infor-
macin, subrayando su carcter espiritual (en contraposicin a la materiali-
dad de los soportes informativos), y al progreso de la libertad, subrayando el
mal que ha costado ese progreso (mal fsico en la prehistoria de ese progreso, y
mal moral en su historia).
El captulo 6 y ltimo, plenamente teolgico, est dedicado a Dios, creador
del universo evolutivo. Comienza ponderando lo poco que se ha dejado impac-
tar nuestra teologa de la creacin por esta concepcin evolutiva, desde los escri-
tos filosficos y teolgicos de Teilhard, publicados en los aos sesenta y seten-
ta del siglo XX. Cita tratados dogmticos para hacer ver qu pocos muestran ese
impacto al tratar de la creacin. Menciona, ciertamente, que la referencia a la
presentacin de Karl Rahner de la autotrascendencia se encuentra hoy en
muchos textos. Pero describe ms largamente cmo la consideracin hoy fre-
cuente del Espritu Santo como principio de la creatividad a todos los niveles
de la materia y la vida lleva a algunos telogos a usarle para cubrir los aguje-
ros en nuestra comprensin cientfica de la evolucin. Subraya finalmente que
la idea de inicio del tiempo no puede ser captada por nuestro pensamiento apri-
sionado en la temporalidad, y este mismo pensamiento nos sigue haciendo
caer en la trampa de dividir el acto creador de Dios en un acto fundamental
constitutivo de la creacin y otro acto sustentador de esa creacin. Su pregunta,
central para una teologa actual de la creacin en perspectiva evolutiva, es: De
qu manera acta Dios en su creacin? (6.1).
Este es el tema del 6.2, Creatio appellata (Creacin llamada). Tras con-
siderar la pobreza del universo primordial segn el modelo cosmolgico estn-
dar y la necesidad de repensar el relato del Gnesis desde nuestro cambio de
cosmovisin (de un mundo del ser a un mundo del llegar-a-ser), resulta evidente
que la representacin de un Dios que acta como soberano supremo, a cuya
imperiosa palabra todo entra en el ser de forma inmediata y perfecta, no se
corresponde con la historia del universo. Por otra parte parece inapropiado
postular un acto especial de creacin inicial, complementado con un acto de

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creacin continua que mantenga el universo en existencia. Y concluye: Ms


bien hemos de considerarlo como un solo acto, que es uno en la eternidad de
Dios y que se despliega en el tiempo en toda su diversidad.
Y comienza as la presentacin de su interesante intuicin teolgica: La
mejor forma de representarse la relacin de la creacin hacia el Creador
evidentemente esta es una opinin subjetiva, pero a mi juicio, en la medida
en que yo pueda juzgarlo, concordante con el universo evolutivo me parece
ser la que quisiera denominar creatio appellata, creacin llamada a acercar-
se. La idea bsica es que el universo es llamado por Dios a salir de la nada
hacia l. El proceso del llegar-a-ser es la respuesta de la creacin. El proceso
total, que es el esfuerzo continuo por responder a la llamada creadora y cre-
ativa de Dios, es la creacin continua. No hay en ella un primer acto, al que
sigui despus la elaboracin de la materia que compone el universo. La accin
que logr realizar el inicio del proceso y la accin que mantiene el proceso en
marcha son la misma llamada de Dios, de la cual depende la existencia de todo
y mediante la cual todo se mantiene en el ser o ms exactamente en el pro-
ceso de llegar-a-ser.
Y matiza as la omnipotencia del Creador que surge de esa intuicin: Esta
imagen bsica de Dios llamando a salir de la nada al proceso universal del lle-
gar-a-ser, necesita una serie de calificaciones, para evitar una interpretacin
asociada a la imagen del Creador de la teologa clsica, que vea al Creador
en primer lugar como el Dios omnipotente. Aunque el universo sigue sien-
do en ciertos aspectos una demostracin de omnipotencia la inmensidad
del universo, con sus miles de millones de galaxias, necesita obviamente de
un Creador muy potente, omnipotente, al menos no lo es en primer lugar.
En esa matizacin de la omnipotencia del Creador subraya la nueva califica-
cin de su paciencia infinita: Como se ha mostrado, Dios no se impone por
la fuerza a sus creaturas. Es infinitamente paciente, no ha catapultado a la
existencia en seis das a nuestro mundo. Su llamada al universo para que salga
de la nada hacia l lo que en teologa hemos aprendido a denominar crea-
tio ex nihilo no produce creaturas ya preparadas, sino que deja aparecer en
escena a las estructuras y elementos ms simples, que hoy seguimos encon-
trando en gran abundancia por el universo. Los miles de millones de aos
desde el big-bang hasta la aparicin de las primeras estrellas y planetas, cier-
to que, para el Dios eterno son como un instante, pero en la medida en que
Dios se ha insertado en este mundo y se apropia en cierto modo su tempora-
lidad, esos tiempos interminables permiten reconocer al Dios que aguarda,
con paciencia infinita, la respuesta a su llamada creadora. Si los espacios infi-
nitos repletos de miles de millones de galaxias dejan traslucir el infinito poder
del Creador, estos tiempos infinitos permiten reconocer al Creador como infi-
nitamente paciente.
La llamada creadora es, pues, paciente, y es una invitacin al proceso de uni-
ficacin que enriquece en el ser: El modo en que Dios crea no es una demos-
tracin de poder, la cual forzara a ir directamente a Dios a todo cuanto es lla-
mado a la existencia Dios parece que no hace que las cosas sucedan, ms bien

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les permite que sucedan Este proceso de unin es rectamente mantenido


mediante la persistente llamada creadora de Dios. Evidentemente, Dios no est
presionando a los elementos, para obligarlos a que se unan Si esto fuera as,
tendramos la situacin paradjica de que la mayora de los elementos del uni-
verso escaparan a la presin divina. Dios seguira siendo visto entonces en pri-
mer lugar como causa eficiente, se convertira en una causa ms dentro de la
cadena causal. Y, sin embargo, en la realidad no se ve nada de eso. Ms bien
Dios dirige a esos elementos la invitacin a unificarse, hacindose presente en
ellos e invitndolos a acercarse a su Suprema Unin: Otra comprensin mejor
de la actividad creadora, compatible con la realidad evolutiva, sera ver a Dios
actuando desde el interior de los elementos. La realidad ms ntima de todas las
cosas se concebira como la presencia de Dios, o ms bien del llamamiento de
Dios a venir a l. Fijmonos en dos aspectos relativos a esta forma de entender
la accin Dios.
El primero de ellos es el carcter activo de la inmanencia divina en las crea-
turas: La omnipresencia de Dios adquirira as un nuevo significado: ya no un
estar en todas partes totalmente abstracto, sino la concreta inmanencia de Dios
que invita a unirse a los elementos prximos. Esta inmanencia del Dios que
llama desde el interior de los elementos mantiene intacta la integridad del ele-
mento. Podemos decir a la vez y con ms precisin que sin esta presencia de la
llamada de Dios el elemento recaera en la nada. Como hemos visto, la abertu-
ra hacia un futuro evolutivo es tanto menor, cuanto ms bajo est situado el ele-
mento en la escala del llegar-a-ser. Lo ilustra con los tomos de hidrgeno, los
ms abundantes del universo, que tienen escasa probabilidad de fusionarse en
tomos ms complejos o de unirse a otros tomos para formar molculas. Y
confiesa grficamente que en esos niveles ms bajos de la evolucin parece
apenas audible la llamada creadora.
Describe los rasgos amorosos que encierra la manera de hacerse esa invita-
cin divina: Cuando Dios invita a unirse a los elementos, no los est forzando
a ello. Su llamada no es la orden de un poder dominante. En cierto modo, bajo
el disfraz de un elemento seduce al elemento prximo para que se le una. No
existe presin externa alguna, tan slo una tendencia interna hacia el elemento
prximo. De este modo el Creador limita el poder de su llamada creadora hacia
la unin a aquello de lo que es capaz el elemento. Nunca se autoimpone, sino
que permite al elemento prximo y al propio elemento que sean lo que son: ele-
mentos infinitamente pequeos que tienen su existencia en una semejanza infi-
nitesimal con el Creador, cuya presencia en el interior de ellos parece ser ade-
cuada a esa semejanza. Su llamada creadora desde el interior del elemento se
adapta as a la realidad del elemento, sin ejercer poder alguno. En el mbito de
las relaciones humanas damos un nombre a esta forma de aceptar al otro, ofre-
cindose uno mismo pero sin imponerse: amor.
Describe tambin los rasgos amorosos que encierra el contenido de esa invi-
tacin: Esto resulta todava ms evidente si consideramos el segundo aspec-
to de la forma en que Dios crea mediante su llamada desde el interior. No hay
ningn camino directo por el que el elemento pueda ir a Dios. Slo puede res-

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ponder a la llamada del Creador unindose a otro elemento. El elemento huma-


no, la persona humana, experimenta esa fuerza que le une a otro elemento
humano sin imponrsele, como amor: el amor no se impone. De forma anlo-
ga, esto puede aplicarse a todos los niveles de unin, donde se debe respetar
siempre la integridad del otro elemento, y donde ambos llegan a ser ms median-
te la unin, al acercarse infinitesimalmente al Creador. Descubrir el amor como
la fuerza creadora fundamental abre una perspectiva que parece muy adecua-
da a la actividad de Dios: le confesamos como Amor, e incluso si atribuimos la
accin creadora especialmente al Espritu Santo, esto concordara al menos
razonablemente con la enseanza teolgica, ya que el Espritu Santo se ha con-
siderado a menudo, en las especulaciones trinitarias, como la fuerza unifica-
dora del amor.
Presenta esta llamada amorosa como la fuerza impulsora de la evolucin,
pero subraya que no modifica ni completa la descripcin cientfica: De este
modo, la amorosa llamada de Dios se podra considerar, teolgicamente hablan-
do, como la fuerza impulsora de la creacin y, por tanto, de la evolucin. Esto
no contradice en modo alguno las observaciones de la ciencia. Los elementos,
a todos los niveles, son exactamente lo que son. Los resultados cientficos no se
modifican en nada; la afirmacin teolgica no aade nada a la descripcin cien-
tfica en cuanto cientfica, aunque sta es en algn sentido incompleta. Ms bien
esta descripcin incompleta de la realidad concreta de la creacin es la des-
cripcin verificable ms exacta que podemos obtener. Comenta que, desde el
punto de vista de la fe, todo lo que la ciencia descubre es parte de la realidad
que ha llegado a ser gracias a la llamada creadora de Dios. Pero que esto man-
tiene totalmente intactas nuestras ciencias, y no ayuda a solucionar sus pro-
blemas, porque el Dios de esta llamada amorosa no es ningn Deus ex machi-
na. Comenta tambin la complementariedad de las tareas cientfica y teolgica,
y concluye: La ciencia puede, al menos en gran parte, describir el universo en
su historia fsico-qumica-biolgica, e incluso en su historia humana; la teolo-
ga, como forma de expresar el sentido de las verdades reveladas de la fe, en su
relacin con el estado actual que ha alcanzado la creacin en evolucin, inten-
ta decir cmo acta Dios en este mundo, en su creacin.
Concluye la seccin afirmando que, desde el punto de vista de la fe, este uni-
verso existe porque es mantenido en la existencia y en su proceso progresivo de
llegar-a-ser por la llamada creadora del amor divino, presente de forma infini-
tesimal en todas las creaturas. Y comenta que en esa llamada creadora divina,
inmanente a toda la creacin, podemos ver el panentesmo de que nos habla
San Pablo (Ef 1,23; 1 Co 12,6 y 15,28), pero debemos traducir su lenguaje del
ser (ontolgico) a un lenguaje del llegar-a-ser (gignontolgico) 14. Pero lo que
hemos de intentar inmediatamente es traducir a este lenguaje del llegar-a-ser la
formulacin misma del misterio de la Trinidad.

14
Permtaseme el neologismo (del griego ggnon ggnontos, el que llega-a-ser, en vez de
n ntos, el que es) que Schmitz-Moormann introducir ms tarde en la dura forma hbrida:
fierologa (del latn fieri, llegar-a-ser).

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1.5. Hablar de Dios en el lenguaje del llegar-a-ser (6.3)

El apartado siguiente, La Trinidad, creadora del universo en devenir, enfo-


ca plenamente el tema de esa traduccin de la formulacin del Dios tri-uno.
Comienza presentando, en el contexto de la trascendencia del Creador sobre la
creacin (que fcilmente lleva a una teologa negativa y apoftica) y del miste-
rio revelado de la Trinidad, el hecho de que desde Toms de Aquino hemos sepa-
rado los tratados De Deo Uno y De Deo Trino, haciendo este ltimo intil para
la praxis cristiana, que resultaba estrictamente monotesta. En los aos sesen-
ta del siglo XX Karl Rahner, junto con cierta teologa protestante iniciaba una
reaccin ante ese hecho. Criticaba, por ejemplo, que la reduccin de la Trini-
dad a una terna de hipstasis consustanciales, cualquiera de las cuales podra
haberse encarnado, hace que la encarnacin no nos diga nada del Logos. Y subra-
yaba que la Trinidad econmica (la comprometida con la historia de salva-
cin y con el mundo) es inseparable de la Trinidad inmanente (la de la vida
trinitaria ntima). A la idea griega de Ser Supremo eterno e inmutable, elabo-
rada a partir de la de actus purus e introducida en el dogma cristiano, Rahner
aada la verdad revelada de que el Logos se hizo carne, y formulaba: un des-
cubrimiento importante de la teologa moderna es que Dios puede hacerse (o
llegar-a-ser) algo, frase que Schmitz-Moormann cita con evidente satisfaccin.
Porque lo que para su tema le preocupa es el contraste entre esa idea del Crea-
dor, como Ser Supremo inmutable, y la de la creacin, como universo en un
proceso de unin en el que van emergiendo nuevas realidades. Se pregunta expl-
citamente si la idea del Creador tri-uno no debera repensarse tambin en el
contexto de una metafsica de la unin. Y comienza a formular su respuesta,
ponderando la necesidad y las dificultades de esa traduccin que exige liberar-
nos de nuestro lenguaje y nuestro pensamiento tradicionales:
Evidentemente, esto no pretende cuestionar el contenido revelado de la
doctrina del Dios tri-uno. Pero puesto que todo lenguaje vivo de una poca es
siempre determinado por el horizonte metafsico de esa poca, ya no tenemos
para mucho tiempo la posibilidad de pensar en el horizonte de un mundo est-
tico, por ms que nuestros hbitos de pensamiento estn an vinculados a esas
formulaciones clsicas. Esto constituye un verdadero handicap: porque hasta
el presente no hemos elaborado plenamente una metafsica de la unin, del
universo del llegar-a-ser, mientras que estamos todava acostumbrados al len-
guaje claro y refinado (aunque ya no necesariamente significativo) de nuestra
tradicin filosfica desde Platn y Aristteles a Toms de Aquino y Buena-
ventura y aun a Kant 15 y Hegel. Por ello nos resulta muy difcil liberarnos de
nuestros hbitos de pensamiento que hemos mantenido durante tanto tiem-
po como leyes del ser y del pensar.

Pone el problema metafsico central de la evolucin emergente, y concluye de


l la radical dificultad de descubrir al ser como aspecto instantneo del llegar-a-

15
Podra resultar til recordar que Kant fue incapaz de pensar en ningn tipo de deve-
nir evolutivo (KANT, Gesammelte Werke, 8:54). [Nota de K. S.-M.]

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ser: Estamos acostumbrados a mantener como correcta la afirmacin clsica


de que lo ms no puede salir de lo menos, aplicando la formulacin lucreciana:
De nihilo nihil (De la nada, nada [sale]). Pero en la historia del universo vemos
que esto ocurre constantemente: a partir de una nada relativa 16 la nada abso-
luta no podemos ni encontrarla ni pensarla vemos que con frecuencia apare-
ce algo nuevo, un plus. Toda la historia de la evolucin, que es la historia de la
creacin, es justamente esto: un continuo llegar-a-ser de algo nuevo, de un plus,
a partir de una nada relativa. Y este algo nuevo no es, digamos, algo totalmente
inmvil que descansara en s mismo, como si tuviese su existencia asegurada.
Ms bien, la realidad propia de cada cosa es un proceso continuo de unificarse
a s misma. As que, el ser es un aspecto instantneo del proceso general del lle-
gar-a-ser.Si esto es correcto, nuestros argumentos basados en la analogia entis
(analoga del ser) necesitarn una revisin al menos parcial: tendremos que pasar
a una analogia fientis (analoga del llegar-a-ser), de la cual la analogia entis es tan
slo un aspecto instantneo. Volveremos sobre esta cuestin.
Con todo, mediante la clsica analoga del ser, pero en la perspectiva de la
llamada creadora, podemos avanzar una semejanza entre la realidad del
Creador y la de las creaturas, semejanza que deberamos poder enunciar en el
lenguaje del llegar-a-ser: Pero aun teniendo muy presente esa dificultad, pode-
mos decir, sin embargo, en la lnea clsica de la analogia entis que nada puede
existir en este universo que sea totalmente diferente de Dios si esto ltimo fuese
posible, podra existir algo totalmente ajeno a Dios; pero todo cuanto llega a ser,
llega a ser gracias a que presenta una cierta semejanza con Dios, por infinitesi-
mal que sta sea. Todo cuanto ha llegado a ser, existe, porque participa en Dios
mediante alguna semejanza. En la perspectiva de la creatio apellata, se puede
decir que Dios llama a s a los elementos, para que lleguen a ser ms y ms seme-
jantes a l. Sin embargo, el hecho de ser semejante a Dios ya no se debera enun-
ciar mediante la idea del existir, sino la del llegar-a-ser, del unirse 17.
Schmitz-Moormann, continuando su argumento sobre el enunciado de esa
semejanza en la lnea de la definicin teilhardiana del plus esse, insiste en que,
pese a toda teologa negativa, nuestro lenguaje sobre la realidad del Creador no
puede ignorar lo que sabemos sobre la realidad de la creacin evolutiva, como
proceso de unin impulsado por la llamada del amor divino. Y concluye que a
Dios hemos de atribuirle un proceso de unin semejante, ms que el clsico ser
inmutable: De acuerdo con la metafsica de la unin, el proceso bsico de la
evolucin es la unin continuada de elementos en niveles cada vez ms eleva-

16
La nada relativa es, por ejemplo, el tomo en relacin a la molcula, que comparada
con el tomo tiene un plus de ser, de realidad. [Nota de K. S.-M.]
17
Ya que la metafsica de la unin carece de un lenguaje plenamente desarrollado, no
podemos evitar retomar a menudo el lenguaje de la metafsica del ser. En la mayora de los
idiomas ni siquiera disponemos de un trmino apropiado para hablar del llegar-a-ser (sino
trminos compuestos devenir, become, o pasivos fieri, ggnomai). No as en la len-
gua alemana (werden), acuada en su pasado metafsico. [Nota de K. S.-M., adaptada a la
traduccin.]

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dos del llegar-a-ser. Todo cuanto existe, existe mientras y en tanto que sus ele-
mentos estn unidos. En la unin y mediante ella el proceso del llegar-a-ser pro-
duce nuevos niveles de ser, es decir, nuevos niveles de semejanza con Dios. Aun-
que, segn el principio de la teologa negativa, no podemos sacar conclusiones
sobre la realidad divina a partir de lo que sabemos sobre las creaturas, sin embar-
go al menos no resulta absurdo que, con respecto a la realidad de Dios, ponga-
mos en cuestin la posibilidad de hablar sobre el ser sin pensar y considerar lo
que sabemos acerca del ser en la creacin de Dios. Podemos hablar del ser de
Dios sin saber algo del ser de las creaturas? Evidentemente no, pues todo lo que
hablamos del ser est basado sobre nuestra experiencia del ser en la creacin,
de la que nosotros somos una parte. Si la definicin teilhardiana del ser es correc-
ta (vase 2.7 ms arriba) y yo opino que lo es, entonces esta definicin
posee al menos cierta importancia para el discurso humano acerca del ser de
Dios. El camino que abre esa definicin para hablar de Dios est al menos tan
justificado si la definicin de esse es correcta, como la clsica costumbre de
atribuir ser a Dios. Puesto que ya no vivimos en un mundo esttico del ser, tene-
mos que intentar entender cmo centellea la reverberacin de Dios en el mundo
del llegar-a-ser. Puesto que reconocemos el proceso del llegar-a-ser en la crea-
cin como un proceso de unin impulsado por la llamada creadora del amor
divino, podramos preguntarnos si existe en Dios una analoga a este proceso
bsico de la creacin.

1.6. La Trinidad como continua unin amorosa (6.3)

Schmitz-Moormann presenta a continuacin la imagen que aqu surge de


Dios como Unin absoluta y Uni-totalidad suprema, y las dificultades que esto
presenta a una concepcin monotesta estricta. Vienen a ser las mismas que
veamos en nuestra seccin 1.3, sobre la necesidad que, para unificarse, ten-
dra Dios del mundo. Las complementa aqu con las de la filosofa procesual
de A. N. Whitehead. En ella Dios se introduce como un factor en el proceso uni-
versal que desarrolla la funcin creatividad, y se afirma explcitamente: Pero
desde luego creatividad no tiene sentido fuera de sus creaturas, y no lo tiene
Dios fuera de la creatividad y de las creaturas temporales 18. Schmitz-
Moormann lo califica de caso especial de pantesmo, y propone en general,
esa integracin del Dios monotesta en el universo como la nica solucin
racional al problema planteado por un mundo en evolucin que llega al ser
mediante la unin.
Comenta a continuacin que ese monotesmo estricto asla a Dios del mundo,
y le hace el Ser Supremo que creaba el mundo infantil de la edad media: un
mundo perfectamente regulado y ordenado, que slo el hombre libre poda desor-
denar con sus pecados, ocasionando el mal fsico como castigo de Dios por ellos.
Pero esto plantea el problema de que el mal golpea a pecadores y a justos (desde

18
WHITEHEAD, 1929, p. 343 [nota de K. S.-M.]; trad. esp., p. 307.

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los planteamientos del Libro de Job a los de Voltaire en el terremoto de Lisboa


de 1755). Frente a esta teologa, Schmitz-Moormann presenta la suya, en la que
la evolucin implica un mundo estructurado por unin y creado por la llama-
da amorosa de Dios, de un Dios que es Arquetipo de todo lo creado, y no puede
ser estrictamente nico e inmutable. Y concluye prudentemente: Sera cierta-
mente falso decir, que podemos deducir la realidad de la Trinidad a partir del
proceso de unin que mantiene a este universo acercndose a Dios mediante su
evolucin. Pero podemos afirmar, que esta realidad revelada del Dios trinitario
y eternamente unido se refleja en el proceso universal de la evolucin que tiene
lugar mediante una unin progresiva.
Pondera a continuacin esa realidad revelada del Dios tri-uno, el mysterium
magnum, que sobrepasa toda comprensin humana. Sobrepasa especialmen-
te una comprensin basada en la metafsica del ser, en la que Dios aparece
como el Ser absoluto e inmutable, difcil de compaginar incluso con el Dios de
Abraham, de Isaac y de Jacob, vinculado a este mundo. Rahner, pona en segun-
do trmino esa inmutabilidad, afirmando que aqu la ontologa ha de orien-
tarse segn el mensaje de la fe, y no censurar ese mensaje. Schmitz-Moor-
mann critica esa pretensin de que los telogos sigan diciendo a la ciencia
cmo funcionan los cielos, y recuerda que la metafsica no es ninguna cons-
truccin arbitraria del espritu humano, sino el resultado del ms amplio esfuer-
zo por entender el universo, es decir la creacin parte tambin ella de la reve-
lacin divina, y que de la actual fsica evolutiva ya no brota una metafsica
del ser (u ontologa), sino una del llegar-a-ser (o gignontologa) 19. Cierto
que era esa ontologa griega la que impuso en el Concilio de Calcedonia la ter-
minologa de las tres hipstasis consustanciales (que se interpretarn inter-
cambiables). Porque vivimos en una historia de la humanidad en la que va
evolucionando nuestra idea misma de Dios. Del Dios infantil del Gnesis como
padre que da normas sin deber razonarlas, pero castiga y perdona, hemos pasa-
do al Dios adolescente medieval 20 como Ser Supremo, eterno e inmutable, omni-
potente y universal, que tiene todo bajo control, todo ordenado con medida,
nmero y peso (Sab 11,20), a excepcin del hombre, que ha decidido crear
libre. Y contina proponiendo su fierologa, y resumiendo de nuevo las difi-
cultades que en ella tiene un monotesmo estricto:
La ontologa vinculada a esta visin adolescente de la realidad parece
que necesita ser reemplazada. Esto no debera asombrarnos, si observamos
la historia de la revelacin, que prosigue al menos a nivel de la creacin con-
tinua. Ya no vivimos en el cosmos, sino en un mundo del llegar-a-ser. A este
mundo le corresponde la metafsica de la unin, a pesar de que slo conte-
mos con un tosco esbozo de ella. Puesto que en esta metafsica el ser se defi-
ne mediante la unin, uno podra afirmar que Dios se une a Dios mismo.

19
Ver nota 14 anteriormente.
20
Schmitz-Moormann dice que los telogos medievales le recuerdan a bachilleres que
lo saben todo, que an no han llegado a sondear los lmites de su conocimiento y la infinitud
de su ignorancia.

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Como ya hemos indicado, si se afirmase esto acerca de un Dios monotesta,


Dios habra de ser considerado como un compuesto o bien como necesitan-
do un universo, tal como le sucede al Dios whiteheadiano. Ambas ideas resul-
tan insatisfactorias. La concepcin whiteheadiana conduce a la integracin
de Dios como un factor dentro del proceso universal, y la idea de unidad com-
puesta exige una materia a partir de la cual Dios haya sido compuesto. De
este modo se veran comprometidas tanto la eternidad de Dios como su tras-
cendencia. Pensar que Dios es tri-uno (esto es, que no se puede pensar a Dios
como uno sin pensarle a la vez como tri-uno) abre una nueva perspectiva para
la metafsica de la unin.

Subraya cmo el misterio de ese acto de unin interpersonal amorosa cons-


tituye, en la metafsica de la unin, la nueva acepcin del actus purus, el acto
puro de ese amor perfecto que supera nuestra comprensin: Puesto que segn
esa metafsica el ser se realiza mediante la unin y existe tan slo porque esta
unin se realiza de nuevo a cada momento, el Ser absoluto tiene que definir-
se mediante la Unin absoluta. El supremo nivel de unin que conocemos es
la unin personal, que en los seres humanos se da slo muy imperfectamen-
te. En Dios las tres personas son una sola cosa en un amor total y eterno, que
se renueva a cada momento de la eternidad naturalmente sta es la forma
de hablar propia del ser humano, que no dispone de ninguna posibilidad real
de hablar sobre la eternidad. El viejo concepto de Dios como actus purus
recibe un nuevo significado: es el acto de unin eternamente renovado y siem-
pre ya completamente realizado, que une en perfecto amor a las tres personas
divinas de la Trinidad: el Padre, el Hijo y el Espritu Santo. La imaginacin
humana no puede alcanzar a comprender la plenitud de esta unin en el amor
divino. El amor humano, el que conocemos, puede intentar darse a s mismo,
pero en realidad nunca lo consigue del todo. En la Trinidad la relacin amo-
rosa carece de defecto alguno. Cada persona de la Trinidad es una sola cosa
con las dems en amor total. Estando unidas en un amor perfecto ms all de
toda comprensin humana, las tres personas divinas son un nico Dios. El
misterio de la perfecta unin amorosa nos permitir la paradjica afirmacin:
cada una de las personas divinas, en perfecta unin con las dems, acta como
un nico Dios.
Schmitz-Moormann precisa esta ltima afirmacin notando que la diferen-
cia entre las personas no es puramente relacional, sino producida por la unin
misma, que diferencia profundamente: Esta afirmacin ha de precisarse, recor-
dando que la unin no fusiona, la unin diferencia. Uno se hace ms uno mismo
al unirse al otro. La diferenciacin tradicional entre Padre, Hijo y Espritu Santo
tendra que ser algo ms que una simple diferenciacin de tipo relacional. Esta
teora, que depende del Concilio de Calcedonia, se desarroll en el horizonte de
una metafsica ontolgica, para la cual todo tena su naturaleza en su esencia.
Segn esta concepcin, cualquiera de las personas de la Trinidad podra tomar
el lugar de una de las otras. En la metafsica de la unin no puede haber una
identidad esencial entre las tres personas: stas ms bien llegan a ser lo que son
a travs de su unin. Las tres personas son un solo Dios, unidas de tal modo que

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cada persona participa completamente de las otras 21. Podramos afirmar tam-
bin que, ms all de toda comprensin humana, las tres personas divinas se
diferencian tanto ms como personas cuanto ms profundamente se unen en el
amor.
Comenta a continuacin lo reducido del fruto obtenido dentro de esta nueva
metafsica de la unin, justificndolo con lo reducido de la explicacin anterior
dentro de la metafsica del ser, y con lo incipiente del nuevo lenguaje. Resume
ese fruto en la imagen de un Dios que trasciende la creacin y no la necesita
para existir. E insina los recientes estudios sobre el papel de cada una de las
personas respecto a la creacin, adems del papel del Hijo descrito en el himno
de la carta a los Colosenses (Col 1,16-17).

1.7. Vestigios e imgenes trinitarios (6.3)

Al hablar del papel de cada persona en la creacin, le surge el tema de los


vestigios de la Trinidad en la creacin. Recuerda los intentos clsicos de des-
cubrir ternas que recuerden las tres personas divinas: Agustn (memoria, enten-
dimiento y voluntad), Anselmo (fuente, ro y desembocadura), Lutero (ser, forma
y potencia). Recuerda tambin la crtica a esa idea misma de los vestigia Trini-
tatis por parte de Barth y de la moderna apologtica catlica. Rahner notaba
que en la teologa escolstica tales vestigios eran imposibles, y que no puede
ser as, pues la Trinidad es un misterio de salvacin 22. Schmitz-Moormann
comenta que, contra lo que pase en una metafsica el ser, en la del llegar-a-ser
todo progreso evolutivo es un vestigio de la Trinidad: Si tomamos seriamente
la analogia fientis, podemos decir, con confianza de no equivocarnos, que esta
creacin, en sus estructuras del llegar-a-ser, es ad similitudinem Trinitatis. Todo
lo que evoluciona hacia un estado de ser ms elevado lo hace mediante la unin,
reflejando as, al modo de las creaturas, el Ser absoluto en el acto absoluto y
eterno de la Unin divina. La evolucin nos acerca as a Dios y contesta la lla-
mada amorosa del Creador imitando la unin divina en aproximaciones infini-
tesimales, mediante la unin con otros elementos en el nivel del llegar-a-ser
entonces alcanzado.
Comenta a continuacin Schmitz-Moormann cmo no hemos de buscar los
vestigios de la Trinidad en aquellas ternas clsicas, sino en los procesos de lle-
gar-a-ser por unin, especialmente por unin interpersonal amorosa, donde, a
nuestro juicio, podramos incluso hablar de imagen trinitaria, interpretando
trinitariamente el texto de la creacin humana (Gen 1.27): El vestigium trini-
tatis ms evidente no se ha de buscar en primer lugar en alguna realidad tri-
partita que de algn modo refleje a las tres personas, sino en el propio proceso

21
Uno podra sentirse tentado a decir que cada una participa completamente de la esen-
cia de las otras, pero eso sera sucumbir al lenguaje de la ontologa, lo cual intentamos evitar.
[Nota de K. S.-M.]
22
RAHNER, Escritos IV, p.117. [Nota de K. S.-M., adaptada.]

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del llegar-a-ser. La unin produce nuevas realidades que en su llegar-a-ser uni-


totalidad reflejan cada vez ms la realidad divina. Hemos de recordar aqu dos
cosas: La unin no fusiona, sino que diferencia. Esto vale en gran medida para
la unin trinitaria, la unio trinitatis. Y tampoco hemos de olvidar, que una per-
sona en cuanto tal slo puede existir en su relacin con otras personas; que no
puede darse, como persona, una persona que exista sola y aislada. As pues,
mediante la unin, que es diferenciadora, la creacin y por tanto los seres huma-
nos, pueden acercarse a Dios. La unin entre seres humanos que respeta su per-
sonalidad 23 se realiza en el amor. Por consiguiente, la afirmacin Dios es amor
es ms que una sentencia moralizadora: afecta a la fuerza central de unin en
la Trinidad, que es la fuerza central de la creacin.
Concluye subrayando, con Teilhard, el mandamiento del amor como el prin-
cipio ontolgico de la evolucin al nivel humano. Pero no se ve que triunfe en
la noosfera. Sin embargo, ese amor desinteresado es la fuerza decisiva que nos
abre el camino al futuro. Es la respuesta a la llamada amorosa de Dios que nos
invita a compartir su vida trinitaria: No hay ningn otro camino para acercarse
al Dios tri-uno. Como ya afirmaba Teilhard, el mandamiento del amor ha deja-
do de ser una exigencia puramente moral, para convertirse en el principio onto-
lgico de la evolucin, de la creacin. Esta creacin slo alcanzar su meta, el
punto que est invitada a alcanzar, si el amor se convierte cada vez ms en la
fuerza dominante que abra nuevas vas hacia el futuro. Sea como sea ese futu-
ro dominado por la fuerza del amor, apenas parece compatible con un indivi-
dualismo exagerado y una autorrealizacin egosta. Lo que Teilhard denomin
la noosfera no puede desarrollar una estructura de soporte humanamente acep-
table, si no est dominada por el amor. La creacin, llamada a participar en la
vida de Dios, puede perder su oportunidad a causa de un rechazo individualis-
ta del amor. Pues, como lo han mostrado los grandes filsofos personalistas de
la primera mitad del siglo XX, uno no conquista su personalidad mediante la
autorrealizacin egosta, sino amando a otras personas. Paradjicamente, los
que aman se realizan a s mismos sin buscar la autorrealizacin egosta. La fuer-
za dominante de la evolucin slo se trasluce confusamente en los niveles ms
tempranos es decir, los ms bajos de la evolucin, aunque se puede distin-
guir claramente como la fuerza de unin. Pero en el nivel humano, desde el
punto de vista de la fe que ve al Dios trinitario como el Arquetipo a ser imitado
por la creacin, el amor se convierte en la fuerza decisiva. Para aproximarse al
Dios tri-uno, para seguir el camino de la creacin evolutiva, tan slo existe una
ley: amaos los unos a los otros (Jn 13,34). No hay ningn otro camino hacia
el futuro que conduzca a la plenitud al pleroma de la creacin que ha sido
invitada a compartir la vida trinitaria. Esta es la respuesta que Dios espera a su
fiel llamada creadora del amor.

23
Forzar a las personas a que se unan de acuerdo con el slogan de la Revolucin Fran-
cesa (Libert, galit, Fraternit ou la Mort) no es fomentar la unin, sino fomentar la indi-
vidualizacin, convertir a las personas en cifras annimas. [Nota de K. S.-M.]

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Y concluye esta larga seccin: Habiendo descubierto con cierta confianza


un vestigium trinitatis en la creacin evolutiva, hemos de plantearnos si los otros
grandes parmetros de la evolucin nos permiten descubrir algn otro, y si nos
permiten reconocer nuevos aspectos del Creador y de sus propsitos hacia este
universo.

1.8. Creacin de la informacin (6.4)

Este nuevo apartado, Creatio informata (Creacin informada), presenta


la informacin el gran parmetro de la evolucin al que, como dijimos, dedi-
ca el captulo 4 como otro vestigio divino, al ver su patente crecimiento pro-
gresivo como un acercamiento a la omnisciencia divina. Pero plantea pronto el
tema de la posibilidad de que Dios trasmita informacin a la creacin por cau-
salidad descendente (top-down causation), declarando ese concepto, inspira-
do en la explicacin psicolgica (ni reductivista ni dualista) del hecho miste-
rioso y patente de que nuestra mente transmite informacin a nuestro cuerpo.
Y discute las opiniones sobre la aplicacin real de esa causalidad divina en rela-
cin a las leyes del universo, el ajuste fino de cuyas constantes est relacionado
con el principio antrpico. Se plantea incluso si la llamada creadora hacia la
unin habra de concebirse como un tipo de causalidad descendente, pero exclu-
ye rpidamente esta concepcin que reintroducira al Dios omnipotente, que
decide mediante la unin el detalle de las nuevas uni-totalidades: La unin crea
nueva informacin, nuevas estructuras; lo que hace el Creador es permitir que
stas aparezcan, ms que causar su aparicin como estructuras especficamen-
te informadas. Y resume as el mbito de la causalidad descendente: El mode-
lo de la causalidad descendente tiene una funcin explicativa cuando Dios habla
a la humanidad a travs de los profetas, cuando Dios escucha las plegarias, cuan-
do la gracia de Dios llega a la persona humana. Tal tipo de causalidad descen-
dente resulta til como modelo de la interaccin de Dios con la creacin para
que ciertos acontecimientos puedan concebirse como accin de Dios en la his-
toria de su creacin, sin que sea ste el nico modelo a aplicar. Dios no se limi-
ta a usar un modelo nico.
Presenta as la relacin que tiene, con esa informacin espiritual, la habitual
y amorosa llamada creadora, que es propiamente gracia: Parece ser que la forma
habitual en que Dios interacta con este universo es sosteniendo su creacin,
sosteniendo la materia/espritu en su camino hacia niveles superiores de com-
plejidad, centralizacin, conciencia y espiritualidad mediante la llamada crea-
dora del amor. Dios llama a salir de la nada al universo para que llegue-a-ser cada
vez ms semejante a l. Y por convertirse cada vez ms en informacin y hacer-
se ms creativo en la produccin de informacin (como ocurre de forma bien
visible al nivel humano), el universo en su cima evolutiva se hace esencialmente
espiritual, y esto significa, hasta cierto punto, ms semejante a Dios. Esto no ha
de hacernos olvidar que la amorosa y creativa llamada de Dios constituye, a su
propio estilo, la base informativa de este universo. No impone ninguna infor-

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macin, pero ofrece la posibilidad de crear informacin, si se aprovecha esta


posibilidad siempre que se den las condiciones para ello). Este ofrecimien-
to siempre presente, esta permanente llamada de Dios, debe denominarse con
toda propiedad: gracia. Puesto que la gracia es el activo amor de Dios a su crea-
cin, puesto que la fuerza conductora de la historia evolutiva del universo es el
amor de Dios, podemos decir que la creacin entera es gracia.

1.9. Creacin de la libertad (6.5)

Este ltimo apartado, Creatio libera (Creacin libre), presenta la liber-


tad el parmetro cualitativo de la evolucin al que dedica el captulo ante-
rior como el elemento bsico para que la llamada creadora pueda tener, al
nivel humano, una respuesta de amor: de unin amorosa con el prjimo y con
Dios.
Comienza recordando la visin tradicional escolstica de un mundo perfec-
tamente ordenado por el determinismo de las leyes de la naturaleza, en el que
por decisin divina los seres humanos gozan de libertad. Recuerda ampliamente
cmo en esa visin, la conviccin de una ordenacin perfecta de la creacin
segn el plan de Dios llev al dilema teolgico de combinar el libre albedro
humano con la predestinacin divina y a sus intentos de solucin mediante
la premocin fsica y la ciencia media. Contrapone a eso nuestra visin evo-
lutiva, actual en la que descubrimos una prehistoria de la libertad en la natu-
raleza, y no descubrimos evidencias de que Dios actuase predestinando cuan-
to ha sucedido.
Cierto que en el proceso evolutivo descubrimos como una propensin en la
naturaleza hacia una mayor complejidad, conciencia, informacin y libertad,
pero esta propensin que tiene rasgos de predestinacin y es la que Schmitz-
Moormann explica mediante la llamada creadora no corresponde a la con-
cepcin escolstica de predestinacin divina experimentada en el movimiento
regular de los cielos y la naturaleza, dentro de un universo esttico y determi-
nista, en el que Dios haca salir el Sol sobre malos y buenos (Mt 5,45). De todo
eso concluye que la creacin divina en evolucin indica ms bien que no exis-
te predestinacin alguna ejercida por el Creador, que esta creacin presenta
ms bien la imagen de un universo que evoluciona libre y dolorosamente y que
la nica orientacin mantenida por los vectores de complejidad, informacin
y conciencia crecientes parece dirigirse hacia la evolucin de la libertad.
As en los ltimos prrafos presenta el sentido profundo de esta libertad: ella
permite responder amorosamente a la llamada creadora. Comienza reafirman-
do que Dios est dispuesto, por el bien superior de esa libertad, a pagar el pre-
cio del derroche y el mal en el mundo: Como ya hemos dicho antes 24, podra-
mos especular que la intencin de Dios al crear este mundo no es la de establecer
un orden perfecto, la de imponer la voluntad divina, sino la de llamar con amor

24
Captulo 5, al final. [Nota de K. S.-M.]

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hacia s a una creacin que un da llegar a ser capaz de responder con amor a
la llamada creadora de Dios. Y Dios acepta no slo el precio de un universo lleno
de desechos, sino tambin el precio, an ms agobiante, del mal. Por una parte,
es razonable que no pueda haber una evolucin libre sin ciertos males inevita-
bles como la muerte, ni sin otros males en principio evitables pero estads-
ticamente posibles y probables. Cuando las cosas pueden ir mal, ms tarde o
ms temprano irn mal. Slo en un mundo esttico y estrictamente determi-
nado se podra evitar el mal. Enfermedades, accidentes y muertes prematuras
son parte del precio. No cabe duda de que perturba nuestra sensibilidad y nues-
tra exigencia de felicidad ver que el Creador acepte este precio, pero no existe
forma alguna racionalmente imaginable de que la evolucin de la libertad se
lleve a cabo sin el mal creciente que sta conlleva. An as nos espanta aban-
donar el bello cuadro infantil de un mundo bien ordenado en el que se tena cui-
dado de todo, y nos resulta muy difcil aceptar que Dios est dispuesto a pagar
el precio de la aparicin del mal a todos los niveles de la evolucin para que la
libertad pudiera alcanzar el nivel de la libertad humana.
Y prosigue su argumento, hasta mostrar que Dios est dispuesto a pagar
como precio de la libertad humana el ms impensable de los males, la muerte
en cruz de su Hijo: Por otra parte, esta dificultad para comprender la presen-
cia del mal en la creacin divina no es nueva. La teologa clsica trataba el pro-
blema como mysterium iniquitatis. Hoy podemos ver la relacin inevitable entre
la estructura de la creacin orientada hacia la libertad y la aparicin del mal.
El precio que el Creador estaba dispuesto a pagar por el llegar-a-ser de la liber-
tad puede parecer extremadamente elevado. Quiz el misterio se encuentre ante
todo en el hecho de que este mundo, como un mundo libre que responde a la
llamada creadora del Amor, sea tan importante para el Creador, que ste acep-
t el ms impensable de los males: que el Hijo de Dios, el Logos, se convirtiese
en hombre y muriese en la cruz la ms horrible de las muertes. Quienquiera que
intente resolver el problema del mal, al menos si esto ocurre en una perspecti-
va cristiana, tendra que meditar el misterio de la cruz, el precio mximo paga-
do para que la libertad humana pudiese existir 25. Esto puede indicar cun alta-
mente valora Dios la realidad de la libertad.
La llamada creadora interviene indirectamente en la unin creadora. Esto
permite a Schmitz-Moormann razonar que, a nivel humano, Dios llama a la
unin amorosa a travs del prjimo, y espera una respuesta de amor al prjimo
(que Dios acepta como amor a l, segn la parbola del juicio final). Esta misma
llamada indirecta, el envo de profetas, cobra un sentido profundo en la encar-
nacin de su Hijo a una humanidad extraviada, y constituye la base de una
moderna cristologa: El gran misterio de la creacin no residira tanto en el
viejo dilema del Dios predestinante y el libre albedro humano, sino en el amor

Esto nos conduce a la temtica de la cristologa, la cual parece necesitar una revisin
25

global para que muestre a Cristo como el Redentor o, por usar un trmino ms adecuado,
como el Salvador y Consumador de este universo. [Nota de K. S.-M.]

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de Dios que se abstiene de imponer un orden que evite el mal, para que las crea-
turas lleguen-a-ser libres y puedan amar a Dios. Si la interpretacin propuesta
no resulta equivocada, esta libertad realizada en los seres humanos necesita el
apoyo constante de la llamada creadora y amorosa de Dios. Como en todos los
niveles de evolucin, la llamada llega a travs del prjimo a cada individuo huma-
no, el cual puede responder a esta llamada a amar a Dios mediante el amor al
prjimo, mediante la unin amorosa con el prjimo (cf. Mt 25,30-45). Dios no
llama al individuo humano directamente hacia s como Dios imponindose y
avasallndolo. Dios ms bien se hace presente a travs de otros seres humanos:
enva profetas. En un sentido muy profundo, en completa coherencia con su
intencin creadora, l, el Logos, la Palabra de Dios, se hace hombre, dejando a
los seres humanos la libertad para amarle o rechazarle 26. La llamada creadora
del amor divino, que llama hacia s a todo a partir de la nada por el camino de
la evolucin mediante la unin creadora, sostiene la creacin a todos los nive-
les, por lejos que sta pueda haberse extraviado: el Creador no le quita nunca la
sustentadora llamada del amor. Los seres humanos no son una excepcin: exis-
ten, como todo lo dems, porque son mantenidos en la existencia mediante la
llamada amorosa del Creador. Los seres humanos pueden rechazarla, pueden
buscarse slo a s mismos: an as, Dios no aparta su amorosa llamada, que ha
de ser respondida mediante el amor.
Insiste en que esa llamada creadora es invitacin amorosa y no imposicin
omnipotente, por lo que resulta ser lo que denominamos gracia: La creacin,
que existe slo porque es llamada con amor por el Creador, alcanza en el ser
humano la capacidad de responder o rechazar el ofrecimiento divino del amor.
En el nivel humano se hace as evidente que el poder creador que trabaja en el
universo, no es tanto la voluntad omnipotente del Creador, como la gracia de
Dios que penetra el universo entero. Todo en este universo se mantiene en la
existencia mediante la gracia de Dios, mediante su amor.
Concluye nuestro documento notando que ese carcter gracioso de la llama-
da creadora se refleja en la creacin entera a travs de la nueva calificacin del
Creador como infinitamente paciente (cf. nuestra seccin 1.4), incluso en su invi-
tacin al pecador a que responda con amor: El amor de Dios es infinitamente
paciente, tal como se ha documentado mediante la lenta respuesta del universo:
Dios nunca aparta su amor creador. Ni tampoco aparta Dios su gracia de nin-
gn ser humano. ste puede rehusar el amar a Dios, el amar a su prjimo, pero
el ofrecimiento divino del amor, de la gracia, nunca le ser retirado. Incluso el
pecador, el ser humano que rechaza a Dios, puede en cualquier momento aga-
rrarse libremente a ese amor pacientemente ofrecido, que impregna el universo
entero. En un sentido muy preciso podemos decir: la creacin entera es gracia.
Y la creacin, que ha llegado a ser capax Dei en la humanidad, est llamada a
responder con amor al Creador, adorando ese eterno Amor.

26
Este aspecto de una cristologa futura necesita un mayor desarrollo.

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2. EL CONTEXTO DE ESTA INTUICIN DE SCHMITZ-MOORMANN

Podramos decir que ese contexto fue toda su vida intelectual. Pero distin-
gamos, por claridad, entre unos precedentes previos a la idea concreta de la lla-
mada creadora, y las primeras menciones de esta idea.

2.1. Precedentes

Karl Schmitz-Moormann (1928-1996) era un bilogo y telogo alemn, cat-


lico y seglar. El dilogo interior entre sus ciencias y su teologa est directa-
mente influido por el de Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, que slo pstumamente
comenzar a hacerse pblico. Schmitz-Moormann, ms agraciado, podr dedi-
carse pblicamente a ese dilogo, e incluso trabajar en su difusin por toda
Europa, como Co-fundador y primer Presidente de la European Society for the
Study of Science and Theology (ESSSAT). Su trabajo teolgico se desarrolla, en
efecto, a partir del Concilio Vaticano II, y la publicacin de la Constitucin Gau-
dium et Spes (1965), que renov la atmsfera de la teologa cristiana. Ya el 1969
publicaba un trabajo sobre el pecado original, distinguiendo en l entre su pre-
sentacin anticuada y lo que nos dice la fe permanente, y en 1970 otro sobre
Teilhard telogo 27. Su inters cientfico y teolgico por Teilhard le llev a edi-
tar, en colaboracin con su mujer Nicole, en 1971 los once volmenes de su Obra
Cientfica completa, y en 1974-1978 los tres volmenes de su Diario personal 28.
En 1986, para relanzar en Alemania ese dilogo, edita en alemn un libro
titulado Teilhard de Chardin en la discusin 29. Y para relanzar el dilogo a nivel
europeo, ese mismo ao y en su propio lugar de trabajo, promueve como orga-
nizador local la celebracin del primer congreso europeo (ESSSAT-1986, Loc-
cum, Alemania), sobre el tema Evolucin y creacin: una perspectiva europea 30.
En l presenta dos importantes comunicaciones de carcter teolgico. Una de
ellas, Evolucin en la tradicin teolgica catlica, concluye mostrando cmo
algunos telogos recientes se interesan en la visin evolucionista global en cuan-
to les obliga a modificar el concepto teolgico clsico de creacin 31. La otra
comunicacin, La visin teilhardiana sobre la evolucin, es an ms intere-
sante, pues desarrolla dos ideas centrales de esta visin: que la evolucin es un
proceso de unin, y que slo resulta inteligible desde el final (y por tanto la evo-
lucin biolgica slo desde los seres humanos) 32. En 1987 publica en Zygon, la

27
SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1969 y 1970.
28
TEILHARD: Luvre Scientifique, Tagebcher y Journal. Schmitz-Moormann recordar
al final de su vida, que la lectura de esos diarios le convenci de que Teilhard era un telogo,
por ms que l pretenda negarlo: SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1995, p. 125.
29
SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1986.
30
Vanse las actas del congreso: ANDERSON Y PEACOCKE (eds.), 1987.
31
Ibdem, pp. 121-131.
32
Ibdem, pp. 162-169. La primera de esas ideas es especialmente interesante para nues-
tro tema. Aunque sea muy concisamente (cinco lneas), testifica el inters de Schmitz-Moor-

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prestigiosa revista de Chicago, un artculo sobre Evolucin de la libertad huma-


na, sobre uno de sus nuevos parmetros de la evolucin 33.
Tres aos ms tarde aprovech el tema del tercer congreso europeo (ESSSAT-
1990, Ginebra), La ciencia y la teologa de la informacin, para coordinar el taller
nmero 3, sobre La evolucin de los sistemas codificadores... e informacin en
los sistemas biolgicos, y presentar en l una comunicacin sobre La evolu-
cin de la informacin, o sea, sobre el otro de sus nuevos parmetros 34. En sep-
tiembre de 1991 tuvimos ocasin de tratarle personalmente en Catalua, con oca-
sin de una reunin de jesuitas cientficos europeos celebrada en el Centro Borja
de Sant Cugat del Valls, a la que l deseaba asistir y en la que nos deleit con
una comunicacin titulada Se puede hacer teologa ignorando las ciencias? 35.
El ao siguiente, particip de nuevo en el cuarto congreso europeo (ESSSAT
1992, Rocca di Papa, Roma), siendo coeditor de sus actas Orgenes, tiempo y com-
plejidad, en las que figura una breve comunicacin suya sobre El concepto de
complejidad a la luz de la evolucin de [sistemas] complejos 36.

2.2. Primeras menciones de la llamada creadora

Hasta aqu no hemos visto ninguna alusin al tema central de la creatio


appellata. Pero en 1992 Schmitz-Moormann publica dos documentos que, segn
hace constar en ellos, haban sido presentados previamente, y en los que men-
ciona concisa pero repetidamente su nueva idea de la llamada creadora. El
primero es un artculo, Teologa en un estilo evolutivo, aparecido de nuevo
en la revista Zygon en junio de 1992, pero presentado al Seminario Avanzado
sobre Religin y Ciencia de Chicago, el 27 de mayo de 1991 37. El artculo defien-

mann, ya en 1989, por esta generalizacin al dominio metafsico de el concepto de unin


como el proceso bsico de la evolucin creadora, y da la referencia al vol. XI de las obras de
Teilhard, y los enunciados latinos de su definicin del plus esse: ibdem, p. 166.
33
SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1987. Este artculo es un anticipo del captulo 5 y el apartado 6.5
de nuestro documento fundamental. Pero curiosamente, no se hallan en l los temas ms teo-
lgicos y relacionados con la amorosa llamada creadora: ni el del mal como precio de la
libertad, ni el de la necesidad de la libertad para poder responder con amor a esa llamada.
34
SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1992a. Esta comunicacin es anlogamente un anticipo del cap-
tulo 4 y el apartado 6.4 de nuestro documento. Pero slo sus dos ltimos prrafos aluden al
aspecto espiritualizador de la informacin y aun a la creacin en su camino hacia el encuen-
tro con el Creador: ibdem, p. 181.
35
SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1991. Esta comunicacin est muy relacionada con un apartado
del captuo introductorio de nuestro documento, 1.2.
36
SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1994: The Concept of Complexity Seen in the Light of the Evolu-
tion of Complexes, en G. V. COYNE y K. SCHMITZ-MOORMANN (eds.), Origins, Time & Comple-
xity, Geneva, Labor et Fides, Part II, pp. 236-241. Esta comunicacin, a travs de la ley teil-
hardiana de complejidad-conciencia, tiene una relacin remota con el captulo 3 de nuestro
documento, sobre el parmetro conciencia.
37
SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1992b. La referencia a este Advanced Seminar, que hemos de supo-
ner en el mismo Chicago Center for Religin and Science responsable de la revista, est al final
de su nota al pie introductoria.

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de la importancia de la evolucin y de la ciencia en general para la teologa, con-


sidera el mundo en evolucin como fuente teolgica, se pregunta sobre las
posibilidades de pensar teolgicamente en un mundo evolutivo y concluye
presentando dos ensayos preliminares de hacer teologa en un contexto evo-
lutivo, de dos pginas justas cada uno.
El primer ensayo, Dios el Creador y su Creacin, comienza contrastando
nuestra fe en la creacin con lo que resulta de una simple reflexin sobre el
modelo del big-bang: que el universo no era perfecto al principio, y que el Crea-
dor ya no aparece como poder omnipotente que impone su voluntad divina sobre
la creacin. En ese contexto cita la teora de la unin creadora desarrollada
por Teilhard de Chardin en 1917, la cual declara esencialmente que las cosas
sustanciales vienen a la existencia, no mediante la accin de cierto poder exter-
no, sino mediante la unificacin de elementos que componen una totalidad esen-
cialmente nueva (por ejemplo, los tomos se unen para formar una molcula, y
las personas para formar un equipo) 38. A continuacin rechaza desde su pers-
pectiva teolgica la afirmacin de Stephen Weinberg como cientfico puro,
de que este universo es absolutamente sin sentido. Pero reconoce que en este
universo no se descubre un orden creciente, sino desorden y libertad crecien-
tes, lo que demuestra que la libertad es muy importante para Dios omnipo-
tente (y cita sobre este tema su artculo de 1987, tambin en Zygon). El prra-
fo final del ensayo dice:
Basndose en el proceso evolutivo (que exige demasiado detalle para resu-
mirse aqu), podemos describir la relacin entre Dios y la creacin, no como
una relacin de dominio, sino como un llamar hacia s (calling forth) en amor,
un Dios que no impone su divina voluntad. Todo esto tiene sentido por cuan-
to que Dios no parece interesado en demostrar omnipotencia, sino en llamar
hacia s (calling forth) una creacin capaz de encontrar y amar a Dios algo
que nunca podra hacer una creatura totalmente determinada. No hay amor
sin libertad.

El segundo ensayo, Encarnacin en un mundo evolutivo, comienza: Po-


dramos aceptar tal visin del Creador y de la creacin inacabada. Pero en este
teatro, cul es el papel del Hijo de Dios encarnado? Es evidente que la teora
clsica de un redentor que ha de expiar el pecado de Adn, no tiene sentido en
este universo evolutivo 39. Por otra parte, puesto que la encarnacin no se hizo
necesaria despus de concluida la creacin, sino ms bien durante el proceso
en curso de creacin, ella se convierte en un elemento del acto global de la crea-
cin. Especulemos sobre esto. Hemos dicho que esta creacin es llamada hacia
s (is called forth) por un Dios amoroso. Pero para amar uno ha de hablar al
otro al nivel de este otro. Esto es verdad para todos los aspectos de la creacin.
Si Dios hablara a los seres humanos o a una parte de la creacin con toda su

38
K. S.-M. da aqu en nota las definiciones del plus esse y la frase la unin diferen-
cia, con la referencia vaga vase Teilhard para ms detalles.
39
Cf. K. SCHMITZ-MOORMANN, 1969. [Nota de K. S.-M., inserta en el texto.]

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gloria, esto significara autoimponerse y forzar lo que Dios por lo visto quiere
dejar libre. Por consiguiente Dios nunca llama hacia s (calls forth) a ninguna
cosa desde un nivel que no sea el de esa cosa. Dios habla a los seres humanos
como los padres hablan a los nios pequeos en su propio lenguaje. El
amor acepta al otro como es, sin autoimponerse 40. Dios estaba siempre encu-
bierto cuando hablaba a los humanos: el Antiguo Testamento deja esto claro.
Hay una nube, un fuego, una voz, un ngel, pero nunca una presencia que del
todo se impone. La llamada creadora (the creative call) de Dios parece ser siem-
pre una llamada indirecta, que viene en una forma humana.Aunque la Encar-
nacin no puede ser deducida del proceso de llamar Dios hacia s (Gods calling
forth) a la creacin, tiene un profundo sentido que, cuando las creaturas de
Dios podan libremente amar, la Palabra de Dios se hiciese presente entre los
humanos en la forma de un humano, pidiendo ser amado por aquellos que hab-
an sido creados.
Como vemos, la idea de la llamada creadora estaba clara en la mente de
Smith-Moormann ya en mayo de 1991, y parece haber llegado a ella en el pro-
ceso de dar sentido a la creacin y a la libertad humana, y sobre todo en el de
presentar la encarnacin como un nuevo acto de esa misma creacin.
El segundo documento de 1992 es un librito alemn, Creacin y evolucin:
Nuevos planteamientos para el dilogo entre las ciencias y la teologa, editado y
mayoritariamente redactado por l 41. Este librito viene a recoger las actas de
dos congresos distintos celebrados en la Academia Catlica de Baviera, esta-
blecida en Munich. La mayor parte de su contenido corresponde a las jornadas
sobre Teora de la evolucin y fe en la creacin (los das 5 y 6 de octubre de
1991), promovidas por la conocida carta de Juan Pablo II a George V. Coyne,
S.J., en 1988, que se publica por primera vez en alemn al final del librito. Sus
cinco conferencias sobre cosmologa, biologa evolutiva, historia de la tensin
darwiniana, interpretacin bblica y la de Schmitz-Moormann sobre Posibili-
dades y perspectivas de la fe en la creacin en un mundo evolutivo, siendo
interesantes, no llegan a dar una elaboracin teolgica positiva. Pero una tal
elaboracin se vio necesaria, y se organiz para ella un da de estudio (el 1 de
febrero de 1992), a cargo de Schmitz-Moormann, que pronunci las tres con-
ferencias. La primera es ms bien introductoria, pero las otras dos retoman, con
mucha ms extensin, los temas de los dos ensayos que haba presentado en
Chicago ocho meses antes, y en las que acabamos de comentar las menciones
de la accin creadora.
La segunda conferencia, El mundo evolutivo: Creacin de Dios, afirma
hacia el final: El Dios trinitario es el arquetipo de la unin suprema que toda
la creacin parece imitar. Y su ltimo prrafo menciona as la accin creado-
ra: El amor del Dios trinitario, que no necesita el mundo, puede sin embargo
libremente y a partir del amor graciosamente ofrecido, llamar al mundo a que

40
K. S.-M. cita ya aqu a Martin Buber, Romano Guardini y Emmanuel Mounier.
41
SCHMITZ-MOORMANN (ed.), 1992c.

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llegue-a-ser (die Welt ins werden rufen). Pero este llegar-a-ser mismo se pre-
senta como proceso de la unin, y sta se presenta en ltimo trmino a los ojos
de la fe como un suceso soportado por la fuerza del amor. La creacin evoluti-
va aparece as esencialmente como hacindose a partir del amor de Dios y sopor-
tada en su hacerse por ese mismo amor de Dios 42.
La ltima conferencia, Evolucin y redencin, menciona repetidamente la
llamada creadora. Cinco veces para indicar que esta llamada no es impositiva
ni directa: El amor no avasalla, no se impone. Por consiguiente Dios, que es el
amor, tampoco crea una mquina que funcione segn leyes deterministas, ms
bien llama al mundo a partir de la nada hacia s (ruft er die Welt aus dem Nichts
zu sich), para que pueda encontrarle con amor. La llamada de Dios (Der
Ruf Gottes), que llama al mundo a partir de la nada hacia s (der die Welt aus
dem Nichts hervorruft) no es tampoco una llamada impositiva. Nada indica que
las cosas surgieran bajo una llamada directa de Dios (unter einem direkten Anruf
Gottes) como si la llamada creadora (der Schpferruf) fuera una llamada que
obliga a la creacin primordial a dirigirse directamente a Dios. El amor como
principio creador permite esperar algo muy distinto, a saber, que se dirija a los
diversos seres al nivel en que ellos existen. Dios no llama a nadie directamente
hacia s, sino slo a travs de los elementos prximos. Dios se hace presente al
tomo en cierta manera como tomo, a la molcula como molcula, a la clula
como clula, al ser vivo como ser vivo, al ser humano como ser humano 43.
Y en esa misma conferencia menciona an la llamada creadora seis veces
ms en relacin a la respuesta libre de la creacin y a la presentacin de la encar-
nacin: La realidad de la creacin evolutiva orientada a la libertad, permite
sospechar que Dios llama hacia s la creacin (Gott die Schpfung zu sich ruft)
para que le responda amando en libertad. Sin embargo, como ya hemos deja-
do claro, Dios no fuerza a la creacin, sino que deja percibir su llamada a unir-
se amorosamente (seinem Anruf zur liebenden Vereinigung) a partir del
correspondiente elemento prximo. Se hace tomo al tomo, molcula a la mol-
cula, clula a la clula, ser vivo al ser vivo. Es evidente que su presencia se con-
figura de una manera distinta en cada caso, que la llamada de Dios (der Anruf
Gottes) que sale del interior de las cosas, es perceptible de maneras distintas.
Ahora bien, si esta representacin de la manera de actuar del Dios creador en
la creacin e correcta, Dios habla a los hombres en forma humana: primero
a travs de otros hombres, pero definitivamente viniendo a este mundo en su
Hijo: As que, en la encarnacin, la actividad creadora de Dios llega a una pri-
mera plenitud de la llamada creadora (des Schpferanrufs) a la realidad libre
y personal llegada-a-ser por evolucin, plenitud que en cierta manera repre-
senta la quintaesencia del proceso creador. En el hombre Jess, el Hijo de Dios,
llama Dios a los hombres hacia s (ruft Gott die Menschen zu sich). Dios, en
defensa de la libertad de una respuesta amorosa de la creacin a su llamada

42
Ibdem, pp. 115-130; especialmente p. 130.
43
Ibdem, pp. 131-148; especialmente pp. 137-138.

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(auf seinem Anruf), la cual se ha hecho hombre en Jess como la Palabra de


Dios, est dispuesto a pagar cualquier precio incluso el precio de la muerte en
cruz 44. Se confirma, pues, la conexin de la elaboracin de la idea de llama-
da creadora con la presentacin novedosa de la encarnacin como un nuevo
acto de la misma creacin.
Indiquemos, por fin, que en 1995 Schmitz-Moormann public un ltimo
artculo en Zygon, El futuro de la teologa teilhardiana, en el que no mencio-
na la llamada creadora, pero en el que insiste en el inters de la metafsica teil-
hardiana, describiendo as sus fuentes: El texto de 1917, la Union Cratrice
(Unin creadora), complementada con la Centrologa de 1943 y numerosas notas
de sus diarios, bosquejan una nueva metafsica, que es la teora que abarca los
rasgos ms generales del universo, reaparecidos a todos los niveles de la evolu-
cin. Menciona su idea central de que en la concepcin de Teilhard, la unin
produce novedad, y que estas ideas muy abstractas pero verificables necesi-
tan una exploracin ulterior. Menciona tambin una tesis doctoral reciente
titulada La fuerza primordial del Cosmos: Dimensiones del amor en la obra de Pie-
rre Teilhard de Chardin 45, y comenta que este es un buen punto de partida para
una teologa de la creacin ms completa, que ha de redactarse ms sistemti-
camente en una concepcin teilhardiana, basada sobre la metafsica de la unin.
Entendemos que ste era su proyecto concreto cuando se retir en 1995-1996
al Center for Theological Inquiry de Princeton, y redact el manuscrito del que
procede su obra fundamental que hemos presentado.

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WHITEHEAD, A. N. (1929): Process and Reality, Cambridge University Press & New York, Mac-
millan; versin argentina: Proceso y realidad, Buenos Aires, 1956, Editorial Losada.

Llaceres, 30 MANUEL GARCA DONCEL


08172 Barcelona
manuel.g.doncel@uab.es

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

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ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD
ON PROCESS PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY
Cosmos and Kenosis of Divinity
JAVIER MONSERRAT
Universidad Autnoma de Madrid

ABSTRACT: The modern dialogue between religion and science has to take into account the process
philosophy and theology. Science, for the authors in this movement, is the thoughts of Whitehead: a science
of the first half of the 20th century, understood according to a certain philosophy of process proposed by
Whitehead (which is not only science but a risky, complex and subtle philosophy based on science). In
this article we are only referring to one of the episodes in the philosophy of process: that which is characterised
by Alfred Whitehead and some of his followers in the creation of the philosophy-theology of process in the
Anglo-Saxon, and especially American world. Our intention is to present an evaluation and discussion that
is oriented towards what we feel is important: the discussion of his cosmology and theology of kenosis.
However, in order to do this we need to make our points of view fit in with a line of thought that makes
reference to his metaphysics and philosophy of religion. Whitehead does not question the world at this
ultimate level of primary causality (in its absoluteness and necessity) given that the world is eternal: that
is absolute and necessary. Whiteheads problem is that of explaining the system of secondary causes,
because they do not seem to constitute a system that is sufficient but rather introduce the reference of
God and an element of the world that contributes to what the world is from the inside. God, for Whitehead,
is also not responsible for Evil because he does not create the world; on the contrary, he is subject to the
conditions established in the same world and tries to overcome it and guide it to perfection. Kenosis or
divine auto-limitation, for Whitehead, is only partial because a large part of divine limitation is imposed by
the nature of the eternal world (not created) of which God form a part.
KEY WORDS: Whitehead, process philosophy, process theology, divine self-limitation, cosmic process,
whiteheadian metaphysics, concept of God, kenosis.

La filosofa y teologa del proceso de Alfred N. Whitehead:


El Cosmos y la Knosis de la Divinidad
RESUMEN: El moderno dilogo entre la ciencia y la religin debe tener en cuenta la filosofa y teologa del
proceso. La ciencia, para los autores de este movimiento, es la visin de Whitehead: una ciencia de la
primera mitad del siglo XX, entendida en conformidad con una cierta filosofa del proceso propuesta por
Whitehead (que no slo es una ciencia, sino una arriesgada, compleja y stil filosofa fundada en la ciencia).
En este artculo nos referimos slo a uno de los episodios en la filosofa del proceso: el protagonizado por
Alfred Whitehead y algunos de sus seguidores en la creacin de la filosofa y teologa del proceso en el
mundo anglo-sajn y en especial americano. Nuestra intencin es presentar una evaluacin y discusin
que se orienta hacia lo que consideramos importante: la discusin de su cosmologa y teologa de la
knosis. Sin embargo, para hacerlo, necesitamos ajustar nuestros puntos de vista con la lnea de pensamiento
que se refiere a su metafsica y filosofa de la religin. Whitehead no pone en cueatin el mundo en su
nivel ltimo de causalidad primera (en su absolutez y necesidad), dado que el mundoes eterno: dado
que es absoluto y necesario. El problema de Whitehead es explicar el sistema de las causas segundas,
porque no parecen constituir un sistema suficiente, sino que introduce la referencia a Dios como un
elemento del mundo que contribuye a lo que el mundo es desde s mismo. Dios, para Whitehead, no es,
por tanto, responsable del Mal porque no ha creado el mundo; al contrario, est sujeto a las condiciones
establecidas por el mismo mundo y por ello intenta superarlo y llevarlo a la perfeccin. La knosis, o auto-
limitacin divina, para Whitehead, es slo parcial porque una gran parte de la limitacin divina est impuesta
por la naturaleza eterna de un mundo (no-creado) del que Dios forma parte fundamental.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Whitehead, filosofa del proceso, teologa del proceso, proceso csmico, auto-
limitacin divina, metafsica whiteheadiana, concepto de Dios, kenosis.

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816 J. MONSERRAT, ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD ON PROCESS PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

The philosophy of process was born out of the ideas of the English physicist
and philosopher Alfred Whitehead (1861-1947), soon after he settled in Harvard
University. His philosophy is already a philosophy of process. However, the birth
of this philosophy as a real philosophical movement is connected with a group
of his disciples, among whom Charles Hartshorne is, with out any doubt, the
most relevant. The importance of this philosophical-theological movement covers
a period from the 1950s until it is consolidated in the 1970s; in these years it is
identified with the Chicago school and the journal Process Studies is founded.
At the end of the 1960s and also in the 70s, there was also a theological movement
that was known as theology of secularization or as the death of God that was
influenced by the theology of process. However, these movements should not
be confused with the theology of process, even though they have many similarities
although perhaps a different sensibility and respond to a group of similar
problems with respect to the meaning of religion in modern times. From those
founding years, there has been the constant presence of the philosophy-theology
of process in Anglo-Saxon theology, principally in America. There still exists
today an orthodox movement of this philosophy-theology that is linked by the
lines of thought of its principal authors: A. N. Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne,
John B. Cobb, David Ray Griffin y W. H. Vanstone. In any case, the process
philosophy and theology is constantly considered to be one of the principal
protagonists in the current dialogue between science and religion.

Basic traits of processual thought

Some of the traits of the philosophy-theology of process allow its special


historical significance to be understood. However, its importance does not only
depend on its intrinsic contents but also on its unquestionable social presence
which can still be seen today throughout the last sixty years of English
philosophy and theology. In this, a new and original way of looking at the
philosophical-theological theme of divine kenosis has been considered. In our
understanding, what it offers to how kenosis is thought about is one of its great
values but at the same time, it is where the most significant problems and lack
of focus can be seen.
Liberal innovation. The philosophy-theology of process stands out, above all
else, for its creative and liberal attitude. This attitude does not depend on the
need to maintain true to the tradition of a given religious paradigm nor on the
fear of possible reactions from an ecclesiastic authority. This school of thought
thinks with complete liberty so that Christianity can be understood and make
sense in the context of modernity. Its analysis came from the hypersensitivity
to the modern world and from complete freedom from the past. This liberal
talent has many existential aspects, such as those that are tragically conscious
of evil and human suffering. Nevertheless, if only paying attention to tradition

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can cause insensitivity to the present, paying too much attention to the modern
threatens an insensitivity to the opposite: a disconnection with the essence of
tradition and the core values of Christianity that are present in the faith of
Christian churches in the past and the present (and not only of the catholic
church).
Theology from science. The process theology has tried to be a theology from
science. This can be understood, as science is one of the essential characteristics
of modern times. Thinking about Christianity from the point of view of modernity
requires that it be approached from the perspective of science. Therefore science,
for the authors in this movement, is the thoughts of Whitehead: a science of the
first half of the 20th century, understood according to a certain philosophy of
process proposed by Whitehead (which is not only science but a risky, complex
and subtle philosophy based on science). The philosophy-theology of process
should be understood as an image of the cosmos, of man and of God which is
made possible by modern science.
The dialogue between science and religion. Theology based on science, throughout
the 20th century, has been a point of reference for the dialogue between science and
religion. Whoever promotes, from other perspectives, the modern dialogue between
religion and science has to take into account the process philosophy. Many examples
can be found. For example, Ian Barbour identifies with many processual
assumptions, although he is critical of others: his work is a well-considered and
critical connection of the Christian tradition. Other authors such as Peacocke and
Polkinghorne are explicitly removed from process but discuss and nuance its
assumptions; at their base, some of their positions, in fact, have a certain relation
to viewpoints that are derived from the influence of the philosophy-theology of
process. In fact, many current opinions about divine omniscience and omnipotence
which can be seen in authors such as George Ellis, W. Stoeger or George Coyne
with out any doubt, have their origin in the process philosophy and theology.
Devine self-limitation and kenosis. The themes of self-limitation and the kenosis
of divinity can be found in the philosophy of Whitehead. It is about self-limitation
or perhaps, even better, as a divine limitation in the world that effects
omnipotence and omniscience. Nevertheless, these ideas have been assumed by
the theology of process in order to justify the inaction of God against Evil and
go even farther than that. God does not resolve the problem of Evil because God
has a limited ability to intervene in things that happen in the world; he is not
responsible for things that happen inevitably. Therefore it is not only about a
divine self-limitation against human freedom but rather a limitation that goes
much deeper and much more radical than that imposed on God by reality. As
we will see, this is one of the most radical and problematic points of traditional
Christian theology. Nevertheless, this theology of process is with out a doubt
religious: it has been the founding, in out times, of an understandable belief
in a God that is personal and creates a feeling of a community of faith in Christian
churches. This theological perspective has understood and taken seriously the

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fact that a modern explanation of Christianity requires the acceptance of divine


limitation and kenosis.
In the face of the theology of process we insist a new type of theology
was born in and around the 1960s and 70s called theology of secularization or
the death of God, which is characterized by its radical choice to be a-religious
(Robinson, Van Buren, Hamilton, etc.). However, the theology of process and the
theology of secularization do not coincide: the latter is not born out of the former
(although it is without a doubt influenced by it) nor is it a school that has been
derived from it, at least from our point of view. They are, in effect two independent
yet connected movements differentiated by their basic roots. The theology of
secularization assumes a new analysis of the way that the absence of divinity
was extended in the world and as a consequence, a new anthropology.
Nevertheless, in this article our attention will only centre on the philosophy-
theology of process.

1. ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE PROCESS PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

Precedents and initial context. The cosmos or universe is not a static reality
but rather a dynamic universal process. In contrast to the static and stable, this
philosophy confirms processual transformation as the essence of the universe.
In contrast to the classical metaphysics that had followed preferentially in the
footsteps of Parmenides (the stable Parmenidian being transformed into the
eidos of Plato and then to Aristotelian form while action is only attributed
to matter) an alternative conception is being considered in the line of Heraclitus
which establishes the process and is some way action as the metaphysical
essence of the universe. As a consequence, there is no doubt that the history of
philosophy (as well as science) allows for the finding of numerous antecedents
to the philosophy of process: we have mentioned Heraclitus but we could also
cite modern authors such as Henri Louis Bergson, Charles Sanders Peirce,
William James or John Dewey. In reality, it is science that gives a processual
(this is the real term and should be used previously) description and itself
constitutes the most important manifestation of processual thought. This is what
Whitehead understood and as a consequence had the desire to construct a
processual metaphysics that was in agreement with science.
However, as mentioned before, in this article we are only referring to one of
the episodes in the philosophy of process: that which is characterised by Alfred
Whitehead and some of his followers in the creation of the philosophy-theology
of process in the Anglo-Saxon, and especially American world. In reality, theology
has been the true place where Whiteheads ideas (which were not theological
but rather philosophical) have had the most impact: these have been theologies
that have valued and cultivated their philosophy and have extended it to establish
a hermeneutical outlook that allows for the understanding of human life and
for the construction of a new theology that could explain Christianity in a way

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that could be understood from modern culture (principally from modern science).
Lastly, Whitehead constructed a metaphysics of process because he understood
that modern science described the world as a process: his metaphysics of process
was, as a consequence, the only metaphysics that sciences allowed. It was the
metaphysics of science that the modern world needed and Whitehead consciously
wanted to shape.

1.1) The roots

Alfred North Whitehead. Whitehead was born in 1861 (died in 1947) and his
scientific career began while at university as a mathematician oriented towards
physics. He was a lecturer in mathematics in Cambridge until 1911; in mathematics
and physics in London until 1924, when he moved to Harvard as a professor of
philosophy. His first period stands out for his collaborations with Bertrand Russell;
above all in the Principia Mathematica (3 volumes, 1910-1913) where the logical
foundations of mathematical reasoning are justified. However, the first works that
introduce us to his nascent philosophy, come later on: The Organisation of Thought
(1917), An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge (1919) y The
Concept of Nature (1920). One of his most important books, Science and the Modern
World, SMW (1925), was written during his time as a professor at Harvard. It is
the first book where references to God appear, although it is in a strictly
metaphysical context as a reference to divine limitation. Whitehead, nevertheless,
thought that the most fruitful way to gain access to God was through the religious
experience of humanity. This was treated later on in his Religion and Making (1926).
But it was with the Gifford Lectures in 1927-28 that he derived the preparations
for his main work, which was published under the title: Process and Reality, PR,
(1929). In it, he explains his processual metaphysics in complete detail: not as
pure science or objective description but as a metaphysic cosmology that always
refers to a subject, a privileged witness to the flowing process of reality. This is
what is now known as organic philosophy (philosophy of organism).
Four more books, which were written in the same period or before, are also
important in order to interpret and compliment Process and Reality. In the
Function of Reason (1929) the role of reason in the process of evolution and
culture are explained more simply. Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect (1927) is
a wide-ranging epistemological refection, from primordial perception to higher
representational processes. His work Adventures of Ideas, AI (1933), in which he
studies how ideas drive social evolution and create human values, is also very
important. Modes of Thought, MT (1938), his last book, in which he offers a
general presentation of his philosophy that more revealing, less technical and
accessible is probably one of his most important works 1.

1
I will cite Whiteheads works following the acronyms found in the text, like SMW for
Science and Modern World. Works not cited in the course of the article do not have their own
acronyms. I will put inside parentheses either the page of the edition used or the corresponding
part or chapter, the latter being difficult to identify because of the various available editions.

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First followers in America. It is evident that Whitehead arrived at Harvard


with an already established reputation. Many important people came to study
under him, attracted by his reputation: On some, for example Willard Van Orman
Quine, Whitehead did not leave a particularly strong influence. This however,
was not the case with his other followers, with whom his influence was a
determining factor, although without impeding the specific biases of each one.
His students, with his help, were able to escape the control of the positivist
philosophy that was dominant at that time. Some of his main students were
Paul Weiss, F. S. C. Northrop and Susanne K. Langer. In Yale, Paul Weiss held
a prestigious professorship and defended an original metaphysics with many
publications that were inspired by Whitehead. His last work was The God We
Seek (1964). Northrop also worked at Yale, in the philosophy of law. There, he
put forth a perspective that was influenced by Whitehead but also tried to find
connections with eastern philosophy. In 1961 he published an anthology on
Whiteheads ideas. Lastly, Susanne Langer, friend and student of Whitehead,
applied his ideas to the philosophy of art, culminating with the work: Mind: An
Essay on Human Feeling (2 volumes, 1967-1972). Among his students of theology,
Nels Ferr stands out as probably one of the first to contribute to the creation
of a theology based on Whiteheads ideas by insisting on a more transcendent
idea of God and the autonomy of the world (Reason in Religion, 1963; The Living
God of Nowhere and Nothing, 1966; The Universal Word: A theology for a Universal
Faith, 1969). Victor Lowe, another of his students of theology, wrote one of the
best introductions to Whitehead, still valid today (Understanding Whitehead,
1962). Lastly, we cannot forget to mention Dorothy Emmet, personal friend of
Whitehead, who wrote Whiteheads Philosophy of Organism (1932) and later on,
an important work dealing with a metaphysics that was in line with Whiteheads
ideas: The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking (1945).

1.2) The theology of process

Charles Hartshorne. With out a doubt, Charles Hartshorne was the other great
theological student of Whiteheads. It is probable, that without his support in
the beginning and his efforts to appropriately extend the consequences that were
implicit in Whiteheads philosophy to theology, the process philosophy and
theology would not have been born. Because of this, it is fair to say that the
American philosophy-theology of process began with Hartshorne just as much
as with Whitehead.
Apparently, Hartshorne (1897-2000) had already finished his PhD and had
already developed, to a large degree, his personal ideas, when in 1925, he began
to hear Whiteheads lectures at Harvard and began to teach with him. From 1923
to 1925 he had a fellowship in Germany where he could have heard lectures from
Husserl or Heidegger, but they did not interest him so much. He did however
have interest in C.S Peirce whose Collected Papers were edited by Weiss and
Hartshorne. We can imagine that Hartshorne found, in the positions of Whitehead,

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a way to deepen his own intuitions on gestation. As the years past, his identification
with Whiteheads metaphysics grew as can be seen by his explicit recognition of
related works and the acceptance of the same terminology.
Despite this, while Whitehead preferred to orient himself toward the
metaphysics of science, Hartshorne oriented towards the philosophy of religion
and theology; which explains how each ones work mutually compliments the
others. Hartshorne was always a professor of philosophy; in Chicago, between
1928 and 1955; nevertheless, he drew his main influence from the School of
Divinity. Ever since, Chicago has been a centre of the process theology and future
home of the journal Zygon. From 1955 to 1962 he worked at Emory University
and form 1962 to his death he was at the University of Texas in Austin, as emeritus
professor. Although Hartshorne himself recognised his influence in theology,
he felt himself as more of a philosopher or philosopher of religion.
His body of work is made up of 22 books, all with different significance. We
will mention several of them with the purpose of gaining access to his most
meaningful works and at the same time reaching a unified vision of the beginnings
of his philosophy (theology). Mans Vision of God (1941) y The Divine Relativity
(1948) represent the first criticisms of the unmoving nature and omnipotence
of divinity in classic metaphysics through the perspective of his neoclassic
metaphysics (this is what he called it based on Whiteheads metaphysics of process).
In The Logic of Perfection (1962), he defends the ontological argument of Saint
Anselm (which is studied later in another monographic work: Anselms Discovery,
1967) and offers a global synthesis of his processual metaphysics. His evident link
with Whitehead is professed in Whiteheads Philosophy (1972). The following is a
list of books that clarify his ideas during the last part of his life: A Natural Theology
for Our Time (1967), Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (1970), Aquinas
to Whitehead (1976), Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (1984), The
Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne (1991) and the last book he wrote, three years
before his death, The Zero Fallacy and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics
(1997).

1.3) The eminence of Whitehead in distinct schools

The ideas of Whitehead had a much wider influence than people under
his direct tutelage. This can be seen in academic theses (that of Charles
Hartshorne being of note) and published works in America and other countries
from the 1930s up to and including the 1960s and 70s. In order to follow
what these scholars have offered, it is necessary to describe their specific
bibliographies.
The schools in Chicago and Claremont, CA. The profound influence that
Whitehead and Hartshorne had over the theology professors in the Divinity
School of the University of Chicago is one of the decisive factors that confirmed
the prestige of the philosophy-theology of process in America. Nevertheless, the
Chicago school already existed, even before Whiteheads arrival at Harvard. It

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was in 1926 when Henry Wieman, in Chicago, began to become interested in


Whitehead. Wiemans identification with Whitehead was complete throughout
many published works until 1958. Daniel Day Williams also followed the theology
of process; but it was Bernard Loomer who was most influenced in this way.
Bernard Meland and Schubert M. Orden who also contributed to the theology
of process in Chicago through many works (Christ without Myth, 1961; The
Reality of God, 1966) created some extremely interesting ideas under the direct
influence of Charles Hartshorne who consequently participated in the theological
movement of the Divinity School. It is also worth mentioning another of the
most important students in Chicago, John B. Cobb, Jr., who soon went to
California to spread processual ideas.
It was California the School of Theology at Claremont University that
ended up assuming the forefront in America of processual thinking. The founding
of the Centre for Process Studies in Claremont gained stature, in effect, in 1973
because of the work of John B. Cobb and David Ray Griffin. Later on, Marjorie
Hewitt Suchocki, Mary Elisabeth Moore y Philip Clayton came to be co-directors.
The founding of the journal Process Studies was in 1971 and was edited by Lewis
S. Ford and co-edited by the same John B. Cobb, Jr.
An open field of productive discussion. Here we have presented a short revision
of some of the extremes regarding the genesis and evolution of the process
philosophy and theology (not meant to replace revisions or bibliographies that
are more specialized) for one reason: to open an understandable perspective of
how the true dimension, from its beginnings with the arrival of Whitehead at
Harvard and his encounter with Hartshorne, has achieved and influence that
has encompassed the last two thirds of the 20th century and continues on our
times.
When one considers the themes that the philosophy-theology of process deals
with, its relevance cannot be denied. It has dealt with the new metaphysical
ontology that could reconcile Christianity with modern science; it has dealt
with the revision of Christianity in order to adapt it to the present culture and
make it understandable to modern man; it has dealt with important theological
questions such as the problem of Evil and human suffering; it has tried to
represent the Christian God through a renewed theodicy that is congruent with
the modern world; it has dealt with the problem of divine limitation or self-
limitation and of divine kenosis; and it has also reconsidered innumerable moral
questions.
All of this is encapsulated in a theology that is theistic, Christian and centred
on religion. Catholic theology, in its time during the 1970s, took the interpretation
and discussion of the theology of secularization seriously. However, it was always
reluctant (more in Europe than in America) to undertake a profound dialogue
with the process theology. We are aware that many of the affirmations of the
theology of process enter into conflict with the basic principles, not only of the
Catholic Church, but also other Christian denominations such as the Church of
England. Despite this, a greater interest in the process philosophy and theology

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would have enriched many of the contents of the philosophy and theology of
modern Christianity 2.

2. THE METAPHYSICS OF ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

Whitehead began his career as a mathematician in order to enter, at a later


point, into the field of physics and at last into metaphysics. It is in this last field
where his ideas become densely cryptic; perhaps not so much for his ideas (which,
in the end, are understandable) as for his style, his terminology, a certain degree
of disorganization in his presentation and his inability to be understood clearly.
In this article, we are not looking for a new review of his metaphysics. Rather,
our intention is to present an evaluation and discussion that is oriented towards
what we feel is important: the discussion of his cosmology and theology of
kenosis. However, in order to do this we need to make our points of view fit in
with a line of thought that makes reference to his metaphysics and philosophy
of religion (a reference that is perhaps more necessary for the reader that is not
used to following an author as difficult as Whitehead is to read).

2.1) Whiteheads view of metaphysics

Mathematics and physics: the image of the world in science. For a large part
of Whiteheads life, he was centred exclusively on the study of science. His
dedication to metaphysics came later: it began to develop in the 1920s and
reached its zenith with his arrival in America as a professor of philosophy at
Harvard and the publication of his two fundamental books (Science and Modern
World, SMW, 1925, y Process and Reality, PR, 1929). It is clear that when he
began with metaphysics, he already had the image of the modern world in his

2
From the variety of cited authors and schools, we see that process philosophy-theology
is much more than the literal interpretation that Whithead gives it. It is actually a philosophico-
theological school of thought constituted by various authors united by common principles,
but who differ in terms of the significant influence of their personalities. Hartshorne, Cobb,
Vanstone and Griffin are the principal personalities of this school. Process philosophy-theology
has three strong points: 1) Seeking to be in harmony with modern science by means of an
evolutive metaphysics of process grounded on Whithead. 2) Explaining the problem of evil by
admitting the limitation of divine power and omniscience, thus liberating God from the moral
responsibility of not being a responsible creator and considering him rather as a companion
who contributes to controlling and overcoming evil. Whitehead also considered God as such,
but his ideas about it were not fully developed. 3) Presenting moral principles founded on a
naturalist enthusiasm inserted in the experience of life as something positive, thus overcoming
some Christian groups morals that are rigid and in some manner quasi-manichean.
Whitehead did not contribute much to this last point, unlike later authors like Cobb or Griffin.
Aside from these three points, we also consider as significant Whiteheads contributions to
the theology of kenosis, which we will discuss after presenting his thought. One can say that,
in the course of the 20th century, the theology of kenosis has found in process theology one of
its principal supports.

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mind. Whats more, it gives the impression that the critical factor that causes
him to crossover into metaphysics is the idea that science had turned traditional
metaphysics head over heals and that is was necessary to create an new
metaphysics that was congruent with it. It was is his 1925 work (SMW) that he
says that science demands a transformation of the world in order to make it
modern: it is science that makes the world modern requiring both a metaphysics
and religion that are modern.
In SMW, he presents the scientific image that conditions the philosophy of
Whitehead. One should keep in mind that the matrix mechanics of Heisenberg
and the wave mechanics of Schrdinger are formulated between 1924 and 1925,
the same time as this work. Upon writing PR in the following years, until 1929,
he had time to follow the deliberation of quantum mechanics during his most
creative years: it was however still a preliminary period when, for example, they
only new of the existence of the proton and electron (the existence of the neutron
was not even experimentally proven). Nevertheless, upon reading chapter VIII of
SMW about quantum mechanics (throughout the history of the development of
scientific concepts analyzed in previous chapters) we understand that, for
Whitehead, it was enough, given that science had worked well enough up until
1925 to reach a precise intuition about the nature of the physical world that would
be confirmed in the future development of science up until present times.
Physical reality (SMW, chapter VIII) consisted of a corpuscular material that
was made up from individuality, discontinuity, distance and interactions between
things (that could be described by mechanics); but this corpuscular matter was
at the same time a wave (that demanded a field physics in the framework of
physical continuity). Primordial microphysical events (e.g. the electron in its
quantum orbit) could not be attributed to a stable temporal identity. Nevertheless,
the flow of microphysical events constituted and gave certain stability in time
to macrophysical objects. These objects were nevertheless open, in their interior,
to continual development and transformation. For Whitehead, it was obvious
that the physics of the beginnings of the 20th century describes a world in flux
with unstable events that interacted with each other by way of physical
prehensions in order to construct real entities in the same way that societies of
organized events dynamically transformed a continuous process.
Metaphysics. The 19th century had introduced a perspective that was radically
new to the understanding of the world: the evolutionary point of view. Classical
metaphysics and philosophy (up until Kant) responded to the world in a
constructed state; evolution, in turn, imposed the view of a dynamic world
continually in process. To understand the general properties of this new world
described by science, the first philosophy: graeco-scholastic or cartesian-
mechanistic metaphysics was not enough. Many thinkers noticed this trend.
Because of this, the philosophy of the end of the 19th and beginning of the
20th centuries was full of attempts to create a new metaphysics; the metaphysics
of a new image of the world born out of science. One of the trends of this new
philosophy was made up of vitalism. In effect, the world up until this point was

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understood from the point of view of a static, dualist graeco-scholastic philosophy


or from the scientific paradigm of the machine (cartesian mechanicism). It was
urgent to build an understanding of the world from an organic paradigm of life
in evolution. This gestating virtalism was present throughout Europe, mainly
in France and Germany but was also an essential ingredient of the so-called
North American pragmatism.
Whitehead therefore formed part of a movement of the times that was clearly
following the trend of vitalism. We do not believe, as it is sometimes said, that
authors such as Santayana, Spengler o Ralph Waldo Emerson influenced him
significantly. Nevertheless, we are convinced that authors such as Charles Sanders
Peirce, William James and above all the French philosopher Henri Bergson did
have a large influence on his work.
When Whitehead arrived at philosophical maturity, Bergson already had
published his great works and had international fame. It is most probable that
Whitehead knew him and was inspired by him. We believe this to be true (as it
can be seen by Whiteheads frequent mention of Bergsonian metaphysics in SMW).
But why study metaphysics at all? Whitehead understood, in effect, that
human understanding is always constructed from some metaphysical framework.
Science was concrete, quantative and precise, although limited in its analysis.
However, science is based on the presupposition of many (metaphysical) ideas
that are anchored in ordinary understanding (these days it would be called
ordinary metalanguage). Scientist always take on their work, understanding
(and using) a natural grouping of concepts that pertain to their primal or first
philosophy or metaphysics: the talk of objects, essence (what objects are made
of), distance, cause, effect, time, properties, qualities, sensations etc. This group
of metaphysical concepts were regulated by classical philosophy, by the
scholastics, and through a long influence, for many centuries, by Christianity.
It was the metaphysics that had reached the ordinary understanding of the people
and the scientists. Because of this, a new metaphysics was necessary. There was
a need for a new general conceptual framework that more precisely allowed for
the explanation of both ordinary human experience and the new scientific image
of the world.
Bergson, in effect, clearly tried to tackle the construction of a metaphysics
derived from the new image of a work based in science; he wanted to do so based
on a dynamic idea of life and evolution. Whitehead also saw the necessity
to construct this new metaphysics, revising bergsonian thought, giving it more
precision, adjusting it to fit in better with science, taking out the more lyrical
passages and formulating a new terminology that was less poetic and more
technical, although much more cryptic. In place of life, Whitehead used the
concept of organism and he talks about an organicist philosophy. To sum up,
Bergson as much as Whitehead, at least for our understanding, move within the
same vitalist-processural intuition that responds clearly to the feeling of belonging
to a specific time in history. The Spanish philosopher Xavier Zubiri (1898-1983)
also felt the need for a new metaphysics or a first philosophy and also
constructed his own proposal.

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826 J. MONSERRAT, ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD ON PROCESS PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

2.2) The method: intuition and experience

Method. So, now, how is metaphysics constructed? There are two different
questions: how a normal person would create it (where does an intuitive
metaphysics come from) and how a philosopher would create it. Science is
created through effort that is rational, organized systematic and quantative.
Metaphysics, however, cannot be constructed like that. Bergson said that
metaphysics was the fruit of intuition: it was an intuition of the profound
nature of vital movement by way of immediate experience. It is intuition that
perceives life as duration of a continuous future (in a similar way to William
James current of conscience). Whitehead also thought that metaphysics was
born out of intuition. However, he thought it was an intuition based on experience.
Alix Parmentier 3 has convincingly systematized his metaphysics and his defence
of an intuitive access to it through experience; he has even studied the description
of those contents of immediate experience that Whitehead considered essential
for gaining access to metaphysics (Parmentier, o.c., 141ss). Human experience
is one form of prehension; man has an apprehension perspective of the world,
and feels a part of the world because of this prehension that anchors it in a world
that transcends his own existence (Adventures of Ideas, AI, 1933, 293). Going up
against the conventional abstractions of the epistemology in use at the time, in
order to express the concrete fact of experience and prehension, Whitehead uses
the term feeling which has the merit of implying the double meaning of subjective
form and apprehension of an object avoiding the disjecta membra that comes
out of abstraction. It will be seen that this sentient-apprehension, when it is seen
as understanding, is not limited to the use of the five senses. Whitehead tells us
that the living organ of experience is the living body in its entirety, being itself
continuous with the rest of nature (AI, 1933, 290; Parmentier, 160).
Experience is not arrived at through data (as is said in modern epistemology)
but rather through sentient-prehensions that unifies the body at one with nature.
What, then, is the bodily experience that is at the base of human existence and
of metaphysics? Whitehead specifies that: a) it is the experience of the insertion
of our body into a nature that is forms part of; b) it is the experience of our bodily
unit; c) finally, it is the experience of the fine coordination between our bodies
and its experiences, in the sense that we understand as a unifying function of
a plurality of things that are distinct from ourselves (Science and Modern World,
SMW, 1926, 210, referenced by Parmentier). This unity with the world as a
functional dimension of our own bodies is for us, the fundamental experience 4.

3
PARMENTIER, ALIX, La Philosophie de Whitehead et le Probleme de Dieu, Bibliotque des
Archives de Philosophie, Beauchesne, Paris, 1968. We think this is one of the books whose
645 pages offer a broad, profound, and correct presentation of Whiteheads synthetic vision.
4
Whiteheads phenomenology of psychic experience presents extraordinarily interesting
features: the unity of consciousness and a holistic experience connecting the experience of ones
body to an external field of reality. In this way, his sentient focus, also emphasized correctly
by Parmentier, also has clear similarities with the sentient philosophy of X. Zubiri and,
generally, with the importance of sensation and emotion in modern neurology (cf. Damasio).

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Objectivist realism. Whitehead claims that humanity has a fundamental


intuition that is present in the daily life of everyone and that the poetry of
romanticism strongly claims this intuition, as it is explained in the commentaries
of Wordsworth and Shelly (CMM, chapter V). In this way, natural experience is
not the result of the subjects cognitive actions. Our body is the organism
whose state regulates our sentient knowledge of the world. Whitehead defines
perceptual knowledge as the conscience of prehensive unification that connects
us to the world through sensation. This functioning of our senses in determined
spatial places reveals to our awareness, as said by Whitehead, some aspects of
a distant medium. This therefore, produces the knowledge of the existence of
things beyond us. If this awareness transmits knowledge of a transcendent
world, it must be because the bodily event unifies, in and of itself, these aspects
of the universe (SMW, 128-129, referenced by Parmentier). It then gives the
impression that for Whitehead, experience is not the world represented in the
mind (created by subjective actions) but rather that the objective reality of the
external world is felt directly in itself. In experience, man perceives sensory
fields open for the subject to organically integrate prehensions in an external
world that he is a part of. The intuition of Whitehead is therefore gibsonian 5.
From intuition to metaphysics. Metaphysics is thus reached by way of intuition.
It comes from experience as from the perception of ones own body in an objective
world that is organically open. Nevertheless, while philosophy is based on
intuitive experience, it is something more: it is a rational and reflective
construction of general concepts that refer to reality that are applied to the
understanding of all concrete situations; in addition, they give meaning to precise
and particular knowledge whether it is in daily life or in the sciences. Metaphysics
can be arrived at intuitively but it is not formulated without rational and
philosophical reflection. Metaphysics, for Whitehead, is an abstraction that tries
to create universal concepts that are general and cover all possible manifestation
of reality. Natural man approaches his life from a metaphysical background,
but this is also done by scientists by constructing science on top of reality.
Whiteheads metaphysics did not come about like a passing emotion
accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction: it was created during hours and hours
of reflection, formulation adjustment and correction of concepts. In this rational
reflection, without doubt, four factors, that cannot be forgotten, were present:
first, intuition based on experience, of the organic self in the world (in this sense,
it is true that metaphysics is born out of experiential intuition); second, his
knowledge of the surprising scientific image of the world in the beginning years
of quantum mechanics; third, his knowledge of the authors that were trying to

5
The connections with James J. Gibson and his theory concerning direct experience and
ecological optics are also clear. Whiteheads holistic thought is along the same line, and
expressed by concepts such as occasion for experience, prehension, concrescence, and the
like. Whiteheads holism is not only physical, but is simultaneously psycho-bio-physical.
Evolution is a holistic process culminating in man.

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formulate the general concepts of a new metaphysics that integrated this


experiential intuition with modern science (we can recall vitalism, Bergson,
Pierce or James); fourth, his original elaboration of a system of concepts that
allowed the integration of all of our ordinary, religious and scientific experiences
in a unified metaphysical system.
Whitehead knew that scientific knowledge had changed drastically in the 19th and
20 centuries. Because of this, he searched for a new metaphysics that overcame
th

the static nature of graeco-scholastic philosophy as well as the mechanistic nature


of Cartesian perspectives. In SMW (chapter IX) the reconstructs the role philosophy
has played in the last centuries up until, in his time, there is a need to have a vitalist
and organicist metaphysics (here we can cite Bergson). Whitehead wants to
contribute to the formulation of this new metaphysics in order to help the modern
world in its intellectual education and creativity, integrating experiential intuition
and science. Without being constructed or taught, this metaphysics could not serve
its function of education the creativity of modern man (SMW, chapter XIII).

2.3) Basic metaphysics

It would be necessary to systematize the, more radical, fundamental


metaphysical concepts that permit the understanding of the real world, both for
the natural person and the scientist. It is clear that the metaphysical concepts
created by Whitehead looked to be congruent with the image of the real world
in science.
Actual entities. This is, without a doubt, Whiteheads basic concept, although
it does cove a wide range of existing realities. This actual entity is organized in
a tree, an elemental particle and also God. Despite this, an entity as a tree, for
example, is real because of a complex association of a large number of more
basic entities. In scientific terms, we would say (and this is what Whitehead had
in mind) that all objects are the result of the interactions between multitudes of
microphysical events. In this way, the first entities would be the primordial
microphysical events, the basis of more complex entities (that Whitehead called
societies or nexus). There exists, therefore, degrees in the actual entities:
those that can be found in empty space; those that are found in stable objects
that are not alive; and finally, those that are found as moments of stable objects
with conscious awareness. Throughout his work, however, we find an evolution
in terms that refers to, one way or another, the same concept of actual entities
(actual event, actual occasion, occasion of experience, actuality, res verae, etc.);
this absence of terminological unity is another reason it is difficult to understand
how Whitehead is thinking. Whitehead establishes some principles that clarify
how to understand reality from actual entities. The ontological principle
affirms that everything that is real is always produced by actual entities; it is
produced by the entity, from the ente, from something that exists. Furthermore,
there are multiple existent entities and they come from their own existence to
interact amongst themselves in multiplicities: the universe can be understood

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as solidarity of actual entities. This is what is formulated in the beginning of


relativity (or, we should say, out of reference or using a zurbirian term, out
of respectivity). This actuality of the entities is also presented as dynamic,
as active existence, like a process. Therefore, the principle of process tells us that
actual entities are not static but in process. All entities are open to possibility
or potential for their dynamic processual evolution in solidarity with other
entities.
For Whitehead, all actual entity is a process of experience that is constructed
through its relationship with other entities: this solidarity is always sensed.
Whitehead calls this the reformed subjective principal: the elements that the universe
is constructed out of are discovered in this sentient subjective experience. It is
experience that, in effect, senses the human subject in its connection with the
world and it is experience that Whitehead universally attributes to all processes
of relationship between other entities and themselves, including those that are
the most primordial. There are no actual entities that are lacking in some degree
of subjective experience. This principle can be seen in the universal Whiteheadian
panpsychism and holism that ends in man.
Eternal objects. For Whitehead, entities can be actual (real things that exist)
or ideal (pure forms that do not exist but are able to define existent realities).
These ideal entities are known as eternal objects. They define a realm of
possibilities, of conditional potentials of existent reality and therefore of actual
entities and their dynamic processes of association in their complex evolution.
There is a terminological diversity that revolves around this concept: forms, ideal
identities, abstract entities, universals, potential forms, etc. Man comes to know
eternal objects by experiencing them in action through actual entities or by
conceiving of them abstractly, discovering pure formal potentialities that could
perhaps be realized in the real processes of actual entities. Whitehead formulated
his metaphysics of forms in his theory of eternal objects: the abstract world
of pure forms accessed via experience of the real world. It is, at its root, his
metaphysics of the formal sciences and above all mathematics, which is an
essential part of modern science; but not only mathematics because for him
blackness or colour are abstract forms that may or may not be manifested
in the world. Eternal objects do not, by themselves, form a harmonic world but
rather a multiplicity of potentials that may or may not have an effect in the real
world.
Concrescence. A genetic study of actual entities tells us that they are the result
of the process of concrescence. This term comes from the vocabulary of biology:
it is the union and the growing together of parts that were originally separate.
It is the constitution of unity in the universe of multiple things until the final
result of a new unitary entity. The evolutionary process of the universe has been
a process of concrescence because the original actual entities are dynamic and
produce a process that is made up of continual relationships between entities.
This is therefore a natural result of processural nature and solidarity (respective)
of the actual entities that make up the primordial nature. Concrescence, for

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Whitehead, is an open process without limit in which all the entities of the
universe are set out in a unitary process of growing convergence. The universe
is then a unitary all. This is where the individuality of classical metaphysics
breaks down and where every entity lives its connection with the unity of all
and produces its effects over it. This is how Whiteheads own organic (vitalist)
metaphysics manifests itself.
Prehension. Concrescence describes a genetic process in which multiple things
in the universe organically unify. Prehension is a term that describes the
activity of each of the actual entities when they make a concretion or unit with
other entities. The unity of the universe is constructed by way of the prehension
of entities upon others. It is the active essence of the actual entity: to be dynamic
in a process that configures the concrescent unit with other entities. A) The
process of the union of entities to others or prehension is on one hand physical,
given that it makes up a relational union between diverse actual entities. B) On
the other hand, it is also an occasion of experience; that is to say, a pulsation
of actuality (a term probably inspired by William James) or a drop of
experience. Therefore, for Whitehead, by attributing everything to prehension,
including the most primordial and primitive actual entities, the quality of
experience continues to move within an evident panpsychist concept. This
prehensive dynamics as an occasion or event of experience is a necessary
metaphysical consideration for a unitary vision of the universe. Without it, a
metaphysics that understood the harmony between human and animal life as
processes of experience open to the universe as a unitarily lived environment
(in the style of Gibson) would not be possible. Terminal psychic experience is
possible because actual entities are always produced (a radice) by a germinal
occasion or event of experience.
Representative apprehension and feeling. Nevertheless, the occasion of
experience, attributed by Whitehead to all actual entities in their prehensive
dynamic, should not be confused with given and eventual representative and
cognitive apprehension in the higher animal and of course in the human world.
The general concept of prehension does not include, therefore, consciousness,
thought or knowledge (nor the psychic subject derived of these). Knowledge
can be thought of as a higher a-prehension or con-prehension that unifies
complex groups of actual entities that mutually imply and modify one another.
However, the perception of knowledge is founded in the germinal primordial
prehensive unification; it is already perceptive, a complex occasion of
experience. So, for Whitehead, all knowledge is formed in a non-cognitive
prehension united with the primordial actual entities.
Prehension is to sense sensation. It is the operation by which the prehended
produces and effect in the subjectivity of the actual entity. Experience, which is
the same as sensing, is likewise a state of affective tonality (to notice) produced
for what is prehended (object or data) in the actual entity that prehends (active
subject of concrescence). Whitehead therefore is not Kantian: it is not the subject
that constitutes experience but rather the experience (sensation) that constitutes

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(a posteriori, dynamic, through evolution, through concrescence) actual entities


as subjects. Therefore, if prehension always implies sensation, the knowledge
built on top of complex groupings of previous prehensions is always knowledge
built from sensation. It is always in some way, a representative knowledge or
apprehension that is sensitive or sentient (this is also what X. Zubiri thinks).
The organic prehension of the universe. The actual entity is dynamic and creator,
by way of concrescence, of the unity of the universe. But this unity is organic,
systematic and open to the whole universe; and in this sense, it not individually
isolated, closed, localizable in a simple way in time or space apart from everything.
Prehension refers an actual entity to other places and other times. The experience
or sensation of this prehensive entity is the experience of space and of time.
Because of this, the experience or sensation of spatial distance or the reference
to the past or future, overflowing the non-organic singular here and now, are
produced by the fact that the actual entities are bound to the whole universe by
prehension. An actual entity, be it man or animal, from its senses, is open to the
sensation of the existent outside world; and this can only be explained by the fact
that the animal or human body is open, or prehensively unifies in itself the different
contents or environments of the universe. Whitehead describes this (in SMW,
chapter V) appealing to the experience of the romantic poets and their integrating
experience of outdoor space, as we have previously mentioned.
Factors of the structure of prehension: the physical and mental spectrum.
Prehension is therefore the essential process of the universe. Concrescence up
until its integration and growing unity are produced by it. Whitehead indicates
that there are three things in all prehension: a) the subject or actual entity which
is doing the prehension, b) the data or content (another actual entity) that is
being prehended and lastly c) the subjective form (sensation) given in the
prehensive assimilation (physical) of the data on the part of the subject. These
three factors must also refer to the prehension that the subject performs on
eternal objects, whose content is specifically prehended and the feeling that this
assimilation (here only conceptual) produces. It is here in his metaphysics where
Whitehead distinguishes between the physical pole and the mental pole of
the concrescence of the prehensions. But the conceptual feelers and the eternal
objects are the mental pole at the same time. So, the human dynamic of
concrescence is open to a physical pole and a mental pole.

3. THE THEISTIC METAPHYSICS OF WHITEHEAD

The original metaphysics of Whitehead has always been theistic, at least


since he introduced the idea of God, for the first time, in his system (in SMW,
1925). The fact is, he considered God as an essential element that could not be
substituted, in the coherence of his metaphysical image of the physical world. He
does not try to religiously apply the concept of God, but rather presents it as a

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coherent metaphysical element (rational and ultimately, even physical) of the


universe. Without God, the coherence of the basic metaphysics shown in the
previous point could not be maintained. As God was necessary for the Aristotelian
system, Whitehead considered that is was necessary for his metaphysics as well.
The truth is, however, that it is not always easy to admit or even consider
permissible what Whitehead, as we will see, says about God.

3.1) Arguments for a theistic metaphysics

God as a coherent factor of metaphysics. The metaphysics espoused here is a


response to the image of science (the quantum image that Whitehead had in
1925) but also responds the vitalist intuition (Bergson) of the universe in
process that produces the psychic experience because it is part of its ontological
basis. Up to this point, everything is permissible. Why introduce in this the real
presence of a divine being? In Aristotle, in scholastic writings or in any other
classical philosophy, it was always necessary to have an argument that justified
the introduction of theistic elements. In Whitehead, we also clearly find, in all
its detail, arguments that justify his theism.
The first argument is based on the ontological principal. Actual events are
always the origin of what exists: everything that exists necessarily derives itself
from real entities. However, these entities are by their own nature limited: they
are what they are and they cannot be more than what they are by their own
nature (ontological principle). Nevertheless, nature as a process is continual
springing forth of new things by way of prehensions and concrescence; in this
springing forth, there is a configuration of a surplus of being that goes beyond
the being of the entities that which prehension is made up of. Because of this,
in the evolutionary process of the general potentiality of the universe, its creative
rise towards newness must be founded in a special non-temporal actual entity
that is always given as the ontological base of the universe. This is what Whitehead
calls God. Nothing can come from non-being to be introduced in the actual
world: God is the fundamental actual entity that gives birth to the (ontological)
potentiality of the universal process.
The second argument that Whitehead puts forth is also related with the
ontological principle, although now it refers to eternal objects. These are by
nature of their pure potentiality, abstract forms without realization and without
relation to actual entities; above all if we pay attention to their most germinal
and primogenital forms. Nonetheless, eternal objects have been made by way
of an evolutionary process: how could they then have entered into the creative
process of actual entities? Whitehead responds to that by saying God is precisely
the mediation between the potential (eternal objects) and the actual (its
actualization in the world as a concrescent process). The existence of God as
the ontological basis of the world therefore explains that the eternal objects have
in God, as an eternal actual entity, an ideal, representative conceptual actuality.

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God is the guide of the realization of the eternal objects (formal) in the
concrescence of the actual entities 6.
God is, therefore, that fundamental entity that allows for the transformation
from potentiality to actuality, including ontological potentiality (the first
argument) or as formal potentiality, eternal objects (second argument). God as
the foundation of the possible transformation of formal potentiality into actuality
appears to us as primordial nature (like for example the mental pole of God).
At the same time, considered as the foundation of the produced transformation
form ontological potentiality to physical actuality in time, we would be referring
to the consequent nature of God (its physical pole).
According to the conception of Whitehead, God is eternal like the world
(reality is finite and limited but lacks a beginning and an end). However, God
does not form part of the world because its fundamental functions are always
alleged to be the ontological basis of the world; a ground where actual
entities assume their temporal role. God is, in this sense, above time or in a non-
temporal condition that makes the space-time of the world possible by way of
its formal and ontological being. God is the foundation of the world without
being a part of it.
God as an unexplained but necessary explanation. The world of actual entities,
in the first metaphysics of Whitehead, is insufficient to explain what they
have produced by themselves in the process of concrescence in the history of
the universe. They are insufficient and need to have reference to a fundamental
basis, understood to be God, which contains, representatively, the universe of
formal possibilities (mental pole) and ontologically, the universe of the physical
possibilities of concrescence in the enriching evolution of the universe (physical
pole). Therefore Whitehead thinks in a similar way to traditional theist philosophy:
the world is insufficient to give reason to itself and it is necessary to postulate
the existence of God as the basis of being. To metaphysically conceive of the
world and go toward its ultimate fundamental roots, we arrive at the ultimate
limitation, which is God. There is nothing beyond that limit; it is the last thing,
ontologically stable and without time which confers to the world a basis. This

6
Note that Whiteheads arguments are worthy of attention. The first is congruent with
something that modern physics has noticed from many perspectives. Quantic flow the
appearance and disappearance of particles assumes an ontological background as reference,
which is currently called quantic vacuum. Whitehead understands this ontological
background as necessary, and identifies it with divine reality; in contrast, modern science
limits itself to the hypothesis about an impersonal background from the fluctuations of which
emerges reality. Whiteheads presupposition that God is the ontological background is also
justified because the organization of the world in its concrescence process should be regulated
by eternal objects that could only be in Gods mind. With the same presupposition, modern
science sees things differently: It is the nature itself of matter that, according to its ontological
properties, blindly determines the rational structure which gradually, through an evolutive
Darwinian process, shapes the complex structure of the world. Modern science thus explains
the process as autonomous: God or a soul of the world that guides the natural process is
not necessary for science. We will refer to these extremes later.

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basis, God, is the beginning of determination and the concrete nature of nature
but is not in itself derived from anything. It is the last in the sense that it is
necessary to postulate metaphysically of an entity that is the basis for and
determines unstable events without itself being founded or determined. We refer
to God as being necessary; as the necessary principle to base the world (the
real and the formal).
God is, then, the fundamental explanatory factor. Nevertheless, at the same
time, God is not a possible as a rational explanatory object. It is the ultimate
irrationality that rationally explains the universe. In a famous quote from the
last page of chapter eleven of SMW, we are told in a slightly cryptic way: God is
the ultimate limitation, and His existence is the ultimate irrationality God is not
concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality. No reason can be given for
the nature of God, because that nature is the ground of rationality (SMW, cap. XI).
How can we understand what divine irrationality means? My personal
interpretation is the following: The world, in the previous sense, is not self
sufficient or absolute: it must be based on an entity that is neither concrete or
determinable from a subsequent dimension: it must be the last, the ontological
basis, sufficient and non-temporal: we can infer that it is the basis and we can
attribute to it necessity (the necessary permanence in being once we know that
it exists). However, this entity that is the basis for the rationality of the world is
not, in turn by itself rational because we cannot explain it. We know that God
exists but not how or why. We cannot speak rationally about the ultimate limit.
We cannot say, for example, that God is that whose essence is to necessarily
exist; we do not know what God is like or what its essence is. The world, for
Whitehead tells us that god should exist and as the basis for being we consider
it necessary.
But if the world does not bring us to God but rather to another explanatory
entity (like for example, a pure world, without God), we should also postulate
the need for that entity. Nevertheless, classical questions such as why does
something exist instead of nothing? do not have a rational answer and belong
to the last realm of the irrational (what we can not explain) of which Whitehead
tries to explain 7.
This is the interpretation that is also offered by Alix Parmentier. As can be
seen from the following quote: Whitehead, at the same time affirms the need

7
I emphasize in the text some considerations about the metaphysics of the natural mind
that I deem important. 1) Human reason primarily seeks to explain empirical facts by situating
them within a reference system considered as sufficient, self-sufficient, or absolute from
the viewpoint of maintaining its own existence. 2) The attribution of necessity is produced in
a second moment: whatever is established as absolute (pure world or God) should be
considered as necessary. 3) Thus, reason, in principle, could attribute necessity both to God
and to a pure world without God. In our opinion, the principle of some schools of classical
metaphysics is not acceptable, since it considers necessity as attributable only to God. These
considerations are essential in order to understand that man, situated in the interior of an
enigmatic universe, remains equally open to a God-creator hypothesis and to a pure-world-
without-God hypothesis.

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for human intelligence to be guided, to establish the existence of God and the
impossibility to find a way to form a concept (of God). We can metaphysically
discover that God exists (and this is the ultimate requirement of human intelligence
and its grandeur) but we cannot know what it is. We can know its existence but
not its determination (Parmentier, 491ss). He also observes that to put God as
the beginning of necessary determination does not imply that we should give him
a reason: it is the ultimate limitation, that it is not possible to give a reason it
escapes all rationality that is on top of it and is able to explain it. From there,
God does not allow itself to be deduced (Parmentier, 492) and it is the ultimate
irrational that is necessary in order to confer rationality to the world.
The primordial nature of God. The primordial nature of God is considered to
be the basis of absolute universal potentiality. Nevertheless, as pure potentiality,
God does not yet have any real physical entity; as a consequence, God does not
have consciousness, it is unconscious. It is really difficult to see Whiteheads
point of view. It is clear, if we think that God, although eternal and non-temporal,
does not have identity apart from the world: it is realized through the actual
identities that make concrete and real being and the formal possibilities based
in the formal and ontological potentiality of divinity. The evolutionary process
of the universe comes up through the basic potentialities that are sustained by
divinity. The ontological rise, the new perfection in the creation of the eternal
objects as well as the subjective aspiration (feeling) of all the actual entities make
God (both ontologically and formally) the object of desire in the universal process.
The consequent nature of god. It is not possible to understand Whitehead if
God is attributed a primordial nature that maintains an existence at the margin
of its consequent nature. God eternally keeps primordial nature and consequent
nature like an untiring base of the world. The distinction that a philosopher
makes when describing the does not suppose a real distinction between them
(God has never existed as pure primordial nature at the margin of its consequent
nature).
Enjuto Bernal 8 explains the nature of Whiteheads God in similar terms to
other authors (e.g. Alix Parmentier). God created the world by way of his
primordial nature, although we should not interpret create here in its classical
sense: it is more akin to make possible. The continuing process of creation that
is given in the temporal world, made possible by the principle of divine
materialization, makes it possible to continue the enrichment of that phase of
Divinity (153). God then, from the perspective of eternity, is based on the actual
entities in concrescence: only in them the transfer from potentiality to actuality
is produced and God does not have an actual being apart from the world. This
physical actualization of God is given through the world, in both actual entities
and their process: it does not have another form of physical actualization and
only in it does it come to make its formal and ontological potentialities concrete.

8
ENJUTO BERNAL, JORGE, La filosofa de Alfred North Whitehead, Tecnos, Madrid, 1967.

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These are made actual by way of the impulse that God offers to the process of
the world. God therefore does not create the world: god and the world have
always existed. However, the work of God brings the best out of the world and
tries to act over it to make it perfect 9.
Through this consequent nature, God prehends each and every one of the
actual entities. They are able to be distinguished because God is not another
element in the world but rather its formal and ontological basis. God is a personal
being, actualized from and by the actual entities. Whenever Whitehead speaks
of God, it seems that he is talking about a personal being that somehow responds
to what everyone calls God and gives meaning to religion. But its consequent
nature is incomplete, new born and processual, actual and conscious, constant
and eternal, without beginning or end; God is in process by way of the process
of the world. However, because of the process of the world, God is open to the
potential realm of its primordial nature; potentiality that only by way of
consequent nature makes god real and conscious as such.
The superjective nature of God. Whitehead considers that the vision of the
universe, in order for it to be congruent, attributes a pole of subjective experience
or feeling to all actual entities. When we refer to lower actual entities, we cannot
attribute to them the condition of being a psychic being (and a fortiori
consciousness). However, they should possess a certain primordial feeling or
experience. From this ontological condition of the actual entities, the complex
psychic experience in biology and humanity can be derived. Whitehead is to some
degree panpsychist. The experience is united with the physical construction of
the actual entities and to the process of the prehensions that integrate one another
in the universes unitary process of concrescence. A feeling of satisfaction, fruition
or ontological enjoyment can be attributed to this experiential pole of process.
Because the process is a realization of ontological and formal potentialities that
are founded by Divinity, the process is a fruition of Divinity. Life, whether it
is known or not by the one living it, is a fruition of the divine.

9
In our opinion, the idea that God is not a creator and should be conceived as the soul
of the world, understood in a more or less platonic sense, is one of the principal weaknesses
of Whiteheads thought. 1) In the first place, such idea makes it difficult for traditional Christian
theology, whether Catholic or Protestant, to accept his metaphysics. 2) Furthermore, this idea
of God entails a mode of understanding divine kenosis that is basically insufficient. The divine
limitation before the world is not a full self-limitation because it is imposed by a cosmos
that is eternal like God and that imposes the constrictions (to which God is subject) of its own
ontology. It is true that, for Whitehead, this God that is subject to the world seeks to relate
with man not by imposition but by persuasion. But there is a manner of understanding kenosis
that is richer than presenting the creation of an autonomous world that presupposes Gods
absolute self-limitation before human freedom and history. In our opinion, which we will
explain later, one should speak of an epistemological kenosis (the creation of an autonomous
world where God creates freedom by not imposing himself on human knowing) rather than
an ontological kenosis (which presupposes the real loss of Gods omnipotence and
omniscience). The development of process philosophy-theology towards a new understanding
of God and kenosis would be necessary for its full integration in the mainstream Christian
Churches.

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Applying God to the subjective nature of the world, given that God makes it
happen by way of its consequent nature in the physical pole of the actual
entities, results in God taking on the global subjectivity present in the process
of the world and creating it from that. This is, for Whitehead, the superjective
nature of God. That in which Divinity takes on the fruition created in the totality
of the process. With respect to whether God is one thing or another, rather than
the base of all things, it can also be said that this divine feeling is integrated
within the pure formal and ontological potentiality present in divinity; it is
universal subjectivity physically constituted in the real process of the world and
the opening to the horizon to the next enrichment by way of the process of
concrescence. In this superjective nature of god, which opens everything and all
has a real presence; all subjective individual experience is assumed or integrated.
This is what happens with human beings and it is one of the ways to approach
the problem of immortality from the perspective of Whiteheads philosophy.
Theistic metaphysics as an option for congruence. It is important to note that
Whitehead constantly rejected the idea that his metaphysics could be something
like the object of a demonstration. It seems that Whitehead only attributed a
certain proven value to the ontological argument (that which Hartshorne later
gave so much importance) and even then, it was not so clear. So then, what value
should we attribute to his primary metaphysics? One must admit that it is the
work of reason and therefore should be presented as a rational option for
congruence to fit into the world. Man intuits that the process that weighs him
down responds to this metaphysical framework: it is congruent, rational and
illuminating but it cannot be demonstrated. Because of this, we can say, in line
with Whitehead, that it has even more value when man can freely place himself
in this congruence. It is a congruence that is assumed but cannot be demonstrated.
It is what happens with philosophical viewpoints given that demonstrations are
things of science, and even then it is difficult.

3.2) Religious metaphysics

Whitehead, in the context of metaphysical congruence, argues for an idea of


God that is quite different from that of the Christian religion and theology (both
for protestants and Catholics). Nevertheless, he does maintain the idea of a
personal God similar to the idea of God in Christian theology. In fact his
metaphysics is religious and based on the so-called Christian theology of process.
Criticism of the religious idea of God in Christian theology. We can find in
Whitehead, in effect, a recurring and radical critique of Christian theology
(Parmentier, 447ss). This critique is based on two reasons: first, his connections
with Greek philosophy; second, his connection with society in his times, referring
socio-politically to an absolute monarchy (in the world of the Romans or in
Mesopotamian despots). But, faced with this theology that induces a false idea
of God, the modern world and processural metaphysics offer a distinct image of
God. We will be able to see how closely Alix Parmentier will be able to explain it.

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838 J. MONSERRAT, ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD ON PROCESS PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

The God that comes from the teachings of Christ is instead of a Despot-God,
a Loving God that works for love and persuasion. Instead of Motor-immobile,
a Loving God that endures the suffering of the world. In place of a Moralistic
God, a loving God that saved the present immediacy by way of constantly
assuming it within its own harmony. God is the Eros that communicates with
every actual entity, freely and without imposing its subjective tendency, its finality
and the ideal of its pure realization (primordial nature). God is that which receives
the reaction of the physical world and transforms, upon accepting it, all suffering
(consequent nature). God is that whose loving immanence penetrates the
immediacy of all experience; the end of which his providence orders all, is an
immediate fruition (superjective nature) (Parmentier, 453-54).
For Whitehead, the traditional Greco-roman Christian theology assumes the
metaphysics of an absolute being that is all powerful and omniscient, the only
source of all being, immutable, existing independently and indifferent before all
relation with the world. This idea of God that has subsisted up till now must be
substituted by the idea of a God of process, inside the bounds of time and space,
that gives space for a better reinterpretation of the same Christianity; that is to
say, of the teachings of Christ.
Divine persuasion. The idea that God does not works upon the world in a
coercive way but rather through persuasion, is a meaningful formulation of
which Whitehead constantly repeated in the theology of process. This discovery
makes him realize that God works by way of persuasion which is one of the
greatest advancements in the history of religious thought; it is the advance that
pretends to break away from the classical philosophy-theology of Christianity,
which in its grand theological systems always worked within the framework of
god as a dominator that always imposed by way of reason and moral order and
as such constituted a coercive principle that dominated the lives of individuals.
We can see this idea in many of his works, but above all others in Adventures of
ideas. The continuous action of God is to move, from within, the concrescient
opening of beings towards the achievement of their formal and ontological
growth: it is an action that is persuasive, loving and gentle because it does not
interfere with or put conditions on the freedom of movement of nature and only
comes from itself, although under the impulse of a divine force that is persuasive
and not coercive which tries to bring the world to better itself. The action of God
is the victory of persuasion over force. This is the way of thought that introduced
Whitehead to the philosophy of Plato, but he thought it should constitute one
of the axes of the modern reform of religion.
Evil and the divine limitation of omnipotence and omniscience. The God of
Whitehead is not a creator: this is the type of God that belongs to classical
Christianity and should be rejected. Whiteheads metaphysics does not have a
divine being that lives transcendently apart from the world and that decides to
create at a certain time. For Whitehead, the Christian God is the God-Foundation
of a world that is understood as eternal. God and the world, the process, are what
they are and he did not create them. He is, therefore, not responsible for the

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process of the world. God is the foundation that makes the formal and ontological
process possible and moves it forward towards good, towards the optimal.
However, God is not the designer nor creator of process. God must abide by what
is: he is not omnipotent to interfere, without limit, with process. God is only the
ultimate limitation necessary and the beginning of the concrescence of process.
Whats more, in the same way, he is not omniscient with respect to the final
development of the process, given that it depends on itself and its own impulses
and in ultimate terms, its freedom. The God of Whitehead is a God limited by
the world, and in this sense, cannot be characterized as self limited given that
he is not the creator of designer of his own limits. Evil, then, is inherent in the
universe in the sense that disorder and disorientation of process can be derived
from order, harmony and the good of process by way of its own autonomous and
free dynamic. God, in some sense, suffers evil in the same way that actual entities
do, by seeing the impulse towards good blocked. God, immersed in process (by
way of its primordial, superjective and consequent nature) is not responsible for
Evil but rather the fellow sufferer that understands, the faithful friend that suffers
as we do, who accompanies us and who understands us.
Whitehead as a religious thinker. The way in which God is, in effect, justified
and described in Whiteheads metaphysics can arouse doubts. There are doubts
as to whether the God that is described is a personal being and also as to whether
the personal life of man is individually saved in an afterlife. There is no doubt,
however, as to what Whitehead believes with respect to congruence, within his
system, of a personal God that assumes and saves for eternity the survival of all
personal life. He is conscious of it being argued in a new form of religion, more
appropriate for the modern world, but definitely a way of religion that assumes
the original form of human religion that has always been and in all cultures.
Whatever Whitehead is according to Parmentier he is a religious thinker.
There are three main reasons that we consider sufficient to make this claim. For
him, the universe would not now how to exist without God (although God did
not create it ex nihilo); without God, the reality that would exist would be
unintelligible. A metaphysics without God would be contradictory. He has seen
that the religious attitude was a fundamental dimension of man; a dimension
without which man would not know how to be himself. He has seen that the
essential part of religious attitude was adoration. Evidently, this adoration, for
Whitehead, is not directed at a creator in the strong sense of the term; whats
left is nothing less than that man, for Whitehead, could not exist without God
and that the recognition of this relationship is translated as adoration and the
adoration of love. He has understood that the religious attitude was not intrinsic
in metaphysics but rather that there not only could be but should be cooperation
between religious intuition and speculative intelligence. Underlining this has
nothing to do with wanting to assimilate Whitehead into Thomism or even into
the teachings of Aristotle or wanting to make him a believer of orthodoxy. He
would not even be allowed to his system of though into a church or the traditional
philosophy of Catholicism (Parmentier, 537).

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4. CRITICAL SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION FROM A PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL


PERSPECTIVE

The complex adventure of ideas, proposed by Whitehead has been the object
of enthusiastic evaluations from these, the philosophy-theology of process was
born and negative critical judgements, as much from the perspective of classical
protestant theology (for example the Church of England) as from catholic
theology. However, before evaluating the theological aspects it is convenient to
consider Whitehead from a purely scientific and philosophical perspective.

4.1) The processualy autonomous universe of science

Whiteheads first metaphysics or basic metaphysics is easily integrated


into modern science: the world is presented as a complex structure of actual
events that order themselves in physical, biological and human systems within
the evolutionary process of the universe oriented towards unitary concrescence;
science also respects (as does Whitehead, we believe) the margin of entropy and
negantropy of the ascendant processes that empirical evidence must admit.
The theistic science of Whitehead. Whiteheads metaphysics is essentially
theistic. Starting from the potentiality open in the formal and in the ontological,
divine reality is postulated as a condition of possibility of this universal
potentiality. Thus, God is necessary: a metaphysics without God would not be
viable because the universal process could not be given without a potential base,
without a formal and ontological founding force (God). For Whitehead, it is
the same science that explains the world that must be theistic. It is true that
Whitehead does not pretend to demonstrate or impose the existence of God
but he defends that only a theistic open hypothesis towards the universe is
truly able to be explained by the same science.
Nevertheless, the norm in modern science is the explanation of the ontological
and formal power of the universe away from theistic hypotheses. Science
conceives of a universe that contains intrinsic principles (non theistic) that have
their own explanation. Because of this, it is difficult for a first metaphysics
that is congruent with modern science to be theistic.
Ontological sufficiency of the universe. It is evident that today we do not think
that the universe is explained for a fixed number of particles that have existed
since the beginning and that for blind interactions have produces the advance
towards a higher natural order. The universe is today, on a microphysical level,
that strange world described by quantum mechanics: with superposition,
apparition, annihilation of particles, uncertainty, balance and electrodynamic
interactions, strange fields, action at a distance, non local causation, quantum
coherence and holistic phenomenon, etc. In this context, science has searched
for an ontological base to refer to that acts like a profound stage from which the
phenomenological scene of the empirical world is born. Before it was called

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ether and today it might be called quantum vacuum (remember the concept
of implied order in the heterodoxical philosophy of physics of David Bohm).
This background field, that is purely physical and impersonal, this offers the
ontological resources that are necessary for the evolution, apparition and
disappearance of particles, order, novelty, creativity and ontological ascent of
the universe. However, how is the universe born out of the primordial ontology
of the universe? We can know things, but we do not know the last theory. String
theory and superstrings are an example of the huge speculative effort of modern
theoretical physics to conceive of the primordial properties of matter that
beyond the era of Plank generate the universe and produce both quantum
mechanics and classic relativist mechanics.
Formal sufficiency of the universe. Modern science also explains why evolutionary
processes have moulded complex formal structures (what Whitehead called eternal
objects). The reasons that have driven their evolution in the way that science has
shown depend on the very same ontology as that of matter. Matter, in effect,
presents certain properties by default that are measureable as constants and
variables that respond to certain values; from there, their progressive organization
is born and the laws of this organization respond. The laws are, therefore, the
description of the factual result of evolution: they are not a previous presupposition.
In this way, matter has gone on producing forms that do not depend on a quasi-
platonic world of eternal objects but rather they bud from the same dynamic
of structural organization in function of their primordial properties. Form and
structure is born from ontological material. However, man, because of reason (as
it is explained in epistemology), being inspired by the structures that have already
been produced, can imagine other possible forms and structures. This is how
formal sciences are definitively born as products of the human mind; they do not
reflect an intuition of eternal objects (in the platonic style of Whitehead) but rather
they are an imaginative product constructed by human reason that is inspired by
real structures.
The evolutionary-processual sufficiency of the universe. In any case, modern
science offers a description of the universe as a consistent and congruent system
in itself like the structure of dynamic interactions in space and time. For modern
science, it is very difficult to introduce God as an immediate and precise factor
of intelligibility for the universe. To put God into the world is to put him in a
secular context where science builds its explanations without the need for theism.

4.2) Philosophical evaluation of Whiteheads metaphysics

Classical Christian metaphysics. Recall how classical metaphysics was


constructed based on Christian philosophy. For this, facts were always the world
of experience, understood as a basis for argument. If something is real and exists,
it should have a fundament for its being: that is to say, it should be based in
something sufficient or more specifically auto-sufficient (it is enough in and

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of itself) to be real and existent. The foundation of being should be absolute, in


the sense that it should not need external references to give sufficient reason
for its own real self. Necessity should also be an attribute of this absolute
foundation of real being: it should be real in the past, present and future, given
that if in some moment is stops existing, it would not be possible to explain its
movement from nothingness to real being.
The expectation of an auto-sufficient and necessary foundation is not only
part of classical (philosophical) metaphysics but also of scientific reasoning.
This search, in effect, describes phenomenon and fits them inside structural
systems in cause and effect interactions that are sufficient. If this sufficiency is
not accounted for in certain real systems, it would then refer these systems to
each other in order to reach more and more complex sufficient causal interaction
systems (an atomic particle is in a molecule which is part of a physical or organic
object and so on leading up to the ultimate system of the universe). However,
while looking for sufficiency, science reached frontiers that, with their own
methods, cannot keep on looking and end up being referred to by other
arguments; for example philosophy. This is what happens in philosophical
speculation of what happened before the big bang.
Classical Christian metaphysics, according to this, is constructed with clarity:
the real being does not have sufficiency as such (it is contingent) and must
infer existence from a foundation of being (given that it is contingent and must
be founded in the being by something that is not part of the world). From there,
Christian metaphysics postulates transcendent existence (which does not form
part of the world but rather transcends it) of a foundation of being which is
absolute and necessary and must produce the world through creation. In creation,
only the existence of that which creates (God) is presupposed (with its own
ontology). The rational argument to admit the existence of God is that this being
can found the universe for creation. This is where the rational foundation to
think of God in a specific way is: as personal, transcendent, omnipotent,
omniscient, etc. If God wasnt like that (for example, was not transcendent or
personal), it could not be the creative foundation.
Whiteheads metaphysics. Whitehead proposes a different analysis. In the first
place, the world is not contingent in the previous sense. It is eternal and was
not created nor can a beginning be attributed to it. It advances forward in an
unprescribed way. The world is absolute and auto-sufficient. However, this
absolute universe is not intelligible if the existence of God is not postulated. God
is and essential explanatory element to found, as Whitehead said, both the
ontological and formal potentiality in the universal process of concrescence.
However, the God that Whitehead postulates is not the classical God of
transcendence but rather a God that forms part of the world. This God is
something like the soul of the world or platonic Demiurge. It is the foundation
of the universe and contributes essentially to this so that it is in effect what it is.
God is something like an essential cog in the functional and evolutionary gears
of the universe. Because of this, Whitehead said that his metaphysics needed God

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in the same way that Aristotle needed the unmoving motor. In reality, the God
of Aristotle like that of Whitehead is a part of a universe that is eternal in itself.
This theistic reasoning distinct from that of classical Christianity prompts
certain considerations. These will follow below.
Problems of Whiteheads metaphysics. Classical metaphysics considers the
world to be contingent; that is to say it is not sufficient, absolute nor necessary.
In order to justify its point of view, Christian metaphysics has a modern dialogue
with science. It takes into account facts like the origin of the universe, its
development in time towards the future, its eventual consistency and stability
as a system, the rationality of its design, etc. The universe does not seem to have
in and of itself, as it is constructed, absoluteness or sufficiency. Because of this,
it makes sense to place them in a transcendent reality in the universe. A reality
that should have sufficiency, absoluteness and necessity, as well as the ability
to found and produce the universe through creation attributed to it. This classical
metaphysics therefore understands that God, as said by scholars, is not found
in secondary causes but rather as the primary cause; this is when ultimate
absoluteness and necessity are searched for within a proper philosophical, not
only scientific, discourse. Because of this, the world is a system of coherent
secondary causes that present a functional autonomy and sufficiency. The
universe, once created, works by itself; without a God that needs to correct
errors. In this way, classical theistic arguments float on the metaphysical edges
of science.
Whitehead in turn, does not question the world at this ultimate level of
primary causality (in its absoluteness and necessity) given that the world is
eternal: that is absolute and necessary. Whiteheads problem is that of explaining
the system of secondary causes, because they do not seem to constitute a
system that is sufficient but rather introduce the reference of God and an element
of the world that contributes to what the world is from the inside.
Here is an example to understand the idea better, although we are aware that
is presents it in a simplified way. Consider a complex device (a computer, a car, etc.).
Classical metaphysics does not question whether this device functions
autonomously in a congruent and sufficient way, as it is presented here. It would
question these things in ways that science could not answer: their undefined
persistence in time, their origin, their ration design, etc., focusing on the problem
of their ultimate absoluteness and necessity. In turn, Whitehead would take for
granted that this device is absolute necessary and eternal in time. Because of this,
he would not ultimately question the sufficiency of the world. Nevertheless, his
argumentation would say that this device does not show an intelligible function
if the existence of a God that forms part of its internal ontology is postulated.
According to our image, God would be necessary for the functioning of the device
whether it be a computer, a car or whatever.
Whiteheads way of thinking, according to my understanding, presents many
difficulties. A) The first is that today, science shows its ability to explain how
and why the universe has evolved from the initial properties of matter. Science

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844 J. MONSERRAT, ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD ON PROCESS PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

constructs, in a continuous way without gaps, an explanation of the evolutionary


process: of matter, of the universe, of life and of man. It is autonomous. It is not
possible to introduce a soul of the world (God) as an explanative factor that
forms part of the world. B) The second is, nevertheless, that although the process
of evolution is autonomous, there are certain enigmas that persist and that
science can not resolve with certainty: the origin of the universe in time,
sufficiency, rational design, the causes of physical and biological order, anthropic
design, the existence (or not) of multiple universes, the nature of consciousness
and psychist, etc. However, these enigmas do not permit the argument for a
soul of the world God (Whitehead) but rather a transcendent foundation of
being God. This is to say, that the possible arguments for admitting the existence
of God seem to more plausibly guide towards a transcendent God (in the classical
sense) than towards a soul of the world God (in the sense of Whitehead).
C) The third reason is that the explanatory autonomy of the universe, from the
viewpoint of science, even allows the argumentation of an absolute auto-
sufficiency (and as a consequence, necessity): therefore, the arguments in favour
of a credible explanatory hypothesis of a transcendent foundation of being
God does not eliminate the possibility that science constructs a credible atheist
hypothesis, without a God, that can explain the enigmas of the universe. This
would mean that the hypothesis of a soul of the world God (in Whiteheads
sense) would be even less credible from the perspective of science and philosophy.

5. WHITEHEAD FROM THE THEOLOGY OF KENOSIS

Assuming that God exists and is real, for both Catholic and Protestant Christian
theology, it would be the fundamental reality and origin of being that
transcends the universe and to which we attribute creation. Therefore, God
would have created the universe that our reason understands (in science and
philosophy). The universe, according to this, is presented as an enigmatic universe
that (from the point of view of science and philosophy) permits arguments that
make the atheist hypothesis, without God, credible (as well as being agnostic).
Therefore, if god exists, it has created a universe in which his existence is not
evident (given that atheism is possible). Therefore, God, the creator, has not
rationally imposed its presence in the world (although there are arguments
that make his existence rationally credible). Therefore God the creator has
renounced the creation of a theocentric world, in which his existence is imposed
by evidence: God has been hidden (kenosis) 10.

10
I defended many years ago the importance of a theology of kenosis as a means to re-
think Christianity within a scientifically modern world. My article entitled Kenosis: Towards
a New Theology of Science is found in Pensamiento, vol. 63, n 238 (Science, Philosophy and
Religion, Special Series, n 1, 2007), pp. 637-658. The explanation of how I understand kenosis
in this article can complement the comprehension of the value I give to the thought of Whitehead
and his theology of kenosis.

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J. MONSERRAT, ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD ON PROCESS PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY 845

The theology of kenosis can be reconciled with the classical idea of God in
Christianity. The real God should be thought of as omnipotent and omniscient
(including the knowledge of the previsions of probabilistic, statistical, and chaotic
development of an autonomous universe created in time). God should be
understood as a foundation of the universe in the modern panentheistic sense
(Arthur Peacocke). God created the autonomous universe that, from the point of
view of human understanding, appears enigmatic and by which man should decide
the path of his life by way of a free and personal commitment. The kenosis of God
in creation is not ontological (because god never looses his omnipotence) but
rather epistemological (because he creates an enigmatic world for human
understanding). The Christian God is the God which trough kenosis (not having
imposed its presence) creates a universe that makes human freedom possible.
One of the things that Whiteheads thinking has given has been the rethinking
of kenosis and the auto-limitation of God in the world. God, insists Whitehead,
does not seek to impose himself but rather seeks a relationship with man based
in offering, friendship and persuasion. In addition, his idea of the union of the
world with God has allowed for the presentation of a positive vision of morality,
based on the enthusiasm of natural experience. God, for Whitehead, is also not
responsible for Evil because he does not create the world; on the contrary, he is
subject to the conditions established in the same world and tries to overcome it
and guide it to perfection. Kenosis or divine auto-limitation, for Whitehead, is
only partial because a large part of divine limitation is imposed by the nature
of the eternal world (not created) of which God form a part. If we consider
Whitehead from the point of view of his possible harmony with classical Christian
theology (both catholic and protestant), the most important problem is the idea
of a non-creator God, limited by a conditional and eternal universe. In our
opinion, not only is it difficult to find a balance between this soul of the world
God and science and philosophy but also with theology and the traditional
religious experience. In our understanding, this is the crucial point that the
theology of process must revise and develop (by trying to avoid, shall we say,
being confined within its own scholasticism). If it develops, the theology of
process would not only be compatible with traditional Christian theology but
would mean an unquestionable enrichment for this theory both in the essential
idea of Christianity as freedom and in substantial questions of moral theology
and in theology related to Evil in personal life and in history.

c/ Universidad Comillas, 7 JAVIER MONSERRAT


28049 Madrid
jmonserrat@res.upcomillas.es

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

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LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA


Y GRECIA: SIMILITUDES Y DIFERENCIAS
MARTN SEVILLA RODRGUEZ
Universidad de Oviedo

RESUMEN: Comparando fuentes para la historia del primitivo materialismo indio y griego, el autor sea-
la las similitudes y diferencias que pueden apreciarse dentro de las caractersticas generales de ambas
tendencias filosficas.
PALABRAS CLAVE: filosofa india, filosofa griega, historia del materialismo, Carvaka, lokayatas, Aristi-
po de Cirene, Teodoro el Ateo, Epicuro.

The Origins of Materialism in India and Greece:


Similarities and Differences
ABSTRACT: Comparing sources for the history of primitive Indian and Greek materialism, the author
indicates the similarities and differences that can be appreciated into the general characteristics of both
philosophical tendences.
KEY WORDS: indian philosophy, greek philosophy, history of materialism, Carvaka, lokayatas, Aristippos
of Cyrene, Theodorus the Atheist, Epikurus.

1. Desgraciadamente, como fuentes para la historia del materialismo indio 1


no contamos ms que con las referencias a su sistema en la crtica de sus adver-
sarios filosficos y religiosos, los diversos sistemas de la ortodoxia y heterodo-
xia hind. De la obra bsica o manual de la escuela materialista, el Br.haspatisutra,
slo quedan algunos fragmentos reproducidos ocasionalmente. Ello dificulta
notablemente la reconstruccin de los rasgos de su pensamiento, ya que las
diversas fuentes 2 no suelen ofrecer un panorama desapasionado de las caracte-
rsticas que pretenden criticar en sus adversarios materialistas 3.

1
FRAUWALLNER, E., History of Indian Philosophy, I (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1953 [first
Indian edition, 1973]), 215-226; WARDER, A. K., A Course in Indian Philosophy (Motilal Banar-
sidass, Delhi, 1998), 32-39, 119-123; vid. SEVILLA RODRGUEZ, M., Los materialistas indios en el
cdigo de Manu: Pensamiento 60 (2004) 137-143; La etiologa del materialista indio Carvaka en
el Mahabharata: Pensamiento 62 (2006) 321-328. El materialismo indio es conocido en los tex-
tos con el trmino snscrito lokayata y a sus seguidores se les conoce como lokayatas o lokayatikas
(dirigidos al mundo: loka-ayata-?). Otro trmino con el que son conocidos es el de nastikas,
ya que consideran que nada trascendente existe; nastika es un derivado nominal de nasti, con-
traccin de na asti no es, no existe. Tambin se les denomina como carvakas por referencia
a un primitivo fundador no divino de tal corriente de pensamiento, conocido como Carvaka
(la letra c nota una africada palatal sorda, como el dgrafo ch en espaol, en la transcripcin
de la escritura devanagar).
2
Vase CHATTOPADHYAYA, D., Carvaka / Lokayata. An Anthology of Source Materials and
Some Recent Studies (South Asia Books, New Delhi, 1994), para las fuentes.
3
Una de tales fuentes es la obra dramtica Prabodhacandrodaya, de Kr.s.n.a Misra, siglo XI,
vid. NAMBIAR, S. K., Prabodhacandrodaya of Kr.s.n.a Misra (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1971), 1,
en la que los materialistas indios aparecen ridiculizados por el autor, tal como ocurre con

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848 M. SEVILLA, LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA

Las primeras referencias a rasgos constituyentes esenciales del materialis-


mo indio, como por ejemplo la opinin de que la conciencia o pensamiento radi-
ca en el cuerpo como constituido por elementos materiales y no en un yo o alma
extracorprea, aparecen ya puestas en boca de los suras o demonios 4 en la
Ch#ndogya Upani{ad, VIII,8, o en la Maitr#ya<a Upani{ad, VII,9-10, donde el dios
Br.haspati 5, en su funcin de preceptor, imparte tal doctrina a los demonios para
confundirlos en su lucha permanente contra los dioses; de este modo los demo-
nios pasaron a considerar el bien como el mal y el mal como el bien, y en lo
sucesivo fueron asimilados a demonios los secuaces de tal doctrina 6. Tal es la
leyenda etiolgica formulada por los brahmanes para justificar una corriente
de pensamiento que les resultaba adversa y completamente ajena, pero que no
debi ser infrecuente ya desde los primeros tiempos.
Se remontan, pues, tales referencias a la poca de la literatura vdica, que
llega aproximadamente hasta el siglo VI a.C 7. Las fuentes para el materialismo
indio continan posteriormente a lo largo de la historia de la literatura india en
snscrito y prcrito en las obras filosficas o religiosas de sus adversarios, como
ha sido indicado, casi siempre con carcter incidental o fragmentario.

2. Consideran los materialistas indios que toda la realidad es el resultado de


las mltiples combinaciones a que pueden dar lugar los cuatro elementos bsi-
cos de la materia: tierra, agua, fuego y aire 8. Pero algunos lok yatas consideran
tambin el espacio o ter la quinta forma de materia y declaran, por tanto, que
el mundo consiste en cinco formas de materia 9. El hombre, tambin, es el resul-
tado de una determinada combinacin de dichos elementos, y una combinacin
tal que posibilita igualmente el surgimiento de la conciencia. Rechazan, pues,
que la conciencia o el yo, como se ha indicado, sea una entidad extracorprea o
inmaterial que pueda viajar a travs de diferentes cuerpos en una cadena de reen-
carnaciones justificadas por el karma o conducta observada en vidas anteriores.
Rechazan, pues, tal doctrina del karma, que establece premios o castigos en
vidas ulteriores por los hechos de una vida anterior o permite la posible libera-
cin definitiva de tal cadena de reencarnaciones. Dicha doctrina es aceptada,
sin embargo, por los otros sistemas heterodoxos, budismo y jainismo.

Scrates en Las nubes de Aristfanes; vase CHATTOPADHYAYA, D., Lokayata, A Study in Ancient
Indian Materialism (Peoples Publishing House, New Delhi, 1959), 10.
4
Los suras fueron originariamente espritus buenos que posteriormente se rebelaron
contra los dioses y se convirtieron en demonios.
5
El sacerdote capelln de los dioses.
6
Tambin llamados en consecuancia barhaspatyas, seguidores de Br.haspati, por refe-
rencia al origen mtico de la misma.
7
MLLER, F. M., The Upanishads, vols. I y XV, of The Sacred Books of the East (The Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1900, 1884 [reprinted by Motilal Banarsidass, 1965]), LXVII.
8
Es inevitable recordar aqu a Empdocles, pero aunque ste y su maestro Parmnides
puedan ser considerados materialistas en cuanto que tenan al Ser como material, aceptan
sin embargo rasgos del orfismo o pitagorismo como la transmigracin de las almas, lo que
los materialistas indios rechazan principalmente.
9
CHATTOPADHYAYA (1994): 266.

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M. SEVILLA, LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA 849

La conciencia o pensamiento surgira en el cuerpo humano como surge el


poder intoxicante de los licores en la mezcla de distintas sustancias, melazas, etc.,
segn una imagen que se repite en las fuentes y remonta a la obra bsica o manual
de la escuela materialista, el B[haspatis tra. En consecuencia, si el yo, la con-
ciencia, es material y radica nicamente en el cuerpo, el bien tico al que poda-
mos dirigirnos ser dar satisfaccin al cuerpo, esto es, buscar el placer. Al igual
que Epicuro sostienen que si el hombre, como los dems seres animados, tiende
de modo natural e instintivo al placer y rechaza el dolor 10, tal debe ser entonces
el referente tico en la conducta. Desgraciadamente las fuentes no permiten pro-
fundizar en el anlisis del placer a que pudieron haber llegado, como llegaron en
el pensamiento griego Aristipo y los cirenaicos y posteriormente Epicuro.
En su rechazo a todo lo trascendente incluyen lgicamente a los dioses o a
cualquier poder creador o sostenedor del mundo, personal o impersonal. Segn
ellos, la naturaleza de las cosas las impulsa a obrar por s mismas, sin un agen-
te externo que las empuje. Rechazan, pues, la religin de los sacrificios u ofren-
das basada en los Vedas y rechazan tambin la ulterior evolucin religiosa del
brahmanismo, en lo que se refiere a la represin del deseo y a la indiferencia al
placer y al dolor, tal como puede apreciarse por ejemplo en la Bhagavadg3t#.
En su afn por enfrentarse a toda la dogmtica de la religin vdica, los mate-
rialistas indios negaron los modos de conocimiento generalmente adoptados
por los dems sistemas religioso-filosficos: la induccin, la analoga, y el tes-
timonio verbal, utilizados tambin en la teodicea brahmnica, aceptando ni-
camente como fuente de conocimiento la percepcin directa por medio de los
rganos de los sentidos. El rechazo de la induccin o inferencia, esto es, el recha-
zo del proceso silogstico si se parte de una premisa universal justificada en la
induccin como modo de conocimiento 11, los llev a adoptar una posicin inad-
vertidamente escptica en su epistemologa. Al rechazar la inferencia ponan en
entredicho, por ejemplo, su postulado de que la realidad est constituida por la
mezcla de los cuatro elementos materiales, y esto debi llevarlos posteriormente
a ulteriores reformas en su posicin epistemolgica.

3. Entre los griegos el materialismo surge principalmente asociado a los


cirenaicos y Epicuro, como es sabido. Pero ya antes, en el mbito de la fsica,
Leucipo y Demcrito haban desarrollado la teora de los tomos como consti-
tuyentes ltimos de la materia, teora que recoger Epicuro aunque alterndo-
la ligeramente. Tal teora ofreca la posibilidad de rechazar en el mbito de la
fsica la intervencin divina, justificando los fenmenos naturales por el movi-
miento mecnico de los tomos. Del mismo modo, considerada tambin el alma

10
DIGENES LAERCIO, Vidas de filsofos, X,137; SEXTO EMPRICO, Compendio de pirronismo,
III,194; CICERN, Sobre los fundamentos del bien y el mal, I,30.
11
Esto es, no aceptan que pueda haber conclusin de un silogismo que tenga como pre-
misa mayor una proposicin del tipo de todo lo que tiene humo tiene fuego, cf. SEVILLA
RODRGUEZ, M., Sexto Emprico y los materialistas indios: el problema de la induccin: Archivum
XLIV-XLV 2 (1994-1995) 71-80.

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850 M. SEVILLA, LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA

como constituida por tomos, era posible rechazar la idea de la inmortalidad y


una vida ultraterrena.
En el mbito de la epistemologa, los cirenaicos y Epicuro destacaron por su
encendida defensa de la percepcin sensorial como nica fuente vlida para el
conocimiento. Y si los sentidos son la base del conocimiento y, por tanto, de los
datos de la experiencia a los que debemos atenernos en nuestra conducta, era
lgico que el fin tico de la misma, aquello a lo que debiramos ajustarnos, fuera
porporcionado tambin por los sentidos, esto es, el placer, como sensacin agra-
dable que de modo natural todos los seres vivos reconocen.
Para comparar los rasgos del pensamiento de los materialistas indios y grie-
gos seguiremos el criterio organizativo de dividir la filosofa en las tres partes
conocidas de lgica, fsica y tica, tal como es comn en la filosofa griega hele-
nstica.

4. EN EL MBITO DE LA LGICA O TEORA DEL CONOCIMIENTO

Veamos en primer lugar los textos de los materialistas indios 12:


(tata1 pravi^ati mah#moho vibhavata^ ca pariv#ra1 | ) 13
mah#moha1: sarvath# lok#yatam eva ^#stra8 yatra pratyak{am eva pram#<a8
(Entra entonces Granengao 14 y los acompaantes segn su rango)
Granengao: En cualquier caso el materialismo es la nica enseanza en la
que la evidencia es el nico modo de conocimiento

A continuacin de Sarvadar^anasa9graha of M#dhav#c#rya 15:


pratyak{aikapram#<av#ditay#num#n#de1 ana9g3k#re<a pr#m#<y#bh#v#t ||
... porque no hay saber probado [del alma], ya que rechazan la inferencia [y
los dems modos de conocimiento] y slo reconocen la evidencia como nico
modo de conocimiento.

Efectivamente, esto constitua un punto especial de ataque desde los otros


sistemas ortodoxos y heterodoxos indios: el rechazo del proceso silogstico si se

12
Citaremos en primer lugar textos snscritos de la obra dramtica Prabodhacandrodaya,
de Kr.s.n.a Misra, siglo XI, Segundo Acto.
13
Todos los textos que se citarn a continuacin, tanto snscritos como griegos, han sido
traducidos por el autor de este trabajo.
14
Granengao o Mahamoha es hijo de Manas, Pensamiento, y de Pravr. tti, Activi-
dad. Padre e hijo han sometido al padre y abuelo de ambos, Purus.a, el Hombre, por medio
de engaos, y como gran aliado de Mahamoha se encuentra Carvaka, el materialista, cf.
NAMBIAR: 4-5.
.
15
Edicin de COWELL, E. B. - GOUGH, A. E., Sarvadarsanasangraha of Madhavacarya, Trans-
lated by - and Edited by K. L. Joshi (Parimal Publications, Delhi, 1882 [reimpresin, 1986]).
El ttulo podra traducirse como Compendio de todos los sistemas: es una obra que recoge
las principales caractersticas de los sistemas de pensamiento indio y parece haber sido com-
puesta en el siglo XIV. En ella se dedica al pensamiento materialista indio un captulo, el pri-
mero, que aunque corto en extensin constituye un pequeo resumen de las ideas que debie-
ron haber conformado tal movimiento desde sus comienzos.

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M. SEVILLA, LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA 851

parte de una premisa universal justificada en la induccin como modo de cono-


cimiento.
Pues bien, entre los cirenaicos tambin son nicamente las sensaciones la
base del verdadero conocimiento. As, Aristipo de Cirene (circa 430-355 a.C.):
N"F< @?< @ 5LD0<"^6@ 6D4JZD4" ,<"4 J? BV20 6" :`<"
6"J"8":$V<,F2"4 6" *4VR,LFJ" JL(PV<,4< 16.
Dicen los cirenaicos que el criterio para conocer es lo que se experimenta,
que es lo nico que se conoce y que no engaa (Sexto Emprico, Contra los
matemticos, VII,191).

Y de estas afirmaciones de Teodoro el Ateo (circa 335-260 a.C.) se infiere con


toda probabilidad el mismo postulado cognoscitivo:
< *r 1,`*TD@H B"<JVBF4< <"4D< J?H B,D 2,< *`>"H 17.
Teodoro rechazaba por completo las opiniones convencionales sobre los dio-
ses (Digenes Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, II,97).
Deos... nullos esse omnino... et Theodorus Cyrenaicus putaverunt 18.
Teodoro el cirenaico pensaba que no exista dios alguno (Cicern, Sobre la
naturaleza de los dioses, I,1,2).

Epicuro (342/1-271/0 a.C.) elabora todo un complejo proceso para explicar cmo
se produce el conocimiento. Pero en la base estn igualmente las sensaciones:
I N,FJ06H *, JX8@H ?B48@(\.,F2"4 6" B?F"< J< ?<VD(,4"<s ?Nr ?<
J? *@>".`:,<" <V(@:,<q , * :Zs BV<J" 6D4F\"H 6" J"D"P0 yH FJ"4
:,FJVq + :VP BVF"4H J"H "F2ZF,F4<s @P >,4H @*r H NH "J<
*4,R,F2"4 BDH J\ B@4@b:,<@H J< <"(T(< 6D\<H 19.
Es necesario llegar a la conclusin de que la ltima referencia es lo que exis-
te y toda la evidencia a la que remitimos las cosas que opinamos. Si no, todo
estar lleno de confusin y desorden. Si rechazas todas las sensaciones no ten-
drs ni aquellas que te sirven de referencia para juzgar las que dices que son
falsas (Digenes Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, X,146) 20.

5. EN EL MBITO DE LA FSICA

Una vez ms la escueta cita al dar cuenta de la opinin materialista sobre el


mundo, tal como aparece reflejada en las fuentes, en primer lugar Prabodha-
candrodaya:

16
Texto griego citado de la edicin de GIANNANTONI, G., Socratis et socraticorum reliquiae,
II (Bibliopolis, Napoli, 1990), 93.
17
Texto griego citado de la edicin de HICKS, R. D., Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent
Philosophers, I (The Loeb Classical Library, London, 1925).
18
Texto latino citado de la edicin de AX, W., De natura deorum (B. G. Teubner, Stutt-
gart, 1933).
19
Texto griego citado de la edicin de HICKS, R. D., Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent
Philosophers, II (The Loeb Classical Library, London, 1925).
20
Vase tambin Lucrecio, Sobre la naturaleza de la realidad, IV, 478-499.

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852 M. SEVILLA, LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA

mah#moha1: p[thivyaptejov#yavas tattv#ni | bh t#ny eva cetayante | n#sti paraloka1


Granengao: los principios de la realidad son la tierra, el agua, el fuego y el
aire. nicamente los elementos [los cuatro antedichos] tienen conciencia. No
hay otro mundo.

A continuacin de Sarvadar^anasa9graha of M#dhav#c#rya:


tatra p[thivy#d3ni bh t#ni catv#ri tattv#ni | tebhya eva deh#k#rapari<atebhya1
ki<v#dibhya1 mada^aktivat caitanyam upaj#yate | vina{}e{u satsu svaya8 vina^yati |
tad #hu1 vij #naghana evaitebhyo bh tebhya1 samutth#ya t#ny ev#nuvina^yati | sa
na pretya sa8 j #st3ti | tac caitanyavi^i{}adeha ev#tm# | deh#tirikte #tmani
pram#<#bh#v#t |
En l 21 los principios de la realidad son los cuatro elementos: la tierra y los
dems. De ellos nicamente, desarrollados en la forma de un cuerpo, se ori-
gina como una consecuencia el pensamiento, como se origina la capacidad de
embriagar de los fermentos y otras cosas; cuando ellos 22 se destruyen l mismo
se destruye. Por eso dicen: Habiendo surgido de estos elementos la inteli-
gencia precisamente, con ellos precisamente se destruye; la inteligencia no es
consciencia tras la muerte. Por eso el alma es simplemente el cuerpo distin-
guido con el pensamiento. Porque no hay modo de conocer un alma aadida
a un cuerpo.

Y tambin en Prabodhacandrodaya:
yan n#sty eva tad asti vastv iti m[{# jalpadbhir ev#stikair
v#c#lair bahubhis tu satyavacaso nindy#1 k[t# n#stik#1 |
ha8 ho pa^yata tattvato yadi puna^ chinn#d ito var{ma<#8
d[{}a1 ki8 pari<#mar pitaciter j3va1 p[thak kair api || 17 ||
atra catv#ri bh t#ni bh miv#ryanal#nil#1 | caturbhya1 khalu bh tebhya^ caitan-
yam upaj#yate | ki<v#dibhya1 sametebhyo dravyebhyo mada^aktivat |
Los creyentes, muchos y charlatanes, que parlotean con falsedad que una
cosa que no existe, existe,
culpabilizan a los ateos, que dicen la verdad.
Oid, miradlo con realismo: si de nuevo se ha ido por la destruccin de los
cuerpos,
alguien ha visto un alma personal separadamente? [estrofa 17]
A este respecto hay cuatro elementos: tierra, agua, fuego y viento, de los cua-
tro elementos se origina como una consecuencia el pensamiento, como la capa-
cidad de embriagar [se origina] de sustancias reunidas, fermentos, etc..

El hombre no sera en ltimo trmino otra cosa que un agregado de los cua-
tro elementos primordiales, de los que, como un subproducto, surgira la facul-
tad de pensar. Llama la atencin el hecho de sealar como a los ltimos cons-
tituyentes de las cosas, los cuatro elementos: tierra, agua, fuego, aire, en
coincidencia con los FJ@4P," de Empdocles, de cuya mezcla las cosas surgen
y en su muerte a ellos vuelven 23.
21
El materialismo.
22
Los elementos.
23
DIELS, H. - KRANZ, W., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, I (Weidmannsche Verlag-

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M. SEVILLA, LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA 853

Los materialistas indios rechazan, pues, una entidad no corprea asociada


al pensamiento, lo que conocen sus oponentes como #tman o alma, sujeta a la
sucesiva transmigracin en los cuerpos.
Pues bien, entre los griegos, Epicuro plantea una opcin diferente en lo que
concierne a la realidad ltima de las cosas, ya que este filsofo, tras ser disc-
pulo de Nausfanes, a su vez discpulo de Demcrito, sigue la conocida teora
atmica de este ltimo 24. Epicuro intenta desvincular a los dioses de la con-
cepcin fsica del mundo; no niega que los dioses existan, como es, sin embar-
go, el caso en los postulados materialistas indios, sino que nada tienen que ver
con el mundo y con los hombres, pretendiendo as evitar los terrores que la
supersticin religiosa poda suscitar entre ellos. Segn Epicuro, los cuerpos
se componen de tomos y a su muerte vuelven a esas entidades ltimas. Pero
como otra sustancia real, con entidad propia, consideraba Epicuro al vaco o
espacio:
J B?< ?FJ4 Ff:"J" 6" 6,<`<
El todo es cuerpos y vaco (Digenes Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, X,39).
, * : < 6,<< 6" PfD"< 6" <"N0 y NbF4< <@:V.@:,<s @6 <
,P, J? Ff:"J" B@L < @* *4r @ ?64<,J@s 6"2VB,D N"\<,J"4 64<@b:,<"
Y si no existiera lo que llamamos vaco, espacio o naturaleza intangible, no
tendran los cuerpos dnde estar ni por dnde moverse tal como aparecen
movindose (Digenes Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, X,40).

Y aqu se encuentra un punto de coincidencia con los materialistas indios,


ya que en algunas de sus fuentes, tal como se ha indicado anteriormente, se
alude a un quinto elemento constitutivo de la realidad: el vaco o #k#^a 25. En una
obra de teatro en snscrito del siglo VII d.C., Bhagavadajjuka o La venerable
prostituta 26, tiene lugar un interesante dilogo en el que un discpulo pregun-
ta a su maestro acerca de conceptos religioso-filosficos centrales del hinduis-
mo. Adoptando una postura realista, empirista, el discpulo acosa al asceta con
sucesivas preguntas que acaban por arrinconarle y le empujan a hacer referen-
cia, incluso, al pensamiento de los lok yatas 27:
parivr#jaka1: laukikam abhihitam | yata^ ca bhedam upagat#n#8 satv#n#8 sth#n#ni
^r yante | ata eva8 br ma1 |

sbuchhandlung, Berlin, 1952), 287-288 [Lehre 28]: @J@H * J? :< FT:"J46? FJ@4P," B@4,
JXJJ"D", BD 6" XD" 6" *TD 6" (0y<, \*4" :< ?<J", B8Z2,4 * 6" 84(`J0J4 :,J"$V88@<J"
6"J? J< Fb(6D4F4< 6" *4V6D4F4<...
24
Vase CICERN, Sobre la naturaleza de los dioses, I,26,73; DIGENES LAERCIO, Vidas de fil-
sofos, X,8.
25
CHATTOPADHYAYA (1994): 266.
26
Vase Mattavilasa Prahasana, Edited and Translated by UNNI, N. P. (Nag Publishers, Delhi,
1998 [primera edicin de 1974]), 6-7; LOCKWOOD, M. - VISHNU BHAT, A., Metatheater and Sanskrit
Drama (Tambaram Research Associates, Madras, 1995), Part Two 3-9; Bhagavadajjukam in
K iya am, by PAULOSE, K. G. (New Bharatiya Book Corporation, Delhi, 2000), 95-106.
27
Tal es mi interpretacin, aunque este texto no ha sido sealado anteriormente, salvo
error, como una de las fuentes para el materialismo indio, cf. CHATTOPADHYAYA (1994).

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854 M. SEVILLA, LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA

] <*ilya1: sarva8 t#vat ti{}hatu | tva8 t#vat ka1 |


parivr#jaka1: ^[<u
khapavanasalil#n#8 tejasa^ caikade^#d upacitacalam rti1 p#rthivadravyar#^i1 |
^rava<anayanajihv#n#sik#spar^aved3nara iti k[tasa8 j a1 ko py aha8
pr#<idharm# || 9 ||
Asceta mendicante: Ese es el criterio mundano. Y por eso yo hablo as, por-
que se oyen tambin las opiniones de los que siguen la heterodoxia 28.
] *<*ilya 29: Quieto ah un momento!, quin eres t, entonces?
Asceta mendicante: Escucha:
El hombre es un cuerpo perecedero constituido por una parte de espacio, de
aire, de agua y de fuego, es un montn de sustancia terrenal,
y conoce por odo, ojo, lengua, nariz y tacto;
con esas seales soy alguien que pertenece a los seres vivos [estrofa 9].

Para Epicuro el alma, instalada en el cuerpo, es tambin cuerpo y, por tanto,


tambin se disuelve cuando se disuelve el cuerpo, deja, pues, de experimentar
sensaciones a travs de los sentidos, lo que justifica precisamente su caracteri-
zacin como cuerpo:
6" :< 6" 8L@:X<@L J@ 8@L 2D@\F:"J@H RLP *4"FB,\D,J"4 6"
@6XJ4 P,4 J?H "J?H *L<V:,4H @* 64<,J"4s FB,D @*r "F20F4<
6X6J0J"4
Cuando se disuelve todo el agregado en que consiste el cuerpo, el alma se dis-
persa y ya no tiene las mismas capacidades ni se mueve, perdiendo la sensa-
cin (Digenes Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, X,65).
J * 6,<< @J, B@40 yF"4 @J, B"2,< *b<"J"4s 88? 6\<0F4< :`<@< *4r
"LJ@ J@H Ff:"F4 B"DXP,J"4. FJ, @ 8X(@<J,H Ff:"J@< ,<"4 J< RLP<
:"J".@LF4<. @2< (?D < ?*b<"J@ B@4,< @J, BVFP,4<s , < J@4"bJ0
El vaco ni puede actuar ni puede ser objeto de actuacin, sino que nica-
mente permite moverse a los cuerpos a travs de l. Por eso los que dicen que
el alma es incorprea hablan sin sentido, pues ni podra actuar ni ser objeto
de actuacin si fuera as (Digenes Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, X,67).

6. EN EL MBITO DE LA TICA

Los materialistas indios establecen el placer como el fin al que debe aspirar
el hombre. Explcitamente consideraron el placer relacionado con el sexo y el
placer proporcionado por la riqueza. As aparece en las fuentes, no imparciales
tal como se indic anteriormente, ya que todas ellas son textos pertenecientes
al resto de las escuelas filosficas y religiosas, que tenan al materialismo como
enemigo comn.
Desconocemos, por tanto, si los materialistas elaboraron una teora del placer
que distinguiera con mayor precisin diferentes tipos de placer o alguna otra carac-
terizacin asociada a este fin tico. S parece en todo caso que admitieron como

28
Sin duda referencia a los lokayatas o materialistas.
29
Es el discpulo.

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M. SEVILLA, LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA 855

un balance por el que deba buscarse el placer aunque llevara aparejado algn
dolor, considerando implcitamente que tal dolor deba ser cuantitativamente
menor que el placer alcanzado. Por otra parte, tal como puede apreciarse, no plan-
tean un fin tico que tenga como referencia una vida ultraterrena. Rechazan la
existencia del alma, tal como se ha visto, y, por tanto, un mundo al que pudiera
acceder tras la muerte. Veamos los textos, primero en Prabodhacandrodaya:
Mah#moha1: (vicintya | sa^l#gham) arthak#mau puru{#rthau | m[tyur ev#pavarga1 |
tad etad asmad abhipr#y#nubandhin# v#caspatin# pra<3ya c#rv#k#ya samarpitam |
tena ca ^i{yopa^i{yadv#re<#smi8 l loke bahul3k[ta8 tantram |
Granengao: (despus de reflexionar, con jactancia) Los fines del hombre son
la riqueza y el deseo amoroso. La muerte es la nica liberacin final. Esto
mismo, tras haberlo establecido, fue transmitido por Vacaspati 30 a Carvaka,
asociado a mis intenciones. Y por Carvaka el sistema ha sido propagado en
este mundo por medio de sus discpulos y los discpulos de sus discpulos.

Y a continuacin en Sarvadar^anasa9graha:
pr#ye<a sarvapr#<inas t#vat
y#vaj j3va8 sukha8 j3ven n#sti m[tyor agocara1 |
bhasm3bh tasya dehasya punar #gamana8 kuta1 ||
iti lokag#th#m anurundh#n# n3tik#ma^#str#nus#re<a arthak#mau eva puru{#rthau
manyam#n#1 p#ralaukikam artham apahnuv#n#1 c#rv#kamatam anuvartam#n#
ev#nubh yante | a9gan#dy#li9gan#dijanya8 sukham eva puru{#rtha1 |
En general a todos los seres vivos se les ve seguir nicamente las ideas de
Carvaka, ya que rindindose a los versos populares:
Mientras hay vida, vive placenteramente:
nadie escapa a la muerte.
Reducido a cenizas tu cuerpo,
de dnde volver de nuevo?
consideran que los fines del hombre son nicamente la riqueza y el amor, segn
las enseanzas sobre la conducta y el deseo amoroso, y rechazan que exista
un fin relacionado con el otro mundo. El fin del hombre es nicamente el pla-
cer que resulta de los abrazos, etc., a las mujeres, etc..

Las enseanzas sobre la conducta y el amor son respectivamente n3ti^#stra y


k#ma^#stra, conjuntos de saberes dedicados a que el hind lleve a cabo de la
mejor manera posible dos de los tres fines en la vida de un brahmn: artha, o
logro de la prosperidad como seor de la casa, y k#ma, el conocimiento tcnico
especializado del sexo para la creacin de una familia numerosa; el tercer fin es
dharma, o cumplimiento de los deberes religiosos. Como es obvio, los materia-
listas slo tienen en cuenta los dos primeros.
Una referencia semejante se encuentra en Prabodhacandrodaya:
(tata1 pravi^ati c#rv#ka1 ^i{ya^ ca |)
c#rv#ka1: vatsa j#n#si da<*an3tir eva vidy# |atraiva v#rtt#ntarbhavati |

30
Seor de la Palabra, epteto especialmenre referido a Br.haspati, seor de la elocuen-
cia, preceptor de los dioses.

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856 M. SEVILLA, LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA

(entra entonces Carvaka y un discpulo)


Carvaka: Muchacho, lo sabes, la nica ciencia es la poltica; en esa nica cien-
cia se incluye la agricultura, ganadera y comercio 31.

Esto se vera corroborado por la cita que se hace de los materialistas en la


obra ms importante del artha^#stra o n3ti^#stra, el Kau il3ya Artha^#stra, donde
se indica 32:
v#rtt# da<*an3ti^ceti b#rhaspaty#1 | 4 | sa8 vara<am#tra8 hi tray3 lokay#tr#vida
iti | 5 |
La agricultura, ganadera y comercio, y la poltica [son las ciencias], segn
los seguidores de Br.haspati. 4. Pues los tres [Vedas] no son otra cosa que una
tapadera para el que entiende de las cosas del mundo.

A continuacin (Sarvadar^anasa9graha) rechazan los materialistas el argu-


mento de sus oponentes en contra del placer como fin tico, ya que segn ellos
todo placer llevara aparejado algn tipo de dolor:
na c#sya du1khasambhinnatay# puru{#rthatvam eva n#st3ti mantavyam | avarjan3yatay#
pr#ptasya du1khasya parih#re<a sukham#trasyaiva bhoktavyatv#t | tad yath# matsy#rth3
sa^alk#n saka<}ak#n matsy#n upadatte | sa y#vad #deya8 t#vad #d#ya nivartate | yath#
v# dh#ny#rth3 sapal#l#ni dh#ny#ny #harati | sa y#vad #deya8 t#vad #d#ya nivarta-
te | tasm#d du1khabhay#d n#nuk lavedan3ya8 sukham tyaktum ucitam | na hi m[g#1
sant3ti ^#layo nopyante | na hi bhik{uk#1 sant3ti sth#lyo n#bhi^r3yante | yadi ka^cid
bh3ru d[{}a8 sukha8 tyajet tarhi sa pa^uvat m rkho bhavet |
tad uktam
ty#jya8 sukha8 vi{ayasa9gama janma pu8 s#8
du1khopas[{}am iti m rkhavic#ra<ai{# |
vr3h3 jih#sati sitottamata<*ul#*hy#n
ko n#ma bhos tu{aka<opahit#n hit#rth3 ||
Y no debe pensarse: no es precisamente el fin del hombre ya que el placer
est unido al dolor. Porque hay que disfrutar enteramente del placer despre-
ciando el dolor que inevitablemente llega al encuentro. Eso es como el que
deseando pescado se ofrece pescados con escamas y espinas; habiendo toma-
do cuanto ha de tomar, lo deja. O como el que deseando granos de cereal coge
granos de cereal con la paja; habiendo tomado cuanto ha de tomar, lo deja.
Por ello no es adecuado renunciar al placer, que es sentido como favorable,
por miedo al dolor. Pues no deja de sembrarse arroz porque haya fieras. Ni
dejan de ponerse al fuego los pucheros porque haya mendigos. Si alguien renun-
ciara a un placer visible por cobarda sera tonto como un animal.
Por eso se ha dicho:

31
Hay cuatro vidyas o ciencias, 1. tray, el triple Veda; 2. anvks.ik, lgica y metafsica;
3. dan.d.anti, la ciencia de gobernar; 4. vartta, artes prcticas, tales como la agricultura, comer-
cio, medicina, etc.; cf. MONIER-WILLIAMS, M., A Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford, 1899) sub voce vidya.
32
The Kaut.ilya Arthasastra, Part I, Edited by KANGLE, R. P. (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi,
1969), 1.2.4-5.

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M. SEVILLA, LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA 857

El placer humano, nacido del contacto con los objetos de los sentidos,
debe ser rechazado
porque va acompaado de dolor, as reflexionan los tontos.
Quin, que busque su bienestar, quiere rechazar un arroz rico en granos
blanqusimos
porque estn mezclados con los desperdicios?

Si no hay alma ni un mundo ultraterreno y el fin tico es el placer que puede


disfrutarse en este mundo, qu puede decirse de la religin y sus administra-
dores, la casta sacerdotal de los brahmanes? La crtica que ejercen los materia-
listas sobre los brahmanes es demoledora e igualmente los argumentos ad ridi-
culum a que someten las prcticas religiosas de los sacrificios. Vemoslo
primeramente en Prabodhacandrodaya:
dh rtapral#pas tray3| svargotp#dakatvena vi^e{#bh#v#t | pa^ya
svarga1 kart[kriy#dravyavin#^e yadi yajvan#m |
tato d#v#gnidagdh#n#8 phala8 sy#d bh ri bh ruh#m || 19 ||
api ca
nihatasya pa^or yaj e svargapr#ptir yad3{yate |
svapit# yajam#nena ki8 nu kasm#n na hanyate || 20 ||
Los tres Vedas son una charla de tramposos y no tiene importancia el hecho
de que inventen el cielo. Mira:
Si el cielo es para los que ofrecen sacrificios por la destruccin
de la ofrenda a manos del oficiante,
habra mucho fruto entonces para los rboles quemados por el fuego
de un bosque?
y tambin:
Si se acepta la llegada al cielo del animal matado en el sacrificio,
por qu razn el que ofrece el sacrificio no mata a su propio padre?

Y a continuacin en Sarvadar^anasa9graha, donde un adversario objeta al


materialista la importancia de la casta sacerdotal, entregada desde antiguo a la
prctica prolija y costosa de los sacrificios, la ceremonia central del hinduismo:
nanu p#ralaukikasukh#bh#ve bahuvittavyaya^ar3r#y#sas#dhye gnihotr#dau
vidy#v[ddh#1 katha8 pravarti{yante | iti cet tad api na pram#<ako}i8 prave{}um 3{}e
| an[tavy#gh#tapunaruktado{air d {itatay# vaidikamanyair eva dh rtabakai1 paras-
para8 karmak#<*apr#m#<yav#dibhi1 j #nak#<*asya j #nak#<*apr#m#<yav#dibhi1
karmak#<*asya ca pratik{iptatvena trayy# dh rtapral#pam#tratvena agnihotr#de1
j3vik#m#traprayojanatv#t | tath# ca #bh#<aka1
agnihotra8 trayo ved#s trida<*a8 bhasmagu<}hanam |
buddhipauru{ah3n#n#8 j3viketi b[haspati1 ||
pa^u^ cen nihata1 svarga8 jyoti{}ome gami{yati |
svapit# yajam#nena tatra kasm#n na hi8 syate ||
m[t#n#m api jant n#8 ^r#ddha8 cet t[ptik#ra<am |
nirv#<asya prad3pasya sneha1 sa8 vardhayec chikh#m ||
gacchat#m iha jant n#8 vyartha8 p#theyakalpanam |
gehasthak[ta^r#ddhena pathi t[ptir av#rit# ||
svargasthit# yad# t[pti8 gaccheyus tatra d#nata1 |
pr#s#dasyoparisth#n#m atra kasm#n na d3yate ||

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858 M. SEVILLA, LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA

yadi gacchet para8 loka8 deh#d e{a vinirgata1 |


kasm#d bh yo na c#y#ti bandhusnehasam#kula1 ||
tata^ ca j3vanop#yo br#hma<air vihitas tv iha |
m[t#n#8 pretak#ry#<i na tv anyad vidyate kvacit ||
Pero entonces, si no hay placer en otro mundo, por qu hombres de avan-
zados conocimientos van a ocuparse del sacrificio a Agni y otros sacrificios,
que se llevan a cabo con esfuerzo corporal y gasto de mucho dinero?. Si se
objeta as, entonces ni siquiera merece la pena atender a la objeccin. Porque
el sacrificio a Agni y los dems sacrificios no tienen otro motivo que ser un
modo de vida, porque los tres Vedas no son otra cosa que charla de trampo-
sos a causa de la recproca oposicin entre los que prefieren la parte de la medi-
tacin en el Espritu y los seguidores de la parte de los ritos y ceremonias, tram-
posos e hipcritas todos ellos, que se piensan especialistas en los Vedas y tienen
los vicios de la falsedad, la contradiccin y la tautologa.
Y por eso los dichos:
El sacrificio a Agni, los tres Vedas, el triple control del asceta 33,
el cubrirse con cenizas,
es el modo de vida de los faltos de inteligencia y virilidad, as dice Br.haspati.
Si un animal matado en la ceremonia del Jyotis.t.oma 34 va al cielo,
por qu entonces el que ofrece el sacrificio no mata a su propio padre?
Adems, si la ceremonia del Sraddha 35 fuera causa de satisfaccin para las
personas muertas,
el aceite de una lmpara agotada hara crecer la llama.
Intil sera preparar provisiones para las personas que viajan por este mundo,
gracias a la ceremonia del Sraddha que hacen los que se quedan en casa,
la satisfaccin en el camino estara garantizada.
Si los muertos, que viven en el cielo, se sienten satisfechos all gracias
a las ofrendas,
por qu no se dan aqu a los que viven en la parte alta de un edificio elevado?
Si el que se libera del cuerpo va a otro mundo,
Por qu no vuelve ms, lleno de amor por sus parientes?
Y por ello los brahmanes han establecido como un medio de vida
en este mundo
los ritos obsequiosos con los muertos, pero no existe otra cosa ms all
de este mundo.

Hay un pasaje en la obra Prabodhacandrodaya en el que Granengao, defen-


diendo las tesis materialistas, llega incluso a atacar el orden social constituido
por las castas:
tulyatve vapu{#8 mukh#dyavayavair var<akrama1 k3d[^o
Habiendo igualdad de cuerpos en lo que respecta a los miembros, boca, etc.,
por qu el sistema de castas?

Pensamientos, palabras, actos.


33

Ceremonia religiosa con sacrificios.


34

35
Rito fnebre en honor y para beneficio de parientes muertos, a los que llegaran los
alimentos ofrendados en el sacrificio.

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M. SEVILLA, LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA 859

No parece que este dato se encuentre en ninguna otra fuente, por lo que debe-
ra ser tomado con cautela. Pero no resulta sorprendente que los materialistas,
opuestos a la religin y a la casta detentadora de su administracin, los brahma-
nes, llevaran su crtica racional a otros aspectos de la sociedad en la que vivan,
como el orden social establecido de las cuatro castas 36.
Dicho pasaje contina con un dato an ms sorprendente, si no ha de pen-
sarse en una exageracin adjudicada a los materialistas por el autor de la obra
dramtica:
yo{eya8 vasu c#parasya tad amu8 bheda8 na vidmo vayam |
hi8 s#y#m athav# yathe{}agamane str3<#8 parasvagrahe
k#ry#k#ryavic#ra<# hi yad ni{pauru{#1 kurvate || 18 ||
Esta mujer es de otro y esa riqueza es de otro, nosotros no entendemos
esa diferencia.
Pues dudan sobre lo que debe y no debe hacerse si hay dao,
o si ha de haber sexo a placer con mujeres
y coger los bienes de otro, los que no tienen virilidad.

Significa que los materialistas indios reclamaban una comunidad de las


mujeres y un reparto de la riqueza? Parece que sera demasiado inferir tal cosa
y resulta ms verosmil ver en ello la atribucin a los materialistas de una con-
ducta malvola que un creyente encontrara natural y consecuente con los otros
rasgos que caracterizaban a tales enemigos de la religin.
En cuanto a los materialistas griegos, el primero de los cirenaicos, Aristipo,
seal el placer como el supremo bien tico, pero en los datos que nos sumi-
nistran las fuentes podemos apreciar que l estableca una templanza o domi-
nio en su disfrute:
I? D4FJ" B,J\2,J@ J 2L("JD z!DZJs FL<"F6< "J< B,D@BJ46< J@
B8X@<@H ,<"4
Dio a su hija Arete la mejor enseanza, educndola para despreciar el exce-
so (Digenes Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, II,72).

O tambin, incidiendo como los materialistas indios en el placer ertico:


,F4f< B@J, ,H J"\D"H @6\"<s 6" J< F?< "J :,4D"6\T< J4<H
?DL2D4VF"<J@Hs @ J ,F,82,<s N0s P"8,B`<s 88? J : *b<"F2"4
?>,82,<.
Entrando una vez en casa de una prostituta y ruborizndose uno de los jve-
nes que iban con l, le dijo: No es lo incmodo entrar, sino no poder salir
(Digenes Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, II,69).
?PD0yJ@ 6" 7"*4 J J"\D BDH @?< J@?H :,:N@:X<@LH "J N0s
PT [7"*"]s 88r @6 P@:"4q ?B, J 6D"J,< 6" : JJ?F2"4 *@<<
D4FJ@<s @ J : PD0yF2"4.

36
La sociedad aparece dividida en las cuatro castas de los brahman.a o brahmanes, la
casta superior de los sacerdotes; los ks.atriya, la casta guerrera aristocrtica; los vaisya, hom-
bres libres agricultores y ganaderos, comerciantes, artesanos, etc.; y los sudra, la casta infe-
rior constituida por siervos de las otras tres.

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860 M. SEVILLA, LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA

Utilizaba [Aristipo] los servicios de la prostituta Laida... Y a los que se lo echa-


ban en cara l les deca: Yo la tengo, pero no soy tenido. Pues es mejor domi-
nar los placeres y no subordinarse a ellos, que dejar de servirse de ellos (Di-
genes Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, II,74-75).

Digenes Laercio nos transmite una ancdota acerca de cierto comporta-


miento suyo en la corte del tirano Dionisio 37:
)4@<LF\@L * BD@FBJbF"<J@H "J ?<XFP,J@. :,:R":X<@L * J4<@Hs ,J"
@ :< "{84,H, ,B,<s B@:X<@LF4 {D"\<,F2"4 J 2"8VJJs <" 6T&4<
20DVFTF4<q ?( * : <VFPT:"4 6DV:"J4 {D"<20 y<"4s <" &8X<<@< 8V&Tp
Soportaba que Dionisio le escupiera. Echndoselo en cara alguien, le dijo:
Segn eso, los pescadores aguantan las salpicaduras en el mar para pescar
un gobio, y yo no voy a soportar que me salpique un escupitajo de vino para
coger un blenio? 38 (Digenes Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, II,67).

Esta ancdota y los anteriores testimonios tienen cierto paralelismo con el


ejemplo que dan los materialistas indios para aceptar el placer como el fin lti-
mo, aunque para ello haya que aceptar un cierto grado de dolor, as, como ya
hemos visto anteriormente, en Sarvadar^anasa9graha:
tad yath# matsy#rth3 sa^alk#n saka<}ak#n matsy#n upadatte | sa y#vad #deya8 t#vad
#d#ya nivartate | yath# v# dh#ny#rth3 sapal#l#ni dh#ny#ny #harati | sa y#vad #deya8
t#vad #d#ya nivartate | tasm#d du1khabhay#d n#nuk lavedan3ya8 sukham tyaktum
ucitam | na hi m[g#1 sant3ti ^#layo nopyante | na hi bhik{uk#1 sant3ti sth#lyo n#bhi^r3yante
| yadi ka^cid bh3ru d[{}a8 sukha8 tyajet tarhi sa pa^uvat m rkho bhavet |
Eso es como el que deseando pescado se ofrece pescados con escamas y espi-
nas; habiendo tomado cuanto ha de tomar, lo deja. O como el que deseando
granos de cereal coge granos de cereal con la paja; habiendo tomado cuanto
ha de tomar, lo deja. Por ello no es adecuado renunciar al placer, que es sen-
tido como favorable, por miedo al dolor. Pues no deja de sembrarse arroz por-
que haya fieras. Ni dejan de ponerse al fuego los pucheros porque haya men-
digos. Si alguien renunciara a un placer visible por cobarda sera tonto como
un animal.

Y tambin:
tad uktam
ty#jya8 sukha8 vi{ayasa9gama janma pu8 s#8
du1khopas[{}am iti m rkhavic#ra<ai{# |
vr3h3 jih#sati sitottamata<*ul#*hy#n
ko n#ma bhos tu{aka<opahit#n hit#rth3 ||
Por eso se ha dicho:

Dionisio, tirano de Siracusa (circa 430-367 a.C.).


37

Pez semejante al gobio, pero que habita en charcas rocosas de la costa; cf. WENTWORTH
38

THOMPSON, D A., A Glossary of Greek Fishes (Oxford University Press, London, 1947), 32-33.
Por esta razn, muy probablemente, Aristipo se refiere a la mayor facilidad para cogerlo con
la comparacin aludida.

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M. SEVILLA, LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA 861

El placer humano, nacido del contacto con los objetos de los sentidos,
debe ser rechazado
porque va acompaado de dolor, as reflexionan los tontos.
Quin, que busque su bienestar, quiere rechazar un arroz rico en
granos blanqusimos
porque estn mezclados con los desperdicios?.

Sin embargo, los cirenaicos, a diferencia de Epicuro, consideran el placer


como activo y no como ausencia de dolor, lo que parece aproximarlos a los mate-
rialistas indios:
*@<< :X<J@4 J< J@ Ff:"J@Hs ?< 6" JX8@H ,<"4... @ J< 6"J"FJ0:"J46<
*@<< J< ?Bz <"4DXF,4 8(0*`<T< 6" @@< <@P80F\"<s ?< z+B\6@LD@H
B@*XP,J"4 6" JX8@H ,<"\ N0F4
Dicen que es sin duda el placer del cuerpo el que constituye el fin tico..., no
el placer esttico que se da al eliminar los dolores y es como una ausencia de
molestias, que es el placer que Epicuro acepta y dice que es el fin tico (Di-
genes Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, II,87).
* J@ 8(@b<J@H B,>"\D,F4Hs H ,D0J"4 B"Dzz+B46@bDs *@6, "J@H
: ,<"4 *@<Zq @* 0*@<\" 8(0*f<. ?< 64<ZF,4 (?D ,<"4 :N`J,D"s
: @F0H J0 yH B@<\"H J0 yH 0*@<\"H 64<ZF,THs ?B, B@<\" @@<,
6"2,b*@<J`H ?FJ4 6"JVFJ"F4H
La eliminacin de sentir dolor, tal como se indica en Epicuro, no les parece
que sea placer, ni dolor la ausencia de placer. Pues ambos se dan en movi-
miento y no son movimiento la ausencia de dolor o la ausencia de placer, pues-
to que la ausencia de dolor es el estado como de uno que duerme (Digenes
Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, II,89).

E igualmente en consonancia con los materialistas indios, a lo que parece


por las fuentes para estos ltimos, sostienen que es ms importante el placer
del cuerpo que el de la mente, lo que igualmente rechaza Epicuro:
B@8? :X<J@4 J< RLP46< J?H FT:"J46?H :,\<@LH ,<4s 6" J?H P8ZF,4H
P,\D@LH J"H FT:"J46VH
Dicen que los placeres del cuerpo son mucho mejores que los del alma, y que
son peores las molestias del cuerpo (Digenes Laercio, Vidas de filsofos,
II,90).

Otro punto de encuentro de los cirenaicos con los materialistas indios sera
el reconocimiento de que el placer es bueno con independencia de la accin o
conducta que lo posibilite. Recordemos a los materialistas indios:
yo{eya8 vasu c#parasya tad amu8 bheda8 na vidmo vayam |
hi8 s#y#m athav# yathe{}agamane str3<#8 parasvagrahe
k#ry#k#ryavic#ra<# hi yad ni{pauru{#1 kurvate || 18 ||
Esta mujer es de otro y esa riqueza es de otro, nosotros no entendemos
esa diferencia.
Pues dudan sobre lo que debe y no debe hacerse si hay dao,
o si ha de haber sexo a placer con mujeres
y coger los bienes de otro, los que no tienen virilidad.

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862 M. SEVILLA, LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA

Ya se ha indicado que tal vez haya de interpretarse como una exageracin


atribuida falsamente, como un intento de desprestigiar al oponente ateo por
parte del adversario religioso. Pero no deja de recordarse cuando se lee de los
cirenaicos:
,<"4 * J< *@<< ("2< 6< B J< FP0:@JVJT< (X<0J"4... , (?D
6" BDV>4H J@B@H ,0s 88z @?< *@< *4z "J< "D,J 6" ("2`<
Dicen que el placer es bueno aunque surja de lo ms vergonzoso... Pues inclu-
so si la accin fuera repugnante, el placer sera sin embargo apetecible por s
mismo y bueno (Digenes Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, II,88).

Y ms an cuando se lee acerca de actos como el robo y el adulterio segn


la concepcin del cirenaico Teodoro:
68XR,4< J, 6" :@4P,bF,4< 6" ,D@FL8ZF,4< ?< 6"4Dq :0*< (?D J@bJT<
NbF,4 "FPD< ,<"4s J0yH ?Bz "J@H *`>0H "D@:X<0Hs ? Fb(6,4J"4 <,6"
J0
yH J< ND`<T< FL<@P0
yH. N"<,DH * J@H ?DT:X<@4H <,L BVF0H N@DVF,TH
PDZF,F2"4 J< F@N`<
Robar, cometer adulterio, cometer sacrilegio, cuando se presente la ocasin.
Pues nada de esto es vergonzoso por naturaleza, una vez que sobre tales cosas
se elimina la opinin que conviene para la contencin de los insensatos. El
sabio tendr amantes abiertamente, sin ocultamiento alguno (Digenes Laer-
cio, Vidas de filsofos, II,99).

Epicuro tiene algo que decir tambin al respecto, coincidiendo en que nin-
guna clase de placer es en s mismo malo, pero s evitable por el posible dolor
que acarrea:
?*,:\" *@< 6"2z "LJ 6"6<q 88? J? J4<< *@<< B@40J46?
B@88"B8"F\@LH ?B4NXD,4 J?H P8ZF,4H J< *@<<
Ningn placer es malo por s mismo, pero las causas productivas de algunos
placeres ocasionan molestias mucho ms grandes que los placeres (Digenes
Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, X,141).

Por su parte Epicuro, como es bien sabido, considera tambin el placer como
el fin tico:
J`J, (?D *@<0 yH PD,\"< P@:,<s J"< ?6 J@ : B"D,<"4 J< *@<<
8(:,<q J"< * : 8(:,<s @6XJ4 J0
yH *@<0
yH *,`:,2". 6" *4? J@J@
J< *@<< DP< 6" JX8@H 8X(@:,< ,<"4 J@ :"6"D\TH .0
y<q J"bJ0< (?D
("2< BDJ@< 6" FL((,<46< (T:,<s 6" B J"bJ0H 6"J"DP`:,2"
BVF0H "DXF,TH 6" NL(0 yH 6" ?B J"bJ0< 6"J"<J:,< H 6"<`<4 J
BV2,4 B?< ("2< 6D\<@<J,H
Sentimos necesidad del placer cuando nos dolemos por no tener placer y cuan-
do no nos dolemos ya no sentimos necesidad del placer. Y por ello decimos que
el placer es principio y fin de una vida feliz. En efecto, hemos reconocido al pla-
cer como el bien primero y congnito; por l nos guiamos para toda eleccin y
rechazo y a l volvemos cuando juzgamos todo bien tomando como referencia
lo que sentimos (Digenes Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, X,128-129).

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M. SEVILLA, LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA 863

Al igual que ya sus antecesores, los cirenaicos, considera tambin que la feli-
cidad, sin embargo, se obtiene con un clculo del placer:
6" ?B, BDJ@< ("2< J@J@ 6" Fb:NLJ@<s *4? J@J@ 6" @ B?F"<
*@<< "D@b:,2"s 88z FJ4< J, B@88?H *@<?H B,D$"\<@:,<s J"<
B8,@< :< J *LFP,DH ?6 J@bJT< B0J"4q 6" B@88?H 8(0*`<"H *@<<
6D,\JJ@LH <@:\.@:,<s ?B,4*?< :,\.T< :< *@< B"D"6@8@L2 B@8?< PD`<@<
B@:,\<"F4 J?H 8(0*`<"H
Y puesto que el placer es el bien primero y congnito, no elegimos en conse-
cuencia cualquier placer, sino que algunas veces dejamos a un lado muchos
placeres, cuando de stos sigue mayor molestia para nosotros. Y pensamos
que muchos dolores son mejores que placeres, cuando nos acompaa un pla-
cer ms grande tras haber resistido mucho tiempo los dolores (Digenes Laer-
cio, Vidas de filsofos, X,129).

Y llega a una elaboracin ms detallada de las clases de placer:


J"< @?< 8X(T:,< *@<< JX8@H BVDP,4<s @ J?H J< FfJT< *@<?H 6"
J?H ?< B@8"bF,4 6,4:X<"H 8X(@:,<s H J4<,H (<@@<J,H 6" @P
:@8@(@<J,H 6"6H ?6*,P`:,<@4 <@:\.@LF4<s 88? J :ZJ, 8(,< 6"J?
F:" :ZJ, J"DVJJ,F2"4 6"J? RLPZ<. @ (?D B`J@4 6" 6:@4 FL<,\D@<J,H
@*z B@8"bF,4H B"\*T< 6" (L<"46< @*z P2bT< 6" J< 88T<s F"
NXD,4 B@8LJ,8H JDVB,."s J< *?< (,<< $\@<s 88? <ZNT< 8@(4F:H 6"
J?H "J\"H ?>,D,L<< BVF0H "DXF,TH 6" NL(0yH 6" J?H *`>"H ?>,8"b<T<
?> < B8,FJ@H J?H RLP?H 6"J"8":$V<,4 2`DL$@H
Cuando decimos que el placer es el fin tico, no decimos los placeres de los
disolutos ni los que consisten solamente en la actividad de disfrutar, como pien-
san algunos que no nos conocen, que no estn de acuerdo con nosotros o que
no nos entienden, sino que hablamos de no padecer dolor en el cuerpo ni per-
turbaciones en el alma. Pues ni bebidas ni fiestas continuas, ni disfrutar de
muchachos, mujeres, peces y otras cosas que ofrece una mesa bien dispuesta,
hacen la vida agradable, sino un clculo sensato que examine las causas de toda
eleccin y rechazo y que elimine las opiniones por las que la mayor confusin
se apodera de las almas (Digenes Laercio, Vidas de filsofos, X,131-132).

7. CONCLUSIONES

I) Ambos materialismos aceptan las sensaciones como la base del conoci-


miento, pero el materialismo indio rechaza la induccin expresamente, lo que
no es el caso en el materialismo griego.
II) Este postulado epistemolgico en que coinciden hace que ambos recha-
cen la existencia de los dioses y de un mundo ultraterreno, aunque Epicuro
admite que puedan existir de un modo que en nada afectara al mundo de los
hombres.
III) Los ltimos constituyentes de la realidad seran los cuatro elementos,
en lo que coinciden los materialistas indios con Empdocles, pero Epicuro sigue
la teora atmica de Demcrito. Tanto Epicuro como los materialistas indios
consideran el alma como un producto o agregado perecedero de tales ltimos
constituyentes de la realidad, los cuatro elementos o los tomos. El vaco o espa-

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864 M. SEVILLA, LOS ORGENES DEL MATERIALISMO EN INDIA Y GRECIA

cio como necesario para la existencia de los seres es otro punto de coincidencia
entre el filsofo griego y una corriente dentro del materialismo indio.
IV) El fin tico es el placer, tanto en unos como en otros. Todos conside-
ran ms o menos explcitamente que la vida feliz debe consistir en la eleccin
del placer siempre que ste no sea superado por un dolor que lleve aparejado
como consecuencia. Entre los materialistas griegos hay un anlisis de los dife-
rentes tipos de placer que no se encuentra en los materialistas indios. Y a su vez
en stos se encuentra una crtica al sistema social y religioso establecido que no
encuentra parangn en los materialistas griegos.

Universidad de Oviedo MARTN SEVILLA RODRGUEZ


Departamento de Filologa Clsica y Romnica
33011 Oviedo
msevilla@uniovi.es

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

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14_AlfonsoGOMEZ.qxd:Maqueta.qxd 26/6/08 12:03 Pgina 865

NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTICA DEL ORIGEN


CONDICIONADO
ALFONSO GMEZ FERNNDEZ
IES Juan Carlos I, Madrid

RESUMEN: La finalidad de este artculo es exponer el concepto de origen condicionado (pratitya-samut-


pada) en el pensamiento de Nagarjuna. Tal concepto es el fundamento de su doctrina de la vacuidad,
segn la cual todo cuanto hay es vaco, insustancial y carente de naturaleza propia, precisamente por
tener un origen dependiente. De este modo, Nagarjuna destruye las alternativas filosficas tradiciona-
les (basadas en conceptos excluyentes) al mostrar que tanto la afirmacin como la negacin unilate-
rales de las mismas son igualmente inconsistentes. No se trata, con ello, de acceder a un escepticis-
mo que se abstenga de todo juicio, ni tampoco de proponer un nihilismo filosfico. Ms bien, estamos
ante la afirmacin de la interdependencia insustancial de todos los fenmenos como realidad funda-
mental. Una sutil forma de realidad, que se sita en el terreno intermedio entre el ser y el no ser, en el
marco de una metafsica relacional y dialctica.
PALABRAS CLAVE: vacuidad, espacio, movimiento, insustancial, realidad, escepticismo, nihilismo.

Nagarjuna and the dialectic of conditioned origin


ABSTRACT: The aim of this article is to expound the concept of conditioned origin (pratitya-samutpada)
in the thought of Nagarjuna. This concept is the basis of his doctrine about vacuity, according to which
all the things that exist are empty, insubstantial and lacking in their own nature, just because they have
a dependent origin. So Nagarjuna destroys the traditional philosophical alternatives (based on excluding
concepts) showing that the statement and the negation of these ideas are likewise flimsy. It is neither
about the scepticism that abstains from every statement, nor about the philosophical nihilism. We are
rather before the assertion that the fundamental reality is the insubstantial interdependence of all the
phenomena. This is a subtle form of reality, the one between being and non-being, in the context of a
relational and dialectic metaphysics.
KEY WORDS: vacuity, space, movement, insubstantial, reality, scepticism, nihilism.

Es una labor ciertamente gratificante dedicar un artculo a intentar exponer


y hacer inteligible la obra de este gran pensador budista, pese a las considera-
bles dificultades que tal empresa supone. El primero que debe aclarar su mente
es justo el autor de semejante empeo, pues se enfrenta a unos textos difciles
y paradjicos, en apariencia, incluso, contradictorios. Nagarjuna escriba en un
estilo conciso y lapidario, cercano al aforismo y no exento de un hlito potico.
Sus breves estrofas son, sin embargo, de una inusitada densidad semntica:
estn llenas de ideas apenas esbozadas o sugeridas que, una vez entrevistas, lan-
zan la mente del lector a un ya imparable viaje en busca de desentraar su sen-
tido. Quien emprende este viaje, si tiene la fuerza de nimo para continuarlo un
buen trecho (no ya para terminarlo, pues seguramente es inacabable) no ser
ya el mismo que lo inici, su manera de mirar el mundo, probablemente, habr
cambiado, hacindose ms sutil y profunda.
Destacar la relevancia de Nagarjuna no es tarea difcil. Es el fundador de la
denominada escuela de la va media o madhyamaka, una de las corrientes ms

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866 A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO

importantes del budismo. El impacto de sus ideas en el desarrollo de esta reli-


gin ha sido inmenso: comentarios y citas de su obra encontramos en multitud
de tratados en la literatura filosfica y religiosa de la India, Tbet, China, Corea
y Japn. Durante casi dos mil aos los estudiosos se han dedicado a interpretar
la obra de este filsofo prolijo. La denominada escuela de la va media supu-
so el origen del mahayana (o gran vehculo) que, como es sabido, es una de
las dos grandes tradiciones o corrientes del budismo (junto al ms primitivo
hinayana o pequeo vehculo). Estamos, pues, ante un pensador que inicia
una nueva etapa en la historia del budismo, en cierto modo, ante un revolucio-
nario en el mundo de las ideas. Su obra, por tanto, ha tenido una influencia con-
siderable en el pensamiento de buena parte de Asia.
Los expertos suelen situar su nacimiento cerca de Amaravati, en el sur de la
India, entre los aos 150 y 250 d.C., de modo que podemos suponer que vivi
entre los siglos segundo y tercero de nuestra era. Y, no obstante, ignoramos casi
todo acerca de su vida. Su perfil se dibuja con los trazos de la leyenda (de la que
tanto gusta la literatura oriental y, en particular, la de la India) que le atribuye
poderes sobrenaturales (como hacerse invisible para introducirse en un palacio
y seducir a las doncellas, durante su juventud, antes de su conversin al budis-
mo). La tradicin tibetana le identifica como una especie de mago y alquimista.
En general, todas estas versiones hagiogrficas destacan sus cualidades notables
y su inteligencia. Lo que s parece cierto es que Nagarjuna fue monje y filsofo,
conoci la vida monstica y escribi una prolfica obra que deja entrever la pro-
fundidad de sus conocimientos: desde el abhidharma budista hasta la lgica y los
mtodos dialcticos de defensa y refutacin de argumentos filosficos, as como,
muy probablemente, las diferentes darsanas del hinduismo. Cierta tradicin quie-
re situarlo como rector de la famosa universidad budista de Nalanda, y vence-
dor en muchos de los innumerables torneos filosficos que all tenan lugar.
Tal es la destreza que se supone haba alcanzado en el manejo de las armas dia-
lcticas. En cualquier caso, y dejando de la lado la polmica (en buena medida
estril) sobre si la sabidura oriental debe ser considerada realmente filosofa,
lo que hoy poseemos de l es un conjunto de textos que llevan su nombre y que,
sin duda, por la riqueza de sus ideas constituyen un material valiossimo para
cualquier filsofo formado en la tradicin occidental. De todos ellos destaca, por
su concisin y profundidad, el denominado Los fundamentos de la va media. En
l encontramos una doctrina filosfica comparable por su rigor lgico, su capa-
cidad crtica y su intuicin gnoseolgica y metafsica, a los principales monu-
mentos de la filosofa occidental. Afortunadamente, disponemos de una recien-
te y excelente traduccin al castellano de esta notable obra en edicin bilinge 1,
de la que me he servido para preparar este trabajo.
El propsito de este breve ensayo es explicar el pensamiento de Nagarjuna
como un tipo de planteamiento dialctico que gira en torno de su nocin cen-

1
NAGARJUNA, Fundamentos de la va media, introduccin, notas y traduccin del snscri-
to de Juan Arnau Navarro, Ediciones Siruela, Madrid, 2004. Los datos y leyendas sobre la vida
de Nagarjuna los hemos tomado de la introduccin a esta obra.

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tral de origen condicionado. Se trata de una dialctica peculiar, que se ubica


en el marco ideolgico del budismo, que impregna su finalidad y el sentido de
muchos de sus conceptos. Razn por la cual deben interpretarse en clave budis-
ta muchas de sus enigmticas afirmaciones, lo que ayuda frecuentemente a acla-
rar su sentido. Este contexto de la sabidura oriental es, por supuesto, muy dis-
tinto de aqul que dio origen a la filosofa occidental en la matriz cultural de
la Hlade. Si el lenguaje y los conceptos no son los mismos en la tradicin sns-
crita y en la griega, tampoco lo es la finalidad primaria de la reflexin: la meta
religiosa-liberadora propia de la sabidura oriental, aunque en cierto modo no
deje de estar presenta en el pensamiento griego (al menos en algunas de sus
corrientes y de sus autores, como los pitagricos, las escuelas morales post-ris-
totlicas o el neoplatonismo) cede en ste el primer rango al ideal del conoci-
miento teortico. Y el nfasis en este ideal es particularmente intenso en los pe-
rodos inicial y clsico, aquellos que vieron el origen y desarrollo de la dialctica
griega. Sin embargo, para un filsofo formado en el pensamiento europeo siem-
pre ser especialmente interesante poder relacionar a un pensador oriental (ya
sea por similitudes o por diferencias) con los autores y escuelas, que l conoce
mucho mejor, de la filosofa occidental. Por ello intentar, cuando ello sea posi-
ble, buscar referentes occidentales que puedan representar algn aspecto (por
accin o por reaccin) del pensamiento de Nagarjuna.
Y el principal de estos referentes, a mi juicio, es justo la idea de dialctica.
Los fundamentos de la va media destacan por la importancia que en ellos encie-
rra la idea de negacin. Fundamentalmente, se trata de una negacin entendi-
da como contradiccin de las propias teoras filosficas, muchas de las cuales
se presentan, en principio, como alternativas exhaustivas a un problema. Pero,
adems, se trata de la negacin entendida como vaco, ese concepto fundamental
en el pensamiento budista y tan ntimamente relacionado con el origen condi-
cionado en Nagarjuna. Esta presencia dialctica de la negacin (frecuentemen-
te utilizada para reducir al absurdo doctrinas filosficas) nos conduce, de un
modo casi natural, a buscar su confrontacin con la dialctica de la filosofa
occidental. Por eso, el primer apartado de este trabajo es justo una breve expo-
sicin de algunas concepciones occidentales de la dialctica. A continuacin
intentar situar el pensamiento de Nagarjuna en el contexto de lo que podramos
denominar las doctrinas o filosofas del vaco que empapan el pensamiento
oriental (bsicamente, los budismos hinayana y mahayana, y el taosmo). Slo
entonces podremos adentrarnos en el concepto de origen condicionado o pra-
titya-samutpada, verdadero ncleo conceptual de la filosofa de Nagarjuna, y
en la peculiar doctrina de la relatividad universal (ella misma relativa o limita-
da) que implica. Finalmente, estar en condiciones de examinar la dialctica de
Nagarjuna y comprender su originalidad respecto de otras concepciones (stas
occidentales) de la dialctica. Todo lo cual puede servir para comprender mejor
(incluso desde nuestros propios patrones culturales) la obra de este gran pen-
sador indio, que ha sido llamado el Hegel budista.

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868 A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO

1. ALGUNAS CONCEPCIONES DE LA DIALCTICA

El trmino dialctica se ha usado con muchos y diferentes sentidos a lo


largo de la historia de la filosofa occidental. Por ello, es particularmente difcil
encontrar un denominador comn a todos ellos. De este modo, ya Raymond
Ruyer mantena, a principios de los aos sesenta 2, que el vocablo dialctica
no designa nada preciso, pues con l se llaman muy diversas cosas: incompati-
bilidad entre dos sistemas, oscilaciones de la realidad, principios que designan
oposiciones, negaciones de negaciones, etc. En cualquier caso, en el contex-
to de la filosofa griega la dialctica apareci como una tcnica (la clebre dia-
lekt tekn) centrada en el arte del dilogo (caracterizado por la exposicin de
opiniones contrapuestas), y relacionada con el empleo de argumentos de tipo
modus tollens (con objeto de refutar o llevar al absurdo doctrinas contrarias a
aqulla que uno quiere mantener). En este sentido, Parmnides emplea en su
poema el modus tollens para mostrar que el ser no cambia (ms an, no puede
cambiar, pues ello sera contradictorio) y es uno (pues sera igualmente con-
tradictorio que hubiera mltiples seres o entes). Siguiendo la estela de Parm-
nides, su discpulo, Zenn de Elea, utilizar razonamientos dialcticos (las cle-
bres aporas de Aquiles y la tortuga, del estadio y de la flecha) para refutar que
el movimiento afecte realmente al ser.
No obstante, el primer autor con quien se institucionaliza la dialctica como
tal es, obviamente, Platn. Podramos decir que, con Platn, la dialctica adquie-
re carta de naturaleza, y ello lo hace, al menos, de dos formas que se corres-
ponden aproximadamente con etapas de su pensamiento 3. Tenemos, en primer
lugar, la dialctica como mtodo de ascenso de lo sensible a lo inteligible (tal
como aparece en el Fedn, en el Fedro, en algunas partes de la Repblica y, en
general, en los primeros dilogos). En estos textos la dialctica aparece como
un dilogo que revela las ideas innatas 4 y que, con ello, conducir a la doc-
trina metafsica de los dos mundos y a facilitar el paso del alma desde las cosas
sensibles hasta sus Formas o Modelos. De este modo, la dialctica es un mto-
do, esto es, un camino, un procedimiento para descubrir las Formas y acceder
a ellas, un procedimiento que utilizar la divisin y la composicin. Pero no es
ste slo el significado que la dialctica revisti para Platn. Tenemos, en segun-
do lugar, una concepcin que va cristalizando, y paulatinamente cobrando un
mayor peso, en sus dilogos de madurez (como el Sofista y el Parmnides). Se

2
RAYMOND RUYER, Revue de Metaphysique et Morale, vol. 66, 1961, pp. 1-34.
3
Vase JOS FERRATER MORA, Diccionario de Filosofa, Editorial Alianza, Madrid, 1984.
Voz Dialctica, p. 797.
4
Naturalmente, este trmino resulta extemporneo aplicado a Platn. Como es sabido,
toda la terminologa de las ideas innatas (y el problema de su existencia) procede de la filo-
sofa moderna en el contexto de la polmica entre racionalismo y empirismo. No obstante, la
concepcin de unas ideas que son patrimonio del alma y que no proceden de la experiencia a
travs de los sentidos, est plenamente presente en Platn y, de hecho, constituye la raz fun-
damental de su teora de las ideas. A falta de otro adjetivo para designar con una sola palabra
esta idea, utilizo innato entrecomillado.

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A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO 869

trata de la dialctica como deduccin racional para discriminar las ideas, para
distinguir unas de otras y para establecer sus relaciones. Dado que en la filoso-
fa de Platn las ideas constituyen la autntica realidad, la dialctica accede as
al rango de ciencia de la realidad en cuanto tal. Tenemos, pues, dos ideas de la
dialctica en Platn. La dialctica como mtodo y la dialctica como ciencia de
la realidad.
Si pasamos a Aristteles, tambin encontramos dos sentidos da la dialcti-
ca 5, que coinciden, ambos, en degradarla del elevado pedestal en el que Platn
la haba situado. En primer lugar, para Aristteles, la dialctica es una forma
no demostrativa de conocimiento, un conocimiento basado en un razonamien-
to meramente inductivo o probable. Frente al conocimiento universal y nece-
sario, verdaderamente cientfico, aparece una segunda forma de conocimiento,
inferior con relacin a aqul: el conocimiento dialctico, que tendr sentido en
aquellos campos en el que el primero no sea posible. Pero, en segundo lugar, la
dialctica adquiere un sentido decididamente peyorativo en algunos pasajes de
la obra de Aristteles: se trata ahora de un saber no meramente probable, sino
de lo aparentemente tomado como real; esto es, de un pseudo-saber, como es el
caso del razonamiento erstico cuyas premisas no son probables, sino que sola-
mente lo parecen, siendo, en realidad, falsas. Tenemos, pues, dos sentidos de la
dialctica en Aristteles: la dialctica como saber probable y la dialctica como
falso saber.
Dejando a un lado los debates escolsticos acerca de la dialctica, presididos
en gran parte por las ideas aristotlicas, el siguiente autor que nos interesa par-
ticularmente es Kant. Con l se inicia una concepcin de la dialctica como saber
eminentemente crtico (y no slo un pseudo-saber). Tal es, como veremos, la
idea kantiana de la dialctica trascendental. Pero tambin en Kant cabe distin-
guir, al menos, dos sentidos de la dialctica 6. Dialctica es, en primer lugar, para
Kant, la lgica general (se trata de un sentido menos conocido que el citado
antes, pero presente tambin en la obra de Kant). Como afirma el filsofo de
Knigsberg, la lgica general en cuanto rgano, es una lgica de la apariencia,
una lgica dialctica, pues nada ensea sobre el contenido del conocimiento y
slo se limita a exponer las condiciones formales de la conformidad del cono-
cimiento con el entendimiento (KrV B86). En segundo lugar, naturalmente,
tenemos la Dialctica trascendental, esto es, la crtica del tipo de apariencias
que no proceden de la lgica ni de la experiencia, sino de la razn en tanto inten-
ta traspasar los lmites impuestos por la esttica y la analtica trascendentales
a la experiencia posible. En tales casos, la razn intenta conocer por s sola y
segn sus propios principios, el mundo, el alma y Dios, cayendo inevitablemente
en errores e ilusiones. De este modo, la dialctica trascendental es, al mismo
tiempo, la crtica de un pseudo-saber (al mostrar las contradicciones que encie-
rra el intento de la razn pura) y un saber crtico (en tanto explica que estas con-

5
J. FERRATER MORA, op. cit., p. 797.
6
Para esta distincin, vase J. F. MORA, op. cit., p. 799.

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870 A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO

tradicciones se deben al intento ilegtimo de traspasar los lmites del conoci-


miento, que vienen marcados por los de toda experiencia posible. La razn pura
cae en contradicciones porque piensa sin referir sus conceptos a intuiciones,
frente al verdadero conocimiento que es una sntesis entre el entendimiento y
la experiencia). Tenemos, pues, la dialctica como lgica general, lgica formal
de la apariencia, y la dialctica trascendental como crtica de las apariencias ilu-
sorias de conocimiento, propias de la razn pura.
Si pasamos de Kant al idealismo alemn se hace mucho ms difcil precisar
los mltiples significados del trmino dialctica. En Fichte la dialctica es el
despliegue infinito del Yo frente a un No-Yo que se le opone. Estamos ante un ide-
alismo moral, una tarea inacabada e inacabable, que es expresin de la libertad
del Yo como fundamento de la posicin de toda realidad, pero que exige siempre
(para su propia accin) un obstculo que le haga frente y le resista. De ah la dia-
lctica constitutiva entre el Yo y el No-Yo, la presencia ineliminable de la nega-
cin. Esta dialctica subjetiva se transforma en objetiva con Schelling: ahora es
una dialctica de la naturaleza, comprendida desde las categoras del idealismo
objetivo a partir de la indiferencia entre sujeto y objeto. En Hegel, finalmente, se
hacen manifiestas las insuficiencias del idealismo tanto subjetivo como objetivo.
Ambos resultarn igualmente unilaterales y parciales para Hegel. No es posible
dar una nica definicin de lo que significa dialctica en la obra hegeliana, pues
la riqueza semntica y la diversidad de contextos en que utiliza el trmino lo impi-
den. Podemos, no obstante decir, que para Hegel lo dialctico es lo opuesto a lo
abstracto. La abstraccin es la realidad muerta y vaca de su propia substancia;
ahora bien, para evitar esta consecuencia es necesario que lo real aparezca bajo
un aspecto tal que se niegue a s mismo: tal es el aspecto dialctico. Por eso la dia-
lctica es el momento negativo de toda realidad. Slo mediante la negacin adquie-
re la realidad su verdadero carcter concreto (recurdese el dictum spinoziano:
omnis determinatio est negatio). La dialctica es, en definitiva, lo que hace posi-
ble el despliegue y, con ello, la maduracin y realizacin de la realidad. Desde esta
perspectiva, la dialctica es tanto un mtodo de conocimiento como el orden
mismo de la realidad. De hecho, mtodo y sistema no pueden entenderse separa-
damente en el pensamiento hegeliano. As, la dialctica tiene en Hegel un neto
carcter ontolgico, como observa Ferrater Mora 7: No es que Hegel sea parti-
dario de la dialctica porque tienda a ver la realidad desde el punto de vista del
movimiento, sino que aspira a ver la realidad desde el punto de vista del movi-
miento porque slo ste le permitir verdaderamente realizarla. Lo que interesa
a Hegel es la realidad realizada y no slo el movimiento dialctico que la reali-
za. Por eso, en la base de la dialctica de Hegel hay una ontologa de lo real, y
adems una ontologa basada en una voluntad de salvacin de la realidad misma
en lo que tenga de real, es decir, de positivo-racional o especulativa.
Con Engels la dialctica es, ante todo, dialctica de la naturaleza, pero no
ya expresada con las categoras del idealismo objetivo de Schelling, sino en clave

7
J. FERRATER MORA, op. cit., p. 800.

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decididamente materialista. La dialctica no es la plasmacin externa de una


actividad espiritual, sino el desarrollo, inequvocamente material, del propio
acontecer natural, en virtud de las tres clebres leyes: del paso de la cantidad a
la cualidad, de la interpenetracin de los opuestos y de la negacin de la nega-
cin. Dentro tambin del contexto del marxismo, pero desde una ptica dife-
rente, encontramos la dialctica negativa de Adorno. Este autor concibe la dia-
lctica en un sentido eminentemente crtico como la negacin de todas las
posiciones filosficas adoptadas y tambin de las adoptables 8. As, todo con-
tenido que abarque la dialctica ha de ser un contenido abierto, llegando inclu-
so (para evitar que hasta la propia dialctica negativa pueda conducir a una
metafsica dogmtica) a permitir que se vuelva contra s misma.
Sin nimo de ser exhaustivo, he citado algunas concepciones de la dialcti-
ca. De su rpido examen se sigue que no es posible dar una definicin univer-
sal, vlida para todas las concepciones de la dialctica que histricamente se
han propuesto. No obstante, hay una serie de caractersticas que, entremez-
clndose y solapndose al modo de los juegos del lenguaje de Wittgenstein, pue-
den describir las concepciones dialcticas. No todas estas caractersticas estn
simultneamente presentes en cada una de las doctrinas dialcticas, pero stas
contienen (cada una segn su propia y diferente seleccin) algunas de ellas.
Tales caractersticas podran ser: papel central de la negacin y an de la con-
tradiccin, insistencia en el dinamismo de la realidad, importancia del movi-
miento y del cambio, ley de la transicin de la cantidad en la cualidad, empleo
sistemtico de la reduccin al absurdo y de argumentos de tipo modus ponens,
actitud crtica ante las abstracciones del entendimiento, crtica de las posicio-
nes filosficas unilaterales, etc. Las concepciones analizadas tienen sus pecu-
liaridades propias, sus maneras especficas de entender la dialctica. Podramos
decir que encarnan, al menos, estos cuatro tipos de concepciones de la dialc-
tica: metodolgica (la primera de Platn, la primera de Aristteles, la primera
de Kant), ontolgica (la segunda de Platn y todas las del idealismo alemn),
materialista (la de Engels) y crtica-negativa (la segunda de Kant y la de Ador-
no). Algunos de los sentidos o concepciones de la dialctica estudiadas abarca-
ran ms de una categora: as, la dialctica hegeliana es simultneamente un
mtodo y un sistema ontolgico e, incluso, encierra un momento crtico-nega-
tivo, sin perjuicio de su culminacin definitiva en la afirmacin positivo-espe-
culativa de la Idea Absoluta. En cualquier caso, destacar que la dialctica pueda
ser un mtodo de conocimiento, una ontologa, una doctrina materialista de la
naturaleza, o una negacin de toda doctrina, en la medida en que sea ilusoria o
errnea, nos servir para clarificar el alcance y naturaleza de una determinada
concepcin dialctica y, con ello, para discutir de un modo ms preciso el posi-
ble carcter dialctico del pensamiento de Nagarjuna, un autor ubicado en la
denominada sabidura oriental, a la que ahora debemos regresar.

8
J. FERRATER MORA, op. cit., p. 803.

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872 A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO

2. FILOSOFAS DE LA VACUIDAD

La idea de vacuidad, la naturaleza vaca de las cosas, su falta de consisten-


cia, su transitoriedad, ocupa un lugar central en la sabidura oriental. En tal
sentido, los casos del budismo y del taosmo son especialmente significativos.
As, podemos referirnos a estas concepciones como doctrinas del vaco. El tr-
mino vaco es la traduccin habitual del snscrito snyata y del chino kung.
Tanto para el budismo como para el taosmo es absolutamente esencial reco-
nocer el vaco (snyata o kung) como un rasgo fundamental de lo existente.
En el contexto del budismo, la idea de snyata aparece ya con las cuatro nobles
verdades: al reconocer que todo lo existente comporta dukha (sufrimiento, dolor)
se vincula este carcter a su naturaleza vaca. Para el budismo, la imposibilidad
de una satisfaccin completa y permanente del deseo se debe a la naturaleza,
en ltimo trmino inconsistente y transitoria, que ha de tener necesariamente
su objeto. De ah que toda satisfaccin slo pueda ser, en el mejor de los casos,
fugaz. Todo deseo viene determinado por un afn de apropiacin de un objeto
por parte de un yo, una apropiacin que busca la permanencia, sin ver el error
bsico de esta pretensin, pues tanto el objeto como el yo son transitorios,
inconsistentes, vacos y, en tal medida, ilusorios. Por eso todo deseo es, en el
fondo, una ilusin que promete lo que no puede dar y que, por ello, ser causa
de sufrimientos futuros. Aunque se trate, claro es, de una ilusin pertinaz y muy
difcil de erradicar.
Por su concepcin del vaco se puede apreciar una diferencia entre el hina-
yana y el mahayana, que corresponde a la evolucin del pensamiento budista 9.
En el hinayana la nocin de vaco slo es referida a la persona (pdgala). Es el
yo el que resulta a la postre vaco, pues es imposible sealar un elemento
permanente ms all de sus manifestaciones, constituidas, en definitiva, por
dharmas transitorios. En el gran vehculo o mahayana, por el contrario, se
avanza un paso ms, y el concepto de snyata se extiende a todos lo fenme-
nos, considerando que el vaco es su naturaleza propia (svabhva). Esta dife-
rencia puede explicarse en trminos de una analoga clebre en la literatura
budista 10: mientras en el pequeo vehculo se declaran las cosas anlogas a un
recipiente vaco, el mahayana mantiene que ni siquiera los recipientes existen
realmente, llegndose as a la doctrina de la no sustancialidad de todo lo exis-
tente. Dentro del mahayana cabe, a su vez, distinguir varias corrientes, con sus
particulares doctrinas acerca del vaco. Las principales son el prajapramita,
el mahdhyamaka y el yogacara. El prajapramita se caracteriza por su nfa-
sis en la no diferencia entre la forma y el vaco. Toda forma es vaca por su
inconsistencia e impermanencia, y el vaco, en definitiva, es lo que constituye
a todas las formas. El mahdhyamaka se centra en su doctrina del origen

9
Para esta diferencia ver: VV.AA., Diccionario de la sabidura oriental (Budismo, Hin-
duismo, Taosmo, Zaen), traduccin del alemn de Julio Valderrama, Paids, Barcelona, 1993.
Voz Snyata, p. 343.
10
Ibdem, p. 343.

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A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO 873

condicionado, y en funcin de sta entiende el vaco: las cosas son vacas por-
que surgen de modo condicionado. La realidad ltima del universo, para el
mahdhyamaka, es snyata, que se caracteriza como cese de la multiplicidad.
As, en el marco de esta doctrina, el trmino vaco significa que ninguna
forma de multiplicidad, ninguna formulacin conceptual o verbal, ni an la
de no-ser, se adecua a la Realidad as denominada. La snyata es el presu-
puesto necesario tanto para la aparicin como para la desaparicin de los entes
y condicin de posibilidad para liberarse del samsra. El yogacara, finalmen-
te, mantiene que las cosas son vacas porque surgen de la Mente (citta). En esta
doctrina, la Mente csmica se identifica con la snyata, lo que constituye una
muy peculiar forma de idealismo.
Conviene precisar que estas doctrinas mahaynicas no son, aunque pudiera
parecerlo a un lector occidental, la expresin de un nihilismo metafsico. La
extensin del concepto de vaco a la totalidad de los fenmenos no significa que
las cosas no existan, sino slo que constituyen fenmeno, apariencia. Todos los
dharmas carecen de subsistencia propia, de sustancia durable, no son ms que
puro fenmeno: no existen fuera del vaco 11. Pero, por ello mismo, recproca-
mente, s existen (aunque slo sea transitoriamente) en ste. El mahayana est
tan lejos de constituir un nihilismo, que equipara la snyata al Absoluto, por-
que est exenta de dualidad y de toda forma emprica.
Tambin en el taosmo, como dijimos, el concepto de vaco desempea un
papel fundamental. Para esta doctrina, el Dao (el camino o principio que cons-
tituye todas las cosas) es inefable, porque el lenguaje es delimitacin, forma que
forja lmites. El Dao, como el vaco, es informe e indeterminado pero, parad-
jicamente, es la fuente de todas las determinaciones y de todas las formas. El
Dao, como el vaco, no es una realidad apresable de forma concreta, directa, lin-
gstica. El captulo XLV del Tao te king lo enuncia poticamente. El Dao que
puede expresarse no es el Dao permanente, el nombre que puede nombrarse no
es el nombre permanente. En tal sentido, el captulo LVIII denomina al Dao
forma de lo informe. Vemos, pues, esta peculiar y paradjica relacin entre
forma, vaco y realidad fundamental o absoluta, que observbamos en el budis-
mo mahayana, tambin en el taosmo. De forma an ms manifiesta, el captu-
lo XLVIII identifica el Dao con el vaco creativo: El Dao es vaco, mas su efi-
ciencia nunca se agota. Es un abismo, parece raz de todos los seres. El vaco
(kung) se relaciona con wu (no hay tal o cual cosa), lo que supone, por
tanto, negacin. En chino, wu es lo opuesto a yu, que sirve para expresar
la afirmacin de existencia. Por tanto, la idea de vaco est ligada, en la lengua
china, a la de negacin, como demuestra que wu sea tambin un sinnimo de
vaco (y as se traduzca a veces). Sin embargo, esto no excluye que, para el taos-
mo, el vaco sea considerado algo creativo como fuente o fundamento de todas
las formas, exactamente lo que es el Dao. As, el captulo LIV del Tao te king,
tras referirse al Dao (por su carcter generador) como el umbral de la hembra

11
Ibdem, p. 343.

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874 A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO

misteriosa, afirma que es la raz del cielo y de la Tierra (es decir, de todos
los seres).
En definitiva, vemos que la sabidura oriental se configura como un pensar
de la vacuidad. En estas doctrinas, el vaco se convierte en un concepto central
de sus visiones del mundo, un concepto con significacin ontolgica, pues se
sita en la raz misma de los seres, como su realidad ms fundamental. Se trata
de un vaco que ya no est yuxtapuesto a los seres concretos, a las realidades
materiales, como ha acontecido normalmente con el concepto de vaco cuan-
do se ha pensado en la tradicin occidental (p. ej., en el atomismo de Dem-
crito). Por el contrario, para el pensamiento oriental, el vaco est nsito en las
realidades que nos rodean, constituye su nica naturaleza propia. Las cosas
mismas en su naturaleza ms profunda son impermanentes, insustanciales,
vacas. Y, sin embargo, este vaco, esta insuficiencia, es la que permite el juego
transitorio de las formas. La filosofa occidental se constituye, desde la obra
de Parmnides y de Platn, en Ontologa, en teora o saber del ser, del ente.
Frente a ella, la sabidura oriental es, ya casi desde sus inicios, una reflexin
sobre esa peculiar forma de no-ser que es el vaco. Por ello, el pensar occiden-
tal se ha caracterizado, fundamentalmente, por los conceptos que denotan ple-
nitud y perfeccin (ser, esencia, forma, cosmos, Idea, ) y por los principios
de ordenacin racional de lo existente (razn suficiente, identidad, teleologa,
). Cuando este modo de pensar ha buscado modelos del acontecer fsico, los
ha elaborado con conceptos ntidos y con distinciones tajantes (como lo lleno
y lo vaco en el atomismo de Leucipo y Demcrito). Frente a la luminosa cla-
ridad del discurso occidental del ente, el pensamiento oriental fluidifica los
conceptos, tiende a borrar las fronteras, se expresa en mximas y principios
paradjicos. Porque slo con conceptos sutiles y con ideas paradjicas puede
llegar a apresar la realidad que intenta conocer. En este mbito de pensamiento
se sita la obra de Nagarjuna.

3. PRATITYA-SAMUTPADA O LA DOCTRINA DE LA RELATIVIDAD UNIVERSAL

La pratitya-samutpada u origen condicionado es el ncleo del pensamiento


de Nagarjuna. Este concepto puede abordarse desde distintas perspectivas que
constituyen, en definitiva, otros tantos aspectos del mismo, pues son a la pos-
tre consecuencias suyas. De manera que puede decirse que el concepto de ori-
gen condicionado vertebra y da unidad a la doctrina de Nagarjuna. Ahora bien,
el origen condicionado nos sita en un terreno que trasciende las distinciones
excluyentes del entendimiento, que debemos abandonar si queremos de verdad
apresar esta doctrina. Tal sucede, para empezar, con la crtica que Nagarjuna
dirige a la idea de movimiento.
Lo que ya ha ido no est yendo. Y lo que no ha ido tampoco est yendo.
Pero, al margen de lo que ha ido y de lo que no ha ido no es posible concebir un
yendo. Tal declara, solemnemente, la primera estrofa del captulo II de Los

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A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO 875

fundamentos de la va media 12. Parece claro que el sentido de esta afirmacin es


destruir la idea de movimiento como una categora racionalmente inteligible.
En este sentido, el propsito de Nagarjuna parece muy similar al que animaba
a Zenn de Elea al formular sus clebres aporas. As, afirma Nagarjuna, el ini-
cio del movimiento es incomprensible: no se comienza a ir cuando ya se ha ido
y tampoco se comienza a ir cuando todava no se ha ido 13. Si no nos pode-
mos representar racionalmente el comienzo del movimiento, en rigor ni siquie-
ra podemos afirmar una proposicin aparentemente tan inocua como el mvil
est yendo porque esto implicara la existencia de dos mviles, es decir, que el
mvil es un mvil incluso cuando est quieto (esto es, el sujeto de la proposi-
cin debera designar algo que sera un mvil independientemente del predica-
do de la misma, es decir, que sera un mvil tambin cuando est en reposo, lo
que resulta, cuando menos, paradjico) 14. En la estrofa 18 insiste Nagarjuna en
este carcter racionalmente inaprensible del movimiento, en los siguientes tr-
minos: el movimiento no es ni idntico ni diferente del mvil. Si fuera lo pri-
mero, habra una identidad entre agente y accin (que Nagarjuna en este cap-
tulo parece considerar absurda, aunque en otros parece presuponerla como la
nica conclusin aceptable).Y si fuera lo segundo, tendramos un movimiento
sin mvil. Rechazar estas dos alternativas supone, a ojos del filsofo hind, reco-
nocer que el movimiento escapa a la posibilidad de comprensin y explicacin
racional. Ello supone que no puede afectar a la verdadera, a la profunda reali-
dad, lo cual no significa que Nagarjuna niegue el movimiento en el mbito de
los fenmenos.
El captulo V lo dedica Nagarjuna al espacio. Etimolgicamente, el espacio
(akasa) es lo omnipenetrante. Aunque este carcter no debe entenderse como
una sustancia que lo llene todo. De l dice Nagarjuna: No podemos entender
el espacio sin percibir sus caractersticas. Pero si hablramos del espacio antes
de la percepcin de las caractersticas se seguira que el espacio no tiene carac-
tersticas. Ahora bien, no existe ninguna cosa que no tenga caractersticas.
El sentido de este oscuro y difcil prrafo es oponerse a la concepcin hinduis-
ta del espacio (como observa Juan Arnau en una reveladora nota a su traduc-
cin) 15 al tiempo que trascender las alternativas duales y excluyentes, basadas
en conceptos abstractos. Hay dos grandes corrientes en la filosofa acerca de la
naturaleza de akasa, el espacio. Para el Hinduismo, akasa es una especie de
ter sustancial. Se trata, pues, de una concepcin sustancialista del espacio: una
sustancia que lo llena y lo penetra todo, en la que se encontraran los cuerpos.

12
NAGARJUNA, op. cit., p. 61.
13
Ibdem, p. 63.
14
Esta observacin procede de David R, Loy. En Nagarjuna, op. cit., p. 61, nota 15. La
implicacin de dos mviles por la citada proposicin se debe a la necesidad de que no sea una
tautologa. Para que tenga un significado no tautolgico es preciso que el sujeto signifique
algo distinto de lo que designa el predicado. Y es por ello que debe tener sentido hablar de un
mvil incluso cuando est en reposo. Lo que, no obstante, resulta paradjico.
15
Ibdem, nota 34, p. 77.

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876 A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO

Para el Budismo, en cambio, el espacio sera un dharma, un factor de la exis-


tencia. Esta concepcin, a su vez, admitira dos versiones bien distintas (con lo
que, a fin de cuentas, tendramos tres doctrinas distintas). Para los sarvastiva-
da se tratara de un dharma incondicionado (asamkrta): por tanto, de uno ms
de los factores de la existencia, pero que no depende de otra cosa, al que nada
afecta. Nagarjuna, en cambio, es el primero en proponer (en todo el mbito de
la filosofa india) la idea de un espacio condicionado (samkrta). Esto significa
que el espacio queda afectado por su contenido, pudiendo depender de otros
factores de existencia. Juan Arnau compara esta concepcin con el espacio mol-
deable de la teora de la relatividad general de Einstein. El espacio puede ser
ocupado por algo, entrando en relacin con ese algo, que lo condiciona mos-
trndolo.
Esto nos aproxima a una concepcin relacional del espacio. Aunque sin iden-
tificarse con un relacionalismo estricto, que definira el espacio simplemente como
un sistema de relaciones (entre cuerpos o entre sucesos o, tal vez, entre percep-
ciones de las mnadas, a la manera de Leibniz). Parece ms bien, que en la doc-
trina de Nagarjuna debemos entender el espacio como algo real (es un dharma y
puede ser afectado por otros dharmas, interacta con ellos), pero cuya realidad
debe entenderse de un modo sutil (esquivo a las alternativas de tipo Todo o nada
del entendimiento). Pues no es una realidad independiente. Por eso, ms adelan-
te afirma que el espacio no es algo caracterizado (esto es, no es una sustancia o
soporte separada de sus caractersticas), pese a haber dado a entender antes que
no puede haber espacio sin caractersticas, pues no existe nada sin stas. Ms an,
llegar a afirmar, no sin cierta consciencia del aire paradjico de la sentencia, que
el espacio tampoco es una entidad existente, ni algo inexistente. Naturalmente,
como vengo proponiendo, esta afirmacin debe entenderse no en el sentido de
que el espacio no sea en absoluto real, sino de que no es una realidad absoluta,
independiente, como tampoco una negacin pura.
El captulo XI, dedicado al samsara, es una aplicacin de la doctrina del ori-
gen condicionado. En sus concisas estrofas afirma Nagarjuna que el samsara
no tiene lmites en el pasado ni en el futuro, no tiene comienzo ni fin. Pasado,
presente y futuro son trminos inapropiados para intentar describirlo. Por eso
mismo, carece de sentido la nocin de centro. Aunque en principio Nagarjuna
parece referirse exclusivamente a una infinitud temporal, ms adelante se apre-
cia que el sentido de sus afirmaciones es ms general. Concierne a la nocin de
lmite, en toda la extensin de su significado. Es el lenguaje el que proyecta lmi-
tes, el que clasifica y divide, el que establece categoras distintas y entidades apa-
rentemente independientes para hacer ms fcil la comprensin del mundo.
sta es la visin corriente de las cosas. De cualquier cosa, ya sea sujeto o expe-
riencia, caracterstica o sustancia, causa o efecto, siempre se supone que una es
el arranque (o lmite) de la otra. No slo el samsara carece de lmites. Ninguna
entidad tiene lmite alguno, anterior o posterior 16. Esto es, la visin de las cosas

16
Ibdem, p. 11.

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A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO 877

como entidades limitadas unas respecto de otras, individualizadas, indepen-


dientes, no representa su verdadera naturaleza. Y ello porque toda pretendida
entidad individual tiene un origen condicionado, se halla inscrita en un entra-
mado de conexiones, de interrelaciones. Vista desde la perspectiva de la indivi-
dualidad, cada cosa es una entidad que surge de una entidad anterior (causa),
durar un cierto tiempo, y cesar sustituida por otra entidad distinta que, a su
vez, dependa de ella. Pero, si se profundiza en la idea de dependencia, se apre-
cia entonces que la naturaleza de tal entidad estaba ya en sus antecedentes (si
realmente son causas o condiciones suyas), por lo que no sera realmente nada
sin ellos, lo que muestra que, en un sentido ms fundamental, no es realmente
distinto de ellos, con lo que el presunto lmite, la aparente barrera que los sepa-
raba, se difumina. La misma consideracin, es aplicable a la citada entidad res-
pecto de sus consecuentes. As, para una visin ms profunda, lo que realmen-
te existe no son las cosas individuales que surgen y cesan, que se suceden y
cambian, sino todo el entramado de las conexiones, de las dependencias que,
como tal, no surge ni perece, no cambia. Por eso, afirmar Nagarjuna que tiene
la paz del nirvana, lo que constituye la explicacin, en el pensamiento de este
autor, de la clebre tesis del mahyana de la identidad del samsara y del nirvana.
En este sentido, afirma Arnau en una nota a su traduccin el carcter central
de estas estrofas, como resumen de toda la obra 17. Arnau relaciona este captu-
lo con un texto de Candrakirti, que comenta estas ideas citando un clebre pasa-
je del Ratnamegha: La naturaleza de todas las cosas ni ha surgido ni se ha dete-
nido. Est en perfecta calma. Y todos los principios (dharma) hacen girar la
rueda de la doctrina (dharma).
De este modo, el captulo XI debe ponerse en relacin con el anterior, dedi-
cado expresamente al origen condicionado, que da la clave para entenderlo. Las
paradojas de la idea de condicin entendida como sucesin de entidades dife-
rentes, se ilustran con el smil del fuego. Si el combustible fuera lo mismo que
el fuego, entonces el agente y la accin seran uno. Pero si el combustible fuera
diferente del fuego, entonces ser podra encender fuego sin utilizar combusti-
ble 18. Esta misma idea, nos dice Nagarjuna, es aplicable al yo y los compo-
nentes de la personalidad. Tambin en este caso se plantea idntica disyuntiva,
lo que parece indicar que el yo no puede concebirse ni como idntico, ni como
distinto de sus componentes. No obstante, y a pesar de su aire paradjico (el
agente sera idntico a la accin), la primera posibilidad parece mucho ms
cercana a la idea que Nagarjuna, indirectamente, quiere proponer. Pues se trata
en definitiva, como observa Arnau 19, de una negacin de las entidades indivi-
duales y sus diferencias limitantes como atributos reales. As, entidad y dife-
rencia slo se entienden como convenciones desde la perspectiva de la condi-
cionalidad de todas las cosas. La condicionalidad de la cosas supone, en suma,
su vacuidad, lo quiere decir que no puede tratarse de entidades reales indivi-

17
Ibdem, nota 80, p. 111.
18
Ibdem, p. 107. El texto citado representa exactamente la estrofa primera del captulo X.
19
Ibdem, nota 77, p. 109.

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878 A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO

duales y separadas. La propia idea de origen condicionado nos conduce al vr-


tigo del regreso infinito y, con ello, al desfondamiento de todas las cosas, a su
prdida de fundamento por la relativizacin de las relaciones causales; en con-
clusin, a la vacuidad. Si algo depende de algo que, a su vez, depende de otra
cosa, no hay fundamento alguno para afirmar ninguna de las dos cosas (pues,
qu se establecera, y basndose en qu?) 20. Arnau comenta esta importante
estrofa en estos trminos: En el origen condicionado (pratityasamutpada) no
hay un antes (causa) y un despus (efecto): las cosas aparecen en sucesin, pero
vienen juntas. Por eso se dice que tienen la serenidad (santa) del nirvana; por
eso se dice que no hay ni surgir ni perecer 21.
El captulo VII ya se refera al origen condicionado, ponindolo en relacin
con el nirvana. Tras establecer las tres caractersticas de todo lo condicionado
(surgimiento, duracin y cese), Nagarjuna plantea una de sus tpicas disyunti-
vas dialcticas 22. Si el surgimiento, duracin y cese tuviera otros surgimientos,
duraciones y ceses, entonces tendramos una regresin infinita. Y si no los tuvie-
ran, no seran condicionados. Ms an, si el surgir lo produce un surgimiento
primario, cmo lo que no ha sido engendrado puede hacer que algo surja?.
Ambas posibilidades (que haya un surgir originario o que la cadena sea infini-
ta) parecen igualmente inconcebibles. La solucin que propone Nagarjuna es
considerar que el surgimiento no concierne a la verdadera realidad que, en cier-
ta manera, es ilusorio, que es fenomnico. Lo surgido, lo no surgido, lo que
est surgiendo, no surge de ninguna manera, en absoluto Todo aquello que
existe en dependencia es sereno por naturaleza 23. Se trata, como ya vimos ante-
riormente, de la clebre tesis mahaynica de la equivalencia del nirvana y del
samsara. Visto en profundidad, el dominio de los surgimientos y ceses (el mbi-
to encadenado de la causalidad) es lo mismo que el nirvana. Con esta paradji-
ca doctrina, Nagarjuna pretende situarse ms all de las dicotomas excluyen-
tes del entendimiento. Intenta expresar la inadecuacin del lenguaje para describir
la causalidad y el cambio, y para acceder a la autntica realidad. De este modo,
ser y no ser, existencia e inexistencia, son conceptos unilaterales no aplicables
a la ms profunda realidad: el origen condicionado. Por ello, Nagarjuna ubica
su pensamiento en un territorio distinto (que, sin embargo, es mucho ms real)
intermedio entre estas alternativas excluyentes de la existencia y la inexisten-
cia, del ser y del no ser. As, afirmar en el mismo captulo: Por lo tanto no se
puede predicar del surgir la existencia o la inexistencia. Como se dijo antes, pues
ni es un existente ni un inexistente. En este caso, toda la terminologa condi-
cionado-incondicionado resulta inadecuada. No puede dar cuenta de la reali-
dad. Dado que ni el surgimiento, ni la duracin y ni el cese pueden estable-
cerse, no podemos hablar de cosas condicionadas. Si no pueden establecerse las

Ibdem, estrofa 10 del captulo X, p. 109.


20

Ibdem, nota 75, p. 109.


21

22
Ibdem, estrofas 1, 2, 3, 6 y 7 del captulo VII, pp. 87 y 89.
23
Ibdem, estrofa 14 del captulo VII, p. 91. En general, para todo lo que sigue, ver las
pp. 87-95.

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A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO 879

cosas condicionadas, cmo sera posible establecer las incondicionadas?.


Como observa Arnau 24, condicionado e incondicionado son conceptos correla-
tivos, se presuponen recprocamente, por tanto si no puede afirmarse con lgi-
ca uno, tampoco el otro. La verdadera realidad est ms all de lo condiciona-
do y lo incondicionado, en un espacio intermedio entre la existencia y la
inexistencia. Este mbito de paz, alejado de las turbulencias del devenir, es el
nirvana. Lo cual supone que el mundo cotidiano de cambio y devenir que cree-
mos habitar no tiene, en realidad, ms consistencia que la de un sueo. Como
dice Nagarjuna: Como un sueo, como una ilusin mgica, como la ciudad de
los gandharva, as han sido explicados (por el Buda) el surgimiento, la duracin
y el cese (de los fenmenos) 25.
Con este captulo VII conviene poner en relacin el captulo XV, que inten-
ta poner de manifiesto, de la forma paradjica habitual en Nagarjuna, la caren-
cia de naturaleza propia que caracteriza a todas las cosas. Esta ausencia de natu-
raleza es una consecuencia del origen condicionado rectamente entendido.
Svabhava es el trmino snscrito que designa la naturaleza propia de las cosas,
lo que tambin podramos hacer equivalente, en el pensamiento indio, al con-
cepto filosfico occidental de esencia. Pues bien, Nagarjuna opone svabha-
va a krtako (fabricado): svabhava es lo que no es krtako, lo no fabrica-
do. Ahora bien, no es posible que una naturaleza propia (esencia) haya surgido
de causas y condiciones. Si la naturaleza propia procediera de causas y condi-
ciones, entonces sera el resultado de algo. Pero cmo podra haber naturale-
za propia en algo fabricado? La naturaleza propia es (por definicin) no fabri-
cada y no depende de otra cosa (causa o condicin) 26. Mas, si no hay naturaleza
inherente a una entidad, tampoco puede haber naturaleza inherente a otra enti-
dad y derivada de ella pues, como afirma Nagarjuna con implacable lgica: la
naturaleza inherente derivada de otra entidad no es sino la naturaleza propia
de otra entidad. La conclusin es ahora manifiesta, aunque tambin metafsi-
camente devastadora: sin naturaleza propia ni ajena no pueden afirmarse ni la
entidad (pues sta slo puede predicarse cuando hay naturaleza propia o ajena)
ni la no entidad (pues la no existencia es lo contrario de la existencia, si la lti-
ma no tiene sentido, tampoco la primera) 27. Esto es: el origen condicionado
supone que las cosas no pueden tener una esencia, una naturaleza propia que
les pertenezca por s, pues dependen de otras cosas, su ser es dependiente, deri-
vado de otras cosas. Esto implica que tampoco pueden tener una naturaleza
ajena, pues sta es, en definitiva, la naturaleza propia de otra cosa. Pero, caren-
tes de una esencia que les pertenezca por s o en virtud de otras realidades, las
cosas no tienen, propiamente, un ser, una entidad. Y, por ello mismo, tampoco
puede afirmarse el no ser. Una vez ms nos vemos conducidos a un mbito que

24
Ibdem, nota 58, p. 93.
25
Ibdem, estrofa 34 del captulo VII, p. 95. Se trata de la estrofa que cierra este decisi-
vo captulo y, en cierta manera, resume su conclusin fundamental.
26
Ibdem, estrofas 1 y 2, captulo XV, p. 125.
27
Ibdem, estrofas 3 y 4, captulo XV, p. 125.

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880 A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO

est ms all de la existencia y la inexistencia. Nagarjuna rechaza dos doctrinas


opuestas, igualmente errneas: la afirmacin de existencia (que conduce, en
ltimo trmino a la doctrina de lo eterno) y la de la inexistencia (que implica
una filosofa nihilista). Si se afirma del objeto que existe, de modo absoluto,
y aplicamos una lgica rigurosa, hasta sus ltimas consecuencias, entonces nos
vemos conducidos al Ser uno e inmutable de Parmnides. Si afirmamos que no
existe absolutamente, entonces nuestra nica perspectiva es la nada. Nagarju-
na nos recuerda que el Bienaventurado (el Buda histrico Gautama) refut
tanto el ser como el no ser: rechaz ambos 28. Esta negacin de la naturaleza
propia es una forma de evitar la cosificacin del pensamiento, su paralizacin
en hipstasis sustancializadas. La red que constituye el origen condicionado
impide considerar las cosas como soportes distintos de sus acciones y propie-
dades, como sustancias. Es la red lo primario, y no sus nudos, que no son sino
los puntos de confluencia de la propia malla. En tal sentido, Arnau relaciona
esta idea del filsofo hind con el rechazo de la cosa-en-s en los textos de La
voluntad de poder de Nietzsche 29. Hay una idea dogmtica que debe rechazar-
se en absoluto, la de que las cosas tienen una naturaleza propia, afirmaba el
filsofo de Rcken. Ms an, para Nietzsche, la cosa-en-s es absurda: retira-
das todas las propiedades y relaciones no queda la cosa. La coseidad es algo
aadido por nosotros.
De este modo, vemos que Nagarjuna interpreta el origen condicionado como
una negacin de todo absoluto ontolgico, de todo en-s, que se situara en un
extremo de la polaridad metafsica a que nos conduce el afn clarificador del
intelecto: el de la afirmacin o la existencia. Ni el ser pleno ni el puro no-ser son
designados por la pratitya-samutpada. Por ello el origen condicionado supone la
relatividad (en sentido literal, esto es, el carcter relacional, respectivo) de todas
las cosas. Resta ahora por ver la naturaleza dialctica de esta doctrina.

4. LA DIALCTICA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO UNIVERSAL

Desde los Further budhist studies de Edward Conze, al menos, se intro-


duce en el mbito de la filosofa europea la idea de que la tradicin occidental
lleg a la posicin medialista (la que representa el budismo de la Va Media o
Mahdhyamaka) con el escepticismo acadmico pirrnico (que, como es sabido,
se extiende desde el siglo III a.C. hasta el II d.C.), por tanto, mucho antes de que
Nagarjuna hubiera incluso nacido. Lo que Conze, en este sentido, entiende por
posicin medialista puede explicarse, en trminos de Ignacio Gmez de Liao,
como una dialctica deconstructiva que tiene por objetivo que el espritu se man-
tenga equidistante y, por ello mismo, aquietado, entre los extremos opuestos de

Ibdem, estrofa 7, captulo XV, p. 127.


28

Ibdem, nota 99, p. 125. Arnau cita los pargrafos 551 y 552 de la obra pstuma de
29

NIETZSCHE, La voluntad de poder.

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A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO 881

los dogmticos de la afirmacin o sustancialistas, y los dogmticos de la nega-


cin o nihilistas 30. Para la Va Media ambos extremos yerran por igual debido
a su pretensin de saber lo que las cosas son, o incluso, simplemente, de creer
que las cosas son o no son. Es ciertamente notable, y en absoluto infundada,
esta tesis de Conze, que tiende puentes (en este caso por similitud estructural
de doctrinas) entre la filosofa oriental y la occidental. Este tipo de estudios
transversales contribuye, sin duda, a hacer ms accesible entre nosotros el pen-
samiento oriental, al compararlo con teoras que conocemos mejor. Gmez de
Liao retoma este planteamiento y dedica un reseable artculo a explicitar y
fundamentar esta tesis. Como observa este autor 31, si hacemos un recorrido por
los Esbozos pirrnicos de Sexto Emprico podramos encontrar en dicha obra
muchos pasajes sorprendentemente similares a algunos textos clsicos de la filo-
sofa hind. Los smiles, que cita Sexto, de la serpiente, del purgante, del az-
car y la miel, de la mueca con forma de joven, entre otras, tienen paralelos casi
literales en el Sutra de Rutnakuta y en obras de Aryadeva y Candrakirti. Como
afirma Gmez de Liao, es impensable que estas coincidencias sean casuales.
Por lo que resulta ciertamente muy probable la hiptesis de una conexin entre
la filosofa griega post-aristotlica y el pensamiento hind de los primeros siglos
de nuestra era. De hecho, la historia da apoyo a esta hiptesis: es sabido que en
la poca del escepticismo pirrnico reyes griegos dominaban el noroeste de la
India y conocan la filosofa de Atenas (que, muy probablemente transmitan a
sus nuevos sbditos). En tal sentido, son numerosos los restos arqueolgicos
hallados en esta regin, como monedas con blasones de Palas Atenea.
Si nos centramos en la obra de Nagarjuna, ciertamente no es difcil hallar
similitudes de contenido entre su pensamiento y el de Pirrn o Sexto Empri-
co 32. Si la finalidad de Pirrn es el amor a la humanidad y superar las doctrinas
dualistas, la de Nagarjuna es la compasin universal que se alcanza al trascen-
der las alternativas duales engaosas. Pero tambin al desarrollar sus doctrinas
pueden encontrarse paralelos en conceptos que desempean una funcin estruc-
tural similar. As, la categora de vacuidad (snyata) es tan esencial en el
Mahdhyamaka como la epoj entre los escpticos. En ambos casos conduce al
rechazo, por infundadas, de determinadas doctrinas propuestas como alterna-
tivas. La pratitya-samutpada supone una interdependencia de todos los fen-
menos muy prxima al tropo con relacin a algo de Sexto Emprico. Gmez
de Liao concluye que debi haber una influencia del escepticismo griego sobre
el pensamiento de Nagarjuna, aunque en su exposicin insiste tambin en algu-
nas diferencias entre ambos planteamientos. En cualquier caso, debemos afir-
mar que no es posible identificar, sin ms, la posicin medialista de Nagarjuna
con la suspensin de todo juicio de los escpticos griegos. Nagarjuna no man-

30
IGNACIO GMEZ DE LIAO, Nagarjuna y el escepticismo griego, en I. G. DE LIAO - M.
CAVALL - A. VLEZ - M. CATENA, Hinduismo y budismo. Introduccin filosfica (Conferencias en
la Facultad de Filosofa de la UCM), Editorial Etnos, Madrid, 1999, p. 29.
31
Ibdem, pp. 31-33.
32
Ibdem, pp. 334-336.

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882 A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO

tiene la completa indiferencia de la mente ante todas las doctrinas filosficas,


por ms que su propia posicin est prxima a esta actitud escptica. De hecho,
podemos encontrar algunas tesis afirmativas, algunas afirmaciones (aunque
se formulen como negaciones) que defiende Nagarjuna, que presuponen sus
razonamientos y su discurso, y que definen una posicin filosfica no simple-
mente equiparable al escepticismo. Entre estas tesis que defiende la filosofa de
Nagarjuna podramos citar (basndonos en textos contenidos en Los funda-
mentos de la va media), al menos, las siguientes:
1) Rechazo de la nocin de lmite como aplicable a la autntica realidad:
toda entidad carece realmente de lmites. No hay nada que tenga verda-
deros lmites que lo determinen o definan absolutamente. Una conse-
cuencia de esta tesis es la ilimitacin del samsara. El samsara no tiene
principio ni fin (Cap. XI).
2) Vaco y no vaco son inseparables (Cap. XIII). Se trata de conceptos corre-
lativos, que se dan juntos. No puede entenderse el vaco al margen de lo
no vaco, ni se pueden separar fsica, realmente (como si cada uno de
ellos existiera en una regin deslindada de la que ocupa el otro). En
este punto parece que estamos en la anttesis de la concepcin del vaco
propia de la filosofa de Demcrito y de la mecnica clsica.
3) Todo lo que existe en dependencia es sereno por naturaleza (Cap. VII).
Se trata de una de las tesis capitales de Nagarjuna y de todo el Mahaya-
na: es la idea de la equivalencia del samsara y el nirvana. El nirvana es
la otra cara del samsara, su contraparte necesaria, oculta por la igno-
rancia consustancial a la vida cotidiana. Todo lo que se halla en depen-
dencia (origen condicionado) tiene la paz del nirvana.
4) Es preciso distinguir dos verdades: lo convencional y el sentido ltimo (que
es la verdad ms profunda, ms exacta y filosfica). Pero lo pertinen-
te es constatar que ambas estn imbricadas. No se puede dar una sin la
otra (Cap. XXIV). Por tanto, la doctrina profunda del nirvana debe dar
cuenta tambin del samsara.

Dado que la filosofa de Nagarjuna defiende, sin duda alguna, estas tesis, no
puede considerarse un escepticismo. Debe observarse que, incluso al margen de
estas ideas filosficas, no podra considerarse una doctrina escptica en sentido
estricto pues, en cualquier caso, presupone las verdades fundamentales del budis-
mo (como las Cuatro Nobles Verdades). Tampoco se trata de un nihilismo, no
estamos ante una filosofa de la nada, del puro no-ser (aunque, una vez ms, su
posicin est prxima al nihilismo, como lo est el escepticismo, pero sin iden-
tificarse con ninguno de los dos). Y ello en virtud, al menos, de dos razones: en
primer lugar, porque rechaza la inexistencia, el puro no-ser (tanto como recha-
za la afirmacin del ser): la verdadera realidad no es, para Nagarjuna, ni ser ni
no-ser, sino algo distinto; en segundo lugar, porque la vacuidad (que tan central
es en su pensamiento) debe entenderse como mera designacin, y no como un
absoluto, lo que supone que el vaco no es la mera nada, sino la existencia rela-

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A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO 883

cional, carente de naturaleza propia, que caracteriza al origen condicionado y a


la Va Media. No representando ni un escepticismo ni un nihilismo, la filosofa
de Nagarjuna representa una sutil metafsica de la interdependencia, de esa casi
inaprensible, tenue pero efectiva realidad que se sita en el terreno intermedio
entre la existencia y la inexistencia. Y esta metafsica es dialctica.
El carcter dialctico de la metafsica de Nagarjuna puede fundamentarse
en tres rasgos de su pensamiento. En primer lugar, porque ste se basa, de forma
efectiva y constante, en la contradiccin entre tesis opuestas que, consideradas
unilaterales y abstractas, rechaza por igual. Toda la doctrina de Los fundamen-
tos de la va media es un intento de exponer estas contradicciones, lo que con-
vierte a las tesis correspondientes en insostenibles. En este sentido, la obra de
Nagarjuna puede considerarse el desarrollo de una gran reduccin al absurdo,
cuyo esquema lgico se repite en mltiples campos o temas. En segundo lugar,
porque la doctrina de Nagarjuna supone, de forma similar a como sucede en el
sistema de Hegel, la superacin de todas las posiciones filosficas anteriores (en
este caso referidas, naturalmente, al mbito de la sabidura oriental). Nagarju-
na pretende haber demostrado que son indefendibles. En este sentido, pues,
coincide con la idea de Hegel de ver a su propio pensamiento como la cima y
culminacin de una tradicin. Aunque no podamos atribuir propiamente la idea
de historia en el campo del pensamiento oriental (pues, como es sabido, la idea
lineal y evolutiva de historia tiene races judeo-cristianas), la crtica que Nagar-
juna realiza de todas las alternativas filosficas posibles ante un problema, pre-
supone que su propia posicin es superior a ellas. Expliquemos este punto con
cierto detalle: dado que Nagarjuna, ante un problema dado, expone y critica por
igual la tesis y la anttesis correspondiente, puede interpretarse que toma en
consideracin todas las alternativas, en principio (si se acepta la ley de tercio
excluso) lgicamente concebibles (que, posteriormente, podran identificarse
con diferentes doctrinas de la sabidura oriental). Por otro lado, si mi interpre-
tacin es correcta, Nagarjuna no se limita a rechazar esas concepciones, sino
que positivamente propone una nueva postura terica que escapa a esas alter-
nativas excluyentes. En este sentido, la posicin de Nagarjuna no es meramen-
te negativa o destructiva, sino que supone una cierta concepcin de la realidad,
que naturalmente Nagarjuna considera superior a las anteriores. Por ello, su
pensamiento puede reconstruirse como una superacin de todas las dems doc-
trinas filosficas, aspecto en el que coincidira con Hegel. En definitiva, aunque
no haya nada parecido a un proceso histrico que conduzca necesariamente, en
el mbito de la sabidura oriental, hasta su propia doctrina, su pensamiento
puede reformularse como una superacin dialctica de las alternativas tradi-
cionales. En tercer lugar, en suma, porque la negacin de la que habla este gran
filsofo (y que juega un papel tan decisivo en su pensamiento) no es el puro no-
ser, no es la nada estril y pasiva, la nada como carencia, como simple nega-
cin. Sino que Nagarjuna utiliza la negacin en un sentido dialctico, que recuer-
da esa nada hegeliana que, paradjicamente, puede ser todo. Por eso mismo,
su doctrina no constituye un nihilismo ontolgico.

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884 A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO

A este respecto conviene recordar el decisivo captulo XIII de Los funda-


mentos de la va media. En l se presupone que el vaco no se puede entender
separado de lo no vaco. Esto significa que el vaco de que habla la doctrina de
la snyata no es la nada, no es la ausencia de toda existencia y realidad. El vaco
no es un absoluto que deba afirmarse dogmticamente. Si hubiera algo no
vaco, entonces habra algo vaco. Sin embargo, y puesto que no hay nada que
sea no vaco, cmo podra haber algo vaco? 33. La vacuidad es una mera desig-
nacin, no el absoluto no-ser. Por eso, no puede ser puesta dogmticamente
como una tesis absoluta, sino que es preciso jugar dialcticamente con esta idea.
Tal es el sentido del conocido lema de Nagarjuna que, en un sorprendente bucle,
afirma: La vacuidad es el abandono de todas las conjeturas, tambin de ella
misma 34. La vacuidad supone abandonar la propia doctrina de la vacuidad
entendida como un absoluto, como la pura nada. La vacuidad no es, pues, el
mero no-ser. No puede afirmarse unilateralmente el no-ser. Ser y no-ser son
correlativos, interdependientes. Cuando se afirma que todas las cosas son va-
cas, lo que se quiere dar a entender es que carecen de naturaleza propia, no que
no existan en ningn sentido. La doctrina de la vacuidad es una consecuencia
de la carencia de naturaleza propia, y sta del origen condicionado. Como con-
secuencia de ver el cambio en las cosas, uno acierta a entender que carecen de
esencia. Puesto que no hay ninguna entidad con naturaleza propia, se dice que
las cosas son vacas. Por eso, la idea de vacuidad no es incompatible con la afir-
macin de toda realidad; ms bien exige esa peculiar realidad que caracteriza
al origen condicionado. Realidad que, en ltimo trmino, remite al nirvana como
su reverso (debido a la clebre tesis del captulo VII). Hay una realidad ltima,
aunque no conceptualizable: el nirvana. Si bien es inexacto decir que el nirva-
na existe o no existe, lo problemtico en estas afirmaciones (advierte Nagarju-
na) son los conceptos de existencia e inexistencia, y no el nirvana mismo. Es
decir, el problema para acceder a esta realidad ltima reside en el lenguaje y sus
conceptos. En este punto, el pensamiento de Nagarjuna supone una apertura a
lo mstico, porque esta realidad ltima se sita en ese terreno intermedio, inde-
cible, inefable, entre la existencia y la inexistencia.
El caso del movimiento inercial en la Fsica de Galileo (y Newton) puede ser-
vir como analoga de lo que pretende afirmar Nagarjuna, en este punto, verda-
deramente central, de su doctrina. Sabido es que para Aristteles todo movi-
miento es un proceso que afecta realmente al mvil que lo experimenta, en cierto
modo acontece en l. En cambio, para Galileo, el movimiento inercial (aqul
que tiene lugar en lnea recta con velocidad constante) es puramente relativo.
Cuando un objeto A se mueve inercialmente, lo hace siempre con relacin a otro
u otros objetos (llammosles B) que ejercen como fondo, esto es, como siste-
ma de referencia del citado movimiento (p. ej., todo el paisaje con relacin al
cual vemos desplazarse a un tren). En este caso, da igual decir que el objeto A

33
NAGARJUNA, op. cit., p. 117.
34
NAGARJUNA, op. cit., p. 119.

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A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO 885

se desplaza a velocidad constante en determinado sentido mientras el objeto B


permanece en reposo, que afirmar que A est en reposo y B se desplaza en sen-
tido opuesto. Ninguna diferencia fsica resulta en los dos casos. Ambas des-
cripciones son fsicamente equivalentes porque el movimiento inercial (a dife-
rencia del acelerado) no produce ningn efecto en el mvil. Nada le sucede
realmente al mvil por moverse inercialmente, lo nico que vara es su posicin
con respecto a otros cuerpos, algo meramente relativo y simtrico. Por eso, las
dos descripciones son compatibles con las mismas leyes fsicas. Esto significa
que, para Galileo, el movimiento inercial no es un proceso que acontezca real-
mente en un sujeto; es simplemente un parmetro en las ecuaciones del movi-
miento. Pues bien, si generalizamos esta idea de la Fsica moderna acerca del
movimiento inercial para todo tipo de cambio, tal vez tengamos una aproxi-
macin al sentido de la tesis de Nagarjuna. El cambio, todo cambio en general,
puede concebirse de dos maneras. Podemos, en primer lugar, entender el cam-
bio como un proceso que afecta a un sujeto, que ocurre realmente en una sus-
tancia. En tal caso, el cambio concierna a la sustancia porque es el proceso de
actualizacin de sus potencialidades. Tal es la tesis de Aristteles.
Pero podemos, en segundo lugar, pensar que el cambio es simplemente la
expresin de la ausencia de una naturaleza propia, de la insustancialidad de
todos los fenmenos. En tal caso, el cambio no puede, desde luego, afectar a un
sujeto sustancial, porque no hay tal. Para esta concepcin, no hay un sujeto que
realmente cambie. No hay nada que experimente o sufra el cambio. Por eso,
visto desde otra perspectiva, la vacuidad que supone el cambio es signo de inmo-
vilidad, de inmutabilidad, de paz. Si la primera concepcin est necesaria-
mente ligada a la continuidad del cambio (debe haber un substrato la mate-
ria que permanezca en todo proceso de cambio, dotndole de continuidad),
esta segunda visin insustancial podra entenderse, tal vez, en trminos de una
sucesin discontinua (discreta) de estados. En cualquier caso, la idea de que el
cambio es indicio de la insustancialidad de los fenmenos, es la tesis de Nagar-
juna. Las cosas son vacas porque no hay ninguna entidad con naturaleza pro-
pia, afirma el filsofo hind; y dada esta ausencia de naturaleza propia, no hay
nada ni nadie que pueda experimentar el cambio. Una vez ms, la razn de esta
doctrina est en el origen condicionado. Debido a ste, pensar el cambio como
el proceso por el cual una realidad (autnoma, individual, permanente), se trans-
forma, actualiza potencialidades, resulta inconcebible. Pues no hay ninguna rea-
lidad verdaderamente autnoma (esto es, independiente, incondicionada) que
cambie. Por el contrario, todo tiene un origen condicionado. La insustanciali-
dad que ste supone conduce a la conclusin, paradjica pero lgicamente impe-
cable, de que el origen condicionado (si se quiere el samsara) tiene la paz del
nirvana.
Estamos, en definitiva, ante una forma de relacionalismo ontolgico para la
que todo lo que hay debe entenderse como un engranaje en un inmenso siste-
ma de relaciones. Todo fenmeno concebible debe considerarse como esen-
cialmente relacional. Slo puede entenderse en trminos de relaciones, pues es
expresin del origen condicionado. Cuando el fenmeno se piensa de este modo,

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886 A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO

entonces resulta consistente y vaco. Por el contrario, cuando se piensa al mar-


gen de toda relacin, como una entidad independiente, entonces nos vemos abo-
cados a todo tipo de contradicciones. Pues no es concebible fenmeno alguno
que no sea relacional, que no tenga un origen condicionado. Por esta razn, no
podemos hacernos a la idea de un dharma que no sea vaco, como afirma el
decisivo captulo XXIV de Los fundamentos de la va media 35. Es decir, lo con-
sistente es lo vaco y, al contrario, lo no vaco (esto es, lo dotado de naturaleza
propia) es lgicamente contradictorio, insostenible. Por ello, afirma Nagarjuna
en el mismo captulo: Lo que racionalmente puede aplicarse al vaco, se apli-
ca racionalmente a todo. Aquello a lo que no se le puede aplicar racionalmente
nada, a eso no se le puede aplicar el predicado de la vacuidad 36. En esta estro-
fa se afirma la tesis de la equivalencia entre vacuidad y consistencia lgica y el
carcter universal de la vacuidad. Como explica Richard Robinson 37, este pasa-
je establece que la funcin proposicional x es consistente (en la que puede
sustituirse x por cualquier entidad) es lgicamente equivalente a x es vaco.
Asistimos aqu a una autntica inversin de los hbitos mentales inveterados
del pensamiento occidental: para nosotros, normalmente, el vaco se relaciona
con lo que carece de consistencia (lo insuficiente, lo que no tiene contenido ni
entidad) frente a la consistencia que atribuimos a lo sustancial; para Nagarju-
na, por el contrario, lo vaco (y no la sustancia) es lo consistente. De este modo,
el relacionalismo metafsico (que supone la vacuidad de todas las relaciones) es
la nica ontologa consistente para Nagarjuna.
Y esta ontologa de la naturaleza relacional de la realidad profunda, sa que
se sita entre la existencia y la inexistencia (y que, por ello, es siempre una rea-
lidad deficiente, ms bien una semi-realidad), es una ontologa dialctica. Edi-
ficada sobre el carcter afirmativo de la negacin, cuando sta es asumida en
su verdadero alcance metafsico, evita la separacin entre dos mbitos irreduc-
tibles e independientes (como seran los del samsara y el nirvana). Por el con-
trario, esta negacin positiva y relativa, esta negacin que, en cierto modo,
puede ser todo, permite reconducirlos a una unidad, de acuerdo con la tesis
bsica del mahayana (segn la cual, el samsara es el nirvana). Naturalmen-
te, no se trata de una dialctica de la Idea Absoluta, porque no hay una sntesis
conceptual final, y porque no es cierto que la concepcin de la realidad que pro-
pone est presidida por la Razn. La semi-realidad profunda que presupone
la filosofa de Nagarjuna no es el despliegue de la Razn hegeliana. Ms bien,
se trata de una dialctica deconstructiva, porque desenmascara la falsedad de
todos los conceptos y tesis unilaterales, su constitutiva negatividad, sin propo-
ner una sntesis final en la que queden superadas. El resultado final al que aboca
este planteamiento, si es que hay que sealar alguno, es la propia dialctica del

NAGARJUNA, op. cit., p. 181.


35

NAGARJUNA, op. cit., p. 177.


36

37
ROCHARD H. ROBINSON, Some logical aspects of Nagarjunas system, en Philosophy
East and West, vol. 6, 1957. Citado por Juan Navarro Arnau en: NAGARJUNA, op. cit., pp. 177 y
179, nota 184.

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A. GMEZ, NAGARJUNA Y LA DIALCTIVA DEL ORIGEN CONDICIONADO 887

condicionamiento recproco y universal de todo lo existente, de su ausencia de


naturaleza propia, de su intrnseca vacuidad. Slo existe propiamente la inter-
dependencia universal que no podemos expresar con conceptos (esa inefable
identidad del samsara y el nirvana), pues cada concepto se refiere a una cosa
aislada, abstracta y, en cuanto tal, puramente fenomnica. De ah la relatividad
universal de todas las (dems) doctrinas.

c/ de la Virgen, 73, 3-A ALFONSO GMEZ FERNNDEZ


28049 Ciempozuelos (Madrid)
alfonso.gomez@educa.madrid.org

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

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EL RETORNO A LA UNIDAD
CUERPO-MENTE
Encuentro de ascesis, terapia y filosofa en Japn
JUAN MASI CLAVEL
Sophia University (Tokyo) / St. Thomas University (Osaka)

MOE KUWANO
Universidad Ramon Llull (Barcelona)

RESUMEN: Los autores han escogido tres personas representativas cuyo pensamiento apunta el cami-
no de retorno hacia la unidad bsica mente-cuerpo en el ser humano, a travs de la integracin del
poder de lo inconsciente en la conciencia: Chih-i (538-597), un monje budista chino; Yasuo Yuasa (1925-
2005), un filsofo japons; y Haruchika Noguchi (1911-1976), un japons que desarroll una terapia
centrada en la interrelacin mente-cuerpo. Los tres coinciden en acentuar la espiritualidad, filosofa y
teraputica sobre el fundamento y el uso del flujo de energa que ha sido descrito en la tradicin chino-
japonesa por medio de la nocin de Ki. Estas tradiciones orientales, en la confluencia de espiritualidad,
filosofa y teraputica son al mismo tiempo una contribucin y un desafio al pensamiento occidental,
al replantear las preguntas en torno al Yo, la Identidad y la Personalidad desde un contexto interdisci-
plinar e intercultural.
PALABRAS CLAVE: cuerpo-mente, filosofa oriental, teraputica, Ki.

Return to the Unity of Body and Mind:


Encounter of Asceticism, Therapy and Philosophy in Japan
ABSTRACT: The authors have chosen three representative persons, whose thought points the way to
return to the basic body-mind unity of the human being through the integration of the power of the
unconscious within consciousness: Chih-i (538-597), a Chinese buddhist monk; Yasuo Yuasa (1925-
2005), a Japanese philosopher; and Haruchika Noguchi (1911-1976), a Japanese who developed a
therapy centered upon the body-mind interrelation. Three of them make a point of focusing spirituality,
philosophy or therapy on grasping and using the flow of energy which has been expressed in the chino-
japanese tradition through the notion of Ki. These oriental traditions, at the crossroads of spirituality,
philosophy and therapy are both a contribution and a challenge to the western thought when revisiting
the questions about self, identity and personhood in an interdisciplinary and intercultural context.
KEY WORDS: body-mind, oriental philosophy, therapy, Ki.

Esta breve nota de reflexin sobre el retorno a la unidad corpreo-espiritual


del ser humano ha sido redactada en forma de mero ensayo como contribucin
al tema del Congreso de la Fundacin Metanexus (Madrid, Universidad Comi-
llas, 2008) sobre Subject, Self and Soul: Transdisciplinary approaches to person-
hood. Hemos elegido tres figuras cuyo pensamiento sirva de hilo conductor para
tratar sobre el retorno a la unidad originaria corpreo-espiritual del ser huma-
no: un monje budista chino, Chih-i (538-597); un filsofo japons, Yasuo Yuasa
(1925-2005), y un terapeuta japons, Haruchika Noguchi (1911-1976), que coin-
ciden en focalizar respectivamente su asctica, pensamiento y terapia en el tema
del KI (en chino, CHI): flujo de energa corpreo-espiritual de la persona. Estas

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tradiciones orientales en la encrucijada de espiritualidad, filosofa y medicina


pueden presentar un reto, a la vez que una aportacin, al tratamiento transdis-
ciplinar de la pregunta por la personeidad.

ESPIRITUALIDAD Y MEDICINA ORIENTAL

La interrelacin entre espiritualidad y medicina es un rasgo de las tradiciones


orientales que el budismo chino hereda de la India y transmite a Japn. Un ejem-
plo tpico es la obra del monje, Chih-I (en chino CHIH-I, o tambin ZHI-YI; en
japons, CHIGI o CHISHA), fundador de la corriente budista conocida con el nom-
bre de Tien Tai, en chino (por la montaa del mismo nombre, donde estaba empla-
zado su templo), y Tendai, en japons. Su obra Pararse a contemplar (Shshikan)
es un manual para sus novicios, en el que se muestra preocupado al mismo tiem-
po por el cuidado higinico del cuerpo y la salud espiritual de la mente. Esta obra
es un manual de espiritualidad; pero hay que tener en cuenta que la espirituali-
dad, en Oriente, es corporalidad. La obra es, a la vez, un manual de meditacin y
un vademcum de salud. Equivaldra a lo que llamaramos con terminologa de
la tradicin occidental ejercicios espirituales que seran, ms exactamente, entre-
namientos corpreo-espirituales.
Llama la atencin en este manual su insistencia en dar consejos concretos
sobre cuidado corporal cuando trata sobre prcticas ascticas, meditacin y
contemplacin. Pero, por otra parte, cuando trata sobre salud y enfermedad,
insiste en recomendar la meditacin y contemplacin como terapia. Al monje
que va a meditar le recomienda que cuide primero la higiene de garganta, nariz
y odos; que haga grgaras, limpie bien sus cavidades nasales y se ejercite en
respirar bien; que no se precipite a sumergirse en el mundo del espritu sin dar
antes importancia a los preparativos del cuerpo. Pero cuando el monje Chih-I
se pone a dar consejos para prevenir o curar enfermedades, insiste en que la
meditacin y contemplacin son magnficos recursos de prevencin y terapia.
Repite a menudo que hay siempre algo psquico en toda dolencia o achaque
somtico. Dos temas emblemticos de su pensamiento son: 1) Para curar el cuer-
po, calmar la mente, y 2) para pacificar la mente, cuidar el cuerpo. Las dos pala-
bras clave, tal como aparecen en el ttulo mismo de su obras son pausa y con-
templacin. Pausa, para respirar hondo. Contemplacin, para ver la realidad
sin engaarse.
En Occidente arrastramos el lastre de una excesiva separacin de lo corpo-
ral y lo espiritual (mental, anmico). Hay un refrn japons muy conocido que
dice as: yamai wa ki kara. Significa: las enfermedades provienen del KI, es decir,
del estado de nimo, del modo con que circula ms o menos fluidamente la ener-
ga corpreo-espiritual. Hay, en toda enfermedad un componente psquico. En
la tradicin budista se dice que todos somos, desde que nacemos, enfermos por
naturaleza; nacemos, se dice, siendo portadores de 404 enfermedades. El ser
humano es un ser enfermo que nace y ha de convivir con las enfermedades. Esas

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J. MASI - M. KUWANO, EL RETORNO A LA UNIDAD CUERPO-MENTE 891

404 enfermedades estn ya desde el principio dentro de nuestro cuerpo, pero


son como una red de iluminacin con los interruptores desconectados. Se conec-
tan cuando surge alguna ocasin o condicin para ello (lo que los budistas
llaman, en japons, un EN, una relacin condicionante). Ah entra el papel de
lo psquico, desencadenando el proceso de la enfermedad. Se insiste en la nece-
sidad de lucidez para asumir que las enfermedades, muy a menudo, no se curan.
En esos casos, de lo que se trata es de conocer y asumir la propia limitacin
(como dice el refrn budista: taru wo shiru, percatarse del lmite, no empear-
se en traspasarlo). Al percatarse el sujeto de que la enfermedad va a seguir estan-
do ah, sin curarse, reconoce que ha de convivir y familiarizarse con ella. Una
palabra tpica para esto en japons es dji, compuesta de dos caracteres que sig-
nifican respectivamente acompaar y curar. La persona enferma convive o
camina acompaando a su enfermedad y acompaada por ella. Quien acom-
paa a la persona enferma camina tambin junto a ella. Para curar, hay que
acompaar; acompaar es curar. Por eso, a la medicina se la llama tradicio-
nalmente, en japons, el arte de la benevolencia (jin-jutsu). Este enfoque influ-
ye tambin en una manera de cuidar la salud, que se llama en japons cultivar
la vida (ysei). Es el equivalente, quizs, de lo que llamaramos medicina pre-
ventiva: cuidar de tal modo el equilibrio del cuerpo, la alimentacin, el ejerci-
cio fsico, etc., que se evite la aparicin de alguna de las posibles enfermedades
que llevamos dentro.
Volviendo al manual de espiritualidad del budismo de Tendai, el monje
Chih-I dedica uno de sus diez captulos a las enfermedades. Recopila diez mto-
dos de concentracin mental como terapia, doce mtodos de ordenar la respi-
racin, tambin como terapia, 72 mtodos de curarse mediante la meditacin, etc.
Todo esto tomado de la tradicin que se refleja desde antiguo en textos de los
sutras o escrituras sagradas budistas. Dice Chi-I que hay unas causas externas
y otras internas de las enfermedades. Entre las externas pone la ruptura de equi-
librio entre los cuatro elementos: tierra, agua, fuego y aire. Entre las internas,
las afecciones de los rganos, como el corazn, el hgado, el rin, etc. Pero a
estas causas se unen las condiciones, es decir, la manera como nuestro nimo
intranquilo, disperso, tenso, etc., condiciona el desencadenarse de las enferme-
dades. Para curarse, recomienda que, as como el nimo ha contribuido a la apa-
ricin de la enfermedad, influya tambin para ayudarnos a hacerla desapare-
cer, si se puede, o a convivir con ella, si no se la puede hacer desaparecer. Propone
entonces los dos mtodos que vertebran su manual: la pausa para respirar bien
y la pausa para contemplar bien la realidad. Con otras palabras, saborear y saber.
Detente un poco, prate a respirar; haz una pausa para ver las cosas como son,
no exageres y prate a contemplar: tal es el lema de Chih-I, que aprendi de
sus mentores en la escuela del Zen el arte no mera tcnica de sentarse en
postura de loto a respirar y meditar; de ah brota, nos dice, un encuentro a fondo
consigo mismo y el conocimiento sapiencial acerca del rostro autntico de la
realidad, a la vez que una fuente de salud corporal y psquica.

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892 J. MASI - M. KUWANO, EL RETORNO A LA UNIDAD CUERPO-MENTE

La tradicin, oriunda de la India, en la que l se inspira para su manual (que


es un manual de meditacin y a la vez de salud corporal y mental) se resuma
en dos palabras snscritas: samathi, que significa apaciguamiento o calma, y
vipasyana, que se traduce por lucidez, clarividencia, sabidura. Es decir, calmar
los altibajos de la mente agitada y observar el mundo de las apariencias con
conocimiento sapiencial, desengandose de los espejismos que nos ocultan la
realidad. La traduccin china, con la verticalidad y visualidad de su escritura,
y la prctica del Zen enriquecieron esta espiritualidad, plasmada en dos carac-
teres ideogrficos que significan respectivamente parada y mirada, dete-
nerse y contemplar. Ledos con pronunciacin japonesa, se pronuncian: shi-kan
(en chino, chih-kuan o zhiguan). Shi: detenerse, pararse a respirar, concentra-
cin. Kan: mirar de otro modo, mirar de nuevo, mirar al fondo, contemplacin
sapiencial. Se podra traducir como pausa contemplativa 1. Dos caras de esta
postura son: saborear y saber. Parafraseando al maestro Chih-I: saborear sin
saber es huero; saber sin saborear es fro. Sin respirar bien, no hay sabidura;
sin sabidura, sabe a poco el respirar. Ni el saber de muchas palabras satisface,
ni el silencio ignorante alimenta el espritu. La espiritualidad empieza por el
apaciguamiento de la corporalidad y el cuerpo humano pide hacerse espritu.
Hasta aqu una simple muestra, tomada de un autor del siglo VI, para colo-
car como teln de fondo de nuestra reflexin esta tradicin de espiritualidad
que ha alimentado el pensamiento de filsofos y la prctica de terapeutas tam-
bin en el siglo XX y sigue presentando en nuestros das el reto y aportacin men-
cionados al comienzo de este ensayo. Pasemos ahora a fijarnos en un filsofo,
Yuasa, y un terapeuta, Noguchi, que piensan y aplican respectivamente el flujo
de energa corpreo-psquica llamado en japons Ki y en chino Chi.i

YASUO YUASA: UN FILSOFO PIENSA EL KI

Desde finales de la dcada de los setenta hubo en Japn un inters renova-


do por el tema de la religiosidad y espiritualidad por parte de algunas figuras
representativas del pensamiento filosfico, entre las que destaca Yasuo Yuasa.
Ocurre esto en el contexto de interesarse por relacionar cuestionamientos con-
temporneos con la cultura tradicional. El profesor de sociologa religiosa Susu-
mu Shimazono designa a estos pensadores con el nombre de intelectuales espi-
rituales, porque tratan de descubrir en los movimientos contemporneos de
espiritualidad aspectos que conectan con antiguas tradiciones culturales de
Oriente. Segn este socilogo tienen, de hecho, ms influjo estos pensadores
que aquellos otros identificados con una determinada religin 2.

1
Para la traduccin espaola, elegimos el ttulo de Pararse a contemplar (Sgueme, Sala-
manca, 2006).
2
SUSUMU SHIMAZONO, From salvation to spirituality, Trans Pacific Press, Melbourne,
2004, 275.

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J. MASI - M. KUWANO, EL RETORNO A LA UNIDAD CUERPO-MENTE 893

Yuasa pertenece a la generacin siguiente a las grandes figuras de la filoso-


fa moderna japonesa, Nishida (1870-1945) y Watsuji (1889-1960), siendo dis-
cpulo de este ltimo y continuador de su reflexin tica y de historia del pen-
samiento japons. Es una de las figuras representativas de la filosofa japonesa
en la segunda mitad del siglo XX. Su fallecimiento sorprendi sin concluir la
publicacin de sus obras completas, hoy ya doce tomos 3.
Y. Yuasa public en 1970 uno de sus mejores estudios comparativos sobre
el tema de la persona en los filsofos modernos japoneses cotejados con la filo-
sofa europea y con los enfoques fenomenolgicos contemporneos sobre la sub-
jetividad 4. Concluye esa obra con el contraste entre el sujeto europeo que se
afirma fuertemente a s mismo y, cuando se abre a lo trascendente, lo hace tras-
cendiendo hacia fuera o hacia arriba, con otro tipo de sujeto en autores orien-
tales como Watsuji o Nishida: un sujeto que se difumina y trasciende ms bien
hacia abajo o hacia adentro, de modo ms receptivo que activo 5. En los aos
siguientes publica varias obras de historia del pensamiento japons 6. En su obra
de 1977 sobre el cuerpo convergen varias lneas de inters de su trayectoria inte-
lectual: las tradiciones ascticas orientales (haba practicado el yoga), la psico-
loga de Jung (escribi varios libros sobre su anlisis psicolgico) 7 y su preocu-
pacin por la filosofa comparada 8, sobre todo por lo que se refiere al contraste
entre los enfoques occidentales y orientales sobre la persona y la trascendencia.
Si se hubiera limitado a proseguir las investigaciones sobre la tradicin del pen-
samiento japons, quizs no habra salido del mbito de la historia de la filo-
sofa. Si se hubiera limitado a su inters por la psicologa religiosa y la para-
psicologa, quizs se habra alejado del mundo filosfico acadmico de Japn.
Pero su vocacin de filosofar y su mentalidad favorable a los puentes interdis-
ciplinares le llev a conjugar espiritualidad, psicologa profunda y filosofa en
su estudio sobre el cuerpo y el KI 9.
Cuando se habla en Occidente de autocultivo o autoayuda se tiende a acen-
tuar el control mental. Pero en las tradiciones del hinduismo, budismo o
taosmo, el autocultivo espiritual es, ante todo, corporal. Se cultiva el creci-
miento e integracin espiritual de la persona comenzando por prcticas de
entrenamiento fsico y corporal. Yuasa trata de conectar estas tradiciones con

3
YASUO YUASA, Obras, ed. Hakua, Tokyo, desde 1999, 12 vols.
4
Y. YUASA, Filosofa moderna japonesa y pensamiento existencial, Sbunsha, Tokyo, 1970.
5
Id., 377.
6
El nacimiento de los dioses. Los mitos japoneses desde la perspectiva de historia del pen-
samiento, en 1972; El mundo espiritual de la antigedad japonesa, en 1980; La conciencia reli-
giosa japonesa, en 1982, y La profundidad de la cultura oriental, en 1982.
7
Jung y el cristianismo, en 1978; Jung y el espritu europeo, en 1979.
8
D. E. SHANER, S. NAGATOMO e Y. YUASA, Science and Comparative Philosophy, Brill, Lei-
den, 1989.
9
Y. YUASA, El cuerpo: Perspectiva oriental sobre cuerpo y mente, 1977 (trad. ingl. por Naga-
tomo Shigenori y Th. P. Kasulis, The Body, State Uniersity of New York Press, Albany, 1987;
El KI, la espiritualidad y el cuerpo (Ki, shugyo, shintai), ed. Hirakawa, Tokyo, 1986; Qu es el
KI? La energa que emana del cuerpo.

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894 J. MASI - M. KUWANO, EL RETORNO A LA UNIDAD CUERPO-MENTE

lo aprendido en la psicologa profunda o en la fenomenologa existencial, pero


vertebrndolo con el enfoque de la subjetividad en pensadores como Nishida
y Watsuji: una persona y mente inseparables del cuerpo, as como una posible
trascendencia inseparable de la inmanencia 10. Como hilo conductor de toda
esta reflexin, la nocin clave del Ki: el flujo de energa corpreo-espiritual de
la persona.
Necesitamos, dice, una nueva filosofa de los estratos ms profundos de la
conciencia. No se centrar esta filosofa en descubrir la base de las certidum-
bres del sujeto consciente. Buscar ms bien el autntico sentido de la expe-
riencia humana en lo autntico del yo oculto en lo hondo de la conciencia 11. La
tradicin de la filosofa oriental, representada por el budismo, nos conducira,
en opinin de Yuasa, hacia un trascender hacia adentro ms que hacia afuera
o hacia arriba. Al decir hacia dentro, lo entiende en un doble sentido: hacia
dentro del cuerpo, arraigando la conciencia en la corporalidad, y hacia el fondo
del inconsciente: trascender tras-descendiendo 12.
Yuasa percibe un contraste muy fuerte entre el yo claro de los pensadores
europeos y el yo difuminado de la tradicin oriental subyacente a los filsofos
japoneses. Sigue en esto la intuicin de su maestro Watsuji. El yo occidental le
parece un yo muy claro al hacer proyectos, al realizarlos, al distinguirse de los
otros, al expresar y formular lo que piensa, al definir sus propias posturas fren-
te a los dems, al afirmarse a s mismo. Por otra parte, del lado japons, encuen-
tra un yo que queda difuminado en el marco del propio cuerpo, del propio grupo
comunitario de pertenencia, del silencio receptivo, o del perderse en el conjun-
to del Todo 13.
Yuasa se ha referido a menudo al arraigo profundo en la tradicin oriental
del mayor de los filsofos japoneses, K. Nishida (1870-1945), que conoca muy
bien a Hegel y a Bergson, pero, a la vez, bebi en la fuente de su prctica del
Zen y en la tradicin budista. Nishida insista en ahondar en lo profundo de s
para que aflore la verdad sobre s mismo. Hay que pensar, deca, con todo el
cuerpo, en el que el espritu se encarna; hay que estribar ms en la intuicin;
hay que buscar ms all de la conciencia superficial lo profundo del yo que pre-
cede a la distincin sujeto-objeto; hay que ahondar y sumergirse en lo concre-
to y singular para llegar a la universalidad; hay que hacer que el pensamiento
se haga lo pensado y que el mirar se identifique con lo mirado; hay que pene-
trar de ese modo a travs del ahora en lo eterno de la corriente de la vida 14.
En la citada obra de Yuasa sobre los filsofos modernos japoneses compa-
rados con los europeos destaca el autor el fuerte influjo de la filosofa moderna

10
Y. YUASA, Sobre el cuerpo. Teoras orientales sobre cuerpo-mente (Shintairon. Tyteki
shinshinron to gendai), Kodansha, Tokyo, 1990 (citamos por esta edicin actualizada), 44-47
y 89-92.
11
Ibid., 67.
12
Ibid., 289.
13
Ibid., 95.
14
Ibid., 73.

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occidental sobre Nishida. Pero, al mismo tiempo, subraya que en la parte esen-
cial de su pensamiento se detecta un sentimiento de extraeza o malestar ante
ese mundo occidental por el que se estaba dejando influir tanto. La moderni-
dad de Nishida se pone de manifiesto, segn Yuasa, en su preocupacin fun-
damental por el problema del yo, por su descubrimiento, su consolidacin y su
revisin crtica. Pero esta toma de conciencia se realiza a nivel de esa experien-
cia originaria de unidad que Nishida llamaba el lugar de la Nada o pensar
desde el background 15, desde el teln de fondo, sin dejarse absorber por el obje-
to ni encerrarse en la superficie del sujeto, sino retrotrayndose o sumergin-
dose, a travs del cuerpo, hacia el fondo de la conciencia. A esta actitud la deno-
mina Yuasa trascender hacia dentro, en vez de hacia fuera. Es posible esa
actitud por la presencia de un ethos tradicional japons, por debajo de las ter-
minologas importadas de la filosofa moderna europea. No se afirma con fuer-
za ese yo para salir a conquistar el mundo, sino que se coloca ms bien en una
actitud de receptividad.
A Yuasa le atraa, como a Watsuji 16, el ideal husserliano de ecumene y logos.
Un ideal de ecumene, como convergencia europea de pueblos ms all de las
propias fronteras; un ideal de logos, como convergencia de pareceres en un marco
de dilogo razonado y razonable. Pero Yuasa tema que el ideal de ecumene se
quedase en cosmopolitismo superficial y que el ideal de logos se quedase en olvi-
do del pathos, del cuerpo y del paisaje. Es significativo que Watsuji se interesa-
ra mucho, como tambin Nishida, por Bergson, y que Yuasa se sintiera muy
atrado por Merleu-Ponty. Ambos, Watsuji y Yuasa, suspiraban desde Oriente
por la Europa del logos y la ecumene, pero teman perder races orientales de
contacto con el cuerpo, el paisaje, la tierra o el Todo. Cuando Watsuji lee a Hei-
degger, trata de compensar el nfasis en la temporalidad acentuando ms el
espacio. Cuando Yuasa estudia a los fenomenlogos existenciales europeos, no
oculta su simpata por los que, como Merleau-Ponty, resaltan la importancia
del cuerpo y la percepcin.
Yuasa reflexiona en la citada obra sobre el cuerpo acerca de los recursos de las
tradiciones orientales para ayudar a la persona a retornar a la unidad originaria
corpreo-espiritual. Estaba convencido de que el enigma de la unidad dual o iden-
tidad bipolar del cuerpo-espritu (shinshin) seguir en un atolladero mientras
no dispongamos para pensarla de otros esquemas que no sean ni dualistas ni
monistas. La filosofa, dice Yuasa, ha descuidado durante mucho tiempo el plan-
teamiento radical de este tema, porque no acababa de soltar lastre de una histo-
ria de debates sobre cmo explicar la relacin mutua de un cuerpo y una mente,
pero sin cuestionar a fondo la razn de presuponer su separacin. Hoy, comen-
zando por las neurociencias, los mismos datos empricos nos obligan a repensar
el tema cambiando de paradigma para enfocarlo.

15
KITAR NISHIDA, Pensar desde la Nada, trad. de J. Haidar y J. Masi, con un estudio de
J. Masi, Sgueme, Salamanca, 2006.
16
TETSUR WATSUJI, Antropologa del paisaje, trad. de J. Masi, A. Mataix y J. Haidar, Sgue-
me, Salamanca, 2006.

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896 J. MASI - M. KUWANO, EL RETORNO A LA UNIDAD CUERPO-MENTE

Ya en su estudio sobre la subjetividad de los pensadores japoneses moder-


nos, Yuasa haba puesto de manifiesto el contraste entre los respectivos acer-
camientos occidental y oriental a la subjetividad. El nfasis occidental en el suje-
to se centra en un yo que se afirma, se expande, se impone y, cuando busca una
trascendencia, la persigue ascendiendo ms all de este mundo. El nfasis orien-
tal en salir de s mismo lleva al sujeto a retrotraerse y descender, sumergindo-
se (haishinteki botsuny) en la sima de la conciencia (alaya ishiki, en las escue-
las de budismo Yogacra). Es decir, se trasciende tras-descendiendo, a travs
de una conciencia arraigada en el cuerpo, en lo inconsciente y, ltimamente en
la corriente de la vida. En su filosofa del cuerpo Yuasa ahond en este pen-
samiento resaltando el origen tradicional de la perspectiva sobre el cuerpo en los
filsofos japoneses estudiados en su obra anterior. Concretamente, el cultivo
budista de la espiritualidad (en realidad, corpreo-espiritualidad), el cultivo del
entrenamiento en las artes marciales y el cultivo de la sensibilidad artstica en
las artes plsticas constituan el teln de fondo de la citada captacin corporal
de la subjetividad. Por otra parte, esta constatacin conectaba con el inters de
Yuasa por la fenomenologa existencial y la psicologa profunda europeas. Al
abordar as el tema del cuerpo se vio inmerso como filsofo en la encrucijada de
espiritualidades orientales, psicoterapia y medicina.
No encuentra Yuasa en Oriente el equivalente de la tpica pregunta de la filo-
sofa occidental acerca de cmo se relaciona un cuerpo con un alma, mente o
espritu. La pregunta, en perspectiva oriental, es otra: Cmo recuperar median-
te autocultivo la unidad originaria corpreo-espiritual de la que nos alejamos
en el dualismo de la vida cotidiana? Dos palabras clave de esa reflexin son:
autocultivo asctico (shugyo) y entrenamiento (keiko). Se parte, tanto en asc-
tica como en esttica, de la experiencia y prctica de cultivarse: entrenarse para
retornar a la unidad originaria, en la espiritualidad; identificarse con la reali-
dad tal cual, en la vivencia artstica. Slo hay lugar para teoras sobre cuerpo y
mente a posteriori, tras haber cruzado el umbral de la experiencia y prctica,
ms exactamente, de la unidad integrada corpreo-espiritual, tanto en la medi-
tacin como en la composicin artstica.
Este nfasis en la prctica ms que en la especulacin conecta este pensa-
miento con el inters que las investigaciones empricas han mostrado hacia las
tradiciones ascticas y artsticas orientales. Los maestros del Zen medievales acu-
aron la expresin identidad de cuerpo y mente (shinshin ichinyo). A recupe-
rar esa unidad se aspiraba tanto en la meditacin como en el teatro Noh o en las
artes marciales. En los tres casos salir de s es decisivo. Al pensar as sobre el
cuerpo nos encaminamos a la metafsica a travs de la metapsicologa. Yuasa
desarrolla su concepcin del cuerpo humano adentrndose desde la superficie
consciente al fondo inconsciente en cuatro pasos. Se fija primero en el nivel de
los circuitos sensorio-motrices externos, que conectan el cuerpo con el mundo
externo. Observa a continuacin el mbito de los circuitos cenestsicos, para
pasar, en tercer lugar, al sistema de informacin emotivo-instintivo. A medida
que se pasa del primero al tercero de estos niveles, aumenta la opacidad y dis-

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J. MASI - M. KUWANO, EL RETORNO A LA UNIDAD CUERPO-MENTE 897

minuye la capacidad de control consciente. Contrasta Yuasa al deportista occi-


dental con los autocultivos orientales como, por ejemplo, en las artes marciales,
la ceremonia del te, el arreglo floral o la meditacin. El deportista occidental con-
trola por hbito de entrenamiento parte de los circuitos del segundo nivel; en
cambio, el autocultivo oriental conduce a controlar parte del circuito emotivo-
instintivo. Es un proceso de integracin de lo inconsciente en lo consciente que
se lleva a cabo a travs del cuerpo. De ah la importancia de centrarse en el con-
trol de la respiracin en todos los citados ejercicios (recordemos que ste era el
tema central en el manual de espiritualidad de Chih-I). Yuasa aade un cuarto
circuito, invisible anatmicamente, al que llama cuasi cuerpo inconsciente.
Ah sita el tema del Ki o flujo de energa corpreo-espiritual, sobre el que acta
la medicina china acupunturista. Es ste un tema muy controvertido en el que
se enfrentarn las prcticas teraputicas y las investigaciones fisiolgicas. Para
el filsofo Yuasa ah tocamos una zona de mediacin entre lo consciente y lo
inconsciente a travs del flujo de energa del Ki. Estamos en una zona de con-
fluencia de cuerpo y mente, materia y espritu, dice Yuasa, que es inexplicable con
categoras cartesianas. Ante la pregunta sobre si es verificable empricamente esta
tesis, Yuasa responde aduciendo la tradicin oriental de las prcticas de medita-
cin como el yoga y el zen. En ellas, los dos primeros circuitos suspenden su ope-
ratividad y, a medida que se avanza hacia una integracin ms profunda, se abre
el camino para integrar en la conciencia el poder del inconsciente. Lo que ocu-
rre en estado de quietud en la meditacin tiene su equivalente en movimiento en
la prctica de las artes marciales, el tiro del arco o la ascesis de recitar los man-
tras caminando. En el primer caso es la concentracin receptiva en quietud y en
el segundo en movimiento, los dos aspectos del samathi que aparecan en la obra
de Chih-I. Los maestros de espiritualidad orientales se han referido tradicional-
mente a esta integracin corpreo-espiritual con expresiones famosas como uni-
dad corpreo-mental (shinshin ichinyo), de Eisai (1141-1215) y el diluirse los
lindes de cuerpo y mente (shinshin datsuraku) de Dogen (1200-1253).
Como seala el citado socilogo Shimazono, es significativo que un filsofo
de la altura de Yuasa se mostrara tan interesado en estudiar el arraigo en la cor-
poralidad de las tradiciones ascticas orientales 17. Su reflexin, a la vez que mos-
traba una salida del atolladero en que se atascan las cosmovisiones dualistas,
apoyaba acadmicamente las tendencias de los nuevos movimientos de espiri-
tualidad unidos a las terapias naturistas. Adems, Yuasa trataba de integrar en
su reflexin las aportaciones cientficas de las neurociencias a la comprensin
de la estructura psicosomtica, conjugndolas con los intentos orientales de con-
trolar la relacin psicosomtica en aquellos niveles que desbordan la conciencia
ordinaria. La tradicin mdica china de controlar el flujo del chi (en japons, ki)
desarroll una terapia a base de estimular los puntos (tsubo) y lneas de trans-
misin (keiraku) mediante procedimientos como el de la acupuntura. En la dca-
da de los ochenta del siglo pasado se reaviv, en relacin con los nuevos movi-

17
S. SHIMAZONO, From salvation to spirituality, 286-290.

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898 J. MASI - M. KUWANO, EL RETORNO A LA UNIDAD CUERPO-MENTE

mientos de bsqueda espiritual, el inters por los ejercicios de entrenamiento o


cultivo del Ki, conocidos desde 1956 con el nombre de qi gong o chi kung (en japo-
ns, kik). Desde 1977 se venan haciendo intentos de medir cientficamente el
flujo del Ki. En Japn, se despierta inters por el tema desde la dcada de los
ochenta. En ese contexto, el que desde el mundo filosfico se reflexione sobre el
Ki aporta un peso mayor que la mera presentacin de un modelo de autoayuda
para responder a una demanda de recursos de relajacin a nivel popular. Yuasa
trata de clarificar el tema desde la doble perspectiva cientfica y filosfica, insis-
tiendo en la aportacin de estas tradiciones orientales para superar el dualismo
en ciencia y en filosofa. Shimazono seala tres puntos en comn de esta refle-
xin filosfica con los movimientos en bsqueda de otra espiritualidad posible:
el inters en otros niveles de la realidad diferentes de los que se captan por los
sentidos y la conciencia ordinaria; el esfuerzo por transformar mente y cuerpo
mediante el control de la respiracin y la meditacin, as como las aplicaciones
a la sanacin corporal y psquica; un acercamiento a lo sagrado basado en la
experiencia directa y en la transformacin de cuerpo y mente, ms que en espe-
culaciones tericas; y, finalmente, una expectativa optimista de integrar el cono-
cimiento cientfico y la experiencia espiritual 18.
Yuasa concluye su obra insistiendo en que su concepcin del cuerpo es dual
en el modo de conocer de la vida cotidiana, pero no dualstica ontolgicamente.
Pero esta unidad originaria, que solemos perder en la conciencia cotidiana, es un
logro como meta del proceso de autocultivo a que aspiran las tradiciones ascti-
cas orientales. Esta filosofa del cuerpo-mente como unidad dual sin dualismo
ontolgico concuerda con nociones clsicas orientales como el nirvana budista,
el satori del Zen o la unidad del Tao. El proceso transformador de autocultivo
sera un camino de espiritualidad y, a la vez, de filosofa como descubrimiento de
la autntica realidad mediante un cambio radical de perspectiva cognoscitiva.

LA PRCTICA TERAPUTICA DE HARUCHIKA NOGUCHI

Pasemos ahora, en tercer lugar, a una figura representativa de la aplicacin de


esta tradicin oriental a la prctica del cuidado de la salud: el doctor Haruchika
Noguchi (1911-1976), que inici el mtodo conocido como regulacin del pro-
pio cuerpo (seitai). Consiste en una serie de entrenamientos corporales, compa-
rables a ejercicios gimnsticos, orientados a regular el movimiento espontneo
del propio cuerpo y canalizar correctamente la energa vital del Ki. Tiene algo en
comn con la medicina china tradicional, las gimnasias Tai-chi o el entrenamiento
del Ki en artes marciales, etc., ya que en todas estas prcticas se busca promover
la armona y el equilibrio psicosomtico de la persona a travs del Ki 19.

Ibid., 288-289.
18

H. NOGUCHI, El Ki, principio de vida saludable (Ki, kenk seikatsu no genri), Zenseisha,
19

Tokyo, 1976, 11.

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J. MASI - M. KUWANO, EL RETORNO A LA UNIDAD CUERPO-MENTE 899

El Seitai es un entrenamiento corporal que fomenta la implicacin acti-


va en el mantenimiento y el cuidado de la salud. Busca promover la armona
y el equilibrio energtico del cuerpo, evitando apoyarse en intervenciones tera-
puticas externas, que generan complicaciones y efectos secundarios, y pro-
moviendo la capacidad regeneradora natural del propio cuerpo 20. El cuerpo
almacena un exceso de energa, que bloquea la capacidad que el mismo cuer-
po posee de recuperar el equilibrio y sanarse a s mismo. El mtodo de Nogu-
chi trata de activar esa capacidad de autorregulacin inmanente en el cuerpo.
Noguchi desarroll notablemente la capacidad de observarse a s mismo a tra-
vs del movimiento espontneo y captar el cuerpo como lleno de energa vital,
capaz de autorregularse y llegar a restablecer el equilibrio que pueda haber-
se perdido, tanto a nivel fsico y psquico como espiritual. El resultado es libe-
rarse de las tensiones que bloquean la recuperacin de la salud. Trata de poten-
ciar al mximo la elasticidad interior que posee el organismo para adaptarse
y reaccionar.
Noguchi consideraba la enfermedad, tanto fsica como psquica, como algo
natural, y reconoca en el cuerpo humano una capacidad notable para recu-
perarse por s mismo. Su mtodo intenta servirse de las orientaciones espon-
tneas del cuerpo humano para ayudarle a desbloquear tensiones musculares
excesivas o bloqueos energticos que repercuten en carencias de vitalidad en
zonas determinadas del organismo. Como en todas las terapias, ascticas y
estticas de la tradicin oriental, Noguchi tambin da mucha importancia a
la respiracin, esencial para que el cuerpo retorne a su equilibrio primordial.
En todas las prcticas de este mtodo se insiste en la respiracin, de cuya pro-
fundidad y armona dependen en gran parte el bienestar y la salud general del
organismo. Inhalar y exhalar se van haciendo cada vez ms completa, pro-
funda y fluidamente de forma natural a medida que se practica. Como resul-
tado de la prctica, el organismo se renueva y recupera holsticamente. El
cuerpo humano necesita mantener regulado el equilibrio interior y el de su
relacin con el mundo externo. Lo hace poniendo en funcionamiento sus diver-
sas reactividades, atendiendo a unas exigencias de adaptacin no dependien-
tes de la voluntad y conciencia, sino por medio de movimientos espontneos
que, conjugados con la respiracin y la relajacin muscular, hacen recuperar
la estabilidad psicosomtica.
Para poner en marcha conscientemente lo que el cuerpo est exigiendo incons-
cientemente, ayuda la prctica de una serie de ejercicios que inducen la motili-
dad espontnea del cuerpo. De pie o sentado, con las manos en la boca del est-
mago, se inhala y exhala rtmica y continuadamente, se flexiona el tronco hacia
adelante, de forma que el cuerpo sienta la presin de las manos en el abdomen,
o se gira en rotacin para recuperar la correcta orientacin del eje crneo,
columna y pelvis. Repitiendo estos ejercicios se trata de suscitar explcitamente

20
H. NOGUCHI, La eficacia teraputica del resfriado (Kaze no ky), Zenseisha, Tokyo, 1962,
p. 204.

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900 J. MASI - M. KUWANO, EL RETORNO A LA UNIDAD CUERPO-MENTE

lo que el cuerpo hace por s mismo espontneamente. Hay que aadir que en
estos ejercicios, mientras el cuerpo se relaja, se intenta dejar la mente en vaco
o en blanco. Todo este tipo de entrenamientos relacionados con el sistema extra-
piramidal, adems de fomentar la sensibilidad y receptividad, ayudan positiva-
mente a recuperar la salud y a mantenerse en equilibrio de cuerpo y mente.
En japons se dice a menudo Ki wa kokoro, expresin del refranero cotidia-
no que traduciramos como el Ki es el sentimiento o el Ki es el corazn.
Noguchi comenta este dicho precisando que el Ki no son propiamente los sen-
timientos mismos, sino que sera ms exacto decir que los sentimientos se mue-
ven al comps del movimiento del Ki. El movimiento del cuerpo tambin depen-
de, segn este doctor, de cmo fluye el Ki. Se trata de un esfuerzo o una energa
que hace vivir a la persona y orienta el cultivo de su crecimiento personal. Pero
el Ki no es perceptible por los sentidos. Su existencia precede a todo aquello que
captamos materialmente. Noguchi, al reflexionar sobre este hecho, identifica el
flujo del Ki como esfuerzo vital. El flujo del Ki, segn la manera de utilizarlo,
puede activar el esfuerzo inconsciente que anima cada cuerpo humano. La prc-
tica teraputica iniciada por Noguchi pretende reorientar ese flujo y recuperar
su impulso originario. Por eso se denomina mtodo para arreglar el cuerpo
(seitaih). Consiste bsicamente en reajustar el sistema del flujo del Ki para recu-
perar la salud.
En este mtodo teraputico hay tres practicas principales: 1) el ejercicio fsi-
co para activar el Ki (katsugen undoo); 2) la transmisin interpersonal del Ki
(yuki), y 3) el autocultivo mediante el Ki (gyki).
Katsugen und son una serie de ejercicios corporales, cuya finalidad es desa-
rrollar un movimiento espontneo (principalmente del citado eje cuello-colum-
na vertebral-pelvis) que activara el poder del Ki, influyendo positivamente en
la salud 21. Significa literalmente movimiento en el origen de la vida, y se expli-
ca como movimiento regenerador, un movimiento corporal espontneo y natu-
ral. Al inducirlo, se trata de suspender momentneamente la accin del sistema
voluntario y dejar que el organismo trabaje solo, sin darle rdenes que ejecutar,
de forma que, poco a poco, ste se normalice buscando reestablecer el equilibrio
perdido. Es un movimiento corporal, una especie de gimnasia involuntaria e
inconsciente, que hace que el cuerpo se mueva libremente en un estado recepti-
vo. La base terica de estas prcticas es la unidad e inseparabilidad de cuerpo y
mente, que se descubre precisamente como consecuencia de la activacin del
flujo de energa vital del Ki. Es algo que resulta difcil de comprender cuando se
quiere trazar la lnea ntida de separacin entre lo consciente y lo inconsciente,
ya que el Ki se sita en la zona difuminada entre ambos niveles. No podemos
inducir artificialmente lo involuntario, pero s podemos poner voluntariamente
las condiciones para que aflore a la superficie.
Un segundo ejercicio es la transmisin del Ki, llamada yuki. Consiste en
enviar el flujo del ki al cuerpo de la otra persona para provocar el nimo o

21
H. NOGUCHI, Introduccin al mtodo Seitai (Seita nymon), 34-40.

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J. MASI - M. KUWANO, EL RETORNO A LA UNIDAD CUERPO-MENTE 901

esfuerzo que favorezca su salud. El efecto del yuki puede activar el movimiento
inconsciente del cuerpo mutuamente mediante la transmisin del Ki a la otra
persona.
El tercer ejercicio se denomina Gyki y tiene el carcter de cultivo personal;
consiste en enviar el Ki a la columna vertebral para facilitar la concentracin de
la mente. Como consecuencia, surgir la energa dentro del cuerpo y se recupe-
rar tanto la salud corporal como la mental. La conjugacin de estos tres ejerci-
cios desemboca en una puesta entre parntesis de los sistemas neuro-motores
voluntarios para dar luz verde a lo involuntario. Por eso no se prescribe en forma
de manual un determinado movimiento exclusivamente, sino se hace por dar va
libre a la espontaneidad corporal y dejar que el cuerpo acte y reaccione por s
mismo. Incluso aplicar a estos mtodos la nocin misma de terapia es inexacto,
ya que no se trata de una intervencin desde fuera, sino de confiar en la capaci-
dad natural autoteraputica del propio cuerpo. Acompaamos as consciente-
mente la espontaneidad inconsciente de la vida. El cuerpo tiende por s mismo
a reorientarse cada vez que se desva. Hay que dejarle que lo haga sin imponer-
le unilateralmente una tcnica de rehabilitacin. La orientacin la lleva dentro
de s mismo y su ruta la definen los meridianos del Ki, cuyos puntos estimula la
acupuntura tradicional.
Noguchi sostiene que la salud es consecuencia de cmo usa uno el propio
cuerpo. Para mantener la salud hay que controlar, dice, el movimiento del pro-
pio cuerpo, as como el Ki, que acta desde dentro del mismo cuerpo. Lo tres
ejercicios citados ayudan a conducir el movimiento del cuerpo, reorientndolo
correctamente, y a activar el poder positivo del Ki para mantener la salud y el
equilibrio interior, recuperando el equilibrio de cuerpo y mente.
No nos podemos extender aqu en introducir los detalles del mtodo de
Noguchi. Lo que nos interesaba subrayar, sobre todo, era que esa prctica se
apoya en una concepcin natural de la medicina y una filosofa de la unidad
corpreo-espiritual del ser humano, tal como la expone el mismo Noguchi en
su introduccin al mtodo descubierto e iniciado por l. El cuerpo y la mente
son inseparables La capacidad adaptativa-reactiva del cuerpo humano es lo
que nos hace vivir La clave de esta fuerza vital y vitalizadora es el flujo de
energa del Ki 22.

CONCLUSIN: UN RETO PARA EL PENSAMIENTO OCCIDENTAL SOBRE PERSONEIDAD


Y CORPORALIDAD

Estas perspectivas orientales sobre el cuerpo nos invitan a pensar la perso-


na y la posible trascendencia a partir de unos enfoques centrados y arraigados
en la corporalidad. Esto supone un reto para la tradicin occidental excesiva-

22
H. NOGUCHI, Fundamentos del mtodo Seitai (Seitah no Kiso), Zenseisha, Tokyo,
1977, 36-41.

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902 J. MASI - M. KUWANO, EL RETORNO A LA UNIDAD CUERPO-MENTE

mente centrada en el sujeto individual y con tendencia a privilegiar el espritu


separado del cuerpo y la trascendencia separada de este mundo. La aportacin
de las tres figuras presentadas aqu un maestro espiritual, un filsofo y un
terapeuta coincide en el rasgo comn de acentuar el proceso de transforma-
cin de la experiencia cotidiana del cuerpo y la mente, encaminndonos hacia
un retorno a la unidad originaria de ambos, que creemos podra y debera reper-
cutir en nuestras concepciones de la persona y la trascendencia.

Nada-ku, Shinohara-Kitamachi, 1-8-25 JUAN MASI CLAVEL


Kobe 657-0068
masiaster@gmail.com
San Alejandro 64, segundo, tercera MOE KUWANO
08031 Barcelona
bl-moemoe@nifty.com

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

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INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA


EN NICOLS DE CUSA
MANUEL CABADA CASTRO
Universidad Complutense de Madrid

RESUMEN: Nicols de Cusa, desde su modo unitario, filosfico y teolgico a un tiempo, de pensar, no
dej de abordar la cuestin de lo mstico en relacin con la temtica de la infinitud, tan central en l.
Tal cuestin constituye el eje de las reflexiones de su escrito De visione Dei, dedicado y enviado a los
monjes benedictinos de Tegernsee, y de la comunicacin epistolar que mantiene asimismo con stos.
El Cusano profundiza aqu en el ver (un ver de Dios y del hombre en mutua y dispar relacin). Es la
infinitud divina la que hace que la divinidad se convierta en el Cusano, en la invisibilidad de lo visible.
En este artculo se analizan la conexin del pensamiento del Cusano con la teologa mstica del Pseu-
do-Dionisio Areopagita, la relacin entre conocimiento y afectividad en la dimensin mstica en el con-
texto de las discusiones de su poca al respecto y, en general, el entronque de la concepcin mstica
del Cusano con su propia sistemtica filosfica y con su visin cristiana del mundo.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Nicols de Cusa, infinitud, mstica.

Divine Infinitude and Mystical Vision in Nicolas of Cusa


ABSTRACT: Employing his unitary manner of thinking, which is simultaneously philosophical and the-
ological, Nicolas of Cusa did not cease to deal with the question of the mystical in relation to the infini-
te, a theme that was very central for him. Such question constituted the pivotal point of the reflections
in his De visione Dei, which he dedicated and sent to the Benedictine monks of Tegernsee, and in his
correspondences with them. In these works, Nicolas provided an in-depth treatment of seeing, a
seeing of God and of man in a mutual and different relation. It is the divine infinitude itself that con-
verts divinity in Nicolas, in the invisibility of the visible. The present article analyzes the connection
between Nicolas thinking and the mystical theology of Pseudo-Dionysius The Areopagite, the link bet-
ween knowledge and affectivity in the mystical dimension within the context of the discussions about
this matter during his time, and, in general, the relation among Nicolas mystical concept, his own sys-
tematic philosophy, and his Christian vision of the world.
KEY WORDS: Nicolas of Cusa, infinitude, mystical.

El pensamiento de Nicols de Cusa opera de manera unitaria y en mutua o


recproca fecundacin en los mbitos filosfico y teolgico. De aqu que, aunque
en principio podra resultar extrao que un filsofo tan destacado e innovador,
tal como l lo fue entre el final de la edad media y el comienzo de la modernidad,
reflexione sobre la dimensin mstica humana, ello es por tal razn perfectamente
comprensible. Se podra pensar tambin, sin embargo, que, aunque l fue hom-
bre de iglesia, obispo, cardenal, delegado pontificio y reformador, esto mismo
podra haberle alejado de las profundidades interiores y de las sutilezas especu-
lativas de lo mstico. Pero me parece que es justamente esta rara y equilibrada
conjuncin de capacidad especulativa filosfica, interior experiencia teolgica y
praxis eclesial de gobierno lo que le convierte en importante figura de referencia
en relacin con un concreto modo de acceder a la comprensin de lo mstico 1.
1
Hace ya algunos aos que Alois M. Haas critic justamente determinadas interpretacio-
nes del pensamiento de Nicols de Cusa que no acertaban a ver la importancia que la dimensin

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904 M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA

Pues bien, uno de sus escritos ms importantes y sutiles, el De visione Dei


(Acerca de la visin de Dios), redactado en los ltimos meses de 1453 (su redac-
cin concluy el 8 de noviembre de este ao) 2, fue dedicado y enviado por su
autor, entonces ya cardenal y obispo de Brixen, a sus conocidos y amigos, el
abad y los monjes benedictinos del monasterio bvaro de Tegernsee, a orillas
del lago del mismo nombre, a unos cincuenta kilmetros al sur de Munich. Este
escrito es en realidad una exigente introduccin a la teologa mstica, basada,
tal como lo indica el propio ttulo, en una especie de fenomenologa, de signo
metafsico, de la visin, del ver 3.
Tal ver tiene un doble sentido. El genitivo del de Dios del De visione Dei
es, en efecto, a la vez genitivo subjetivo y objetivo, es decir, un ver por parte
de Dios, en cuanto sujeto que ve, y tambin un ser visto el mismo Dios, en
cuanto objeto del vidente humano, aunque sea naturalmente el primer ver
(el ver del Dios que ve) el verdaderamente primario y fundamentante 4.
En efecto, el ver activo divino es un ver omniabarcante, superando cualquier
perspectiva, cualquier ngulo, limitado o parcial, de visin:
Tu visin as se expresa el Cusano en su escrito, en sostenido dilogo,
a la manera agustiniana, con Dios, al ser ojo o espejo vivo, lo ve todo en s.
Es, en realidad, la causa de todo lo visible. Por eso lo abarca y lo ve todo en la
causa y la razn de todo, es decir, en s misma. Tu ojo, Seor, lo alcanza todo,
sin cambio en s [sine flexione]. El que nuestro ojo se dirija a un objeto pro-
cede de que nuestra visin ve en una determinada perspectiva [per angulum
quantum]. La perspectiva [Angulus], en cambio, de tu ojo, oh Dios, no es deter-
minada, sino infinita, como un crculo, una esfera infinita, porque tu visin es
el ojo de la esfericidad y de la perfeccin infinita. Pues todo lo ve simultnea-
mente alrededor, hacia arriba y hacia abajo 5.

de lo mstico tiene en l. Cf. ALOIS MARIA HAAS, Deum mistice videre in caligine coincidencie.
Zum Verhltnis Nikolaus von Kues zur Mystik (Basel / Frankfurt, Verl. Helbing & Lichtenhahn,
1989), 9-11. Recientemente ha vuelto a insistir Bernard McGinn sobre que el lugar de Nicols
de Cusa en la historia de la mstica cristiana no ha sido an plenamente apreciado (B. MCGINN,
Nicolas de Cues sur la vision de Dieu, en La naissance de Dieu dans lme chez Eckhart et Nico-
las de Cues, ed. Marie-Anne Vannier, Pars, Cerf, 2006, p. 158).
2
Cf. W. BEIERWALTES, Mystische Elemente im Denken des Cusanus, en Deutsche Mys-
tik im abendlndischen Zusammenhang, Kolloquium Kloster Fischingen, 1998 (hrsg. von W.
Haug u. W. Schneider-Lastin), Tbingen, Max Niemeyer, 2000, 426.
3
B. McGinn indica acerca del De visione Dei que, si se lo relaciona o compara con otros
modos de formulacin de lo mstico de su poca, es ms que un simple resumen de lo que
ha sido dicho antes del mismo, es una nueva creacin (MCGINN, o.c., 158).
4
Tal como indica Alois M. Haas, en relacin con este primario ver de Dios en el Cusa-
no: El ver de Dios precede siempre al ver humano, de tal manera que el hombre mirado por
Dios ha de tener en todo momento el sentimiento de que l es el exclusivamente escogido por
tal mirada (HAAS, Deum, 32). Sobre la centralidad de la reflexin acerca de este ver en el
De visione Dei comenta W. A. Euler que el entrelazamiento del ver divino y del, por ste posi-
bilitado, ver de Dios por parte del hombre es el gran tema de todo el escrito (WALTER A. EULER,
Die beiden Schriften De pace fidei und De visione Dei aus dem Jahre 1453, en Mitteilungen
und Forschungsbeitrge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft, Trier, Paulinus Verl., 1995, 196).
5
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, VIII (NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Philosophisch-Theologische
Schriften, ed. L. Gabriel, Wien, Herder, 1964ss, III, 126).

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M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA 905

La infinitud que aqu aparece ya como caracterizando el ver divino es as


porque tal ver se identifica con la misma esencia de la divinidad, que no es
sino infinitud: Tu ver es, Seor, la esencia tuya 6. Y como la esencia divina est
en todo, as tambin su ver: Si tu esencia lo penetra todo, tambin por tanto
tu visin, que es tu esencia 7.
Pero no se trata de un ver divino mera o pasivamente contemplativo. Es
un ver activo. Es un ver que es accin: tu ver es hacer [operari] 8. Y en
esta accin, en este hacer del ver divino, el amar es constitutivo prima-
rio: Tu amar es tu ver 9.
De modo que, en definitiva, el ser de Dios, su verme y su amarme estn
mutuamente implicados en la misma accin: Tu ver, Seor, es amar; y as como
tu vista tan atentamente me mira que nunca se aparta de m, as tambin tu
amor. Y dado que tu amor est siempre conmigo y no es otra cosa el amor sino
t mismo que me amas, de aqu que t ests, Seor, siempre conmigo 10.
Con ello est poniendo el Cusano las bases especulativas 11 (en su sentido
original) de toda visin mstica humana. Porque por el ver hacedor y aman-
te de Dios la creacin toda se eleva sobre s misma hacia la divinidad infinita,
crculo infinito de todos los crculos. El Cusano se referir a ello en un escrito
que redacta tambin, como el De visione Dei, en los postreros meses del mismo
ao 1453. Se trata de su Complementum theologicum. Obsrvese la audacia y
dialctica de este relevante pasaje cusaniano, en perfecta continuidad con sus
reflexiones del De visione Dei:
La visin y el ver son en Dios una misma cosa. Pues el que Dios es la visin
de los videntes significa que lo ve todo. A la pregunta de si se comporta de modo
diferente al verse a s mismo y al ver a las criaturas, se responde de la siguien-
te manera: a la igualdad [aequalitati] infinita no le corresponde la alteridad,
sino la identidad. Al verse, pues, a s mismo, ve tambin al mismo tiempo todas
las cosas creadas; en modo alguno se ve a s mismo y ve las otras cosas de mane-
ra diferente. Al ver las cosas creadas, se ve simultneamente a s mismo. Digo
las cosas creadas, porque stas no son vistas de manera perfecta si no se ve al
Creador. El efecto no es visto perfectamente en cuanto tal si no es vista tam-
bin la causa. Ahora bien, la visin de Dios es perfectsima y, vindose a s
mismo, dado que es causa, ve todas las cosas causadas, y al ver las cosas cau-
sadas, por ser tales, se ve a s mismo, puesto que es la causa [] De este modo,

6
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, IX (D., Philosophisch, III, 128). Cf. NIKOLAUS VON
KUES, De visione Dei, IV (D., Philosophisch, III, 104); D., o.c., XII (D., Philosophisch, III:
142, 144).
7
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, IX (D., Philosophisch, III, 130).
8
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, V (D., Philosophisch, III, 110).
9
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, VIII (D., Philosophisch, III, 122).
10
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, IV (D., Philosophisch, III, 104).
11
W. Beierwaltes ha puesto bien de relieve esta especificidad de la mstica cusaniana como
especulativa en el sentido de que se basa toda ella en el ver, lo que se muestra en el len-
guaje mismo utilizado por el Cusano al respecto: videre, visio, visus y sus sinnimos contem-
plari, inspicere, intuitus, intuitio, intueri, speculari, speculatio, theoria, theorizare, etc. Cf. BEIER-
WALTES, Mystische, 440.

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906 M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA

ver y ser visto coinciden, verse a s mismo es ser visto por s mismo, ver las cria-
turas es ser visto en las criaturas. Lo mismo ocurre si se trata de la creacin,
pues en Dios la creacin es visin. El crear, el ver, el entender, el querer, el
medir, el hacer, el operar y similares atributos que asignamos a Dios han de ser
considerados como denominaciones del crculo infinito. No es, por tanto, ms
absurdo decir que Dios se crea a s mismo y todas las cosas que decir que Dios
se ve a s mismo y todas las cosas, y que crear todas las cosas es crearse en todas.
Si bien las palabras humanas, al estar referidas a las cosas finitas, no son aptas
para la divinidad 12.

La creacin es as para el Cusano el lugar en el que la invisibilidad del Dios


infinito se hace visible, permaneciendo invisible en s, en virtud del ver
creador divino que posibilita el ver y el ser humanos:
Te presentaste alguna vez a m, Seor, como invisible a criatura alguna,
porque eres el Dios escondido infinito. Y la infinitud es incomprensible para
todo modo de comprender. Te presentaste, luego, a m como visible a todos,
porque en tanto una cosa existe en cuanto t la ves. Y no existira realmente
tal cosa si no te viese. Pues es la visin la que dona el ser, ya que es ella tu esen-
cia. Eres invisible tal como t eres, eres visible en cuanto existe la criatura, la
cual en tanto existe en cuanto te ve 13.

Si se sigue atentamente el proceso de las reflexiones del Cusano, no dejar


de sorprender la honda radicacin ontolgica de su concepcin de la relacin
humana con la divinidad y del ver humano de la misma. Pues tal ver no es
algo as como una accin que adviene, por as decirlo, al ser humano previa-
mente constituido en su ser. Es ms bien, por el contrario, el ver, es decir, el
ver humano del Dios que le ve, el que le constituye propiamente en su ser, en
su ser humano mismo. De modo que sin tal ver humano de Dios no se es pro-
piamente:
Eres visible por todas las criaturas y las ves a todas. Pues precisamente
por verlas a todas eres visto por todas. Ya que de otro modo no pueden exis-
tir las criaturas, porque existen merced a tu visin. Si no te vieran a ti que las
ves a ellas, no recibiran de ti el ser. El ser de la criatura es al mismo tiempo
tu ver y tu ser visto 14.

En esta primordialidad del ver humano de Dios parece radicar, desde un


punto de vista ms directamente epistemolgico (pero que se fundamenta lti-
mamente en la dimensin metafsica u ontolgica), la paralela consideracin
cusaniana de la precedencia de la afirmacin sobre la negacin, que se tradu-
ce, en el caso del ver humano de Dios, en que a ste se le ve ms verdadera-
mente que al mundo 15.

12
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Complementum theologicum, XIV (D., Philosophisch, III, 700-702).
13
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XII (D., Philosophisch, III, 142).
14
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, X (D., Philosophisch, III, 134).
15
Como se dice en un escrito de la ltima poca: veo ms verdaderamente a Dios que
al mundo (NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Trialogus de possest: D., Philosophisch, II, 348). Cf. D., o.c.,
II: 350, 352.

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M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA 907

Naturalmente, se trata de un modo de visin que sobrepasa cualquier cono-


cimiento sensible, pero que no por ello deja de ser verdadera o autntica visin
o intuicin. En el Compendium, que redacta en el ltimo ao de su vida, el Cusa-
no conectar al respecto con la tradicional imagen de la luz o del sol, para
mostrar con tal smil que existe en el hombre un modo de intuicin mental
de una realidad, que es en definitiva la divinidad misma, la cual precede a todo
ulterior conocimiento concreto y que, al mismo tiempo, lo posibilita:
Tenemos nos dice una visin mental intuitiva de aquello que es pre-
vio a todo conocimiento. Por lo que quien intenta encontrar en el conocimiento
lo que as se ve se fatiga en vano, lo mismo que quien intentara tocar tambin
con la mano el color que nicamente es visible. La visin de la mente respec-
to de tal modo de ser viene a ser algo as como la visin sensible respecto de
la luz, a la que se ve como ciertsimamente existente, pero que no se conoce.
Pues precede a todo lo que con tal visin puede ser conocido 16.

El lenguaje dialctico o paradjico de que se vale el Cusano para expresar de


algn modo la profundidad divina de la realidad no est sino en funcin de esta
misma profundidad inalcanzable, pero que se muestra a la mente en esa misma
imposibilidad de alcanzarla. Es preciso, por ello nos dice entrar en la obs-
curidad [intrare caliginem], para de ese modo buscar la verdad all donde ocu-
rre la imposibilidad. Se ha de intentar acceder cognoscitivamente a esa obs-
cura imposibilidad, porque es all justamente donde se encuentra la divinidad.
Por lo cual te doy gracias, Dios mo aade el Cusano, ya que me mani-
fiestas que no hay otro camino para acceder a ti sino aquel que a todos los hom-
bres, tambin a los doctsimos filsofos, les parece totalmente inaccesible e
imposible, puesto que me has mostrado que no puedes ser visto en otro lugar
sino all donde se presenta e interpone la imposibilidad 17.

16
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Compendium, I (D., Philosophisch, II, 684).
17
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, IX (D., Philosophisch, III, 132). Con fecha del 14
de septiembre de 1453 (es decir, un par de meses antes de la aparicin del De visione Dei, del
que proceden estas expresiones sobre la imposibilidad) se diriga el Cusano a los monjes de
Tegernsee instruyndoles sobre la mutua implicacin dialctica entre afirmacin y nega-
cin, etc., en la dimensin de la teologa mstica, haciendo paralelamente referencia a que la
aceptacin de la imposibilidad, ms all de la mera y simple racionalidad, es necesaria
para el acceso a lo mstico: sta es la secretsima teologa, a la que ninguno de los filsofos
ha tenido acceso ni puede acceder mientras se mantenga en pie el comn principio de toda
la filosofa, el de la no coincidencia de dos contradictorios. Le es necesario, por tanto, al que
ejerce la teologa mstica [mistice theolo(g)izantem] arrojarse a la obscuridad, yendo ms all
de toda razn e inteligencia, abandonndose incluso a s mismo; y encontrar cmo aquello
que la razn juzga como imposible, a saber, ser y no ser al mismo tiempo, es la misma nece-
sidad; ms an, si no se viese una obscuridad y densidad tan grande de imposibilidad, no exis-
tira la suma necesidad, la cual no est en contradiccin con tal imposibilidad; ya que la impo-
sibilidad es la misma necesidad verdadera (E. VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour de la docte ignorance.
Une controverse sur la thologie mystique au XV sicle, Mnster, Aschendorffsche Verlags-
buchhandlung, 1915, 114-115). Me permito indicar que esta obra de E. Vansteenberghe, si
bien actualmente de difcil adquisicin, es de gran inters para conocer el pensamiento del
Cusano en torno a la problemtica de la teologa mstica, dado que en ella se incluyen casi

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908 M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA

El Cusano no hace aqu sino aplicar al conocimiento del Dios infinito la para-
djica norma o sentencia que, algunos aos antes, formulaba en el Idiota de
sapientia: La ms alta sabidura es sta: saber alcanzar lo inalcanzable de modo
inalcanzable [quomodo attingitur inattingibile inattingibiliter] 18. Y esto no
es sino un modo ms de expresar lo que constitua, diez aos antes ya, el tema
central y el ttulo de su conocido escrito De docta ignorantia.
Se percibe as cmo la docta ignorancia del Cusano est estrechamente
vinculada con el ver de su teologa mstica, puesto que se trata aqu de ver
al Dios invisible, al Dios considerado por el Cusano como la invisibilidad de lo
visible 19. Y si su docta ignorancia fue combatida por Johannes Wenck, el
Cusano le replicar en su Apologia doctae ignorantiae (1449), haciendo referen-
cia justamente a que, frente al gnero de ciencia que hace gala de la con-
frontacin y de la mera pugna o victoria verbal, la docta ignorancia, por
el contrario, se dirige hacia la tranquila intuicin de la mente [per vacationem
in mentis visionem tendit]. Ahora bien, sta es precisamente para el Cusano la
pretensin de su teologa mstica, la de conducirnos a la sosegada visin
del Dios invisible. En palabras suyas: la teologa mstica conduce al descan-
so [vacationem] y al silencio, en donde est la visin, que se nos concede, del
Dios invisible 20.
Se trata, como se dir algo ms adelante en este mismo escrito, de experi-
mentar y sostener la admiracin 21 que se desprende de esta dialctica oculta en
la realidad de las cosas, que aparecen o se muestran como imagen del Dios
invisible y por medio de las cuales se avanza de modo incomprensible hacia lo
incomprensible [incomprehensibiliter ad incomprenhensibilem pergit]. Es esta
experiencial y especulativa paradoja la que caracteriza el modo del ver huma-
no, intelectual e incomprensible a un tiempo, en relacin con quien es en s
mismo la mxima inteligibilidad o la verdad absoluta. As nos lo viene a decir
seguidamente el Cusano con su habitual agudeza y profundidad:
Si de algn modo se ha de acceder a la misma [la verdad absoluta], es
necesario que ello ocurra en un cierto modo de incomprensible intuicin, a la
manera de un rapto momentneo, tal como intuimos de manera momentnea
e incomprensible con el ojo corporal el resplandor del sol; no es que el sol no
sea en mximo grado visible, ya que su luz se adentra en los ojos por su pro-
pio poder, sino que por su eminente visibilidad es comprensiblemente invisi-
ble. De la misma manera Dios, que es la verdad, la cual es el objeto del enten-

cuarenta textos de la mutua correspondencia (del ao 1451 al 1456) entre el Cusano y los mon-
jes benedictinos Kaspar Aindorffer y Bernhard von Waging, abad y prior respectivamente del
citado monasterio de Tegernsee.
18
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Idiota de sapientia, I (D., Philosophisch, III, 426).
19
Qu es Dios sino la invisibilidad de lo visible? (NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Trialogus de pos-
sest: D., Philosophisch, II, 354).
20
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Apologia doctae ignorantiae (D., Philosophisch, I, 534).
21
Pues como dice aqu el Cusano, uno es conducido al estupor al admirar el infinito
que est en todas las cosas comprensibles como en un espejo y enigma (NIKOLAUS VON KUES,
Apologia doctae ignorantiae: D., Philosophisch, I, 542).

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M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA 909

dimiento, es inteligible en grado mximo y por su supereminente inteligibili-


dad es ininteligible 22.

En el De visione Dei aplicar el Cusano idntico modo de reflexin, siguien-


do las pautas platnicas y neoplatnicas, a la belleza inalcanzable del ros-
tro de Dios. Su belleza es la misma absoluta belleza, que es forma donante de
ser a toda forma bella. Por eso la belleza divina se oculta y, al mismo tiempo,
se desvela en cierta manera, si bien siempre en el silencio y la ignorancia,
al ver humano:
En todos los rostros se ve el rostro de los rostros de manera velada y en
enigma. Pero no se ve de manera descubierta mientras ms all de todos los
rostros no se entra en un cierto secreto y oculto silencio, en donde no hay
nada de saber ni de concepto de rostro. Mientras no entre quien busca tu
rostro en esta obscuridad, niebla, tiniebla o ignorancia, ms all de todo
saber y de todo concepto, no puede sino veladamente encontrar tu rostro.
Pero la misma obscuridad muestra que hay all un rostro ms all de todos
los velos 23.

Por lo dems, la concepcin de lo mstico por parte del Cusano debe, como
es fcil advertir, buena parte de sus intuiciones bsicas a los escritos del Pseu-
do-Dionisio. Es bien sabido el influjo de ste en pensadores como Escoto Eri-
gena o Eckhart, predecesores del Cusano; pero no es menor tal influjo en el pro-
pio Cusano.
En efecto, en su escrito sobre la Teologa mstica, tan breve en su extensin
como amplio en su influencia histrica, el Pseudo-Dionisio, hace una y otra vez
alusin a este modo especial de acceso a lo divino por medio de la superacin
de todo cuanto es sensible, conceptual o intelectivo, y por el adentramiento en
las tinieblas luminosas de la divinidad. Porque sta, en cuanto causa de todo,
no es palabra ni pensamiento, no se puede nombrar ni entender; acerca de la
misma no hay conocimiento intelectual, ni ciencia; no hay palabras para ella,
ni nombre, ni conocimiento 24. Una vez abandonado, pues, todo ello, es preci-
so elevarse hasta el rayo supraesencial de las divinas tinieblas 25, y poder as
ver esa tiniebla supraesencial que toda la luz de las cosas no deja ver 26. Y ello
significa penetrar en las tinieblas realmente misteriosas del no-saber, abis-

22
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Apologia doctae ignorantiae (D., Philosophisch, I, 542). Poste-
riormente, en el De visione Dei, se aludir todava en un contexto similar a la ceguera u obs-
curidad procedente del exceso de luz, utilizndose tambin el smil del sol: De la excelencia
de la luz del sol proviene la obscuridad en el ojo (NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, VI: D.,
Philosophisch, III, 116). Es esto algo que el Cusano intentar posteriormente comunicarles
tambin a sus oyentes en el sermn del 28 de agosto de 1456, al decirles que Dios es incog-
noscible por su infinita cognoscibilidad de la misma manera que la luz, que, siendo de por s
visible, es a nuestros ojos invisible por su excesiva luminosidad (NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia,
Hamburg, Meiner, 1932ss, XIX, 236).
23
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, VI (D., Philosophisch, III, 114-116).
24
PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, Obras Completas (Madrid, B.A.C., 2002), 251-252.
25
PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, o.c., 245.
26
PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, o.c., 248.

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910 M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA

mndose en lo totalmente incomprensible e invisible 27, pues tales tinieblas


exceden toda inteligencia 28.
Pero en el Pseudo-Dionisio las tinieblas no son pura negatividad o igno-
rancia, sino el modo mismo como lo divino se muestra o aparece, ms all de
las cosas que no son l mismo. Son, pues, en tal sentido, tinieblas luminosas:
Rogamos que tambin nosotros podamos adentrarnos en esas tinieblas
luminosas y, renunciando a toda visin y conocimiento, podamos ver y cono-
cer al que est por encima de toda visin y conocimiento 29.

Tal positividad como podramos denominarla de las tinieblas lumino-


sas aparece todava, ms ntidamente quiz, al comienzo mismo de la carta que
le dirige al dicono Doroteo: La tiniebla divina le indica es luz, donde se
dice que habita Dios [], es ciertamente invisible debido a su deslumbrante cla-
ridad e inaccesible debido al desbordamiento de sus irradiaciones supraesen-
ciales 30.
Pues bien, se habr podido advertir que no pocas de las reflexiones del Cusa-
no acerca del conocimiento mstico estn en clara continuidad ideolgica con rele-
vantes asertos de la Teologa mstica del Pseudo-Dionisio. Ms an, el propio Cusa-
no puso especial empeo en mostrar que su concepcin de la teologa mstica
responde a la verdadera y autntica intencin del Areopagita. Significativa mues-
tra de esto ltimo es la carta que les escribe a los ya mencionados benedictinos
de Tegernsee el 14 de septiembre de 1453 (menos de dos meses antes, por tanto,
de concluir la redaccin del De visione Dei) explcitamente sobre el tema de la
teologa mstica (tal como figura en cabeza del escrito epistolar).
En dicha carta intenta responder a los deseos de sus destinatarios de recibir
informacin sobre el modo como l entiende o interpreta lo que el gran Dioni-
sio Areopagita escribe sobre el ascender de modo ignoto hacia la teologa ms-
tica [ignote ascendere ad mysticam theologiam]. Pues bien, el Cusano, que ase-
gura basarse para su interpretacin en el texto griego y la traduccin latina de la
obra del Pseudo-Dionisio, va a insistir justamente y de manera especial en lnea
con lo que acabo de denominar la positividad de la tinieblas luminosas de
los ltimos textos aducidos del Pseudo-Dionisio en esta positividad, lo que
naturalmente no implica la supresin de la negatividad u obscuridad de las
tinieblas de lo mstico, sino que ms bien las posibilita y explica o justifica.
Pero lo importante es para el Cusano (interpretando de ese modo tambin al
Pseudo-Dionisio) el que con la mera y simple negatividad o negacin no se
accede al Dios de la teologa mstica.
El pasaje ms decisivo de su respuesta a la cuestin planteada por los bene-
dictinos de Tegernsee sobre lo que realmente quiere decir el Pseudo-Dionisio
en su Teologa mstica es el siguiente:

27
PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, o.c., 247.
28
PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, o.c., 249.
29
PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, o.c., 248.
30
PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, o.c., 258.

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M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA 911

Dice [el Pseudo-Dionisio] que es necesario que se ascienda ms all de


todo lo inteligible, incluso ms all de s mismo, con lo que ocurrir que se
entra en la sombra y en la obscuridad [caliginem]. Pues si la mente no entien-
de ms all de ello, permanecer en la sombra de la ignorancia. Y el percibir
la obscuridad es seal de que all est el Dios que se busca. De igual manera
que al que busca el sol, si es que accede correctamente al mismo, le surge la
obscuridad, debido a la excelencia del sol, en la impotente visin. Esta obscu-
ridad es seal de que quien quiere ver el sol va por el camino correcto; y si no
aparece la obscuridad, no habra caminado por la va correcta hacia la luz
excelentsima. Y si bien casi todos los ms doctos afirman que la obscuridad
se encuentra cuando se ha sustrado todo de Dios, de modo que al que busca
se le presente as ms bien nada que algo, no soy yo de la opinin de que han
logrado acceder correctamente a la obscuridad cuantos nicamente giran en
torno a la teologa negativa. Ya que, dado que la (teologa) negativa quita y no
pone nada, entonces por medio de ella manifiestamente no se ver a Dios, pues-
to que no se encontrar que Dios es [esse], sino ms bien que no es 31.

El Cusano insistir todava seguidamente, en la misma carta, en que en la


Teologa mstica del Pseudo-Dionisio se piensa siempre conjuntamente nega-
cin y afirmacin, pues se est siempre ms all de ellas 32 y de cualquier
disyuncin entre las mismas; de modo que, desde este punto de vista, la obs-
curidad es luz y la ignorancia es saber [scienciam] 33.
Ahora bien, a mi juicio, la base ltima sobre la que apoya el Cusano esta
positividad de su concepcin de la teologa mstica, por la que a travs o en
medio de cualquier tiniebla u obscuridad se deja entrever la divinidad, es su
visin de sta como infinitud 34. Una visin que en l tiene una relevancia de-
cisiva.
En efecto, para l es Dios forma al mismo tiempo simplicsima e infinitsi-
ma 35. Un Dios, al que l se dirige denominndolo Dios escondido infinito,
sobreexaltado al infinito 36. La infinitud adquiere as en l, en relacin con la

31
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 114. Cf. D., o.c., 113-115.
32
Como es sabido, el Pseudo-Dionisio cierra su Teologa mstica afirmando que la Causa
perfecta y nica de todas las cosas est por encima de toda afirmacin, y tambin la trascen-
dencia de quien est sencillamente libre de todo est por encima de toda negacin y ms all
de todo (PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, o.c., 252).
33
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 114-115. En el sermn pronunciado, algunos aos despus,
en Brixen el da de Navidad de 1456 el Cusano se referir a la teologa mstica diciendo acer-
ca de la misma que por ella entramos de manera negativa [negative] en la obscuridad en la
que est Dios, negando [abnegando] en l toda cosa conocida o nombrable (NICOLAI DE CUSA,
Opera Omnia, XIX, 380). Ahora bien, algunos prrafos despus en esta misma alocucin nos
dir que tal negacin [abnegatio] de la teologa mstica implica afirmacin, aunque sta
sea una afirmacin latente, ya que cuando decimos, por ejemplo, que Dios es innombra-
ble, negamos en l todo lo nombrable, afirmando ocultamente que l est por encima de todas
las cosas nombrables (NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 383-384).
34
Sobre la importancia y las implicaciones de la idea de infinitud en relacin con el
problema de Dios me permito aludir a M. CABADA CASTRO, El Dios que da que pensar. Acceso
filosfico-antropolgico a la divinidad (Madrid, B.A.C., 1999), 345-381.
35
Cf. NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Trialogus de possest (D., Philosophisch, II, 340).
36
Cf. NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, X (D., Philosophisch, III, 142).

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912 M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA

caracterizacin de la divinidad, un rango tal que le obliga a pensar desde la infi-


nitud cualquier otra denominacin de lo divino, convirtindose ella por tanto
en algo en definitiva difcilmente enunciable:
La infinita bondad no es bondad, sino infinitud. La cantidad infinita no
es cantidad, sino infinitud. Y lo mismo se puede decir de todo. T eres un Dios
grande, de cuya magnitud no hay trmino. Y por ello te veo como medida inme-
dible de todo, como fin infinito de todo. Eres, pues, Seor, dado que eres infi-
nito sin principio ni fin, principio sin principio y fin sin fin, eres principio sin
fin y fin sin principio y de tal modo principio que eres tambin fin y de tal
manera fin que eres igualmente principio, y ni principio ni fin, sino que eres,
sobre principio y fin, la misma siempre bendita absoluta infinitud 37.

Absolutez e infinitud se intercambian, alternan o conjuntan as termino-


lgicamente en la denominacin cusaniana de la divinidad como expresiones de
significado y valor equivalentes. La divinidad (Deitas) es as simultneamente
unidad absoluta y unidad infinita 38 o, conjunta y simultneamente tambin,
absoluta infinitud 39, como al final del texto anterior. O bien: T, Dios, eres
absoluto e infinito 40. Para el Cusano Dios es, pues, el absolutamente infinito
mismo 41 o intercambiando entre s ambas cualificaciones slo Dios es abso-
luto infinita y simplemente (solus est infinite absolutus et simpliciter) 42.
En continuidad con la gran tradicin de la especulacin sobre la divinidad,
de la que se dice que supera todo concepto clausurante, el Cusano afirmar asi-
mismo que acerca de Dios, la ltima y ms alta consideracin es sin trmino,
infinita y ms all de todo concepto 43. Por lo que incluso ni siquiera lo deno-
minamos dir seguidamente uno o trino ni con ningn otro nombre, dado
que excede todo concepto de uno o trino o de cualquiera otra cosa denominable 44.

37
Cf. NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XIII (D., Philosophisch, III, 152).
38
Cf. NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De docta ignorantia, Lib. I, V (D., Philosophisch, I, 210).
39
Cf. NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XII (D., Philosophisch, III, 144). T, Dios mo,
eres la misma infinitud absoluta (D., De visione Dei, XIII: D., Philosophisch, III, 148).
40
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XII (D., Philosophisch, III, 144).
41
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Complementum theologicum, XII (D., Philosophisch, III, 696).
42
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Idiota de mente, XII (D., Philosophisch, III, 586).
43
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Trialogus de possest (D., Philosophisch, II, 314).
44
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Trialogus de possest (D., Philosophisch, II, 316). La caracteriza-
cin de Dios en este escrito de 1460 como la misma infinitud puede observarse igualmen-
te y en el mismo sentido en el otro escrito de la misma poca Cribratio Alkorani (1460-1461),
en donde el Cusano (en su anlisis de la doctrina del Corn) afirma acerca de Dios en cuan-
to principio lo siguiente: Desde esta consideracin es totalmente infinito [penitus infini-
tum] y sin trmino, incomprensible e inefable. Entonces ciertamente, al exceder todo senti-
do, todo entendimiento, todo nombre y cualquier cosa nombrable, no es denominado ni uno,
ni trino, ni bueno, ni sabio, ni padre, ni hijo ni espritu santo, ni nada de cuanto pueda ser
dicho o pensado, tal como lo sostiene Dionisio Areopagita, ya que l excede y antecede infi-
nitamente todos estos nombres. Permanece as escondido a los ojos de todos los sabios y no
es l conocido por ninguna criatura sino slo por s mismo; y acerca de l slo conocemos
esto, que es la misma infinitud [ipsa infinitas], que est infinitamente por encima de todo
entendimiento creado. De este modo, al no poder propiamente afirmarse ni decirse acerca del
mismo cosa alguna que l no la sobrepase, lo admiramos, contemplamos y adoramos en silen-

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M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA 913

En definitiva, desde el rango de la especfica infinitud de Dios, es ste por


su infinitud la misma infinitud 45, si bien incluso habra que decir que est
sobre todo trmino e infinitud 46, superando con ello la denominacin misma
de infinitud.
Ahora bien, que la infinitud sea fundamento y al mismo tiempo meta de
la teologa mstica lo viene a decir el propio Cusano en la mencionada carta a los
monjes de Tegernsee. Ello, adems, no poda ser de otro modo, dado que tal
como queda dicho la divinidad misma est caracterizada fundamentalmente
por su infinitud, por su absoluta infinitud. En dicha carta, en efecto, se dice:
Y a m me ha parecido que toda esta teologa mstica consiste en entrar
en la infinitud absoluta misma, dado que la infinitud expresa la coincidencia
de los contradictorios, es decir el fin sin fin; y nadie puede ver msticamente
a Dios sino en la obscuridad de la coincidencia, que es la infinitud 47.

De modo que como se ve teologa mstica e infinitud absoluta estn,


en la poca de la redaccin del De visione Dei, estrecha e ntimamente relacio-
nadas 48.

cio (NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, VIII, 74). Con anterioridad a estos escritos, en el De pace
fidei (redactado en 1453, es decir, en el mismo ao del De visione Dei), escriba ya: Dios, en
cuanto creador, es trino y uno; en cuanto infinito, no es ni trino ni uno ni nada de cuanto
puede ser dicho. Pues los nombres que se atribuyen a Dios son tomados de las criaturas, sien-
do l en s mismo inefable y estando por encima de todo cuanto podra ser nombrado o dicho
(NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De pace fidei VII: D., Philosophisch, III, 730). Cf. WILLIAM J. HOYE, Die
mystische Theologie des Nikolaus Cusanus (Freiburg, Herder, 2004), 47. En este sentido, viene
a decir con razn A. M. Haas que la primordialidad de la infinitud en Dios relativiza y uni-
fica en s misma incluso otros modos cusanianos de caracterizacin del mismo: Cuando el
Cusano dice que en Dios coinciden las contradicciones o que Dios est ms all de las con-
tradicciones, en ambos casos se hace referencia a la infinitud absoluta, que es una y simple
(HAAS, Deum, 39).
45
Puesto que eres infinito, eres la misma [ipsa] infinitud (NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visio-
ne Dei, XIII: D., Philosophisch, III, 150). En uno de sus todava inditos Sermones dice en
igual sentido Nicols de Cusa: Dios es la infinitud (Infinitas est deus). Cf. HOYE, Die mys-
tische, 173, n. 136.
46
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Trialogus de possest (D., Philosophisch, II, 356).
47
Et michi visum fuit quod tota ista mistica theologia sit intrare ipsam infinitatem abso-
lutam, dicit enim infinitas contradictoriorum coincidenciam, scilicet finem sine fine; et nemo
potest Deum mistice videre nisi in caligine coincidencie, que est infinitas (VANSTEENBERGHE,
Autour, 115-116). En relacin con la conexin establecida aqu por el Cusano entre la teo-
loga mstica y la obscuridad de la coincidencia de los contradictorios, haca l tambin la
siguiente anotacin en su ejemplar de la obra de Alberto Magno sobre el Pseudo-Dionisio:
Parece que Alberto y casi todos tienen el defecto de tener siempre miedo a entrar en la obs-
curidad, que consiste en la admisin de los contradictorios, ya que la razn rehuye esto y teme
entrar en ella y, en consecuencia, al evitar la obscuridad, no alcanza la visin del invisible
(Cf. NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 380).
48
Como la infinitud absoluta de Dios implica inefabilidad, el Cusano podr rela-
cionar tambin explcitamente con esta ltima su teologa mstica, tal como se muestra en
el ttulo mismo del primer captulo del libro segundo de su escrito posterior Cribratio Alkora-
ni (1460-1461): Acerca de la teologa mstica, segn la cual Dios es inefable (NICOLAI DE CUSA,
Opera Omnia, VIII, 72).

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914 M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA

En este sentido W. Beierwaltes, por ejemplo, viene a indicar que la carac-


terizacin de Dios como absoluta infinitas se convierte en el De visione Dei cada
vez ms explcitamente en el centro mismo del escrito, aadiendo todava: Ver
a Dios como infinitud absoluta en un ver indiferenciado, comprender su incom-
prensibilidad, mantenerla como la caracterizacin esencial de Dios que funda-
menta y determina todas las dems, hacer coincidir la mirada finita con la infi-
nita mirada del rostro absoluto: esto es en la intencin del Cusano mstica
o culminacin de la mystica theologia 49.
Esta destacada relevancia que en el Cusano adquiere la infinitud como fun-
damentacin secreta y movilizante del ver mstico est en relacin con su
conocida imagen de la muralla del paraso. Y es tambin aqu donde apare-
ce claramente la ntima conexin entre la concepcin de Dios como infinitud
absoluta y la posibilidad de trnsito al interior de la muralla, es decir, a lo que
constituye en realidad la dimensin misma de la visin mstica. As se expresa
en este sentido en el De visione Dei:
Oh profundidad de las riquezas, cun incomprensible eres! Mientras con-
cibo a un creador creante [creatorem creantem] estoy ms ac de la muralla
del paraso. De la misma manera, mientras concibo a un creador creable [cre-
atorem creabilem], no he entrado todava, sino que estoy junto a la muralla [in
muro]. Cuando, en cambio, te veo como infinitud absoluta, a la que no le corres-
ponde ni el nombre de creador creante ni el de creador creable, entonces empie-
zo a mirarte de manera manifiesta y a entrar en el jardn de las delicias, dado
que en modo alguno eres algo de lo que pueda ser dicho o concebido, sino abso-
luta e infinitamente supereminente por encima de todo ello 50.

Para empezar, por tanto, a ver al Dios de la infinitud absoluta es nece-


sario traspasar la muralla del paraso:
Debo, pues, Seor, saltar por encima de aquella muralla de la visin invi-
sible para ser t all encontrado [] Pues t, que te me presentas como si fue-
ras todas las cosas y al mismo tiempo ninguna de ellas, habitas en el interior
de aquella elevada muralla, que ningn ingenio humano puede por su propio
poder escalar 51.

49
BEIERWALTES, Mystische, 433. Algunos aos ms tarde insistir todava W. J. Hoye en
la importancia en el Cusano de la infinitud en relacin con las bases mismas de su teologa
mstica: Convencido como est el Cusano de que existe un fundamento originario para todo,
l lo encuentra en la infinitud. La infinitud, que es absolutizada por l de una manera nueva
y radical, es el concepto clave de su teologa mstica. Sobre ella se asienta la coincidencia de
los opuestos. Su doctrina acerca la docta ignorantia depende igualmente del concepto de infi-
nitud (HOYE, Die mystische, 76). Hoye indica asimismo que en esto, es decir, en la rele-
vancia de la infinitud para la comprensin de la teologa mstica cusaniana, existe una clara
diferencia entre sta y la Teologa mstica del Pseudo-Dionisio (Cf. HOYE, Die mystische, 51).
50
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XII (D., Philosophisch, III, 144). Las formulacio-
nes de creador creante y creador creable hacen referencia al modo de expresarse al res-
pecto el Erigena en su Periph. I, 12 (PL 122, 453C-454D). Pueden verse las expresiones eriu-
genianas en la reciente traduccin castellana: JUAN ESCOTO ERIGENA, Sobre las naturalezas
(Periphyseon) (Pamplona, EUNSA, 2007), 95-97.
51
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XII (D., Philosophisch, III, 142).

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M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA 915

En el smil cusaniano, el lugar en el que habita la divinidad est rodeado


por la coincidencia de los contradictorios. La puerta de entrada est cus-
todiada por el excelso espritu de la razn, el cual, si no es vencido, no permiti-
r el ingreso al interior de la muralla del paraso. El Cusano es aqu bien
explcito en su afirmacin de que la divinidad no puede ser vista si no es dejan-
do atrs la muralla de la coincidencia de los contradictorios: Podrs ser visto
ms all [ultra] de la coincidencia de los contradictorios nos dice, y en modo
alguno ms ac [citra] de la misma 52.
De modo que en el mbito meramente racional, finito, de las oposicio-
nes o contradicciones o de su mutua coincidencia no es posible acceder a
la plenitud inconmensurable de la infinitud y unidad de la divinidad. Slo al
franquear dicha entrada se inicia la visin propia de lo divino: es en el umbral
de la coincidencia de los opuestos, custodiado por el ngel a la entrada del para-
so, donde empiezo, Seor, a verte 53.
En este sentido, Beierwaltes considera la muralla de la coincidencia de los
opuestos como algo anterior, meramente racional, que debe ser sobrepasa-
do si se pretende acceder a la verdadera y autntica visin de la infinitud abso-
luta de la divinidad:
El Cusano, en el De visione Dei, no ha identificado el pensamiento mismo
de la coincidentia oppositorum con la infinitud absoluta, sino que lo ha retro-
trado al menos tendencialmente a la funcin de condicin o estadio pre-
vio para una intuicin del Infinito: la coincidentia oppositorum es como una
forma del conceptus, del pensamiento intelectual y conceptualizador que nece-
sita ser superado, si quiere ser fiel a la infinitud, hacia una visin que no es ya
conceptualizadora u objetivizadora 54.

52
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, IX (D., Philosophisch, III, 132). Ver tambin NIKO-
LAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XV (D., Philosophisch, III, 158). Para Beierwaltes la exigen-
cia cusaniana de vencer al excelso espritu de la razn viene a significar que el pensamiento
ha de superarse a s mismo en cuanto productor de un concepto que podra conducir a una
deficiente comprensin de la unidad de Dios como una conjuncin de objetos o como una
continuacin de los mismos en la coincidencia (BEIERWALTES, Mystische, 431-432). El mismo
Beierwaltes aludir, por otra parte, a que la idea cusaniana de que la infinitud divina est ms
all de la dimensin de los opuestos o contradictorios depende de ideas similares de Proclo y
del Pseudo-Dionisio. Cf. BEIERWALTES, o.c., 431.
53
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, X (D., Philosophisch, III, 134). La divinidad est
as ms all de la complicacin o de la explicacin, de la conjuncin o de la disyun-
cin: Cuando te veo, Dios mo, en el paraso rodeado por la muralla de la coincidencia de
los opuestos, veo que no te comportas de manera complicativa o explicativa, disyuntiva o copu-
lativa. Pues tanto la disyuncin como la conjuncin son la muralla de la coincidencia, ms
all de la cual existes t desvinculado [absolutus] de todo cuanto puede ser dicho o pensado
(NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XI: D., Philosophisch, III, 140).
54
BEIERWALTES, Mystische, 431. Ello no obsta, sin embargo, como el mismo Beierwal-
tes con razn seala, a que la coincidentia oppositorum deba ser considerada, sin embar-
go, como necesario paso previo para el acceso a la infinitas absoluta, de tal manera que por
ello no es posible acceder a la visin del In-finito sin realizar el paso, de manera intensiva y
conceptualizadora, a travs del pensamiento de la coincidencia de los opuestos o contradic-
torios, porque ste [el In-finito] es precisamente el ser complicativo que est por encima de

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916 M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA

En cualquier caso, se ha de tener en cuenta que, por ejemplo, en la Apologia


doctae ignorantiae (1449), slo algunos aos antes de la aparicin del De visio-
ne Dei, el Cusano se refera a la coincidencia de los opuestos, indicando que
era ya ella misma el inicio del ascenso a la teologa mstica, no dejando de cri-
ticar, por lo dems, all el racionalismo de los aristotlicos que est en la base
de su resistencia a la aceptacin de este modo de pensar 55.
La idea de la superacin de lo meramente racional como presupuesto para
el ascenso a lo mstico est acompaada en el Cusano por una clara conciencia
de la insuficiencia de la mera subjetividad humana en general en relacin con
tal ascenso. De modo que se impondr en definitiva la necesidad de que ha de
ser Dios mismo quien de un modo u otro posibilite activamente el hecho de la
visin mstica.
En efecto, ya en uno de los escritos de su primera poca, en el De quaerendo
Deum (1445), habla el Cusano de una va para buscar a Dios dentro de uno
mismo, caracterizada por el desprenderse de cuanto es finito en uno mismo 56,
como los sentidos, la imaginacin, la razn, el entendimiento, etc., para de ese
modo poder concebir al Dios que es mejor que cuanto puede ser concebido.
Ahora bien, el Cusano aade significativamente que en tal operacin de des-
prendimiento de las propias perfecciones limitadas aparece o se muestra Dios
como la causa posibilitante de la misma: mientras buscas ms all, no encuen-
tras en ti nada semejante a Dios, sino que afirmas, por encima de todas estas cosas,
a Dios como causa, principio y luz vital [lumen vitae] de tu alma intelectiva 57.
Esta funcin especfica de Dios como el verdadero autor o propulsor del pro-
ceso interior de la visin mstica parece afianzarse ms decidida y claramente
en los escritos posteriores. Como cuando, al denominar el Cusano a Dios como
possest (significndose con ello que viene a ser en s mismo la realidad y
actualidad de toda posibilidad o potencialidad), se dice acerca de tal deno-
minacin:
Este nombre conduce al que reflexiona, por encima de todo sentido, razn
y entendimiento, a la visin mstica, en donde se encuentra el trmino de toda

oposicin y contradiccin (D., o.c., 432). Esta es la razn por la que el mismo Beierwaltes
mantiene que existe una estrecha conexin, en lo que a la infinitud absoluta divina del Cusa-
no se refiere, entre los conceptos de infinitud y coincidencia de los opuestos: la infini-
tas escribe est constitutivamente ligada con la formacin de este concepto [el de la coin-
cidencia de los opuestos], es por decirlo as su idea (D., o.c., 429).
55
Dado que ahora predomina la corriente aristotlica que considera como hereja la
coincidencia de los opuestos, siendo as que en su admisin consiste el inicio del ascenso a la
teologa mstica, a los formados en tal corriente les resulta totalmente absurda esta va. La
rechazan, pues, totalmente como algo contrario a sus propsitos. De modo que sera casi un
milagro algo as como un cambio de escuela el que rechazasen a Aristteles para as ascen-
der ms alto (NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Apologia doctae ignorantiae: D., Philosophisch, I, 530).
56
Existe todava una va para buscar a Dios dentro de ti mismo, que consiste en des-
prenderse de toda limitacin (NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De quaerendo Deum, V: D., Philosophisch,
II, 602).
57
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De quaerendo Deum, V (D., Philosophisch, II, 604).

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capacidad cognoscitiva y el inicio de la manifestacin del Dios desconocido.


Ya que cuando el buscador de la verdad, abandonando todo, ha ascendido
sobre s mismo y encuentra que no tiene ya ms acceso al Dios invisible, el
cual al no ser visible con luz alguna de la razn permanece invisible para l,
entonces espera con humildsimo deseo a aquel sol omnipotente y a ser ilu-
minado por su nacimiento, ahuyentador de la obscuridad, para ver al invisi-
ble en el grado en que l mismo se manifieste 58.

Pero esta espera de la libre y gratuita comunicacin del Dios invisible al


hombre, que se da a conocer segn el modo y la medida que l mismo deter-
mina y que en este pasaje del Trialogus de possest (1460) aparece suficientemente
explcita, era ya claramente afirmada, con mayor o menor intensidad, en el De
visione Dei, de manera especial en el captulo XVI de este escrito que lleva como
ttulo: Si Dios no fuese infinito, no sera fin [finis] del deseo.
Aqu, en efecto, se muestra el Dios infinito como el que lleva la iniciativa, jus-
tamente por su infinitud esencial, del proceso interior de acercamiento cog-
noscitivo humano a l. Por ello el deseo intelectual o volitivo es llevado, es
conducido, etc. (obsrvese la constante denominacin gramatical pasiva) por
la infinitud del Dios que atrae, impulsa, moviliza, posibilita, etc. en cuanto fin,
es decir, en cuanto verdadera causa final. Advirtanse algunas de estas signi-
ficativas expresiones en el siguiente texto:
No cesa el fuego en su ardor ni el amor en el deseo, que es llevado hacia
ti, Dios, que eres la forma de todo lo deseable y la verdad que en todo deseo se
desea [] Oh fuente de las riquezas! Quieres ser comprendido con mi pose-
sin y permanecer incomprensible e infinito, porque eres el tesoro de las deli-
cias, cuyo final nadie puede apetecer. Cmo podra el apetito apetecer no ser?
Apetezca la voluntad ser o no ser, el apetito mismo no puede descansar, sino
que es llevado al infinito. Desciendes, Seor, para ser comprendido y te man-
tienes innumerable e infinito, y si no permanecieras infinito no seras fin del
deseo. Eres, pues, infinito para ser fin del deseo. Pues el deseo intelectual no
es llevado hacia algo que pueda ser mayor o ms deseable. Todo lo que est
ms ac del infinito puede ser mayor. El fin, por tanto, del deseo es infinito.
Eres, pues, oh Dios, la infinitud misma, que nicamente deseo en todo deseo.
No puedo acercarme mejor a este saber sobre la infinitud sino sabiendo que
es infinita. Ya que cuanto ms, Dios mo, te comprendo como incomprensi-
ble, tanto ms te alcanzo, pues alcanzo ms el fin de mi deseo [] Mi deseo
[] es llevado por ti hacia ti. El deseo es, pues, llevado por el principio eterno,
del que le viene el ser deseo, hacia el fin sin fin. Y ste es infinito. Porque el
que yo, hombrecillo, no me contentase contigo, Dios mo, si supiese que eres
comprensible procede de que yo soy llevado por ti hacia ti, incomprensible e
infinito. Te veo, pues, Seor, Dios mo, en un cierto rapto mental 59.

El ser llevado o el rapto son, efectivamente, la seal ms clara del modo


como entiende el Cusano esta especie de ruptura con la supuesta, mera y sim-

58
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, Trialogus de possest (D., Philosophisch, II, 284-286).
59
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XVI (D., Philosophisch, III, 164-166). Las cursi-
vas son mas.

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918 M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA

ple, autosuficiencia de la subjetividad, que est en la base de su visin de Dios.


Como se dice concentradamente en otro pasaje, en el mismo De visione Dei:
Nadie te concebir [capiet], si no te donas a l 60. No deja de ser significativo
que el Cusano concluya este su gran tratado sobre la visin de Dios con una
splica, que da claro testimonio, una vez ms, de esta primordialidad de la accin
o iniciativa divina en el proceso todo de tal visin: Arrstrame [Trahe me],
Seor, ya que nadie podr llegar a ti sino arrastrado [tractus] por ti, para que,
de este modo atrado [attractus] me libere de este mundo y me junte contigo,
Dios absoluto, en la eternidad de la vida gloriosa. Amn 61.
Tres meses despus de la aparicin del De visione Dei, el Cusano escribe desde
Brixen el 12 de febrero de 1454 a Kaspar Aindorffer, abad de los benedictinos
de Tegernsee (a quienes previamente, segn se indic, haba remitido este su
nuevo escrito). Pues bien, en su carta utiliza su acostumbrado smil de la caza
justamente para insistir de nuevo en la idea a la que me estoy refiriendo (y que
tanta importancia tiene, por lo dems, para la comprensin del pensamiento
cusaniano en general) de la previa relacin con el Dios infinito (por invisible que
ste sea), sin la que resultara imposible o irrealizable la dinmica de la ten-
dencia humana hacia el encuentro con l. El Cusano se expresa del modo siguien-
te, hablando de la que l mismo llama caza divina (divina venatio):
El Dios escondido a los ojos de todos los sabios es buscado; y ya que l
inspira [inspirat] para ser buscado, la mente vida realiza cualquier intento
para alcanzar alguna vez al amado. El perro de caza corre variadamente de
una parte para otra al empezar a buscar la liebre por l nunca vista; y si su
naturaleza no tuviera una cierta impresin de su [de la liebre] especie, no se
sentira incitada a correr, ya que trabajara en vano si ignorase lo que encuen-
tra. Lo mismo le ocurre a nuestra naturaleza intelectual que se mueve hacia
la verdad como hacia su propia vida 62.

Seguramente este smil venatorio est todava de algn modo presente cuan-
do diez aos ms tarde, el mismo ao de su muerte, aplica otra metfora simi-
lar, la del caminante, a la necesaria previa visin de Dios por parte de la mente
humana para que sta pueda ponerse en movimiento y dirigirse hacia l. Es
decir, para que ella pueda moverse hacia el Dios infinito es necesario que pueda
ver de lejos hacia dnde tiende, como el caminante ve con antelacin el trmi-
no de su movimiento para poder dirigir sus pasos hacia el trmino deseado 63.
Pues, tal como dice seguidamente el Cusano: Si la mente no pudiera ver desde
lejos el trmino de su descanso y deseo, de su alegra y felicidad, cmo habra
de correr hacia su comprensin? 64.
Por lo dems, uno de los temas a los que el Cusano hubo de prestar atencin
en el contexto de la comprensin de la dimensin mstica es el del modo como

60
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, VII (D., Philosophisch, III, 120).
61
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei, XXV (D., Philosophisch, III, 218).
62
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 121-122.
63
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De apice theoriae (D., Philosophisch, II, 372).
64
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De apice theoriae (D., Philosophisch, II, 372).

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se debera pensar la relacin entre lo que se puede denominar el aspecto afec-


tivo y el intelectual en la misma. Fueron, una vez ms, los benedictinos de
Tegernsee quienes plantearon esta cuestin al cardenal, debido a las diversas
opiniones que circulaban al respecto en el ambiente monacal o teolgico de la
poca. En efecto, ms de un ao antes de la aparicin del De visione Dei y en
una fecha seguramente poco anterior al 22 de septiembre de 1452 (da en el que
est datada la carta de respuesta de Nicols de Cusa), el abad Kaspar Aindorf-
fer 65 le comunica su deseo y el de sus compaeros de que l, bien ejercitado en
toda la ciencia teolgica, y principalmente mstica, les manifieste su opinin
acerca de lo siguiente:
Se trata de la cuestin de si el alma devota sin el conocimiento del enten-
dimiento o tambin sin pensamiento previo o concomitante, nicamente con
el afecto o por medio del pice de la mente [mentis apicem] que llaman sind-
resis, puede alcanzar a Dios y ser movido y llevado de modo inmediato a l 66.

Puede decirse que la respuesta cusaniana (del mencionado 22 de septiem-


bre) discurre por los derroteros clsicos de la filosofa y la teologa, al ponerse
en ella claramente de manifiesto que el afecto y el amor no pueden ser ajenos
al conocimiento o que, tal como indica el propio Cusano, el conocimiento coin-
cide en el amor (in dilectione coincidit cognitio). Pero esta afirmacin es
fundamentada y explicada seguidamente en el sentido de que el conocimiento
(del bien, en definitiva, de Dios) es el que posibilita tanto el amor como el sub-
siguiente afecto:
Pues es imposible contina analizando lcidamente el Cusano que el
afecto no sea movido sino por medio del amor [per dilectionem], y cualquier
cosa que es amada no puede serlo sino por razn del bien; y nadie es bueno sino
Dios, segn dice la Verdad. Pues todo cuanto es amado y elegido por razn del
bien, no es amado sin conocimiento del bien, ya que es amado por razn del bien.
Existe, pues, en el interior de cualquier amor, por el que se es conducido a Dios,
conocimiento, aunque se ignore qu [quid] es aquello que uno ama. Hay, pues,
coincidencia de ciencia e ignorancia o docta ignorancia. Pues si no se supiese
qu es el bien, no se amara el bien, y sin embargo el que ama ignora qu [quid]
es el bien; pues el amor del bien muestra al bien en cuanto todava no aprehen-
dido [apprehensum], ya que cesara el movimiento del espritu, que es amor, si
alcanzase su fin. Es, pues, movido el espritu para ir siempre a ms [ut plus attin-
gat] y, dado que el bien es infinito, nunca deja de moverse. El espritu amante
no puede, pues, pararse, porque la amabilidad del amado es inalcanzable. As
pues, no ocurre sin conocimiento el ser arrebatado del amante 67.

65
El abad de Tegernsee, el muniqus Kaspar Ainforffer (1402-1461), fue designado abad
de Tegernsee en 1426 (con apenas 24 aos de edad) y ejerci su cargo durante 35 aos hasta
su muerte. Cf. VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 17; HAAS, Deum, 11-12, 26.
66
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 110. Aindorffer alude seguidamente a Hugo de Balma (fina-
les del siglo XIII) y a Juan Gerson (1363-1429), denominado aqu nicamente como cance-
llarius novus (canciller de la Universidad de Pars). Sobre las divergentes opiniones de
ambos autores (Hugo de Balma y Gerson) respecto de la relacin del entendimiento o del
conocimiento con el afecto o el amor en la teologa mstica puede verse HAAS, Deum, 11-14.
67
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 111-112.

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920 M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA

Como se ve, la consideracin del conocimiento como fundamento prima-


rio y condicin de posibilidad del amor y del afecto no le conduce en modo algu-
no al Cusano al abandono de sus ideas bsicas acerca de la infinitud y de la
consecuente inabarcabilidad cognoscitiva del bien sumo o infinito, sino que ste
permanece firmemente asentado en la carta del Cusano como el verdadero motor
y posibilitador definitivo de todo el proceso de la mente, tanto cognoscitivo como
afectivo. Sin tal realidad movilizadora no habra, pues, ni conocimiento, ni amor,
ni afecto, es decir, no habra mente.
Pero si los benedictinos de Tegernsee aceptaban con agradecimiento las ideas
sobre la mstica vertidas por el Cusano en sus cartas y escritos, no ocurre lo
mismo, en el caso de su declarado adversario, el cartujo Vicente de Aggsbach
(1464), que entre los aos 1435 y 1448 haba sido prior de la Cartuja de Aggs-
bach (no lejos de la gran abada benedictina de Melk, en Austria). Vicente de
Aggsbach, en efecto, bien al contrario de lo expresado aqu por el Cusano sobre
la necesidad del conocimiento para el amor o el afecto y apoyndose en buena
parte en su predecesor, tambin cartujo, Hugo de Balma, defenda la ignoran-
cia en el proceso mstico, es decir, la ausencia en l de cualquier tipo de cono-
cimiento 68.
Sern de nuevo los benedictinos de Tegernsee los receptores de la opinin
del Cusano respecto de estas ideas de Vicente de Aggsbach. Efectivamente, en
carta del 14 de septiembre de 1453 el Cusano critica el modo del que habla el
cartujo, o sea, la hermenutica de lo mstico de Vicente de Aggsbach, en cuan-
to que ste, segn el Cusano, postula un modo de ascenso mstico por medio
del afecto y dejando de lado el entendimiento [per affectum linquendo intellec-
tum], contraponiendo a ello por su parte el Cusano unas reflexiones que vie-
nen a estar en continuidad con las realizadas en la precedente carta, tambin
de septiembre del ao anterior, a los mismos destinatarios. Frente a la ausen-
cia, pues, de lo cognoscitivo, sostenida por el cartujo, se vuelve a poner de
relieve la necesidad de previo conocimiento:
Es necesario que todo amante que se eleva de modo ignoto [ignote con-
surgentem] a la unin con el amado posea de antemano un cierto modo de
conocimiento, porque lo que es absolutamente desconocido ni es amado ni es
encontrado y, aunque fuese encontrado, no sera reconocido [non apprehen-
deretur]. Por tanto, la va por medio de la cual uno intentara elevarse de modo
ignoto [consurgere ignote] no es segura [] 69.

68
Cf. VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 29; HAAS, Deum, 11-12, 29.
69
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 115. Respecto ya de la frmula concreta, que procede del
Pseudo-Dionisio, del ignote consurgere (de la ascensin ignorante o del elevarse de modo
ignoto), el Cusano la interpretar consecuentemente como algo referido, no al afecto, sino
a la facultad cognoscitiva (en relacin objetiva con la cusaniana docta ignorancia): El
elevarse de modo ignoto [Ignote consurgere] no puede decirse sino de la capacidad intelec-
tual, ya que el afecto no se eleva de modo ignoto [ignote], puesto que ni siquiera lo hace de
modo conociente [scienter] a no ser que reciba del entendimiento el saber. El saber y el no
saber se refieren al entendimiento, no a la voluntad, de la misma manera que el bien y el mal
se refieren a la voluntad, no al entendimiento (ibd.).

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M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA 921

El hecho es, sin embargo, que Vicente de Aggsbach, aun despus de la apa-
ricin del De visione Dei, continu por su cuenta con su enfrentamiento con
Nicols de Cusa, motivado ya ms, al parecer, por acontecimientos relaciona-
dos con la poltica eclesial o institucional y los consecuentes resentimientos que
por razones intrnsecas o estrictamente tericas respecto de la cuestin misma
de la comprensin de la teologa mstica 70.
El 18 de marzo de 1454, seis meses despus de la carta precedente, el Cusa-
no volver a ponerse de nuevo en contacto con los benedictinos del monasterio
de Tegernsee en carta dirigida ahora a Bernhard von Waging (1472), entre los
aos 1452 y 1465 prior de dicho monasterio (siendo abad del mismo el ya men-
cionado Kaspar Aindorffer) 71. Obviamente, el Cusano seguir insistiendo, en
relacin con el proceso del ascenso a la divinidad, en la mutua implicacin entre
conocer y amar, de modo que, a tenor de ello, conocer es amar y amar es
conocer [cognoscere sit amare, et amare cognoscere]. En este sentido, escri-
bir aqu en el contexto de la bsqueda humana de lo divino:
Dios, que est sobre lo bueno y lo verdadero, que es la fuerza de lo bueno
y de lo verdadero, no es alcanzado tal como l es sino superando todo cuanto
es entendido y amado, aunque no podamos realizar nuestro acercamiento a l
sino buscando [querendo]. Ahora bien, no existe un buscar sin entender ni
amar. Amamos el bien y buscamos (saber) qu es lo que amamos, y sin embar-
go, como dice Agustn, no buscaramos si ignorsemos totalmente. Pues no
hay amor del bien sin algn conocimiento [notitia] del mismo; y no existe cono-
cimiento sin amor 72.

Ahora bien, y en relacin con las ltimas palabras del precedente texto, creo
conveniente aadir que parece darse en el Cusano efectivamente una progresi-

70
Vase lo que escribe Vicente de Aggsbach en 1454 (un ao, por tanto, despus de la
publicacin del escrito De visione Dei) sobre Nicols de Cusa, con el teln de fondo del paso
de ste, dos dcadas antes, del partido de los conciliaristas al de los partidarios del Papa duran-
te el Concilio de Basilea: El Cusano se opuso al Espritu Santo y se opone a l hoy todava.
Pues el Espritu Santo reuni el concilio de Basilea, y el Cusano, no contento con haberlo
hecho saltar por los aires, no deja de justificar lo que l ha hecho contra la iglesia [] Este
autor es grande en figura, en entusiasmo, en saber y en elocuencia, en prebendas, abundan-
te en riquezas y ha hecho carrera. Ahora seguramente quiere crearse, con la publicacin de
nuevas doctrinas, un halo de santidad. Quiera el Seor protegerme a m y a todo fiel de la
reciente doctrina venida del extranjero (Cf. HAAS, Deum, 30-31).
71
Sobre la entusiasta aceptacin de Bernhard von Waging de las ideas del Cusano acer-
ca de la mstica y, en especial, de la ntima relacin entre la docta ignorancia y la teologa
mstica cusanianas puede verse HAAS, Deum, 26-27.
72
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 134-135. El pasaje de Agustn al que hace aqu referencia
el Cusano podra ser el siguiente: Pero quin ama lo que ignora? Se puede conocer una cosa
y no amarla; pero pregunto: es posible amar lo que se desconoce? Y si esto no es posible,
nadie ama a Dios antes de conocerlo. Y qu es conocer a Dios, sino contemplarlo con la mente
y percibirlo firmemente? No es Dios cuerpo para que se le busque con los ojos de la carne
(AGUSTN, De Trin. 8, 4, 6). En carta posterior al mismo Bernhard von Waging de 28 de julio
de 1455 le indicar el Cusano a ste que quienes afirman que el afecto es llevado o movido
hacia algo totalmente desconocido estn en contra de Aristteles, Toms de Aquino y todos
los telogos (Cf. VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 159-160).

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922 M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA

va tendencia, cada vez ms explcita, a ver no slo la mutua implicacin entre


conocimiento y afecto, sino tambin a considerar el afecto o el amor como el
lugar mismo en el que se asienta de hecho tal implicacin. De modo que habra
tambin aqu, se podra decir, una especie de coincidencia de los opuestos,
en cuanto que por un lado el amor depende del conocimiento (a tenor de las cr-
ticas dirigidas sobre todo contra Vicente de Aggsbach) y, por otro, el conoci-
miento dependera a su vez, en un sentido cada vez ms neto, del amor.
En efecto y respecto de esto ltimo, hay que tener en cuenta, en primer lugar,
lo que indica W. Beierwaltes sobre la impregnacin afectiva de lo intelectual
o cognoscitivo en el modo de pensar del Cusano:
El aspecto intelectual de la mstica cusaniana no es algo en s mismo ais-
lable, como si fuera algo puramente racional. La speculatio o el ver del in-fini-
to, en cuanto intencin que se da a priori en el intellectus, no ha de ser enten-
dida en modo alguno en analoga con un conocimiento meramente informativo
respecto de algo, como un permanecer a distancia desde el punto de vista emo-
cional, sino que est ms bien dirigida por una intensa voluntad de llegar a ver
lo que es en definitiva invisible, por un deseo de contacto (attingere) e identi-
ficacin (uniri) justamente con el fin de este movimiento. Y sta es una carac-
terstica fundamental del amor (amor, dilectio) a Dios 73.

Pero, en continuidad con esto y ms all de ello, es necesario poner de relie-


ve tambin que el amor o el afecto va adquiriendo en el Cusano, a pesar de su
anteriormente afirmada dependencia del conocimiento, un protagonismo es-
pecial.
Ya en carta al abad de Tegernsee de 12 de febrero de 1454 el Cusano se expre-
saba en los siguientes trminos:
Aqu, mientras somos caminantes, corremos hacia la aprehensin de ella
[de Dios en cuanto verdad], uno de una forma y otro de otra; y nos agrada ms
alguna vez el camino del uno que el del otro; pero el camino ms breve y ms
seguro es el amor [dilectio] [] El amor conduce, pues, al abrazo del conoci-
do [ad amplexum cogniti] 74.

Pero ser sobre todo dos aos despus, en el verano de 1456, cuando en dos
sermones pronunciados por l en su dicesis de Brixen, al margen, se podra
decir, de las discusiones ms tcnicas en torno a la teologa mstica, har refe-
rencia a la ahora privilegiada posicin del amor por encima en cierto modo del
conocimiento intelectual.
En el primer texto, del 31 de julio de 1456, va a poner de relieve la coinci-
dencia entre conocimiento intelectual y amor de Dios, frente a una recortada
o dualista comprensin del principio tradicional de que nada es amado si pre-
viamente no es conocido, que no hara justicia al protagonismo o primordia-
lidad del deseo o del amor en la dinmica del espritu humano. He aqu el texto
cusaniano:

73
BEIERWALTES, Mystische, 441.
74
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 122.

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M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA 923

No es cierto que los que buscan conocer [quaerentes scire] aman a la ver-
dad que buscan? Ahora bien, si amas a aquella a la que buscas, amas lo que
ignoras y no lo ignoras puesto que lo buscas. Ama, en consecuencia, a la ver-
dad de todo corazn [] y encontrars a Dios, al que ama tu alma. Pues Dios
es la verdad. Por lo tanto, el modo de aprehender la ciencia de la verdad, es
decir, de aprehender a Dios con la mente intelectual consiste en acceder al
mismo con el espritu del deseo o del amor. Cuando se dice que nada desco-
nocido es amado se dice algo verdadero, a no ser que haya coincidencia entre
lo verdadero y lo bueno. Pues el amor [Caritas], que es Dios, en tanto es enten-
dido en cuanto es amado y en tanto es conocido por el amor [a caritate] en
cuanto es amado, y el que ama en tanto conoce en cuanto ama. Advierte, por
tanto, la coincidencia 75.

Pero esta especie de imperativo categrico del amor como camino al cono-
cimiento es reforzado de nuevo por l desde un punto de vista algo diferente,
slo un mes despus, en su alocucin del 28 de agosto de 1456. En ella, de un
modo que parece rememorar previas reflexiones en torno tambin al tema del
amor plasmadas por Agustn (no por causalidad el sermn es pronunciado en
el da de su festividad), el Cusano pondr de relieve que existe una manera de
acceder al conocimiento del Dios-amor, la cual consiste en la experiencia
del amor al prjimo, toda vez que en este amor natural se experimenta y se
vive dicho al modo anselmiano por el Cusano lo mejor que cabe pensar
y desear. Tal experiencia nos conduce, pues, al conocimiento y amor de Dios,
en cuanto fuente de la misma. De manera que sera a travs del amor huma-
no, a modo de imagen y semejanza, como se accede al conocimiento de
Dios. Vase cmo se expresa el Cusano:
Advirtamos tambin que por el amor llegamos al conocimiento de Dios.
Aunque nada es amado si no es conocido, sin embargo Dios [] es cognosci-
ble por semejanza. Pues todo aquello que era desconocido se convierte por seme-
janza en conocido, del mismo modo que un rostro desconocido se convierte en
conocido por su imagen visual. Ahora bien, sabemos que Dios es amor. Y el
amor al prjimo es semejanza del amor. Accedemos, en consecuencia, por medio
del amor, a manera de imagen y semejanza, al conocimiento de Dios [] El
amor natural muestra que no hay nada ms deseable que el amor. Porque si
desaparece el amor y la concordia, todo se viene abajo. Si no hay amor ni con-
tento [delectatio], toda la vida sensible viene a asentarse en la tristeza y en la
muerte y fracasa. Aquello, pues, que proporciona vida con alegra y contento
es el amor, ms dulce o mejor que el cual nada puede ser pensado. En conse-
cuencia, la fuente de un bien tan grande, de la que mana la vida y el movimiento
de la alegra y del contento, supera todo sentido y es el descanso de todo movi-
miento y algo mejor que cuanto pueda ser pensado 76.

Una vez analizado todo lo anterior, parece quedar suficientemente claro que
el Cusano se mueve siempre, a pesar de todo, aun hablando del amor y de su
primordial experiencia conducente al conocimiento de Dios, en el plano te-

75
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 210.
76
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 236-237.

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924 M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA

rico, es decir, en la dimensin de su fundamentacin filosfica y teolgica. En


este sentido, K. Reinhardt y H. Schwaetzer han aludido a que el Cusano no fue
un mstico, sino un pensador cuyo pensamiento todo encontr en la teo-loga
mstica su ltimo fundamento y su culminacin 77. Me parece que se puede
decir, sin embargo, que l posea, si no una directa experiencia mstica en el sen-
tido tradicional del trmino, una gran pasin por la misma y una declarada nos-
talgia tambin por tal tipo de experiencia. Precisamente en la carta ms arriba
aducida (de 12 de febrero de 1454) y en el contexto de su mencionada afirma-
cin de que el amor conduce al abrazo del conocido dir a sus amigos bene-
dictinos: Estoy, sin embargo, alejado en gran manera de estas altsimas cosas
por las ocupaciones del mundo; por ello he pedido a los hermanos que prepa-
ren para m una celda. Ojal se me concediese gozar del sacro ocio entre los her-
manos que en sosiego ven cun suave es el Seor [quoniam suavis est dominus] 78.
Nicols de Cusa fue, efectivamente, de manera principal un hombre de accin,
que en sus intervalos de ocio redactaba los brillantes escritos que conocemos.
Pero sin poder disfrutar del sacro ocio que aqu aora, vivi sin embargo un
modo particular de experiencia mstica no desgajado de su vida activa ni de su
poderosa capacidad especulativa. Su mstica flua as, de manera espontnea y
natural, de su propia vida. Por eso puede hablarnos de la facilidad de la teolo-
ga mstica, tal como se lo comunica en el inicio mismo del De visione Dei a los
benedictinos de Tegernsee, tras la dedicatoria a los mismos: Os mostrar ahora
les dice lo que a vosotros, queridos hermanos, os haba prometido acerca
de la facilidad de la teologa mstica 79.
Una facilidad que proviene sin duda de la connnaturalidad al espritu del
hombre de la experiencia, aunque oculta e implcita, de la infinitud, cuyo ms
alto grado, la infinitud absoluta, se identifica con la misma divinidad.
De aqu surge tambin, aunque en principio pudiera resultar extrao, la capa-
cidad de la que da muestras el Cusano para, desde tal concepcin, poder abor-
dar e integrar en su propia sistemtica problemticas filosficas o teolgicas
relacionadas, por ejemplo, con la existencia de otras culturas y religiones. Es
sintomtico y, desde este punto de vista, no carece de inters terico el hecho
de que tanto el De visione Dei como el De pace fidei, escritos que tienen en prin-
cipio objetivos bien distintos (el primero como ya sabemos est en relacin

77
K. REINHARDT - H. SCHWAETZER, Mystik und Kirchenreform bei Nikolaus von Kues, en
Die Kirchenkritik der Mystiker. Prophetie und Gotteserfahrung. Bd. 2: Frhe Neuzeit (hrsg. von
M. Delgado - G. Fuchs), Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer, 2005, 40.
78
VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 122. El propio Cusano conclua una carta anterior (del 22 de
septiembre de 1452) al mismo abad de Tegernsee, relacionada con la aludida problemtica del
conocimiento y del afecto en la teologa mstica, de la siguiente manera: Uno puede mos-
trar a otros el camino que conoce como verdadero por haberlo odo, aun sin haber caminado
por l; lo har sin embargo de manera ms segura [certius] quien, vindolo, camin por l. Lo
que yo haya escrito o dicho ser ms inseguro [incertius], pues no he saboreado todava cun
suave es el Seor [quoniam suavis est dominus] (VANSTEENBERGHE, Autour, 113). La expresin
gustad y ved cun suave es el Seor pertenece, como es sabido, al Salmo 34 (33).
79
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De visione Dei (D., Philosophisch, III, 94).

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con la teologa mstica y el segundo se inscribe en el contexto, podramos decir,


ecumnico, de encuentro con otras religiones), hayan salido de su pluma por la
misma poca, a finales de 1453, en el mismo ao de la cada de Constantinopla
slo algunos meses antes, en el mes de mayo de este mismo ao. De modo que
mstica y dilogo interreligioso podran tener algo que ver entre s 80 y, en lo que
se refiere al Cusano, as parece ocurrir de hecho.
En su De pace fidei da muestras, en efecto, en primer lugar, de una notable
y casi inesperada comprensin de lo que en la terminologa antropolgica actual
se denominara cultura, al escribir all al respecto: Es propio de la condicin
terrenal humana el que una larga costumbre, que se considera transformada en
naturaleza, se defienda como verdad 81. Ahora bien, esta concepcin de lo cul-
tural le vale al Cusano para, ante la manifiesta relatividad de la costumbre
que viene a constituirse en naturaleza, poder pensar, segn expone seguida-
mente, la diversidad de las costumbres religiosas desde su propia concepcin
de la infinita y omniabarcante divinidad, que est ms all de los opuestos.
En esta misma obra intenta mostrar, en segundo lugar, que todos veneran
a Dios en todo aquello que parecen adorar, apoyando tal aserto en las siguien-
tes reflexiones, directamente relacionadas con la invisibilidad e infinitud
del Dios de la teologa mstica (tal como se analiz en el De visione Dei):
Pues nadie apetece en todo aquello que parece apetecer sino el bien, que
eres t. Ni nadie busca en cualquier discurso intelectual sino la verdad, que
eres t. Qu busca el viviente sino vivir? Qu busca el existente sino ser? T,
que eres el dador de vida y de ser, eres, pues, aquel que apareces como bus-
cado de manera diferente en los diversos ritos y que eres nombrado con los
diversos nombres, ya que t permaneces desconocido e inefable para todos en
cuanto a tu propio ser [ut es]. Ya que t, que eres el infinito poder, no eres
nada de cuanto creaste, ni puede la criatura comprender el concepto de tu infi-
nitud, dado que no hay proporcin entre lo finito y lo infinito. Pero t, Dios
omnipotente, invisible a toda mente, puedes hacerte visible, del modo que pue-
das ser concebido, a quien quieras. No te ocultes, pues, ms, Seor [] Si te
dignases hacerlo as, cesar la espada, la malevolencia del odio y cualquier
mal. Y conocern todos que no hay sino una sola religin en la variedad de sus
ritos 82.

Para completar este recorrido por los anlisis cusanianos acerca de la teolo-
ga mstica, es decir, acerca del conocimiento humano de la divinidad ms all
de un mero conocimiento inicial, afirmativo, pero ms ac tambin de otros
modos ms elevados de conocimiento, aludir brevemente a algunas pertinen-
tes consideraciones del Cusano.
Tres aos despus de dar a conocer en el De visione Dei su concepcin gene-
ral acerca del acceso mstico a la divinidad, en su sermn de la festividad del

80
Puede leerse a este respecto el ya citado escrito de EULER, Die beiden Schriften De pace
fidei und De visione Dei aus dem Jahre 1453.
81
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De pace fidei I (D., Philosophisch, III, 710).
82
NIKOLAUS VON KUES, De pace fidei I (D., Philosophisch, III, 710).

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926 M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA

da de Navidad en Brixen del ao 1456 har un intento de clasificacin u orde-


nacin del conocimiento mstico en la jerarqua de los diversos modos de cono-
cimiento de la divinidad.
Pues bien, a tenor de las declaraciones del Cusano en esta celebracin litr-
gica, se daran cuatro grados de conocimiento de Dios.
El primero (el escaln inferior) sera el por l denominado conocimiento
natural, es decir, el que obtenemos basndonos en los deseos del espritu
racional. Bajo la gua de tales deseos nuestra mente realiza unas determinadas
afirmaciones acerca de lo que ella imagina sobre Dios. Ahora bien, tal modo
meramente afirmativo de referirse cognoscitivamente a lo divino no es tan
verdadero nos dice como lo es el modo negativo, caracterstico de la va
mstica. Por ello indicar aqu el Cusano que el conocimiento perfecto acer-
ca de Dios no puede obtenerse naturalmente [naturaliter] por la va de la afir-
macin, la cual no lo alcanza 83.
El segundo grado de conocimiento de Dios, es decir, la categora de conoci-
miento que sigue inmediatamente a la anterior, ser precisamente el conoci-
miento mstico. En comparacin y en contraste con el primer grado de cono-
cimiento, el modo de conocimiento mstico se realiza bajo el influjo de una
luz ms elevada, en la que se le manifiesta [revelatur] al alma que Dios est por
encima de todo cuanto se expresa por medio de los nombres de los deseos del
espritu 84, es decir, por encima de lo alcanzado en el primer grado de conoci-
miento. Por ello se insiste de nuevo seguidamente aqu en que este modo aade
al primero la luz de una manifestacin [revelationis] ms elevada 85. Sin embar-
go, aun siendo esto as, para el Cusano con este segundo grado de conocimien-
to, el mstico, no se accede todava al perfecto conocimiento de Dios. Tal
como se expresa el Cusano:
El perfecto conocimiento de Dios no puede obtenerse [] por la va ms-
tica de la negacin, la cual, aun siendo ms elevada [que el primer grado de
conocimiento], dice, sin embargo, ms bien qu no es Dios que qu es, y per-
manece ms ac de su mostracin [ostensionem] facial. Es necesario, por tanto,
que se le aada la revelacin o la gracia a la naturaleza para que se alcance la
visin facial, la cual es un conocimiento plenificante y engendrador de felici-
dad [] aqu en la fe de modo enigmtico y en la regin de los vivos de mane-
ra real y veraz, es decir, cara a cara [facialiter] 86.

Al final de este texto se alude ya sintticamente a lo que constituye el tercer


grado de conocimiento de Dios, en el cual el Cusano, ya desde un punto de vista
directamente teolgico, incluye de hecho unitariamente, no solamente el cono-
cimiento identificado con la denominada visin beatfica, sino tambin el pre-
vio conocimiento o experiencia terrenal de Dios por la fe y la gracia. De modo
que existe, desde la comprensin cusaniana de este tercer grado, una deter-

83
Cf. NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 382-383.
84
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 383.
85
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 384.
86
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 383.

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minada continuidad entre ambas fases de conocimiento, lunar la primera y


solar la postrera y definitiva, a tenor de las imgenes utilizadas. Vase cmo
se describe este tercer grado de conocimiento, comn a ambas fases:
El tercer grado es el de la mostracin de su rostro, el cual permaneci en
la obscuridad en el segundo modo [el mstico], y es luz que ilumina la obscu-
ridad a la que conduce la segunda va [la mstica]. Y esta luz que ilumina la
obscuridad es la luz verdadera que ilumina en este mundo las tinieblas de la
ignorancia a la manera como la luz de la luna ilumina las tinieblas de la noche.
Pero las formas [facies] de las cosas permanecen obscurecidas en esta ilumi-
nacin, porque la luz ilumina as a travs de la fe, de una manera en cierto
modo parecida a la luz del sol que ilumina a travs de la luna, en la que la luz
del sol es inestable. La iluminacin no es clara, sino enigmtica, al no mostrar
de manera ntida al conocimiento un rostro claro, sino ensombrecido; y la fe
crece y mengua como la luna. Pero en la regin estable o celeste la luz del sol
de justicia ilumina por s misma [] y muestra verdaderamente el rostro de
Dios tal como es: sin sombra ni enigma. Es el conocimiento de Dios tal como
l es 87.

Ms all de los precedentes tres grados de conocimiento de Dios, un cono-


cimiento que se refiere exclusivamente al que puede tener el hombre respecto
de Dios, el Cusano habla todava de un cuarto y ltimo grado de conocimiento:
el que Dios tiene de s mismo. Se trata de un modo de conocimiento de Dios que
ninguna criatura puede en manera alguna alcanzar, ni siquiera en la celestial
visin cara a cara, dado que la quiddidad o esencia de Dios supera, por su
infinitud misma, cualquier modo creado de acceso cognoscitivo:
Hay an concluye el Cusano un ltimo conocimiento, que se refiere
a la esencia [quiditatis] de Dios. Dado que la esencia de Dios excede toda medi-
da de conocimiento que no se identifique con la misma esencia, por ello, al
identificarse nicamente en Dios su esencia con su conocimiento y no ser
comunicable o multiplicable la esencia de un Dios infinito, as tampoco lo es
[comunicable o multiplicable] el conocimiento que se identifica con su esen-
cia. En consecuencia, slo Dios se conoce de este modo a s mismo, lo que es
lo mismo que (decir) que slo Dios es su conocimiento 88.

La exclusividad divina de este cuarto grado de conocimiento hace que nin-


gn grado de conocimiento anterior (humano), no slo el mstico sino tambin
el facial, pueda en modo alguno comparrsele. Respecto de este ltimo dir,
en efecto, explcitamente el Cusano que el conocimiento facial es un conoci-
miento que sacia el deseo, como la bebida sacia al sediento aunque el que bebe
ignora la esencia [quiditatem] de lo que bebe 89. Al ser humano le es, por tanto,
absolutamente imposible, ni siquiera en el cara a cara ultraterrenal, acceder
al conocimiento de la esencia de Dios, pues ello significara en definitiva iden-
tificarse con Dios mismo.

87
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 384.
88
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 384-385.
89
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 385.

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928 M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA

Pero, volviendo de nuevo a los tres primeros grados de conocimiento,


aqullos a los que nicamente puede aspirar el ser humano, me parece con-
veniente insinuar al menos que, ms all de la explcita y pedaggica clasifi-
cacin o mutuo deslindamiento realizados por el Cusano en el mencionado
sermn navideo, su misma concepcin general filosfica (y no slo una cohe-
rente y consecuente teologa) abogara por una ms estrecha implicacin entre
tales grados, en el sentido de que se podra afirmar que no slo en el segun-
do grado (el mstico), sino tambin en el primero (el natural de los dese-
os humanos) se da ya de hecho una experiencia o presencia del misterio reve-
lado de Dios, actuante como tal eficazmente y desde siempre sobre el espritu
humano.
Y de hecho, la unin que realiza el Cusano entre el misterio de Cristo como
revelacin de Dios y la realidad humana en cuanto tal me parece muy signifi-
cativa a este respecto. En un sermn suyo pronunciado en Mainz el 11 de noviem-
bre de 1444 (once aos antes del arriba mencionado sermn navideo), el Cusa-
no pona de relieve, en efecto, cmo los deseos del ser humano se dirigen hacia
la realizacin plena de su propia humanidad (y no de otra especie distinta de
ella misma). En tal sentido, el ser humano ansa su propia y total perfeccin, la
cual implica, a tenor de la interna dinmica de sus deseos, indefectibilidad,
inmortalidad, etc. El ser humano no se aquieta, pues, mientras no est en pose-
sin de la totalidad de la vida, de la verdad y del bien. Pero esto viene a
significar en definitiva, segn el razonamiento cusaniano, que el ser humano
quiere ser hombre y Dios de manera unitaria y conjunta 90. Pues bien, es jus-
tamente de este modo como Cristo, el Dios-hombre, viene a convertirse en algo
que pertenece en cierto modo a la propia autocomprensin del ser humano
mismo. Vase en este sentido una vez establecida por el Cusano esa inagota-
bilidad de los deseos humanos (a los que correspondera el ms tarde denomi-
nado por l primer grado de conocimiento de Dios) el indudablemente ori-
ginal planteamiento y razonamiento, por medio del cual el fundamental dato
de la revelacin (Cristo), aceptado por la fe (y correspondiente, en la clasifica-
cin cusaniana, al tercer grado de conocimiento de Dios), entra en conexin
con la estructura misma del ser humano:
El movimiento, pues, de mi humanidad es aquel por el que consiga el des-
canso en un hombre de mi humanidad. Ahora bien, dado que nada puede ser
dicho o pensado mayor o mejor que aquello que me debe apaciguar, o sea, la
vida sin corrupcin, la verdad sin engao, el bien sin mal ninguno, entonces
afirmo que esto es Dios. Ya que Dios es aquello mximo y ptimo, por enci-
ma de lo cual no puede ser pensado nada mayor ni mejor. Pero aquello por
encima de lo cual no puede ser pensado nada mayor ni mejor es el descanso
y el trmino del movimiento del espritu intelectual. De aqu que el movimiento
de mi humanidad consista en que en un hombre de mi humanidad alcance a
Dios. Encuentro, pues, en m mismo un hombre de mi humanidad, que de tal
manera es hombre que tambin es Dios. Y ste es el hombre en el que nica-

90
Cf. NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XVII, 145-147.

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mente puedo yo en mi humanidad alcanzar el descanso. Pues el descanso es


Dios. Ahora bien, aquel hombre, que es Dios tambin, es aquel hacia el que
todos los hombres se mueven segn la naturaleza de la humanidad. Y ste es
Jesucristo 91.

Con ello da la respuesta el Cusano a la cuestin que se haba planteado sobre


cmo encontrar a Cristo en nosotros. Una respuesta como se ve, en la
que, en paralelismo con otras conocidas tesis suyas sobre la ntima relacin
entre Dios y el hombre, el Cristo de la revelacin se inserta en el centro mismo
de la realidad humana. As se podr comprender la a primera vista paradjica
o desconcertante afirmacin del Cusano: Si no encontramos a Jess en noso-
tros, no lo encontraremos 92.
Pero, a fin de cuentas, qu tiene que ver todo esto con la teologa mstica
del Cusano, ese segundo grado de conocimiento, considerado por l como
algo intermedio entre el conocimiento natural y el sobrenatural de la fe o de
la gracia?
Una posible respuesta a ello, parcial al menos, podra quedar sugerida retor-
nando de nuevo al posterior sermn de Navidad de 1456 en el comentario cusa-
niano al neotestamentario quien me ve a m ve al Padre (Juan 14, 8-9). En este
comentario se dice, entre otras cosas, lo siguiente:
Cmo se revela el invisible? Respondo: esto es revelar a Dios, que Dios
es y no es algo visible. Y sta es la teologa mstica, por la que entramos de
modo negativo en la obscuridad, en la que est Dios, negando en l cualquier
cosa conocida o nombrable. Pues ha sido revelado que quien venera lo visi-
ble no venera a Dios. Ahora bien, como Dios debe ser venerado y lo que es
absolutamente desconocido no puede ser venerado, ha sido por ello en con-
secuencia revelado que es necesario que el Dios invisible sea visto por medio
de los ojos corporales o por medio de la certeza visible de la mente en la fe
para ser venerado. Se muestra, pues, cmo se accede al invisible, a saber,
por la fe. Y esta es la fe: Cristo, el Hijo de Dios, es el manifestador [ostenso-
rem] de nuestro Dios y Padre suyo, en cuya visin est la suficiencia de la
felicidad 93.

En la precedente respuesta, mediadora entre lo visible y lo invisible, entre lo


manifestado o revelado y lo mstico, entre la fe y el pensamiento, el Cusano ha
realizado un meritorio esfuerzo por mostrar a Cristo como el posibilitador mismo
de todo encuentro humano (ya sea natural, mstico o creyente) con el Dios
invisible. Pues en l, en el hombre-Dios que es Cristo, se ve, de modo miste-

91
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XVII, 147-148. El Cusano considera a Cristo, el hom-
bre-Dios, como aquello a lo que aspira no slo todo ser humano, sino tambin, en cuanto le
es posible, la creacin entera: Toda criatura aade aqu desea ser del modo mejor que
puede. Y esto no puede ser sino en el hombre que incluya [complicante] todas las naturale-
zas inferiores en su naturaleza intelectual y que sea adems Dios (NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera
Omnia, XVII, 149).
92
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XVII, 145.
93
NICOLAI DE CUSA, Opera Omnia, XIX, 379-380.

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930 M. CABADA, INFINITUD DIVINA Y VISIN MSTICA EN NICOLS DE CUSA

rioso 94, el que en s mismo es invisible. El ver mantiene, en consecuencia,


hasta el final una funcin clave en la concepcin de la teologa mstica del Cusa-
no, la cual, tal como se ha podido advertir, se inserta, desbordndola, en la din-
mica misma de la reflexin filosfica cusaniana.

c/ Universidad Comillas, 7 MANUEL CABADA CASTRO


28049 Madrid
m.cabada@res.upcomillas.es

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

94
El Cusano no poda menos de tener presente lo que el Pseudo-Dionisio haba escrito
en su carta tercera a Gayo: Pues [Cristo] es misterio incluso despus de su revelacin o,
hablando con ms propiedad, incluso en la revelacin. Y este misterio de Jess, efectivamen-
te, permanece oculto, y no hay palabras ni entendimiento alguno que lo descubran, sino que
incluso si se habla de l permanece inefable, y aunque se lo quiera entender queda incom-
prensible (PSEUDO DIONISIO AREOPAGITA, o.c., 256).

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EL SUFISMO Y EL ISLAM
GAMAL ABDEL-KARIM
Universidad de El Cairo
Universidad Complutense de Madrid

RESUMEN: La experiencia suf es el encuentro con la verdad absoluta, y esa verdad no puede convertir-
se en feudo ni monopolio de nadie y para nadie, y tampoco est limitada a una cultura, raza o creencia
concreta. La doctrina del sufismo consiste en que el hombre se entrega voluntariamente en cuerpo y alma
a Dios. Estos ascetas y msticos sufes lo hacen, unos en solitario y otros en retiros colectivos de asocia-
ciones msticas llamadas turuq, como miembros seguidores de un maestro (Shaykh) que les permita lle-
var una vida normal y austera compatible con determinadas normas y prcticas ascticas de acuerdo con
el criterio de cada tariqa (camino inicitico mstico). As, el sufismo se convirti en el Islam perfecto, bajo
la direccin de sus maestros y guas espirituales (shuyukh) experimentados y en asociaciones piadosas
donde se impartan enseanzas y prcticas sufes. En la experiencia mstica del sufismo llega la religiosi-
dad rabe-musulmana a su perfeccin: en el ella el ser humano se entrega a Dios, se libera del engao
de lo inmediato y se siente unido a Dios en el universo como inmensa luz que manifiesta su grandeza.
PALABRAS CLAVE: sufismo, espiritualidad rabe-musulmana, asctica islmica, mstica islmica, Islam,
Corn, vida interior, experiencia csmica interior.

Sufism and Islam


ABSTRACT: The Sufi experience is the encounter with absolute truth. This truth cannot be converted
into a stronghold nor into a monopoly by and for anyone, and neither is it limited to a concrete culture,
race or belief. According to the Sufi doctrine, man voluntarily offers himself in body and soul to God.
Some ascetic and mystic sufis do so individually, while others, collectively, through retreats with mystical
associations called turuq. Some sufis are members of associations as followers of a master (Shaykh)
who allows them to live a normal and austere life compatible with specific norms and ascetic practices
conforming to the criteria of each tariqa (way of mystical initiation). Sufism is thus converted into perfect
Islam under the guidance of its experienced masters and spiritual guides (shuyukh), and into pious
associations imparting sufi teachings and practices. Arabic-Moslem religiosity reaches its perfection in
the mystical experience of Sufism, in which the human being, liberated from the deception of the
immediate, offers himself to God and feels united to God who is like an immense light manifesting its
greatness in the universe.
KEY WORDS: sufism, Arabic-Moslem spirituality, Islamic asceticism, Islamic mysticism, Islam, Koran,
interior life, interior cosmic experience.
CONCEPTOS CLAVE: Fan: autoanulacin y extincin del yo y la evanescencia; designa en el sufis-
mo (anulacin o trnsito del suf). Baq: subsistencia y permanencia temporal y pasajera. Btin: eso-
terismo, lo oculto y lo interior. Dikr (dhikr): recuerdo, mencin y recogimiento, como rito, invocacin
indefinida del nombre de Dios. Tawhd: afirmacin de la unicidad de Dios, Uno y nico para toda la
humanidad. Qutb: el polo-eje; en el sufismo una jerarqua o categora suprema del suf. Dq, Dawf
(dhawf): gusto y sabor mstico. Mafm: estado o vivencia espiritual del suf. Tariqa (singular de Turuq):
camino-asociacin, rden, cofrada, sendero, comunidad espiritual... designa la va mstica y espiritual
del suf hacia Dios bajo la direccin de un maestro (murshid o shayj). Yaqun: certidumbre intuitiva. Slik:
viajero mstico de una etapa a otra para alcanzar la verdad y la Unin con Dios. Marifa o Marifa: el cono-
cimiento y la gnosis. Murid (singular de Muridin): se dice de los seguidores y adeptos sufes de un shayj
(maestro) o una tariqa (va o camino mstico. Hadit-Hadiz: hechos, dichos, sentencias del profeta Muham-
mad como revelacin indirecta adems del Corn (Revelacin directa transmitida). Sayj-shaykh: maes-
tro suf, gua mstico. Tasawwuf: conjunto de vas contemplativas y ejercicios espirituales muy riguro-
sos. Saria-Shara: ley sagrada (revelada) transmitida al profeta muhammad como mensajero (rasul,
singular de rusul) de Dios. Sufismo: viene de sf, que significa lana o sofs, que es sabidura sfi o pru-
dencia, y de saf, pureza del alma suf.

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932 G. ABDEL-KARIM, EL SUFISMO Y EL ISLAM

Deca el gran mstico suf Ibn Arab:


Mi corazn se ha hecho capaz de adoptar todas las formas. Es pasto de
gacelas, y convento de monjes cristianos, y templo de los dolos, y la Kaaba
de los peregrinos, y las Tablas de la Ley, y el Libro del Corn. Yo milito en la
religin del amor, cualquiera que fuere el sendero que hallaren sus camellos.

INTRODUCCIN

El sufismo es la dimensin principal y reveladora de la espiritualidad de cada


religin divina, que tiene su importancia en la vida de los hombres de las dife-
rentes religiones, y su deseo en la realizacin de su existencia cotidiana. El sufis-
mo es un movimiento mstico y espiritual y una experiencia vvida de entidad
humana, donde el mstico suf encuentra en su espiritualidad la realidad de su
existencia, de su ser y lo ms profundo y oculto de su corazn y alma, para lle-
gar a Dios por este camino.
Es una realidad exenta de toda casualidad e inters superficial de la mayo-
ra de la gente (vulgo), porque la palabra suf (mstico) significa todo lo que es
puro, real y sincero en la profundidad del corazn humano, y a travs del cono-
cimiento y el corazn encuentra el hombre con lo verdadero y absoluto: Dios.
Esto, en s, es la verdadera experiencia religiosa y humana ms profunda del
suf como ltima etapa (maqm) de la existencia del hombre y su verdadero y
elevado significado de su vida.
En otro sentido, la experiencia suf es el encuentro con la verdad absoluta, y
esa verdad no puede convertirse en feudo ni monopolio de nadie y para nadie, y
tampoco est limitada a una cultura, raza o creencia concreta; como dice el santo
Giovanni Della Crotcha: el hombre se caracteriza por las cualidades divinas.
Los sufes utilizan un lenguaje y terminologa difciles de entender por la gente
corriente, ya que se trata de un pensamiento o expresin interna teolgica y racio-
nal; las experiencias sufes son vivas y palpables como una realidad absoluta, por-
que el corazn es el centro de su experiencia espiritual vivida intensamente como
un ideal religioso que camina hacia el entendimiento esotrico de las leyes divi-
nas, las creencias religiosas y sus formas teolgicas racionales.

VISIN HISTRICA DEL SUFISMO EN EL ISLAM

En sus comienzos, el sufismo se present como un movimiento religioso asc-


tico-mstico que se caracterizaba por la espiritualidad como uno de los ideales
del Islam y de su realizacin. Sin embargo, ya fue manifestado en su aplicacin
y ejerci una distincin que con el correr del tiempo se decant hacia lo inter-
no esotrico como principio y fin (btin) 1 de la religin oficial la privada y la

1
Es el sentido alegrico de una gran parte de las asociaciones o turuq, defensoras del
sentido oculto y secreto, mstico-espiritual, que se encierra y esconde bajo la corteza de la

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G. ABDEL-KARIM, EL SUFISMO Y EL ISLAM 933

individual apoyndose en la trayectoria del profeta del Islam como fenme-


no mstico y suf en la manera de entender la religin, como una manifestacin
surgida en el Islam a juzgar por las suras cornicas: a ti pedimos ayuda, y como
lo interpreta el profesor Rafael Ramn Guerrero 2 alude a nuestra vida interior.
As quedara, con ello, abierto el camino para la vida mstica dentro del Islam,
no como elemento constitutivo, sino como un fenmeno similar a otros que se
desarrollaron en los primeros tiempos del Islam como uno de los mltiples aspec-
tos que ofreca la vida musulmana, siguiendo incluso la trayectoria del profeta
Abraham, padre de la espiritualidad como hanif (musulmn en su sentido espi-
ritual).

LA APARICIN Y ORIGEN DEL SUFISMO

No se sabe con exactitud la fecha de la aparicin del sufismo islmico como


movimiento espiritual. No fue casual ni de repente, sino que se desarroll gra-
dualmente, ligado en su conjunto a la evolucin del pensamiento islmico y la
tendencia espiritual dentro del patrimonio y legado histrico y cultural del mundo
musulmn, ya que existan indicios de su aparicin durante al poca del profe-
ta Muhammad y de los cuatro califas musulmanes bien guiados, y ms concre-
tamente durante el siglo VIII. Los sufes pretendan que Muhammad fuera el pri-
mer suf del Islam como mensaje universal divino, de igual modo a como lo
fuera Abraham, a pesar de que no era judo ni cristiano, sino hanif, es decir,
crea en el poder superior divino que es uno y nico para toda la humanidad.
Ambos fueron modelos del perfecto sufismo y ejemplarizantes como hombres
ideales; equilibrados moral y racionalmente por sus actitudes humanas y sus
nobles virtudes como mensajeros y enviados de Dios.
Segn Ibn Jaldun 3 el sufismo, en sus inicios, pas por varias etapas de desa-
rrollo, empezando como un movimiento asctico que incorpor en su inicio ele-
mentos agnsticos (maarifa, plural de marif) y luego foment tendencias
pantestas.
Hay que tener en cuenta, adems, que el sufismo hall en el corazn del ms-
tico suf la razn de existir en el Corn, en sus manifestaciones textuales corni-
cas y en las tradiciones profticas (hadices) que forman el cuerpo de los dichos,
hechos e interpretaciones del profeta como justificaciones y pruebas testimo-
niales, escritas y orales, consideradas como segunda fuente del derecho islmi-

letra recurriendo a este recurso que les permita introducir en el trono del Islam sus ideas
religiosas y sus teoras filosficas como la mutazala; vase TITUS BURCKHARDT, Esoterismo Isl-
mico, Madrid, 1980, p. 15; GAMAL ABDEL-KARIM, Ciencia del Islam desde los orgenes hasta hoy,
ed. La Fundacin del Sur, Madrid, 2005, p. 169, y CRISTBAL CUEVAS, El pensamiento islmi-
co, pp. 183-212.
2
RAFAEL RAMN GUERRERO, Filosofa y Mstica en el Islam. Avicena e Ibn Tufayl, UCM,
Madrid.
3
IBN JALDUN, El Muqadima, ed. Al-dar al Tunisiyya, tomo II, Tnez, 1984.

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934 G. ABDEL-KARIM, EL SUFISMO Y EL ISLAM

co (fiqh). El hecho de recibir inspiraciones el profeta Muhammad y otros guas


maestros piadosos del Islam y sus actitudes y nobles comportamientos ticos
y morales a favor de los ms dbiles de la sociedad islmica de aquel entonces,
explica esta tendencia. En este sentido se convirtieron en base, pilar y adalid de
esta doctrina-movimiento suf tomando la fe, la luz, la sabidura, la prudencia,
el conocimiento y el amor a Dios como la ms alta de las perfecciones morales
para alcanzar su meta final: el amor divino, Dios.

QU ES EL SUFISMO?

El sufismo es una doctrina mstica, pero cules sus ncleos y pilares? Los
sufes en general, y unos grupos musulmanes sufes en particular, dijeron que
somos la luz, el saber y el amor divino 4. Sin embargo, otros sufes musulma-
nes dijeron: arrepentimiento, abstinencia, renuncia, pobreza, paciencia, con-
fianza en Dios y satisfaccin, pudiendo ir acompaados adems de diversos
estados psicolgicos segn Nicholson, son: la meditacin, cercana a Dios,
amor, miedo, esperanza, anhelos, inquietud, tranquilidad, contemplacin y cer-
teza 5. El que aspire a ser suf que aparte de s la envidia, la codicia, el odio y
sea capaz de explorar los misterios de la infinitud interior y de soportar una
rigurosa iniciacin bajo la supervisin de un igual, por lo que se le considera un
viajero mstico (slik) que debe atravesar varias y numerosas y lentas etapas ini-
citicas o jornadas (maqamt) a lo largo de una vida o un camino (tariqa) antes
de alcanzar la autoanulacin absoluta del yo (fana) con la finalidad de encon-
trarse y unirse con su amor divino, Dios 6.

CMO SURGI EL SUFISMO ISLMICO?

En un principio surgieron en los primeros tiempos del Islam como una va


o pensamiento de perfeccionamiento y acercamiento para llegar a Dios un gran
nmero de sectas, movimientos, asociaciones y vas ascticas msticas (turuq)
que plantearon cuestiones que pusieron en duda sus soluciones a los problemas
que afectan a la humanidad en general, y a los musulmanes recin islamizados
en particular, a travs de la tradicin religiosa literal, enfrentando y dividiendo
una parte de la sociedad musulmana enojosa, insatisfecha y enojosa durante
largos periodos, antes y despus de la aparicin del Islam, o sea, desde su comien-

4
R. A. NICHOLSON, The Mystics of Islam, Londres, 1914-66, pp. 3 y ss. y 10 y ss.; Studies
in Islamic Misticism, Londres, 1921; The idea of personality in Sufism, Lahore, 1964, y Poetas
y msticos del Islam, Mxico, 1943.
5
Vase ABDEL-KARIM AL-QUSHAYRI (Qushar) en su obra Risla, El Cairo, 1948, y TITUS
BURCKHARDT, Esoterismo
6
ANWAR G. CHEJNE, Historia de la Espaa musulmana, versin castellana, ed. Ctedra,
Madrid, 1980, pp. 292 y ss.

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G. ABDEL-KARIM, EL SUFISMO Y EL ISLAM 935

zo hasta los siglos VIII, IX y X. Estos grupos de sufes se llamaron a s mismos la


gente de la verdad (ahl al haqq) apoyndose en unos pasajes del Corn y en las
tradiciones profticas (hadices) concernientes a la pobreza, la castidad, la pure-
za del alma, la humildad, la renuncia a la riqueza y al mundo material (baqa),
que es la permanencia temporal confiando en Dios y en todo lo que le agrada;
todo ello, seguramente conducira al amor divino y la sabidura que es uno de
los elementos bsicos derivados de la ciencia que hace alarde del saber y reco-
noce al mismo tiempo, y humildemente, que no sabe nada, siendo la clarivi-
dencia del alma y su rosal interior que es la sabidura que educa el carcter y
sus modales, como en el dicho: Quien se conoce a s mismo, conoce a su Dios.
Todo ello justifica la doctrina suf y su actitud, interpretando algunos verscu-
los del Corn: A donde quiera que te vuelvas, hallars el rostro de Cristo (el
Corn, 2:109) l los ama, y ellos le aman (el Corn, 5:50) que se convirtieron
en suficiente justificacin al movimiento suf como gua del camino hacia Dios 7.
En cuanto al origen de este trmino y su derivacin, probablemente son dudo-
sos a pesar de que algunos autores dieron explicaciones e hiptesis varias en
torno a su etimologa, como Jorge Ziydan, Hasan Sdiq y otros autores occi-
dentales asociando su derivacin del latn sfia, derivado del griego (sofs) en
el sentido de tesofo, que significa: sabio, sabidura, prudencia (hikma-marifa).
Sin embargo, el arabista Noldeke, en un artculo suyo niega de manera conclu-
yente esta relacin por razones lingsticas, precisamente griegas, ya que la pala-
bra griega sigma se escribi en pocas tardas con la letra sin (S) en rabe, fon-
ticamente sonora, y no la letra sad (S) en rabe; a pesar de su arabizacin se
qued as, pero no con la letra enftica sad (S), con punto debajo de la s 8.
Algunos dicen que procede del rabe safa, que significa purificacin o pure-
za del alma, y otros, como el mismo Noldeke, la derivan de la palabra rabe sf
(lana) o sif (cualidad, caracterstica) en pocas histricas avanzadas. En resu-
men, la palabra suf (sufismo, misticismo) admite etimolgicamente varios sig-
nificados como hemos visto anteriormente; sin embargo el trmino suf como
lana (que posiblemente sea el ms acertado) y que en un principio se aplic a
ciertos religiosos y piadosos ascticos-msticos sufes que, imitando a los ermi-
taos cristianos, se vestan con un sayal de este tejido (lana) en seal de humil-
dad, pobreza, abandono y retiro de la vida mundana y material. En opinin de
varios autores, el fenmeno suf (sufismo) islmico apareci aproximadamen-
te en el siglo VIII, en la poca del profeta Muhammad y los cuatro califas, segn
cuentan la historia y los primeros sabios musulmanes (antepasados) como resul-
tado de su fuerte y genuino inters por los movimientos religiosos ascticos y
msticos, para que el musulmn mejorara su manera de amar y servir a Dios y
buscar su Unin como anhelo espiritual por la va mstica. Separarse de este
mundo temporal y pasajero para encaminarse hacia otro mundo eterno, de espi-

7
Ibid., pp. 294 y ss.
8
HASAN SDIQ, Races de la fitna en los grupos islmicos desde la poca del profeta hasta el
asesinato de El Sadat, El Cairo, 1991, y GAMAL ABDEL-KARIM, Ciencia del Islam, p. 103.

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936 G. ABDEL-KARIM, EL SUFISMO Y EL ISLAM

ritualidad, a travs de la autoanulacin del YO y rechazando la permanencia


temporal en el mundo actual (baqa) para alcanzar la meta de la salvacin eter-
na que requiere una interpretacin alegrica interior.
Ese sufismo y todo lo que representa no era ms que un movimiento basa-
do en una actitud por parte de algunos musulmanes de corazn y devocin
piadosa, como una corriente ms dentro del pensamiento islmico, de base
espiritual ingenua mediante una interpretacin alegrica y la unin mstica
del alma con su Dios como ideal religioso espiritual. Estos sufes se entre-
garon por devocin a contemplar y profesar ciertas prcticas espirituales de
ascetismo porque consideraban que el sufismo era el nico camino para pre-
sentarse ante Dios, en alma mstica y en unin con l, por amor sentido en el
corazn.
As empezaron los primeros beduinos sufes que sentan ansia de perfeccin
espiritual, por lo que tuvieron que integrar en el Islam las reglas ascticas y las
vas msticas que haban conocido los antiguos cristianos. Estos primeros musul-
manes recomendaban la vida asctica acogindose a los hadices profticos y a
la interpretacin alegrica del Corn, como sealamos anteriormente, ponien-
do en boca de Jess ancdotas y afirmaciones piadosas de tipo mstico y calor
musulmn 9.
Tambin Asn Palacios ha demostrado que este movimiento de vida espiri-
tual del Islam, llena de prcticas piadosas, oraciones, mortificaciones, medita-
ciones, ayunos rigurosos, penitencias, culto a la castidad, etc., aparecen mucho
antes del siglo XI. La finalidad de este formidable esfuerzo religioso, siempre
segn el insigne arabista don Miguel Asn Palacios, era el amor divino que con-
duca a la Unin con Dios 10.
Estas prcticas ascticas eran el camino de las humanas pasiones y el encuen-
tro con la presencia de Dios en su corazn, de modo que al tiempo pudiera el
asctico-mstico alcanzar el xtasis y la unin divina que sumerge el alma en
Dios y se identifica con l.
Insiste Hasan Sadq en criticar a los sufes musulmanes radicales que per-
judicaron a otros muchos, moderados, que se desmarcaron de los dems musul-
manes exagerados en su aplicacin a las enseanzas del Islam, dedicando toda
su vida al ascetismo y al retiro espiritual absoluto, hasta tal punto, que el pro-
feta Muhammad les aconsej abstenerse de esa actitud irracional, cuando les
dijo: Vine con la hanafiyya (espiritualidad de Abraham) tolerante, y aadi:
No es el mejor de vosotros quien abandona el mundo actual, en bsqueda de
otro mundo eterno; pero el mejor de vosotros es quien toma de la una y de la
otra lo bueno y conveniente de la bondad, piedad, bendicin y el amor divino,
siguiendo mis palabras: Realiza y vive tu vida como si fueses a vivir eternamente,
y preprate a vivir la otra vida como si fueses a morir maana. Este es el ideal
que deben seguir los verdaderos musulmanes.

9
MIGUEL CRUZ HERNNDEZ, La filosofa rabe, Rev. de Occidente, Madrid, 1963, pp. 10 y ss.
10
Ibid., p. 11.

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G. ABDEL-KARIM, EL SUFISMO Y EL ISLAM 937

Segn Hasan Sadq, los historiadores y escritores observaron que algunos


sufes, para lograr el xito de su doctrina o su tariqa (camino hacia Dios) utili-
zaban smbolos que atraan a las masas, o vulgo, para adjudicarse a s mismos
emblemas, signos y banderas utilizando tambores, adufes y danza; sin embargo,
otros sufes se caracterizaban por la seriedad, moderacin y correccin sin recu-
rrir a mtodos materiales sensibles ajenos al autntico sufismo. Estas manifes-
taciones que acabamos de mencionar no eran ms que formalismos y elementos
procedentes del paganismo, como es el caso de las invocaciones a Dios. (dikr).

EL SUFISMO EN EL ISLAM

El sufismo es otro pensamiento del Islam practicado en el siglo VIII por unos
grupos que optaron por resolver sus problemas alejndose de las estructuras for-
males de las religiones y esencias tradicionales intermediarias, tratando de acer-
carse a Dios por diferentes caminos y vas msticas ms reales y puras, con pro-
fundidad, abandonando totalmente la vida mundana y su materialismo dominante
y la adulteracin de la verdad. El sufismo es una riqueza espiritual indisociable
de la cultura islmica; en definitiva, es el cultivo del espritu, del alma, el ansia
de saber y la utilizacin de la razn como instrumento para conocer a Dios. Este
sufismo tard mucho tiempo en adquirir derechos de ciudadana y reconoci-
miento por parte de los religiosos ortodoxos tradicionales y pensadores musul-
manes, ya que era considerado por algunos de ellos como hereja (zandaqa) 11.
Su relacin con la religin y derecho est basada en la cultura de la ley, ya
que los criterios acerca del sufismo (tasauwwaf) varan de un autor a otro, bien
sea a favor o en contra, alabado o descalificado 12. Sin embargo, muchos pien-
san que es una de las formas del conocimiento de la ley religiosa revelada y exter-
na (shara) nacida en el Islam porque reposa sobre la prctica estricta de la pie-
dad, de la fe exclusiva en Dios, de la renuncia a las vanidades del mundo y sus
placeres, a las riquezas. El suf, en el momento de retiro y abandono est lejos
del mundo ruidoso para consagrarse a la contemplacin y rechazar el gusto por
los bienes terrenales, gusto que era frecuente entre los primeros musulmanes
del siglo VIII en adelante. A partir de entonces, estos sufes desarrollaron un modo
de conocimiento mstico particular: el xtasis, encaminado a pasar de un grado
a otro hasta alcanzar la Unin definitiva con Dios 13. Se trata de una experien-
cia interior enriquecedora e intransferible que no est al alcance de todos.
El sufismo islmico como seala Muhammad Shakor es la base del amor
divino respetuoso y tolerante con todas las creencias, y cuya nica y verdadera

11
MUHAMMAD SHAKOR, Cultura islmica. Breviario suf, ed. Simbad, Madrid, 1984.
12
Ibid., p. 51.
13
Es la reconciliacin entre la ortodoxia y el sufismo, anlisis y concepto interpretativo
por el gran jurista, filsofo y suf Algacel (1058-1111), autor de muchas obras, entre las que
destaca: La incoherencia de los filsofos y la vivificacin de los saberes religiosos,Muhammad
Shakor, Cultura islmica, pp. 58 y ss.

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938 G. ABDEL-KARIM, EL SUFISMO Y EL ISLAM

fe es el amor espiritual, como rbol frondoso de sabrossimos frutos metafsi-


cos 14 del que el suf paladea la fe como la lengua saborea la miel reflejado por
Ibn Arabi de Murcia (1165-1240) prncipe de los msticos especulativos anda-
luses, el vivificador de la religin y gran mentor espiritual en sus obras,
entre las que citamos Las gemas de la sabidura, en la que destaca sentirse, l
mismo, identificado con Dios.
Por eso el mensaje suf es de difcil captacin y entendimiento, ya que cada
frase o expresin, concepto o idea, requiere una honda y prolongada medita-
cin, reflexin y contemplacin clarividente, o visin espiritual (basra). Quizs
sea incomprensible por sus sutilezas y smbolos msticos, pero si no fuera por
los espacios del alma no habra camino hacia Dios, el nico que sabe y entien-
de al hombre y su mundo.
Ibn Atta al-Sakandar (m. 1309) deca en su obra El libro de la sabidura
(Kitb-al-hikma): El misterio que envuelve la existencia del hombre es la refle-
xin constante; si no le son abiertos los espacios del ms all el hombre, en el
universo, es considerado prisionero de su entorno y est emparedado en la figu-
ra de su propio yo.
La espiritualidad del suf inspirado le condujo a decir: Yo me he converti-
do en m o somos dos espritus fundidos en un mismo cuerpo 15.
El suf Al-Hallay (827-922) 16, el mrtir de Dios, que se senta trascendido
por Dios, deca:
Tengo un amigo a quien visito, en la soledad
est presente aun cuando los ojos no le ven,
sus palabras no tienen letra ni sonidos,
ni nda semejante a la meloda.
Es como si yo hablara de la voz conmigo mismo
hablando a mi esencia por la idea surgida de ella.
l est presente y ausente,
cercano y lejano,
y sus cualidades no le pueden limitar.
l est ms cerca que la conciencia
a la imaginacin, y ms recndito
que la llama de los pensamientos huidizos
por haber exclamado en pblico
yo soy la verdad creadora, y dijo a sus verdugos:
Matadme, mis fieles compaeros.
En mi muerte est mi vida. Mi muerte
es sobrevivir, y mi vida es morir.
Siento que la abolicin de mi ser
es el don ms notable que me podis hablar.

Ibid.
14

Para conocer las funciones de estas asociaciones y turuq y sus normas, vase la obra
15

de CRISTBAL CUEVAS, El pensamiento del Islam, pp. 183-212.


16
Al-Hallay (Hallag) fue clebre, encarcelado durante nueve aos y ejecutado por blas-
femo, pero era tan grande su fe que ni siquiera se perturb ante sus verdugos; vase la obra
mencionada de Muhammad Shakor, pp. 19 y ss. y p. 53.

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G. ABDEL-KARIM, EL SUFISMO Y EL ISLAM 939

En la poca abbas (750-1283) se desarroll el sufismo con gran expectativa


cuando Bagdad se convirti en capital abierta a todas las corrientes: el pensa-
miento islmico y otras tendencias, entre ellas el sufismo y su espiritualidad
como una forma ms de pensar y sentir la religin, por otra va, en su aspecto
interno (esotrico). Inici sus actividades paralelamente a otras reuniones y
ciclos de debate que se celebraban en torno a cuestiones relacionadas con la
shara (jurisprudencia islmica) el fihq (derecho islmico) y la unicidad (al-taw-
hid) en un ambiente tranquilo, propicio y adecuado, basado en la conviccin,
los testimonios y el razonamiento.
Los sufes tenan al mismo tiempo otras reuniones cercanas en medio de un
ruido exagerado que proceda de los maestros sufes y adeptos, cuya nota domi-
nante en sus debates era un tono muy alto y molesto, hasta el punto en que sus
voces llegaban a todos los hogares musulmanes a travs de las abayas (sayales),
distintivas de los maestros fundadores de escuelas, asociaciones y caminos msti-
cos, atrados por sus conversaciones con el pblico demostrando su capacidad de
dilogo y habilidad para el contacto con los seguidores y alumnos recin islami-
zados e incorporados a las escuelas sufes. Esta nueva doctrina llenaba as los patios
de las casas y tiendas islmicas convirtiendo a estos nuevos alumnos captados y
reclutados en asociaciones como miembros de sus tariqas y aplicando sus ritua-
les bajo el nombre de estados espirituales; y tambin, con sesiones msticas que
iban sucedindose de manera gradual al entrar en alguno de estos caminos (turuq)
en un estado psicolgico de apasionamiento (ishtiq) y el sentimiento ms pro-
fundo del estado del xtasis (wugd) para alcanzar la autoanulacin del YO (fana) 17,
negando la permanencia (baqa) en este mundo de contrariedad y vanidad.
Algunos pocos sufes no se salvaron del flujo de sus fuentes hindes, griegas,
persas y cristianas, como prctica y ejercicio espiritual de la corriente del pensa-
miento, encerrados en s mismos y en las ideas de autodestruccin de sus ideales.
Sin embargo, otros, una mayora muy comprometida con su sana y correcta creen-
cia islmica sunn estaba muy lejos de la exageracin 18. Adems, hay que obser-
var el mtodo de diferenciacin entre los mismos sufes aplicando los asuntos de
adoracin, devocin y culto junto al gusto o el goce (dq/dawq) 19, llevndolos a
cabo de manera contraria y contradictoria a la tradicin religiosa del Islam y sus
principios, seguido por el 90% de los musulmanes de todo el mundo. Por eso, el
mtodo suf, en estos aspectos que acabamos de mencionar, fue considerado por
los juristas y sabios musulmanes competentes y especializados en materia reli-
giosa e intelectual, fuera del texto, ya que estas prcticas corrompan los signifi-
cados originales del Islam, debido a sus interpretaciones hermenuticas e inco-
rrectamente opuestas a sus contenidos y obligaciones religiosas. Este tipo de gusto,

17
Es decir, que el suf descansa en la creencia de que cuando se pierde a s mismo se
encuentra en el YO universal, en el interior de su alma o, dicho en lenguaje religioso, que el
xtasis (wugd) ofrece la nica manera para que el alma posee la capacidad de comunicar direc-
tamente con Dios y unirse a l. Vase la obra de NICHOLSON, Poetas y Msticos del Islam, p. 88.
18
Es el sabor o el gusto mstico, se trata de una percepcin interna del suf (amor divino).
19
HASAN SDIQ, Races de la fitna, El Cairo, 1991, pp. 19 y ss.

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940 G. ABDEL-KARIM, EL SUFISMO Y EL ISLAM

goce o sabor (dq) no era acorde con las normas y directrices de la religiosidad
musulmana por ser contrario a la ley revelada y a los preceptos y pilares del Islam,
en opinin de Hasan Sdiq 20. Pero, a pesar de la dura crtica, ataques y oposicin
a la doctrina suf y su aplicacin, observamos que en sucesivas pocas, este fen-
meno suf y la enseanza de sus maestros sufes adquieren cada vez ms apoyo y
sigue en aumento. Sin embargo, crticos del sufismo alegan esta tendencia y su
xito a la ignorancia de algunos sufes y su interpretacin de la religin, su mane-
ra de presentarla y entenderla, teniendo en cuenta que sus convicciones y reali-
zaciones siguen vigentes desde hace mil aos. De este modo, se llenaban los hoga-
res musulmanes de elementos sufes, que para algunos se escondan bajo esta
incorrecta y exagerada tendencia y su mala aplicacin de los ritos, doctrinas, aso-
ciaciones o turuq (caminos y vas msticas), manifestndose los unos contra los
otros en cuanto al sistema y mtodo de actuacin y prctica se refiere.
El sufismo no es un sistema de reglas y ciencias, sino una doctrina de la uni-
cidad, un pensamiento monotesta nico, de base espiritual y moral que denun-
cia y advierte la imperfeccin del mundo aparencial, por lo que el suf debe
cerrar los ojos a todo lo mundano e imperfecto, contemplndose slo en el ms
all de toda perfeccin (R. A. Nicholson, Poetas y msticos del Islam, Mxico,
1945, p. 53). La meta de los sufes consiste en la identificacin con la realidad
divina en la bsqueda de la verdadera realidad (alhaqq) que es Dios, luz de los
cielos y de la tierra (Corn, XXIV, 35).

EL SUFISMO ISLMICO Y ANDALUS

Uno de los panoramas ms bellos que puedan imaginarse por excelencia, en el


magnfico ropaje del misticismo literario, potico rabe y persa del Islam, sin olvi-
dar las bellezas literarias msticas de los sufes espaoles, sobre todo andaluses,
como Fray Luis de Len, Raimundo Llull e Ibn rabe de Murcia que confirman que
el alma espaola tiene tambin sus races en el Islam y la cultura rabe. Escribe R.
A. Nicholson en Los poetas y msticos del Islam la siguiente reflexin: que en las
voces lricas con que habla el alma eterna del Islam, producto de la civilizacin medi-
terrnea de la Edad media, gracias a los que contribuyeron a la introduccin de los
elementos islmicos en la forja del espritu mstico de la cristiandad.
En el Islam, como en toda autntica religin, se apreci la elevacin y belle-
za de la mstica islmica que comienza con el esfuerzo del espritu para domi-
nar y someter a la naturaleza y las pasiones con las dos palancas poderosas de
toda moral: el temor y el amor a Dios; es decir, temor de obrar mal, raz de sen-
timiento de la caridad. El no se puede y el se debe. Dios est con los que le temen
y con los que son caritativos (Corn, XVI-128).
Todas las flores lricas de la mstica rabe y persa son cimientos en el Corn,
de igual suerte que la teologa cristiana late en las palabras de Jess, el profeta

20
CRISTBAL CUEVAS, El pensamiento islmico, p. 191.

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G. ABDEL-KARIM, EL SUFISMO Y EL ISLAM 941

ms considerado y dignificado en el Corn, entre todos los profetas, antes de la


aparicin del profeta Muhammad del Islam:
Y nosotros no hacemos distincin entre sus enviados (profetas de Dios)
aceptando a unos y rechazando a otros, todos son profetas de la divinidad.
(Corn, II, 285)

El libro (el Corn) viene despus de la Tor y el Evangelio para continuar


y construir el libro revelado que encierra la verdad para confirmar las escri-
turas que le han parecido
(Corn, II-I-2)

El sufismo (mstica) es el amor a Dios, el centro del corazn, es la luz que


emana de Dios en el alma del hombre, clave de la mstica islmica que deriva
tambin de la palabra del pensamiento del Islam, que muchos siglos antes de
Fray Luis de Len y Francisco de Osuna, haba dicho:
Dios est ms cerca del hombre, que el hombre mismo.
(Corn, L-15)

La doctrina de los sufes presenta la ms excelsa mstica cristiana, singular-


mente la espaola y la andalus; hasta tal punto que es posible eludir el con-
vencimiento de que las voces de los sufes rabes, o sus ecos, debieron llegar a
los odos de Juan de la Cruz y Santa Teresa. En opinin de R. A. Nicholson, e
independientemente de que el sufismo musulmn tenga en su origen ideas ms-
ticas cristianas o neoplatnicas, gnsticas, hindes y griegas. Sin embargo surge
la tentacin de suponer que el sufismo estuvo inspirado, o basado, en estos movi-
mientos o incluso tanto el sufismo de unos como de otros que tena varios
elementos comunes de influencias mutuas, habida cuenta que el sufismo isl-
mico tuvo una enorme acogida y aceptacin entre los primeros musulmanes y
que se extendi por todos los territorios del Islam, del Este al Oeste islmico,
generando destacadas figuras universales en el pensamiento y convirtiendo la
doctrina suf en una de las ciencias ms importantes del Islam, sigue diciendo
Nicholson, acerca del sufismo islmico y su historia 21: El sufismo no es filo-
sofa ni tampoco una ciencia teolgica, afirmacin que indica la independen-
cia de la experiencia suf de la mente filosfica y la aceptacin (al-taslim) reli-
giosa, ya que el sufismo, en su esencia, est ligado por una parte a la filosofa,
y por otra a la teologa. En la primera, el elemento ms destacado es el conoci-
miento (epistemologa) mstico-suf. El siglo X, fue el siglo de oro del sufismo
como doctrina, y segn los investigadores sobre este movimiento-doctrina, no
es ms que la reproduccin de los textos griegos, del Corn y el hadit, apoyn-
dose en el mstico egipcio Du-l-Nun, considerado el primer fundador de la doc-
trina suf (epistemologa mstica) 22.

21
Ibid.
22
Los discpulos de este maestro suf son los que introdujeron el canto y la msica, como
mtodo intensificador del alma y su emocin religiosa.

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942 G. ABDEL-KARIM, EL SUFISMO Y EL ISLAM

LA DOCTRINA SUF

La doctrina del sufismo consiste en que el hombre se entrega voluntaria-


mente en cuerpo y alma a Dios. Estos ascetas y msticos sufes lo hacen, unos
en solitario y otros en retiros colectivos de asociaciones msticas llamadas turuq,
como miembros seguidores de un maestro (Shaykh) que les permita llevar una
vida normal y austera compatible con determinadas normas y prcticas ascti-
cas de acuerdo con el criterio de cada tariqa (camino inicitico mstico). As, el
sufismo se convirti en el Islam perfecto, bajo la direccin de sus maestros y
guas espirituales (shuyukh) experimentados y en asociaciones piadosas donde
se impartan enseanzas y prcticas sufes.
Estas prcticas, que solan ser de notable sobriedad, tenan lugar en los ceno-
bios en donde la creacin, el canto, el gusto por la soledad, el retiro, el ayuno,
el vegetarianismo, el celibato, el examen de conciencia, la abstinencia y domi-
nio del mismo suf, eran las prcticas habituales 23.
El primer fundador de estas asociaciones y turuq fue Abdel-Qdir al-Guil-
n (m. 1166) 24, a quien corresponde el inicio de la primera tariqa. La gente sen-
sible se vea atrada por estas asociaciones debido a la misteriosa fascinacin
que stas conferan a la pretensin de practicar una creencia oculta inspirada
por Dios, cuyas enseanzas son la lectura, escritura, el canto, la exgesis, etc.
Todo ello se entiende, quizs, a travs del conocimiento gnstico (marifa) de
la doctrina suf, su origen, caractersticas, el desarrollo de su pensamiento tanto
en Oriente como en el Occidente musulmn sus escuelas, sus turuq (caminos)
sus maestros (shuyukh) y su relacin con la filosofa y teologa, el conocimiento
de la mstica, la vocacin de los practicantes de esta disciplina o el modo de su
conocimiento y vida espiritual, el amor a lo divino y el comportamiento esttico
y moral de los individuos msticos en la vida cotidiana.
El conocimiento, o epistemologa suf, no empez con los amantes de la orto-
doxia, entre los que destacan Du-l-Nn, el egipcio (m. 867), padre de la mstica
musulmana y autor de varios tratados y poemas sufes que reflejaban el inten-
so sentimiento de amor hacia su amado y por haber introducido el ideal del
amor como gnosis (marifa), soporte del sufismo, del mismo modo a como lo
anticiparon Maruf al Karje (m. 822) y Al-Hrit Ibn Asad al-Muhasib (m. 865),
este ltimo considerado el verdadero fundador de la doctrina, que contribuy
con sus opiniones a la purificacin del alma y al conocimiento del sufismo en
general, afirmando que estos conocimientos sufes no fueron influenciados por
la cultura moderna de Platn.
Independientemente de la crtica de algunos arabistas y escritores occiden-
tales, dirigida a los grandes filsofos sufes y autores musulmanes en general
con el fin de vaciar de contenido cultural, y sabidura oriental y espiritual, la
civilizacin rabe-islmica tuvo su esplendor, y el sufismo adquiri fama y xito

23
NICHOLSON, The Mystics of Islam, Londres, 1914, pp. 10 y ss.
24
IBN JALDUN, al-Muqaddima, pp. 76 y ss.

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G. ABDEL-KARIM, EL SUFISMO Y EL ISLAM 943

enorme en pleno siglo X como uno de los instrumentos vitales que expres cla-
ramente la parte espiritual de esta civilizacin y present un sufismo que se dis-
tingui de los dems sufes y msticos occidentales por sus caractersticas pro-
pias, puras, reales y convincentes, entre los que destacaba el empeo de sus
grandes personalidades y sabios para distinguir y aportar la iluminacin suf
(ilhm) de la revelacin proftica recibida, y agregan Hasan Sadq y otros isla-
mlogos que el sufismo no posea legalidad para tener carcter legislativo den-
tro del Islam y sus fuentes. Este fue, por una parte, el intento constante de los
occidentales para ligar o relacionar el sufismo con la jurisprudencia islmica.
Por otra parte, el sufismo arabo-musulmn tuvo su papel en el resurgimiento
de la literatura rabe, en general, y de la musulmana en particular, por lo que
es necesario distinguir entre el estudio del sufismo y su aportacin epistemol-
gica, a lo largo de sus pocas de esplendor encabezado por sus figuras ms rele-
vantes como Abu-l-Qasim Ibn Muhammad al-Yunayd al-Bagdad (m. 919), al-
Sarry, Abul-Qasim Abdel-Karim al-Qushar (o Qushayri, m. 1087), Abu Hamid
Muhammad Ibn Ahmad al-Gacel (m. 1127), Muhy-l-Din Ibn Arabi de Murcia.
Todos ellos estudiosos del sufismo en sus pocas de decadencia, cuando se apar-
t del camino recto del Islam y sus principios y finalidades, debido a las cir-
cunstancias de su europeizacin u occidentalizacin y su culturizacin en la
poca de la ausencia, del descuido y despreocupacin por la verdadera cultura
rabe-islmica. La realidad suf es una excelente experiencia vivida y un cono-
cimiento intuitivo para llegar a Dios a travs de una mstica de base espiritual,
sin apartarse nunca de la revelacin, razn por la que el sufismo perdi su esen-
cia y unidad.
Titus Burckardt califica y explica el sufismo como el aspecto esotrico o inte-
rior del Islam cuando en realidad el sufismo no es ms que el aspecto asctico
de cualquier religin desde el punto de vista espiritual y religioso en cuanto a
su significado inmediato, que es el conocimiento ms profundo y directo de lo
eterno y la unin con Dios, sin intermediarios, sentido puro eterno de la divi-
nidad para liberarse de la vida material musulmana. As se entiende el sufismo
como el espritu o el corazn del Islam, que es parecido al corazn, que es, a su
vez, el centro vital del cuerpo humano y sede de su esencia en donde todo con-
verge 25.
El sufismo est extrado de manera constante y necesaria del Corn y las
enseanzas del profeta, ya que los primeros sufes se expresaban en un lengua-
je muy cercano al Corn y sus expresiones llevan en s mismas lo esencial de la
doctrina 26. Al tiempo, no hay que olvidar que hubo contactos entre los prime-
ros sufes y el monaquismo de los contemplativos cristianos de Oriente, a juz-
gar por la historia del suf Ibn Asma (m. 777) de Balj (Juristn-Turquistn) y
como explica Abdel-Karim al-Guil, continuador de Ibn Arab de Murcia, en su

25
NICHOLSON, El sufismo islmico, obra traducida al rabe por Abu-l-ula, El Cairo, 1969,
p. 104.
26
NAGUI HUSAYN GODA, El conocimiento del sufismo (versin rabe), ed. Dar-el-Guil, Bei-
rut, 1992.

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944 G. ABDEL-KARIM, EL SUFISMO Y EL ISLAM

libro El hombre universal o perfecto, donde aprecia en el mensaje de Oriente


algunos aspectos del monotesmo de Abraham, como dogma natural del uni-
verso en lo divino y humano, que en cierto modo es la enseanza del sufismo
en cuanto al acercamiento a Dios. A pesar de ello, los sufes no sitan la perso-
na de Cristo en la misma perspectiva e imagen de la cristiandad, la espirituali-
dad y la doctrina del sufismo que se transmite por influencia espiritual, y que
debe ser conferida por un maestro espiritual, un shayj suf que en representa-
cin de uno entre los enviados de Dios: Jess, Muhammad entre otros cita-
dos en el Corn. Esta es la doctrina suf que nos llega de las primeras ensean-
zas de stos rusul (enviados), seguidos de los representantes, que son los maestros
espirituales, y que ms tarde, a su vez, transmiten a los discpulos todas las ense-
anzas en lo referente a la vida mstica espiritual.

CMO SE EXPRESAN LAS DIFERENTES RAMAS DE LA FILIACIN ESPIRITUAL DEL SUFISMO?

Se expresan de forma muy natural con los diversos caminos (turuq) como la
Qadriyya, Daraqawiyya, la Chadiliyya, al-Rifaiyya como un crculo exterior de
carcter popular de esencia intelectual. Cada maestro, como autoridad espiri-
tual, tiene su mtodo para que sea aplicado, y conforme a las aptitudes de una
determinada categora de hombres dotados para la vida espiritual. Son dife-
rentes caminos, vas msticas sufes y maestros que corresponden a las diferen-
tes vocaciones dentro del sufismo, que para algunos no es el movimiento, sino
el signo interior de una tendencia, de una doctrina, pero no de una teologa o
filosofa (pensamiento humano y no divino).
Al-Suhraward (m. 1167) aconseja al verdadero adepto al sufismo que reali-
ce cada ao un retiro de cuarenta das dedicando la mayora de su tiempo a la
oracin, al ayuno y arrepentimiento, pidiendo perdn por los pecados cometi-
dos durante toda su vida, recitando constantemente el nombre de Dios en voz
alta, y cuando se canse de la recitacin debe hacerla pronuncindola con el cora-
zn para que el nombre de Dios quede grabado en su alma. La oracin, el canto,
la soledad, la abstinencia son algunas de las prcticas habituales del suf en las
asociaciones privadas cuyas enseanzas se transmiten de generacin en gene-
racin, inspiradas por Dios, y que forman un cuerpo doctrinal que puede cons-
tar de una serie de reglas de conducta y normas rituales para su tica y cum-
plimiento 27.
Un rasgo distintivo del sufismo es el equilibrio entre el amor y el conoci-
miento, teniendo en cuenta que la actitud religiosa, punto de partida de toda
espiritualidad islmica, es el lenguaje y la embriaguez del amor que superan el
pensamiento, ya que ste amor (belleza interior) se desmarca de cualquier dis-
crepancia mental o intelectual 28.

27
TITUS BURCKARDT, Esoterismo islmico, Madrid, 1980, pp. 15 y ss.
28
Ibid., p. 17.

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G. ABDEL-KARIM, EL SUFISMO Y EL ISLAM 945

El sufismo, derivado del ascetismo y misticismo, brot en la sociedad isl-


mica desde sus principios, a pesar de la crtica y oposicin ortodoxa islmica
que lo tachaba de invencin y hereja debido a que en el mismo siglo VII apa-
recieron el piadoso Hasan al-Basri, de Basora (m. 720), y la clebre mstica
suf Rbiaa al Adawiyya (m. 801), que basaba su espiritualidad en el amor a
Dios y en el temor al da del Juicio final como un eminente ejemplo de verdad
y mstica y la renuncia a s misma. Nallino 29 deca que Ibn Al-Farid, en el
siglo VIII, vivi una experiencia personal mstica y espiritual, expresada en su
poesa: la entrega del hombre al amor divino manifestando al tiempo sus ansias
de morir.
Para Al-Gacel (m. 1111), mxima figura filosfica musulmana y del sufismo,
alega que ste y sus mritos son la suprema aspiracin de los creyentes que anhe-
lan una verdad perfecta. Segn Ibn rabi, todas las religiones son verdaderas,
y entre las manifestaciones divinas las ms perfectas son los santos, de los que
cada poca tiene uno eminente, a quien el suf murciano llama polo (qutb) y
cuya supremaca moral se proclama enrgicamente. As, el sufismo qued asi-
milado e integrado a la espiritualidad y en la vida de la comunidad musulma-
na, con aceptacin polmica, reserva y, sobre todo, la crtica en cuanto a la exa-
geracin y su manifestacin alegrica y agnstica. El mstico suf nada posee,
y tampoco es posedo por nadie, sino Dios (vase la obra de Cristbal Cueva, El
pensamiento islmico).
Segn el padre F. Pareja, los representantes de los sufes se han esforzado
siempre en buscar un fundamento escriturario alegrico a las concepciones asc-
ticas-msticas. Segn algunos islamlogos el sufismo surge en el Islam por
influencia de fenmenos cristianos paralelos, sobre todo, y en este mismo sen-
tido habran influido las corrientes helensticas de espiritualidad, la teosofa de
las tierras norteafricanas y diversos elementos iranios junto al misticismo secu-
lar de las religiones de Persia y, sobre todo, del Indostan. Est claro que los pri-
meros tratados musulmanes de espiritualidad fueron inspirados en libros cris-
tianos, mientras que la terminologa asctico-mstica deriva incuestionablemente
de la religiosidad india, segn Cristbal Cuevas 30.

CONCLUSIN

Hemos observado en el siglo pasado y el actual, un enorme inters por todo


lo suf, que es la vuelta a Dios, como consecuencia de una desesperacin pro-
funda del hombre ante la globalizacin universal que irrumpi en el siglo pasa-
do y cuyos resultados fueron desastrosos; este hecho nos hace reflexionar y pen-
sar en lo que dijo el destacado pensador laico francs, Andr Malreaux: El
siglo XXI ser el siglo del sufismo, o no ser nunca.

29
C. A. NALLINO, El poema mstico, de Ibn al Farid.
30
Segn CRISTBAL CUEVAS, El pensamiento islmico, p. 183.

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946 G. ABDEL-KARIM, EL SUFISMO Y EL ISLAM

Este pensador no vea otra solucin para salvar a la humanidad si no era vol-
ver al espritu a travs del misticismo que es el sufismo real puro y sincero,
en la profundidad del corazn humano, donde se encuentra el hombre orienta-
do en su esencia, hacia lo intangible: Dios.
Tanto Andr Malreaux como el egipcio Hasan Sdiq afirman que el univer-
so, segn la visin suf, tiene dos dimensiones, o mejor dos caras: una variable
y mvil, y otra, firme e invariable. Tengamos en cuenta que especular slo con
la parte variable experimentada fue el gran error que cometi la ciencia moder-
na que condujo a una visin del universo, global y laica, y a la prdida de su
dimensin sagrada, y, por consiguiente, a la prdida del ser humano a pesar de
lo realizado en cuanto al avance cientfico y la tecnologa. En la poca moder-
na se ha perdido el significado de la existencia.

Departamento de Estudios rabes e Islmicos GAMAL ABDEL-KARIM


Facultad de Filosoga. Edificio A
Ciudad Universitaria
28040 Madrid
fundasur@wanadoo.es

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

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EL YO INTERIOR.
REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES
SOBRE LA EXPERIENCIA DE LO NUMINOSO
SCAR CASTRO GARCA
Universidad Autnoma de Barcelona

RESUMEN: En estos tiempos en que el espritu cientfico describe y delimita con definiciones tcni-
cas muy concretas las explicaciones cientficas, cuando se trata de explicar temas fronterizos exis-
ten dificultades semnticas y no se repara en mixtificaciones. Aparece una nueva conexin interdis-
ciplinar entre las ciencias de la mente y las ciencias del espritu, abordndose el estudio de los
fenmenos msticos como cuestin fundamental para plantear el problema de la existencia de Dios.
Las respuestas de los neurobilogos se centran en ofrecer explicaciones estmulo-respuesta, pero
no comprenden por qu ocurre por autoinduccin. Tampoco hay explicacin de la experiencia per-
sonal, cuando en un proceso mstico el individuo tiene diferentes manifestaciones de su individuali-
dad: el ego, la mismidad, el yo, la ipseidad, etc. No son lo mismo y deben exponerse en una analti-
ca comparativa. Lo que se pretende aqu es ofrecer un programa transdisciplinar de estudio de la
experiencia personal, en cuanto es fundamento para el estudio de lo numinoso segn el trmino
de Rudolf Otto, o de aquello que siempre ha fundamentado la experiencia mstica, desde que el
hombre es homo religiosus. Expondr dos de los puntos cruciales de un programa transdisciplinar.
A) Primero el estudio de semntica comparativa de los diferentes conceptos del yo, alma, espritu y
conciencia desde las principales fuentes tradicionales. Viendo as tanto las similitudes como las dife-
rencias, ontolgicas y fenomenolgicas. B) Segundo, expongo un breve repaso de la reciente histo-
ria de la neuroteologa. Veremos los modelos explicativos de los diversos programas de estudio neu-
robiolgico de los fenmenos msticos. Todo esto para concluir con una propuesta nueva, tanto
epistmica como hermenutica, de la pregunta por la experiencia personal de lo numinoso, plante-
ada en un marco cientfico transdisciplinar.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Ipseidad, lo numinoso, Purusha, theosis, Adam Kadmon, ayin, sunyata, al-insn
al-kmil, wahdat al wujd, cortex prefrontal ventromedial, monoamino oxidasa, area de asociacin y
de orientacin, lo ntimo, enaccin, oikeiosis, anagoga.

The Interior I:
Transdisciplinary Reflections on the Experience of the Numinous
ABSTRACT: In these times when the scientific ethos describes and delimits scientific explanations with
very concrete technical definitions, there exist semantic difficulties not remedied by mystifications
whenever one tries to explain boundary themes. A new interdisciplinary connection between the sciences
of the mind and the sciences of the spirit appears dealing with the study of mystical phenomena as a
fundamental question in posing the problem about the existence of God. The response of neurobiologists
center on offering stimulus-response explanations, but do not include why stimulus-response occurs
because of self-induction. Neither is there any explanation of personal experience, when the individual
in a mystic process has different manifestations of his individuality: the ego, self, I, selfhood, etc. They
are not the same, and they should be explained in a comparative analysis. This article aims to offer a
transdisciplinary program about the study of personal experience as foundation for a study of the
numinous following Rudolf Otto or that which has always been the foundation of mystical experience
from the time man became homo religiosus. I will elaborate two of the crucial points of a transdisciplinary
program: First, a study of the comparative semantics of the different concepts of I, soul, spirit, and
consciousness by using the principal traditional sources, thus allowing the consideration of similarities
and differences from ontological and phenomenological perspectives. Second, I will present a brief
review of the recent history of neurotheology, offering the explanatory models of different programs of
neurobiological study on mystical phenomena. The article concludes with a new epistemological and

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948 . CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES

hermeneutical proposal concerning the question about the personal experience of the numinous within
a scientific interdisciplinary framework.
KEY WORDS: Selfhood, the numinous, Purusha, theosis, Adam Kadmon, ayin, sunyata, al-insn al-
kmil, wahdat al wujd, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, monoamine oxidase, association and orienta-
tion areas, the private, enaction, oikeiosis, anagogy.

INTRODUCCIN

Estamos en una poca en que el sentido de la realidad que vivimos se ve alte-


rada por sobrecargas de informacin que intoxican paulatinamente el cerebro,
volvindolo vulnerable a la contaminacin informtica. Cuanta ms informa-
cin acumulamos en nuestro cerebro, menos espacio tenemos para llenarnos
de otras evidencias vitales. Resulta insana la hipertrofia de la actividad intelec-
tiva si se equilibran la actividad mental y las actividades fsicas. Pero, sobreto-
do hay un efecto hoy inevitable: la alienacin de nuestros propios pensamien-
tos. Pensamos o somos pensados por nuestros propios pensamientos? Es
nuestra existencia cartesiana, es decir, existimos como consecuencia de nues-
tro pensar? Somos soberanos de nosotros mismos?
Sostengo la propuesta del filsofo chileno Daro Salas Sommer que en su libro
Moral para el siglo XXI 1 dice que el ser humano vive una subordinacin de su
propia actividad intelectiva a pensamientos ajenos. Estamos obedeciendo a
memes inoculados por otros sin llegar al procesamiento profundo de los men-
sajes que recibimos. Mensajes que llevan al establishment cientfico actual a
entender que somos producto del cableado elctrico de nuestro cerebro. Al igual
que Berger y Luhmann, en su famoso libro, consideran que la realidad que vivi-
mos es una construccin de la sociedad, me pregunto si mi propio yo es tam-
bin una construccin compleja de la sociedad; sobretodo de mi medio inme-
diato (unidad familiar, educacin primaria, etc.) que hubiera llegado a construirme
como un fantasma en la mquina.
El problema se hace ms complejo cuando no comprendemos que es signi-
ficativamente distinto hablar de m mismo, de ego, o de yo. Por eso quie-
ro destacar, entre otras cosas, la diferencia neurobiolgica del ego y de lo que
ocurre cuando ese ego se disuelve en la mente de expertos en oracin, contem-
placin y meditacin de diferentes tradiciones religiosas o espirituales. De este
modo alcanzaremos a entender la experiencia de lo que Rudolf Otto denomin
lo numinoso, lo santo o lo sagrado.
Para comenzar la explicacin transdisciplinar de la experiencia de lo numi-
noso expondremos primero el marco arquitectnico y transdisciplinar implica-
do, en sus estructuras y complejidad. Despus ofrecer dos dinmicas de esta
arquitectura: primero un estudio pluralista de las tradiciones religiosas en su
entendimiento del yo, de sus implicaciones y de sus caractersticas. Segundo

1
SALAS, DARO, Moral para el siglo XXI, Ed. Xistral, Madrid, 1998.

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. CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES 949

un estudio comparativo de la historia de la neurofilosofa, con los ltimos estu-


dios sobre neuroteologa, donde se discute la epistemologa de las neurocien-
cias y las experiencias espirituales del sujeto como persona. Veremos as ver-
tientes multidisciplinares, la interrelacin que conllevan, su estudio y sus grados
de dificultad 2.
De hecho, el estudio transdisciplinar conlleva sorpresas. Finalmente pro-
pondremos una concepcin nueva de la experiencia del estado mstico, y que
podra constituir un hecho falsable para los estudios neurocientficos. Con
ello vislumbraremos una va mstica inherente a las tradiciones espirituales
perennes que no ha sido recogida hasta ahora.

1. LA TRANSDISCIPLINARIEDAD DEL FENMENO DE LO NUMINOSO

Vamos a tratar de analizar epistemolgicamente los enfoques inter-trans-


disciplinares del estudio de la experiencia de lo numinoso por el mtodo de
Edgar Morin para el estudio de Sistemas Complejos 3. Procederemos as bajo el
amparo de una filosofa de la complejidad que sea a la vez meta-cientfica, meta-
fsica y meta-humana. Este mtodo abre realmente una arquitectura cogniti-
va. Se abren, pues, tres ejes de estudio noolgico de la experiencia espiritual
humana, en conexin con sus dimensiones antropolgicas, csmico-bio-fsicas,
ecolgicas y socio-culturales.

1.1. El eje meta-humano

El eje meta-humano conecta con variadas dimensiones interdisciplinares:


La antropologa: el origen del yo, el estudio comparativo de los ritos y las
religiones en busca de nexos comunes en la experiencia de abandono del
ego, la separacin o el xtasis, as como el ntasis o en entrar dentro
de s, el estudio de los llamados entegenos y su relacin con los dife-
rentes estados de consciencia, etc.
La filosofa: lo relacionado con la mente entra en conexin interdiscipli-
nar con las denominadas ciencias cognitivas. Es interesante unificar lo
que en su momento se haba llamadoNos referimos a las Ciencias del
Espritu de Dilthey o a los trabajos de Paul Ricoeur en que la hermenu-
tica se une a la neurologa trabajada por Jean-Pierre Changueux, donde

2
ANDRESEN, JENSINE - FORMAN, ROBERT K. C., Methodological Pluralism in the Study of
Religion: How the Study of Consciousness and Mapping Spiritual Experiences can Reshape
Religious Methodology, in Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 7, n. 11-12, November-
December 2000, pp. 7-17, Imprint Academic.
3
MORIN, E., Introduccin al pensamiento complejo, Editorial Gedisa, Mxico, 2004. Ori-
ginal: Introduction la pense complexe, ESPF diteur, Paris, 1990. MORIN, E., El Mtodo III.
El conocimiento del conocimiento, Ediciones Ctedra, Madrid, 1999. Original: La Mthode III.
La conaissance de la connaissance, ditions du Seuil, Paris, 1986.

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950 . CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES

se plantea la naturaleza biolgica del self y del sentido de la alteridad como


s mismo. En una palabra lo que Francisco Mora denomina la neuro-
filosofa. Por otro lado, la filosofa de la naturaleza, o la Naturphiloso-
phie en la poca del romanticismo alemn, renace en una perspectiva no
slo heurstica, sino tambin holstica. Hay mucho por descubrir an en
los escritos de Goethe, Hemsteruis, Baader, Novalis, Holderlin, Ritter,
Tieck y en Hegel, Fichte y Schelling por un idealismo transcedental que
lleva al yo al abismo de s mismo (Urgrund) en la experiencia notica
de lo numinoso.
La historia del pensamiento literario ofrece narraciones que expresan
diversas experiencias numinosas. Por ejemplo, Fiedrich y August Wilhelm
Schlegel, con Novalis y los primeros estudios transdisciplinares de su
Enciclopedia; tambin el galvanismo, la alquimia de Paracelso y el neo-
platonismo romntico. Tambin se deberan investigar los enlaces entre
literatura y psicoanlisis para desentraar las experiencias del yo y su
presencia en las categoras de la razn y su impronta cognitiva, como en
Proust, Blake, Shelley, Schiller y otros.
En la psicologa cognitiva, transpersonal y evolutiva, sera apropiado estu-
diar el asombro. La psicologa del asombro es uno de los pasos ms impor-
tantes para el estudio de lo numinoso. El factor emocional que produce
en el nio un cdigo cerrado de pulsiones emotivas y cognitivas. Tam-
bin sera interesante reactivar los estudios filosficos y psicolgicos de
Jung para el estudio de la transdisciplinar de la hermenutica de la unin
de la consciencia con el inconsciente para relacionarlo con los mtodos
actuales de neuropsicologa.

1.2. El eje meta-fsico

En el eje meta-fsico se abarcan las disciplinas que van unas ms all de la


fsica segn la apreciacin de Ren Guenn. Son las disciplinas que van tras
la fsica; es decir, que su apreciacin ontolgica lleva al estudio transdiscipli-
nar de las ciencias de la naturaleza (fusij). Constituiran el eje meta-cientfico:
La metafsica de las tradiciones espirituales conlleva una muy apreciada
diferenciacin entre los aspectos exotricos de las religiones (los ritos, los
dogmas) para llegar a su convergencia esotrica (gnosis o conocimientos
sagrados) que conducen a los introducidos en el camino espiritual de la
experiencia ntima de lo numinoso. La palabra esotrica es stricto sensu
la apreciacin griega de la palabra esoterikoj: de lo interior hacia lo inte-
rior; es decir, enseanza que va dirigida al mundo interno del iniciado
o del novicio para la comprensin ms profunda de s mismo.
La historia, la fenomenologa, la sociologa y la filosofa de las religiones
estudian junto a las neurociencias el proceso de integracin de los aspec-
tos emotivos e intelectivos de las experiencias espirituales y el sentido de
la firme conviccin consciente de la experiencia ntima.

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. CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES 951

1.3. El eje meta-cientfico

El eje meta-cientfico es el ms complejo. De hecho en el mtodo cientfico


toda experiencia ha de estar acompaada de una explicacin cientfica que apoye
y describa con precisin el desarrollo de lo acontecido. El problema es doble,
puesto que:
1. La experiencia ntima de lo numinoso es una experiencia personal que
parece excluir la explicacin cientfica. Sera aceptable un solo indivi-
duo para la ciencia?
2. La experiencia ntima de lo numinoso, es la experiencia segn la ter-
minologa kantiana de un fenmeno o de un nomeno?

Como no es posible tratar cientficamente lo noumnico, hay que abordarlo


en el eje metafsico de las tradiciones; es decir, estableciendo desde estas una
va de investigacin cuya dinmica apunte hacia el eje meta-fsico.
Ahora bien, fue Francisco Varela el primero que proporcion al estudio de la
conciencia un mtodo cientfico para que el sujeto experimental colabore en pri-
mera persona e informe autorizadamente de su propia experiencia. De hecho
este enfoque al que denomin Neurofenomenologa 4 ofreca uno de los pri-
meros mtodos para afrontar el problema de la conciencia. Actualmente hay una
mayor aceptacin de la metodologa cientfica del informe verbal en primera
persona, aunque con mayor o menor sofisticacin segn sea su desarrollo.
Al problema de la conciencia, o de los correlatos neuronales de la conciencia,
le acompaa otro no menos complejo, el de la autoconciencia. De hecho los estu-
dios de neurologa cognitiva necesitan programas interdisciplinares que desarro-
llen estudios biofisicos, e incluso cunticos, para explicar cmo el cerebro proce-
sa datos con coherencia tanto en el imput como en el output. Ya no se trata
nicamente de 1014 de sinapsis que fogonean con sincronas orquestadas en deter-
minados lbulos o zonas del cortex, con su respectivo top down hacia el tlamo y
su bottom up cortical. Si son correctas las conjeturas de Hameroff-Tuszinsky-Wolf-
Nanopoulos y otros 5 sobre la importancia de la actividad microtubular de las neu-
ronas para las uniones de hendidura, estaramos hablando de 109 de unidades de
tubulina por cada neurona (de las que hay 1010 neuronas en un cerebro adulto de
un ser humano). La actividad de este computador cuntico es entonces del orden
de 1090 unidades de tubulinas por cerebro. Es un nmero inabarcable para una

4
VARELA, F. J., Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem,
Journal of Consciousness Studies, Special Issues on the Hard Problems, J. Shear (ed.), June
1996.
5
HAMEROFF, S. - PENROSE, R., Orchestrated Reduction Of Quantum Coherence In Brain
Microtubules: A Model For Consciousness?, en Toward a Science of Consciousness - The First
Tucson Discussions and Debates, eds. Hameroff, S. R. - Kaszniak, A. W. - Scott, A. C., Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 507-540 (1996); HAGAN, S. - HAMEROFF, S. - TUSZYNSKI, J., Quantum
Computation in Brain Microtubules? Decoherence and Biological Feasibility, en Physical
reviews E, 2002, 65:061901; WOLF, N. J. - HAMEROFF, S., A Quantum Approach To Visual Cons-
ciousnes, en Trends in Cognitive Science, vol. 5, n. 11, November 2001.

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952 . CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES

mente humana. Pero lo ms importante es que el efecto de coherencia cuntica


en las tubulinas permite que en una frecuencia de 40 Hz todas las tubulinas de
los microtbulos de las neuronas de varias zonas corticales y talmicas esten bom-
beando al unsono, generando una orquestacin unificada de actividad de impul-
sos de transduccin de neurotransmisores intraneuronales.
Mi estudio se orienta en especial a observar los efectos de coherencia desde
el nivel cuntico ofrecido por las tubulinas; es decir, como fundamento de ml-
tiples efectos coherentes a escalas macroscpicas 6, de forma jerrquica, hasta
llegar al grado de sincronicidad gamma talamo-cortical, mediante la cual, pro-
bablemente, expertos meditadores han llegado a la experiencia ntima de lo
numinoso (que en la filosofa del budismo tibetano es llamada la naturaleza
ltima de la mente).

2. DE LA IMPERSONALIDAD DEL YO EN LAS TRADICIONES ESPIRITUALES


(EJE META-FSICO)

Al comenzar este escrito hemos planteado una pregunta sobre el yo. Es


acaso una pregunta referida a m mismo? Parece que s, pero tiene trampa. Exis-
ten diferentes tradiciones espirituales en las que el yo se presenta como algo
impersonal. Por tanto, la pregunta no sera quin soy yo?, sino qu soy yo?

2.1. En el hinduismo

En primer lugar, en la poca ms antigua de la tradicin hind, posiblemente


ms de 2000 aos antes de Cristo, se escribi en el texto sagrado del Rig Veda
el siguiente pasaje:
No s lo que soy,
camino limitado con el peso de mi mente.
Cuando el primer nacido del Orden (la Verdad) [rta] venga a m
tomo parte en la misma palabra.
(RV I, 164, 37) 7

Tomando el texto como un canto a la autoconciencia de la ignorancia, se nos


presenta como la vivencia del enigma de uno mismo. El texto como dice Rai-
mon Panikkar no pregunta lo que somos para despus decir que no lo sabe-
mos. El texto dice muy claramente lo que somos. Somos aquellos que sabemos
que no sabemos lo que somos 8.

6
CASTRO, SCAR, Aspectos biosemiticos de la conciencia: en bsqueda de los signos de la
vida y su referencia a la conciencia como principio teleonmico: Pensamiento, vol. 62, n. 234,
2006, pp. 471-504.
7
PANNIKKAR, RAIMON, The Vedic Experience, All India Books, Pondicherry (India), 1977.
8
PANNIKKAR, RAIMON, LHinduisme, en Les intucions fonamentals de les grans religions,
VV.AA., Ed. Cruilla, Col. Cristianisme i Cultura, Barcelona, 1991.

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No quiero referirme a posibles equivalentes homeomrficos sobre esto en el


cristianismo, salvo el sentido de la Trinidad que incluye creacin y encarnacin.
Es mejor en todo caso exponer las definiciones y terminologas que en el hin-
duismo encontramos con relacin a nuestra pregunta por lo que es el yo. Sea-
lamos las siguientes:
Aham: El Yo, el Yo Absoluto. Aham brahman: yo soy Brahman, uno
de los mahavakyas (uno de los cuatro sentidos de la Gran Totalidad). Es el prin-
cipio ontolgico. Se ha de distinguir de ahamkara, como principio psicolgico.
Ahamkara: Sentido del ego, ego-ismo, el ego centrado en su individualidad.
Atman: El principio espiritual individual, el principio de la vida, el aliento
del S Mismo (Self). Es el centro del centro en el ser humano. Es el estado de
unin inmediato con el Brahman.
Brahman: El Absoluto en las Upanishads designa el principio impersonal,
primera causa del universo. Asociado a la mitologa del Huevo de Oro, a la pala-
bra divina, a la plegaria y al sacrificio como sacro-oficio o mximo esfuer-
zo sagrado. Ishvara sera la actividad relacional de Brahma en el Atman del ilu-
minado, as como otras revelaciones de Dios que exceden el lenguaje.
Buddhi: Facultad de Inteligencia Superior, intelecto arquetpico, intuicin
espiritual, meditacin, pensamiento superior.
Cit: Conciencia Superior, Estado de Comprensin Significativo, Espritu. Se
puede comprender como estado notico. Es una de las tres caractersticas de
Brahman (juntamente con Sat-Ser, Realidad y Anada-Felicidad, espiritual inin-
terrumpida).
Citta: El organo de la mente (manas), del pensamiento. Sera el cerebro.
Dvaita: Dualidad, dualismo mental y sistema filosfico. Se distingue de Advai-
ta: para A-dual hay una concepcin espiritual y filosfica de la realidad del Yo
y del Mundo. Est asumida en el budismo por Nagarjuna.
Jiva: Alma individual, ser viviente (como ens commune) o realidad intrn-
seca natural anmica, que incorpora el ahamkara o ego. Sera el estado ordina-
rio del anima junguiana de los seres humanos. Normalmente el jiva contiene
Klesha; es decir, aflicciones, estados egoicos, impurezas anmicas, complejos.
Jnana: Conocimiento (gnosis), Sabidura suprema. Estado de Unin Mstica
Atman-Brahman, donde el Buddhi se autocomprende en un Cit.
Karuna: Estado de conciencia de la Compasin. Muy importante en el bu-
dismo.
Manas: Es la mente en el sentido amplio del trmino, el estado body-mind
y sede de los pensamientos, los sentidos, los sentimientos y la voluntad.
Moksa: Liberacin del Maya o ilusin del mundo, y del Samsara o ciclos de
nacimientos y de muertes.
Neti Neti: No es as, No es as. Tambin: Ni esto, Ni aquello, referen-
cia a la ltima realidad del Ser, que slo puede ser expresada por la va negativa.
Caracterizacin de la unin mstica del Atman-Brahman. Puro apofantismo.
Nirguna Brahman: Brahman sin atributos ni cualidades. Trascendencia Ab-
soluta.

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954 . CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES

Nirvana: Literalmente extincin de la llama, superacin de todas las limi-


taciones de lo pensable, incluyendo espacio, tiempo y ser. La ltima meta sin
meta, tanto en el jainismo como en el budismo.
Nityanita-Vatsuviveka: La discriminacin entre la realidad atemporal y la
temporal o mudable.
Paramatman: El Atman supremo. Dios. Es el trmino para distinguir el atman
universal del individual.
Purusha: El Ser Humano Arquetpico. Es el Espritu en todas sus manifes-
taciones csmicas. La Persona Espiritual (purusha vidha), la Persona Imperso-
nal (apurusha vidha). Principio Espiritual de la Realidad.
Purushottama: El mejor de los seres humanos, la Persona Suprema; epteto
relacionado con Vishnu y Krishna.
Rishi: Sabio, Visionario, el vidente de los Vedas.
Samadhi: Estado de profunda concentracin o absorcin. El ltimo de los
estados yguicos.
Samsara: El mundo fenomnico. El ciclo de las existencias temporales.

En los textos sagrados hindes, encontramos mencin del yo, por ejem-
plo, en la Brihadarankaya Upanishad, como el Purusha 9:
1. En el principio slo exista el Ser, en la forma de una persona [purus-
ha]. Aqulla mir a su alrededor y no vio nada excepto su propio Ser. Lo pri-
mero que dijo fue: Yo soy; as fue como, pronunciando su nombre, se con-
virti en yo. Por consiguiente, si a un hombre se le pregunta, lo primero que
dice es: Yo soy, y luego pronuncia el otro nombre que pueda tener, y pues-
to que antes de esto [purva], l (el Ser) quem [ush] todos los seres perver-
sos, as fue como se convirti en persona [pur-usha]. En verdad, quien esto
conoce, quema todo aquello que intenta anteponrsele.
(Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, Primer Adhaya, Cuarto Brahmana)

O como aquel que tira del cordel:


20. El que mora en la mente, y dentro de la mente, a quien la mente no
conoce, cuyo cuerpo es la mente, aquel que tira del cordel (gobierna) en el inte-
rior de la mente, es tu Ser, que tira del cordel (gobierna) en tu interior, el in-
mortal.
(Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, Tercer Adhaya, Sptimo Brahmana)

En el hinduismo el Atman y el Brahman se unen en una realidad unvoca de


uno mismo como Dios. Pero el Atman, no puede ser identificado con el alma
individual tal como se entiende en la tradicin occidental:
2. El Atman posee mente, tiene a prana por cuerpo, es de la forma de
luz, concibe la verdad, tiene por esencia el espacio, contiene todas las accio-
nes, todos los deseos, todos los olores, todos los sabores, abarca todo esto, care-
ce de palabras, es indiferente. 3. Ese es mi Atman dentro del corazn, ms

9
PANNIKKAR, RAIMON, El Cristo desconocido del Hinduismo, para una Cristofana Ecum-
nica. Un encuentro entre Oriente y Occidente, Grupo Libro, Coleccin Parasos Perdidos, Madrid
(Spain), 1994.

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pequeo que un grano de cebada, o de centeno, o de mostaza, o de mijo, ms


pequeo que un brote de mijo. Ese es mi Atman dentro del corazn, ms gran-
de que la tierra, ms grande que la atmsfera, ms grande que el cielo, ms
grande que estos mundos. [] Es Brahman.
(Chandoya Upanishad, tercer Prapathaka, catorceavo Khanda)

2.2. En el cristianismo

El alma judeo-cristiana 10, sentida como parte del ser humano, est hecha de
los cuatro elementos: agua, tierra (para formar el fango del gnesis), fuego (para
la coccin) y aire (para su secado). El quinto elemento, que pertenece a Yahveh-
Elohim, es la Ruah, el Espritu o Aliento de Dios. Por eso, el asiento del Esp-
ritu es el Reino de los Cielos, realizado aqu en la tierra, pero no pertenece a
este mundo (Jn 18, 36). Pero vemos que tiene una identidad reconocida en la
Chandoya Upanishad 3,14 cuando dice: Ese es mi Atman, ms pequeo que
un grano () de mostaza (), ms grande que la tierra () que los cielos ()
que estos mundos:
El Reino de los Cielos es semejante a un grano de mostaza que, toma uno,
sembr en su campo; y con ser la ms pequea de todas las semillas; mas cuan-
do crece es mayor que las hortalizas, y se hace rbol, de modo que van las aves
del cielo y anidan en sus ramas.
(Mt 13, 31-32)

Esta parbola aparece tambin en Mc 4, 30-32, en Lc 13, 18-19. Pero tam-


bin en el documento Q y en el EvTom 20. Es la parbola de la realidad del cuer-
po mstico. El grano de mostaza es el poder (dynamis) de la transformacin espi-
ritual del ser humano que define el alma convertida (metanoia) en Reino de los
Cielos, o Reino de Dios.
Preguntando sobre cundo vendra el Reino de Dios, les respondi dicien-
do: El Reino de Dios no vendr aparatosamente. Y no dirn: Mira, aqu
est!, o: All est! Porque el Reino de Dios est dentro de vosotros.
(Q 17, 20-21)

Pues en el evangelio apcrifo de Toms aparece la misma afirmacin:


Pero el Reino est dentro de vosotros y fuera de vosotros. Cuando os lle-
guis a conocer, entonces seris conocidos y sabris que vosotros sois los hijos
del Padre Viviente. Pero si vosotros no os conocis entonces vosotros estis en
pobreza y vosotros sois la pobreza.
(EvTom 3, Nag Hammadi II 32, 22- 33, 2)

10
Las Escrituras Sagradas: Bible. Hebrew and English, The Bible Society in Israel. Jeru-
salem 1997. The Greek New Testament, Bible Society United. 1975. ROBINSON, J. M. - HOFFMANN,
P. - KLOPPENBORG, J. S., El Documento Q. Edition in greek and spanish with parallels from the
Gospels of Mark and Thomas, Ediciones Sgueme, Salamanca, 2002; PIERO, A. - MONTSERRAT
TORRENTS, J. - GARCA BAZN, F., Textos Gnsticos. Biblioteca de Nag Hammadi II. Evangelios,
hechos, cartas, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 1999.

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956 . CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES

Pero el sentido de la fe en Dios es la integracin trinica del amor y la espe-


ranza en la actividad del alma. Excede el sentido de creencia, para pasar a ser
una conciencia de la realidad que slo puede entender el ser humano como
vivencia. Tiene relacin a la parbola del grano de mostaza:
Si tuvierais fe como un grano de mostaza, dirais a esa morera: arrnca-
te y plntate en el mar. Y os obedecera.
(Q 17, 6)

Como tambin aparece en Mt 17, 20b, en Lc 17, 6, en Mc 11, 22 b-23, y en


EvTom 48.
Pero esta fe, o Pistis Sofa, es un trabajo interior que es la experiencia msti-
ca de la metanoia:
Cuando hagis de los dos uno y hagis de lo de dentro como lo de fuera
y lo de fuera como lo de dentro y lo de arriba como lo de abajo de modo que
hagis lo masculino y lo femenino en uno solo, a fin de que lo masculino no
sea masculino ni lo femenino sea femenino; cuando hagis ojos en lugar de un
ojo y una mano en lugar de una mano y un pie en lugar de un pie, una imagen
en lugar de una imagen, entonces entraris [en el Reino].
(EvTom 22, Nag Hammadi 37, 27- 33)

La experiencia mstica del cristiano se fundamenta en la experiencia de Cris-


to en el interior tal como lo expres San Pablo:
Mas yo por la misma Ley he vuelto a la Ley, por vivir para Dios; estoy cru-
cificado con Cristo, y ya no vivo yo, es Cristo quien vive en m.
(Gal 2, 20)

Y en las palabras de Jess en San Mateo:


y el que no toma su cruz y sigue en pos de m, no es digno de m.
El que haya su vida la perder, y el que la perdiere por amor de m la halla-
r. El que os recibe a vosotros, a m me recibe, y el que a m me recibe, recibe
al que me envi.
(Mt 10, 38-40)

Que quedaron tambin reflejadas en Mt 16, 24-25; Lc 9, 23-24 ;Lc, 14, 27; Lc
17, 33; Mc 8, 34-37, o en Jn 12, 25-26 y Jn 13, 20. stos pasajes son tomados
como discursos apostlicos, puesto que su exigencia tiene una recompensa o
una finalidad:
En verdad os digo que hay algunos de los que estn aqu los cuales no pro-
barn la muerte hasta que vean al Hijo del Hombre [Cristo] viniendo en su
reino [de Dios].
(Mt 16, 28)

Reflejados tambin en Mc 9, 1; Lc 9, 27 y Jn 8, 51-52 como los que no per-


dern su alma hasta morir en el hombre viejo para ser un hombre apstol, es
decir enviado y escogido, un hombre nuevo.

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Porque los que son movidos por el Espritu de Dios, stos son hijos de
Dios () El Espritu mismo da testimonio a nuestro espritu de que somos
hijos de Dios.
(Rn 8, 14,16)

Este es el nuevo hombre, el ecce homo que, olvidndose de s mismo


moral, psicolgica y mentalmente, habindose vaciado (kenosij) de s mismo,
hacindose como un nio (Mt 18, 1-5; Mc 9, 37; Mc 10, 15; Lc 18, 17; Lc 18, 48)
y habiendo nacido de nuevo (Jn 3, 3) puede entrar y ver en el Reino de Dios.
La elevacin del hombre al proceso de divinizacin o deificacin (qeosij) ha
sido tratada con mucho cuidado y recelo en el cristianismo. O se sigue a Cristo
por la fe, o se es Cristo en uno por Amor. La gnosis y sus gnosticismos probaron
la transformacin espiritual o pneumtica del hombre, estando en gracia por la
sabidura divina vivida transformadoramente. Mas no se ha comprendido an con
profundidad qu es la propuesta de la gnosis cristiana si no se vive la experiencia
anaggica (Orgenes) de la unin con Dios. Vivir la transformacin del hombre
en Dios por la gracia ha sido el fundamento ecumnico en la patrstica. Y, siendo
o no influida por las iniciaciones mistricas, el valor es el mismo que entra en el
fundamento de la mstica carmelitana. La va unitiva es el Amor de Dios:
Y es de tan alta excelencia
aqueste sumo saber,
que no hay facultad ni sciencia
que le puedan emprender;
quien se supiere vencer
con un no saber sabiendo,
ir siempre trascendiendo.
(SAN JUAN DE LA CRUZ, Coplas del mismo com-
puestas tras un xtasis de alta contemplacin)

2.3. En el judasmo

La Kabbalah, o tradicin mstica del judasmo, visualiza tres etapas de ine-


xistencia que ocurren entre las Tinieblas de lo Profundo del Gnesis, y la mani-
festacin de la Luz: 1) ayin, nada, lo que no existe, el vaco, lo ms all de
todo concepto; 2) ein sof, sin lmite, sin fin, la extensin ilimitada o inter-
minable; y 3) ein sof or, la luz sin lmites, la luz ilimitada.
Cuando ein sof, impulsada por el pensamiento y la voluntad de la divini-
dad, por el poder misterioso de contraccin y extensin, quiso manifestar una
parte de ella misma, concentr su esencia en un solo punto. A esto los cabalis-
tas lo llamaron Kether, Centro, la primera emanacin de Luz, y desde este
punto primordial brotaron nueve luces esplndidas.
En un intento de aclarar lo que siempre permanecer siendo un misterio
impenetrable, los cabalistas concibieron el proceso maravilloso del Uno con-
virtindose en muchos en formas diversas, la mayora de las veces como un rbol
de Vida compuesto de diez Sefirot, diez partes o emanaciones de ein sof, la

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958 . CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES

ilimitada extensin, formando un universo diez veces mayor. En medio del bri-
llo insoportable de ein sof or, la luz ilimitada, visualizaron la cabeza de
Adam Kadmon, el Hombre Ideal o el Modelo Ideal de Hombre, el pri-
mero de cuatro Adanes que se revelan en los cuatro Mundos (o sistema Olamot,
es decir, multiversos) de estatura espiritual descendente. El cuarto Adn sobre
el cuarto Mundo, nuestra tierra, marca el comienzo de nuestra humanidad, para
luego convertirse en la actual humanidad. En otras palabras, en cada uno de los
cuatro mundos, un dcuplo rbol de Vida se revela junto con el Modelo Ideal
de Hombre y se reviste a s mismo en muchsimas formas materiales. El cuar-
to mundo, por fin, es capaz de sustentar los reinos mineral, vegetal y animal; y
sobre este mundo, tambin a la humanidad; originalmente, desde la existencia
asexual, despus como andrgino, y ahora como hombre y mujer 11.
Tal como lo explica el Rab Najmn De Breslov 12, todos los multiversos que
Dios cre son slo pantallas que filtran la poderosa radiacin de su Luz Infini-
ta. Llamamos a estos filtros de maneras diferentes Nombres Divinos, Sefirot,
Mundos, Universos, Dimensiones, o en su conjunto, la Dimensin Espiritual.
Pero por qu necesitamos un sistema de canales, una dimensin espiritual,
entre nosotros y el infinito? Por qu no podemos relacionarnos directamente
con Dios? Najmn De Breslov compara al ser humano con una lmpara que
quiere conectarse a un reactor atmico. A menos que no quiera desintegrarse,
necesitar de una estacin reductora del potencial elctrico que pueda utilizar-
se para no quedar daado.
Intuiciones similares han sido expuestas en todas las tradiciones, incluso en
la mitologa griega con la desintegracin de Smele ante la completa manifes-
tacin de Zeus en su peticin, y que del fruto de su unin sexual-mstica-sacri-
ficante, nace Dionisos.
Dentro del misticismo judo existen varios puntos de vista sobre experien-
cias humanas relacionadas lo divino. Devekut, significa pegndose a Dios.
La comunin con Dios, es un principio y la experiencia general; pero entre los
estudiosos hay opiniones diferentes sobre cmo es posible esta ntima comu-
nin. Gershom Scholem 13 escribe, que incluso en un marco exttico de la mente
el mstico judo casi invariablemente retiene un sentido de la distancia entre el
Creador y su criatura; slo en casos sumamente raros ese xtasis significa la
unin real con Dios. Pero Idel, Jacobs y Halevi, entre otros, proponen una visin
alternativa en las descripciones de la unin mstica en la kabbalah, donde se
logra la unin completa con Dios.
Segn Daniel Matt 14 los estados de vacuidad o ayin no pueden conocerse
por el pensamiento, pero pueden experimentarse directamente; en esta expe-

11
SCHOLEM, GERSHOM GERHARD, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, Schoken Books, New
York, 1995, p. 202.
12
NAJMN DE BRESLOV, Anatoma del Alma, Breslov Research Institute, Jerusalem, p. 17.
13
SCHOLEM, G., Jewish mysticism, London: Thames and Hudson, 1990, pp. 122-123.
14
MATT, D., Ayin: The concept of nothingness in Jewish mysticism, en ROBERT FORMAN
(ed.), The problem of pure consciousnes, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 121-159.

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riencia el pensamiento puede aniquilarse. Otros autores como Idel, Jacobs y


Winther describen las experiencias de ascensin espiritual, al acercarse o unir-
se con Dios o ayin, como asociadas con cualidades como beatitud, alegra, luz
y con aniquilacin o disolucin de pensamiento.
El primer paso en la emanacin del mundo del nada de Dios (el ms alto de
los diez sefirot, el keter) se designa a menudo tambin como ayin, o la ani-
quilacin de pensamiento. Dion Fortune 15 informa sobre su ascensin hacia el
keter en una ocasin dnde yo toqu su lmite extremo, apareca a m como
una luz blanca deslumbradora en que todo el pensamiento era completamente
aniquilado.
La escuela Hasdica de misticismo judo (fundada alrededor de ao 1750)
introduce lo psicolgico en la Kabbalah. Ayin ya no pertenece a la teologa y
se ha convertido en una realidad psicolgica. En la aniquilacin de las distin-
ciones del intelecto, todos son iguales. El mstico se vaca y hace sitio para una
infusin de sabidura divina, ms all las fronteras normales de conciencia 16.
La inmersin en la nada no induce una mirada fija y plida. Se ha descrito
como la experiencia ms alta para el mstico judo, y puede asociarse con el
deleite extremo y entusiasmo: hitlahavut. Se dice que el estado de ayin engen-
dra la nueva vida mental a travs de un ritmo de aniquilacin. Un hasdico, Lev
Yitzhak de Berditchev, declar: Cuando uno logra el nivel de mirando fija-
mente al ayin, los intelectos de uno se aniquilan Despus, cuando uno devuel-
ve al intelecto, est lleno con la emanacin 17.

2.4. En el Budismo

Es importante tomar en consideracin que el budismo, habindose iniciado


como una filosofa prctica de la liberacin de la ilusin (maya) y de la igno-
rancia de la realidad, se convirti en una religin no-testa mstica, de natura-
leza dharmica (doctrinal) y de actividad nastika (pensamiento heterodoxo
surgido del Vedanta). Nutrido en su principio de la cosmologa brahmnica,
introdujo conceptos que venan de las Upanishads.
En realidad ni es no-testa ni testa. En el panten del budismo tibetano, por
ejemplo existen los llamados Yidam. Pero son de una naturaleza jerrquica
espiritualmente diferente a la naturaleza del bodhisatva 18, o aquel que encarna

15
FORTUNE, D., Kabbalaen (in Danish), Copenhagen: Sankt Ansgars Forlag, 1995.
16
MATT, D., op. cit., pp. 139-140.
17
MATT, D., op. cit., pp. 139-140.
18
Yidam es una palabra que no tiene traduccin occidental, pero es frecuentemente tra-
ducida como deidad de meditacin, aunque es ms preciso traducirlo como aspecto bdico.
El Yidam es utilizado como un mtodo de transformacin hacia la completa iluminacin. Los
Yidams son tanto una forma especfica de un Buda, as como la naturaleza bsica o potencial
del estudiante para volverse un Buda. El estudiante medita en las caractersticas resaltantes
del Yidam hasta que realiza una completa unin con ste. El Yidam, que puede ser tanto mas-
culino como femenino, puede corresponder al aspecto bdico personal, lo que esto significa
es que la naturaleza del Yidam corresponde al temperamente psicolgico y las cualidades de
cada adepto. Wikipedia.

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en s mismo la naturaleza buddhica. El ejemplo ms claro es su santidad el Dalai


Lama (Gyatso) actualmente Tenzin Gyatso. l es la emanacin del Buda de la
Compasin (Avalokitesvara), y por ello maestro de maestros en el budismo eso-
trico Vajrayana (tantra) o Camino del Diamante. Dicha doctrina tiene como
objetivo la liberacin del sujeto de la trampa fenomnica del yo hasta llegar
a la vivencia de la denominada naturaleza ltima de la mente. Esta es idnti-
ca a la naturaleza ltima de la realidad. Es inherentemente completa y per-
fecta en tanto que real. Siendo el Ser no es Ser, es Todo y Nada. Inmanente y
trascendente, inefable y ocenico (Gyatso). El silencio de Buda es el silencio de
Dios. Vivido a travs del rgano de conocimiento mstico llamado en snscrito
boddhi y diferenciado de la mente humana razonadora manas. La natu-
raleza ltima de la mente es la impersonalidad en vivo y en directo del indivi-
duo y para el individuo.
Comprendiendo dicha naturaleza viva en todas sus dimensiones se hace paten-
te el estado de conciencia que despierta la compasin. Esto es as por la expe-
riencia de la ley de interdependencia de todo con todo. No existe ningn tomo
que est aislado de todo y que no tenga inherente una vibracin. Se podra decir
de forma oximornica que la quietud vibra viviendo de este modo uno de los
dichos a-lgicos o koan, tan familiares en el budismo shan (en China) o zen
(en Japn).
En el camino del medio (Madhyamaka) el mximo exponente de la enseanza
fue Nagarjuna. A travs de su doctrina de las dos verdades, surgida del Maha-
yana, Nagarjuna ofrece una epistemologa de la meditacin en el sunyata o
vaco, o mejor dicho vaco cero, a diferencia de no-lleno. El sunyata es
la liberacin de las contradicciones en un rango espiritual muy profundo, donde
el vaco y el no-vaco forman una experiencia nica e inefable. De hecho ya en
el Canon Pali relata que el monje Ananda, el asistente de Gautama Buda, pre-
gunt: En qu sentido se dice que el mundo es vaco?. Buda replic: En el
sentido de que carece de un alma (anatman) o de algo perteneciente a un alma.
Por eso se dice que el mundo es vaco.
Por eso la experiencia del sunyata est ntimamente ligada a la experien-
cia de la interdependencia. Hay vaco en la independencia. Pero esa experien-
cia conlleva otra ms profunda: la avidya o la ignorancia primordial de la ver-
dadera naturaleza de la realidad. Por eso cuando ese saber, no sabiendo se
una a la comprensin vivificada del sunyata en su experiencia de la ausencia
de experimentacin del sunyata, es en ese estado cuando se vive el despertar
o la iluminacin en el budismo. De ah que sea el camino de la va media.
El Sutra del Corazn, por ejemplo, declara que los skandhas (o factores de
existencia: la sensacin, la percepcin, la volicin, la conciencia, y la forma),
que constituyen nuestra existencia mental y fsica, son vacos en su naturaleza
o esencia. Pero tambin declara que esta vacuidad es igual a la forma (lo que
denota plenitud); en otras palabras, que es una vacuidad que al mismo tiempo
no es diferente del tipo de realidad que normalmente atribuimos a los eventos;
no es un vaco nihilista que socava nuestro mundo, sino un vaco positivo que
lo define.

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Cuando el Bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara practicaba la profunda Perfeccin


del Conocimiento (Prajaparamita), percibi con claridad que los cinco skand-
has son todos vacos y super todo sufrimiento.Oh Shariputra, la forma no
es diferente de la Vaciedad (shunyata), la Vaciedad no es diferente de la forma;
la forma es la Vaciedad, la Vaciedad es la forma. Lo mismo (ha de decirse con
referencia a) la sensacin, la percepcin, la volicin, la conciencia. Oh Shari-
putra, todos los dharmas tienen como caracterstica esencial la Vaciedad. No
surgen, no desaparecen, no son ni impuros ni puros; ni aumentan ni disminu-
yen. Por esta razn en la Vaciedad no existe la forma, ni la sensacin ni la per-
cepcin ni la volicin ni la conciencia; ni ojo, ni odo, ni nariz, ni lengua, ni cuer-
po ni mente; ni forma, ni sonido, ni olor, ni sabor, ni lo tangible ni las
concepciones mentales; ni dhatu-ojo hasta ni dhatu-conciencia de la mente; ni
ignorancia, ni extincin de la ignorancia, hasta ni la vejez y la muerte, ni la extin-
cin de la vejez y la muerte; ni el sufrimiento, ni su origen, ni su cesacin, ni el
Camino; ni el Conocimiento ni la obtencin. Como no existe nada que pueda
ser obtenido, el Bodhisattva, por apoyarse en la Perfeccin del Conocimiento
(Prajaparamita), tiene su mente libre de obstculos; por carecer de obstcu-
los, no siente temor, ha superado el error y la ilusin: es el Parinirvana! Todos
los Budas de los tres tiempos (pasado, presente y futuro), por apoyarse en la
Perfeccin del Conocimiento (Prajaparamita), alcanzan la Suprema Perfecta
Iluminacin. Por esta razn ha de conocerse este Gran Mantra de la Perfec-
cin del Conocimiento (Prajaparamita), este Mantra de la Gran Sabidura, este
Mantra Supremo, este Mantra igual a lo Inigualable, que puede eliminar todo
sufrimiento, que es la Verdad por no ser falso; por esta razn ha de recitarse el
Mantra de la Perfeccin del Conocimiento, el Mantra que dice as:
GATE GATE PARAGATE PARASAMGATE BODHI SVAHA
El Sutra del Corazn (Esencia) de la Perfeccin del Conocimiento (Prajaparamita)

2.5. En el sufismo

La mstica islmica es el camino esotrico (btin) hacia la unin con Allah.


Existen cofradas esotricas chies, sunes, pero se integran en las llamadas cofra-
das sufies o Tasauuf como va unitiva venga de donde venga la observacin
de la ley (Sharah). Las cofradas sufes, sean de orden Melewi, Naqsbandi,
Sanusiyyah, Tjniyyah, Qdiriyyah, Qwal, etc., viven como pobres (suf, faqr o
derwish en turco) en el sentido del conocimiento de la ignorancia. Seguir
el sufismo es morir gradualmente a s mismo, nacer de nuevo y volverse cons-
ciente de lo que uno ha sido siempre desde la eternidad (azal) sin haberse dado
cuenta de ello, hasta haberse cumplido la transformacin necesaria. Significa
deslizarse fuera del propio molde, como una serpiente cambia de piel. Seme-
jante transformacin implica una profunda transmutacin de la sustancia misma
del alma a travs de un efecto milagroso de la Presencia Divina (hudur) que se
implanta en el corazn mediante la iniciacin por el maestro espiritual (shaykh),
y que es eficaz debido a la gracia (Barakah) que fluye del origen mismo de la
revelacin.

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962 . CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES

Es indispensable, para que esta transformacin del alma pueda acontecer,


que exista un enlace tradicional con el origen de la cadena espiritual (silsilah),
una disciplina o mtodo para ejercitar el alma.
Una definicin sinttica del camino del sufismo es la que escuch cierta vez
de un maestro. En ella se alude al Tasauuf explicando el significado de las letras
que forman su nombre (t-s-u-f, pues en rabe no se escriben las vocales breves).
La T es taubah, el arrepentimiento. El aspirante debe empezar por volverse
hacia Dios arrepintindose de sus faltas. La S representa saf, la purificacin;
es preciso eliminar lo que enturbia el alma con los ejercicios espirituales y la
remembranza de Dios. La U es uilaiah, la intimidad y amistad con Dios, que
El concede a Sus siervos sinceros y purificados. La F es fan, la aniquilacin
en el Amado, ya no hay dos, solo Uno.
Aunque como dice Hossein Nasr 19 este proceso de transformar la psique
del hombre aparece en principio como gradual, el dhikr o quintaesencia de
la invocacin, termina por convertirse en naturaleza real del hombre y la reali-
dad con la que ste se identifica. Con la ayuda del dikhr, combinando las for-
mas apropiadas de meditacin (fikr), el hombre obtiene un alma integrada, pura
y entera como el oro, y luego en el dhikr ofrece este alma a Dios en forma supre-
ma de sacrificio. Finalmente en la aniquilacin (fan) y la subsistencia (baq)
se da cuenta que nunca estuvo separado de Dios, ni an en el principio.
Esa integracin que ha sido producida a travs del dikhr queda reflejada inclu-
so en el cuerpo fsico. De ese modo es reflejo simblico del ser interior del hom-
bre. Se mantiene centrado en el corazn del corazn, en el centro del templo
(haykal) del espiritu. La mente, que siempre va errante de un pensamiento a otro
sin cesar, se aquieta. De ese modo la mente se asienta en el presente, aqu y ahora,
en el instante que conecta lo temporal con lo eterno. Dice Nars: Cuando Rmi
escribe en su Mathnawi que en el retiro espiritual (khalwah) el adepto debe invo-
car hasta que los dedos de los pies empiecen a decir Allh, se refiere precisa-
mente a esta integracin final que incluye el cuerpo, as como la mente y el alma 20.
Dichos rasgos son discernibles por aquellos que son capaces de vibrar en
dicha sintona. Pero incluirn efectos incluso en rasgos externos. De esta mane-
ra una persona as esta protegida de todas las enfermedades del alma, no por
un psicoanlisis, sino por realizar todas las pulsiones que emergen del instinto
y ser condicin necesaria para que el hombre se encamine a la trascendencia.
Se ha curado de la hipocresa, del egosmo, habiendo realizado el ideal islmi-
co de unificacin de las vas contemplativa y activa. Por ello se realiza la The-
osis en l, es decir la teofana total (tajall) de los Nombres y Cualidades divi-
nas. Es la realizacin del al-insn al-kmil o el Hombre Universal o perfecto.
De este modo el suf vive el secreto de los secretos: La Unidad Trascendente
del Ser (wahdat al wujd). Mediante el hombre universal, Dios se contempla a
s mismo y a todas las cosas que l ha hecho ser 21.

19
NASR, SEYYED HOSSEIN, Sufismo vivo, Editorial Herder, Barcelona, 1984, p. 59.
20
NASR, SEYYED HOSSEIN, op. cit., p. 60.
21
NASR, SEYYED HOSSEIN, op. cit., p. 41.

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. CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES 963

l ha mandado su Ipseidad con l mismo, de l mismo y hacia l


mismo, sin ningn intermediario o causalidad exterior a l mismo. Ninguna
diferencia de tiempo, espacio o naturaleza hay entre el que enva el mensaje,
el mensaje y el destinatario del mensaje.
(IBNARABI, El Tratado de la Unidad)

3. NEUROFILOSOFA

Para establecer ciertos parmetros epistemolgicos para el estudio de lo numi-


noso en neurobiologa, tenemos antes que retomar ciertos antecedentes sobre
los aspectos filosficos del estudio del cerebro en el siglo XX. Con William James,
ya en 1890, se puso en marcha el estudio del yo, a travs de su libro Los prin-
cipios de la psicologa. Propona que, aunque el yo pudiera dar la impresin de
ser un ente unitario, posee muchas facetas que van desde la conciencia de nues-
tro cuerpo y de los recuerdos, hasta la percepcin de nuestro lugar en la socie-
dad en que vivimos. Todo esto, an sin saber cmo se produca el pensamientos
en el cerebro, quedaba entretejido como manifestacin de un nico yo.
Pero el yo tambin pas por manos del psicoanlisis freudiano, como sede
de la actividad individual, llegando a la descomposicin de sus primeros tpicos:
el consciente, el inconsciente y el subconsciente. En 1920 Freud llev al yo a
ser parte de instancias psquicas que, junto con el ello y el super-yo, forma-
ran el sistema adaptativo del individuo, que entonces pas a llamarse el ego.
Con Jung el yo es el punto focal de la conciencia. Es el portador de nues-
tra conciencia de existir, as como del sentimiento permanente de identidad per-
sonal. Es el organizador consciente de nuestros pensamientos e intuiciones, de
nuestros sentimientos y sensaciones. Es el portador de la personalidad, pero no
es la personalidad misma. El yo surge del s-mismo, y desempea papeles
de crucial importancia. Percibe significados y evala valores, actividades que
favorecen la supervivencia y hacen que la vida valga la pena vivirse y encontrarle
sentido. De esa manera se alcanza el principio de individuacin personal.

3.1. Eccles, Popper, Singer, Llins

Pero es con Sir John Eccles y Karl Popper donde por primera vez el yo se
contrapone al cerebro en el sentido dual y reflexivo de estar enfrente de. Es
el yo y su sede (el cerebro) como referencias platnicas / semi-cartesianas
que manifiestan su dualismo en los mundos de Popper. Ambos 22 aprueban
una postura interaccionista en la que el yo est identificado con la mente,
y sta se sita por encima de las condiciones materiales, interactuando con el
cerebro. Popper afirma la existencia de la causacin descendente (top down)

22
POPPER, K. - ECCLES, J., The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism, Berlin:
Springer Verlag, 1977.

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964 . CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES

defendida por R. W. Sperry en 1969 y por D. T. Campbell en 1974. De ese modo


se diferencia de la causalidad cartesiana, pues esta ltima es errnea por su con-
dicin de paralelismo y la popperiana es interactiva y jerrquica.
Popper utiliza en su argumentacin su teora de los tres mundos: el Mundo 1
de las entidades fsicas, el Mundo 2 de los fenmenos mentales, y el Mundo 3
de los productos de la mente humana. Afirma la realidad de los objetos del
Mundo 3, que tienen cierta existencia propia (las teoras cientficas entran
en este mbito). Tambin afirma la realidad de los fenmenos del Mundo 2
(estados de conciencia, experiencias subjetivas), y dice que no pueden redu-
cirse a objetos fsicos del Mundo 1. Y aade que esos tres Mundos interactan
mutuamente, lo cual confirmara la realidad de los objetos del Mundo 2 y del
Mundo 3.
Ahora bien, para Popper la funcin principal de la mente y del Mundo 3 (el
mundo de las ideas popperianas) es la de posibilitar la aplicacin del mtodo
de ensayo-error. De ese modo en la emergencia de la mente y del Mundo 3 la
seleccin natural se supera a s misma y a su carcter violento. Piensa que la
mente humana, el yo o la mente, lo peculiar del hombre que lo diferencia de
los dems animales, es un producto de esa evolucin puramente natural: ha
emergido en el curso de la evolucin, como resultado de los procesos naturales,
sin que exista ninguna causa fuera de la naturaleza. La existencia segn Pop-
per no permite verificar una teora; slo permite probarla, y en el mejor de
los casos ver sus errores. Esta asimetra lgica muestra que no es posible pro-
bar la verdad de un enunciado general a travs del mtodo emprico, mientras
que tan solo basta un nico caso contrario para mostrar la falibilidad de dicho
enunciado. Metafsicamente hablando Popper es un sustancialista evolucionis-
ta, donde la evolucin noolgica del Mundo 3 no conlleva la afirmacin de la
existencia de un ser trascendente, ya que evit plantear la pregunta ntica-
ontolgica (qu es la mente?, qu es el yo?, qu es la materia?).
Al tratar acerca del yo, Popper dice: aunque me opongo al esencialismo
con todo creo en algo que se podra denominar la naturaleza del yo cuasi-esen-
cial (o cuasi-sustancial) Sin embargo, pienso que somos procesos psicofsi-
cos ms bien que sustancias (p. 119).
John Eccles est de acuerdo con la teora de Popper sobre los tres Mundos,
y la utiliza. Tambin coinciden ambos en el interaccionismo y lo apoya, supo-
niendo que el yo acta sobre el cerebro; concretamente, sobre los mdulos
abiertos. Estos son agrupaciones de neuronas ubicadas en el hemisferio domi-
nante pero relacionadas con las dems estructuras cerebrales, cada una de las
cuales operara como una unidad de radio transmisora y receptora: la mente
recogera, interpretara, seleccionara e integrara las seales emitidas por el
cerebro, y a su vez la mente actuara directamente sobre esos mdulos y, a tra-
vs de ellos, sobre los dems. Esos mdulos seran el puente que comunicara,
en ambos sentidos, el Mundo 1 (cerebro) y el Mundo 2 (conciencia).
Eccles apoya la hiptesis interaccionista, contrastable por datos cientficos
que aporta analizando casos clnicos. Afirm la unidad de las experiencias del

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. CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES 965

yo consciente, o la capacitacin de integrar en una imagen coherente los dis-


persos acontecimientos neuronales. De hecho no se alej en su momento de las
actuales argumentaciones a favor de los correlatos neuronales de la conciencia,
aportados por Susan Greenfield, en que las neuronas distribudas por todo el
cerebro trabajan de forma sincrnica y prevalecen hasta un segundo estmulo
que hace surgir una segunda coalicin. Estas asambleas se conjugan y se disuel-
ven continuamente. Tan solo se diferencian en que Greenfield afirma que la con-
ciencia se genera por un incremento cuantitativo en la actividad holstica del
cerebro, es decir, la clave est en el proceso mismo. Eccles se qued en el mode-
lo interaccionista popperiano argumentado por el desfase temporal entre los
acontecimientos nerviosos y la experiencia consciente. Este desfase justific su
rechazo del fisicalismo.
Desde que Wolf Singer 23 demostrase que una poblacin ingente de neuronas
alojadas en el tlamo y la corteza cerebral destelleaban al unsono, de forma
transitoria, a una frecuencia de 40 veces por segundo, los procesos de actividad
consciente se estudiarn en dos vas: la descendente o top down ya conside-
rada por Eccles, y la ascendente talmico-cortical o bottom up. Pero el pro-
ceso de conciencia debera ofrecer un requisito adicional que ni Eccles ni Sin-
ger podan obtener con sus ensayos in vitro. Y menos an nos pueden ofrecer
explicacin alguna de la posibilidad de estados de conciencia que permitan al
indivduo experimentar el qualia del yo.
Rodolfo Llins 24, del Hospital de la Universidad de Nueva York, ha propuesto
en fecha reciente que las rfagas coordinadas y transitorias (estudiadas por Sin-
ger, y actualmente por Greenfield) establecen dos bucles complemetarios entre
el tlamo y la corteza cerebral que operan en conjunto para mantener la con-
ciencia: un sistema especfico asociado al contenido de la conciencia y un sis-
tema inespecfico asociado al despertar y la alerta de la conciencia. Esa des-
cripcin explicara por qu la enrgica llegada de las seales de un despertador,
por ejemplo, desencadenan la conciencia plena. As lo distingue de la concien-
cia onrica donde en los sueos no existe una entrada sensorial que alimente el
bucle del despertar, por lo que funciona solamente en el bucle de contenidos
registrados en la mente.
El problema de Llins es que no alcanza a describir de qu modo logra el
cerebro acomodarse al flujo y reflujo de un estado de conciencia continuamen-
te variable. En el problema del yo se constata tanto en la lucidez del desper-
tar como en el sueo lcido donde uno se identifica conscientemente en su pro-
pio sueo. Lo que llamamos yo o autoconciencia es una de tantas danzas
neuronales o estados funcionales del cerebro, afirma Llins. Slo existe un
mundo, a diferencia de Popper y Eccles, y el ser humano no es que tenga un
cerebro, sino que es el propio cerebro. Somos mquinas de soar.

23
SINGER, W., Synchronization of cortical activity and its putative role in information pro-
cessing and learning: Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 1993, pp. 349-375.
24
LLINS, R., El cerebro y el mito del yo, Belacqua de Ediciones, Barcelona, 2003.

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966 . CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES

3.2. Jean Pierre Changeux y Paul Ricoeur

En cambio, el dilogo que plantean Jean-Pierre Changeux y Paul Ricoeur, en


La naturaleza y la norma. Lo que nos hace pensar 25, al respecto del cuerpo y el
espritu, nos lleva a la siguiente cuestin: cmo un hombre neuronal (concor-
dando con la idea de Llins de que somos cerebro) puede ser un sujeto espiri-
tual o mstico? Segn Ricoeur, la tica de la vida nos lleva a vivir una plenitud
de vida. Los valores vitales influyen en el sujeto como normativas de vida, y por
lo tanto se crean relaciones entre la norma y la naturaleza.
Pienso que de este modo se generan dos condiciones: una, la creacin de una
moral o una tica, que me gusta recordar tal como hace Novalis denominn-
dola: un rgano moral (gimut). La otra condicin es la psicologa de una posi-
ble evolucin del hombre, de la que hablar ms adelante.
Tanto Ricoeur como Changeux, estn de acuerdo en que existen dos tipos de
discursos. Un discurso anatmico o morfolgico sobre el cerebro, su organiza-
cin microscpica, neuronal y sinptica (lo que llama Ricoeur el cuerpo-obje-
to). Y un discurso de las conductas, pensamientos y acciones sobre el medio
(lo que llama Ricoeur cuerpo-sujeto o cuerpo-propio). Dichos discursos
coinciden con lo que deca Llins entre el sistema inespecfico de los corre-
latos neuronales de la experiencia del aqu y ahora y el sistema especfico
de los contenidos de la conciencia.
Changeux comenta por ello que ningn neurobilogo confunde la descripcin
anatmico-fisiolgica con la experiencia vivida por el individuo; diciendo cosas
del estilo de el lenguaje es la regin frontal posterior de la corteza cerebral. Ms
bien se dir que contribuye, moviliza, activa. Las interacciones hacen inter-
venir un conjunto de procesos que no quedan incluidos en ninguno de los dis-
cursos: se trata de actividades dinmicas transitorias electroqumicas que circu-
lan por la red neuronal, y que constituyen el nexo interno de la organizacin
anatmico-funcional. Es posible que los correlatos neuronales necesiten tanto una
semntica como una ontologa que converjan en una experiencia epistmicamente
descriptible.
En un momento del discurso, Ricoeur comenta de forma concreta que mi
cerebro no piensa, pero mientras que yo pienso, ocurre alguna cosa en mi cere-
bro. Hasta cuando pienso en Dios! 26. Ricoeur critica el abuso de los cientfi-
cos al tolerar ciertas expresiones semnticas; por ejemplo, cuando se habla de
que el cerebro est ocupado o implicado, o que es responsable de. Apela
por ello a una crtica semntica que evite, de ese modo tesis eliminativas como
las de Patricia y Paul Churchland, incluso para quienes profesan de una onto-
loga monista materialista 27.
Tambin Ricoeur seal que, en una relacin interdisciplinar entre las cien-
cias que tienen referentes distintos es donde aparece la correspondencia con el

25
CHANGEUX, J. P. - RICOEUR, P., La naturaleza y la norma. Lo que nos hace pensar, Fondo
de Cultura Econmica, Mxico, 2001.
26
CHANGEUX, J. P. - RICOEUR, P., op. cit., p. 46.
27
CHANGEUX, J. P. - RICOEUR, P., op. cit., p. 52.

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enfoque neurobiolgico y no en el interior de las disciplinas aisladamente. Chan-


gueux se esfuerza en modelizar estas tareas cognitivas interdisciplinares. Esto
es lo que, juntamente con Stanislas Dehaene, ha estado haciendo sobre la arqui-
tectura jerrquica neuronal y su actividad espontnea.
Ricoeur pretenda atraer a Changeux a un intercambio transdisciplinar sobre
la complejidad y la modelizacin jerrquica de la neurobiologa. Por su parte
Changeux define el concepto de objeto mental como el estado fsico del cere-
bro que moviliza las neuronas reclutadas entre mltiples reas o dominios para-
lelos, pertenecientes a uno o varios niveles de organizacin jerrquicos inter-
conectados de forma recproca (o como dira G. Edelman, re-entrante) 28. La
actividad de una poblacin o asamblea de neuronas queda topolgicamente
definida como objeto mental y, ste segn Changeux detenta el sentido.
Tal como dira Wittgenstein, el sentido est en la comprehensin. Y la palabra
comprender viene del latn cum prehendere, tomar con 29. Y eso es lo que
pasa en ese concepto hbrido de objeto mental, toda una constelacin de
reas cerebrales se encuentran tomadas simultneamente cuando hay com-
prehensin. Y aqu radica, tanto la capacidad de aprehensin de la realidad
vivida en primera persona, como en el intercambio de comprensin o inter-
comprehensin que para Changueux es una de las operaciones fundamenta-
les del avance normativo y tico, y que para Ricoeur, no slo se basa en un claro
objeto mental, sino tambien en un desarrollo semntico que clarifique y que
ofrezca una experiencia de mejor comprensin, yendo ms all de los lmites
del cerebro.
Se ha de acentuar tambin que tanto Ricoeur como Changeux estn de acuer-
do en la naturaleza proyectiva del cerebro en su actividad, pues no slo vive de
la estimulacin de los rganos sensitivos, sino tambin de las actividades in-
ternas.
Mi pregunta est en lo que sucede en el cerebro cuando hay suspensin de
los sentidos. No tan slo en casos de lesin, sino en experiencias en cmaras de
aislamiento, o en estados profundos de meditacin, de oracin, o en estados
superiores de consciencia. Cules son los objetos mentales que pueden regis-
trarse en determinadas condiciones extraordinarias y qu actividad cerebral se
obtiene en los sujetos en estos estados?

4. NEUROBIOLOGA DE LAS EXPERIENCIAS ESPIRITUALES EN EL SER HUMANO

Lo que pretendemos en el estudio de la fenomenologa espiritual es descri-


bir qu ocurre en ncleo de la persona que vive la experiencia mstica. Y habla-
mos de fenomenologa espiritual diferencindola de la fenomenologa religiosa
de la creencia. Veamos porqu.

28
EDELMAN, G., Biologie de la conscience, Editions Odile Jacob, Paris, 1992.
29
CHANGEUX, J. P. - RICOEUR, P., op. cit., p. 112.

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968 . CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES

4.1. Sam Harris

Un nuevo estudio dirigido por Sam Harris 30, de la University of California de


Los ngeles, detect que las reas asociadas a las creencias, el escepticismo, la
incredulidad y la incerteza, activan diferentes regiones del cerebro que estn tam-
bin asociadas con el agrado o desagrado en los sentidos del gusto y del olfato.
Los catorce partcipes del experimento dieron respuesta escrita sobre lo creble
(verdadero), lo no creble (falso) y lo indecidible (incerteza), con independncia de
la afeccin emocional de su contenido significativo, bien fueran preguntas ticas,
matemticas, autobiogrficas, geogrficas o religiosas.
Harris y colegas trataron las imgenes a travs de resonancia magntica fun-
cional (el fMRI), al mismo tiempo que analizaron las declaraciones por escrito.
Los resultados fueron que los estados de creencia, escepticismo, e incertidum-
bre activaron diferencialmente regiones distintas del Cortex Prefrontal Ventro-
medial (VMPFC) parietal, as como de los ganglios basales.
El VMPFC recibe las conexiones recprocas fuertes del sistema lmbico, de
los ganglios basales, y de la asociacin del cortex con el lbulo parietal. Esta
regin de los lbulos fronterizos parece ser instrumental, uniendo el conoci-
miento con las asociaciones emocionales pertinentes, modulando la conducta
en la contestacin a las contingencias del premio, y en la seleccin de la accin
basada en el resultado. El VMPFC tambin se activa razonando tareas que incor-
poran una saliencia emocional elevada.
Aadira personalmente y es una conjetura a discutir que debera exis-
tir tambin una actividad en el nucleus accumbens, relacionado con las emo-
ciones positivas, la recompensa y la dependencia, y que se activa en momentos
de humor y de diversin (Vinod Goel y Raymond J. Dolan) 31.
La interpretacin de Harris sobre el experimento es que creencia y escepti-
cismo difieren de la incertidumbre. El mecanismo que subyace a esta diferencia
parece involucrar positivamente al cortex cingulado anterior (CAC) y el cauda-
to. Aunque muchas reas de cognicin superior estn probablemente implica-
das en evaluar el valor de verdad de las proposiciones lingsticas, la ltima acep-
tacin de una declaracin como verdadero, o su rechazo como falso, parece
depender ms de las partes ms primitivas del cerebro, asociadas con el sen-
tido del gusto, del olfato, del dolor, incluso del asco. Se detecta el procesado de
placer en el cortex prefrontal medio y la nsula anterior. La verdad puede ser bella
(bella es la verdad), en ms de un sentido metafrico, y las proposiciones falsas
pueden disgustarnos y asquearnos literalmente. Esto tendra consecuencias evi-

30
HARRIS, SAM - SHETH, SAMEER A. - COHEN, MARK S., Functional Neuroimaging of Belief,
Disbelief, and Uncertainty, American Neurological Association, 2007 Dec., pp. 141-147.
31
GOEL, VINOD - DOLAN, RAYMOND J., Social regulation of affective experience of humor,
J. Cogn. Neurosci., 2007 Sep., 19 (9): 1574-80. Para revisar otros artculos asociados con las
creencias, ver los mismos autores: GOEL, VINOD - DOLAN, RAYMOND J., Explaining modulation
of reasoning by belief, Cognition, 2003 Feb., 87; GOEL, VINOD - DOLAN, RAYMOND J., Recipro-
cal neural response within lateral and ventral medial prefrontal cortex during hot and cold
reasoning, Neuroimage, 2003 Dec., 20 (4).

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dentes para la deteccin del engao, y para el control del efecto placebo, vg. en
el estudio de drogas. Pero, sobretodo, para entender que una creencia es un jui-
cio de valor que no se distingue de un juicio de razonamiento lgico.
Pero esto no supone una conversin, un cambio en el yo, aunque nos es
til para acercarnos ms a la epistemologa cognitiva. No nos ofrece una des-
cripcin de una experiencia numinosa, en tanto que experiencia. Sin embargo,
nos podr ser til para detectar juicios apodcticos. Es algo que averiguare-
mos pronto. Pero, sobretodo nos sirve para detectar la intolerancia en la con-
ducta. Pone de manifiesto el gran desvo que han sufrido muchas religiones al
no apoyar la experiencia numinosa, al entenderla tambin como una experien-
cia de Fe (stricto sensu).
Harris expone en su libro The End of Faith 32 que las instituciones religiosas
han preferido ir ms por el camino de una aglutinacin de fieles devotos y cre-
yentes en dogmas que de experimentadores de experiencias espirituales numi-
nosas. La tesis es que bsicamente no se respetan las creencias de los dems; lo
que realmente convence o no son los motivos que se aportan para las creencias;
o sea, las argumentaciones y sus pruebas. Es una postura de la doxa y de la
episteme que no lleva a la fronesis. Lo nico que no comparto con Harris
es la mezcolanza entre la palabra fe y la palabra creencia, y que no com-
prende de forma significativa sus diferencias. Aunque si comparto que uno pueda
ser ateo y tambin ser espiritual notica y ticamente.

4.2. Robert M. Gimello

El estudio neurobiolgico de los procesos espirituales del ser humano a fina-


les de siglo XX marc un antes y un despus en el inters por las experiencias
numinosas. Para concretar los estudios neurobiolgicos de las experiencias ms-
ticas vamos a guiarnos en primer lugar por una clasificacin de las experien-
cias msticas propuesta por el profesor Robert M. Gimello de la Harvard Uni-
versity.
1. La sensacin de Unidad y consecuente disolucin o prdida del ego.
2. La prdida del sentido del tiempo y del espacio.
3. La sensacin de contacto con lo Sagrado o lo Numinoso, como aque-
llo con lo que conecta el mstico y se presenta como factor esencial per-
sistente en el mundo religioso.
4. La sensacin de objetividad y de realidad profunda. El mstico fiable no
es el psictico que ha perdido contacto con la realidad. Al contrario, est
dotado de un fuerte sentido de lo comn que le permite ser testimonio
de la realidad ms profunda tanto como de la realidad ms concreta y
aparente. No por el hecho de tener el sndrome de Gastaut-Geschwind,
o personalidad del lbulo temporal, se es ms espiritual. Ser propen-

32
HARRIS, S., The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason, W. W. Norton,
New York, 2004.

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970 . CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES

so a esta hiperactividad de sensaciones de fervor religioso conlleva tanto


bipolaridad psicolgica como epilepsia, y viceversa. Estas alteraciones
no favorecen la objetividad realista.
5. La cualidad notica, o sensacin de la intuicin de verdades profundas
al margen del intelecto discursivo. Es una sensacin realista de inme-
diatez radical que va unida a la experiencia mstica. As ha sido vivida por
msticos como Ignacio de Loyola, Bernardo de Claraval, Al-Gazzali, Ovi-
dio, Rumi, Ibn Arabi, etc.
6. La superacin del dualismo y de las contradicciones. Va ms all del
principio de contradiccin y del tercio excluso, llegando a la lgica trans-
cendental de Hegel, o a la comprensin de la Tercera Fuerza de Gurd-
jieff, o a la coincidentia oppositorum de Nicols de Cusa.
7. La prdida del sentido de la causalidad.
8. Inefabilidad.
9. La sensacin de profunda paz y alegra. Inmensa felicidad, coherencia
y una armona interna imperturbable. Lo acompaa un peak expe-
rience. Pero lo que importa sobretodo es la perdurabilidad de un esta-
do de conciencia superior a lo comnmente vivido. Y es comn a todas
las religiones perennes.
10. La percepcin de Luz o Fuego. Es la experiencia literal de la ilumina-
cin. Lo describi Hildergard von Bingen, Teresa de Jess, Jacob Bhme,
Jacopone da Todi, etc.
11. Transitoriedad.
12. Cambio positivo de conducta. Es un criterio fundamental. Todas las
grandes huellas de vida religiosa profunda llevan a los sujetos que los
experimentan a un mundo interno ms maduro y una mejora de cali-
dad en el mundo emocional.

Esta clasificacin nos permitir comprender la diferencia entre las descrip-


ciones de la mstica y de las creencias en la neurobiologa de las experiencias
numinosas.

5. EL GEN DE DIOS DE DEAN HAMER

El profesor Dean Hamer es director de la Unidad de Regulacin de la estruc-


tura gentica en el National Cancer Institute de Bethseda. Segn Hamer 33, la
espiritualidad responde a un mecanismo biolgico, comparable al mecanismo
que rige el canto de los pjaros, aunque ms complejo. Existe una predisposi-
cin gentica a la autotranscendencia, a travs de una protena llamada VMAT2,
que est involucrada en la rotura, a travs del MAO (monoamino oxidasa: enzi-

33
HAMER, D., The God Gene: How Faith is Hardwired into our Genes, Doubleday, New
York, 2004.

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ma que rompe las monoaminas despus de su liberacin sinptica) y en el trans-


porte de monoaminas vesiculares. stas son neurotransmisores que contribu-
yen a la sensibilidad emocional. De esta manera influye en las capacidades cog-
nitivas con diversos tipos de tipos de conciencia que constituyen la base de las
experiencias espirituales. Segn Hamer la VMAT2 est relacionada, primero,
con el olvido se si mismo y por tanto de la transcendencia del espacio-tiempo;
segundo, con la identificacin transpersonal y tercero con el misticismo o el sen-
tido de lo sagrado y la captacin de realidades inefables.
Algunos telogos como John Polkinghome, rechazan la tesis de Hamer alu-
diendo un reduccionismo gentico darwinista que va en contra de mis con-
vicciones teolgicas personales segn testimoni pblicamente. Pienso que
Polkinghome cae en la trampa de la que habla Harris. Puesto que ha de ser el
mtodo cientfico el que ofrezca respuesta interpretativa a la actividad cerebral
que permite las experiencias msticas.
Hamer tambin alude a la experiencia personal y al influjo cultural para la
experiencia mstica. Esto lo corrobora un estudio del McGovern Institute for
Brain Research del Massachussets Institute of Technology (MIT) que han reali-
zado un equipo de investigadores de la Stony Brook University de NY, del MIT
y de la Standford University de California 34. En pocas palabras, el nivel de iden-
tificacin que tenemos con la cultura que hemos vivido no slo condiciona nues-
tros pensamientos, sino que tambin rige los patrones de actividad neuronal.
Los experimentos realizados con personas de mbitos culturales opuestos (occi-
dental americano versus extremo oriental) han determinado que la construc-
cin social de la realidad que compartimos de forma memtica (injertada y ajena
a nuestra realidad) a lo largo de nuestra vida confiere la actividad de nuestro
cerebro. Los occidentales, por ejemplo no estamos tan acostumbrados a las acti-
vidades interdependientes como los orientales, y los orientales no tienen tan
desarrollado su capacidad de actuar autnomamente, con independencia y liber-
tad. La exploracin realizada a travs de fRMI en sujetos experimentados con
tareas visuoespaciales 35 registr actividad en las regiones frontal y parietal del
cerebro, zonas directamente asociadas al control de la atencin. Dicha activi-
dad era mayor durante la emisin de juicios no-preferidos culturalmente que
durante la emisin de juicios preferidos culturalmente. Llegndose a la con-
clusin de que cuanto ms identificado est uno con su recorte psicolgico del
inconsciente colectivo, mayor es la dificultad de salirse de dicho recorte. Es un

34
HEDDEN, TREY - KETAY, SARA - ARON, ARTHUR - MARKUS, HAZEL ROSE - GABRIELI, JOHN D. E.,
Cultural Influences on Neural Substrates of Attentional Control, Psychological Science, 19
(1), 2008 Jan., pp. 12-17.
35
Las imgenes presentadas consistan en diagramas consecutivos en los que haba una
lnea vertical dentro de una caja. A los participantes se les mostr una serie de estos dibujos
para que emitieran su juicio de percepcin en funcin de dos reglas: una de ellas les exiga
ignorar el contexto y definir la longitud de la lnea sin tener en cuenta el tamao de los cua-
drados (juicio absoluto). La otra regla consista en tener en cuenta el contexto, y comparar las
proporciones de las lneas con los cuadrados en los que estaban (juicio relativo) (ver:
www.tendencias21.net/La-cultura-rige-tambien-la-actividad-del-cerebro_a2035.html).

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972 . CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES

fenmeno que viene asociado a la supervivencia, en cuanto que la cultura pro-


pia, en el medio inmediato que le envuelve, lo identifica como persona y le per-
mite reforzarse para sobrevivir en un medio hostil.
Pero, como seala Francisco J. Rubia, de la Universidad Complutense de
Madrid, si la cultura es un subproducto del cerebro, y estamos de acuerdo en
que el cerebro est hecho para la supervivencia, y si el cerebro genera un yo
social para sobrevivir, entonces, cmo sobrevive el individuo si lo despojas de
este yo?

6. LOS OPERADORES COGNITIVOS DE ANDREW NEWBERG Y EUGENE DAQUILI 36

En su libro Why God wont go away. Brain Sciene and Biology of Belief 37, New-
berg y DAquili, de la Universidad de Pennsylvania, sealaban en primer lugar
una zona cerebral (seccin posterior del lbulo parietal) a la que nombran rea
de Orientacin y Asociacin (OAA), fundamental en la orientacin fsica del
espacio, en la consideracin de ngulos y distancias; siendo de suma impor-
tancia en su desarrollo para los pilotos de aviones y aeroplanos.
Qu ocurre si el OAA no recibe informacin para activarse? Si no hay infor-
macin que fluya a travs de los sentidos, el rea de Orientacin y Asociacin
no es capaz de encontrar fronteras. Entonces, dnde se encuentra el lmite fsi-
co del Self y del mundo exterior? No existe. En ese caso el cerebro no tiene otra
opcin que percibir que el yo es interminable e ntimamente ligado a todo de
forma inevitable.

6.1. Localizaciones neurales

Es cierto que pueden existir lesiones en el OAA que provoquen esta expe-
riencia. Pero, qu ocurre cuando es una experiencia autoinducida por uno
mismo a travs de un serio trabajo de largos aos de meditacin? O quiz pro-
venientes de muchas horas de oracin, como aparecera en los datos del estu-
dio realizado por Newberg y DAquili. Estas experiencias seran las que podr-
an llamarse de identificacin transpersonal, segn la escala de Hamer.
Newberg y DAquili consideran que existen cuatro reas de asociacin
que manifiestan un protagonismo especial en las experiencias religiosas pro-
fundas:
rea de Asociacin Visual.
rea de Orientacin y Asociacin.

36
He de dar las gracias al libro de RAMN MARIA NOGUS, Deus, creences i neurones. Un
acostament cientfic a la religi, Fragmenta Editorial, Barcelona, 2007, por lo clarificador de
sus notas respecto a ambos autores citados.
37
NEWBERG, ANDREW M. - DAQUILLI, EUGENE G., Why God wont go away. Brain Sciene and
Biology of Belief, Ballantine Books, Nova York, 2001.

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. CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES 973

rea de Atencin y Asociacin.


rea Verbal-Conceptual de Asociacin, o TPO junction porque se sita
en el punto de contacto de los lbulos Temporal, Parietal y Occipital.

De hecho, el lbulo temporal merece mucha atencin en estudios de estados


mentales singulares relacionados con la mstica y los estados alterados de la
conciencia (ASC). Tal como lo plante Michael Persinger 38, la amgdala y el hipo-
campo estn asociados con el sentido del yo en relacin con el espacio-tiem-
po y sus lmites, de acuerdo con su memoria y sus afecciones primarias. Per-
singer tambin postula la existencia en el lbulo temporal de patrones de descarga
transitorios de las clulas nerviosas que provocan el fenmeno de kindling.
Tambin postula que la inestabilidad de esta excitacin puede provocar expe-
riencias alucinatorias, como la impresin de estar fuera del cuerpo o sensacio-
nes vestibulares, o auditivas (la escucha de Dios, o la hiptesis del genio malig-
no de Descartes), sea el paciente creyente o agnstico. Sus interpretaciones
vendrn configuradas por el contexto cultural en que est envuelto el individuo
o paciente en que esto sucede.
Tambin Newberg y DAquili llegan a decir que la mente es mstica por defec-
to en el sentido de que se obtienen experiencias religiosas combinando el sis-
tema vegetativo, el lmbico y las funciones analticas del cerebro. El sistema
vegetativo combina la accin vegetativa-sinptica (fundamentalmente desvela-
dora) con la parasimptica (relajadora o quiescente). Eso ofrece estados de
hiperquiescencia o quietud, hiperdespertar; o gran activacin hiperquies-
cente con irrupcin de despertar; o hiperdespertar con irrupcin de quies-
cencia. Y todo esto se complementa con los estados emocionales dependientes
del sistema lmbico (concretamente con la amgdala e hipocampo) muy rela-
cionados con la memoria.

6.2. Operadores cognitivos y experiencia religiosa

Tambin ha hecho referencia a que existen estructuras neurales que, actuan-


do simultneamente proceden como algoritmos para ordenar la percepcin de
la realidad y se activan especialmente en la generacin de experiencias msti-
cas. Se denominan operadores cognitivos y son las siguientes:
1. Operador holstico: permite ver el mundo como una totalidad. Es posi-
ble que esta capacidad mental nazca de la actividad parietal del hemis-
ferio derecho. Un ejemplo sera ver el reloj de agujas.
2. Operador reduccionista: Responde primariamente a la actividad del hemis-
ferio izquierdo. Representa la anttesis de la funcin holstica. Permite
dividir el conjunto en partes. Representa la capacidad analtica. Un ejem-
plo sera ver las agujas del reloj.

38
PERSINGER, M. A., Religious and mystical experiences as artifacts of temporal lobe
function: A general hypothesis, Perceptual and Motor Skills, 57, pp. 1255-1262, 1983.

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974 . CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES

3. Operador abstractor: Es el taxonomista mental. Probablemente activado


desde el lbulo parietal del hemisferio izquierdo. Permite la formacin
de conceptos a partir de la observacin de las partes individualizadas.
La abstraccin para formar conceptos es la base de la generacin de la
cultura de las ideas.
4. Operador cuantitativo: Es la mente calculadora. Cuantifica el mundo real
y tambin calcula los elementos de supervivencia (distancias, nmero de
elementos, etc.).
5. Operador binario: Esto contra aquello. Capacidad de organizar el mundo
fsico y sus relaciones. Facultad de elaboracin de opiniones y similitu-
des entre las piezas de la realidad. Est relacionado con la parte inferior
del lbulo parietal, ya que las lesiones en dicha zona impiden realizar
estas funciones.
6. Operador existencial: Funcin de la mente que ofrece la sensacin de vivir,
de existir o de realidad a travs de la informacin procesada por el cere-
bro. Nos informa de que lo percibido es real. Probablemente relaciona-
do con el sistema lmbico, que nos capacita para asumir emocionalmente
la realidad.
7. Operador de valor emocional: El sentimiento consecuente. Asigna los valo-
res emocionales a cada elemento de la percepcin y del conocimiento.
Este operador preside tambin nuestro mundo intencional.

La actuacin de todos estos operadores genera lo que denominan impera-


tivos cognitivos. En stos se encuentran los significados de los mitos y la sim-
blica metafsica tan importantes para todas las culturas. Son bsicos para la
interpretacin de la realidad y los problemas metafsicos de sentido que esta
realidad suscita. De esta manera minimizamos la ansiedad que genera nuestra
existencia y la convivencia en un mundo incgnito.
Los mitos, traducidos en doctrinas y prcticas rituales, constituyen arqui-
tecturas mentales imprescindibles sin las cuales no es posible vivir para la mayo-
ra de los humanos. Este fundamento es el que permite que la creacin del mito
o mito-cultura sea un producto de la mente humana orientada al propsito de
la supervivencia del individuo y del colectivo humano.
La congruencia entre el mito y la supervivencia del yo se fundamenta en
la estructura de la actividad cerebral. Los operadores causal y binario son los
que intervienen en el origen de la interpretacin de los orgenes de los fenme-
nos, de las responsabilidades y en la delimitacin de los contrarios, cosa que
permite poner orden en la ambigedad de muchos datos de la realidad. Para
que sobreviva la experiencia cognitiva que produce el mito ha de sobrevivir tam-
bin la transmisin por va cultural; y esto se hace en forma narrativa, repre-
sentacional (generador del mundo simblico) y vivencial (el rito y la normativa
socio-cultural). Los lbulos frontales seran entonces los que capacitaran a los
humanos para la creacin de una realidad simblica que sustentara el equili-
brio de la mente y de la conducta adaptativa al medio.

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Newberg y DAquili 39, descubrieron que, cuando se alcanza un estado de medi-


tacin profunda, las regiones del cerebro que regulan la construccin de la pro-
pia identidad se desactivan. De este modo el practicante de meditacin pierde
el sentido del propio yo individual, producindose un estado de paradoxicali-
dad: no existen lmites entre l mismo y todo lo dems; supera las dualidades
y se integra en una totalidad nica transcendente.
Eso se traduce en una cada de la actividad del rea de orientacin del lbu-
lo parietal (que procesa toda la informacin sobre el espacio y la ubicacin del
cuerpo fsico en l) y en un aumento de la actividad de la regin prefrontal dor-
solateral de manera inusual. Las imgenes fueron obtenidas a travs de tomo-
grafa computerizada por emisin de un solo fotn (SPECT).
Ser entonces que son estos lbulos los que capacitan la experiencia y el
concepto de yo? Existe diferencias en las pruebas neurofisiolgicas respec-
to el ego? Es posible que se registre la vacuidad del yo y del ego de una
forma clara y distinta?

7. LOS RECUERDOS MSTICOS SEGN MARIO BEAUREGARD Y VINCENT PAQUETTE

7.1. Experiencia mstica y correlatos neuronales

El objetivo principal del estudio realizado por Mario Beauregard y Vincent


Paquette de la University of Montreal est en determinar los correlatos neu-
ronales de las experiencias msticas a travs de la tcnica de fMRI. Este estu-
di se realiz con un total de 15 monjas carmelitas de entre 23 y 64 aos de
edad con una media de algo ms de 19 aos de vida religiosa (entre 2 y 37
aos) 40.
El resultado del nivel de oxgeno en sangre en la persona (BOLD) seala cam-
bios experimentales durante una condicin Mstica, una condicin de Control,
y una condicin Bsica. En la condicin Mstica, se les haba pedido recordar
y volver a vivir (con los ojos cerrados) la experiencia mstica ms intensa vivi-
da alguna vez en sus aos en la Orden Carmelita. Se adopt esta estrategia dado
que las monjas dijeron antes del comienzo del estudio que Dios no puede ser
convocado a voluntad. En esta condicin, las monjas tenan instrucciones de
recordar y volver a vivir (tambin con los ojos cerrados) el estado de unin ms
intenso con otro humano en sus aos de vida religiosa.
Durante el experimento, se recogieron imgenes por resonancia magntica
de cortes transversales del cerebro cada tres segundos, y del cerebro completo
cada dos minutos. Una vez registrada la actividad cerebral, Mario Beauregard
y Vincent Paquette compararon los patrones de activacin en las distintas situa-

39
NEWBERG, ANDREW M. - DAQUILLI EUGENE G., The Mystical Mind, Fortress Press, Min-
neapolis, 1999.
40
BEAUREGARD, MARIO - PAQUETTE, VICENT, Neural Correlates of a Mystical Experience in
Carmelite Nuns, Neuroscience Letters, 405 (2006) 186-190.

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ciones (el recuerdo social y el mstico), descubriendo las reas del cerebro que
se activaban con ms fuerza durante la experiencia mstica.
De este modo descubrieron que en el recuerdo de la Unio Mystica coope-
raban la corteza orbitofrontal central, el lado derecho de la corteza temporal
media, los lbulos parietales inferior y superior derechos, la corteza izquierda
prefrontal media o la corteza cingulada anterior izquierda, entre otras.
Es as como la memoria espiritual (que en este caso es memoria a largo plazo
de un peak experience) vigoriza varias regiones cerebrales en esos instantes,
como por ejemplo el ncleo caudado, que es la regin del centro del cerebro
relacionada con el aprendizaje, la memoria o el enamoramiento. Otras zonas
activadas son la corteza insular o nsula, relacionada con las emociones y sen-
timientos (posible conectiva con el amor incondicional), y el lbulo parietal dere-
cho (relacionado con la OAA y la sensacin de ilimitacin del self, explicado
anteriormente por Newberg y DAquilli). Para la experiencia de aniquilacin
del ego, para la alteracin corporal y para la sensacin unitaria del s mismo
con el mundo (o unidad indiferenciada).
Asegura Beauregard que los estados msticos se producen gracias a una com-
pleja red neuronal distribuida por todo el cerebro. No obstante, ambos cientfi-
cos siempre han dejado claro que no es lo mismo el recuerdo de una experien-
cia mstica que la experiencia en tiempo real. De hecho, de todos los ensayos
con monjas de la orden Carmelita tan slo se han recogido 15 de los 32 items o
niveles de experiencias msticas segn la valoracin o clasificacin aportada por
Ralph W. Hood 41. Esto ha sido deliberado ya que la estrategia del experimento
era en parte ver la diferencia entre un estado mstico real y un estado recorda-
do. Pero como decan las monjas al inicio de las pruebas: la experiencia de Dios
no es sobrevenida a nuestra voluntad.
Es cierto entonces que el papel de la memoria asociativa est relacionado
con los recuerdos emocionales. Tanto el miedo y como la felicidad son facto-
res imprescindibles para la excitacin emocional y la supervivencia; y en
ello juegan un papel fundamental los factores de recuerdo. La amgdala baso-
lateral es la parte del cerebro que se cree responsable de los recuerdos emo-
cionales, segn han determinado Mark Mayford, Leon G. Reijmers y colegas 42
de The Scripps Research Institute de La Jolla, California. Es interesante cono-
cer no slo la localizacin de los correlatos neuronales de la memoria aso-
ciativa, sino tambin saber que sin miedo no es posible sobrevivir, aunque
adolezcamos de felicidad. Ahora bien tambin es muy interesante darnos cuen-
ta de que la memoria de la felicidad vivida provoca nuevos niveles de recrea-
cin de la felicidad vivida en tiempo real (the remembered present de Edelman).
Y es un factor volitivo para el aprendizaje de la regulacin de la memoria
afectiva.

41
HOOD, RALPH W., Jr., The Construction and Preliminary Validation of a Measure of
Reported Mystical Experience, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 14: 29-41, 1975.
42
REIJMERS, L. G. - PERKINS, B. L. - MATSUO, N. - MAYFORD, M., Localization of a stable
neural correlate of associative memory, Science 317: 1230, 2007.

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Son las mismas neuronas activadas durante el aprendizaje las que se reac-
tivan durante recuerdo por la memoria? Utilizando el miedo condicionado en
ratones, un modelo de comportamiento de trastorno de estrs postraumtico,
constatamos que las mismas neuronas activadas durante el aprendizaje se reac-
tivaron cuando el animal temeroso record el evento. Tambin se utiliz este
enfoque en el estudio de la extincin; se trata de un proceso utilizado en el tra-
tamiento de las fobias cuando los recuerdos se debilitan por la exposicin repe-
tida a un estmulo relevante. Result que las neuronas antes activadas por el
estmulo miedo ya no se activaban tras la extincin. Este hallazgo sugiere, por
tanto, que la extincin borra o interfiere algunos componentes neurales de la
memoria original.
Ahora bien, quin es el que recuerda, el cerebro o el yo? Existe un yo
en el ratn que recuerda, asocia, olvida o aprende? Es el proceso de individua-
lizacin biolgica del ratn un reflejo de los procesos jerrquicos de individua-
lizacin fenotpicos hasta llegar a los procesos de individuacin 43 humanos?

7.2. Richard J. Davidson: meditacin y mapeado emocional

Para llegar a esa experiencia numinosa de s mismo, que los estoicos llama-
ron oikeiosis debemos antes de ello enfrentarnos con nuestros miedos.
Es importante el estudio realizado por David Dunning y Emily Balcetis de la
Cornell University de Ithaca, N.Y. En l han dado con la clave de que no todo lo
que tomamos como real es real 44. Los participantes de un examen de auto-pre-
diccin sobrestimaron la probabilidad de que las conductas deseables (los pre-
juicios) dependeran de consideraciones imparciales en sus predicciones. En
general se tom un auto-conocimiento modificado por auto-percepciones dis-
torsionadas, donde el prejuicio no dejaba ver la realidad tal cual era. Exista una
ceguera atencional que no permita tener una informacin completa de noso-
tros mismos. Era una informacin sesgada fruto de una manipulacin de la
informacin de nosotros mismos que no interesaba.
Los miedos reprimidos son factores que impiden percibir la realidad de uno
mismo. Philippe Goldin y James Gross, de la Universidad de Standford publi-
caron un artculo en la revista Biological Psychiatry, donde la estrategia de recon-
sideracin cognitiva (pensar sobre lo que est pasando) tendra un impacto tem-
prano en el proceso de generacin emocional; por otra parte, la represin
expresiva (evitar que se note lo que estamos sintiendo) sera una estrategia de
comportamiento cuyo impacto sera tardo, dentro del proceso de generacin

43
El proceso de individuacin se define desde la psicologa junguiana como un proceso
de transformacin del ego en el S-mismo, la naturaleza ntima del individuo. Es la oikeio-
sis. sta hace que el ser vivo se experimente o se perciba como perteneciente a s mismo y
que l tienda al desarrollo de su naturaleza peculiar.
44
EPLEY, N. - DUNNING, D., The mixed blessings of self-knowledge in behavioral predic-
tion: Enhanced discrimination but exacerbated bias, Personality and Social Psychology Bulle-
tin, 32, pp. 641-655, 2006.

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emocional 45. La represin emocional no llevara, pues, a la comprensin ni a la


transformacin de la emocin.
Por ello, desde 1992, Richard J. Davidson ha estado estudiando la imagine-
ra mental que ofrecen las emociones. Ha realizado varias pruebas en el E. M.
Keck Laboratory for Functional Brain Imaging and Behaviour, ubicado en el cam-
pus de Madison de la University of Wisconsin, sobre neurociencia afectiva y las
relaciones existentes entre el cerebro y las emociones. Sus trabajos han sido con-
siderados de alta importancia en el desarrollo de imgenes tomadas por RMNf
en experiencias positivas del cerebro en meditadores expertos de la tradicin
budista tibetana Vajrayana.
En los ltimos cuatro aos Richard Davidson ha ofrecido unos estudios muy
completos sobre la influencia de la meditacin en los trastornos afectivos y su
mapeado cerebral 46. En resumen, Davidson ha examinado a centenares de mon-
jes budistas tibetanos de dos tipos: un grupo de monjes que llevaban largo adies-
tramiento en la meditacin (entre 10.000 a 50.000 horas), entre 15 y 40 aos de
experiencia, y otro grupo constituido por estudiantes con pocas horas de medi-
tacin. Los hizo meditar en diferentes estadios: visualizacin, kyerim yidam lha
yi mig pa; concentracin en un punto, tse chik ting nge dzin; en estado de aper-
tura, rigpai chok shag; vacuidad, gang la yang jig pa med pai mig pa y compa-
sin, migme nyngye.
Se estudiaron diferentes aspectos de la actividad cerebral: Por ejemplo, la
inmutabilidad facial de registros de micro-emociones, comn en el resto de
los mortales, en estado de meditacin de concentracin en un punto 47. Las alte-
raciones o sobresaltos (por muy fugaces y enmascarados que sean) se activan
desde la amgdala y surgen registros oculares y faciales, a veces imperceptibles,

45
GOLDIN, PHILIPPE R. - MCRAEA, K. - RAMELA, W. - GROSS, JAMES J., The Neural Bases of
Emotion Regulation: Reappraisal and Suppression of Negative Emotion, Biological Psychiatry,
vol. 63, Issue 6, 15 March 2008, pp. 577-586.
46
LUTZ, A. - GREISCHAR, LL. - RAWLINGS NB, RICARD, M. - DAVIDSON, R. J., Long-term medi-
tators self-induce high-amplitude gamma synchrony during mental practice, Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, 101: 16369-73, 2004.
47
Para conocer ms con profundidad ver del neurlogo Paul Whalen: WHALEN, P. J. - SHIN,
L. M. - MCINERNEY, S. C. - FISCHER, H. - WRIGHT, C. I. - RAUCH, S. L., A functional MRI study of
human amygdala responses to facial expressions of fear vs. anger, Emotion, 2001, 1:70-83;
SOMERVILLE, L. H. - KIM, H. - JOHNSTONE, T. - ALEXANDER, A. - WHALEN, P. J., Human amygdala res-
ponse during presentation of happy and neutral faces: Correlations with state anxiety, Biolo-
gical Psychiatry, 2004, 55:897-903; WHALEN, P. J - KAGAN, J. - COOK, R. G. - DAVIS, F. C. - KIM, H. -
POLIS, S. - MCLAREN, D. G. - SOMERVILLE, L. H. - MCLEAN, A. A. - MAXWELL, J. S. - JOHNSTONE, T.,
Human amygdala responsivity to masked fearful eye whites, Science, 2004, 306:2061. Y tam-
bin Paul Eckman: BARTLETT, M. S. - HAGER, J. C. - EKMAN, P. - SEJNOWSKI, T. J., Measuring facial
expressions by computer image analysis, Psychophysiology, 36, 253-263, 1999; RUCH, W. - EKMAN,
P., The expressive pattern of laughter, in A. W. KASZNIAK (ed.), Emotion qualia, and cons-
ciousness, Word Scientific Publisher, Tokyo, 426-443, 2001; LEVENSON, R. W. - EKMAN, P., Dif-
ficulty does not account for emotion-specific heart rate changes in the directed facial action
task, Psychophysiology, 39 397-405, 2002; TSIAMYRTZIS, P. - DOWDALL, J. - SHASTRI, D. - PAVLIDIS, I.
T. - FRANK, M. G. - EKMAN, P., Imaging Facial Physiology for the Detection of Deceit, Interna-
tional Journal of Computer Vision, 71 (2), 197-214, 2005.

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pero registrables. En lamas muy duchos en meditacin result que sonidos que
nos alteran a todos, o sustos, no les perturban ni en sus micro-expresiones.
Otro ejemplo fue la capacidad de coherencia sincrnica registrada en los
cerebros de grandes meditadores. Dicha sincrona, registrada con cascos de 256
electrodos en la cabeza de los monjes, se contrast con la de noveles en medi-
tacin. Los datos registrados por la red de sensores en los monjes budistas fue-
ron impresionantes. La amplitud de las ondas gamma recogidas en algunos de
los monjes son las mayores de la historia registradas en un contexto no patol-
gico, entre 25 y 42 Hz. Muy por encima de los noveles que registraron una baja
sincrona con una actividad oscilatoria lenta (entre 4 y 13 Hz.). Esta alta ampli-
tud de frecuencia gamma, est asociada con la capacidad de prestar atencin y
aprendizaje. Se registraron bilateralmente sobre la regin parietotemporal y el
mediofrontal. Cuando los meditadores dispersaron el punto de atencin de su
concentracin hacia una meditacin sin objeto (llevndola a la compasin) se
gener en sus percepciones una experiencia de amor incondicional que no slo
ampli la sincrona en banda gamma como un fenmeno en red de asambleas
neurales, sino que reflej un aumento en la precisin temporal de las interac-
ciones talamocorticales y corticales. El estado de transicin no es inmediato y
requiere entre 5 y 15 s. De este modo qued reflejado un cambio de calidad de
instante en instante, de un alto estado de conciencia a otro.
Estos datos sugieren que el entrenamiento mental involucra mecanismos de
integracin temporal, y puede inducir a corto plazo y a largo plazo cambios neu-
ronales 48. Es lo que se ha llegado a observar por imgenes de resonancia mag-
ntica funcional (fRMI) para indicar que el cultivo de la compasin y de la bon-
dad se aprende del mismo modo que se aprende a tocar un instrumento musical
o dominar un deporte.
En otro experimento se escogi a 16 monjes tibetanos y practicantes laicos
con un curriculum de ms de 10.000 horas de prctica en meditacin y otros 16
que, sin formacin previa, fueron instruidos en los fundamentos de la medita-
cin sobre la compasin, dos semanas antes de escanear sus cerebros. A cada
uno de los 32 sujetos se les coloc en el escner de fMRI en el UW-Madison Wais-
man Center for Brain Imaging, que dirige Davidson, y se le pidi comenzar la
meditacin de la compasin o abstenerse de ella. En cada estado, los sujetos
fueron expuestos a sonidos y vocalizaciones humanas negativas y positivas dise-
adas para evocar respuestas de empata, as como vocalizaciones neutrales:
sonidos de una mujer afligida, un beb rindose o el ruido de fondo de un res-
taurante.
La hiptesis principal fue que la preocupacin por los dems cultivada median-
te esta forma de meditacin mejora el procesamiento afectivo, en particular en
respuesta a los sonidos de angustia, y que esa respuesta emocional a los soni-
dos es modulada por el grado de formacin de la meditacin. La presentacin

48
LUTZ, A. - BREFCZYNSKI-LEWIS, J. - JOHNSTONE, T. - DAVIDSON, R. J., Regulation of the neu-
ral circuitry of emotion by compassion meditation: Effects of meditative expertise, PLoS
ONE, 2008 Mar 26;3(3): e1897.

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de los sonidos emocionales estaba asociada con la activacin de la regin lm-


bica (la nsula y cortex del cingulado) durante la meditacin. Durante la medi-
tacin, la activacin de la nsula fue mayor en los expertos que en los novicios
durante la presentacin de sonidos negativos y menor en los positivos o neu-
trales. La fuerza de activacin en la nsula se asoci tambin con la intensidad
de la meditacin para ambos grupos. Estos resultados apoyan el papel del cir-
cuito lmbico en la emocin compartida. La comparacin entre la meditacin
frente a los estados de descanso entre los expertos y los novatos tambin mos-
traron una mayor activacin en la amgdala, en el cruce temporo-parietal dere-
cho (TPJ), y el sulcus temporal superior posterior derecho (pSTS), en respues-
ta a todos los sonidos. Esto sugiere una mayor deteccin de los sonidos
emocionales, y una mayor actividad mental en respuesta a vocalizaciones emo-
cionales humanas en los expertos que en los novicios durante la meditacin. En
conjunto, estos datos indican que la experiencia mental de cultivar emociones
positivas altera la activacin de los circuitos neurales. Por ello cabra conside-
rar un aumento de neuroplasticidad para permitir la regeneracin de circuitos
neurales, as como la produccin de nuevas y diferentes conexiones sinpticas.
Se debe advertir que una habilidad mental no tiene porqu implicar desa-
rrollo espiritual. No obstante, en el momento que un monje desarrolla el senti-
do de la compasin no con la razn, sino con la meditacin, la unin de la
habilidad meditativa se une al mensaje espiritual. Entonces el mensaje, el men-
sajero y el receptor del mensaje se unen como en el pasaje de IbnArabi citado
anteriormente. Podramos decir que no hay ruido mental que distraiga la expe-
riencia directa de la unio mystica.

CONCLUSIONES: EN BUSCA DE LO NTIMO

La inmaterialidad de la conciencia y del espritu deja de ser un escnda-


lo biolgico o fsico, por una parte porque la conciencia y el espritu no pue-
den ser concebidos independientemente de procesos y de transformaciones
fsicas y, por otra, porque la organizacin ya es inmaterial ella misma al mismo
tiempo que est unida a la materialidad fsica () Podemos concebir un bucle
recursivo-productivo en que el espritu, ltima emergencia de la evolucin
cerebral, es generado-regenerado continuamente por la actividad cerebral, ella
misma generada-regenerada por la actividad de todo el ser, y en que el espri-
tu tiene su papel activo y organizador esencial para el conocimiento y la accin.
(EDGAR MORIN, El mtodo III. El conocimiento del conocimiento) 49

Morin sostiene que no puede haber una relacin directa entre los aspectos
neurolgicos del cerebro y los aspectos psquicos y espirituales, si no es ponien-
do en funcionamiento conjuntamente el principio de emergencia, el principio

49
MORIN, EDGAR, El mtodo III. El conocimiento del conocimiento, Ediciones Ctedra,
Madrid, 1999, pp. 89-90.

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de computacin, el principio de traduccin. Sostengo que es cierto. Que es nece-


sario un estado de correlacin que no sea nicamente el de transducir las cas-
cadas de flujos sinpticos en estado de coherencia. Debera haber tambin un
principio de superveniencia entre la dinmica neuronal y la actividad espiritual.
Debera fundarse en un principio quirlico, de jerarqua, entre la actividad
coherente y constructiva psico-bio-fsica de la performance humana y su funda-
mento en las leyes evolutivas de la naturaleza. Es decir, que lo humano es fsi-
co (en el sentido de la Physis o de la Naturaleza) y permite generar el nivel nti-
mo personal de uno mismo.
Tratar de explicar las experiencias msticas ser siempre un problema. Pues
partimos de un hecho de experiencia personal, intrasferible, vivido por un ser
humano. El mstico tratar de comprenderse en un primer momento, para ade-
cuar la experiencia interior, dada en su estado de unin con lo inefable, con la
vida del mundo ordinario que no vive en lo mstico y que poco o nada advierte
de esta extraa experiencia.
Tratar de comprender lo que ocurre en el cerebro mstico es entrar en la expe-
riencia personal. Hacerlo plantea un problema de alta complejidad epistemo-
lgica y nos lleva a la fiabilidad de nuestras hiptesis sobre la experiencia sub-
jetiva de otros.
Salvar este escollo es complejo y requiere una revisin de lo que Francisco
Varela inici a partir de la publicacin de su libro De cuerpo presente, donde
afirma que la cognicin no es la representacin de un mundo pre-dado por
una mente pre-dada, sino que es ms bien la activacin vivencial del mundo
y de la mente en conexin con la historia de la variedad de acciones que un ser
ha realizado y realiza en el mundo. Este es el sentido de la enaccin basada
en el concepto budista de la interdependencia en tanto que el mundo feno-
mnico no existe con independencia del sujeto que lo percibe.
Por eso es urgente que en el estudio de la neurociencia comprenda el senti-
do enactivo de la experiencia personal. Este es el sentido en que la neuro-
ciencia de los estados msticos podra trabajar. No para describir si Dios est en
el cerebro, precipitndose en interpretaciones nada profundas y en juicios aven-
turados. Hasta ahora, la interpretacin de las experiencias msticas no ha sido
cientfica (stricto sensu). Esto es lo que Anne L. C. Runehov 50 destaca en sus
estudios comparativos. Agradece el amplio espectro de explicaciones neurofi-
siolgicas y neuroanatmicas de las experiencias msticas. Las describen los
neurocientficos como un mapeo de la actividad cerebral y neurocognitiva de la

50
RUNEHOV, A. L. C., Neuroscientific Explanations of Religious Experience are Not free
from Cultural Aspects, Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science, n. 2,
January 2008, pp. 141-156; RUNEHOV, A. L. C., Sacred or Neural? The Potential of Neuroscience to
Explain Religious Experience, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht: Gttingen, Germany, 2007; RUNEHOV,
A. L. C., A Neuro-psychological Explanation of Religious Experience?, Studies in Science and
Theology, Grman, U. - Drees, W. B. - Meisinger, H. (eds.), vol. 9, 59-68, 2004; RUNEHOV, A. L. C.,
A Being or To Be? Philosophical Thoughts about Future Research on Neuroscience and Reli-
gions and the Need for Interdisciplinarity, European Journal of Science and Theology, vol. 2,
n. 1 (March), 55-66, 2006.

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experiencia de lo inefable. Pero cuando han tratado de explicar la experiencia


personal, no han podido hacer ciencia por la dificultad interpretativa del fen-
meno. La experiencia de lo numinoso est estrechamente ligada con la cultura.
La cultura ofrece al mstico los arquetipos que permiten fundar el constructo
social de la realidad que reside en el cerebro del sujeto y del mstico y su
conciliacin el inconsciente colectivo y la naturaleza noumnico-numinosa de
la realidad.
Querra destacar un estudio que Francisco Varela 51 present sobre la decons-
truccin de un instante mental. Varela y sus colaboradores pidieron a volunta-
rios del laboratorio de Pars que estaban siendo controlados con EEG que pre-
sionasen un botn en el preciso instante en que reconocieran una imagen. Se
evidenci que el sujeto responde durante los primeros 180 milisegundos des-
pus de la presentacin de la pauta en blanco y negro. El reconocimiento se pro-
duce entre los milisegundos que preceden a la respuesta. En el siguiente sexto
de segundo, el cerebro del sujeto vuelve a descansar de ese acto de reconoci-
miento. La pulsacin del botn se origina durante el siguiente sexto de segun-
do. Y toda la secuencia finaliza antes de los tres cuartos de segundo.
Un perodo de fuerte desincronizacin marca la transicin entre el momen-
to de la percepcin y la respuesta motora. Varela sugera que esta desincroni-
zacin reflejaba un proceso de desvinculacin activa de los conjuntos neurona-
les que es necesario proceder de un estado cognitivo a otro. En otras palabras,
el primer impacto visual, como tambin sonoro es no-conceptual mientras
que a partir de los primeros 180 milisegundos existe el instante de reconoci-
miento (el aj!). El cerebro primero percibe sin identificar, sin interpretar. Y
luego surge el reconocimiento y la interpretacin de lo percibido.
Para los budistas la comprensin de que el primer momento de la cognicin
no es conceptual, percepcin sin recurrencia a la memoria (namba) y que los
momentos posteriores son conceptuales constituye la puerta de acceso a la libe-
racin 52. Liberacin de la ilusin (maya) y de la inercia de los hbitos mentales.
Por lo tanto percibimos primero los objetos en s mismos tal como se nos pre-
sentan en nuestro cerebro, y luego los percibimos desde una representacin
mental. Realizndose este proceso tambin en la memoria, la expectativa, la
postura, el movimiento y la intencin.
Varela no era partidario de que las emociones distorsionen la percepcin,
puesto que esto sugerira la existencia de una emocin posterior que se le su-
perpone. Ms bien Varela enuncia que no existe percepcin sin componente

51
RODRGUEZ, E. - GEORGE, N. - LACHAUX, J. P. - MARTINERIE, J. - RENAULT, B. - VARELA, F. J.,
Perceptions shadow: long-distance synchronization of human brain activity, Nature 397,
430-433 (4), February 1999.
52
Este tema ha sido motivo de ms de mil aos de debate entre las escuelas budistas
(Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Yogashara y Madhyamaka). La Vaibhashika es la nica que admi-
te la percepcin es un caso de representacin refleja. Las otras escuelas mantienen la idea que
se trata de un proceso ms activo en el que el namba (aspecto) desempea un papel orga-
nizador subjetivo.

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emocional la enaccin interdependiente. Mas si hay percepcin sin reco-


nocimiento representativo, cmo se vive la emocin en esos primeros 180 mili-
segundos? Es algo que Varela no pudo resolver por su fallecimiento.
La experiencia de la percepcin unida a la propia accin de percibir es el fac-
tor que queda por estudiar en neurociencia. De hecho algo parecido se ha des-
crito con Richard J. Davidson 53 al trabajar con un monje extraordinario: ser.
No slo se mantuvo prcticamente imperturbable fisiolgicamente (neuronal-
mente registrado) ante la exposicin de un fuerte sonido por encima del umbral
de tolerancia humano. Tambin redujo hasta casi eliminar los pensamientos
autnomos que revolotean por la mente de cualquier ser humano (memes).
No obstante no podemos olvidar que es tan importante la experiencia nou-
mnica en s como la descripcin fenomenolgica. Slo podremos confiar en
las descripciones fenomenolgicas personales de sujetos capaces de desidenti-
ficacin emocional, o de supresin del pensamiento insubordinado, que respi-
re conscientemente, o que pueda desdoblar la atencin sobre s mismo como
un observador-observado. Son estados de conciencia no ordinarios que no slo
forman parte de un adiestramiento mental sino que tambin denotan una cali-
dad tica superior.
Este es un camino que debe recorrerse para el estudio neurofenomenolgi-
co de lo ntimo. Es la diferencia entre la percepcin subjetiva de un nivel medio
de conciencia, donde la atencin flucta en el estado de duerme-vela, comn
en todos nosotros, que convivimos con ese egotismo limitador e inercial (Aham-
kara), y el nivel extraordinario de las monjas Carmelitas, de los iniciados en el
agni yoga (o yoga del conocimiento), o los monjes budistas tibetanos o zen, a los
que se han registrado ritmos sincrnicos de sus neuronas en las experiencias
msticas. La experiencia de lo numinoso promueve en ellos capacidades no iner-
ciales en el ejercicio cognitivo: incrementar el nivel de conciencia viglica hasta
la supresin del ego limitador, al mismo tiempo que la superacin de las emo-
ciones destructivas.
El profesor Francisco Mora ha dicho que es en el cerebro emocional donde
toda la informacin que recibimos del mundo externo a travs de los sentidos
se impregna de matices emocionales, de placer o dolor, lo que realmente nos
impide ser felices. Es que el cerebro est diseado para la lucha por la supervi-
vencia. Quiz por eso el ego, como programa cerebral, est diseado para sobre-
vivir. Pues si no hbiera ego, qu sera de mi propio yo?
Apelando a la conclusin del profesor Mora, me tomo la licencia de para-
frasear un pasaje del Mahabharata que utiliz en una conferencia tenido en un
ciclo titulado En tierra de nadie.
Quien en medio del placer no siente deseo Quien ha abandonado todo
impulso, temor o clera Quien ni odia ni se entristece se, est en plena
posesin de la felicidad o de la sabidura.

53
GOLEMAN, D., Emociones Destructivas. Como entenderlas y superarlas, Ed. Kairs, Bar-
celona, 2003.

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Este es el proceso de la Oikeiosis estoica, donde el ser humano se convierte


en Ser Humano, al percibirse a s mismo, reconoce que slo el S Mismo
hace posible su existencia. Y este proceso de Oikeiosis se logra por un principio
de individuacin sostenido. De esta manera en su interior este individuo-indi-
viduado alberga lo ntimo como una experiencia de elevacin de su con-
ciencia (hipso-conciencia). Es un proceso de experiencias anaggicas que ele-
van su percepcin hacia lo ms ntimo de S Mismo.
Hemos de recordar que el proceso de la Oikeiosis es en realidad una propie-
dad, tal como dice la misma etimologa. Es un proceso gradual donde el indi-
viduo va adquiriendo la capacidad de conciencia de s mismo. Es un proceso
que no aperece espontneamente, puesto que requiere un mtodo o iniciacin.
En un principio los seres humanos tienen esta sensacin incipiente. Sensacin
producida por el desarrollo natural del individuo hacia el entorno o medio cir-
cundante. El estoicismo entiende la oikeiosis como proceso o iniciacin que
provoca revelacin de realidades antes no comprendidas en la vida ordinaria.
Es la revelacin del Logos en el tiempo vivo del ser humano. Es la perma-
nencia, la conciliacin y la adecuacin de lo numinoso en perfecta armona entre
el cuerpo, el cerebro y el alma o psique. Por tanto, la aspiracin es la concilia-
cin espiritual vivida interiormente. La interioridad numinosa ni es objetiva ni
subjetiva. Es exactamente la realidad impersonal que produce la experiencia de
la interioridad personal 54.
Dicha conciliacin es concebible en un estado humano de equilibrio mental
y emocional (el sentido autntico de apaqoj), donde el pequeo yo atrapado por
lo inmediato fenomnico se disuelve en el Todo, como en la experiencia de los
aviadores o de los msticos estudiados por Newberg y DAquili con la OAA. Un
estado donde ya no existen las fronteras. Es una experiencia autnticamente
cosmopolita en el sentido estoico de la palabra, es decir, partcipe de la huma-
nidad del cosmos. Es el Estado Universal de la antigua Stoa, al igual que la
filantropa de la Stoa o el amor a la humanidad que genera el entusiasmo que
eleva el logos individual al Logos Csmico y se une al noun en esa anagoga o
estado ntimo de sublimacin de la experiencia mstica 55.

54
Mutatis mutandis, es interesante relacionarlo con algo que en lingstica no existe,
y es la primera persona del singular del imperativo. Sera algo as como camino yo, voy
yo, oigo yo; etc., es decir, formado con un verbo (logos) indicativo en formula de auto-
imposicin volitiva. Es una forma verbal que no tiene sentido, ya que es una orden impe-
rativa que ofrece uno a s mismo y que no hace uso verbal. Pero es una orden mental. Es
decir, en un estado de observador-observado, desdoblado internamente (segn el mtodo
de George I. Gurdjieff), uno puede darse esa orden imperativa como observado, es decir,
objetivado. En ese estado uno mismo es sujeto y objeto en una autoobservacin y en un
recuerdo de s que provoca un vaco entre s mismo donde no hay dilogo interior, sino una
autocontemplacin volitiva y una quietud de pensamiento insubordinado. Es entonces donde
se da la orden silenciosa de la primera persona del singular del imperativo omitido, en pura
qeoria anagogika.
55
Es segn la Stoa la Megalopsiquis condensada en el Hegemonikon. El Hegemo-
nikon es lo que da unidad a toda la vida psquica humana, la fuente de la vida del alma y del

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. CASTRO, EL YO INTERIOR. REFLEXIONES TRANSDISCIPLINARES 985

El yo de lo ntimo en el ser humano no es entonces un ego perturbador,


sino un salto al vaco donde uno esta con todo, con todos y todos estn en uno.
Por eso la funcin de la supervivencia del yo es el fundamento de la actividad
de la conciencia, en tanto que ese yo no es otra cosa que lo ntimo o lo
numinoso de uno mismo. El hilo que conduce a lo que somos como revelacin
del universo.

c/ Parar.el, 8 SCAR CASTRO GARCA


Alcoletge 25660 (Lleida), Espaa
oscarcastrogarcia@yahoo.es

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

conjunto psico-fsico, de la conciencia y de las facultades cognoscitivas superiores como la


capacidad representativa, el juicio y la razn. Mientras los estoicos lo situaban en el corazn,
actualmente estara situado en el cerebro paleomamfero segn la divisin Paul MacLean.

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ESTUDIOS, NOTAS, TEXTOS Y COMENTARIOS

THE RELEVANCE OF JAN PATOCKAS


PHENOMENOLOGY IN QUESTIONS OF SCIENCE
AND RELIGION

IVN ORTEGA RODRGUEZ 1


Universidad Comillas (Madrid)

To Krzysztof Sitarz

ABSTRACT: Jan Patockas attempt of an a-subjective phenomenology represents a complex thesis


which has in itself many potentialities of which Patocka himself was not probably aware. In this article we
enumerate some problems to which Patockas thought can give us a new insight. Firstly we make a brief
description of the fundamental of his a-subjective phenomenology. Secondly and finally, we indicate
four problems concerning science and religion to which Patockas theses are relevant. These problems
are the epistemic value of scientific research, the mind-body problem, the possibility of a religious revelation
and the reasonability of theism and atheism. In some of these problems we indicate references to authors
who have already dealt with the topic for further information. Our aim is to invite scholars to take into
account the thought of Jan Patocka, so that they will deepen in the questions we present here.
KEY WORDS: Jan Patocka, phenomenology, science, religion, mind-body problem, revelation, theism
and atheism.

La relevancia de la fenomenologa de Jan Patocka en cuestiones


de ciencia y religin
RESUMEN: El intento de Jan Patocka de una fenomenologa a-subjetiva constituye una propuesta
compleja que tiene muchas potencialidades de las que el mismo Patocka probablemente no era cons-
ciente. En este artculo enumeramos algunos problemas para los cuales Jan Patocka puede darnos una
nueva perspectiva. En primer lugar, hacemos una sucinta descripcin de los aspectos fundamentales
de su fenomenologa a-subjetiva. En segundo y ltimo lugar, indicamos cuatro problemas para los que
el pensamiento de Jan Patocka es relevante. Estos problemas son los del valor epistmico de la inves-
tigacin cientfica, el problema mente-cuerpo, la posibilidad de una revelacin religiosa y la racionalidad
del tesmo y el atesmo. En algunos de estos problemas indicamos referencias a autores que han tra-
bajo ya estos temas para obtener mayor informacin. Nuestro objetivo es invitar a los estudiosos a tener
en cuenta el pensamiento de Jan Patocka y profundicen en las cuestiones que aqu presentamos.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Jan Patocka, fenomenologa, ciencia, religin, problema mente-cuerpo, revelacin,
tesmo y atesmo.

1
I want to express my gratitude to the Fundacin Ramn Areces [Ramn Areces Foundation] for
its support to this research program on the philosophy of Jan Patocka at the Universidad Pontificia Comillas.
This research is being carried out under the guide of Professor Dr. Miguel Garca-Bar, within the context
of a research program on the philosophical foundations of the idea of solidarity. This article can be considered
as a result of the research so far accomplished. All the possible defects are exclusively my responsibility.

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988 I. ORTEGA, THE RELEVANCE OF JAN PATOCKAS

INTRODUCTION

In the last years, Patockas thought has been given its due place in philosophical and
political discussions, and he has been acknowledged as one of the great thinkers of the
20th century. Within phenomenological circles, his idea of an asubjective phenomenology
and his theory of the movements of existence are closely and thoroughly studied. Likewise,
his ethical and political thought has been attentively studied, in so far as it can give ideas
about how to propose ideals for public life in increasingly pluralistic societies. Patockas
relevance lies also in that his thought is a philosophy of resistance to the oppressor, where
intellectual and vital quest for the truth defies the established powers. Patockas thought
is also a praxis of resistance to oppression. Patocka in fact was an intellectual and a moral
example for Czech dissidents, especially for Vclav Havel, whose ideas are to a good
extend inspired in Patockas thought.
Our aim in this article is to show how Patockas thought is also relevant in the fields
of science and religion, even if Patocka himself did not deal with these topics. However,
the complexity of his thought allows us to find in him some clues for contemporary debates
on issues of science and religion. With this, we also show one of the best characteristics
of philosophical theories, namely that they open new possibilities which could even be
unknown to the one who first thought them.
This article consists of two parts. The first one consists of a basic presentation of
Patockas philosophy in the points which are essential to the aims of this article. We will
not deal then with his philosophy of history and the ethical consequences of his thought.
Instead, we will speak of Patockas asubjective phenomenology and his conception of the
world and human existence in it. In the second part we will show how Patockas thought
can be used in some scientific and religious issues such as the mind-body problem, the
value of scientific research or the problems of a theistic (or atheistic) worldview.

1. PATOCKAS CRITIQUE OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND ASUBJECTIVE


PHENOMENOLOGY

1.1. The critique of transcendental phenomenology

As we have indicated, Patocka accepts that the phenomenological method is the best
indicated to carry out a radical philosophical research. However, Patocka does not fully
accept Husserls understanding of phenomenology as a sort of idealism. This idealism
claimed to take exact account of knowledge and rationality, and with it the very disclosure
of being, by describing the process of Constitution of the world to consciousness.
This idealism is distinct from other versions in that the world is not simply taken as
a creation of the mind. The world and its objects do appear as having their own entity,
and neatly distinct from consciousness, to which notwithstanding they appear. This
consciousness is also transcendental intersubjectivity, as Husserl says in the fifth of his
Cartesian Meditations. Intersubjectivity is a phenomenological datum, the world can only
appear within horizons shared by the different conscious subjets, in such a way that the
world is a common world.
Patocka knows well that transcendental phenomenology is not equivalent to classic
idealism, and even less to solipsism. Nevertheless Patocka, along with many of Husserls
disciples, thinks that this idealism does not correspond to the original impulse of

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I. ORTEGA, THE RELEVANCE OF JAN PATOCKAS 989

phenomenology. Patocka considers that if we hold to the original intention, that is to say,
to the fundamental principle of taking what is given in exactly the measure that it is given 2,
then we cannot defend an idealistic philosophy, however different from other idealisms
it may be. Patocka states that Husserls phenomenology ends being idealistic because of
theoretical presuppositions which cause the introduction of non-phenomenological
constructions in the analysis.
According to Patocka, Husserl misses his own discovery of appearing as such. The
study of phenomenon discloses the primordial fact of appearing. Before any thought,
action or evaluation, something appears to me. However, Husserl assumes that analyzing
the phenomenon as such is the analysis of appearing to me, to a subject full of contents
whose existence and certitude is guaranteed by the self-evidence of the cogito. In Husserl,
then, the study of the phenomenon is not that of appearing in its originality, but an ontology
of subjectivity. With this, we abandon the field of appearing and we confound it with the
realm of what appears, repeating the same mistake as Plato and Descartes 3.
The central point in Patockas critique is, in our view, the consideration of the subject
which is necessarily given in phenomenological analysis. To Husserl, this subject includes
all his acts. Everything that can be related to consciousness, to what is lived, is absolutely
given in the analysis of the Cartesian cogito in its certitude. On this basis, it can be stated
that the phenomenon is ultimately founded on such subjectivity. To Patocka, it is not
this full subjectivity that is given in phenomenological analysis, but only a subjective
pole to which appearing is referred but upon which it is not founded 4. Appearing has
its own entity 5 and a thorough phenomenological analysis must study it in itself. Patocka
criticizes that Husserl keeps the prejudice of the evidence of conscience as a unitarian
entity. In his consideration of the first data, Husserl went beyond what was actually given
by these data. The problem is not the undoubtfulness of the very act of living, but that
along with it, the conscience as a sort of unity encompassing all its noments is taken
for self-evident. This unity is not individual conscience, but transcendental conscience,
namely the ultimate horizon to which all that appears is referred. Thus, conscience is
taken as a sort of absolute entity to be analysed in reflection, in the realm of the inmanent 6.

2
This is the principle of all principles. See Ideen zu einer reinen Phnomenologie und phnomenologi-
schen philosophie, Erstes Buch, Husserliana III/1, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, p. 43.
3
See JUAN MANUEL GARRIDO, Appearing as Such in Patockas A-Subjective Phenomenology, in
Philosophy Today, De Paul University, 51:2 (2007) 121-136. Patockas critique of husserlian subjectivism
can be found in the following essays: JAN PATOCKA, Der Subjektivismus des Husserlschen und die Mglichkeit
einer asubjektiven Phnomenologie, and Der Subjektivismus des Husserlschen und die Forderung
einer asubjektiven Phnomenologie, in KLAUS NELLEN, JIR NEMEC and ILJA SRUBAR (eds.), Die Bewegung
der menschlichen Existenz, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1991, pp. 267-285 and 286-309. [Spanish translation: El
subjetivismo de la fenomenologa husserliana y la posibilidad de una fenomenologa asubjetiva and El
subjetivismo de la fenomenologa husserliana y la exigencia de una fenomenologa asubjetiva, in AGUSTN
SERRANO DE HARO (ed.), El movimiento de la existencia humana, translated by Agustn Serrano de Haro and
Teresa Padilla, Encuentro, Madrid, 2004, pp. 93-112 and 113-136.]
4
See for example [poch et rduction] in Papiers Phnomnologiques, translated by Erika Abrams,
Grenoble, Jerme Millon, 1995, pp. 163-210, especially p. 169. This text must not be confounded with the
essay Epoche und Reduktion (quoted below, note 8) of which this one is a draft version considerably
longer than the final essay.
5
We write this term between quotation marks to indicate that appearing must not be taken as an
entity in the ontological sense, as if it were a real object. As we will see, appearing has to be considered as
distinct from what appears, as a non-real sphere though, as we shall see, it discloses the world.
6
Understood as what is given by itself, as opposed to simple the structural elements. This
distinction is described in EDMUND HUSSERL, Die Idee der Phnomenologie. Fnf Vorlesungen, Meiner,
Hamburg, 1986.

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990 I. ORTEGA, THE RELEVANCE OF JAN PATOCKAS

In other words, when in Husserl life is affirmed 7 as self-evident, it is not only about
the current act of living, the present evidence of being alive and conscious, but also all
the determinations which we find in our living. They are all taken as equally self evident,
and with this it is also assumed the evidence of the terrain: conscience as a Unitarian
entity or pre-entity. This is for Patocka a result of the introduction of theoretical theses
foreign to the strictly phenomenological research starting from the first data, which
proceeds only assuming what can be inferred from those first data.
The subjectivist presupposition prevents Husserl from carrying out the phenomenological
epoch in a fully radical way 8. poch consists of interrupting the belief in the real existence
of the world and its objects, not eliminating the contents as such, but leaving them in
their pure appearing. Epoche is not doubting the existence of the world; this belief, which
certainly supports everyday life as a basic thesis, simply ceases to be posed, and this in
order that all that is present to us can show itself under a different light. With this, a whole
new field of research is opened, which is claimed to give account of the most fundamental
principles that sustain every science and every knowledge, as well as every act in our life
in the world.
Husserls use of poch is however not radical enough, says Patocka. The interruption
is not applied to consciousness, understood as a whole unity, a unitarian entity. To
Husserl, explains Patocka, if we interrupted the thesis of the existence of consciousness,
then there would no longer be an absolute terrain from which and on the grounds of
which the constitution of the world could be studied with guaranties 9.
This limitation of poch is due to Husserls subjectivistic prejudice, which takes
subjectivity as absolutely given with all its contents. Thus, phenomenon, referred as it is
to subjectivity, is necessarily founded on and constituded by it. To be firmly grounded,
all the phenomena need to be referred to absolute subjectivity. The phenomenological
analysis must, then, clarify how phenomena are founded on subjectivity; it must redirect,
reduce them to their subjective foundation. The main aim of phenomenology is,
consequently, reduction. Therefore, poch is only a secondary tool subordinated to
reduction. Otherwise the phenomena (and with them the world) would not be reduced
and phenomenology would have no sense at all.
On the contrary, Patocka thinks that epoche can be universally and radically applied,
and that this does not paralyse philosophical research. Radical poch discloses the pure
structure of appearing as such and reveal that the true discovery of phenomenology is
appearing and not its purported foundation. poch, and not reduction, is the main concept
in phenomenology. Furthermore, a radical use of epoche leads to a new, and for Patocka
more accurate, understanding of existence in the world, of knowledge, and especially, as
we will see below, of the configuration of rationality in an always unachieved teleology
towards truth, which always remains as a goal.

7
Life is always understood as conscious life, in the broad sense of being affected and/or referred
to an object. This refers to a broad extent of experiences, the ones classically described as those of the
senses and of the intellect.
8
This is the main idea of the text Epoche und Reduktion in Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz,
pp. 415-423. (Spanish translation: Epoj y reduccin, in El movimiento de la existencia humana,
pp. 241-250.)
9
See Ibidem, p. 249.

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I. ORTEGA, THE RELEVANCE OF JAN PATOCKAS 991

1.2. The asubjective phenomenology of Jan Patocka

a) Radical poch, appearing as such and the world

According to Patocka, then, if we use poch without any subordination to other


theoretical aims, we find that the analysis of phenomena is no access to any absolute
entity or pre-entity, but to the pure appearing of what appears, that is, to appearing as
such. poch, radically considered, leaves us before (or, rather, within) the disclosure of
the space of appearing in which subjectivity is no longer the absolute terrain to which
what appears necessarily refers. Subjectivity is one of the essential moments of the
structure of appearing (to whom it appears), the other two being the world and its contents
(what appears) and the laws of appearing (how it appears) 10. In this sphere of appearance,
subjectivity is an essential pole, but referred to a world that subjectivity has not at all
founded or constituted. The appearing of the world and its objects, as such appearing,
is certainly referred to subjectivity, but this subjectivity shows itself as existing in a world
to which it belongs 11:
Perhaps the immediacy of the auto-donation of the self is a prejudice and the experience
of the self has, like the experience of things, its a priori, an a priori that allows the appearing
of the self. Understood this way, poch is not the access to any entity or pre-entity,
whether worldly or not, but precisely for this reason it is perhaps the access to appearing
instead of [the access] to what appears, that is to say, to appearing itself. Thanks to the
universality of poch it is also clear that, as well as the self is the condition of possibility
of the appearing of the worldly, the world as a proto-horizon (and not as a totality of
realities) represents the condition of possibility for the appearing of the self 12.

Liberated, then, from subjectivist prejudice, Patocka thinks that poch can and must
be universally used, and this makes us study the subject as constituted within a world in
which the subject appears as rooted. At the same time, this subjectivity rooted in the
world lives in a natural world, the world of everyday life, shared with others. Therefore,
it can be said that radical poch leads us to affirm a quite particular way of being in the
world. This particular way consists of being rooted in the world as an apriori to subjectivity,
and, at the same time, existing in a natural world that appears to a subjective horizon.
Once we have indicated the general pattern of how Patocka, to our understanding,
presents human existence in the world, we will see in more detail how his theses are
developed. We are first going to deal with the appearance of the world as a previous
totality, and then we will explain the configuration of the natural world according to
Patocka 13. In the description of Patockas theory of the configuration of the natural world,

10
See ANA CECILIA SANTOS, Die Lehre des Erscheinens bei Jan Patocka: drei Probleme, in Studia
Phaenomenologica. Romanian Journal for Phenomenology VII (2007) pp. 303-329, especially the pp. 304
and 310-14.
11
A problem in Patockas conceptualization is the double status of subjectivity as a pole of appearing
as such, to which the world is referred, and at the same time a part of what appears and a part of the world.
We cannot deal with this problem in this paper. See ANA SANTOS, Vers une phnomnologie asubjective,
in RENAUD BARBARAS (ed.), Jan Patocka: phnomnologie asubjective et existence, Paris, Mimesis, 2007, pp. 49-
71, especially pp. 67-69.
12
Epoch und Reduktion, p. 420; Epoj y reduccin, pp. 247-248. My italics.
13
The theme and scope of this paper does not allow us to enter into the complexities of Patockas
conceptualization of human existence and that to which it is opened. Karel Novotn shows that there can
be traced up to three conceptualizations. The first one points to Heidegger and takes the opening as the
understanding of Being and the opened as the entity in that it is the Being understood as in a certain
way. The second one refers to philosophy of corporality and considers the disclosure of the world as the

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992 I. ORTEGA, THE RELEVANCE OF JAN PATOCKAS

there will be also a description of the existential dynamism within the natural world.
Once we have explained the basic patockian notions of human existence within the world,
we will be able to indicate the ethical root in Patockas phenomenology.

b) The world as an all-encompassing totality

As we have said above, radical epoche discloses the world as the a priori of subjectivity.
Appearing things are shown within horizons, internal and external 14. These horizons are
included the one in the other in such a way that they all can be finally included in an all-
encompassing horizon. This horizon is the world as an all-encompassing totality. In order
to explain how the world is disclosed as the totality of things included in an all-encompassing
horizon, Patocka makes use of the concept of Weltfge, taken from Eugen Fink 15.
What first of all appears to us in our perceptions, are limitations, that show the forms
in which things are placed. Limitations are, each one separately, contingent; however,
we cant eliminate a limitation without replacing it with another. Individual limitations,
then, are contingent, but limitation as such is not. If there are always necessarily limitations
when we perceive, then the idea of a totality which encompasses all limitations appears
as necessary. This is in fact for Patocka the kantian idea of absolute space or the finkean
concept of Weltfge 16.
This totality is necessarily one and all-encompassing, since if not we would have again
another limitation which could be integrated in a totality of a superior order and so on.
Nevertheless, the fact that an all-encompassing totality is an unavoidable horizon when
considering perception, does not involve that this totality actually exists. At most we could
say that it is impossible to think this totality as non-existent, but it does not mean that
this totality in fact exists. Patocka tries to solve this problem with the help of the mutual
foundation of the part and the whole. If we get to demonstrate the real existence of a part
of the totality, then we will have demonstrated the existence of the all-encompassing
totality. In other words, if a limitation of something is found as evidently existing, then
the totality that encompasses this limitation is also necessarily existing 17.

presentation of possibilities to an incorporated subject. These three conceptualizations are not mutually
exclusive; to the contrary, they all deal with human existence and its place in the world disclosed by
appearing. We will centre our attention in the conceptualization referred to Eugen Fink which, to our
understanding, gives the clearest exposition of the basic lines of the problem of appearing and world in
Jan Patocka. See KAREL NOVOTN, Louverture du monde phnomnologique: donation ou comprehension?
Sur le problme de lapparatre comme tel chez Jan Patocka, in RENAUD BARBARAS (ed.), Jan Patocka.
Phnomnologie asubjective et existence, pp. 9-25.
14
See for example: [Leons sur la corporit] in Papiers Phnomnologiques, pp. 53-116, especially
pp. 63-70.
15
Universo y mundo del hombre. Observaciones a un planteamiento cosmolgico contemporneo,
in El movimiento de la existencia humana, pp. 85-92. For the original text in German, see Weltganzes und
Menschenwelt, in BEIERWALTES and SCHRADER (hrsg.), Weltaspekte der Philosophie. Festschrift fr R.Berlinger,
Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1972. Also in Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, pp. 257-264.
16
See Ibidem, pp. 85-86.
17
It should be noted that here Patocka passes from phenomenology to philosophical
phenomenology. The former deals with appearing as such, in its pure appearing, the latter tries to draw
metaphysical conclusions from phenomenology. The problem of appearing and the world is, then, a
problem in which phenomenology and philosophical phenomenology are implicated. It can be asked
whether phenomenology and philosophical phenomenology can be really separated. Patocka himself, at
the end of his life, thought that asubjective phenomenology needed an ontology. In our opinion, considering
appearing as such leads to consider the world, and this last consideration cannot be coherently made
without questioning what is disclosed as the world and whether it really exists.

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I. ORTEGA, THE RELEVANCE OF JAN PATOCKAS 993

In order to demonstrate the existence of such a part, Patocka seeks to show the
asubjective self-disclosure and self-attestation of a part of the world in its appearing in
our perception. In our perception there must be the presentation of something identifiable
as a form, as something within limits, and this without our subjectivity playing any active
role (which would once again raise the problem of idealism and actual existence of the
world out of us). This is possible, according to Patocka, by virtue of an asubjective
phenomenology in which what appears gives account of itself exclusively from itself:
For any totality, whether it be an ulterior collection of parts, or a previous totality,
the mutual foundation of the part and the whole is, however, valid; they are mutually
presupposed. Therefore, if there is no direct access in experience to the whole, it is enough
to know of it as such whole in order to have a right to affirm the meaning of part as
independent from the subject. Such a right seems to be able to be shown in an asubjective
phenomenology of perception that does not need to acknowledge the limit of perceptive
auto-donation in immanence which takes place in apodictic self-perception, and that
considers the meaning of perception, through twisted paths, as founded in the strictly
worldly phenomena, and not in the subjective ones 18.

c) The world as the natural world of ordinary life

Thus, the world appears to us as separate and independent from subjectivity. However,
we also know that the world appears as the natural world within which we carry out
our everyday life. Patocka makes a careful analysis of the structure of the natural
world, as well as of the existential dynamism deployed within it. It is in the careful considera-
tion of these analyses where we can see the ethical impulse within Patockas first
philosophy.
Patocka studies the natural world from the points of view of its structure and of
existential dynamism. The study of the structure of the natural world leads to the analysis
of the referents, the study of existential dynamism leads to Patockas theory of the three
movements of human existence.

i) The referents of the natural world


The fundamental referents of the natural world are the earth and the heavens 19. The
earth is the immobile substrate upon which our activity is being carried out. Upon the
earth we move among things, and relate to them as well as to the others. The earth is thus
the bearer and the referent of all relations 20. The earth also appears as force and power,
everything is in a certain way subordinated to the earth:
The earth rules the heights and the depth. It rules even over the components which
are forces beside it, even against it, though it is the earth that ultimately has power over
them. For even a stream of water, even the ocean, are forced to cleave to it 21.

18
Ibidem, p. 87. These twisted paths are not specified here. These are ways in which appearing as
such reveals itself as constituting a web of references where subjectivity is one of the poles of this autonomous
realm, but not its founder or constituter. The phenomenon shows to us and in this showing it is
disclosed as a structure referred to us, but to which we are also caught and by which we are in a certain
way co-constituted. Patocka tries repeatedly to explore this self-attestation of appearing as a non-
subjective realm. See for example Epoch et reduction. Manuscript de travail, in Papiers Phnomnologiques,
Grenoble, Jrme Millon, 1995, pp. 163-210.
19
JAN PATOCKA, The natural World and Phenomenology, in ERAZIM KOHK, Jan Patocka. Philosophy
and selected writings, The University of Chicago Press, 1989, pp. 239-273, especially pp. 255-257.
20
Ibidem, p. 255.
21
Loc. cit.

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The earth is not the only referent. Together with the essentially near referent of the
earth, we find another referent correlative to this, which is essentially distant, the heavens:
There is, however, yet another referent, one that is essentially distant, intangible,
unmanageable by bodily touch, no matter how present it appears a referent to which
all that is essentially beyond reach belongs the heavens, the light, the heavenly lights
and bodies, all that encloses our horizon without closing it in, all that constitutes the
outside as something that constantly encloses us in an interior 22.

This so structured natural world is also radically shared with others. In our ordinary
life we are referred to the Others in a space inhabited by me and others. In fact, Patocka
states that we are in rapport with the world through the rapport with the others. The other,
in fact, is made apparent and patent before myself, since the individual always perceives
himself as within a meaningful situation in which the self is already referred to, and
appealed by, the other. This essential contact with others in the natural world is what gives
reality and density to life in the world:
Contact with the others is the very center of our world, endowing it with its most
intrinsic content, but also its most important meaning, perhaps even all its meaning. It
is only contact with others that constitutes the proper context in which man lives; our
sense contact with present reality, or in-tuition, gains its central significance by bestowing
a mark of its immediate persuasiveness on the reality of the others 23.

ii) The movements of human existence


Human existence in the natural world is dynamic. Human existence is then in
movement 24. Man is confronted to tasks and possibilities, which are presented to an
embodied existence 25. The movement of existence is lived in the inner experience 26, and
is described also as a relationship with the other. This movement can take place in three
different forms, which are typical of different existential positions. There are then three
existential movements: the movements of rootedness, of defence, and the movement of
truth.
The existential movement is first of all a movement of rootedness, through which an
individual is received and accepted into life. Rootedness is the acceptance of one by the
others in the community. By virtue of this acceptance, the individual has a place in the
group, and therefore a place in the world. Thus, the individuals existence has a primary
meaning. Rootedness discloses the world for the first time, in the sense that one is
accepted into it: Thus man is from the start of life immersed, rooted primarily in the
other 27.

22
The natural world and phenomenology, p. 256. The italics are Patockas.
23
The natural world and phenomenology, p. 258. The italics are Patockas.
24
Patocka understands movement as the realization of human existence through the appropriation
of possibilities. Patocka recuperates Aristotles notion of movement as the actualization of an essence and
modifies it in an existencial sense, in such a way that the actualization of human essence is not that of a
preexisting one which discloses itself, but of an essence which is being built in each appropriation of
possibilities. Patockas main work on this subject has not yet been translated to any commonly accessible
language: Aristotels, jeho predchudci a dedicov [Aristotle, his predecessors and his successors], Praha,
Nakladatelstv Ceskoslovensk Akademie Ved, 1964. This book has a french abstract which, to our knowledge,
has not been either translated or republished: pp. 389-403.
25
For the study of corporality in Patocka, see Leons sur la corporit, in Papiers Phnomnologiques,
translated by Erika Abrams, Grenoble, Jerme Millon, 1995, pp. 53-116; Body, Community, Language,
World, translated by Erazim Kohk, Peru (Illinois-USA), 1998.
26
The natural world and phenomenology, p. 255.
27
The natural world and phenomenology, p. 260.

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The movement of rootedness has a strong connection with the movement of defence.
This second movement consists of working to obtain what is necessary for subsistence,
and to maintain the order which allows the acceptance of life and the movement of
rootedness. The individual, who has been accepted into life, has to join the others in the
task of working so that the conditions of the acceptance can be maintained. In this
movement the world as exteriority is disclosed:
The other as well as, in the natural, inevitable mutual bonding, the others is
what covers us, thanks to whose help the earth can first become the earth for me, the
sky the sky the others are our original home. A home, that sinking of roots, is not,
however, possible of itself and for itself. A home is a place where the sinking of roots
among things takes place, that is, where needs are met, through the mediation of others.
What is needed, though, must be procured, secured and that takes place only partially
in the home the activity of procuring what is needed, work, entails an outside, the
work place, the domain of objectivity 28.

Finally, the movement of truth is the confrontation with finitude and the question
for the meaning of such a finite existence. When someone assumes his finitude, he
confronts his existence and he is situated explicitly in front of the world as a totality. In
this situation, the individual is in a position from which the question for himself and his
life can be posed. This assumption of finitude and this questioning for the meaning of
existence has for Patocka clear moral connotations. In the movement of truth, the human
being accepts his finitude as well as the responsibility for his existence. Each one is then
responsible for the choices he makes and for the subsequent shape he gives to his life
and being. This moral dimension of the movement of truth is essential to the ethical and
political dimensions of Patockas thought, and is especially essential to the understanding
of the ethical root and impulse already present in Patockas first philosophy.

d) Conclusive remarks of this section

Thus, asubjective phenomenology leads to a consideration of man that is situated


in a previously existing and independent world 29. The human being lives in a natural world,
as well, structured with referents. In this natural world, human existence develops in a
dynamic way according to the three fundamental movements described above. Mortality
and finitude are made explicit in the movement of truth and it is here where responsibility
for ones life and the shape one gives to ones being takes place. This means that
responsibility is rooted in the human dynamism of the existential movements. The teleology
of truth is then present in Patocka within the frame of philosophy of existence, which
starts from the standpoint of finite existence. The finite individual, existing in a pre-given
world, is then oriented, by virtue of its third movement, to responsibility. Morality is then
incorporated in the dynamism of finite human existence. In the following section I will
try to show how these positions can play an important role in current debates about
questions of science and religion. We will deal with the value of scientific research, the
mind-body problem, the problem of revelation and the possibilities of theism and atheism.
We will not enter in detail and the list of problems is not complete. Our aim is to show
how Patockas philosophy is complex enough to provide us with insights in different
debates.

Ibidem, p. 260.
28

To be more precise, it is asubjective phenomenology and its phenomenological philosophy that


29

make us draw these conclusions about human existence and the world.

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996 I. ORTEGA, THE RELEVANCE OF JAN PATOCKAS

2. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF JAN PATOCKAS THOUGHT IN THE FIELDS


OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION

At first sight, it is not evident that Patockas considerations may have relevant
consequences as far as scientific or religious issues are concerned. However, Jan Patockas
philosophy is richer than it seems, and his views can provide us with intellectual tools
to approach some contemporary problems of science and religion. Jan Patocka himself
never dealt with these topics but, as it usually happens with great thinkers, his thought
enshrines potentialities unaware to the author but which we can infer.
We will limit ourselves here to indicate certain problems to which Patockas thought
gives the possibility of a new insight. We will deal at the first place with the consequences
in scientific issues like the mind-body problem (based on prof. James Menschs
considerations). Secondly, we will speak of the religious question of how to think revelation
and the world.

2.1. Jan Patocka and Science (I): the unity of the world and its exploration.
The value of scientific research

As we have seen, Jan Patocka rejects husserlian transcendentalism and states the co-
originality of subjectivity and the world as they are given in the phenomenon, understood
as appearing as such. This co-originality is given in the phenomenon itself but on the
metaphysical level Patocka goes one step further and states the primacy of the world as
the a priori of subjectivity. The world is present to subjectivity as the all-encompassing
totality which is never given as an actual whole. The world is always richer than the present
phenomenon (even if implicitly the whole is hinted in the form of an all-encompassing
horizon) and so we are permanently open to new aspects of the world.
Two characteristics stand out: the unity of the world (including the subject in itself)
and its openness. These two traits are of fundamental importance as far as the value of
scientific research is concerned. Scientific exploration can be thought to have an important
role in the discovery of the one world by the subject, especially if we compare with the
consequences of all idealism, which have the tendency, in my opinion, to devaluate science
in the name of the inclusion in the all-encompassing and absolute subjectivity.
Thus, by virtue of the phenomenon we are left before a world which is continually
opening itself in new possibilities. The world is then, according to this conception, a totality
which is never exhausted by our actual knowledge. It is certainly known as a totality
because of the givenness of the all-encompassing horizon, but not because of our actual
knowledge of every entity in the world. This means that the world is always open to
exploration. To our knowledge, Patocka does not specify much about the sort of exploration
can be carried out. Presumably, this is because he had other aims and felt no need to
explore this subject.
Although Patocka did not seem to indicate the different sorts of exploration of the
world, this classification is one that we can do without contradiction with the basic lines
of his thought. Thus, we can distinguish at least two types of exploration. On one hand
there is, obviously, the nave exploration that we can make in our ordinary lives with
the tools provided by our senses. On the other hand, weve got the scientific exploration,
carried out with the methodological and technical tools of modern science and technology.
Even if the question of the relationship between these two sorts of exploration remains

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open, we can see that nothing speaks a priori against the specific value of scientific
exploration. It may be objected that classical subjectivist phenomenology also gives value
to modern science. Nevertheless, in transcendental phenomenology the epistemic value
of science is clearly subordinated to subjectivity, whereas in Patockas asubjective
phenomenology there is no transcendental subject posed as the absolute terrain of
appearing. Patockas phenomenology leaves us before a phenomenon where the world
is co-original with the subject as a never-exhausted totality which is always to be explored.
Patockas phenomenology, then, provides us with a general metaphysical view that accepts
and includes the exploration and results of modern science. This very acceptation and
assumption is also the key to avoiding scientism, since the never-ending richness of the
world in its appearing prevents us from accepting dogmatically any particular view as
the definitive one, even if it is one issued from modern sciences or even if it is the
affirmation of the exclusivity of the scientific approach.

2.2. Jan Patocka and Science (II): the mind-body problem

Another crucial issue for which Patockas thought can provide us with intellectual tools
is the mind-body problem 30. Once again, Patocka did not explicitly mention the topic, which
was not so relevant in intellectual debates at that time. However, his phenomenological
and metaphysical views allows us to consider the problem of the relationship in such a way
that we can conceptualize the mental or spiritual as having its own entity and
autonomy with regard to material causal reality, at the same time that we avoid ontological
dualism. Let us have a closer look.
In order to explain the relevance of Patockas thought in the mind-body problem, we
need to focus our attention on the problem of experience as such and in the way Jan
Patocka dealt with it. As Mensch states, experience has been one of the central philosophical
problems in the history of Philosophy, especially in modern times. This problem consists
specifically of how to take account of experience as such, that is to say, how do we have
to explain to ourselves the very fact of having an experience, with its inevitable element
of interiority and immateriality (at least in the phenomenological description). The
explanation of experience as such becomes a problem because experience occurs in an
finite existent individual who is integrated in a world dominated by causal relations which
can be fully explained from an impersonal perspective, centred on the third person. This
perspective necessarily does not consider experience in its inner character and takes
everything under its sight as caught in a net of cause-effect relations fully explainable
within deterministic laws. The problem of experience is, then, the problem of explaining
the very fact of grasping something in its very inner aspect of assuming in ones
interiority and knowing it, an explanation which, however, must take into account the
fact that this experience is of someone integrated in a causal world. The problem of
experience show in all its complexity the mind-body problem, that is to say, the problem

30
In this point I follow Professor James Mensch, from the San Francis Xavier University in Antigonish
(Nova Scotia, Canada). He took part in the International Conference Jan Patocka (1907-1977) with the paper
Patockas Asubjective Phenomenology, Artificial Intelligence and the Mind-Body Problem. This paper
will soon be published in the periodical Focus Pragensis (presumably during the year 2008). It can be found
on-line in this address: http://people.stfx.ca/jmensch/Patocka%20and%20Artificial%20Intelligence.doc (the
menu of texts can be found on this page: http://people.stfx.ca/jmensch/Papers_You_Can_Download.html).
Our brief rapport is based on the text distributed to the attendants to the Conferences. All the possible
interpretation mistakes are however my own responsibility.

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998 I. ORTEGA, THE RELEVANCE OF JAN PATOCKAS

of the relationship between mental phenomena and bodily or cerebral ones. It is


also the specification of the mind-body problem as the problem of experience which helps
us understand in what sense Patockas phenomenology is relevant when considering this
problem. This relevance of Patockas thought lies concretely in his theses about appearing
as Such, posed within his project of an a-subjective phenomenology.
According to Mensch, the problem of experience has been approached in such a way
that we have tried to find a bridge between experience as such and the causal order of
the world. This search for a bridge has resulted in three different solutions. Two of them
have affirmed the total subordination and assumption of one into the another (which
involves its elimination) and the third one strives to find a positive relationship between
both aspects, without eliminating the actual reality of any of them. The first solution is
monistic materialism, which eliminates experience as such, reducing it to causal processes
(the latest version of this solution reduces experience to neuronal processes). The second
solution is monistic idealism, which takes the causal order as a creation of subjectivity.
The third solution includes interactive dualism or emergentism. We are not going to
explain these positions, already well known in contemporary debates on the subject. Instead,
we focus our attention on a presupposition common to them all and we see how Patocka
give us a hint about thinking the whole subject without affirming this presupposition.
This presupposition is precisely that there must be a bridge between appearing and
the causal order, that we need to translate somehow the characteristics of the one into
the other. What Patockas asubjective phenomenology helps us question is exactly the
necessity of such a presupposition to approach the mind-body problem. As we have seen,
Patocka explains that asubjective phenomenology leaves us before appearing as such,
which has its own legality, different from the (causal) legality of what appears. The
phenomenal order and the causal order are on different levels, each one has their own rules
and are not reducible to the other. To Patocka, both the causal and the phenomenal are
part of the one world, but both spheres keep their autonomy. It is true that Patocka himself
speaks of a possible relationship beween these spheres (Patocka speaks of a relationship
of co-originality, which would suggest a certain interactive dualism). However, this statement
does not say anything against the legal autonomy of each sphere and thus does not force
us to look for any bridge between them 31.
Thus, following Patockas thesis of the autonomy of appearing as such, we can say
that his philosophy provides us with arguments to be posed in the debate. Patockas
philosophy, in its affirmation of appearing as such, could give reasons for a certain
dualism which would not seek for any bridge at the same time that the unity of the
world is kept.

2.3. Jan Patocka and Religion (I): the manifestation of the world and Revelation

Another aspect in which Patockas phenomenology is relevant is the consideration of


the possibility of a religious revelation in the world. Once again, it is appearing as such
(and its structure) which give us hints for this issue 32. Asubjective phenomenology states
that the analysis of phenomena affirms the primacy of appearing over being (which is

31
In any case, we can take the theme of appearing as such and explore its potentialities for thinking
the mind-body problem.
32
Here I follow the above quoted article of JUAN MANUEL GARRIDO, Appearing as such in Patockas
A-Subjective Phenomenology, especially the p. 136.

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disclosed by appearing, whatever the relationship in the ontological order) and this
appearing leads us to affirm the world as an a priori of subjectivity. The affirmation of
the primacy of appearing has a serious metaphysical consequence which can be better
exposed if we compare Patockas thesis about the primacy of appearing with Heideggers
one about the primacy of being in its self-hiding disclosure. To Heidegger, as it is well
known, the appearing of any entity necessarily presupposes the previous disclosure of
being, a disclosure that is inevitably accompanied by a self-hiding of being. Any appearing
is then, according to Heidegger, a necessarily incomplete one since the foundation is never
fully revealed. We are not going to analyse in detail this thesis but this succinct description
enables us to see the fundamental difference with Patockas view. In Patocka there is a
primacy of appearing, it is appearing what first discloses itself and opens the way to the
world. This does not mean of course that everything is revealed by appearing. As we have
already seen, the disclosure of the world is never complete. Nevertheless, there is an
essential difference between these two views. To Heidegger, there is a hiding in manifestation
itself, and thus, we may say, a certain source of mistrust concerning the revelation of
being. In the core of reality there is a self-hiding. To Patocka, to the contrary, manifestation
is, in its inner structure, essentially transparent. The never-exhausting richness of the
world is in no way in Patocka the result of the self-hiding of being but of the richness of
manifestation itself 33. Another important point is that manifestation, although autonomous,
can only happen to human beings. Human beings are not the source of appearing (at
most a necessary presupposition) but they are the place of appearing 34.
These two theses, the primacy of appearing as transparent manifesting and humanity
as the place of appearing, are of fundamental importance when considering the possibility
of a religious revelation in the world. It is also relevant when thinking the eventual place
of the human being in such a revelation. The relevance of Patockas thought in this subject
touches the fields of both philosophy and theology. From a strictly philosophical point
of view, Patockas theses state a world which, in its very manifestation, is open to be
considered as a revelation. From a theological (and especially apologetically) standpoint,
Patockas views provide us with a metaphysical basis to defend the reasonability of a
religious faith based upon a Revelation from the divine.

2.4. Jan Patocka and Religion (II): the possibilities of theism and atheism

Finally, Jan Patockas philosophy gives us hints for considering the possibility
of a theistic or atheistic worldview. In our opinion, Patockas phenomenology provides us
with a philosophical bases for both positions. His philosophy is, in our view, agnostic,
in that it does not say anything about the problem of God. It is true that we can detect
christian elements in his positions, like the consideration of the world as revealing
itself 35 and the thesis that human existence is constituted to transcend its own

33
It is true that in some occasions Patocka seems to accept Patockas view (like, for instance in his
seminars about the problem of Europe). However, these statements are in a context in which Patocka is
explaining other heideggerian concepts which he accepts. This is the case, for example, of the concept of
Gestell, which Patocka takes to explain contemporary crisis. In his explanation, Patocka explains the self-
disclosure and hiding of being. However, Patockas own views about appearing in many other writings
make us sustain the interpretative thesis that Patocka does not accept Heideggers position on manifestation.
34
This point is also briefly but extraordinarily exposed by Juan Manuel Garrido in his already quoted
article.
35
See once again JUAN MANUEL GARRIDO, Appearing as such in Patockas A-Subjective Phenomenology.

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finitude 36. However, these statements do not necessarily involve the affirmation of a theistic
thesis, which is never explicitly posed. It is also true that in his philosophy of history
Christianity is seriously considered as a socio-political formation which gave shape in a
certain historical phase to the ideal of life within the truth. Nevertheless, the consideration
of a socio-political phenomenon is not the same as considering it from a strictly religious
perspective which, to our knowledge, is not present in Patocka.
In our view, Patockas phenomenology enables us to hold both a theistic and an
atheistic worldview. This means also that Patockas philosophy leaves space for human
freedom on this topic. We are not forced to hold a theistic or atheistic position if we
accept Patockas metaphysical considerations about appearing and the world. Patockas
considerations speak about a phenomenon whose analysis leaves us before appearing as
such. The analysis of appearing as such in its structure discloses the world as an original
proto-structure necessarily presupposed by the structure of the phenomenon itself. This
movement by virtue of which we analyse the phenomenon and stand before the world
as a totality is the movement of transcending the given. The discovery of the world is the
result, then, of an essential capability of transcendence present within the very dynamism
of human existence. Jan Patockas thought clearly and unambiguously affirms the reality
of transcendence in human life. To Patocka, the human being is not enclosed within his
instincts or interests (which in his view correspond to the first and second movement)
but he keeps within himself the capability of transcending them. However, from this
transcendence does not necessarily follow a transcendent. Patockas phenomenology
leaves us before the world as a totality. We can endlessly explore this totality, but nothing
forces us a priori to pose the existence of God. The unending richness of the world can
be that of an autonomous self-sustained world and human transcendence can be opened
to the spectacle of a self-disclosing world 37. On the other hand, this atheistic worldview
is not an inevitable consequence. Human existence could discover in the world an absolute
foundation or a personal interpellation from transcendence. In any case, what is most
important on our opinion is that neither possibility is excluded. This means that the
human being is intelectually free to explore the world, hold a theistic or atheistic (or
agnostic) worldview, of keeping or changing it and of discussing it. This consequence on
the metaphysical level of the worldview is of fundamental importance on the political
level. If the disclosure of the world does not force us to hold a particular position concerning
the problem of God, then there is no reason to impose any particular view 38. This political
consequence goes beyond the field of religious tolerance. If the world is a totality which
is never fully comprehended, then no particular worldview can be imposed 39.

36
A good exposition of this topic (though unfortunately not easy to find) can be found in Filip Karfk,
Das Unendlichwerden durch die Endlichkeit. Die Transzendenz und die Bewegung der Hingabe den
Anderen bei Jan Patocka, Documents of the CTS (CTS 98/04), Center for Theoretical Studies and Center
for Phenomenological Research, April 1998.
37
It should be noted that this atheistic worldview would not be a scientist or deterministic one (at
least, it would not be necessarily so). The autonomous world to which we would be open would always be
richer than what could be comprehended by our knowledge and would always be open to further research.
It goes without saying that a theistic world view would similarly be open to research.
38
We leave aside the fact that, in our view, the necessity of respect would also be obvious even if this
metaphysical openness were not present. This would make us enter in the fields of political theory and
we would go beyond the limits of this paper. The political consequence that we want to express here is to
be seen as an a fortiori argument in favour of religious tolerance.
39
Once again, this is a metaphysical a fortiori argument.

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3. FINAL REMARKS

The aim of this article has been to show the potentialities present in Patockas thought
in fields relevant to science and religion. Our intention has been to invite scholars to take
Patockas phenomenology into account when discussing religious or scientific issues. It
has not been our aim to analyse these topics in detail, but to present the basic lines in
which Patockas positions can be relevant. As we have said, Patocka never dealt with this
topic and thus it does not immediately draw the attention of those who do research in
fields related to science and religion. However, we hope that this paper has shown that
his thought deserves attention.

Presidente Alvear, 10, 8-A IVN ORTEGA RODRGUEZ


35006 Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain)
ivan.ortega.rodriguez@gmail.com

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

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FARAH
. ANT. N: ACTIVE RECEPTION
OF EUROPEAN THOUGHT
JOSEP PUIG MONTADA
Universidad Complutense de Madrid

ABSTRACT: Farah. Ant.n (1874-1922) was a playwright and a journalist and in both activities he was
socially and politically motivated. He always aimed at a laic state. In the beginning he believed it could
comprise those lands of the Ottoman Empire from Istanbul to Cairo, later he focused in Egypt, although
he may never have abandoned the first idea. He disseminated his ideas through his journal al-Jmia.
His social concerns shaped his views of such a state and its people. Farah. Ant.n read, translated, and
explained European writers. His choices point to these concerns, namely on natural goodness and nat-
ural freedom (Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, Jean Jacques Rousseau), on religious freedom and freedom
of conscience (Lev Tolstoy), on public instruction (Jules Simon). His ideal society should have an open
approach to religion, inspired by A. Comte and, in particular, by E. Renan and his works, some of which
he translated. His attitude toward Nietzsche was double-sided: He could not accept his moral doctrines
but he felt attracted by his doctrine of power of will that supposedly had brought the United States to
their magnificence and that could help the Arab countries to reach a new age. However those values
as represented by the French liberal tradition were more decisive.
KEY WORDS: Farah. Ant.n (1874-1922), journal al-Jmia, League, modern translations into Arabic.

Farah
. Ant.n y la recepcin activa del pensamiento europeo
RESUMEN: Farah. Ant.n (1874-1922) fue autor teatral y periodista, comprometido social y polticamente
en las dos actividades. Su ideal era un estado laico, y en un principio crea que este estado podra com-
prender los territorios del Imperio Otomano, extendidos desde Estambul hasta El Cairo, pero luego se
centr en Egipto, aunque es probable que nunca abandonase el primer objetivo. Difundi sus ideas
sobre todo a travs de la revista al-Gmia, La liga. Sus inquietudes sociales influan en cmo deba
ser este estado y sus gentes. Farah. Ant.n lea, traduca e interpretaba escritores europeos. La elec-
cin de los escritores refleja sus inquietudes, sea acerca de la bondad y libertad naturales (Bernardin
de Saint-Pierre, Jean Jacques Rousseau), de la libertad religiosa, y de conciencia (Lev Tolstoy), o de la
educacin pblica (Jules Simon). La sociedad ideal aceptara religin en una forma abierta, y se inspi-
raba en los escritos de Ernest Renan, varios de los cuales tradujo al rabe. Su relacin con F. Nietsche
fue ambivalente. Farah. Ant.n rechazaba sus doctrinas morales pero se senta atrado por su fe en el
poder de la voluntad, doctrina que le pareca haba llevado a los Estados Unidos de Amrica a su esplen-
dor y que ayudara a los pases rabes a alcanzarlo tambin. Sin embargo, los valores representados
por la tradicin liberal francesa resultaban ms importantes.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Farah. Ant.n (1874-1922), revista al-Gmia, La liga, traducciones modernas al
rabe.

The turn of the XX century witnessed a dynamic movement of renewal in Egypt.


Translations from Western authors played an important role and they included many
areas of knowledge. A large number of journals of various kinds were founded in those
pioneering years 1. Society revealed new trends, and the literary Renaissance, nahd.a,

1
In the XIX century, almost 200 journals appeared in Egypt. ABDELGHANI AHMED-BIOUD, 3200 revues
et journaux arabes, de 1800 1965, Paris: Bib. Nationale, 1969. IBRHM ABDUH, Tat.awwur as. -s. ih.fa al-
Mis.rya, 1798-1981, 4th ed., Cairo: Muassasat Sijill al-Arab, 1982. Cf. also ELIAS HANNA ELIA, La presse arabe,
Paris: Maisonneuve-Larose, 1993.

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began. Individuals were able to be creative in this environment; the purpose of this article
is to study one of them, Farah. Ant.n. He was a novelist, playwright and journalist, but
the scope of this article is limited to his activity as main editor of the journal Al-Jmia.
The limitation has the advantage of dealing with authors and works that F. Ant.n explicitly
read, interpreted, and often translated. In this way, I shall try to show how F. Ant. n
created his own intellectual world, and how this world changed under the influence of
the authors he read, explained and translated.

1. LIFE AND EDUCATION

Farah. Ant.n was born in Tripoli, Lebanon, in 1874 to a family that belonged to the
Greek Orthodox Church 2. From 12 to 16 years old, he was at the Kiftn boarding school,
the Orthodox monastery situated in the hills above Tripoli. In 1908, when F. Ant.n lived
in New York he would leave his dark room in Brookline and walk to the gardens of Coney
Island to have a glimpse of his days at Kiftn.
The natural beauty of Kiftn, the school days, the students, the very history of Kift. n,
I have postponed the talk about all this until the moment comes, and when I shall write
the history of my life, it will be its opening chapter (J5: 1 [1906], p. 81).

Farah. Ant.n acknowledged the great influence that Kiftn exerted on him. He recalls
the centers tolerance. The president of the school was a Protestant, the director, a Maronite,
the teacher of Arabic language and literature, a Muslim, the administrator, a Maronite.
Although the school belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church, only one teacher was
Orthodox, and the faculty was as diverse as the sum of its students.
At Kiftn he learned Turkish, English, and above all French whose literature fascinated
him. His formal education was limited to this period. Afterwards, he would be a self-
taught person. His lack of preparation in science would cause most of his popularizing
work to be rather weak. However, in literature or philosophy, the consequences of his
auto didactical training would not be negative. Insofar as he was reading new authors
and appreciating them, he was also writing articles on them, and throughout the issues
of the journal we can follow his intellectual development.
The Ottoman Lebanon could not offer to the gifted F. Ant.n the opportunities needed
to develop his talent. So, as many educated Syrians and Lebanese did, he decided to
immigrate to Egypt, a country that was flourishing and offered opportunities to Arab
professionals from many fields. Journalism was one of the growing fields and F. Ant.n
would be one of its pioneers in the Arab world. Journalism did not have its present
orientation. Instead, it had an educational orientation, and was a way of disseminating
knowledge and literature.
In 1897 he moved to Alexandria and joined the newspaper Al-Ahrm which was founded
in 1876 by Bishra Taql. On March 15, 1899 he launched the journal Al-Jmia
al-Uthmniyya (The Ottoman league), but after a few months he changed its title to
simply Al-Jmia. He might have realized that his Egyptian readers were not very keen
of being reunited under Ottoman rule but it does not mean that he abandoned his
Ottomanism. Let us remind, for instance, that as late as in January 1910 he celebrated
the newly proclaimed Ottoman constitution (J7: 2, pp. 67-78).

2
For his biography, see DONALD M. REID, with indication of sources in The Odyssey of Farah. Ant.n.
A Syrian Christians Quest for Secularism (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica Inc, 1975), p. 3, footnote 1.

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The journal went on irregularly until October 1904. After almost two years of silence,
F. Ant.n published it again in New York, where he had moved following other Syrian
Christian immigrants who were his potential readers. The American experience failed
and F. Ant.n returned to Egypt where he published the last issues of the journal in 1909,
in Cairo. He suspended it the following year, but remained active mainly as a playwright
until his death on June 6, 1922.
The pages of the journal were mainly his writing. His sister Rosa and his brother-in-
law Niql H . addd, were the other main contributors, more Niql than Rosa. In the
journal Farah. Ant.n would publish articles on the most various subjects, from politics
to technical inventions, and published his own novels too. His sources were mainly French
periodicals: Answering a reader in 1903, F. Ant. n says that he had been reading Tan,
Dbat, Le matin, Le Figaro, Laurore, Le gaulois, La revue de Paris, La revue des revues,
and sometimes La revue des deux mondes (J4: 4, 1903, p. 296), but the structure of Al-
Jmia and the latter is strikingly similar. Another one of his sources were encyclopedias,
as La Grande Encyclopdie 3.
What interests us here is the dimension his journal as disseminating instrument
of Western modern thought, which was either explicated by philosophers or wrapped
up in literary works. From his days at Kiftn on, Farah. Ant. n was an avid reader of
French literature, and very interested in French secular thinkers. In his journal he wrote
about French authors as well as he published his own translations of French master
works.

2. ENTHUSIASM FOR THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

In the September 1899 issue of Al-Jmia al-Uthmnya, F. Ant. n announced the


publication of the novel Awakening of the lion, a historical novel by the famous French
writer Alexandre Dumas (J1:12, p. 228). Dumas pre (1802-1870) was best known for
novels of the historical genre, and of high adventure. F. Ant.n observed that the novel
deals with true personalities of the French life during the Revolution. His choice of the
title was very free because the original one of Dumas novel is not other than Ange Pitou,
Paris, A. Cadot, 1851, 8 vol. in-8, the third part of the series Mmoires dun mdecin.
Some English translations render it as Storming of the Bastille. Dumas wrote the novel
with Auguste Maquet, between 1850 and 1851; it focuses on the beginning of the French
Revolution, 1789.
He went on publishing the novel in form of supplements to each issue, from Al-Jmia
1:13 up to 2:7. With the issue 2:8, November 1900, he started publishing his translation
of Dumas Attack of the lion, being its continuation. He meant the novel La comtesse
de Charny, the fourth volume of the series 4. Alexandre Dumas wrote it between 1852 and
1855 with Auguste Maquet too, and the novel completes the narrative of the Revolution,
until the execution of Louis XVI. The Arabic translation of the first part of the novel
occupied the supplements of the journal as far as the issue of April 1901 (2: 22-23-24),
and Jmia of December 1902 (3: 10-11-12), had a supplement of 116 pages containing
the second part, to which F. Ant.n gave the title The prey of the lion.

3
Inventaire raisonn des sciences, des lettres, et des arts, a 31-volume encyclopedia published in Paris
from 1886 to 1902 by H. Lamirault, and later by the Socit anonyme de la grande encyclopdie. F. Ant.n
quotes it as one of his sources in Ibn Rushd wa-falsafatu-hu (Alexandria, January 1, 1903), p. viii.
4
Paris: A. Cadot, 1855, 19 vol. in-8.

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Later (October 1906), when Al-Jmia was published in New York, he would translate
Dumas again, namely, the first part of Kean ou dsordre et genie, a drama (Jmia 5: 8,
pp. 318-322).
Farah. Ant. n shared the enthusiasm of many Arab intellectuals for the French
revolution. He found some similarity between the Ottoman Empire of his time and France
before the Revolution 5. Therefore the subject should interest the politically motivated
readers and, in any case, Dumas narrative would add enough adventure to attract all
kind of readers. As for his enthusiasm for the French revolution, F. Ant.n would give it
up over the years, but he always would retain the fascination of the events.

3. J. J. ROUSSEAU, NATURAL GOODNESS AND THE POWER OF LOVE

Other French writers translated by F. Ant.n in the journal were Jean de la Bruyre
(1645-1696), and Jacques Henri Bernardin de Saint Pierre (1737-1814). Victor Hugo
(1802-1885) was the focus of a long article in Al-Jmia of March 1902 (J3: 7, pp. 429-
452) which included a translation of his poem Napoleon I 6, and a poem by A. Shawq,
but no further text of Hugo was published in the journal.
De la Bruyre is the author of Les caractres (1687) which is made of observations
about the society of his lifetime and criticizes the royal court, the nobility, the clergy and
even the king. His observations are expressed by short sentences, like aphorisms. F. Ant.n
translated some of them and published in two sections of the journal called Strong food
for the stomach (J1:1, 1:2).
The December 1900 issue (Jmia, 2: 9, pp. 505-533) opened with an article entitled
Where do we find the truth, and how we do find it, or The Indian Hut. La chaumire
indienne The Indian Hut is a work of Bernardin de Saint-Pierre published in 1790 by
Didot le Jeune in Paris. F. Ant.n explains that Napoleon loved the novel so much that
he would ask B. de Saint-Pierre when he would write a second Indian Hut. He gives
us the translation of the first chapter.
About thirty years ago, a society of learned Englishmen was founded at London
who undertook to go to the different parts of the world in search of all such scientific
information, as might serve to enlighten mankind or contribute to their happiness.

The novel criticizes the academies and learned societies. The scientist sent to India
to find solution to some scientific problems eventually meets a good-hearted pariah who
lives isolated from the world, but happy in company of his wife and a cat. More chapters
of the novel were published in 2: 10, pp. 577-588, although not the entire novel. In the
August 1901 issue (3: 1, p. 48), F. Ant.n offered the novel in form of a book as a present
to subscribers.
One year later, Al-Jmia in August 1902, F. Ant.n announced a new project in Arabic
language in order to satisfy the need for good and pleasant literature in this language.
His project consisted of translating the best quality French philosophical novels of belles-
lettres (J3: 9, p. 602). Each issue of Al-Jmia would deliver parts of a novel, starting

5
When the translation was printed for the second time, he wrote an introduction explaining why he
chose the book. English translation in RIF KHR, Al-fikr al-arab al-h.adth: thr ath-Thawra al-Faransya
f tawjh as-siys wa-l-ijtim, translated as: Modern Arab thought: Channels of the French revolution to the
Arab East (Princeton, N.J.: Kingston Press, 1983), pp. 172-175.
By T. anius Abd al-Muh.arrir, first published in the journal Al-Bas.r.
6

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with Paul et Virginie of Bernardin de Saint-Pierre (written 1788). The novel records the
fate of a child of nature corrupted by the false sentimentality that prevailed at the time
among the upper classes of France.
F. Ant. n then writes about the life of Bernardin de Saint-Pierre and prints two
drawings, one of his, and the other of Jean Jacques Rousseau. He comments: We have
put in this section the drawing of Bernardin de Saint-Pierre at the side of the one of
Master Jean Jacques Rousseau (J3: 9, p. 607) and tells us a story. B. de Saint-Pierre and
Rousseau were walking and B. de Saint-Pierre asked him Are you Saint-Preux? who
was the preceptor of Julie dEtanges, the female protagonist of Rousseaus Julie ou La
Nouvelle Hlose, roman pistolaire (1761). Rousseau answered Not exactly, but I wish
I were Saint-Preux. F. Ant.n wonders if someone would have asked B. de Saint-Pierre
Are you the old man who tells the story of Paul and Virginie? would he have answered
in similar terms.
F. Ant.ns translation of Paul et Virginie appeared as an annex to the December 1902
issue (3: 10-11-12), which also contained the last part of La comtesse de Charny of Dumas.
As an introduction he wrote on the counter page:
In the European languages, there are such writings that their wise men, philosophers
and scholars compose to enlighten the minds, to refine the intellects, and to improve the
moral characters, which are their most famous compositions (Alexandria, September 10,
1902).

Since such works have great influence in the education of the European nations, he
feels his duty is to translate them into Arabic. He defines Paul et Virginie as a literary,
philosophical, and naturalist novel with which he started his project to give to the Arab
readers a new genre, the novel, and a secular doctrine. The novel was independently
published in Alexandria, on September 10, 1902, so that F. Ant.ncould reveal its reception;
he devoted pages 654-665 of the same third volume (December 1902) to Poets of Egypt
and readers of Al-Jmia between Paul and Virginia. The truth of Viriginia.
The effort of Al-Jmia to translate French literature, he reflects, has not been futile
and the readers of the Arabic translation of Paul et Virginie had appreciated its value. The
readers sent letters and telegrams to the journal congratulating F. Ant.n for the publication
of the book; he thought that the poets should express their feelings too. Thus, he asked
several poets to write classical poems. Ah.mad al-Kshif (1878-1948) 7 of Qurshya, Ah.mad
Muh. arram (1877-1945) 8 of Dalanjt and Mus.t.afa Lut.f al-Manfalt. (1876-1924) 9, all
three renowned poets, sent him poems inspired by the novel.
If Ant.n printed the portraits of Bernardin de Saint-Pierre and Jean J. Rousseau
together, his admiration for both of them was comparable. On his way to the United
States in 1906, he disembarked in Marseille, traversed France and embarked in Le Havre,
and visited different places.
On the train I was like wonder-struck, I moved from one window to the other and
said: This is Gods Paradise on earth. At times I tried to forget myself on the train, and
once twenty hours elapsed while I was looking at the country, like a panorama displayed
in front of me to the infinite (J5: 1, p. 35).

F. Ant.n visited Chambry in the French Alps and he describes the visit as one of the
most important events of his trip. What moved him to visit the place was his profound

7
Diwan, Cairo, 1987.
8
Diwan, Cairo, 1963.
9
An-Naz.art, Cairo: Mat.baat al-Rah.mnyah, 1923.

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admiration for Rousseau (1712-1778), which he shared with Tolstoy (J5:1, p. 36). For
15 years he had wanted to go to Chambry, the place where Rousseau met Madame
Franoise-Louise de Warens, a French Catholic baroness thirteen years his elder who
would later become his lover 10. Rousseau who had been born in Calvinist Geneva in 1712,
came to Chambry in 1732. Under the protection of Madame de Warens, Rousseau
converted to Catholicism, but his view that man is good by nature conflicted with the
doctrine of original sin and his theology of nature led to the condemnation of the book
in both Calvinist Geneva and Catholic Paris.
Rousseau left Chambry for Paris in 1741. In 1754, he returned to Geneva where he
reconverted to Calvinism. After spending two years in England, with help of D. Hume,
Rousseau went back to France in 1767, and died in Paris in 1172. Among his works there
is his autobiography, Les confessions, composed of 12 books; books I-VI were published
in 1782, and books VII-XII, in 1789.
F. Ant.n tells us (J5:1, p. 36) that he had read Les confessions and that he was longing
to see the place where Rousseau and Madame de Warens had dwelled, the house of Les
Charmettes, situated in a forest valley south of Chambry. Rousseau said of the house:
Ici commence le court bonheur de ma vie; ici, viennent les paisibles, mais rapides
moments qui mont donn le droit de dire que jai vcu (Livre VI, 1736). F. Ant.n writes
in Al-Jmia about Chambry, about the love story of Rousseau and Madame de Warens
and about her influence on Rousseau and describes his visit to the place full of religious
devotion:
I arrived in Chambry at midnight, I spent the rest of the night in the Htel de la
poste, and since I set my foot on the earth of Chambry I started to feel the fever of Jean
Jacques pervading my joints. I told to myself: Tomorrow Ill see the house where Jean
Jacques slept, Ill have the shadow of the trees that gave him shadow, Ill tread the earth
that he treaded, and Ill hear the singing of the birds and the sound of the creeks that he
heard (J5:1, p. 41).

F. Ant.n visited Les Charmettes early in the morning; when he walked the doorstep,
he felt a shivering in his body, and greeted Rousseau in his imagination: Jean Jacques,
here is some one among thousand or a million people harmed by your principles, he
comes to complain you. For 15 years I have wished to visit you and here I am in your
house. He visited the house reliving in his imagination the life of Rousseau in the rooms,
and then he looked at the visitors book, where he added his name and the comment on
my way heading to America.
F. Ant.n was impressed by the personality of Madame de Warens, and the passionate
love between her and Rousseau, but he was also interested in Rousseaus teachings, and
he had in mind to translate his works (J5: 1, p. 37). However, F. Ant.n did not translate
any of Rousseaus texts; maybe he knew that the readers would not like his pedagogical
novels. No doubt they preferred more adventure, as in Dumass historical novels, o
romantic love, as in Bernardin de Saint-Pierres Paul et Virginie.

4. LEV TOLTSTOY, AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

If F. Ant. n mentioned Lev Tolstoy in relation to their common admiration for


Rousseau, Tolstoy was object also of his admiration. The October 1900 issue reproduced

10
Mmoires de madame de Warens et de Claude Anet, pour servir de suite aux Confessions de J. J.
Rousseau, Chambry, 1786.

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a drawing of Tolstoy with the title The famous philosopher Tolstoy whom the Russian
Holy Synod excommunicated this year (Jmia 2: 7, p. 369).
Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy (1828-1910) is not only one of the greatest of all novelists,
particularly noted for his masterpieces War and Peace and Anna Karenina but also a moral
philosopher. In the 1880s Tolstoy wrote also philosophical works such as A Confession
and What I Believe, which was banned in 1884. His troubles with the Synod of the Orthodox
Church intensified in 1889, after publishing The Kreutzer Sonata, which portrays an intense
conflict between sexual desire and moral constraint 11. Tolstoy was forced to write Epilogue
to The Kreutzer Sonata in 1890 in order to explain his unorthodox views. However, the
prosecution continued. After he published Resurrection in 1899, he was excommunicated
for the first time. Al-Jmia informed that to this purpose Joannicius archbishop of Klin
sent a letter to all the bishops of Russia on March 31, 1900. The decree of the Synod for
the second excommunication was issued on February 24, 1901 12.
F. Ant.n devoted to Tolstoy an article which begins pointing out the development of
Russia in recent times (October 1900) and the flourishing of scientists and philosophers.
In the forefront of them is Count Tolstoy in whom the Russian soul has risen to the
degrees of wisdom and has proven that the rise of the Russians is true, not superficial,
and apparent, like it is in the Oriental countries (J2: 7, p. 370).

For F. Ant.n the Russian soul has yet to be discovered, enormous forces are hidden
in its profound bents, and this soul has brought out the figure of Tolstoy. F. Ant.n gives
a short biography of Tolstoy, summarizes his views on religion, society and fine arts, and
underlines his pacifism, either on the subject of the Transvaal war or on that of the
redemption of Alsace, surrendered by France to Prussia after the 1870 war.
F. Ant.n supported the cause of the Boers and their leader Kruger, against the British
invasion, and mentioned that the Boers sent a delegation to the United States. Tolstoy,
who sympathized with the Boers, was asked to send a telegram wishing them success
and F. Ant.n comments:
Tolstoy gave this weird answer: I cannot wish the Boer delegation to be successful
because their success depends on the intervention of the United States, and their
intervention will drag war between them and England. If I call on the Boers to be free,
it will be like calling on ending a war by means of another one (J2: 7, p. 372).

F. Ant.n does not disclose us his sources of information, usually French journals, but
he read only French, and since he translated the letter, which Andrei Vasilevich Laptev
[ ] sent to Tolstoy from Baku on October 6, 1899 and the
answer which Tolstoy wrote, therefore his ultimate source of information was this booklet:
propos de Rsurrection, lettre dA. V. Laptev et rponse du Cte. Lon Tolsto. Traduit
sur les manuscrits originaux par Paul Boyer et Charles Salomon, Paris: Perrin, 1900 13.

11
Jmia of June 1903 reported in an article The Kreutzer Sonata that the journal Manz.ir had
published an Arabic translation by Rafawl Sadah in 1902 (J4: 4, pp. 256-257).
12
The text of the first excommunication was published in J2: 7 (1901), pp. 379-380, and the second
in J2: 10 (1901), pp. 648-652, the latter was accompanied by letters of protest, of his friends and his wife
Countess Sophia, who sent a letter to the Synode on March 11, 1901.
F. Ant. n added that Reuter, the news agency, had named him main instigator of the revolution
against the Czar, p. 651.
13
Paul Jean Marie Boyer (1864-1949) and Charles Salomon (1862-1936) are well known French Slavic
scholars. Solomon met Tolstoy in 1893, and he later introduced Boyer to him, who wrote about his visits
to Tolstoy in Yasnaya Polyana (1901 and 1902), cf. Chez Tolsto. Entretiens Iasnaa Poliana, Paris: Institut
dtudes slaves, 1950.

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F. Ant.n considered the letter as well as the answer weird too and exclaimed, the
weirdest is that Tolstoy borrowed from Laptev the main ideas for his famous novel
Resurrection (Al-Bath, J2: 7, p. 378). He added an extract of the excommunication decree
(pp. 379-380) and finished his article regretting the resultant conflict between philosophy
and religion because philosophers and men of religion are leaders of other people who
fell in perplexity when they both dispute.
F. Ant.n found Tolstoy mistaken in his exaggerate avowal Do not fight violence
with violence, and blamed him for bringing doubts and despair among the neediest.
Nevertheless, those who excommunicated Tolstoy were wrong because persecution
strengthens philosophers in their claims and principles. Moreover, freedom of thinking
is one of mans natural rights (J2: 7, p. 380).
When F. Ant.n wrote the article for the October issue, he had not read any of Tosltoys
books, maybe some fragments, but he soon acquired a copy of Resurrection. In less than
a week he read its 593 pages in small print (J2: 9, p. 534). He gives the information in
the December issue and the indication about the number of pages shows that he was
reading the French translation by Thodore de Wyzewa, Paris: Perrin, 1900.
Resurrection (1899) is the last of Tolstoys major novels. It tells the story of Nekhlyudov,
a nobleman, and his attempt to redeem the suffering that he inflicted on Katusha, a peasant
girl who ends up a prisoner in Siberia. Resurrection is at the same time a panoramic
description of social life in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century, reflecting its authors
outrage at the social injustices of the world in which he lived.
F. Ant.n summarized the novel, translated some selected fragments, and spoke about
his feelings on the moral as well as on the social issues of the novel. He insisted that the
injustices denounced by Tolstoy were not confined to the Russian society, but were universal.
He finally thanked Tolstoy for three reasons: His book caused Ant.n to write the article
which he considers his best until now; it made him live in his spiritual company as long
as he was writing the article; and it prompted him to write summaries of the best books
(J2: 9, p. 553).
Thus his predilection for Tolstoy was related not only to moral, but also to social
concerns that they both shared. Such concerns were also present in the life and works
of the second Russian author translated by F. Ant. n, Maxim Gorky (1868-1936) who
wrote stories of tramps and social outcasts. F. Ant.n partially translated his short story
Malva 14. Malva, the name of the restless wife of a fisherman, seeks out love from every
man she meets. Vassili is a peasant who left his village to earn a little money to support
his wife and children. For a while he sends small sums of money home, but gradually
the village and the old life fade away. He ceases to think of them. His son Iakov seeks
him and work for himself for a season. Later, he falls, like the others, under the spell of
Malva. Ant.ns translation appeared in J7:1 (1909) 60-64 and J7: 2 (1910) 121-128, but
was incomplete because they were the last pages of Al-Jmia.

5. MINOR RELEVANCE OF GERMAN AND ENGLISH LITERATURE

In al-Jmia of September 1900 (2: 6, p. 317), Zk Mbr contributed with a review


of Friedrich Schillers Kabale und Liebe. The piece had been translated into Arabic by

14
MAKSIM GORKIJ ( ), Malva [La vieille Izerguille], Paris: Librairie universelle,
ca. 1906.

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Nql Fayyd. and Najb Nasm T . ard., and had been performed at the Russian Consulate
in Beirut for three evenings. The translators complimented al-Jmia with a free copy
(2: 6, p. 360). Zk Mbr worked on the translation and adaptation of theater plays. Like
F. Ant.n, he worked for the actor Salma al-H . ijz (1855-1917) and his troupe and, for
15

instance, he adapted Angelo of Victor Hugo 16.


Intrigue and Love (1784), is one of Schillers more famous works. Major Ferdinand von
Walter and Louisa Miller are desperately in love, but he is a nobleman and she is part of
the bourgeoisie, daughter to a music teacher. Ferdinands father, the heartless Premier
Minister, wants him to marry Lady Milford, mistress to the Prince. Ferdinand refuses,
wanting to marry Louisa, and the Baron tries to force his sons hand. The Baron conspires
with Wurm, the court secretary (who wants Louisa for himself), and soon they spin a web
of intrigue that drives the lovers apart, Louisas parents into jail, and the Princes mistress
across the border.
In his review, Z. Mbr gave the summary of the work and pointed to the fact that
the translation was done from the French he mentioned A. Dumas as the French
translator not from the German. He criticized the translators for distorting the original
meaning of Schillers piece. Najm Nasm T . ard., one of the translators responded to the
criticism in the December 1900 issue (Jmia, 2: 9, pp. 525-528) and Mbr wrote once
again about it, in the January 1901 issue (J2: 10, p. 624). He realized that the disagreements
arose because T . ard read the French translation by Ad. Regnier (Paris: L. Hachette, 1859)
and Mbr, the one by A. Dumas (Poissy: impr. de G. Olivier, 1847), and no one read the
German original.
The anecdote is representative of the dominance of French literature and philosophy
in Egypt and the Levant at the time. The only example of German literature is this
summary of Schillers Kabale und Liebe. We find few references to English literature,
one is in the January 1902 issue. F. Ant. n wrote about The philosopher Bacon and the
poet Shakespeare and discussed the old issue whether Francis Bacon is the author of
some of the latters works (Jmia, 3: 6, p. 351-368). In fact, the reference has an antecedent
in the December 1901 issue, which publishes a letter sent by Ilys, Elias, sw (Jmia,
3: 5, pp. 333-334). E. saw (1882-1941, a Syrian Orthodox Christian living in Cairo),
wrote to the journal about having read an article in the Egyptian Gazette, the author of
which suspiciously signs as Peakespeare. sw says that it is useful to reproduce the
article, and he does it:
One day I borrowed from the Khedivial Library an Arabic book in old handwriting.
While I was turning its pages, I came across some pages written in English, signed by
Mr. John Bent at Helwan on January 2, 1624. The mentioned Mr. Bent had come to
Egypt as a secretary of Lord Bacon. In his letter, he reports of the travel of Lord Bacon
to Egypt; and how physicians advised him to travel to the South of France for a change
of air. He came to Marseille, where he met a number of educated Venetians heading for
Alexandria, and in their company, he travelled to Alexandria, then to Rosetta, and Bulaq.
From there he reached the prince of the Mamelukes, presenting himself as son of the
deceased queen Elisabeth, and a relative of King James (J3: 5, p. 333).

The text goes on affirming that Bacon is the author of Shakespeares works. We also
read that Bacon advised the Egyptians how to reform the country, or that he learned
Arabic and read the Thousand and One Nights. The forgery goes so far as to give the call

15
JACOB M. LANDAU, Studies in the Arab Theater and Cinema (Philadephi: U Penn, 1958), pp. 70-72.
16
ATIA ABUL NAGA, Les sources franaises du thtre gyptien (1870-1939) (Alger: SNED, 1972), pp. 235-
237.

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number of the book: 1056 gm 356 lif. Maybe the falsifier did not know that there was
a printed catalogue of the library already at that time 17.
In this article I rarely deal with authors whose works F. Ant.n did not read. One of
them is John Ruskin, the English Romantic writer and painter (1819-1900). F. Ant. n
devoted a study of him in Al-Jmia of January 1901, entitled The famous John Ruskin
invites men to love nature and beauty, in which he included a poem by Ab Tammm
H. abb ibn Aws, at. -T
. (IX cent.) on the spring season (J2: 10 [1901], pp. 561-572). The
article is mainly a biography of Ruskin and news on the spring festival in England. Ruskin
was a prolific writer 18, but F. Ant. n may have not read any of his works, and his
information came from French journals as the Revue des deux mondes.

6. JULES SIMON, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION

If we turn now to philosophy or writings of philosophical orientation, the situation


of French predominance is similar. His discovery of Nietzsche is tardy. He writes about
him for the first time in 1904 when the journal was published in New York: he allots him
several articles that are mainly translations. In any case, the French influence was early
and extended. Jules Simon is mentioned in the first issue of the journal (J1: 1, p. 4). Jules
Simon born Jules-Franois Suisse, was born in Lorient, 1814 and died in Paris, 1896. He
was active in the political life of his country, serving as representative to the National
Assembly and Senator, as minister and premier minister of the Third Republic, but his
active life was no obstacle to authoring many books on many subjects.
Simon was a freethinking deist, a committed Republican, yet rather conservative. If
there is a constant in his activity, it is no doubt his concern for public instruction, ducation
nationale. He pleaded for a free compulsory education; free means not excluding the
Church from running its own schools. As a philosopher he cannot be put on the footings
of Nietzsche, or Auguste Comte, the founder of Positivism, who interested F. Ant.n too.
The presence of Jules Simon is apparent throughout the various issues of the journal
until 1903 (In that year, February 1903, F. Ant.n wrote an article on Comte, J4: 1, pp. 15-
21). The issue June 1, 1899 contains the photography of Jules Simon and his biography
(J1: 6, pp. 96-98), The August 1900 issue has a notice about the planned monument to
him (J2: 5, p. 292) and the one August 1903 issue includes a photo of the monument and
information on the inaugural ceremony (J4: 5, p. 260). F. Ant. n called him The
philosopher of Al-Jmia and he said that he read many of his books:
There was a time, when I opened one of the books of Jules Simon, like Duty (Le
devoir, 1854), Woman in the XX century (La femme du vingtime sicle, 1891), The School
(LEcole, 1864), The Working Woman (LOuvrire, 1861), Political Freedom (La libert
politique, 1859?), etc. I opened it with such veneration as the clergymen approachs the

17
Fihrist al-kutub al-arabyah al-mah.fz.ah bi-l-Kutubkhanah al-Khidwyah, 7 vols., Cairo: Mat.baat
Uthmn Abd al-Razzq, 1301/1883-1308/1890. It is organized first by subjects, and then by titles following
the order of the alifate; books have a general number nimra ummya, and a particular number, nimra
khus.s.ya.
Since the subject seems to be history, I searched the section and found a lithographic print under the
closest call number: 23112 general and 1056 particular, vol. 5, p. 58. The print includes three travel accounts,
or rih.la: At-ta rf by Ibn Khladn (d. 1406), Al-wsit.a by Ah. mad Shidyq (1804-1887), and the rih.la of
H. asan Tawfq to Berlin.
18
E. T. COOK - A. WEDDERBURN (eds.), 39 vols., London: G. Allen; New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.,
1903-1912.

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sanctuary. Some years ago, I translated his book Woman in the XX Century (J4: 5 [August
1903], pp. 265-266).

Jules Simon was very pleased to give him permission to publish the translation, which
was partially printed in the journal. The first section of the book is entitled The True
Reform 19 and F. Ant.n refers to it at the very beginning of the journal, in March 1899.
Simon called on the women of the XX century to restore the family, which the women
of the two former generations had let fall down; to this purpose, woman had mainly to
relay on education, elle doit compter surtout sur lducation, instrument de toutes les
reformes sociales.
In his opening article, F. Ant.n insisted that true reform of any country is based on
education, which develops in two fields, family and school. School education stands on
family education, which is the womans responsibility; therefore she lays the foundations
on which the social virtues are built. He then linked the argument to the purpose of his
journal, the reform of the Ottoman and Egyptian nation, meaning a literary and political
reform.
F. Ant. n found guidance in the book and published many parts of it. Al-Jmia of
August 1899 mentioned Qsim Amn as author of The liberation of Woman (1: 10, p. 182)
and devoted an article to him in which he used information coming from La femme du
vingtime sicle 20. In the June 1, 1900 issue, he translated extracts of the health section
of (J2: 3, p. 174-176) 21. In October 1900, F. Ant.n said he was translating from an article
in which [Simon] criticized the education of girls in France (J2: 7, p. 407) and which
was a section of the same book 22. The issues November 1900 (J2: 9, pp. 470-480) 23, and
January 1901 (2: 10, pp. 592-602) 24, printed longer translations from La femme. There
are only some quotations in (J1: 21-22 [1900], pp. 514-515) that he says come from Lcole
butt I could not identify them yet.
In 1899 when Qsim Amn (1865-1908) published the Liberation of Woman 25, the
mainstream of the Egyptian public opinion attacked him fiercely, and in 1900 he had to
write The New Woman no explain his position and defend himself. However, Al-Jmia
was an exception. In the previously mentioned January 1901 issue, F. Ant.n included an
article entitled Views of the philosopher of al-Jmia and of Qsim Amn on woman
which begins:
After we read the book Liberation of Woman by Qsim Amn, magistrate at the
Appellate Court in the capital, with the great attention it deserves and after we summarized
it in the section Education and instruction of this volume, we held it useful to translate
for the readers of Al-Jmia, as well for those in Egypt and in Syria who seriously care
about this issue, the view of the philosopher of Al-Jmia, we mean Jules Simon, who
does not lack behind at all in his sound judgment and exact insight. Some words that
Qsim Amn says in his book have reminded us of the testimony of this philosopher,
namely, the saying that the causes for the weakness of the Muslim nations are reducible

19
La vraie rforme, in JULES SIMON - GUSTAVE SIMON, La femme du vingtime sicle, 3 ed. (Paris:
Calmann Levy, 1892), pp. 1-16.
20
La femme, Les programmes, pp. 243-246.
21
La femme, La mre et la nourrice, pp. 317-320.
22
La femme, Les programmes, pp. 249-255.
23
La femme, La carrire, pp. 292-307.
24
La femme, Le mariage, fragments, pp. 126-127, 135-136, 118-119; Le salon, fragments, 20-23,
24, 25, 26-27, 31; La femme avocat, summarized, 81-92; Le dsert Paris, sumarized, 173-187.
25
Tah.rr al-mara. English transl. Samiha Sidhom Peterson, The American University in Cairo Press,
1992.

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to three, either to geography, religion or family. Then he refutes geography and religion
as causes, and credits the universal cause to family (J2: 1, p. 592).

As he says, he reviewed Qsim Amns book Al-mara al-jadda in the same issue (2: 1
[1901] pp. 626-640), and reproduced many fragments. There F. Ant.n refers to Descartes,
as the founder of modern philosophy, and to his directive Do not believe anything of
which you do not possess certainty to reject the old doctrine of truth based on authority.
For F. Ant. n, Qsim Amn proceeded in a similar way to Descartes insofar as he
approached the old Muslim civilization not to imitate it, but to weight it with the scales
of reason (J2: 1, p. 627). This is a very different approach from Jules Simon, but F. Ant.n
looked for the coincidences. He did not affirm that Q. Amn had read Descartes and
Al-mara al-jadda does not make any reference but he was right in pointing to the
common features that unbiased reasoning shows in any research.

7. RENAN AND AVERROES; ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY

Ernest Renan was born at Trguier on February 28, 1823 26. A brilliant student, he
had started an ecclesiastical career which he abandoned in 1845. He continued his
education at the Sorbonne and at the Collge de France, becoming a renowned philologist.
Early in 1847 he took the Volney prize awarded by the Institut de France on comparative
philology for the manuscript of the General History of Semitic Languages 27. In 1852, Renan
took his degree of Docteur-s-lettres and published his two thesis, the Latin one being
De philosophia peripatetica apud Syros, and the French one being Averros et laverrosme 28.
Averros et laverrosme is primarily a philological work. Every assertion is founded
on a text. Renan searched for the texts and translated them, and most of them were
manuscripts and early printed books. Averros et laverrosme is also a paramount of
methodical work. Renan explains the life and doctrines of Averroes. He describes the role
of the Jewish translators, his reception in the West, the Scholastic reaction to his doctrines,
the development of the legend of Averroes, and the revival of Averroism in northern Italy
through the 17th century. Renan knows how to bind art and history when he deals with
the paintings of Averroes and Aquinas in the 14th century. Renans statements had to be
impartial, but the pages of the book do not hide his horror of fanaticism and his love for
freedom of thought.
Archaeological expeditions to the Near East and further studies in Semitics led Renan
to a concept of religious studies that would later be known as comparative religion. The
result of this approach was La vie de Jsus published on June 24, 1863 29, in which he
portrayed Christ as a historical phenomenon. Renan affirmed that Jesus was entirely
human and never performed miracles. The Catholic Church reacted with rage and Renans
foes smeared him with all kind of calumnies. However, the book enjoyed great popularity,
which increased with the years. Constructive criticism was also heard; for instance, Ernest
Havet wrote a positive review and praised Renan historical criticism in Revue des deux
mondes 30, a journal known to Antn.

26
Bibliography on Ernest Renan is extremely aboundant; the journal tudes Renaniennes, published
since 1970 by the Socit dtudes renaniennes, contains updated information.
27
Published some years later, Histoire gnrale et systme compar des langues smitiques, Paris: Impr.
impriale, 1855.
28
Both thesis appeared at Paris: A. Durand, 1852.
29
Life of Jesus, Paris: M. Lvy frres, 1863.
30
Lvangile et lhistoire, Revue des deux mondes, 46 (August 1, 1863), pp. 564-596.

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The Life of Jesus was the opening volume of the History of the Origins of Christianity
(1863-1883) 31. Three years later The Apostles appeared, to which he subsequently added
The Gospels and the Second Christian Generation, Saint Paul, The Antichrist, The Christian
Church and Marcus Aurelius. They were all noteworthy volumes, but none will reach the
popularity level of the Life of Jesus.
Until his death on October 2, 1892, Renan continued his research on religious history.
His later works include the five volumes of the History of the People of Israel (1888-1896,
the last two appeared posthumously). Since he was convinced that Civilization is the
result of the alternate collaboration of Greece, Judea and Rome, he ought to have begun
with the History of the People of Israel and made the Life of Jesus its continuation but he
placed first what he felt as first in his existential longing for rational explanation of
Christianity.
F. Ant.n could easily have heard of Renan but he did not write about him until 1901.
Al-Jmia of September 1901 32 opens with a photograph of Ernest Renan and devotes
him an essay entitled
The philosopher Ernest Renan. The famous historian and Orientalist, author of the
book Life of Jesus.

F. Ant.n begins the essay (J3: 2, pp. 74- 86) with the statement In todays world there
are two strong movements, the first is Islam, the second is Christianity. He immediately
explains the differences: The Islamic movement wants to improve the condition of the
believers by means of religion, while the Christian movement is characterized by some
groups who want to restrict the power of the clergy, rijl ad-dn, and confine their activity
to the places of prayer. But the Christian movement has a negative aspect, he continues.
In the last two years, the masses, al-amma, in countries like Portugal, Spain, Belgium,
France and Russia have assaulted and humiliated the priests, something unacceptable
among civilized countries because it violates personal freedom. The case is most distressing
in France, because it is the country of those writers and philosophers who opposed to
the clergy and kept it within its borders, like Voltaire, Diderot and Renan did (J3: 1, p. 74).
Ant. ns introduction to the life and works of E. Renan is a very simplifying one,
presenting him only as a defender of secularization. As usual, he does not inform us of
the sources for his article, but he tells us that he has a copy of Life of Jesus, and that the
book was in its 25th edition at the time. He describes the reactions after the publication
as hot and cold springs swooping on Renan. The hot springs were, of course, the
insults and calumnies of the priests and ecclesiastical circles.
The cold springs swooped on from the Jews all over the world because this book
traces back to them the world civilization, affirms that Christianity comes from them
although if it is said that its highest culture does not derive from theirs. With them, all
materialist scholars in Europe and all writers who do not profess any religion agreed
with satisfaction on the subject of the book (J3: 1 [1901] p. 78).

F. Ant.n adds a summary of the book, paying attention to Renans dedicatory preface
to his sister Henriette, and the introductions to following editions. The next issue of Al-
Jmia (J3: 2) starts with selected translations from the book itself. When it comes to

31
Histoire des origines du christianisme. Renans works were all published in uvres compltes, d.
dfinitive tablie par Henriette Psichari. Paris: Calmann-Lvy, 1948-1961; Vie de Jsus in vol. 4, pp. 11-427.
32
Al-Jmia of August 1901 had already mentioned the name of Renan. In an article Curiosities of
the bears eyes it quotes a work that he calls Refutation of the excesses of the materialists and he ascribes
to Renan.

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Renans description of Nazareth, he remarks that the town has changed since 30 years
ago; now there are new buildings, more inhabitants and Jewish and German agricultural
firms have transformed many of our wastelands into prosperous gardens (J3: 3 [1901],
p. 161).
The readers became interested in the text. In the issue of December 1901, F. Ant.n
published some of the many letters he says had received from readers who supported
Renans views (J3: 5, pp. 327-330). The letters came from different places, even from
America. One Syrian reader who signed ad Servant of humankind disagreed with Renan
and affirmed the existence of miracles (J3: 9 [1902], pp. 620-623).
The translation of many pages of the book continued to the January 1902 issue (J 3: 6),
and then he added a text, Reason for translating this book into Arabic (J3: 6, [1902]
pp. 385-387). There is a question, he says, that the readers have asked, namely, whether
Christianity has preserved all the principles which its Lawgiver came to plant on earth.
F. Ant.n reminds of the social changes introduced by Christianity. Then he makes clear
to those readers that some things in any religion have to change by law of nature, but
there are essentials, which cannot be changed, they are the pillars of the building. F. Ant.n
counts among them the sermon of the Lord on the mountain, serving God with truth
and spirit, loving the little people, doing good to everybody. He not only answers the
question but also explains the moral cause for translating the book into Arabic to
remind of the virtues and principles preached by the Son of Man.
In March 1902, he dealt again with the issue (J3: 7, pp. 453-455), and synthesized the
two reasons for translating the book, to be exact, of many of its parts. First he wanted to
make the reader of Arabic acquainted with one of the most important social movements
of history, and second, he wanted to remind everybody of the Evangelical virtues. But
he added a third one: in reading the book, people became aware that interreligious
understanding is possible.
When F. Ant.n wrote the preliminary article on E. Renan, he obviously had not read
any of his books. After reading Life of Jesus and translating a good deal of it into Arabic,
his views changed. Renan was no longer a secularist writer, he was a religious one who
grasped the essence of Christianity, and F. Ant.n agreed with him.
Three following issues of Al-Jmia in the year 1902 contained translations of Renans
The Apostles 33, 3: 7, of March, 3: 8 of June, and 3: 10-12 of December; the last summary
of The Apostles came in Al-Jmia 4: 1 (1903), and began with the paragraph Christian
and Modern Socialism. The American edition of Al-Jmia still had place for a partial
translation of Saint Paul (J6: 1 [February 1908], pp. 21-24). He was speaking in Renans
voice, and this could be the reason why we do not know of any movement by the Greek
Orthodox Church in Egypt against him.
The subject of the early development of Christianity was no longer relevant to F. Ant.n,
but the discovery of Renan led him to discover his other books, and one became decisive
for his interpretation of Islam and Christianity, namely Averros et lAverrosme.
The article History of Averroes and his philosophy. The greatest philosopher of Islam
appeared in the June 1902 issue (J3: 8, pp. 517-540). In order to compose it, F. Ant.n
probably used various sources. One of them is known because, in the same issue, he
added another entry Coming back to Averroes (J3: 8, pp. 568-572) where he referred
to the acquisition of Renans full-size book of 486 pages. From the indication, we gather
that F. Ant.n had bought a copy of the third, revised and enlarged edition, Paris: Michel

33
uvres compltes, vol. 4, pp. 433-702.

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Lvy frres, 1866. He reproduced parts of the Arabic appendix the notices of Ibn al-
Abbr, al-Ans.r and Ibn Ab Us.aybia on Averroes in this entry.
In the main article, F. Ant. n begins with a question on justice in the universe. He
criticizes those who claim that there is no law but that life is a harsh struggle between
men, the stronger prevails and the weak falls down (Let us remember that he opposed
Darwin and the evolutionist theory). No victory, according to them, is for justice and
virtue, and violence imposes the triumph of evil. However, F. Ant.n joints to those who
have another view, namely, that true triumph is neither the matter of one hour, nor of
one day; victorious is the man whose memory lasts forever. He mentions Socrates and
quotes Plotinus to the purpose and, as usual provides no references. In this way, F. Ant.n
leads us to his goal, because the further example that he produces as evidence is that of
Averroes:
His contemporaries charged him with non-belief, they prohibited his books, they
demeaned him, and they deported him. Nevertheless, what does all this mean to the
intelligent and wise man who looks for the substances of the things, not for their accidents?
Will Averroes not forget all those little humiliations, if he can see from his eternal place
what humankind today says about him, in Arabic and in other languages? (J3: 8 [1902],
p. 518).

F. Ant.n expounded on the teachings of Averroes and relied heavily on Renans book,
but he emphasized the image of Averroes as a victim of Muslim bigotry. No wonder, the
article triggered a debate with the Mufti of Egypt Muh.ammad Abduh (1849-1905) 34.
M. Rashd Rid., a friend of F. Ant.n, who was the editor of the Islamic journal Al-Manr,
brought the article to the attention of Muh.ammad Abduh, who wrote a counter for Al-
Manr. In his turn, F. Ant.n wrote a reply (J3: 9, [1902], pp. 626-639); Muh.ammad Abduh
published his views through of Al-Manr 35. F. Ant. n eventually printed a book of the
debate, with some changes, called Averroes and his Philosophy 36. He dedicated the book
to the Eastern intellectuals, in Islam, Christianity and other religions. The subject in
dispute was no longer the philosophy of Averroes but the conflict between philosophers
and theologians, and how Islam and Christianity faced it.
Donald Reid points to a disadvantage with which F. Ant. n entered the debate 37.
M. Abduh mastered the Islamic classics, and F. Ant.n not. He seldom gives the sources
for his writings but on page viii of the book Averroes and his Philosophy, he cites: Renans
Averros et laverrosme, Salomon Munks Mlanges de philosophie juive et arabe, La grande
encyclopdie, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, by al-Ghazl, The Incoherence of The
Incoherence, and The Decisive Treatise, both by Averroes, some notices found in Arabic

34
Among the many authors who have dealt with the debate, may I point out three:
M. RASHD RID. , Tarkh al-ustdh al-Imm al-Shaykh Muh.ammad Abdh: wa-f-hi tafs.l srati-hi, wa-
khuls.at srat mqiz. al-Sharq al-h.akm wa-l-Islm Jaml al-Dn al-Afghn, vol. 1 (Cairo: Mat.baat al-Manr,
1324-1350 H [1906-1931]. 2nd ed. Dr al-Fad.lah, 2003), pp. 805-816.
GEORGE C. ANAWATI, Lorthodoxie dIbn Rushd (Averros) la lumire de la polmique Farah. Ant.n
et le cheikh Muh.ammad Abduh, in Institut Franais dArchologie Orientale. Livre du Centenaire, 1880-
1980 (Cairo, 1980), pp. 341-354.
ANKE VON KGELGEN, Averroes und die arabische Moderne. Anstze zu einer Neubegrndung des Rationalismus
im Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1994), pp. 77-98.
35
Al-Manr: majalla shahrya tabh.athu f falsafat al-dn wa-shun al-ijtim wa-al-umrn, vol. 5, Cairo,
1902: Al-faylasf Ibn Rushd, pp. 361-280; Al-id..tihd f n-nas.ranya wa-l-islm, pp. 401-434; Al-islm
wa-n-nas.ranya maa l-ilm wa-l-madanya, pp. 441-465, pp. 481-501, pp. 521-545, and pp. 561-577.
36
Ibn Rushd wa-falsafatu-hu, Alexandria, January 1, 1903.
37
The Odyssey, p. 82.

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bio-bibliographic repertories, and a certain Philosophy of Averroes and its Religious


Principles by Mr. Mller 38. The controversy poisoned the relationship of F. Ant.n to
Rashd Rid., and to Muslim readers, although it contributed decisively, in the long term,
to the study of Averroes and Islamic philosophers in the Arab world.
The interest of F. Ant.n for Renan lingered for some time. The last issue of Al-Jmia 4,
used the raising of a monument to Renan in his native town of Trguier as an opportunity
to write about him and his political ideas (J4: 6-7-8 [1903], pp. 298-315). F. Ant.n makes
up If someone would ask Renan What is your political party? No doubt he would answer
Humankind all is my party. Then F. Ant. n mentions Al-mubh.atht al-ilmya,
Philosophic Dialogues 39 and includes the play Caliban among them. This is wrong
because Caliban is the first of the Philosophic Dramas 40. He probably was using journals
as his sources. Further, he quotes some fragments from Awrq manthra Scattered
leaves 41, and finally translates most of the Prayer on the Acropolis:
Oh! nobility! Oh! true and simple beauty! Goddess, the worship of whom signifies
reason and wisdom, thou whose temple is an eternal lesson of conscience and truth, I
come late to the threshold of thy mysteries; I bring to the foot of thy altar much remorse.
Ere finding thee, I have had to make infinite search. The initiation which thou didst
confer by a smile upon the Athenian at his birth, I have acquired by force of reflection
and long labor 42.

F. Ant.ns translation is very accurate and reads as elegant Arabic. He closes the article
justifying its publication for two reasons. First, because of the language. He considers
the style of Renan especially good, and adds that eloquence expresses good nature, internal
and external (h.asan fit.r). He praises the French language and he defends the art of
translation too. Those who blame the Arabic language should recognize that the deficiency
in style lies in the bad Arabic, not on the incapacity of Arabic.
Second, because of his philosophy. F. Ant.n mentions the words Renan wished to
have inscribed on his tomb He loved truth, and affirms that Renans aim was the quest
for pure truth, by means of intellectual forces, not depending on the witnesses of books
and people (J4: 6-7-8 [1903], p. 314).
F. Ant.n prays to Athena too, and reminds her of the Phoenicians who helped construct
Greek civilization: oh Athena! in your veins there is some Oriental blood. He asks for
her help to improve our science and characters, and he particularly asks for the spirit
of absolute tolerance, of which the great apostle was your friend Renan.
This article is, in fact, the last one devoted to Renan 43, and his choice of the Prayer
on the Acropolis says much. By the hand of Renan he discovered the scholarly reading
of Christian history and by the hand of Renan he discovered Islamic philosophy. He
sympathized with Renans superiority feelings toward Islam but he moved in an Islamic
world, and the misstep would bring trouble to him and his journal.

38
He may refer to Marcus Joseph Mller, editor of three works of Averroes: Philosophie und Theologie
von Averroes, Mnchen, G. Franz: 1859, and translator of them into German: Philosophie und Theologie
von Averroes, aus dem Arabischen bersetzt von Marcus Joseph Mller, Mnchen: G. Franz, 1875.
39
1876. Dialogues philosophiques, uvres compltes, vol. 1, pp. 545-632.
40
1888. Drames philosophiques, uvres compltes, vol. 3, pp. 375-435.
41
1892. Feuilles dtaches, uvres compltes, vol. 2, pp. 937-1182.
42
1899. Prire sur lAcropole, uvres compltes, vol. 2, pp. 752-59. English by Eugene Vinavar and
T. B. L. Webster, Manchester University Press, 1934.
43
Jmia, 6: 1 (New York, February 1908), pp. 21-22.

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8. AUGUSTE COMTE, RELIGION OF MANKIND

No other thinker had so much influence on F. Ant.n as Renan. He read Auguste Comte
(1798-1857) too and here again the issue arises what he really read. Comte is considered
the founder of sociology. He formulated the so-called Law of three phases according to
which society has gone through three phases: Theological, Metaphysical, and Positive. In
the last one, society recognizes only knowledge that is based on data obtained by exact
perception and experimentation. In the second part of his life (1846-1857), Comte organized
a religious movement, a religion of humankind, religion de lhumanit, the pillars of
which were altruism, order and progress.
Al-Jmia of February 1903, published an article with following heading The
philosopher Auguste Comte, founder of the philosophy of Positivism and creator of the
religion of humankind and added that the article was published on the occasion of the
recent death of Comtes successor as supreme leader of the religion de lhumanit (J4: 1,
pp. 15-21). The successor was Pierre Lafitte (1825-1903), and F. Ant.n wrote a few lines
on him too.
F. Ant.n saw the benefit of Positivism in the hallowing of humankind and the absolute
respect of human individual (J4: 1, p. 21). He was not really influenced by Comte,
although his novel Religion, Science and Property, or the Three Cities 44 shows some
reminiscences of the theory of the three phases.
Moving from Alexandria to New York meant also a change more in the content than
in the form of the journal. F. Ant.n was still dependent of French sources but his choices
changed. He translated A. Dumas again but now he chose Kean ou dsordre et gnie (1836) 45,
a play paying tribute to the theatrical art and exalting the passion of being an actor.
Back to Cairo, he published an article entitled Difficulty of social issues (J7: 1 [1909],
pp. 19-28). The publisher Khall S . diq had complimented him with a copy of the Arabic
translation of Gustave Le Bons La psychologie des foules 46 which had come out in November
1909. Le Bon was a social psychologist and considered himself the founder of crowd
psychology. He introduced the notion of collective soul, but his views were rather negative:
Little adapted to reasoning, crowds, on the contrary, are quick to act, and he stressed
the role of propaganda, which he considered a rational technique for managing groups.
The translator was Sad Ah.mad Fath. Zaghll (ca. 1850-1927), leader of the nationalist
political party, the Wafd party. For the Egyptian masses, Sad Zaghl would be their
national leader, the zam al-umma, in the struggle against the British occupation of the
country. F. Ant.n opened his article with a free quotation of Platos Republic: the happiest
nation is the nation ruled by learned men and philosophers. He appreciated the translation
work of S. Zaghll in spite of his intense political activity, but he censured him for not
expressing his own views about the book that he translated.
F. Ant.n had spent some time in Paris and attended political meetings, for instance,
he mentions that he had listened to discourses by Gustave Herv (Brest 1871-Paris 1944),
whom he described as the leader of the insurgent socialists. He went to listen to him
because.
He exerted influence on the peoples of Europe with his weird principles which he
spread and many people followed him. If they were implemented, the present society

44
Al-dn wa-l-ilm wa-l-ml aw al-mudun al-thalth, Alexandria, 1903.
45
Translated as Edmud Kean: or the genius and the libertine, London: Vickers, 1847.
46
Paris: F. Alcan, 1895; in 1908 the 13th edition was on sale. English translation, The Crowd: A Study
of the Popular Mind, London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1896.

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would be destroyed and a new society would be established, God alone knows the results
(J7:1, p. 20).

F. Ant.n believed that these principles, like those of Marx, Bebel, Jaurs caused le
Bon to write his book as a refutation against them. Le Bon never mentioned these names,
although he openly disdained any workers organization. He did not want to be ruled by
the crowds but wanted to control them. Thus F. Ant.n could accept neither Hervs
nor Le Bons ideas. He summarized the book and criticized it because it runs against the
principles of the present civilization, because all these organizations are helpful to the
weak in society. F. Ant.n reminded Jules Simons Political Freedom 47 and his views on
political organizations, and wondered:
Therefore, who speaks the truth? Dr. Le Bon or the experienced statesman and
famous philosopher Jules Simon who never flattered the people when expressing his
independent views, neither saying nor acting? (J: 1, pp. 26-27).

F. Ant.n was very harsh in his criticism and accused Le Bon of composing his book
in order to intimidate the French government and make it more submissive to the interests
of the capital owners. He added that the ongoing war between workers and property
owners which we partially related few years ago in our book Religion, Science and
Property required the righteous thinker to take stand, and he pleaded to take stand for
the weak (J7: 2, p. 28).

9. NIETZSCHE, THE FASCINATION FOR ENERGY AND PROGRESS

F. Ant.n always depended on French sources, which he never quoted. When he wrote
on Friedrich Nietzsche, whom he calls Frederic following the French spelling, he read
him in French. He made a critical notice in J5: 4 (September 1906), pp. 149-150, as a
digression within an article on J. al-Afghns ideology. There he said that he had been
working on Nietzsche for the last two years and he considered that the doctrine of Nietzsche
had brought Germany into its present supremacy, but he criticized him for his extreme
views on religion, for calling religions a web of superstitions and hoaxes.
After publishing a selection of aphorisms in J5: 4 (September 1906) 48, pp. 173-174,
and after a short article in J6: 1 (February 1908), pp. 16-17 49, F. Ant.n wrote a not so
short article, in Al-Jmia 6: 3 (April 1908), pp. 57-64, in which he aimed at expounding
only the key concepts of his philosophy and he translated some passages. The translated
passages appear under the heading Nietzsche flunks Socrates and Greek wisdom. They
belong to the chapter Das Problem des Sokrates, in Gtzen-Dmmerung, Twilight of
the Idols that begins Throughout the ages the wisest of men have passed the same
judgment on life: it is worthless; F. Ant.n likely used the French translation by Henri
Albert 50.

47
La libert politique, 3 ed., Paris: Hachette, 1867.
48
Aphorisms like Principle of self-love: Love yourself and then love everybody, Maxims and Arrows,
9 or I searched for great men but found only the apes of their ideals, ibid. 39. F. Ant.n could have gathered
them from pages of Twilight of the Idols or maybe he knew the selection and translation by HENRI LICHTENBERGER:
Aphorismes et fragments choisis, Paris: F. Alcan, 1899.
49
Readers asked F. Ant.n to write on Nietzsche but he warns them that his thoughts are but an odd
mixture of right and wrong, of sane and insane.
50
Le crpuscule des idoles: Le Cas Wagner: Nietzsche contre Wagner: LAntchrist / Frdric Nietzsche;
traduits par Henri Albert, Paris: Mercure de France, 1899.

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In a later article, he stresses the influence of Nietzsche on the ideas of men and remarks:
He tried to destroy the majority of the old principles, either good or corrupt (Jmia,
6: 4, [May 1908], pp. 81-86). As usual, F. Ant.n does not even quote the book of Nietzsche,
from which he translates the fragments. They are taken from Roving expeditions of an
inopportune philosopher, another chapter of Twilight of the Idols, the longest fragment
has the heading Whether we are became more moral.
Nietzsche attacked Renan in the second of his expeditions in the Twilight of the
Idols as he attacked Darwin in the 14th. F. Ant.n translated both expeditions and the
epilogue beginning And as regards my long sickness, do I not owe to it unutterably more
than to my health? of Nietzsche contra Wagner (J6: 5 [June 1908], pp. 125-128).
Nietzsche attacked Renan for being half-hearted, for trying to be both Christian and
freethinker, and said to him you continue to be a Christian, a Roman Catholic, and even
a priest, in your intestines!. F. Ant.n published the text with no particular comments.
Does it mean that he accepted Nietzsches ideas?
F. Ant.n appended his last novel Al-lam al-jadd The New World to the periodical
from September 15, 1906 onwards. He wanted to contrast the Roman and Jewish
civilizations in the novel, in which the pagan Cicero expressed views that reflect Nietzsches
doctrine. Ciceros new world is the world where the powerful and the wholesome will
dominate. But the hero of the novel is Magdalena who is the prey of the powerful and
wealthy. Years later, in 1913, he wrote Mis.r al-jadda wa-Mis.r al-qadma Modern Egypt,
Old Egypt: Fud Bey, the hero of New Egypt, is a man of strong power of will and, at
the same time, a defender of virtue and family values.
F. Ant. n might admire Nietzsche but he was never convinced. There is one place
where he seemingly sounded more enthusiastic: he composed a long poem entitled
The qasida on the mountain (Poetry in scientific way). Between Nietzsche and Tolstoy.
In the center of the glories of the United States (J6: 8 [1908], pp. 212-218). The poem
begins:
Stop over on the mountains, do not stop over in the valley if you want to see these
glories.
Ride the steam-driven trains to go there, the age of the she-camels has past, and so
the shouting of the camel driver.
The breeding camels are extinct, and the remains of the deserted encampment are
wiped out, you do not find any one bewailing them or leading to them.
Ask the trains to fly, do not say slowly, because you travel with my beloved heart.
Time is money, and this is time to rush, not time to be effeminate and to be asleep.
This is time of determined will, which fights any resistance by way of jihad.

The classical Arabic qasida always begins bewailing the rests of the camp and mourns
the caravan leaving the place with the beloved. F. Ant.n derides the nostalgic attitude
and calls for modernity. He introduces Nietzsche and his will to power, in the popularized
version as he understood him. We read later:
The old has died, wrap it with the linen for the grave! For us it has neither return
nor place to return.
The earth needs will, determination and energy, not the delusion of the religion and
prophecy.
With will, the raving of the country ascends and it is the rise of any civilization and
of any country.
This is Nietzsches language, and Nietzsche was straightening the bent and the twisted
according to some people, but I leave my opinion about Nietzsche untouched until the
appointed time.

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In the continuation of the poem, F. Ant. n takes a stand against Nietzsche, who
frightened him with this discourse but he found relief in a book, Resurrection of Tolstoy,
that Ant n had with him. Ant.n reprimands him:
Oh! Nietzsche! (the philosopher spoke) I have listened to your strange discourse,
now you listen to me.
Do you believe that what you have spoken is a new science? No, you know it very well.
It is an old thing. You would not have said it, if you had been wakeful, and if you
had not shut your eyes.
Go into the woods where men still live like freely grazing cattle.
There you find the men who follow the laws of Nietzsche according to all his principles.
They have no law (shar) except the company of power, fear and feud.

F. Ant.n uses an ambiguous term, shar, than means law as well as religion, because
of religious law. Then he came down from the mountain and ended the poem with a
hemistich he is not sure if it is by al-Buh.tur (IX cent.) or Ab Tammm: the stream
is an enemy of the higher place.
The poem expresses his deception with Nietzsche but also his distancing from the
United States, insofar as he relates them to Nietzsches philosophy. F. Ant.n admired the
magnificence of the land and the achievements of its industrious people and he appreciated
the kindness of people who get together without malice and hatred. However he preferred
the lower place and he would soon leave the United States. Volume 7 of Al-Jmia would
appear in Egypt again, although it would comprise only two issues.
Nevertheless, Nietzsche retained Ant.ns interest and he wrote about his philosophy
an article called Return to Nietzsches philosophy, and to the History of Renan in J7: 1
(1909), pp. 42-46. 7:2 (1910), pp. 101-105. He acknowledged to have read five books of
Nietzsche and one on Nietzsche, En lisant Nietzsche, by mile Faguet (1847-1916) and
in addition, he knew of the publication of La Vie de Frdric Nietzsche by Daniel Halvy
(1872-1962). He names also two of the five Nietzsches books which he had read: Ecce
homo (1908) 51 and Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-85) 52.
In the article, F. Ant.n mainly translated fragments of the latter book. He commented
that the principles of this man comprise many truths necessary for life. The children of
the East should read them to make themselves strong (J7: 1, p. 42). He wanted to take
from Nietzsche whatever was useful to Orientals to build up a new personality (khalq
jadd) and to leave out what did not have a place in the East, he was not going to translate
anything that Nietzsche said on religion and moral (al-adyn wa-l-adt). F. Ant.n saw
in Nietzsche a source of inspiration for the renewal and progress of the Orient, how
amazing may it sound.

10. CONTINUITY OF ANT.NS THOUGHT

While the novels and theater plays of F. Ant.n often show his concern for social issues,
his selection and reception of western thinkers and essayists show us a more diverse image.
His backing of the French revolution stirred him to translate two works of Alexandre Dumas,
Ange Pitou and La comtesse de Charny, and although he soon abandoned revolutionary
ideas, he always felt sympathy with that time. In the beginning, the journal was called The

Ecce Homo, suivi des Posies. Traduit par Henri Albert, 4th ed., Paris, Mercure de France, 1909.
51

F. Ant.n was reading the French translation by Henri Albert: Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra, un livre
52

pour tous et pour personne, Paris: Socit du Mercure de France, which reached its 16th edition in 1908.

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Ottoman league and F. Ant. n had in mind the Ottoman Empire when he spoke of
revolution. When he moved to New York, he was a citizen of that empire stretching from
Istanbul to Libya and he was never outspoken against belonging to it.
However, his concern was not only politics. He soon translated Bernardin de Saint-
Pierre, who was influenced by Rousseau, and was moved by other interests. Innocent love,
natural goodness, non confessional deism were beliefs which he discovered and embraced.
His approach to Tolstoy was also characterized by his concern for moral values, which
are independent from religious orthodoxy, if sometimes not the opposite. Freedom of
conscience within ones official religion was an essential value. While he defended Tolstoy
against the condemnation by the Russian Church, he also defended the right of any member
of a religious community to think freely without being ousted from it.
Jules Simon and Ernest Renan are the two major figures with the most impact on his
thinking. Simon reinforced his faith in education and coached him in his views of moderate
reform, especially concerning women. Public education was seen by both as the keystone
to reform and develop a country.
Renan reinforced his Christian faith, towards himself and towards the surrounding
Muslim world, adopting it in liberal terms. Thanks to Renan he discovered Averroes and
that philosophy had flourished in the Arab world. The debate with Muh.ammad Abduh
brought him much dissatisfaction and many nuisances although both of them stood
intellectually closer together than did Abduh to his mentor al-Afghn. Although the
debate contributed to the revival of philosophy in the Arab world, F. Ant.n would be left
to be a minor player, because he was a Christian.
Later on, F. Ant.n set aside the conflictive issue of Islam and Christianity and addressed
his readers on issues such as moral conduct and national pride. His nuanced rejection
of Nietzsche and his predilection for Tolstoy as seen in the poem above illustrate his
concern for defending virtue. His literary works always had a pedagogical purpose and,
in the introduction to his play Ibn ash-shab Son of the people in the journal, he reminded
readers:
I do not approve novels (riwyt) built on passion and love without giving a useful
lesson to the people. But I escape from it as I have done in all my novels because I
understand that the writer who deserves this name must fear poisoning the souls of the
readers through corrupting passion and cold love, on which most of the novels are built
(J5: 1 [NY 1906], p. 64).

Nationalism as an issue gained import in his works and I have stressed his interest
in Nietzsche as ideological source of new energy to an Eastern nation. He was already
in New York and he wrote an article entitled Voice from far away after the incident of
Dinshawi (or Danishway) 53. The incident increased national sentiment in Egypt. F. Ant.n
distinguished between religious and national fanaticism, and while he censured the
former, he approved the latter (ta as.s.ub jins), and greeted it as a thread to string the
nation (J5: 5 [September 15, 1906], pp. 183-191). The incident took place in Egypt, but
this nation referred not only to Egypt, but to the Ottoman and Egyptian nation.

53
The Herald Tribune of June 15, 1906 reported: It appears that a party of officers were engaged in
pigeon-shooting near the village of Danshawi when a stray shot set fire to a haystack. This aroused the
fanaticism of the natives, who attacked the officers and attempted to disarm them by force. The result was
a serious collision with the natives, during which one officer was killed and others were wounded. A native
woman was shot dead.
It remains unclear what happened in Dinshawi, but a British officer was found dead. The British
response was disproportionate and cruel; four peasants were sentenced to death.

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As F. Ant.n absorbed new sources, many of his ideas changed, but his main concerns
remained. His concern for educating people was as permanent as were his worries for
freethinking; thus, Jules Simon and Ernest Renan continued to be influential throughout
his life. New sources and his American experience oriented his thoughts toward nationalism,
but he could not shape the kind of nation he wanted. He wanted to create a great Oriental
nation educated, social and secular which the Arabic language would bring together
but reality imposed different national states and often a religious orientation.
Looking at the situation of the Arab world today we shall most likely think that his
project has completely failed. However, after some reflection, shadows and lights appear:
Translating Western literature into Arabic helped develop the modern language, and
to introduce literary genres such as the novel, the short story and the drama. F. Ant.n
and the journal contributed to this development, and to the creation of an environment
of open discussion and free expression.
Public education has become more common in the Near East and women have access
to its various levels. As for Ant.ns ideas about the positive influence of educated women
in raising their children, many practical instances support his views.
The shadowy side comes out when we consider the political fragmentation of the
Middle East. Steps towards unity are more rhetorical than factual and Ant.n could not
have imagined that Arab countries would lead wars against each other. But, no doubt,
his views on religion and the secular state have been ignored the most. The upsurge of
Islamist movements retards the slow evolution towards state forms based on universal
rational principles which seemed to be in accordance with his project. Here we should
refer to F. Ant.ns novel Religion, Science and Property, or the Three Cities, in which he
proposed a utopian society based on the principles of equality, fraternity, and moderate
socialism as the solution to conflicts existing in Western societies. Maybe An n should
have thought that similar conflicts could arise in Arab societies too, and that a more
realistic proposal was needed.
Entanglement in religious arguments does not occur for any one reason; it is often is
caused by social conflicts. In any case, it is something that F. Ant.n could scarcely foresee.
Although his reform project suffered a backslash, it has not vanished, and its revival may
be initiated by reforming society in a more realistic way than the one he proposed in
Religion, Science and Property, or the Three Cities but in the same spirit.

Departamento de Estudios rabes e Islmicos JOSEP PUIG MONTADA


Facultad de Filologa. Edificio A
Ciudad Universitaria
28040 Madrid
puigmontada@gmail.com

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

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CRISTIANISMO, ISLAM E ILUSTRACIN


A propsito del discurso de Benedicto XVI
en la Universidad de Ratisbona

J. SERAFN BJAR BACAS


Facultad de Teologa de Granada

RESUMEN: En septiembre del 2006, el papa Benedicto XVI pronunci una leccin magistral en la Uni-
versidad de Ratisbona, de la que aos atrs haba sido profesor. En ella, ensayaba un tentativo de
encuentro entre fe y razn a partir de la entrada, llevado a cabo en el primer siglo de nuestra era, del
cristianismo en el contexto de la filosofa helnica. Pero el principal motivo de la repercusin mundial
de dicho discurso fue la citacin de un texto donde se apuntaba la relacin entre violencia y religin
islmica. En el presente artculo descodificamos la pretensin del papa a partir de tres categoras cla-
ves: cristianismo, islam e ilustracin.
PALABRAS CLAVE: cristianismo, islam, ilustracin, Benedicto XVI.

Christianity, Islam and Enlightenment:


Benedict XVI at the University of Regensburg
ABSTRACT: September 2006 pope Benedict XVI pronounced a doctors lesson at the University of
Regensburg, where he was professor years before. In it he tried an essay of understanding between
faith and reason, beginning with the appearance of Christianity in the context of the hellenic philosophy,
which was achieved during the first Century AD. But the first reason of the worldly impact of that lesson
was the quotation of a text where it was suggested the link between violence and Islam. In this article
we interpret the aim of the pope starting from three significant cathegories: Christianity, Islam,
Enlightenment.
KEY WORDS: Christianity, Islam, Enlightenment, Benedict XVI.

I. STATUS QUESTIONIS

El pasado 12 de septiembre, con motivo de un viaje oficial a Alemania, el papa Bene-


dicto XVI tuvo un encuentro con el mundo de la cultura en la Universidad de Ratisbo-
na. Dicho encuentro, cuyo tema central fue Fe, razn y universidad, tuvo unas repercu-
siones a nivel mundial que no se hicieron esperar. El motivo consisti en la citacin de
un texto, marginal dentro del conjunto de la reflexin pero en absoluto casual, donde se
plantea el problema de la violencia en el Islam 1. El texto de la polmica hace referencia
a un dilogo mantenido en el ao 1391 entre el emperador bizantino Manuel II Palelo-
go y un culto persa sobre la relacin entre cristianismo e islam y la verdad de ambos. La
cita, de un momento de este dilogo, tomada del emperador por el papa reza: Mus-

1
Tenemos la intuicin de que el texto de la polmica, aun siendo marginal en el conjunto de la refle-
xin, tal como hemos afirmado, tiene una meditada intencionalidad. Si no fuera as no se comprende muy
bien que su ubicacin en el conjunto d la impresin de un cierto forzamiento. De hecho, los musul-
manes que han comentado la conferencia del papa han subrayado este dato. As, Aref A. Nayed afirma que
no est claro en qu sentido el dilogo del Palelogo haya hecho venir a la mente a Benedicto XVI todo
esto, en www.webislam.com.

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1026 J. S. BJAR, CRISTIANISMO, ISLAM E ILUSTRACIN

trame tambin lo que Mahoma ha trado de nuevo, y encontrars solamente cosas malas
e inhumanas, como su disposicin de difundir por medio de la espada la fe que predi-
caba. No obstante, nos parece significativo citar el prrafo completo en el que la cita se
inserta para contextualizar tal afirmacin:
En el sptimo coloquio, editado por el profesor Khoury, el emperador toca el tema
de la yihad, la guerra santa. Seguramente el emperador saba que en la sura 2,256 est
escrito: Ninguna constriccin en las cosas de fe. Segn dice una parte de los expertos,
es probablemente una de las suras del perodo inicial, en el que Mahoma mismo an no
tena poder y estaba amenazado. Pero, naturalmente, el emperador conoca tambin las
disposiciones, desarrolladas sucesivamente y fijadas en el Corn, acerca de la guerra
santa. Sin detenerse en detalles, como la diferencia de trato entre los que poseen el
Libro y los incrdulos, con una brusquedad que nos sorprende, brusquedad que
para nosotros resulta inaceptable, se dirige a su interlocutor llanamente con la pregun-
ta central sobre la relacin entre religin y violencia en general, diciendo: Mustrame
tambin lo que Mahoma ha trado de nuevo, y encontrars solamente cosas malas e
inhumanas, como su disposicin de difundir por medio de la espada la fe que predica-
ba. El emperador, despus de pronunciarse de un modo tan duro, explica luego minu-
ciosamente las razones por las cuales la difusin de la fe mediante la violencia es algo
insensato. La violencia est en contraste con la naturaleza de Dios y la naturaleza del
alma. Dios no se complace con la sangre dice; no actuar segn la razn es contra-
rio a la naturaleza de Dios. La fe es fruto del alma, no del cuerpo. Por tanto, quien quie-
re llevar a otra persona a la fe necesita la capacidad de hablar bien y de razonar correc-
tamente, y no recurrir a la violencia ni a las amenazas Para convencer a un alma
racional no hay que recurrir al propio brazo ni a instrumentos contundentes ni a nin-
gn otro medio con el que se pueda amenazar de muerte a una persona 2.

La recurrencia a incluir una referencia al binomio violencia/religin en el conjunto


de una conferencia que pretende clarificar las relaciones entre fe y razn muestra, a nues-
tro juicio, cmo para Benedicto XVI el problema fundamental con el que debe enfren-
tarse hoy el Islam no es otro que su confrontacin con el programa de emancipacin
moderna que conocemos con el nombre de Ilustracin. As pues, en el discurso de diciem-
bre pasado del Santo Padre a los cardenales, arzobispos, obispos y prelados superiores
de la Curia Romana con motivo de la Navidad, despus de la polmica suscitada en sep-
tiembre y de su posterior viaje a Turqua, se afirma:
En el dilogo con el Islam, que es preciso intensificar, debemos tener presente que
el mundo musulmn se encuentra hoy con gran urgencia ante una tarea semejante a la
que se impuso a los cristianos desde los tiempos de la Ilustracin y que el concilio Vati-
cano II, como fruto de una larga y ardua bsqueda, llev a soluciones concretas para la
Iglesia catlica. Se trata de la actitud que la comunidad de los fieles debe adoptar ante
las convicciones y las exigencias que se afirmaron en la Ilustracin 3.

De esta manera, el papa cifra el contenido del dilogo entre cristianos y musulma-
nes, cada uno dentro de sus propias tradiciones, en la bsqueda de soluciones adecua-
das a lo que considera las verdaderas conquistas de la Ilustracin; concretamente en este
discurso de Navidad seala los derechos del hombre y especialmente la libertad de la fe
y de su ejercicio. As, Benedicto XVI est mostrando su inters por ubicar el dilogo no
tanto en el campo teolgico de lo interreligioso, cuanto en el escenario preteolgico de

2
Cf. texto oficial en www.vatican.va, Discurso del Santo Padre en la universidad de Ratisbona. Fe,
razn y universidad. Recuerdos y reflexiones, martes 12 de septiembre de 2006.
3
Cf. texto oficial en www.vatican.va, Discurso del Santo Padre Benedicto XVI a los cardenales, arzo-
bispos, obispos y prelados superiores de la curia romana, viernes 22 de diciembre de 2006.

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lo cultural como bsqueda de un encuentro entre civilizaciones. Es significativo a este


respecto el hecho de que el papa haya incluido el Consejo Pontificio para el dilogo inte-
rreligioso en el ms amplio Consejo Pontificio para la cultura. Este paso hacia el dilo-
go cultural, segn explica Samir Khalil Samir, jesuita egipcio que particip en septiem-
bre de 2005 en Castel Gandolfo en un encuentro de estudios promovido por Benedicto XVI
sobre el concepto de Dios en el islam, estara materializando las ideas de un cardenal
Ratzinger que siempre se mostr escptico ante las posibilidades de un dialogo estricta-
mente teolgico con musulmanes, as como con los encuentros de oracin en Ass con
hombres de otras religiones promovido por su predecesor Juan Pablo II 4.
Por tanto, en la conferencia del papa en Ratisbona se encuentran apuntados, si acaso
atemticamente, tres conceptos que estn necesitados de clarificacin y de estudio: cris-
tianismo, islam e ilustracin; cifrndose la intencionalidad ltima de Benedicto XVI en
un necesario dilogo entre culturas donde, por una parte, en un mundo pluralista y eman-
cipado las religiones comprendan que la razn es el nico lugar donde todos los hom-
bres, creyentes e increyentes, pueden encontrarse; al mismo tiempo que la razn descu-
bra la necesidad de abrirse a un exceso de misterio que le obliga a medirse ms ancho y
ms hondo 5. As pues, nos viene dado el itinerario de la presente reflexin en un triple
momento: en primer lugar, de un modo ms breve, trataremos la relacin entre cristia-
nismo e ilustracin; en segundo lugar, como grueso de la reflexin, intentaremos escla-
recer las posibilidades de encuentro entre Islam e ilustracin, atendiendo ante todo al
problema de la violencia; para concluir, en tercer lugar, con una reflexin sobre la moder-
nidad de Benedicto XVI.

II. CRISTIANISMO E ILUSTRACIN

La conferencia del papa, despus de la referencia marginal al Islam que hemos apun-
tado, intenta retratar el momento de encuentro entre la fe bblica y el pensamiento grie-
go, en lo que podemos considerar la primera gran inculturacin del cristianismo ms
all de la connaturalizad que le era inherente en contexto semita. En efecto, la parfra-
sis del primer versculo del libro del Gnesis en el prlogo de S. Juan hace una identifi-
cacin no carente de consecuencias para la historia posterior: Jesucristo es el Logos de
Dios (En el principio ya exista el Logos). De esta manera, el papa llega a afirmar cmo
S. Juan nos ha brindado la palabra conclusiva sobre el concepto bblico de Dios, la pala-
bra con la que todos los caminos de la fe bblica, a menudo arduos y tortuosos, alcan-
zan su meta, encuentran su sntesis 6. As, atendiendo a la naturaleza ntima de la fe cris-
tiana y de la filosofa helnica se llega a una fusin donde se evidencia cmo el encuentro
entre mensaje bblico y el pensamiento griego no era una simple casualidad 7.

4
Cf. S. KHALIL SAMIR, Cmo Joseph Ratzinger ve al Islam, en www.sintesis.blogspot.com, Benedicto XVI
y el Islam. Estas dificultades eran sealadas por el cardenal Ratzinger en una conversacin con Peter See-
wald donde afirmaba: el Islam no es una realidad uniforme. No cuenta con una autoridad uniforme, y
por eso el dilogo con el Islam slo puede llevarse a cabo con determinados grupos Islamicos. Nadie puede
hablar en nombre de todo el Islam, que no tiene un magisterio doctrinal comn, en J. RATZINGER, La sal
de la tierra. Quin es y cmo piensa Benedicto XVI, Madrid, 52005, 264.
5
A este ltimo respecto cf. www.lanacion.com.ar/704223 el intercambio de ponencias entre J. Haber-
mas y J. Ratzinger a principios del 2004 en la Academia Catlica de Baviera en Munich con el tema Las
bases morales prepolticas del Estado liberal.
6
Fe, razn y universidad, 3.
7
Ibd.

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1028 J. S. BJAR, CRISTIANISMO, ISLAM E ILUSTRACIN

No obstante, esta preciada sntesis comienza a resquebrajarse, a juicio de Benedic-


to XVI, con el comienzo de la modernidad y el convencimiento de que la bsqueda del
cristianismo primordial supone una deshelenizacin del mismo. De esta manera, y esto
es clave en la reflexin del papa, la metafsica se presenta como un presupuesto que
proviene de otra fuente y del cual se debe liberar a la fe para que sta vuelva a ser total-
mente ella misma 8. El artfice principal de esta tarea ser I. Kant que, desbancando la
fe del mbito especfico de la razn pura, ancla al cristianismo exclusivamente a la razn
prctica, religando la fe cristiana al mbito de la moral. Veamos este movimiento con
mayor detencin.
La propuesta filosfica de Kant slo adquiere su plena significacin si es situada en
el contexto de la llamada Ilustracin, el proceso de emancipacin del hombre de toda
culpable incapacidad. Esta poca de las luces propone elevar al hombre a cimas antes
insospechadas a travs de un proceso que tiene en la razn pura su aliado ms fiel. De
esta manera, sobre todo en una Europa que ha vivido el azote de las guerras de religin
y que se va abriendo a nuevos mundos para descubrir la existencia de diferentes expre-
siones religiosas, comienza un proceso que intenta remontarse, ms all de toda apa-
riencia y barniz histrico, a la naturaleza misma de las cosas 9.
Desde esta ptica, se puede comprender que la Ilustracin sea entendida como un
salto sobre la historia hasta la naturaleza, desde la revelacin particular hasta la razn
universal. Windelband defini a la Ilustracin como el proceso de la razn contra la his-
toria 10. Se trata, por tanto, de un cambio radical en la comprensin de una Europa que
haba sido cocida en el horno de realidades positivas, cuyo fundamento ltimo era la
revelacin acontecida en Jesucristo:
Naturaleza es la palabra mgica a partir de la cual se intenta una reconstruccin
completa de la realidad: religin natural, Dios natural (Desmo), culto natural, derecho
natural, ley natural, hombre natural, sociedad natural. Y frente a ellas son rechazadas
las correspondientes realidades positivas, como son: la revelacin en la historia, el Dios
de Jesucristo como redentor y santificador, las leyes divinas positivas, la gracia, la Igle-
sia como comunidad de fe, el culto y la autoridad divinamente legitimada y garantiza-
da, el dogma como palabra de Dios explicitada por la Iglesia 11.

En este contexto es donde hemos de situar la aportacin filosfica de I. Kant 12, que
nos ayudar a comprender la reduccin de Dios a mero fundamento de la moral. El
punto de partida de la filosofa kantiana lo podemos tomar de sus cuatro famosas pre-

8
Ibd., 4.
9
As, por ejemplo, en el anlisis de las diversas causas que dan lugar a la modernidad entendida
como magnitud polifactica hay que otorgar especial relieve a la ruptura de la unidad eclesial que tiene
lugar con la Reforma. sta pone de manifiesto el fracaso de la religin como elemento de cohesin social,
de modo que ahora hay que buscar el consenso de la razn, nico lugar verdaderamente comn a los hom-
bres. Esta nueva poca, que tiene como pilares ejecutores la burguesa y la mentalidad cientfica, es el ini-
cio de la prdida de toda funcin social de la religin. Para esta reflexin, cf. W. KASPER, El Dios de Jesu-
cristo, Salamanca, 1985, 19ss.
10
O. GONZLEZ DE CARDEDAL, La entraa del cristianismo, Salamanca, 21998, 210. Hay que matizar que
el concepto de naturaleza propio de la Ilustracin difiere en relacin al usado en el mundo griego. En
lneas generales, y simplificando mucho, se pasa de la idea de invariabilidad, identidad, bsqueda en lo
mudable de lo que no vara a un concepto que expresa las leyes o reglas de los fenmenos. En este sen-
tido, cf. J. ORTEGA Y GASSET, Historia como sistema, Madrid, 1971, 30-40.
11
O. GONZLEZ DE CARDEDAL, La entraa, 211.
12
Para esta reflexin, cf. J. ALFARO, De la cuestin del hombre a la cuestin de Dios, Salamanca, 1988,
29-33, y J. GMEZ CAFFARENA, La filosofa de la religin de I. Kant, en M. FRAIJ (ed.), Filosofa de la reli-
gin. Estudios y textos, Madrid, 1994, 179-205.

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guntas: gnoseolgica, tica, religiosa y antropolgica. No obstante, en Kant, tenemos


una fuerte concentracin antropolgica ya que considera la ltima de las cuatro cues-
tiones, qu es el hombre, como sntesis y expresin de las tres restantes. As pues, y
por primera vez, un filsofo define la religin desde la cuestin antropolgica. La ori-
ginalidad de esta filosofa est en determinar que la cuestin que ms interesa al hom-
bre es la cuestin sobre s mismo, de modo que si antes se veneraba al hombre a la
luz de Dios y como si fuera Dios, ahora por el contrario la clave de evidencia, de sen-
tido y de accin es el hombre. Para Kant la filosofa tiene como objeto y centro nico
al hombre 13.
En este preguntar, el filsofo crtico quiere liberarse de toda tradicin, de todo pre-
juicio y de todo dogma; de ah que lo gue el inters por descubrir las condiciones de
posibilidad de nuestro conocimiento, de manera que se pueda construir un sistema de
pensamiento ms all de todo engao, con una referencia cierta a las verdaderas fuen-
tes de nuestro conocer. Este inters ser llevado a buen puerto en su obra Crtica de la
razn pura donde se plantea los trascendentales propios de todo conocer. La pregunta
con que inicia esta obra, es decir, la posibilidad de la metafsica como ciencia, ser res-
pondida de forma negativa ya que el campo propio del conocimiento siempre debe tener
una referencia explcita al mundo sensible 14. La cuestin de Dios, en esta primera crti-
ca, queda suspendida en un interrogante porque desde las posibilidades de esta razn
pura no es posible la afirmacin ni la negacin de la existencia de Dios 15.
Pero la filosofa kantiana no slo pregunta por los condicionantes del conocer, sino
que tambin tiene inters en las condiciones de posibilidad del obrar y del esperar huma-
nos, mostrando as dos usos complementarios de la razn. Este inters se materializa en
su Crtica de la razn prctica donde, entendiendo por prctico aquello que se hace posi-
ble mediante el ejercicio de la libertad, pregunta por las condiciones de posibilidad de
la misma. Previos a la actuacin de la libertad existen dos dimensiones ontolgicas que,
a priori, condicionan su ejercicio: el deber tico y la esperanza en una plenitud venide-
ra. Estas dimensiones constitutivas del ser humano estn por encima de la misma razn
pura y se establecen como postulados de la razn, ya que su modo de conocer estar
inevitablemente marcado por la opcin de reconocer el deber tico y de escuchar la lla-
mada de la esperanza 16. La realizacin de la libertad, que posee estos dos constitutivos
internos previos a su ejercicio, est esencialmente abierta a una plenitud que no puede
ser alcanzada como conquista, sino que debe ser esperada como don. Por este camino,
Kant descubre a Dios como fundamento ontolgico previo del deber tico, con el bien
supremo que estoy obligado a promover, y del esperar humano, con sus exigencias de
una felicidad colmada 17.

13
GONZLEZ DE CARDEDAL, La entraa, 211.
14
Cf. Fe, razn y universidad, 5.
15
Cf. J. MARTN VELASCO, El encuentro con Dios, Madrid, 1995, 130-134.
16
J. ALFARO, De la cuestin, 31.
17
Cf. J. GMEZ CAFFARENA, La filosofa, 183. En palabras del propio Kant: Pero no es imposible repre-
sentarnos (segn todas nuestras facultades racionales) que se unan por solas causas naturales estas dos
exigencias del fin final que nos propone la ley moral, de modo adecuado a la idea de dicho fin. De modo
que no concuerda el concepto de la necesidad prctica de un tal fin mediante la aplicacin de nuestras
fuerzas con el concepto terico de la posibilidad fsica de realizacin del mismo, si no enlazamos con nues-
tra libertad ninguna otra causalidad (de un medio) que la de la Naturaleza [] Por consiguiente, tenemos
que admitir una causa moral del mundo (un Creador) para proponernos un fin final segn leyes morales,
en I. KANT, Crtica del juicio, Apndice, 87: La prueba moral de la existencia de Dios, V, 450. El texto est
tomado de J. GMEZ CAFFARENA, La filosofa, 203.

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1030 J. S. BJAR, CRISTIANISMO, ISLAM E ILUSTRACIN

En este proceso llegamos al extremo de que la moralidad funda la existencia de


Dios 18. Es importante hacer notar cmo, lo que I. Kant realiza, no es una simple y vul-
gar negacin del cristianismo sino una superacin del mismo en una asimilacin a con-
ceptos de razn. Si la esencia del hombre est constituida por la moralidad y la mora-
lidad funda la existencia de Dios entonces se llega a la conclusin de que Dios queda
as incluido en el crculo de la humanidad moral, es decir, el cristianismo es juzgado,
aceptado o rechazado en la medida en que sus ideas, dogmas o instituciones puedan
acreditar significacin o eficacia moral 19. Esta reduccin o valoracin del cristianismo
desde la ptica moral tiene su expresin mxima en la cristologa filosfica que de ah
deriva. En adelante no interesa la figura de Jesucristo por su constitucin metafsica,
entre otras cosas porque es un dato asequible slo por la fe en una revelacin positiva,
sino por el contenido de su mensaje. Jesucristo es as reducido a un maestro de moral,
alto en humanidad, moralmente bueno, persona admirada y figura objeto de nuestra imi-
tacin, en definitiva, como el fundador e iniciador del cristianismo 20. Por esta razn, no
es de extraar que en la segunda etapa de deshelenizacin iniciada en los siglos XIX y XX
por la teologa liberal se llegue a la imagen de un Jess histrico que, lejos de los aadi-
dos de filosofa helnica ajenos a su identidad ms profunda, sea reducido a simple maes-
tro de moral. De esta manera, y como afirma Benedicto XVI, el objetivo de Harnack era
hacer que el cristianismo estuviese en armona con la razn moderna, librndolo preci-
samente de elementos aparentemente filosficos y teolgicos, como por ejemplo la fe en
la divinidad de Cristo y en la trinidad de Dios 21.
Por ello, lo repetimos una vez ms, la Ilustracin, entendida como el salto desde la
historia hasta la naturaleza, implica inevitablemente una nueva concepcin de verdad 22.
Hemos visto en la filosofa kantiana el foso que se va dibujando y que distancia inevita-
blemente la potencia universalizable de la razn con la particularidad de los hechos acon-
tecidos en las coordenadas espacio-temporales. Poco a poco se va estableciendo una
nueva percepcin de la religin que se mueve slo en el mbito de la mera razn, o de
otro modo, que busca el consenso en aquello que es comn a todos los hombres ms all
de revelaciones positivas con pretensin de universalidad. En el fondo, el problema que
subyace es el de la posibilidad de que el Absoluto se medie en la historia.
G. E. Lessing es el que formaliza para la posteridad esta nueva concepcin de verdad
en su conocida distincin entre verits de fait y verits de raison. Las primeras, las ver-
dades de hecho, son histricas y constituyen la esencia del cristianismo, sobre todo en
la inaudita afirmacin de que Dios se ha hecho hombre en un tiempo y lugar concretos.
Las segundas, las verdades de razn, engendran evidencia, pueden ser, por tanto, acep-

18
GONZLEZ DE CARDEDAL, La entraa, 211.
19
Ibd.
20
Cf. O. GONZLEZ DE CARDEDAL, Cristologa, Madrid, 2001, 329s., y La entraa, 214s. La carta de ciu-
dadana de esta nueva comprensin de la religin la podemos encontrar en la obra kantiana La religin
dentro de los lmites de la mera razn, donde considera la relacin entre religin revelada y racional como
de crculos concntricos; el ms interno de los cuales respondera a la fe religiosa pura. De esta manera,
ve como posible, aunque lo considera difcil y pretencioso, deducir apriorsticamente lo correspondiente
a tal religin pura. El lugar de inters del filsofo, por tanto, ser el crculo ms amplio correspondiente
a la religin natural, desde la cual visitar sucesivamente el crculo ms interno de la religin revelada
para mostrar cmo el cristianismo es la idea de religin tipo que se puede fundar en la razn, confirin-
dole as un estatuto natural.
21
Fe, razn y universidad, 4.
22
Slo el tipo de certeza que deriva de la sinergia entre matemticas y mtodo emprico puede con-
siderarse cientfica, en Fe, razn y universidad, 5.

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tadas por todos los hombres en el ejercicio compartido de la racionalidad. Despus de


una Europa asolada por las guerras de religin, la nueva recomposicin poltica busca-
r el consenso en estas ltimas que, en caso de necesidad, incluso el Estado puede impo-
ner a los ciudadanos.
Desde aqu se hace comprensible el terrible foso que se ha abierto entre hechos
particulares y verdades universales, entre fe e historia, entre Iglesia y ciencia, entre el
judo Jess y el personaje confesado como Cristo e Hijo de Dios 23, del cual habla Les-
sing, y que, desde una mnima honestidad intelectual, es imposible saltar. Aunque es ver-
dad que no se puede alegar ningn argumento histrico serio en contra de la resurrec-
cin de Jesucristo no se puede pedir el salto desde este hecho histrico a toda una
cosmovisin metafsica de alcance universal:
Pero saltar de esta verdad histrica a una clase de verdades totalmente distintas y
exigir de m que forme, segn aquella, todos mis conceptos metafsicos y morales; exi-
girme que modifique todas mis ideas fundamentales sobre la esencia de la Divinidad
segn aquella, porque no puedo oponer ningn testimonio creble a la resurreccin de
Cristo; si eso no es un paso a otra esfera conceptual, no s lo que entendera Aristteles
por ello [] Ese, ese es el repugnante gran foso con el que no puedo por ms que inten-
te bien en serio saltrmelo. Si alguien puede echarme una mano, hgalo; se lo ruego, se
lo suplico. Dios se lo pagar 24.

III. ISLAM E ILUSTRACIN

Hemos visto cmo el dilogo que el papa propone en referencia al Islam se ubica en
el mbito preteolgico de lo cultural. En efecto, tanto el cristianismo como el Islam deben
reconocer el contexto en que estn hoy situados, es decir, deben asumir los retos funda-
mentales que el programa de emancipacin y mayora de edad ilustrado lanz a sendas
religiones. Por esta razn, hemos comenzado nuestra reflexin estableciendo la relacin
histrica entre Cristianismo e Ilustracin y subrayando el problema fundamental que la
autonoma de la razn moderna plantea a nuestra fe: la validez universal del hecho his-
trico-concreto Jess de Nazaret. Ahora toca clarificar las relaciones histricas entre
Islam e Ilustracin teniendo en cuenta que en ninguna parte del mundo Islmico de los
siglos XVII y XVIII [] se puso en marcha un cambio de paradigma hacia la Modernidad
semejante al acontecido en Occidente 25.

23
GONZLEZ DE CARDEDAL, La entraa, 385.
24
G. E. LESSING, Sobre la demostracin en espritu y fuerza, en A. ANDREU RODRIGO (ed.), Escritos
filosficos y teolgicos, Madrid, 1982, 448s. Debemos reconocer cmo, an en forma de rechazo, Lessing
ha comprendido perfectamente la pretensin escandalosa del cristianismo que R. Guardini describa como
sigue: La doctrina cristiana afirma, en efecto, que por la humanizacin del Hijo de Dios, por su muerte
y su resurreccin, por el misterio de la fe y de la gracia, toda la creacin se ha visto exhortada a abando-
nar su aparente concrecin objetiva y a situarse, como bajo una norma decisiva, bajo la determinacin de
una realidad personal, a saber: bajo la persona de Jesucristo. Ello constituye, desde el punto de vista lgi-
co, una paradoja, ya que parece hacer problemtica la misma realidad concreta de la persona. Incluso el
sentimiento personal se rebela contra ello. Someterse, en efecto, a una ley general cierta bien natural,
mental o moral no es difcil para el hombre, el cual siente que al hacerlo as contina siendo l mismo,
e incluso que el reconocimiento de una ley semejante puede convertirse en una accin personal. A la pre-
tensin, en cambio, de reconocer a otra persona como ley suprema de toda la esfera religiosa y, por tanto,
de la propia existencia, el hombre reacciona en sentido violentamente negativo, en La esencia del cristia-
nismo, Madrid, 1959, 21.
25
H. KNG, El Islam. Historia, presente, futuro, Madrid, 2006, 461.

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1032 J. S. BJAR, CRISTIANISMO, ISLAM E ILUSTRACIN

De esta manera, se hace urgente una serena meditacin sobre este punto que, como
ya hemos apuntado, es el reto fundamental que se presenta a la religin islmica, es decir,
un necesario cambio de paradigma que permita adecuar la esencia de su fe a la altura
del tiempo. Justamente, al igual que el judasmo y el cristianismo, el Islam vive en esta
fase de transicin de la historia mundial un conflicto fundamental entre tradicin e inno-
vacin, y todava est por ver cmo se dirime tal conflicto y que solucin final encuen-
tra 26. As pues, el Islam debe ser receptivo a un interlocutor que ejerce con adultez el
uso de una racionalidad que nos ana a creyentes e increyentes y debe percibir las inquie-
tudes de tal interlocutor moderno no como amenaza, sino como oportunidad de expo-
ner significativamente su fe en un contexto plural. Por ello en su conferencia, Benedic-
to XVI extraa como enseanza fundamental del Palelogo la afirmacin decisiva de que
no actuar segn la razn es contrario a la naturaleza de Dios 27 y lanzaba, como inquie-
tud fundamental del interlocutor ilustrado con respecto a la religin Islmica, el pro-
blema de la violencia. Por tanto, la pregunta que queremos esclarecer es si la violencia
en el Islam es fruto de una cristalizacin histrico-concreta, tal como ha acontecido repe-
tidas veces en referencia al cristianismo, o puede ser introyectada en su misma esencia.
O de otro modo, si la verdadera esencia del verdadero Islam acontece en diferentes for-
mas histricas 28, el uso de la violencia: ha sido una concrecin histrica errnea de su
esencia o slo una explicitacin de la misma?

III.1. La pregunta por el fundamentalismo-violencia en el Islam

Toda religin debe atender a un doble nivel: su esencia y las distintas formas, hist-
ricamente condicionadas, a las que da lugar. Ahora bien, la esencia slo se manifiesta en
la forma cambiante y no siempre es sencillo establecer qu pertenece a un nivel o a otro.
Por ello, en la reflexin que sigue, como telogos cristianos, queremos lanzar una serie
de preguntas que ataen fundamentalmente a la esencia del Islam, convencidos de que
el telogo tiene como tarea trascender los determinantes histricos para conectar la fe
con su entraa ms pura y genuina. De esta manera, y en referencia al problema de la
violencia en el Islam, vamos a exponer tres puntos clave: la interpretacin del Corn, la
pregunta sobre los orgenes y el problema de la teocracia en relacin a los sistemas demo-
crticos contemporneos.

III.1.1. La interpretacin del Corn

El prrafo, antes citado, de la conferencia de Benedicto XVI en la Universidad de


Ratisbona, donde se contiene la frase del Palelogo, comienza hablando de la guerra
santa (yihad) 29 como tema del sptimo coloquio entre el emperador y el culto persa.
As, se cita la sura 2,256: Ninguna constriccin en las cosas de Dios que, siendo la
sura ms larga del Corn, cuenta con 286 versculos 30. El papa, siguiendo las indica-
ciones de los especialistas, afirma que se trata de una de las suras del perodo inicial

26
Ibd., 42.
27
Fe, razn y universidad, 2.
28
H. KNG, El Islam, 39.
29
Constatamos que dicho trmino no significa guerra santa, sino esfuerzo en el camino de Dios.
30
El Corn est compuesto por 114 secciones llamadas suras o azoras que, a su vez, se dividen en
versculos llamados aleyas; en total 6.666 versculos.

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J. S. BJAR, CRISTIANISMO, ISLAM E ILUSTRACIN 1033

de la vida del profeta cuando, no teniendo ninguna clase de poder y experimentando


la oposicin incluso de su propia tribu, estaba amenazado. Ahora bien, y esto es algo
que molest especialmente al mundo Islamico, el papa expone cmo el emperador
bizantino deba ser consciente de que la disposicin ya citada entraba en contradic-
cin con otras enseanzas desarrolladas sucesivamente y fijadas en el Corn acerca de
la guerra santa.
Khaled Fouad Allam, argelino residente en Italia y profesor de islamologa en las uni-
versidades de Trieste y de Urbino, en un comentario a la conferencia del papa la maa-
na siguiente de ser dictada, afirm que Benedicto XVI haba levantado un real proble-
ma en relacin al binomio violencia y Corn que se funda en el hecho de que el Corn
puede ser ledo segn interpretaciones opuestas 31. En efecto, segn el profesor de isla-
mologa, las suras que componen el Corn pueden distinguirse segn su procedencia, es
decir, mecanas o medinenses segn provengan del periodo de presencia del profeta en
la Meca o en Medina, respectivamente. Ahora bien, la diferencia fundamental es que,
mientras las primeras tienen un carcter ms proftico y escatolgico, retratando la etapa
primera de desproteccin del profeta, las segundas hacen referencia a una estructura-
cin del Islam desde el punto de vista jurdico, poltico y social que da razn de una pre-
sencia Islmica fortificada ya en estructuras e instituciones.
En este sentido, la diferencia entre suras mecanas y medinenses ha sido motivo de
polmicas al interior del Islam porque evidencia la necesidad de armonizar las contra-
dicciones del libro sagrado buscando una acertada hermenutica que facilite un instru-
mental adecuado para dicha tarea. As, la teologa clsica resolva el choque entre vers-
culos que derogan y versculos que son derogados afirmando que si hay dos principios
que se contradicen entre s, el principio positivo abroga el negativo. En este sentido, afir-
ma Khaled Fouad Allam:
El clebre versculo citado por el Papa Benedicto XVI puede ser ledo segn
dos interpretaciones opuestas. Segn la teologa clsica y segn la teologa de tipo
liberal este versculo debera abrogar todos los versculos que incitan a la violencia.
Pero hoy, en una situacin caracterizada por el monopolio de una teologa neofun-
damentalista, es aquel versculo que en cambio es abrogado de hecho, en el sentido
que muchos no lo tienen en cuenta en absoluto, como hacen por ejemplo los sala-
fistas 32.

No obstante, otras interpretaciones hacen referencia al criterio de que los versculos


ms recientes abrogan a los ms antiguos. Y aqu debemos sealar una afirmacin del
papa que se opone al consenso mayoritario de los especialistas. En efecto, hemos visto
que Benedicto XVI sita la disposicin: Ninguna constriccin en las cosas de fe de la
sura 2,256 en el perodo inicial, por tanto, considera que la sura segunda es de proce-
dencia mecana. Sin embargo, la mayora de los especialistas creen que dicha sura es de
procedencia medinense. En efecto, la distribucin de las azoras se realiza en tres pero-
dos mecanos iniciales y un ltimo medinense, con un esencial acuerdo entre los espe-
cialistas. La distribucin ms aceptada corresponde a Rgis Blachre al comienzo de la
traduccin francesa del Corn. All, la sura segunda es situada en el perodo de Medi-
na 33. De esta manera, se explica la molestia de ciertos sectores Islmicos que, en esta

31
Cf. SANDRO MAGISTER, Dos estudiosos musulmanes comentan la leccin papal en Ratisbona, en
www.chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it.
32
Ibd.
33
Cf. R. BLACHRE, Le Coran, Pars, 1980, 11-19. En esta lnea tambin, cf. J. CORTS, El Corn, Bar-
celona, 1986, 33, y J. L. SNCHEZ NOGALES, Cristianismo e Islam. Frontera y encuentro, Madrid, 1998, 48.

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1034 J. S. BJAR, CRISTIANISMO, ISLAM E ILUSTRACIN

equivocacin, habra interpretado la insinuacin del papa de una falsa posicin Isl-
mica que fue sostenida slo por motivo de una temporal falta de poder 34.
Pues bien, si esto es as y la segunda sura pertenece al cuarto perodo, la interpreta-
cin que se hace de la misma puede variar. De esta manera, en la Fatwa sobre las decla-
raciones del papa Benedicto XVI de Abdalqadir As-Sufi, publicada por la mezquita del
Albaicn de Granada, se afirma que la azora segunda est abrogada por aquella de la
espada (47,4) que, perteneciente tambin al perodo de Medina, es, sin embargo, ms
reciente. En esta sura, se afirma:
Cuando sostengis, pues, un encuentro con los infieles, descargad los golpes en el
cuello hasta someterles. Entonces, atadlos fuertemente. Luego, devolvedles la libertad,
de gracia o mediante rescate para que cese la guerra. Es as como debis hacer. Si Dios
quisiera, se defendera de ellos, pero quiere probaros a unos por medio de otros. No deja-
r que se pierdan las obras de los que hayan cado por Dios 35.

Este cierto detenimiento en la explicitacin de una problemtica que puede pasar


desapercibida con la simple lectura de la conferencia de Benedicto XVI al no especialis-
ta sirve, sin embargo, para mostrar cmo la intuicin del papa, a pesar del error rese-
ado, sigue siendo vlida: una lectura fundamentalista de los grandes textos sagrados
que sustentan la vida espiritual de las religiones del libro puede conducir dramtica-
mente al ejercicio de la violencia.
En este sentido, es preciso apuntar que la principal dificultad para la aplicacin de ins-
trumentos hermenuticos en la lectura del Corn se encuentra en el concepto mismo de
revelacin 36. En efecto, el Corn es un libro sagrado porque Dios mismo es su nico autor.
Segn el propio testimonio del profeta Mahoma, el Corn le fue transmitido por el ngel
Gabriel a partir del Urbuch o libro arquetipo o primordial que no se conserva en la tierra,
sino en el cielo: S, es un Corn glorioso, en una Tabla bien guardada! (85:21-22; tam-
bin cf. 56:77-80). De esta manera, el concepto de revelacin Islmico es dictafnico 37,
recreando el momento en que el arcngel Gabriel, como afirma la sura 96,1-5, dicta al odo
del profeta Mahoma, palabra por palabra, el contenido del Corn celeste escrito en lengua
rabe. All podemos leer:
Recita en el nombre de tu Seor, Que ha creado, ha creado al hombre de sangre
coagulada! Recita! Tu Seor es el Munfico, Que ha enseado el uso del clamo, ha
enseado al hombre lo que no saba (96,1-5).

En la edicin del Corn preparada por Julio Corts, que es la que estamos citando en
castellano, el editor afirma que habla el ngel Gabriel a Mahoma. Estas aleyas consti-
tuyen, segn la tradicin que ha prevalecido, la primera revelacin que recibi Maho-
ma, con la que comienza su profetismo, en el monte Hira, en la inmediaciones de la Meca,
hacia el ao 610 38. Esta veneracin al libro que, como afirma la sura 97, se hizo des-
cender del cielo la noche del Destino, nos puede llevar a la bsqueda de la especificidad
del Islam en relacin al propio cristianismo. As pues, si parafraseando el prlogo de
S. Juan podemos decir que la Palabra de Dios se hizo carne en Jesucristo (cf. Jn 1,14), el

34
AREF ALI NAYED, en www.webislam.com.
35
SHAYKH DR. ABDALQADIR AS-SUFI, Fatwa sobre las declaraciones del Papa Benedicto XVI en Alemania,
en www.cislamica.org/pensamiento.
36
Para la reflexin que sigue, cf. J. L. SNCHEZ NOGALES, Cristianismo e Islam, 47-56, y H. KNG, El
Islam, 80-98 y 578-596.
37
J. L. SNCHEZ NOGALES, Cristianismo e Islam, 47.
38
J. CORTS, El Corn, 732.

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J. S. BJAR, CRISTIANISMO, ISLAM E ILUSTRACIN 1035

Islam afirmara que la Palabra de Dios se ha hecho libro. Desde esta clave, podemos
entender que para los musulmanes el Corn posea atributos divinos. En efecto, se trata
de un libro lingsticamente perfecto, es un libro singular, inimitable e insuperable, de
modo que el profeta no necesita ningn milagro porque el Corn mismo ya lo es, es intra-
ducible y para entenderlo bien hay que saber el rabe puro, de modo que es la ms anti-
gua obra rabe en prosa que ha legitimado dicha lengua como sagrada y litrgica, y, por
ltimo, es un libro inenarrable y absolutamente fidedigno.
Este ltimo atributo divino es especialmente significativo para el tema que nos ocupa.
En efecto, si el Corn fue transmitido palabra por palabra, esto es precisamente lo que
entendemos por el concepto de revelacin en sentido dictafnico, est libre de todo error
y de toda contradiccin. As, en la sura 4:82 podemos leer: No meditan en el Corn? Si
hubiera sido de otro que de Dios, habran encontrado en l numerosas contradicciones.
De esta manera, se hace perfectamente claro a un interlocutor atento la dificultad para
introducir cualquier instrumento hermenutico en la lectura del Corn. Es ms, la con-
sideracin hacia el libro sagrado llega a tal extremo que la escuela teolgica asar, fun-
dada en el siglo IX y considerada la escolstica ms ortodoxa del Islam, hace una inter-
pretacin tan esencialista de los atributos divinos, frente a la interpretacin alegrica de
la escuela ms abierta denominada mutazil, que llega a afirmar que el Corn es increa-
do, palabra eterna de Dios, atributo eterno. Esta reflexin, lgicamente, pone en eviden-
cia la dificultad de articular el rgido monotesmo islmico con la afirmacin de dos incre-
ados: Al y el Corn. No obstante, los asares hacen tal afirmacin de un modo fidesta 39
sin encontrar contradiccin ninguna y llegando a afirmar que los atributos de Dios exis-
ten tal y como son expuestos por el Corn, es decir, Dios tendra rostro, dos manos, etc.,
aunque no en sentido humano 40. Como conclusin de lo expuesto:
La teora Islmica de la revelacin empieza por no reconocer mediacin alguna
entre el acontecimiento revelador en s y la objetivacin textual de la revelacin. La orto-
doxia musulmana absolutiza la letra del texto sagrado cornico como la Palabra misma
de Dios, sin mediacin, recitada por Mahoma, sello de los profetas, que abroga toda
profeca anterior restituyendo las desviaciones-falsificaciones por la recitacin en len-
gua rabe clara del libro celeste al dictado del ngel Gabriel. Esta teora mecanicista o
dictafnica de la revelacin no reconoce a Mahoma como verdadero autor humano del
Corn, sino como mero recitador de un dictado procedente de un libro celeste escrito
en rabe claro que contiene la mismsima Palabra de Dios increada 41.

Por tanto, y en relacin a la interpretacin del Corn, sigue quedando como pro-
blema para el mundo islmico la pregunta por la contingencia histrica de su libro
sagrado. En efecto, el Corn es un libro inspirado por Dios que al mismo tiempo sigue
siendo inspirador; o de otra manera, se trata de un testimonio religioso del siglo VII que
sigue siendo esencial para millones de personas en el siglo XXI. Si esto es as, se hace
del todo necesario plantear la pregunta acerca de los condicionantes histricos, socia-
les y religiosos de dicho documento para que pueda ser trasladado al presente y siga
inspirando vida a millones de creyentes, pero a la altura del tiempo. En este sentido,
es importante hacer notar que no se trata de un libro cado del cielo porque ms bien
le fue comunicado al profeta en el corazn, despus fue anunciado por Mahoma y slo

39
Sin duda que aqu podemos ver un reflejo de lo expresado por Benedicto XVI en su conferencia a
propsito de la dificultad del Islam para la aplicacin de la analoga al hacer un subrayado tan categri-
co de la trascendencia divina. Cf. Fe, razn, universidad, 2.
40
Cf. J. L. SNCHEZ NOGALES, Cristianismo e Islam, 89ss.
41
Ibd., 198.

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1036 J. S. BJAR, CRISTIANISMO, ISLAM E ILUSTRACIN

ms tarde, tras la muerte del profeta, recopiladas sus enseanzas y plasmadas por escri-
to hasta llegar a la edicin cannica del Corn unificado del califa Utmn entre los
aos 644-656. De ah que, en contexto actual, se haga especialmente urgente una refle-
xin acerca de cmo hay que entender el Corn y se aplique para ello una rigurosa ex-
gesis cornica 42.

III.1.2. La inquietud ante los orgenes

El papa Benedicto XVI alude en su discurso en la Universidad de Ratisbona, como


ya hemos apuntado, al perodo inicial en el que Mahoma mismo an no tena poder y
estaba amenazado 43. El profeta Mahoma nace en la Meca en el ao 570 y recibe su pri-
mera revelacin en el ao 610, dando comienzo a su predicacin pblica en el 613 44.
Como para todo profeta, recibir la palabra de Dios supone el no fcil ejercicio de con-
frontacin con el misterio. Un misterio que, si es verdad y no una mera proyeccin de
nuestro anhelos ms ntimos, se torna impertinente y trastoca la vida del creyente en una
difcil tarea no exenta de incomprensiones de parte de sus mismos contemporneos. As,
entre los quraises, una de las muchas tribus que existan en la Arabia del siglo VII y que
constitua el grupo de pertenencia del profeta, el mensaje de Mahoma no slo suscita
curiosidad, sino incomprensin. Pronto la predicacin de Mahoma, sustentada en una
tica de la justicia en vistas al juicio de Dios y el progresivo esclarecimiento de un mono-
tesmo frreo, le va acarrear sus primeros problemas.
Por un lado, la tica de la justicia predicada por el profeta va a chocar con la injusti-
cia social reinante entre la clase gobernante de los ricos mercaderes que generaba un
gran nmero de pobres en torno a La Meca. Por otro, el profeta Mahoma entra en pol-
mica con el politesmo existente que, en un contexto como el de coexistencia de tribus,
era el sustento del propio sistema social y econmico de la Arabia de entonces. En efec-
to, la predicacin del profeta pona en entredicho los dioses de las distintas tribus, sus
santuarios de referencia, sus tradiciones y, por tanto, su propia identidad. Es ms, pona
en peligro la ciudad de La Meca como lugar de peregrinacin anual que congregaba pac-
ficamente a todas las tribus y que se constitua en el escenario de un gran mercado supra-
rregional. De esta manera, un qurais cuestiona los cimientos de su propia tribu: el culto
a los dioses de los antepasados, las tradiciones, la unidad y cohesin de los clanes y la
identidad de la tribu. Se da comienzo as al enfrentamiento con un individuo, respalda-
do todava por un minsculo grupo, contra toda la tribu, acabando en una escisin que
supone el inicio de tiempos duros para el profeta.
No obstante, en el ao 620, y con motivo de la peregrinacin anual a La Meca, tiene
lugar un cambio esencial para la historia del naciente Islam. Un grupo de seis varones
de la ciudad de Medina se convierten a las revelaciones de Mahoma y en el ao 622, com-
prometidos a proteger al profeta, es invitado a dirimir las rivalidades entre las dos tri-
bus ms importantes que componan el oasis. Este suceso se conoce como la hgira, la
emigracin o el xodo y marca un cambio de rumbo que supone el trnsito a otro mundo
donde la clave no ser la del parentesco tribal, sino la de la comunidad de fe fundada en
la creencia en el nico Dios (Umma). La trascendencia de este hecho es tal que el 16 de
julio del ao 622 comienza el ao primero de la nueva era islmica.

42
Cf. B. FORTE, La esencia del cristianismo, Salamanca, 2002, 35-39.
43
Fe, razn y universidad, 2.
44
Para esta reconstruccin de los orgenes, cf. H. KNG, El Islam, 118-151, y SNCHEZ NOGALES, Cris-
tianismo e Islam, 36-43.

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As, y ubicado en Medina, el carisma y la fuerza del profeta logra unificar a todas las
tribus y acallar los conflictos, dando lugar a la comunidad o confederacin de Medina
como ncleo de la ulterior gran comunidad musulmana. La esencia de esta nueva comu-
nidad vendr determinada por la comunin en un mismo fundamento religioso. De esta
manera, se puede constatar un cambio de roles fundamental para la comprensin de la
figura de Mahoma que bien podra ser tematizado como el paso del profeta al hombre
de estado, del carismtico itinerante al general del ejrcito.
La nueva comunidad requiere unas tareas de organizacin interna o poltica interior
y de legitimacin ad extra o poltica exterior. Esta ltima va a suponer la organizacin
de una fuerte proteccin militar que ser la sea ms reconocible de la nueva comuni-
dad islmica y que tendr como objetivos inmediatos la lucha encarnizada contra los
quraises, los ataques por sorpresa a las caravanas meques, como fuente de ingresos, y
la fortificacin defensiva de la ciudad ante las amenazas de posibles desquites del ene-
migo. Poco a poco, y a medida que avanza el poder de la nueva comunidad y sus triun-
fos blicos, la ciudad de La Meca ser el gran objetivo a batir:
Al principio se trata de batidas contra intereses quraises que cuentan con el bene-
plcito y la colaboracin de Muhammad [] Pero estas batidas, que fundamentalmen-
te responden a razones econmicas, pronto se convierten en una guerra de fe que se
lleva a cabo contra estos infieles de La Meca! por orden divina, o sea, en un com-
batir en el camino de Dios 45.

Evidentemente, este repaso a los orgenes del Islam, con el profeta an en vida, est
necesitado de una contextualizacin que ubique tales acciones belicosas en el horizon-
te de comprensin de la Arabia del siglo VII, donde no existe an el concepto de derechos
humanos y donde los mtodos brutales de guerra son la prctica comn. De hecho, Maho-
ma no se atribuy a s mismo tales xitos polticos y militares, sino siempre a Dios: Si
Dios os auxilia, no habr nadie que pueda venceros. Pero, si os abandona, quin podr
auxiliaros fuera de l? Que los creyentes confen en Dios! (3:160) Al mismo tiempo, el
profeta, que comparta una antropologa rabe sostenida ms en lo colectivo que en lo
individual, tena la pretensin de cambiar a mejor aquella sociedad sobre los cimientos
de una cosmovisin donde no exista distincin entre lo poltico y lo religioso. Por ello,
la umma creada por Mahoma deba tener una dimensin inevitablemente blica si se
esperaba su continuidad e institucionalizacin en un contexto como el descrito. Tam-
bin es necesario apuntar que el profeta tuvo una enorme disposicin a la reconciliacin
una vez conquistada La Meca e instaurada en ella la capital de toda la comunidad musul-
mana unificada.
No obstante, tambin es comprensible una cierta inquietud ante los orgenes; sobre
todo atendiendo a la relacin entre religin y violencia en contexto ilustrado. En efecto,
el telogo cristiano, que reconoce la importancia decisiva de la figura del profeta para la
historia universal de las religiones, no puede dejar de hacer determinadas preguntas cr-
ticas en relacin a la persona y obra de Mahoma. Concretamente, no puede ser la vida
misma del profeta una justificacin de ciertas prcticas violentas o derivarse de ella con
facilidad determinadas acciones belicosas? En este sentido, somos conscientes de que el
trmino yihad de ninguna manera quiere decir guerra santa, trmino que no aparece
ni una sola vez en el Corn, sino esfuerzo en el camino de Dios. Pero, al mismo tiem-
po, ciertos pasajes del Corn parecen afirmar que Dios no slo permite, sino que puede
llegar a exigir un violento afanarse en esos caminos de Dios. De esta manera, el telogo

45
H. KNG, El Islam, 140s.

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1038 J. S. BJAR, CRISTIANISMO, ISLAM E ILUSTRACIN

cristiano no puede dejar de pensar en el contraste que la figura de Mahoma tiene en rela-
cin a la persona de Jesucristo. En palabras de H. Kng:
A posteriori, la pregunta de si Muhammmad tena o no otras opciones apenas es
relevante. Lo que s resulta relevante es que, mientras que el maestro de Nazaret se opuso
por principio a la guerra y al empleo de violencia y opt por la no violencia y la paz, el
profeta de La Meca y Medina admiti de antemano el uso de la violencia y de la guerra
como medios para la consecucin de sus objetivos, sobre todo para asegurar a la nueva
comunidad una existencia pacfica 46.

Siguiendo esta argumentacin, el mismo H. Kng reconoce que es preciso que los
musulmanes reconozcan de manera ms inequvoca que ni siquiera el Profeta era moral-
mente perfecto 47. En efecto, su desconfianza ante los judos como un posible grupo de
oposicin que produjo depuraciones y masacres, su excesivo apego a las leyes no escri-
tas de la antigua sociedad rabe, el hecho de no respetar las reglas de guerra que eran
por todos reconocidas, al menos en dos casos y en referencia a la prohibicin de lanzar
ataques en los tiempos sagrados y a la prohibicin de la tala de palmeras 48 son ele-
mentos que podran ayudar a establecer una distancia crtica con unos mtodos que, en
absoluto, pueden ser aceptados hoy da por ms que pertenezcan a la praxis histrica
del Profeta.

III.1.3. Teocracia versus democracia

Este sucinto repaso a la historia de los orgenes del Islam nos ha hecho descubrir
cmo la nueva religin vincula indisolublemente la soberana religiosa y el poder polti-
co como fundamento de la unidad de Arabia. De esta manera, se hace patente otro ele-
mento de problematicidad, especialmente significativo en el contexto ilustrado, que hace
referencia a la teocracia como sistema poltico inherente al Islam. En efecto, la comu-
nidad Islmica es ambas cosas a la vez: comunidad religiosa y comunidad poltica, ciu-
dad de Dios. Pues no existe separacin entre el Estado y la religin. Ambas realidades
estn amalgamadas en una indisoluble unidad 49. Por esta razn, no es de extraar las

46
H. KNG, El Islam, 649. En este mismo sentido, es significativa una frase de Pascal que reza: Si
Mahoma escogi el camino del xito humano, Jesucristo eligi el de fracasar humanamente; Mahoma mata,
Jess se deja matar, en Pensamientos, ed. Brunschvicg, 601. Es interesante hacer notar cmo en una Carta
abierta a su Santidad el papa Benedicto XVI que treinta y un especialistas dirigen al papa como comentario
a su conferencia, se hace referencia al uso de la violencia por parte de Cristo: Por otra parte, es notable
que Manuel II Paleologus diga que la violencia va en contra de la naturaleza de Dios, cuando Cristo mismo
us la violencia contra los mercaderes y cambistas del templo, y dijo: No pensis que he venido a traer la paz
a la tierra; no he venido a traer paz, sino una espada (Mt 10:34-36). Cuando Dios ahog al Faran, esta-
ba yendo contra Su propia Naturaleza? Tal vez el emperador quera decir que la crueldad, la brutalidad y
la agresin se oponen a la Voluntad de Dios, en cuyo caso la ley clsica y tradicional de la yihad en el Islam
suscribira sus palabras por completo, en www.duaatalislam.com/pope_letter_spanish.pdf, 3. Precisamente,
tales afirmaciones de este grupo de especialistas refuerzan la idea de la necesaria exgesis de los textos
sagrados, tanto cristianos como musulmanes, para evitar todo riesgo de fundamentalismo.
47
H. KNG, El Islam, 146.
48
La tala de palmeras, que necesitaban dcadas para crecer de nuevo, era una prohibicin expresa
de los hombres del desierto, por todos respetada y establecida como regla del arte rabe de guerrear. As,
en el ao 625, dentro del proceso de depuraciones y masacres de los judos que se haban negado a ser
miembros de la confederacin musulmana, Mahoma, violando esta ley, manda talar las palmeras de la
tribu juda de nadir. Posteriormente, encontramos en el Corn una justificacin religiosa de tal accin en
la sura 59:5: Cuando talabais una palmera o la dejabais en pie, lo hacais con permiso de Dios y para con-
fundir a los perversos.
49
H. KNG, El Islam, 187.

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J. S. BJAR, CRISTIANISMO, ISLAM E ILUSTRACIN 1039

reservas y cautelas de este papa cuando, en la entrevista de Peter Seewald que ya hemos
citado, al ser preguntado por las relaciones cristianismo e Islam responde:
El Islam, efectivamente, tiene estructuras para la convivencia social, para la pol-
tica, para la religin, totalmente diferentes. Cuando hoy en da se discute en Occidente
la posibilidad de establecer facultades de teologa Islmica, o presentar el Islam como
corporacin de derecho pblico, se presupone que todas las religiones estn estructu-
radas de igual forma; que todas se adaptan a un mismo sistema democrtico con sus
ordenamientos jurdicos y con los espacios libres propios de ese ordenamiento. Pero la
esencia misma del Islam lo contradice. Porque el islamismo no admite, en absoluto, esa
separacin de los mbitos poltico y religioso, que, desde el principio, caracteriza al cris-
tianismo. El Corn es una ley religiosa que regula la totalidad de la vida poltica y social
Islmica, y de ah se sigue que todo el ordenamiento de vida, en general, sea como dice
el Islam. La sharah configura la sociedad desde el principio hasta el final 50.

En este texto del papa hay un concepto necesitado de clarificacin y que se presenta
esencial para entender la problemtica que intentamos exponer: sharah 51. Este elemen-
to central del Islam es un trmino tcnico que designa la ley cannica Islmica. Los fun-
damentalistas piensan que el Corn es la constitucin del mundo. Ahora bien, existe el
problema de que, aun cuando el Corn contiene mandamientos y normas, stos son poco
numerosos. De ah la necesidad reconocida en el mundo Islmico de una concrecin de
dichos mandamientos de modo que se abarque la totalidad de la vida del hombre, sin
dejar ninguna de sus dimensiones fuera del mbito de influencia del elemento religioso.
Las fuentes de la sharah son cinco. La primera, como es obvio, es el mismo Corn.
Ciertamente, donde el Libro sagrado seala un mandamiento o norma, la obligacin es
absoluta. Pero, tal como hemos apuntado, el hecho de que el Corn no entre en excesi-
vos detalles ni descienda a casos concretos, ms que en contadas ocasiones, obliga a bus-
car luz en otras fuentes. Por ello, la segunda fuente que conforma la sharah es la sunna
como conjunto de dichos y hechos de Mahoma y su manera de proceder segn resulta
del testimonio de los ashab, sus contemporneos y compaeros 52. Aqu nos encontra-
mos con la tradicin entendida como categora religiosa, al igual que en el cristianismo.
La tercera fuente es el qiyas o deduccin por analoga que, ante nuevas problemticas
que no estn recogidas en el Corn ni en la sunna, partiendo de casos semejantes, se
intenta establecer legislacin por analoga. La cuarta fuente es el iyma como consenti-
miento o consenso universal de la comunidad que no puede estar toda ella de acuerdo
en el error. Y, en quinto y ltimo lugar, el iytihad que supone el esfuerzo de sacar el dere-
cho de las cuatro fuentes citadas y que da lugar a las distintas escuelas jurdicas que com-
ponen el Islam. De esta manera, se hace patente cmo la sharah es una ley total que no
deja espacio alguno de sombra en la vida del hombre que pueda sustraerse a la lumino-
sidad del Dios nico. Una ley que nos presenta un universo homogneo donde todo es
comprendido desde la ptica islmica.
As pues, el fenmeno de la globalizacin ha puesto de manifiesto un problema de no
pequeas dimensiones, precisamente porque ahora el interlocutor para un posible di-
logo cultural y religioso no se encuentra en la distancia, sino en la propia casa. De esta
manera, son usuales los desajustes que el creciente nmero de creyentes musulmanes,
ciudadanos de las sociedades de derecho, crean en el seno de nuestras democracias. Se
hace patente aqu, una vez ms, cmo la religin islmica est necesitada de confronta-

50
J. RATZINGER, La sal de la tierra, 264s.
51
Para la reflexin que sigue, cf. J. L. SNCHEZ NOGALES, Cristianismo e Islam, 67-88.
52
F. M. PAREJA, Islamologa, II, Madrid, 1952-54, 511.

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1040 J. S. BJAR, CRISTIANISMO, ISLAM E ILUSTRACIN

cin, en el sentido positivo de la palabra, con una ilustracin que ha aportado para la
configuracin de las sociedades occidentales la separacin entre Iglesia y Estado, la divi-
sin de poderes (legislativo, ejecutivo y judicial), la declaracin universal de los derechos
humanos en definitiva, una articulacin pluralista que debe tener su sustento ltimo
en la tolerancia 53.
De esta forma, y como citbamos al comienzo de esta reflexin, es una preocupa-
cin especialmente patente en la reflexin del papa el tema de los derechos humanos y,
especficamente, la aportacin de las religiones a su implantacin prctica en el mundo.
Cuando en 1948 la asamblea plenaria de las Naciones Unidas aprob la Declaracin
Universal de los Derechos Humanos, hubo una oposicin de principio, al igual que ocu-
rri con la Iglesia, de parte musulmana. El motivo de tal oposicin era doble: la Decla-
racin no apuntaba que tales derechos eran un don de Dios y el reconocimiento del
derecho al cambio de religin se viva como un desprecio al Corn. Desde entonces,
algunas importantes organizaciones islmicas han intentado una articulacin del Islam
y los derechos humanos pero integrando tales derechos en el sistema existente de la sha-
rah. Especialmente significativa es la Declaracin del Cairo sobre los Derechos Huma-
nos en el Islam 54 que la Organizacin de la Conferencia Islmica acept en 1990 y que,
aun no siendo vinculante desde el punto de vista jurdico, s posee un gran peso polti-
co. No obstante, en esta declaracin, cualquier observador crtico constata las tensio-
nes existentes entre derechos humanos y sharah y descubre que se han obviado aque-
llos derechos que no se dejan integrar si ms en la ley Islmica. As, por ejemplo, en el
artculo quinto, en referencia al matrimonio, no se contempla la no discriminacin por
motivos religiosos; o, en el artculo dcimo, se concede al Islam un status privilegiado
al considerarlo una religin de naturaleza incorrupta, estrechando el derecho recono-
cido a un legtimo cambio de religin. No es de extraar, por tanto, que el papa comen-
te en la entrevista mencionada:
En el ordenamiento vital del Islam hay una totalidad que abarca absolutamente
todo, con planteamientos muy distintos a los nuestros. Hay un claro sometimiento de
la mujer al varn, y, en su concepcin de la vida, existe un sistema ordenado de dere-
cho penal, que continuamente se contrapone a nuestro concepto de sociedad moderna.
A ese respecto interesa distinguir claramente que no se trata de una confesin religiosa
como tantas otras, pues no se inserta en los espacios libres de una sociedad pluralista.
Si se entiende as, cosa que sucede con cierta frecuencia, se estara juzgando al Islam
como un modelo cristiano y no segn su propia naturaleza 55.

IV. CONCLUSIN

Despus de esta meditacin sobre la conferencia del papa en Ratisbona, esperamos


haber contribuido a un esclarecimiento de las intenciones de Benedicto XVI en referen-
cia a su visin del Islam. Este papa ilustrado, que como telogo de oficio ha ejercido
durante largos aos la labor del esfuerzo del concepto, es consciente de que la mejor
forma de presentar plausiblemente el tema de Dios ante nuestro mundo es ensanchar los
estrechos lmites de una racionalidad que lo ha expulsado de sus dominios. Por ello, Dios
slo puede ser presentado en un contexto pluralista, como el de una sociedad globaliza-

53
Cf. H. KNG, El Islam, 457-484.
54
Cf. www.humanrights.harvard.edu/documents/regionaldocs/cairo-dec.htm.
55
J. RATZINGER, La sal de la tierra, 265.

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J. S. BJAR, CRISTIANISMO, ISLAM E ILUSTRACIN 1041

da, con el ejercicio del recto uso de la razn; precisamente porque nuestra razn, don
del creador a todo hombre, puede ser el nico mbito donde creyentes e increyentes
podemos encontrarnos. De esta manera, las preguntas que se hacen al Islam no tienen
que ser entendidas como ataque o sospecha, sino como una contribucin esperanzada
para esclarecer su propia credibilidad como religin que confiesa al Dios nico, miseri-
cordioso y compasivo.
No obstante, s nos gustara conscientemente apuntar la condicin demasiado
moderna de nuestro papa actual. En efecto, aunque es cierto que el discurso analizado
est plagado de invitaciones a una ampliacin del concepto de razn y de su uso, sin
embargo, la naturaleza de la leccin de Ratisbona sigue siendo en exceso ilustrada. El
matrimonio celebrado entre la razn y la fe con la incursin del cristianismo primitivo
en contexto helnico nos parece de tal solemnidad que, precisamente por eso, puede pre-
sentar algunos elementos que estn necesitados de una clarificacin y profundizacin
ulteriores:
San Juan nos ha brindado la palabra conclusiva sobre el concepto bblico de Dios,
la palabra con la que todos los caminos de la fe bblica, a menudo arduos y tortuosos,
alcanzan su meta, encuentran su sntesis. En el principio exista el logos, y el logos es
Dios, nos dice el evangelista. El encuentro entre el mensaje bblico y el pensamiento grie-
go no era una simple casualidad 56.

De la solidez de este matrimonio, se explica las reticencias del papa al programa de


deshelenizacin del cristianismo que reconoce en tres etapas: la iniciada con la Refor-
ma, la ejecutada por la teologa liberal y la que se est difundiendo actualmente en rela-
cin con la necesidad de inculturacin del cristianismo ms all de la cosmovisin occi-
dental. De ah su fuerte convencimiento:
Este acercamiento interior recproco que se ha dado entre la fe bblica y el plante-
amiento filosfico del pensamiento griego es un dato de una importancia decisiva, no
slo desde el punto de vista de la historia de las religiones, sino tambin del de la his-
toria universal, que tambin hoy hemos de considerar. Teniendo en cuenta este encuen-
tro, no sorprende que el cristianismo, no obstante haber tenido su origen y un impor-
tante desarrollo en Oriente, haya encontrado finalmente su impronta decisiva en
Europa 57.

En este sentido, nos encontramos cercanos a la postura del profesor de la Pontificia


Universidad Gregoriana E. Salmann que, a propsito de la leccin magistral que nos
ocupa, hizo unas declaraciones en el diario Klner-Stadt Anzeiger con el ttulo Mit
beschrnkter Haftung. All afirma que precisamente el olvido de nuestras races mtico-
religiosas, como verdadero humus y horizonte de toda razn, pueda ser la causa de que
otras culturas nos vean tan extraos. As, lo fascinante, lo insondable, lo mtico, las elec-
ciones sin sentido, los afectos, el xtasis, el instinto, la apuesta, la voluntad, la decisin
entreteje y sostiene nuestra vida cotidiana y componen el alma de todo verdadero arte,
de toda verdadera religin:
Ya los griegos eran conscientes de la complejidad y la profundidad abismal de la
razn. En ellos no exista el concepto de razn pura y clara. La tragedia, la historiogra-
fa, la filosofa presocrtica y la escptica, incluso Platn, conocen el lado demonaco
(daimonico) y contradictorio de la razn. Acaso no saba el Kant de los ltimos aos
del enigma del Mal, de aquello que, en la voluntad, es prevoluntario? Y nosotros, no

56
Fe, razn y universidad, 2s.
57
Ibd., 4.

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1042 J. S. BJAR, CRISTIANISMO, ISLAM E ILUSTRACIN

seguimos, a menudo, con todo derecho, la dinmica y la gramtica de las pulsiones, los
sueos, los traumas? 58.

Por ello, intuimos que un dilogo fructfero con otras culturas y con otras religiones
exige hoy una reconfiguracin de un concepto de razn que est an muy determinado
por la historia del desarrollo del pensamiento en occidente. Un concepto de razn que
reconozca humildemente que el paso del mito al logos siempre se est haciendo porque
el mito es ya ilustracin; la ilustracin recae en mitologa 59.

Facultad de Teologa de Granada J. SERAFN BJAR BACAS


Apartado 2002
18080 Granada
serabejar@mixmail.com

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

58
http://www.ksta.de/html/artikel/1162473077791.shtml.
59
M. HORKHEIMERT - TH. W. ADORNO, Dialctica de la Ilustracin. Fragmentos filosficos, Madrid,
4
2001, 56.

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LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA


DESDE LA METAFSICA DEL DEVENIR

JESS ROMERO MOIVAS


Universidad San Pablo-CEU
y C. U. Villanueva (UCM)

RESUMEN: Este artculo tiene dos objetivos fundamentales: en primer lugar, defender la necesidad de
que la teora social se site dentro del dilogo entre las ciencias y la teologa. Por ello se muestra el
caso concreto de convergencia que se puede dar entre las ciencias, la filosofa, la teora social y la teo-
loga bajo la nueva ontologa fluida o metafsica del devenir. En segundo lugar, tras la presentacin de
la ontologa de la fluidez social y de la metafsica del devenir, se apuesta por una reformulacin de la
dogmtica teolgica desde ese paradigma ms dinmico y evolutivo propio de las ciencias y la filoso-
fa modernas, menos esttico y fijista que el paradigma griego que hasta ahora ha servido de apoya-
tura filosfica a las construcciones teolgicas.
PALABRAS CLAVE: metafsica del devenir, teologa dogmtica, ontologa de la fluidez social, dilogo
teologa-ciencias.

The ontology of social fluency and the reformulation of theological


dogmatic from metaphysics of becoming
ABSTRACT: This paper has two fundamental objectives: firstly, to defend the necessity that the social
theory enters inside the dialogue between the sciences and theology. For it is explicated the case of
convergence that it can exists among science, philosophy, social theory and theology under the new
flowing ontology or metaphysics of becoming. Secondly, after the presentation of ontology of social
fluency and of metaphysics of becoming, it is defended a reformulation of the dogmatic theology from
a more dynamic and more evolutionary paradigm characteristic of modern science and philosophy, a
less static philosophy than the Greek paradigm that up to now has served as philosophical foundation
to the theological constructions.
KEY WORDS: metaphysics of becoming, dogmatic theology, ontology of social fluency, theology-scien-
ce relationships.

1. INTRODUCCIN: LA TEORA SOCIAL Y LA TEOLOGA, POR QU NO DIALOGAN?

Al leer los manuales de los ms destacados y brillantes autores en el dilogo entre la


teologa y las ciencias, se percibe una carencia muy sintomtica 1: no hay referencias a
las teoras sociales ms importantes, ni se las tiene en cuenta a la hora de construir una
imagen o cosmovisin del mundo. En cierto modo, y pese a los esfuerzos tericos post-
popperianos y post-kuhnianos para eliminar el estril positivismo radical en la ciencia,
an en la mente de los cientficos naturales (y de los propios telogos) sigue existiendo
un prejuicio de superioridad con respecto a las ciencias sociales, basadas en la idea de
que las nicas ciencias que producen un conocimiento fiable son las ciencias duras y,
por tanto, la teologa debe dialogar exclusivamente con ellas. En un artculo anterior

1
En espaol el anlisis ms sistemtico y, a la vez, paralelo entre los tres grandes autores (llamados
por Polkinghorne cientficos-telogos) son los estudios de Javier Monserrat (2004, 2005a y 2005b). En
ellos es sintomtico la ausencia de referencias a teoras sociales en los tres autores.

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1044 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

(Romero Moivas, 2007), ya mostr que el nacimiento de la sociologa tanto de la mano


de Comte y Spencer como, sobre todo, de la sistematizacin de Durkheim estuvo deter-
minado precisamente por la intencin de crear una ciencia social que tuviera como refe-
rente el modelo de ciencia positivista del siglo XIX. Gran parte de los socilogos clsicos,
con la notable y esencial excepcin de Weber, siguieron esta corriente sociolgica posi-
tivista, que pretenda estudiar los hechos sociales como si fueran hechos naturales.
Ante este estado de cosas la teora social se dividi en dos corrientes. La primera asu-
mi el presupuesto epistemolgico que afirma que las ciencias duras (incluso aunque se
haya superado el positivismo radical) son las nicas que proporcionan un conocimien-
to fiable del mundo. Y, por tanto, la sociologa si quiere ser una ciencia seria y rigurosa
debe asimilarse a la metodologa de las ciencias naturales. Esta corriente mantena como
presupuesto implcito (y a veces explcito) la idea de que la realidad natural y la realidad
social tienen una naturaleza ontolgica similar.
La segunda corriente se opone a esta naturalizacin o positivizacin de la socio-
loga, y asume un presupuesto ontolgico distinto: afirma que el mundo fsico y el mundo
social son independientes y excluyentes, no mezclables, y que no comparten una misma
naturaleza ontolgica. Son dos tipos distintos de realidad que exigen diferentes meto-
dologas y diversas herramientas epistemolgicas (Giddens, 1982: 14). La clave para com-
prender la diferencia de mtodo entre las ciencias naturales y las sociales est en la natu-
raleza del propio objeto de estudio: La diferencia crucial es que los objetos de las ciencias
sociales, como los cientficos sociales que los estudian, son seres reflexivos conscientes
que dotan a sus acciones de sentido (meaning) (Benton y Craib, 2001: 90).
En cualquier caso, sea cual fuere el enfoque que se privilegie, lo cierto es que la teo-
ra social tiene un poder poitico, es decir, productor de cosmovisiones. Tanto las cien-
cias naturales como las sociales no slo descubren una realidad externa, que est ah
fuera; si no que su tarea es tambin constructora y re-constructora de esa misma reali-
dad. No es casualidad, en este sentido, que en la actualidad la epistemologa mayorita-
ria de la ciencia natural y de la ciencia social sea, sobre todo, el realismo crtico. Con
ello, se defiende al mismo tiempo en la ciencia un descubrir y un producir, y ambos meca-
nismos son los que fundamentan las cosmovisiones que acompaan nuestra vida coti-
diana.
La teora social es una fuente de produccin de imgenes de la realidad social que in-
teracta con e influye en las propias cosmovisiones de la realidad natural. De hecho,
algunos autores han comenzando a defender la idea de que la ciencia natural debe con-
vertirse en ciencia social, puesto que toda la naturaleza es cultura 2. No pretendemos lle-
gar a tesis demasiado arriesgadas, pero s defendemos la mutua interaccin entre las teo-
ras sociales y las teoras naturales a la hora de crear nuestras cosmovisiones
socio-naturales. Hay que tener en cuenta que el ser humano es un animal biolgico-natu-
ral, pero tambin cultural-social, puesto que no existen dualismos en ese punto nodal
(Hefner) que es el ser humano 3. La cosmovisin que da sentido a la vida humana com-
pleta es una indisoluble unin de ciencia natural y ciencia social (junto con filosofas,

2
Como quiera que sea, dada la asimetra original entre la distincin ontolgica y epistemolgica,
las alteraciones ontolgicas del par naturaleza/cultura tienen consecuencias epistemolgicas: gradual-
mente, todas las ciencias sern concebidas como ciencias sociales. Hoy en da, la distincin entre natu-
raleza y cultura es el resultado de la inercia (Santos, 2003: 94).
3
Philiph Hefner de Chicago presenta el homo sapiens como un punto nodal en que confluyen y
coexisten dos corrientes de informacin que, lejos de oponerse, establecen una simbiosis de genes y cul-
tura, que no ha de romperse contraponiendo genes egostas a cultura altruista (Doncel, 2003: 32).

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J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA 1045

religiones, etc.), y de hecho nuestras imgenes del mundo (incluso las aparentemente
ms naturales) son siempre co-construcciones de naturaleza y cultura.
Por todo ello, cuesta entender la razn de por qu el prestigioso movimiento interna-
cional de dilogo entre la teologa y las ciencias excluye sistemticamente las teoras socia-
les. Parece que la nica utilidad de las ciencias sociales para la teologa sean las simples y
superficiales encuestas acerca de la evolucin de las prcticas religiosas y el debate acer-
ca de la secularizacin. Esta visin es miope y produce un verdadero sesgo intelectual y
terico en la interrelacin entre la teologa y las cosmovisiones cientficas. Como si el ser
humano fuera un ser abierto nicamente a las realidades cosmolgicas, biolgicas y micro-
fsicas y ciego a la cotidianidad de su entorno social. Sin embargo, ya William I. Thomas
afirmaba: if men [sic people] define things a real, they are real in their consequences. La
vida de las personas se configura y re-configura siempre en apertura a la realidad natural
y a la realidad social; los modos de actuacin divina (que tanto preocupan a los tericos
del dilogo teologa-ciencias) 4 tambin se reflejan en las estructuras sociales y en el modo
de comprender las relaciones inter-humanas y los vnculos humanos con la trascendencia
y con la realidad natural. La ontologa social es tan necesaria para la teologa como la onto-
loga natural o la ontologa filosfica.
De este modo, continuamos defendiendo la insercin de la teora social entre el
speakers club del dilogo teologa-ciencias. Si ese artculo arriba citado lo dedicamos a
un tema de fondo, genrico, de este dilogo, reflejando el inters de un socilogo como
Durkheim en plantear las relaciones entre la Ciencia y la Religin desde un enfoque socio-
lgico, en este segundo pretendemos centrarnos en el anlisis de una convergencia teri-
ca entre la teora social, la ciencia natural, la metafsica y la teologa: todos ellos estn
comenzando a edificar la disparidad de sus teoras sobre una ontologa de fondo que tiene
una clave de bveda comn: la fluidez y el devenir. A este respecto, es importante aclarar
algo: no partimos de un supuesto sistema metafsico a priori que establezca desde arriba
una ontologa comn a todas las esferas del ser, eliminando las posibles variaciones intrn-
secas a cada regin o capa; sino que ms bien, partimos de un regionalismo ontolgico
que considera que en cada una de esas esferas pueden existir diferentes ontologas no sub-
sumidas por una sola metafsica deducible a priori. No obstante, lo que ponemos de mani-
fiesto es que en la actualidad algunas de esas regiones (la de la realidad fsica, la de la rea-
lidad social y la propiamente metafsica) estn construyndose bajo una ontologa comn
basada en la fluidez y el devenir. Lo cual nos permite pensar que quiz se pueda construir
un sistema que integre en todas esas regiones una misma ontologa, dando la posibilidad
de convergencias tericas y, sobre todo, de nuevas implicaciones teolgicas.
Pero nuestra preocupacin no es simplemente la de mostrar esa convergencia, sino
que vamos ms all de las cuestiones puramente ontolgicas y abogamos por una refor-
mulacin de la dogmtica teolgica que tome en cuenta, precisamente, el nuevo fondo
ontolgico, alejado, pues, de esa metafsica griega ms esencialista, fijista y estatista que,
desde nuestro punto de vista, hace ms difcil de actualizar el cristianismo en dilogo
con nuestro mundo moderno 5.
Para desarrollar las dos vertientes u objetivos de este artculo, comenzamos hacien-
do en el epgrafe segundo una breve referencia a los fundamentos de la nueva ontologa

4
La grandiosa obra en cuatro volmenes, ya clsica, editada conjuntamente por el Observatorio Vati-
cano y por el CTNS de Berkeley, tiene como subttulo e hilo conductor de sus investigaciones las Scien-
tific Perspectives on Divine Action.
5
Esta tesis de la excesiva (y ya anacrnica) helenizacin de la teologa no es, por supuesto, nada
moderna.

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1046 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

de la fluidez social que ha nacido en el pensamiento sociolgico prcticamente en las


dos ltimas dcadas. Con ello, se pretende indicar las nuevas vas aproximativas a una
convergencia terica (que impulse el dilogo de la teologa con la teora social) con la
moderna preocupacin por lo evolutivo, el flujo y la metafsica del devenir de las cien-
cias y de la metafsica, y que ha empezado a calar en la teologa, pero slo en la llama-
da teologa de la ciencia; a ello dedicamos, pues, el tercer epgrafe. En el cuarto intenta-
mos una breve aproximacin a la reformulacin de algunos temas teolgicos desde la
metafsica del devenir. Finalmente, en el ltimo apartado hacemos una rpida defensa
de la intrepidez intelectual y de la libertad de creatividad terica, tanto en el campo cien-
tfico como teolgico, como modos de mantener abiertos en el pensamiento y en la vida,
esa nueva actitud fluidificadora.

2. LOS FUNDAMENTOS ONTOLGICOS DE LA SOCIOLOGA DE LA FLUIDEZ SOCIAL

En la teora social los nuevos planteamientos empricos y especulativos han dado lugar
a una ontologa de la fluidez social, frente al estatismo basado en el orden social de las
clsicas teoras sociales, as como una comprensin antropolgica menos antropocntri-
ca y en continuidad tambin con aspectos que antes se consideraban que quedaban fuera
de la comprensin del ser humano. No obstante, la propuesta que se presenta a conti-
nuacin no es unnimemente aceptada en sociologa. Simplemente la hemos querido pre-
sentar como ejemplo de un posible punto de encuentro, quiz puramente intuitivo e ima-
ginativo, entre la sociologa, las ciencias naturales y la teologa. Pero antes de presentar
la ontologa de la fluidez social, vamos a hacer una breve referencia a la ontologa social
clsica.

2.1. La exigencia de una ontologa social para la sociologa

Aunque en los orgenes de la sociologa los tericos mantenan cierta disposicin


positiva a tratar cuestiones filosficas de fondo, una gran parte de los socilogos moder-
nos se ha alejado de este tipo de reflexiones esenciales para toda ciencia. Sin embargo,
Magali Uhl (2005) ha defendido muy recientemente que aunque la sociologa cannica
actual, fundada sobre la investigacin emprica, oculta sin embargo su herencia filos-
fica y profundiza la fosa que separa las dos disciplinas (p. 81), tambin es verdad que,
paradjicamente, la mayor parte de los socilogos que han marcado la historia de la
disciplina son de formacin filosfica y utilizan en sus escritos las problemticas, las
temticas y las conceptualizaciones de la filosofa clsica (p. 82). En realidad, los deba-
tes que tratan sobre la naturaleza de la realidad social (realismo, idealismo, constructi-
vismo, interaccionismo, etc.) tienen todos una dimensin ontolgica, e incluso metaf-
sica (p. 22).
Dejando de lado las cuestiones epistemolgicas y metodolgicas, la cuestin filos-
fica crucial para la sociologa es la de la ontologa social, problema que la teora social
no ha sido capaz de cerrar y que reaparece recurrentemente en los debates ms serios
de la sociologa. Cul es el estatuto ontolgico del concepto de sociedad? Este deba-
te ha estado presente desde el mismo desarrollo de la sociologa en los escritos de los cl-
sicos: Durkheim, Marx, Weber, Simmel y Tnnies. Tras sus pasos se han ido desarro-
llando las posiciones modernas que beben de un modo u otro de ellos. De hecho, siguiendo

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J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA 1047

a Outhwaite (2006) podemos distinguir tres ontologas tradicionales con sus correspon-
dientes conceptos de sociedad: el realismo emprico, el idealismo trascendental y el rea-
lismo trascendental. El realismo emprico ofrece una clara eleccin. Bien la sociedad es
una entidad holstica, en analoga a un organismo biolgico (ej., el sociologismo de Dur-
kehim), o la sociedad es un concepto pre-cientfico y sin sentido que no es necesario
en el estudio de los fenmenos sociales particulares y necesariamente individuales (ej.,
el individualismo de Weber). Para el idealismo trascendental, la sociedad es un principio
abstracto de sociacin (Vergesellschaftung), localizado a menudo en las percepciones
de sus miembros (ej., el kantismo social de Simmel). Finalmente, el realismo trascen-
dental ve la sociedad a la vez como una condicin y como un resultado de la accin repro-
ducida continuamente, puesto que toma en serio el poder configurador de las rela-
ciones sociales, algo que no hace el idealismo.
Vamos a hacer tres precisiones a estas ontologas:
1) Las tres (con excepcin de la weberiana) son realistas y esencialistas, puesto que
tratan de localizar una naturaleza permanente que identifique la estructura fija
y consolidada de la sociedad. De hecho, a este respecto es muy sugerente com-
probar que toda la sociologa clsica confirma la dualidad entre esttica y din-
mica, o entre lo que permanece y lo que cambia en la sociedad (estructura y cam-
bio). Esta dicotoma ha sido considerada por Sztompka (2004) como el pecado
original de la sociologa y reproduce, de algn modo, la metafsica fijista que
analizaremos despus. Hay cambios ms o menos grandes, cambios del sistema
o cambios en el sistema, pero la estructura ltima de la sociedad permanece fija.
El devenir no roza la profundidad ontolgica del ser de la sociedad. La sociedad
es siempre. Aunque se produzcan cambios, el cambio no es constitutivo de
la ontologa social. Lo real es el ser, lo que permanece, la estructura, y el cambio
es un estado transitorio de no-ser entre los dos momentos intersticiales del cons-
truir-destruir-reconstruir. Lo que caracteriza a la sociedad es la perma-
nencia frente al cambio y de lo que se trata es de reconstruir las leyes ontolgi-
cas que regulan el cambio para ayudar a la construccin del orden social. Esta
visin se da tanto en el funcionalismo positivista de Durkheim, como en el mar-
xismo revolucionario de Marx. En ambos, el cambio est supeditado a la bs-
queda del orden, y la sociedad tiende a un estado fijo de perfeccionamiento.
2) A estas ontologas realistas hay que sumar la ms reciente ontologa constructi-
vista 6, y que tanto se ha extendido desde los aos setenta en la todas las ramas
de la sociologa. Para el constructivismo sociolgico (que sigue presa del dua-
lismo estructura-cambio) la realidad social que conocemos no tiene por qu ser
la nica, puesto que no hay nada natural en ella, sino que ha sido construi-
da por el ser humano. La sociedad se produce y reproduce a travs de acciones
humanas y la configuracin resultante de la sociedad no obedece a ninguna esen-
cia o naturaleza ontolgica y necesaria de esa misma sociedad construida. Lo
importante no es el ser objetivo de las cosas (la estructura), sino el sentido sub-

6
La tensin constitutiva que se dio en la sociologa del siglo XX entre la sociologa marxista y la anti-
marxista (estructural-funcionalista) se resquebraja a partir de 1968, coincidiendo con fenmenos histri-
cos y tericos capitales. Autores como Blau, Berger y Luckmann, Garfinkel, Schutz, Blumer, etc., inau-
guran nuevas corrientes que colocan de nuevo el actor en el centro de anlisis y a la cultura y la construccin
social de la realidad (constructivismo) como procesos determinantes. Estamos, pues, ante el equivalente
en ciencia social del giro lingstico o hermenutico de la filosofa que ocurre por los mismos aos
(Lamo de Espinosa, 2001: 37-38).

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1048 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

jetivo que los seres humanos proyectan sobre la sociedad (sentido, accin). Gar-
ca Selgas afirma (2003: 28): El problema [del constructivismo] empieza cuan-
do queremos indagar en los procedimientos por los que se llevara a cabo esa
construccin y vemos que tienden a ser de orden simblico o formal en la mayo-
ra de los casos, o preguntamos quin realiza la construccin y aparece algn
tipo de sujeto no construido y perfectamente real, o cuestionamos si hay lmites
a esa construccin y parece que no hay cosa alguna, humana o no humana, que
se le resista.
3) Finalmente, tanto las ontologas esencialistas como la constructivista no slo
comparten la dicotoma entre estructura-cambio, sino que adems reproducen
esa otra dualidad propia de la modernidad que Latour ha puesto de manifiesto
(1997 y 1992): aquella que se da entre lo natural y lo cultural, entre lo biolgico
y lo social, entre lo tcnico y lo humano, entre lo masculino y lo femenino. Esto
implica que lo real es lo que permanece en la sociedad, pero lo social y lo cultu-
ral se definen en tajante oposicin a la realidad natural y biolgica, que se exclu-
yen mutuamente. Tanto las ontologas esencialistas como las constructivistas
separan en dicotomas excluyentes la indisoluble realidad que quiere defender
la nueva ontologa de la fluidez social y la Teora del Actor-Red.

De todo lo dicho, hay que retener varias cosas: 1. Que toda teora social se funda en
una ontologa social determinada y por ello es necesario adentrarse en estas cuestiones.
2. Que la ontologa social clsica, a pesar de sus variedades, era fundamentalmente esen-
cialista. 3. Que en los aos setenta nace, por oposicin al esencialismo, el constructi-
vismo. 4. Que tanto los esencialistas como los constructivistas dan preeminencia al ser
frente al devenir, y que establecen dicotomas excluyentes que impiden una visin unida
de lo social y lo natural.

2.2. La nueva propuesta de la ontologa de la fluidez social 7

A) El marco histrico del nacimiento de la teora de la fluidez social:


fenmenos y procesos

La fluidificacin de lo social es un fenmeno histrico y, por ahora, slo tendencial


(Garca Selgas 2003: 29). Esta frase de uno de los socilogos ms implicados en el desa-
rrollo de esta nueva ontologa, quiere poner de manifiesto la idea de que la ontologa
social (quiz al contrario de lo que entendemos por ontologa en el mbito metafsico)
no es necesaria, sino contingente. Lo cual implica que la ontologa de fondo de toda
teora social est en relacin con los fenmenos histricos de los que da cuenta. No hay
una ontologa social, sino ms bien varias ontologas que dependen del contexto
social en el que nacen. Esto es lo que da sentido a la idea de que lejos de pretender esbo-
zar el ser social o de querer hablar de algn rasgo o esencia inmutable, afirmar que la
ontologa social no es necesaria sino contingente (Ibd.) 8.

7
En Espaa el mximo exponente de esta ontologa es el profesor Garca Selgas de la Universidad
Complutense.
8
Esta caracterizacin de la ontologa es congruente con la propia teora de la fluidez social. Sin
embargo, mis dudas se refieren al hecho de si de lo que Garca Selgas habla es de una terica ontolgi-
ca o ms bien ntica. Lo que no se termina de ver con claridad es si la fluidez alcanza el ser (ontolo-
ga) y, por tanto, la ontologa social no puede ser histrica, sino necesaria, puesto que lo caracterstico del

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J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA 1049

En cualquier caso, varios son los fenmenos histricos que hacen pensar que esta
tendencia a la fluidificacin es real. No podemos entrar aqu en el detalle pormenori-
zado de cada uno de esos fenmenos (que, adems, son bien conocidos por su relacin
con el proceso de la globalizacin) y slo nos entretendremos en el ltimo, por ser el que
tiene ms convergencia con la problemtica cientfico-teolgica:
Paso del capitalismo industrial o fordista al capitalismo financiero o de acumu-
lacin flexible.
Las nuevas teoras sobre la fluidez laboral y los nuevos modos de trabajar ms fle-
xibles.
Los enormes flujos migratorios y la porosidad intercultural e interreligiosa.
La emancipacin de la mujer y, sobre todo, las nuevas concepciones acerca de la
diversidad de gneros, con cierta fluidificacin entre ellos.
La individualizacin de nuestras sociedades y la inestabilidad de las identidades
colectivas y personales.
La masiva presencia de la tecnologa con la consiguiente interconexin mundial,
la fluidez en las comunicaciones y la facilitacin de la virtualidad en la vida coti-
diana.

Estos son algunos de los sntomas socio-histricos que han comenzado a convulsio-
nar el paradigma ontolgico tradicional de la teora social. As, Garca Selgas afirmaba:
Todos esos procesos me llevaban a afirmar que la fluidez se haba ido erigiendo en forma
constituyente de la existencia social, que lo social es hoy fluidez (2006: 17) 9. Todos esos
fenmenos mostraban, en definitiva, que las instituciones sociales, las identidades y, en
suma, lo social, no gozaban de la estabilidad reflejada en la clsica teora social. Ade-
ms, son procesos que se suceden simultnea e interrelacionadamente y que se retroa-
limentan mutuamente. No obstante, me gustara referirme a uno slo de esos procesos
por ser quiz el ms cercano a los telogos y filsofos implicados en el dilogo entre las
ciencias y la teologa: me refiero a la fuerte influencia de la tecnologa y su capacidad
reestructuradora de la sociedad.
Ms abajo se pondr de manifiesto que la teora del cambio social se ha visto refor-
mulada debido a estos nuevos contextos histricos, en lo que se da preeminencia a la
innovacin frente a la permanencia. No cabe duda de que esa nueva reformulacin del
cambio social y de la ontologa subyacente tiene que ver no slo con procesos tecnol-
gico-materiales, sino tambin identitarios, psquicos, ideolgicos, culturales, etc. En este
sentido, nos alejamos de cualquier presupuesto determinista (material-tecnolgico) 10 que
privilegie unilateral y monocausalmente el papel de la tecnologa en estos procesos flui-
dificadores.

ser en todo tiempo y lugar es su carcter fluido y, por ello, ms devenir que ser. O si el alcance de la teo-
ra de la fluidez slo se refiere a, por as llamarlos, los entes sociales (nticos) que por su contextuali-
zacin histrica tienen una apariencia fluida, aunque no de suyo, sino por las circunstancias contin-
gentes propias de nuestro tiempo. Las afirmaciones del autor son equvocas: por un lado afirma que la
fluidez es una forma de existencia social histricamente delimitada (plano ntico); a rengln seguido sugie-
re que ello no implica que se pueda detectar esa fluidez en espacios-tiempos pasados (se movera en un
plano ontolgico?); para terminar sentenciando que la fluidez no es para nosotros un rasgo necesario o
esencial de nuestras sociedades, no fue necesaria y puede dejar de serlo (2006: 20).
9
Un poco ms adelante afirmaba: de aqu, por ejemplo, que pasemos a hablar de la fluidificacin
(como fenmeno histrico) a hablar de la fluidez como condicin existencial bsica de lo social (Ibd.).
10
No es posible desarrollar aqu la complejidad de los procesos dialcticos, contextuales e incluso
no-separables, que se dan entre los cambios tecnolgicos y los contextos socio-culturales adyacentes. Remi-
timos a Romero Moivas, 2008.

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1050 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

Pero tambin es cierto que no sera posible comprender la ontologa de la fluidez


social sin poner de manifiesto el enorme papel (propulsor, facilitador y mantenedor) de
la tecnologa en la configuracin de este nuevo modo de existencia social (cf. Romero
Moivas, 2006). A este respecto el concepto de innovacin ha cobrado una fuerza tal
que es imposible imaginar el futuro sin referirse al concepto de innovacin (Nowotny,
2006: 1). La innovacin hace referencia a futuro, evolucin, cambio, incertidumbre y
riesgo. La innovacin genera riesgo a la vez que es un modo de gestionarlo. La inestabi-
lidad social propia de la fluidez social implica, de suyo, una vulnerabilidad caracte-
rstica de nuestras sociedades (cf. Bijker, 2006) 11, un futuro captado a travs de modelos
y metforas siempre provisionales, que se construyen y reconstruyen, y que hablan del
futuro en condicional, sin las predicciones matemticas que se pretendan exactas, de
hace unos aos. En efecto, los modelos se reconocen como provisionales; capturan un
presente fluctuante en un modo conjetural que proyecta algunas presuposiciones y sus
dinmicas (Nowotny, 2006: 3). Esto significa que la tecnologa y los procesos continuos
de innovacin han hecho de la estructura social un paradjico y continuo desestruc-
turamiento fluido difcil de apresar en conceptos y que no slo roza el ser de lo social,
sino que lo ha convertido (como hemos dicho ya) en un fluido devenir.
Sin embargo, junto a esta capacidad propulsora de la fluidificacin, la tecnologa
misma se ha convertido en condicin de posibilidad y mantenedora de la misma. En efec-
to, las Tecnologas de la Informacin y de la Comunicacin, especialmente Internet y el
telfono mvil, permiten la constante movilidad social, la descentralizacin institucio-
nal y la consiguiente creacin de flujos globales de transmisin de informacin instan-
tnea, que crea y recrea nuevas posibilidades identitarias en los individuos y los colecti-
vos, facilita la porosidad intercultural y el cuestionamiento continuo de lo dado como
verdadero, y la reestructuracin fluida e inestable de las comunidades 12. Todos ellos
son fenmenos de fluidificacin al estilo de lo afirmado por Garca Selgas y, en este sen-
tido, posibilitan que las estructuras ya fluidas se mantengan en ese estado. No obstante,
tambin es cierto que la inestabilidad y fluidez puede ser gestionada o controlada desde
los mecanismos ideolgicos propios de las nuevas tecnologas:
Todo hace pensar que en el mundo de la globalizacin economicista a la que estamos
asistiendo, el nuevo orden busca su estabilidad apoyndose tambin en el digitalismo como
nueva religin oficial, cuya versin sofisticada como nueva gnosis es la que elaboran las
elites iniciadas para expresar sus ilusiones de un mundo armnico pero que cuenta con su
propia versin de platonismo para el pueblo [] (Prez Tapias, 2003: 88).

No cabe duda de que, en el caso paradigmtico del telfono mvil (con la cada vez
ms asentada convergencia de mvil e Internet), contribuyen a crear esa fluidez entre
mbitos, categoras y relaciones, al tiempo que son utilizados para gestionar las conse-
cuencias de dicha fluidez, y son tambin protagonistas de muchas de las tensiones que
dicha coexistencia origina (Lasn Daz, 2006: 155) 13. Y as, el mvil constituye un sm-

11
Bijker propone, frente a concepciones de la vulnerabilidad, objetivas e independientes del contex-
to, que este concepto es socialmente construido y es relacional: Vulnerability is a constructivist concept
in the sense that it does not describe a context-independent and intrinsic quality of the system (2006: 59).
12
Communal solidarities appear to be seriously if not terminally undermined by processes of
dislocation, reconstruction and acceleration, experienced in communities as irresistible external pressu-
res. [] In modern society, communities are bound to be more permeable, more interpenetrative, more
voluntaristic and less stable than their predecessors (Beeson, 2003: 105).
13
Tecnologa nmada, mvil inmutable, contacto permanente, continuidad en la accesibilidad a los
dems, a la informacin, a las oportunidades que puedan surgir, fluidez entre escritura y oralidad, entre

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J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA 1051

bolo clave de la sociedad actual definida por las ciencias sociales desde la fluidez y la
movilidad como una de sus caractersticas fundamentales (Cabrera 2006: 92). La tec-
nologa actual, pues, permite dar razn de ese nuevo modo de existencia liquido-fluido
propio de la nueva teora social.

B) Un nuevo concepto de cambio social y de cultura

La sociologa clsica concibi el cambio social siempre como inherente a la socie-


dad, pero ms bien como un momento transitorio hacia los sucesivos estados domina-
dos por el orden, la estructura y la esttica. Por este motivo, casi toda la sociologa ha
estado atravesada por una dicotoma constituyente entre orden/desorden, estructu-
ra/agencia, esttica/dinmica; es decir, entre lo que cambia y lo que permanece. La onto-
loga social estaba dominada por el ser y el cambio no llegaba a rozar ms que superfi-
cialmente la profunda estructura ontolgica esttica; el cambio no era constitutivo a lo
social, sino ms bien su instrumento. Siempre hay un ncleo sustancial que sirve de
soporte estructural a todos los elementos accidentales y, por lo tanto, cambiantes y muda-
bles. Este modelo se corresponde segn Sztompka con los modelos sistmicos y orga-
nicistas, e impiden dar cuenta de los nuevos fenmenos sociales que estn configuran-
do la sociedad y, por tanto, la teora social 14.
Por este motivo, Sztompka prefiere hablar de la sociedad como de un campo social
dinmico, en el que las palabras claves son flujo, proceso o corriente de cambio, pues-
to que: ontolgicamente hablando, la sociedad como estado continuo no existe ni puede
existir. Toda realidad social es pura dinmica, un flujo de cambios de velocidades, inten-
sidades, ritmos y tiempos diversos (2004: 31). A fin de cuentas, lo que pretende este
nuevo modelo terico es considerar el devenir como constitutivo de lo social y no slo
como su instrumento transitorio, es decir, afectar y situar el cambio en la misma mdu-
la de la ontologa, que ya no anhelara la determinacin como categora esencial en la
sociologa:
nicamente pensadores sociales situados en los mrgenes de la ciencia social nor-
mal, tales como C. Castoridis, E. Morin, M. Maffesoli, G. Balandier, P. Tacussel han alu-
dido, bajo esta u otra denominacin, a su realidad abundante [la de la dimensin legis-
ladora en la ciencia social]. Y, por ende, han advertido contra los intentos de la sociologa
de estructurar y normalizar la vida social con arreglo a la categora de determinacin,
que constituye la tendencia dominante del pensamiento occidental. [] Como dice Cas-
toriadis, la categora de la determinacin ha sido central para Occidente y la sociologa,
hija legtima de la modernidad occidental, ha compartido el propsito de reducir la plu-
ralidad al uno en expresiones tericas como el marxismo, el funcionalismo, el estruc-
turalismo, que buscaban lo universal en la condicin humana (leyes de la historia, la
bsqueda del equilibrio social, la estructura binaria de la conciencia humana) (Sn-
chez Capdequ, 2006: 71).

presencia y ausencia; flujos de conversaciones, de mensajes, de gestos, de interacciones; fluidez entre espa-
cios, mbitos, relaciones, cuya coexistencia se intensifica gracias al mvil (Ibd.).
14
Garca Selgas (2003: 18) afirma que el modelo de la ontologa de la fluidez social se enfrenta con
los dos modelos dominantes en sociologa, que l identifica como sustancialista y formalista. l los
define as: Modelo sustancialista (materialista), de Aristteles a la eleccin racional (J. Elster, por ejem-
plo), que encuentra un soporte slido de la realidad social en algn tipo de naturaleza (la del individuo, pe.),
de esencia (la racionalidad, el progreso, la comunidad, etc.) o de ley necesaria de desarrollo (de lucha de
clases, de acumulacin de capital, etc.). [] Modelo formalista (estructuralista), de E. Durkheim y G. Sim-
mel a N. Luhmann, que ha querido ver la solidez de lo social en la forma o estructura que lo constituye. Lo
social se convierte as en la estructura o forma (posiciones, oposiciones, distinciones, etc.) de las relaciones
que condicionan los comportamientos humanos.

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1052 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

Para la ontologa de la fluidez social, la determinacin implica, de suyo, la absorcin


ilegitima de la pluralidad y la diversidad, bajo la norma y lo estructural 15. Por ello, cuan-
do se pretende negar el cambio como constitutivo ontolgico de lo social se elimina al
mismo tiempo la capacidad innovadora de lo diverso. Y es que, efectivamente, las socie-
dades modernas han entronizado el cambio y no la estabilidad, la innovacin y no la
repeticin como mecanismo de adaptacin, de ah la tendencia de la sociologa actual a
ocuparse de sucesos en lugar de hacerlo de cosas, de procesos en lugar de estados, como
componentes ltimos de la realidad (Brunet y Belzunegui, 2006: 23) 16.
Dentro de esta reformulacin ontolgica del cambio social, en continuidad con ella
y en anticipo de la promiscuidad del siguiente epgrafe, es fundamental para la teora
de la fluidez social el concepto de cultura no-esencialista propio de las modernas refle-
xiones socio-histricas. En efecto, y del mismo modo que se consideraba la estructura
social como algo invariante en cuyo interior se producan cambios que no alcanzaban
la mdula de lo social, as tambin se consideraba a la cultura de una sociedad como un
armazn homogneo, fijo y sustancial que caracterizaba de modo esencial a una socie-
dad frente a otras sociedades con culturas igualmente fijas y cerradas. Esta visin es coin-
cidente con la metafsica y teologa esencialista que est en trance de ser superada; y de
hecho, existe una retroalimentacin histrico-social entre esa visin esencialista de la
cultura, de la teologa e, incluso, de la propia Iglesia. Sin embargo, los anlisis ms moder-
nos han descartado esta visin insostenible de la cultura:
Aunque muchas caracterizaciones continan suprimiendo las zonas fronterizas, las
culturas humanas no son ni necesariamente coherentes ni siempre homogneas. Ms a
menudo de lo que nosotros creemos, nuestras vidas cotidianas estn cruzadas por zonas
limtrofes, bolsas y erupciones de todo tipo. Las zonas fronterizas frecuentemente se con-
vierten en sobresalientes alrededor de frentes tales como la orientacin sexual, el gne-
ro, la clase, la raza, la etnicidad, la nacionalidad, la edad, la poltica, el vestido, la ali-
mentacin o el gusto. Junto con nuestros yos supuestamente transparentes desde la
perspectiva cultural, tales zonas limtrofes deben ser consideradas no como zonas tran-
sicionales analticamente vacas sino como espacios de produccin cultural creativa que
requieren investigacin (D. Rosaldo, citado en Ario, 2000: 39) 17.

15
Aunque desde otro punto de vista (la definicin del moderno concepto de riesgo, tambin fun-
damental en la actual teora social) se pone de manifiesto el carcter central que en la Sociologa suele
ocupar lo normal, la norma, frente a lo cual se erige la categora de desviacin social tpica en el
pensamiento social: La tecnologa del riesgo permite entonces definir las normas e identificar las dife-
rencias con respecto a las normas, diferencias que se llegan a definir como riesgos. El riesgo cobra el
significado de anomalas o de inadaptacin. El anormal es aquel que se diferencia demasiado de la norma
(media) del grupo y por consiguiente representa para este una amenaza, un peligro, un riesgo (Leflai-
ve, 2004: 207).
16
Como se ve, la terminologa de la teora social moderna se asemeja mucho a la propuesta por la
filosofa del proceso de Whitehead. Ambos proponen dos ontologas ms procesuales, evolutivas, cam-
biantes, que sustancialistas, fijistas y estticas. Whitehead trata de entender la ontologa de la realidad.
Su punto de partida no es la constatacin de objetos o entidades estables, sino una referencia al evento
(su terminologa vara: acontecimiento, ocasin actual) (Monserrat, 2004: 54).
17
Los recientes e interdisciplinares anlisis de Julio L. Martnez (2007) tambin estn atravesados
de la idea de que lo ms importante es tomar estas definiciones a la luz de un concepto no esencialista y
naturalista de la cultura en virtud del cual las culturas seran realidades perfectamente definidas, cohe-
rentes y homogneas, ntidamente diferenciadas unas de otras. El culturalismo esencialista exacerba y
fosiliza las diferencias y produce, bien rechazo de la diversidad (formas contemporneas de racismo), o
yuxtaposicin de guetos culturales que desemboca en multiculturalismo relativista (p. 36). Y al final del
libro vuelve a reiterar: la propuesta intercultural considera la cultura propia no como una esencia fija
que se debe preservar de la influencia perniciosa de novedades, sino como una realidad dinmica, per-
meable a los efectos de la interaccin e incluso del conflicto con lo diferente (p. 596).

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J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA 1053

Estas zonas limtrofes o marginales, fundamentales para la crtica social, permiten


la fluidificacin incesante de esas instituciones, identidades y estructuras que parecan
monolitos fijos cuya ontologa daba preeminencia al ser frente al devenir. As, en defi-
nitiva, la nueva ontologa de la fluidez social transforma, en primer lugar, el estatuto te-
rico del cambio dentro de la teora social, y con ello desbarata el esencialismo cerrado
de las culturas, dando paso a una nueva trasgresin en la teora social: la promiscuidad
ontolgica.

C) La promiscuidad ontolgica: Latour, Law y el principio


de simetra generalizada

En continuidad con las reflexiones precedentes, la ontologa de la fluidez social apoya


sus propuestas en la nueva teora social de Latour, Law, Woolgar y otros, que se conoce
con la etiqueta genrica de teora del actor-red (actor-network theory, ANT). No es este
el lugar para detenernos en un anlisis profundo de sus implicaciones sociolgicas y filo-
sficas; nicamente queremos traer aqu un aspecto clave de los tericos del actor-red:
el principio de simetra generalizada. La simetra generalizada es una radicalizacin del
tradicional principio de simetra del Programa Fuerte de la Sociologa del Conocimien-
to Cientfico de Bloor. Con este se pretendi dar un paso ms en el cuestionamiento de
la imagen tradicional positivista de la ciencia: se negaba con ello la diferenciacin entre
el llamado contexto del descubrimiento (que s poda estar sujeto a un anlisis socio-
lgico) y el contexto de la justificacin (que se converta en una caja negra que slo
poda ser analizada por la filosofa de la ciencia). De hecho, inicialmente haba una clara
asimetra en la consideracin de la labor de la sociologa de la ciencia. As, los factores
sociales solo se tenan en cuenta como fuente de explicacin cuando se trata de un cono-
cimiento falso o incorrecto, en tanto que no hay nada social que interfiera cuando habla-
mos del conocimiento verdadero. La sociologa de la ciencia naca como una sociologa
del error. Esta asimetra es la que denuncian los proponentes del programa fuerte, que
pretenden aplicar el principio de simetra; es decir, explicar sociolgicamente tanto el
error como la verdad y explicitar el carcter socialmente construido del conocimiento
cientfico.
No obstante, la ANT se rebel contra esta simetra a la que consideraba insuficiente
y adems apoyada en un prejuicio semejante a la versin positivista de la ciencia que
pretenda combatir. Latour (1992) lanzaba un ataque contra los estudios sociales de
la ciencia y propona un nuevo giro en la epistemologa: su Post-scriptum: un giro
despus del giro social, supona un intento de establecer una simetra generalizada
en la teora social. A fin de cuentas, el alcance de esta generalizacin del principio de
simetra no slo tena consecuencias epistemolgicas, sino sobre todo ontolgicas
(Latour, 1997). En definitiva, lo que se afirmaba era que ni la naturaleza ni la socie-
dad podan utilizarse como factores explicativos del conocimiento, lejos de cualquier
problematicidad:
Si para la sociologa de la ciencia, la sociedad es algo que segn como est estruc-
turado favorece o no la generacin de conocimiento cientfico (pero era la naturaleza
la que determinaba el contenido del mismo), el programa fuerte y sus desarrollos plan-
tean que el conocimiento cientfico (y la naturaleza) es el reflejo de la sociedad que lo
genera. La naturaleza se ha convertido, para est simetra, en una nocin problemti-
ca, pero no as la sociedad. De este modo los estudios sociales de la ciencia empiezan a
convertir el contexto social la construccin social en un vago, poderoso y omni-
potente concepto explicativo. Es esta parcialidad lo que lleva a los autores de la ANT a

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1054 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

decirnos que la propuesta de Bloor no es realmente simtrica. Es constructivista para


la naturaleza y realista para la sociedad. Se ha sustituido una asimetra por otra asi-
metra: la sociedad, lo social lo explica todo (Vitores Gonzlez, 2001).

As pues, la ANT problematiza tanto el concepto de naturaleza como el de sociedad,


y con ello se da lugar a una verdadera sociologa simtrica (cf. Domnech y Tirado, 1998).
De este modo, se rompe con la ontologa tradicional: no hay ninguna cosa que se pueda
llamar sustancialmente natural ni ninguna otra sustancialmente social: as pues, cae el
sustancialismo ontolgico en la teora social. Pero como consecuencia de ello tampoco
se puede defender la separacin de esos dos (supuestos) mbitos sustanciales tradicio-
nales: con ello se elimina cualquier dualismo ontolgico entre lo social y lo natural. La
ANT es tanto una sociologa como una ontologa 18, que pretende reformular la teora
social desde un nuevo acercamiento a travs del concepto de red y su unin indisolu-
ble con el actor.
La promiscuidad ontolgica es una consecuencia de esta deriva de la teora social. La
sociedad ahora se concibe como una red de elementos heterogneos con la misma impor-
tancia ontolgica en tanto que son a la vez constructores de la red y construidos por ella 19.
Estos elementos son actores, pero se les prefiere llamar actantes para poner de mani-
fiesto que este actor no es exclusivamente humano, sino que puede ser animal, mecni-
co, inorgnico, etc. Los actores se definen como resultado o efecto de la red en la que se
encuentran interactuando con materiales heterogneos: el actor va ms all de su propio
cuerpo. Es decir, se define y se construye en tanto que define y construye la red, y a la
inversa: la red le define y le construye tanto como l define y construye la red. No hay una
red a la que se aada un actor ya configurado, sino que ambos son co-constructores de
su ser.
Esta promiscuidad ontolgica tiene consecuencias importantes para la antropologa.
No slo se elimina cualquier resquicio de dualismo metafsico en el ser humano, adems
se evita la pretensin de un esencialismo antropolgico que lo situaba frente al mundo
y lo no-humano. La antropologa que se deriva de la ANT no celebra la idea de que haya
diferencia de clase entre personas por un lado, y objetos por otro. Niega que las perso-
nas sean necesariamente especiales (Law, 1998) 20. A pesar de la provocacin que puede
suscitar, esta antropologa es, de hecho, mucho ms intuitiva que la tradicional antro-
pologa escolstica sustancialista. En efecto, nuestra experiencia ms inmediata de noso-
tros mismos siempre nos sita en relacin a otras personas, a otros objetos tecnolgicos
con los que interactuamos y nos definimos, y nuestra construccin de nosotros mismos
siempre pasa por la toma de decisiones a travs de redes de elementos heterogneos:

18
[ANT] is as much an ontology or a metaphysics, as a sociology (Latour, 1998: 2).
19
This, then, is the crucial analytical move made by actor-network writers: the suggestion that the
social is nothing other than patterned networks de heterogeneous materials (Law, 1992: 381). Esta unin
de actor y red, dialctica, y por tanto alejada de la idea de que los actors son simples puntos nodales de
una red que parmenecen inalterados, es puesta de manifiesto energicamente por Latour (1998: 11): There
is not a net and an actor laying down the net, but there is an actor whose definition of the world outlines,
traces, delineate, limn, describe, shadow forth, inscroll, file, list, record, mark, or tag a trajectory that is
called a network. No net exists independently of the very act of tracing it, and no tracing is done by an
actor exterior to the net. A network is not a thing but the recorded movement of a thing.
20
I could argue (as have sociologists such as Steve Woolgar and psychologist of technology like
Sherry Turkle) that the dividing line between people and machines (and for that matter animals) is sub-
ject to negotiation and changes. Thus it is easily shown that machines (and animals) gain and lose attri-
butes such as independence, intelligence and personal responsibility. And, conversely, that people take on
and lose the attributes of machines and animals (Law, 1992).

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J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA 1055

Si yo estoy lejos de mi ordenador, de mis colegas, de mi oficina, de mis libros, de


mi escritorio, de mi telfono, no sera un socilogo que escribe artculos, pronuncia con-
ferencias y produce conocimiento. Sera algo muy distinto y lo mismo es verdad para
todos nosotros. As, la cuestin analtica es esta: un agente es un agente primariamen-
te porque l o ella habita un cuerpo que transporta conocimientos, destrezas, valores y
lo dems? O un agente es un agente porque l o ella habita un conjunto de elementos
(incluyendo, por supuesto, un cuerpo) que se extiende en una red de materiales, som-
ticos y de otro tipo, que rodea cada cuerpo? (Law, 1992).

Como se ve, la afirmacin es radical 21 en un sentido, si se mantienen antropologas


esencialistas; pero prudente en otro, si se apuesta por una antropologa del devenir y de
la formacin de lo humano en continuidad con la realidad cosmo-fsico-biolgica de la
que procede, y que adems niega cualquier tipo de instancia (llmese alma o como se
quiera) que estara ya dada y construida desde el comienzo del nacimiento, como una
especie de yo intemporal que me definira siempre en tanto que yo mismo y no otro.
La antropologa de la ANT defiende una promiscuidad ontolgica que est, en cier-
to modo, latiendo en las modernas metafsicas y teologas no-sustancialistas. El ser huma-
no se hace en un proceso de devenir y en continuidad con el mundo (humano, animal,
fsico, mecnico, etc.). En este sentido, no se niega que los seres humanos usualmente
tengan que ver con cuerpos []. Ni niega que los seres humanos [], tengan una vida
interior. Pero insiste en que los agentes sociales no son nunca localizados en cuerpos
solamente, sino ms bien que un actor es una red estructurada de relaciones heterog-
neas, o un efecto producido por una tal red. El argumento es que pensar, actuar, escri-
bir, amar, ganarse la vida todos los atributos que normalmente adscribimos a los seres
humanos son generados en redes que pasan a travs de y se ramifican tanto dentro
como ms all del cuerpo. De ah el trmino actor-red un actor es tambin, siempre,
una red (Law, 1992) 22. Para la antropologa, lo que todo esto implica es, por tanto, que
no existe una suerte de yo sustancial (o actor) previo al propio acto de situarse en rela-
ciones y acciones con otros supuestos actores (humanos, pero tambin animales, tec-
nolgicos, etc.) tambin ya constituidos a los que se aadiran relaciones de modo acci-
dental. Sino ms bien lo contrario: la construccin de la persona significa la esencial
co-construccin actor-red dentro de la interrelacin reticular, donde no existen por sepa-
rados ni actores (nodos) ni redes que los vehiculen. Parece esto cercano a la propuesta
zubiriana de la respectividad: Ninguna realidad est montada sobre s misma, de suer-
te que luego saliera a entrar en relacin con otras, aunque esta salida les fuera esencial.
No se trata de relaciones, no, sino de que intrnseca y formalmente cada realidad es en
s misma, in re, respectiva (Zubiri, 1989: 25) 23.

21
En cualquier caso, Law se apresura a negar cualquier tipo de implicacin tica sobre esta antropo-
loga: To say that there is no fundamental difference between people and objects is an analytical stance, not
an ethical position. And to say this does not mean that we have to treat the people in our lives as machines.
22
Una antropologa tan actual y potente como la de Manuel Cabada Castro que pretende un acceso a
la divinidad desde esa estructura antropolgica humana constituida por el amar, el querer, la libertad, la bs-
queda del sentido, etc., podra salir beneficiada desde un punto de vista filosfico, si en vez de considerar
estos atributos humanos desde una perspectiva estructural lo hiciera desde este enfoque reticular, con-
siderando que el amor, el querer, etc., son cuestiones humanas que se dirimen no en una soledad esencialis-
ta, sino en una continua reformulacin y reconstruccin dentro de una red de elementos heterogneos, inclui-
dos materiales. No obstante, aunque Manuel Cabada no estuviese de acuerdo con este enfoque, lo que est
claro es que su antropologa est mucho ms cerca de la antropologa de la ANT (dinmica, fluida y en deve-
nir) que de la tradicional antropologa sustancialista escolstica. Cf. Cabada, 1999, y Romero Moivas, 2007.
23
Scheler parece tambin cercano a esta concepcin antropolgica, quiz debido a su afirmacin de
la indefinibilidad [Undefinierbarkeit] del hombre, frente a la concepcin fijista que pretende definirlo como

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1056 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

Como se ver seguidamente, el anlisis que hemos desarrollado de esta ontologa de


la fluidez social mantiene profundas convergencias con las propuestas metafsicas y cien-
tficas que apuestan por el devenir frente al ser y que, desde nuestro punto de vista,
deben servir (junto con esta teora social de la fluidez) para reformular aspectos impor-
tantes de la dogmtica teolgica tradicional.

3. METAFSICA DEL DEVENIR Y PENSAMIENTO TEOLGICO

En lo que sigue no se pretende desarrollar una metafsica, ni siquiera analizar el pro-


blema del ser ni la posibilidad misma de fundamentar la metafsica (complejidad que
desborda nuestra cuestin; cf. clsicos que asumimos aqu slo en determinadas cues-
tiones como: Coreth, 1964; Gilson, 1973 y 1983; Gmez Caffarena, 1983; Marchal, 1964;
Maritain, 1963; Raeymaeker, 1970), sino simplemente trazar los jalones histricos por
los que ha transitado la cuestin del ser y el devenir.

3.1. Fijismo y metafsica del Ser: presupuestos de la antigua Ciencia y Teologa

Hasta hace relativamente poco, la metafsica, la ciencia y la teologa dominantes


compartan un presupuesto comn: la verdad de la realidad se asienta en un orden fijis-
ta sustentado en un ser esttico que es ya plenitud en el origen 24. Por eso: orden, ser,
verdad, fijismo-estatismo y origen han sido conceptos profundamente interrelaciona-
dos en las ciencias, la metafsica y la teologa. La verdad se identifica con el ser, el ser
con lo esttico y fijo, lo esttico con el orden y ese orden est ya dado desde el origen
de la realidad. En este esquema el devenir era un contraste del ser y en muchos casos
era considerado como menos real y verdadero que el ser, siendo aquel una apariencia
de este (es decir, como simple momento potencial del ser en acto puro). Milesios y pita-
gricos 25, pero especialmente los eleatas (en confrontacin directa con Heraclito) 26 esta-
rn preocupados por fijar la verdad del ser frente al devenir, cuya postura ms acaba-
da ser la de Parmnides frente al devenir heraclitiano: el ser parmenidiano siempre

esencia: [Segn Scheler] un doble frente hay que hacer, segn esto: primero, contra todas las teoras meta-
fsicas de la sustancia psquica o de un yo entendido como sustancia-cosa (res cogitans), y luego, contra toda
interpretacin del concepto del yo de la psicologa. Expresamente se presenta la teora de Scheler sobre la
persona cual centro de actos como una prosecucin de la tendencia kantiana contra la metafsica sustan-
cialista del alma que se manifiesta en la crtica de la psicologa racional. El ncleo de la existencia espiri-
tual personal del hombre no es una sustancia con ciertas facultades y disposiciones, no es una cosa que
se altera y cuyas propiedades cambian en el tiempo; la identidad de la persona no reside en modo alguno
por detrs ni por encima de sus actos, en un sustrato permanente, sino que existe y vive solamente en
los actos y en la dileccin cualitativa de su puro y mismo tornarse distinta (Heimsoeth, 1966: 361).
24
La frase de Tertuliano (aunque utilizada para justificar lo ms sagrado en la Iglesia de los aps-
toles) es representativa de lo dicho: Id verius quod prius, id prius quod [ab initio].
25
En la tabla pitagrica de los contrarios el movimiento est en el lado de lo ilimitado y del mal.
Su metafsica de los nmeros, aunque segn todas las apariencias naci de los procesos de movimiento
astronmico y msico, tiene abiertamente la tendencia a lo esttico y geomtrico, a la forma fija (Heim-
soeth, 1974: 134)
26
Una necia tradicin de fines de la Antigedad ha querido estigmatizarlo [a Herclito] como el
pesimista, el filsofo llorn, porque haba hablado con poderoso sentimiento del devenir y del fenecer,
de la inconstancia de todo lo real y de la imposibilidad de remontar por segunda vez el mismo ro; porque
vea en la guerra y la discordia la madre de todas las cosas (Heimsoeth, 1974: 135).

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igual, rgido, en eterno reposo, es, una vez ms, una rplica contra Heraclito que no
concibe el ser sino como devenir, distincin y multiplicidad, pero no como algo esta-
ble y universal (Hirschberger, 1997, I: 57). As, mientras que para Herclito trans-
formndose descansa el ser, por el contrario para Parmnides solo el ser inmutable y
rgido tiene verdadera realidad, frente al movimiento que es pura ilusin. Y justamen-
te ser el sistema metafsico parmenidiano el que influir decisivamente en los filso-
fos posteriores.
Esta metafsica que concibe el ser esttico y esencialmente acabado como el funda-
mento de la realidad real ser afirmada por los dos grandes metafsicos griegos. Ni Pla-
tn ni Aristteles fueron capaces de intuir la enorme trascendencia de una metafsica
que tomara en serio el devenir, el movimiento y la vida por s mismos y sin ningn
para qu (como haran luego el maestro Eckhart, en un sentido, y Fichte en otro). Por
el contrario, para Platn el devenir y la pluralidad quedan reducidos al mbito de lo sen-
sible, en tanto que esta multiplicidad encuentra su asidero firme en la inmovilidad est-
tica de las formas eternas. Y el estagirita no escapar a esta visin del movimiento pro-
pia de su maestro, a pesar de que la transformacin y la vida representan para l un papel
relevante en su sistema del universo:
El fluir como vida propia, que corre por s misma, es una imagen ajena a Aristteles.
Todo proceso supone un para qu; es solo un trnsito hacia algo esttico. No puede
haber, por ende, en esencia, un movimiento infinito, sino que todo movimiento tiene su
fin y sus lmites. El movimiento, ya sea el cambio de lugar de una piedra, o la vida de un
animal, o la actividad del hombre, es una realizacin de lo no realizado, la realizacin
de lo posible, en cuanto es aun meramente posible, un trnsito de la materia, que puede
serlo todo, a la forma, que es. El devenir se extingue necesariamente en la realizacin del
fin que le es impuesto cada vez. Por eso donde no hay materia tampoco hay movimiento.
[] La vida no es, por tanto, algo esencial en s mismo, algo primitivo, sino slo un trn-
sito hacia el ser, solo una afeccin (pavqo~) del ser (Heimsoeth, 1974: 137 y 138).

Muy sintomtico a este respecto sobre los fines y lo limitado es que Aristteles (y
tambin Platn, aunque ms discretamente) se opone a la existencia del Infinito, preci-
samente porque para l el lmite es lo que adquiere relevancia y superioridad sobre lo
ilimitado, siendo este ltimo, por tanto, incognoscible 27. En cierto modo, no podemos
dejar de pensar que el miedo que an muchos telogos y metafsicos manifiestan a la hora
de pensar el ser como devenir y la posibilidad de un Infinito en acto (con todas las con-
secuencias no fijistas que una ontologa tal implicara) se debe a la dificultad, que ya se
trasluce en el debate Heraclito-Aristteles, a no poder encerrar y captar en un concep-
to al mismo ser, y en definitiva haciendo de este no tanto una profundidad insondable,
sino un concepto que, en cuanto tal, no deja de ser finito y, por tanto, fijo y esttico 28:

27
Ahora bien, el talante filosfico de Aristteles es el de un implacable y dialctico conceptualiza-
dor de las realidades concretas que se le ofrecen a la observacin y a la reflexin. Desde este punto de vista,
lo que del modo que fuere parezca sustraerse a ello y, por tanto, a la capacidad ordenadora y conceptua-
lizadora del intelecto, corre el evidente riesgo de ser considerado como falso o inexistente. En ello se sita
naturalmente Aristteles en continuidad con determinadas corrientes de reflexin anteriores a l, en las
que el lmite viene a adquirir relevancia y superioridad sobre lo ilimitado o infinito en el acercamiento
cognoscitivo a la comprensin de la realidad (Cabada Castro, 2007: 112).
28
As opina tambin Heimsoeth (1974: 133) cuando afirma: El pensamiento ha buscado en todos
los tiempos la sustancia en este sentido, lo persistente, lo que se puede comprender y no se disipa cuando
la mano apretada de la ratio quiere sujetarlo. [] La razn salva la dificultad, tratando de concebir lo
mudable como una mera modificacin exterior, por decirlo as, de lo eterno e indestructible, de la sus-
tancia []. La divisa es: de la nada no sale nada y lo que no existe no puede dejar de ser. Pero con esto
no se resuelve en realidad el enigma, sino que se le desplaza simplemente a otro plano.

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1058 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

Esta realidad es lo que llamamos ser, algo, por tanto, que no puede consistir en un mero
concepto, sino que es, ms bien, origen y causa de todo concepto, de toda la indefinida
conceptualizacin, que es la vida misma de la mente (Cabada Castro, 1975: 66). Tomar
seriamente el ser como ese origen y causa de la dinmica del pensamiento, es en cier-
to modo considerar que es un Infinito en acto que por su inagotable riqueza no puede
ser subjetivizado y, en este sentido, no se deja ser fijado por el pensamiento huma-
no, puesto que es pura dinamicidad y devenir, infinitud inagotable de riqueza ontolgi-
ca. No obstante, este esquema metafsico no casaba con los planteamientos aristotlicos,
que son los que serviran de fundamentacin a la teologa cristiana y a la ciencia occi-
dental, haciendo del ser una plenitud ya cerrada y acabada, esttica y fija, que per-
manece desde el origen siempre ah, esperando a que la mente humana la aprehenda
y manifieste su verdad en el juicio como adecuacin esttica entre la mente y la rea-
lidad.
En cualquier caso, la filosofa griega utilizar esta preeminencia del ser sobre el deve-
nir para fundamentar la posibilidad de una ciencia verdadera (episteme) por contrapo-
sicin a la opinin vulgar y cambiante (doxa). En este sentido, los tres grandes filsofos
griegos se oponen al relativismo que pareca 29 brotar de la metafsica del devenir hera-
clitiana: Si todo fluye y nada permanece ha afirmado Aristteles contra Heraclito
no puede darse una ciencia ni una verdad (Met. A, 6; M, 4). Naturalmente, nuestros con-
ceptos y nuestros juicios son estables, son esquemas. Pero si todo fluye, se nos escapar
de entre los dedos aquello que tratamos de aprisionar por medio de nuestros conceptos,
y esto sern palabras hueras, pues no les corresponder ninguna realidad (Hirschber-
ger, I: 54).
Un sistema as concebido chocaba frontalmente con la concepcin judeo-cristiana de
un Dios que es vida. El estatismo del universo griego se derrumba con la llegada del con-
cepto de creacin; y el Dios inmvil, perfecto, actus purus se presenta incompatible con
un Dios histrico, providente, que acompaa al hombre y a la creacin entera en su deve-
nir y que, incluso, se ha hecho carne en Jess de Nazaret. De este modo, la revelacin no
es dada de una vez para siempre sino que se despliega en un proceso histrico y csmi-
co. Sin embargo, no obstante todo el desarrollo patrstico en este sentido, nunca son
superados completamente el cosmos antiguo, con todos los rasgos estticos que le eran
inherentes, y el contraste antiguo entre la perfeccin espiritual de lo inmvil, no solo de
lo eterno e imperecedero, y el devenir como signo de imperfeccin (Heimsoeth, 1974:
144) (curiosamente siempre vinculado a la materia, que parece todava ser considerada
como ontolgicamente inferior y enfrentada al espritu). No debe olvidarse que la mayor
sistematizacin teolgico-metafsica, la de Toms de Aquino, es deudora del sustancia-
lismo aristotlico y de su concepcin del movimiento como trnsito de la mera posibili-
dad a la realizacin, no obstante las matizaciones que los tomistas quieran introducir afir-
mando que el acto y la potencia no son principios constitutivos sino complementarios.
Esta concepcin aristotlico-tomista fue dominante en la escolstica dificultando hasta
hace poco cualquier dilogo fructfero de la teologa con la filosofa y la ciencia moder-

29
En efecto, dejamos de lado lo que realmente quiso decir Heraclito en el conjunto de su filoso-
fia: It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that Heraclitus meant to teach that there is nothing which
changes, for this is contradicted by the rest of his philosophy. Nor is the proclamation of change even the
most important and significant feature of his philosophy. [] Heraclituss original contribution to philo-
sophy is to be found elsewhere: it consists in the conception of unity in diversity, difference in unity. []
For Heraclitus, then Reality is One; but it is many at the same time and that not merely accidentally,
but essentially (Copleston, 1962 I-I: 54 y 55).

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J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA 1059

nas 30. Habr que esperar a la audacia de Duns Escoto, el maestro Eckhart y, sobre todo,
Nicols de Cusa, para poder vislumbrar una va alternativa para comprender el uni-
verso, el devenir y la apertura pneumtica a la novedad, la vida y el movimiento infinito,
que nos llevarn desde Bruno hasta Leibniz, el primer Kant y los idealistas alemanas,
Fichte, Schelling y Hegel, desembocando en Nieztsche y en la nueva metafsica-teologa
del devenir.
No obstante, hasta entonces ser dominante una triple concepcin del ser que, aun
procediendo de la especulacin metafsica, influir notablemente en la teologa, y an
hoy es fuente de confrontacin entre la ortodoxia y la (supuesta) heterodoxia: 1. El ser
es ser fijo: con ello se negaba casi cualquier tipo de evolucin que pudiera alcanzar una
dimensin propiamente ontolgica y no simplemente accidental. 2. El ser es ser espiri-
tual y no material: se produce una escisin irresoluble de origen platnico entre lo mate-
rial y lo espiritual, considerndose, adems, que lo primero es inferior a lo segundo. Este
dualismo aun remanente en la teologa y prcticamente eliminado de la filosofa y de
la ciencia influy decisivamente sobre la cosmologa y la antropologa, y adems pro-
pici un desinters por supuesto, no pretendido inicialmente sobre la historicidad
frente a una intemporal y superior eternidad. 3. El ser es ser homogneo: con esta lti-
ma tesis se cay en un sustancialismo y esencialismo cerrado al cambio y la promis-
cuidad ontolgica, a la fluidez y la porosidad propia de la experiencia real de las per-
sonas e incluso de la materia.

3.2. Devenir, dinamismo e historicidad: metafsica, ciencia y teologa

Duns Escoto junto a Joaqun de Floris afirman frente al estatismo dogmtico la


necesaria presencia del Espritu a lo largo del desenvolvimiento histrico y, por lo tan-
to, insiste especialmente en que el Espritu Santo sigue an y seguir siempre vivien-
do, obrando y construyendo en la Iglesia y la evolucin de sus doctrinas (Heimsoeth,
1974: 146). Sin embargo, para la metafsica del devenir el punto clave es el maestro
Eckhart:
Para Eckhart lo inmvil, lo inanimado, ya no tiene, pues, ninguna clase de ventaja
en valor ni en realidad. El acto de la colacin se confunde con el movimiento interno de
Dios. En el proceso sin fin ni trmino objetivo del autoconocimiento de Dios viven
todas las criaturas, vive el universo. Todo es devenir, todo fluye. Y en esto radica el con-
tinuo verdear y florecer de la vida, que no se cansa ni envejece nunca. Tambin en lo
intemporal hay un devenir, o mejor: solo aqu existe el verdadero devenir, el eterno ser
de nuevo, sin renovacin y sin vejez ni decrepitud (Heimsoeth, 1974: 149).

30
En el aspecto propiamente religioso o teolgico esta visin ahog sobremanera la penumatolo-
ga y el dinamismo y apertura hacia lo siempre novedoso propio del cristianismo, encerrndolo en una
visin ms dogmatista y esencialista de la revelacin. La breve digresin teolgica de Heimsoeth (1974:
145-146) en su repaso metafsico me parece, en ese sentido, bien afinada: Tampoco el motivo histrico-
filosfico triunfa propiamente sobre la creencia en lo dado de una vez para siempre. [] Pero siempre se
opone y permanece invicta la conviccin, nacida del sentimiento antiguo del universo, de que la verdad,
religiosa y filosfica, no nos es lograda en un proceso, sino que existe conclusa hace largo tiempo, y solo
se trata de conservarla y aprovecharla. Todas las verdades de la salvacin, en la medida en que pueden ser
asequibles al hombre en esta vida, se consideran reveladas de una vez para siempre en la Sagrada Escri-
tura y en las enseanzas de los padres de la Iglesia. Del mismo modo segn la profunda conviccin fun-
damental que determina tan esencialmente toda la ciencia medieval y tambin la pone obstculos tan gra-
ves todo lo esencial del conocimiento filosfico natural ha sido descubierto de una vez para siempre por
los hroes de la ciencia antigua.

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1060 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

El pensamiento metafsico de Eckhart es continuado en la mstica de Bhme, en quien


sale a la luz una conviccin metafsica fundamental: la de que lo ltimo y Absoluto en
todo lo que es, no es un ser en reposo, una sustancia-cosa o una forma e idea eterna [],
sino una vida (Heimsoeth, 1966: 38). Pero ser en Nicols de Cusa en quien se unan las
tendencias metafsico-cientficas y las propiamente msticas (cf. Cabada, 2008), desple-
gando una enorme capacidad metafsica que le ha hecho ser considerado como el genial
pensador de transicin que inicia prcticamente la filosofa moderna. En l cobran impor-
tancia metafsica el infinito y el devenir, haciendo del universo la explicatio Dei y, en este
sentido, dotndolo de dinamicidad y procesualidad infinitas: [en el Cusano no existe]
la forma esttica de las teoras anteriores sobre el mundo y sus grados de existencia, sino
que es esencialmente un devenir, un movimiento real, continuo, ascendente. El concep-
to de la evolucin recibe una expresin totalmente nueva, sobremanera significativa para
la construccin de la metafsica moderna. El verdadero y supremo modo de ser de las
cosas del mundo, aquel en que ellas despliegan el sentido divino, no es el ser perfecto, la
forma acabada y rotunda, sino el crecimiento, el progresivo despliegue de la idea divina
depositada en ellas (Ibd.: 29). Esta visin metafsica heraclitiana se hace fuerte con el
concepto cristiano de un Dios que es vida y no motor inmvil o actus purus y va a
determinar una lnea de pensamiento particular que tiene en Bruno una de sus figuras
principales. Y es que en Bruno la reflexin sobre la infinitud del mundo como reflejo de
la infinitud de Dios y su lucha contra el finitismo aristotlico medieval le causaron la
muerte por hereja y, desde entonces, una errnea comprensin de su pensamiento como
pantesta. En cualquier caso, en Bruno se produce una cuestin decisiva para nuestro
tema, y es la reformulacin del concepto de materia siguiendo la senda abierta por el
Cusano, a pesar de que a veces tambin hable de ella como pasiva: [Para Bruno] la mate-
ria no es aquel ente falto de determinacin y extrao a todo sentido por el cual se la haba
tomado. Bruno enlaza con la transformacin del concepto de potencia hecha por Cusa-
no, que convierte la posibilidad pasiva en facultad activa, la idea del naturalismo anti-
guo y averrosta. Las fuerzas formales son inmanentes a la materia misma; ella hace bro-
tar de su seno eternamente igual y sobreviviente a todas las mutaciones, las formas
diversas y cambiantes (Heimsoeth, 1966: 52).
Desde Bruno, y a travs de Descartes y Malenbrache llega hasta Leibniz que, a pesar
de ciertas deficiencias en su monadologa, contina el impulso dinamista en la metaf-
sica: [Con Leibniz] expresamente se rechaza siempre la concepcin de que la sustancia
sea un ser, al que el movimiento se adhiera solamente y del cual, como en s mismo
inmvil y meramente susceptible de actividad, sta solo parta con ocasin de un est-
mulo externo (Heimsoeth, 1974: 158). As pues, el movimiento es para Leibniz tambin
evolucin, no en un sentido aristotlico de potencia a acto, sino de ascensin y creci-
miento infinitos. Toda esta concepcin estar presente en el Kant de la primera poca,
y desde ah pasar a los sistemas idealistas post-kantianos: Fichte (quien pone los cimien-
tos), Schelling y Hegel, quienes representan el mayor triunfo del movimiento y la vida
sobre el ser esttico (Ibd.):
El idealista no sabe nada del ser esttico del dogmatismo, dado de una vez para
siempre; nada de un ser en s, muerto como las cosas. Para l lo nico positivo es la liber-
tad, la espontaneidad del obrar. El ser es para l una mera negacin de la libertad. No
es un concepto primero y primitivo, sino meramente derivado, formado en la percep-
cin de las resistencias a la actividad (Ibd.: 161).

La vida y la libertad se constituyen en las claves de la metafsica idealista. Y mientras


que Fichte pareca haberse centrado en la conciencia descuidando la naturaleza como

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J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA 1061

mera oportunidad de accin para la conciencia, Schelling conecta con Bruno y preten-
de aplicar ese dinamismo absoluto a la naturaleza como prehistoria dinmica de la con-
ciencia. En tanto que Hegel, como nadie antes que l, considerar la propia historia como
categora metafsica fundamental, introduciendo lo concreto y lo histrico (aunque slo
como momentos del despliegue del Espritu Absoluto) dentro de su sistema metafsico.
Este modo de comprender el fundamento dinmico del universo ha llegado en la
metafsica moderna de la mano de E. de Hartmann e, incluso, del ltimo Scheler. No
obstante, a nosotros nos interesa sobre todo poner de manifiesto que este movimiento
que se inicia especialmente en el maestro Eckhart nos permite establecer un dilogo
mucho ms fecundo entre la teologa y las ciencias cosmolgicas, fsicas y biolgicas. No
deja de ser cierto que a menudo los libros de divulgacin cientfica estn ya teidos de
consideraciones filosficas que pueden dar lugar a interpretaciones metafsicas distin-
tas (el caso de la mecnica cuntica es paradigmtico), desde el ms absoluto atesmo-
materialista hasta propuestas espiritualistas-exticas (cf., por ejemplo: Arsuaga y Mar-
tnez, 2001; Mayr, 1998; Monod, 1993; Davies, 1986a y 1986b; Einstein e Infeld, 1984;
Ferris, 1990; Feynmann, 1998; Gonzlez de Alba, 2000; Heisenberg, 1972; Ortoli y Pha-
rabod, 1985; Hooft, 2001; Rae, 1988; Yndurain, 2006). No obstante, a pesar de la dispa-
ridad de interpretaciones, nos parece que cosmlogos, fsicos y bilogos estn en su
mayor parte dentro del paradigma que aqu hemos llamado de la metafsica del devenir
o de la ontologa fluida. Es decir, parece haber una convergencia en la interpretacin de
una mega-historia cosmo-fisio-bio-antropolgica en la que las potencialidades y dina-
mismos pasan a primer plano frente a lo esttico y lo fijado.
En este sentido, el concepto de materia ha perdido muchas de sus significaciones pasi-
vas e inertes. La estructura de la materia parece sin lugar a dudas atmica, constituida
por electrones, neutrinos y quarks y sus interacciones mutuas, y ello implica que todos
los procesos fsicos y las configuraciones csmicas que vemos han surgido del dinamis-
mo entre unas pocas partculas o ladrillos constituyentes. Junto a ello, las investigaciones
de Prigogine acerca de las estructuras disipativas 31 y de la autoorganizacin de la mate-
ria en puntos alejados del equilibrio, nos parecen situarla ms cerca de la metafsica del
devenir y de la concepcin del Cusano y de Bruno de la materia, que de la metafsica aris-
totlico-escolstica y de la materia pasiva 32. No es casualidad que Zubiri uno de los
pocos filsofos y telogos de mediados de siglo que se tom el trabajo de estudiar seria y
rigurosamente la ciencia de su tiempo y de discutir con los padres fundadores de esa nueva
ciencia considerara que la realidad tiene de suyo un momento activo que consiste en
dar de s: el dinamismo consiste fundamentalmente en que cada realidad, precisamente
ella, en s misma y por s misma es activa, y que por consiguiente las estructuras son estruc-
turas de actividad, y en su virtud lo que llamamos realidad no est constituido simple-
mente por notas en cierto modo estticas. La realidad es dinmica y activa por s misma
y no en virtud de unas potencias que emergen de ella (Zubiri, 1989: 65) 33.

31
Suelen caracterizarse como propiedades de las estructuras disipativas las siguientes: versatilidad
creativa, interaccin sinrgica entre sus componentes, estabilidad estructural, autoorganizacin, variabi-
lidad evolutiva, cognicin adaptativa, memoria determinativa, tamao crtico, climanen (no-linealidad,
ruptura de simetra, puntos de bifurcacin, complementariedad entre azar y necesidad).
32
La materia puede, por tanto, encontrarse en dos fases diferentes: la inerte y la clinmica. La
materia inerte compone (pasivamente) las estructuras del equilibrio; la materia clinmica compone y engen-
dra (activamente) las estructuras disipativas (Hidalgo, 1991: 96).
33
Tampoco es casualidad que justamente todas esas reflexiones le lleven al final de su vida (y por la
influencia del telogo dominico Boismard acerca de la resurreccin) a afirmar que el espritu surge por
elevacin de la materia (conclusin que nosotros desarrollaremos ms abajo con Siewerth y Rahner, y

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1062 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

A la teologa le ha costado mucho aceptar cualquier tipo de devenir o cambio, cuyo


ejemplo ms claro son las controversias que an se mantienen acerca de la evolucin 34
(cf. Sequeiros, 2000, 2006, 20007a y 2007b). Sin embargo, ya Teilhard de Chardin trat,
al menos incipientemente (y con lagunas y fallos), de construir una teologa que tuviera
como horizonte una cosmovisin evolutiva y no esttica. Ms recientemente, los telogos
Schmitz-Moormann (2005) y Denis Edwards (2008), entre otros, han propuesto modelos
de teologas de la creacin en universos evolutivos, en los que la realidad csmica, biol-
gica y antropolgica evoluciona con el impulso creador de Dios y del Espritu, pero no de
manera categorial y pre-diseada de modo definido por Dios. Schmitz-Moorman 35 (y tam-
bin Edwards, deudor de Rahner y de Teilhard) se apoya en una metafsica del devenir
de impronta teilhardiana en la que la clave teolgica es la creatio appellata (creacin lla-
mada a acercarse). Para Schmitz-Moormann, el proceso evolutivo slo puede ser com-
prendido teolgicamente si percibimos el universo como llamado por Dios a salir de la
nada a l. La bella frase siguiente es insuperable: El acto que produjo el inicio del pro-
ceso y el acto que mantiene el proceso en marcha son la misma llamada de Dios, de la
cual depende la existencia de todo y mediante la cual todo se mantienen en existencia
(2005: 214). La evolucin es libre porque Dios no obliga ni empuja a los elementos cs-
micos a unirse en niveles de complejidad cada vez mayores. Dios acta desde dentro de
los elementos. La continua llamada de Dios es la que posibilita desde dentro las uniones
y la constante tendencia del universo a sacar orden del caos. La metafsica de la unin
tiene su fundamento teolgico en la llamada interior de Dios que, sin imposiciones, invi-
ta, por as decir, el despliegue evolutivo csmico con la intencin de que libremente
aparezca la conciencia que le responda (Doncel, 2006). No obstante, estas propuestas teo-
lgicas a menudo son ignoradas o no terminan de llevar a cabo una reformulacin de la
dogmtica teolgica desde el devenir y la evolucin csmica. Esto es, precisamente, lo que
se necesita en la teologa actual.

4. EL FUTURO DE LA TEOLOGA Y LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA

Del mismo modo que el telogo dominico Claude Geffr (2006: 27) afirmaba para el
caso del dilogo interreligioso, que no basta aadir a una dogmtica tradicional que
permanezca inmutable dos nuevos captulos consagrados a la teologa de la increencia
y del ecumenismo, sino que se trata, de hecho, de reinterpretar algunos enunciados
del cristianismo a la luz de una experiencia histrica indita 36, as tambin una nueva

tambin eliminando como hace Zubiri el dualismo): Boismard logra convencerle de que las definiciones
dogmticas de la Iglesia catlica no obligan a mantener la idea del alma. La nocin de sustancialidad y la
tesis de la pervivencia del alma desparecen definitivamente de la filosofa de Zubiri. [] En cuanto a su
gnesis, se atreve a afirmar sin remilgos que el alma surge por elevacin de la materia (Corominas y
Vicens, 2006: 661).
34
Con la cuestin de la evolucin tambin ocurre lo mismos que en las otras ciencias. Hay hechos
incontrovertibles, pero las interpretaciones filosficas son dispares. Adems, se agrava con el hecho de
que la evolucin desde el punto de vista cientfico tiene cuestiones importantes sin resolver que diversifi-
can las propias interpretaciones cientficas. No obstante, eso no mengua que todos estn de acuerdo en
que existe, de hecho, un proceso evolutivo.
35
Puede verse una larga recensin hecha por m de este libro de Schmitz-Moormann en: Actualidad
bibliogrfica de filosofa y teologa 85 (2006) 14-19.
36
Tambin afirma: Une thologie responsable, cest une thologie qui prend en compte les dimen-
sions historiques nouvelles de lintelligence de la foi (Ibd.).

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J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA 1063

teologa a la altura de los tiempos, que pretenda un dilogo sincero y honesto con la cul-
tura, la ciencia y la filosofa modernas con la intencin de dar un mensaje ltimo de
esperanza a las personas de nuestra poca histrica, debe ser capaz de repensar y refor-
mular muchos aspectos de su quehacer teolgico y de su doctrina desde los nuevos pre-
supuestos ontolgicos y metafsicos que se desprenden de las ciencias fsico-naturales y
sociales, y que tienen como principal paradigma una imagen ms dinmica, vital y evo-
lutiva del mundo csmico, biolgico y antropolgico. Esto exige nuevos planteamientos
teorticos que hagan posible, a travs de la reformulacin de algunos captulos de la dog-
mtica teolgica, nuevas sntesis teolgicas y filosficas que den cuenta de la vivencia
cristiana dentro de esta nueva concepcin de la realidad. No deja de ser significativo que
ya el Concilio Vaticano II percibiera la importancia de la bsqueda de nuevas sntesis
teolgicas a este respecto: El gnero humano pasa as de una concepcin ms bien est-
tica del orden csmico, a otra ms dinmica y evolutiva: de donde surge una tan grande
complejidad de problemas que est exigiendo la bsqueda de nuevos anlisis y nuevas
sntesis (GS 5; la cursiva es ma).
La cuestin es si verdaderamente la teologa dogmtica (dejamos de lado la teologa
fundamental por su menores repercusiones sobre las sntesis doctrinales) ha tomado en
serio ese encargo conciliar. Desde mi punto de vista, y sin grandes anlisis estadsticos,
se puede afirmar que no, que la mayor parte de la teologa sigue encerrada en s misma
y a penas es capaz de reformular viejas ideas a la luz de las nuevas propuestas cientfi-
co-filosficas 37. La realidad es que la mayor parte de los manuales de teologa presentan
una profusin de citas de la patrstica, de la escolstica y de otros telogos modernos
(algo, evidentemente, no slo lgico, sino claramente necesario), pero eso implica una
imagen de la teologa como un sistema auto-referencial en el que la dogmtica se diri-
me desde dentro y para dentro, ajeno a la savia nueva que procede de la filosofa no-cris-
tiana y de las ciencias naturales y sociales 38.
Es en este contexto en el que surge el amplio movimiento internacional de dilogo
entre la teologa y las ciencias, y, como consecuencia de ello, aparece la llamada teolo-
ga de la ciencia:
Frente a estas teologas de corte fundamentalista aparecen esfuerzos persona-
les y colectivos que buscan un dilogo y un encuentro que superen los aparentes con-
flictos entre las ciencias profanas y la religin. Estas teologas pretenden una refle-
xin constructiva encaminada a tender puentes entre las culturas cientficas
emergentes y las formulaciones de las convicciones de la fe. Estos intentos de dilo-

37
Si uno se para a analizar cuantos de los telogos (no digo ya sacerdotes) que se dedican exclusi-
vamente a la ejercitacin teolgica tienen verdadero conocimiento (e inters) en las nuevas ciencias y filo-
sofas, nos haremos una idea del enclaustramiento dogmtico del pensar teolgico. Por eso, antes de todo
esto habra que ser honestos y repensar el sentido, alcance y significado de la teologa, y sus conexiones
acadmicas, humanas y sociales con el mundo en el que se desarrolla. Desde mi punto de vista, a pesar de
que algunas ideas no son ya aplicables a nuestro momento histrico, siguen siendo extremadamente ilu-
minadoras las reflexiones sobre las responsabilidades de la teologa en Espaa que el joven y liberal Ole-
gario Gonzlez de Cardedal, con enorme arriesgo personal, llev a cabo en el contexto inmediatamente
posconciliar. Desde entonces muchas cosas han mejorado, pero otras siguen en situacin pre-conciliar y
con pocas esperanza de cambio Cf. Gonzlez de Cardedal, 1970, especialmente la parte III, Responsa-
bilidades de la teologa en Espaa (pp. 337-450).
38
Curiosamente, muchos, por no decir la mayora, de estos escritos [en los que se establece el di-
logo entre la teologa y las ciencias] estn escritos por cientficos que muestran su inters y preocupacin
por la cuestin religiosa. Personalmente, he podido comprobar la existencia de este inters por temas reli-
giosos entre cientficos, y no tanto el inters correlativo entre telogos por los problemas cientficos
(A. Udas, citado en Sequeiros, 2006: 72).

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1064 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

go y encuentro interdisciplinar pueden dar lugar a reformulaciones de algunas tesis teo-


lgicas en funcin de los avances del conocimiento cientfico. A este conjunto de tare-
as se denomina con la expresin Teologa de la Ciencia (Sequeiros, 2006: 57, cur-
siva ma).

Esta nueva teologa de la ciencia (Monserrat, 2007) es una disciplina til pero a la vez
insuficiente y engaosa. La utilidad se evidencia en la clara necesidad de que exista un
dilogo sistemtico entre las nuevas orientaciones cientficas y las construcciones teo-
lgicas, para que la teologa no quede superada en su desenvolvimiento histrico por no
haber sido capaz de integrar las nuevas cosmovisiones cientficas y filosficas con su
mensaje evanglico. No obstante, en la prctica se ha producido una situacin de facto
(que no es, desde luego, de iure) que en realidad est dando pocos frutos teolgico-ecle-
siales: me refiero a que la teologa de la ciencia se ha constituido en una suerte de sub-
disciplina especial que se desarrolla al margen del grueso de la dogmtica. Esto tiene
consecuencias importantes, porque lo que ocurre es que el enorme y fructfero esfuerzo
de telogos y cientficos dedicados a ese mutuo dilogo, no ha llegado (y muy posible-
mente no llegar) a la mayor parte de la produccin teolgica general. De esta manera
se ha producido una situacin paradjica: un grupo minoritario de telogos crean cons-
trucciones teolgicas modernizadas y en consonancia y dilogo con las ciencias; pero,
por otra parte, el resto de la teologa (incluida, pues, la doctrina magisterial) se sigue
auto-reproduciendo en eso que hemos llamado un sistema auto-referencial cerrado
que en el mejor de los casos desconoce completamente la ricas y variadas teologas de
ese otro grupo minoritario, y en el peor las censuran o las persiguen por no ajustarse
a la oficialidad teolgica que permanece ciega a las nuevas cosmovisiones cientfico-
metafsicas. En este sentido, y como ya apuntbamos para el caso del ecumenismo y del
dilogo interreligioso con Geffr, no se trata de crear subdisciplinas o captulos distin-
tos dentro del sistema cerrado e inalterable de la dogmtica. Sino que ms bien se exige
una reformulacin de algunos temas importantes de esas disciplinas (creacin, trinidad,
cristologa, antropologa, escatologa, etc.) desde la nueva luz que arroja la ciencia y la
filosofa modernas. De otro modo, no tendra sentido una teologa de la ciencia ms que
como esfuerzo personal de telogos aislados que pretenden una revitalizacin del pen-
sar teolgico pero que no llega a calar en la Iglesia 39. Este es el reto junto a una hones-
ta teologa del dilogo interreligioso de la teologa del siglo XXI. Y de su logro depende
la renovacin eclesial, espiritual y evanglica que grandes sectores cristianos estn exi-
giendo.
Por este motivo, y a modo de breves indicaciones sin pretensin de exhaustividad, a
continuacin explotaremos algunas de las posibilidades que se abren a la teologa (muchas
de ellas ya iniciadas hace tiempo) si se toma en serio la metafsica del devenir. Porque
no debe olvidarse que no es posible un dilogo entre la teologa y las ciencias si no es con
la mediacin ineludible de la filosofa, puesto que de otro modo se pueden incurrir en acti-
tudes apologticas o en la construccin de parches circunstanciales que no tomen en
serio el hecho de que tanto la construccin teolgica como la cientfica estn sustenta-

39
Esto, por supuesto, sera legtimo, pero no tendra mucho sentido si, cmo se afirma, la Iglesia,
en cuanto pueblo de Dios y comunidad de fe, es el sujeto de la teologa. La fe no es algo que afecte de una
manera aislada e individual a la persona, sino que reclama esencialmente comunin, comunidad, ecle-
sialidad (Cordovilla, 2007: 92). No es posible una renovacin eclesial-institucional como venimos exi-
giendo, sino no se revitaliza la teologa y la dogmtica desde nuevos presupuestos histrico-cientficos; y
la teologa no se situar a la altura de los tiempos si no integra en su entero edificio esa savia nueva que
procede de la teologa de la ciencia y de la metafsica.

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J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA 1065

das en una previa metafsica. Por este motivo, sin un primigenio, riguroso y correcto
planteamiento filosfico de fondo no es factible ni la teologa de la ciencia, ni la refor-
mulacin de la dogmtica a la luz de la ciencia.

1. Creacin, materia-espritu, mundo.Precisamente, una de las cuestiones fun-


damentales de la teologa (y de la que en buena parte depender la formulacin filo-
sfica concreta de las construcciones teolgicas subsiguientes) es la concepcin meta-
fsica que sirve de apoyatura terica acerca de la relacin entre Dios y lo creado.
En este sentido, no partimos de Dios en cuanto tal o en cuanto revelado, sino de la rela-
cin previa fundante Dios-mundo, puesto que el discurso sobre Dios no puede arran-
car de su puro ser-en-s, como si pudiera prescindir del mundo existente. La razn cre-
ada y finita tiene como punto de partida la experiencia del mundo ya dado (Mller,
1998: 213). Slo queremos sugerir algunas ideas apoyndonos en Gustav Siewerth y
Karl Rahner.
La concepcin teolgica del proceso del surgimiento del espritu desde la materia
propuesto por Rahner es muy iluminador para la antropologa, pero antes es necesario
retrotraernos a una cuestin metafsica previa que nos pueda permitir conectar poste-
riormente con la intuicin rahneriana: me refiero a la dilucidacin puramente metafsi-
ca (sin necesidad, por tanto, de incluir datos propiamente teolgicos) de la naturaleza
ontolgico-divina de la realidad creada, que se concretiza en las reflexiones acerca de las
relaciones especiales que se dan entre lo infinito y lo finito 40. Aqu el pensamiento de Sie-
werth nos puede proporcionar un armazn terico importante.
En efecto, el punto de partida del metafsico alemn es si existe la posibilidad del
conocimiento filosfico de Dios (sigo a Cabada, 2004 y 2005), para lo cual sera necesa-
rio que la divinidad misma estuviera ya reflejada en esa realidad creada, es decir, que
fuera semejanza de Dios (Gleichnis Gottes). Para ello, Siewerth construye una metafsi-
ca del ser creado que se inicia en la concepcin (de raigambre tomasiana) de que la deci-
sin de la accin creadora de Dios se dirige a s mismo y no al mundo: la creacin del
otro por Dios es necesariamente una decisin de Dios desde s mismo y hacia s
mismo, aun siendo naturalmente este otro algo que no puede identificarse en modo
alguno con la divinidad (Cabada, 2004: 179) 41. Esta procedencia de la realidad creada
desde una decisin desde s y para s de Dios, tiene consecuencias fundamentales para
la relacin entre lo finito y lo infinito, puesto que no se conciben de modo radicalmen-
te separado, sino que ya desde su origen creado lo finito no est cerrado en su finitud
sino que se encuentra atravesado y roto por lo infinito; con lo que lo finito es reflejo de
la divinidad, puesto que en cuanto creada desde y para Dios la realidad finita adquiere
una eminente positividad (Ibd.: 181-183). Lo finito no slo esta referido a su fundamento

40
Debo a Manuel Cabada no slo sus estudios sobre Siewerth (que seguir aqu), sino la intuicin
fundamental que me ha transmitido en conversaciones recientes acerca de la precedencia del anli-
sis metafsico de las relaciones infinito-finito sobre cualquier anlisis de la naturaleza de la materia (que
slo puede ser subsiguiente). Creo que su postura (que yo asumo y tratar de explicitar) cobra mucho sen-
tido en el orden en que tratar la cuestin, primero Siewerth y luego Rahner.
41
Cobra aqu todo su sentido la concepcin siewerthiana de la nada como produccin intelectiva
de la razn, incluso la de Dios, que le permite en decisin haca si, poder crear lo otro de s: Para Sie-
werth la comprensin de s mismo del ser en su positividad lleva implcita en s misma la produccin
intelectiva de la nada. La nada surge o resulta del ser en cuanto ser, no, por tanto, de su posible con-
crecin finita. Si la produccin de la nada estuviera ligada a la finitud en cuanto tal, resultara que el
Infinito, al no poder producir la nada, ni podra hacer surgir de s mismo lo no-infinito, es decir, la
realidad concreta finita, ni l mismo se podra entender a s mismo como no-finito en sentido estricto
(Cabada, 1991: 11-12).

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1066 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

infinito, sino que su propia estructura ontolgica es ya ms que algo puramente finito,
es semejanza del Absoluto 42:
El ser de la razn y el de las cosas en tanto en cuanto estn en el conocimiento huma-
no, no es nunca sustancia inmediata finita, sino que es luz activa, procedente de lo divi-
no, portando en s la seal de su origen primigenio, inteligiblemente formada y en uni-
dad con su procedencia divina [] Todo ser [Wesen] est, por tanto, infinitamente
cualificado en cuanto cognoscente o cognoscible. La finitud del espritu es ya, pues, desde
su inicio finitud infinita o la vida en la eternidad que se transparenta a travs de las for-
mas del tiempo. Es, por tanto, absurdo hablar de un espritu finito en el sentido de una
delimitacin o separacin respecto de toda infinitud absoluta divina. Se trata ms bien
de la infinitud del fundamento mismo absoluto de la verdad en el que el espritu vive su
vida cognoscitiva, porque l [el espritu] recibe su ser de ella y en cuanto creado perma-
nece ms esencialmente ligado a su causa creadora que a s mismo (Siewerth, citado en
Ibd.: 180).

Este texto insuperable nos muestra ya la deriva que puede tomar esta conceptuali-
zacin concreta de las relaciones Infinito-finito, hacia la ontologa de la materia y sus
consecuencias antropolgicas. El propio Siewerth es consciente de las implicaciones que
su concepcin dinmica de la realidad procedente, precisamente, de su metafsica pue-
den tener para una explicacin ontolgica adecuada del proceso evolutivo del cosmos
y de la vida desde la posibilitacin del surgimiento de una nueva y ms elevada infor-
macin en la naturaleza a travs de lo que l denomina la profundidad, grvida de for-
mas [formenschwangere], del ser (Ibd.: 180). El dinamismo y el carcter de proceso
del cosmos en su propio ser finito deriva, precisamente, de esa relacin especial de una
realidad creada que, por proceder de una decisin de Dios hacia s mismo 43, dota a la
materia de una espontaneidad que se encuentra muy lejos de las concepciones de una
materia pasiva, inerte, degrada ontolgicamente y que, por ello, necesitara una conti-
nua intervencin sobrenatural y milagrosa de Dios para dotarla de dinamismo y de valor
divino. Muy lejos de esto ltimo (que an subyace, como veremos, en la base de buena
parte de la antropologa teolgica), Siewerth considera y creo que este texto tiene seme-
janzas con la autotrascendencia activa de Rahner (cf. infra) que la historia evolu-
tiva de la naturaleza es verdaderamente una progresiva estratificacin desde abajo, una
epignesis [Epigenese] continua, en la que de hecho no aparece nada que no haya sur-
gido y nacido de la naturaleza, habilitando al fundamento de la misma para una nueva
profundidad, y sin embargo ello no puede ser pensado sin la profundidad conformado-
ra del ser y de Dios (cit. en Ibd.: 186).
De este modo, se confirma la intuicin cabadiana de que es necesaria una previa dilu-
cidacin metafsica de las relaciones Infinito-finito para poder arrojar algo de luz sobre
la temtica de la materia, sin que esto signifique, por supuesto, ningn tipo de cons-
truccin metafsica a priori o deductiva, sino muy al contrario, teniendo en cuenta los

42
Se pueden establecer claras referencias con el pensamiento de Hegel (cf. Cabada, 1972 y 2004) en
tanto que para l, precisamente, lo finito en cuanto toma conciencia de su finitud automticamente la
supera. Por eso dice Hegel que las cosas finitas estn rotas (gebrochen). Explica Pannenberg (1992: 27)
a este respecto ms desde una perspectiva gnoseolgica-subsiguiente que presupone la ontolgica-previa:
Ahora bien, lo otro mediante cuya limitacin lo finito es lo que es, es a su vez o bien otro finito o lo otro
de lo finito en cuanto tal, es decir, lo infinito. Ambas cosas estn ya dadas con el lmite incluido en el con-
cepto de lo finito.
43
Es necesario notar que con ello no se cae en ningn tipo de acosmismo metafsico, puesto que
Siewerth defiende, precisamente, que esta decisin de Dios para s, es la que da la mayor positividad a la
realidad creada.

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J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA 1067

datos de las ciencias empricas. Precisamente, en continuidad con lo dicho hasta ahora,
podemos introducir las reflexiones filosficas, con sus ramificaciones teolgicas, de Rah-
ner sobre el concepto de autotrascendencia activa 44.
Este concepto rahneriano 45 surge como preocupacin, precisamente, por iniciar un
intento de reflexin teolgico-metafsica acorde con los datos de aquel momento acer-
ca del proceso de hominizacin. Era necesario para ello establecer un anlisis que refor-
mulase, en cierto modo, la tradicional concepcin del espritu y la materia, puesto que
segn el magisterio eclesial el primero es distinto de la segunda y no puede derivarse
de ella. Ahora bien, este claro dualismo ontolgico que adems es problemtico
dificulta la comprensin teolgica de las realidades creadas, que son siempre corpora-
les o materiales, y adems supone callejones sin salida para la teologa o exigen con-
cepciones mgicas, milagrosas y, a menudo, devaluadoras de las realidades creadas. Es
evidente que existe cierta inderivabilidad del espritu desde la materia debido a una
doble prioridad lgica y ontolgica del primero frente a la segunda. No obstante, esta
inderivabilidad no es conceptualizada de modo correcto dentro del magisterio eclesial,
puesto que la Iglesia la funda en una dicotoma cuasi-absoluta entre materia y espri-
tu 46. Con ello, la nica conclusin razonable que se desprendera sera la de la inter-
vencin sobrenatural continua (y categorial) de Dios sobre una suerte de materia iner-
te y muerta a la que se aadira lo espiritual como un aadido postizo. Para refutar
esta suerte de dualismo Rahner recurre a la mostracin del parentesco o unidad de la
materia y el espritu desde varios frentes teorticos 47, concluyendo la referencia mutua
del uno hacia la otra.
En realidad, el problema que tiene Rahner ante sus ojos es una cuestin que an est
dando lugar a dificultades teolgico-filosficas: [El problema] para Rahner se plantea
al contrastar la evolucin humana con el dogma catlico de la creacin inmediata del
alma espiritual. Como indica la encclica Humani generis (1950, Denz. 2327), ese dogma
no interfiere con un evolucionismo moderado en cuanto investiga sobre el origen del
cuerpo humano. Como se ve, esta visin estrecha del magisterio reproduce continua-
mente dificultades tanto desde el punto de vista de la unidad esencial del ser humano,
como de la intervencin intramundana de Dios 48. Es para evitar este conjunto de pro-
blemas, para lo que Rahner introduce su concepto de la autosuperacin o autotras-
cendencia activa, que pretende hablar de una causalidad trascendental y no categorial
de Dios, en la que la divinidad juega el papel de horizonte o sobre-qu que fundamenta
trascendentalmente (y como desde dentro) el movimiento auto-superante del espritu

44
Seguimos aqu el completo anlisis que desarrolla Doncel, 2007.
45
Aparece en: La hominizacin en cuanto cuestin teolgica, en la obra conjunta con Overhage
acerca del El problema de la hominizacin (1961).
46
De hecho, su postura es tan poco refinada y estrecha metafsicamente, que cualquier intento como
este que estamos proponiendo es susceptible de una condena automtica por materialismo.
47
Tales frentes o mbitos son: la metafsica trascendental, la metafsica tomista, la teologa cristia-
na, la creacin del mundo, la consumacin escatolgica del mundo y la encarnacin del Verbo.
48
Doncel (Ibd.: 611) resume as las tres principales dificultades de esa visin tradicional: Las difi-
cultades metafsicas provienen de introducir a Dios en la cadena cerrada de causas segundas, hacindole
intervenir demirgicamente en el mundo en vez de mantener creativamente al mundo. Las dificulta-
des teolgicas provienen de convertir la sobriedad profana de la naturaleza y su historia en un suceso mara-
villoso, un verdadero milagro, y ponerla as al nivel de la historia salvfica, caracterizada por ese contac-
to personal de la inmediatez divina. Y las dificultades cientficas provienen de que para su metodologa eso
constituye un escndalo a evitar con todo empeo. Y con razn, pues la causalidad divina, por ser tal, est
siempre representada en su accin natural intramundana por una causa creada, que es la que le toca des-
cribir a las ciencias.

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1068 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

finito. No podemos entrar aqu en el difcilmente resumible mtodo trascendental, pero


se puede decir:
Ese anlisis del horizonte o sobre-qu de la trascendencia nos lo presenta, pues,
como la causa (Ur-sache) que fundamenta al espritu en su movimiento trascendental.
l es quien, como horizonte de la trascendencia, posibilita la captacin del ser que se
ofrece, y quien, al permanecer como inabarcable por encima del espritu, pone causal-
mente en movimiento esa autosuperante trascendencia del sujeto finito. En esa origina-
ria experiencia trascendental es donde hemos de buscar lo que significa causa y accin.
Pues toda pregunta por otra causalidad acontece en ese movimiento del espritu, y toda
duda sobre ese movimiento es a su vez un movimiento de esos y afirma implcitamente
lo que duda. Y toda otra clase de causalidad activa (ontolgicamente comprendida) slo
puede conocerse como modo deficiente de esa causalidad (Doncel, Ibd.: 615).

De este modo, se evita esa injerencia categorial de Dios, porque en realidad el espri-
tu finito se supera a s mismo: es decir, hay verdadera superacin y esa superacin es
llevada a cabo por el propio sujeto finito, aunque producida por ese movimiento tras-
cendental de Dios que lo pone en movimiento, lo funda y lo sostiene, sin quedar l mismo
reducido a ese mismo poner en movimiento 49. En este mismo sentido, Bela Weissmahr
(1986: 109), que sigue muy de cerca a Rahner en el mtodo trascendental, pone de mani-
fiesto con claras resonancias rahnerianas este mismo supuesto metafsico:
Cierto tambin que la realidad incondicionada slo puede hacer comprensible el
incremento del ser autooperado por los entes finitos, si dicha realidad se distingue radi-
calmente de stos, sin ser frente a los mismos otro ente. Pues en el caso de que se identi-
ficar sin ms con stos, la plenitud de perfeccin estara ya en el contenido ontolgico
de los entes finitos y ya no podra hallarse de que stos se superan a s mismos realmente
y no solo en apariencia. [] Pero simultneamente el ser de la realidad absoluta debe
ser de tal modo que no est simplemente fuera del ser de los entes finitos. Pues si el abso-
luto no perteneciera de una manera inequvoca, imposible de determinar pero real, al
ser de los entes finitos, es decir, que si a pesar de su diversidad no fuera el fundamento
interno y constitutivo del ser de los entes finitos, no se comprendera cmo de lo menos
por s mismo puede resultar un ms, ni cmo el ente finito puede superarse a s mismo.

El mundo es, as, creacin de Dios, pero (como ya vimos en Teilhard, Schmitz-Moor-
mann y Edwards, que tambin reformulan, a su modo, la teologa de la creacin desde
la metafsica del devenir) es una creacin que dota a la materia de las virtualidades y
potencialidades propias del espritu. Porque, en realidad, no hay una materia inerte, pasi-
va y mala y un espritu vivo, activo y bueno. La concepcin cientfica de la materia que
pusimos de manifiesto en el epgrafe anterior, es producto, precisamente, de que como
dijeran Siewerth o Hegel desde la metafsica la realidad creada est ya desde siempre
transida por lo Infinito. No hay, por lo tanto, una suerte de impostacin posterior de lo
espiritual sobre lo material, porque de hecho la materia finita est ya espiritualizada
(Rahner habla de la materia como de espritu congelado) 50 y lleva en su seno ese hori-

49
Esta superacin perfectiva no es determinacin pasivamente recibida por el sujeto, no es un ser-
perfeccionado por el Ser absoluto, porque ste de tal forma es fundamento primigenio de ese automovi-
miento, que constituye un momento interno del movimiento mismo. Pero tampoco se trata de un reali-
zarse del Ser absoluto, porque ste, como momento interno al movimiento, permanece al mismo tiempo
libre e inalcanzado, por encima del movimiento. Mueve sin ser movido (Doncel, Ibd.: 616).
50
Nos parece que esta concepcin rahneriana tiene semejanzas con la idea de Schelling de la natu-
raleza como un yo sin yos o como espritu visible o como sujeto-objeto objetivo, y sin pantesmos
de ningn tipo. Este nuevo idealismo de la Naturaleza ensea que la Naturaleza, devenir del espritu, es
ella misma espritu en devenir. La Naturaleza, considerada como el conjunto de las cosas externas per-

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J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA 1069

zonte trascendental (o segn Siewerth, lo finito es ya semejanza o reflejo de lo Absolu-


to) que provoca desde dentro un impulso autosuperante. En este sentido, en cierto modo
el espritu humano surge desde y en la materia y su proceso csmico, pero porque la
materia no es esa cosa pasiva e inerte (e impura) que se opone al espritu, sino que
es esa realidad creada por el Espritu divino que por salir de una decisin de Dios hacia
s mismo (Toms de Aquino y Siewerth) est dotada de un dinamismo y espiritualidad
ontolgicas y contiene en s misma las virtualidades para, desde s misma, moverse hacia
su fundamento y respondiendo a su llamada (Moormann) generar el proceso evolutivo
csmico que desemboque en el ser humano. Porque, en efecto, todo ello implica que,
efectivamente, de lo menos puede salir ms 51. Y es importante afirmar que esta concep-
cin no tiene nada de materialista ni de pansiquista, por ms que aqu no podamos entrar
de lleno en ello. Son evidentes, pues, las consecuencias antropolgicas de esta concep-
cin de la relacin finito-infinito y de la materia que resulta de ella.

2. Antropologa teolgica.Si nos hemos extendido tanto en esta primera reflexin


es porque de su correcto planteamiento dependen las siguientes, que trataremos de abor-
dar de manera mucho ms esquemtica. De stas, inicialmente nos ocuparemos de la
antropologa teolgica. Slo nos vamos a detener en dos cuestiones: la primera es la de
la creacin inmediata del alma humana por Dios y la segunda tiene que ver con las rela-
ciones natural-sobrenatural.
En primer lugar, de lo dicho hasta aqu se desprende que no es necesario, e incluso
es perjudicial teolgica, filosfica y, por supuesto, cientficamente, seguir hablando de
una creacin inmediata del alma por Dios. Por mayores sutilezas teolgicas que se quie-
ran utilizar para disfrazar este dualismo, lo cierto es que visto desde esa perspectiva, se
est generando una clara discordancia en lo que en realidad es una experiencia absolu-
tamente unitaria en el ser humano. Pero es que, adems, desde un punto de vista meta-
fsico, como ha quedado reflejado en lo anterior, no es necesario recurrir a una accin
milagrosa (de claro carcter categorial) para afirmar que, efectivamente, Dios crea a
la persona humana, sino que es perfectamente coherente con ello (y para muchos, teo-
lgicamente ms bello) el hecho de que el ser humano mismo surja de esa capacidad auto-
superante, sostenida por Dios, de los padres del nuevo ser. Como se ve en conexin con
esto, aunque es una cuestin que aqu no vamos a discutir, nos parece oportuno siquie-
ra indicar que desde un punto de vista bblico no parecen existir demasiados alicientes
para continuar utilizando las categoras cuerpo-alma dentro de la antropologa teolgi-
ca, sobre todo cuando se la reviste de un carcter sustancialista 52; entre otras cosas, por-
que, como ya hemos apuntado, siempre se acaba recayendo en dualismos y en dificul-
tades teolgicas y metafsicas. Evidentemente, eso no significa renunciar a lo que, de

ceptibles por los sentidos, es la mera realidad de lo material; pero la Naturaleza, en su unidad y produc-
tividad determinantes de cada cosa particular (natura naturans) es vida ideal, anloga a la inmanencia de
la formacin del yo. [] La idea metafsica inicial del yo absoluto ha de tener sus consecuencias para la
Naturaleza sin yos, infrahumana, que se despliega en los objetos o productos de forma corprea sensi-
ble. Tambin la Naturaleza, lo visible es (en s mismo, como este ente real) espritu; la Naturaleza es esp-
ritu visible. Un yo todava sin yos, un sujeto todava absorto en lo objetivo, por decirlo as, ha de actuar
y ser determinante en las producciones reales de la Naturaleza, un sujeto-objeto objetivo, no el sujeto-
objeto subjetivo de la teora fichteana de la conciencia (Heimsoeth, 1966: 27).
51
Algunos, como Ruiz de la Pea (1992), parecen todava negar este axioma.
52
Adems, esto dificulta enormemente la concepcin cristiana de la resurreccin, basada no en una
supuesta inmortalidad del alma, sino en la verdadera muerte de la persona que ser recreada en una
nueva creacin que depende no de una propiedad intrnseca al alma, sino de la infinita fidelidad de Dios
mismo que prometi nuestra perduracin por su amor.

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1070 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

hecho, se quiere significar 53 cuando se habla de alma, quiz desde lenguajes poticos, litr-
gicos o espirituales-cultuales, pero surgen verdaderos problemas precisamente por el las-
tre griego y la falta de un desarrollo metafsico diferente que continuamente se cuela
por la puerta de atrs cuando se trata de elaborar construcciones tericas en un len-
guaje metafsico o teolgico 54. Por este motivo, es por lo que nos parece mucho ms opor-
tuno hablar de persona como esa realidad creada en la que las virtualidades espiri-
tuales ya implicadas en la materia autosuperante han hecho surgir, no un alma en unidad
sustancial con un cuerpo, sino una realidad dinmica, no esttica, cf. infra en la que
lo corporal es ya de suyo (y, por tanto, no simple epifenmeno marginal) apertura espi-
ritual a la trascendencia, en grados y cualidades mayores que en cualquier otra realidad
material. Sea lo que fuera del concepto de alma o de persona, lo que queremos poner
de manifiesto especialmente aqu, es que su creacin por parte de Dios no implica una
actuacin inmediata de Dios, sino que es un tipo de creacin que se ajusta a la causa-
lidad autosuperante explicada ms arriba para el caso del surgimiento del espritu en
general desde la materia:
La creacin del alma [o, en nuestra terminologa, de la persona entendida en
el sentido arriba indicado] concebida as como un caso ms (aunque eminentemente
singular) de realizacin autosuperante, pierde todo el aspecto escandaloso de irrupcin
divina en el mundo milagrosa y categorial. Esa accin de Dios no es categorial, porque
nada produce que no produzcan las causas segundas, no acta junto a, sino en la
accin misma autosuperante del agente finito. La trascendentalidad de la accin de Dios
en el mundo no ha de concebirse como un mero soportar estticamente el mundo, sino
como un fundamentarlo en su realizarse autosuperante. Y aunque estas autosupera-
ciones se den necesariamente en puntos espacio-temporales de la historia, esto no sig-
nifica que la accin divina que las posibilita est como tal categorialmente localizada
en ellos (Doncel, 2007: 618).

53
Diciendo que el hombre es alma (y no slo cuerpo), se quiere decir: a) que el hombre vale ms
que cualquier otra realidad mundana; b) que es capaz de sustentar un dilogo salvfico con Dios (Ruiz
de la Pea, 1989: 153).
54
Es curioso que Polkinghorne parezca hacerse un lo precisamente por hablar del concepto de
alma en lenguaje divulgativo, a pesar de ser un claro detractor del dualismo. As, mientras que en un
libro mucho ms riguroso cientfica y teolgicamente afirma (2007a: 44): Cuando se lee a Eccles, se sien-
te a menudo que una de sus motivaciones para creer en el dualismo es que a l le parece que es el nico
modo de salvaguardar la realidad de lo mental y lo espiritual, frente al ataque cido de un reductivismo
fsico. Afortundamente, yo creo que hay otro enfoque que puede alcanzar ese deseable fin. [] La pode-
mos etiquetar como monismo de aspecto dual. Hay slo una sustancia en el mundo (no dos la mate-
rial y la mental), pero puede darse en dos estados opuestos (las fases material y mental, que dira un fsi-
co), lo cual explica nuestra percepcin de la diferencia entre mente y materia. No obstante, en un libro
ms divulgativo (2007b: 65-66), aunque tambin rechaza el dualismo, sigue empleando la palabra alma
con los problemas que ello conlleva: Adoptar una visin psicosomtica [la que l defiende] del hombre
exige reflexionar con cuidado sobre cmo entender la naturaleza del alma humana. Este concepto tiene
una importancia central en la teologa la cual atribuye al alma el papel de portadora de la esencia intrn-
seca de la personalidad individual; del yo verdadero, podramos decir. Aunque la antropologa teolgi-
ca no pueda renunciar a este uso del lenguaje del alma, s debe ser capaz de liberarse el lastre de una heren-
cia pasada que conceba sta con la ayuda de categoras platnicas. A esta afirmacin hay una cosa
fundamental que objetar; y es que Polkinghorne al decir que el alma es el portador de la personalidad indi-
vidual o yo verdadero, est sin darse cuenta dejando de lado la profunda implicacin que para nuestro yo
verdadero tiene el cuerpo, y, como vimos en la antropologa de la ANT, todas las relaciones somticas y
extrasomticas que la persona establece con su entorno animal, natural y tecnolgico, y la co-construc-
cion mutua entre esos elementos. En este sentido, el concepto de alma nos parece, por eso, problemtico
para una construccin rigurosamente filosfico-teolgica de la antropologa que pretenda una clara uni-
dad personal, porque siempre, aunque no sea de modo consciente, se va a terminar por identificar con el
yo verdadero slo lo anmico, dificultando la introduccin de todo lo dems en el concepto de persona.

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J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA 1071

En segundo lugar, y aunque no directamente vinculado al problema del alma, nos


encontramos con una cuestin puramente teolgica, aunque tambin puedan sernos ti-
les las reflexiones precedentes. En efecto, en la antropologa teolgica a menudo se dife-
rencia una suerte de dualidad antropolgica: lo natural y lo sobrenatural. Desde mi punto
de vista, esta dualidad reproduce, a otra escala ms propiamente religiosa pero basada
en el mismo prejuicio teolgico, el dualismo alma-cuerpo. En efecto, se afirma:
La condicin supracreatural del hombre no elimina su ser creatural; al contrario, lo
implica, porque el hombre, al no ser Dios, no puede entrar en comunin con l ms que
en cuanto distinto del mismo, es decir, en cuanto criatura. [] Ahora bien, y aqu est
el punto decisivo de la gratuidad de la condicin supracreatural, sta en ningn momen-
to puede ser una exigencia de la criatura.

Y ms adelante en relacin con Cristo:


El hombre, en virtud de su subsistencia creatural, no es, como Jess, pura referen-
cia. Por una parte es verdad que dado nuestro ser de criaturas dependemos totalmente
de Dios, estamos referidos a l. Pero ya que la creacin no implica comunin personal
esta referencia nos da un ser relativamente absoluto; nuestro ser y nuestro ser personal
no se identifican. No somos pura referencia a un t; nos abrimos al otro siempre desde
nuestra condicin de sujetos; esto quiere decir que nos experimentamos siempre como
teniendo en nosotros mismos nuestro centro (Ladaria, 1987: 166 y 389. Las cursivas
son nuestras).

En este prrafo se condensan una serie de cuestiones que no se pueden tratar aqu.
Por ello, nos vamos a contentar con reflexionar sobre la pertinencia o no de esa distin-
cin que expresa Ladaria entre condicin creatural y condicin supracreatural. Desde
mi punto de vista, no parece necesaria una tal dicotoma entre el hombre natural y el hom-
bre elevado sobrenaturalmente. No es simplemente que no conozcamos a ningn hom-
bre en su desnuda condicin natural y que, por ello, nos resulte imposible definir al
hombre natural. Es que no tenemos por qu pensar que exista tal dicotoma. La gratuidad
de Dios, la gracia, no tiene por qu pensarse como un aadido a una condicin previa-
mente natural que no la poseyera. No podemos pensar en un hombre natural sin la gra-
cia ya en l. No se trata de dos momentos, de dos escalones en la creacin del ser del hom-
bre. Qu sentido podra tener afirmar la creacin de un hombre que desde el principio
fue a imagen y semejanza de su creador pero que no estuviera ya agraciado desde el mismo
momento en que recibe el ser de Dios? El hombre no puede ser primero simplemente refe-
rencia ontolgica a Dios y posteriormente elevacin relacional con ese mismo Dios. Sino
que desde que recibe el ser, el hombre est ya elevado e invitado a la relacin con Dios.
La gratuidad no est en el hecho de que Dios quisiera agraciar al hombre para permi-
tirle entrar en relacin con l, despus de haberle creado sin esa posibilidad. De hecho,
dentro de la propuesta teolgica de Schmitz-Moormann (cf. supra) se sugera que es pre-
cisamente esa llamada de Dios la que interpela al proceso csmico a dar de s, en impul-
so, para responder a esa llamada, cosa que ocurre en el ser humano. En este sentido, debe-
ramos pensar que la gratuidad est en que Dios, sin necesitarlo, ha creado desde esa
potencialidad autosuperante una criatura que expresamente va a estar dirigida a una rela-
cin sobrenatural con l. Teolgicamente es una pura abstraccin (y en este sentido un
presupuesto ontolgico innecesario) introducir distinciones entre creaturalidad y supra-
creaturalidad, puesto que, adems, tienen poco fundamento bblico 55. Habra que pen-

55
Desde un punto de vista evolutivo-paleoantropolgico tampoco se puede establecer con seguridad
en qu momento de la flecha evolutiva se podra hablar del surgimiento de un homo religiosus, entre otras

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1072 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

sar que Dios quiso crear a un hombre ya elevado para una relacin personal con l por-
que es lo que, de hecho, vemos 56. Con ello no se elimina la gratuidad, porque Dios no tiene
necesidad de crear a un tal ente-personal, sino que lo hizo por amor desbordante. Por ello,
Ladaria 57 (frente, por ejemplo, a Buber o Levinas) no puede considerar que el ser huma-
no sea esencialmente relacionalidad personal con otros. En efecto, tanto Buber (1948)
como Levinas justifican esa esencial relacionalidad de la persona en la primigenia rela-
cionalidad del hombre hacia Dios. Pero desde el momento en el que Ladaria considera
que es necesario un plus ontologico de gracia para mantener una relacin yo-t con
Dios, se sigue lgicamente para l que nuestro ser y nuestro ser personal no se identifican
y que, por lo tanto, no somos referencia pura a un t. De este modo, se hace inviable fun-
damentar ontologicamente su ser-relacin con otros. Nos parece, en este sentido, que la
distincin obedece ms bien a un prejuicio teolgico impostado para salvar una suerte de
gratuidad de Dios, que desde una teologa del devenir queda igualmente salvada sin inter-
calar determinaciones aadidas subsiguientes de carcter sobrenatural.
Por supuesto, esto no impide que en la cuestin de la revelacin, podamos distinguir
con Rahner un doble nivel:
Ms all de esta revelacin natural, que propiamente es la donacin de Dios como
pregunta (no, como respuesta), existe tambin la autntica revelacin de Dios (que, dicho
sea de paso, tiene un fuerte contenido dinmico, en tanto que Jess nos deja el Espri-
tu para que vaya desvelndonos el misterio divino). sta no est dada simplemente con
el ser espiritual del hombre como trascendencia, sino que tiene carcter de suceso, es
dialogstica (Rahner, 1979: 208).

Pero este doble escaln de la revelacin presupone ya un ser humano desde siempre
sobrenaturalizado o elevado a la comunicacin con Dios, capaz, por tanto, de or la palabra
y acogerla desde dentro de su propia naturaleza ontolgica 58. Cuestin a parte es la eleva-
cin escatolgica a la beatitud, que de hecho no es parte del problema general y primigenio
del hombre natural y sobrenatural. Por ello, creemos que en la antropologa teolgica
no es necesario crear ese supuesto hombre natural (o como dira Ladaria: creatural), por-
que lo que experimentamos es un hombre siempre sobrenatural (o supracreatural).

3. Dios: vida, trinidad, mutabilidad y sus conexiones cristolgicas.Hablar sobre


Dios en s mismo no deja de ser problemtico, tanto desde un punto de vista filosfico
como teolgico. Precisamente, por querer ir ms all de lo que verdaderamente pode-
mos saber de Dios la teologa y la Iglesia a menudo se han constituido en instancia abso-
lutizadora y excluyente frente a otras religiones o concepciones sobre la divinidad. La

cosas porque nuestra visin teolgica de la creacin desde la metafsica del devenir vista desde Siewerth,
Rahner y Schmitz-Moormann y junto con nuestro rechazo de la creacin inmediata del alma, nos hace inne-
cesario establecer una suerte de momento creativo puntual o de elevacin sobrenatural en la especie homo.
Precisamente, porque la religin (en el sentido de relacin personal con Dios, aparte de cualquier tipo de
revelacin o de positivacin) aparecera dentro de ese horizonte trascendental autosuperante sostenido tras-
cendentalmente por Dios pero no creada categorialmente por l.
56
Nada de esto elimina la posibilidad y absoluta legitimidad del ateismo, puesto que esa presencia
de Dios en la estructura ontolgico-trascendental del ser humano no es evidente en s misma. Bien por lo
que Monserrat (2007) llama una knosis epistemolgica de Dios, bien sencillamente por el exceso onto-
lgico del Infinito sobre el espritu finito.
57
Tambin Guardini parece caer dentro de esta misma situacin que Ladaria respecto a la esencia-
lidad de la relacionalidad personal del ser humano. Cf. Guardini, 2000.
58
La autocomunicacin de Dios revelando su esencia ntima supone que el hombre en virtud de su
naturaleza concreta es capaz de acoger el mensaje y la palabra de Dios. Ahora bien, para ser capaz de ello,
tiene que poseer en virtud de su naturaleza racional la capacidad de conocer a Dios (Weissmahr, 1986: 186).

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J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA 1073

revelacin de Dios no deja de ser limitada y no puede excluir, por principio, otras arti-
culaciones posibles sobre las que la revelacin no dice nada, o que por su ropaje hist-
rico permite otras vas de profundizacin terica y de ejercitacin existencial. Por eso, y
aunque parezca poca cosa, aqu nos vamos a contentar con sealar alguna de esas cues-
tiones que permiten una reformulacin ms acorde con la metafsica del devenir, pero
con la conciencia de que son eso, tentativas, tanto las de unos como las de otros. La pri-
mera cuestin decisiva, desde mi punto de vista, es dotar a la comprensin de la natu-
raleza de Dios de dinamismo, de vida, y alejarlo definitivamente de algunos de los asi-
deros ontolgicos del concepto esttico de la divinidad propio del mundo griego. Y es
que el concepto trinitario de Dios del cristianismo es absolutamente rico en matices de
este tipo, porque implica que Dios posee autofecundidad y actividad, y se debera enten-
der el carcter relacional de Dios como justamente el que da sentido a su posible atri-
buto de sustancia y no al revs. La vida y el dinamismo trinitario es de una importan-
cia enorme si queremos construir una teologa dinmica y no esttica: Dios no es, por
tanto, una substancia esttica u opaca, sino espiritual, dinmica, transparente y viva
(Rovira Belloso 1998: 589). As, trascendiendo la pura reflexin metafsica de Siewerth,
nos encontramos desde la revelacin la necesidad de comprender el dinamismo inhe-
rente a Dios y, como consecuencia, del poder autocreador de su creacin. Desde aqu se
hace necesario repensar atributos como la omnipotencia o la omnisciencia. En efecto,
la relacionalidad constitutiva en el interior de Dios la ha sacado hacia fuera en su crea-
cin del mundo considerada como Gleichnis Gottes, y desde ese momento ya no es
posible entender a Dios aparte de su creacin, y a sta aparte de su fundamento 59. Por
este motivo, tiene poco sentido no ya teolgico, sino propiamente religioso, seguir empe-
ados en conceptualizar a Dios principalmente con esos atributos dificultando temas
como el de la libertad humana porque es un atributo abstracto que se desarrolla al
margen de la relacionalidad dinmica propia entre Dios y creacin (ser humano). No
puede haber omnipotencia y omnisciencia frente a la libertad creada, porque esa omni-
potencia no existe al margen de la creacin. De hecho, nos parece mucho ms fructfe-
ro como mostramos antes, el concepto de Dios como Infinitud, precisamente porque per-
mite una comprensin del dinamismo infinito del mundo mucho ms acorde con la
ciencia y la filosofa modernas, y sin menoscabar la libertad de la creacin.
La segunda cuestin, unida a la anterior, se refiere a la necesidad de incluir una suer-
te de polo temporal en la naturaleza de Dios. Esta es una cuestin compleja desde el punto
de vista filosfico, porque nos parece imposible pensar a Dios transido por la temporali-
dad y la mutabilidad, afectado por el dolor y el sufrimiento, debido a que el mundo grie-
go consideraba, precisamente, que la suma perfeccin era la inmovilidad e inmutabilidad
porque eso implicaba plenitud ontolgica. No obstante, es un dato que se nos impone por
revelacin y que es necesario integrar en las construcciones teolgicas 60, puesto que el
dato bblico es firme al presentarnos a un Dios afectado, preocupado e interesado por su
creacin. El actus purus de la metafsica no sirve para comprender al Dios revelado en
los profetas y en Cristo. El Dios bblico es dinamicidad hacia dentro y hacia fuera. Y este
segundo aspecto es capital dentro de una teologa que quiera tomar en serio el devenir y

59
Al afirmar que es imagen de Dios estamos integrando el misterio de aquel en el de ste, y ope-
rando una relativizacin de ambos conceptos, no en el sentido ontolgico de que cada uno sea dependiente
del otro, sino en el sentido de una imposibilidad de comprensin histrica del uno sin el otro (Gonzlez
de Cardedal, 1967: 59).
60
Por supuesto, esto tambin tiene consecuencias desabsolutizadoras para las configuraciones ecle-
siales concretas, como se puede adivinar.

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1074 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

la historicidad y comprender a Dios no slo frente al tiempo, sino en y dentro del tiem-
po, sin negar una suerte de segundo polo de eternidad (Polkinghorne) 61.
Finalmente, dentro del mbito propiamente cristolgico, nos parece necesario desa-
rrollar una imagen ms dinmica de la persona de Jesucristo 62, que es precisamente el
lugar de la revelacin (dinmica) trinitaria (Rovira Belloso, 1998: 387). Es pues impor-
tante, sin negar las reflexiones ms propiamente ontolgicas del modo de unin de divi-
nidad y humanidad en Cristo, poner de manifiesto que el cristianismo que Jess nos
muestra en los evangelios es una existencia dinmica y relacional con el Padre desde el
Espritu. Y ello tiene consecuencias importantes para temas clave dentro de la cristolo-
ga, como la necesidad de pensar el desvelamiento de la autoconciencia de Cristo de modo
dinmico y no esttico. En efecto, no se niega en Jess la existencia de la autoconcien-
cia filial, mesinica y escatolgica que ha quedado plasmada, no tanto en los pasajes
(muy pocos) en los que explcitamente Jess imparti alguna doctrina cristolgica sobre
s mismo utilizando para s ciertos ttulos cristolgicos; ms bien el dato fundamen-
tal es la cristologa que subyace en, con y bajo el anuncio, la doctrina y los hechos del
Jess histrico, punto de partida de cualquier cristologa eclesial posterior (cf. Fuller,
1979: 107-146). Dicho esto, se comprende que hablar de un progresivo desvelamiento
auto-reflexivo de la conciencia de Jess no es negar que tal conciencia existiera, ni tam-
poco que no fuera constitutiva en el sentido de momento interno de la unin hipos-
ttica como determinacin fundante de Cristo, pero lo cierto es que tal fundamen-
talidad originante hace imposible elevarla del todo a palabra y para lograrlo es esencial
el tiempo, el hacer, el existir (Gonzlez de Cardedal, 2001: 470). Es decir, hay una intrn-
seca historicidad en el proceso a travs del cual Cristo hace explcita esa determinacin
fundante y originaria en la que ha vivido desde siempre: esa conciencia se realiza en
Jess de manera histrica y progrediente, en marcha hacia su misin y estando siempre
determinada por esa misin (Ibd.). De hecho, de esta asuncin humana de Dios por
parte de la conciencia Cristo depende que se pueda hablar de una verdadera revelacin 63.
Por este motivo, resulta confusa la afirmacin de Amato (1998: 443) de que en Jess se
da una certeza pacfica de su identidad. Evidentemente, la conciencia en tanto que fun-
dante y originaria no tiene un comienzo reconocible en el tiempo, pero si lo que quiere

61
La filosofa y la teologa del proceso han tratado de integrar esta temporalidad en el concepto de
Dios. Por otra parte, la teologa del Dios crucificado de Moltmann es paradigmtica a este respecto. En
Espaa, me parece que las dos bellsimas cristologas de Jon Sobrino (1991 y 1999) (muy influidas por ese
Dios crucificado) son un gran exponente de este tomar en serio el devenir incluso en Dios. No es cierto
que Sobrino niegue la divinidad de Jess de Nazaret, lo que ocurre es que su inters principal es mostrar
que ese supuesto Dios impasible del mundo griego queda superado por un Dios que se hace humano y que
nos muestra en la humanidad de Jess la parcialidad indiscutible de Dios hacia el pobre y el oprimido.
Desde mi punto de vista, lo que pretende Sobrino es mostrar que la humanidad de un Jess cercano a los
pobres es la humanidad que caracteriza a Dios, y no la de un Dios Rey o un Dios Omnipotente fundados
en una cristologa de la exaltacin de Cristo; por eso da preeminencia a la imagen de un Jess humano
ms acorde con un Dios humilde y kentico, frente a la preponderancia en la historia de la teologa de un
Jess Divino, Rey y Seor. Por supuesto, todo ello tiene conexiones con los tipos de eclesiologa vincula-
dos a un Jess siervo o a un Jess triunfante. Pero nunca Sobrino niega la divinidad de Jess.
62
Esta visin dinmica indaga en la propia estructura de la realidad humana de Jess para descu-
brir la posibilidad, conveniencia y ordenacin intrnsecas a un trascendimiento, existencia en el otro y
constitucin desde la relacin con l, como lo ms absolutamente propio del espritu humano, en cuanto
realidad abierta, y de la persona constituyndose en alteridad (Gonzlez de Cardedal, 2001: 456).
63
Hay revelacin de Dios en la medida en que se da comprensin humana de Dios por parte de
Jess; en la medida en que l va asumiendo conceptual y reflejamente esa filiacin en que, como solar per-
manente, vive arraigado, y es que la vida de Jess, su proyecto propio y el destino que le fue conferido
tienen densidad reveladora en cuanto pasan por su conciencia (Gonzlez de Cardedal, 1993: 371 y 372).

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decir el telogo salesiano es que se da casi de modo mgico una identificacin refle-
xiva plena desde siempre en la conciencia de Jess, parece estar, de nuevo, situando la
historicidad y el devenir fuera de la humanidad de Cristo, y haciendo problemticas afir-
maciones bblicas en las que se muestra un proceso de maduracin, incluso salpicado
por las llamadas tentaciones, en cuya superacin tambin est de modo implcito ese
carcter procesual del encuentro pleno y reflexivo de Jess consigo mismo.
Y junto a ello, tambin es importante comprender la muerte de Cristo no como un
diseo esttico prefijado por Dios, como una suerte de necesidad expiatoria exigida san-
grientamente por l. Al contrario, es ms claro pensar que el dinamismo de la vida de
Jess y su fidelidad al Padre y a su vocacin le llevaron a la muerte, que externamente
fue un asesinato pero que la conciencia de Jess supo trascender el hecho histrico exter-
no y transmutarlo en un momento necesario de carcter salvfico y servicial 64.

4. Existencia cristiana y eclesiologa.A este respecto la metafsica del devenir tiene


varias implicaciones importantes, pero slo apuntamos dos. La primera tiene que ver
con tomar muy en serio el devenir dentro de la propia historia humana y, por lo tanto,
asumir como categora central para el cristianismo y la existencia cristiana, la historici-
dad y la desnaturalizacin de algunas categoras sociales, al asumir en serio el hecho de
la encarnacin de Dios en Cristo. Por este motivo, consideramos de una gran impor-
tancia las ltimas reflexiones del jesuita Paul Valadier expuestas en su reciente libro
del 2003 La condicin cristiana (2005). Para l no hay un ser-cristiano garantizado,
que se consiguiese en una especie de evolucin siempre continua y progresiva. Por ello,
considera que dentro del cristianismo a menudo se ha olvidado una categora central
evanglica (especialmente en los escritos paulinos): el discernimiento y la libertad que
la presupone. Porque, de hecho, la existencia humana se caracteriza por la vacilacin,
el titubeo, la incertidumbre en cuanto a las opciones y a los riegos que debe asumir
(p. 127) 65. De este modo, la existencia cristiana est siempre atravesada de una real his-
toricidad que no se puede obviar en las construccin teolgicas (especialmente en la teo-
loga moral): en efecto, nuestras voluntades ni estn ni pueden estar unidas a Dios o
tener la intuicin clara del bien hasta el punto de no tener necesidad de discernirlo, bus-
carlo y optar muchas veces en medio de una semioscuridad sobre lo que, despus de
reflexionar a fondo, parece lo mejor posible o, ms frecuentemente, el menor mal dese-
able (Ibd.). Por ello, para el telogo francs uno de los lmites de la teologa moral agus-
tiniana es precisamente que est demasiado influida por el paradigma ms platnico
que evanglico de la inmutabilidad de Dios y con ello nuestra relacin con la voluntad
divina tendra que ser para Agustn una unin sin fluctuaciones y sin fallos. Pero
esto no se corresponde con la experiencia diaria de las personas que, religiosas o no, tie-
nen que tomar decisiones importantes en esa semioscuridad que caracteriza toda vida
humana. As, pues, en este sentido, el discernimiento acompaado del espritu es la clave
de bveda para toda existencia cristiana: Se trata menos de obedecer a una doctrina
enteramente elaborada que de intentar descubrir a qu nos convoca el Espritu viviente
del Resucitado a travs del complejo juego de las relaciones constitutivas del presente

64
Jesus [] did not seek death; he did not go up to Jerusalem in order to die; but he did pursue,
with inflexible devotion, a way of truth that inevitably led him to death, and he did not seek to escape
(Moule, 1978: 109).
65
Slo quienes se han alejado de la fe o algunos ilusionistas que creen tenerla piensan que dicha fe
es un seguro a todo riego, que el creyente sabe a ciencia cierta por dnde pasa la fidelidad a Dios, que bas-
tara con obedecer al magisterio eclesistico o a la voluntad de Dios (que, por definicin, se supone siem-
pre clara y accesible) para salir de las sombras e incertidumbres del juicio moral (p. 79).

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1076 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

(p. 145). Y todo ello, precisamente, porque no se puede concebir una antropologa sus-
tancialista que pensara a la persona como estticamente definida por una suerte de alma
fija que negara la mutabilidad intrnseca al yo 66.
En segundo lugar, el devenir y la historicidad tienen consecuencias esenciales para
la eclesiologa y para la configuracin institucional concreta de la Iglesia 67. Del mismo
modo que en Valadier, tambin en esta ocasin la asuncin plena y en todas sus conse-
cuencias de la encarnacin es la que permite al telogo dominico Geffr (2006) afirmar
que ninguna configuracin histrica del cristianismo o de la Iglesia puede ser absoluta
y, por ello, no puede identificarse sin ms las formas y estructuras de la Iglesia histri-
ca con el misterio de Dios en Cristo, que siempre lo trasciende. Ni les christianismes
historiques, ni les glises que les hommes voient ne sont absolus. Seule est absolue la
rvlation finale qui concide avec lavnement du Royaume de Dieu (p. 37) 68. De aqu
se deduce la necesidad de desabsolutizar esas configuraciones concretas 69, lo cual no
slo tiene bellas repercusiones en el interior de la Iglesia, sino que tambin permite una
honesta y dialogante teologa del pluralismo interreligioso 70. Por ello, no es fcil hablar
de la Iglesia en su positividad histrica, porque sta no puede ser ignorada ni absoluti-
zada. Ella, a su vez, remite ms all de s misma, y vale no tanto por su consistencia cuan-
to por su transparencia. Su valor es aquello que por ella se dice, ms que lo que ella
misma dice (Gonzlez de Cardedal, 1989: 163). Efectivamente, siempre habr que plan-
tearse qu estructuras, configuraciones y positivizaciones concretas en la Iglesia son sus-
citadoras del evangelio en su pura transparencia o cuales jugaron un papel histrico en
un determinado momento pero ahora son ms opacas que transparentes y, por tanto,
habr que reformar o eliminar. En esta reconfiguracin eclesial es fundamental tener en
cuenta la marginacin de la mujer. No slo las telogas feministas denuncian esta situa-
cin injusta. Muchos apostamos por una solucin institucional urgente a este problema.

66
La idea de un yo esttico y permanente como condicin de la unidad de la conciencia experien-
cial es, por tanto, una construccin idealizada, aducida para justificar la existencia de una base unitaria
para la descripcin cientfica del mundo en el sentido de las ciencias experimentales modernas seculari-
zadas. [] la teora de una subjetividad trascendental no est tampoco legitimada para suponer, en con-
tradiccin con los hechos y a propsito del proceso de formacin de los individuos en el que surge pri-
meramente y alcanza estabilidad la instancia yoica, que haya ya desde el principio un yo esttico y
permanente, que posibilita el surgimiento de una conciencia de la unidad del mundo y la adquisicin del
lenguaje (Pannenberg, 1999: 51 y 52).
67
Est por hacer an la tarea de aplicar las premisas de la ontologa de la fluidez social a la propia
institucionalizacin eclesistica.
68
On ne peut donc confondre luniversalit du Christ comme Verbe incarn et luniversalit du chris-
tianisme comme religion historique (p. 54). La plnitude de la Rvlation en Jsus-Christ est eschato-
logique (p. 67). En dautres termes, aucune manifestation historique de Dieu, mme lvnement Jsus
de Nazareth, ne peut tre absolutise (p. 69).
69
Dentro de este marco desabsolutizador de las configuraciones histricas, me parece cuestin fun-
damental el desarrollo de una verdadera hermenutica magisterial que a veces es vista con temor por el
magisterio, mientras que la hermenutica bblica es ya un presupuesto asentado de toda la teologa moder-
na. Sesbo es uno de los telogos importantes que ms est insistiendo en esta cuestin, apelando a la
necesidad de considerar de modo paralelo los textos bblicos y los magisteriales. Cf. Sesbo, 2006. Den-
tro de esta hermenutica magisterial es de capital importancia el captulo dedicado a la hermenutica con-
ciliar: cf. Rovira Belloso, 2000: 162-166.
70
No es azaroso el hecho de que la mayor parte de las actuales y provocadoras a la vez que hones-
tas teologas del dilogo interreligioso, acudan a esa relativizacin de las estructuras y las formulacio-
nes y pongan en guardia ante los peligros del absolutismo catlico, siempre asumiendo la historicidad
caracterstica del cristianismo por la encarnacin del verbo. Adems, la pneumatologa es la clave fun-
damental para entender que el soplo del Espritu no puede ser controlado por ninguna autoridad reli-
giosa.

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5. Liberacin-Salvacin y escatologa. Finalmente, tambin de modo breve, con-


cluimos con dos cuestiones importantes mutuamente conectadas entre s. Primero: una
teologa construida sobre el armazn del devenir que toma en serio la historicidad y la
encarnacin como esenciales para el cristianismo, debe partir siempre de la historia con-
creta de las personas, y no de verdades reveladas o leyes naturales y transhistoricas que,
a menudo, se constituyen en normatividades extrensicistas, que pretenden regular el
flujo de la vida y homogeneizar los ricos y variados matices de las vidas concretas. No
se puede hacer una construccin teolgica ni antropolgica desde arriba, sino siempre
desde abajo y teniendo en cuenta esa historicidad y las diversas articulaciones cultura-
les, sociales y humanas que estn ah. Porque los problemas son siempre problemas his-
tricos-contextuales que exigen una penosa, ardua y siempre cambiante y continua ejer-
citacin reflexiva tanto filosfico-sociolgica como teolgica 71. Por supuesto, el lugar
privilegiado de reflexin teolgica sigue siendo las estructuras injustas, los pobres 72. Y
para darse cuenta de ello no es necesario ser un telogo de la liberacin, sino sencilla-
mente leer los evangelios en los que el pobre es el destinatario principal (aunque por
supuesto no nico) del mensaje de Jess. A este respecto es necesario tener en cuenta
que slo fue posible una teologa de la liberacin desarrollada de modo sistemtico
cuando en filosofa y en teologa se abri la puerta a la historicidad y al devenir, lo que
produca una preeminencia de lo histrico frente a lo transhitrico, y de la desnatura-
lizacin sociolgica frente a la naturalizacin de las estructuras sociales. Por eso, no es
de extraar que Po IX afirmara: La diferencia de clases en la sociedad civil tiene su
origen en la naturaleza humana y, por consiguiente, debe atribuirse a la voluntad de
Dios (Syllabus, Enchiridion Symbolorum). Palabras que para una sensibilidad moder-
na tan imbuida de historicidad son muy duras y estn fuera del espritu evanglico 73.
Junto a esta desnaturalizacin comenz a cuestionarse tambin esa teologa que afir-
maba que el dolor dignifica a la persona y que el sufrimiento es querido y valorado posi-
tivamente por Dios (y muy a menudo con cierto cinismo religioso se apelaba a la volun-
tad de Dios para explicar situaciones y vivencias concretas dolorosas), creando una
imagen siniestra del Dios amor de los evangelios que, por supuesto, no niega la exis-
tencia del dolor y del sufrimiento (que pertenece a la propia limitacin de la realidad
creada), pero que no es un dolor querido por s mismo y an ms, cuando se trata de
estructuras injustas, el mensaje evanglico siempre se sita a favor de los oprimidos y
en contra de los opresores, clave central para la comprensin de la vida, muerte y resu-

71
[Algunos creyentes] han actuado como si su fe les procurase soluciones evidentes, inmutables,
transhistricas, a muchos problemas que los creyentes, lo mismo que los humanistas, slo pueden resol-
ver por medio de una penosa investigacin de una marcha titubeante en el seno de situaciones histricas
movibles (Schillebeeckx, 1968: 73).
72
Es lo que Rovira Belloso (2000: 172-188) llama la mediacin socio-analtica de la teologa, que
explica con detalle, asumiendo algunas posturas, matizando otras y rechazando otras, pero todo ello desde
una palabra muy agradecida y honesta hacia aquellos que han defendido esta mediacin desde la Teolo-
ga de la Liberacin, con sus limitaciones y errores, pero con honestidad y radicalidad evanglica.
73
Por supuesto, esta desigualdad social se reproduca en el interior de la Iglesia y quedaba justifi-
cada del mismo modo. Tras el Concilio Vaticano II (en el que la eclesiologa del Pueblo de Dios est en el
centro, frente a lo autoritario y lo jurdico de la eclesiologa pre-conciliar de raigambre tridentina) pala-
bras como las siguientes de Po X daan los odos: La Iglesia es, por su propia esencia, una sociedad desi-
gual, es decir una sociedad que incluye a dos categoras de personas: los pastores y el rebao, los que ocu-
pan en un rango de diferentes grados de la jerarqua y la multitud de los fieles. Y estas categoras son de
tal forma distintas entre s, que nicamente en la Jerarqua reside el derecho y la autoridad necesarias para
promover y dirigir a todos los miembros al fin de la sociedad. En cuanto al pueblo, no tiene otro derecho
que el de dejarse conducir y, como rebao fiel, seguir dcilmente a sus pastores (cursivas mas).

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1078 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

rreccin de Cristo 74. Por ello, en la tradicin bblica (tanto veterotestamentaria como
neotestamentaria) existe una tensin permanente y constitutiva entre liberacin (hist-
rica) y salvacin (escatolgica). Tensin que se manifiesta justamente en el anuncio del
Reino, que es a la vez una realidad histrica iniciada por el propio Jess, pero que solo
conseguir consumacin escatolgica al fin de los tiempos. Pero en los textos bblicos
no se pretende una desvalorizacin de la liberacin frente a la salvacin, sino que ms
bien la liberacin que inaugura Cristo es el signo real de que nos est reservada una sal-
vacin definitiva escatolgica. La excesiva escatologizacin del Reino de Dios puede dar
lugar a una actitud pasiva frente al mundo, algo que no ocurri en Cristo, puesto que
l identifica los signos de ese Reino futuro con signos que l ya estaba haciendo pre-
sente en la tierra 75.
A este respecto, el segundo punto a considerar es la escatologa, pero slo desde un
ngulo que interesa aqu especialmente para poner de manifiesto la riqueza teolgica de
una metafsica del devenir: me refiero especialmente al tema de en qu consistir la vida
eterna: en una contemplacin intelectual esttica o en una vida amorosa y voluntarista
dinmica. Filosficamente, desde el mundo griego ya se plante esta cuestin y se desa-
rroll a lo largo de toda la historia de la filosofa occidental. Y lo ms curioso es que las
respuestas teolgicas concretas (que carecen todas ellas de carcter apodctico) que se
han dado han tenido como apoyatura terica una concreta metafsica: bien la del pri-
mado del intelecto (normalmente vinculadas a metafsicas ms estticas y fijistas), bien
la del primado de la voluntad (las ms de las veces fundadas en metafsicas dinmicas y
no-fijistas). As, es conocida la absoluta preeminencia que concede el mundo griego al
conocimiento y al intelecto frente a la voluntad. Esto es lo que explica que la escatolo-
ga griega siempre est atravesada por la afirmacin de la posesin intelectual de las ver-
dades eternas, y por ello: todo el sentido de la vida, toda verdadera aspiracin inteli-
gente se reduce esencialmente a la tranquila posesin del conocimiento del ser, en tanto
que no hay para el hombre dicha tan alta, ventura tan profunda como la posesin de
las formas eternas en el puro conocimiento racional (Heimsoeth, 1974: 205). Este modo
de ver las cosas alcanza su cima en el neoplatonismo de Plotino. No obstante, con la apa-
ricin del cristianismo comienza a decaer el optimismo intelectualista y surge con fuer-
za un nuevo modo de comprender las relaciones de la voluntad con el intelecto. Pero a
pesar de los esfuerzos de la patrstica, en la mayora de los casos se sigue bajo el prima-
do del intelecto como ocurra en el mundo griego. Y no ser hasta Agustn que el pri-
mado de la voluntad adquiera peso terico especfico, aunque tambin l caer en la rbi-
ta de la escatologa griega: Pero la coronacin de todo es tambin en San Agustn el
ideal antiguo de la pura contemplacin. Por encima de la dicha de la unin voluntaria,
de la comunin con el amor eterno, la escatologa de San Agustn aspira al estado de
reposo y anegacin en la eterna verdad y belleza (Ibd.: 213). En cualquier caso, la
influencia de Agustn ser decisiva y sus ideas influirn en Escoto Ergena, San Ansel-
mo y Abelardo, aunque todos ellos terminaban por ceder al peso de la influencia griega

74
No conozco libro ms liberador para los cristianos que nos sentamos contrariados con esa teo-
loga que estaba ya tan asentada en la sociedad, que el de JOS MARA CASTILLO, Espiritualidad para insatis-
fechos (2007), donde el soplo del Espritu es agraciante, liberador, feliz y humano, y apuesta siempre por
la vida.
75
Por eso puede resultar peligrosa una lectura unilateral del siguiente prrafo de Blondel (1966: 193):
siempre estamos dispuestos a calcular para maana el reino de Dios en la tierra; ilusin carnal que es nece-
sario evitar a todo trance, porque engendra impaciencia y violencia, decepcin y desaliento, por no decir
abdicacin y traicin. El filsofo francs parece olvidar las contrapartidas: miseria y explotacin, desespe-
ranza y sufrimiento, resignacin y opresin, utopa y fidelidad al proyecto humanizador de Cristo.

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aristotlica o neoplatnica, sistemas en los que el nus es predominante. En este sentido,


la escolstica de Alberto y Toms de Aquino, por su aristotelismo, cerraron filas en torno
a la primaca del intelecto y desarrollaron escatologas de pura contemplacin esttica 76.
Ser la escuela franciscana, por oposicin al tomismo, los que volvern a rescatar las
reflexiones agustinianas acerca de la voluntad; impulso que se desarrollar de modo para-
digmtico en Duns Escoto, quien se alejar tanto de Plotino y el neoplatonismo como de
Aristteles: Consecuentemente ya no se busca la bienaventuranza en la contemplacin
de Dios y las ideas divinas. [] Ni el concepto ni el conocimiento intuitivo traen la ver-
dadera unin con Dios, como cree Santo Toms, sino que sta reside ante todo en la
voluntad y en el amor. [] Por el amor nos unimos del modo ms inmediato y ms per-
fecto con Dios (Ibd.: 223). La influencia escotista se extiende hasta Eckhart, el Cusano
y Descartes, aunque con fluctuaciones. Y a travs de una larga marcha, llega hasta Kant,
pero magistralmente se desarrolla en Fichte, quien une precisamente su metafsica di-
nmica con un voluntarismo que se despliega necesariamente hasta la escatologa: La
bienaventuranza de la vida espiritual no es la de anegarse un da en la eterna contem-
placin, sino la viva actividad de la misma voluntad moral; es la bienaventuranza de la
voluntad humana, que se una verdaderamente con Dios, que se confunda con la misma
voluntad infinita (Ibd.: 244).
Evidentemente, se puede afirmar que la respuesta teolgica concreta que se d den-
tro de este debate intelectualismo-voluntarismo, estar condicionada por la sensibilidad
filosfica de cada telogo. No obstante, nos parece mucho ms adecuada con una meta-
fsica del devenir, una escatologa ms dinmica, que considera la consumacin escato-
lgica no como una pasividad intelectiva, sino como un profundizamiento amoroso
(nunca pleno) en la vida de Dios, que tampoco es esttica, sino abrazo creadoramente
amoroso; o como dice Martn Velasco (1978: 121): La salvacin es la realizacin de la
relacin con esa realidad que vale y da sentido, que es y se justifica por s misma, que es
y es plenamente digna de ser. Y esto no nos parece banal, puesto que adems arroja una
igualmente ms dinmica y, por qu no decirlo, ms amorosa y fiel a la imagen del
Dios amor de Jess de Nazaret, concepcin de esa fiesta casi segura (Gonzlez-Car-
vajal, 1989: 263) que ser el Juicio escatolgico, no como un s o no que Dios nos lanza
como ultimtum en una suerte de nico da del Juicio, sino como un Juicio en s mismo
dinmico. Polkinghorne (2007a: 248) es quien desde mi punto de vista ha visto esto de
modo insuperable y con una enorme sensibilidad teolgica, por eso nos extendemos en
la cita:
Es muy necesario que la teologa cristiana recupere un concepto de purgatorio cre-
ble y desmitologizado, si ha de ser capaz de hablar del Dios misericordioso que acta
en los procesos, y no de forma mgica. Si lo que he dicho es verdadero, de ello se dedu-
ce que no puede existir una especie de cortina que baja en el momento de la muerte,
dividiendo irreversiblemente a la humanidad en dos clases, la de los salvados y la de los
condenados. El que Dios ofrezca amorosamente misericordia, no puede ser solamente
durante el periodo de nuestra vida terrena, de forma que sea suprimida despus de sesen-
ta o setenta aos. Aqu est la respuesta a la perplejidad sobre cul ser el destino de los
que, por una u otra razn, nunca se han encontrado verdaderamente con las reivindi-
caciones y las promesas del evangelio. Decir esto no es disminuir nuestra responsabili-

76
La felicidad, segn Santo Toms, no descansa en el acto de la voluntad. Esta, en efecto, no puede
ser nuestro fin, pues tiende siempre a lo querido, mientras por otra parte todo ser halla su descanso ni-
camente en el fin. Solo el intelecto proporciona el ltimo fin y la dicha de la posesin perfecta. Ultima
hominis salus est ut secundum intellectivam partem perficiatur contemplatione virtutis purae (Heimsoeth,
1974: 216).

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1080 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

dad a la hora de dar testimonio del evangelio, ya que sta proviene simplemente de nues-
tra obligacin de testificar la verdad tal como la hemos encontrado. Ni tampoco es dis-
minuir la importancia de las decisiones que tomamos en esta vida. Cada alejamiento de
Dios har que el camino de vuelta sea ms duro. [] Pero habr quienes rechacen el
perdn y la purificacin divinos para siempre, o al final se salvarn todos (incluso Hitler
y Stalin)? [] No puedo creer que Dios extinguir para siempre su ofrecimiento amo-
roso de misericordia, pero tampoco creo que har caso omiso de que la libertad huma-
na le rechace.

5. EPLOGO: APOLOGA DE LA IMAGINACIN CREADORA Y DE LA LIBRE INTREPIDEZ INTELECTUAL

El cristianismo no tiene esencia, tiene entraa (Gonzlez de Cardedal, 1997) y


lo entraable es de por s dinmico e histrico, porque se trata del amor y el seguimien-
to esperanzado a una persona que es Dios mismo en su comunicacin dentro del mundo,
y no de la asuncin pasiva de dogmas y verdades: la esperanza expresa el aspecto din-
mico de la fe, por cuanto el mensaje que recibimos no es la revelacin de una verdad abs-
tracta en la que hay que creer, sino la revelacin de una persona, que es camino y causa
de salvacin (Vanhoye, 1999: 249) 77. En este sentido, y parafraseando la insuperable
definicin blondeliana de la filosofa 78, la teologa ser la misma fe tomando concien-
cia y direccin de s misma. Por eso, la teologa es necesariamente dinamismo reflexi-
vo puro, y no anquilosamiento doctrinal.
Con esto, es importante para la actividad intelectual en general, y para el caso con-
creto de la teologa en particular, hacer una apologa de la libre intrepidez intelectual y
de la imaginacin creadora. Es fundamental comprender que la teologa necesita de savia
nueva y de una reformulacin importante que la site a la altura de los tiempos, puesto
que tanto la metafsica como las ciencias cambian constantemente 79, y as tambin la
teologa. Porque la fidelidad, es siempre una fidelidad creadora y no angostada en las
estructuras intelectuales pasadas. En el cristianismo la tradicin siempre ha distingui-
do entre el depositum fidei (que exige adhesin por proceder de la revelacin) y las arti-
culaciones concretas que filosfica o culturalmente las implementan y dan forma. Por
eso, son muchas las voces que estn exigiendo nuevas formulas teolgicas y nuevas estruc-
turas eclesiales que hagan ms creble y comprensible el mensaje evanglico para las
mujeres y los hombres de hoy 80. Por supuesto, estamos de acuerdo con el joven telogo
Cordovilla (2007: 184) cuando afirma: A un verdadero telogo no le es suficiente ni una
ortodoxia formal, que repite sin argumentar ni preguntarse por sus razones ltimas aque-
llas afirmaciones que realiza el magisterio, ni una heterodoxia estril, que da la impre-
sin de estar motivada por la necesidad de mostrar fidelidad a modas o grupos de pre-

77
El cristianismo se comprende no como un sistema arquitectnico de verdades salvficas, sino
como la comunicacin de la vida divina dentro del mundo (Boff, 1993).
78
[La filosofa] ser la misma vida tomando conciencia y direccin de s misma [] (Blondel,
1967: 56).
79
Nous avons tendance en effet parler de la science et de la philosophie en gnral comme des-
sences immuables et ternelles. Or, le fait est quelles sont en changement constant et par suite que le
problme de leurs rapports change sans cesse de forme. Il nest plus ce quil tait au temps dAristote, pas
mme ce quil tait il y a cinquante ans. Il sera autre demain (Jolivet, 1958: 61).
80
Todo parece indicar que entre el arcaico mundo greco-escolstico y el moderno mundo de la cien-
cia, la cultura y las sociedades modernas media una enorme distancia. Lo sensato es pensar que ha llega-
do ya para la Iglesia catlica el momento de cambiar de paradigma: es mucho pedir despus de veinte
siglos de persistencia en el paradigma griego? (Monserrat, 2005: 267 y 268).

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J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA 1081

sin social y que no cuestiona crticamente las consecuencias de sus propias afirmacio-
nes. Ahora bien, cul es la instancia capaz de juzgar que un determinado movimiento
filosfico o teolgico o una exigencia social mayoritaria de una sociedad democrtica es
simplemente una moda y no un verdadero y necesario cambio de paradigma? En este
sentido, el magisterio no tiene ni legitimidad eclesial ni autoridad cientfica para pro-
nunciarse al respecto. De hecho, debera ser la propia comunidad cientfica la que esta-
blezca los criterios de validacin internos que permitan discernir el valor de las nuevas
propuestas teolgicas y filosficas. No puede existir una instancia carismtica que, fuera
del circuito cientfico, pretenda constituirse en criterio ltimo y supremo de las nuevas
reformulaciones teolgicas, puesto que no se trata de discutir acerca del depositum fidei,
sino de la creacin de nuevos lenguajes, formulas y categoras intelectuales que permi-
tan la comprensin del evangelio en nuevos universos simblicos. A este respecto, no
debe olvidarse la afirmacin del ahora cardenal Walter Kasper, en su Introduccin a la
fe: No hay a penas un solo descubrimiento cientfico importante y moderno que no haya
sido condenado o mirado con recelo en alguna ocasin por una u otra de las Iglesias.
Y, por supuesto, no slo novedades en el campo de las ciencias fsico-naturales, sino tam-
bin y sobre todo en la metafsica, en las ciencias humanas y en la propia teologa. Por
este motivo, no se puede ocultar la inevitable tensin que este hecho produce entre la
teologa y el magisterio, y que muchos telogos tratan de maquillar con bonitas dialc-
ticas verbales 81, pero que dejan intacto el problema. Porque ocurre que se est haciendo
tan duro vivir realmente la eclesialidad propia de la teologa y del telogo, que cada vez
ms los telogos viven en una suerte de mundo interior de ostracismo por miedo a las
condenas y las censuras oficiales, y slo algunos pocos deciden hacer pblico su disen-
so, mientras que la mayora comienzan a perder precisamente esa necesaria insercin
de la ejercitacin teolgica dentro de la Iglesia, viviendo esquizofrnicamente, con opi-
niones propias silenciadas y con manifestaciones externas falseadas, en un doloroso
mundo interior 82. De ah que muchos tengamos la intuicin fundada de que cada vez
ms se repite aquello que C. G. Valls contaba en su Querida Iglesia (citado en Moral,
2007: 398), acerca de la tpica situacin de un profesor de teologa: Yo digo una cosa
en los apuntes fotocopiados que van a Roma. Otra cosa en clase donde la palabra habla-
da nunca compromete tanto como la escrita. Otra en pequeos grupos con mayor fami-
liaridad y confianza. Y otra al fin al hablar de t a t con amigos Cuatro niveles de una
sola verdad. Me mortifica, pero no me queda otro remedio si quiero subsistir. Y todos
hacemos lo mismo. Esta situacin no deja de ser absurdamente inhumana y anti-evan-
glica. No hay aqu un la verdad os har libres, sino ms bien la necesidad de ocultar
los nuevos pensamientos teolgicos con la nica intencin de subsistir dentro de la ofi-
cialidad y, ms an, de dar una falsa impresin de homogeneidad doctrinal y teolgica.
Sea lo que fuere de ello, lo cierto es que el cristianismo necesita urgentemente refor-
mular su mensaje dentro de los universos simblicos modernos. Del mismo modo que
la metafsica del siglo XX se alej y rechaz las grandes construcciones deductivas y a priori
que pretendan dar cuenta de toda la realidad de una vez por todas, as tambin la teo-

81
Me parece que sin tener que recurrir a otros autores que a muchos les pareceran sospechosos,
una buena aproximacin valiente y sin maquillajes, es la que hace Rovira Belloso en el Manual de la BAC
(2000: 274-291, El telogo en la Iglesia y ante el magisterio).
82
Son muchos los ejemplos que tenemos de esta situacin penosa de dolor y sufrimiento de telo-
gos y filsofos que han sufrido y sufren el desgarro interior producido por la incomprensin por parte de
las burocracias eclesiales. Para evitar citar a autores modernos, slo citar el caso paradigmtico de Con-
gar como telogo (2004) y de Zubiri como filsofo (sobre todo, por la crisis modernista) (Corominas y
Vicens, 2006).

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1082 J. ROMERO, LA REFORMULACIN DE LA DOGMTICA TEOLGICA

loga tiene que ser capaz de caminar desde abajo y en comunin con las mujeres y hom-
bres de su tiempo, escapando a visiones totalizadoras que niegan que pueda haber algo
nuevo bajo el sol. Y, sobre todo, desde la humildad y la conciencia de que nadie es po-
seedor absoluto de la verdad, y que el pluralismo y la relatividad de nuestros conoci-
mientos, no son sinnimo de indiferentismo ni relativismo. Se impone la exigencia de
una imaginacin creadora, a travs de la cual los telogos estn en condiciones de poder
ensayar modos de responder a los retos intelectuales del presente, y dar cabida a len-
guajes y universos simblicos que sugieran ms que la metafsica griega. En este senti-
do, uno de mis grandes encuentros ha sido el libro de Gonzlez de Cardedal, Cuatro poe-
tas desde la otra ladera (1996), que con magistral pluma evoca una cristologa potica, y
desde mi punto de vista, mucho ms sugerente para el seguimiento dinmico y amoro-
so a Cristo, que los sesudos y estticos manuales de cristologa.
Pero todo ello debe hacerse desde la libre intrepidez intelectual del telogo que se arries-
ga, porque el telogo est llamado a consagrarse a la verdad y a la santidad de la inte-
ligencia. l tendr que estar dispuesto a arriesgar su carrera civil y eclesistica, el pres-
tigio social y meditico, en aras de la verdad. Una verdad que no es la suya y que nunca
pretender haberla alcanzado ya desde su inteligencia o su voluntad (Cordovilla, 2007:
98). Evidentemente, son muchos los telogos de la ciencia en los que se ana esta ima-
ginacin creadora con la libre intrepidez intelectual; pero ya dijimos que a menudo corren
el riesgo de que sus aportaciones queden reducidas a su propio mbito acadmico sin
repercusin eclesial. Tambin son muchos los filsofos y telogos sistemticos que estn
trabajando en esa reformulacin, y que en Espaa, por ejemplo, son conocidos por todos.
No obstante, quisiera simplemente citar por ser menos conocido, el ltimo y reciente
libro del salesiano Jos Luis Moral (2007), cuyo ttulo es significativo: Ciudadanos y cris-
tianos. Reconstruccin de la Teologa Pastoral como Teologa de las Praxis Cristiana, que
es un valiente esfuerzo por hablar sin tapujos de la difcil situacin actual de la teologa
y su necesaria reconstruccin (nosotros hemos hablado de reformulacin) desde un nuevo
paradigma, y sobre todo de poner de manifiesto que la recepcin del Concilio Vatica-
no II ha quedado truncada. Este libro, a pesar de no haber sido citado en este trabajo
con la profusin que debera, ha sido el impulso ltimo para poner yo en palabra escri-
ta mi deseo de una verdadera reformulacin de la teologa, en mi caso, desde la metaf-
sica del devenir.
Pero todo esto no son ms que simples propuestas, y ninguno de los que pretende-
mos esta renovacin, exigimos absolutez ni definitividad a nuestros planteamientos. Sino
que justamente por asumir la historicidad, el devenir, la fluidez y el dinamismo inhe-
rente a la realidad creada, apostamos por una continua reconstruccin y profundizacin
teolgica y filosfica, pero siempre hecha desde los universos simblicos comprensibles
para la humanidad de nuestro tiempo. Eso s, hace mucho que algunos tenemos claro
que todo conocimiento (y especialmente el teolgico) tiene que estar al servicio de la libe-
racin de las personas, de la construccin de un mundo ms justo, de denuncia de las
estructuras injustas y opresoras. A nosotros nos impact mucho leer recientemente la
afirmacin que el fallecido socilogo y telogo Hugo Assmann escribiera hace ms de
treinta aos:
Si la situacin histrica de dependencia y dominacin de dos tercios de la huma-
nidad, con sus treinta millones anuales de muertos de hambre y desnutricin, no se con-
vierte en el punto de partida de cualquier teologa cristiana hoy, aun en los pases ricos
y dominadores, la teologa no podr situar y concretar histricamente sus temas fun-
damentales. Sus preguntas no sern preguntas reales. Pasarn al lado del hombre real
Por eso, como observaba un participante del encuentro de Buenos Aires, es necesario

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salvar a la teologa de su cinismo. Porque realmente frente a los problemas del mundo
de hoy muchos escritos de teologa se reducen al cinismo.

Creemos sinceramente que el conocimiento profundo de la realidad es una va para


hacer que otro mundo sea posible. Una teologa ms fundada en el devenir y la histori-
cidad como la aqu propuesta en unin con esa ontologa de la fluidez social nos
parece mucho ms adecuada para dar respuesta a los problemas sociales y humanos que
una teologa encerrada en s misma y basada en paradigmas estticos, fijistas y preocu-
pados por el orden y la ley natural transhistrica. Necesitamos desnaturalizar las
realidades sociales y las articulaciones filosficas que dan forma el depositum fidei, para
poner la teologa y el evangelio al servicio de la vida, la felicidad y la libertad de las per-
sonas. Y si no lo hemos conseguido en este artculo, ser mejor que tanto lector como
autor olviden para siempre lo dicho aqu y busquen nuevas vas ms humanas y justas.

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c/ Barrionuevo, 5 - 1. izda. JESS ROMERO MOIVAS


28011 Madrid
jesromtel@yahoo.es

[Artculo aprobado para publicacin en abril de 2008]

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PERFILES EN CIENCIA Y RELIGIN


PROFILES IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION

MATHEMATICAL MODELS BEYOND SPACE AND TIME


Michael Heller reflects on the big questions of cosmology

JAVIER MONSERRAT
Universidad Autnoma de Madrid

The winner of the Templeton Prize 2008 was announced during a press conference at
the United Nations Church Centre in New York on 17 March this year. The Prize was
awarded to Michael Heller for his work over more than forty years and his shrewd and
often surprising insights regarding our concepts of the origin and cause of the universe.
Heller is a professor of philosophy, although he trained in the fields of mathematics, physics
and cosmology, as well as in philosophy and theology. His contributions pertain, in many
senses, strictly to the field of physics, although they are theoretical rather than experimental.
Indeed, they are more proposals of speculative mathematical-formal models and have been
published in many prestigious international physics journals. But the heart of Hellers
concerns always points towards the philosophy or metaphysics of the universe, where the
fundaments of reality relate the ontological roots of the universe to the ontology of the
Divinity and the act of creation. One may or may not agree with Hellers speculations, may
view them as more or less plausible and consider their formal construction to be either
laudable or poor, but anyone who reads his work cannot help but gain the impression of
following the arguments and affirmations of an extraordinarily well-informed, precise and
deep-thinking physicist-philosopher.

One significant circumstance in Hellers life was his relationship with Pope John Paul II, which
was established even before Cardinal Karol Wojtyla acceded to the pontificate. In private meetings
with Heller and other Polish scientists, John Paul II often reflected on the implications of key scientific
questions on theology. It seems (since officially, we can obviously affirm nothing) that Heller is the
author of the letter John Paul II sent in 1996 to George Coyne, the then director of the Vatican
Observatory. This letter, later published on the STR Chair website, is one of the most explicit and
open theological documents ever signed by John Paul II. In it, the Pope echoed the need for a theory
inspired in the world of science, just as a theology inspired in Aristotles teachings was developed
during the Middle Ages.

MICHAEL HELLERS CURRICULUM VITAE

Michael Heller is a professor of philosophy at the Pontifical Academy of Theology in Krakow.


He graduated in theology from the Catholic University of Lublin and was ordained in 1959. He
returned to university in 1960, earning a Masters degree in philosophy in 1965, with a dissertation
on the theory of relativity, followed by a PhD in cosmology with a thesis on relativist cosmology.
Although his studies focused on theoretical physics, he nevertheless earned his degree in philosophy
because during the communist era, the Catholic university lacked the authority to bestow degrees
in physics. In 1969, Heller earned a post-doctorate degree which authorised him to begin lecturing.
Again, his thesis focused on Machs principle in relativist cosmology.

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He was not granted a passport until 1977. Once he was free to leave the country, he was appointed
visiting professor at the Catholic University of Louvains Institute of Astrophysics and Geophysics,
in Belgium, and also carried out research at the Oxford University Institute of Astrophysics and the
physics and astronomy department of the University of Leicester. In 1985 he joined the teaching staff
of the Pontifical Academy of Theology in Krakow, where he has engaged in a wide range of teaching
activities over the last twenty years.
In 1986 he began collaborating with the Vatican Observatory in Castel Gandolfo, where he worked
with the Jesuits George Coyne and William Stoeger, repeatedly mentioned in trends of religions. He
also made contact with the Vatican Observatory Research Group at the Steward Observatory at the
University of Arizona, Tucson, and is the co-author of a book with Coyne. Some of his other works
in English were also published by the Vatican Observatory.
Hellers biography reflects the dramatic nature of the tormented history of 20th century Europe.
His father, an engineer by profession, sabotaged the chemical facility in which he worked in order
to prevent it from being used by the German troops during the Second World War. Fleeing from
repercussions, the family lived in Ukraine, Siberia and Southern Russia, before finally returning to
Poland. Hellers decision to devote his life to science was frustrated and severely limited for decades
due to the oppression of the communist regime. Only the protection of the Polish Church enabled
him to pursue his scientific and philosophical vocation, which recently culminated in his being
awarded the Templeton Prize.

PUBLICATIONS

The statement issued by the Templeton Foundation accompanying the announcement of the 2008
prize-winner described Hellers oeuvre as prodigious, encompassing thirty books (some in English,
the majority in Polish) and around 400 papers, consisting of both research and, mainly, dissemination.
Here, we will refer to the four books in English that, for now at least, provide a feasible point of access
for getting to know the work of this great academic.
Theoretical Foundations of Cosmology (World Scientific, 1992) is a technical cosmological work
examining the mathematical models which underpin theoretical physics and cosmology. In Some
Mathematical Physics for Philosophers (Pontifical Council for Culture, Gregorian University, 2005),
Heller provides philosophers with a structuralist vision of the theory of relativity and quantum
mechanics.
His other two English-language works relate both new physics and cosmology with the question
of God, religion and theology. These works are: The New Physics and a New Theology (Vatican
Observatory Publications, 1996) and also Creative Tension: Essays on Science and Religion (Templeton
Foundation Press, 2003). We will base our overview of Hellers personality and work on both these
two books and the documentation included on the website templetonprize.org, about the author.

A STRUCTURALIST CONCEPTION OF PHYSICS

People often say that physics is a science of matter or of the material world, but while most
books on theoretical physics contain lots of mathematics, few mention anything about matter. This
is because physics develops by constructing mathematical models of the world and then by confronting
them with empirical results. One may say that the world, as viewed by modern physics, is constructed
not out of matter but rather out of mathematics. But mathematics is a science of structures.
Of course, mathematics deals also with much more complex structures, for instance, vector
spaces, algebras, Euclidean or Riemannian spaces and so on. And physicists take some of these
structures and interpret them as structures of the world. For instance, they say that the space-time
of our world is a four-dimensional Riemannian space. This is a very powerful method; it sees the
world through the glasses of structures. In this sense, physics is not a science of matter but rather
a science of structures. This view is called structuralist philosophy of physics. I not only develop it
in my philosophical papers, but also try to do science and teach it in the spirit of this philosophy
(Heller, Reflections on Key Books and Publications, templetonprize.org).

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Here we see with absolute clarity the perspective that enables us to assess the nature and meaning
of Hellers physical-philosophical thought: his analysis and understanding of physical theories of
matter and the universe is always a reflection on the mathematical models applied to provide an
ontological view of reality. This structuralist approach to scientific theories is not something unique
to Heller, but rather has a long history in the epistemology of science. We need go no further than
empiriocriticism, Pierre Duhem or Poincar, or Wolfgang Stegmller in the nineteen-seventies.
However, it is an approach that was assimilated by Heller, and which illuminates his way of probing
the philosophical problems of physics.
His early studies, focusing mainly on the theory of relativity, provided him with access to an
example of structuralism: Einsteins relativity identified using Riemannian geometries which enabled
him to make the world fit and describe it. Prompted by the mathematical logic of relativist models,
Heller began exploring the issue of singularities (anticipated in the mathematical form of the relativist
model). However, when reason reaches the limits of Plancks era and attempts to cross Plancks
threshold in time and space (1033 cm), entering the original limits of the singularity in which the
big bang occurred, the question arises as to the type of real situation in which all this was possible.
And asking about a real situation is, in physics, the same as asking about the mathematical (structural)
models which enable us to understand it.

MATHEMATICAL MODELS FOR THE ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSE

The question is then, what type of physical situation existed in Plancks era, from which our real
world emerged. This, as it is accessible to us now, corresponds on the one hand to the classical-
relativist mechanics (macrocosmos) encompassed in a Riemannian geometric mathematical model,
and on the other to the quantum mechanics (microcosmos) encompassed in a non-geometrical
mathematical model (Hilbert space), with primordially statistical and probabilistic traits. In ordinary
physics, relativity and quantum mechanics have both become parallel correct explanatory dimensions
of the macroscopic and microphysical (respectively) physical reality.
However, when entering Plancks era, both relativist and quantum perspectives necessarily become
confused, since there is no physical reality that can be known by either of these approaches. The only
physical theory capable then of responding to the situation existing in Plancks era must be quantum-
relativist; hence the vital importance of current research into quantum gravity. As Heller observes,
the problem of this quantum-relativist merging is that the mathematical model of relativity is geometric,
while the quantum model is not. Hence the difficulty in finding a single conception that encompasses
mathematical models of different natures (relativist and quantum).
Some relativity theorists have in fact proposed diverse ways of explaining the geometrical nature
of the singularity (in physical terms, the big bang) and the birth of the relativist space-time until the
end of Plancks era. Heller offers an in-depth analysis of these different theoretical proposals. He does
not appear to study the superstring theory here in any great depth (although he doubtless does so in
other parts of his extensive oeuvre), but we should remember that Magic Theory is also a formal
mathematical speculation designed to explain, based on its eleven dimensions or variables, how our
space-time world emerged though Plancks era.
Here is where the fundamental idea provided by Heller fits in. It is an evidently speculative idea
(as indeed is the superstring theory) that suggests that in Plancks era, relativist and quantum approaches
may coincide and be understood from a higher level of abstraction represented by the mathematical
model of a non-commutative geometry. This new geometry, constructed recently by some authors,
is not a space-time geometry, but rather a space without points or seconds which would, according
to Heller, enable the emergence of both classic-relativist space-time and the special form of quantum
space-time.

METAPHYSICAL-THEOLOGICAL SPECULATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF COSMOLOGY

The primordial reality modelled by this non-commutative geometry would therefore be non-
local, non-temporal, on the sidelines of the space-time we know and dynamic, rather than static.

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There would be different states and operators between one state and another, but no space-time; in
other words, there would be a kind of superimposed simultaneity. In some way, in this primordial
reality modelled by the non-commutative geometry, in which the classical-relativist and quantum
worlds could be reconciled, many of the quantum properties to which we now have experimental
access though a series of observables would become valid.
It is clear that Heller likes this idea, since as a theologian and someone engaging in a moment
of second order speculation, this model seems to suggest certain parallels with the idea of a God
existing beyond the space-time which is, nevertheless, dynamic. This God would not be eternal (i.e.
with infinite time), but rather simply something different, non-temporal, existing beyond the space-
time, where the superimposition of states and simultaneity would prevail.
Furthermore, the idea of God suggested by this non-commutative geometry is used by Heller
to discuss some of the principles of process theology (Whitehead), namely, the idea of God as a non-
creator Demiurge subjected to the space-time of the real classical world. For Heller, it is erroneous
to claim that God should be subject to the space-time in order to be a dynamic, living God, connected
to the events of the world. The non-commutative geometry model enables him to conceive a type of
reality outside the space-time, which is nevertheless dynamic. In this sense, the model proposed by
Heller responds more to the traditional idea of a transcendent God who is also the creative origin,
the fundament of being, out of whom the space-time of the created world emerges.
We should not forget that there is also another speculative aspect regarding the ultimate origins
and foundations of the physical reality. We talk of a singularity (within the framework of the
mathematical model of relativity) which translated into a real big bang that actually occurred as a
physical event. But, what existed before the big bang? Today, there is much debate and speculation
around the idea that the singularity of our universe is just one of an infinite number of singularities
occurring in a meta-space or eternal fundamental universe constituted perhaps by a quantum
vacuum, by a sea of energy, by Bohms implicate order or by a primordial ether (although not in
the Newtonian sense) from which infinite multiverses are generated. In each of these scenarios,
the emerging universe responds to a set of values in keeping with the structure of variables conceived
(also using speculative-mathematical methods) by the superstring theory.
Heller is obviously opposed to these speculations about multiverses and string theory. He proposes
instead an alternative speculation which he believes is more realistic and, in his opinion, more in
keeping with theology: his speculation deals with a universe which, in moving towards its primordial
foundations, transforms into a non-space-time dimension which ends up connecting to the transcendent
reality of an atemporal God beyond any possible geometric singularities and the big bang.

NON-COMMUTATIVE GEOMETRY FOR A THEIST PHILOSOPHY

According to Heller, we can speculate that, rather than an artificial instrument used in relation to
classic singularities in general relativity, non-commutative geometry is, in fact, something which reflects
the structure of the era of quantum gravity. The fact that the operators in Hilbert space (the typical
mathematical objects of quantum mechanics) respond to the true essence of a non-commutative description
of singularities may suggest that said singularities have a certain knowledge of quantum effects. The
tempting hypothesis is that the era of quantum gravity exists under Plancks threshold, modelled by a
non-commutative geometry and, as a result, absolutely non-local. In this era there is neither space nor
time in the usual sense. Only when the universe passes over Plancks threshold is there a transition phase
to commutative geometry, and it is during this transition that ordinary space-time emerges, along with
its frontiers or singular limits (singularities) (Creative Tension, 92-93).
Singularities are formed during the transition process over Plancks threshold, when space-time
emerges from a non-commutative geometry. This process can be explained in the following way.
Normally, we think of Plancks era as something hidden in the prehistory of the universe, when its
typical scale was around 1033 cm. However, Plancks era can in fact be seen even now if we delve
deeper and deeper into the structure of the world, until we reach the 1033 cm threshold. Upon crossing
this threshold, we find ourselves in Plancks stratum, with its non-commutative regime. At this
basic level under Plancks scale, all states exist equally, and there is no difference between singular

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and non-singular ones. Only the macroscopic observer, located in space-time (and therefore beyond
Plancks threshold), can say that their universe began in a singularity in a finite past, and may
possibly finish in a final singularity in a finite future (Creative Tension, 93).
The non-commutative perspective provides a natural explanation for all non-local phenomena.
Since the fundamental level is totally non-local, it is hardly surprising that certain quantum phenomena
(such as the EPR experiment) that occur at this level have non-local effects; they are like the tip of the
iceberg of this non-local non-commutativity which remains present despite the transitional phase to
ordinary physics. In order to explain the horizon problem [the astrophysical fact that very distant parts
of the universe that have not had any physical contact nevertheless have exactly the same values for
certain parameters], Heller believes we should adopt a different approach and regard fundamental
non-commutativity as being located at the beginning, in the pre-Planck era. This hypothesis supposes
that this era was totally global; it would not, therefore, be at all surprising if, when passing over Plancks
threshold, the universe preserved certain global characteristics even in those places that never (after
Plancks threshold) came into causal contact with each other (Creative Tension, 115).
The second order speculative reflection (the first order one would be scientific only) is for Heller
the philosophical-metaphysical-theological one. It is here that the logic of his explanatory hypothesis
of the non-commutative geometry prompts him to reinterpret certain classic themes of philosophy-
theology, such as: the idea of time, or to be more precise, space-time, in God; the application of this
to the traditional idea of creation (continuous creation from eternity, as foreseen by Saint Thomas);
the concept of causality and the first cause; the way in which chance, probability and statistics can
be understood as elements of the creative design of a divinity beyond the space-time; the classic
themes of divine omnipotence and omniscience in the debate with process philosophy-theology
(Whitehead); and the classic theme of the meaning of the actions of God in the world, among others.

DOES THE UNIVERSE NEED A CAUSE?

In his acceptance statement for the Templeton Prize, Heller says:


When contemplating the universe, the question imposes itself: does the universe need to have
a cause? It is clear that causal explanations are a vital part of the scientific method. Various processes
in the universe can be displayed as a succession of states in such a way that the preceding state is
a cause of the succeeding one. If we look deeper at such processes, we see that there is always a
dynamical law prescribing how one state should generate another state. But dynamical laws are
expressed in the form of mathematical equations, and if we ask about the cause of the universe we
should ask about a cause of mathematical laws. By doing so we are back in the Great Blueprint of
Gods thinking the universe. The question on ultimate causality is translated into another of Leibnizs
questions: Why is there something rather than nothing? (from his Principles of Nature and Grace).
When asking this question, we are not asking about a cause like all other causes. We are asking
about the root of all possible causes.
Upon reading this text (and other similar ones by Heller), one has the impression that the author
admits the approach of classic Thomist metaphysics, i.e. that the explanation of the universe requires
a non mundane and necessary first cause, attributable only to God, since the need cannot be attributed
to the world. Only God, not the universe, can be understood as the root cause, as the fundament
of being, or in other words, as a necessary being: only God can be necessary.
Playing devils advocate, however, we may perhaps dare to make a few observations. 1) Science,
and also philosophical reason, base their thinking on a factual empirical world and strive to understand
its ability to be real, to be just as we experience it (the expectation of science and reason would be,
in principle, for the real system we see to be self-sufficient). 2) The problem with science/reason is
precisely that any understanding of this sufficiency is enigmatic: it can be attributed to a pure world
without a God (atheism) or to a God understood as a reality which transcends the universe (theism).
3) Regardless of whether we attribute this sufficiency to the universe or to a God, in both cases, it
should itself, eo ipso, be attributed the need. This would be the specific approach of science.
In other words, the need is something we should postulate, either for the universe or for God,
depending on whom we attribute the sufficiency of reality to. However, in neither case do we

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understand why its ontology makes it necessary. Returning to Leibnizs question, which Heller
mentions in the text quoted above, we cannot know why the universe exists or does not exist, or
why God exists or does not exist. The only thing reason and science can do is try to understand the
basis of the sufficiency of the universe that does in fact exist and which contains us, and eo ipso,
attribute the need to it.
This is exactly what Leo Smolin says in reference to Leibnizs question why is there something
rather than nothing?, in a text cited by Heller himself, in which he says that he does not really
understand how science, despite all its progress, can ever help us understand questions of this kind.
At the end of the day, perhaps room should be left for mysticism. However, mysticism is not
metaphysics, and this, he says, is all he is trying to eliminate (Creative Tension, 160).
Indeed, if reason could only attribute need to God, then the existence of God would be rationally
certain (in other words, it would be a metaphysical certainty as the Thomist school would say).
Atheism would not be feasible for reason. Is this what Heller thinks? The truth is that he seems
somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, we have texts like the one cited above. But on the other,
he also says that sciences greatest contribution to theology is the fact that it makes us understand
that the universe is a Mystery. And here, we wholeheartedly agree with him.
It is a mystery that some try to clarify with freely assumed atheist hypotheses. But it is also a
mystery susceptible to others, such as Heller, suggesting freely assumed possible hypotheses and
speculations that demonstrate the verisimilitude of the hypothesis that it was created by a personal
divine being, the fundament of being.

[Texto bsico publicado en Tendencias21.net, JAVIER MONSERRAT


por la Ctedra CTR, Escuela Tcnica Superior de Ingeniera,
Universidad Comillas, Madrid]

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ETHICAL AND SACRED RESPECT FOR NATURE


Rolstons ecological ethics in science, philosophy and theology

GUILLERMO ARMENGOL
Universidad Comillas de Madrid

Holmes Rolston III is an American philosopher who trained as a physicist and mathematician
and who has spent his academic life in the philosophy department of Colorado State University.
The son of a Presbyterian minister, he himself is also a pastor in the Presbyterian Church,
despite deciding to dedicate his life to academia. Although retired, he still remains intellectually
active. Among the many prizes and accolades he has won throughout his career, the Templeton
Prize in 2003 was the one which, without doubt, most served to popularise his name and work.

ROLSTON THE MAN

Holmes Rolston graduated in physics and mathematics from Davidson College, Charlotte, N.C.,
before studying theology at the Union Seminary in Virginia. Later, in 1958, he earned a PhD in
theology from Edinburgh University, Scotland, and finally, several years later, earned a second
doctorate in philosophy of science from Pittsburgh University. He was then invited to work at the
philosophy department of Colorado State University, where he was appointed a full professor in 1976.
His contributions were not always highly valued by the scientific community, and indeed, some of
his key manuscripts were initially rejected by important publishing houses. However, full recognition
arrived when he was invited to give the Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh in 1997-1998.
When examining Rolstons intellectual contribution to science, we should remember that he is
known as the father of environmental ethics. Rolston himself has observed that it turned out that the
direction in which I wanted to go, and in which I went for two decades, ended up being the direction
in which the world started to move. His work coincided with the rise of environmental issues, and in
this field he ended up becoming one of the most important authors of American philosophy.
For Rolston, the ethical discovery of nature is philosophical, but it is a philosophy that accepts
science and which is based on the intrinsic values of nature itself. Nevertheless, as a theologian,
Rolston has also described the theological logic that enables us to recognise not only the ethic value,
but also the sacred value of nature. Rolstons work then, merges, quite independently, the logic of
philosophy, which accepts and applies ethical rules to science and technology, and the logic of
theology, which projects onto nature the perspective of faith which accepts philosophy and science,
but which views nature with a kind of sacred respect which steers human behaviour towards new
ethical-ecological dimensions.

HIS WORK AND THE SCIENCE-RELIGION DEBATE

Rolston gained a certain level of recognition for the first time in 1975, when he published his
paper Is there an Ecological Ethic? The paper explored some of the ideas that Rolston has striven to
combat for years, namely the existence of a value-free nature, with no intrinsic value in itself, since
all ethical valuation depends always on a connection with humans. Rolston, on the other hand,
believes that natural ethics does not always depend on mankind.
Nature itself possesses ethical values that any ethical being (i.e. man) should respect for themselves,
regardless of their repercussions on human life. Soil, plants, animals, species and ecosystems hold,
for Rolston, a value in themselves, regardless of and separate from human issues. This value constitutes
ethical principles that impose themselves on human conduct.
Some of his most important works include Philosophy Gone Wild (1986), Environmental Ethics
(1988) and Conserving Natural Value (1994). In other works he explores the ethical-theological view
of the natural world, with this being his own individual contribution to the science-religion debate,
understood on the basis of the convergence of philosophy and theology in ecological ethics. Here,

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1094 G. ARMENGOL, ETHICAL AND SACRED RESPECT FOR NATURE

we will be looking at Science and Religion: A Critical Survey (1987) and Genes, Genesis and God
(1999), in connection with the Gifford Lectures of 1997-1998.
Rolston intuitively explains his approach to the debate on science and religion. Other approaches,
he says, have either based themselves on religion and tried to reach out to science, or have based
themselves on science and have tried to reach out to religion. However, they have always tried to
make peace between the warring parties. Rolston, on the other hand, aims to prompt both science
and religion to make their peace with nature, and to come together in nature itself.
Science has always seen nature as a medium, something neutral with no intrinsic ethical value;
for its part, monotheist theology has always seen nature as something fallen owing to human sin.
For Rolston, if both science and religion were to change their view of nature, they could also lessen
the secular gap that separates them, thus reaching a convergence between the philosophical ethics
of reason and the sacred ethics of theology.

A NATURALISED RELIGION: THE DIVINE EPIC OF LIFE

Rolston believes that religion should naturalise itself in that it should return to the sacred
experience of nature. For Rolston, all religious experience is a numinous experience of nature. This
experience may explain the prehistoric origin of religion, and is therefore the form that religious
experience has gradually taken in our genes (and which is in keeping with current empirical results
on the existence of what is today known as the mystic brain).
One must also get religion naturalised, not so much in the sense of explaining it (away)
naturalistically, as of explaining the numinous encounter with manifest nature. Biology does generate
religion: the phenomenon of life evokes a religious response whether or not a functional human
society is at issue. Nature is the first mystery to be encountered, and society comes later, much
later, after one learns evolutionary history (Genes, Genesis and God, Cambridge University Press,
1999, 294).
As human beings with mind, we are here and therefore need a unified recounting of the history
of the Earth that has brought us to where we are today.

A PROLIFIC EARTH

The first numinous experience of an ethical and sacred Earth is its fertility. The idea of a surprising,
fertile Earth that produces life. Fertility, Rolston says, is exactly what is evoked by religious faith.
The Earths prolific fertility, fruitfulness or generative capacity is what most needs to be explained
in the spectacular unfolding of life in which we ourselves are immersed. We should remember,
Rolston reminds us, that Natures root idea is that of giving birth (p. 226).
We need to explain the unfolding, the generative processes. We need to find out how possibilities
are updated, how spaces and deep sources of creativity become possible. In this genesis, more regularly
comes out of less. Sometimes, it even comes out of nothing; or in other words, out of somewhere
where nothing similar ever existed before. Information is superimposed onto matter and energy, as
the key to the vital regeneration of life. It is a pregnant Earth. We know the meaning of pregnant in
child-bearing women; it is the period during which life information is transferred via DNA from one
generation to another. However, we need to rethink where and how this information arises on Earth.
Virtually all biologists are religious, in the deepest sense of the term, even if it is a religion without
revelation. We discern something sublime, in the sense that it inspires awe, because there is something
sublime (in the etymological sense of the term), something which takes us to the limits of our
understanding, and mysteriously even beyond (p. 297).

NATURE, SIN, SUFFERING

In this prolific process of the Earth in which more seems to emerge from less, nature proceeds
unbendingly: it is the logic of the selfish gene in which progress towards life is built over death. If
this progress which tramples on the past is seen as a sin, then nature becomes prolific on the basis

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G. ARMENGOL, ETHICAL AND SACRED RESPECT FOR NATURE 1095

of sin. Making headway by cutting off others, aborting possibilities, in the midst of death, burdens
the dynamics of life with the weight of transgression or sin. This dramatic quality of moving forward
sinfully (in the widest sense of the term) on the basis of negation, is one of the unmistakable traits
of the natural world.
However, in beings endowed with sensibility, this move forward also occurs in the midst of
suffering. History, Rolston says, is the history of the evolution of suffering. Genes do not suffer;
organisms with genes do not need to suffer, but those with neurons do. Life is unquestionably prolific,
and is therefore as undeniably pathetic (from the Greek pathos) as if its logic were exactly that of
pathos. Fertility is closely linked to struggle (p. 303).
Suffering, Rolston believes, is a torturous fact, but the first thing we learn is that suffering is
the downside of sentience, the sentient experience, consciousness, pleasure, intention, all excitation
of subjectivity that is so strangely generated from pure objectivity. Rocks, he says, do not suffer, but
the substratum of the rocks has organised itself into animals whose experience produces pain and
pleasure, and into men whose existence includes anxiety and affliction (p. 303).
Not only because of this dramatic quality of moving forward in sin through negation, but also
because of its progress through the affliction of suffering, nature is prolific and creates life along a
dramatic road that Rolston describes as cruciform, alluding to both the cross, the essence of
Christianity, and to the core of the experience of other religious traditions, such as Buddhism.

NATURE AND SUPERNATURE

Man forms part of nature through his experience of existing in a prolific nature. This fertility is
so great that it seems to give the false impression that, in its advance, nature becomes supernature,
as if it were beyond itself, or as if more had emerged from less. Rolston defends an emergence in
which the natural dynamics produce new ways of being (which lead to the human spirit); but this
process towards more is always based on previous stages, and at the end of the day, on matter-
energy. The future (more, supernatural) is possible because it already existed in the past-present
(less, natural).
According to Rolston, believing in God is, for many, like putting the supernatural beyond the
natural. But no theory can establish a complementary link between God and nature while an
unresolved dualism exists between the natural and the supernatural (Science and Religion. A Critical
Survey, p. 298). Everything is in everything. In this sense, the dignity of the spirit already exists in
the nature of matter-energy. Thus, the ethical discourse for respecting human dignity and autonomy
is, at this level, the same ethical discourse for respecting the dignity and autonomy of natural
processes.
However, at the end of the day, Rolston also offers a religious interpretation of the process which
constitutes an even more powerful foundation for ecological ethics. God is the ultimate supernatural
conclusion, but at the same time, the origin of the whole process, the foundation existing in nature.
All this has an unmistakable Teilhardian flavour based on the concepts of alpha and omega. Indeed,
Teilhard is continually present in Rolstons work.
God is, at a certain level and order of magnitude, beyond the states of quantum superimposition,
beyond the ambital ether of space-time and beyond the anthropic order. God is the supernature from
which nature is frozen. In this sense, God as a fundament comes before what comes after matter,
life, mind, spirit and becomes gradually manifest (by being omnipresent) in the superb evolutionary
sequence in which more and more supernature emerges in nature.
According to Rolston, the universe and the Earth are both God in the form of history. The form
of an explanation of this kind would be more fitting for nature than the best scientific explanations
based on mere laws. It could reach the level of our senses which goes beyond pure cause. It could
reach the sense of the Presence of God, of the Divine You existing in the mundane That (p. 305).
Rolston then, believes that the coherent image of God from the perspective of science is that of
a panentheist God, compatible with orthodox Christianity, which constitutes the non-local
background of the universe and produces nature through creation. Thus, spiritual (supernatural)
divine ontology would emerge through the evolutionary process right up to the appearance of man.

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1096 G. ARMENGOL, ETHICAL AND SACRED RESPECT FOR NATURE

THE PRESENCE OF THE GOD OF NATURE IN CHRIST

Rolston believes that in Christian theism, Jesus is the living parabola of God. Unlike those who
say that suffering is always too painful to be divine, Christianity presupposes a free life dedicated
to love, leading towards a mysterious end, although it detects in suffering the endless power of God.
Through the cross, Christians enter into communion with this normative power in redemptive
suffering. They join with Christ, who thus dramatically shows that he commands divine energy in
always emerging levels.
What in principle seems an annoying anomaly which contradicts the claim that God is
omnipresent, i.e. the scandalous history of a peasant abandoned by God and crucified, thus becomes
key evidence of the presence of God. The Creator, Rolston believes, is always present, perfecting his
creation through suffering.
Jesus on the cross is a painful God. The hypothesis of God offers the only viable explanation for
the emergence of Jesus in the world. God is both Author and Actor in this exciting story. Jesus loves
with perfection in perfect freedom. And he dies as a testimony to the power of love through suffering
(pp. 326-327).

ROLSTONS ECOLOGICAL THEOLOGIA CRUCIS

Through ecology, Rolston strives to understand theologia crucis, or the logic of God on the cross,
i.e. what God is trying to tell us through Christ. His perspective belongs to the Christian tradition:
the evangelical logion take up your cross and follow me is a succinct summing up of Rolstons
theology of the cross. Evolution is cruciform and being a Christian means accepting the cross of
suffering and letting oneself be moved by the impulse towards the supernatural, that in turn leads
to God.
It is, without doubt, an aspect of the message of the cross that is unmistakably Christian.
Nevertheless, the message of the cross also has other important aspects that Rolston does not
consider. The cross shows that God does not impose his presence on the universe, but rather gives
man his freedom, a freedom that is evident in a world in which life, and even ecological ethics, may
be understood without God.

[Texto bsico publicado en Tendencias21.net, GUILLERMO ARMENGOL


por la Ctedra CTR, Escuela Tcnica Superior de Ingeniera,
Universidad Comillas, Madrid]

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LEE SMOLIN HACE UNA CRTICA CONSTRUCTIVA


DE LA TEORA DEL TODO
Entra en crisis la teora de ms prestigio en la fsica terica

MIGUEL LORENTE
Universidad de Oviedo

Durante tres siglos, a partir de los Principia de Newton en 1687, los avances de las
ciencias fsicas se han ido consolidando no slo experimentalmente, sino sobre todo teri-
camente, de manera que el conocimiento de la naturaleza por el hombre se ha profundiza-
do como nunca en la historia de la humanidad. Se pueden clasificar los grandes descubri-
mientos en perodos de veinticinco aos, desde 1780, entre los que podemos contar las
fuerzas elctricas y magnticas, las propiedades microscpicas de la materia descritas por
la mecnica cuntica y las macroscpicas que estudia la teora de la relatividad, as como
las fuerzas nucleares fuerte y dbil que producen las interacciones entre las partculas ele-
mentales. Con esto llegamos a 1970 en que se produce un equilibrio entre experimento y
teora por medio de un modelo que unificaba las fuerzas conocidas (exceptuando la gravi-
tatoria) y que se llam el modelo standard. Pero el exigente control de la especulacin por
el experimento en el modelo standard dio lugar en los ltimos aos a portentosas propuestas
tericas que especulaban arriesgadamente sobre la gnesis de la estructura microfsica de
la materia.

Durante siglos la fsica terica ha estado complementada con la fsica experimental. A partir de
1970 irrumpe la teora de supercuerdas que pretende solucionar los problemas que afectan a la cien-
cia (unificacin de partculas y fuerzas, paradojas de a mecnica cuntica y gravedad cuntica), pero
que no dispone de una tcnica adecuada para su comprobacin experimental. El optimismo que aco-
gi la nueva teora se desvanece. Lee Smolin hace un balance de los treinta ltimos aos en su libro
The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, the Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next, que
l ha vivido, primero como defensor y luego como promotor de alternativas.

LA TEORA DE SUPERCUERDAS A EXAMEN: NACIMIENTO, CADA Y FUTURO

Hasta los aos setenta la fsica terica y experimental haban ido paralelas, apoyndose mutua-
mente, pero pronto empezaron las perplejidades. La fsica terico-experimental no careca de pro-
blemas y el modelo standard distaba de ser un modo perfecto. No se haba encontrado, en efecto,
una teora que unificase los hadrones y los leptones. Lo mismo suceda adems con las fuerzas cono-
cidas, y los clculos perturbativos de algunas interacciones entre ellas se hacan infinitos.
[Queremos anticipar a los lectores de este artculo que hemos optado por resumir el pensa-
miento de Smoln cindonos a los trminos tcnicos para tener mayor exactitud. Esto facilitar la
lectura de quienes conozcan el mundo de la fsica terica. Para los otros lectores se presentarn
dificultades, pero aun as alcanzarn una comprensin intuitiva ms real de las cuestiones tratadas
por la teora de cuerdas y las dificultades cientficas que Smolin propone.]

LA PRIMERA TEORA DE CUERDAS: EXPECTACIN Y RESULTADOS

En 1970 tuvo lugar la primera revolucin de la teora de cuerdas, que solucionaba todos los pro-
blemas mencionados: se unificaban las partculas y las fuerzas, al mismo tiempo que se eliminaban
los infinitos. Pero la nueva hiptesis no encontraba los experimentos apropiados para alcanzar el
rango de teora confirmada. En principio, es legtimo en la ciencia proponer teoras, aunque estas
sean especulativas; lo que ocurre es que las buenas teoras cientficas deben permitir, de una u otra
manera su confrontacin con la experiencia.

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1098 M. LORENTE, LEE SMOLIN HACE UNA CRTICA CONSTRUCTIVA DE LA TEORA DEL TODO

Pero han pasado tres dcadas y las pruebas experimentales siguen sin aparecer (al menos con
los medios de que dispone hoy da la tcnica experimental). Se multiplican los modelos pero faltan
nuevos conceptos, como ha sucedido con otras revoluciones cientficas. Lo que se consideraba la la
ciencia del todo empieza a convertirse en una ilusin que no explica nada. D. Gross, premio Nobel
de Fsica por su trabajo en el modelo standard, se convirti en un formidable luchador de la teora
de cuerdas, pero recientemente ha dicho: No sabemos de qu estamos hablando. Y B. Greene aade:
Los investigadores piensan que nuestra formulacin de la teora de cuerdas no posee el ncleo de
fundamentos que encontramos en otros grandes descubrimientos.
Esta situacin de la Fsica, que ha acabado en un camino sin salida, ha motivado a Lee Smolin
a escribir el libro The Trouble with Physics. The Rise of String Theory, the Fall of a Science and What
comes Next (Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 2006). Smolin es la persona indicada para hacer la cr-
tica de los ltimos treinta aos de la fsica y en particular de la teora de cuerdas. Ha sido un par-
tidario decidido de la teora de cuerdas, pero tras aos de reflexin objetiva parece haber llegado a
consecuencias inevitables que ha tenido la valenta de exponer.
Smolin estudia Fsica en la Universidad de Harvard, donde obtiene el ttulo de Doctor. Ha sido
profesor de Fsica terica en las Universidades de Princeton, Yale y Pennsylvania State, y ahora en
el Instituto Perimeter de Toronto, del que ha sido uno de sus fundadores. Sus ms de un centenar
de artculos cientficos reflejan su trayectoria, que va desde la teora de supercuerdas a los spin
networks de Penrose y la teora loop quantum gravity de Ashtekar. Sus tres libros, The Life of the
Cosmos, Three Roads to Quantum Gravity y The Trouble with Physics, reflejan tambin de forma
autobiogrfica su trayectoria ideolgica, desde un cultivador de la teora de supercuerdas hasta el
desengao por esta teora y la bsqueda de alternativas.

PROBLEMAS FUNDAMENTALES DE LAS NUEVAS TEORAS

El libro de Smolin no es slo un libro de historia que expone acontecimientos de los ltimos
treinta aos, sino tambin un libro programtico que trata de analizar la teora de cuerdas y sus
alternativas, con unos principios que todas deben cumplir. Estos principios se postulan al comien-
zo de libro para que ayuden a hacer la crtica de los intentos que se han hecho en estos treinta lti-
mos aos y permitan pensar en el futuro. Smolin los llama problemas, pero en realidad son prin-
cipios o condiciones necesarias que toda nueva teora debe cumplir:
Problema 1 (Principio de la gravedad cuntica): Consistira en unificar la teora de la relati-
vidad y la mecnica cuntica en una sola teora. Esto implica que la nueva teora ha de ser
independiente del espacio-tiempo contenedor o que ste tenga un caracter dinmico.
Problema 2 (Problema fundamental de la mecnica cuntica): Resolver las paradojas de la
mecnica cuntica de manera que sta tenga sentido. Por ejemplo, la nueva teora debe ser
realista, o sea, que sea independiente del observador y del aparato de medida.
Problema 3 (Problema de unificacin de las partculas y fuerzas): Unificar todas las partcu-
las elementales (todas las familias de quarks y leptones), as como todas las fuerzas conoci-
das (gravitatorias, electromagnticas, nucleares fuertes y dbiles).
Problema 4 (Problema de las constantes universales): Explicar por qu las constantes fsi-
cas que aparecen en el modelo standard tienen valores determinados.
Problema 5 (Materia y energa oscura): Explicar qu es la materia oscura y la energa oscu-
ra; o, si estas no existiesen, por qu la gravedad se modificara tanto a gran escala.

A continuacin Smolin hace un breve resumen de la historia que ha llevado a la teora de super-
cuerdas.

LA REVOLUCIN QUE SE AVECINA

En 1968 G. Veneziano propone un modelo para describir las interacciones entre las partculas
elementales. Considera a las partculas como cintas de goma, que se estiran cuando reciben ener-
ga y se encogen cuando la pierden. Pronto se cambi la imagen de bandas de goma por la de cuer-

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das vibrantes, de modo que a cada partcula corresponda un modo de vibracin de esta cuerda.
Este modelo era consistente con la mecnica cuntica y la teora de la relatividad si el espacio con-
tenedor tena 26 dimensiones; pero tena la limitacin de que solo admita bosones y de que per-
mita taquiones (con velocidad mayor que la de la luz).
En 1979 P. Ramond descubre una nueva simetra (las simetras sirven para diferenciar las part-
culas en bosones y fermiones), de tal modo que la nueva simetra, llamada supersimetra, aplicada a
las cuerdas unificaba los dos tipos de partculas, y rebajaba el nmero de dimensiones de 26 a 10 y
adems no contena taquiones. Por otro lado, al unirse una cuerda por sus extremos daba lugar a una
fuerza que dependa de la tensin y del movimiento de la cuerda. Si la cuerda era abierta se produca
la fuerza gravitatoria, si era cerrada, las dems fuerzas. Por consiguiente, las cuerdas supersimtricas
o supercuerdas unificaban todas las partculas y las fuerzas conocidas.

LA REVOLUCIN DE LAS SUPERCUERDAS

En 1984 Schwarz y Green descubren una propiedad en la teora de supercuerdas que suscita el
inters de la comunidad cientfica. Los clculos perturbativos para las interacciones entre dos cuer-
das eran finitos hasta el segundo orden. Y en 1992 Mandelstam prueba que los desarrollos pertur-
bativos eran finitos, trmino a trmino, lo cual produjo la sensacin que se haba conseguido una
teora definitiva, una autntica revolucin cientfica.
Pero quedaban muchos problemas por resolver: al pasar del modelo standard, con muchas cons-
tantes sin determinar, a la teora de supercuerdas con una sola constante, pero con mayor nmero
de dimensiones, se encontraban soluciones diferentes que daban lugar a diferentes teoras. En par-
ticular se haban encontrado cinco soluciones diferentes que conducan a cinco teoras de super-
cuerdas.
En 1995 Witten en una famosa conferencia en la Universidad de Los ngeles prueba que se pue-
den unificar, dos a dos, las cinco teoras de supercuerdas utilizando la T-dualidad (que se produce
cuando una cuerda se enrosca alrededor del crculo formado por la dimensin extra compactifica-
da) o por la S-dualidad (cuando una teora tiene una constante de acoplamiento igual a la inversa
del la constante de acoplamiento de la segunda teora). En la misma conferencia Witten consigui
probar que si se ampliaba el espacio-tiempo a once dimensiones, las cinco teoras de supercuerdas
eran idnticas, y adems estas teoras de supercuerdas se podan hacer derivar de una teora fun-
damental que l llam M-teora (Magic-theory), pero que no especific en qu consista.
Empez la carrera para descubrir la M-teora. Uno de los oyentes, Polchinski, present a los pocos
meses una nueva teora basada en objetos elementales de dos dimensiones (recurdese que la cuer-
da es un objeto de una dimensin) que el llam D-branas (abreviatura de membrana). Se puede pro-
bar que las fluctuaciones de las branas lleva directamente a la M-teora.
En 1997 Maldacena presenta una nueva dualidad entre las teoras de supercuerdas, ms atre-
vida que la T-dualidad y la S-dualidad. En ella se identifica una teora de supercuerdas de dimen-
sin 4 con una teora gauge de dimensin 3 (recurdese que una teora gauge sirve para determi-
nar un objeto por el conjunto de simetras y consigue diferenciar los objetos que poseen las mismas
simetras por un mecanismo llamado ruptura de simetras).

UNA TEORA DEL TODO

En 1998 se descubre la energa oscura del universo, cuyo efecto produca una aceleracin posi-
tiva en la expansin del universo. Produca los mismos efectos que la constante cosmolgica de
signo positivo (Einstein propuso por primera vez la constante cosmolgica para evitar la expansin
y describir un universo esttico). Los experimentos recientes haban encontrado un valor muy peque-
o para la constante cosmolgica. Las teoras de supercuerdas tienen que tener en cuenta este valor
para conseguir que ser realistas y no ser rechazadas. Segn este criterio se pueden considerar cua-
tro situaciones de teoras de supercuerdas:
1. Cuerdas que se mueven en un espacio fijo de dimensin 10 con trminos perturbativos fini-
tos hasta de segundo orden. La constante cosmolgica es nula.

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1100 M. LORENTE, LEE SMOLIN HACE UNA CRTICA CONSTRUCTIVA DE LA TEORA DEL TODO

2. Teora de cuerdas que son idnticas a las teoras gauge con una dimensin menor, siguien-
do el criterio de Maldacena. La constante cosmolgica es negativa.
3. Existe un sinnmero de teoras de supercuerdas que se mueven en un espacio-tiempo din-
mico donde la constante cosmolgica puede ser positiva.
4. Existe una teora de dimensin 26, sin fermiones, llamada la cuerda bosnica, pero esta
teora admite taquiones, que hace a la teora poco consistente.

Todas estas teoras se podran deducir de una teora fundamental llamada M-teora, cuya for-
mulacin ms exacta desconocemos.

CMO RESPONDEN LAS TEORAS DE SUPERCUERDAS A LOS CINCO PROBLEMAS

Despus de haber recorrido los principales avances que han conseguido las teoras de super-
cuerdas, es hora de hacer un balance de dichas teoras con respecto a los cinco grandes problemas
que pone Smolin al comienzo del libro:
Problema 1: La teora de supercuerdas no unifica la mecnica cuntica y la teora de la rela-
tividad, porque las ecuaciones de esta ltima son independientes del espacio-tiempo de refe-
rencia (como dicen los matemticos las leyes de la fsica son invariantes bajo difeomor-
fismos).
Problema 2: La teora de supercuerdas no dice nada sobre una teora fundamental que resuel-
va las paradojas de la mecnica cuntica.
Problema 3: La teora de supercuerdas unifican todas las partculas conocidas (bosones y
fermiones), as como todas las fuerzas y las partculas gauge portadoras de las fuerzas (gra-
vitones, fotones, gluones y partculas W) que son producidas por vibraciones de las cuerdas.
Problema 4: La teora de supercuerdas no puede explicar los valores de los parmetros que
aparecen en el modelo standard solamente a partir de los valores constantes arbitrarios que
poseen las supercuerdas (tensin y constante de acoplamiento).
Problema 5: La teora de supercuerdas no explica qu es la materia y la energa oscura. Los
axiones se podran identificar con la materia oscura, pero esta identificacin no se puede
deducir de la teora de supercuerdas.

TEORAS ALTERNATIVAS A LA TEORA DE SUPERCUERDAS

Hemos visto las dificultades tericas que tienen la teora de supercuerdas y su falta de compro-
bacin experimental. Smolin ha propuesto algunas de las teoras alternativas, sin renunciar a nada,
a la espera de que nuevas experiencias vengan a confirmar alguna de las alternativas o las mismas
teoras de supercuerdas.
Una de las alternativas comienza por criticar la teora de la relatividad de Einstein. Segn esta
teora, en sistemas inerciales se mueven con la velocidad de la luz, dos observadores lo veran con
la misma velocidad y si un observador ve un objeto movindose con velocidad menor que la de la
luz, el otro observador lo ver tambin con menor velocidad. En 1999 Amelino-Camelia aplica esta
situacin a las distancias, y en particular a la longitud de Planck. Si un objeto tiene la longitud de
Planck, dos observadores en sistemas de referencia en sistemas de referencia equivalentes vern el
objeto con la misma longitud, y si el objeto es mayor que la longitud de Planck, los dos observado-
res la vern con longitud mayor. Esto significa que en el orden de magnitud de la longitud de Planck
no rigen las leyes de la teora de la relatividad especial, por lo cual Amelino-Camelia llam a esta
teora doble relatividad especial. En realidad lo que se propona en esta teora eran las leyes cl-
sicas para valores muy alejados de la constante de Planck y las leyes cunticas para valores muy
prximos a la constante de Planck.
Otras alternativas provienen de modelos que son independientes del espacio-tiempo contene-
dor, de modelos de espacio y tiempo discretos y de modelos que se basan en el principio de causa-
lidad. Estas tres propiedades han dado origen a la causal dynamical triangulation de Ambjorn y
Loll y los causal sets de Sorkin que son modelos muy consistentes de gravedad cuntica, en los

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M. LORENTE, LEE SMOLIN HACE UNA CRTICA CONSTRUCTIVA DE LA TEORA DEL TODO 1101

cuales el espacio-tiempo emerge como consecuencia de las relaciones entre los sucesos ms ele-
mentales.
Tambin Penrose en 1961 presenta su modelo de los spin networks que es discreto y relacio-
nal, donde el espacio-tiempo emerge como consecuencia de las combinaciones de los spines que
cumplen las leyes de la mecnica cuntica. Aunque este modelo se podra identificar con causal
sets discretos de Sorkin, Penrose lo ampla a la teora de los twistors que se mueven en un espa-
cio-tiempo complejo para admitir las transformaciones de los vectores de posicin (discreto) y
momento (continuo). La teora de los twistor ha sido continuada por numerosos matemticos y fsi-
cos, porque ofrece un marco riguroso donde describir todos los campos y partculas conocidos inclu-
yendo la relatividad general.
Otra teora alternativa ha sido la geometra no conmutativa de A. Connes, segn la cual las
magnitudes fsicas y matemticas no conmutan (AB no es igual a BA). Es una teora que unifica las
funciones algebraicas y geomtricas de manera que se deduce inmediatamente el modelo standard.
La teora que ms se ha enfrentado como alternativa a las supercuerdas es loop quantum gra-
vity que fue propuesta por Ashtekar en 1986. En ella prob que la teora de la relatividad general se
poda expresar como una teora gauge con solo introducir unas nuevas variables.
Cuando tratamos de describir las lneas del campo gauge no necesitamos de un espacio-tiem-
po contenedor, sino que las lneas de campo definen la geometra del espacio. Esta geometra est
definida por un grafo (conexiones entre vrtices y aristas), que evolucionan a nuevas estructuras,
de las que emerge la estructura subyacente del espacio-tiempo. Por otra parte como las conexiones
en un grafo pueden ser muy complicadas, dependiendo del tipo de lazos que se construyen entre
las aristas que unen dos vrtices, esta diversidad de lazos da lugar a las diferentes familias de par-
tculas elementales, como recientemente han demostrado 2006 e Bilson-Thompson, Markopoulou
y Smolin.
Segn Hofmann y Winkler, las predicciones de la teora loop quantum gravity podrn obser-
varse experimentalmente en las oscilaciones de la radiacin de fondo.

LA TEORA DE SUPERCUERDAS HA BLOQUEADO OTRAS LNEAS DE INVESTIGACIN

El libro de Smolin acaba con unos captulos dedicados a los aspectos sociolgicos y filosficos
de la teora de supercuerdas. Los peligros de esta teora son patentes. Han invadido las Universi-
dades y Centros de investigacin de todo el mundo, de modo que los investigadores jvenes que no
quieran trabajar en dicha teora tienen cerrado prcticamente el camino a dichos centros. Smolin
ha resumido la postura de las comunidades de supercuerdas con estos rasgos:
1. Considerable autosuficiencia y conciencia de pertenecer a una lite.
2. Comunidades monolticas con gran uniformidad de opiniones sobre cuestiones abiertas,
generalmente impuestas por los que constituyen la jerarqua de la comunidad.
3. Sentido de identificacin con el grupo parecido a la pertenencia de una comunidad reli-
giosa o partido poltico.
4. Sentido de frontera entre el grupo y otros expertos.
5. Gran desinters por las ideas y personas que no son del grupo.
6. Una confianza excesiva en interpretar positivamente los resultados e incluso aceptarlos
exclusivamente porque son credos por la mayora.
7. Una falta de percepcin del riesgo que conlleva una nueva teora.

TICA DE UNA COMUNIDAD CIENTFICA

Smolin defiende que el xito de una comunidad cientfica no es solamente por la adherencia a
una teora, sino por la adherencia a una tica. Smolin resume en dos principios esta tica:
1. Si un resultado puede ser decidido por personas de buena fe, despus de aplicar argu-
mentos razonables con la evidencia pblica disponible, entonces tiene que ser aceptada
como tal.

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1102 M. LORENTE, LEE SMOLIN HACE UNA CRTICA CONSTRUCTIVA DE LA TEORA DEL TODO

2. Por otra parte, si los argumentos racionales tomados de la evidencia pblicamente dispo-
nible, no consiguen poner de acuerdo a las personas de buena voluntad, la sociedad tiene
que permitir y animar a la gente a sacar conclusiones diversas.

Smolin saca algunas conclusiones de estos principios:


1. Estamos de acuerdo en argumentar racionalmente y de buena fe a partir de la evidencia,
cualquiera que sea el grado de evidencia compartida.
2. Cada cientfico es libre de desarrollar sus propias conclusiones a partir de la evidencia. Pero
cada cientfico tiene la obligacin de presentar argumentos sacados de la evidencia a la comu-
nidad cientfica.
3. La habilidad de los cientficos para deducir resultados fiables de la evidencia compartida
se basa en el dominio de los medios experimentales y procedimientos desarrollados duran-
te muchos aos.
4. Cada miembro de la comunidad cientfica reconoce que el fin provisional es el conseguir
consenso. Los jueces finales de un trabajo cientfico son los futuros miembros de la comu-
nidad cientfica, de tal manera alejados del trabajo en cuestin que estn en condiciones
idneas para emitir un juicio objetivo.
5. La pertenencia a una comunidad cientfica est abierta a todo ser humano. La entradas en
la comunidad esta basada en dos criterios. Preparacin suficiente para desarrollar un tra-
bajo con plena independencia y la adhesin continuada a la tica comunitaria.
6. Aunque la ortodoxia est permitida temporalmente en un campo subordinado, la comuni-
dad reconoce que las opiniones contrarias y los programas de investigacin son necesarios
para la salud continua de la comunidad cientfica.

[Texto bsico publicado en Tendencias21.net, MIGUEL LORENTE


por la Ctedra CTR, Escuela Tcnica Superior de Ingeniera,
Universidad Comillas, Madrid]

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WHY DID LIVING COMPLEXITY ARISE?


Beyond reductionism: Stuart Kauffman reinventing the sacred

JAVIER MONSERRAT
Universidad Autnoma de Madrid

Stuart Kauffman has and continues to be one of the most eminent thinkers in the
development of modern evolutionary biology. His theories on the self-organisation of matter
have served to complement the ordinary explanation offered by Darwinism and complexity
theories. In a recent contribution to the journal Zygon, dated 22 October 2006, Kauffman
admits the possibility of accepting quantum factors in the emergence of life, at the same
time as offering a self-creative and sacred image of nature, which is nevertheless different
from traditional theism.

Stuart Alan Kauffman takes a stance against recent trends in the philosophy of biology. On
the one hand, he offers an opinion regarding the recent controversy on theism-atheism arising
out of the works of Dawkins and Dennett. Kauffman sticks to his previous position, refusing to
believe in a transcendent God. However, he qualifies this position by defending his belief in a
sacred world that should underpin our search for meaning. The world of complexity is not
reductionism, but rather a major self-creative and emergent step towards superior levels of reality.
This natural self-creativity prompts in us an attitude of reverence, respect and mystery. On the
other hand, however, Kauffman has also taken an important step forward by accepting the role
of quantum causality in the origin of life. In this sense, his authority reinforces heuristic speculations
which attempt to explain life in terms of a quantum, emergentist and non-reductionist physical
underpinning.
Today, Kauffmans works are some of the most important in the field of biological self-organisation
processes within the framework of complexity theories. His interdisciplinary training may perhaps
explain the shear breath of his questions, and the ambitiousness of his answers. His analyses touch
upon physics, biology, psychology, neurology and even philosophy, and his thinking directly affects
the existing neo-Darwinist paradigm, not to deny it, but rather to complement it. The causes which
produced life would depend on the ontology of the matter whose ontological properties prompted
self-movement towards organised complexity. These properties are particularly evident in the genetic
process and in the genetic networks already studied by other authors.

A COHERENT LINE OF RESEARCH

Stuart Kauffman was born in 1939. In 1960 he earned degrees in philosophy and physics from
Dartmouth College, before moving to Oxford, where he continued to study philosophy, expanding
his scope to include psychology and biology. Finally, he studied medicine at the University of
California in 1968 and a short time later, decided to focus his professional activities exclusively
on research. He carried out genetic research at the University of Chicago and, from 1975 to 1995,
lectured in biochemistry in Pennsylvania. He has also remained in contact with other research
institutes, such as the Complex Systems Institute in Santa Fe. Today, an emeritus professor at
the University of Pennsylvania, he works at the University of Calgary, Alberta, where he directs a
number of institutes on biological complexity. He has also been a NASA consultant since the year
2000.
His cornerstone work is Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution (1993).
Some time later, in 1995, he published At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-
Organization and Complexity. Finally, in the year 2000, he brought out his last work: Investigations,
in which he explored the same themes in more depth. In a paper published in 2006 under the title
Beyond Reductionism: Reinventing the Sacred, he offers a series of new ideas which we shall comment
on here.

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1104 J. MONSERRAT, WHY DID LIVING COMPLEXITY ARISE?

How can one understand Kauffmans work? What causes does he propose to explain the
emergence of complex biological systems? Is there really irreducibility between different emergent
levels? In what sense can we talk about emergent novelties? How are they related to systemics and
complexity? Kauffmans stance is anti-reductionist; he believes that reality cannot emerge from the
mere evolution of linear systems. For Kauffman, the emergence of novelty stems from continuity
and the systemic interaction of matter. New systems produce new forms of reality. In this sense,
Kauffmans work fits into the traditional framework of emergence theory.
A good overview of Kauffmans contributions to the field can be found in a research paper on
his work by Alfredo Prez, published by the University of Madrid. This paper states that: The question
is from where did the useful variation on which selection acts come from? [Margullis, 2000]. This
is the problem that Kauffman aims to resolve. Furthermore, regarding the problem of the origin of
life, one of the dominant trends sustains that life could not have existed until the appearance of a
primitive genetic system, and said primitive genetic system was the result of chance. If the weight
of the argument on the origin of life rests on the formation of a primitive genetic system created as
the result of a random conjunction of different elements under certain conditions, then the emergence
of life becomes an enormously improbable event. These problems are the ones that steer Kauffmans
research, and can be expressed through the following questions: How can we convincingly explain
the fact of the emergence and evolution of life? How can we explain the order found in complex
adaptive systems? For Kauffman, the key lies in bearing in mind the self-organisational capacity of
complex systems (p. 8).

THE SEARCH FOR THE SELF-ORGANISATIONAL LOGIC OF LIFE

Kauffmans contributions are historically based on the results obtained by Watson, Crick and
Walkins. For these authors, the molecular structure of nucleic acids and the transfer of information
between different organisms are essential factors. Thus, molecular structure transmits the hereditary
genetic information required for the stability of the species.
Some time later, in 1965, the researchers Franois Jacob, Jacques Monod and Andr Lwoff were
awarded the Nobel Prize in Medicine. Their research improved our understanding of the genetic
control of enzymes, the synthesis of viruses, cellular differentiation and ontogenesis. It was then
that the synthesis of a protein in the cytoplasm by the gene transcribed from DNA by RNA (ribonucleic
acid) was understood. The so-called messenger RNA was found to control protein synthesis through
its genetic code.
In 1977, the Russian-Belgian researcher Ilya Prigogine was awarded a Nobel Prize for his
discovery of the characteristics that make order arise from far-from-equilibrium systems (when
the particles of the system move randomly in total disorder). The order generated by fluctuations
is a mechanism which produces self-organisation, an essential phenomenon for the formation of
dissipative structures. Small variations in a systems fluctuations do not affect its stability; however,
if they become larger, these fluctuations make the system unstable and push it to the edge of
chaos. It is then that self-organisation arises, thus enabling the system to stabilise itself in a
different ordered state.
Through situations of instability, fluctuations push systems towards totally new, stable, although
also fluctuating, structures. The stability of biological systems is therefore dynamic and fluctuating,
and forms the basis of the evolution of living systems in search of new ways of organising themselves
in order to ensure adaptive stability. Prigogines model has since been successfully applied to research
aiming to understand the causes that prompted the evolution of living entities.
These ideas were soon developed by new research into the physics of chaos and its application
to living systems. Basically, what these areas of research revealed is that life was not only produced
by selection, but also by the primordial nature of matter and living matter (let us also remember
the auto-poietic systems of Varela and Maturana). According to Darwinist principles, natural selection
acts on the structures of ordered systems that have already been produced by evolution. Evolution
selects only those ordered structures that have already been tried and tested by nature in accordance
with ontological principles, prior to selection itself.

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KAUFFMANS PROPOSAL: BEYOND REDUCTIONISM

In order to explain Kauffmans point of view, we shall use the overview that the author himself
provides in a recent paper entitled Beyond Reductionism: Reinventing the Sacred (2006). As mentioned
earlier, Kauffmans position is in line with the emergence approach, at least in relation to its basic
concepts regarding the origin of life.
Reductionism has been the general perspective of science over recent years. Roughly,
reductionism is the view that, as Nobel Laureate Stephen Weinberg eloquently puts it, the explanatory
arrows always point downwards. This downward-looking perspective leads us to explain everything
on the basis of the elementary particles that make up the primordial substratum of the universe. A
series of simple laws for this primordial matter would constitute the dream of the final theory,
whose existence Weinberg has indeed postulated.
Kauffman underlines the increasing doubts among many scientists regarding the adequacy of
reductionism and mentions two Nobel Laureates, Philip Anderson and Robert Laughlin. Nevertheless,
today, it is in string theory that reductionists seek that final theory, and seem to be going from
strength to strength.
But it is precisely in the province of string theory itself, that doubts are arising says Kauffman.
The early hope was that a single string theory would be found that would explain quantum gravity
and all the known particles and forces. Such a single string theory would be the answer to Weinbergs
dream of a final theory. But at present, it appears that there are as many as 10 to the 500th power
string theories. Hope for a single theory is fast fading and a number of high energy physicists are
abandoning reductionism in the sense of finding such a single theory. Thus, Leonard Susskind, in
the Cosmic Landscape, suggests a multiverse of pocket universes, each with a randomly chosen
string theory, and a landscape over these pocket universes with respect to those whose laws are
life friendly. As a critical side note, part of Susskinds move is an attempt to explain the roughly 23
physical constants in physics like the speed of light, the ratio of electron to proton mass, and so on.
No one knows where these constants come from or how to explain them. Weinberg himself uttered
the A word anthropic.
In short, concludes Kauffman, many, but not all physicists, are giving up on the adequacy of
reductionism alone as a scientific principle to explain the properties of the world. In its stead a new
scientific world view is just starting to come into view: Emergence.

THE EMERGENCE OF LIFE: HOW IT CANNOT BE REDUCED TO PHYSICS

Kauffmans scientific work focuses on the most solid, mechanical and physical-chemical
foundations causally involved in the origin of life. However, he has been against reductionism right
from the start. His stance is more in line with emergence, a theoretical framework which is today
becoming increasingly popular, and which is being espoused by more and more physicists and
biologists who are abandoning reductionism as a doctrine of the past.
Kauffmans emergence is not dualism, but rather systemic monism that justifies the emergence
of novelty when the continuity of the evolutionary process (based on the physical world) combines
with the evolutionary genesis of new systemic structures that produce ontological novelties.
His emergence is systemic and ontological. Kauffman himself says that the ontological view (in
emergence) is that new entities with their own properties and causal powers arise and are part of
the furniture of the universe.
How did life arise? We do not really know, although in Kauffmans opinion, certain theories do
exist, even if none have yet been definitively established. The first is based on the properties of DNA
and RNA, their helical structure and reduplicative capacity. The second is based on the recently-
discovered properties of RNA, not only for carrying information, but also for acting as enzymes,
speeding up chemical reactions in the cytoplasm. The third theory is based on the chemical structure
of lipids, which experimental research has shown to be capable of growing and dividing. These
processes may form part of the origin of life.
The fourth theory is that proposed by Kauffman himself, and defended by Freeman Dyson, and
may also describe the events occurring in the origin of life. It rests on the observation that cellular

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1106 J. MONSERRAT, WHY DID LIVING COMPLEXITY ARISE?

life is based on collective processes of autocatalysis, where catalysis is the acceleration of the speed
of reaction. No molecule can catalyse its own formation. However, a system of molecules may
maintain interactive systemic relations that, together, control the regularity, stability and replication
of a system that would thus be autocatalytic. These systems, along with lipid chemistry, may have
created the basic replicative stability of the living systems in which the subsequent function of DNA
and RNA would have been possible.
Does the appearance of these systems, i.e. life, represent an emergence in relation to the physical
world? Kauffmans answer is yes. Darwins natural selection acts on already emerged biological
entities, capable of self reproduction and heritable variation. This, says Kauffman, seems clearly
to be ontological emergence, not reducible to physics. In short, Darwins natural selection is a
new law operating on the level of self reproducing entities with heritable variation, regardless of
the physical underpinning. In contrast to Weinbergs claim, here the explanatory arrows point
upward.

THE EMERGENCE OF LIVING AGENTS

Life is not only a level of emergence not reducible to physics due to the novelty of its self
reproducing structures with heritable variability thanks to Darwinist selection, but also due to the
supposition of agency (the capacity to select directed actions).
In many of his works, Kauffman asks about the minimum properties a physical system must
have in order to be considered an agent. A minimal molecular agent is a system which can reproduce
itself and carry out at least one work cycle in the thermodynamic sense. A bacterium, swimming
up a glucose gradient, and performing work cycles, is an agent, and glucose has value and meaning
for the bacterium, without assuming consciousness. Of course, it is natural selection that has achieved
this coupling. But teleological language has to start somewhere, and I am willing to place it at the
start of life. Either here, or later in the evolutionary pathways, meaning and value arise in the
biosphere. They too are ontologically emergent. As we will see, the evolutionary appearance of
sensation-consciousness also plays a key role in this emergence.

THE EMERGENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS QUANTUM ORIGINS

However, the fact is that consciousness has also arisen in living organisms. We are, in fact,
conscious, states Kauffman. That is, we have experiences of the world. The philosophers call these
qualia. For years, philosophers of mind have tried to argue that such experiences are ghosts in the
machine. This is just false. We are, in fact, conscious. Whatever explains consciousness, it is clearly
ontologically emergent.
However, how can we explain the fact of this emergence? At the end of the day, the aim is to
explain the causes of emergence, i.e. the causes (or real facts) that explain why in the animal world
and in ourselves, the emergence of consciousness arose evolutionarily (and before sensibility).
Kauffman refers to three different answers to this question; however, we do not know with any
certainty which (if any) is correct. The first response is the dualist one. The author refers to Saint
Augustine, Schroedinger and Tibetan Buddhism. The second answer, which is the predominant
view among cognitive scientists today, reduces the question to complex computer programmes. At
heart, this is nothing more than the modern continuation of reductionism. The third answer, which
is the one Kauffman himself espouses, refers to consciousness in a quantum medium produced by
evolution in biological structures.
With this, Kauffman aligns himself with the general framework of quantum neurology, coming
close (although he does not mention them in the text we are analysing here) to both the hypothesis
posed by Hameroff-Penrose and the possibility of the existence of other quantum phenomena in
living cellular tissue.
The third view of mind and consciousness, says Kaufmann, which I tentatively favour, is that
it is related to quantum behaviour. The standard physicists answer is that quantum effects cannot
occur at body temperature.

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However, recent theorems in quantum computing, and facts about cells cast doubt on this
conclusion. The theorems show that, if measurements are made and work is done on a quantum
computer, its qubits can remain quantum coherent when they should decohere towards classical
behaviour. Thus, if work is done on a system, parts of it may remain quantum coherent at body
temperature in principle. But cells do thermodynamic work and might be able to carry out such
measurements and work to maintain some variables quantum coherent. Second, cells are crowded
by proteins and other molecules, and the water between these molecules is largely ordered, not like
an ordinary liquid. This may permit quantum coherence physically in cells. No one knows. It seems
worth investigation in its own right. Meanwhile, my approximate theory is that mind is acausal,
quantum mechanics is acausal on the familiar Born interpretation of the Schroedinger equation (to
the grief of Einstein), that consciousness is due to a special state where a system is persistently
poised between quantum and classical behaviour, that the emergence of classical behaviour in the
mind-brain system, perhaps by decoherence, is the mind making something actual happen in the
physical world, and big jump that consciousness itself consists in this quantum coherent state
as lived by the organism. This is a long jump, but not impossible. I dont even think it is stupider
than other theories of consciousness, and may be true. Whatever the case, consciousness is
ontologically emergent in this universe.

KAUFFMAN AND THE TRENDS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY

These interesting considerations by a person of the stature of Stuart Kauffman reveal certain
trends that are well worth highlighting:
1) His qualified positive assessment of the hypotheses of quantum neurology is indicative of
a growing tendency to admit that this heuristic line is the best constructed (within its obscurity)
and the one most able to explain the physical medium in which the sensibility-consciousness which
emerged during the evolutionary process exists. Earlier we mentioned Margullis, who asked where
did the useful variation on which selection acts come from? Here, the answer would be: from the
emergence of quantum states which supported sensation (probably in the unicellular world, perhaps
with the appearance of the cytoskeleton and microtubules); subsequently, selection made more
efficient sensitive systems possible in pursuit of optimum survival.
2) Kauffman understands perfectly that any assessment of quantum neurology is a mere
question of science, and as such, is philosophically neutral. This is compatible with his atheist
stance, in the sense of not leaning towards the acceptance of a personal God. Valuing the
contributions of quantum neurology is merely the consequence of scientific honesty, which prompts
us to try and explain the real phenomenological experience of our consciousness, or in other
words, of that which constitutes society and human history. Kauffman is not concerned that
accepting the relevance of quantum neurology hypotheses constitutes eo ipso an acceptance of
theism.
3) Even from his decidedly atheist viewpoint, Kauffman steers his anti-reductionist and
emergence stance towards a way of understanding our feelings of reverence towards a creative
universe that he describes as sacred. His approach to the mysterious sacredness of nature is
reminiscent of Einsteins hotly debated religiousness.
God is the most powerful symbol we have created. The Spaniards in the New World built their
churches on the holy sites of those they vanquished. Notre Dame sits on a Druid holy site. Shall we
use the God word? It is our choice. Mine is a tentative yes. I want God to mean the vast ceaseless
creativity of the only universe we know of, ours. What do we gain by using the God word? I suspect
a great deal, for the word carries with it awe and reverence. If we can transfer that awe and reverence,
not to the transcendental Abrahamic God of my Israelite tribe long ago, but to the stunning reality
that confronts us, we will grant permission for a renewed spirituality, and awe, reverence and
responsibility for all that lives, for the planet.
4) This sacred emergence in the face of a nature that, surprisingly, points upward and which
demands superior explanatory criteria that arise from the evolutionary creativity of the universe
itself, demonstrates the increasing trend towards taking very seriously attempts aimed at overcoming

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1108 J. MONSERRAT, WHY DID LIVING COMPLEXITY ARISE?

reductionism. Although Kauffman does not make the jump from this sacred nature to the hypothesis
sustained by religious traditions of a transcendent God, modern theism is much more comfortable
with the atheist sacredness of Kaufman than with the reductionist robotism of the ancien rgime
of science. Theism is but the opening up of the last superior level that explains the ontological origin
of life, sensibility and consciousness in the physical universe.

[Texto bsico publicado en Tendencias21.net, JAVIER MONSERRAT


por la Ctedra CTR, Escuela Tcnica Superior de Ingeniera,
Universidad Comillas, Madrid]

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EMERGENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE IN PHILIP CLAYTON


His moderate ideas place him in an ideal position
for dialogue

JAVIER LEACH
Universidad Complutense de Madrid

In his book Mind & Emergence, Philip Clayton explores the relationship between the
emergentist vision of the human mind and the question of transcendence. The ongoing
explosion of scientific knowledge in the 21st century will tempt many to conclude that no
knowledge can exist beyond the boundaries of natural science, only opinion and sentiment.
The debate presented by Clayton regarding emergence aims to offer one (although not the
only) way of demonstrating that the equation between knowledge and natural science is far
from exact. Our perception of there being any true knowledge when the issues at hand go
beyond that which can be empirically proven by science may be tenuous. There are certain
areas of knowledge, over and above the strict dividing line established by physics and biology,
which remain open and which influence life.

The debate on key issues is now more urgent than ever as the human mind continues, in the
era of science, to expand not only the limits of its knowledge, but also its knowledge of those limits
themselves, refusing to be dominated by tradition, force or absolute authority. This domination
may stem from philosophy, theology or religious traditions, or alternatively from the imposition
of political correctness in science, all of which limit the critical freedom of individuals use of
reason. Philip Clayton (Philip Clayton, Mind & Emergence, from quantum to consciousness. Oxford
University Press, 2004) aims to develop a Christian theology in constructive dialogue with
metaphysics, modern philosophy and science. This task has prompted Clayton to write about the
theory of knowledge, the history of philosophy and theology, the philosophy of science, physics,
evolutionary biology and neuroscience, comparative theology and constructive metaphysics. As
a theologian, Clayton embraces panentheism and has his own dialogue-based and pluralist view
of process theology.
He rejects Dawkins scientism, without falling into the trap of fundamentalism. Claytons moderate
stance opens up a series of complex and interesting questions within the field of science and religion,
and steers clear of the full-on fight between warring factions. Philip Clayton is Ingraham Professor
of Theology at Claremont School of Theology and Professor of Religion and Philosophy at Claremont
University.
In the first part of his book, Mind & Emergence, Philip Clayton defends strong emergence as the
most appropriate description of what occurs in the evolutionary process of the universe.
Supporters of strong emergence maintain that evolution has gradually produced new
and different ontological levels in the cosmos, and that each of these new levels is
characterised by its own laws, regularities and causal forces.
Those who defend weak emergence, on the other hand, insist that when new
evolutionary levels appear, the causal processes of the first evolutionary level of physics
remain in play. Although new emergent categories, such as, for example, protein
synthesis, hunger or the desire to be accepted, may overcome the behaviour of other
structures from lower levels, they are not, in themselves, considered new types of
causes.
(Philip Clayton cites, among others, Samuel Alexander as a staunch defender of weak
emergence and C. D. Broad as a supporter of strong emergence).

In his book, Mind and Emergence, Clayton defends strong emergence against the inadequacy of
both physicalism and dualism. For Clayton, both physicalism and dualism overlook a crucial part
of reality.

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1110 J. LEACH, EMERGENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE IN PHILIP CLAYTON

THE INADEQUACY OF PHYSICALISM AND DUALISM

The aspirations of microphysical reductionism have failed. Indeed, in complete opposition to


this approach, our world now has increasing numbers of different organisational levels, with each
level being characterised by its own irreducible type of causal explanation. The conclusion is not
that scientific study is futile or wrong, but rather that science reveals an ever larger world with more
complex interactions between the diverse levels of organisation.
For its part, physics fails to consider the experience that humans have of themselves as conscious
agents. Human beings not only experience the fact that they think, want and decide, they also
experience the fact that their thoughts and desires are effective, that they do things and act effectively
on the world around them. Clayton says he experiences himself as an effective conscious agent, who,
for example, decides to change things when, after careful reflection, he decides to modify the last
sentence he has just written, thus consciously sparking off a series of causes which prompt him to
reread the last paragraph of his text, ask himself whether or not he is satisfied with it and think
about whether or not it is true.
Dualism also fails to explain the increasing number of correlations which neuroscience has
found between the states of the central nervous system and the states of consciousness. It is true
that these neural correlates do not apodictically prove that dualism is false, in much the same way
that neither do they prove that one day, we will be able to completely reduce consciousness to
physiology; however, the findings of neuroscience suggest that consciousness is derived (partially
at least) from a biological system which interacts with a series of physical, historical and (possibly)
linguistic and cultural factors.

THE EMERGENTIST ALTERNATIVE

Claytons emergence is plural in nature. Consciousness is not the only emerging level. Indeed,
to a certain extent, it is simply one of a long series of steps which characterise the evolutionary
process. The human mind and consciousness represent a particularly interesting and complex
evolutionary level, which encompasses humanitys whole intellectual, cultural, artistic and religious
existence. However, consciousness does not represent any one single, absolutely new manifestation
in the history of evolution; indeed, conscious phenomena share important similarities with other
emerging realities that appeared in much earlier stages of said history.

The thesis of Mind & Emergence is that the days of forced dilemma between physicalism
and dualism are over
A fairly common but nevertheless false point of view, in Claytons opinion, is that there are only
two basic ways of interpreting the world: the physicalist world-picture, and the dualist one. This
erroneous belief is rooted in the confrontation between Newtonian physics and the metaphysical systems
comprising Greek, Christian and medieval elements, which still remained dominant in the 17th century.
For Clayton, the current philosophical view of the world has three roots. The first is the revolution
provoked in metaphysics by Kant, and sustained by German idealism and process philosophy. The
second is the revolution provoked in the theory of knowledge by non-objectivist epistemologies, the
contextual philosophies of science and the limits inherent to knowledge which were discovered
within the different branches of science itself. And finally, the third root is the current debate on
the dualism-physicalism dichotomy. In his book, Clayton focuses on this third root of philosophical
debate, which is the consequence of the revolution provoked by evolutionary science.
Some of the theses of Claytons emergentist vision are:
(1) Ontological monism: at the end of the day, reality is made up of a single basic type of
matter. However, for Clayton, ontological monism does not mean that the entities postulated
by physics represent the entire inventory of everything which exists. Therefore, for Clayton,
emergentism is monist, but not physicist.
(2) The irreducibility of emergence: emergent properties cannot be reduced to phenomena
which occur at a lower level. An important question for the theory of emergence is that of

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when we can say that a new level emerges. Traditionally, life and mind have been taken
as genuine levels of emergence. But emergence cannot be reduced to these two indisputable
levels, since there may also be a considerable number of other emergence levels. In a recent
book, the Yale biophysicist Harol Morowitz identified no less than 28 different levels of
emergence from the big bang to the present day.
(3) Downward causality: the downward causality of an emergent structure onto its constituting
parts diverges from the standard philosophical treatment of causality in modern science.
This concept of downward causality is a key point of Claytons discussion of strong emergence.

The theory of emergence is not just disguised dualism; rather, it requires certain modifications
to both theism and traditional theologies
The theory of emergence is not just disguised dualism, since it recognises that consciousness is,
to a certain extent, nothing more than another level of emergence. The theory of emergence has
its own logic, and requires certain modifications to traditional theism and traditional theologies.
Clayton identifies eight characteristics of emergence:
(1) Monism: there is a single primordial reality from which all other realities have evolved.
(2) Hierarchical complexity: the world is hierarchically structured.
(3) Emergentist monism: more complex units appear, formed on the basis of other, more
simple ones.
(4) Non-uniform emergence: diverse levels of emergence can be identified which are drastically
different from each other.
(5) Cross-cutting emergence patterns: the majority of emergence leaps share some similar
characteristics.
(6) Downward causality: new emergent objects appear as new causes which act on objects at
a lower level.
(7) Emergent pluralism: downward causality does not imply dualism, but rather pluralism
(Clayton cites Morowitz, who proposes at least 28 levels of emergence).
(8) The mind as an emergent element: Claytons proposal is that there is a two-way interaction
between mind and matter, i.e. from mind to matter and from matter to mind.

Some levels of reality are susceptible to a determinist mathematical explanation (microphysics),


others to explanations that are mathematical but not determinist (quantum physics), and yet others to
explanations centred around the function and development of life structures (all branches of biology,
from genetics to neurophysiology). However, at other levels of social and cultural science, laws play a
less important role, with more idiosyncratic factors taking centre stage. As a result, in these levels,
narrative tends to replace empirical measurement and prediction becomes more difficult. It seems that
a large part of human beings inner life, social interactions and creative expressions are based on this
inner world. It is true that the different branches of social science may share their knowledge of social
and cultural phenomena and thus increase their knowledge over time, and it is also true that natural
science contributes to developing social science, but it does not do so as a mere extension of itself.
The scale of levels of complexity does not end here. People often wonder about the sense and meaning
of their natural and social world. Here again, one level of explanations becomes part of a much broader
whole. And again, thinkers are invited to join in the search for knowledge at a higher level. Is our ability
to find answers enough to respond to all our questions? Cosmology itself asks questions it seems that
physical science will never be able to answer completely: what is the origin of the big bang? Do multiverses
exist? Why are there laws that are valid at all times and in all parts of the universe? In other words,
when do we cross the line that separates the emergent mind from the transcendent mind? And when
we do cross this line, have we reached questions that surpass all the answers we could possibly debate?

EMERGENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE

What are the links between metaphysics and mind? Clayton offers four different metaphysical
approaches from which to tackle the problem of the emergence of the mind.

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1112 J. LEACH, EMERGENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE IN PHILIP CLAYTON

1. Physicalist approach: the mind appeared from matter. According to the physicalist hypothesis,
the appearance of the mind was a happy coincidence. We do not hold beliefs about freedom, values,
rationality and conscious choices because there are (physicalist) reasons for doing so, but rather
because holding them helps us in some aspects of our personal or social life.
2. Contingent emergence: according to this approach, mental causation exists in nature and
physicalism is false. There are different emergent levels in the evolutionary process, but emergence
is a product of evolution that has no metaphysical consequences. According to this approach, the
evolutionary process involves no conscious design or choice.
3. Necessary emergence: emergence is a necessary consequence, but its inevitability can be
explained in a naturalist manner. Scientific reasons exist which delimit the possible results of
evolution. However, these factors do not necessarily prove the existence of an intelligent designer.
Scientists who believe in the necessary delimitation of the evolutionary process, within certain
parameters, comprise theists, atheists and agnostics. This distinguishes them from those who defend
the concept of an intelligent design, who use the scientific data of evolutionary process delimitation
to prove the existence of God. For Clayton, the degree of contingency involved in the evolutionary
process does not prove the existence of God. Thus, one may, for scientific reasons, believe that
evolution is severely delimited from a scientific point of view, and yet remain agnostic.
4. Emergence open to the existence of an intelligent and transcendent being: i.e. the belief that
the universe was created by an intelligent being who wanted the universe to be just as it is. Clayton
calls this way of seeing things theism, and calls the being in which all theists believe God. The novelty
here is that until recently, theists believed that God must have predetermined the result of the world
process, similarly to Laplaces demon. Laplace, with his Newtonian vision, believed that a demon
could know the precise location and momentum of every atom in the universe at any moment.
According to his theory, the demon would therefore be capable of predicting the state of things in
the future, by creating the right particles in the right place at the right time, since both past and future
were predetermined. Given the limitations of the current scientific way of understanding emergence,
we do not know how much control the theist God has over emergence. Perhaps the divine agent
established the physical conditions at the beginning of evolution, so as to ensure that life developed
first, followed by conscious life as the result of a physical necessity. Or alternatively, perhaps God
simply provided an ongoing creative impulse towards conscious life, without determining which type
of life would appear. Arthur Peacocke has provocatively written that God is a composer who writes
the general outline of the piece, but then leaves the musicians to finish developing it. The theologist
Philip Hefner has introduced the idea that human beings are created co-creators who collaborate
with God in his creative work. Alfred North Whitehead defends a correlational model between man
and God, which includes the idea of a divine lure that coincides with the idea of emergence.

DIVINE ACTION

For Clayton, it is impossible to defend miracles in such a way so as not to contradict physics;
however, there is a way of viewing the causal action of God that avoids said conflict: God acts at a
quantum level (assuming that quantum events are ontologically indeterminate), causing the wave
function to collapse in one direction or another, while still maintaining the total distribution of
probability. In this case, no laws are broken. The problem is that we do not, and indeed cannot,
know what actions are taken by God at this level. The physical approach also poses another problem:
if the mental level is anomalous, in the sense that it is not governed by physical laws, then God has
no way of influencing it, although he could make one thought more probable than another.
Miracles may be possible through a suppression of natural laws by God. However, this statement
is not a solution to the problem of divine action. One may believe this at a specific subjective level,
but one would still have to deny the objective level of physical laws.
The problem changes when dealing with human action. In the case of human thought and its
resulting actions, there are no laws which completely determine the decision-making process.
Needless to say, given the structure of the brain, an individuals life history and his or her environment,
some responses are bound to be much more likely than others. But to what extent is divine action

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similar to mental causes, assuming these are understood as emergent elements? Given that human
actions are by nature unpredictable, there are no determining conditions that are broken when
divine force acts upon them.
Here, emergentists encounter a dilemma: emergentist theory may help defend the concept of
divine action, but only if the divine is constructed as a new emergent level in the evolutionary process.
Samuel Alexander defends this point of view. For Alexander, God is not a pre-existent being, but
rather a new type of property, the deity, which appears after a certain degree of complexification.
Looking back over history and seeing how God acts in human minds, two basic strategies can
be identified. Each seeks to find a way to interrelate (among others) three levels of causality: physical
causes, mental causes and divine causes. The first strategy constructs human beings in accordance
with the model of the divine person (or persons); i.e. the biblical model of the creation of man in
Gods image. In this case, the interaction between man and God is not problematic at all, because
both share the same nature. However, this interaction has its price: it states that the human spirit
is different in nature from the physical world, which renders the mind-body interaction impossible.
This solution is known as anthropology of the supernatural soul.
The second approach can be described as the naturalist vision of the human person, and sees
the human person as a phenomenon that occurs naturally in the world. Here, both dualism and its
associated epistemic and ontological problems appear in the relationship between human and divine
causality.
Physics is where we most clearly observe behaviour governed by laws, and there, nothing leads
us to believe that said laws are prompted by intention. Of course, the fact that a downward divine
action is physically undetectable, does not make it impossible. Human actions, on the other hand,
are prompted by intention and are justified by reasoning. While human science does not demand
the presence of a transcendent agent, it does, however, leave room for one. Furthermore, the reference
to a transcendent agent is natural when human beings start wondering about ultimate causes.

CONCLUSION: A NEW ANTHROPOLOGY AND A NEW THEOLOGY

In the study presented in this book, Clayton espouses a school of thought (as an example, see
Claytons work with Paul Davis) that is fairly widespread today in modern science: moving beyond
physicalism (the reductionist science) and dualism (the traditional anthropology in many religious
and theological cosmovisions), emergentism is seen as the best constructed and most easily acceptable
supposition. However, in order to make any headway with this supposition, both reductionist and
religious traditions need to adopt new stances: reductionism needs to move away from its mechanicist-
determinist narrowness and theologies need to reformulate themselves on the basis of ontological
monism. What theologies respond to these new needs for congruence with modern science? Clayton,
as mentioned earlier, defends process philosophy-theology, but does not seem to be at all radical in
his way of understanding those areas in which this theology has most trouble reconciling itself with
the traditional orthodox doctrine of the Christian Churches (i.e. the idea of God the creator or the
way in which we understand divine omnipotence and omniscience).

[Texto bsico publicado en Tendencias21.net, JAVIER LEACH


por la Ctedra CTR, Escuela Tcnica Superior de Ingeniera,
Universidad Comillas, Madrid]

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MAJESTAD Y MISERIA DE LA TEORA DE CUERDAS


Frente a sus crticos cabe defender su legitimidad
cientfico-metafsica

GUILLERMO ARMENGOL
Universidad Comillas de Madrid

Un artculo de Glenn Statile en The Global Spiral nos ofrece la ocasin de plantear un tema
de actualidad cientfica que esconde la discusin de fondo sobre la tendencia de la fsica te-
rica en los prximos aos. Es evidente que la teora de cuerdas ha representado en los lti-
mos treinta aos una aventura cientfica extraordinaria que muestra algo que ya era claro
para los epistemlogos de la ciencia: que sta no consiste slo en experimentos sino en cons-
truccin de teoras. La teorizacin es no slo legtima, sino esencial e insustituible en la cien-
cia. El cansancio hacia la teora de cuerdas se debe, ante todo, a la dificultad en hallar evi-
dencias empricas que permitan someterla a prueba, de acuerdo con los mtodos experimentales
ordinarios de la ciencia. Pero, en todo caso, pensamos que debemos defender y esta es al
parecer la posicin que sostiene tambin Glenn Statile la legitimidad y necesidad no slo
cientfica, sino incluso metafsica de una especulacin teortica (u otra similar) del orden de
lo que ha sido la teora de cuerdas.

REPOSA EL MUNDO SOBRE UNA CUERDA?

Quiz alguien pudo pensar que cuando Frank Sinatra hace unos aos cantaba que sostena el
mundo sobre una cuerda, apoyaba uno de los proyectos tericos ms importantes de la fsica de
los ltimos veinte aos del siglo XX. Lo ms probable es que Sinatra no conociera la existencia de
la teora de cuerdas. Sin embargo, s es un hecho que la doctrina polticamente correcta de las lti-
mas dcadas ha credo que nuestro mundo, en efecto, se sostiene en unos eventos primordiales que
conocemos como cuerdas o supercuerdas. Sin embargo, una ola de recientes crticas a estos
complejos supuestos tericos, nos obliga a preguntarnos, ha comenzado ya la decadencia de la
teora de supercuerdas?
Glenn Statile pertenece a la St. John University de Nueva York. Su campo de especializacin
es la historia y filosofa de la ciencia; en esta perspectiva se ha introducido en la reflexin sobre rela-
ciones entre la ciencia y la religin, entrando en contacto con el Metanexus Institute for Science and
Religion de Philadelphia, editor de The Global Spiral. En su reciente artculo The Majesty and Misery
of String Theory, Statile se hace eco de las recientes crticas a la teora de cuerdas, pero defiende la
posicin de que, ms all de estas crticas, por descontado respetables, esta teora es legtima, aun-
que quiz por su falta de falsabilidad experimental pueda considerarse la conveniencia o no de lla-
marla cientfica. En nuestra opinin, la especulacin terica forma parte intrnseca de la ciencia,
ya que sta no es slo investigacin puramente emprica. Primero, no tenemos pruebas de que la
teora de cuerdas no sea en ltimo trmino correcta y en el futuro en alguna manera constatable.
Segundo, plantearse un proyecto del orden de la teora de cuerdas es necesario para la ciencia y su
importancia va incluso ms all de lo cientfico para proyectarse tambin sobre lo metafsico y lo
religioso.
En nuestra opinin, la opinin de Statile es matizada, permite acceder al problema de fondo
que hoy se plantea y es digna de comentario, aunque en algunos aspectos deba ser tambin discu-
tida. Nosotros creemos que, en efecto, la teora de cuerdas ha nacido de una necesidad teortica de
la ciencia. Las preguntas que la han hecho nacer tienen sentido; pero si se llega a considerarla una
respuesta inviable, sera necesario especular sobre las alternativas de repuesto. Sera muy difcil
que esas nuevas alternativas u otros campos de la fsica no hicieran uso, en alguna manera, de
una parte sustancial de la especulacin producida en teora de supercuerdas (sobre todo matem-
tica) que, en este sentido, no habra resultado histricamente intil.

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1116 G. ARMENGOL, MAJESTAD Y MISERIA DE LA TEORA DE CUERDAS

CIENCIA REAL O CIENCIA FICCIN

Para Statile es quiz una actitud excesivamente crtica y poco elegante decir hoy que la teora
de cuerdas es una teora desorientada que camina hacia no se sabe donde. Es verdad que podra ser
un cuento desmesurado con un complicado argumento matemtico ya casi inasequible. Pero podra
ser tambin un intento justificado por hallar la esencia de la realidad material en sus niveles ms
profundos y primigenios; es decir, los bloques bsicos de la naturaleza en su proceso germinal pri-
migenio. Un intento, en definitiva, de proponer una teora sobre aquellos eventos primordiales que
sucedieron en dimensiones microfsicas mucho ms all de la era de Plank; es decir, en aquellos
niveles en que la realidad nace como vibraciones primigenias que hubieran producido ms adelante
las primeras formas corpuscular-ondulatorias ya en alguna manera detectables en el mundo ase-
quible a la investigacin cientfica ordinaria, respaldada por evidencias empricas controlables.
Por otra parte, las hiptesis y conjeturas primordiales de la teora de cuerdas o mejor, el con-
junto de diferentes teoras de cuerdas existentes han conducido a establecer complejas propues-
tas tericas sobre las variables y dimensiones que seran necesarias para describir este nacimiento
y evolucin de las vibraciones primordiales. Al atribuir valores cuantitativos a esta compleja estruc-
tura de dimensiones fsicas, concebidas tericamente, la teora de cuerdas ha conducido a exten-
derse hacia la llamada Magic-Theory (teora M) en que se unificaran todas las teoras y se especu-
lara, para muchos exticamente y ms all del sentido comn, con la existencia paralela de mltiples
universos causalmente separados y aislados del nuestro. Es sabido que la actual teora de multi-
versos tiene en su referencia a la teora de cuerdas uno de sus apoyos especulativos ms firmes. Sin
embargo, para muchos se ha ido cayendo en una especulacin desmedida y pintoresca que nos intro-
duce en la imaginacin de mundos inverosmiles cuya existencia es difcil de aceptar.
De esta manera, sin esperanzas de hallar comprobaciones empricas y en deriva hacia ese derro-
tero especulativo hacia mundos inverosmiles, la teora de cuerdas, despus de treinta aos de
esforzado trabajo y de imponer la ley de lo polticamente correcto, parece haber entrado en una
nueva situacin en que le crecen los enanos por todas partes. Algunos creen que David Hume
hubiera recomendado que la teora de cuerdas fuera arrojada a las llamas, junto con otros dudosos
y excesivamente teatrales dolos de la razn (mind).
Podemos aventurarnos a decir, afirma Statile, que la teora de cuerdas es al mismo tiempo
miserable y majestuosa como teora de la realidad material. Miserable, en el sentido de llena de
deficiencias, por su falta de confirmacin experimental y por su imaginacin desbordada que roza
para muchos la frontera hacia lo inverosmil. Majestuosa por su impresionante ambicin de cons-
tituir una reconstruccin racional completa de la gnesis de la realidad material. Pero para Statile
esta majestuosidad podra tener, ms all de lo cientfico, incluso una proyeccin metafsica ms
profunda.
Si la teora de cuerdas fuera en alguna manera capaz superar sus muchos problemas, enton-
ces para los creyentes religiosos su verdadera majestuosidad consistira no meramente en su capa-
cidad explicativa en relacin a la realidad material, ni en su exitosa unificacin de todas las fuer-
zas naturales incluyendo la gravedad, sino en que podra constituir posiblemente una profunda
seal material hacia una realidad que no es de este mundo. Sin embargo, aun sabiendo que la teo-
ra de cuerdas puede ofrecer soluciones cientficas a problemas cientficos, todos sabemos tambin
que ninguna teora puramente cientfica puede nunca ofrecer nada que se acerque a un slido fun-
damento metafsico. Statile entiende, pues, que la reflexin que lleva la teora de cuerdas hacia la
metafsica no es ciencia sino filosofa.
Para Statile, por tanto, est claro que la teora de cuerdas por s misma no permite extraer con-
secuencias metafsicas que pertenecen a otro tipo de discurso. Las consideraciones de Statile, que
expondremos ms adelante, se internan en esa reflexin que, ms all de lo puramente cientfico,
se introduce en lo metafsico y lo religioso.
Mi intencin en este ensayo es la de mediar entre ambas caras de la moneda de la teora de
cuerdas, la miserable y la de su posibilidad de ser majestuosa. Primeramente tomar partido por
aquellos que mantienen que la teora de cuerdas no merece el status de una teora cientfica, pero,
en segundo lugar, pondr en consideracin las credenciales de la teora de cuerdas en relacin con
el mbito de la religin.

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G. ARMENGOL, MAJESTAD Y MISERIA DE LA TEORA DE CUERDAS 1117

CUANDO LA MATEMTICA SE ENMASCARA DE CIENCIA

Edward Witten fue uno de los grandes maestros de la revolucin de las cuerdas en sus prime-
ros tiempos. Hace ya veinte aos hizo la sugerencia de que la teora de cuerdas era futurista, vin-
dolos como una especulacin del siglo XXI que accidentalmente trataba de gestionar su entrada en
la ciencia a destiempo. Ni siquiera la matemtica necesaria para la teora de cuerdas haba sido
inventada en el tiempo de su nacimiento. Naci adems de forma muy distinta a la teora de la rela-
tividad, sin una idea clara del modelo de realidad que deba describir matemticamente.
Mientras que Einstein aplic la geometra no-eucldea de Riemann para dar expresin a su
intuicin previa de una equivalencia fsica entre aceleracin y gravedad, la teora de cuerdas fue
introducida como una teora matemtica todava en busca de una intuicin fsica anloga a la que
haba guiado a Einstein, nos dice Statile.
La matemtica es ciertamente un poderoso instrumento para la descripcin del mundo. Pero una
cosa es la matemtica, otra el mundo fsico y otra la capacidad de la matemtica para modelizarlo.
En el caso de la teora de cuerdas el escepticismo surge muy pronto para todo aquel que busca corro-
borar los fantasmas intoxicadores de la imaginacin matemtica, nos dice Statile.

LA TEORA DE CUERDAS Y SUS CRTICOS

Debemos recordar el dicho de que la ausencia de evidencia no es evidencia de la ausencia. As,


la teora de cuerdas no es refutada simplemente por el hecho de que sus predicciones no hayan sido
confirmadas por la ciencia experimental. Sin embargo, cosa que no pasaba tiempo atrs, la cre-
ciente lista de sus crticos es hoy impresionante.
El premio Nobel Sheldon Glashow habl contra lo que vio como mgicas coincidencias y
milagrosas supresiones que toman forma en la teora de cuerdas y que la hacen parecer como si
la matemtica y la esttica suplantaran y trascendieran el experimento. Lawrence Krauss, de la
Case Western Reserve University, de Cleveland, se refiere a la teora de cuerdas como un colosal
error. El reciente libro de Lee Smolin titulado The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory,
The Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next, puede servir como antdoto a los muchos libros y ar-
tculos de los ltimos aos han servido una dieta continua de ideas prometedoras todava incum-
plidas, dirigidas por ahora a un pblico cientfico aturdido de tanto or hablar de las cuerdas. Pero
ha sido quiz el conocido enfant terrible de la fsica, Richard Feyman, el ms impactante de todos
en su denuncia de las deficiencias empricas de la teora de cuerdas al indicar que los tericos de
cuerdas no hacen predicciones, slo ofrecen excusas. Murray Gell-Mann se refiri a la teora de
cuerdas como una mostruosidad matemtica en la forma de un self abuse, aunque es verdad que en
otras ocasiones fue ms conciliador. La terica de partculas de Harvard Lisa Randall, al igual que
Leonard Susskind, han ido tambin muy recientemente severos crticos de la teora de cuerdas.
Frente a la situacin que, en los ltimos aos, ha venido imponiendo en mbitos universitarios y
de investigacin el dogma polticamente correcto de la teora de cuerdas, es hoy creciente el nme-
ro de cientficos de primera lnea sin olvidar a Penrose que han expuesto y siguen exponiendo
sus objeciones rigurosas a la teora.
Ni siquiera como pura concepcin matemtica est la teora de cuerdas libre de problemas. Su
complejidad matemtica la reduce a una bsqueda de soluciones aproximadas a ecuaciones apro-
ximadas. Una teora que permite mltiples versiones que llevan adems a ms de 10500 soluciones
alternativas posibles debe enfrentarse ciertamente con el principio taxativo de la navaja de Ockam.
Esto ha llevado a la necesidad de unificar y concebir una macroteora de cuerdas, la Magic Theory
(teora M), no menos fantstica, de la que las mltiples versiones de la teora de cuerdas podran
derivarse. Mltiples universos seran posibles. El nuestro sera slo la realizacin de una de estas
posibilidades; pero no el nico universo, puesto que se postulara la existencia de un cuasi-infinito
nmero de universos paralelos. La viabilidad real de probar esta cadena de supuestos altamente
imaginativos son en la prctica imposibles de alcanzar. No slo ahora, sino tambin en el futuro.
Ni siquiera en los proyectos europeos para la experimentacin en colisin de partculas (CERN)
queda claro lo que se podra constatar, cmo se debera interpretar y si en realidad constituira una
evidencia indirecta de la teora de cuerdas.

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1118 G. ARMENGOL, MAJESTAD Y MISERIA DE LA TEORA DE CUERDAS

Como Lee Smolin ha observado, la astronoma tolemaica produjo en su tiempo importantes


avances en matemticas y en el diseo de instrumentos astronmicos. Sin embargo, estos avances
no bastaron para convencernos de la conformidad entre la teora y la naturaleza; la teora tolemai-
ca, en efecto, acab mostrndose como incorrecta. La teora de cuerdas ha producido igualmente
avances matemticos incuestionables, aplicados en diversas ramas de la fsica. Pero esto no es nin-
guna garanta de que la imagen de la realidad fsica que nos ofrece, o sea, la teora en su conjunto,
acaben por confirmarse como correctos. La teora de cuerdas podra desaparecer como desapare-
ci la teora tolemaica. En la actualidad no hay evidencia de que la teora de cuerdas sea falsa, pero
tampoco hay evidencia de que describa correctamente la realidad. No sera mejor dejar que la teo-
ra de cuerdas muriera con dignidad, manteniendo su status como especulacin de alto nivel, para
situar la ciencia con realismo en el marco de lo verificable?

TEORA DE CUERDAS, METAFSICA, TESMO

Teoras cientficas de la ambicin de la teora-del-todo (Theories of Everything) o de la teora de


cuerdas (que en el fondo es tambin una teora del todo) llevan el conocimiento humano a las fron-
teras del conocimiento natural. En ellas se especula con el nacimiento mismo de la realidad fsica,
ya en sus fronteras ontolgicas con lo absoluto, la ultimidad metafsica y la posible existencia en
esa dimensin trascendente que se afirma en el pensamiento testa.
Para Statile, la teora de cuerdas tiene la fuerza de llevarnos al momento en que lo natural y
lo sobrenatural o bien entran en contacto, o bien se refuerzan uno a otro. Para la gente religiosa la
teora de cuerdas, en caso de que fuera ciencia de bona fide y ltimamente correcta, no puede ser
anatema para la religin. Como Ralph Waldo Emerson seala: la religin que teme a la ciencia es
un insulto a Dios y comete suicidio.
Gerald Clever de la Baylor University, importante terico de cuerdas, escribe que la teora de
cuerdas, si es correcta, nos enfrenta con los trazos de la obra de Dios en la creacin. Ms que la
msica de las esferas, toda la creacin est literalmente compuesta por la msica de las cuerdas.
Clever nos describe as la majestuosidad testa de la teora de cuerdas.
Leonard Susskind, uno de los arquitectos iniciales de la teora de cuerdas, se ha convertido tam-
bin en defensor de una nueva evocacin del Principio Antrpico fundado en la teora de cuerdas.
Significa esto que un diseo teleolgico, obra de un desconocido autor, debiera inscribirse en la
fbrica del universo? Para Susskind, nos dice Statile, el mecanismo conocido como inflacin ince-
sante, que representa una reproduccin exponencial del espacio que engendra universos nacientes,
unido al pleno desarrollo de la Magic Theory, no slo permite, sino incluso exige un horizonte con-
sistente en un indescribible, pero finito, nmero de universos en los que la probabilidad impone
que el surgimiento de un universo apto para producir vida inteligente sea prcticamente igual a 1.
Para Statile la posicin de Susskind es probablemente antrpica slo en el nombre. Sin
embargo, apunta la necesidad testa de permitir la posible existencia de muchos ms niveles inter-
medios de causas eficientes que los descubiertos hasta ahora, si se intenta dar cuenta del ajuste pre-
ciso de varias constantes y otros parmetros fsicos situados entre nuestra realidad csmica pre-
sente y su primigenio origen causal. Susskind pensara, pues, que el diseo del universo supondra
el diseo de un proceso ms amplio de multiuniversos que acabara produciendo el preciso ajuste
de nuestro universo real apto para la vida. El diseo de un universo antrpico por Dios implicara
as el diseo de un proceso generador de multiuniversos. Sin embargo, la pregunta que parece que-
dar planteada por Statile es si ese universo singular situado en un horizonte de multiuniversos nece-
sitara un diseo en sentido testa. Por esto considera Statile que el anlisis de Susskind podra ser
antrpico slo de nombre.
Statile considera que hay otra forma de conectar la teora de cuerdas con la metafsica testa:
es la consideracin de que las cuerdas no son cosas materiales. Las partculas materiales resul-
tan de la vibracin de las cuerdas. Pero para los tericos de cuerdas, stas no son partculas pun-
tuales; por tanto, para Statile es fcil concluir que deben ser algn tipo de componentes esenciales,
pero en ningn caso materiales, del universo. As, Gerald Clever entiende tambin las cuerdas como
pura energa. Para Michio Aku la materia, siguiendo a Einstein, sera una condensacin de ener-

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G. ARMENGOL, MAJESTAD Y MISERIA DE LA TEORA DE CUERDAS 1119

ga. La equivalencia materia-energa no debera ser entendida, pues, como una equivalencia cuali-
tativa. Statile cree poder citar a Brian Green para decir que las cuerdas energticas seran funda-
mentales para la materia, pero no seran ellas mismas materiales.
Statile recuerda finalmente que los filsofos presocrticos aportaron ya la idea de que la mate-
rialidad no es suficiente para explicar la existencia del mundo material. La primera crtica filos-
fica seria del materialismo fue por descontado Anaximandro que sostuvo que el Apeiron inmaterial
era la ltima fuente de la realidad material. Incluso los mismos ultra-materialistas filsofos ato-
mistas deban suponer la existencia de un vaco real, aunque inmaterial, en el que los tomos po-
dan tener marco suficiente en el que colisionar. En obras como Philosophical Problems of Quan-
tum Physics y Physics and Philosophy, Werner Heisenberg insisti en documentar sus dudas sobre
el carcter material de las partculas elementales. La teora de cuerdas, por tanto, pone de mani-
fiesto el error de la creencia fundamentalista del materialismo acerca de que nada existe fuera de
la materia y de sus diversas manifestaciones. Hace aos que Gilbert Ryle intent argir a favor del
materialismo al negar el supuesto de un fantasma en la mquina. Si la teora de cuerdas prevale-
ciera eventualmente, entonces esta negacin podra mostrarse como falsa, no precisamente porque
no haya ningn fantasma, sino porque, en ltimo trmino, no habra ninguna mquina.

PRECISANDO ALGUNOS CONCEPTOS

Las reflexiones de Statile se hacen eco, en efecto, de la actual discusin sobre la teora de cuer-
das. Son un buen hilo conductor para entender cules son los problemas que hoy afectan a una teo-
ra tan compleja. Sin embargo, la dificultad misma de valorarla y emitir un dictamen crtico, as
como las opiniones de Statile, nos llevan a concluir con algunas observaciones:
1) La ciencia debe explicar, o sea, conocer las causas que han llevado al universo fsico de nues-
tra experiencia. Se ha explicado hasta ahora por teoras no unificadas como la relativista y la cunti-
ca. Si los supuestos considerados en el modelo cosmolgico estndar sobre la naturaleza del big
bang (fundados en una argumentacin emprica y contrastables en alguna manera) no bastan para
explicar cmo naci el universo (armonizando lo relativista y lo cuntico) la ciencia debe especular y
establecer hiptesis sobre la gnesis de un universo cuntico-relativista. La dificultad en constrastar
hiptesis tan especulativas no les quita legitimidad como ciencia terica. Si el macroconstructo espe-
culativo-terico de la teora de cuerdas no gustara (quiz por su dificilsima o imposible contras-
tabilidad, por su intrnseca complejidad, o por sus supuestos inverosmiles), habra que buscarle alter-
nativas mejor construidas y, sobre todo, ms simples (twistors de Penrose, loop quantum gravity, u
otras que puedan proponerse).
2) No creemos apropiada la argumentacin de Statile cuando dice que las cuerdas nos llevar-
an a una realidad que no es de este mundo, o que las cuerdas no son cosas materiales. Ya en la fsi-
ca de principios de siglo XX estaba claro que la realidad fsica se manifestaba de dos maneras: como
cuerpos (digamos materia) y radiacin (fenmenos de campo, calor, electromagnetismo, luz).
Ambos fenmenos, que la mecnica cuntica unific en la dualidad corpsculo-onda, forman parte
de este mundo y de la realidad fsica. La radiacin, aunque no sea cuerpo material, puede encap-
sularse y producir partculas-cuerpos (as sucede en los instantes posteriores al big bang, tal como
reconstruye el modelo cosmolgico estndar). Creemos que esto mismo debera aplicarse a las hipo-
tticas supercuerdas. La vibracin, incluso en los germinales supuestos de la teora de cuerdas, sera
materializable y formara parte de los constituyentes reales de este mundo fsico. Otra cosa es que
los fenmenos de campo, como la coherencia cuntica, se consideren hoy ms aptos para expli-
car la naturaleza del psiquismo. Pero el psiquismo sera de este mundo y tendra propiedades deri-
vadas de la ontologa de la materia corpuscular-ondulatoria de este mundo.
3) Parece correcto advertir que al entender el universo a partir de ciertos eventos vibratorios
(no corpusculares), bien en la teora de cuerdas o en la teora cuntica ordinaria, se contempla su
gnesis y su disolucin. Al estar construida la estructura consistente del universo sobre esta estruc-
tura finsima de eventos inconsistentes (que en su orden primigenio ms pequeo seran las cuer-
das) parece necesario que la teora necesite un fondo de referencia (del que brotan y en el que se
diluyen) estas vibraciones en un campo que van construyendo el universo ordenado. Este fondo o

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1120 G. ARMENGOL, MAJESTAD Y MISERIA DE LA TEORA DE CUERDAS

campo fsico real se ha entendido bajo las ms variadas formas conceptuales: peiron (Anaxi-
mandro, que menciona Statile), vaco cuntico, fondo de energa, ter, espacio, orden implcito, etc.
Este fondo se conceptua como realidad fsica, material en germen (porque genera las vibraciones
que producen la materia ferminica del mundo diferenciado y estable de los cuerpos), y pertenece
para la ciencia fsica a este mundo. Pero es comprensible que, la argumentacin filosfica testa
(no cientfica) relacione e interprete esta ontologa fsica de fondo con la ontologa divina. En este
sentido es comprensible que la nueva ontologa de la fsica haga al pensamiento testa ms veros-
mil la existencia de esa realidad fundante trascendente e inmanente (panentenista) que llamamos
Dios.
4) Si la teora de cuerdas acabara por confirmarse y debiramos pensar que el universo de ha
formado a partir de un fondo fsico en el que han ido producindose alteraciones vibratorias que
han dado origen puntual a indefinibles multiuniversos (universos burbuja), esta concepcin de las
cosas sera tambin conciliable con un pensamiento testa, aunque es claro que la hiptesis atesta
sera tambin obviamente posible. La fsica entendera, en el atesmo, que ese fondo de energa
del que brotan los multiuniversos sera pura realidad fsica. Pero el tesmo, pues, podra enten-
der alternativamente, dentro de su interpretacin, que el diseo que conduce al hombre es el dise-
o antrpico de la produccin de multiuniversos, tal como parece concebir Susskind. Pero si la
realidad fsica fuera en efecto obra de una Divinidad creadora, siempre parecera ms fcil, apli-
cando el criterio de la navaja de Ockam, que Dios hubiera creado un universo nico cuyas cons-
tantes y variables respondieran por diseo al ajuste preciso necesario para producir un universo
antrpico que produce al hombre (o sea, el nuestro). Sin embargo, aunque el universo creado fuera
nico en realidad, sin embargo, el hombre racional desde el interior de ese universo, podra con-
cebir hipottica y especulativamente la existencia posible de multiuniversos (cuya existencia real
nunca llegara a probarse porque en realidad no existen).

[Texto bsico publicado en Tendencias21.net, GUILLERMO ARMENGOL


por la Ctedra CTR, Escuela Tcnica Superior de Ingeniera,
Universidad Comillas, Madrid]

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FRANCISCO DE ASS Y LA ECOLOGA


Actualidad de su experiencia de fraternidad csmica

EDUARDO GARCA PEREGRN


Departamento de Bioqumica y Biologa Molecular I,
Universidad de Granada

Generalmente se ha considerado que el Cntico de las criaturas representa uno de los


logros ms importantes de la espiritualidad de Francisco de Ass, en el que puso de manifiesto
una profunda reconciliacin entre el cielo y la tierra, entre la vida y la muerte, entre el uni-
verso y Dios. A pesar de estar escrito en el siglo XIII, todava se tiene como una de las joyas de
la poesa occidental y de la mstica de la naturaleza.

Se trata del canto de un hombre que durante toda su vida luch para lograr un poco ms de fra-
ternidad entre sus conciudadanos y para que se hiciera visible la humanidad de Dios. Francisco
aprendi a contemplar los seres vivos y las cosas de una forma ingenua, sencilla, fraterna. Dej de
verlos desde el ngulo de su valor comercial, como se haca en su tiempo y se sigue haciendo en
gran parte hoy, para considerarlos criaturas de Dios y, por tanto, dignos de inters por s mismos.
Francisco cant para mostrarles a los hombres la tierra fraternal, liberada del dominio del dinero
y de toda servidumbre.

LA FRATERNIDAD CON LAS PERSONAS

Todas las biografas ms antiguas de Francisco coinciden en destacar la estrecha unin que
estableca con todas las personas y todas las cosas. Pero este torbellino de fraternidad no naci de
un modo intemporal, sino que coincide con la revolucin social que se estaba produciendo en su
tiempo y con la revolucin personal que supuso su encuentro con los pobres y los leprosos. En este
sentido, se cuenta que pas tres aos dedicado a atenderlos a la vez que restauraba la capilla de San
Damin, hasta que un 24 de febrero, festividad de San Matas, escuch el evangelio de la misin de
los Doce (Mt. 10,5-10) y comprendi que Dios no le peda que restaurara iglesias ruinosas, sino la
Iglesia viva y sus ruinas humanas Y el Seor le dio hermanos, con los que fund su primera fra-
ternidad. Era la primavera de 1208.

LA FRATERNIDAD CON LAS CRIATURAS

Francisco ampli su fraternidad fuera de los lmites de lo humano para llegar al mundo de los ani-
males y al mundo de los vegetales. Todas las biografas escritas en los aos siguientes a su muerte des-
tacan unnimemente la amigable unin que Francisco estableca con todas las criaturas. La fraterni-
dad en Francisco no slo se humaniza, sino que se hace universal. Son mltiples los detalles que se
nos han transmitido sobre cmo Francisco viva esta fraternidad: en su trato con las plantas, con los
animales, etc. As, sus bigrafos sealan que andaba sobre las piedras en atencin a Aqul que se haba
llamado piedra a s mismo; recoga las babosas de los caminos para que no fueran pisadas por la gente;
daba miel y vino a las abejas en el invierno para que no muriesen de fro y de hambre. Con su enor-
me optimismo, prest al mundo un servicio inapreciable que los poetas y dems hombres tendremos
siempre que agradecer. Y esto, en una poca en la que especialmente los ctaros haban despertado
las sombras del maniquesmo, considerando intrnsecamente mala a la materia.

LA FRATERNIDAD CSMICA

Francisco dio un paso ms en el concepto de fraternidad. Ya no se tratara slo de las criaturas


vivientes, sino que ampli el crculo a todo el cosmos, a toda la creacin. Y no solamente a la creacin

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1122 E. GARCA, FRANCISCO DE ASS Y LA ECOLOGA

material, sino tambin a la inmaterial pero existente y, por tanto, tambin hermana. Como veamos
al principio, la demostracin ms elevada de ese sentido de fraternidad csmica lo podemos observar
en el Cntico de la criaturas. En este cntico, Leonardo Boff ha querido ver, sobre todo, una snte-
sis afortunada entre ecologa interior y ecologa exterior. Su estructura revela el encuentro de la uni-
dad global, entrecruzndose dos lneas: una vertical en la que se dirige a Dios y otra horizontal en la
que estima que, si por nuestra minoridad no podemos hablar directamente con Dios, s podemos hacer-
lo con las criaturas en las que Francisco ve la presencia de Dios, considerndolas sacramentos de Dios.
As, la primera estrofa va dirigida directamente a Dios y las siguientes tambin a Dios, pero por medio
de las criaturas, organizadas en parejas masculinas-femeninas: el sol y la luna, el viento y el agua, el
fuego y la tierra. El Dios al que Francisco se dirige es un Dios pequeo a pesar de su magnitud; no es
un Dios lejano, sino que es un Dios cercano. Sin embargo, en su minoridad, Francisco percibe que no
puede cantar directamente a Dios; por eso lo hace a travs de las criaturas. As canta al hermano sol
al que lo considera seor, pero como tambin ha sido creado por Dios, no deja de ser hermano. Y lo
mismo a la luna, al viento, al agua, al fuego y a la Tierra, considerada por Francisco como madre, pero
que por haber sido creada por Dios es tambin hermana. Finalmente, la hermana muerte corporal, a
la que no teme, sino que la considera una hermana que viene a abrirle las puertas de la eternidad. Por
eso, Francisco se abraza a la muerte porque es una hermana, portadora de una vida ms amplia e
inmortal. No hay por qu temer; poda abrazarla. Francisco acaba su vida reconcilindose as con la
muerte.

FUNDAMENTOS DE LA FRATERNIDAD EN FRANCISCO

Simplificando mucho las cosas, podramos decir que lo que fundamenta el concepto y la vivencia
de la fraternidad en Francisco es su imagen de Dios y su imagen del hombre y, especialmente, la rela-
cin entre ambas. Francisco no fue un telogo ni mucho menos. l se consideraba un iletrado; por
eso nunca pretendi ejercer de telogo. Sin embargo, es interesante destacar que el Dios de Francis-
co es un Dios Padre, un Dios cercano, el abba de Jess. Es un Dios dbil y pequeo, pero que asu-
mi nuestra condicin para mostrar la grandeza de la condicin humana. Es un Dios Padre creador
de todas las cosas, a las que ama porque las ha creado buenas, como podemos leer en Sab. 11. Por
otra parte, se ha dicho que la antropologa de Francisco est cargada de dimensiones teolgicas, por
la cercana que encuentra entre el hombre y Dios o entre Dios y el hombre. Para Francisco, el hom-
bre es fundamentalmente un hermano, sobre todo un hermano menor, siervo y al vez corts, libre por-
que es pobre, alegre con la alegra de sentirse en comunin con la creacin, compasivo y misericor-
dioso, etc.

ACTUALIDAD DE LA EXPERIENCIA DE FRATERNIDAD CSMICA EN FRANCISCO

De acuerdo con E. Haeckel, su primer definidor, la ecologa es el estudio de la inter-retro-rela-


cin de todos los seres vivos y no vivos entre s y con su medio ambiente. Por tanto, no se trata de
estudiar por separado el medio ambiente y los seres vivos y no vivos, sino hacerlo desde la globa-
lidad de su interaccin mutua. Cada vez est ms aceptado que un ser vivo no puede ser conside-
rado aisladamente como un simple representante de su especie, sino que tiene que verse en rela-
cin y en equilibrio con los dems representantes de la comunidad de vivientes y con las condiciones
en que se desarrollan. De aqu que, en la actualidad, se suelen distinguir tres niveles o tipos de eco-
loga:
a) Una ecologa ambiental, que trata del medio ambiente y de las relaciones que los seres vivos,
especialmente el hombre, establecen con l.
b) Una ecologa social, que se ocupa de las relaciones derivadas de la consideracin del hom-
bre como un ser social.
c) Una ecologa mental, que se fundamenta en el hecho de que la naturaleza no es algo exte-
rior al ser humano, sino interior; es de la mente de donde surgen los patrones de compor-
tamiento que se concretan en actitudes de defensa o de agresin a la naturaleza.

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E. GARCA, FRANCISCO DE ASS Y LA ECOLOGA 1123

LA ECOLOGA AMBIENTAL EN FRANCISCO DE ASS

La Declaracin de Ro de Janeiro de 1992 acabada diciendo que la salvacin del planeta y de


sus pueblos, de hoy y de maana, requiere la elaboracin de un nuevo proyecto de civilizacin que
debe ser construido sinergticamente por todos. La ecologa no puede reducirse al campo verde
de la naturaleza, sino que se basa en las relaciones que todos los seres, principalmente los seres
vivos, mantienen ente s y con su entorno. Por eso se ha dicho que hoy hemos llegado a un punto
en que o nos salvamos todos o nos perdemos todos.
La visin moderna del mundo que nos est proporcionando la fsica cuntica, la biologa mole-
cular o la propia ecologa nos debe llevar a comprender que todo tiene que ver con todo, que estamos
envueltos en una red de relaciones y que nada ni nadie existe fuera de esas relaciones. Segn la fsica
cuntica, toda la materia del universo deriva de las mismas partculas elementales de las cuales slo
cuatro parecen ser estables: el protn, el electrn, el fotn y el neutrn. Como resultado de la atrac-
cin de las cargas opuestas de los protones y electrones surgen los tomos. Como dira F. Betto, lo
que sustenta al tomo es una cuestin de amor. A su vez, de la combinacin de los tomos surgen
las diferentes molculas de que est hecho todo nuestro mundo. El agua est formada por un tomo
de oxigeno y dos de hidrgeno; al aire est formado por tomos de nitrgeno, oxgeno, carbono, hidr-
geno, etc. La tierra, las plantas, los animales todo est formado por tomos mantenidos por esa espe-
cie de amor o atraccin bsica.
A escala celular, la bioqumica y la biologa molecular nos estn diciendo que cada una de las
miles de molculas que existen en cada una de nuestras clulas tiene una estructura determinada
que hace que sea la ms apropiada para llevar a cabo una funcin determinada, de tal modo que
entre ellas se establece una relacin que las hace a todas igualmente necesarias y que, a su vez, se
encuentra perfectamente regulada para que funcionen como un todo orgnico y armnico. Pero
no olvidemos que cada molcula es el resultado de un abrazo amoroso entre sus tomos consti-
tuyentes, y que, a su vez, las molculas se funden en otro abrazo amoroso para formar las clu-
las, y stas igualmente los tejidos, los rganos y los sistemas de un organismo.
Por otra parte, dada la complejidad de los seres vivos, cada da est ms aceptado en el campo
de las ciencias de la vida lo que se ha dado en llamar el principio hologramtico, que viene a decir
que en las partes est presente el todo y el todo est en las partes. Por eso, el sentido actual de eco-
loga implica el pensar siempre holsticamente, convencindonos de que la totalidad no es slo la
suma de las partes, sino fundamentalmente la interdependencia orgnica de todos los elementos.
La ecologa actual tiene que ser holstica o no ser ecologa. La ecologa se entiende hoy como rela-
cin, de tal manera que no existe nada fuera de la relacin, porque todo tiene que ver con todo, en
todos los momentos y en todas las circunstancias.
Este sentido relacional est tambin presente en la antropologa actual. Se ha definido el hom-
bre como un nudo de relaciones, en todas las direcciones: hacia lo alto, hacia Dios; hacia los lados,
hacia sus hermanos; hacia abajo, hacia la tierra; hacia dentro, hacia su corazn.
Pues bien, en este mbito es donde se mueve Francisco de Ass. Pero con algo aadido. Para Fran-
cisco, el hombre no es slo un nudo de relaciones sino que es un nudo de relaciones cordiales. La
cordialidad es una caracterstica fundamental de Francisco: todo est unido a su corazn. Eso da
lugar a que su experiencia de fraternidad represente el ms vivo ejemplo de una antropologa de rela-
cin y, sobre todo, de cordialidad con todos los seres. Es una antropologa que sabe sentir el cora-
zn de las cosas, para lo cual es indispensable entrar en sintona con ellas viviendo la fraternidad
universal y csmica. No se trata solamente de que el otro est all y nosotros aqu, por muy cercanos
que estemos. Es que tenemos que convertirnos en el otro, transformarnos en el otro, lograr una fusin
mstica con las dems realidades, vivir una experiencia de identificacin con el otro. Se trata de con-
vivir, con-sentir, com-partir y co-mulgar con las cosas. De ah nace la comunidad con esas cosas cono-
cidas amorosamente. Y esa fue la idea de fraternidad csmica y la vida de Francisco.

LA ECOLOGA SOCIAL EN FRANCISCO DE ASS

Como decamos antes, la crisis ecolgica nos concierne a todos, por lo que necesita la partici-
pacin de todos. Y la mejor forma de participacin es una democracia. En esta democracia ecol-

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1124 E. GARCA, FRANCISCO DE ASS Y LA ECOLOGA

gico-social, los ciudadanos no son solamente los seres humanos, sino todos los seres que compo-
nen el mundo: una biocracia y una cosmocracia. Esto significa que todos los seres de la natu-
raleza son ciudadanos, sujetos de derechos, dignos de respeto y de admiracin.
El filsofo francs J. Maritain y otros muchos han considerado que Francisco es el precursor de
una nueva democracia universal de tipo socio-csmica; no se trata de una democracia en la que todas
las personas humanas son iguales y sin jerarquas, sino de una democracia csmica, que incluye den-
tro de s como ciudadanos no slo a los hombres, sino tambin a los animales, las plantas, el agua, el
sol, la luna y las estrellas. Todos estos ciudadanos de la nueva democracia csmica participan de nues-
tra convivencia, tienen derecho a vivir y deben ser plenamente respetados. Esta democracia csmica
es una democracia biocentralizada, es decir, centrada slo en la vida y en la naturaleza. Ahora bien,
como la naturaleza es el equilibrio entre la vida y la muerte, tambin debe ser incluida la muerte. Eso
es lo que hizo Francisco en su tiempo: su democracia incluye todas las formas de vida e incluso la pro-
pia muerte. Cuando llamaba hermanos a los animales y a las plantas, al sol, la luna y las estrellas y
hasta a la muerte, no estaba sentando las bases de esta nueva democracia csmica?
La cultura moderna parece situar al hombre por encima de las cosas para poseerlas y domi-
narlas. Este antropocentrismo se ha considerado como el resultado de una lectura arrogante de los
textos bblicos. Sin embargo, Francisco vivi otra manera de ser en el mundo. Francisco no define
al ser humano por lo que lo diferencia de los dems seres, sino por lo que tiene de comn con ellos.
Se pone al lado de todas las cosas y de todas las criaturas para amarlas y convivir con ellas como
hermanos y hermanas en una casa comn. Todas las cosas las consider animadas y personaliza-
das; l descubri intuitivamente lo que hoy conocemos por la ciencia: que todos los seres vivos
somos hermanos porque tenemos el mismo cdigo gentico. Para Francisco, todos con-vivimos en
la misma casa paterna y materna, con un profundo respeto hacia todas las diversidades, especial-
mente con los ms dbiles.

LA ECOLOGA MENTAL EN FRANCISCO DE ASS

La ecologa de la mente, tambin llamada ecologa profunda, trata de despertar en las personas
su espritu de escucha. Por eso, una de las misiones del ser humano es descifrar el mensaje que nos
transmiten todos los seres del universo y celebrarlo. A partir de la ecologa interior, el universo deja
de ser una entidad neutral para convertirse en algo que concierne al ser humano. El universo se
dirige hacia el ser humano, lo mismo que el ser humano se vuelve hacia el universo de donde pro-
cede. Ambos nos pertenecemos mutuamente. Nos une un vnculo de fraternidad que Francisco ya
intuy en su tiempo. No podemos considerarnos como seres separados de la Tierra; somos hijos de
la Tierra, somos la misma Tierra que se hace autoconsciente.
Francisco vivi esta experiencia de un modo profundo. Su gran aportacin para su tiempo fue
considerar que todas las cosas de la creacin son hermanas porque proceden del mismo Padre. Fran-
cisco personaliz todas sus relaciones al considerar a todos los seres del universo como sacramen-
tos de la presencia de Dios. Hoy da se acepta que esta sacramentalidad no debe considerarse slo
en direccin vertical de Dios-universo, sino tambin en la horizontal de Dios-proceso evolutivo cos-
mognico. Esto lleva consigo el mantener abierta la sacramentalidad hacia las nuevas formas de
manifestacin del misterio de Dios. La fe de Francisco le llev a vivir intensamente la experiencia
religiosa del origen comn de todas las cosas. De esta manera experiment cmo Dios muestra su
presencia en cada ser y en su historia. Para l, Dios est presente en el cosmos y el cosmos est pre-
sente en Dios.
Diversos filsofos y telogos del siglo XX (Whitehead, Ogden, Griffin, etc.) han dejado de poner
a Dios y al mundo frente a frente, para considerar a Dios dentro del proceso del mundo y al mundo
dentro del proceso de Dios, de tal manera que todo lo que ocurre en el mundo le afecta a Dios de
alguna forma. El Creador rodea siempre a la criatura y al revs, aunque cada uno conserva su iden-
tidad. As, la distincin sirve a la comunin. Dios no se identifica con el proceso csmico, pero s
en el proceso csmico. Y a la inversa, el universo no se identifica con Dios, pero se identifica en Dios.
Francisco se adelant a esta manera de pensar ya en el siglo XIII, puesto que vea a Dios en todas
las cosas, en todas las circunstancias. Comenz a verlo en los pobres, en los leprosos, en las plantas

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E. GARCA, FRANCISCO DE ASS Y LA ECOLOGA 1125

y los animales, en el hermano sol, etc., hasta llegar a ver a Dios en la hermana muerte. Francisco se
adelant en la reconciliacin entre el hombre y la naturaleza que hoy se exige en diferentes foros.
Francisco reconcili con su experiencia de vida al hombre con toda la creacin. Por eso se le ha
considerado como el paradigma de homo reconcilatus. De hecho, cuando el Concilio Vaticano II
seala que: el hombre, hecho nueva criatura, puede y debe amar las cosas creadas por Dios, por-
que de Dios las recibe, y las mira y las respeta como salidas de sus manos (GS, 37) est teniendo
plenamente presente el cmo Francisco vio y am a todas las criaturas.
Esta visin franciscana de la naturaleza y Dios es lo que hoy se quiere expresar con la palabra
panentesmo. No se trata de caer en el pantesmo, sino de admitir el panentesmo. Para el pan-
tesmo, Dios es todo y todo es Dios. El cristianismo no puede aceptar esta visin pantesta porque
eso significara hacer a Dios igual que el universo, confundir el Creador con la criatura. Dios y el
universo son diferentes, pero estn abiertos uno al otro en una perfecta comunin. Para el panen-
tesmo, Dios est en todas las cosas y a la inversa; eso significa que podemos ver a Dios en las pie-
dras, en los animales, en las plantas, en el sol, etc., como ya hizo Francisco en el siglo XIII. Francis-
co vive y experimenta la presencia de Dios en todas las cosas; encontr a Dios en s mismo y en
todas las criaturas, considerndolas como sacramentos reveladores de Dios. La creacin entera es
el gran sacramento de Dios.
En este sentido (como en otros muchos), Francisco puede considerarse un precursor de P. Teil-
hard de Chardin. En la ltima pgina de su diario escrita el da 7 de abril de 1955, el Jueves Santo
antes de su muerte, este jesuita recoga como sntesis de su credo la frase: Dios todo en todas las
cosas (1Cor. 15,28). Esa era la expresin bblica del misterio de los misterios: pleromizar a Dios,
como l deca. Pleromizar ser la consecucin final del momento en que Dios y la creacin se unan
en una totalidad sin confusin.

CONCLUSIN

Despus de todo lo anterior, podemos explicarnos el por qu de la fascinacin que Francisco


ejerci sobre los hombres de su tiempo y los hombres de los siglos XX-XXI. Cre una sntesis que se
haba perdido en el cristianismo: el encuentro con Dios, con Cristo y con el Espritu en la natura-
leza y, consecuentemente, el descubrimiento de la inmensa fraternidad/sororidad csmicas (L. Boff).
Por eso no es de extraar que ya en 1967 el historiador norteamericano L. White, Jr., propusie-
ra considerar la piedad csmica de Francisco como un ejemplo para la mentalidad ecolgica actual
y sugiriera que fuera declarado oficialmente patrono de los ecologistas. Y eso fue lo que hizo Juan
Pablo II, el 27 de noviembre de 1979, con todas las honras y privilegios litrgicos inherentes a esa
proclamacin.

[Texto bsico publicado en Tendencias21.net, EDUARDO GARCA PEREGRN


por la Ctedra CTR, Escuela Tcnica Superior de Ingeniera,
Universidad Comillas, Madrid]

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BIBLIOGRAFA

RESEAS

ARTIGAS, M., Ciencia y Religin. Conceptos sonas. Basta pensar en dos diccionarios de
fundamentales (EUNSA, Pamplona, tipo enciclopdico que se han publicado en
2007). 422 pp. ISBN: 978-84-313- los ltimos aos: el editado en Roma en
2490-2. 2002 por Giuseppe Tanzella Nitti (Univer-
sidad de la Santa Croce) y Alberto Strumia
En estos ltimos aos es muy numero-
(Universidad de Bari), y el editado en Nueva
sa la produccin de ensayos, investigacio-
York en 2003 por J. Wentzel Vrede van
nes, comentarios y textos sobre Ciencia y
Huyssteen (Princeton). Dentro de una lnea
Religin. Basta con consultar el nmero
teolgica conservadora, el autor intenta (a
especial de nuestra revista Pensamiento.
veces con demasiada buena voluntad)
Ciencia, Filosofa y Religin [vol. 63,
armonizar el pensamiento neotomista con
nm. 238, 2007] y ste para tener una idea
los retos que a la religin supone muchos
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cientfico, filosfico y teolgico sobre el di- de los planteamientos de las ciencias de la
logo y los conflictos entre el pensamiento naturaleza y de las ciencias sociales. Maria-
cientfico y la experiencia religiosa. El pre- no Artigas acab este libro muy poco antes
sente volumen contiene 26 conceptos orde- de su fallecimiento y ofrece una madura
nados por orden alfabtico relativos a la sntesis de su pensamiento disperso a lo
problemtica Ciencia-Religin. Posible- largo de 30 aos de trabajo en muchas
mente falten conceptos fundamentales y a publicaciones, 18 libros y numerosos folle-
otros se les da ms relevancia de lo que tos y artculos.L. SEQUEIROS.
merecen en realidad. De alguna manera, es
el testamento filosfico pstumo del pro- HAUGHT, J. F., Christianity and Science.
fesor Mariano Artigas (1938-2006), que ha Toward a Theology of Nature (Orbis
dedicado muchos aos de su vida a la refle- Books, New York, 2007). 208 pp. ISBN:
xin y el debate sobre estos temas desde la 978-1-57075-740-2. 23 15 cm.
Universidad de Navarra. Doctor en Cien-
cias Fsicas y en Filosofa, fue el primer Como apunta Peter C. Phan en el pr-
Decano de la Facultad Eclesistica de Filo- logo de este ensayo, las relaciones entre las
sofa y profesor ordinario de Filosofa de la ciencias y el cristianismo se sitan en estos
Ciencia y de la Naturaleza en la Universi- momentos en un punto caliente de enten-
dad de Navarra desde 1987. Fue honrado dimiento. Despus de varios siglos de in-
con el premio Europa de la Universidad de comprensin mutua, cuando no de exclu-
Navarra en el ao 2002. Recibi varias ayu- sin, son muy abundantes las reflexiones
das de investigacin de la Fundacin Tem- publicadas en el mundo anglosajn y
pleton de los Estados Unidos. El mismo sobre todo en sectores ms abiertos del
autor reconoce en el prlogo que no ha pre- pensamiento protestante sobre la opor-
tendido escribir un diccionario en el senti- tunidad, necesidad y posibilidad de dilo-
do habitual. Ello hubiera requerido ms go. El profesor John F. Haught es colabo-
tiempo y la colaboracin de muchas per- rador de la Universidad de Georgetown en

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1128 RESEAS

temas de Ciencia y Religin, dentro del cen- ser humano dentro de ella. Abordado
tro teolgico de Woodstock. Haught resal- desde el punto de vista de la sociologa y
ta la importancia de Pierre Teilhard de de la psicologa, este ensayo se pregunta
Chardin en ese intento de reencuentro entre por el origen de la religiosidad en la natu-
la lectura materialista y cientfica de la rea- raleza humana. Los relatos de los pueblos
lidad natural y la lectura teolgica de esa sin religin demuestran a juicio de
misma realidad. No se contraponen como Hume que la religiosidad ni se funda-
enemigos irreconciliables, sino que hay menta en la razn humana ni pertenece a
fronteras comunes en las que ambas se la originaria capacidad emocional del ser
encuentran, contactan, repiensan juntas y humano. Para Hume, la religin brota de
reelaboran los conceptos en categoras una reaccin psicolgica como un senti-
comprensibles para una cultura laica. El miento de temor de los humanos hacia la
matrimonio entre ciencia y cristianismo naturaleza. Desde este punto de vista, la
no es, pues, un matrimonio de convenien- religin aparece como un elemento con-
cia, apunta el prlogo. El ensayo se estruc- tingente del desarrollo psicosocial. La his-
tura en diez captulos que abordan la his- toria de las religiones muestra un ritmo de
toria pasada y las oportunidades actuales abstraccin en la construccin social de
de diez aspectos de las relaciones entre las las religiones, desde el politesmo inicial
ciencias y el cristianismo. Desde la ciencia al monotesmo. Pero segn Hume esto no
y la esperanza cristiana a la verdad de la se debe a una racionalidad progresiva de
ciencia y la verdad de la fe, pasando por la las religiones, sino que es consecuencia de
ciencia y el misterio, la ciencia y la revela- los complejos mecanismos psicolgicos
cin, la evolucin y la providencia divina, que organizan la relacin de los humanos
la cosmologa y la creacin, etc. El inten- con lo que llaman Dios. El Dios del
to de responder teolgicamente a los retos Hume est muy lejos de los humanos y es
de las ciencias modernas (lo que hoy se tan omnipotente que cae en el fatalismo y
suele definir como Teologa de la Ciencia) en la negacin de la autonoma del hom-
implica la reelaboracin de conceptos cl- bre religioso. Acompaado de un excelen-
sicos acuados en unos moldes filosficos te estudio preliminar, una bibliografa
que hoy son inadecuados y expresarlos en extensa y clarificadoras notas a pie de pgi-
otras categoras diferentes. Una completa na, este ensayo es una valiosa contribu-
bibliografa y un ndice temtico detallado cin al conocimiento en los pases de len-
completan este volumen que desearamos gua espaola del pensamiento de Hume.
ver pronto publicado en castellano.L. SE- L. SEQUEIROS.
QUEIROS.

POLKINGHORNE, J., La fe de un fsico. Refle-


HUME, DAVID, Historia natural de la religin. xiones teolgicas de un pensador as-
Estudio preliminar, traduccin y notas cendente (Editorial Verbo Divino, Este-
de Carlos Mellizo (Tecnos, Madrid, Cl- lla, 2007). 302 pp. ISBN: 978-84-8169-
sicos del Pensamiento, 32007). 115 pp. 747-6. 22 14 cm.
ISBN: 978-84-309-4644-0. 20 13,5 cm.
No son todava muchas las obras de
Aparece ahora la tercera edicin de esta John Polkinghorne traducidas al castella-
obra clsica del filsofo escocs David no. Llega ahora al pblico espaol con un
Hume (1711-1776). Publicada nueva aos cierto retraso (el original es de 1994) este
despus de su Investigacin sobre el cono- ensayo que ha tenido un gran impacto en
cimiento humano (1748), se fundamenta los pases anglosajones: The Faith of a Phy-
en las mismas races epistemolgicas: la sicist. The Glifford Lectures, 1993-1994. Su
reflexin sobre la naturaleza y el lugar del autor, John Polkinghorne, es un cientfi-

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RESEAS 1129

co muy conocido en el Reino Unido, Cate- rreccin y en la profundizacin cristol-


drtico de fsica terica en Cambridge, y gica, el Espritu Santo y la Iglesia, la esca-
que a edad relativamente madura fue orde- tologa y el dilogo ecumnico e interreli-
nado como sacerdote de la Iglesia de Ingla- gioso. Una interesante presentacin del
terra y que dedica todo su tiempo a la refle- profesor Manuel G. Doncel, Director del
xin teolgica sobre la relacin entre la Seminario Teologa y Ciencias de Barce-
ciencia y la religin. El libro contiene (muy lona (STICB), as como una introduccin,
sustancialmente ampliadas) las conferen- una completa bibliografa y unos ndices
cias que bajo el patrocinio de Lord Glif- bien elaborados, completan este trabajo
ford, llevan al gran pblico los temas fron- que esperamos tenga eco en los ambien-
terizos de la ciencia, las culturas y las tes cultos espaoles.L. SEQUEIROS.
religiones. Esta iniciativa, de gran tradi-
cin en Gran Bretaa, ha dado lugar a inte- TORRUBIA, JOSEPH, Aparato para la Historia
resantes controversias interdisciplinares Natural Espaola. Edicin facsmil del
entre ciencia, filosofa y teologa. Cons- original de 1754. Introduccin y notas
ciente de la cultura secular emergente en de Leandro Sequeiros y Francisco Pela-
occidente, la preocupacin del autor es yo (Editorial Universidad de Granada,
cmo formular con un vocabulario y una Coleccin Archivum, 2008). 81 pp. +
conceptualizacin comprensible para los 204 pp. de texto facsmil + ndices,
hombres y mujeres de nuestros das las leyenda de lminas y lminas origina-
grandes afirmaciones del Credo cristiano, les. ISBN: 978-84-338-4780-5, 978-84-
formulado dentro de unas coordenadas 00-08590-2. NIPO: 653-07-127-2.
filosficas en Nicea y Constantinopla. Para
el autor, el credo de Nicea no es una exi-
gencia de renuncia intelectual ante un con- La Editorial de la Universidad de Gra-
junto de proposiciones no negociables; en nada acaba de publicar en su coleccin
lugar de eso, representa el resumen de in- Archivum la edicin facsmil del Aparato
tuiciones y experiencias cosechadas desde para la Historia Natural Espaola del fran-
los siglos fundacionales de la historia de ciscano granadino Jos Torrubia (1698-
la iglesia. Frente a una metodologa des- 1761). Esta obra interesantsima de carc-
cendente (de acuerdo con la metafsica ter cientfico, publicada en Madrid en
griega), Polkinghorne propone una meto- 1754, aborda el problema de las causas de
dologa ascendente, en el sentido si- la existencia de restos de conchas de seres
guiente: su discurso asciende desde la base marinos en los alrededores de Molina de
fenomenolgica de los datos experimen- Aragn. Para Torrubia, estos restos fsi-
tales a las ms novedosas consideraciones les incrustados en las rocas, deben ser
teolgicas formuladas en un lenguaje cer- interpretados como restos del Diluvio uni-
cano a la sensibilidad moderna. Como nos versal bblico. Esta interpretacin, en el
dir el mismo autor, esto supone tejer un siglo XVIII, supona toda una revolucin en
tapiz en el que si la urdimbre es el com- la interpretacin cientfica de la naturale-
promiso con el registro de la tradicin cris- za geolgica. La obra est acompaada de
tiana, la trama es el compromiso con la trece excelentes lminas que figuran los
comprensin contempornea de nosotros primeros fsiles descubiertos en Espaa.
mismos y del universo que habitamos. En Entre otras cosas, esta obra se considera
este tapiz van emergiendo diversos temas el primer tratado de paleontologa espa-
de inters teolgico: el sentido de nuestro ola.
ser humano con sus conocimientos y La obra de Jos Torrubia tuvo amplio
creencias, Dios y la Creacin, Jesucristo eco en los cenculos ilustrados del si-
en su crtica histrica, en su muerte y resu- glo XVIII. Entre 1755 y 1760 fue discutido

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1130 RESEAS

su contenido en cuatro revistas cientficas el que ahora comentamos, y que public


francesas e inglesas de la poca. La tra- en Madrid en 1754. El Aparato cuenta con
duccin del captulo dedicado a los gigan- 204 pginas a las que hay que aadir las
tes fue publicada en francs en 1760; y en 14 lminas, los ndices y la leyenda de las
1773 ya exista una edicin en alemn de lminas. Viene precedida por los diversos
todo el libro con unas lminas de mejora. permisos y censuras donde muestra que
El Aparato de Torrubia fue muy citado por los contenidos estn de acuerdo con la doc-
el gran naturalista y viajero irlands trina de la Iglesia. El volumen original est
William Bowles (1705-1780) que lo us de dividido en 35 captulos. La mitad de ellos
gua para su expedicin por Espaa y que estn dedicados a comentar el hallazgo de
public en 1775 como Introduccin a la fsiles en Espaa y en los dominios colo-
Historia Natural y a la Geografa Fsica de niales de Filipinas y Amrica interpretn-
Espaa. Jos Torrubia naci en Granada dolos como petrificaciones de animales
en 1698. Profes en la orden franciscana de antes del Diluvio. Los captulos 16 a 28
muy joven, en 1713, partiendo como misio- los dedica Torrubia a discutir acerca de
nero para Filipinas siete aos ms tarde. los fsiles espaoles rebatiendo las hip-
Entre 1721 y 1733 permaneci en estas tesis de Benito Jernimo Feijo (1676-
islas lejanas trabajando como predicador 1764). Los ltimos captulos (del 29 al 35)
y visitador de los conventos de su orden. los dedica a la exposicin apologtica de
Su innata curiosidad por la naturaleza hizo la teora diluvista del origen de las petrifi-
que recogiese multitud de observaciones caciones rebatiendo el carcter natural del
sobre plantas y animales a los que alude Diluvio, tal como hacen Buffon y los auto-
en su obra. En 1733, al ser nombrado pro- res protestantes. En estos aos, Torrubia
curador para los captulos generales fran- fue nombrado Cronista y Archivero gene-
ciscanos de Madrid y Roma, embarc en ral de la Oden franciscana siendo trasla-
Manila para Espaa, atravesando Mxico, dado a Roma. En la ciudad eterna perma-
tal como se acostumbraba en esa poca. neci hasta su fallecimiento en 1761,
El viaje fue muy accidentado por los tem- dedicndose a publicar, entre otros, su
porales e incluso un naufragio, por lo que famoso tratado sobre los Gigantes. La edi-
no lleg a Cdiz hasta julio de 1735. Tras cin facsmil del Aparato de Torrubia se
diez aos en Espaa, fue destinado a ha editado precedida por una extensa
Nueva Espaa en 1745, recorriendo Gua- introduccin crtica al autor y a la obra,
temala, el Yucatn y Honduras. En 1749, con una gran cantidad de bibliografa que
Torrubia regresa a Europa para asuntos ayudar al lector no especializado a com-
de su orden viajando a Roma, Rmini, prender mejor el alcance cientfico de esta
Padua y Pars. En torno a 1750 se dirige joya del siglo XVIII. El Aparato para la His-
desde Francia hacia Madrid. El da 10 de toria Natural Espaola de 1754, de Jos
agosto hizo un alto en el camino para Torrubia, es hoy una de las piezas funda-
almorzar cerca de Molina de Aragn. mentales para conocer el pensamiento
Mientras coma observ que una nia juga- cientfico sobre la naturaleza, y en espe-
ba con unas piedras de forma extraa, cial de los fsiles como restos petrificados
parecidas a conchas y caracoles marinos. de la vida del pasado, y tambin sobre los
Este fue el origen de una investigacin minerales (Torrubia describe y dibuja los
sobre el origen de estas piedras y sobre su prismas hexagonales del aragonito, un
localizacin en los montes de Castilla. La mineral emblemtico de Espaa). Torru-
interpretacin diluvista, progresista en esa bia alude en repetidas ocasiones al mto-
poca, gui su mente hacia la elaboracin do cientfico de observacin de Francis
de una gran memoria de la cual, desgra- Bacon, aunque las conclusiones a las que
ciadamente, solo escribi el primer tomo, llega no coincidan con las que actualmente

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RESEAS 1131

imperan en el mundo cientfico. De algu- (Manuel G. Doncel). Cierra el volumen una


na manera, Torrubia fue el introductor en selecta y actualizada bibliografa referen-
Espaa del llamado Diluvismo cientfico te a la puesta al da de las ediciones fran-
que, irnicamente, vuelve a estar de moda cesas, castellanas y catalanas de Teilhard
entre las sectas fundamentalistas de los de Chardin, as como a trabajos de inves-
Estados Unidos. La creencia de que los tigacin sobre su figura posteriores a los
avances de las Ciencias no pueden con- aos setenta.L. SEQUEIROS.
tradecir la lectura al pie de la letra de los
pasajes de la Biblia est muy incrustada PEACOCKE, A., Los caminos de la Ciencia
todava hoy en la mente de mucha gente. hacia Dios. El final de toda nuestra
Desde el punto de vista del dilogo entre exploracin (Editorial Sal Terrae, San-
la Teologa y las Ciencias de la Naturale- tander, Presencia Teolgica 164, 2008).
za, esta obra escrita hace ms de 250 aos 254 pp. ISBN: 976-84-293-1750-3.
ilumina muchos de los planteamientos que
intenta desarrollar la Facultad de Teolo- Con un cierto retraso (el original ingls
ga de Granada.L. SEQUEIROS. es de 2001) llega ahora la traduccin de
este excelente ensayo de Arthur Peacocke,
GARCA DONCEL, M. - ROMERO, JOSEP M. (eds.), fallecido en 2006 con 82 aos. El autor es
Actualitat de Teilhard de Chardin (Fun- un hombre muy conocido dentro del
daci Joan Maragall, Barcelona, 2008, campo del dilogo entre Ciencia y Reli-
Editorial Crulla). 186 pp. ISBN: 976- gin. Despus de 25 aos de dedicacin
86-661-2027-2. profesional al mundo de la bioqumica,
Pecocke fue ordenado sacerdote en la Igle-
En abril de 1955 falleca el Padre Pie- sia de Inglaterra. Desde 1973 comenz a
rre Teilhard de Chardin, sbitamente en impartir clases de Teologa en el Clare
Nueva York de un ataque al corazn. Collage de Cambridge. En 1985 se trasla-
Medio siglo despus, entre los das 8 y 9 d a la Universidad de Oxford donde diri-
de abril de 2005 tuvieron lugar en Barce- gi un centro para el dialogo ente Ciencia
lona, en la sede de la Fundacin Joan y Religin. Public durante su vida ms de
Maragall un ciclo de conferencias en las doscientos artculos y doce libros (a la que
que se recuperaba la memoria del gran aadimos una obra pstuma, editada por
cientfico y mstico, filsofo y humanista. Philip Clayton: All Thats Is A Nanuralis-
El presente volumen presenta la edicin tis Faith for the Twenty-First Century). En
catalana (que pronto desearamos ver en 1995, la Fundacin Templeton le otorg el
castellano) de las diversas conferencias que premio que lleva su nombre por su ensa-
se impartieron. El volumen contiene cinco yo Theology for a Scientific Age. Esta misma
estudios sobre Teilhard, al que se han aa- institucin le concedi en 2001 el presti-
dido la traduccin catalana de Lo Crstico gioso Templeton Prize for Progress in Reli-
(1955) y la ltima pgina escrita por Teil- gion por el conjunto de su obra. Aplican-
hard el 7 de abril de 1955. Los estudios do las reglas del pensamiento cientfico a
corresponden a la reelaboracin de las con- cuestiones teolgicas (Teologa de la Cien-
ferencias impartidas sobre la gnesis del cia), Peacocke sostiene que el principio
pensamiento teilhardiano (Leandro Se- divino opera detrs de todos los aspectos
queiros), su concepcin de la ciencia y la de la existencia, ya sean espirituales o fsi-
convergencia humana (Agustn Udas), el cos. Parafraseando la famosa poesa de
Medio Divino (Ignacio Cacho), la nueva T. S. Eliot, el autor aborda al final de
imagen de Dios en Teilhard (Ignacio N- nuestra exploracin, problemas funda-
ez de Castro), y la herencia de Teilhard mentales como la compatibilidad de evo-
en el dilogo entre Ciencia y Teologa lucin y creacin, o la relacin existente

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1132 RESEAS

entre Isaac Newton, la causalidad y la mente. En la tercera parte (El fin de nues-
accin divina. El volumen se estructura en tra exploracin) dedica cinco captulos a
tres partes: en la primera (La bsqueda apuntar las lneas de futuro de una nueva
espiritual en el nuevo mundo de la cien- manera de abordar la Teologa. El volu-
cia) se incluyen dos captulos sobre los men se completa con la reproduccin del
desafos de la ciencia a la Teologa y cu- artculo del profesor Javier Monserrat,
les seran los nuevos caminos de la Teolo- Ciencia, bioqumica y pan-en-tesmo en
ga como respuesta a los retos de la Cien- Arthur Peacocke, publicado en nuestra
cia. En la segunda parte (Exploracin revista Pensamiento (vol. 61, 229 [2005]
desde la Ciencia hacia Dios) dedica cua- 59-76), que es imprescindible para enten-
tro captulos a la reflexin interdisciplinar der en su justa dimensin los contenidos
sobre el mundo cientfica y teolgica- de este trabajo.L. SEQUEIROS.

PENSAMIENTO, ISSN 0031-4749 PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64 (2008), nm. 242, RESEAS


PENSAMIENTO Revista de Investigacin e Informacin Filosfica

CIENCIA, FILOSOFA Y RELIGIN


Serie Especial

PENSAMIENTO
Special Series: Science, Philosophy and Religion
CALL FOR PAPERS
PENSAMIENTO
[Journal founded in 1945 and included in the
principal national and international scientific indexes]
Opens a new area of international communication
in English or Spanish
concerning the thematic Science, Philosophy and Religion
Papers (two hard copies and a disc copy)
should be mailed to:
Javier Monserrat (Direccin)
Revista Pensamiento
c/ Universidad Comillas, 7
28049 MADRID (Spain)
[Submitted papers are subject to scientific evaluation
in accordance with the regular norms of the journal]

volumen 63 nm. 238 serie especial nm. 1 (2007)


(Viene de la tercera pgina de cubierta.)

GUILLERMO ARMENGOL Ethical and Sacred Respect for Nature:


Rolstons Ecological Ethics in Scien-
ce, Philosophy and Theology ............. 1093-1096
MIGUEL LORENTE Lee Smolin hace una crtica constructiva
de la teora del todo: entra en crisis
la teora de ms prestigio en la fsica
terica .................................................... 1097-1102
JAVIER MONSERRAT Why Did Living Complexity Arise? Beyond
Reductionism: Stuart Kauffman Rein-
venting the Sacred ............................... 1103-1108
JAVIER LEACH Emergence and Transcendence in Philip
Clayton: His Moderate Ideas Place Him
in an Ideal Position for Dialogue ......... 1109-1113
GUILLERMO ARMENGOL Majestad y miseria de la teora de cuer-
das. Frente a sus crticos cabe de-
fender su legitimidad cientfico-meta-
fsica ....................................................... 1115-1120
EDUARDO GARCA PEREGRN Francisco de Ass y la ecologa. Actuali-
dad de su experiencia de fraternidad
csmica .................................................. 1121-1125

BIBLIOGRAFA
Reseas ........................................................................................................... 1127-1132
ARTIGAS, M., Ciencia y Religin. Conceptos fundamentales, 1127.HAUGHT, J. F.,
Christianity and Science. Toward a Theology of Nature, 1127.HUME, DAVID, His-
toria natural de la religin, 1128.POLKINGHORNE, J., La fe de un fsico. Reflexio-
nes teolgicas de un pensador ascendente, 1128.TORRUBIA, JOSEPH, Aparato para
la Historia Natural Espaola, 1129.GARCA DONCEL, M. - ROMERO, JOSEP M. (eds.),
Actualitat de Teilhard de Chardin, 1131.PEACOCKE, A., Los caminos de la Ciencia
hacia Dios. El final de toda nuestra exploracin, 1131.

AVISO A LOS SUSCRIPTORES


En el ao 2007 la revista PENSAMIENTO comenz la publicacin de una serie especial constituida por
un nmero extraordinario al ao que se numera a continuacin de los tres nmeros ordinarios que se
editarn como hasta ahora, dedicados a las temticas filosficas habituales de la revista. Esta serie
especial est monogrficamente dedicada a Ciencia, Filosofa y Religin y ser por ello la primera
revista en espaol sobre esta temtica, hoy tan relevante, sobre todo en el mbito cultural de lengua
inglesa.
En julio de 2008 aparece el segundo volumen de esta serie especial (PENSAMIENTO, vol. 64, n. 242,
serie especial n. 2, 2008). Se reparte a los suscriptores gratuitamente, sin coste alguno adicional. El
segundo nmero ordinario de PENSAMIENTO en 2008 se enva a los suscriptores durante el mes de
julio y el tercero se enviar en el mes de noviembre. La paginacin del nmero extraordinario se hace
a partir del final del tercer nmero (que terminar en la 576, siendo la 577 la primera del extraordinario).

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