G.R. No.

145226 February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2 dated August 5, 1996
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court
found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and
sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccionalas minimum to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the
resolution3 of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for
reconsideration.

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-
1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While
in Canada, they maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join
her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990
at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant
Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to
take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at

the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
 complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the
City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the
prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.

On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as
follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y
Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayoras
maximum.

SO ORDERED.7

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first marriage
to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled
that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed
to marry again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which held
that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both
spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to
determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not
entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the
second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed
to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the
law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20700.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage
between Lucio and Lucia void ab initiosince no marriage ceremony actually took place. No
appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
 WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.11

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not
acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 34912 of the Revised
Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been
dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not
a valid defense in a bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of the
Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article
1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that the
doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the
effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.16 However, the
denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P.
Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio,
then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of
the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he
cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE

RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE]
PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE
SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.

C.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE
RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF
THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if
so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.

The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce
decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage
openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner
further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant
case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code,
is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete
defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the
intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a
second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the
instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all
the elements concur, stressing that under Article 4019 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of
nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said
Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that
petitioners contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the
Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Lucia.

Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first
determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of
the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No.
6020, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the

annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on
August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar,
Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
 SO ORDERED.21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and
Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that
the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there
was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the
first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first
marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married."24 The records show that
no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the
decision had long become final and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.
Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal
purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria
Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant
charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter
case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the
second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent

one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just
once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again
six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared
to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their
own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot
be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for
bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in
favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to
ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner
has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the
validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the
appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with
moral certainty.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206832 January 21, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALFREDO MORALES Y LAM, Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is an Appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Alfredo Morales y Lam (Morales)
assailing the Decision2of the Court of Appeals dated 14 August 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
04287.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is an affirmance of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76 in Criminal Case Nos. 7534-7535, finding the accused
Morales guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 entitled "An Act Instituting the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

In the Criminal Case No. 7534, Morales was charged with illegal sale of shabu as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of April 2004, in the Municipality or Rodriguez, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another person
one (1) heat scaled transparent plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline
substance, which gave positive result to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also
known as shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation orthc above-cited law.3

In the Criminal Case No. 7535, Morales was charged with illegal possession of shabu as
follows:

That on or about the 14th day of April 2004, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, direct custody and
control three (3) heat-scaled transparent sachets each containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline
substance, which gave positive results to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also
known as shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.4

When arraigned, the accused pleaded not guilty of the crimes charged.5

The RTC held that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof in the cases of
illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The trial court relied on the categorical
statements of the prosecution witnesses as against the bare denials of the accused. The
presumption or regularity of performance of duties was upheld in the absence of any improper
motive on their part to testify falsely against the accused. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:

 (1) In Criminal Case No. 7534, finding the accused Alfredo Morales y Lam GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime or Sale or Dangerous Drug (Violation of Section
5, 1st par., Article II, R.A. 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Life
Imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (500, 000.00).

(2) In Criminal Case No. 7535, finding the accused Alfredo Morales y Lam GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of POSSESSION of DANGEROUS DRUG
(Violation of Section 11, 2nct par., No. 3, Article II, R.A. 9165) and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Twelve Years (12) years and one (1) day to Twenty
(20) years and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (300,000.00).6

Upon appeal, the appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court. It upheld the presence of
all the elements of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of drugs, and preservation
of the corpus delicti of the crime from the time they were seized and presented in court. The
procedural steps required by Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 were liberally construed in
favor of the prosecution in view of the preservation of integrity and identity of the corpus delicti.
Conformably, the finding on the presumption of regularity of performance of duties was affirmed
in the absence of ill-motive on the part of the police officers.

On 29 August 2012, a Notice of Appeal7 was filed by Morales through counsel before the
Supreme Court.

While this case is pending appeal, the Inmate Documents and Processing Division Officer-in-
Charge Emerenciana M. Divina8 informed the Court that accused-appellant Morales died while
committed at the Bureau of Corrections on 2 November 2013 as evidenced by a copy of Death
Report9 signed by New Bilibid Prison Hospital's Medical Officer Ursicio D. Cenas. The death of
accused-appellant Morales pending appeal of his conviction, extinguishes his civil and criminal
liabilities.

Under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code:

Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment. x x x x

Ordinarily, both the civil and criminal liabilities are extinguished upon the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction by the lower courts.

However, a violation of Republic Act No. 9165 does not entail any civil liability. No civil liability
1w phi 1

needs extinguishment.

WHEREFORE, in view of his death on 2 November 2013, the appeal of accused-appellant

Alfredo Morales y Lam from the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 14 August 2012 in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04287 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal,
Branch 76 in Criminal Case Nos. 7534-7535 convicting him of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby declared MOOT and ACADEMIC.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207264 June 25, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June 2013 filed by petitioner
Regina Ongsiako Reyes, assailing the Resolutions dated 27 March 2013 and 14 May 2013
issued by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 13-053. The
assailed Resolutions ordered the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the
position of Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.

On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny
Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the ground that it
contained material misrepresentations, specifically: (1) that she is single when she is married to
Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas;1 (2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac,
Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the residence of her
husband, and at the same time, when she is also a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa,
Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of
Representatives;2 (3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her
birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960;3 (4) that she is not a permanent resident of
another country when she is a permanent resident or an immigrant4 of the United States of
America;5and (5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.6

In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is publicly known to be the wife of
Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas), there is no valid and binding
marriage between them. According to petitioner, although her marriage with Congressman
Mandanas was solemnized in a religious rite, it did not comply with certain formal requirements
prescribed by the Family Code, rendering it void ab initio.7 Consequently, petitioner argues that
as she is not duty-bound to live with Congressman Mandanas, then his residence cannot be
attributed to her.8 As to her date of birth, the Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National
Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964.9 Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation
that she is a permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United States of America is not
supported by evidence.10

During the course of the proceedings, on 8 February 2013, respondent filed a "Manifestation
with Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of Exhibits"11 consisting of,
among others: (1) a copy of an article published on the internet on 8 January 2013 entitled
"Seeking and Finding the Truth about Regina O. Reyes" with an Affidavit of Identification and
Authenticity of Document executed by its author Eliseo J. Obligacion, which provides a
database record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that petitioner is an American citizen
and a holder of a U.S. passport; (2) a Certification of Travel Records of petitioner, issued by
Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief, Verification and Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration
which indicates that petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various travels abroad.
On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution12 cancelling petitioners
COC, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Certificate of Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is hereby CANCELLED.

The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that she made in her COC,
petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the
requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003, namely: (1) to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (2)
to make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. In addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not
have the oneyear residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.13 Thus, she is ineligible to run for the position of Representative for the lone district
of Marinduque.

Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration14 on 8 April 2013 claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she
has not lost such status by simply obtaining and using an American passport. Additionally,
petitioner surmised that the COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her marriage to an
American citizen in concluding that she is a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner averred,
however, that such marriage only resulted into dual citizenship, thus there is no need for her to
fulfill the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225. Still, petitioner attached an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public on 24 September 2012. As
to her alleged lack of the one-year residency requirement prescribed by the Constitution, she
averred that, as she never became a naturalized citizen, she never lost her domicile of origin,
which is Boac, Marinduque.

On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution15 denying petitioners

Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013
Elections.

On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality16 declaring the 14 May
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and executory, considering that more than
twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from the date of promulgation with no order issued by this
Court restraining its execution.17

On same day, petitioner took her oath of office18 before Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of
the House of Representatives.

Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of 30 June 2013.

In the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order, petitioner raises the following issues:19

31) Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a
duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of
 Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of
Marinduque.

32) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of Respondent Tans
alleged "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and
offered and admitted in evidence which became the basis for its Resolution of the case
without giving the petitioner the opportunity to question and present controverting
evidence, in violation of Petitioners right to due process of law.

33) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a
Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency requirement for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives.

34) Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by enforcing the provisions
of Republic Act No. 9225, it imposed additional qualifications to the qualifications of a
Member of the House of Representatives as enumerated in Section 6 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution of the Philippines.

The petition must fail.

At the outset, it is observed that the issue of jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC vis-a-vis that
of House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) appears to be a non-issue. Petitioner is
taking an inconsistent, if not confusing, stance for while she seeks remedy before this Court,
she is asserting that it is the HRET which has jurisdiction over her. Thus, she posits that the
issue on her eligibility and qualifications to be a Member of the House of Representatives is best
discussed in another tribunal of competent jurisdiction. It appears then that petitioners recourse
to this Court was made only in an attempt to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its final
and executory judgment in SPA No. 13-053.

Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the petition, and consider each of the issues raised by
petitioner. The need to do so, and at once, was highlighted during the discussion En Banc on 25
June 2013 where and when it was emphasized that the term of office of the Members of the
House of Representatives begins on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed20 because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has
the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives.

Contrary to petitioners claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following
reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners qualifications, as well
as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal.
Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of
the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. x x x

As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,21 the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is
not a member of the House of Representatives, to wit:

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals supposed assumption of jurisdiction

over the issue of petitioners qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that
HRETs jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of
the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives,
it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of
Representatives?

In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC,22 citing Aggabao v. COMELEC23 and Guerrero v.

COMELEC,24 the Court ruled that:

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and
the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)

This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Limkaichong v. COMELEC,25 wherein the
Court, referring to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC vis-a-vis the HRET, held that:

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and
the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)

This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC,26 to wit:

After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office by Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the
matter of his qualifications, as well as questions regarding the conduct of election and contested
returns were transferred to the HRET as the constitutional body created to pass upon the
same. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation has
been made, COMELECs jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests
relating to elections, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
However, it must be noted that in these cases, the doctrinal pronouncement was made in the
context of a proclaimed candidate who had not only taken an oath of office, but who had also
assumed office.

For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC,27 the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the
HRET against that of the COMELEC only after the candidate had been proclaimed, taken his
oath of office before the Speaker of the House, and assumed the duties of a Congressman on
26 September 2007, or after the start of his term on 30 June 2007, to wit:

On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte filed his comment in which he brought to Our
attention that on September 26, 2007, even before the issuance of the status quo ante order of
the Court, he had already been proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected Member of the
House of Representatives of the First Congressional District of Lanao del Norte. On that very
same day, he had taken his oath before Speaker of the House Jose de Venecia, Jr. and
assumed his duties accordingly.

In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has already been transferred to the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). (Emphasis supplied.)

Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the questioned candidate had already assumed
office, and hence, was already considered a Member of the House of Representatives, unlike in
the present case.

Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because,
primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of
office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only "at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election."28 Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.

In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a purported Oath Of
Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is not the oath of
office which confers membership to the House of Representatives.

Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:

Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. Members shall take their oath or affirmation either
collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session.

Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1) before the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made
the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in
open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed
complied with.

More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy that before the
proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed
of the issue of petitioners lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14
May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on
petitioners qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representative. We
will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the argument of the petitioner that the
COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the
COMELEC En Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser which proclaimed petitioner cannot by
such act be allowed to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En Banc which affirmed a
decision of the COMELEC First Division.

Indeed, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division which was promulgated on 27
March 2013, and the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc which was promulgated on
14 May 2013, became final and executory on 19 May 2013 based on Section 3, Rule 37 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides:

Section 3. Decisions Final after five days. Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to
deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare nuisance candidate or to
disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory
after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.

To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013 from becoming final and executory,
petitioner should have availed herself of Section 1, Rule 3729 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure or Rule 6430 of the Rules of Court by filing a petition before this Court within the 5-day
period, but she failed to do so. She would file the present last hour petition on 10 June 2013.
Hence, on 5 June 2013, respondent COMELEC rightly issued a Certificate of Finality.

As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove her Filipino citizenship, as well as her one-
year residency in Marinduque, suffice it to say that the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of
discretion in finding her ineligible for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of
"newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and
admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay
and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends
that there was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the
opportunity to question and present controverting evidence.

Her contentions are incorrect.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules
of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission."
In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted
by respondent COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given
every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tans
petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner
had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of
the opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be
given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:31

The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a
hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral
argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)

As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the
COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:

"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office,
the law requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine
Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid
requirements. Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioners lack of proof
regarding her American citizenship, contending that it is petitioners burden to present a case.
She, however, specifically denied that she has become either a permanent resident or
naturalized citizen of the USA.

Due to petitioners submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated

February 7, 2013, however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American
passport which she continues to use until June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to substantiate his
allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence to prove
otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that
respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless
and until she can establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual
Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold
any elective public office in the Philippines."32 (Emphasis supplied.)

Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioners
COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a
holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of
proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has reacquired such status in accordance with the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen,
however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any
proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.

Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, petitioner admitted
that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American
citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her.33 Still, attached to the said
motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September
2012.34 Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit "if only to show her desire and zeal to
serve the people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity."35 We cannot, however,
subscribe to petitioners explanation. If petitioner executed said Affidavit "if only to comply with
the rules," then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that
she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions were
promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in September 2012.

Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, to this effect: "This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her
oath of office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of
reacquisition of natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper
proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of office is in order to make reference to what is
already part of the records and evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the
records evidence on matters of fact that was not previously passed upon by Respondent
COMELEC."36 This statement raises a lot of questions Did petitioner execute an oath of
allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present it
at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has indeed
lost her natural-born Filipino status?

To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner
contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as
Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a
natural-born Filipino citizen.

This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this
Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot
be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met
as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules
Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-
002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of
Immigration. Thus, petitioners oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered
as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.

These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioners
citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.

As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that petitioner has lost her natural-born
status, we quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC First Division that petitioner cannot
be considered a resident of Marinduque:

"Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile
of origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, he must still show that
he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his
residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.

In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that petitioner had already re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she has regained her domicile in the
Philippines. There being no proof that petitioner had renounced her American citizenship, it
follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
The only proof presented by petitioner to show that she has met the one-year residency
requirement of the law and never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque is her
claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to July
13, 2011. But such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For, petitioner
has never regained her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No
amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her
domicile of choice in the USA."37 (Emphasis supplied.)

All in all, considering that the petition for denial and cancellation of the COC is summary in
nature, the COMELEC is given much discretion in the evaluation and admission of evidence
pursuant to its principal objective of determining of whether or not the COC should be cancelled.
We held in Mastura v. COMELEC:38

The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice
except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such
findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of
the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC created and explicitly made independent by
the Constitution itself on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC
has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the
attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.
1wphi1

Time and again, We emphasize that the "grave abuse of discretion" which warrants this Courts
exercise of certiorari jurisdiction has a welldefined meaning. Guidance is found in Beluso v.
Commission on Elections39 where the Court held:

x x x A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved
to exist. "Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or
despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical,
arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck
down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross. (Emphasis supplied.)

Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that grave
abuse of discretion exists.

Lastly, anent the proposition of petitioner that the act of the COMELEC in enforcing the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225, insofar as it adds to the qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives other than those enumerated in the Constitution, is unconstitutional, We find
the same meritless.

The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for the House of
Representatives who have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the qualifications
prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that the candidate must be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and must have one-year residency prior to the date of elections.
Such being the case, the COMELEC did not err when it inquired into the compliance by
petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to determine if she reacquired her status as a
natural-born Filipino citizen. It simply applied the constitutional provision and nothing more.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Bane affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is
upheld.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the
nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an
individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an
individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the
second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia
Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial
Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without
interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter
was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner,
Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:

That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in
lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the
essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom
he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each
other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that
he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to
verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and
Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.9

On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a
decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS

CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME
OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE
ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID
AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
assailed judgment.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 12

Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the
existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator
that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on
which the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the
elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.14

Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the
existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence
presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes,
dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City
Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12,
1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16

To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by
the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City
Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the
respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B.
Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.

To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage
contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court
provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract,
Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may
be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).

This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in
custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract
plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November
10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents.

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics
Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3,
1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that there was no
marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10,
1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of
such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from
documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as
to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the
existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage,
especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract
needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a
marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the
defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any
requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced
against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed her of
the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to
indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.

Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first
marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is
significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil
Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both
documents, therefore, are dated after the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private
respondent in this case.

As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to
prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.

The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial
declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration
of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was
subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.21

This argument is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails
to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are
concerned.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid

marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that
the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To
our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is
null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage
that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability
for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in
recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an
individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between
spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites
for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into
essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence
of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license,
and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before
the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family
Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by
petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted
the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial
Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal
effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute
nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written
into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To
hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to
thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this
case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a
third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this
is irrelevant in the determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the
act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State
does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of
which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the
foundation of the States basic social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step in.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy
is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its
medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a
minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which
has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals
correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner
Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154645 July 13, 2004

MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS J. REYES, petitioner,

vs.
LOURDES REYES, MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM and RODOLFO JR. -- all surnamed
REYES, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Though registered in the paramours name, property acquired with the salaries and earnings of
a husband belongs to his conjugal partnership with the legal spouse. The filiation of the
paramours children must be settled in a probate or special proceeding instituted for the
purpose, not in an action for recovery of property.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify
the February 4, 2002 Decision2 and the August 14, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-GR CV No. 45883. The CA disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby partially DENIED and

the Decision dated May 30, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 111
in Civil Case No. 9722-P is MODIFIED to read, as follows:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the

defendant as follows:

a. Declaring the house and lot registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
90293 (26627-A) of the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV as conjugal
partnership property of the late Spouses Rodolfo and Lourdes Reyes;

b. Ordering the [petitioner] to surrender possession of said subject property,

pursuant to the applicable law on succession, to the respective estates of the late
Rodolfo Reyes and Lourdes Reyes and to pay a reasonable rental of P10,000.00
a month, to the same juridical entities, upon their failure to do so until possession
of the property is delivered; and

c. To pay [respondents] attorneys fees in the sum of P20,000.00 and to pay the
costs."4

The questioned Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The CA narrated the facts as follows:

"[Respondents] filed a Complaint for reconveyance and damages, dated January 23,
1982, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, containing the following allegations:
 x x x The complaint alleges that [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes is the widow of
Rodolfo A. Reyes who died on September 12, 1981; that [respondents]
Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo, Jr. are the legitimate children of
[respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes and the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes; that for
years before his death, Rodolfo A. Reyes had illicit relations with [petitioner]
Milagros B. Joaquino; that before his death, x x x Rodolfo A. Reyes was Vice
President and Comptroller of Warner Barnes and Company with an income
of P15,000.00 a month and, after retirement on September 30, 1980, received
from said company benefits and emoluments in the amount of P315,0[1]1.79;
that [respondent] wife was not the recipient of any portion of the said amount.

The complaint further alleges that on July 12, 1979, a [D]eed of [S]ale of a
property consisting of a house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila
was executed by the spouses Ramiro Golez and Corazon Golez in favor of
[petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90293
of the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV was issued in the name of
[petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino; that the funds used to purchase this property
were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes as
executive of Warner Barnes and Company as [petitioner] Joaquino was without
the means to pay for the same; that [petitioner] executed a Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A. Reyes to mortgage the property to
Commonwealth Insurance Corporation in order to pay the balance of the
purchase price; that said Rodolfo A. Reyes executed a mortgage in favor of
Commonwealth Insurance Corporation for P140,000.00 and to guaranty payment
thereof, he secured a life insurance [policy] with Philam Life Insurance
Corporation for the said amount, assigning the proceeds thereof to
Commonwealth Insurance Corporation; that the monthly amortizations of the
mortgage were paid by said Rodolfo A. Reyes before his death and at the time of
his death, the outstanding balance of P110,000.00 was to be paid out of his
Philam Life Insurance [p]olicy.

The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had two cars in [petitioners]
possession and that the real and personal properties in [petitioners] possession
are conjugal partnership propert[ies] of the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and
Rodolfo A. Reyes and one-half belongs exclusively to [respondent] Lourdes P.
Reyes and the other half to the estate of Rodolfo A. Reyes to be apportioned
among the [other respondents] as his forced heirs. [Respondents] therefore, pray
that the property covered by T.C.T. No. 90293 be declared conjugal property of
the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and that [petitioner] be
ordered to reconvey the property in [respondents] favor; that the two cars in
[petitioners] possession be delivered to [respondents] and that [petitioner] be
made to pay actual, compensatory and moral damages to [respondents] as well
as attorneys fees.

xxx xxx xxx

"[Petitioner] eventually filed her Answer, dated August 1, 1982, the allegations of which
have been summarized by the trial court in the following manner:
 In her Answer, [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino alleges that she purchased the
real property in question with her own exclusive funds and it was only for
convenience that the late Rodolfo Reyes facilitated the mortgage over the same;
that although the late Rodolfo Reyes paid the monthly amortization of the
mortgage as attorney-in-fact of [petitioner], the money came exclusively from
[her].

[Petitioner] further alleges in her answer, by way of special and affirmative

defenses, that during all the nineteen (19) years that [she] lived with Rodolfo
Reyes from 1962 continuously up to September 12, 1981 when the latter died,
[petitioner] never had knowledge whatsoever that he was married to someone
else, much less to [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes; that [petitioner] was never the
beneficiary of the emoluments or other pecuniary benefits of the late Rodolfo
Reyes during his lifetime or after his death because [she] had the financial
capacity to support herself and her children begotten with the late Rodolfo
Reyes. [Petitioner] prays for a judgment dismissing [respondents] complaint and
for the latter to pay unto [petitioner] moral and exemplary damages in such
amounts as may be determined during the trial, including atto[r]neys fees and
the costs of the suit. x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

"On February 2, 1993, [respondent] Lourdes Reyes died.

"Subsequently, the trial court granted the complaint based on the following factual
findings:

Lourdes Reyes was legally married to Rodolfo Reyes on January 3, 1947 in

Manila. They have four children, namely: Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo
Jr., all surnamed Reyes and co-[respondents] in this case. Rodolfo Reyes died
on September 12, 1981. At the time of his death, Rodolfo Reyes was living with
his common-law wife, Milagros Joaquino, x x x with whom she begot three (3)
children namely: Jose Romillo, Imelda May and Charina, all surnamed Reyes.

During his lifetime, Rodolfo Reyes worked with Marsman and Company and later
transferred to Warner Barnes & Co., where he assumed the position of Vice-
President [Comptroller] until he retired on September 30, 1980. His monthly
salary at Warner Barnes & Co. was P15,000.00 x x x and upon his separation or
retirement from said company, Rodolfo Reyes received a lump sum
of P315,011.79 in full payment and settlement of his separation and retirement
benefits.

During the common-law relationship of Rodolfo Reyes and [petitioner] Milagros

Joaquino and while living together, they decided to buy the house and lot
situated at No. 12 Baghdad Street, Phase 3, BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro
Manila. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 12, 1979 was executed in favor of
[petitioner] Milagros Joaquino and Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-90293
covering the said property was issued in the name of [petitioner only] on July 20,
1979.
 To secure the finances with which to pay the purchase price of the property in
the amount of P140,000.00, [petitioner] executed on July 20, 1979, a Special
Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A. Reyes for the latter, as attorney-in-fact,
to secure a loan from the Commonwealth Insurance Company. An application for
mortgage loan was filed by Rodolfo Reyes with the Commonwealth Insurance
Company and a Real Estate Mortgage Contract was executed as collateral to the
mortgage loan. The loan was payable in ten (10) years with a monthly
amortization of P1,166.67. The monthly amortizations were paid by Rodolfo
Reyes and after his death, the balance of P109,797.64 was paid in full to the
Commonwealth Insurance by the Philam Life Insurance Co. as insurer of the
deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes."5

On appeal to the CA, petitioner questioned the following findings of the trial court: 1) that the
house and lot had been paid in full from the proceeds of the loan that Rodolfo Reyes obtained
from the Commonwealth Insurance Company; 2) that his salaries and earnings, which were his
and Lourdes conjugal funds, paid for the loan and, hence, the disputed property was conjugal;
and 3) that petitioners illegitimate children, not having been recognized or acknowledged by
him in any of the ways provided by law, acquired no successional rights to his estate.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the RTC, the CA held that the property had been paid out of the conjugal funds of
Rodolfo and Lourdes because the monthly amortizations for the loan, as well as the premiums
for the life insurance policy that paid for the balance thereof, came from his salaries and
earnings. Like the trial court, it found no sufficient proof that petitioner was financially capable of
buying the disputed property, or that she had actually contributed her own exclusive funds to
pay for it. Hence, it ordered her to surrender possession of the property to the respective
estates of the spouses.

The appellate court, however, held that the trial court should not have resolved the issue of the
filiation and the successional rights of petitioners children. Such issues, it said, were not
properly cognizable in an ordinary civil action for reconveyance and damages and were better
ventilated in a probate or special proceeding instituted for the purpose.

Hence, this Petition.6

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for the Courts consideration:

"I.

Whether or not it has been indubitably established in a court of law and trier of facts, the
Regional Trial Court, that petitioners three [3] illegitimate children are x x x indeed the
children of the late Rodolfo Reyes.

"II.

Whether or not it is legally permissible for [respondents] to make a mockery of the law by
denying [the] filiations of their [two] 2 illegitimate sisters and one [1] illegitimate brother
 when in fact the very complaint filed by their mother, the lawful wife, Lourdes[,] shows
that her husband Rodolfo had illicit relations with the petitioner Milagros and had lived
with her in a house and lot at Baghdad Street.

"III.

Whether or not the fact that the Court of Appeals made a finding that the house and lot
at Baghdad Street are conjugal property of lawfully wedded Rodolfo and Lourdes
including the insurance proceeds which was used to pay the final bill for the house and
lot, this will prevail over Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.

"IV.

Whether or not the Supreme Court should enforce the rule that the parties to a lawsuit
should only tell the truth at the trial and in [their] pleadings x x x.

"V.

Whether or not the legitimate children of the late Rodolfo Reyes should respect their
fathers desire that his illegitimate children should have a home or a roof over their
heads in consonance with his duty to love, care and provide for his children even after
his death."7

The issues boil down to the following: 1) the nature of the house and lot on Baghdad Street (BF
Homes Paraaque, Metro Manila); and 2) the propriety of ruling on the filiation and the
successional rights of petitioners children.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

First Issue:
The Conjugal Nature of the Disputed Property

Before tackling the merits, we must first point out some undisputed facts and guiding principles.

As to the facts, it is undisputed that the deceased Rodolfo Reyes was legally married to
Respondent Lourdes Reyes on January 3, 1947.8 It is also admitted that for 19 years or so, and
while their marriage was subsisting, he was actually living with petitioner. It was during this time,
in 1979, that the disputed house and lot was purchased and registered in petitioners name.

Plainly, therefore, the applicable law is the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 145
thereof, a conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) is created upon marriage9 and lasts until the legal
union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or judicial separation of
property.10 Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the husband and wife.11 As to
what constitutes such properties are laid out in Article 153 of the Code, which we quote:
 "(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;

(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of
either of them;

(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the
common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse."

Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage, unless proven to pertain
to the husband or the wife exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the rebuttable
presumption to arise, however, the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during
the existence of the marriage.12

The law places the burden of proof13 on the plaintiffs (respondents herein) to establish their claim
by a preponderance of evidence14 -- evidence that has greater weight or is more convincing than
that which is offered to oppose it.15

On the other hand, Article 14416 of the Civil Code mandates a co-ownership between a man and
a woman who are living together but are not legally married. Prevailing jurisprudence holds,
though, that for Article 144 to apply, the couple must not be incapacitated to contract
marriage.17 It has been held that the Article is inapplicable to common-law relations amounting to
adultery or concubinage, as in this case. The reason therefor is the absurdity of creating a co-
ownership in cases in which there exists a prior conjugal partnership between the man and his
lawful wife.18

In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the Family Code has been applied.19 The
latter Article provides:

"Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit.

"If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party which acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.

"The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith."

Thus, when a common-law couple have a legal impediment to marriage, only the property
acquired by them -- through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry -- shall
be owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective contributions.
With these facts and principles firmly settled, we now proceed to the merits of the first issue.

The present controversy hinges on the source of the funds paid for the house and lot in
question. Upon the resolution of this issue depends the determination of whether the property is
conjugal (owned by Rodolfo and Lourdes) or exclusive (owned by Milagros) or co-owned by
Rodolfo and Milagros.

The above issue, which is clearly factual, has been passed upon by both the trial and the
appellate courts, with similar results in favor of respondents. Such finding is generally
conclusive; it is not the function of this Court to review questions of fact. 20

Moreover, it is well-settled that only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in
cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals or under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.21 This
principle applies with greater force herein, because the CA came up with the same factual
findings as those of the RTC.

Even then, heeding petitioners plea, we have gone through the pleadings and the evidence
presented by the parties to find out if there is any circumstance that might warrant a reversal of
the factual findings. Unfortunately for petitioner, we have found none.

Indeed, a preponderance of evidence has duly established that the disputed house and lot was
paid by Rodolfo Reyes, using his salaries and earnings. By substantial evidence, respondents
showed the following facts: 1) that Rodolfo was gainfully employed as comptroller at Warner,
Barnes and Co., Inc. until his retirement on September 30, 1980, upon which he received a
sizeable retirement package;22 2) that at exactly the same time the property was allegedly
purchased,23 he applied for a mortgage loan24 -- intended for "housing"25 -- from the
Commonwealth Insurance Company; 3) that he secured the loan with a real estate
mortgage26 over the same property; 4) that he paid the monthly amortizations for the loan27 as
well as the semi-annual premiums28 for a Philam Life insurance policy, which he was required to
take as additional security; and 5) that with the proceeds of his life insurance policy, the balance
of the loan was paid to Commonwealth by Philam Life Insurance Company.29

All told, respondents have shown that the property was bought during the marriage of Rodolfo
and Lourdes, a fact that gives rise to the presumption that it is conjugal. More important, they
have established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo were used to pay for the
property; and that the loan was, in turn, paid from his salaries and earnings, which were
conjugal funds under the Civil Code.

In contrast, petitioner has failed to substantiate either of her claims -- that she was financially
capable of buying the house and lot, or that she actually contributed to the payments therefor.

Indeed, it does not appear that she was gainfully employed at any time after 196130 when the
property was purchased. Hearsay are the Affidavits31 and the undated Certification32 she had
presented to prove that she borrowed money from her siblings and had earnings from a jewelry
business. Respondents had not been given any opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, who
had not testified on these matters. Based on the rules of evidence, the Affidavits and the
Certification have to be rejected. In fact, they have no probative value.33 The CA was also correct
in disregarding petitioners allegation that part of the purchase money had come from the sale of
a drugstore34 four years earlier.
Under the circumstances, therefore, the purchase and the subsequent registration of the realty
in petitioners name was tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to Milagros. By express provision
of Article 739(1) of the Civil Code, such donation was void, because it was "made between
persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation."

The prohibition against donations between spouses35 must likewise apply to donations between
persons living together in illicit relations; otherwise, the latter would be better situated than the
former.36 Article 87 of the Family Code now expressly provides thus:

"Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses
may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also
apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage." (Italics
supplied)

Regarding the registration of the property in petitioners name, it is enough to stress that a
certificate of title under the Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be used as an
instrument for the deprivation of ownership.37 It has been held that property is conjugal if
acquired in a common-law relationship during the subsistence of a preexisting legal marriage,
even if it is titled in the name of the common-law wife.38 In this case, a constructive trust is
deemed created under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which we quote:

"Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes."

The registration of the property in petitioners name was clearly designed to deprive Rodolfos
legal spouse and compulsory heirs of ownership. By operation of law, petitioner is deemed to
hold the property in trust for them. Therefore, she cannot rely on the registration in repudiation
of the trust, for this case is a well-known exception to the principle of conclusiveness of a
certificate of title.39

Second Issue:
Ruling on Illegitimate Filiation
Not Proper

It is petitioners alternative submission that her children are entitled to a share in the disputed
property, because they were voluntarily acknowledged by Rodolfo as his children. Claiming that
the issue of her childrens illegitimate filiation was duly established in the trial court, she faults
the CA for ruling that the issue was improper in the instant case.

Her position is untenable.

Indeed, it has been ruled that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be
ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose
of determining such rights.40 Sustaining the appellate court in Agapay v. Palang,41 this Court held
that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedents estate could not
be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.
Considerations of due process should have likewise deterred the RTC from ruling on the status
of petitioners children. It is evident from the pleadings of the parties that this issue was not
presented in either the original42 or the Supplemental Complaint43 for reconveyance of property
and damages; that it was not pleaded and specifically prayed for by petitioner in her
Answers44 thereto; and that it was not traversed by respondents Reply to the Supplemental
Complaint.45 Neither did petitioners Memorandum,46 which was submitted to the trial court, raise
and discuss this issue. In view thereof, the illegitimate filiation of her children could not have
been duly established by the proceedings as required by Article 887 of the Civil Code.47

In view of the foregoing reasons, the CA cannot be faulted for tackling the propriety of the RTCs
ruling on the status of the children of petitioner, though she did not assign this matter as an
error. The general rule -- that only errors assigned may be passed upon by an appellate court
admits of exceptions. Even unassigned errors may be taken up by such court if the
consideration of those errors would be necessary for arriving at a just decision or for serving the
interest of justice.48

The invocation by petitioner of Articles 1949 and 2150 of the Civil Code is also unmeritorious.
Clearly, the illegitimate filiation of her children was not the subject of inquiry and was in fact not
duly established in this case. Thus, she could not have shown that respondents had acted in
bad faith or with intent to prejudice her children. These are conditions necessary to show that an
act constitutes an abuse of rights under Article 19.51 She also failed to show that respondents --
in violation of the provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code -- had acted in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.

Moreover, we note that the issue concerning the applicability of Articles 19 and 21 was not
raised by petitioner in the trial court or even in the CA. Hence, she should not be permitted to
raise it now. Basic is the rule that parties may not bring up on appeal issues that have not been
raised on trial.52

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.