UNLAWFUL COMBATANT WITH REFERENCE TO

GUERRILLAISM

CRIMINOLOGY, PENOLOGY AND VICTIMOLOGY

Submitted To Submitted By
Mrs. Soma Bhattacharya Shivanshu Pandey

DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA

NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, VISAKHAPATNAM

(2016-2017)

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my very special thanks of gratitude to Mrs. Soma

Bhhatacharjya, lecturer of Criminology, Penology and Victimology subject, for giving me a
golden opportunity to do a wonderful project on such topic which helped me in doing a lot of
research and I came to know many things about application of foreign law in Matrimonial
Dispute. I am really thankful to him for giving such an important topic which gave me
immense knowledge about this particular area of Private International Law.
Secondly, I would also like to thank my parents and friends who helped me a lot in
finishing this project within a stipulated time. I am making this project not only for marks but
to also increase my knowledge.

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 CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the project work titled Application of Foreign Law: Divorce &
Matrimonial Alimony has been made by Shivanshu Pandey, as a part of completion of the
9th Semester is carried out under my guidance is an original piece of work.

Mr. Saurabh Sood

Faculty of Law, DSNLU

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 DECLARATION

I hereby expressly declare that the contents of this project titled Application of
Foreign Law: Divorce & Matrimonial Alimony submitted by me to my Assistant Professor,
Mr. Saurabh Sood is an original piece of work undertaken by me as a student of Damodaram
Sanjivayya National law University, Visakhapatnam in academic year 2016-2017.

Shivanshu Pandey
9th Semester, Section B
Roll Number- 2012099

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

I.H.L. International Humanitarian Law.

I.C.R.C. International Committee of Red Cross.
N.L.F. National Liberation Front.
N.R.A. - National Resistance Army.
R.I.C. - Royal Irish Constabulary.

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 CONTENTS
CHAPTER I ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED .
INTRODUCTION ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED .
CHAPTER II ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED .
COMBATANT ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED .
CHAPTER III ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED .
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GUERRILLA WARFARE ERROR!
BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED .
CHAPTER IV ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED .
CHARACTERISTICS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT
DEFINED.

CHAPTER V ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED .

INTERNATIONAL LAW ON GUERRILLA WARFARE ERROR! BOOKMARK
NOT DEFINED .

CHAPTER V ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED .

TERRORISM AND GUERRILLA WARFARE ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT
DEFINED.

BIBLIOGRAPHY ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED .

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 CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The revolution is not an apple that falls when it is ripe. You have to make it fall.1

Since the United States and their Allies launched their war on terror, the concept of
unlawful combatants has gained more prominence in the international debate. This debate
was initiated when the Bush administration denied the Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees
prisoner of war status and stated that they were to be regarded as unlawful combatants.2

The purpose of this thesis is to examine on the one hand the scope of the concept of
unlawful combatants and Guerrilla warfare and on the other hand its relation with the
international law of war and conventions. IHL provides protection for combatants and
civilians in armed conflicts. IHL is a branch of public international law specifically designed
to protect victims of armed conflicts and to regulate the means and methods of warfare.3 It is
based on several fundamental principles, one of them being the principle of distinguishing
between combatants and civilians. The concept of unlawful combatants challenges this
distinction, and seeks to add yet another category of persons into the IHL regime and,
consequently, jeopardizes the balance this regime has been traditionally based on. However,
nowhere are unlawful combatants mentioned. This led to claims that IHL does not foresee
any protection regarding unlawful combatants. This essay will show that those claims are
false. In this thesis chapter I deal with the small introduction of the seminar paper. Chapter 2
deals with the explanation of the combatant and its categorization as lawful and unlawful. It
also dealt with the definition of guerilla warfare and its explanation. Further Chapter 3 dealt

1
Che- Guevara, Seeds of Revolution: A Collection of Axioms, Passages and Proverbs, Volume 2, By Iam A.
Freeman.
2
White House Press Office, Fact sheet, 7 February 2002,
http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf (consultation 28 April 2010).
3
IHL applies, with some minor exceptions, solely in armed conflict, which has been recently defined as a resort
to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised
armed groups or between such groups within a State. ICTY, Prosecutor v. DukoTadi, Case No. IT-94-1-
AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October
1995, par. 70.

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with the historical background of the guerilla warfare around the world and in India. The
Guerilla warfare is also categorized as lawful and unlawful, chapter 4 particularly deals with
the categorization of the guerilla warfare. After this chapter 5 deals with the status of guerilla
warfare under international law and chapter 6 deals with the distinction between terrorism
and guerilla warfare.

CHAPTER II
COMBATANT

Over the past years, the concept of unlawful combatants has been the focus of
numerous articles, policy papers and books.4 Most of these texts have primarily focused on
the legal status of persons described as unlawful combatants, and on the rights and privileges
such persons enjoy under current IHL. While not completely omitting discussion on these
issues, this thesis talks about the status of guerilla warfare as unlawful combatant. In addition
to dealing with the concept of unlawful combatants as such, this work draws attention to the
multifaceted debate that has recently (and in the past) accompanied its use. In doing so, it
aims at advancing two main arguments: firstly, the debate, despite its alleged focus on one,
central issue, is characterized by immense confusions, which manifest themselves in three
spheres: a terminological, a conceptual, and a legal. These confusions turn the debate into a
cacophonic chorus of mutually incompatible positions that often do not meet each other at the
discursive or epistemological level. Secondly, these confusions- far from unwanted- play an
integral role in contributing to becloud the true purpose of the recent use of the term.

The word combatants is denoted as a right to participate directly or indirectly in

warfare under international law. It was stated by Inter-American Commission that, the
combatants privilege is a licence to kill or wound enemy combatants and wipe out enemy
military subjects.5 As a result lawful combatants cant be charged for lawful acts of war in
the course of military operations even if their behaviour would constitute a serious crime in
peacetime. They can be prosecuted only for violations of international humanitarian law, in
particular for war crimes. The combatants who are captured once are given the status of
prisoner-of-war and they are given the advantage from the protection of the Third Geneva
Convention. Combatants are lawful military targets. Generally speaking, members of the
4
5
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/- V/II.116
Doc. 5 rev. 1 corr., 22 October 2002, para. 68

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armed forces (other than medical personnel and chaplains) are combatants. The conditions for
combatant/prisoner-of-war status can be derived from Article 4 of GC III and from Articles
43 and 44 of PI, which developed the said Article 4.6

Under international law it can hardly be maintained that unlawful combatants are not
entitled to any protection whatsoever under international humanitarian law. If they fulfill the
nationality criteria of GC IVs Article 4, they are clearly protected by that convention. The
fact that a person has unlawfully participated in hostilities is not a criterion for excluding the
application of GC IV, though it may be a reason for derogating from certain rights in
accordance with Article 5 thereof. The specific protections of GC IV depend on the situation
in which such persons find themselves in enemy hands. They are most extensive if unlawful
combatants are in enemy hands in occupied territory. For those in enemy hands in enemy
territory the protections of international humanitarian law are also quite well developed,
whereas on the battlefield, where no actual control is established-depending on the
interpretation of occupation-they may be the least developed. The guarantees contained in
Article 75 of PI constitute the minimum protections that apply to all persons, including
unlawful combatants, in the hands of a Party to an international armed conflict, irrespective
of whether they are covered by GC IV or not.

There are three main confusions currently characterize the debate on unlawful
combatants these are: terminological, conceptual, and legal confusions.

GUERRILLA AS COMBATANT

Guerrilla warfare is also a kind of combatant and its a lower category of insurgency.
Guerrilla warfare is irregular military actions such as harassment and sabotage carried out by
small usually independent forces.7 Guerrilla is a member of a usually small group of soldiers
who do not belong to a regular army and who fight in a war as an independent unit. He is a
person who engages in irregular warfare especially as a member of an independent unit
carrying out harassment and sabotage.8

Guerrillas are lawful combatants if they belong to an organized resistance movement

to a party to the conflict, are commanded by persons responsible for their subordinates,

6
Article 44 of PI sets the standard for parties to the Protocol. Its status under customary international law is
more doubtful.
7
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/guerrilla%20warfare (Last visited on October 20, 2016).
8
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/guerrilla (Last visited on October 20, 2016).

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wearing fixed distinctive signs, carry their arms openly, and obey the laws and customs of
war.9 Under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), guerrillas are included in the category of
irregular forces defined more specifically as fighters who use unconventional methods of
warfare, such as sabotage, ambushes, and sniping.10

Guerrilla warfare is a seemingly natural response of a relatively small, undermanned

and outgunned force to the overwhelming firepower and strength of another. In other words,
for the militarily weak, it is a strategy of survival.11

The term guerrilla is used both independently and as a component part in various
expressions, such as guerrilla warfare, guerrilla tactics, guerrilla fighters. As a rule, the
meaning of these expressions is more or less clear in the given context; but this is far from
suggesting that they have an agreed, unequivocal meaning. Thus, it seems necessary first of
all to give some indication of their scope and to examine whether a common denominator can
be found. The word guerrilla itself seems to be used in two different ways, as a synonym for
guerrilla warfare, or for a guerrilla fighter for which the correct term would be guerrillero.
Guerrilla warfare is usually understood to mean the type of armed conflict on land in which
guerrilla fighters are involved in the hostilities at the side at least of one of the parties to the
conflict. This conflict may moreover be characterized by the application of guerrilla tactics,
although the degree to which this is the case may vary with the various stages of the conflict.
The term guerrilla fighters is used in more than one way, but according to a fairly widely
accepted view it embraces all irregular combatants. It should be noted that this excludes
members of the regular armed forces applying guerrilla tactics.12

Guerrillas may be described as bands not belonging to a regular army and not under
strict military discipline, but nevertheless operating actively in the field and devoting
themselves entirely and continuously to warlike avocations without intervals of the peaceful
pursuits of ordinary life. They often perform valuable services to their own side by attacking
convoys of arms and provisions on the way to the enemy, cutting off communications,

9
Judge Guillermo S. Santos, The Rule of Law in Unconventional Warfare, 40 Philippine Law Journal 455, 466
(1965).
10
Jon Lee Anderson: Guerrillas, available at: http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/guerrillas/ (Last visited on
October 20, 2016).
11
Lieutenant Commander Kenneth B. Brown, Counter-Guerrilla Operations: Does the Law of War Proscribe
Success?, 44 Naval Law Review 123, 125 (1997).
12
F. Kalshoven, The Position of Guerrilla Fighters under the Law of War, 11 Military Law and the Law of War
Review 55, 58 (1972).

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blowing up bridges and destroying railways in rear, intercepting despatches, and harassing
the enemy in numberless ways that patriotic ingenuity can suggest and superior mobility
carry out.13

There is a very thin line demarcating belligerents, insurgents, and guerrillas.

Belligerents are the persons belonging to or recognized as a state at war and protected
by and subject to the laws of war.14 Insurgent is a person who revolts against civil authority
or an established government, especially, a rebel not recognized as a belligerent.15

Insurgency means rebellion, riot or mutiny by portion of the citizens of a State against
the established government. It indicates armed struggle by dissident forces with the
established government in a state. Insurgency can be considered to be of a more serious
nature than rebellion. While the precise definition of the insurgency is unclear, it seems to be
the case that the insurgency is a type of civil disturbance which usually is confined to a
limited area of the territory of the State and with the support of a minimum of section of the
people in the State. Through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
Insurgents are allowed to enter the arrangements for humanitarian protection and other
general agreements. However, there is also another other point of view that other rights such
as the right of blockade, which bind the belligerents, in fact, do not bind the insurgents.16

Belligerency is the final category of a challenge to the established government,

recognized by customary international law, and implies a more serious conflict than any
rebellion or insurgency. It is also a concept more clearly defined in international law than any
of the other categories of conflict. The recognition of belligerency formalizes the rights and
obligations of all parties in a war. It is the acknowledgement of a legal fact that there exists a
state of hostilities between the two groups vying for power or authority it is, the recognition
of the existence of war.17

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

1. The main aim of the research is to study about a unique form of war tactics i.e.,
Guerrilla Warfare.

13
T. J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law 490 (1923).
14
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/belligerent (Last visited on October 10, 2016).
15
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/insurgent (Last visited on October 10, 2016).
16
Rashi Gupta, Recognition of Insurgents and Belligerent Organisations in International Law, 4 (2013).
17
Kelson, Recognition in International Law, 35 A.J.I.L.605 616 (1941).

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 2. To study the Guerrillaism and Unlawful combatant?.
3. The chronological development of guerrilla warfare around the world.
4. To find out what leads to Che-Guevara and other unlawful combatant to get deviate in
the path of war and violence.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What matter of man can inspire such acts and revolutionary movement around the
world?
2. What is guerrilla warfare and how it is different from terrorism?
3. What were the ideologies and philosophies of Che-Guevara and Laden? Whether both
of them were revolutionary or a terrorist or an unlawful combatant?
4. What criminological theories shall be applicable with respect to acts of that unlawful
combatant?
5. Whether Guerrilla warfare tactics are still used in modern warfare?
6. Whether Guerrilla warfare is a successful strategy in combating?

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The scope of the study is limited to study of strategy and tactics adopted by guerrillas through
the study of historical perspectives of guerrilla warfare and international aspects.

SPECIAL REFERENCE

A. Che-Guevara

Born: June 14, 1928, Rosario, Argentina

Died: October 9, 1967, La Higuera, Bolivia
Full name: Ernesto Rafael Guevara de la Serna

B. Osama Bin Laden

Born: 1957
Died: October 9, 1967, La Higuera, Bolivia
Full name: Osama bin Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden

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SIGNIFICANCE AND BENEFIT OF STUDY

The researcher came to know about the history of guerrilla warfare and their struggles. It
helped the researcher to get knowledge about the international law dealing with guerrilla
warfare.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The method of research which is followed for the project is a doctrinal study. The
research includes gathering the data from the existing information like referring the books
related to the topic, articles, journals and the documents relating to the topic available online.

HYPOTHESIS
Guerrilla warfare tactics are still adopted in modern warfare.
Guerrilla warfare is the best tactic to tackle the larger and less mobile army.

LITERATURE REVIEW

S. Kalyanram (2002) in his thesis mentioned that Guerrilla warfare is not a new
phenomenon and history is witness to its repeated occurrence. The term Guerrilla
Warfare entered the modern lexicon during the Napoleonic Wars. It is a form of
warfare, meaning a technique or method used to pursue an objective, as opposed to a
type of war like Total War or Limited War.
Major Johnie Gombo (1990) mentioned in his thesis that Guerrilla warfare has been
practiced throughout the ages as a method of oppressed people to overcome the
strength of an enemy through an unconventional form of warfare. The philosophy of
the guerrilla is that the guerrilla represents the masses.
T. J. Lawrence (1923) states that Knowledge of the country, coolness, and daring are
the conditions of success in guerilla warfare. With small means it may inflict
irreparable damage upon the side against which it is directed; but those who engage in
it are free from many of the restraints of more regular combatants.
Charles R. King (1971) contends that there is nothing in the nature of guerrilla
warfare which per se places the guerrilla combatant outside of the protections of

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 international law. As in every form of armed conflict, much will depend on the
circumstances of the particular case.
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph B. Kelly, Captain A. Pelletier Jr., (1964), opine that the
civilian supports the guerilla because of promises of social reform and because of
terror. Thus, emergency laws must be tailored to prevent the guerillas propaganda
from reaching the civilian.
F. Kalshoven (1972) in his report stated that the term guerrilla tactics, finally, is
perhaps the least unequivocal of the various expressions mentioned. As a technical,
military notion it indicates the tactics which are applied by guerrilla fighters in
particular when they resort to outright military operations and which remain,
however, below the level of regular, open battles. Taken thus, the term comprises
inter alia a sophisticated use of the elements of mobility, dispersion and surprise in
combating superior enemy forces; their aim is as much to do the enemy harm
wherever he is found, as to dislodge him from specific positions.

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 CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

Mao Zedong said, Guerrilla warfare is neither a product of China nor peculiar to the
present day. From the earliest historical days, it has been a feature of wars fought by every
class of men against invaders and oppressors. Under suitable conditions, it has great
possibilities. The many guerrilla wars in history have their points of difference, their peculiar
characteristics, their varying processes and conclusions, and we must respect and profit by
the experience of those whose blood was shed in them. What a pity it is that the priceless
experience gained during the several hundred wars waged by the peasants of China cannot be
marshaled today to guide us. Our only experience in guerrilla hostilities has been that gained
from the several conflicts that have been carried on against us by foreign imperialists. But
that experience should help the fighting Chinese recognize the necessity for guerrilla warfare
and should confirm them in confidence of ultimate victory.

Russian Guerrilla Warfare

In September 1812, Napoleon, in the course of swallowing all of Europe, invaded

Russia at the head of a great army totaling several hundred thousand infantry, cavalry, and
artillery. At that time, Russia was weak and her ill-prepared army was not concentrated. The
most important phase of her strategy was the use made of Cossack cavalry and detachments
of peasants to carry on guerrilla operations. After giving up Moscow, the Russians formed
nine guerrilla divisions of about five hundred men each. These, and vast groups of organized
peasants, carried on partisan warfare and continually harassed the French Army. When the
French Army was withdrawing, cold and starving, Russian guerrillas blocked the way and, in
combination with regular troops, carried out counterattacks on the French rear, pursuing and
defeating them. The army of the heroic Napoleon was almost entirely annihilated, and the
guerrillas captured many officers, men, cannon, and rifles. Though the victory was the result
of various factors and depended largely on the activities of the regular army the function of
the partisan groups was extremely important. The corrupt and poorly organized country that

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was Russia defeated and destroyed an army led by the most famous soldier of Europe and
won the war in spite of the fact that her ability to organize guerrilla regimes was not fully
developed. At times, guerrilla groups were hindered in their operations and the supply of
equipment and arms was insufficient. If we use the Russian saying, it was a case of a battle
between the fist and the axe18

From 1918 to 1920, the Russian Soviets, because of the opposition and intervention of
foreign imperialists and the internal disturbances of White Russian groups, were forced to
organize themselves in occupied territories and fight a real war. In Siberia and Alashan, in the
rear of the army of the traitor Denikin and in the rear of the Poles, there were many Red
Russian guerrillas. These not only disrupted and destroyed the communications in the
enemys rear but also frequently prevented his advance. On one occasion, the guerrillas
completely destroyed a retreating White Army that had previously been defeated by regular
Red forces. Kolchak, Denikin, the Japanese, and the Poles, owing to the necessity of staving
off the attacks of guerrillas, were forced to withdraw regular troops from the front. Thus not
only was the enemys manpower impoverished but he found himself unable to cope with the
ever-moving guerrilla.19

Abyssinians Guerrilla Warfare

During seven months in 1935 and 1936, the Abyssinians lost their war against Italy.
The cause of defeat aside from the most important political reasons that there were dissentient
political groups, no strong government party, and unstable policy was the failure to adopt a
positive policy of mobile warfare. There was never a combination of the war of movement
with large-scale guerrilla operations. Ultimately, the Abyssinians adopted a purely passive
defence, with the result that they were unable to defeat the Italians. In addition to this, the fact
that Abyssinia is a relatively small and sparsely populated country was contributory. Even in
spite of the fact that the Abyssinian Army and its equipment were not modern, she was able
to withstand a mechanized Italian force of 400,000 for seven months. During that period,
there were several occasions when a war of movement was combined with large-scale
guerrilla operations to strike the Italians heavy blows. Moreover, several cities were retaken
and casualties totaling 140,000 were inflicted. Had this policy been steadfastly continued, it
would have been difficult to have named the ultimate winner.

18
Subrata Mukherjee, Sushila Ramaswamy, Mao Zedong: His thoughts and Works, p.no: 59 (1998).
19
Ibid.

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Taiping War

In 1841 and 1842, when brave people from San Yuan Li fought the English again
from 1850 to 1864, during the Taiping War, and for a third time in 1899 in the Boxer
Uprising, guerrilla tactics were employed to a remarkable degree. Particularly was this so
during the Taiping War, when guerrilla operations were most extensive and the Ching troops
were often completely exhausted and forced to flee for their lives.

Chinese Red Army

From 1927 to 1936, the Chinese Red Army fought almost continually and employed
guerrilla tactics contently. At the very beginning, a positive policy was adopted. Many bases
were established, and from guerrilla bands, the Reds were able to develop into regular armies.
As these armies fought, new guerrilla regimes were developed over a wide area. These
regimes co-ordinated their efforts with those of the regular forces This policy accounted for
the many victories gained by the guerrilla troops relatively few in number, who were armed
with weapons inferior to those of their opponents. The leaders of that period properly
combined guerrilla operations with a war of movement both strategically and tactically. They
depended primarily upon alertness. They stressed the correct basis for both political affairs
and military operations. They developed their guerrilla bands into trained units. They then
determined upon a ten year period of resistance during which time they overcame
innumerable difficulties and have only lately reached their goal of direct participation in the
anti-Japanese war. There is no doubt that the internal unification of China is now a permanent
and definite fact, and that the experience gained during our internal struggles has proved to be
both necessary and advantageous to us in the struggle against Japanese imperialism. There
are many valuable lessons we can learn from the experience of those years. Principle among
them is the fact that guerrilla success largely depend upon powerful political leaders who
work unceasingly to bring about internal unification. Such leaders must work with the people;
they must have a correct conception of the policy to be adopted as regards both the people
and the enemy.20

20
Id. at 61.

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 After 18 September 1931, strong anti-Japanese guerrilla campaigns were opened in
each of the three north-east provinces. Guerrilla activity persists there in spite of the cruelties
and deceits practiced by the Japanese at the expense of the people, and in spite of the fact that
her armies have occupied the land and oppressed the people for the last seven years. The
struggle can be divided into two periods. During the first, which extended from 18 September
1931 to January 1933, anti-Japanese guerrilla activity exploded constantly in all three
provinces. Ma Chan Shan and Su Ping Wei established an anti-Japanese regime in
Heilungkiang. In Chi Lin. the National Salvation Army and the Self-Defence Army were led
by Wang Te Lin and Li Tu respectively. In Feng Tien, Chu Lu and others commanded
guerrilla units. The influence of these forces was great. They harassed the Japanese
unceasingly, but because there was an indefinite political goal, improper leadership, failure to
co ordinate military command and operations and to work with the people, and, finally,
failure to delegate proper political functions to the army, the whole organization was feeble,
and its strength was not unified. As a direct result of these conditions, the campaigns failed
and the troops were finally defeated by the enemy.

During the second period, which has extended from January 1933 to the present time,
the situation has greatly improved, This has come about because great numbers of people
who have been oppressed by the enemy have decided to resist him, because of the
participation of the Chinese Communists in the anti-Japanese warm and because of the fine
work of the volunteer units. The guerrillas have finally educated the people to the meaning of
guerrilla warfare, and in the north-east, it has again become an important and powerful
influence. Already seven or eight guerrilla regiments and a number of independent platoons
have been formed, and their activities make it necessary for the Japanese to send troops after
them month after month. These units hamper the Japanese and undermine their control in the
north-east, while, at the same time they inspire a Nationalist revolution in Korea. Such
activities are not merely of transient and local importance but directly contribute to our
ultimate victory said Mao Zedong.21

Vietnam War

The Vietnamese Communists, or Vietcong, were the military branch of the National
Liberation Front (NLF), and were commanded by the Central Office for South Vietnam,
which was located near the Cambodian border. For arms, ammunition and special equipment,

21
Id. at 62.

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the Vietcong depended on the Ho Chi Minh trail. Other needs were met inside South
Vietnam.

The Guerrilla tactic was widely used by the Vietcong. During some ambushes the
Vietcong guerrilla fighters would sneak up on unaware U.S. troops, attack them, and leave
before risking capture. The Vietcong would also pose as citizens or farmers then, when least
expected, they would surprise attack U.S. troops using arms provided by Ho Chi Minh. Ho
Chi Minh was a Vietnamese Marxist revolutionary leader and also the president of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. He ordered an elaborate 200 mile long tunnel system to be
dug to aid the guerrilla fighters in their ability to move from place to place undetected by
U.S. infantry. Vietcong soldiers had access to Chinese versions of the AK-47; they also had
heavy, medium, and light machine guns. The heavy machine guns were mainly used as anti-
aircraft weapons, most effective against U.S. helicopters. Other weapons such as land mines,
and booby traps were hand crafted in North Vietnamese villages. The Vietcong also got aid
from an unexpected source: they would scavenge the country side for unexploded American
bombs and land mines and use the explosives in bombs of their own. In one year
approximately 20,000 tons of explosives could be found in unexploded or dud American
bombs.22

In December 1965, Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese leadership ordered a
change in a way the war in the South was to be fought. From now on, the Vietcong would
avoid pitched battles with the Americans unless the odds were clearly in their favor. There
would be more hit and run attacks and ambushes. To counter the American build-up,
Vietcong recruitment would be stepped up and more North Vietnamese Army troops would
be infiltrated into South Vietnam. The Vietcong, following the example of Chinese guerillas
before them, had always given the highest priority to creating safe base areas. They were
training grounds, logistics centers and headquarters. They also offered secure sanctuaries for
times when the war might go badly. Hiding the base areas had always been a high priority for
the Vietcong. Now, with American spotter planes everywhere, it was more vital than ever to
protect them. In remote swamps or forests, there were few problems, but nearer the capital, it
was much more difficult. The answer was to build enormous systems of underground tunnels.
The orders coming from NLF headquarters were absolutely clear. Tunnels were not to be
treated as mere shelters. They were fighting bases capable of providing continuous support

22
http://vietnamawbb.weebly.com/guerrilla-warfare-and-war-of-attrition.html (Last Visited on October 22,
2016).

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for troops. Even if a village was in enemy hands, the NLF beneath were still able to conduct
offensive operations. There were complexes big and small scattered across the country. Each
villager in a NLF area had to dig three feet of tunnel a day. There was even a standard
handbook specifying how tunnels were to be built. The biggest tunnel systems were in the
Iron Triangle and the Cu Chi District, only 20 miles from Saigon.23

American Civil War

Throughout the American Civil War, as vast armies in blue and gray clashed on
conventional battlefields, a drastically different kind of conflict was raging as well: a bloody
guerrilla war that erupted in the South in response to Federal invasion. Characterized by
ambushes, surprise raids, and irregular styles of combat, this guerrilla war became savage,
chaotic, and often disorganized. The guerrilla war, as waged by both Confederate guerrillas
and Unionists in the South, gathered in intensity between 1861 and 1865 and had a profound
impact on the outcome of the war.

As soon as the Civil War broke out in April 1861, guerrilla warfare emerged as a
popular alternative to enlistment in the Confederate army. Fearful of the imminent Federal
invasion, secessionist civilians throughout the Midwest, upper South, and Deep South wasted
no time organizing themselves into guerrilla bands to independently resist Yankee
occupation. Fighting as a guerrilla was attractive: it would allow men more freedom than
they would enjoy in the regular army, and most importantly, would allow them to remain at
home to defend their families and communities. Several different kinds of guerrillas emerged
during the Civil War. The majority of Civil War guerrillas were called bushwhackers, so
named because of their tendency to hide behind foliage and forest lines, what Union soldiers
referred to as the bush, and attack their foes. Bushwhackers were un-uniformed civilian
resisters, who had no affiliation with the Confederate army, and were a source of constant
confusion for the Union army who had no way of distinguishing a peaceful Southern civilian
from one who would attack them later.

The efforts of guerrillas to antagonize the Union army were undeniably successful. In
response, Union commanders tried sending out scouting parties to capture the guerrillas.
These attempts, however, accomplished little. Guerrillas, who had the advantage of surprise
and knowledge of the territory, were nearly impossible to catch and efforts to capture them

23
http://www.pbs.org/battlefieldvietnam/guerrilla/ (Last Visited on October 22, 2016).

20 | P a g e
only distracted soldiers from fighting the Confederate army. Their inability to stop the
guerrillas who continued to destroy Union supplies and kill Union men encouraged a growing
dislike among Northern soldiers for the Southern population from which the guerrillas came.
By late 1862, the Union Army, overwhelmed by fighting a conventional army in their front
and a guerrilla threat from all sides, began to meet guerrilla action with hard war policies.
Union commanders began to hold civilians responsible for the actions of guerrillas, often by
burning homes and communities, arresting civilian non-combatants, and in some cases
evacuating entire counties. By 1865, the guerrilla war throughout the South had become
confused, bloody, and disorganized. The Union Army had ceased to tolerate guerrillas, and
met their attacks unhesitatingly with retaliation. Civilians, exhausted by the violence in their
communities and hopeful of preventing Federal retaliation against their homes, lost their
support for the guerrilla movement and it soon began to die out.24

Chatrapati Shivaji

Chatrapati Shivaji Bhosale (1630-1680) the popular king from medieval India is
always been idol for the whole world. King Shivaji gave world new optimum war technique
known as Guerrilla Warfare. He modified and rearranged the way of fighting to the enemies,
which is most favourable work in weak condition of a kingdom/state. Guerrilla warfare
performed very important role in many independence movements at end of 20th century. His
technique inspired many nations and warriors to fight for their motherland. Chatrapati Shivaji
is taught in every army while training.25

Shivaji believed in the tenets of guerrilla warfare. He was a voracious reader and an
ardent follower of Kautilyas Kut Niti. He learnt the importance of terrain in guerrilla war
in his early years and never confronted the enemy in open combat. Few of his Guerrilla
tactics can be summarised as below:-

(a) Use terrain to own advantage. Shivaji as a boy travelled all over the Mawal region and
found the terrain was suitable for resisting Adilshah and the Mughals. The western ghats
from Junnar in the north to Mahabaleshwar in the south have been cut by nature into valleys

24
http://www.civilwar.org/education/history/warfare-and-logistics/warfare/guerrilla-warfare-during-the.html
(Last Visited on October 22, 2016).
25
https://vimsharvam.wordpress.com/2014/07/17/chatrapati-shivaji-maharaj-some-uncommonly-known-
unbiased-honest-observations/ (Last Visited on October 22, 2016).

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and each valley is fed by a separate river .These valleys are called Mawals. High hills tower
over these valleys where forts were constructed.

(b) Be kind to people. Shivaji knew that his greatest strength was the people of his land. He
won over the loyalty of his people by being one of them. He also won over his opponents by
his forthrightness and good conduct.

(c) Intelligence is the essence of all operations. Shivaji very early realised the importance of
intelligence. He had a full fledged department of spies who provided vital information of
political, military and social nature. He had a well oiled system of horsemen and runners to
disseminate information at the earliest.

(d) Treat women folk with respect. Shivaji was especially harsh on his soldiers who didnt
respect women. He treated the women folk of Surat with respect, when he raided the city. He
expected the same from his men. Any digression in this aspect was met with harsh
punishment.

(e) Religious tolerance. Shivaji was a devout Hindu, but was far from fanaticism. He was
highly tolerant and respectful of other religions. He was never actuated by a feeling of hatred
towards the Muslims as a people or the religion itself. The people of his kingdom had
complete religious freedom His chief naval commanders were Muslims.

(f) Fort based tactics. Shivaji developed and devised a technique of defence and offence
through a hundreds of forts as a necessary adjunct of guerrilla methods adopted by him.
There are three lines of distinct forts in Maharashtra which can be recognized even in present
day. The main forts are on the top of the Sahayadri range; then there are two main lines of
them, one on the eastern and other on the western spurs of the mountain ranges. In addition,
some sea forts were constructed by Shivaji on inaccessible rocks near the sea coast as a
counter to foreign maritime powers. Sindhudurg, Vijaydurg, Kolaba and Suvarnadurg are
some of his major sea forts.

(g) Strict discipline. Shivaji maintained a high standard of discipline in his army. Whatever
booty was obtained by the army during the campaigns had to be deposited in the treasury.
Khafi Khan, a critic of Shivaji writes, He made it a rule, that whenever his followers went
plundering, they should do no harm to mosques, Book of God or women of any one.
Whenever a copy of Quran fell into his hands, he treated it with respect and gave it to some
of his Muslim followers.

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(h) Guile. Shivaji was a master mind in bluffing his enemies. Afzal Khan fell into his trap and
paid with his life. At the siege of Panhala, Siddi Jauhar was lulled into inactivity by a promise
of surrendering the fort. Bahadur Khan was befooled by him as he was convinced of a
submission of a petition seeking negotiations and pardon by the emperor

(j) Speed, Surprise and Audacity. Shivaji was a man of terrific speed and mobility, which
helped him to gain surprise. Nobody could know where he would be the next day. He was
always on the move, avoiding engagement with the better equipped and numerically superior
enemy. He followed the principle of surprise to harass the enemy, when he was not prepared
to meet him. Shivaji was bold and fearless and led his men personally on distant and perilous
campaigns.26

For a good many years, Shivaji and his band of Marathas, who can with some justice, be
claimed as having originated the idea of guerrilla warfare in India.27

Shivaji challenged the Mughal emperors authority. After a ceaseless struggle he had
himself crowned as king in 1676. Aurangzeb authorized numerous campaigns to defeat him.
The vast Mughal army on a number of occasions advanced against Shivaji. But the elusive
Maratha perfected the art of evasion, retreat and counterattack and made the Mughal army
pay a heavy price for attacking him. Shivaji thus fought the Mughal army with guerrilla
tactics. He would, with his band of soldiers move away into the Western Ghats and attack the
imperial Army only at a place and time of his choosing. Thus the Maratha warrior made a
name for himself and the down trodden Hindus had someone to look up to. It must be
mentioned that Shivaji was a devout Hindu and for the first time when he challenged
Aurangzeb, the Hindus could live and practice their religion with ease. Shivaji had a
continuous battle with Aurangzeb and the Mughal Army. Aurangzeb was an inveterate
enemy of Shivaji and after repeated attempts to defeat him armies were employed against him
for 19 years, but nevertheless, his state is always increasing. But again the fact remains that
as long as Aurangzeb was in power the effect of his power was minimal. Aurangzeb reduced
the Moslem ruled states of Bijapur and Golkonda and this brought him in direct confrontation
with Shivaji. The Moslem army also had a large number of Maharathas in their ranks and this
created confusion, which was skillfully exploited by Shivaji. He adopted Guerrilla tactics to
fight the superior armies of Aurangzeb. But the battles did not give him a decisive victory
26
http://www.ukessays.com/essays/history/chapter-iv-shivaji-the-great-guerrilla-history-
essay.php#ixzz3prkWv55h (Last Visited on October 22, 2016).
27
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/southasia/History/Mughals/Shivaji.html (Last Visited on October 22, 2016).

23 | P a g e
over the Mughals. Shivajis mark as a warrior will remain forever. But again it must be
understood that he was unable to decisively defeat Aurangzeb and the emperors rule and
power continued to increase. His significance lies in the fact that he challenged the Mughal
Empire when it was at its apex and carved a niche for himself for all time to come as a
warrior and Soldier who dared Aurangzeb and the Mughal Empire.28

Maharana Rana Pratap

Guerrilla Warfare had been in existence since times unknown, but Maharana Rana
Pratap was probably the first to use Organized Guerrilla Warfare against a mighty enemy
and very successfully administered a disastrous blow to the Mughal army. Akbar launched an
offensive against Rana Pratap in A.D. 1576 after all the efforts, to bring Rana Pratap to his
servitude failed. Akbar established his headquarters at Ajmer and this became one of the 22
subahs of Akbars empire. As a Guerilla Warfare tactic Rana Pratap restricted his region in
the mountains of Aravali i.e., from north to south, Kumbhalgarh to Rishabdev and from west
to south Mirpur to Satola. The faithful aborigines The Bhils took to field, with Rana Pratap
with their ordinary weapon the Bow and Arrow and huge stones ready to roll upon the
combatant enemy, above and below the Rajputs were posted and on the cliffs and pinnacles
the Bhils. To save the honor of their land against the mighty Mughal army with the strength
of Two Lakh soldiers. There stood the Twenty Two thousand, for the defense of Haldighati
and only eight thousand quitted the field alive.29

Chechen-Russian Conflict

Guerrilla tactics have also been employed in the Chechen-Russian conflict. The
Chechen-Russian conflict is the centuries-long conflict, often armed, between the Russian
(formerly Soviet) government and various Chechen nationalist and Islamist forces. Formal
hostilities date back to 1785, though elements of the conflict can be traced back considerably
further.

The most recent conflict between Chechen and the Russian government took place in
the 1990s. As the Soviet Union disintegrated, the Chechen separatists declared independence
in 1991. By late 1994 the First Chechen War broke out and after two years of fighting the

28
http://guerillawartactics.blogspot.in/2010/08/military-campaign-of-shivaji-against.html (Last Visited on
October 22, 2016).
29
http://udaipurtimes.com/maharana-pratap-the-great-patriot/ (Last Visited on October 22, 2016).

24 | P a g e
Russian forces withdrew from the region. In 1999, the fighting restarted and concluded the
next year with the Russian security forces establishing control over Chechnya.

The Chechens are Muslim people, but the conversion of the country was not complete
until well into the nineteenth century. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, successive
Russian invasions destroyed many of the forests which traditionally sheltered Chechen
guerrillas. The conquest of the North Caucasus area, including Chechnya, took the Russians
most of the first half of nineteenth century. Chechnya was the scene of one of the longest
guerrilla insurgencies of the nineteenth century, out of which arose Shamil Basayev, one of
the great guerrilla commanders of his age. The Chechens experiences of the past two
hundred years have made them in fact one of the great martial peoples of modern history.
Even teenaged boy, for example, is expected to know how to handle weapons.30

After the 1917 Bolshevik coup in Petrograd, the Chechens declared independence.
Betrayed by duplicity, they waged guerrilla war against tremendous odds well into the 1930s
considering the recent wars, the active Chechen fighters probably never exceeded 3,000 at
any one time, while estimates of the number of Russian troops of various types in Chechnya
range from 30,000 to 55,000.31

To confront Russians, the Chechens fighters who were impervious to daily air attacks,
mined or shot up Russian vehicles on their way to Grozny, capital of Chechnya. The Chechen
aim was to inflict sufficient casualties on the Russian forces to turn opinion within Russia
against the conflict. At the first period of war in 1992, Chechen rebels did not resort to more
of guerrilla tactics and relied on conventional warfare tactics. As the battle progressed, they
resorted to guerrilla tactics. They relied on light equipment, including portable anti-tank
weapons, they also used automobiles as platforms for mortar ambushes. Civilians often
guided Russian soldiers through Grozny streets into these ambushes, at which Chechens
excelled. They struck small or exposed enemy positions and then scattered, melting into the
civilian population, or ambushed Russian columns coming to the rescue. Their mobility also
enabled them to concentrate quickly several fighting groups for big attacks, even regimental-
sized ones. The insurgents usually sought out the enemy, even when outnumbered. Chechen
fighters would hug Russian forces, staying close to them to neutralize Russian artillery and
airpower. The Chechens sent out fast moving hunter groups to attack tanks and planted

30
Anthony Joes, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, p.no: 133 (2007).
31
Id. at 134.

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antitank mines everywhere. The Chechens liked to fight at night. The Chechens taste for
night fighting and the deadliness of their snipers filled Russian soldiers with constant dread.32

Later, after the Second Chechnya war, Russians occupied and took control if
Chechnya and the Chechens had to withdraw to the mountainous areas of the country. The
Chechen rebels have continued their struggle in the form of guerrilla warfare. Forced
disappearances and torture had been commonplace in the region from 2000 to 2005. Hostage-
taking, abductions, assassinations, and other types of terror had plagued Chechnya. There had
been attempts to bring out a ceasefire agreements. Occasional bombing and ambushes still
persist throughout the North Caucasus.33

Anglo-Irish War

The Irish War of Independence or Anglo-Irish War was a guerrilla war fought from
1919 to 1921 between the Irish Republican Army (the army of the Irish Republic) and the
British security forces in Ireland. It was an escalation of the Irish revolutionary period into
armed conflict. The Anglo-Irish war was a typically guerrilla war. It followed what we now
perceive as a predictable pattern. Attacks on RIC patrols in order to acquire arms and
ammunition, attacks on RIC barracks obliging the paramilitary police to withdraw from the
area, the establishment of flying columns originally brought together for individual
operations against the enemy, the original company based columns were afterwards stood
down. With men forced to go on the run, they formed permanent company flying columns.
The preferred size of the column was around twenty to thirty men.34 When fighting on its
terms, this permanent small mobile army which consisted of experienced fighters was able to
take on equal and superior numerical forces and defeat them. These flying columns drove the
British from the country side back into the towns and cities. At night these garrisoned towns
were isolated from other British garrisons. The IRA then made probing assaults, often taking
over these towns for several hours, opening fire on police and army barracks before
withdrawing.35

The problem that beset the British was where a flying column came from before the
action and where it went afterwards.36 The guerrilla tactics carried out by the IRA kept the

32
Id. at 143.
33
Ali Askerov, Historical Dictionary of the Chechen Conflict, p.no: 201 (2016).
34
Joseph McKenna, Guerrilla Warfare in the Irish War of Independence, 1919-1921, p.no: 116 (2011).
35
Id. at 117.
36
Id. at 118.

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British forces under a perpetual nervous strain. This type of warfare was beyond anything
they had previously experienced. For the most part they were men who had fought in the
trenches. Their thinking was trench-warfare thinking. The British forces, army and
paramilitaries were permanently on the back foot.37

The Palestinian Guerrilla Warfare

The Palestinian guerrilla warfare of the 1960s induced a sense of achievement

amongst the Palestinians, mobilized Arab support for the cause, and raised the Palestinian
homeland issues to international priority on the Arab agenda. However, while utilizing the
host countries and the populace base were generally a tactical success in the short-run, it
became strategically crippling for the guerrillas in the long-run. Throughout the period,
strategic relationships between host countries and host populations were simultaneously vital
and debilitating for the Palestinian guerrillas. The Six-Day War served to destroy the faith in
the conventional Arab armies and bolster the credibility of the guerrillas, promoting a policy
of incrementalism of which remnants are still visible today. Yet, whether due to the
movements dependence on the whims of the populace or Arab politics, these guerrillas were
unable to effectively enact a national cohesion or centralization of fighting force. The guerilla
warfare of the 1960s has relevant implications for todays conflict in the Middle East. Formal
wars between the Arab-Israeli states have been replaced by a continuing pattern of
asymmetric warfare between states, in the form of attritive conflicts, and wars between states
and non-state actors. The guerrilla campaign of yesterday has transformed into asymmetric
low-level intensity war of attrition that will continue as long as it is rewarded by Israeli
concessions and supported across the Arab world.38

The main appeal of guerrilla warfare in the 1960s was the quick fix it provided in
promoting strategic goals and garnering international attention. Leaders of the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO), for example, considered terrorism to be a straightforward
strategy with a high success rate. Publicized guerrilla operations induced a sense of
achievement among Palestinians, mobilized Arab support for the cause, and raised the
Palestinian homeland issues to international priority on the Arab agenda. At the same time,
Palestinian political groups adopted guerrilla warfare because it was the best they could do
militarily. The plan was to utilize the population itself by instituting a peoples war,
37
Id. at 121.
38
http://jessicasnapper.com/strategic-thinking-behind-palestinian-guerrilla-warfare-in-the-1960s/ (Last Visited
on October 22, 2016).

27 | P a g e
following the examples of other successful guerrilla movements. The plan was to begin with
hit-and-run cross-border raids, gradually building up to a more advanced level of combat:
larger units, the transfer of bases to enemy territory, the seizure of demarcated zones, and
finally an enactment of the enemys utter collapse.39

Ugandan Civil War

The Ugandan Bush War (also known as the Luwero War, the Ugandan civil war or
the Resistance War) refers to the guerrilla war waged between 1981 and 1986 in Uganda by
the National Resistance Army (NRA) against the government of Milton Obote, and later that
of Tito Okello. Yoweri Musevini, a politician who like Obote had spent many years in
Tanzania in the 1970s, and who had been active in the war against Idi Amin, rejected the
election results and started a guerrilla war. His group became known as the National
Resistance Movement and its army, the National Resistance Army. Basing itself to the north-
west of Kampala in the district of Luwero, the NRA quickly became adept at guerrilla
warfare. It hit Obotes army with ambushes and surprise attacks, organized a network of
information and support at village level through what were called resistance committees,
and provoked Obotes army into vicious counter insurgency operations, further alienating the
population from the government, and simultaneously building its own support. The young,
poorly disciplined, and ill-trained troops of Obotes army were increasingly no match for the
highly organizes, mobile guerrilla fighters. In January 1986, the NRA captured Kampala, and
Yoweri Museveni became Ugandas new President.40

ISIS and Guerrilla Warfare

ISIS seeks to create an Islamic Emirate extending across Iraq and Syria, meaning it
has a territorial objective. This vision is also expansionist, and more importantly it is
implemented through military conquest not solely through terrorist tactics. ISIS is a military
network because ISISs grand strategy depends upon military superiority to control Sunni
populated terrains by overcoming state security. We should however note that the ISIS style
of warfare combines and hybridizes terrorism, guerilla warfare, and conventional warfare.41

Fusion of guerrilla warfare, with its almost singular focus on efforts to take and hold land and
simultaneously to win the hearts and minds, of the populace by means of terrorism. While
39
Ibid.
40
Ian Leggett, Uganda, p.no: 25 (2001).
41
http://www.academia.edu/7632564/ISIS_MILITARY_STRATEGY (Last Visited on October 22, 2016).

28 | P a g e
the use of terror by guerrilla organizations is neither a new nor original idea, the wide-spread,
systematic, and seemingly predominant use of terror as a pacification method seems to be a
watershed event in the modern terrorism experience.42 ISIS is at heart a guerrilla army that
43
has recently captured large stocks of modern and heavy weaponry. Outnumbered and
outgunned, the jihadists who have held Tikrit since June 2014 have been resorting to guerrilla
tactics to disrupt the governments advance and are using urban warfare and snipers.44

Chindit Guerrilla Warfare

The Nagas and the Meiteis had played a crucial role in the Burma Front (1942-45)
against the Japanese assault during World War II. In 1942, the famous Chindit guerrilla force
was formed by the legendary British Major General Wingate, who had vast experience in
unconventional warfare in Sudan, against Italian forces in Ethiopia during World War II, and
against the Arab forces in the Middle East. The Chindits comprised of English forces mostly
from the north of England, Burmese forces made up of the Kachins and the Karens, and
Naga, Manipuri and Mizo forces, who provided local intelligence. These forces comprised of
300 strong individual units of an overall force of 20,000 men led by Wingate. In December
1942, these 300 units launched the Arakan offensive against the Japanese forces in Burma
crossing the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy rivers. This joint training and experience in the
Burma jungles and their successes in thwarting the Japanese immensely influenced the
Nagas, Mizos and Manipuris. Phizo, the leader of the Naga movement had himself fought
alongside the British in the Naga areas and in Burma. Interestingly, the KNU formed in 1947
and the 1961 Kachin insurgency in Myanmar largely grew out of their World War II
experience. Thus, the sophistication of their jungle warfare skills and organizational
capability greatly influenced the North Eastern armed groups. Subsequently, the KNU and
KIO became one of the most ardent trainers of groups like NSCN (IM), NSCN (K), UNLF
and the ULFA, charging Rs.100, 000 per head for training in guerrilla warfare. 45

42
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-richard-chasdi/alqaeda-30-fusion-of
terr_b_5923264.html?ir=India&adsSiteOverride=in (Last Visited on October 22, 2016).
43
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/17/opinion/bronk-isis-guerillas/ (Last Visited on October 22, 2016).
44
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/192085 (Last Visited on October 22, 2016).
45
http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/EnlistingMyanmarshelpintacklingNorthEastGuerrillas_NGoswami_
180209 (Last Visited on October 22, 2016).

29 | P a g e
Laden and Guerrilla Warfare

Question: Is Osama bin Laden just an evil person or is he a thoughtful, determined adversary
with a well-planned strategy?

Osama bin Laden, was a mujahedeen fighter in the Soviet Afghanistan War, became familiar
with Maos protracted guerrilla concept, and he later proclaimed its significance in
developing his Jihad warfare strategy. In his words

..Nevertheless, it must be obvious to you that, due to the imbalance of power between
our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted
i.e. using fast moving light forces that work under complete secrecy. In other word to
initiate a guerrilla war46

On the morning of September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists (with strong ties to Al Qaeda),
on four separate planes, slaughtered almost 3000 civilians at the World Trade Center and at
the Pentagon (9/11 Attacks). The above given statements are made by the leader of those
terrorist LADEN.

By using different criminological theories and comparing their actions, this aims to
take a comparative look at ideologies of Osama-bin-Laden and his pathways into crime and
terrorism. Recent terrorist attacks and threats have elevated the publics fear. Catastrophic
occurrences, such as the 9/11 attacks, highlight a need to apply criminological explanations to
the perpetrators behaviour in a bid to stop future attacks.

Osama bin Laden was an international terrorist, religious extremist, and founder of the
radical jihad organization Al Qaeda. A devout Sunni Muslim, as a student bin Laden was
devoted to religious study, and after graduating used his wealth to fund religious resistance
fighters in the Soviet War in Afghanistan. The organizations he founded helped to supply
arms, resources and training to militant religious factions in Saudi territory. When the Saudi
Arabian government sanctioned the deployment of U.S. troops on Saudi soil, bin Laden
spoke out vocally against his own country and was eventually banished to Sudan where he
continued to grow his resources and fund jihad. After his organization failed an assassination
attempt and was exiled from Sudan, he returned to Afghanistan and declared war on the
United States with a fatwa entitled the Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying

46
Osama bin Laden and Guerrilla War, DON D. CHIPMAN, Studies In Conflict & Terrorism Vol. 26 , Iss.
3,2003

30 | P a g e
the Land of the Two Holy Places. He began a series of coordinated attacks on the U.S.
embassies in East African cities and many other international sites until his war crimes
culminated with the World Trade Center attacks. In the United States bin Laden became
public enemy number one, and was wanted internationally for his violent attacks on unarmed
civilians

Bin Ladens stated political goals and his attacks were the obvious signs of an
organized war effort. Similar to other military campaigns, his Al Qaeda combatants received
orders, planned their tactics, and carried out their attacks, all within a designated guerrilla
strategy. The initial shots of this war were fired in 1996 against the Americans in Khobar
Towers, then against the U.S. embassies in Africa, and later against the USS Cole. The
second round came on September 11. This guerrilla war is being organized and run by a cold
blooded strategist, Osama bin Laden, who in the fall of 2001 was using Afghanistan as a
sanctuary. Because this is a complex war and not an emergency, it requires, as U.S. Army
General Tommy Franks noted, an effective, thoughtful strategy with not only boots on the
ground, but more importantly it requires eyes on the ground.47

Bin Ladens blend of Ambitious and fearless personality patterns suggests the
presence of Millions unprincipled narcissist48 syndrome. This composite character
complex combines the narcissists arrogant sense of self-worth, exploitative indifference to
the welfare of others, and grandiose expectation of special recognition with the antisocial
personalitys self aggrandizement, deficient social conscience, and disregard for the rights of
others

However, among most Muslims, bin Laden is not a man of destiny. According to the Wall
Street Journal, after an initial wave of support following the September 11attacks, Arab
opinion began changing. The quick and overwhelming U.S. and Northern Alliance victories
in Afghanistan and the rapid fall of the Taliban quickly dampened Osamas support.
America, which was seen as unable to secure a definitive victory over its foes, was
suddenly viewed in a more positive light. In part, this sentiment changed because many Arabs
did not want to back a loser. In general, noted one journalist, most Middle Easterners see the

47
Personal interview with U.S. Army General Tommy R. Franks, Commander, Central Command (8 April
2002), and U.S. Army General Tommy R. Franks, presentation to USAF Air Command and Staff College, Air
University, Montgomery, Alabama (8 April 2002).
48
Narcissistic personality disorder and the DSM-V, journal of abnormal psychology 2010 American
psychological association, Joshua d. Miller, university of Georgia, http://wkeithcampbell.com
;4.04AM,9/18/2016

31 | P a g e
Taliban and Al Qaeda organizations as an introverted-suicidal version of Islamic doctrine and
this has caused deep psychological scars of pain, despair, and fury among Arabs and
Muslims.49

Bin Laden wanted to provoke a clash between West and Middle East cultures by initiating a
guerrilla war. But in the end, it was Muslim citizens who undermined his efforts. It was
Northern Alliance soldiers, Hamid Karzais rebels, and Pakistans leaders that helped ensure
that bin Laden and his Al Qaeda forces were on the run. Hopefully, bin Laden does not have
easy access to any nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. If he does not, then he must
continue his dedicated guerrilla warfare strategy by conducting isolated bombing attacks and
assassination attempts. Ultimately, commented Peter Bergen, Bin Laden tried to provoke a
clash of civilizations, and it turned out to be a huge dud.50

World War and Guerilla Warfare51

World War I to World War II

In World War I the most spectacular theater of guerrilla operations was the Arabian
Peninsula, where, under the leadership of T. E. Lawrence and Faisal al-Husayn (later Faisal
I), various Arab guerrilla bands fought superior Turkish forces. In the late 1920s and 30s the
Chinese Communists under the leadership of Mao Zedong, perhaps the world's leading
theorist of modern guerrilla warfare, conducted a large-scale guerrilla war, along with mobile
and positional warfare, against both the Kuomintang and the Japanese in N China. Mao saw
the People's War, as he called it, progressing from minor skirmishing to a conventional
conflict as he led the Communists to victory.

Guerrilla tactics, aided by the development of the long-range portable radio and the
use of aircraft as a means of supply, reached new heights in World War II. The Germans
failed to establish a complete hold on Yugoslavia because of the guerrilla resistance, which
was led by the Communist partisan leader Tito and supplied in part by Allied airdrops. In the
Soviet Union guerrilla warfare was included in instruction at the military academy; in the

49
Yaroslav Trofimov, Arab Opinions Softens Amid Afghan Blitz, Wall Street Journal, 26 November 2001, p.
A10.
50
Peter L. Bergen Terrorisms CEO, The Atlantic Online January 2002), available at (9
(http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/interviews/)
51
The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th ed. Copyright 2012, Columbia University Press, Accessed on
13/10/2016.

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field it was so brilliantly organized that it constituted a continual threat to the German rear
and contributed greatly to the German disaster on the Eastern Front.

In Western Europe the Allies organized guerrilla forces in France, Norway, Denmark,
Holland, Belgium, Italy, and Greece. These forces (known collectively as the underground
and, in France, as the maquis) were supplied by Allied airdrops and coordinated from London
by radio. The resistance forces in Western Europe, led mainly by British- and American-
trained officers, conducted not only guerrilla operations but also industrial
sabotage, espionage, propaganda campaigns, and the organization of escape routes for Allied
prisoners of war.

By the end of World War II resistance forces had played a major role in the defeat of
Germany. Throughout the war the United States and Britain also carried on guerrilla warfare
in the Philippines and Southeast Asia, and in China large-scale guerrilla operations were
conducted against the Japanese by both Communists and Nationalists.

Since World War II

Since World War II guerrilla warfare has been employed by nationalist groups to
overthrow colonialism, by dissidents to launch civil wars, and by Communist and Western
powers in the cold war. There have been dozens of such conflicts.

Just after World War II large-scale guerrilla warfare broke out in Indochina between
the French and the Communist Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap. After
the French defeat at Dienbienphu (1945), France withdrew from the conflict; but the
1954 Geneva Conference brought no permanent peace, and Communist guerrilla activity
continued in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. In the subsequent Vietnam War the United
States fought in support of the South Vietnamese government against local guerrillas (Viet
Cong) aided by North Vietnamese troops. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge waged guerrilla
warfare to win control of the nation and, after being ousted by the Vietnamese army, again
resorted to it until the group's disintegration (1999).

In Algeria guerrilla warfare against the French was begun by the nationalists in 1954
and conducted with ever-increasing violence until Algeria won its independence in 1961.
Greek nationalists in Cyprus carried on guerrilla warfare against the British from 1954 until
that country gained independence in 1959. Fidel Castro and Ernesto (Che) Guevara in 1956
launched a guerrilla war in Cuba against the government of Fulgencio Batista; in 1959,

33 | P a g e
Batista fled the country and Castro assumed control. This success gave encouragement to
rebel guerrilla bands throughout Latin America. In 1967, Guevara was killed by the Bolivian
army while leading such a rebel band in the jungles of Bolivia.

In the late 1960s, Palestinian Arab guerrillas intensified their activities against the
state of Israel. In 1971, after a full-scale war with the Jordanian army, they were ousted from
their bases in Jordan. However, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and other groups
continued their raids on Israel from other Arab countries. After the PLO was forced to leave
Lebanon (1982, 1991) its fighters were again dispersed, but it continued to mount attacks
until peace negotiations in the early 1990s. Since the late 1980s, terrorism-long an element in
conflict and a hallmark of many Hamas attacks-and other tactics (see Intifada) have
increasingly marked the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The United States has sponsored guerrillas, most notably anti-Castro Cuban forces
and Nicaraguan contras. Modern urban guerrilla activities such as hijacking
and kidnapping are frequently inspired by ideology rather than patriotism and are often tinged
with elements of terrorism. The Irish Republican Army (late 1960s to mid-1990s) and
Peru's Shining Path engaged in both attacks on government forces and various forms of
terrorism. Since the 1990s many nations experienced some degree of ongoing societal
disruption due to persistent unconventional warfare, among them Afghanistan, Algeria,
Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Turkey (in Kurdish areas).

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 CHAPTER IV

CHARACTERISTICS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

There are certain characteristics to best understand the Guerrillas and Guerrilla warfare. They
are:52

The revolutionary-guerrilla believes he is living in a society which is repressive,

corrupt, decadent, rotten, and dying, and therefore he owes it absolutely no
allegiance. This is the fundamental factor underlying his thinking and action.
The revolutionary-guerrilla is motivated by a revolutionary kinship to what he calls
the struggle of liberation in the so-called third world. This means that he believes
himself not alone but part of a world-wide revolutionary movement aimed at the
destruction of the imperialist, voracious beast.
The revolutionary-guerrilla conceives of himself as an armed guerrilla inside our
society and, since he feels part of an international guerrilla viewpoint, he seeks the
guidance, inspiration, and assistance of foreign guerrilla movements.
The revolutionary-guerrilla believes in violence directed against the society he so
bitterly detests. This violence is not to be postponed in the hope of some type of
revolution in the distant future but should come now, by taking this position, he
rejects all types of reform within the structure of democratic society.
He is as a general rule rather youthful, more of an activist than a thinker, highly
arrogant in his opinions. Almost invariably he has been influenced.

Guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare. They are
but one step in the total war, one aspect of the revolutionary struggle. They are the inevitable
result of the clash between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach the limits of their
endurance.53 Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon
that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful
aggressor nation. When the invader pierces deep into the heart of the weaker country and
occupies her territory in a cruel and oppressive manner, there is no doubt that conditions of
terrain, climate, and society in general offer obstacles to his progress and may be used to

52
John Edgar Hoover, The Revolutionary-Guerrilla Attacks Law Enforcement and Democratic Society: An
Analysis of the Destructive Power of the Fanatical Few, 35 Albany Law Review 613, 617 (1971).
53
Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 41 (1937).

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advantage by those who oppose him. In guerrilla warfare we turn these advantages to the
purpose of resisting and defeating the enemy. During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas
gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the
regular army. Thus the regularly organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that
status and those who have not reached that level of development combine to form the military
power of a national revolutionary war. There can be no doubt that the ultimate result of this
will be victory.54

To be an effective a guerrilla fighter must have a good knowledge of the surrounding

countryside the paths of entry and escape, the possibilities of speedy maneuver, and good
hiding places. A fundamental characteristic of a guerrilla is mobility. How fast and
effectively can teams move from point A to point B and then back again. Guerrillas never
engage in frontal head-to-head confrontations against enemy forces. Guerrilla actions are
designed to keep enemy leaders confused so that they must constantly rethink strategies and
change plans. Aggressive actions cannot endure for long, but must be rapid; there must be of
a high degree of effectiveness, lasting only a few minutes, and be followed by an immediate
withdrawal.55

Strategy and Tactics Of Guerrilla Warfare

There are certain peculiarities in their strategic, tactical and operational approach to
combat. First, to guerrillas, the terms front and rear are applicable only to the enemy. As
such, they see no benefit in capturing territory, but prefer to accomplish their goals of
destroying the enemy by way of physical and mental attrition through combat and
psychological warfare. In addition, while a guerrilla necessarily must maintain some method
of supply and communication with a coordinating command, the methods used to achieve
these ends are far less formal than with a conventional force.56

Second, in an effort to avoid a disastrous application of the enemys superior

firepower, guerrillas endeavor to disperse in the face of concentration. This is at variance
with conventional strategic thinking, since military forces generally seek out enemy
concentrations in an effort to close and destroy them. Guerrilla action reverses the normal
practise of warfare, strategically by seeking to avoid battle and tactically by evading any

54
Id. at 42.
55
http://www.assatashakur.org/forum/guerrilla-warfare-tactic-technique-survival/5580-guerrilla-warfare-
tactics.html (Last visited on October 20, 2016).
56
Supra note 5 at 126.

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engagement where it is likely to suffer losses. On the other hand, while they seek to avoid
strength, guerrillas aspire to concentrate against weakness. While any competent military
planner would necessarily agree with this concept, for the guerrillas, it is the only option they
have. A conventional force can viably go head to head with a superior enemy army and
gain victory. For the guerrillas, however, such an engagement only invites substantial loss of
invaluable personnel and equipment. The end result of this doctrine, therefore, is probably
best termed hit and run, where the guerrillas will attempt to attack a weak enemy
formation, and then disperse before retaliatory firepower or a rescue detachment reaches the
area.57

Third, in places where a conventional army would find difficult terrain, an unfriendly
environment, and a weak national infrastructure, the guerrilla sees opportunities. The areas
that are difficult to reach offer the beginning guerrilla movement a refuge and a location to
set up hospitals, training centers, supply dumps, propaganda mills. They also restrict the
enemys mobility and hamper his ability to locate the guerrillas and mass firepower against
him. This offers the guerrillas an opportunity to isolate and annihilate small enemy
detachments sent on reconnaissance missions. However, such areas do have a drawback for
the guerrillas when the force becomes proficient enough to warrant an engagement, then the
guerrillas must move closer to the enemy, and away from any support structures they have
developed.58

The fourth major difference is logistics. For the guerrillas, most of their supplies must
come from any of three sources: the enemy; the population; or outside assistance. The first of
these is highly important and the most reliable since the guerrillas can plan to use low risk
combat opportunities as a means of collecting supplies. Besides, often the enemy is the only
source for specialized military weapons such as explosives and light machine guns. The
second source, the population, as will be discussed in detail below, is essential to the very
survivability of a guerrilla movement. The third, on the other hand, is the least reliable since
the guerrillas have little direct impact on another nations decision to assist their efforts, and
the dependability of the support is always subject to external political forces. Although the
differences discussed above are significant, the fifth and sixth are the most fundamental, and
form the keys to successful guerrilla warfare, fifth, popular support and sixth, mobility.
Concerning the former, any military organizations operations would be facilitated by

57
Id. at 127.
58
Id. at 128.

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cooperation from the population. However, the guerrillas need more than passive cooperation
there must be a fair proportion of the population who will give them active and willing
assistance.59

The fundamental tactics of Guerrilla warfare are completely different from that of
conventional military warfare, but that doesnt mean that it is any less effective. In military
language, tactics are the practical methods of achieving the grand strategic objectives
winning the war. The tactics of Guerrilla warfare does not require soldiers willing to die in
every battle nor does it require that every attack should result in enemy kills. That may sound
completely backwards to a conventional soldier, but the successfulness of Guerrilla warfare
become clear when its characteristics are closely examined. Guerrilla warfare is a repeated
Hit and Run style of combat designed to confuse and disrupt enemy operations. The enemy
soldier in a zone of operations should not to be allowed to sleep, rest or organize. The enemy
should always feel that they are surrounded. Continued disruptions can be very demoralizing
to an enemy force. Five or six well-trained guerrilla soldiers can cause enemy units ten times
larger to retreat in haste.60

The Maoist Theory of Peoples War of china divided the Guerilla warfare into three
phases. In first phase, the guerrillas have to earn the support of population by spreading party
line and hitting the organs of government. In Phase Two, escalating attacks are launched
against the governments military forces and vital institutions. In Phase Three, conventional
warfare and fighting are used to seize cities, overthrow the government, and assume control
of the country. Maos doctrine anticipated that circumstances may require shifting between
phases in either directions and that the phases may not be uniform and evenly paced
throughout the countryside. Mao Zedongs seminal work, On Guerrilla Warfare, has been
widely distributed and applied most successfully in Vietnam, by military leader and theorist
Vo Nguyen Giap, whose Peoples War, Peoples Army closely follows the Maoist three-
phase approach, but emphasizing flexibility in shifting between guerrilla warfare and a
spontaneous General Uprising of the population in conjunction with guerrilla forces. Some
authors have stressed this interchangeability of phases inherent in this model and guerrilla
warfare more generally, especially as applied by the North Vietnamese guerrilla

59
Id. at 129.
60
Id. at 130.

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TYPES OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS

61

TYPES OF ATTACKS

The following are the types of attacks made by the guerrillas against law enforcements:62

(1) Bomb attacks against police stations.

(2) The bombing of police vehicles.

(3) The setting of ambushes.

(4) Deliberate sniper attacks.

61
Main Force 274 Regiment versus 11th Armored cav. Reference- US Army: John A. Cash, John Albright, and
Allan W. Sandstrum: "Seven Firefights in Vietnam: CONVOY AMBUSH ON HIGHWAY 1, 21 NOVEMBER
1966," US Army, Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms Research Library, United States Army
Center of Military History: Vietnam Studies, (DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
1985),http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/7-ff/Ch2.htm self-created diagram. (Accessed on 11/8/2016)
62
Supra note 8 at 627.

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(5) Expropriations, that is, where extremists commit a robbery, burglary, or other crime for
the purpose of obtaining funds for revolutionary purposes.

(6) Theft of weapons from government arsenals or private gun shops which can later be used
against the police.

(7) Revolutionary kidnapping of court personnel.

(8) On-the-street physical confrontations with the police which often result in serious injuries
to police personnel, reducing manpower available for protection of the community.

(9) The threat of assassination of police and others in authority.

(10) harassment of police officers and members of their families; for example, making
anonymous and threatening phone calls to their homes, publication in the radical press of the
names, home addresses, and telephone numbers of officers, making false charges against
officers, chalking obscene graffiti on the property or in the neighborhood of the officers
home uncomplimentary cartoons of officers in underground papers.

Civil War Guerilla Leaders

During the Civil War, groups of so-called partisan rangers engaged in bloody
campaigns of guerrilla attacks, raiding and psychological warfare against rival military units
and civilians. These units had tenuous ties to the regular Confederate and Union Armies and
were led by men who often operated outside the recognized rules of warfare. Meet six
guerrilla leaders whos unconventional-and often barbaric-tactics played a major role in the
Civil War.

1. William C. Quantrill

One of the Civil Wars most infamous figures, William Quantrill spent most of his early
life as a schoolteacher and gambler. Shortly after war broke out; Quantrill assembled a ragtag
band of guerrillas and began harassing and killing Union forces and sympathizers along the
Missouri-Kansas border. His exploits earned him the rank of captain from the Confederate
Army, but he was also labeled an outlaw by the Union, which viewed his unconventional
tactics as illegal and even murderous.

40 | P a g e
 Quantrills most brutal attack came in 1863 when he led 450 guerrillas on a raid on the
Union stronghold of Lawrence, Kansas. In one of the wars great atrocities, Quantrill and his
men burned the town and executed some 200 men. Union forces responded by burning four
nearby Missouri counties and driving the citizens off their land. In the confusion that
followed, Quantrills raiders disbanded and formed smaller guerrilla units in Texas and
Oklahoma. His forces now weakened, Quantrill continued to operate outside of the
Confederate Army, which had withdrawn support following his attack on Lawrence. In 1864
Quantrill briefly assembled a band of soldiers with the intention of riding east and
assassinating President Abraham Lincoln, but he abandoned the idea after recognizing the
strength of Union defenses. Undeterred, Quantrill continued his bloody raids against Union
troops well into 1865, when he was killed in Kentucky after suffering a gunshot wound to the
chest.

2. Willium T. Anderson

Later known as Bloody Bill because of his cold-blooded acts against Union
soldiers, William T. Anderson entered the Civil War with a well-established outlaw
reputation, having already murdered a judge who had killed his father over accusations of
horse theft. Known for his brash behavior and piercing eyes, Anderson took up with William
Quantrills raiders in 1863 and soon began leading attacks against Union forces. When one of
his sisters was captured by U.S. soldiers and then killed in an accidental building collapse,
Andersons dislike for the Union intensified into pathological hatred. He is known to have
personally executed several people during William Quantrills raid on Lawrence, Kansas, and
his units savage tactics reportedly included cutting off enemies ears, decapitation and
scalping. In 1864 Andersons band-which included famed outlaw Jesse James-attacked a train
in Centralia, Missouri, and butchered 22 unarmed Union soldiers. When Union troops were
sent in pursuit, Andersons outfit-dressed in stolen Federal uniforms-ambushed them and
slaughtered another 120 men. Desperate to put a stop to Andersons bloodshed, the Union
Army eventually raised a small militia to hunt him down. In October of 1864, Andersons
unit was trapped and outnumbered in Missouri, and Bloody Bill was killed when he tried to
charge the Union troops.

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 3. James H. Lane

James Lane was one of the most famous members of the Jayhawkers, a group of pro-Union
partisans who operated in Kansas before and during the Civil War. A career politician, Lane
was elected as one of Kansas first U.S. senators in 1861, but he quickly left the safety of
Washington, D.C., and returned to the field. There, he organized fighting units to help combat
Confederate bushwhackers who were terrorizing the Missouri-Kansas border. Known as the
Grim Chieftain, Lane was as calculating a military leader as he was a politician. In 1861 he
orchestrated the sacking of Osceola, Missouri, in which the town was burned and nine
residents were executed. The attack-which was not authorized by the Union-drew the ire of
Confederate guerrilla leaders like William Quantrill, who began to target Lane in raids on
Union positions. Worried that Lanes activities were only serving to galvanize the opposition,
in 1862 the Union cancelled his command. Lane continued to play a vital role in the war
effort and later made history when he independently organized the 1st Kansas Volunteer
Infantry, the first unit of black soldiers to serve in combat during the Civil War.

4. John Mosby

One of the Civil Wars legendary figures, John Mosby was a Confederate colonel
whose hit and run style of warfare earned him the nickname the Gray Ghost. Mosby first
entered the war as a private and soon impressed his superiors with his skill at gathering
intelligence on Union troop movements. In 1863 J.E.B. Stuart and Robert E. Lee gave Mosby
command of a small cavalry unit and unleashed him in central Virginia, where he began
tormenting Union positions. A true guerrilla force, Mosbys small posse was known for
carrying out blistering attacks on Union outfits and destroying rail lines and bridges before
scattering into the woods and blending with the civilian population. Rather than meeting its
enemies in open battle, Mosbys unit would often slip behind Union lines under cover of
darkness and capture soldiers and supplies. In one infamous raid in Fairfax County, Virginia,
Mosbys Rangers crept around Union defenses and proceeded to capture 30 soldiers, 50
horses and several officers without ever firing a shot. According to his memoirs, Mosby
personally captured General Edwin H. Stoughton by waking him from his bed with a slap to
the back. Mosby continued to operate with impunity in Virginia until the end of the war; the

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regions he haunted became known as Mosbys Confederacy. When Robert E. Lee
surrendered in 1865, Mosby disbanded his unit and returned to civilian life. In a startling
move that proved controversial in the South, he went on to join Lincolns Republican party
and serve in Ulysses S. Grants presidential administration as the United States consul to
Hong Kong.

5. Charles Jennison

An ardent abolitionist, Charles Jennison first gained notoriety in the late 1850s as a
prominent Jayhawker-the moniker assigned to a collection of militant antislavery guerrillas
in Kansas. At the outset of the Civil War, Jennison organized a small Union force and began
waging war on Confederate bushwhackers in Missouri. As ruthless as he was principled,
Jennison adopted a scorched earth policy of warfare that included razing and looting
homesteads that appeared to support Confederate guerrillas. By 1862 Jennisons attacks had
become increasingly indiscriminate-his men were known to rob and gun down Union as well
as Confederate sympathizers-and martial law was declared in Kansas. Jennison briefly retired
after this controversial period, but he would return to the war in 1863 following William
Quantrills raid on Lawrence, Kansas. He served until the end of the conflict, at which point
he was court-martialed for plundering and discharged from the army. He left military service
with a polarizing reputation but went on to serve for several years in the Kansas state
legislature.

6. John McNeill

Along with John Mosby, John McNeill was one of the most effective Confederate
guerrillas on the Civil Wars eastern front. A native of modern-day West Virginia, he was the
leader of McNeills Rangers, a small force of roughly 200 men that used guerrilla tactics to
wreak havoc on Union operations in western Virginia. McNeill made effective use of his
small fighting force by screening Confederate troop movements and scavenging supplies. He
also proved a thorn in the side of the Union Army with his constant raids on wagon trains and
railroads. His most famous exploit involved the disruption of the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad, a key Union supply line running through western Virginia. The Rangers
successfully burned B&O machine shops in Piedmont, West Virginia, and even destroyed a

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bridge, forcing the Union to divert almost 25,000 troops to protect the railroad from
McNeills handful of men. McNeill was killed in 1864 after a raid on Union troops, but his
Rangers continued to operate until the end of the war, and even made an excursion into
Maryland to capture Union officers.

SUN T ZU ON GUERRILLA WARFARE

Sun Tzu was an ancient Chinese military general, strategist and philosopher, who is
believed to have written the famous ancient Chinese book on military strategy, The Art of
War. Through his legends and the influential The Art of War, Sun Tzu had a significant
impact on Chinese and Asian history and culture. The book drew immense popularity during
the 19th and 20th centuries when the Western Society saw its practical use. The famous
military treatise, The Art of War written by Sun Tzu depicts a philosophy of war for
managing conflicts and winning battles.63

Sun Tzu in The Art of War, says, Be sure of victory by attacking the undefended, Oh,
subtlety of subtleties! Without form! Oh, mystery of mysteries! Without sound! He is master
of his enemys fate.64

The above verse has been extracted for the Chapter Empty and Full in his book. The
above principles refer to the form of guerrilla tactics. One of the tactics adopted by guerrillas
is to attack the undefended. By attacking the undefended, the rate of success in casualities or
doing damage is high. Next, the guerrillas move stealthily without sound and it becomes a
mystery for the enemy to track where the guerrilla came from and where he went. The subtle
nature of guerrillas is a nightmare to the enemy.

Sun Tzu says, I am concentrated into one; He is divided into ten. I am ten to his one
Many against Few, and adds Attack few with many. And my opponent will be weak. 65

The above principles also depict the nature of guerrillas. Generally guerrillas combat
in small numbers against large group of enemies. This is one of the fine features of guerrillas
as few soldiers overthrow large group of enemies making them weak.

63
http://www.thefamouspeople.com/profiles/sun-tzu-261.php (Last visited on October 10, 2016)
64
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, p.no: 31 (2002).
65
Id. at p.no: 33.

44 | P a g e
 Sun Tzu answers to the question, How should we confront numerous and well
arrayed, poised to attack?, my reply is seize something he cherishes, and he will do your
will, and says, Speed is the essence of war. Exploit the enemys unpreparedness; Attack
him unawares; Take an unexpected route.66

This has been extracted from the Chapter Nine Kinds of Ground. The above
principles also describe the main characteristics of guerrillas. Guerrillas generally attack
numerous and well arrayed enemies in order to have more casualties and to loot the arms,
ammunition etc. By this the enemies will be left with irreparable losses. Another main
characteristic that can be attributed to guerrillas is their speed and swift actions. Guerrillas
hasty movements surprises the enemy and this helps the guerrillas to attack the unprepared
enemy.

The above are certain principles said by Sun Tzu in Art of War, which have relation
with guerrilla tactics.

CHE GUEVERA ON GUERRILLA WARFARE

Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara formulated his principles of guerrilla warfare from
1956 to 1958 during the revolt against President Fulgencio Batista. The war, which
contributed to the fall of Batistas regime, helped install Fidel Castro as El Presidente.67

Che-Guevara was born Ernesto Guevara de la Serna on June 14, 1928, to an

aristocratic family in Rosario, Argentina. Years later, Cuban revolutionaries in Mexico g:.ve
him the nickname Che a word from the Guaran Indians that is commonly used in
Argentina and can be roughly translated as hey you. In 1959, after the triumph of the
Cuban Revolution, he became a Cuban citizen and legality adopted Che as part of his name.

Che-Guevara had answered the question Why does the guerrilla fighter fight? and
concluded that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that he takes up arms responding to
the angry protest of the people against their oppressors, and that he fights in order to change
the social system that keeps all his unarmed brothers in ignominy and misery.

This is also known as FOCO theory given by Che Guevara. In the 1960s, the Marxist
revolutionary Che Guevara developed the FOCO (Spanish: foquismo) theory of revolution in

66
Id. at p.no: 76.
67
Che Guevara and Guerrilla Warfare: Training for Todays Nonlinear Battlefields Captain Steve Lewis, US
Army.

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his book Guerrilla Warfare, based on his experiences during the 1959 Cuban Revolution.
This theory was later formalized as focalism by Rgis Debray. Its central principle is that
vanguardism by cadres of small, fast-moving paramilitary groups can provide a focus for
popular discontent against a sitting regime, and thereby lead a general insurrection. Although
the original approach was to mobilize and launch attacks from rural areas, many FOCO ideas
were adapted into urban guerrilla warfare movements.

Characteristic of Guerilla Movement By Che-Guevara

Guerrilla warfare principles are part of the Marxist dogma to which many insurgent
organizations adhere68. Because US forces might face similar situations in the future, it is
important for commanders to study such tactics in order to be successful on nonlinear,
changing battlefields. Although not considered a strategic military genius, Guevaras
effective, realistic principles served him well. They included mobility, movement by night,
careful use of ammunition (supplies), flexibility, careful study of the ground and surprise and
fury.69

1. Mobility

The fundamental characteristic of a guerrilla band is mobility. Mobility is the ability to

move vehicles, soldiers and equipment rapidly with relative freedom. Guevaras plan was
to strike and move freely, avoiding detection. Mobility complemented surprise and
flexibility. The guerrillas did not become comfortable or get tied to certain areas. They
had to stay one step ahead of government forces. Their mobility put a constant strain on
government forces, which had to spread their assets thin.

2. Movement by Night

Movement by night, another important characteristic of the guerrilla band, includes road
marches, convoys, reconnaissance, and emplacement of operational bases, resupply
activities, rehearsals and attacks. Guevara believed his guerrillas knew the ground better
than did government forces. Therefore, they would have more success while operating at
night against government forces whose garrison attitude kept them safely indoors during
the night. Guerrillas were free to move forces, conduct surveillance, attack with surprise

68
Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1985).
69
Supra 66

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then withdraw into the night, contributing to the impression that they were everywhere
and could attack at any time.

3. Careful Use of Supplies

The care which must be taken of ammunition and the method of using it are further
characteristics of guerrilla warfare.6 All armies have restrictions on available supplies,
the care and management of which can contribute significantly to any operations
outcome. For example wasteful movement of unneeded supplies can detract from a battle
in the same way as can the absence of needed supplies. Supply bases or depots are also
high-payoff targets. Ammunition was Guevaras most critical supply item. It was only
available from government forces, and it was quickly expended. Food, clothing and
shelter were available from the local population, and weapons, taken from the
government or guerrilla dead, had long, useful lives if properly maintained. But only
small amounts of ammunition were available. Guevara trained his soldiers to fire only at
certain targets and to never waste ammunition. Fire discipline and marksmanship were
critical.

4. Flexibility

Another fundamental characteristic of the guerrilla soldier is his flexibility, his ability to
adapt himself to all circumstances and to convert to his service all the accidents of the
actions. Flexibility is the ability to adapt to changing circumstances to take advantage of
change. Guerrilla armies are usually forced to limit their operations to targets of
opportunity early in their campaigns. This requires flexibility and the ability to take
advantage of an unguarded government asset or military target.

5. Careful study of the Ground

Guerrilla-defended positions, when they have been selected on the basis of a careful study
of the ground, are invulnerable. The value of reconnaissance and preparation, map
reconnaissance, terrain walks, rehearsals, familiarity with the patterns of the enemy and
the local population and a relationship with the local population cannot be overstated.
Guerrilla forces usually are familiar with the people and the terrain in which they operate.
The most useful aspect of a study of the ground is recognizing patterns. Most large
organizations, especially military organizations, fall into patterns of conduct. Convoys
leave and arrive; guards change shifts; and units receive supplies. Patterns can tell how

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 long it takes a unit to react to an enemy attack and what weapons it will use. Guevaras
guerrillas familiarity with the area allowed them to always have the most reliable
information.

6. Surprise and Fury

The form of attack of a guerrilla army is also different; starting with surprise and fury,
irresistible, it suddenly converts itself into total passivity.10 Surprise is doing the
unexpected and doing it rapidly an action that gives no indication or warning when it
begins or when it will end. However, surprise cannot be accomplished without mobility
and flexibility. Also, movement at night increases flexibility and contributes to surprise.

BOOK: Guerrilla Warfare By Che-Guevara

A Guerilla Warfare is a manual written by Ernesto Che Guevara to instruct the

reader in the proper method to wage a guerilla war against a non-communist regime. Che
discusses all of the main aspects of guerilla warfare in this text and tries to take his
experience in Cuba and then to generalize from that experience to gather general principles
that he can impart to the would-be revolutionary.70

The book is divided into three chapters each with several sub-sections. The first
chapter focuses on the general principles of guerilla warfare including an abstract discussion
of the social role of the guerilla fighter and the role he plays in the global communist
revolution. In this chapter Che discusses the general strategies and tactics that the guerilla
will employ as well as a discussion of the types of territory that will be more or less favorable
to conduct guerilla war.

Chapter 2 focuses on the organization and structure of the guerilla band itself. An
important idea in this chapter and throughout the entire book is the idea of the guerilla as a
social reformer who takes the subjective conditions of revolution and then objectifies them
through his action. The proper role of doctors, women, and training is discussed in this
chapter. Also discussed are some technical details about how to make guerilla camps and
how to convert shotguns in to Molotov Cocktail launchers.71

70
Guerrilla Warfare :Che Guevara ,Introduction to the Bison Books Edition by Mare Beeker
71
Ibid 68

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 Chapter 3 deals with the organization of the guerilla war along its primary front
against the enemy. The basic guerilla strategy is to progressively mover further and further
out from the guerillas natural base, converting captured zones into new home bases. To this
end, the guerilla must concentrate on indoctrinating the peasant population in the right way to
gain support for the revolutionary cause. Other important topics discussed in this chapter
include the proper techniques and goals of sabotage and the use and importance of
propaganda. Towards the end of the chapter, the organization of the guerilla army itself is
also discussed.72

In the appendices, Che deals with the problem of organizing a guerilla band at the
beginning of the revolution and the opposite problem of defending the revolutionary
government once power has been achieved by the guerilla war. The first problem requires
absolute secrecy and the organization of a small nucleus or cell of men that can then
transition into a guerilla army. The second problem involves the consolidation of power and
the defense of revolutionary institutions against counter-revolutionary forces. The key at the
outset of the defense of the revolution is to eliminate and overhaul all of the old institutions
of the previous regime, most importantly the old army. In the Epilogue, Che describes how
the Cuban revolutionary forces did seize power and how they began to reform the institutions
of Cuban society. The book ends with a kind of call to arms to other Latin American
revolutionaries asking them to join the revolutionary struggle.

72
Ibid68.

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 CHAPTER V

INTERNATIONAL LAW ON GUERRILLA WARFARE

The Hague Convention of 1907, on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the
Geneva Conventions of 1929 on Prisoners of War, and the Wounded and Sick, and the
Geneva (Red Cross) Conventions of 1949 provide for certain rules in irregular, partisan, or
guerrilla, i.e. unconventional warfare situation. Thus international law under these
Conventions extends protection to participants in unconventional warfare. This protection has
been stated very succinctly and quite comprehensively, thus unconventional warfare is
governed by international law. In the context of the cold war, it must be considered in relation
to both international and internal wars. In international war, volunteers are lawful as are
troops belonging to an authority not recognized by the enemy. Guerrillas are lawful
combatants if they belong to an organized resistance movement to a party to the conflict, are
commanded by persons responsible for their subordinates, wearing fixed distinctive signs,
carry their arms openly, and obey the laws and customs of war. In countering guerrilla
activity, reprisals, may not be used against prisoners of war or civilians in occupied territory.
Hostages may not generally be taken. If inhabitants in guerrilla areas are deported, their
welfare must be safeguarded. Captured lawful combatants can only be sentenced by a
competent tribunal. In occupied territory, the death penalty against an unlawful combatant is
only possible if the pre-occupation law of that territory allowed it. Espionage, sabotage,
corruption and propaganda may be employed in war. In civil and colonial wars both sides
must obey the code laid down in Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.73

The legal status of guerrillas under the international law of war traditionally has been
divided into two categories: (1) partisans, who wore the uniform of their army, and (2)
intermittent combatants, who did not act under commission and wore no uniforms. Those
captured personnel qualifying for the first category were entitled to all the privileges of
prisoner of war. However, those who fell outside its definition and in the latter category, were
to be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates, receiving none of the privileges of a
recognized combatant.74

73
Supra note 3 at 467.
74
Supra note 5 at 148.

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 Article 44 does however put obligations on the belligerent employing guerilla tactics.
A minimum requirement for the combatants to be recognized as lawful combatants and thus
in event of capture having the right to be treated as prisoners of war, is that they during
military engagements and in deployments proceedings such, carry their arms openly. Further
the guerilla combatant is bound by the general rules of the laws of war. This implies amongst
others, that they are required in their operations not to direct their attacks against protected
persons or objectives that they have to treat captured enemy soldiers according to the rules on
treatment of prisoners of war etc. Also they are required not to involve their own civilians in
a way which would make them legal objectives of attack to the enemy forces. This obligation
gives rise to a problem as far as there is no natural or pure distinction between combatants
and non combatants in guerilla warfare. For instance, any member of the population can
participate in military operations as long as the requirements in Article 44 are met. The point
is that the operations must not be launched in a way giving rise to enemy operations against
bodies of civilians not at the time engaged in hostile operations. A problem arising from the
nature of the guerilla belligerent is the taking and treatment of prisoners. Guerilla forces often
lack the facilities necessary to protect and treat prisoners according to the regulations of
international law. Naturally such difficulties cannot free the party from the legal obligations
to treat prisoners as laid down in international law. The question of whether a person qualifies
for the status of prisoner of war may give rise to doubt. This question will normally arise in
relation to a given person who, because of his action is liable to punishment for criminal
offences. The determination of his status will in this case be the answer to whether his actions
are criminal offences or not. The competent jurisdiction will therefore be the tribunal at
which he is at trial. The prosecution will in advance give an opinion as to his status. Only
when the military authorities are of the opinion that the person does not qualify for the status
of prisoner of war charges will be held against the person. Until otherwise is determined by a
tribunal, the person will be granted status of prisoner of war according to Article 47,
paragraph 2.75

The status of civilians in a conflict involving guerilla warfare is often in fact difficult
although it legally is not different from other armed conflicts. They have the same right to
protection and also the same obligation to refrain from hostile activities as in any other
conflict governed by the laws of war. Difficulties arise from the fact that in conflicts

75
Hans Petter Graver, Armed Forces and the Development of the Law of War, 21 Military Law and the Law of
War Review 181, 185 (1982).

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involving guerilla warfare the civilians often support the guerilla in way of shelter, supplies
information and even directly by armed actions. As long as the support given by the
population is not hostility towards the enemy, they enjoy the full rights of protection from
attack or actions by the enemy forces. However, even the mere sheltering and supplying food
to friendly guerilla forces could easily be judged as hostile actions towards the enemy. Such
actions do not, however, empower the enemy to attack civilians, individuals or the population
as such, or deny the responsible persons a due process of trail. Likewise, attacks against the
civilians by way of reprisals are under all circumstances prohibited.76

Any regular soldier who commits acts pertaining to belligerence in civilian clothes
loses his privileges and is no longer a lawful combatant. Unlawful or illegal combatants thus
either be members of resistance, guerrilla movements, or which is nowadays often the case
terrorists, all of whom do not fulfill the conditions of lawful combatants. Regular forces of
belligerents may include militia or volunteer corps; The Hague Regulations and Geneva
Convention all recognize that such units may be incorporated in the regular forces as they are
considered as lawful combatants.

Guerrillas emphasize that they abide by the rules of the Law of War and it is their
enemy who violates them. There has been a gradual erosion of the concepts of freedom
fighter or member of resistance, guerrilla or terrorist movements. The term chosen sometimes
merely indicates the attitudes of the beholder, or indeed, who was finally successful. The
Protocols of 1977 afford protection to both resistance movements and to guerrilla action
insofar as members of both these types of forces will have the status of lawful belligerents, on
certain conditions and therefore qualify for prisoner of war status. It appears possible to
comply with the provisions on combatant status under protocols of 1977 without significantly
reducing the protection of civilians. Protocol I of 1977 affords no protection for terrorists, nor
does it authorize soldier to conduct military operations disguised as civilians. In practice it is
obviously difficult to identify terrorists and distinguish them from lawful combatants, surely
members of resistance and guerrilla movements often use precisely terrorist tactics and could
easily be subsumed under a terrorist concept by their adversary. However, Protocol I does
give members of force operation in occupied territory an incentive to distinguish themselves
from civilians when preparing to carry out an attack.77

76
Id. at 186.
77
Ingrid Detter, The Law of War, p.no: 159 (2013).

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 In R. v. Allen,78 the Court of Kings Bench Division of Ireland confronted the issue of
the justiciability of extremely repressive military action during a period of martial law in
Ireland. Although Allen has been regarded as a definitive analysis of military and executive
powers during martial law, the pleadings of the military and the reasoning of Chief Justice
Molony offer highly persuasive authority concerning the parameters of executive discretion
in dealing with urban guerillas. In Allen the court declined jurisdiction to intervene so as to
prevent a military court from executing a person found in possession of arms. The military
argued, inter alia, that the court did not have jurisdiction and that the exercise of martial law
powers, durante bello, was not justifiable. The key issue in Allen was characterized by Chief
Justice Molony to be: What are the powers of the Executive Government in dealing with
armed insurrection? although the court was also prepared to examine whether, in fact, a state
of war existed justifying martial law. After carefully reviewing the history of insurrection
from the fourteenth century, Molony noted that the traditional approach had been to use
severe repressive measures, including the suspension of habeas corpus, and to protect the
military and executive from judicial review post durante bello by the vehicle of Indemnity
Acts. The Chief Justice observed that none of these Acts had contemplated either courts-
martial or death sentences. However, Molony distinguished all prior armed insurrections on
the factual basis that the then extant insurrection consisted exclusively of warfare of a
guerilla character. It was noted that guerillas did not wear uniforms and often were posing as
peaceful citizens. As long as guerilla warfare of this type continued, the Chief Justice was of
the opinion that the Government is entitled and, indeed, bound to repel force by force, and
thereby put down the insurrection and restore public order. Moreover, precedents which had
emphasized the justiciability of martial law powers while the ordinary courts were still open
were distinguished: It may, however, be doubted whether they contemplated such a system of
guerilla warfare as now described. The military derived both its sole justification and
authority from the existence of rebellion and also the duty of doing whatever may be
necessary to quell it, and to restore peace and order. The death sentence for possession of
arms was, in the opinion of the military and of the court, absolutely essential. The court,
therefore, accepted that which in modem parlance would be termed an argument of
operational necessity. In essence guerilla warfare was deemed to create a broader and more
repressive category of necessity, namely operational necessity, emanating from the military

78
(1921) 2 I.R. 241.

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commander and beyond the oversight of both due process of law and judicial review at an
appellate level.

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 CHAPTER V

TERRORISM AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

The guerrilla fighters war is political and social, his means are at least as political
as they are military, his purpose almost entirely so. Thus we may paraphrase
Clausewitz: Guerrilla war is the extension of politics by means of armed conflict.

: Emphasis in original; Taber (1972: 26)

Politically motivated and justified version of state violence. Terrorism is use of

violence and intimidation in pursuit of political aims.79 Contemporary terrorism has plethora
of meaning since it has no universally accepted definition. I would like to call the early
twenty-first century as period of brutalization. Prominent uses of coercive forces were
considered as weapons of self defense and safe haven.

Insurgency is protracted political-military activity which is directed towards

controlling the countrys resources through the irregular military forces and illegal political
organization.80Insurgency today is becoming a part of conflicts between the states. And they
are more competent in getting overseas hands. Stages of insurgency in contemporary world
are Guerrilla warfare, semi-conventional warfare (terrorism & Sabotage) and Conventional
warfare.

The middle of the 18th century and the increase of violence between powers brought
with it a new form of small force fighting, what the French termed la petite guerre which
later became the Spanish guerilla. Due to the rising lethality of weaponry, and the
utilization of formation warfare, the need for external forces to harass opposition forces
evolved the guerilla fighter. While detested as not a form of war, but rather a manifestation
of criminality, the usefulness of guerilla warfare proved fruitful in fighting and turning the
tide in many battles.

Terrorists have become accustomed to claiming that they are engaged in guerrilla
warfare. It is true that there are some resemblances between terrorists and guerrillas; but
guerrillas do not behave like terrorists. To put the matter more accurately, the distinction

79
Oxford dictionary, Definition of Terrorism.
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english/terrorism (accessed October 23, 2016)
80
05-JAN-2009, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency.
http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/insurgency.pdf (accessed October 23, 2016)

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drawn above between terrorism and the activities of certain revolutionary groups enables us
to draw a useful distinction between guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Some of the groups that
have engaged in guerrilla warfare have also engaged in terrorism, while others have not.
Guerrilla warfare is characterized by small-scale, unconventional, limited actions carried out
by irregular forces against regular military forces, their supply lines, and communications.
This has been the meaning of the term since its first use by the Spanish and Portuguese
guerrilleros who joined the Duke of Wellingtons forces during their Iberian campaigns
against the French, blocking roads, intercepting couriers and convoys, and waging various
forms of warfare against them. American colonists formed guerrilla bands to fight the
redcoats during the Revolution. During the American Civil War, guerrillas under the
command of John Mosby harassed the Union Army in Virginia. During World War II,
guerrilla groups, sometimes called partisans, devoted themselves to the destruction of
German communications, blowing up trains and trucks, and killing an estimated 250,000
German soldiers.81

It has been suggested that terrorism is one of the tactics of guerrilla warfare. But on
closer analysis, it turns out that the terrorism to which reference is made consists of
assassinations of military and political leaders, sneak attacks on military installations, and
other actions designed to weaken and destroy the morale of the enemy. This is different from
the indiscriminate killing of civilians that is the hallmark of terrorism as defined herein.
Guerrilla warfare has certain fairly well-defined characteristics. Despite the fact that some of
those characteristics are shared in common with present-day terrorists, others are not and
should be perceived as essential differences between them. To broaden the meaning of every
term that refers to irregular armed forces so that it will encompass both those who fight
honorably against the armies of enemy regimes and those which attempt to overthrow them
by attacks on the weak and the defenseless is to debase and cheapen our language, to obscure
thought, to render clear analysis and meaningful moral judgment impossible. The word
guerrilla should be reserved for those irregular forces which operate against regular military
machines and against those who are actively collaborating with the enemy during wartime
(e.g., spies, saboteurs, and informers). The word terrorist, however, applies to persons and
groups engaged in irregular activities that are directed against civilians and other non-military
targets. This distinction cannot always be rigidly maintained in practice. Some guerrillas may

81
Burton M. Leiser, Terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare, and International Morality, 12 Stanford Journal of
International Studies 39, 45 (1977).

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slip over into terrorist activities, and some terrorists may engage in more conventional
guerrilla operations. However, no useful purpose is served by treating similar terms whose
denotations overlap as if they were synonyms. This merely compounds confusion.82

82
Id. at 46.

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 CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

Guerrilla warfare is a form of irregular warfare in which a small group of combatants

such as paramilitary personnel, armed civilians or irregulars use military tactics including
ambushes, sabotage, raids, petty warfare, hit-and-run tactics, and mobility to fight a larger
and less-mobile traditional military. Guerrilla warfare has often been thought to involve
particularly perfidious methods of warfare. Guerrilla war is characterized by certain tactics
not often used in other warfare.

The tactics which are used by the guerrillas will be driven by the organization,
support, and equipment which is available. During Phase I, the guerrillas will concentrate on
small attacks against isolated units and supply facilities in an attempt to obtain supplies and
equipment. As more supplies and equipment become available, and the size of the guerrilla
force expands, the guerrillas will enter Phase II, and begin to attack larger enemy facilities
and units. When the guerrilla organization is of sufficient size and strength, and possess
adequate supplies and equipment, the guerrillas will enter Phase III, form conventional
fighting units, and engage the enemy in a more conventional style.

Guerrilla warfare has been used throughout history and some of the successful
campaigns have been led in Vietnam War, Chechen-Russian conflict, Ugandan Civil war,
American Civil wars etc.

While there is no question but that numerous provisions of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions have been violated in many of the armed conflicts which have occurred since
their adoption and that they have not always been accorded the respect which they deserve,
there has been compliance with some, and sometimes many, of their provisions in all such
conflicts, and compliance with substantially all of their provisions in some conflicts. Even in
a conflict such as that between Iran and Iraq, where there is only minimal compliance, the
fact that both sides have, from time to time, permitted the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) to function and to visit prisoner-of-war camps may be attributed to those
Conventions. Moreover, many of the points of special concern expressed by both of those
countries to the Mission dispatched by the Secretary-General of the United Nations were
based upon the standards of the Conventions. Under these circumstances they can scarcely be
termed moribund.

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 There is a confusion regarding the legal recognition of Guerrillas. So a specific
arrangement shall be done to rectify this as the guerrilla tactics are still being used in the
modern warfare. International aspects shall be taken into consideration for the recognition of
guerrillas. Even though in modern warfare, they are not adopting guerrilla tactics directly as it
was before, now they are being a part of warfare. So there is a necessity to protect the
guerrillas on par with belligerents and other lawful combatants.

We must come to the inevitable conclusion that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that
he takes up arms responding to the angry protest of the people against their oppressors, and
that he fights in order to change the social system that keeps all his unarmed brothers in
ignominy and misery as stated by Ernesto Che Guevera.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
STATUTES

Geneva Convention, 1949.

Hague Convention, 1907.

BOOKS

Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Translated by John Milford), 2002, Penguin Group, London, UK.
Ingrid Detter, The Law of War, 3rd Edition (2013), Ashgate Publishing Limited, Surrey,
England.
Subrata Mukherjee, Sushila Ramaswamy, Mao Zedong: His thoughts and Works, 1998, Deep
and Deep Publications, New Delhi.
Anthony Joes, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, 2007, The University Press of Kentucky, Kentucky.
Ali Askerov, Historical Dictionary of the Chechen Conflict, 2016, Rowman and Littlefield,
London, UK.
Joseph McKenna, Guerrilla Warfare in the Irish War of Independence, 1919-1921, 2011,
McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers, North Carolina.
Ian Leggett, Uganda, 1st Edition (2002), Oxfam GB, United Kingdom.

ARTICLES

Judge Guillermo S. Santos, The Rule of Law in Unconventional Warfare, 40

Philippine Law Journal 455 (1965).
Lieutenant Commander Kenneth B. Brown, Counter-Guerrilla Operations: Does the
Law of War Proscribe Success? 44 Naval Law Review 123 (1997).

F. Kalshoven, The Position of Guerrilla Fighters under the Law of War, 11 Military
Law and the Law of War Review 55 (1972).
John Edgar Hoover, The Revolutionary-Guerrilla Attacks Law Enforcement and
Democratic Society: An Analysis of the Destructive Power of the Fanatical Few, 35
Albany Law Review 613 (1971).
Hans Petter Graver, Armed Forces and the Development of the Law of War, 21
Military Law and the Law of War Review 181 (1982).
Burton M. Leiser, Terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare, and International Morality, 12
Stanford Journal of International Studies 39 (1977).

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WEBSITES

http://home.heinonline.org/ (Last visited on October 10, 2016).

http://www.merriam-webster.com/ (Last visited on October 10, 2016).
http://www.assatashakur.org/ (Last visited on October 20, 2016).
http://www.pbs.org/ (Last Visited on October 22, 2016).
http://www.civilwar.org/ (Last Visited on October 22, 2016).
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ (Last Visited on October 22, 2016).

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