Review of Global Politics

2011No.36 19-42

The Role of Ocean Strategy in Chinas

Global Layout
Wen-Cheng Lin

Professor of Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies
National Sun Yat-Sen University

/ Abstract

Chinas rise recently seems to have become a phenomenon commonly

acknowledged by the international community, yet experts and observers lack
consensus on the question of whether China is a status quo power. Although the
U.S. has expressed its desire for China to become a responsible stakeholder, it
remains reserved on whether China has already taken up such a constructive
role. In the past few years, East Asian countries, especially Japan, Vietnam and
Philippine, feel great pressure from Chinas strong behavior. Media reports
regarding Chinas delimitation of the South China Sea as its core interest and
the PLAs rigid position regarding the Yellow Sea have caused countries in the
region to become more vigilant of China. As East Asian countries become wary
of Beijings national strategy, especially its ocean strategy, countries in the
region seek to bring in U.S. power to balance China. This article aims to
introduce the goal, experience and current status of Chinas development of
ocean strategy and analyze Chinas ocean strategy in a global context. This
article also examines some challenges China would face in developing sea
power.

Keywords: China, Ocean Strategy, Sea Power, Global Layout

 2011 10 21

2009 3 8 USNS Impeccable

120 12010 7
1
2
ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF
Hillary Clinton
3 9 2011
7 Bali
4 8 10

2001 911

status quo power

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22 Review of Global Politics, No.36, October 2011

stakeholder

2020
5

5
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24 Review of Global Politics, No.36, October 2011

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26 Review of Global Politics, No.36, October 2011

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150 600
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960
13 0.008
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30 Review of Global Politics, No.36, October 2011

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29
30 4 Sovremmenyy-class
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4 1990
(052 )2 (051B )1 I (052B )2
II (052C )3 (051C )2 13
(051 )
28 (053
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2015-2020
31

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132 3.3

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33
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Christopher Yung et al., Chinas Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories,
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33
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26 (Kitty Hawk)
2008 12

2011 11 (Gulf of Aden)
9 2010 3 (the Persian Gulf)
7 8
4
2 3 2 10
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34
(Booz Allen Hamilton)
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32 Review of Global Politics, No.36, October 2011

Gwadar
Hambantota
Chittagong

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35

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Strengthen Military Marine Safety

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36

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ORourke, op. cit., p.38.
36

2001-2003(
) 67-96
 2011 10 33

10
2
Karachi37

2003 11
Gulf of Thailand 200
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38
Rouge
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2001
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37
Pehrson, op. cit., p.4.
38
Ibid.
34 Review of Global Politics, No.36, October 2011

the
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39

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1990 1995 5
1996
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39
Chris Rahman, Chinas Maritime Strategic Agenda, Policy Analysis (April 28, 2010), p.2.
40




41
468
 2011 10 35

State Oceanographic Administration

42

regimes
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15
1992 2
25
1998 6
26

12 24
200 200

42
469-471
36 Review of Global Politics, No.36, October 2011

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4343

GDP 2007
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425-430 () 317-331
49


2003 8
(Royal Dutch/Shell Group)(Unico Oil) 5
()
38 Review of Global Politics, No.36, October 2011

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2+2

50

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40 Review of Global Politics, No.36, October 2011

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HP1500-2 52 2
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 2011 10 41

1840

Alfred Mahan

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42 Review of Global Politics, No.36, October 2011

Lyle Goldstein

---
58

58
Ibid., p.24.