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Republic of the Philippines above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously

SUPREME COURT make or draw and issue to EILEEN FERNANDEZ herein represented by ________
Manila to apply on account or for value the check described below:

THIRD DIVISION EQUITABLE BANK

Check No. 021711

G.R. No. 131540 December 2, 1999 In the amount of P50,000.00

BETTY KING, petitioner, Postdated July 24, 1992


vs.
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he did not have sufficient
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount
of such check upon their presentment, which check when presented for payment
within ninety (90) days from the date thereof were subsequently dishonored by
PANGANIBAN, J.:
the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed" and despite receipt of notice
Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the prosecution must prove not only that of such dishonor the accused failed to pay the face amount thereof or make
the accused issued a check that was subsequently dishonored. It must also arrangement for the full payment thereof within five (5) working days after
established that the accused was actually notified that the check was dishonored, receiving notice. 7
and that he or she failed, within five banking days from receipt of the notice, to
When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. After the
pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for
prosecution presented its evidence and rested its case, petitioner filed a
its payment. Absent proof that the accused received such notice, a prosecution
Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court, on the ground that the prosecution
for violation of the Bouncing Check Law cannot prosper.
failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court denied the
The Case Demurrer in its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer to evidence without prior leave
of Court assailing the January 30, 1997 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 (CA) in of court is DENIED for lack of merit.
CA-GR CR No. 18226 and its November 5, 1997
3
Since accused has waived her right to present evidence, judgment is hereby
Resolution denying reconsideration. The CA affirmed the June 14, 1994
rendered finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Batas
Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Metro Manila 5 in Criminal
Pambansa Bilang 22 in the eleven (11) above-entitled cases and is ordered to:
Case Nos. 93-3335 to 93-3345 which convicted petitioner of 11 counts of
violation of BP 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Check Law. 1. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
P50,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P50,000.00
On April 28, 1993, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jaime A. Adoc filed
as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3335;
against petitioner eleven separate Informations, 6 which are identically worded,
except for the check number, the amount and the date, as follows: 2. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
P50,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P50,000.00
That in or about the month of January, 1992 in the Municipality of Las Pias,
as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3336;
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
3. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of The Facts
P50,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P50,000.00
Evidence for the Prosecution
as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3337;
The Office of the Solicitor General 11 summarized the facts, as viewed by the
4. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
prosecution, in this wise:
P64,200.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P64,200.00
as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3338; On several occasions in January, 1992, at Las Pias, Metro Manila, petitioner
discounted with complainant Ellen Fernandez several Equitable Bank checks
5. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
postdated from July 23 to 29, 1992 in the total amount of P1,070,000.00 in
P66,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P66,000.00
exchange for cash in the amount of P1,000,000.00. When the checks were
as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3339;
deposited for payment, they were dishonored by the drawee bank because they
6. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of were drawn against an account without sufficient funds. Petitioner failed to make
P100,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of good the checks despite demand. (Memorandum dated April 7, 1993 of Assistant
P100,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3340; Provincial Prosecutor to the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor)

7. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of During the hearing on the merits of this case on September 17, 1998, the
P150,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of prosecution offered in evidence its documentary evidence. Petitioner admitted
P150,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3341; the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented.12

8. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of Evidence for the Defense
P150,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of
As noted earlier, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court.
P150,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3342;
In doing so, she waived her right to present evidence and submitted the case for
9. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of judgment on the basis of the documentary exhibits adduced by the
P130,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of prosecution. 13
P130,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3343;
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
10. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals explained that the prosecution
P130,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of
proved all the elements of the crime. The CA also pointed out that the failure of
P130,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3344; and,
petitioner to sign the pretrial order was not fatal to the prosecution, because her
11. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of conviction was based on the evidence presented during the trial.
P130,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of
The Issues
P130,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3345. 8
Petitioner submits the following issues for the Court's consideration:
As already stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in this wise: 9
I
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed [I]N TOTO. Costs against
appellant. Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in admitting
in evidence all the documentary evidence of the prosecution though their due
Hence, this Petition. 10
execution and genuineness were not duly established in evidence pursuant to the True, a pretrial agreement not signed by a party is inadmissible. However, the
provisions of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence; conviction of petitioner was based not on that agreement but on the documents
submitted during the trial, all of which were admitted without any objection from
II
her counsel. During the hearing on September 17, 1993, the prosecution offered
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring as evidence the dishonored checks, the return check tickets addressed to private
that Rule 118, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, as applied in the case of Fule complainant, the notice from complainant addressed to petitioner that the
vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 446, which states that no agreement or admission checks had been dishonored, and the postmaster's letter that the notice had
made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against been returned to sender. Petitioner's counsel did not object to their admissibility.
the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel, is This is shown by the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing on
inapplicable in the case at bar; September 17, 1993:

III COURT:

Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling You have no objection to the admissibility, not that the Court will believe it.
that the burden of evidence has already been shifted from the prosecution to the
ATTY. MANGERA
defense despite the definite factual issues in the pre-trial order; and
No, Your Honor.
IV
COURT:
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt albeit Exhibits "A" to "A" to "K" are admitted.
the prosecution did not produce any evidence. 14
ATTY. MAKALINTAL:
In the main, the resolution of the Petition hinges on (1) the admissibility and (2)
We offer Exhibit "L", the return-check ticket dated July 27, 1992, relative to
the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.
checks No. 021745 and 021746 indicating that these checks were returned DAIF,
This Court's Ruling drawn against insufficient funds; Exh. M, returned check ticket dated July 28,
1992, relative to Check No. 021727, 021711 and 021720 likewise indicating the
The Petition has merit insofar as it contends that the elements of the crime
said checks to have been drawn against insufficient funds, Your Honor. Exhibit N,
charged have not all been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
returned check ticket dated July 29, 1992, relative to Check Nos. 021749 and
First Issue: 021748, having the same indications;

Admissibility of Documentary Evidence Exhibits O, returned check ticket dated July 29, 1992 relative to Check Nos.
021750 and 021753, with the same indications;
Because the first, the second and the third issues raised by petitioner all refer to
the same matter, they will be discussed together. She contends that the pieces Exhibits P, returned check ticket dated August 4, 1992 relative to Check No.
of documentary evidence presented by the prosecution during pretrial are 021752, having the same indication as being drawn against insufficient funds;
inadmissible, because she did not sign the pretrial agreement as required under
Exhibit Q, the demand letter sent to the accused by Atty. Horacio Makalintal
Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court. 15 Hence, she argues that there is no
dated August 3, 1992;
basis for her conviction.
Exhibit R, the letter-request for certification addressed to the Postmaster General COURT:
sent by the same law office dated 17 September 1992, showing that the said
So, admitted.
letter was dispatched properly by the Central Post Office of Makati;
ATTY. MAKALINTAL:
Exhibit S, 1st Indorsement of the Makati Central Post Office dated 21 September
1992; With the admission of our offer, Your Honor, the prosecution
rests. 16
Exhibit T, the Philippine Postal Corporation Central Post Office letter dated 24
September 1992, addressed to this representation showing that there were 3 From the foregoing, it is clear that the prosecution evidence consisted of
notices sent to the herein accused who received the said letter. documents offered and admitted during the trial. In view of this, the CA correctly
ruled that Fule v. Court of Appeals 17 would not apply to the present controversy.
COURT:
In that case, a hearing was conducted during which the prosecution presented
Let's go to the third check slip; any objection to the third slip? three exhibits. However, Fule's conviction was "based solely on the stipulation of
facts made during rile pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the
ATTY. MANGERA:
petitioner, nor by his counsel." Because the stipulation was inadmissible in
We have no objection as to the due execution and authenticity. evidence under Section 4 of Rule 118, the Court held that there was no proof of
his guilt.
COURT:
In the present case, petitioner's conviction was based on the evidence presented
Admitted. during trial, and not on the stipulations made during the pretrial. Hence,
ATTY. MAKALINTAL: petitioner's admissions during the trial are governed not by the Fule ruling or by
Section 4 of Rule 118, but by Section 4 of Rule 129 which reads:
We are offering Exhibits Q, R, S and T, for the purpose of showing that there was
demand duly made on the accused and that the same had been appropriately Sec. 4. Judicial Admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in
served by the Central Post Office Services of Manila. the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
ATTY. MANGERA: palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
We admit as to the due execution and authenticity only as to that portion, Your Hence, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in taking cognizance of
Honor. the said documentary evidence.
COURT: Second Issue:
We are talking of admissibility now, so admitted. In other words, at this point, he Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
makes an offer and the Court will either grant admission, [admit] it in evidence or
deny it. It can deny admission if it is not properly identified etcetera. Petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the elements of the offense. After a careful consideration of the records of this
ATTY. MANGERA: case, we believe and so rule that the totality of the evidence presented does not
I think it is already provided. support petitioner's conviction for violation of BP 22.

Sec. 1 of BP 22 defines the offense as follows:


Sec. 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws and therein the date and the amount involved. She adds that they were improperly
issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue filled up by Eileen Fernandez. Thus, she concludes, she did not "issue" the
that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the dishonored checks in the context of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently defines "issue" as the "first delivery of the instrument complete in form to a
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have person who takes it as a holder." 19
been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
Petitioner's contentions are not meritorious. The questioned checks, marked as
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of
Exhibits "A" to "K," contained the date of issue and the amount involved. In fact,
not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less
petitioner even admitted that she signed those checks. On the other hand, no
than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no
proof was adduced to show that petitioner merely signed them in blank, or that
case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment
complainant filled them up in violation of the former's instructions or their
at the discretion of the court.
previous agreement. The evidence on record is clear that petitioner issued eleven
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds checks, all of which were duly filled up and signed by her.
in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check,
Checks Dishonored
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount
of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's argument that "there appears no
appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. evidence on record that the subject checks were unpaid and
dishonored." 20 Under Section 3 of BP 22, "the introduction in evidence of any
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or
unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or
persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable
written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall
under this Act.
be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the due
18
Accordingly, this Court has held that the elements of the crime are as follows: presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the
same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped, or attached by
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value.
the drawee on such dishonored check."
2. The checks subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
In the present case, the fact that the checks were dishonored was sufficiently
funds or credit; or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
shown by the checks themselves, which were stamped with the words "ACCOUNT
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
CLOSED." This was further supported by the returned check tickets issued by PCI
3. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have Bank, the depository bank, stating that the checks had been dishonored.
sufficient funds in, or credit with, drawee bank for the payment of the check in
Clearly, these documents constitute prima facie evidence that the drawee bank
full upon its presentment.
dishonored the checks. Again, no evidence was presented to rebut the
We shall analyze the evidence, purportedly establishing each of the prosecution's claim.
aforementioned elements which the trial and the appellate courts relied upon.
Knowledge of Insufficiency of Funds
Issuance of the Questioned Checks
To hold a person liable under BP 22, it is not enough to establish that a check
Contending that the prosecution failed to prove the first element, petitioner issued was subsequently dishonored. It must be shown further that the person
maintains that she merely signed the questioned checks without indicating who issued the check knew "at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon Thus, in order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the
its presentment." Because this element involves a state of mind which is difficult insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or she received a notice of
to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima facie presumption of such dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of
knowledge, as follows: 21 the check or make arrangement for its payment.

Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and To prove that petitioner knew of the insufficiency of her funds, the prosecution
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of presented Exhibits "Q" to "T." Based on these documents, the Court of Appeals
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) concluded that "[p]rivate complainant sent a demand letter to appellant to make
days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of good said checks . . .. Appellant failed to pay the face value of the eleven checks
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder or make arrangement for the full payment thereof within 90 days after receiving
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the notice." 24
the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that
Upon closer examination of these documents, we find no evidentiary basis for the
such check has not been paid by the drawee.
holding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner received a
In other words, the prima facie presumption arises when a check is issued. But notice that the checks had been dishonored.
the law also provides that the presumption does not arise when the issuer pays
True, complainant sent petitioner a registered mail, as shown in Exhibit "Q"
the amount of the check or makes arrangement for its payment "within five
informing the latter that the checks had been dishonored. But the records show
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
that petitioner did not receive it. In fact, Postmaster Wilfredo Ulibarri's letter
drawee." Verily, BP 22 gives the accused an opportunity to satisfy the amount
addressed to complainant's counsel certified that the "subject registered mail
indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. As the Court held in Lozano
was returned to sender on September 22, 1992 . . .. " 25
v. Martinez, the aforecited provision serves to "mitigate the harshness of the law
in its application." 22 This opportunity, however, can be used only upon receipt by Notwithstanding the clear import of the postmaster's certification, the
the accused of a notice of dishonor. This point was underscored by the Court prosecution failed to adduce any other proof that petitioner received the post
in Lina Lim Lao v. Court of Appeals: 23 office notice but unjustifiably refused to claim the registered mail. It is possible
that the drawee bank sent petitioner a notice of dishonor, but the prosecution
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator
did not present evidence that the bank did send it, or that petitioner actually
a "compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt
received it. It was also possible that she was trying to flee from complainant by
the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated." This was
staying in different address. Speculations and possibilities, however, cannot take
also compared "to certain laws allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain
the place of proof. Conviction must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt.
period of time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the Government,
Clearly, the evidence on hand demonstrates the indelible fact that petitioner did
without incurring any criminal liability." In this light, the full payment of the
not receive notice that the checks had been dishonored. Necessarily, the
amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor
presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of funds cannot arise.
is a "complete defense." The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives
an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, Be that as it may, the Court must point out that it cannot rule on petitioner's civil
procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually liability, for the issue was not raised in the pleadings submitted before us.
served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand and the basic postulates
of fairness require that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received We must stress that BP 22, like all penal statutes,
26
is construed strictly against the
by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under BP 22. State and liberally in favor of the accused. Likewise, the prosecution has the
burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt each element of the crime. Hence, the
prosecution's case must rise or fall on the strength of its own evidence, never on
the weakness or even absence of that of the defense.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED


and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Betty King is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution
to prove all the elements of the crimes charged. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines sign the aforesaid chEck as an alternate story. Plaintiff Ricardo S. Santos, Jr. did
SUPREME COURT sign the check.
Manila
It appears that the check (Exh. '1') was issued to defendant Ernestina Crisologo-
SECOND DIVISION Jose in consideration of the waiver or quitclaim by said defendant over a certain
property which the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) agreed to sell to
the clients of Atty. Oscar Benares, the spouses Jaime and Clarita Ong, with the
G.R. No. 80599 September 15, 1989 understanding that upon approval by the GSIS of the compromise agreement
with the spouses Ong, the check will be encashed accordingly. However, since the
ERNESTINA CRISOLOGO-JOSE, petitioner, compromise agreement was not approved within the expected period of time,
vs. the aforesaid check for P45,000.00 (Exh. '1') was replaced by Atty. Benares with
COURT OF APPEALS and RICARDO S. SANTOS, JR. in his own behalf and as Vice- another Traders Royal Bank cheek bearing No. 379299 dated August 10, 1980, in
President for Sales of Mover Enterprises, Inc., respondents. the same amount of P45,000.00 (Exhs. 'A' and '2'), also payable to the defendant
Melquiades P. de Leon for petitioner. Jose. This replacement check was also signed by Atty. Oscar Z. Benares and by the
plaintiff Ricardo S. Santos, Jr. When defendant deposited this replacement check
Rogelio A. Ajes for private respondent. (Exhs. 'A' and '2') with her account at Family Savings Bank, Mayon Branch, it was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. A subsequent redepositing of the said check
was likewise dishonored by the bank for the same reason. Hence, defendant
REGALADO, J.: through counsel was constrained to file a criminal complaint for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 with the Quezon City Fiscal's Office against Atty. Oscar Z.
Petitioner seeks the annulment of the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals,
Benares and plaintiff Ricardo S. Santos, Jr. The investigating Assistant City Fiscal,
promulgated on September 8, 1987, which reversed the decision of the trial
Alfonso Llamas, accordingly filed an amended information with the court charging
Court 2 dismissing the complaint for consignation filed by therein plaintiff Ricardo
both Oscar Benares and Ricardo S. Santos, Jr., for violation of Batas Pambansa
S. Santos, Jr.
Blg. 22 docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-14867 of then Court of First Instance of
The parties are substantially agreed on the following facts as found by both lower Rizal, Quezon City.
courts:
Meanwhile, during the preliminary investigation of the criminal charge against
In 1980, plaintiff Ricardo S. Santos, Jr. was the vice-president of Mover Benares and the plaintiff herein, before Assistant City Fiscal Alfonso T. Llamas,
Enterprises, Inc. in-charge of marketing and sales; and the president of the said plaintiff Ricardo S. Santos, Jr. tendered cashier's check No. CC 160152 for
corporation was Atty. Oscar Z. Benares. On April 30, 1980, Atty. Benares, in P45,000.00 dated April 10, 1981 to the defendant Ernestina Crisologo-Jose, the
accommodation of his clients, the spouses Jaime and Clarita Ong, issued Check complainant in that criminal case. The defendant refused to receive the cashier's
No. 093553 drawn against Traders Royal Bank, dated June 14, 1980, in the check in payment of the dishonored check in the amount of P45,000.00. Hence,
amount of P45,000.00 (Exh- 'I') payable to defendant Ernestina Crisologo-Jose. plaintiff encashed the aforesaid cashier's check and subsequently deposited said
Since the check was under the account of Mover Enterprises, Inc., the same was amount of P45,000.00 with the Clerk of Court on August 14, 1981 (Exhs. 'D' and
to be signed by its president, Atty. Oscar Z. Benares, and the treasurer of the said 'E'). Incidentally, the cashier's check adverted to above was purchased by Atty.
corporation. However, since at that time, the treasurer of Mover Enterprises was Oscar Z. Benares and given to the plaintiff herein to be applied in payment of the
not available, Atty. Benares prevailed upon the plaintiff, Ricardo S. Santos, Jr., to dishonored check. 3
After trial, the court a quo, holding that it was "not persuaded to believe that the ordinary concept of a debtor therein in the sense that he has not received
consignation referred to in Article 1256 of the Civil Code is applicable to this case,"
any valuable consideration for the instrument he signs. Nevertheless, he is liable
rendered judgment dismissing plaintiff s complaint and defendant's to a holder for value as if the contract was not for accommodation 5 in whatever
counterclaim. 4 capacity such accommodation party signed the instrument, whether primarily or
secondarily. Thus, it has been held that in lending his name to the accommodated
As earlier stated, respondent court reversed and set aside said judgment of
party, the accommodation party is in effect a surety for the latter. 6
dismissal and revived the complaint for consignation, directing the trial court to
give due course thereto. Assuming arguendo that Mover Enterprises, Inc. is the accommodation party in
this case, as petitioner suggests, the inevitable question is whether or not it may
Hence, the instant petition, the assignment of errors wherein are prefatorily
be held liable on the accommodation instrument, that is, the check issued in favor
stated and discussed seriatim.
of herein petitioner.
1. Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that
We hold in the negative.
private respondent, one of the signatories of the check issued under the account
of Mover Enterprises, Inc., is an accommodation party under the Negotiable The aforequoted provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law which holds an
Instruments Law and a debtor of petitioner to the extent of the amount of said accommodation party liable on the instrument to a holder for value, although
check. such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an
accommodation party, does not include nor apply to corporations which are
Petitioner avers that the accommodation party in this case is Mover Enterprises,
accommodation parties. 7 This is because the issue or indorsement of negotiable
Inc. and not private respondent who merely signed the check in question in a
paper by a corporation without consideration and for the accommodation of
representative capacity, that is, as vice-president of said corporation, hence he is
another is ultra vires. 8 Hence, one who has taken the instrument with knowledge
not liable thereon under the Negotiable Instruments Law.
of the accommodation nature thereof cannot recover against a corporation
The pertinent provision of said law referred to provides: where it is only an accommodation party. If the form of the instrument, or the
nature of the transaction, is such as to charge the indorsee with knowledge that
Sec. 29. Liability of accommodation party an accommodation party is one who the issue or indorsement of the instrument by the corporation is for the
has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without accommodation of another, he cannot recover against the corporation thereon. 9
receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other
person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, By way of exception, an officer or agent of a corporation shall have the power to
notwithstanding such holder, at the time of taking the instrument, knew him to execute or indorse a negotiable paper in the name of the corporation for the
be only an accommodation party. accommodation of a third person only if specifically authorized to do
so. 10 Corollarily, corporate officers, such as the president and vice-president,
Consequently, to be considered an accommodation party, a person must (1) be a have no power to execute for mere accommodation a negotiable instrument of
party to the instrument, signing as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, (2) not the corporation for their individual debts or transactions arising from or in
receive value therefor, and (3) sign for the purpose of lending his name for the relation to matters in which the corporation has no legitimate concern. Since such
credit of some other person. accommodation paper cannot thus be enforced against the corporation,
Based on the foregoing requisites, it is not a valid defense that the especially since it is not involved in any aspect of the corporate business or
accommodation party did not receive any valuable consideration when he operations, the inescapable conclusion in law and in logic is that the signatories
executed the instrument. From the standpoint of contract law, he differs from thereof shall be personally liable therefor, as well as the consequences arising
from their acts in connection therewith.
The instant case falls squarely within the purview of the aforesaid decisional rules. instrument. Under the doctrine in Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Aruego, supra,
If we indulge petitioner in her aforesaid postulation, then she is effectively barred he is in effect a co-surety for the accommodated party with whom he and his co-
from recovering from Mover Enterprises, Inc. the value of the check. Be that as it signatory, as the other co-surety, assume solidary liability ex lege for the debt
may, petitioner is not without recourse. involved. With the dishonor of the check, there was created a debtor-creditor
relationship, as between Atty. Benares and respondent Santos, on the one hand,
The fact that for lack of capacity the corporation is not bound by an
and petitioner, on the other. This circumstance enables respondent Santos to
accommodation paper does not thereby absolve, but should render personally
resort to an action of consignation where his tender of payment had been refused
liable, the signatories of said instrument where the facts show that the
by petitioner.
accommodation involved was for their personal account, undertaking or purpose
and the creditor was aware thereof. We interpose the caveat, however, that by holding that the remedy of
consignation is proper under the given circumstances, we do not thereby rule
Petitioner, as hereinbefore explained, was evidently charged with the knowledge
that all the operative facts for consignation which would produce the effect of
that the cheek was issued at the instance and for the personal account of Atty.
payment are present in this case. Those are factual issues that are not clear in the
Benares who merely prevailed upon respondent Santos to act as co-signatory in
records before us and which are for the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to
accordance with the arrangement of the corporation with its depository bank.
ascertain in Civil Case No. Q-33160, for which reason it has advisedly been
That it was a personal undertaking of said corporate officers was apparent to
directed by respondent court to give due course to the complaint for
petitioner by reason of her personal involvement in the financial arrangement
consignation, and which would be subject to such issues or claims as may be
and the fact that, while it was the corporation's check which was issued to her for
raised by defendant and the counterclaim filed therein which is hereby ordered
the amount involved, she actually had no transaction directly with said
similarly revived.
corporation.
3. That respondent court virtually prejudged Criminal Case No. Q-14687 of the
There should be no legal obstacle, therefore, to petitioner's claims being directed
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City filed against private respondent for violation
personally against Atty. Oscar Z. Benares and respondent Ricardo S. Santos, Jr.,
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, by holding that no criminal liability had yet attached
president and vice-president, respectively, of Mover Enterprises, Inc.
to private respondent when he deposited with the court the amount of
2. On her second assignment of error, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals P45,000.00 is the final plaint of petitioner.
erred in holding that the consignation of the sum of P45,000.00, made by private
We sustain petitioner on this score.
respondent after his tender of payment was refused by petitioner, was proper
under Article 1256 of the Civil Code. Indeed, respondent court went beyond the ratiocination called for in the appeal
to it in CA-G.R. CV. No. 05464. In its own decision therein, it declared that "(t)he
Petitioner's submission is that no creditor-debtor relationship exists between the
lone issue dwells in the question of whether an accommodation party can validly
parties, hence consignation is not proper. Concomitantly, this argument was
consign the amount of the debt due with the court after his tender of payment
premised on the assumption that private respondent Santos is not an
was refused by the creditor." Yet, from the commercial and civil law aspects
accommodation party.
determinative of said issue, it digressed into the merits of the aforesaid Criminal
As previously discussed, however, respondent Santos is an accommodation party Case No. Q-14867, thus:
and is, therefore, liable for the value of the check. The fact that he was only a co-
Section 2 of B.P. 22 establishes the prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
signatory does not detract from his personal liability. A co-maker or co-drawer
insufficiency of funds or credit. Thus, the making, drawing and issuance of a
under the circumstances in this case is as much an accommodation party as the
check, payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds
other co-signatory or, for that matter, as a lone signatory in an accommodation
in or credit with such bank is prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency To repeat, the foregoing matters are properly addressed to the trial court in
of funds or credit, when the check is presented within 90 days from the date of Criminal Case No. Q-14867, the resolution of which should not be interfered with
the check. by respondent Court of Appeals at the present posture of said case, much less
preempted by the inappropriate and unnecessary holdings in the aforequoted
It will be noted that the last part of Section 2 of B.P. 22 provides that the element
portion of the decision of said respondent court. Consequently, we modify the
of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit is not present and, therefore, the
decision of respondent court in CA-G.R. CV No. 05464 by setting aside and
crime does not exist, when the drawer pays the holder the amount due or makes
declaring without force and effect its pronouncements and findings insofar as the
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
merits of Criminal Case No. Q-14867 and the liability of the accused therein are
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
concerned.
drawee.
WHEREFORE, subject to the aforesaid modifications, the judgment of respondent
Based on the foregoing consideration, this Court finds that the plaintiff-appellant
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
acted within Ms legal rights when he consigned the amount of P45,000.00 on
August 14, 1981, between August 7, 1981, the date when plaintiff-appellant SO ORDERED.
receive (sic) the notice of non-payment, and August 14, 1981, the date when the
debt due was deposited with the Clerk of Court (a Saturday and a Sunday which
are not banking days) intervened. The fifth banking day fell on August 14, 1981.
Hence, no criminal liability has yet attached to plaintiff-appellant when he
deposited the amount of P45,000.00 with the Court a quo on August 14, 1981. 11

That said observations made in the civil case at bar and the intrusion into the
merits of the criminal case pending in another court are improper do not have to
be belabored. In the latter case, the criminal trial court has to grapple with such
factual issues as, for instance, whether or not the period of five banking days had
expired, in the process determining whether notice of dishonor should be
reckoned from any prior notice if any has been given or from receipt by private
respondents of the subpoena therein with supporting affidavits, if any, or from
the first day of actual preliminary investigation; and whether there was a
justification for not making the requisite arrangements for payment in full of such
check by the drawee bank within the said period. These are matters alien to the
present controversy on tender and consignation of payment, where no such
period and its legal effects are involved.

These are aside from the considerations that the disputed period involved in the
criminal case is only a presumptive rule, juris tantum at that, to determine
whether or not there was knowledge of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the
drawee bank; that payment of civil liability is not a mode for extinguishment of
criminal liability; and that the requisite quantum of evidence in the two types of
cases are not the same.
Republic of the Philippines refunds were in fact due to him. He argued that he had issued the postdated
SUPREME COURT checks for purposes of accommodation, as he had in the past accorded similar
Manila favors to petitioner. During the proceedings, private respondent contested
several tickets alleged to have been erroneously debited to his account. He
THIRD DIVISION
claimed reimbursement of his alleged over payments, plus litigation expenses,
and exemplary and moral damages by reason of the allegedly improper
attachment of his properties.
G.R. No. L-56169 June 26, 1992
In support of his theory that the checks were issued for accommodation, private
TRAVEL-ON, INC., petitioner, respondent testified that he bad issued the checks in the name of Travel-On in
vs. order that its General Manager, Elita Montilla, could show to Travel-On's Board
COURT OF APPEALS and ARTURO S. MIRANDA, respondents. of Directors that the accounts receivable of the company were still good. He
RESOLUTION further stated that Elita Montilla tried to encash the same, but that these were
dishonored and were subsequently returned to him after the accommodation
purpose had been attained.
FELICIANO, J.: Travel-On's witness, Elita Montilla, on the other hand explained that the
Petitioner Travel-On. Inc. ("Travel-On") is a travel agency selling airline tickets on "accommodation" extended to Travel-On by private respondent related to
commission basis for and in behalf of different airline companies. Private situations where one or more of its passengers needed money in Hongkong, and
respondent Arturo S. Miranda had a revolving credit line with petitioner. He upon request of Travel-On respondent would contact his friends in Hongkong to
procured tickets from petitioner on behalf of airline passengers and derived advance Hongkong money to the passenger. The passenger then paid Travel-On
commissions therefrom. upon his return to Manila and which payment would be credited by Travel-On to
respondent's running account with it.
On 14 June 1972, Travel-On filed suit before the Court of First Instance ("CFI") of
Manila to collect on six (6) checks issued by private respondent with a total face In its decision dated 31 January 1975, the court a quo ordered Travel-On to pay
amount of P115,000.00. The complaint, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of private respondent the amount of P8,894.91 representing net overpayments by
preliminary attachment and attorney's fees, averred that from 5 August 1969 to private respondent, moral damages of P10,000.00 for the wrongful issuance of
16 January 1970, petitioner sold and delivered various airline tickets to the writ of attachment and for the filing of this case, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees
respondent at a total price of P278,201.57; that to settle said account, private and the costs of the suit.
respondent paid various amounts in cash and in kind, and thereafter issued six (6) The trial court ruled that private respondent's indebtedness to petitioner was not
postdated checks amounting to P115,000.00 which were all dishonored by the satisfactorily established and that the postdated checks were issued not for the
drawee banks. Travel-On further alleged that in March 1972, private respondent purpose of encashment to pay his indebtedness but to accommodate the General
made another payment of P10,000.00 reducing his indebtedness to P105,000.00. Manager of Travel-On to enable her to show to the Board of Directors that Travel-
The writ of attachment was granted by the court a quo. On was financially stable.
In his answer, private respondent admitted having had transactions with Travel- Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration that was, however, denied by the
On during the period stipulated in the complaint. Private respondent, however, trial court, which in fact then increased the award of moral damages to
claimed that he had already fully paid and even overpaid his obligations and that P50,000.00.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, but with petitioner was a running or open one, which explains the varying figures in
reduced the award of moral damages to P20,000.00, with interest at the legal each of the statements rendered as of a given date.
rate from the date of the filing of the Answer on 28 August 1972.
The appellate court erred in considering only the statements of account in
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeal's' decision, without determining whether private respondent was indebted to petitioner under the
success. checks. By doing so, it failed to give due importance to the most telling piece of
evidence of private respondent's indebtedness the checks themselves which
In the instant Petition for Review, it is urged that the postdated checks are per
he had issued.
se evidence of liability on the part of private respondent. Petitioner further
argues that even assuming that the checks were for accommodation, private Contrary to the view held by the Court of Appeals, this Court finds that the checks
respondent is still liable thereunder considering that petitioner is a holder for are the all important evidence of petitioner's case; that these checks clearly
value. established private respondent's indebtedness to petitioner; that private
respondent was liable thereunder.
Both the trial and appellate courts had rejected the checks as evidence of
indebtedness on the ground that the various statements of account prepared by It is important to stress that a check which is regular on its face is deemed prima
petitioner did not show that Private respondent had an outstanding balance of facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration and every person whose
P115,000.00 which is the total amount of the checks he issued. It was pointed out signature appears thereon is deemed to have become a party thereto for
that while the various exhibits of petitioner showed various accountabilities of value. 1 Thus, the mere introduction of the instrument sued on in evidence prima
private respondent, they did not satisfactorily establish the amount of the facie entitles the plaintiff to recovery. Further, the rule is quite settled that a
outstanding indebtedness of private respondent. The appellate court made much negotiable instrument is presumed to have been given or indorsed for a sufficient
of the fact that the figures representing private respondent's unpaid accounts consideration unless otherwise contradicted and overcome by other competent
found in the "Schedule of Outstanding Account" dated 31 January 1970 did not evidence. 2
tally with the figures found in the statement which showed private respondent's
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, contrary to these established rules,
transactions with petitioner for the years 1969 and 1970; that there was no
placed the burden of proving the existence of valuable consideration upon
satisfactory explanation as to why the total outstanding amount
petitioner. This cannot be countenanced; it was up to private respondent to show
of P278,432.74 was still used as basis in the accounting of 7 April 1972
that he had indeed issued the checks without sufficient consideration. The Court
considering that according to the table of transactions for the year 1969 and
considers that Private respondent was unable to rebut satisfactorily this legal
1970, the total unpaid account of private respondent amounted to P239,794.57.
presumption. It must also be noted that those checks were issued immediately
We have, however, examined the record and it shows that the 7 April 1972 after a letter demanding payment had been sent to private respondent by
Statement of Account had simply not been updated; that if we use as basis the petitioner Travel-On.
figure as of 31 January 1970 which is P278,432.74 and from it deduct P38,638.17
The fact that all the checks issued by private respondent to petitioner were
which represents some of the payments subsequently made by private
presented for payment by the latter would lead to no other conclusion than that
respondent, the figure P239,794.57 will be obtained.
these checks were intended for encashment. There is nothing in the checks
Also, the fact alone that the various statements of account had variances in themselves (or in any other document for that matter) that states otherwise.
figures, simply did not mean that private respondent had no more financial
We are unable to accept the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the checks here
obligations to petitioner. It must be stressed that private respondent's account
involved were issued for "accommodation" and that accordingly private
respondent maker of those checks was not liable thereon to petitioner payee of good." It will be seen that this claim was in fact a claim that the checks were
those checks. merely simulated, that private respondent did not intend to bind himself thereon.
Only evidence of the clearest and most convincing kind will suffice for that
In the first place, while the Negotiable Instruments Law does refer to
purpose; 6 no such evidence was submitted by private respondent. The latter's
accommodation transactions, no such transaction was here shown. Section 29 of
explanation was denied by Travel-On's General Manager; that explanation, in any
the Negotiable Instruments Law provides as follows:
case, appears merely contrived and quite hollow to us. Upon the other hand, the
Sec. 29. Liability of accommodation party. An accommodation party is one who "accommodation" or assistance extended to Travel-On's passengers abroad as
has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without testified by petitioner's General Manager involved, not the accommodation
receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other transactions recognized by the NIL, but rather the circumvention of then existing
person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, foreign exchange regulations by passengers booked by Travel-On, which
notwithstanding such holder, at the time of taking the instrument, knew him to incidentally involved receipt of full consideration by private respondent.
be only an accommodation party.
Thus, we believe and so hold that private respondent must be held liable on the
In accommodation transactions recognized by the Negotiable Instruments Law, six (6) checks here involved. Those checks in themselves constituted evidence of
an accommodating party lends his credit to the accommodated party, by issuing indebtedness of private respondent, evidence not successfully overturned or
or indorsing a check which is held by a payee or indorsee as a holder in due rebutted by private respondent.
course, who gave full value therefor to the accommodated party. The latter, in
Since the checks constitute the best evidence of private respondent's liability to
other words, receives or realizes full value which the accommodated party then
petitioner Travel-On, the amount of such liability is the face amount of the checks,
must repay to the accommodating party, unless of course the accommodating
reduced only by the P10,000.00 which Travel-On admitted in its complaint to
party intended to make a donation to the accommodated party. But the
have been paid by private respondent sometime in March 1992.
accommodating party is bound on the check to the holder in due course who is
necessarily a third party and is not the accommodated party. Having issued or The award of moral damages to Private respondent must be set aside, for the
indorsed the check, the accommodating party has warranted to the holder in due reason that Petitioner's application for the writ of attachment rested on sufficient
course that he will pay the same according to its tenor. 3 basis and no bad faith was shown on the part of Travel-On. If anyone was in bad
faith, it was private respondent who issued bad checks and then pretended to
In the case at bar, Travel-On was payee of all six (6) checks, it presented these
have "accommodated" petitioner's General Manager by assisting her in a
checks for payment at the drawee bank but the checks bounced. Travel-On
supposed scheme to deceive petitioner's Board of Directors and to misrepresent
obviously was not an accommodated party; it realized no value on the checks
Travel-On's financial condition.
which bounced.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT due course to the Petition for
Travel-On was entitled to the benefit of the statutory presumption that it was a
Review on Certiorari and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated 22
holder in due course, 4 that the checks were supported by valuable
October 1980 and the Resolution of 23 January 1981 of the Court of Appeals, as
consideration. 5 Private respondent maker of the checks did not successfully
well as the Decision dated 31 January 1975 of the trial court, and to enter a new
rebut these presumptions. The only evidence aliunde that private respondent
decision requiring private respondent Arturo S. Miranda to pay to petitioner
offered was his own self-serving uncorroborated testimony. He claimed that he
Travel-On the amount of P105,000.00 with legal interest thereon from 14 June
had issued the checks to Travel-On as payee to "accommodate" its General
1972, plus ten percent (10%) of the total amount due as attorney's fees. Costs
Manager who allegedly wished to show those checks to the Board of Directors of
against Private respondent.
Travel-On to "prove" that Travel-On's account receivables were somehow "still
Republic of the Philippines and Reyes again issued two checks, each in the amount of
SUPREME COURT P14,210.00, the first dated April 10, 1986, and the other April 15, 1986.
Manila
On April 9, 1986, Reyes placed another order for 200 sacks of rice, which Garcia
FIRST DIVISION delivered to her on the same day. While the 200 sacks were being unloaded,
Reyes asked to buy an additional 200 sacks, and since there were 400 sacks of
rice loaded on the truck, Garcia agreed to sell the whole stock to her.
G.R. Nos. 101127-31 November 18, 1993
For the 400 sacks (plus 2 more sacks to complete the first purchase order for
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 200 sacks), Reyes again issued two checks, each for P66,330.00, one dated April
vs. 9, 1986 and the other April 15, 1986.
CRESENCIA C. REYES, accused-appellant.
All the checks were drawn against the Bank of the Philippine Islands at its
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Espaa Branch.

Timoteo A. David for Oriental Assurance Corporation. Of the six checks issued by Reyes, only three were made good, to wit, the check
dated April 4, 1986 for P15,750.00, which was encashed by Garcia; the check
Rosendo C. Ramos for accused-appellant. dated April 10, 1986 for P14,210.00, which was redeemed by Reyes; and the
check dated April 9, 1986 for P66,330, which was paid by Reyes by installments.

CRUZ, J.: The other three checks were, either upon encashment or deposit, returned by
the drawee bank to Garcia due to "insufficient funds." Garcia notified Reyes of
The appellant has instituted this proceeding for the reversal of the decision of their dishonor and the latter promised to pay their total value. Despite repeated
the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated March 12, 1991, convicting her of demands on Reyes, however, she failed to make good the checks or to replace
estafa and violation of BP 22 under five separate informations which had been them with cash
consolidated and tried jointly on her own motion.
The five criminal cases filed against Reyes were Criminal Cases Nos. 86-51206 to
From the unrebutted evidence of the prosecution, the trial court that 86-51208, for violation of BP 22 in connection with the issuance of BPI Check
complainant Lorie Garcia came to know Cresencia Reyes through Manny No. 308202 for P5,750,1 BPI Check No. 308223 for
Carbrera, a friend and business acquaintance of Garcia, who requested her to P14,210.00, 2 BPI check No. 308226 for P66,330.00,3 and Criminal Cases Nos.
deliver rice to Reyes because he had no more stock to sell. Garcia initially 86-51209 and 86-51210, both for estafa involving the same checks.
refused but eventually agreed to sell to Reyes but only on the condition that
Reyes first make a purchase order and, upon delivery, pay 50% of the cost of the After the prosecution had rested its case, Reyes manifested through her counsel
rice, the balance to be paid with a postdated check. that she would file a demurrer to evidence. She did not do so during the 10-day
period allowed her, whereupon the trial court, on motion of the prosecution,
The first purchase order was for 200 sacks. On April 4, 1986, Garcia delivered to declared the cases submitted for decision. Instead of filing a motion for
Reyes 100 sacks of rice worth P 31,500.00, for which two checks were issued, reconsideration, Reyes, assisted by her counsel, submitted a waiver of
each in the amount of P15,750.00. One was dated April 4, 1986 and the other appearance.4 Judge Angelina S. Gutierrez thereafter rendered the challenged
April 10, 1986. On April 9, 1986, Garcia delivered 98 more sacks of rice to Reyes, decision in which she disposed as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, finding the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, she is (3) In holding that there was sufficient evidence her to justify her conviction for
hereby sentenced as follows: estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code and for violation of BP
22; and
In Criminal Case No. 51206, to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay
the fine of P15,750.00; (4) In convicting her for the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code for having issued a bad check, even if the check had been
In Criminal Case No. 51207, to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay
issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation.
the fine of P14,210.00;
The Court, after deliberating on the above assignment of errors and the briefs
In Criminal Case No. 51208, to suffer one year imprisonment and to pay the fine
submitted by the parties, finds for the People.
of P66,330.00;
We re-affirm at the outset the established doctrine that:
In Criminal Case No. 51209, to suffer 22 years of reclusion perpetua together
with the accessory penalties and to indemnify the complaining witness by way While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas
of actual damages in the sum of P80,540.00 and to pay the costs; and Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by the petitioner,
In Criminal Case No. 51210, there being no modifying circumstances that
the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single
attended the commission of the offense, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is
six (6) years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1
variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and
day of reclusion temporal as maximum together with the accessory penalties
another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what
and to indemnify the complaining witness by way of actual damages in the sum
the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two
of P15,750.00 and to pay the costs.
(2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited.
On May 13, 1992, the First Division referred en consulta to the Court en What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of
banc the question of whether the appellant, having been sentenced to serve 22 the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy
years of reclusion perpetua, should be allowed to remain on bail during the (People v. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 570).7
pendency of her appeal.5 On August 7, 1992, the Court en banc ordered the
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing
surrender of Reyes by her bondsman to the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for
Branch 37, for her confinement by the Bureau of Corrections.6
payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad check a malum
In the appellant's brief, it is alleged that the trial court committed grave errors: prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being deemed pernicious
and inimical to public welfare.9
(1) In convicting Reyes of estafa and violation of BP 22 when on the face of the
evidence itself it is clear that the issuance of the checks in question was involved According to Chief Justice Pedro L. Yap in the landmark case of Lozano v.
in a credit transaction and that the said checks were issued by the latter as Martinez: 10
guarantee for the payment of her civil obligation to the complainant;
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests
(2) In holding her guilty of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the
Code when there was no deceit employed by her in the issuance of the checks community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
in question; holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check."

The appellant argues that the questioned checks were not intended for deposit To constitute estafa under this provision, the act of postdating or issuing a check
or encashment but merely to guarantee payment of her obligations to Garcia, in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation; as
who, she stresses, admitted that for every delivery of rice the corresponding such, it should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud. 12 The
checks were given in return. She contends that in credit transactions, a check offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party
may serve merely as a guaranty for the payment of the amount indicated because of the issuance of the check, whether postdated or
therein, to be redeemed later by the drawer "on the maturity date of the check not. 13 It must be shown that the person to whom the check was delivered
or on a much later date, depending on the availability of funds of the latter." would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance
of the check by the other party. Stated otherwise, the check should have been
It is now settled that BP 22 applies even in cases where the dishonored checks
issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his money
were issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guaranty and not as actual
or property and not in payment of a pre-existing obligation.
payment. The law does not make any distinction. Criminal liability attaches to
the drawer of the check whether it was issued in payment of an obligation or It is recalled that Garcia was unwilling at first to deal with Reyes but was finally
merely to guarantee the said obligation. As we held in Que v. People: 11 persuaded when she issued the two checks in payment for the first 100 sacks of
rice. One of these checks was encashed before the second could mature and be
. . . Inasmuch as the law does not make any distinction in this regard, no such
subsequently dishonored. Believing the Reyes' credit was good, Garcia accepted
distinction can be made by means of interpretation of application. Furthermore,
two more checks from her in payment for another 100 sacks, and Reyes
the history of the enactment of subject statutes evinces the definitive legislative
redeemed one of them before the other could mature and be subsequently
intent to make the prohibition all embracing, without making any exception
dishonored. Garcia was still unaware of Reyes's deception when she entered
from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. This intent may be gathered
into their last sale of 400 sacks, for which Reyes issued another two checks in
from the statement of the sponsor of the bills . . . which was enacted later into
payment, one of which was also to be dishonored later. In all this series of
BP 22, when it was introduced before the Batasang Pambansa that the bill was
transactions, Garcia was induced to sell because of the checks issued by the
introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncig checks, to prevent checks
appellant which the complainant believed to be funded.
from becoming "useless scrap of paper" and to restore respectability to checks,
all without distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. . . . The deceit practiced by Reyes on Garcia is all too palpable. Reyes was able to
maintain Garcia's confidence by making good three of the checks she had issued
Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused had
and thus giving Garcia the impression that the other checks, which she could
deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts and that the checks
not yet present for payment, would be honored. Reyes' timing was clever. She
were dishonored upon presentment regardless of whether or not the accused
saw to it that one of her checks for the first delivery was valid (and was
merely issued the checks as a guarantee. (Emphasis added)
subsequently encashed) before she made her second purchase, for which she
Even on the assumption, then, that the subject checks were given by the issued two more checks. She redeemed one of these checks before she bought
appellant as a mere guaranty and not as payment, this circumstance will not the final 400 sacks, for which she issued another two checks. All this time,
absolve Reyes from her violation of BP 22. Garcia believed that the remaining postdated checks she had yet to encash
were all good when they were in fact all worthless.
The appellant has also been convicted under Art. 315 (2) (d) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 4885, which penalizes any person who shall The three postdated checks that were subsequently dishonored were issued at
defraud another "by postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an a time when the funds in her account were insufficient and even nil. Two of
these checks were dated April 10, 1986, and the third April 15, 1986. The their confidence in her. Her counsel manifested that she is also facing similar
records of the drawee bank showed that Reyes had a zero balance at the time charges in other branches of this Court.
the checks were issued and also when they were presented for payment.14 The
It is indeed pathetic that the appellant should suffer the physical handicap
dishonored checks she had issued to Garcia had a total value of P96,290.00, and
above described, but what is especially tragic is she has chosen to use this
this represented the damage sustained by Garcia because of the appellant's
handicap for the deception of Garcia, who trusted her partly out of sympathy
deceit. Reyes had issued these check upon her fraudulent assurance to Garcia
for her abnormal appearance. By her deceitfulness, Reyes has forfeited all
that they were fully funded.
feelings of charity or kindness toward her and earned instead the punishment of
Her situation worsened when she failed to make good the checks within three the laws she has scorned.
days from receipt of notice of their dishonor and the demand from the
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DENIED,
complainant for their value. Her failure to take advantage of this grace period
with costs against the appellant. It is so ordered.
offered by the law raised the prima facie inference of deceit consisting of "false
pretense or a fraudulent act."15

The appellant's final contention is the, prior to the delivery of the rice, she had
agreed that only 50% of the purchase price would be paid upon delivery and
that the remaining 50% would be covered by a postdated check. Hence, as the
subject checks covered the balance of the purchase price of the 600 sacks of
rice, they were issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation and so did not
violate Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code or BP 22.

The facts established by the prosecution belie this assertion. The evidence to
the contrary is overwhelming. There is no doubt that the subject checks were
issued by Reyes (and accepted by Garcia) in exchange for the three deliveries of
rice as each delivery was made. We are satisfied that the postdated checks were
issued by the appellant not as payment for a pre-existing obligation but as the
consideration for each shipment of rice she received from the complainant.

The argument that the postdated checks were promissory notes and not for
negotiation is so unsubstantial as to deserve no serious attention.

The Court notes the following observations of the trial court on the personality
of the appellant:

Accused, past 50, is a physically handicapped lady whose height is barely two (2)
feet. In fact, whenever she came to court, she was always assisted by one or
two companions. But she is well educated and speaks English fluently. The Court
discerns that it is this unique combination of bizarre physical make-up and
seeming trustworthiness which led others, like herein complainant, to repose
Republic of the Philippines make/s or draw/s and issue/s a check but she failed to keep sufficient funds or
SUPREME COURT maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check, which check when
Manila presented for encashment was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
"ACCT. CLOSED" or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
FIRST DIVISION
drawer, without any valid reason ordered the bank to stop payment, and despite
G.R. No. 177438 September 24, 2012 notice of dishonor and demands for payment, said accused failed and refused and
still fails and refuses to redeem the check or to make arrangement for payment
AMADA RESTERIO, Petitioner, in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving the
vs. notice of dishonor, to the damage and prejudice of the aforenamed private
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent. complainant, in the aforestated amount and other claims and charges allowed by
DECISION civil law.

BERSAMIN, J.: CONTRARY TO LAW.1

The notice of dishonor required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to be given to the After trial, the MTCC found the petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as follows:
drawer, maker or issuer of a check should be written. If the service of the written WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered finding the accused, AMADA Y.
notice of dishonor on the maker, drawer or issuer of the dishonored check is by RESTERIO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas Pambansa
registered mail, the proof of service consists not only in the presentation as Bilang 22 and sentences her to pay a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (
evidence of the registry return receipt but also of the registry receipt together 50,000.00) and to pay her civil liabilities to the private complainant in the sum of
with the authenticating affidavit of the person mailing the notice of dishonor. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS ( 50,000.00), TEN THOUSAND PESOS ( 10,000.00) as
Without the authenticating affidavit, the proof of giving the notice of dishonor is attorneys fees and FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS ( 575.00) as
insufficient unless the mailer personally testifies in court on the sending by eimbursement of the filing fees.
registered mail.
SO ORDERED.2
Antecedents
The petitioner appealed, but the RTC affirmed the conviction.3
The petitioner was charged with a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Mandaue City through the information By petition for review, the petitioner appealed to the CA, stating that: (a) the RTC
that alleged as follows: erred in affirming the conviction and in not finding instead that the Prosecution
did not establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (b) the conviction was
That on May, 2002, or thereabouts, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and contrary to existing laws and jurisprudence, particularly Yu Oh v. Court of
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with Appeals.4
deliberate intent of gain, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
make, draw and issue ChinaBank Check bearing No. AO141332, dated June 3, On December 4, 2006, the CA found the petition to be without merit, and denied
2002, in the amount of 50,000.00 payable to the order of Bernardo T. Villadolid the petition for review.5
to apply on account or for value, the accused fully knowing well that at the time
Issues
of the issuance of said check that she does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; The petitioner assails the affirmance of her conviction by the CA based on the
or the accused having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when she following grounds, to wit:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE The existence of the first element of the violation is not disputed. According to
ERROR AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN IGNORING THE the petitioner, she was "required to issue a check as a collateral for the
APPLICABILITY IN THE PRESENT CASE THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN obligation," and that "she was left with no alternative but to borrow the check of
THE CASE OF ELVIRA YU OH VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 125297, JUNE 26, her friend xxx and used the said check as a collateral of her loan." 8 During her
2003. cross-examination, she stated that she did not own the check that she drew and
issued to complainant Bernardo Villadolid.9
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT FINDING THAT THE Yet, to avoid criminal liability, the petitioner contends that Batas Pambansa Blg.
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME 22 was applicable only if the dishonored check was actually owned by her; and
OF VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22. that she could not be held liable because the check was issued as a mere collateral
of the loan and not intended to be deposited.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT FINDING THAT NO The petitioners contentions do not persuade.
NOTICE OF DISHONOR WAS ACTUALLY SENT TO THE PETITIONER.
What Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punished was the mere act of issuing a worthless
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE check. The law did not look either at the actual ownership of the check or of the
ERROR AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT FINDING THAT THE account against which it was made, drawn, or issued, or at the intention of the
PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER BEYOND drawee, maker or issuer. Also, that the check was not intended to be deposited
REASONABLE DOUBT.6 was really of no consequence to her incurring criminal liability under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. In Ruiz v. People,10 the Court debunked her contentions and
The appeal hinges on whether or not all the elements of a violation of Batas
cogently observed:
Pambansa Blg. 22 were established beyond reasonable doubt.
In Lozano v. Martinez, this Court ruled that the gravamen of the offense is the act
Ruling
of making and issuing a worthless check or any check that is dishonored upon its
The petition is meritorious. presentment for payment and putting them in circulation. The law includes all
checks drawn against banks. The law was designed to prohibit and altogether
For a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the Prosecution must prove the eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with
following essential elements, namely: insufficient or no credit or funds therefor. Such practice is deemed a public
(1) The making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated. The mere act of issuing a
value; worthless check, either as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a
pre-existing debt or as a mode of payment is covered by B.P. 22. It is a crime
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there classified as malum prohibitum. The law is broad enough to include, within its
were no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of coverage, the making and issuing of a check by one who has no account with a
such check in full upon its presentment; and bank, or where such account was already closed when the check was presented
(3) The dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or for payment. As the Court in Lozano explained:
credit or the dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests
cause, ordered the drawee bank to stop payment.7 of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless This knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit at the time of the issuance of
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the check is the second element of the offense. Inasmuch as this element involves
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually a state of mind of the person making, drawing or issuing the check which is
hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. As aptly stated difficult to prove, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates a prima facie presumption of
such knowledge. Said section reads:
The "check flasher" does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the
pillars of business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and
him in the same category with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
and for whom the constitutional inhibition against "imprisonment for debt, insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90)
except in cases of fraud" was intended as a shield and not a sword. days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer
Considering that the law imposes a penal sanction on one who draws and issues
a worthless check against insufficient funds or a closed account in the drawee pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
bank, there is, likewise, every reason to penalize a person who indulges in the payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
making and issuing of a check on an account belonging to another with the latters receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
consent, which account has been closed or has no funds or credit with the drawee
For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must prove the following: (a) the
bank.11 (Bold emphases supplied)
check is presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check; (b) the
The State likewise proved the existence of the third element. On direct drawer or maker of the check receives notice that such check has not been paid
examination, Villadolid declared that the check had been dishonored upon its by the drawee; and (c) the drawer or maker of the check fails to pay the holder
presentment to the drawee bank through the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) of the check the amount due thereon, or make arrangements for payment in full
as the collecting bank. The return check memorandum issued by BPI indicated within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been
that the account had already been closed.12 The petitioner did not deny or paid by the drawee. In other words, the presumption is brought into existence
contradict the fact of dishonor. only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that
within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or
The remaining issue is whether or not the second element, that is, the knowledge
to make arrangements for its payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence
of the petitioner as the issuer of the check that at the time of issue there were no
as provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of nonpayment by the
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when
in full upon its presentment, was existent.
such notice was received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of
To establish the existence of the second element, the State should present the reckoning the crucial 5-day period.
giving of a written notice of the dishonor to the drawer, maker or issuer of the
A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus
dishonored check. The rationale for this requirement is rendered in Dico v. Court
indispensable before a conviction can ensue. The notice of dishonor may be sent
of Appeals,13 to wit:
by the offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be in writing. A mere
To hold a person liable under B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution must not only establish oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice. The lack of a written notice
14
that a check was issued and that the same was subsequently dishonored, it must is fatal for the prosecution. (Bold emphases supplied)
further be shown that accused knew at the time of the issuance of the check that
The giving of the written notice of dishonor does not only supply the proof for the
he did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
second element arising from the presumption of knowledge the law puts up but
of such check in full upon its presentment.
also affords the offender due process. The law thereby allows the offender to the offense. No less would fulfill the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
avoid prosecution if she pays the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or for, as the Court said in Ting v. Court of Appeals:18
makes arrangements for the payment in full of the check by the drawee within
Aside from the above testimony, no other reference was made to the demand
five banking days from receipt of the written notice that the check had not been
letter by the prosecution. As can be noticed from the above exchange, the
paid.15 The Court cannot permit a deprivation of the offender of this statutory
prosecution alleged that the demand letter had been sent by mail. To prove
right by not giving the proper notice of dishonor. The nature of this opportunity
mailing, it presented a copy of the demand letter as well as the registry return
for the accused to avoid criminal prosecution has been expounded in Lao v. Court
receipt. However, no attempt was made to show that the demand letter was
of Appeals:16
indeed sent through registered mail nor was the signature on the registry return
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator receipt authenticated or identified. It cannot even be gleaned from the testimony
a compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt of private complainant as to who sent the demand letter and when the same was
the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated xxx In this sent. In fact, the prosecution seems to have presumed that the registry return
light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking receipt was proof enough that the demand letter was sent through registered
days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. The absence of a notice of mail and that the same was actually received by petitioners or their agents.
dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal
As adverted to earlier, it is necessary in cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of
22, that the prosecution prove that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor.
dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand and
It is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that
the basic postulate of fairness require that the notice of dishonor be actually
the notice was served must prove the fact of service (58 Am Jur 2d, Notice, 45).
sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution
The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. Now,
under B.P. 22."17 (Bold emphases supplied)
ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal
To prove that he had sent the written notice of dishonor to the petitioner by cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable
registered mail, Villadolid presented the registry return receipt for the first notice doubt. Hence, for Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of
of dishonor dated June 17, 2002 and the registry return receipt for the second notice. Moreover, it is a general rule that, when service of a notice is sought to
notice of dishonor dated July 16, 2002. However, the petitioner denied receiving be made by mail, it should appear that the conditions on which the validity of
the written notices of dishonor. such service depends had existence, otherwise the evidence is insufficient to
establish the fact of service (C.J.S., Notice, 18). In the instant case, the
The mere presentment of the two registry return receipts was not sufficient to
prosecution did not present proof that the demand letter was sent through
establish the fact that written notices of dishonor had been sent to or served on
registered mail, relying as it did only on the registry return receipt. In civil cases,
the petitioner as the issuer of the check. Considering that the sending of the
service made through registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by
written notices of dishonor had been done by registered mail, the registry return
the mailing office and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing
receipts by themselves were not proof of the service on the petitioner without
compliance with Section 7 of Rule 13 (See Section 13, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil
being accompanied by the authenticating affidavit of the person or persons who
Procedure). If, in addition to the registry receipt, it is required in civil cases that
had actually mailed the written notices of dishonor, or without the testimony in
an affidavit of mailing as proof of service be presented, then with more reason
court of the mailer or mailers on the fact of mailing. The authentication by
should we hold in criminal cases that a registry receipt alone is insufficient as
affidavit of the mailer or mailers was necessary in order for the giving of the
proof of mailing. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to present the
notices of dishonor by registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving
testimony, or at least the affidavit, of the person mailing that, indeed, the
of the notices of dishonor to predicate the existence of the second element of
demand letter was sent. xxx
Moreover, petitioners, during the pre-trial, denied having received the demand dishonor were not effective because it is already settled that a notice of dishonor
letter (p. 135, Rollo). Given petitioners denial of receipt of the demand letter, it must be in writing.19 The Court definitively ruled on the specific form of the notice
behooved the prosecution to present proof that the demand letter was indeed of dishonor in Domagsang v. Court of Appeals:20
sent through registered mail and that the same was received by petitioners. This,
Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor is fatal. The Court
the prosecution miserably failed to do. Instead, it merely presented the demand
agrees.
letter and registry return receipt as if mere presentation of the same was
equivalent to proof that some sort of mail matter was received by petitioners. While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor
Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not prove themselves; they be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that
must be properly authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact
(Central Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines, 218 NW 580). shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a mere oral
notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the
Likewise, for notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served on the
law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks
addressee or a duly authorized agent of the addressee. In fact, the registry return
Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the
receipt itself provides that "[a] registered article must not be delivered to anyone
accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has
but the addressee, or upon the addressees written order, in which case the
actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that
authorized agent must write the addressees name on the proper space and then
penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor
affix legibly his own signature below it." In the case at bar, no effort was made to
of the accused. (Bold emphases supplied; italics in the original text)
show that the demand letter was received by petitioners or their agent. All that
we have on record is an illegible signature on the registry receipt as evidence that In light of the foregoing, the proof of the guilt of the petitioner for a violation of
someone received the letter. As to whether this signature is that of one of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing to Villadolid the unfunded Chinabank Check
petitioners or of their authorized agent remains a mystery. From the registry No. LPU-A0141332 in the amount of 50,000.00 did not satisfy the quantum of
receipt alone, it is possible that petitioners or their authorized agent did receive proof beyond reasonable doubt. According to Section 2 of Rule 133, Rules of
the demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof beyond Court, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt. There being insufficient proof that petitioners received notice reasonable doubt, which does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
that their checks had been dishonored, the presumption that they knew of the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty; only a moral certainty is
insufficiency of the funds therefor cannot arise. required, or that degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind. This is the required quantum, firstly, because the accused is presumed to
As we stated in Savage v. Taypin (G.R. No. 134217, May 11, 2000, 311 SCRA 397),
be innocent until the contrary is proved, and, secondly, because of the inequality
"penal statutes must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor
of the position in which the accused finds herself, with the State being arrayed
of the accused." Likewise, the prosecution may not rely on the weakness of the
against her with its unlimited command of means, with counsel usually of
evidence for the defense to make up for its own blunders in prosecuting an
authority and capacity, who are regarded as public officers, "and with an attitude
offense. Having failed to prove all the elements of the offense, petitioners may
of tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of (the accused) engaged in
not thus be convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. (Bold emphases
a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life."21
supplied)1wphi1
Nonetheless, the civil liability of the petitioner in the principal sum of 50,000.00,
Also, that the wife of Villadolid verbally informed the petitioner that the check
being admitted, was established. She was further liable for legal interest of 6%
had bounced did not satisfy the requirement of showing that written notices of
per annum on that principal sum, reckoned from the filing of the information in
dishonor had been made to and received by the petitioner. The verbal notices of
the trial court. That rate of interest will increase to 12% per annum upon the
finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on December 4, 2006, and ACQUITS petitioner AMADA
RESTERIO of the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as charged for failure to
establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court ORDERS the petitioner to pay to BERNARDO VILLADOLID the amount
of 50,000.00, representing the face value of Chinabank Check No. LPU-
A0141332, with legal interest of 6% per annum from the filing of the information
until the finality of this decision, and thereafter 12% per annum until the principal
amount of 50,000.00 is paid.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines arraigned, for failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence against the accused,
SUPREME COURT the Court hereby declares her innocent of the crime charged and she is hereby
Manila acquitted with cost de oficio.

THIRD DIVISION For Criminal Case No. 84-26967, the Court finds the accused Lina Lim Lao guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of ONE (1) YEAR imprisonment and to pay a fine of P150,000.00
G.R. No. 119178 June 20, 1997 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

LINA LIM LAO, petitioner, For Criminal Case No. 84-26968, the Court finds the accused Lina Lim Lao guilty
vs. beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. the penalty of ONE (1) YEAR imprisonment and to pay a fine of P150,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of of (sic) insolvency.

For the two cases the accused is ordered to pay the cost of suit.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The cash bond put up by the accused for her provisional liberty in Criminal Case
May an employee who, as part of her regular duties, signs blank corporate checks No. 84-26969 where she is declared acquitted is hereby ordered cancelled (sic).
with the name of the payee and the amount drawn to be filled later by another
signatory and, therefore, does so without actual knowledge of whether such With reference to the accused Teodulo Asprec who has remained at large, in
checks are funded, be held criminally liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang order that the cases as against him may not remain pending in the docket for an
22 (B.P. 22), when checks so signed are dishonored due to insufficiency of funds? indefinite period, let the same be archived without prejudice to its subsequent
Does a notice of dishonor sent to the main office of the corporation constitute a prosecution as soon as said accused is finally apprehended.
valid notice to the said employee who holds office in a separate branch and who
Let a warrant issue for the arrest of the accused Teodulo Asprec which warrant
had no actual knowledge thereof? In other words, is constructive knowledge of
need not be returned to this Court until the accused is finally arrested.
the corporation, but not of the signatory-employee, sufficient?
SO ORDERED.
These are the questions raised in the petition filed on March 21, 1995 assailing
the Decision 1 of Respondent Court of Appeals 2 promulgated on December 9, The Facts
1994 in CA-G.R. CR No. 14240 dismissing the appeal of petitioner and affirming
Version of the Prosecution
the decision dated September 26, 1990 in Criminal Case Nos. 84-26967 to 84-
26969 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33. The dispositive portion of The facts are not disputed. We thus lift them from the assailed Decision, as
the said RTC decision affirmed by the respondent appellate court reads: 3 follows:
WHEREFORE, after a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the Appellant (and now Petitioner Lina Lim Lao) was a junior officer of Premiere
prosecution and that of the defense, the Court renders judgment as follows: Investment House (Premiere) in its Binondo Branch. As such officer, she was
authorized to sign checks for and in behalf of the corporation (TSN, August 16,
In Criminal Case No. 84-26969 where no evidence was presented by the
1990, p. 6). In the course of the business, she met complainant Father Artelijo
prosecution notwithstanding the fact that there was an agreement that the cases
Pelijo, the provincial treasurer of the Society of the Divine Word through Mrs.
be tried jointly and also the fact that the accused Lina Lim Lao was already
Rosemarie Lachenal, a trader for Premiere. Father Palijo was authorized to invest
donations to the society and had been investing the society's money with P150,000.00 payable to Fr. Artelijo A. Palijo dated October 7, 1983 well knowing
Premiere (TSN, June 23, 1987, pp. 5, 9-10). Father Palijo had invested a total of that at the time of issue he/she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
P514,484.04, as evidenced by the Confirmation of Sale No. 82-6994 (Exh "A") drawee bank for full payment of the said check upon its presentment as in fact
dated July 8, 1993. Father Palijo was also issued Traders Royal Bank (TRB) checks the said check, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date thereof,
in payment of interest, as follows: was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason: "Insufficient Funds"; that
despite notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Artelijo A. Palijo
Check Date Amount
the amount of the said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the
299961 Oct. 7, 1993 (sic) P 150,000.00 (Exh. "B") same within five (5) banking days from receipt of said notice.

299962 Oct. 7, 1983 P 150,000.00 (Exh. "C") CONTRARY TO LAW.

323835 Oct. 7, 1983 P 26,010.73 2. In Criminal Case No. 84-26968:

All the checks were issued in favor of Artelijo A. Palijo and signed by appellant That on or about October 7, 1983 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
(herein petitioner) and Teodulo Asprec, who was the head of operations. Further accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully draw and issue to Artelijo A.
evidence of the transaction was the acknowledgment of postdated checks dated Palijo to apply on account or for value a Traders Royal Bank Check No. 299961 for
July 8, 1983 (Exh. "D") and the cash disbursement voucher (Exh. "F", TSN, supra, P150,000.00 payable to Fr. Artelijo A. Palijo dated October 7, '83 well knowing
at pp. 11-16). that at the time of issue he/she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for full payment of the said check upon its presentment as in fact
When Father Palijo presented the checks for encashment, the same were the said check, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date thereof,
dishonored for the reason "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds" (DAIF). Father Palijo was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason: "Insufficient Funds"; that
immediately made demands on premiere to pay him the necessary amounts. He despite notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Artelijo A. Palijo
first went to the Binondo Branch but was referred to the Cubao Main Branch the amount of the said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the
where he was able to talk with the President, Mr. Cario. For his efforts, he was same within five (5) banking days from receipt of said notice.
paid P5,000.00. Since no other payments followed, Father Palijo wrote Premiere
a formal letter of demand Subsequently, Premiere was placed under receivership CONTRARY TO LAW.
(TSN, supra, at pp. 16-19). 4
3. And finally in Criminal Case No. 84-26969:
Thereafter, on January 24, 1984, Private Complainant Palijo filed an affidavit-
That on or about July 8, 1983 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
complaint against Petitioner Lina Lim Lao and Teodulo Asprec for violation of B.P.
did then and there wilfully and unlawfully draw and issue to Artelijo A. Palijo to
22. After preliminary investigation, 5 three Informations charging Lao and Asprec
apply on account for value a Traders Royal Bank Check No. 323835 for P26,010.03
with the offense defined in the first paragraph of Section 1, B.P. 22 were filed by
payable to Fr. Artelijo A. Palijo dated October 7, 1983 well knowing that at the
Assistant Fiscal Felix S. Caballes before the trial court on May 11, 1984, 6 worded
time of issue he/she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
as follows:
bank for full payment of the said check upon its presentment as in fact the said
1. In Criminal Case No. 84-26967: check, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason: "Insufficient Funds"; that despite
That on or about October 7, 1983 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Artelijo A. Palijo the
accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully draw and issue to Artelijo A. amount of the said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same
Palijo to apply on account or for value a Traders Royal Bank Check No. 299962 for within five (5) banking days from receipt of said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. Quezon City, and notin Binondo, Manila, where petitioner was holding office.
(Ocampo, T . S. N., 19 July 1990, p. 24;Marqueses, T . S. N., 22 November 1988,
Upon being arraigned, petitioner assisted by counsel pleaded "not guilty." Asprec
p. 8)
was not arrested; he has remained at large since the trial, and even now on
appeal. The foregoing circumstances attended the issuance of the checks subject of the
instant prosecution.
After due trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Petitioner Lina Lim Lao in
Criminal Case Nos. 84-26967 and 84-26968 but acquitted her in Criminal Case No. The checks were issued to guarantee payment of investments placed by private
84-26969. 7 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial complainant Palijo with Premiere Financing Corporation. In his transactions with
court. the corporation, private complainant dealt exclusively with one Rosemarie
Lachenal, a trader connected with the corporation, and he never knew nor in any
Version of the Defense
way dealt with petitioner Lina Lim Lao at any time before or during the issuance
Petitioner aptly summarized her version of the facts of the case thus: of the delivery of the checks. (Palijo, T . S. N., 23 June 1987, pp. 28-29, 32-34; Lao,
T . S. N., 15 May 1990, p. 6; Ocampo, T . S. N., p. 5) Petitioner Lina Lim Lao was
Petitioner Lina Lim Lao was, in 1983, an employee of Premiere Financing not in any way involved in the transaction which led to the issuance of the checks.
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the "Corporation"), a corporation
engaged in investment management, with principal business office at Miami, When the checks were co-signed by petitioner, they were signed in advance and
Cubao, Quezon City. She was a junior officer at the corporation who was, in blank, delivered to the Head of Operations, Mr. Teodulo Asprec, who
however, assigned not at its main branch but at the corporation's extension office subsequently filled in the names of the payee, the amounts and the
in (Binondo) Manila. (Ocampo, T . S. N ., 16 August 1990, p. 14) corresponding dates of maturity. After Mr. Asprec signed the checks, they were
delivered to private complainant Palijo. (Lao, T . S. N ., 28 September 1989, pp. 8-
In the regular course of her duties as a junior officer, she was required to co-sign 11, 17, 19; note also that the trial court in its decision fully accepted the testimony
checks drawn against the account of the corporation. The other co-signor was her of petitioner [Decision of the Regional Trial Court, p. 12], and that the Court of
head of office, Mr. Teodulo Asprec. Since part of her duties required her to be Appeals affirmed said decision in toto)
mostly in the field and out of the office, it was normal procedure for her to sign
the checks in blank, that is, without the names of the payees, the amounts and Petitioner Lina Lim Lao was not in any way involved in the completion, and the
the dates of maturity. It was likewise Mr. Asprec, as head of office, who alone subsequent delivery of the check to private complainant Palijo.
decided to whom the checks were to be ultimately issued and delivered. (Lao,
At the time petitioner signed the checks, she had no knowledge of the sufficiency
T . S. N., 28 September 1989, pp. 9-11, 17, 19.)
or insufficiency of the funds of the corporate account. (Lao, T . S. N ., 28
In signing the checks as part of her duties as junior officer of the corporation, September 1989, p. 21) It was not within her powers, duties or responsibilities to
petitioner had no knowledge of the actual funds available in the corporate monitor and assess the balances against the issuance; much less was it within her
account. (Lao, T . S. N., 28 September 1989, p. 21) The power, duty and (duties and responsibilities) to make sure that the checks were funded. Premiere
responsibility of monitoring and assessing the balances against the checks issued, Financing Corporation had a Treasury Department headed by a Treasurer, Ms.
and funding the checks thus issued, devolved on the corporation's Treasury Veronilyn Ocampo, which alone had access to information as to account balances
Department in its main office in Cubao, Quezon City, headed then by the and which alone was responsible for funding the issued checks. (Ocampo,
Treasurer, Ms. Veronilyn Ocampo. (Ocampo, T . S. N., 19 July 1990, p. 4; Lao, T . S. N ., 19 July 1990, p. 4; Lao, T . S. N ., 28 September 1990, p. 23) All
T . S. N., 28 September 1989, pp. 21-23) All bank statements regarding the statements of account were sent to the Treasury Department located at the main
corporate checking account were likewise sent to the main branch in Cubao, office in Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioner was holding office at the extension in
Binondo Manila. (Lao, T . S. N., 28 September 1989, p. 24-25) Petitioner Lina Lim appointing a rehabilitation receiver for the purpose of settling claims against the
Lao did not have knowledge of the insufficiency of the funds in the corporate corporation. (Exh. "1") As he himself admits, private complainant filed a claim for
account against which the checks were drawn. the payment of the bounced check before and even after the corporation had
been placed under receivership. (Palijo, T . S. N ., 24 July 1987, p. 10-17) A check
When the checks were subsequently dishonored, private complainant sent a
was prepared by the receiver in favor of the private complainant but the same
notice of said dishonor to Premier Financing Corporation at its head office in
was not claimed by him. (Lao, T . S. N ., 15 May 1990, p. 18)
Cubao, Quezon City. (Please refer to Exh. "E";Palijo, T . S. N., 23 June 1987, p. 51)
Private complainant did not send notice of dishonor to petitioner. (Palijo, T . S. N., Private complainant then filed the instant criminal action. On 26 September 1990,
24 July 1987, p. 10) He did not follow up his investment with petitioner. (Id.) the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, rendered a decision convicting
Private complainant never contacted, never informed, and never talked with, petitioner, and sentencing the latter to suffer the aggregate penalty of two (2)
petitioner after the checks had bounced. (Id., at p. 29) Petitioner never had notice years and to pay a fine in the total amount of P300,000.00. On appeal, the Court
of the dishonor of the checks subject of the instant prosecution. of Appeals affirmed said decision. Hence, this petition for review. 8

The Treasurer of Premiere Financing Corporation, Ms. Veronilyn Ocampo The Issue
testified that it was the head office in Cubao, Quezon City, which received notice
In the main, petitioner contends that the public respondent committed a
of dishonor of the bounced checks. (Ocampo, T . S. N ., 19 July 1990 pp. 7-8) The
reversible error in concluding that lack of actual knowledge of insufficiency of
dishonor of the check came in the wake of the assassination of the late Sen.
funds was not a defense in a prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. Additionally, the
Benigno Aquino, as a consequence of which event a majority of the corporation's
petitioner argues that the notice of dishonor sent to the main office of the
clients pre-terminated their investments. A period of extreme illiquidity and
corporation, and not to petitioner herself who holds office in that corporation's
financial distress followed, which ultimately led to the corporation's being placed
branch office, does not constitute the notice mandated in Section 2 of BP 22;
under receivership by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
thus, there can be no prima facie presumption that she had knowledge of the
(Ocampo, T . S. N ., 16 August 1990, p. 8, 19; Lao, T . S. N ., 28 September 1989,
insufficiency of funds.
pp. 25-26; Please refer also to Exhibit "1", the order of receivership issued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission) Despite the Treasury Department's and The Court's Ruling
(Ms. Ocampo's) knowledge of the dishonor of the checks, however, the main
office in Cubao, Quezon City never informed petitioner Lina Lim Lao or anybody The petition is meritorious.
in the Binondo office for that matter. (Ocampo, T .S. N ., 16 August 1990, pp. 9- Strict Interpretation of Penal Statutes
10) In her testimony, she justified her omission by saying that the checks were
actually the responsibility of the main office (Ocampo, T . S. N ., 19 July 1990, p. 6) It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that penal statutes are strictly construed
and that, at that time of panic withdrawals and massive pre-termination of against the state and liberally for the accused, so much so that the scope of a
clients' investments, it was futile to inform the Binondo office since the main penal statute cannot be extended by good intention, implication, or even equity
office was strapped for cash and in deep financial distress. (Id., at pp. 7-9) consideration. Thus, for Petitioner Lina Lim Lao's acts to be penalized under the
Moreover, the confusion which came in the wake of the Aquino assassination and Bouncing Checks Law or B.P. 22, "they must come clearly within both the spirit
the consequent panic withdrawals caused them to lose direct communication and the letter of the statute." 9
with the Binondo office. (Ocampo, T . S. N ., 16 August 1990, p. 9-10) The salient portions of B.P. 22 read:
As a result of the financial crisis and distress, the Securities and Exchange Sec. 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws and
Commission placed Premier Financing Corporation under receivership, issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue
that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, also enumerated the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently elements of the offense defined in the first paragraph of Section 1 of B.P. 22, thus:
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have
1. That a person makes or draws and issues any check.
been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of 2. That the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value.
not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less
than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no 3. That the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time
case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
at the discretion of the court. bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds 4. That the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, of funds or credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit or to cover the full amount the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. 11
of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date Crux of the Petition
appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Petitioner raised as defense before the Court of Appeals her lack of actual
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or knowledge of the insufficiency of funds at the time of the issuance of the checks,
persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable and lack of personal notice of dishonor to her. The respondent appellate court,
under this Act. however, affirmed the RTC decision, reasoning that "the maker's knowledge of
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and the insufficiency of funds is legally presumed from the dishonor of his checks for
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficiency of funds. (People 12
vs. Laggui, 171 SCRA 305; Nieras vs. Hon. Auxencio
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) C. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1)" The Court of Appeals also stated that "her alleged
days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of lack of knowledge or intent to issue a bum check would not exculpate her from
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder any responsibility under B.P. Blg. 22, since
13
the act of making and issuing a
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by worthless check is a malum prohibitum." In the words of the Solicitor General,
the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that "(s)uch alleged lack of knowledge is not material for petitioner's liability under
such check has not been paid by the drawee. B.P. Blg. 22." 14

This Court listed the elements of the offense penalized under B.P. 22, as follows: Lack of Actual Knowledge of Insufficiency of Funds
"(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for Knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit in the drawee bank for
value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue the payment of a check upon its presentment is an essential element of the
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the offense. 15 There is a prima faciepresumption of the existence of this element
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor from the fact of drawing, issuing or making a check, the payment of which was
of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor subsequently refused for insufficiency of funds. It is important to stress, however,
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the that this is not a conclusive presumption that forecloses or precludes the
bank to stop payment." 10 presentation of evidence to the contrary.
In the present case, the fact alone that petitioner was a signatory to the checks addition to that of Teodulo Asprec, who alone placed the name of the payee and
that were subsequently dishonored merely engenders the prima the amount to be drawn thereon. This is clear from her testimony:
facie presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of funds, but it does not
q . . . Will you please or will you be able to tell us the condition of this check when
render her automatically guilty under B.P. 22. The prosecution has a duty to prove
you signed this or when you first saw this check?
all the elements of the crime, including the acts that give rise to the prima
facie presumption; petitioner, on the other hand, has a right to rebut the prima Witness
faciepresumption. 16 Therefore, if such knowledge of insufficiency of funds is
proven to be actually absent or non-existent, the accused should not be held a I signed the check in blank. There were no payee. No amount, no date, sir.
liable for the offense defined under the first paragraph of Section 1 of B.P. 22. q Why did you sign this check in blank when there was no payee, no amount and
Although the offense charged is a malum prohibitum, the prosecution is not no date?
thereby excused from its responsibility of proving beyond reasonable doubt all
the elements of the offense, one of which is knowledge of the insufficiency of a It is in order to facilitate the transaction, sir.
funds. xxx xxx xxx
After a thorough review of the case at bar, the Court finds that Petitioner Lina Lim COURT
Lao did not have actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the corporate
accounts at the time she affixed her signature to the checks involved in this case, (to witness)
at the time the same were issued, and even at the time the checks were
q Is that your practice?
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank.
Witness
The scope of petitioner's duties and responsibilities did not encompass the
funding of the corporation's checks; her duties were limited to the marketing a Procedure, Your Honor.
department of the Binondo branch. 17 Under the organizational structure of
COURT
Premiere Financing Corporation, funding of checks was the sole responsibility of
the Treasury Department. Veronilyn Ocampo, former Treasurer of Premiere, That is quiet (sic) unusual. That is why I am asking that last question if that is a
testified thus: practice of your office.
Q Will you please tell us whose (sic) responsible for the funding of checks in a As a co-signer, I sign first, sir.
Premiere?
q So the check cannot be encashed without your signature, co-signature?
A The one in charge is the Treasury Division up to the Treasury Disbursement and
then they give it directly to Jose Cabacan, President of Premiere. 18 a Yes, sir.

Atty. Gonzales
Furthermore, the Regional Trial Court itself found that, since Petitioner Lina Lim
Lao was often out in the field taking charge of the marketing department of the (to witness)
Binondo branch, she signed the checks in blank as to name of the payee and the
amount to be drawn, and without knowledge of the transaction for which they q Now, you said that you sign first, after you sign, who signs the check?
were issued. 19 As a matter of company practice, her signature was required in a Mr. Teodoro Asprec, sir.
q Is this Teodoro Asprec the same Teodoro Asprec, one of the accused in all these q Only to facilitate your business transaction, so you signed the other checks?
cases?
Witness
a Yes, sir.
a Yes, Your Honor.
q Now, in the distribution or issuance of checks which according to you, as a co-
q So that when ever there is a transaction all is needed . . . all that is needed is for
signee, you sign. Who determines to whom to issue or to whom to pay the check
the other co-signee to sign?
after Teodoro Asprec signs the check?
a Yes, Your Honor.
Witness
COURT
a He is the one.
(To counsel)
Atty. Gonzales
Proceed.
q Mr. Asprec is the one in-charge in . . . are you telling the Honorable Court that
it was Teodoro Asprec who determines to whom to issue the check? Does he do Atty. Gonzales
that all the time?
(to witness)
Court
q Why is it necessary for you to sign?
q Does he all the time?
a Because most of the time I am out in the field in the afternoon, so, in order to
(to witness) facilitate the transaction I sign so if I am not around they can issue the check. 20
a Yes, Your Honor. Petitioner did not have any knowledge either of the identity of the payee or the
transaction which gave rise to the issuance of the checks. It was her co-signatory,
q So the check can be negotiated? So, the check can be good only upon his
Teodulo Asprec, who alone filled in the blanks, completed and issued the checks.
signing? Without his signing or signature the check cannot be good?
That Petitioner Lina Lim Lao did not have any knowledge or connection with the
a Yes, Your Honor. checks' payee, Artelijo Palijo, is clearly evident even from the latter's
testimony, viz.:
Atty. Gonzales
ATTY. GONZALES:
(to witness)
Q When did you come to know the accused Lina Lim Lao?
q You made reference to a transaction which according to you, you signed this
check in order to facilitate the transaction . . . I withdraw that question. I will A I cannot remember the exact date because in their office Binondo,
reform.
COURT: (before witness could finish)
COURT
Q More or less?
(for clarification to witness)
A It must have been late 1983.
Witness may answer.
ATTY. GONZALES: construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the
defendant . . ." 22 The element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds having been
Q And that must or that was after the transactions involving alleged checks
proven to be absent, petitioner is therefore entitled to an acquittal.
marked in evidence as Exhibits B and C?
This position finds support in Dingle vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 23 where we
A After the transactions.
stressed that knowledge of insufficiency of funds at the time of the issuance of
Q And that was also before the transaction involving that confirmation of sale the check was an essential requisite for the offense penalized under B.P. 22. In
marked in evidence as Exhibit A? that case, the spouses Paz and Nestor Dingle owned a family business known as
"PMD Enterprises." Nestor transacted the sale of 400 tons of silica sand to the
A It was also. buyer Ernesto Ang who paid for the same. Nestor failed to deliver. Thus, he issued
Q And so you came to know the accused Lina Lim Lao when all those transactions to Ernesto two checks, signed by him and his wife as authorized signatories for
were already consummated? PMD Enterprises, to represent the value of the undelivered silica sand. These
checks were dishonored for having been "drawn against insufficient funds."
A Yes, sir. Nestor thereafter issued to Ernesto another check, signed by him and his wife
Q And there has never been any occasion where you transacted with accused Lina Paz, which was likewise subsequently dishonored. No payment was ever made;
Lim Lao, is that correct? hence, the spouses were charged with a violation of B.P. 22 before the trial court
which found them both guilty. Paz appealed the judgment to the then
A None, sir, there was no occasion. Intermediate Appellate Court which modified the same by reducing the penalty
of imprisonment to thirty days. Not satisfied, Paz filed an appeal to this Court
Q And your coming to know Lina Lim Lao the accused in these cases was by
"insisting on her innocence" and "contending that she did not incur any criminal
chance when you happened to drop by in the office at Binondo of the Premier
liability under B.P. 22 because she had no knowledge of the dishonor of the
Finance Corporation, is that what you mean?
checks issued by her husband and, for that matter, even the transaction of her
A Yes, sir. husband with Ang." The Court ruled in Dingle as follows:
Q You indicated to the Court that you were introduced to the accused Lina Lim The Solicitor General in his Memorandum recommended that petitioner be
Lao, is that correct? acquitted of the instant charge because from the testimony of the sole
prosecution witness Ernesto Ang, it was established that he dealt exclusively with
A I was introduced.
Nestor Dingle. Nowhere in his testimony is the name of Paz Dingle ever
xxx xxx xxx mentioned in connection with the transaction and with the issuance of the check.
In fact, Ang categorically stated that it was Nestor Dingle who received his two (2)
Q After that plain introduction there was nothing which transpired between you
letters of demand. This lends credence to the testimony of Paz Dingle that she
and the accused Lina Lim Lao? signed the questioned checks in blank together with her husband without any
A There was none. 21 knowledge of its issuance, much less of the transaction and the fact of dishonor.

Since Petitioner Lina Lim Lao signed the checks without knowledge of the In the case of Florentino Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, promulgated December 18,
insufficiency of funds, knowledge she was not expected or obliged to possess 1986, it was held that an essential element of the offense is knowledge on the
under the organizational structure of the corporation, she may not be held liable part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds.
under B.P. 22. For in the final analysis, penal statutes such as B.P. 22 "must be
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the assailed decision of the Intermediate to inform them as the corporation was in distress." 29 The Court of Appeals
Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals) is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is affirmed this factual finding. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, this finding is
hereby rendered ACQUITTING petitioner on reasonable doubt. 24 binding on this Court. 30

In rejecting the defense of herein petitioner and ruling that knowledge of the Indeed, this factual matter is borne by the records. The records show that the
insufficiency of funds is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for notice of dishonor was addressed to Premiere Financing Corporation and sent to
insufficiency of funds, Respondent Court of Appeals cited People its main office in Cubao, Quezon City. Furthermore, the same had not been
vs.Laggui 25 and Nierras vs. Dacuycuy. 26 These, however, are inapplicable here. transmitted to Premiere's Binondo Office where petitioner had been holding
The accused in both cases issued personal not corporate checks and did not office.
aver lack of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or absence of personal notice of
Likewise no notice of dishonor from the offended party was actually sent to or
the check's dishonor. Furthermore, in People vs. Laggui 27 the Court ruled mainly
received by Petitioner Lao. Her testimony on this point is as follows:
on the adequacy of an information which alleged lack of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds at the time the check was issued and not at the time of its Atty. Gonzales
presentment. On the other hand, the Court in Nierras vs. Dacuycuy 28 held mainly
that an accused may be charged under B.P. 22 and Article 315 of the Revised q Will you please tell us if Father Artelejo Palejo (sic) ever notified you of the
Penal Code for the same act of issuing a bouncing check. bouncing of the check or the two (2) checks marked as Exhibit "B" or "C" for the
prosecution?
The statement in the two cases that mere issuance of a dishonored check gives
rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued Witness
the same without funds does not support the CA Decision. As observed earlier, a No, sir.
there is here only a prima facie presumption which does not preclude the
presentation of contrary evidence. On the contrary, People vs. Laggui clearly q What do you mean no, sir?
spells out as an element of the offense the fact that the drawer must have a I was never given a notice. I was never given notice from Father Palejo (sic).
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in, or of credit with, the drawee bank for
the payment of the same in full on presentment; hence, it even supports the COURT
petitioner's position.
(to witness)
Lack of Adequate Notice of Dishonor
q Notice of what?
There is another equally cogent reason for the acquittal of the accused. There can
a Of the bouncing check, Your Honor. 31
be no prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds in the instant
case because no notice of dishonor was actually sent to or received by the Because no notice of dishonor was actually sent to and received by the petitioner,
petitioner. the prima facie presumption that she knew about the insufficiency of funds
cannot apply. Section 2 of B.P. 22 clearly provides that this presumption arises
The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank.
not from the mere fact of drawing, making and issuing a bum check; there must
The trial court itself found absent a personal notice of dishonor to Petitioner Lina
also be a showing that, within five banking days from receipt of the notice of
Lim Lao by the drawee bank based on the unrebutted testimony of Ocampo
dishonor, such maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check the amount
"(t)hat the checks bounced when presented with the drawee bank but she did
due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment in full by the drawee of such
not inform anymore the Binondo branch and Lina Lim Lao as there was no need
check.
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator innocent until the contrary is proven. 37 These rights must be read into any
"a compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt interpretation and application of B.P. 22. Verily, the public policy to uphold civil
the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated." This was liberties embodied in the Bill of Rights necessarily outweighs the public policy to
also compared "to certain laws 32 allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain build confidence in the issuance of checks. The first is a basic human right while
period of time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the Government, the second is only proprietary in nature. 38 Important to remember also is B.P.
without incurring any criminal liability." 33 In this light, the full payment of the 22's requirements that the check issuer must know "at the time of issue that he
amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank" and that he
is a "complete defense." 34 The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily must receive "notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee." Hence,
deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. B.P. 22 must not be applied in a manner which contravenes an accused's
Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be constitutional and statutory rights.
actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand and the basic
There is also a social justice dimension in this case. Lina Lim Lao is only a minor
postulates of fairness require that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to
employee who had nothing to do with the issuance, funding and delivery of
and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P.
checks. Why she was required by her employer to countersign checks escapes us.
22.
Her signature is completely unnecessary for it serves no fathomable purpose at
In this light, the postulate of Respondent Court of Appeals that "(d)emand on the all in protecting the employer from unauthorized disbursements. Because of the
Corporation constitutes demand on appellant (herein petitioner)," 35 is pendency of this case, Lina Lim Lao stood in jeopardy for over a decade of
erroneous. Premiere has no obligation to forward the notice addressed to it to losing her liberty and suffering the wrenching pain and loneliness of
the employee concerned, especially because the corporation itself incurs no imprisonment, not to mention the stigma of prosecution on her career and family
criminal liability under B.P. 22 for the issuance of a bouncing check. Responsibility life as a young mother, as well as the expenses, effort and aches in defending her
under B.P. 22 is personal to the accused; hence, personal knowledge of the notice innocence. Upon the other hand, the senior official Teodulo Asprec who
of dishonor is necessary. Consequently, constructive notice to the corporation is appears responsible for the issuance, funding and delivery of the worthless
not enough to satisfy due process. Moreover, it is petitioner, as an officer of the checks has escaped criminal prosecution simply because he could not be located
corporation, who is the latter's agent for purposes of receiving notices and other by the authorities. The case against him has been archived while the awesome
documents, and not the other way around. It is but axiomatic that notice to the prosecutory might of the government and the knuckled ire of the private
corporation, which has a personality distinct and separate from the petitioner, complainant were all focused on poor petitioner. Thus, this Court exhorts the
does not constitute notice to the latter. prosecutors and the police authorities concerned to exert their best to arrest and
prosecute Asprec so that justice in its pristine essence can be achieved in all
Epilogue
fairness to the complainant, Fr. Artelijo Palijo, and the People of the Philippines.
In granting this appeal, the Court is not unaware of B.P. 22's intent to inculcate By this Decision, the Court enjoins the Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of
public respect for and trust in checks which, although not legal tender, are Interior and Local Government to see that essential justice is done and the real
deemed convenient substitutes for currency. B.P. 22 was intended by the culprit(s) duly-prosecuted and punished.
legislature to enhance commercial and financial transactions in the Philippines by
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of
penalizing makers and issuers of worthless checks. The public interest behind B.P.
the Regional Trial Court, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Lina Lim
22 is thus clearly palpable from its intended purpose. 36
Lao is ACQUITTED. The Clerk of Court is hereby ORDERED to furnish the Secretary
At the same time, this Court deeply cherishes and is in fact bound by duty to of Justice and the Secretary of Interior and Local Government with copies of this
protect our people's constitutional rights to due process and to be presumed Decision. No costs.
THIRD DIVISION "Check No. : 149900
G.R. No. 139292 December 5, 2000
Drawn Against : Traders Royal Bank
JOSEPHINE DOMAGSANG, petitioner,
vs.
In the Amount of : P50,000.00
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Dated/Postdated : June 24, 1991
DECISION

VITUG, J.: Payable to : Ignacio H. Garcia, Jr.

Petitioner was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 63, of "said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, she did not have
having violated Batas Pambansa ("B.P.") Blg. 22 (Anti-Bouncing Check Law), on sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the
eighteen (18) counts, and sentenced to "suffer the penalty of One (1) Year face amount of such check upon its presentment, which check when presented
imprisonment for each count (eighteen [18] counts)." Petitioner was likewise for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently
"ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P573,800.00."1 The dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason `ACCOUNT CLOSED' and despite
judgment, when appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CR No. 18497), was receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face
affirmed in toto by the appellate court. amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof within
It would appear that petitioner approached complainant Ignacio Garcia, an five (5) banking days after receiving notice.
Assistant Vice President of METROBANK, to ask for financial assistance. Garcia "CONTRARY TO LAW."2
accommodated petitioner and gave the latter a loan in the sum of P573,800.00.
In exchange, petitioner issued and delivered to the complainant 18 postdated Subsequent Informations, docketed Criminal Cases No. 92-4466 to No. 92-4482,
checks for the repayment of the loan. When the checks were, in time, deposited, inclusive, similarly worded as in Criminal Case No. 92-4465 except as to the dates,
the instruments were all dishonored by the drawee bank for this reason: "Account the number, and the amounts of the checks hereunder itemized -
closed." The complainant demanded payment allegedly by calling up petitioner
at her office. Failing to receive any payment for the value of the dishonored "Check Number Dated/Postdated Amount
checks, the complainant referred the matter to his lawyer who supposedly wrote
petitioner a letter of demand but that the latter ignored the demand.

On 08 May 1992, Criminal Case No. 92-4465 was lodged against petitioner before
TRB No. 161181 July 18, 1991 P6,000.00
the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Makati. The Information read:

"That on or about the 24th day of June, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro TRB No. 149906 July 24, 1991 3,000.00
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously No. 182074 July 30, 1991 29,700.00
make out, draw and issue to complainant Ignacio H. Garcia, Jr., to apply on
account or for value the dated check/described below:
No. 182084 August 30, 1991 9,300.00 of the loans obtained by petitioner. Opposed by the prosecution, the demurrer
was denied by the trial court.1wphi1 In the hearing of 17 February 1994,
petitioner, through counsel, waived her right to present evidence in her defense.
No. 182078 September 15, 1991 6,000.00
Relying solely then on the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the lower court
rendered judgment convicting petitioner. The decision, as heretofore stated, was
No. 161183 September 18, 1991 6,000.00 affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision of 15 February 1999.
Reconsideration was also denied in the resolution, dated 09 July 1999, of the
No. 161177 September 18, 1991 100,000.00 appellate court.

Hence, the instant petition where petitioner raised the following issues for
No. 182085 September 30, 1991 9,000.00
resolution by the Court -

No. 182079 October 15, 1991 6,000.00 "1. Whether or not an alleged verbal demand to pay sufficient to convict herein
petitioner for the crime of violation of B.P. Blg. 22;
No. 182086 October 30, 1991 10,500.00 "2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error
when it affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court, on the
No. 182080 November 15, 1991 6,000.00 ground that a written notice of dishonor is not necessary in a prosecution for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, contrary to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in
No. 182087 November 30, 1991 11,400.00 the case of Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572; (and)

"3. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in considering the
No. 182081 December 15, 1991 6,000.00 alleged written demand letter, despite failure of the prosecution to formally offer
the same."4
No. 182082 December 15, 1991 100,000.00
The pertinent provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 "Bouncing Checks Law," provide:
No. 182088 December 30, 1991 12,000.00 "SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws
and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of
No. 182089 December 30, 1991 100,000.00 issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
No. 182090 December 30, 1991 100,000.00" 3 subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
were also filed against petitioner. The cases were later consolidated and jointly any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
tried following the "not guilty" plea of petitioner when arraigned on 02 November imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by
1992. fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which
fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand pesos, or both such fine and
On 07 September 1993, petitioner filed a demurrer to the evidence, with leave of imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
court, premised on the absence of a demand letter and that the checks were not
issued as payment but as evidence of indebtedness of petitioner or as collaterals
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.6

"Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the
persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable maker, drawer or issuer of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank
under this Act. of the check issued if the dishonored check is presented within 90 days from the
date of the check and the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon or to make
"SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and
arrangement with the drawee bank for that purpose. The statute has created
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
the prima facie presumption evidently because "knowledge" which involves a
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90)
state of mind would be difficult to establish.7 The presumption does not hold,
days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
however, when the maker, drawer or issuer of the check pays the holder thereof
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the
the amount due thereon or makes arrangement for payment in full by the drawee
holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in
bank of such check within 5 banking days after receiving notice that such check has
full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice
not been paid by the drawee bank.
that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
In Lao vs. Court of Appeals,8 this Court explained:
"SEC. 3. Duty of drawee; rules of evidence. It shall be the duty of the drawee of
any check, when refusing to pay the same to the holder thereof upon "x x x. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 clearly provides that this presumption arises not
presentment, to cause to be written, printed or stamped in plain language from the mere fact of drawing, making and issuing a bum check; there must also
thereon, or attached thereto, the reason for drawee's dishonor or refusal to pay be a showing that, within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor,
the same: Provided, That where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such such maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check the amount due
drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor thereon or to make arrangement for its payment in full by the drawee of such
or refusal. In all prosecutions under this Act, the introduction in evidence of any check.
unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or
"It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the
written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall
violator `a compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to
be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the due
preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated.
presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the
This was also compared `to certain laws allowing illegal possessors of firearms a
same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or attached by
certain period of time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the
the drawee on such dishonored check.
Government, without incurring any criminal liability. In this light, the full payment
"Notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop payment, the drawee shall state in of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of
the notice that there were no sufficient funds in or credit with such bank for the dishonor is a `complete defense. The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily
payment in full of such check, if such be the fact."5 (Underscoring supplied.) deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be
The law enumerates the elements of the crime to be (1) the making, drawing and
actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand and the basic
issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the
postulates of fairness require that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and
received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal,"11 a mere
22."9 oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under
the law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals predicated the conviction of
Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that
petitioner on the supposed fact that petitioner was informed of the dishonor of
the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has
the checks through verbal notice when the complainant had called her up by
actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor.12 The consistent rule is
telephone informing her of the dishonor of the checks and demanding payment
that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in
therefor. The appellate court said:
favor of the accused.13
"The maker's knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds is legally presumed from
Evidently, the appellate court did not give weight and credence to the assertion
the dishonor of his check (People vs. Laggui, 171 Phil. 305). The law does not
that a demand letter was sent by a counsel of the complainant because of the
require a written notice of the dishonor of such check.
failure of the prosecution to formally offer it in evidence. Courts are bound to
"In the instant case, appellant had knowledge that her checks were dishonored consider as part of the evidence only those which are formally offered14 for judges
by the bank when complainant Garcia made several oral demands upon her to must base their findings strictly on the evidence submitted by the parties at the
pay the value of the checks in the amount of P573,800.00. Despite said demands, trial.15 Without the written notice of dishonor, there can be no basis, considering
appellant failed and refused to pay the same. Moreover, complaining witness what has heretofore been said, for establishing the presence of "actual
further testified that his lawyer made a written demand upon appellant but the knowledge of insufficiency of funds."16
latter ignored said demand (tsn., May 27, 1993, pp. 13-14). In this connection,
The prosecution may have failed to sufficiently establish a case to warrant
appellant waived her right to present evidence or rebut complainant's testimony
conviction, however, it has clearly proved petitioner's failure to pay a just debt
that he made oral demands upon appellant to make good the dishonored checks
owing to the private complainant. The total face value of the dishonored checks,
and his lawyer wrote her a demand letter.
to wit-
"Likewise, appellant did not object to the admission of the complainant's
1wphi1
testimony with regard to the written demand by moving that it be stricken off the
record for being hearsay, hence, the same is admissible evidence. In the case "Check Number Dated/Postdated Amount
of People vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440, the Supreme court ruled:

"`x x x (It) must be noted that neither the defendant nor his counsel below
objected to the admission of the testimonies which are now being assailed as
hearsay. This is fatal to defendant-appellant's present posture since the failure to TRB No. 149900 June 24, 1991 P50,000.00
object to hearsay evidence constitutes a waiver of the x x right to cross-examine
the actual witness to the occurrence, rendering the evidence admissible.'"10 TRB No. 161181 July 18, 1991 6,000.00
Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor is
fatal.1wphi1 The Court agrees. TRB No. 149906 July 24, 1991 3,000.00

While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor
No. 182074 July 30, 1991 29,700.00
be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that
where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such
No. 182084 August 30, 1991 1,300.00 the total amount of P563,800.00 with 12% legal interest, per annum, from the
filing of the informations until the finality of this decision, the sum of which,
inclusive of the interest, shall be subject thereafter to 12%, perannum, interest
No. 182078 September 15, 1991 6,000.00
until the due amount is paid. Costs against petitioner.

No. 161183 September 18, 1991 6,000.00 SO ORDERED.

No. 161171 September 18, 1991 100,000.00

No. 182085 September 30, 1991 9,900.00

No. 182079 October 15, 1991 6,000.00

No. 182086 October 30, 1991 10,500.00

No. 182080 November 15, 1991 6,000.00

No. 182087 November 30, 1991 11,400.00

No. 182081 December 15, 1991 6,000.00

No. 182082 December 15, 1991 100,000.00

No. 182088 December 30, 1991 12,000.00

No. 182089 December 30, 1991 100,000.00

17
No. 182090 December 30, 1991 100,000.00"

or the sum of P563,800, has yet to be made good by petitioner. This amount, with
12% legal interest per annum from the filing of the information until the finality
of this decision, must be forthwith settled.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. Petitioner


Josephine Domagsang is acquitted of the crime charged on reasonable doubt. She
is ordered, however, to pay to the offended party the face value of the checks in
Republic of the Philippines When she went to these companies to collect on what she thought were still
SUPREME COURT unpaid accounts, she was informed of the issuance of the above-listed crossed
Manila checks. Further inquiry revealed that the said checks had been deposited with the
Associated Bank (hereinafter, "the Bank") and subsequently paid by it to one
FIRST DIVISION
Rafael Sayson, one of its "trusted depositors," in the words of its branch manager
and co-petitioner, Conrado Cruz, Sayson had not been authorized by the private
respondent to deposit and encash the said checks.
G.R. No. 89802 May 7, 1992
The private respondent sued the petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
ASSOCIATED BANK and CONRADO CRUZ, petitioners, City for recovery of the total value of the checks plus damages. After trial,
vs. judgment was rendered requiring them to pay the private respondent the total
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and MERLE V. REYES, doing business under the name value of the subject checks in the amount of P15,805.00 plus 12% interest,
and style "Melissa's RTW," respondents. P50,000.00 actual damages, P25,000.00 exemplary damages, P5,000.00
Soluta, Leonidas, Marifosque, Javier, Liboon & aguila Law Offices for petitioners. attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit. 1

Roberto B. Lugue for private respondent. The petitioners appealed to the respondent court, reiterating their argument that
the private respondent had no cause of action against them and should have
proceeded instead against the companies that issued the checks. In disposing of
CRUZ, J.: this contention, the Court of Appeals 2 said:

The sole issue raised in this case is whether or not the private respondent has a The cause of action of the appellee in the case at bar arose from the illegal,
cause of action against the petitioners for their encashment and payment to anomalous and irregular acts of the appellants in violating common banking
another person of certain crossed checks issued in her favor. practices to the damage and prejudice of the appellees, in allowing to be
deposited and encashed as well as paying to improper parties without the
The private respondent is engaged in the business of ready-to-wear garments knowledge, consent, authority or endorsement of the appellee which totalled
under the firm name "Melissa's RTW." She deals with, among other customers, P15,805.00, the six (6) checks in dispute which were "crossed checks" or "for
Robinson's Department Store, Payless Department Store, Rempson Department payee's account only," the appellee being the payee.
Store, and the Corona Bazaar.
The three (3) elements of a cause of action are present in the case at bar, namely:
These companies issued in payment of their respective accounts crossed checks (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
payable to Melissa's RTW in the amounts and on the dates indicated below: arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
PAYOR BANK AMOUNT DATE
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach thereof.
Payless Solid Bank P3,960.00 January 19, 1982 (Republic Planters Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 131 SCRA 631).
Robinson's FEBTC 4,140.00 December 18, 1981
And such cause of action has been proved by evidence of great weight. The
Robinson's FEBTC 1,650.00 December 24, 1981
contents of the said checks issued by the customers of the appellee had not been
Robinson's FEBTC 1,980.00 January 12, 1982
questioned. There is no dispute that the same are crossed checks or for payee's
Rempson TRB 1,575.00 January 9, 1982
account only, which is Melissa's RTW. The appellee had clearly shown that she
Corona RCBC 2,500.00 December 22, 1981
had never authorized anyone to deposit the said checks nor to encash the same; facilitated the encashment of the checks, they cannot be made liable to the
that the appellants had allowed all said checks to be deposited, cleared and paid private respondent.
to one Rafael Sayson in violation of the instructions in the said crossed checks
The subject checks were accepted for deposit by the Bank for the account of
that the same were for payee's account only; and that the appellee maintained a
Rafael Sayson although they were crossed checks and the payee was not Sayson
savings account with the Prudential Bank, Cubao Branch, Quezon City which
but Melissa's RTW. The Bank stamped thereon its guarantee that "all prior
never cleared the said checks and the appellee had been damaged by such
endorsements and/or lack of endorsements (were) guaranteed." By such
encashment of the same.
deliberate and positive act, the Bank had for all legal intents and purposes treated
We affirm. the said checks as negotiable instruments and, accordingly, assumed the
warranty of the endorser.
Under accepted banking practice, crossing a check is done by writing two parallel
lines diagonally on the left top portion of the checks. The crossing is special where The weight of authority is to the effect that "the possession of check on a forged
the name of a bank or a business institution is written between the two parallel or unauthorized indorsement is wrongful, and when the money is collected on
lines, which means that the drawee should pay only with the intervention of that the check, the bank can be held 'for moneys had and received." 6 The proceeds
company. 3 The crossing is general where the words written between the two are held for the rightful owner of the payment and may be recovered by him. The
parallel lines are "and Co." or "for payee's account only," as in the case at bar. position of the bank taking the check on the forged or unauthorized indorsement
This means that the drawee bank should not encash the check but merely accept is the same as if it had taken the check and collected without indorsement at all.
it for deposit. 4 The act of the bank amounts to conversion of the check. 7

In State Investment House vs. IAC, 5 this Court declared that "the effects of It is not disputed that the proceeds of the subject checks belonged to the private
crossing a check are: (1) that the check may not be encashed but only deposited respondent. As she had not at any time authorized Rafael Sayson to endorse or
in the bank; (2) that the check may be negotiated only once to one who has encash them, there was conversion of the funds by the Bank.
an account with a bank; and (3) that the act of crossing the check serves as a
When the Bank paid the checks so endorsed notwithstanding that title had not
warning to the holder that the check has been issued for a definite purpose so
passed to the endorser, it did so at its peril and became liable to the payee for
that he must inquire if he has received the check pursuant to that purpose."
the value of the checks. This liability attached whether or not the Bank was aware
The effects therefore of crossing a check relate to the mode of its presentment of the unauthorized endorsement. 8
for payment. Under Sec. 72 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, presentment for
The petitioners were negligent when they permitted the encashment of the
payment, to be sufficient, must be made by the holder or by some person
checks by Sayson. The Bank should have first verified his right to endorse the
authorized to receive payment on his behalf. Who the holder or authorized
crossed checks, of which he was not the payee, and to deposit the proceeds of
person is depends on the instruction stated on the face of the check.
the checks to his own account. The Bank was by reason of the nature of the
The six checks in the case at bar had been crossed and issued "for payee's account checks put upon notice that they were issued for deposit only to the private
only." This could only signify that the drawers had intended the same for deposit respondent's account. Its failure to inquire into Sayson's authority was a breach
only by the person indicated, to wit, Melissa's RTW. of a duty it owed to the private respondent.

The petitioners argue that the cause of action for violation of the common As the Court stressed in Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Equitable
instruction found on the face of the checks exclusively belongs to the issuers Banking Corp., 9 "the law imposes a duty of diligence on the collecting bank to
thereof and not to the payee. Moreover, having acted in good faith as they merely scrutinize checks deposited with it, for the purpose of determining their
genuineness and regularity. The collecting bank, being primarily engaged in
banking, holds itself out to the public as the expert on this field, and the law thus subject checks. We also agree with the reduction of the award of the exemplary
holds it to a high standard of conduct." damages for lack of sufficient evidence to support them.

The petitioners insist that the private respondent has no cause of action against WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
them because they have no privity of contract with her. They also argue that it ordered.
was Eddie Reyes, the private respondent's own husband, who endorsed the
checks.

Assuming that Eddie Reyes did endorse the crossed checks, we hold that the Bank
would still be liable to the private respondent because he was not authorized to
make the endorsements. And even if the endorsements were forged, as alleged,
the Bank would still be liable to the private respondent for not verifying the
endorser's authority. There is no substantial difference between an actual forging
of a name to a check as an endorsement by a person not authorized to make the
signature and the affixing of a name to a check as an endorsement by a person
not authorized to endorse it. 10

The Bank does not deny collecting the money on the endorsement. It was its
responsibility to inquire as to the authority of Rafael Sayson to deposit crossed
checks payable to Melissa's RTW upon a prior endorsement by Eddie Reyes. The
failure of the Bank to make this inquiry was a breach of duty that made it liable
to the private respondent for the amount of the checks.

There being no evidence that the crossed checks were actually received by the
private respondent, she would have a right of action against the drawer
companies, which in turn could go against their respective drawee banks, which
in turn could sue the herein petitioner as collecting bank. In a similar situation, it
was held that, to simplify proceedings, the payee of the illegally encashed checks
should be allowed to recover directly from the bank responsible for such
encashment regardless of whether or not the checks were actually delivered to
the payee. 11We approve such direct action in the case at bar.

It is worth repeating that before presenting the checks for clearing and for
payment, the Bank had stamped on the back thereof the words: "All prior
endorsements and/or lack of endorsements guaranteed," and thus made the
assurance that it had ascertained the genuineness of all prior endorsements.

We find that the respondent court committed no reversible error in holding that
the private respondent had a valid cause of action against the petitioners and that
the latter are indeed liable to her for their unauthorized encashment of the

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