FORECLOSURE - Recusal Refusal Organized Judicial Crime

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR COLLIER COUNTY, FLORIDA
BANKUNITED,
as [purported] successor in interest to [SEIZED] BANKUNITED, FSB.,
Plaintiff,
vs. CASE NO.: 09-6016-CA
JENNIFER FRANKLIN-PRESCOTT, et al.
NOTICE OF APPEAL, DISPOSITION, AND

BANKRUPT BANKUNITED’S SEIZURE
___________________________________________________________________________/
NOTICE OF APPEAL AND DISPOSITION IN FAVOR OF J. FRANKLIN PRESCOTT
BANKRUPT BANK SEIZURE INFORMATION AND § 673.3011, FLA. STAT.,
EVIDENCE OF NO entitlement to enforce non-existent instrument
DISPOSITION NOTICE IN FAVOR OF JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT
PURSUANT TO UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE, AND U.C.C., ART. 3,
AND FLORIDA LAW
NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM ALTERATION OF RECORD
1. Jennifer Franklin Prescott, who was never served, hereby appeals from
a. The unlawful alteration of the official documents, records, and Case Docket;
b. The lack of any record of the purported “disposition” in Jennifer Franklin Prescott’s
favor in the Case File;
c. The lack of any record of the dismissal in Jennifer Franklin Prescott’s favor;
d. The absence of the FINAL DISPOSITION FORM, § 25.075, Florida Statutes, and
Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.998, from the Case File;
e. The lack of any record, reason, and/or explanation of the publicly recorded removal of
the August 2010 “complaint” in the Case File;
f. The absence of any record, reason, and explanation of the publicly recorded removal of
the August 2010 “summons” from the Case File;
g. The lack of any transparency, accountability, due process, and equal protection of law;
h. The record lack of any mortgage or note in this facially fraudulent and frivolous action;
i. The lack of any record of the removal of ALFRED CAMNER, Esq., and the CAMNER
LIPSITZ law firm and its Attorneys from the mock proceedings;
j. The record lack of the means of final disposition before any hearing.
RECORD ABSENCE OF FINAL DISPOSITION FORM, § 25.075, FLA. STAT.
2. Jennifer Franklin Prescott could not find the Final Disposition Form, Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.998, in
the Case File on Tuesday, August 17, 2010. See § 25.075, Florida Statutes.
ABSENCE OF DISMISSAL IN JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT’S FAVOR
3. On Tuesday, August 17, 2010, Jennifer Franklin Prescott could not find the Dismissal in
Jennifer Franklin Prescott’s favor in the Case File.
DEFENDANT JUDGE HUGH D. HAYES SUBSTITUTED COUNSEL ON 08/18/2010
4. On August 18, 2010, Defendant Judge Hayes substituted Counsel, and BILL McCOLLUM,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, and Shelley B. Cridlin, Fla. Bar No. 0022451, made an
appearance as counsel for Defendant Judge Hugh D. Hayes, in place of any and all prior
counsel in Federal Case 2:2009-cv-00791.
FALSIFICATIONS AND/OR ALTERATIONS APPARENT
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5. Jennifer Franklin Prescott reported Case File demand and/or review in the Clerk of Court’s
Office on August 12, 13, and 16, and 17, 2010. While the electronic Docket showed
a. “disposition”;
b. “complaint”; and
c. “summons”,
none could be ascertained and/or verified in the Naples Courthouse.
DEMANDS FOR CLARIFICATION AND EVIDENCE
6. On Monday, August 16, AM, and Tuesday, August 17, 2010, PM, at the Naples Courthouse,
Jennifer Franklin Prescott demanded to see the Case File evidence of:
a. “disposition”;
b. “complaint”; and
c. “summons” in this fraudulent action.
DEFENDANT JUDGE’S ASSISTANT ASSERTED MISTAKE/ERROR
7. Defendant Hayes’ Judicial Assistant, Jan, stated to Jennifer Franklin Prescott that
a. NO “August 2010 complaint”, and
b. NO “August 2010 summons”
appeared in the Case File.
NO negotiable instrument UNDER GOVERNING CODE
8. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Article 3, governs Negotiable Instruments.
Pursuant to § 3-104. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT, no “negotiable instrument” existed,
and no promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money and interest existed in this
fraudulent action. Bankrupt and seized Bankunited was unable to prove any right to
enforce the admittedly non-existent purported “instrument”. Here, the Court may not enter
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judgment in favor of seized and bankrupt Bankunited. See UCC, Article 3. Here, the Court
must enter judgment in favor of Jennifer Franklin Prescott. WHEREFORE, Jennifer
Franklin Prescott, who was not served and does not submit to any jurisdiction, moves this
Court to declare the purported action fraudulent and a fraud on the Court, and enter
judgment of dismissal in favor of Jennifer Franklin Prescott.
JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT HOLDS FREE & CLEAR RECORD TITLE
9. Jennifer Franklin Prescott holds unencumbered record title to the subject protected
homestead real property. See Collier County Public Records.
PURPORTED “DISPOSITION”
10. The Case Docket stated “disposition”:
The purported “disposition date” was “08/12/2010”.
RULE 1.540, FLA. R. CIV. P.
11. Rule 1.540(a), Fla.R.Civ.P., authorizes the court to correct mistakes in a judgment. Here,
purported “disposition” appeared on the official Docket. Here there were no note, no
entitlement to enforce the admittedly lost/destroyed note, no service, no hearing, and no
due process. Here, records were altered.
BANKUNITED VIOLATED CH. 49, FLA. STAT.
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12. Seized and bankrupt Bankunited violated Ch. 49, Fla. Stat., for illegal purposes of
defrauding Jennifer Franklin Prescott and perpetrating fraud on this Court. In this
fraudulent Case, service by publication was not allowed:
49.011 Service of process by publication; cases in which allowed.

49.021 Service of process by publication, upon whom.
49.031 Sworn statement as condition precedent.
49.041 Sworn statement, natural person as defendant.
49.051 Sworn statement, corporation as defendant.
49.061 Sworn statement, parties doing business under a corporate name as defendants.
49.071 Sworn statement, unknown parties as defendants.
49.08 Notice of action, form.
49.09 Notice of action, return day.
49.10 Notice of action, publication, proof.
49.11 Notice of action, posting, proof.
49.12 Mailing of notice of action.
RECORD PERJURY
13. The record and Case File showed perjury by, e.g., Nicholas Krancher. See Exhibits on file.
PURPORTED “SUMMONS”
14. Purportedly, a summons was issued, “ELSA JARERO”, who is not any known party to this
fraudulent action. The summons disappeared from the record without any explanation.
PURPORTED “COMPLAINT”
15. A “complaint” appeared on the Docket.
Pursuant to Rule 1.190, Fla.R.Civ.P., the Court had never granted any leave. The summons
disappeared from the record without any explanation.
PURPORTED plaintiff HAD NO right to enforce FICTITIOUS note
16. Seized and bankrupt BankUnited was not entitled to enforce a fictitious note. Here,
BankUnited was not any holder of any note or mortgage at the time it filed suit or any time
5
thereafter. It is elementary that to be a holder, one must be in possession of the instrument.
See s. 673.3011, F.S. Here, BankUnited was not any proper party to file suit to foreclose a
fictitious un-delivered lost and/or destroyed instrument.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF ANY delivery
17. Under Florida law delivery is necessary to validate a negotiable instrument. A lost and/or
destroyed note or mortgage could not have possibly been delivered.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF ANY reestablishment
18. Here, the lost and/or destroyed note or mortgage could not have possibly been reestablished
pursuant to Ch. 71, Fla. Stat.
EMERGENCY AND THREAT OF FURTHER INJURY
19. Known foreclosure fraud is an EMERGENCY. Further injury must be prevented.
NO note – NO default
20. The purported plaintiff did not own or hold any note. No obligation existed. No “default”
could have possibly occurred. See also Uniform Commercial Code; Negotiable Instruments.
UNKNOWN LOSS OR DESTRUCTION
21. The bankrupt and seized “plaintiff” bank asserted that any “promissory note and mortgage
have been lost or destroyed and are not in the custody or control of Bankunited, and the time
and manner of the loss or destruction is unknown.” In this Case, Bankunited could not have
possibly reestablished any lost or destroyed note or mortgage.
CAMNER KNEW THAT reestablishment WAS IMPOSSIBLE, CH. 71, FLA. STAT.
22. In particular, Founder and Attorney Alfred Camner and his law firm knew that Bankunited
could not have possibly reestablished any lost or destroyed note or mortgage.
SEIZURE OF BANKRUPT BANKUNITED
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23. On Thursday, May 21, 2009, BankUnited, FSB, Coral Gables, FL was seized by the Office
of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
was named Receiver. Said seizure stripped away the main asset that belonged to the holding
company, BankUnited Financial Corp. Counsel Alfred Camner was the largest shareholder.
24. The June 22 Report by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Inspector
General (OIG) was critical of the bank’s management and Attorney and Founder Alfred
Camner. See Counsel, Camner Lipsitz law firm.
FAILURE & SEIZURE OF THE PURPORTED plaintiff
25. BankUnited, FSB’s failure in May 2009 cost the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp’s insurance
fund about $5.7 billion – the second most costly failure in FDIC history.
NO instrument, and NO lien
26. Here, there was neither any instrument nor any lien. No property was described.
NO interest, and NO successor in interest
27. Here, Bankunited, FSB, had no interest. Here, Bankunited was not and could not have
possibly been any successor in interest. No sum was due to the plaintiff bankrupt bank.
NO rights and NO standing
28. Here, Bankunited, just like Bankunited, FSB, had no rights and no standing.
NO conditions precedent – FACIALLY FRIVOLOUS action
29. Here, the conditions precedent to the institution of any foreclosure action did not occur and
could not have possibly occurred. Here on its face, the sham action was frivolous.
THE COURT KNEW THAT reestablishment WAS IMPOSSIBLE
30. Here as a matter of law, “reestablishment” was impossible. Here, the falsified “promissory
note and mortgage have been lost or destroyed and are not in the custody or control of
7
Bankunited, and the time and manner of the loss or destruction is unknown.” See Ch. 71,
Fla. Stat.
31. Here, Jennifer Franklin’s record title to her homestead property was free and clear.
PROTECTED HOMESTEAD PROPERTY
32. Franklin Prescott’s property is protected homestead property.
33. As a matter of law, any accounting under a prima facie non-existent note and mortgage was
impossible. The prima facie non-meritorious demand for an accounting was fraudulent.
34. Jennifer Franklin Prescott is not any “married woman”.
35. Jennifer Franklin Prescott is not any defendant and was not served.
36. Hugh D. Hayes is a named party Defendant in several actions. See, e.g., Summons/service,
U.S.A. Ex Rel, et al. v. U.S.A., et al. in U.S. District Court.
RECUSAL LAW
37. In light of the publicly recorded alterations of the official records and documents, Jennifer
Franklin Prescott has been forced to live in fear of public corruption and the lack of any
opportunity of fair, just, and transparent due process and proceedings.
38. Here, Defendant Judge Hayes knew that
a. Bankrupt Bankunited did not hold any instrument;
b. Seized and bankrupt Bankunited had no right to enforce and prosecute;
c. Florida’s real party in interest Rule, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a), only permitted an action to
be prosecuted if there had been an actual interest.
RULE 1.432 DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE

“(a) Grounds. Any party may move to disqualify the judge assigned to the action on
the grounds provided by statute.
(b) Contents. A motion to disqualify shall allege the facts relied on to show the
grounds for disqualification and shall be verified by the party.
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(c) Time. A motion to disqualify shall be made within a reasonable time after
discovery of the facts constituting grounds for disqualification.
(d) Determination. The judge against whom the motion is directed shall determine
only the legal sufficiency of the motion. The judge shall not pass on the truth of the
facts alleged. If the motion is legally sufficient, the judge shall enter an order of
disqualification and proceed no further in the action.
(e) Judge's Initiative. Nothing in this rule limits a judge's authority to enter an order of
disqualification on the judge's own initiative.”
Said rule was intended to unify the procedure for judicial disqualification.
RULE 2.330. DISQUALIFICATION OF TRIAL JUDGES
39. Said Rule stated:
(a) Application. This rule applies only to county and circuit judges in all matters in
all divisions of court.
(b) Parties. Any party, including the state, may move to disqualify the trial judge
assigned to the case on grounds provided by rule, by statute, or by the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
(c) Motion. A motion to disqualify shall:

(1) be in writing;
(2) allege specifically the facts and reasons upon which the movant relies as the
grounds for disqualification;
(3) be sworn to by the party by signing the motion under oath or by a separate
affidavit;”
SECTION 38.10, FLA. STAT.
40. Section 38.10 gives parties the right to move to disqualify a judge when the party fears that
“he or she will not receive a fair trial . . . on account of the prejudice of the judge of that
court against the applicant or in favor of the adverse party.” Fla. Stat. § 38.10. Rule of
Judicial Administration 2.330 specifies that a motion to disqualify must show that “the party
fears that he or she will not receive a fair trial or hearing because of specifically described
prejudice or bias of the judge.” Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330.
41. S. 38.10, Fla. Stat., stated:
9
38.10 Disqualification of judge for prejudice; application; affidavits; etc.--
Whenever a party to any action or proceeding makes and files an affidavit stating fear
that he or she will not receive a fair trial in the court where the suit is pending on
account of the prejudice of the judge of that court against the applicant or in favor of
the adverse party, the judge shall proceed no further, but another judge shall be
designated in the manner prescribed by the laws of this state for the substitution of
judges for the trial of causes in which the presiding judge is disqualified.
42. Here, Franklin Prescott has been “stating fear that she will not receive a fair trial in the court
where the suit is [purportedly] pending on account of the objective prejudice of the judge of
that court against the applicant. Here, objectively biased Judge Hayes “shall proceed no
further, but another judge shall be designated in the manner prescribed by the laws of this
state for the substitution of judges for the trial of causes in which the presiding judge is
disqualified.”
JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT’S RIGHT TO APPEAL
43. If the judge denies a motion to disqualify brought under § 38.10 the movant has the right to
appeal. Lynch v. State, ___ So. 2d ___, Nos. SC06-2233, SC07-1246, 2008 WL 4809783, at
*26 (Fla. Nov. 6, 2008). As the Florida Supreme Court recently held: “A motion to
disqualify is governed substantively by section 38.10, Florida Statutes, and procedurally by
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330. Here, Franklin Prescott’s motion to
disqualify Defendant objectively partial Judge Hayes is citing § 38.10 and Rule 2.330, as
well as Canon 3E(1).
44. The Florida Supreme Court has also held, in effect, that § 38.10 and the Canons require the
same thing. See Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1983). In Livingston the
court cited the Canon’s requirement that a judge disqualify himself when his “impartiality
might reasonably be questioned” and concluded that it was “totally consistent” with Florida
case law applying § 38.10. Id. Both require disqualification when a party can show “a well
10
grounded fear that she will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the judge.” Id. (quoting
State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 179 So. 695, 697-98 (Fla. 1938)); see also Berry v. Berry, 765
So. 2d 855, 857 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (quoting Canon 3E(1) when describing the standard for
granting a motion under § 38.10). Here of course, this Court was bound to follow Florida
appellate court decisions interpreting that state’s law. The final arbiter of state law is the
state Supreme Court, which is another way of saying that Florida law is what the Florida
Supreme Court says it is.
CANON(S) 3E(1), 3E(1)(f), FLORIDA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
45. The Florida Supreme Court has adopted a Code of Judicial Conduct to govern the actions
of state court judges and candidates for judicial office. Canon 3E(1) states, e.g.:
(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances
where …
46. Those provisions address situations in which a judge must disqualify himself because his
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” including when he has “made a public
statement that commits, or appears to commit, the judge with respect to” a particular party,
issue, or controversy. Canon 3E(1) [general disqualification provision in Canon 3E(1)],
3E(1)(f) [“commits clause” at Canon 3E(1)(f)].
47. Canon 3E(1), backed by the threat of a disciplinary proceeding, requires a judge to
disqualify himself if his “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Fla. Stat. § 38.10,
supplemented by Rule 2.330, allows a party to have a judge disqualified for the same reason.
48. Canon 3E(1)(f), which the Florida Supreme Court adopted in January 2006, covers one area
in which a judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” See In re Amendment to
Code of Judicial Conduct, 918 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 2006). In addition to the Florida Supreme
Court, the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee (Ethics Committee) and the Judicial
11
Qualifications Commission (JQC) have roles in administering the Code. The Florida
Supreme Court established the Ethics Committee “to render written advisory opinions to
inquiring judges concerning the propriety of contemplated judicial and non-judicial conduct.”
Petition of Comm. on Standards of Conduct for Judges, 327 So. 2d 5, 5 (Fla. 1976).
49. Canon 3E is enforced by the Judicial Qualifications Commission, which has the authority
to bring disciplinary charges against a judge.
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS – WELL-GROUNDED FEARS
50. Here, Franklin Prescott has been specifically alleging the following facts and reasons upon
which the movant relied as the grounds for Defendant County Judge Hayes’
disqualification. Here, Franklin Prescott had well grounded fears that she will not receive
a fair trial at the hands of Defendant objectively partial and bribed County Judge Hugh D.
Hayes.
ADOPTION BY REFERENCE
51. Jennifer Franklin Prescott adopts by reference the pleadings and EXHIBITS on file and of
record in this Notice of Appeal and Notice of Disposition of facially fraudulent action.
WHEREFORE, Jennifer Franklin Prescott demands
1. An Order clarifying the disposition in favor of J. Franklin Prescott on the official record;
2. An Order declaring the purported action fraudulent and a fraud on the Court;
3. An Order clarifying said purported “disposition”, “summons”, and “complaint”;
4. An Order for judgment and dismissal in favor of Jennifer Franklin Prescott on the record;
5. An Order declaring non-service on any defendant in this fraudulent action, Ch. 49, Fla.
Stat.;
6. An Order extinguishing the facially non-meritorious action;
12
7. An Order declaring the admitted lack of any record of any note or mortgage;
8. An Order declaring any reestablishment of any note or mortgage impossible;
9. An Order declaring the lack of any interest by Bankunited;
10. An Order declaring the action without any merit under existing law;
11. An Order enjoining any further fraud and harassment by Bankunited;
12. An Order for sanctions and expenses against said seized and bankrupt bank and its
dismissed and/or fired attorneys at Camner Lipsitz;
13. An Order removing the fired judicial officers with the Camner Lipsitz firm from these
proceedings, and striking their fraudulent pleadings, because they perpetrated record fraud
and fraud on this Court.
________________________
/s/Jennifer Franklin Prescott, record holder of unencumbered title to homestead property
Victim of bankrupt Bankunited’s record fraud
Victim of seized Bankunited founder Alfred Camner’s record fraud on this Court
EXHIBITS ON FILE: DOCKET ALTERATIONS
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
U.C.C. Article 3, Negotiable Instruments
PERJURY EVIDENCE, Nicholas Krancher
§ 673.3011, Fla. Stat.; Ch. 71, Fla. Stat.
F.D.I.C. FAILED BANK INFORMATION
13
8/14/2010 Public Inquiry
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Case Information Printer Friendly Version
Style: BANKUNITED vs FRANKLIN-PR ESC O TT, JENNIFER

Uniform Case Number: 112009C A0060160001XX Filed: 07/09/2009
Clerks Case Number: 0906016C A
Court Type: C IR C UIT CIVIL Disposition Judge: HAYES, HUGH D
Case Type: MO R TGAGE FO R ECLO SUR ES Disposed: 08/12/2010
Judge: HAYES, HUGH D Reopen Reason:
Case Status: DISPO SED Reopened:
Next Court Date: Reopen Close:
Last Docket Date: 08/12/2010 A ppealed:
Parties Dockets Events Financials
1 of 1 page s. Entrie s pe r page : 60
Date Text All Entries

07/09/2009 C A48/R EAL PR O PER TY MO R TGAGE FO R EC LO SUR E (PR E 2010) (FILING)
07/09/2009 C IVIL C O VER SHEET
07/09/2009 C O MPLAINT
07/09/2009 NO TIC E O F LIS PENDENS
07/09/2009 PAID $10.00 PER ISSUANC E O F SUMMO NS $40.00
07/09/2009 R EAL PR O PER TY VALUATIO N SHEET
07/10/2009 SUMMO NS ISSUED
JENNIFER FR ANKLIN PR ESC O TT/ W ALTER P R ESC O TT/ JO HN DO E/ MAR Y DO E/
PLAC ED IN SO UTH FLO R IDA PR O C ESS SER VER S BIN
09/03/2009 AFFIDAVIT O F NO N-SER VIC E O F SUMMO NS MAR Y DO E
10/14/2009 AFFIDAVIT O F LO ST O R IGINAL SUMMO NS JO HN DO E
10/14/2009 AFFIDAVIT O F NO N-SER VIC E O F SUMMO NS JO HN DO E
12/21/2009 AFFIDAVIT O F NO N-SER VIC E O F SUMMO NS W ALTER PR ESC O TT
12/21/2009 AFFIDAVIT O F NO N-SER VIC E O F SUMMO NS JENNIFER FR ANKLIN-PR ESC O TT
02/22/2010 NO TIC E O F APP EAR ANC E
AS C O -CO UNSEL BY ER IN M R O SE Q UINN O N BEHALF O F PLT
04/06/2010 ALIAS SUMMO NS ISSUED
JENNIFER FR ANKLIN-PR ESC O TT/W ALTER PR ESC O TT/P LAC ED IN PR O VEST LLC BIN
05/20/2010 AFFIDAVIT O F NO N-SER VIC E O F SUMMO NS JENNIFER FR ANKLIN PR ESC O TT
05/20/2010 AFFIDAVIT O F NO N-SER VIC E O F SUMMO NS W ALTER PR ESC O TT
06/15/2010 C O RR ESPO NDENCE FR O M C O UNSEL TO C LERK
06/15/2010 AFFIDAVIT O F C O NSTR UC TIVE SER VIC E AS TO W ALTER PR ESC O TT
06/15/2010 AFFIDAVIT O F C O NSTR UC TIVE SER VIC E AS TO JENNIFER FR ANKLIN-PR ESC O TT
06/15/2010 AFFIDAVIT O F C O NSTR UC TIVE SER VIC E
AS TO ANY AND ALL UNKNO W N PAR TIES C LAIMING
06/15/2010 AFFIDAVIT O F DILIGENT SEAR C H AS TO W ALTER PR ESC O TT
06/15/2010 AFFIDAVIT O F DILIGENT SEAR C H AS TO JENNIFER FR ANKLIN-P R ESC O TT
apps.collierclerk.com/…/Case.aspx?UC… 1/2
06/15/2010 C O RR ESPO NDENCE FR O M C O UNSEL TO GULF C O AST BUSINESS R EVIEW
06/17/2010 LETTER TO GULF C O AST BUSINESS R EVIEW
06/17/2010 NO TIC E O F AC TIO N
TO W ALTER PR ESC O TT/JENNIFER FRANKLIN-PR ESC O TT & ANY AND ALL UNKNO W N
PAR TIES C LAIMING
06/17/2010 AFFIDAVIT O F MAILING MAILED 6/18/10
06/18/2010 C O NFIR MATIO N O F EMAIL R EC EIVED BY GULF C O AST BUSINESS R EVIEW
07/07/2010 AFFIDAVIT O F PUBLIC ATIO N
NO TIC E O F AC TIO N TO W ALTER PR ESC O TT/JENNIFER FR ANKLIN-PR ESC O TT/ANSW ER
W ITHIN 30 DAYS O F FIRST PUBLIC ATIO N 6/25/10
07/09/2010 MO TIO N TO DISMISS BY JENNIFER FR ANKLIN P RESC O TT
07/22/2010 NO TIC E O F SER VIC E MO TIO N TO DISMISS
07/22/2010 MO TIO N TO DISMISS BY JENNIFER FR ANKLIN P RESC O TT /PR O SE
07/22/2010 MO TIO N TO ENJO IN / BY JENNIFER FR ANKLIN-PR ESC O TT -P RO SE
07/22/2010 NO TIC E O F SER VIC E
O F PUBLISHED NO TIC E O F R EC O R D & MO TIO N TO DISMISS
BY DEFENDANT
07/23/2010 MO TIO N FO R C LAR IFIC ATIO N O F C O UNSEL
07/23/2010 MO TIO N TO DISMISS
07/23/2010 MO TIO N TO C LAR IFY ALLEGED PLAINTIFFS PUBLISHED NO TIC E O F R EC O R D FR AUD
08/12/2010 MO TIO N TO DISMISS PR O SE JENNIFER FR ANKLIN P RESC O TT
08/12/2010 BANKR UPTC Y BANKUNITED
08/12/2010 C A48/R EAL PR O PER TY MO R TGAGE FO R EC LO SUR E (PR E 2010) (DISPO SITIO N)
08/12/2010 SUMMO NS ISSUED ELSA JAR ER O / PUT IN SO UTH FLO R IDA PR O C ESS BIN
W e dne sday night is re gular m a inte nance tim e on our se rve rs; as a re sult brie f o utage s m ay o ccur.
W e apologize in advance for any inconve nie nce.
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Court Type: C IR C UIT CIVIL Disposition Judge:
Case Type: MO R TGAGE FO R ECLO SUR ES Disposed:
Case Status: O PEN Reopened:

PAR TIES C LAIMING
BY DEFENDANT
08/12/2010 SUMMO NS ISSUED ELSA JAR ER O / PUT IN SO UTH FLO R IDA PR O C ESS BIN
W e apologize in advance for any inconve nie nce.

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Court Type: C IR C UIT CIVIL Disposition Judge: HAYES, HUGH D
Case Type: MO R TGAGE FO R ECLO SUR ES Disposed: 08/12/2010
Case Status: DISPO SED Reopened:

06/15/2010 AFFIDAVIT O F DILIGENT SEAR C H AS TO W ALTER PR ESC O TT
PAR TIES C LAIMING
BY DEFENDANT
08/12/2010 MO TIO N TO DISMISS PR O SE JENNIFER FR ANKLIN P RESC O TT
08/12/2010 BANKR UPTC Y BANKUNITED
08/12/2010 C A48/R EAL PR O PER TY MO R TGAGE FO R EC LO SUR E (PR E 2010) (DISPO SITIO N)
W e apolo gize in advance for any inconve nie nce .
8/17/2010 p g
Public
y
Inquiry
Case 2:09-cv-00791-CEH-SPC Document 254 Filed 08/18/10 Page 1 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JENNIFER FRANKLIN
PRESCOTT, DR. JORGE BUSSE,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No. 2:09-cv-00791-CEH-SPC
ROGER ALEJO et al.
Defendants.
_________________________________/
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL

WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney, Shelley B. Cridlin, now makes
an appearance as counsel for Defendants, the Honorable Cynthia A. Pivacek and the Honorable
Hugh D. Hayes, in place of any and all prior counsel in this action. Please forward all pleadings
and other legal documents to the undersigned counsel.
BILL McCOLLUM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
/s/ Shelley B. Cridlin

Shelley B. Cridlin
Assistant Attorney General
Fla. Bar No. 0022451
Office of the Attorney General
501 East Kennedy Blvd., Suite 1100
Tampa, FL 33602
T - (813) 233-2880 F - (813) 233-2886
Shelley.Cridlin@myfloridalegal.com
Attorney for Defendants, the Honorable
Cynthia A. Pivacek and the Honorable Hugh
D. Hayes
[CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ON NEXT PAGE]
Page 1 of 2
Case 2:09-cv-00791-CEH-SPC Document 254 Filed 08/18/10 Page 2 of 2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on August 18, 2010, I electronically filed the foregoing with
the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of electronic filing to
those persons capable of receiving such notice of electronic filing. I further certify that I mailed
the foregoing document and the notice of electronic filing by first-class mail to the following
non-CM/ECF participants: Jennifer Franklin Prescott, P.O. Box 845, Palm Beach, FL 33480 and
Jorg Busse, P.O. Box 11124, Naples, FL 34101 on this the 18th day of August, 2010.
/s/ Shelley B. Cridlin

Shelley B. Cridlin
Assistant Attorney General
Page 2 of 2
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DEKALB COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
JANET D. MCDONALD,
JAMES B. STEGEMAN,
PLAINTIFFS CIVIL ACTION
FILE NO: 07CV11398-6
V
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, et., al.,

DEFENDANTS
PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO VOID

THIS COURT’S JUNE 11, 2008 ORDER
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ CASE WITH PREJUDICE
____________________________________________________________________________
COMES NOW Plaintiffs Janet D. McDonald and James B. Stegeman and file
Plaintiffs’ Brief In Support of Motion To Void This Court’s June 11, 2008 Order
Dismissing Plaintiffs’ Case With Prejudice.
Both Georgia and Federal law are clear that when a Judge is also a defendant, the
Judge must recuse or disqualify themselves. In the case at bar, Judge Becker, the day
after being served with Summons and Complaint,1 dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs’
complaint against Georgia Power, leaving the counterclaim against them intact.
The dismissal was either the act of retaliation under color of law against Plaintiffs 2
1
Judge Becker was named defendant in US District Court action File No.: 1:08-cv-1981-WSD,
service was perfected June 10, 2008 the day before she signed the Order dismissing with
prejudice Plaintiffs’ complaint against GA Power leaving only the defendant’s counterclaim.
2
Mr. Stegeman is Legally Disabled as recognized by Americans with Disabilities Act and Social
Security Act, thereby is a member of a protected class of person and is afforded extra protections.
State programs which receive Federal funding that should be protecting Mr. Stegeman have been
denied to Mr. Stegeman. Several state and Federal laws have been violated as well. See
for attempting to enforce their Civil and Constitutional Rights;3 or an unfair act of
extreme, unreasonable discriminatory/bias/prejudice. The Ruling is without authority and
effect and is not merely voidable, but void.
BRIEF BACKGROUND
After a continuing dispute with Georgia Power, Plaintiffs, one of which is 100%
Federally disabled and receives Supplemental Security Income, filed a verified, prima
facie complaint October 26, 2007. Georgia Power filed a verified answer and
counterclaim December 3, 2007.4 Plaintiffs moved to strike the verified answers and
counterclaim on March 8, 20085 due to verification and counterclaim containing
perjury/false swearing. Plaintiffs moved to stay discovery and all other processes
Attached “Exhibit I”
3
See U.S.C. 42 §12203: “Prohibition against retaliation and coercion” (a) Retaliation No person
shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice
made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.
(b) Interference, coercion, or intimidation It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or
interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having
exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual
in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter.
(c) Remedies and procedures The remedies and procedures available under sections 12117,
12133, and 12188 of this title shall be available to aggrieved persons for violations of
subsections (a) and (b) of this section, with respect to subchapter I, subchapter II and subchapter
III of this chapter, respectively.
4
Although the docket reflects the answer and counterclaim was filed December 3, 2007 Plaintiff
McDonald called the Court on December 6, 2007 after not receiving an answer and was told by
Judge Becker’s Clerk that no answer had yet been filed. This has been brought up several times
by Plaintiffs, but they cannot prove what they were told on the telephone by the clerk.
5
The docket reflects the filing of Motion to Strike on March 12, 2008, but Postal records show
delivered on March 8, 2008 and since all of Georgia Power’s filings reflect the day received by
the Court, it would be only fair that Plaintiffs were treated equally. This too has been shown to
the Court and ignored.
2
pending Ruling on Motion to Strike6 on March 20, 2008 after being lied to by opposing
counsel and after opposing counsel’s orchestration of a false discovery dispute.
Plaintiffs’ Motions went un-addressed by the Court until their case was dismissed with
prejudice although opposing counsel had the Court assisting them, setting hearings, and
making rulings in their favor.
Although Plaintiffs repeatedly requested assistance from the Court for the
numerous problems between Plaintiffs and attorney Watt, the Court refused to address the
problems. Plaintiffs more than once pointed out discrepancies, and manipulations within
the Court system, the Court ignored all of Plaintiffs’ requests.
After it became apparent that this Court was going to continually aid Georgia
Power and their attorneys and that Plaintiffs’ Civil and Constitutional Rights under color
of law would continue to be violated, Plaintiffs filed the action in US District Court. That
Court dismissed under Younger and Plaintiff Stegeman Appealed. The Appeal is
currently pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
VOID JUDGMENT
Both Georgia and Federal law are clear that when a Judge is a defendant, the
Judge has a personal interest and must recuse or disqualify themselves. In the case at bar,
Judge Becker, the day after being named a defendant, dismissed with prejudice only
Plaintiffs’ complaint, leaving the counterclaim against them intact. The dismissal was
either the act of retaliation under color of law against Plaintiffs for attempting to enforce
their Civil and Constitutional Rights; or an unfair act of extreme, unreasonable

6
The defendants never responded to Motion to Strike, they moved for a continuance which was
NEVER GRANTED.
3
discriminatory/ bias/prejudice, all of such instances calls for mandatory
disqualification/recusal. The Ruling is without authority and effect and is not merely
voidable, but void.
void judgment. A judgment that has no legal force or effect, the

invalidity of which may be asserted by any party whose rights are
affected at any time and any place, whether directly or collaterally *
From its inception, a void judgment continues to be absolutely null. It
is incapable of being confirmed in any manner or to any degree.
Black’s Law Dictionary West Group, 7th Ed. pg. 848.
There are several grounds for which a ruling or judgment is void, i.e.: fraud in the
procurement of a Ruling (which is applicable here); Judge is a defendant thereby
disqualified to act (which is applicable here); non amendable defect:
“A disqualified judge can take no judicial action in the case and any
attempt at such action is a mere nullity.” Garland v. State of Ga., 110
Ga. App. 756 (140 SE2d 46) (1964).
"The judgment of a court … void for any other cause, is a mere

nullity, and may be so held in any court when it becomes material to
the interest of the parties to consider it." Miller v. Miller, et., al.,
38752. (104 Ga. App. 224) (121 SE2d 340) (1961)
JUDGE’S DUTY TO DISQUALIFY/RECUSE
Georgia’s Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3 C. (1) (a) states:

"Judges should disqualify themselves in proceedings in which their
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited
to instance where: . . . the judge has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party or a party's lawyer . . . ."
"We interpret the word 'should' to mean 'shall' in the context of this
requirement." Savage v. Savage, 234 Ga. 853, 856 (218 SE2d 568)
(1975).
The American Bar Association’s Model Rule of Judicial Conduct states:

“A judge shall disqualify himself of herself in a proceeding in which
the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” ABA
4
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2, R. 2.11(A) (2007).
It has long been held that a Judge which is a defendant, must disqualify/recuse
themselves.
“The judge against whom such an action is brought, … is of course
disqualified from hearing the case…. See Code 24-2623.” Hamby v.
Pope, 27245 (229 Ga. 339) (191 SE2d 53) (1972).
Further a Judge who has been named a defendant loses neutrality, which “helps
guarantee that life, liberty and/or property will not be taken” in retaliation.
“The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or
property will not taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted
conception of the facts of the law.” Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. 466
U.S. 238, 242, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 64 L. 2d 182 (1980).
If the Due Process Clause requires recusal only when a party could prove actual
bias arising from personal animus in the judge’s heart or cold cash in the judge’s pocket,
then the rights of parties to a fair and impartial judge would be imperiled. Probabilities
of unfairness, likelihood of bias, and unacceptable perceptions are at the heart of
circumstantial evidence, which is sometimes the only evidence available on the issue
whether a judge is constitutionally required to disqualify.7
Violations of the Due Process Clause also results in voids judgments.
I. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Based on the findings “that persons with disabilities have been faced with
restrictions, limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and
relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics
7
See Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 1059, 1087 (1996)
5
that are beyond the control of such individuals”, Congress “invoke[d] the sweep of
congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment,” to
enact the ADA.8
In Lassiter v. Department Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) it was held: “The
Due Process Clause imposes an affirmative obligation upon States to take such measures
as are necessary to ensure that individuals, including those with disabilities, are not
deprived of their life, liberty, or property without procedures affording ‘fundamental
fairness.’” The Due Process Clause requires States to afford “individuals with
disabilities, fair proceedings”, and when “denied access to benefits or programs created
by state regulations and policies”.
The United States Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) that
“Title II of the ADA validly abrogates States’ Eleventh Amendment Immunity as applied
to the context of access to judicial services.” That decision was also supported in United
States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877, (2006). The Court in Lane found that Title II enforces
rights under the Equal Protection Clause as well as an array of rights subject to
heightened constitutional scrutiny under the Due Process Clause” Lane 541 U.S. at 522-
523; accord Constantine, 411 F.3d at 486-487.
Rulings made in violation of Due Process are void. Plaintiffs in this case
attempted to bring to the Judge’s attention numerous times unfair, manipulative treatment
by opposition’s attorneys only to have the treatment continue and get worse. A disabled
individual was forced into pro se litigation due to the State of Georgia’s failure to protect
8
42 U.S.C. §12101(b)(4).
6
him and his property, this Court had a duty to ensure fairness. This Court failed, or
refused to ensure that fairness and worked to see that the case against Georgia Power was
dismissed.
Marshall v. Jerrico, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 446 U.S. 238 (U.S. 04/28/1980);
64 L. Ed.2d 182, (1980); at [21] “The Due Process Clause entitles a
person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and
criminal cases. This requirement of neutrality in adjudicative
proceedings safeguards the two central concerns of procedural due
process, the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the
promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the
decisionmaking process. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-262,
266-267 (1978).”
Plaintiffs have been discriminated against and treated with unfairness, bias and
prejudice by this Court and the opposing counsel. An uninterested, lay person, would
question the partiality and neutrality of this Court.
“Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of

cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even
the probability of unfairness.” In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955).
Further it is the obligation of every Judge in Georgia to honor, abide by, and
uphold not only the Constitution and laws of the State of Georgia, but they are bound by
the laws and Constitution of The United States as well.
"State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to

safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law." Stone v
Powell, 428 US 465, 483 n. 35, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067
(1976).
Speaking of discrimination against disabled individuals, the Eleventh Circuit has
stated “occurs when a disabled individual is treated differently than a non-disabled or less
disabled individual. 42 U.S.C. §12112(b).” Nadler v. Harvey, No. 06-12692 (11th Cir.
7
2007) before Edmondson, Hull, and Forrester.
Further, a pro se litigant, and a disabled pro se litigant, have not been received the
treatment that staire decisis and past case precedent mandates they receive. Not once has
the court liberally construed their pleadings, held them to a less stringent standard than
opposing counsel.
“In considering appellant's enumerations of error, we are guided by

the general rule that "[p]ro se pleadings are held to less stringent
standards than pleadings that are drafted by lawyers" ( Thompson v.
Long, 201 Ga. App. 480, 481 (1) (411 SE2d 322)), and by the
statutory provision that "[w]here it is apparent from the notice of
appeal, the record, the enumeration of errors, or any combination of
the foregoing . . . what errors are sought to be asserted upon appeal,
the appeal shall be considered in accordance therewith
notwithstanding . . . that the enumeration of errors fails to enumerate
clearly the errors sought to be reviewed." OCGA 5-6-48 (f).” Cotton
v. Bank South, N.A., A93A2579 (212 Ga. App. 1) (440 SE2d 704)
(1994)
“holding pro se petition cannot be held to same standard as pleadings

drafted by attorneys” See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.
Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106,
97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); McDowell v.
Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States
v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)
“A court faced with a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint must read

the complaint’s allegations expansively,” Haines v. Kerner 404 U.S.
519, 520-21, S. Ct. 594, 596, 60 L.Ed. 2d 652 (1972)
“Court has a special obligation to construe pro se litigant’s pleadings

liberally” Polling v. Hovnanian Enterprises, 99 F. Supp. 2d 502,
506-07 (D.N.J. 2000).
“We hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than pleadings

drafted by attorneys and construe them liberally.” Tannenbaum v.
United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)
8
The Due Process Clause requires notice and opportunity to be heard. By this
Court’s own Order Dismissing Plaintiffs’ case with Prejudice states “On May 27, 2008,
the Court conducted a hearing to resolve outstanding discovery disputes…”; “Despite
adequate notice and actual knowledge…” To date, no party to the case in Superior Court,
or the case in U.S. District Court has produced evidence that Plaintiffs (1) had “adequate
Notice” or had (2) “actual knowledge” of a hearing for “discovery disputes”; (3) a
Motion Calendar showing Plaintiffs or Defendants listed on the Calendar for any
hearings; or (4) a showing that the Docket Report reflected in the “scheduled events” any
such hearings. Plaintiffs did request that the Docket Report and Motion Calendar to
reflect a hearing if a hearing was scheduled. Plaintiffs’ Motions were not addressed until
June 11, 2008 when their claims were dismissed.
OATH OF OFFICE
In Georgia as elsewhere, Judges take an Oath of Office, swearing to support the
Constitution of the United States as well as the State of Georgia Constitution:
“I swear that I will administer justice without respect to person and do

equal rights to the poor and the rich and that I will faithfully and
impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent on me as
judge of the superior courts of this state, according to the best of my
ability and understanding, and agreeably to the laws and Constitution
of this state and the Constitution of the United States. So help me
God.” O.C.G.A. § 15-6-6;
Note: The federal constitution requires that the judicial officers of the
state be bound by oath or affirmation to support the federal
constitution. See U.S. Const., Art. 6, § 3.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “No state legislator or executive or
judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to
9
support if.” Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401 (1958). Any judge who does
not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States, wars against that
Constitution and engages in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land. If a judge does
not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S.
200 (1888), he is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in an act or acts of treason.
U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S. Ct. 471, 66 Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821).
"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer
of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers
of the government from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the
law, and are bound to obey it." Butz v. Economou, 98 S.Ct. 2894
(1978); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 220, 1 S.Ct. at 261 (1882).
The United States Constitution:

Article VI.
Clause 2: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Country notwithstanding.
Clause 3: The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and
the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and
judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States,
shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution…
Amendment XIV
Section 3.: No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member or Congress, or as
an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State
legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given any aid or comfort
to the enemies thereof.
10
rebellion. 2. Open resistance or opposition to an authority or
tradition. Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Ed. West Group, pg. 1273
Violation of Oath of Office is not only grounds for void judgment, but more
importantly is grounds for impeachment, forever barring holding of Judicial Office.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs in this matter, having shown sufficient grounds to have this Court’s
Order Dismissing their Complaint with Prejudice set aside as a void judgment, Move this
Court to grant their Motion. Plaintiffs further Move this Court to disqualify/recuse Judge
Becker so that Plaintiffs may be able to have a fair and impartial tribunal, or a better
alternative is to have this case transferred out of Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit to a
Court which treats disabled and pro se litigants with dignity and respect.
Submitted this 24th day of February, 2009
By: ___________________________
JANET D. MCDONALD, Pro Se
821 Sheppard Rd
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
(404) 300-9782
By: ___________________________
JAMES B. STEGEMAN, Pro Se
821 Sheppard Rd
(404) 300-9782
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DEKALB COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA
11
JANET D. MCDONALD,
JAMES B. STEGEMAN, CIVIL ACTION
PLAINTIFFS
FILE NO: 07CV11398-6
v
GEORGIA POWER CO., et., al.,

DEFENDANTS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby Certify that I have this 24th day of February, 2009 served upon
Defendants a true and correct copy of Motion To Void This Court’s June 11, 2008
Order Dismissing Plaintiffs’ Case With Prejudice by depositing with U.S.P.S. First class
mail, proper postage affixed and mailed to Defendant’s counsel on record as follows:
Troutman Sanders, LLP
Brian P. Watt
5200 Bank of America Plaza
600 Peachtree Street
Atlanta, GA 30308-2216
By: ______________________________
JANET D. MCDONALD, Pro Se
By: _______________________________
JAMES B. STEGEMAN, Pro Se
821 Sheppard Rd
(770) 879-8737
12

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FORECLOSURE - Recusal Refusal Organized Judicial Crime

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR COLLIER COUNTY, FLORIDA

vs. CASE NO.: 09-6016-CA

JENNIFER FRANKLIN-PRESCOTT, et al.

NOTICE OF APPEAL, DISPOSITION, AND

NOTICE OF APPEAL AND DISPOSITION IN FAVOR OF J. FRANKLIN PRESCOTT

BANKRUPT BANK SEIZURE INFORMATION AND § 673.3011, FLA. STAT.,

EVIDENCE OF NO entitlement to enforce non-existent instrument

DISPOSITION NOTICE IN FAVOR OF JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT

PURSUANT TO UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE, AND U.C.C., ART. 3,

AND FLORIDA LAW

NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM ALTERATION OF RECORD

favor in the Case File;

Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.998, from the Case File;

the August 2010 “complaint” in the Case File;

the August 2010 “summons” from the Case File;

RECORD ABSENCE OF FINAL DISPOSITION FORM, § 25.075, FLA. STAT.

ABSENCE OF DISMISSAL IN JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT’S FAVOR

Jennifer Franklin Prescott’s favor in the Case File.

DEFENDANT JUDGE HUGH D. HAYES SUBSTITUTED COUNSEL ON 08/18/2010

counsel in Federal Case 2:2009-cv-00791.

FALSIFICATIONS AND/OR ALTERATIONS APPARENT

none could be ascertained and/or verified in the Naples Courthouse.

DEMANDS FOR CLARIFICATION AND EVIDENCE

c. “summons” in this fraudulent action.

DEFENDANT JUDGE’S ASSISTANT ASSERTED MISTAKE/ERROR

a. NO “August 2010 complaint”, and

b. NO “August 2010 summons”

appeared in the Case File.

NO negotiable instrument UNDER GOVERNING CODE

8. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Article 3, governs Negotiable Instruments.

Pursuant to § 3-104. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT, no “negotiable instrument” existed,

must enter judgment in favor of Jennifer Franklin Prescott. WHEREFORE, Jennifer

judgment of dismissal in favor of Jennifer Franklin Prescott.

JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT HOLDS FREE & CLEAR RECORD TITLE

homestead real property. See Collier County Public Records.

10. The Case Docket stated “disposition”:

The purported “disposition date” was “08/12/2010”.

RULE 1.540, FLA. R. CIV. P.

entitlement to enforce the admittedly lost/destroyed note, no service, no hearing, and no

due process. Here, records were altered.

BANKUNITED VIOLATED CH. 49, FLA. STAT.

fraudulent Case, service by publication was not allowed:

49.011 Service of process by publication; cases in which allowed.

15. A “complaint” appeared on the Docket.

disappeared from the record without any explanation.

PURPORTED plaintiff HAD NO right to enforce FICTITIOUS note

fictitious un-delivered lost and/or destroyed instrument.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF ANY delivery

destroyed note or mortgage could not have possibly been delivered.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF ANY reestablishment

pursuant to Ch. 71, Fla. Stat.

EMERGENCY AND THREAT OF FURTHER INJURY

19. Known foreclosure fraud is an EMERGENCY. Further injury must be prevented.

UNKNOWN LOSS OR DESTRUCTION

possibly reestablished any lost or destroyed note or mortgage.

SEIZURE OF BANKRUPT BANKUNITED

Camner. See Counsel, Camner Lipsitz law firm.

FAILURE & SEIZURE OF THE PURPORTED plaintiff

NO instrument, and NO lien

NO interest, and NO successor in interest

NO rights and NO standing

NO conditions precedent – FACIALLY FRIVOLOUS action

THE COURT KNEW THAT reestablishment WAS IMPOSSIBLE