Amex vs. Cordero
Smith
Amex is a foreign corp. that issues charge cards.
Nida Cordero was issued a charge card, together with an
extension card in favor of her husband, Noel, herein respondent.
Nov. 29, 1991, Noel, together with his wife, children and
relatives went to HK.
Nov 30, 1991, they went to Watsons and presented his card with
the cashier upon checkout.
Sales clerk verified the card by making a phone call. Susan
Chong, the store manager informed respondent that the card
must be confiscated and was later cut in half.
Upon verification with petitioner, respondent was informed that
his card was placed in Inspect Airwarn Support System as in
November 1, 1991 someone from HK attempted to use the same
card.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages, anchored on Art.
2176.
Trial Court, for respondent. Moral Damage 300K, Exemplary
Damage 200K, and Attorneys Fees 100K.
CA affirmed but reduced in half the damages and deleted
attorneys fees.
Issue: WN Amex is liable for damages?
Held: No.
In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there
must be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
But there are exceptions. There may be an action for quasi-delict
notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract between the
parties. A liability for tort may arise even under a contract,
where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently,
when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have
itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby
allowing the rules on tort to apply.
Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence
must be the proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by
the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury and without which the result would
not have occurred
As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his card
upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is
the authorized cardholder. This could have been accomplished
had respondent talked to petitioners representative, enabling the
latter to determine that respondent is indeed the true holder of
the card. Clearly, no negligence which breaches the contract can
be attributed to petitioner. If at all, the cause of respondents
humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to
petitioners representative.
Picart vs.
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the
defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum of P31,000, as damages
alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by the
defendant. From a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of La Union absolving the defendant from liability the
plaintiff has appealed.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard
the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of
the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony
closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge
instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this
was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to
the other side.
Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead
of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing
down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being
then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side,
the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to
escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then
standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its
body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so
doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange
of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider
was thrown off with some violence. From the evidence adduced
in the case we believe that when the accident occurred the free
space where the pony stood between the automobile and the
railing of the bridge was probably less than one and one half
meters. As a result of its injuries the horse died.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant in manoeuvring his car in the
manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise
to a civil obligation to repair the damage done.
Held: Yes.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation
before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence and determines liability by that.
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the
position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present
case we think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent
man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our
opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing
was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm
to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that
course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the
defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
 It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were Petitioners would make much of the point that no direct
not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant evidence was presented to prove that the door knob was indeed
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable defective on the date in question.
interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person
who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party. The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the window
shows that the door could not be opened from the inside. That
Child Learning Center vs. Tagario sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the
door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa
This petition started with a tort case filed with the Regional Trial loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the
Court of Makati by Timothy Tagorio and his parents, Basilio R. accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it
Tagorio and Herminia Tagorio, docketed as Civil Case No. 91- would not have happened except for the defendants negligence;
1389. The complaint1 alleged that during the school year 1990- (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
1991, Timothy was a Grade IV student at Marymount School, an
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of
academic institution operated and maintained by Child Learning
Center, Inc. (CLC). In the afternoon of March 5, 1991, between the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3)
1 and 2 p.m., Timothy entered the boys comfort room at the the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or
third floor of the Marymount building to answer the call of contribution on the part of the person injured. 11 Petitioners are
nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and unable to clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their
get out. Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked school toilets are at all times in working condition.
the door and yelled several times for help. When no help arrived
he decided to open the window to call for help. In the process of Valenzuela vs. CA
opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down
three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical
At around 2:00 A.M. in the morning of June 24, 1990, petitioner,
treatment for serious multiple physical injuries.
Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving her Mistsubishi Lancer
(Blue) when she stopped at a lighted place where there were
people to check her flat tire.
An action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by
respondents against the CLC, the members of its Board of
She parked along the sidewalk and went to the rear of here car to
Directors
get the tools when suddenly, the car being driven by Richard Li
(Lancer1987), reg. under the Alexnader Comm. Inc., bumped
After trial, the court a quo found in favor of respondents and
the car of plaintiff, causing the latters left leg to be amputated.
ordered petitioners CLC and Spouses Limon to pay respondents,
jointly and severally, 200,253.12 as actual and compensatory
RTC ruled for plaintiff (41,840 actual damages, 1M moral
damages, 200,000 as moral damages, 50,000 as exemplary
damages, 50K exemplary damages, 60K attorneys fees).
damages, 100,000 as attorneys fees and the costs of the suit.
Ricahrd, together with his employer were held solidarily and
jointly liable.
Both parties appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision of
the Trial Court.
CA affirmed but absolved the employer from liability.
Issue: WN petitioner is liable for damages?
Issue: WN Ricahrd was negligent, WN petitioner was liable for
contributory negligenc, WN employer is liable?
Held: Yes
Held: Richard negligent, petitioner not guilty of contributory
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
negligence, and employer liable.
plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of
Version of petitioner was corroborated by disinterested witness
the defendant or some other person for whose act he must
(she parked at the sidewalk, well lighted, and that it was not
respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the
raining).
fault or negligence and the damages incurred.
Richard seems to be under influence of alcohol and was driving
Fault, in general, signifies a voluntary act or omission which
fast
causes damage to the right of another giving rise to an obligation
on the part of the actor to repair such damage. Negligence is the Petitioner not liable for contributory negligence:
failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another
person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
circumstances justly demand. Fault requires the execution of a injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he
positive act which causes damage to another while negligence has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
consists of the omission to do acts which result in damage to required to conform for his own protection.14 Based on the
another. foregoing definition, the standard or act to which,
according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have
 conformed for her own protection was not to park at all at
any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone. We
cannot agree.
Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan
vs. Court of Appeals,16 an individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act
without much time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless
the emergency was brought by his own negligence.17
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise
the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and
could not be considered to have contributed to the
unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the
amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency
which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora
Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident
that she had taken all reasonable precautions.
Employer is liable:
Alexander Commercial Corporation must therefore fail.
We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in
question is not based on the principle of respondeat
superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the
servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability
ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of his employees. It is up to this
point, however, that our agreement with the respondent
court ends. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard
expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, 28 we are of
the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc.
is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the
accident of June 24, 1990.
Company car serves the business and goodwill of the
company.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated,
to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car
to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the
company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain
the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave
full and unlimited use of a company car
Mckee vs. IAC
Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977,
in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between
Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision
took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, with
Plate No. RF912-T Philippines '76 owned by private
respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort
car bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga '76 driven by Jose Koh.
The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh
McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh
McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all
passengers of the Ford Escort.
Before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two
hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was
traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando
Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the
other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando.
When the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the
southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted
from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The
boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all
the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of
the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he
then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes
and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do
so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the
lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said
bridge.
Two civil cases (4477 and 4478) and a criminal case were filed.
Ruben Galang as convicted (reckless imprudence resulting to
multiple homicide, physical injuries and damage to property)
and said conviction was later affirmed by the CA.
The two civil cases were later dismissed. IAC reversed the
dismissal of the civil cases.
Issue: WN Galang is liable for the quasi delict?
Held: Yes
Responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code.
It is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh.
Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to
avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from
where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite
lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course
to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would
be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to
the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car.
Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one
who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required
to act without time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his
own negligence."
The car occupying the lane of the truck is not the proximate
cause, it was the failure of the truck driver to stop or evade the
car which caused the accident (witness narrated that the car did
not stop nor did it slow down, it only stopped upon collision)
Truck ran at 48kph when the max at the bridge was only 30kph.
 We now rule, that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing
to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law,
the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck
driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting
damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from
the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is
only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. 59 Their only possible
defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent the damage.
Dy Teban Trading vs. Jose Ching
On July 4, 1995, at around 4:45 a.m., Rogelio Ortiz, with helper
Romeo Catamora, was driving a Nissan van owned by
petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. along the National Highway
in Barangay Sumilihon, Butuan City, going to Surigao City.
A Joana Paula passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane
towards the van. In between the two vehicles was a parked
prime mover with a trailer, owned by private respondent Liberty
Forest, Inc.
The prime mover was not equipped with triangular, collapsible
reflectorized plates, the early warning device required under
Letter of Instruction No. 229. As substitute, Limbaga placed a
banana trunk with leaves on the front and the rear portion of the
prime mover to warn incoming motorists. It is alleged that
Limbaga likewise placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front
and rear of the trailer
To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the
incoming passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of
the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright and glaring
headlights and the approaching passenger bus. He pumped his
break slowly, swerved to the left to avoid the oncoming bus but
the van hit the front of the stationary prime mover. The
passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover.6
Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor injuries. The Nissan
van, however, became inoperable as a result of the incident.
RTC ruled for petitioner, proximate cause of the accident was
the improper parking of the prime mover truck (with bulldozer)
RTC further held that Defendant Liberty Forest, Inc. did not
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in managing
and running its business. The evidence on record shows that it
failed to provide its prime mover and trailer with the required
"early warning devices" with reflectors and it did not keep
proper maintenance and condition of the prime mover and the
trailer.
CA reversed. Proximate cost was the failure of the Nissan van to
give way to the passenger bus. (BTW, Joana Paula bus was not
impleaded)
Issue: Which was the proximate cause? Truck or Van?
Held: RTC decision affirmed, CA reversed. Truck was the proximate
cause.
Defendant Liberty Forest, Inc. did not exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family in managing and running its business.
The evidence on record shows that it failed to provide its prime
mover and trailer with the required "early warning devices" with
reflectors and it did not keep proper maintenance and condition
of the prime mover and the trailer.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. To sustain a claim
based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a)
damage suffered by plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of
defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by
plaintiff.
Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on the
national highway; he failed to prevent or minimize the risk to
oncoming motorists.
The statement of Limbaga that he could not park the prime
mover and trailer deeper into the sand and gravel shoulder of the
highway to his right because there were banana plants is
contradicted by the picture marked Exhibit "F." The picture
shows that there was ample space on the shoulder. If defendant
Limbaga was careful and prudent enough, he should have the
prime mover and trailer traveled more distance forward so that
the bodies of the prime mover and trailer would be far more on
the shoulder rather than on the cemented highway when they
were parked.
The RTC noted that private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. also
failed to keep the prime mover in proper condition at the time of
the collision. The prime mover had worn out tires. It was only
equipped with one spare tire. It was for this reason that Limbaga
was unable to change the two blown out tires because he had
only one spare. The bulldozer was not even loaded properly on
the prime mover, which caused the tire blowouts.
The case of Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals is
inapplicable; Limbaga did not put lighted kerosene tin cans on
the front and rear of the prime mover.
The skewed parking of the prime mover was the proximate cause
of the collision.
We cannot rule on the proportionate or contributory liability of
the passenger bus, if any, because it was not a party to the case;
joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable.
Reyes vs. Sisters of Mary Hospital
Petitioner I the wife of victim, Jorge Reyes.
On January 8, 1987, Jorge was taken to the Mercy Community
Clinic by his wife. He was attended to by respondent Dr. Marlyn
Rico, resident physician and admitting physician on duty, who
gave Jorge a physical examination and took his medical history.
 Suspecting that Jorge could be suffering from this disease, Dr.
Rico ordered a Widal Test, a standard test for typhoid fever, to
be performed on Jorge. Blood count, routine urinalysis, stool
examination, and malarial smear were also made.4 After about
an hour, the medical technician submitted the results of the test
from which Dr. Rico concluded that Jorge was positive for
typhoid fever.
Dr. Marvie Blanes attended to Jorge at around six in the evening.
She also took Jorges history and gave him a physical
examination. Like Dr. Rico, her impression was that Jorge had
typhoid fever. Antibiotics being the accepted treatment for
typhoid fever, she ordered that a compatibility test with the
antibiotic chloromycetin be done on Jorge
Dr. Blanes ordered the first five hundred milligrams of said
antibiotic to be administered on Jorge at around 9:00 p.m. A
second dose was administered on Jorge about three hours later
just before midnight.
At around 1:00 a.m. of January 9, 1987, Dr. Blanes was called as
Jorges temperature rose to 41C. The patient also experienced
chills and exhibited respiratory distress, nausea, vomiting, and
convulsions.
Dr. Blanes put him under oxygen, used a suction machine, and
administered hydrocortisone, temporarily easing the patients
convulsions.
After about 15 minutes, however, Jorge again started to vomit,
showed restlessness, and his convulsions returned. Dr. Blanes
re-applied the emergency measures taken before and, in
addition, valium was administered. Jorge, however, did not
respond to the treatment and slipped into cyanosis, a bluish or
purplish discoloration of the skin or mucous membrane due to
deficient oxygenation of the blood. At around 2:00 a.m., Jorge
died. He was forty years old.
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against respondents
Sisters of Mercy, Sister Rose Palacio, Dr. Marvie Blanes, Dr.
Marlyn Rico, and nurse Josephine Pagente.
Petitioners offered the testimony of Dr. Apolinar Vacalares,
Chief Pathologist at the Northern Mindanao Training Hospital,
Cagayan de Oro City. The other doctor presented was Dr. Ibarra
Panopio, a member of the American Board of Pathology
On September 12, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision
absolving respondents from the charges of negligence and
dismissing petitioners action for damages. CA affirmed.
Issue: WN respondent were liable for negligence?
Held: No.
Res Ipsa Loquitur, the action speaks for itself.
petitioners presented Dr. Apolinar Vacalares as an expert witness, we
do not find him to be so as he is not a specialist on infectious diseases
like typhoid fever. Furthermore, although he may have had extensive
experience in performing autopsies, he admitted that he had yet to do
one on the body of a typhoid victim at the time he conducted the
postmortem on Jorge Reyes. It is also plain from his testimony that
he has treated only about three cases of typhoid fever.
On the other hand, the two doctors presented by respondents clearly
were experts on the subject. They vouched for the correctness of Dr.
Marlyn Ricos diagnosis. Dr. Peter Gotiong, a diplomate whose
specialization is infectious diseases and microbiology and an
associate professor at the Southwestern University College of
Medicine and the Gullas College of Medicine, testified that he has
already treated over a thousand cases of typhoid fever.
Dr. Rico was also justified in recommending the administration of the
drug chloromycetin, the drug of choice for typhoid fever. The burden
of proving that Jorge Reyes was suffering from any other illness
rested with the petitioners. As they failed to present expert opinion on
this, preponderant evidence to support their contention is clearly
absent.
Ramos vs. CA
Erlinda Ramos, the victim, was a robust and healthy woman,
except for some discomforts.
She and her husband went to see Dr. Hozaka who scheduled her
for cholecystectomy.
A day before the scheduled date of operation, she was admitted
at one of the rooms of the DLSMC
At around 7:30 A.M. of June 17, 1985 and while still in her
room, she was prepared for the operation by the hospital staff.
Her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who was the Dean of the
College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was also there
for moral support.
Her hands were held by Herminda as they went down from her
room to the operating room. At the operating room, Herminda
saw about two or three nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, the
other defendant, who was to administer anesthesia.
The operation was supposed to take place at 9:00A.M. but Dr.
Hozaka arrived 3 hours late.
Erlinda became comatose and stayed at the ICU for a month.
About four months thereafter or on November 15, 1985, the
patient was released from the hospital.
Petitioners filed a civil case for damages.
RTC-for petitioners
o Dra. Gutierrez omitted to exercise reasonable care in
intubating and in no t repeating the administration of
atropine.
o Dr. Hozaka, liable for being late and for the
negligence of the anaesthesiologist.
o Delos Santos Hospital, liable for the negligence of its
doctors.
CA, reversed.
Issue: Liability of Dr. Gutierrez, Dr. Hosaka, and the hospital.
Held: RTC affirmed.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the
thing or the transaction speaks for itself. (evidentiary in nature)
In the present case, Erlinda submitted herself for
cholecystectomy and expected a routine general surgery to be
performed on her gall bladder. On that fateful day she delivered
her person over to the care, custody and control of private
respondents who exercised complete and exclusive control over
her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound
and, except for a few minor discomforts, was likewise
physically fit in mind and body. However, during the
administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of
cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain.
Dr. Gutierrez, negligent in the anaesthesia phase.
Dr. Orlino Hosaka as the head of the surgical team. As the so-
called "captain of the ship," 73 it is the surgeon's responsibility
to see to it that those under him perform their task in the proper
manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his
failure to exercise the proper authority (as the "captain" of the
operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist
observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on
record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if
respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient.
Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka
had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the
same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over
three hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had
little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the
anesthesia delivery.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the
negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own
acts but also for those of others based on the former's
responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas.
Garcia-Rueda vs. Pascasio
Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-
Rueda, underwent surgical operation at the UST hospital for the
removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by Dr.
Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda
Balatbat-Reyes was the anaesthesiologist. Six hours after the
surgery, however, Florencio died of complications of "unknown
cause," according to officials of the UST Hospital
Not satisfied with the hospitals investigation, the petitioner
requested the NBI to investigate. NBI recommended that Dr.
Antonio and Dr. Reyes be charged for homicide through reckless
imprudence.
Fiscal passed/ping pong the case.
Petitioner filed graft charge before the Ombudsman which
dismissed the complaint.
Held: Case dismissed, appeal should be to the DOJ Sec.
Four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty,
breach, injury and proximate causation.
Moreover, in malpractice or negligence cases involving the
administration of anaesthesia, the necessity of expert testimony
and the availability of the charge of res ipsa loquitur to the
plaintiff; have been applied in actions against anaesthesiologists
to hold the defendant liable for the death or injury of a patient
under excessive or improper anaesthesia. 16 Essentially, it
requires two-pronged evidence: evidence as to the recognized
standards of the medical community in the particular kind of
case, and a showing that the physician in question negligently
departed from this standard in his treatment
Another element in medical negligence cases is causation which
is divided into two inquiries: whether the doctor's actions in fact
caused the harm to the patient and whether these were the
proximate cause of the patient's
injury
Professional Service vs. Agana
On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of the
Medical City Hospital, performed an anterior resection surgery
on Natividad Agana. He found that the malignancy in her
sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the
removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the
consent of Natividads husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr.
Juan Fuentes, respondent in G.R. No. 126467, to perform
hysterectomy on her.
After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil
took over, completed the operation and closed the incision.
However, the operation appeared to be flawed. In the
corresponding Record of Operation dated April 11, 1984, the
attending nurses entered these remarks:"sponge count lacking 2,
"announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but to no avail
continue for closure."
A few days later, Natividad complained of excruciating pain on
her anal region but was advised by Dr. Ampil to see an
oncologist.
Natividad went ot the US for further treatment and returned to
the country on Aug. 31, 1984.
Two weeks thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze
protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed about it, Dr.
Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by
hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then
assured her that the pains would soon vanish.
Dr. Ampils assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains
intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the
Polymedic General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon
Gutierrez detected the presence of another foreign object in her
vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width
which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula
had formed in her reproductive organs which forced stool to
 excrete through the vagina. Another surgical operation was
needed to remedy the damage.
A complaint for damages was filed against Dr. Ampil ,
Professional Services which owns Medical City and Dr. Fuentes.
RTC- defendants liable jointly and severally.
CA-Dr. Fuentes not liable. Dr. Ampil to reimburse the hospital
for whatever it had paid the plaintiff.
Issue: Liability of Dr. Ampil, Dr. Fuentes and PSI.
Held: Dr. Ampil and the hospital are liable while Dr. Fuentes not
liable.
Dr. Ampil, liable for not informing the patient about the missing
gauze, a clear case of medical malpractice. He is the captain of
the ship.
Dr. Fuentes, not liable. we find the element of "control and
management of the thing which caused the injury" to be
wanting. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie.
PSI: private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over
their attending and visiting consultant staff. While consultants
are not, technically employees, x x x, the control exercised, the
hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the
important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with
the exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether
such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining.
In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical
City Hospital the names and specializations of the physicians
associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and
Dr. Fuentes. We concur with the Court of Appeals conclusion
that it "is now estopped from passing all the blame to the
physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public
directory leading the public to believe that it vouched for their
skill and competence.
PSIs liability is traceable to its failure to conduct an
investigation of the matter reported in the nota bene of the count
nurse. Such failure established PSIs part in the dark conspiracy
of silence and concealment about the gauzes. Ethical
considerations, if not also legal, dictated the holding of an
immediate inquiry into the events, if not for the benefit of the
patient to whom the duty is primarily owed, then in the interest
of arriving at the truth.
Meralco v. Remoquillo
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story
house of Antonio Pealoza, his stepbrother, located on
Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a media
agua said to be in a leaking condition. The media agua
was just below the window of the third story. Standing on
said media agua, Magno received from his son thru that
window a 3 X 6 galvanized iron sheet to cover the
leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the lower
end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric
wire of the Manila Electric Company (later referred to as
the Company) strung parallel to the edge of the media
agua and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution.
RTC- Meralco Liable.
CA-Affirmed RTC
Issue: WN Meralco is liable?
Held: No
Distance of the Meralco wire was 7 ft., well above the
prescribed distance.
Owner of the house violated his building permit which was the
reason why the wire came only 30 inches from the media agua.
Death was caused by victims own negligence.
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the
electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause,
but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning
around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking
any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the
wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the
latters length of 6 feet.
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action
if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition
or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause
and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient
cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger
existed in the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause.
People v. Villacorta
On January 23, 2002, Villacorta stabbed Cruz with a sharpened
bamboo stick and immediately fled.
Cruz was rushed to the Tondo Medical Center where he was
treated as an outpatient.
Cruz was later (February 14, 2002) brought to San Lazaro
Hospital for treatment where he died the following day (tetanus).
Villacorta was charged and convicted for murder.
Issue: WN the stab wound was the proximate cause of death?
Held: No. Only guilty of slight physical injury.
 Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred."21
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in
the early morning of January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and
treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On
February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro
Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection, where he
died the following day, on February 15, 2002. The prosecution
did not present evidence of the emergency medical treatment
Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by
Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-
up medical treatment of his stab wound, or Cruzs activities
between January 23 to February 14, 2002.
There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the
stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro
Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If
Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then
the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days
later. As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has
a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that
exhibit symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have
one hundred percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can only
deduce that Cruzs stab wound was merely the remote cause,
and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the
proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruzs stab
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.
Tison vs. Sps Pomasin, et.al.
Version of Respondents:
Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarnis father, was on board the jitney
and seated on the passengers side. He testified that while the jitney
was passing through a curve going downward, he saw a tractor-trailer
coming from the opposite direction and encroaching on the jitneys
lane. The jitney was hit by the tractor-trailer and it was dragged
further causing death and injuries to its passengers.
Version of Petitioner
Jabon recounted that while he was driving the tractor-trailer, he
noticed a jitney (being driven by Laarni, the daughter of Gregorio) on
the opposite lane falling off the shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it
began running in a zigzag manner and heading towards the direction
of the truck. To avoid collision, Jabon immediately swerved the
tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a tree and sacks of palay.
Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left fender of the tractor-trailer
before it was thrown a few meters away. The tractor-trailer was
likewise damaged.4
Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted.
RTC: for Petitioners, dismissing the complaint for damages.
CA-reversed the RTC, it was the reckless driving of Jabon (tractor
driver), who was driving the tractor downwards which encroached on
the lane of the jeepney.
Issue: WN it was the driver of the tractor which was the proximate
cause of the accident?
Held: RTC affirmed, CA reversed. It was the jeepney driver who is
negligent.
Jabon, being the driver has a more focused concentration about the
incident as compared to Gregorio who was a mere passenger of the
jeep.
Gregorio claimed that their jeep was uphill but evidence shows it was
downhill.
Aside:
We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident, Jabon
was prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction imposed
on his drivers license, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3. As a matter of
fact, Jabon even asked the Land Transportation Office to reinstate his
articulated license containing restriction code 8 which would allow
him to drive a tractor-trailer. The Court of Appeals concluded
therefrom that Jabon was violating a traffic regulation at the time of
the collision.
In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the
tractor-trailer drivers restrictions on his license to the vehicular
collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the
Land Transportation Office merely erred in not including restriction
code 8 in his license.
Mercury Drug vs. Baking
On November 25, 1993, Sebastian M. Baking, respondent, went
to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. On the
following day, after undergoing an ECG, blood, and hematology
examinations and urinalysis, Dr. Sy found that respondents
blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal levels. Dr. Sy
then gave respondent two medical prescriptions Diamicron for
his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his triglyceride.
Instead of giving Diamicron, the saleslady of the petitioner gave
Dormicum (sleeping pills)
On the 3rd day that he was taking the medicine, he fell asleep
while driving, thereby figuring into an accident.
Upon being shown the medicine, Dr. Sy was shocked to find that
what was sold to respondent was Dormicum, instead of the
prescribed Diamicron.
Thus, on April 14, 1994, respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 80 of Quezon City a complaint for
damages against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-
20193.
RTC-for Baking, CA affirmed.
Issue: WN the Petitioner, through its salesclerk was negligent and
WN such negligence was the proximate cause?
Held: RTC and CA decision affirmed.
The negligence of petitioners employee was the proximate
cause of the accident.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or
on the occasion of their functions.
Mercury Drug vs. Sps. Huang
On December 20, 1996 at aroung 10:30 PM along C5 road,
Setephen Huang was driving a 1991 Toyota Corolla GLi (1,450
kg) while Rolando Del Rosario was driving a truck (14,058 kg)
owned by Mercury Drug.
The truck suddenly swerved and slammed into the front right
side of the car.
The car was a total wreck while Stephen Huang was paralyzed
for life from chest down.
RTC- Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and solidarily liable.
1. Two Million Nine Hundred Seventy Three Thousand Pesos
(2,973,000.00) actual damages;
2. As compensatory damages:
a. Twenty Three Million Four Hundred Sixty One Thousand, and
Sixty-Two Pesos (23,461,062.00) for life care cost of Stephen;
b. Ten Million Pesos (10,000,000.00) as and for lost or impaired
earning capacity of Stephen;
3. Four Million Pesos (4,000,000.00) as moral damages;
4. Two Million Pesos (2,000,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
5. One Million Pesos (1,000,000.00) as attorneys fees and litigation
expense.4
On February 16, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court but reduced the award of moral damages to
1,000,000.00. The appellate court also denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners.
Issue: WN Mercury Drug and Del Rosario are liable?
To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that
it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, both in the
selection of the employee and in the supervision of the performance
of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective employees, the
employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience, and service records.12 With respect to the supervision of
its employees, the employer should formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary
measures for their breach. To establish compliance with these
requirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.
If the car bumped the truck, the result would have been different as
the truck is heavier.
Mercury Drug Negligent:
Del Rosario was issued Traffic Violation Ticket
Did not attend driving seminar (once since 1984)
Driving for 13 hours at the time of accident
Was hired as delivery man and not driver
School of the Holy Spirit vs. Taguiam
Respondent Corazon P. Taguiam was the Class Adviser of Grade
5-Esmeralda of the petitioner, School of the Holy Spirit of
Quezon City.
On March 10, 2000, the class president, wrote a letter5 to the
grade school principal requesting permission to hold a year-end
celebration at the school grounds.
The principal authorized the activity and allowed the pupils to
use the swimming pool.
Respondent admitted that Chiara Mae Federicos permit form6
was unsigned. Nevertheless, she concluded that Chiara Mae was
allowed by her mother to join the activity since her mother
personally brought her to the school with her packed lunch and
swimsuit.
Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils who
did not know how to swim to avoid the deeper area. However,
while the pupils were swimming, two of them sneaked out.
Respondent went after them to verify where they were going.
Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae
drowned.
After an Administrative Investigation, respondent was dismissed
from employment due to gross negligence resulting to loss of
trust and confidence.
The parents of the victim filed a claim for damage and a
criminal case (reckless imprudence resulting to homicide).
Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal which was
dismissed by the LA arguing that respondent was validly
dismissed. NLRC affirmed.
CA-reversed NLRC
Issue: WN respondent was guilty of gross negligence?
Held: Dismissal affirmed.
 Respondent had been grossly negligent. First, Chiara Maes
permit form was unsigned. Yet, respondent allowed her to join
the activity because she assumed that Chiara Maes mother has
allowed her to join it by personally bringing her to the school
with her packed lunch and swimsuit.
Second, it was respondents responsibility as Class Adviser to
supervise her class in all activities sanctioned by the school. 18
Thus, she should have coordinated with the school to ensure that
proper safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult
personnel, were present during their activity.
All told, there being a clear showing that respondent was
culpable for gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and
confidence, her dismissal was valid and legal. It was error for
the Court of Appeals to reverse and set aside the resolution of
the NLRC.
Saludaga vs. FEU
Saludaga was sophomore law student of FEU when one of the
security guards (Rosete) on duty shot him.
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondents on
the ground that they breached their obligation to provide
students with safe and secure environment.
RTC for petitioner which CA reversed.
Issue:
WN FEU is liable? WN De Jesus (FEU President) is jointly liable?
WN under Art. 2180, FEU can be held liable for the act of the
security guard?
Held: For petitioner.
It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law
student in respondent FEU. As such, there was created a
contractual obligation between the two parties.
In the instant case, we find that, when petitioner was shot inside
the campus by no less the security guard who was hired to
maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a prima facie
showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation to
provide a safe and secure environment to its students.
After a thorough review of the records, we find that respondents
failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due
diligence in providing a safe learning environment for their
students. They failed to prove that they ensured that the guards
assigned in the campus met the requirements stipulated in the
Security Service Agreement. Indeed, certain documents about
Galaxy were presented during trial; however, no evidence as to
the qualifications of Rosete as a security guard for the university
was offered.
FEU President is not liable with the corp.
FEU not liable for the act of the security guard as the sec. guard
is not an employee of FEU.
Regino vs. PCST
Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at
Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST).
Reared in a poor family, Regino went to college mainly through the
financial support of her relatives. During the second semester of
school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects
under Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad,
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the
"Rave Party and Dance Revolution," the proceeds of which were to
go to the construction of the school's tennis and volleyball courts.
Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100
each. The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing
students who purchased tickets with additional points in their test
scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take
the final examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending
dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets
and as a consequence, was not allowed to take her exams.
On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint5
for damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad. In her Complaint,
she prayed for P500,000 as nominal damages; P500,000 as moral
damages; at least P1,000,000 as exemplary damages; P250,000 as
actual damages; plus the costs of litigation and attorney's fees.
The complaint was dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Issue: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedy (should she have filed
with the CHED?) Lack of cause of action? Liability for Tort?
Held: for Petitioner.
Exhaustion of administrative remedy is not applicable as she was not
asking for the reversal of the schools action, which is to allow her to
take the exam. Issue here is purely legal.
She has cause of action: breach of contract (student and school) and
liability for Tort.
Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise
bound by a contract. An academic institution, however, may be held
liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students,
since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort. Here, there
was a contract between the school and the student; however, the tort
(not allowing her to take the exam) was the cause of the breach of the
contract. Since by the act of the school of disallowing her to take the
exam resulted in the breach of contract, the school becomes liable for
tort.