Running head: THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 1

The Abu Ghraib Prison Controversy

A Criminological Analysis

Macey Culver

Eastern Kentucky University

THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 2

The Abu Ghraib Prison Controversy

A Criminological Analysis

While white collar crime has predominately been disregarded as criminal within the U.S.

justice system, this is especially evident for state crimes (Friedrichs, 2010, 17). Criminal

violations by the U.S. government, particularly its military, are frequently considered necessary

acts of war to ensure public protection (Barkan, 2012, 384). Instead, those actions violate

domestic and international laws of war and few consequences are distributed to those responsible

(Friedrichs, 2010, 132-133). Recently at Abu Ghraib, a converted U.S. military prison,

individuals were abused and tortured by soldiers, yet only a small percentage of those were

prosecuted or reprimanded (Risen, 2004). The criminality of the response by the U.S.

government, along with the actions committed by the U.S. military at the Abu Ghraib prison will

be evaluated within the context of criminological theories. This evaluation will begin with a

description of the actions and actors involved in the crime along with a review of the legislation

surrounding this issue will be presented. Criminological theories will then be used to analyze

actions from an individual, group, national, and international perspective.

The Events at Abu Ghraib

The following section will discuss the events that occurred at Abu Ghraib under the

control of Saddam Hussein and then the U.S. Government.

History of Abu Ghraib

The atrocity of the torture and abuse executed by the U.S. military, particularly the 372nd

Military Police Company, was furthered by the history of the Abu Ghraib prison (Brinkley,

2008). Prior to its control by the United States, the prison was a symbol of Saddam Husseins

authoritarian regime (Brinkley, 2008). During the Anfal Campaign, the prison was a place of
THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 3

brutal torture, including electric shock, rape, mutilation and mass executions (U.S. Department

of State, 2003). The Anfal Campaign resulted in an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 deaths (U.S.

Department of State, 2003). Many of the prisoners were unjustly imprisoned and were subjected

to torture and execution without trial (The Associated Press, 2008). After the U.S. government

threatened to declare war against Iraq, 10,000 Iraqi citizens stormed the prison, forcing Saddam

Hussein to release its prisoners (Brinkley, 2008). The U.S. government then seized Abu Ghraib

and attempted to revitalize it as a U.S. military prison (Brinkley, 2008). However, evidence of

similar practices executed by Saddam Hussein arose involving U.S. officials (CNN Library,

2014). The prison that was once a symbol of the oppressive rule of Saddam Hussein quickly

became a similar symbol for the U.S. conflict in Iraq (The Associated Press, 2008; Leung, 2004).

Actors and Actions

Once a symbol of Saddam Husseins oppressive rule, Abu Ghraib became a converted

U.S. military prison in Iraq. From 2003 to 2006, the U.S. military incarcerated thousands (up to

3,800) Iraqi citizens at Abu Ghraib (CNN Library, 2014). On April 4, 2004, a CBS 60 Minutes

broadcast revealed photographs and reports of the torture and abuse of Iraqi detainees by U.S.

soldiers, mostly from the 372nd Military Police Brigade (Leung, 2004). The photographs

displayed naked Iraqi citizens piled on top of each other, or positioned to stimulate sexual acts

with other inmates (Hersh, 2004). Other military reports uncovered sadistic, blantant, and

wanton criminal abuse including incidences of pouring phosphoric liquid from light bulbs on

prisoners along with sodomizing and raping them (Hersh, 2004). Prisoners were also subjected to

harsh prison conditions such as lack of proper ventilation, food, clothing, and water (Hersh,

2004). There were also accounts of military police soldiers using muzzled dogs to intimidate and

attack detainees (CNN Library, 2015). This resulted in the deaths of at least 25 Iraqi citizen at
THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 4

the responsibility of the United States (Leung, 2004). At least 60% of the prisoners subjected to

these conditions had been considered non-threatening to the safety and security of the United

States (Hersh, 2004). Most were either common criminals or innocent citizens picked up from

military highway stops (Hersh, 2004). Only a few were working against the U.S. military

operation in Iraq (Hersh, 2004). Allegations eventually surfaced after Specialist Joseph Darby

received a CD from Spc. Charles Graner, containing incriminating photographs, and reported it

to his supervisor (Hersh, 2004).

In his article Preventing Prisoner Abuse: Leadership Lessons of Abu Ghraib, Paul

Bartone held several actors responsible for the actions that occurred at Abu Ghraib (2010, 163).

While news articles and internal investigations were quick to assign responsibility to low

ranking, reserve military police officers with the 372nd Brigade, Bartone acknowledges the

responsibility of higher leadership within the chain of command (2010, 163). This includes

Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, who was assigned to the U.S. military prisons in Iraq (Hersh,

2004). Although she had extensive military experience, she lacked any correctional experience,

yet was assigned to operate three Iraq prisons, including the one at Abu Ghraib (Hersh, 2004).

She was rarely seen at any of the prisons, and when given information of misconduct by officials

within the prison, she did not check to assure her recommendations were followed (Hersh, 2004;

Bartone, 2010, 164).

There was also a breakdown in communication within the chain of command (Bartone,

2010, 164). Staff Sergeant Chip Frederick, one of the soldiers facing criminal charges, cites this

as his main defense (Leung, 2004). According to Frederick, when he asked for information about

operating procedure and rules and guidelines, he was continually denied them by superior

officers (Leung, 2004). He also states that he was not provided a copy of the Geneva Convention
THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 5

until after he was charged (Leung, 2004).There was also confusion about who was in charge at

the prison (Bartone, 2010, 164). Military intelligence, CIA, and private military contractors

including CACI frequented the prison to perform interrogations (Hersh, 2004; Bartone, 2010,

164). According to Sgt. Frederick, military intelligence often instructed them to soften up

prisoners for interrogations, and then received positive feedback from interrogators (Leung,

2004). The breakdown in communication can be further highlighted by the fact that Frederick

was considered an excellent correctional officer when he worked for the Virginia Dept. of

Corrections, and thus has a baseline knowledge of how prison systems should operate (Hersh,

2004; Leung, 2004). Sergeant Michael Smith offered a similar explanation, stating that the use of

his Belgian shepherd to intimidate detainees prior to questioning was allowed by Col. Thomas

M. Pappas, the chief intelligence officer at Abu Ghraib (The New York Times, 2006). Col.

Pappas then stated he was following the direction of Major General Geoffrey Miller (The New

York Times, 2006). There were also interpreters from Titan and contractors from CACI, both

private military companies hired by the U.S. government involved in the abuse at Abu Ghraib

(Hersh, 2004).

Social and Legal Responses

After the news segment aired on 60 Minutes, President George W. Bush, along with high

ranking military officials including Gen. Mark Kimmitt, repeatedly claimed that the actions did

not reflect the actions of the entire U.S. military, but instead were confined to a few individuals

(Roth, 2005, 394; Leung, 2004). In his journal article Getting Away with Torture, Kenneth

Roth states the Bush administration wanted to minimize the blame on the U.S. government by

claiming the abusers were a handful of errant soldiers, a few bad apples at the bottom of the

barrel (2005, 394). This claim supports President Bushs continual news presence, apologizing
THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 6

for the actions of U.S. troops (CNN Library, 2015). Former Secretary of Defense Donald

Rumsfeld also engaged in similar behavior by addressing the Armed Services Committees in the

House and the Senate, assuming full responsibility for what happened (The New York Times,

2006). However, Bush twice denied his resignation (The New York Times, 2006). No high

ranking official in Washington has been reprimanded (Roth, 2005, 395). As Roth notes, even

senior military officials do not possess the authority to criticize high ranking officials in

Washington (2005, 395).

In response to the evidence of abuse, Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, the lead

commander in Iraq, launched several investigations (Hersh, 2004). One of the most well-known

and thorough reports was that conducted my Major General Antonio M. Taguba. In contrast to

the report Provost Marshal Donald Ryder, which was considered a cover up of the torture, the

Taguba Report confirmed the allegations of abuse and torture inflicted, and those responsible

included high ranking officials (Hersh, 2004). Maj. Gen. Taguba in his reported stated that there

is no evidence that the command, although aware of these deficiencies, attempted to correct them

in any systemic manner (U.S. Department of Defense, 2004). Despite Tagubas finding, most

Court Martials and criminal charges have been issued against low ranking soldiers (Roth, 2005,

396; The New York Times, 2006). A total of eleven soldiers were convicted and none were

officers (CNN Library, 2015). To date, the highest ranking person convicted was a captain and

received a mere 45 days in jail (The New York Times, 2006). Staff Sergeant Chip Frederick

served three years in military prison and received a dishonorable discharge (CNN Library, 2015).

Brig. General Janis Karpinksi received no formal charges, and despite Maj. Gen. Tagubas

recommendation of her removal from duty, she was only denoted to the rank of colonel by

President Bush and then quietly dismissed from duty (CNN Library, 2015; Hersh 2004).
THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 7

Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan, former director of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing

Center was the only officer charged, yet he was later acquitted (CNN Library, 2015). Several

other senior military officials were either denoted or relieved from duty but none were criminally

prosecuted (CNN Library, 2015; The New York Times, 2006). According to an article in the

New York Times, defense lawyers for low ranking soldiers attempted to prove the responsibility

for the torture at Abu Ghraib was with those higher in the chain of command, but failed to

convince a military jury (The New York Times, 2006).

In addition to high ranking officials, government contractors such as CACI and Titan,

evaded prosecution for crimes committed at Abu Ghraib. According to the journal article,

Reclaiming the Moral High Ground, employees of private military contractors equally

participated in the torture of Iraqi detainees (Clark, 2009). However, none of the private

contractors have been criminally charged (Serralvo, 2012, 127). This may be due to the vague

definition of a federal agency within the Federal Tort Claims Act (Clark, 2009). In November

2007 a case against CACI was allowed to proceed to federal court and in 2013 Engility

Holdings, Inc. did pay $5.28 million to former detainees, but no criminal convictions have been

made (CNN Library, 2015).

Analysis

The U.S. government, particularly the Bush Administration, described the torture that

occurred at Abu Ghraib using the bad apple theory (Snow, 2009, 556). In this frame of

reference, the torture was a result of a few rogue soldiers, and not a reflection of the prison or the

U.S. military as a whole (Snow, 2009, 556). However, associating one theory with the events

that occurred at Abu Ghraib would place a restricting scope on its analysis. Therefore, following
THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 8

section will introduce several different theories through which the complexity of the actions of

multiple actors can be discussed.

Differential Reinforcement and Social Learning Theory

The bad apple theory was seemingly popular amongst high-ranking officials and

military leaders in the U.S. government (Snow, 2009, 556). With this theory, the main

explanation is that the soldiers of the Tier-One Alpha cellblock where the torture occurred, made

a personal choice (Reid, 2005). However, investigations such as the Taguba report, have

undermined the legitimacy of this theory as it relates to Abu Ghraib (Snow, 2009, 556). One

theory that can be used to explain the actions of the soldier is the Differential Reinforcement

Theory.

The Differential Reinforcement Theory by Robert L. Burgess and Ronald L. Akers shares

a main principle with Sutherlands Differential Association Theory (Barkan, 2012, 191). This

principle is that criminal behaviors, just like other non-criminal behaviors (i.e. reading, riding a

bike, etc.) are learned through a socialization process (Barkan, 2012, 191). Differential

Reinforcement is unique in that it states criminal behavior is more likely to be learned and

integrated into ones normal behaviors if that criminal behavior is rewarded (Barkan, 2012, 192).

This is especially true if the rewards for the criminal behavior outweigh the rewards for non-

criminal behavior (Barkan, 2012, 192). A similar theory by Albert Bandura claims that

aggressive tendencies are learned (Barkan, 2012, 192). If outside influences deem aggressive

tendencies as acceptable behavior, aggressive behavior will dominate an individuals actions

(Barkan, 2012, 187).

In contrast to the bad apple theory, differential reinforcement supports testimonies from

soldiers that participated in the torturous acts. In an article from The Washington Post, Specialist
THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 9

Graners defense attorney stated that the soldier followed orders and was praised for his actions

(Reid, 2005). Soldiers with repeatedly told by interrogators to soften up prisoners for

questioning, and then praised for doing a good job (Fox News, 2004). Even more startlingly is

the testimony from PFC England, who can be seen in a picture holding a leash attacked to the

neck of a naked detainees (Polk, 2004). Prior to the photograph being taken, England claims she

was hesitant, and didnt want to participate in the actions (Mastroianni & Reed, 2006, 244).

However, she received pressure from others to participate (Mastroianni & Reed, 2006, 244).

Snow, in her analysis of Abu Ghraib, offers a similar explanation (2009). She states that

perpetrators learn by doing and that the torture soldiers were involved in eventually became

routine (Snow, 2009, 559). Strikingly, Snow also states that repetition increases the

psychological pleasure an individual experience (Snow, 2009, 559). Therefore, while soldiers

like PFC England may first oppose engaging in acts of torture, routine repetition will create a

psychological reward (Snow, 2009, 559). This, along with the verbal praises of CIA and military

interrogators, the rewards for torturing detainees strongly outweighed the reward for not

engaging in those actions (Reid, 2005). Several individuals, even from outside the group of

soldiers present in Abu Ghraib, witnessed the torture, yet failed to report the problem (Snow,

2009, 565). These accounts support the social learning and differential reinforcement theory in

that soldiers learned that torture was acceptable and rewarded.

Social Disorganization Theory

While the group of soldiers from the Tier-One Alpha cellblock are responsible for their

actions, differential reinforcement cannot fully explain the complexity of the events at Abu

Ghraib (Reid, 2005). While soldiers were encouraged by interrogators to soften up detainees,

there were other factors that facilitated the unethical behavior (Fox News). Even with the support
THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 10

from interrogators, soldiers still could have recognized the atrocity of the action (Mastroianni &

Reed, 2006, 244-245). A combination inadequate leadership, confusion over policies, and the

constant fear of violence all contributed to what happened at Abu Ghraib (Mastroianni & Reed,

2006, 246).

Social Disorganization theory is a viable explanation for the incidences at Abu Ghraib.

Famous sociologists Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay hypothesized a new explanation for

why crime occurs more in certain areas than others, termed social disorganization (Barkan, 2012,

163). This theory states that crime is more likely to occur when there is a breakdown in social

bonds and social control and on the accompanying confusion regarding how to behave (Barkan,

2012, 163). The breakdown in social bonds, or influential connections to important institutions

such as family, in combination with a decline in societal control, can increase the opportunity for

crime to occur (Barkan, 2012, 163; 200). This is even more prevalent when individuals are no

longer aware of how to behave due to the breakdowns in social bonds and social control (Barkan,

2012, 163). While this theory by Shaw and Mckay is generally applied to high crime

neighborhoods, it can also be applied to the prison culture of Abu Ghraib.

First, a breakdown in social bonds is the least applicable of the theory to the events at

Abu Ghraib. However, the other two facets of this theory can provide insight into what occurred.

Many reports about Abu Ghraib cite a breakdown in social control as an influential factor in

facilitating the decisions of the soldiers and interrogators (Mastroianni, 2013 & Snow, 2009).

First, the chain of command was not properly established (Mastroianni, 2013, 58). Especially

with the presence of private military contractors, military personnel were unsure of who was in

charge. Second, there was little supervision in how the enhanced interrogation techniques were

carried out (Mastroianni, 2013, 64). Staff Sergeant Frederick stated that they received only
THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 11

instruction not to kill a detainee (Reid, 2005). The issues that were reported by people inside the

prison and outside regulators such as the Red Cross, were failed to be corrected (Balestrieri,

2004, 7-8). Brig. Gen. Karpinski was found to have known about the problem, but never checked

to assure her recommendations were followed (Hersh, 2004). All of these factors allowed for

violent behavior to continue unabated and without reproach.

There was also confusion about how to behave within the prison. Despite the fact that

many soldiers were military police, there were reservist, and thus were unaccustomed their

deployments (Mastroianni & Reed, 2006, 248). And despite their position as military police, few

had received and formalized training or preparation for working in a military prison (Reid,

2005). The soldiers also encountered conflicting roles (Mastrioanni & Reed, 2006, 244). While

interrogators ordered them to soften up detainees, they also had the responsibility to practice

sound corrections management techniques. Finally, there may have been confusion on the

rules of interrogation, since policy varies among different military prisons (Mastrioanni, 2013,

61). This confusion coupled with a lack of social control, created an environment that fostered

unethical behaviors (Mastrioanni, 2013; Mastrioanni & Reed, 2006; Snow, 2009). Similar to

crime prone neighborhoods in Shaw and McKays original study, a breakdown in social control

and confusion over how to behave created the crime prone prison culture at Abu Ghraib.

Radical Theory and Neutralization

While only a select group of soldiers in a specific military prison engaged in committing

torture, analyzing the event as an isolated incident, uninfluenced by outside policy and agenda,

would be to severely limit the analysis. The remaining part of the analysis will focus on the Bush

Administration and how they capitalized on the fear of the American public and utilized the

United States political and military power to wage war in the Middle East (Balestrieri, 2004).
THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 12

Similar to Marxs Conflict Theory, Radical Theory suggest that the powerful or wealthy

are able to manipulate the legal system in order to evade prosecution for criminal behavior

(Barkan, 2012, 213). By influencing legislature, powerful individuals can influence the creation,

or lack therefore, of certain laws (Barkan, 2012, 222).

Preventative Laws. Currently, there are several forms of international law against war

crimes, including torture, in which the United States is accountable. Widely discussed with the

events at Abu Ghraib is the Geneva Conventions. Under the 4th Convention, Common Article 3,

prisoners of war are protected from murder, mutilation, torture, humiliating and degrading

treatment (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015). However, upon its ratification, the United

States included a reservation for what constituted torture along with the importance of intention

(Hathaway et al., 2012, 805;808). Therefore, if injury or death is an accidental result, the term

torture may not be applied (Hathaway et al., 2012, 793). This can be seen in the United States

use of term enhanced interrogation, instead of torture when referring to certain acts. A similar

instance to Abu Ghraib occurred at Guantanamo Bay (Balestrieri, 2004, 12). Instead of prisoners,

the detainees were labeled and enemy combatants and thus denied some of the protections for

prisoners outlined in the Geneva Conventions (Rothe et al., 2009, 33).

There are also several international courts that preside over the actions of member

countries. For example, the International Court of Justice with the United Nations can bring

charges against a state, but has limited power in its prosecution (Rothe et al, 2009, 34). The

United States is also one of the five permanent and most powerful members, making the nation

very influential in determining who is prosecuted for certain crimes (Rothe et al, 2009, 34). This

allows the United States to evade prosecution. International committees such as the International

Committee of the Red Cross produced a report detailing the atrocities of the crimes at Abu
THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 13

Ghraib, but the information in the report was relatively neglected by the Bush Administration

(Balestrieri, 2004, 8). With the United States ability to evade international prosecution, the Bush

Administration has widely considered international law illegitimate (Sundstrom, 2006). In Roths

article, Getting Away with Torture, he states that the U.S. disregarded international controls

and believed that no one should be able to regulate the actions of the U.S on an international

level (2005).

This narrative is supportive of the radical theory in that the Bush Administration was able

to influence the legal definition of torture concerning the U.S. in the international realm

(Hathaway, 2012, 794). They also avoided international prosecution even after reports surfaced

about the interrogations practices used at Abu Ghraib (Balestrieri, 2004, 12). It wasnt until the

Supreme Court ruling on Hadam v. Rumsfeld that the Bush Administration agreed to adopt

guidelines outlined in the 3rd Geneva Convention (Sundstrom, 2005, 400).

Neutralization Theory. While the Bush Administration certainly had the political and

economic power to influence the international discourse on torture, there is still debate as to why

the Administration decided to allow torture. Rothe et al. suggest that as long as nations perceive

international laws to be legitimate, that nation will follow those laws (2009, 33). However, the

Bush Administration was able to perceive these laws as illegitimate through the process of

neutralization. The neutralization theory by Gresham M. Sykes and David Matza claims that

prior to criminal or deviant behavior occurring, and individual will likely neutralize any guilt or

shame (Barkan, 2012, 194). There are five specific techniques for neutralization which include

denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of the victim, condemnation of the condemners,

and appeal to higher loyalty (Barkan, 2012, 194). The Bush Administration applied nearly all of

these techniques which resulted in a shift of the U.S. opinion on torture.

THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 14

First, denial of responsibility played a crucial role in allowing torture to occur under the

Bush Administration. In countless media articles, President Bush along with Secretary of

Defense Donald Rumsfeld continually deny that they knew anything about the acts of torture at

Abu Ghraib (Roth, 2005, 394-395). The bad apple allegations made against a few soldiers also

shifted responsibility away from the Bush Administration (Mastroianni & Reed, 2006). President

Bush, in a public address states that what occurred was a result of disgraceful conduct by a few

American troops who dishonored our country and disregarded our values (Human Rights

Watch, 2004, 2). By taking a firm stance against torture in the media, President Bush was able to

separate himself from what happened at Abu Ghraib (Roth, 2005, 393-395).

The fifth principle of the neutralization theory is also highly applicable to the Bush

Administrations involvement with Abu Ghraib. The fifth principle is an appeal to higher loyalty

and states that individuals can justify their illegal behavior if it benefits other people (Barkan,

2012, 194). Post 9/11, American citizens developed a deep rooted fear of terrorism and

subsequent attacks (Snow, 2009, 557). The Bush Administration used this fear as an opportunity

to wage war in the Middle East (Balestieri, 2004). In a declaration of war, President Bush stated,

For the peace of the world and the benefit and freedom of the Iraqi people, I hereby give the

order to execute Operation Iraqi Freedom (Balestieri, 2004, 5). This and similar expressions of

care and concern for the American and Iraqi people were used to justify both war and torture.

Conclusion

The explanations for what that occurred at Abu Ghraib are as complex as the events

themselves. No single individual, culture, or political administration could solely be blamed for

the acts of torture carried out against detainees. Instead, interrelated policies, outside influences,

lack of leadership, and public fear after the attacks on 9/11 fostered an environment that
THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 15

facilitated torture. While international laws and courts have been considered less effective than

their domestic counterparts, an examination at Abu Ghraib has highlighted some of their

weaknesses and opportunities for improvement (Rothe et al., 2009, 33). A considerable

opportunity being the restructuring of the International Court of Justice in order to decrease the

power of its five permanent members (Rothe et al, 2009, 34). Still, the international community

is only partially responsible for regulating nations. Its important to note that the American

public seemingly supported many of the actions of the Bush Administration following the attacks

on the World Trade Center (Keating, 2014, 2). It would also be beneficial for the American

public to take a more proactive approach in understanding complex international issues in order

to express concern and disapproval of certain political actions.

THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 16

References

Balestrieri, E.B. (2004). Abu Ghraib Prison Abuse and the Rule of the Law. International

Journal on World Peace, 21.4, 3-20.

Barkan, S. E. (2012). Criminology: A Sociological Understanding. (5th ed.). Upper Saddle River,

NJ: Pearson Education, Inc.

Bartone, P.T. (2010). Preventing Prisoner Abuse: Leadership Lessons of Abu Ghraib. Ethics and

Behavior, 20.2. 161-173. doi: 10.1080/10508421003595984.

Brinkley, D. (2008, July 13). Abu Ghraib: The Back Story. The Washington Post. Retrieved from

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2008/07/10/AR2008071001952.html

Clark, A. (2009). Reclaiming the Moral High Ground: U.S. Accountability for Contractor

Abuses As a Means to Win Back Hearts and Minds. Public Contract Law Journal, 38.3.

CNN Library. (2014, Nov. 7). Iraq Prison Abuse Scandal Fast Facts. CNN. Retrieved from

http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/meast/iraq-prison-abuse-scandal-fast-

facts/index.html

Council on Foreign Relations. (2015). Geneva Conventions. Council on Foreign Relations.

Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/geneva-conventions/p8778#

Fox News. (2004, May 21). Prison Abuse Soldiers: We Were Following Orders. Fox News.

Retrieved from http://www.foxnews.com/story/2004/05/21/prison-abuse-soldiers-were-

following-orders/

Friedrichs, D. O. (2010). Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime in Contemporary Society. (4th

ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning.

THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 17

Hathaway, O.A.; Nowlan, A. & Spiegal, J. (2012). Tortured Reasoning: The Intent to Torture

Under International and Domestic Law. Virginia Journal of International Law, 52.4, 791-

837.

Hersh, S.M. (2004). Torture At Abu Ghraib. The New Yorker. Retrieved from

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib

Human Rights Watch. (2004). The Road to Abu Ghraib. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from

http://www.hrw.org/node/12123/section/1

Keating, V.C. (2014). Contesting the International Illegitimacy of Torture: The Bush

Administration's Failure to Legitimate its Preferences within International Society.

British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 16.1, 1-27.

Iraq Abuse Trial Is Again Limited to Lower Ranks (2006, Mar. 23). The New York Times.

Retrieved from

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/23/us/23abuse.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&

Leung, R. (2004). Abuse at Abu Ghraib. CBS News. Retrieved from

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/abuse-at-abu-ghraib/

Mastroianni, G.R. (2013). Looking Back: Understanding Abu Ghraib. Parameters: U.S. Army

War College, 43.2, 54-65.

Mastroianni, G.R. & Reed, G. (2006). Apples, Barrels, and Abu Ghraib. Sociological Focus,

39.4, 239-250.

Polk, J. (2004, Aug.4). Testimony: Abu Ghraib photos just for fun. CNN. Retrieved from

http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/08/03/england.hearing/index.html
THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON CONTROVERSY 18

Reid, T.R. (2005, Jan. 11). Military Court Hears Abu Ghraib Testimony. The Washington Post.

Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62597-

2005Jan10.html

Risen, J. (2004, Apr. 29). The Struggle for Iraq: Treatment of Prisoners; G.I.s Are Accused of

Abusing Iraqi Captives. The New York Times. Retrieved from

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/29/world/struggle-for-iraq-treatment-prisoners-gi-s-

are-accused-abusing-iraqi-captives.html

Roth, K. (2005). Getting Away with Torture. Global Governance, 11.3, 389-406.

Rothe, D.L.; Kramer, R.C. & Mullins, C.W. (2009). Torture, impunity, and open legal spaces:

Abu Ghraib and international controls. Contemporary Justice Review, 12.1, 27-43.

Serralvo, J. (2012). Privatized Military Firms Impunity in Cases of Torture: A Crime of

Humanity? International Community Law Review, 14.2, 117-135.

Snow, N.E. (2009). How Ethical Theory Can Improve Practice: Lessons from Abu Ghraib.

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12.5, 555-568.

Sundstrom, R. (2006). Torture and Legitimacy. Peace Review, 18.4, 439-446.

The Associated Press. (2008, Sept. 4). Iraq to open Saddam Husseins abuse museum at Abu

Ghraib. NY Daily News. Retrieved from http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/iraq-

open-saddam-hussein-abuse-museum-abu-ghraib-article-1.319546

U.S. Department of Defense (2004). Articles 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police

Brigade. Retrieved from

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/paper/reports.html

U.S. Department of State. (2003). Human Rights in Saddams Iraq: The Violent Coercion and

Repression of the Iraqi People. Human Rights Review, 4.4, 3-6.