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1. Zialcita et al vs Philippine Airlines, Inc.

FACTS:

Zialcita is a stewardess of PAL. She was fired from work because she had gotten married. PAL argued and cited its
policy that stewardesses must be single. The policy also states that subsequent marriage of a stewardess shall
automatically terminate employment.

Zialcita anchored on Article 136 of the Labor Code. PAL sought refuge from Article 132.

Article 132 provides, "Article 132. Facilities for women. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall establish
standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees. In appropriate cases, he shall, by regulations,
require any employer to: To determine appropriate minimum age and other standards for retirement or termination
in special occupations such as those of flight attendants and the like."

ISSUE:

Whether or not Zialcita’s termination is proper?

LAW:

Article 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly
or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually
dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage."

CASE HISTORY:

This case is decided by the office of the President.

RESOLUTION:

The termination was improper. First of all, during the time Zialcita was terminated, no regulation had yet been
issued by the Secretary of Labor to implement Article 132. Second, even assuming that the Secretary of Labor had
already issued such a regulation and to the effect that stewardesses should remain single, such would be in violation
of Article 136 of the Labor Code.

Article 136's protection of women is broader and more powerful than the regulation provided under Article 132.

OPINION:

a former school teacher in the respondent Kong Hua School.The policy of the Philippines Airlines which states that flight attendant applicant must be single and will be automatically separated from employment in the event that they will subsequently get married is discriminatory and unconstitutional and should not be served as an example to other companies or establishments. NLRC: Dismissed Reyes’ appeal. In view of complications resulting from the delivery of her child. she asked for a leave extension. As stated in her letter: "I wish to get my two months’ vacation salary dated April-May 1982. who had in the meantime fully regained her health. applied for reinstatement. that it was in fact procured by her employer on the promise that she would be given priority for re-employment and in consideration of immediately paying her two months’ vacation which she desperately needed then because she was ill. In connection with this am (sic) tendering my resignation as advised and wished by the administration on conditions that I'll be given priority to be accepted when the time comes when I will be ready to render service to the school. REYES vs NLRC and KONG HUA SCHOOL FACTS: In this petition for certiorari. On September 13. She went on maternity leave effective August 26 up to October 10. ISSUE: Is the petition of Reyes meritorious? LAW: CASE HISTORY: Labor Arbiter: Dismissed the petition of Reyes. assails the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). When the school opened in June 1985. upon the advice of the school principal. 2. dismissing her claim for separation pay. she submitted the following letter of resignation." . the petitioner. RULING: Supreme court ruled in favor of Reyes. Petitioner started teaching in the respondent school in August 1972. 1982. the petitioner. The respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded facts in the records proving that the petitioner's supposed "resignation" was involuntary. 1983. but the school refused to re-hire her.

as well . to the health of her co-employees" nor the kind that would have legally prohibited her continued employment.00 a month which was ultimately increased to P575. Private respondent Sinclitica Candido was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company. she expressed the hope that the school administration "will be true and sincere to their promise. 3. The school must have realized that it could not dismiss the petitioner for health reasons under Art. Article 133(b) of the Labor Code provides: ART.00 to persuade her to quit her job.00 a month. Consequently. which renders the woman unfit for work.00 which was eventually increased to P5. However. on January 17. on May 18. Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4." and that it would release her vacation pay "as soon as possible because I need it very badly. unless she has earned unused leave credits from which such extended leave may be charged. 133(b). Florendo D. . but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work. and. . 1988. . . 1973 to perform laundry services at its staff house located at Masara. The maternity leave shall be extended without pay on account of illness medically certified to arise out of the pregnancy. Asirit. OPINION: The school’s refusal in bad faith to re-employ her despite its promise to do so. even if her service was terminable on account of illness. she was paid on a monthly basis at P250. Her resignation was involuntary. Davao del Norte. the petition is meritorious. She reported the accident to her immediate supervisor Mila de la Rosa and to the personnel officer. she was paid on a piece rate basis. Therefore. she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. 1987. She was permitted to go on leave for medication. while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry. amounted to illegal dismissal. The school had no right to disapprove petitioner's application for an indefinite leave of absence due to illness caused by the delivery of her child and to force her to resign instead. 284 of the Labor Code because apparently her illness was not "prejudicial . Inc. or miscarriage. Maco. abortion. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with her work. In the same letter.000. 1982. she is entitled to be reinstated with three years back wages." These circumstances prove beyond cavil that the petitioner was forced to resign. On December 18. In the beginning. APEX MINING COMPANY vs NLRC FACTS: Is the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a domestic helper or a regular employee of the said firm? This is the novel issue raised in this petition.000. . delivery. De la Rosa offered her the amount of P2.

1990.161. the dispositive part of which reads as follows: “WHEREFORE.289. whether male or female.00 3. 1988. Masara. where-in in due course a decision was rendered by the Fifth Division thereof on July 20. Book 3 of the Labor Code. 13th Month Pay Differential ..30 or in the total of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY ONE PESOS AND 42/100 (P55. After the parties submitted their position papers as required by the labor arbiter assigned to the case on August 24. Davao del Norte. Salary Differential . 4. petitioner appealed to the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). A motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a resolution of the NLRC dated June 29. as amended. Separation Pay (One-month for every year of service [1973-1988]) .P16.1. Not satisfied therewith. to pay the complainant. Emergency Living Allowance . CASE HISTORY: Private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and Employment. ISSUE: Whether or not the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a domestic helper or a regular employee of the said firm? LAW: Under Rule XIII. Conformably With The Foregoing. Apex Mining Company. Section 1(b). judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent.119. petitioner appealed to the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). 1989 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the appealed decision.42). who renders services in and about the employer’s home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof. SO ORDERED.12. where-in in due course a decision was rendered by the Fifth Division thereof on July 20.On March 11. 1990.32.430. and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family.322. the terms “househelper” or “domestic servant” are defined as follows: “The term ‘househelper’ as used herein is synonymous to the term ‘domestic servant’ and shall refer to any person. A motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a resolution of the NLRC dated June 29.”1 Not satisfied therewith. . private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and Employment and got a favorable decision and ordered that APEX Mining should pay the complainant. to wit: 1.25. 1988 the latter rendered a decision. 1989 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the appealed decision. Inc.20 2.

it cannot be considered to extend to the driver. service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer. houseboy. houseboys and other similar househelps. they are employees of the company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee. whether male or female. OPINION: I strongly agree to the decision of the court that the complainant cannot be considered as a “househelper” or “domestic servant” as contemplated under the Labor Code. Book 3 of the Labor Code. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper. like petitioner who attends to the needs of the company’s guest and other persons availing of said facilities. Under Rule XIII. Such definition covers family drivers. and which in the interest of justice. They may not be considered as within the meaning of a “househelper” or “domestic servant” as above-defined by law. the staffhouses and its premises. laundry women. DEL MONTE vs VELASCO . The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer. the difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case. or gardener exclusively working in the company.Hence. as amended. gardeners. domestic servants. By the same token. and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family. She is regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper or domestic servant because she servant is working within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business for its guest or even for its officers and employees. the herein petition for review by certiorari. domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature. whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit. 4. The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a company. RESOLUTION: The petition is devoid of merit. who renders services in and about the employer’s home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof. In such instance. which appopriately should be a special civil action for certiorari. yayas. Section 1(b). the terms “househelper” or “domestic servant” are defined as follows: “The term ‘househelper’ as used herein is synonymous to the term ‘domestic servant’ and shall refer to any person. is hereby treated as such.”3 The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such house-helper or domestic servant who is employed in the employer’s home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family.

the petitioner cannot terminate respondent’s services because in doing so. respondent herein was dismissed by the petitioner Del Monte Philippines due to excessive absences without permission. be violating the Labor Code which prohibits an employer to discharge an employee on account of the latter’s pregnancy. therefore. OPINION: The respondent’s sickness was pregnancy-related and. The respondent’s sickness was pregnancy-related and.FACTS: Lolita M. CA: Affirmed NLRC’s decision favoring Del Monte RULING: Yes. ISSUES: Was Lolita Velasco illegally dismissed on account of her pregnancy? LAW: Art. 1976 as a seasonal employee and was regularized on May 1. Velasco (respondent) started working with Del Monte Philippines (petitioner) on October 21. the petitioner had no legal basis in considering these absences together with her prior infractions as gross and habitual neglect. She also went to see the company doctor for check-up and was advised to rest for four days. The respondent alleged that her absences was due to urinary tract infection. 1977. in effect. petitioner will. dismissal is illegal. therefore. . it must be stressed that respondent’s discharge by reason of absences caused by her pregnancy is covered by the prohibition under the Labor Code. Since her last string of absences is justifiable and had been subsequently explained. Her latest assignment was as Field Laborer. Lolita Velasco. NLRC: Ruled in favor of Velasco. the petitioner cannot terminate respondent’s services because in doing so. be violating the Labor Code which prohibits an employer to discharge an employee on account of the latter’s pregnancy. respondent was pregnant and suffered related illnesses. 135 of the Labor Code CASE HISTORY: Labor Arbiter: Dismissed Velasco’s complaint for lack of merit. The undeniable fact is that during her complained absences in 1994. Again. petitioner will. in effect. pregnancy-borne and that she filed an application for leave to her supervisor.

Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company vs. All of these took place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29. its branch supervisor in Baguio City. private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&T’s policy regarding married women at the time. 1992. .1 Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with petitioner company. before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City. It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10. 1991. She then executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner. sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between the parties. Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29. In her reply letter dated January 17. and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later. Delia M. At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith. private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary employee. 1992.” for a fixed period from November 21. 1991 to August 8. which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose. 1991 vice one C. from June 10. that is. NLRC FACTS: Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever. On September 2. she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. 1990 until April 20. In her reply letter dated January 17. specifically as a “Supernumerary Project Worker. 1991. and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. Thereafter. her services were terminated. After August 8. 1991. 1991 and July 8. coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA).75 of her collections. which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal. she was reminded about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment. 1991. this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. 1991 to July 1. private respondent volunteered the information. In that memorandum. private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&T’s policy regarding married women at the time. coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA). on May 26. Oficial. the probationary period to cover 150 days. 1991.380.F. before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.5. that she had failed to remit the amount of P2. and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. and from July 19. 1992. 1991. private respondent’s services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner. Dizon who went on leave during both periods. Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. 1992. 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy.

the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T. petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of. 136. That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M.”Again. the decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned. with the reminder. RESOLUTION: In the case at bar. who had already gained the status of a regular employee. discharge. it ruled that private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her employer. the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter. afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. was correspondingly ordered. said public respondent upheld the labor arbiter and. and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. discrimination. was her violation of the company’s policy against marriage (“and even told you that married women employees are not . including the order for the reinstatement of private respondent in her employment with PT&T. discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage. in its decision dated April 29. as well as the denial resolution of the latter. plus payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). and the right against. Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated. over and on top of that. Her reinstatement. PT&T. in the termination notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor. the labor arbiter being of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient. 1993. or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married. In all other respects. private respondent was made to understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but. as it was verbally instructed to you. in the words of the latter. hence this special civil action assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and respondent NLRC.” CASE HISTORY: On November 23. Rimando handed down a decision declaring that private respondent. or to actually dismiss. and that it was apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules. However. was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Stipulation against marriage. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent NLRC in its resolution of November 9.—It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married. 1994.ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for violating Article 136 of the Labor Code? LAW: ART. 1994. the branch supervisor of the company. that “you’re fully aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic). Oficial.

6. good customs. but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy. OPINION: I strongly agree to the decision of the Supreme Court that Philippine Telephone Company is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code which gives a right to all women to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment. public order. therefore. so it is claimed. morals. not because the latter got married but because she concealed that fact. and conditions that they may deem convenient. or public policy. Petitioner’s policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment. a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. illegal. or unjustified. PAL argued and cited its policy that stewardesses must be single. terms. Furthermore. ZAMORA vs SY FACTS: Zamora is a stewardess of PAL.applicable [sic] or accepted in our company. bespeaks dishonesty hence the consequent loss of confidence in her which justified her dismissal. the same should not be contrary to law. In other words. with interstitial distinctions. Carried to its logical consequences. she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. Petitioner would asseverate. does have a hollow ring. Verily. but it also assaults good morals and public policy. tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status. . Hence. a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements. which deprives a woman of the freedom to choose her status.”) Parenthetically. perturbs the Court since private respondent may well be minded to claim that the imputation of dishonesty should be the other way around. The policy also states that subsequent marriage of a stewardess shall automatically terminate employment. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employer’s caprices. petitioner’s expostulations that it dismissed private respondent. it may even be said that petitioner’s policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage. it should not be simulated. private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. She was fired from work because she had gotten married. it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper. Her concealment. This improbable reasoning. it nonetheless takes umbrage over the concealment of that fact. In the present controversy. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment. that while it has nothing against marriage. Zialcita anchored on Article 136 of the Labor Code. this seems to be the curious reason why it was made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this case only by its said supervisor and not by its highest ranking officers who would otherwise be solidarily liable with the corporation. PAL sought refuge from Article 132.

" CASE HISTORY: This case is decided by the office of the President. OPINION: The policy of the Philippines Airlines which states that flight attendant applicant must be single and will be automatically separated from employment in the event that they will subsequently get married is discriminatory and unconstitutional and should not be served as an example to other companies or establishments. require any employer to: To determine appropriate minimum age and other standards for retirement or termination in special occupations such as those of flight attendants and the like." ISSUE: Whether or not Zamora’s termination is proper? LAW: Article 136. RESOLUTION: The termination was improper. First of all. Facilities for women. no regulation had yet been issued by the Secretary of Labor to implement Article 132. during the time Zamora was terminated. he shall. 6. In appropriate cases. Second. discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage. such would be in violation of Article 136 of the Labor Code. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married. "Article 132. by regulations. even assuming that the Secretary of Labor had already issued such a regulation and to the effect that stewardesses should remain single. Article 136's protection of women is broader and more powerful than the regulation provided under Article 132. STAR PAPER CORPORATION vs SIMBOL . a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated. or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married. or to actually dismiss. discharge. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees. Stipulation against marriage.Article 132 provides.

Section 3 state our policy towards the protection of labor under the following provisions. Section 18. she was nonetheless dismissed by the company. she later submitted a letter of resignation in exchange for her thirteenth month pay. 1999 but she found out that her name was on-hold at the gate. After he got her pregnant. RULING: The Supreme Court held that the 1987 Constitution under Article II. She refused to sign the memorandum because she was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has not been given a chance to explain. The management asked her to write an explanation. The Civil Code likewise protects labor with the following provisions such as articles 1700 and 1702. 1999. Thus.The Labor Code is the most comprehensive piece of legislation protecting labor. Article XIII. ISSUES: Is the 1995 Policy/Regulation of the company violative of the Constitutional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and of article 136 of the Labor Code? LAW: Article 136 of the Labor Code CASE HISTORY: Labor Arbiter: Ruled in favor of Star Paper Corporation NLRC: Affirmed Labor Arbiters decision CA: Reversed and set aside NLRC’s decision. separation pay and attorney’s fees. Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice. she discovered that he was not separated. after submission of the explanation. or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated. As to respondent Estrella. The memorandum stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. However. She was denied entry. or to actually dismiss.FACTS: According to the respondents. They were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy. she alleges that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuñiga who misrepresented himself as a married but separated man. constructive dismissal. On November 30. discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee . Simbol and Comia allege that they did not resign voluntarily. she met an accident and was advised by the doctor at the Orthopedic Hospital to recuperate for twenty-one (21) days. The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides that it shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married. Due to her urgent need for money. She was directed to proceed to the personnel office where one of the staff handed her a memorandum. She returned to work on December21. she severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy. discharge.

albeit disproportionate. respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job.merely by reason of her marriage. Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia. The SC do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar. There must be a compelling business necessity for which no alternative exists other than the discriminatory practice. The employer has the burden to prove the existence of a reasonable business necessity. Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-employee. viz. but established a permissible exception. then a helper in the cutter-machine. We held that the company policy violates the right against discrimination afforded all women workers under Article 136 of the Labor Code. the employee was dismissed in violation of petitioner’s policy of disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage. To justify a bona fide occupational qualification. such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. the employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employee s right to security of tenure. the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory. then a Sheeting Machine Operator.: A requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a bona fide occupational qualification. . Petitioner’s sole contention that the company did not just want to have two (2) or more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity is lame. but not on the ground of a general principle. the SC applied the two factors to justify a bona fide occupational qualification: Since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification justifies an employer’s no-spouse rule. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company. could be detrimental to its business operations. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol. Decision of the CA affirmed OPINION: The policy of the Starpaper Corporation which states that female applicant must be single and will be automatically separated from employment in the event that they will subsequently get married is discriminatory and unconstitutional and should not be served as an example to other companies or establishments. The cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us that the requirement of reasonableness must be clearly established to uphold the questioned employment policy. where the particular requirements of the job would justify the same. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory. but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. and. That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first paragraph of the questioned rule is evidently not the valid reasonable business necessity required by the law. (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job. It is significant to note that in the case at bar. The burden was successfully discharged in Duncan but not in PT&T. the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved. who married Howard Comia. to Alma Dayrit. but they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. the exception is interpreted strictly and narrowly. In said case. then a Production Helper in the Selecting Department. In denying the contention of the petitioner company. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance. then an employee of the Repacking Section. NLRC. The requirement that a company policy must be reasonable under the circumstances to qualify as a valid exercise of management prerogative was also at issue in the 1997 case of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v. or BFOQ. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without valid justification. effect.

and held. the appellate court struck down said employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil Code. discharge.8. discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage. OPINION: . another employee (electrical engineer) of the company. The company informed her that she was regarded to have resigned her office. or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married. invoked a policy of the firm to consider female employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the moment they get married due to lack of facilities for married women. ISSUE: Whether or not an employer may terminate an employee by reason of marriage. Respondent further claimed that complainant was employed in the project with an oral understanding that her services would be terminated when she gets married. RESOLUTION: No.” CASE HISTORY: The Court of Appeals not only upheld her claim for damages but also awarded exemplary damages. 148 and the Constitution.—It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married. Presidential Decree No. She married Roberto. Olympia filed a claim for compensation. LAW: ART. Gualberto vs Marinduque Mining Corporation FACTS: The company employed plaintiff Olympia Gualberto as a dentist in 1971 while she was still single. in 1972. invoking the firm’s policy that stipulated that female employees were regarded to automatically terminate their employment the moment they got married. or to actually dismiss. 136. a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated. Stipulation against marriage. respondent. inter alia: ‘No employer may require female applicants for jobs to enter into pre-employment arrangements that they would be dismissed once they get married and afterwards expect the Courts to sustain such an agreement. The judgment of the Court of Appeals held that such policy is considered as void a policy. in dismissing from the service the complainant. Branding the policy of the employer as an example of “discriminatory chauvinism” tantamount to denying equal employment opportunities to women simply on account of their sex. In said case.

underpayment of wages. NLRC: Reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. a corporation engaged in the trading business and that she continuously worked with Remington until she was unceremoniously prevented from reporting for work when Remington transferred to a new site.The contention of Marinduque Mining Corporation that they are not allowing female employees in their company because they lack facilities for married women is absurd and their policy is void and unconstitutional. Erlinda alleged that she started working in 1983 as company cook for Remington. not a regular employee. Erlinda worked as a cook and this job had nothing to do with Remington’s business of trading in construction or hardware materials. therefore. respondent could not have been illegally dismissed. vs CASTANEDA FACTS: Erlinda Castaneda instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal. the LA dismissed the complaint and ruled that the respondent was a domestic helper under the personal service of Antonio Tan (the Managing Director). REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP. 9. Section 1(b). ISSUES: Is Castaneda a regular employee or a domestic servant? LAW: Under Rule XIII. but also their policy is against the law. On the issue of illegal dismissal. It posited that Erlinda was a domestic helper. and that the latter did not exercise control over her functions. They also violated. In a Decision. not only the provision of Article 136 of the Labor Code. non-payment of overtime services. before the NLRC-NCR. . Remington denied that it dismissed Erlinda illegally. non-payment of SIL pay and non-payment of 13th month pay against Remington Industrial Sales Corp. steel plates and wire rope products. Book 3 of the Labor Code CASE HISTORY: Labor Arbiter: Ruled in favor of Remington. the labor arbiter found that it was the respondent who refused to go with the family of Antonio Tan when the corporation transferred office and that. finding that her work as a cook was not usually necessary and desirable in the ordinary course of trade and business of the petitioner corporation. morals and public policy.

domestic servants. who caters not only to the needs of Mr. Inc. The criteria are the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper. and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family. Tan and his family. makes her fall squarely within the definition of a regular employee under the doctrine enunciated in the Apex Mining case. laundry women. which is the PRIMARY indicator of the existence of an employer-employee relationship. That she works within company premises. the difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case. gardeners. this Court held that a househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company was a regular employee of the said firm. yayas. houseboys and similar househelpers. Book 3 of the Labor Code. Tan and his family but also to that of the petitioner’s employees. the situs. domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staff house may be similar in nature. they are employees of the company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee. NLRC.” The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is employed in the employer’s home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family. and that she does not cater exclusively to the personal comfort of Mr. In the case at bar. service is being rendered in the staff houses or within the premises of the business of the employer. In Apex Mining Company. as well as the nature of respondent’s work as a cook. Such definition covers family drivers. Section 1(b). Book 3 of the Labor Code. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business. the petitioner itself admits in its position paper that respondent worked at the company premises and her duty was to cook and prepare its employees’ lunch and meribendan. CA: Ruled in favor of Castaneda RULING: She is a REGULAR EMPLOYEE. warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee of the employer and NOT as a mere family househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII. Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned to certain aspects of the business of the employer that such househelper or domestic servant may be considered as such an employee. who renders services in and about the employer’s home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof. whether male or female. Section 1(b). as amended. OPINION: . the terms “househelper” or “domestic servant” are defined as follows: “The term ‘househelper’ as used herein is synonymous to the term ‘domestic servant’ and shall refer to any person. In such instance. as amended. Clearly. v. We ratiocinated that: Under Rule XIII. is reflective of the existence of the petitioner’s right of CONTROL over her functions. The Court finds no merit in making any such distinction. as in its staff houses for its guest or even for its officers and employees. whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit.

PHILAC.Clearly. makes her fall squarely within the definition of a regular employee under the doctrine enunciated in the Apex Mining case. ISSUE: Whether or not Dayag was illegally dismissed and also entitled to be given 15 day salary for the unexpired portion of the contract. Leonora Dayag applied with petitioner Philippine Integrated Labor Assistance Corporation (PHILAC) for employment abroad.500 on five different occasions. 1992 and started working the following day as the domestic helper of Roger Chan Hong’s family. Dayag signed an employment contract with PHILAC providing for a fixed two-year term as a domestic helper/babysitter in Hongkong with a monthly salary HK$3. who caters not only to the needs of Mr. as well as the nature of respondent’s work as a cook. Labor Assistance Corporation vs NLRC FACTS: Dissatisfied with her income as a DSWD social worker.000 (salary and allowance) for the unexpired portion of the contract with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). On January 11.” . Dayag was suddenly told by Mr. 10. Hong’s baby to risks. he or she shall be paid the compensation already earned plus that for fifteen (15) days by way of indemnity. Phil. did not issue complete receipts covering such payments informing Dayag that such receipts are “unnecessary” because the payments were recorded in a log book. Dayag filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. She left for Hongkong on May 7. Upon her return. Hong’s wife to “pack-up” and “leave” at once. After complying with the requirements for overseas employment. 149. neither the employer nor the househelper may terminate the contract before the expiration of the term.—If the period of household service is fixed. LAW: “ART.200 and an allowance of HK$20/day. however. “If the househelper leaves without justifiable reason. She was given HK$750 for the services rendered. PHILAC countered that Dayag’s dismissal was for cause due to “dishonesty” and “misrepresentation” in her application that she was previously employed as a househelper and that she is an experienced baby sitter thereby allegedly exposing Mr. he or she shall forfeit any unpaid salary due him or her not exceeding fifteen (15) days. the situs. illegal exaction for non-issuance of receipts and payment of HK$76. 1992. Tan and his family but also to that of the petitioner’s employees. If the househelper is unjustly dismissed. Indemnity for unjust termination of services. except for a just cause. On the seventh day of her work. Dayag paid a placement fee of P22.

as a settled rule. as the recruiter and agent of the foreign employer.  Hence. The amount is in addition to and not a substitute for the househelper’s salary for the unexpired portion of the contract. Our review of the records failed to convince us that the assailed findings of the agencies below are not supported by substantial evidence. OPINIION: I am saddened by the outcome of this case because Dayag’s counsel overlooked the monetary award and failed to appeal to the POEA and deprives Dayag to have additional affirmative relief constituting the 15-day indemnity award in which the POEA and the NLRC failed to grant.”  The appeal was dismissed. is awarded as a result of the violation of her security of tenure under the contract term Petitioner’s interpretation of the word “payment” under clause 12(b) to refer to the salary for the unexpired portion of the contract is therefore misplaced. Petitioner. is solidarily liable with the latter for such violations and for the corresponding award. considering that Dayag failed to appeal the monetary award given by the POEA. The 15-day salary is awarded in the form of an indemnity due to unjust dismissal. we cannot therefore grant her the additional affirmative relief constituting the 15-day indemnity award which the POEA and the NLRC failed to grant. It is already final considering that PHILAC limited its appeal to the NLRC only on the monetary award. are accorded great respect and even finality if supported by substantial evidence. which in this case is PHILAC.. In any event. as quasi-judicial bodies exercising particular expertise. PHILAC has the burden of proving that the dismissal of Dayag was for a just or lawful cause. ambiguities in a contract are interpreted against the party that caused the ambiguity. this petition imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent NLRC for affirming “the findings of facts and conclusion of the POEA which are not supported by substantial evidence RESOLUTION: The petition has no merit.053. . The salary for the unexpired portion of the contract. Besides. Furthermore. i. findings of facts of the POEA and the NLRC.CASE HISTORY:  The POEA found that Dayag was dismissed without cause and ordered PHILAC to pay her “HK$76.  PHILAC appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but limited its appeal on “the award of salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract.18 or its peso equivalent” for the unexpired portion of the contract. the party that drafted and caused the inclusion of the subject clause. The findings of the POEA that Dayag was dismissed without just cause can no longer be reviewed.16 which burden PHILAC failed to discharge. dismissal without just cause and notice and before the lapse of the contract term. However. The “payment” contemplated by the parties in their contract is more in the concept of a penalty or damages arising from the manner of the dismissal.e.