[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.
] social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption
MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.
Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for respondents Williams, Fragante
and Bayan
City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648; DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS. The provisions of
section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under
which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to
promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of
the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily
to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not
the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon
which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national
roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition
of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of
some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists
for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.
2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. Commonwealth Act
No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said
Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit
upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said
law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It
was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety.
Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons
and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but
liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should
achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and, personal discipline, so
that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the
residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of
liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence
of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must
be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society
and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this
petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public
Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as
Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that
animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal
Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from
a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of
the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national
roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal
Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing
at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the
recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn
vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of
the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila
have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of
such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places
above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is
unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is untenable.
As was observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has
nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a
multitude of cases, namely: The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Commrs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as
held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to
an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or
subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
(U.S. v. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the
necessity of the case."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and
streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling or
regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national
roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and
his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which
they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands
but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote
safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the
National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to
any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or
advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the
determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon
which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national
roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition
of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of
some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists
for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As was
said in Lockes Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a
future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is
passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know." The
proper distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can
make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends
to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many
things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power,
and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v.
Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)
In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and
in Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940,
this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to
the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of
governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the
legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the
execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public
interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade
and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed
by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare.
It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety.
Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons
and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but
liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should
achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so
that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the
residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of
liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins v.
Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and
a business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed situation, the growth of population or other
causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good." And in
People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing civilization is bringing within the police power
of the state today things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of
civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part
of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have
brought within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The
promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given
group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization
of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare
of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments
on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers
and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as
a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of
the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to
the greatest number."cralaw virtua1aw library
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.
[G.R. No. 120095. August 5, 1996]
JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then Secretary of the Department of
the Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in his capacity as acting Secretary of
the Department of Labor and Employment and HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The limits of government regulation under the State's Police Power are once again at the vortex of the
instant controversy. Assailed is the government's power to control deployment of female entertainers to Japan
by requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for
overseas employment. By contending that the right to overseas employment, is a property right within the
meaning of the Constitution, petitioners vigorously aver that deprivation thereof allegedly through the onerous
requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause and constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power.
The factual antecedents are undisputed.
Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President Corazon C. Aquino
ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations. The
ban was, however, rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment industry promised to extend full
support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of deployment. In its place, the government,
through the Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently issued Department Order No. 28, creating the
Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training,
testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad.
Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations,[1] the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued
Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists
under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former. Performing artists
successfully hurdling the test, training and certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book
(ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA. Upon request of
the industry, implementation of the process, originally scheduled for April 1, 1994, was moved to October 1,
1994.
Thereafter, the Department of Labor, following the EIAC's recommendation, issued a series of orders
fine-tuning and implementing the new system. Prominent among these orders were the following issuances:
1. Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines on the training, testing, certification and
deployment of performing artists.
2. Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, which could be
processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has passed the required
tests.
3. Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a performing artist ought to receive (not less than
US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions therefrom.
4. Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use of the ARB by returning
performing artists who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special Orientation Program (shorter than the
basic program) although they must pass the academic test.
In Civil Case No. 95-72750, the Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines
(FETMOP), on January 27, 1995 filed a class suit assailing these department orders, principally contending
that said orders 1) violated the constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and
3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP, likewise, averred that the
issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the
constitutional right... to life liberty and property." Said Federation consequently prayed for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders.
On February 2, 1992, JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. and Kary International, Inc., herein
petitioners, filed a Motion for Intervention in said civil case, which was granted by the trial court in an Order
dated 15 February, 1995.
However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners' prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint.
On appeal from the trial court's Order, respondent court, in CA G.R. SP No. 36713 dismissed the
same. Tracing the circumstances which led to the issuance of the ARB requirement and the assailed
Department Order, respondent court concluded that the issuances constituted a valid exercise by the state of
the police power.
We agree.
The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the character of the entire spectrum of public
laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's police power. As an inherent
attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public needs," [2] this "least limitable"[3] of governmental
powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state, as parens patriae gives effect to a host
of its regulatory powers.
Describing the nature and scope of the police power, Justice Malcolm, in the early case of Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro[4] wrote:
"The police power of the State," one court has said...'is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not
inaptly termed 'the law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the state
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.' Carried onward by the
current of legislature, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion,
provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare
or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual." [5]
Thus, police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order
enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order,
particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably.
A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the assailed orders compels
us to rule that the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its issuance
were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.
In 1984, the Philippines emerged as the largest labor sending country in Asia dwarfing the labor export of
countries with mammoth populations such as India and China. According to the National Statistics Office,
this diaspora was augmented annually by over 450,000 documented and clandestine or illegal (undocumented)
workers who left the country for various destinations abroad, lured by higher salaries, better work opportunities
and sometimes better living conditions.
Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who left the country for greener pastures in the last few years,
women composed slightly close to half of those deployed, constituting 47% between 1987-1991, exceeding this
proportion (58%) by the end of 1991,[6] the year former President Aquino instituted the ban on deployment of
performing artists to Japan and other countries as a result of the gruesome death of Filipino entertainer
Maricris Sioson.
It was during the same period that this Court took judicial notice not only of the trend, but also of the fact
that most of our women, a large number employed as domestic helpers and entertainers, worked under
exploitative conditions "marked by physical and personal abuse." [7] Even then, we noted that "[t]he sordid tales
of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by
testimonies of returning workers" compelled "urgent government action."[8]
Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing artists ended
up as prostitutes abroad (many of whom were beaten, drugged and forced into prostitution), and following the
deaths of a number of these women, the government began instituting measures aimed at deploying only those
individuals who met set standards which would qualify them as legitimate performing artists. In spite of these
measures, however, a number of our countrymen have nonetheless fallen victim to unscrupulous recruiters,
ending up as virtual slaves controlled by foreign crime syndicates and forced into jobs other than those
indicated in their employment contracts. Worse, some of our women have been forced into prostitution.
Thus, after a number of inadequate and failed accreditation schemes, the Secretary of Labor issued on
August 16, 1993, D.O. No. 28, establishing the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), the policy
advisory body of DOLE on entertainment industry matters. [9] Acting on the recommendations of the said body,
the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued the assailed orders. These orders embodied EIAC's
Resolution No. 1, which called for guidelines on screening, testing and accrediting performing overseas Filipino
artists. Significantly, as the respondent court noted, petitioners were duly represented in the EIAC, [10] which
gave the recommendations on which the ARB and other requirements were based.
Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance
of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to
"high risk" destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at
the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and
artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the
unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least
lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Moreover, here or abroad, selection of performing artists is usually accomplished by auditions, where
those deemed unfit are usually weeded out through a process which is inherently subjective and vulnerable to
bias and differences in taste. The ARB requirement goes one step further, however, attempting to minimize the
subjectivity of the process by defining the minimum skills required from entertainers and performing artists. As
the Solicitor General observed, this should be easily met by experienced artists possessing merely basic
skills. The tests are aimed at segregating real artists or performers from those passing themselves off as such,
eager to accept any available job and therefore exposing themselves to possible exploitation.
As to the other provisions of Department Order No. 3 questioned by petitioners, we see nothing wrong
with the requirement for document and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-C), a minimum salary scale (D.O. 3-E), or
the requirement for registration of returning performers. The requirement for a venue certificate or other
documents evidencing the place and nature of work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign
employers and helps keep our entertainers away from prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with
unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative practices. Parenthetically, none of these issuances appear to us, by
any stretch of the imagination, even remotely unreasonable or arbitrary. They address a felt need of according
greater protection for an oft-exploited segment of our OCW's. They respond to the industry's demand for
clearer and more practicable rules and guidelines.Many of these provisions were fleshed out following
recommendations by, and after consultations with, the affected sectors and non-government organizations. On
the whole, they are aimed at enhancing the safety and security of entertainers and artists bound for Japan and
other destinations, without stifling the industry's concerns for expansion and growth.
In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend
the fullest protection to our overseas workers. The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section
18 of Article II of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare.
More emphatically, the social justice provision on labor of the 1987 Constitution in its first paragraph
states:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and
social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a
backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce,
local or overseas. As this Court explained in Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI) v. Drilon,[11] in
reference to the recurring problems faced by our overseas workers:
What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and
humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it
cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to
insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from
home.
We now go to petitioners' assertion that the police power cannot, nevertheless, abridge the right of our
performing workers to return to work abroad after having earlier qualified under the old process, because,
having previously been accredited, their accreditation became a property right," protected by the due process
clause. We find this contention untenable.
A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One
cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights,
the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong. [12]
Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade
has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly
when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the
State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in
which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others. [13]
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is certainly much wider.[14] To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process
clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of
various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams
before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. Seamen are required to take tests determining their
seamanship. Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission has began to require previously licensed doctors and
other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken continuing
education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an
unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as Professionals and other workers
meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.
Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to
support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the
freedom to contract. In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, we held that "[t]he non-impairment
clause of the Constitution... must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government."[15] Equally important, into
every contract is read provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the
agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare.
A last point. Petitioners suggest that the singling out of entertainers and performing artists under the assailed
department orders constitutes class legislation which violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. We do
not agree.
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to
operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.[16] We have held, time and again, that the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial differences
having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. [17] If classification is germane to the purpose of
the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification
does not violate the equal protection guarantee.
In the case at bar, the challenged Department Order clearly applies to all performing artists and entertainers
destined for jobs abroad. These orders, we stressed hereinbefore, further the Constitutional mandate requiring
Government to protect our workforce, particularly those who may be prone to abuse and exploitation as they are
beyond the physical reach of government regulatory agencies. The tragic incidents must somehow stop, but short of
absolutely curtailing the right of these performers and entertainers to work abroad, the assailed measures enable our
government to assume a measure of control.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed, petition is hereby DENIED.
A.M. No. P-92-695 December 7, 1994
CYNTHIA A. FLORENDO, complainant,
vs.
EXEQUIEL ENRILE, respondent.
Edgardo G. Villarin for complainant.
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn letter-complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 17 March 1992, the complainant
charged the respondent deputy sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) at Cabanatuan City with
the failure to enforce a writ of demolition notwithstanding his collection and receipt of P5,200.00. She averred
that she was the plaintiff in Civil Cases Nos. 9241 to 9249, all for ejectment, and that in a joint decision
rendered on 22 June 1987 by Branch 2 of the MTCC 1 the defendants were ordered to vacate the premises and
to surrender the possession thereof to the complainant. The defendants appealed this decision to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) which in a joint decision of 18 August 1989 2 affirmed it in toto. On 19 January 1990, the
MTCC issued a writ of execution. 3
The writ was assigned to the respondent for implementation. In view of the refusal of the defendants to vacate
the premises, the complainant asked for the issuance of a writ of demolition, which the court granted pursuant
to its order of 21 March 1990. 4 On 27 June 1990, it denied the defendant's motion for extension of time to
execute the writ of demolition. 5 For the service and implementation of the writ of demolition, the respondent
asked and received from the complainant and her lawyer the total sum of P5,200.00 purportedly as sheriff's
fee. 6 The respondent issued no official receipt for this amount. His acknowledgment of the partial payment of
P2,700.00 appears on the stationery of the complainant's lawyer, Atty. Edgardo G. Villarin, while that for the
other payment of P500.00 is handwritten on the stationery of the Office of the City Legal Officer, who is the
same Atty. Edgardo G. Villarin. The other payment of P2,000.00 was by check drawn by the complainant's
counsel.
The respondent did not execute the writ of demolition despite the receipt of P5,200.00. The complainant's
lawyer then wrote a letter to the respondent on 8 November 1990 demanding that the latter implement the writ
of demolition or return the aforesaid sum within ten days from receipt of the letter, otherwise the matter would
be brought up to this Court. 7 Since nothing was done by the respondent, the complainant filed this complaint.
She asked that the respondent be dismissed from the service.
On 25 May 1992, we required the respondent to comment on the letter-complaint.
In his comment (denominated as an answer) dated 16 June 1992, the respondent did not deny the charge that
he collected P5,200.00 as sheriff's fee; however, he specifically denied the allegation that he did not implement
the writ of execution and the writ of demolition. He claimed that he "returned to the defendants for several times
to advice [sic] them to vacate the said place," but since they did not, he advised the complainant's counsel to
file a motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition. When he received the writ of demolition, he served it on
the defendants on 25 July 1990; the latter requested an extension of thirty days. He then prepared a return of
service dated 25 July 1990. 8 Then, after the expiration of the extended period, he again approached the
defendants on 4 September 1990 to make them vacate the premises. However, he was threatened by them
that if he would enforce the writ of demolition something would happen, i.e., "magkamatayan muna." He then
prepared the return of service on the said date. 9 The writ was thus unsatisfied. It appears, however, that these
returns dated 25 July 1990 and 4 September 1990 were filed with the MTCC only on 29 May 1991 and 6 June
1991, respectively.
He further claimed that on 8 July 1991, Judge Romeo Mauricio of the MTCC referred to Mr. Arsenio S.
Vicencio, Clerk of Court IV and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the MTCC, the respondent's return of service of 4
September 1990 for comment. 10 In his compliance of 15 July 1991, 11 Mr. Vicencio informed Judge Mauricio
that the threat on the respondent's life was "real, and it will be very risky for him to implement" it, and requested
that a new deputy sheriff be assigned to enforce the writ. Pursuant to this request, Judge Mauricio sent a
formal request to the Presiding Judge of Branch I of the MTCC of Cabanatuan City asking that deputy sheriff
Teodoro Pineda be assigned to implement the writ of demolition. 12
This case was referred to the Executive Judge of the RTC in Cabanatuan City for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation dated 4 March 1994, but transmitted to this Court only on 6 June 1994,
Executive Judge Johnson L. Ballutay narrates the several instances that the case was set for hearing and the
postponements thereof because of the respondent's plea for time to secure the services of counsel or because
of his non-appearance. Judge Ballutay recommends:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, and taking into account the stubborn attitude of the respondent
of not engaging the services of counsel to facilitate the early termination of the investigation,
it is respectfully recommended that in addition to the suspension for one (1) year without
pay and to return to the complainant the P5,200.00, a suspension without pay for six (6)
months be imposed upon the respondent.
In the resolution of 8 August 1994, we referred the Report and Recommendation of Judge Ballutay to the Office
of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In its Memorandum of 23 September 1994, the Office of the Court Administrator finds that:
An exhaustive study of the evidence on record shows a considerable amount of Neglect of
Duty on the part of respondent. He should have coordinated with the counsel of the
complainant and/or caused the citation of the defiant defendants for contempt of court when
they resisted the implementation of the writ. Moreover, he should have requested for
additional sheriff and/or police assistance for the proper and immediate implementation of
the subject writs, but he did not. For a long period time, the complainants have been
deprived of their constitutional right to a speedy administration of justice considering that the
Decision sought to be enforced was issued in 1989 yet, all because of the negligence of
herein respondent.
In the case of Active Wood Products, Inc. vs. IAC, 183 SCRA 671, the Court declares that
sheriffs must implement or execute the decision of the court without delay to prevent injury
or damage to the winning party and so as not to prejudice said party of obtaining speedy
justice.
Respondent did not also conduct himself in an upright and professional manner as the
judiciary code of ethics require [sic], particularly in his getting the amount of P5,200.00 in
installment basis from the respondent.
This Court, speaking through Justice Regalado, in the case of Anonuevo vs. Pempena
(Administrative Matter No. P-93-795) promulgated on July 18, 1994, enunciates: "It is an
abhorrent and anomalous practice for a sheriff to demand fees in excess of those lawfully
allowed. This Court has emphasized time and again, that the conduct and behaviour of
everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the
presiding judge to the sheriff down to the lowliest clerk should be circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct at all times, must be characterized with
propriety and decorum, but above all else, must be above and beyond suspicion," for every
employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty (Valenton, et al. vs.
Melgar A.M. No. P-92-698, March 3, 1993, 219 SCRA 372).
It then recommends:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended to the
Honorable Court that respondent be imposed a FINE equivalent to his one (1) month salary
payable within ten (10) days upon notice, taking into account that (a) he was not totally
remiss in his duties but also exerted efforts to execute the writs; (b) he even went to the
extent of approaching the City Mayor for relocation of the defendants; and (c) the
complainant herself is in conformity to the dismissal of the complaint; and (2) to RETURN
the total amount of P5,200.00 to the complainant, without interest, within twenty (20) days
from notice hereof, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.
We do not agree with the penalty recommended by Judge Ballutay or the Office of the Court Administrator.
Both are, especially that of the latter, grossly inadequate in the light of the gravity of the administrative offenses
committed by the respondent. Moreover, the former's recommendation of an additional penalty of suspension
for six months on account of the "stubborn attitude of the respondent of not engaging the services of counsel to
facilitate the early termination of the investigation" is improper. The records disclose that Judge Ballutay was
very accommodating to the parties. No less than fifteen scheduled hearings were cancelled or postponed and
despite admonitions that he would proceed with the hearing regardless of the absence of counsel, he never
did.
Having been delegated by this Court the authority to investigate the case and to submit his report and
recommendation, he should have, upon deliberate failure of the respondent to engage the services of counsel,
allowed the complainant to present ex-parte her evidence and, upon the non-appearance of the respondent on
any of the scheduled dates of hearing, considered him to have waived the presentation of his evidence. As we
see it then, Judge Ballutay is not entirely without blame for the delay in the termination of the investigation of
this case.
It must be stressed that administrative cases involving misconduct, nonfeasance, misfeasance, or malfeasance
in office of officers and employees in the judiciary are of paramount public interest as the respondents are
involved in the administration of justice, a sacred and solemn task. Such cases must be resolved with
reasonable dispatch to clear the name of the innocent and to punish forthwith the guilty whose stay in office,
prolonged by delay, could further tarnish the image of and diminish the public's faith in the judiciary.
We cannot likewise give weight to the circumstances relied upon by the Office of the Court Administrator to
mitigate the respondent's liability. As hereinafter noted, he is guilty of grave misconduct, gross dishonesty,
serious dereliction or neglect of duty, gross inefficiency or incompetence, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. That the complainant "is in conformity to the dismissal of the complaint" can by no
means be considered a mitigating circumstance as it is offensive to the postulate that a complaint for
misconduct, malfeasance, or misfeasance against a public officer or employee cannot just be withdrawn at any
time by the complainant and that the need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the
Government and its agencies and instrumentalities demands the proceedings in such cases should not be
made to depend on the whims and caprices of the complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses
therein. 13 In this case, the conformity of the complainant, found in the motion to dismiss dated 8 February
1994 14 and signed by the counsel for the complainant, is based on the ground that the respondent had already
"fully implemented the writ of execution." That motion to dismiss was not, and correctly so, granted by Judge
Ballutay. On the contrary, on 4 March 1994 he made his Report and Recommendation.
The respondent never denied that he received the sum of P5,200.00 from the complainant in connection with
the writ of demolition. He did not issue any official receipt for the amount received. At the time the writ of
demolition was placed on his hands for implementation, the basic amount that the complainant had to pay was
only P8.00 pursuant to paragraph (g), Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. This was later increased to
P100.00 per this Court's en banc resolution of 4 September 1990. 15 There are, of course, other sheriff's
expenses that prevailing parties have to pay for the service or implementation of court processes, or the
safeguarding of property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage, guard's fees, warehousing and
similar charges, in an amount to be estimated by the sheriff. However, the approval of the court thereof is
needed and upon such approval, the amount shall be deposited by the interested party with the clerk of court
and ex-officio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the process, subject
to liquidation within the same period for rendering a return of the process. Any unspent amount shall be
refunded to the party making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with his
return. 16
In the instant case, the respondent did not make any report on the amount he received from the complainant
nor did he issue an official receipt therefor. It is then obvious that he asked for the amount not as lawful fees
alone but as a consideration for the performance of his duty. Any portion of the P5,200.00 then in excess of the
lawful fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction which makes the respondent liable for grave
misconduct and gross dishonesty.
The records further disclose that the respondent's returns of service dated 25 July 1990 17 and 24 September
1990 18 were filed by him only on 29 May 1991 and 6 June 1991, respectively, with the MTCC, which issued
the writ of demolition. Either the respondent correctly dated the returns, in which case there was a deliberate
and unreasonable delay in their filing with the court, or he antedated them to make it appear that he prepared it
well within the period provided for by the Rules of Court. Section 11 of Rule 39 thereof provides that a writ of
execution should be returned at any time not less than ten days nor more than sixty days after its receipt by the
sheriff who must set forth in writing on its back the whole of his proceedings by virtue thereof and file it with the
clerk or judge to be preserved with the other papers in the case. 19 As the court personnel primarily responsible
for the speedy and efficient service of all court processes and writs originating from his court, 20 it was the
respondent's duty to immediately implement the writ of demolition. The Manual for Clerks of
Court 21 provides:
2. Duty of sheriff as to execution of process. When a writ is placed in the hands of the
sheriff, it is his duty in the absence of instructions, to proceed with reasonable celerity and
promptness to execute it in accordance with its mandate. . . . He has no discretion whether
to execute it or not.
Section E(4) of the Manual also provides:
4. All sheriffs and deputy sheriffs shall submit a report to the Judge concerned on the action
taken on all writs and processes assigned to them within ten (10) days from receipt of said
process or writ. Said report shall form part of the records of the case.
The duty imposed upon the sheriff to execute the writ is ministerial, not directory. A purely ministerial act or
duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience
to the mandate of the legal authority, without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. 22
The respondent's explanation that he was not able to implement the writ of demolition because he was
threatened with death by the defendants is unacceptable. If that were true, he should have either reported it to
the MTCC and requested the assistance of other sheriffs or law enforcement authorities, or filed the
appropriate criminal complaint against the defendants who had threatened him. Instead of doing so, he filed his
returns only after several months had lapsed.
For such nonfeasance and misfeasance, the respondent is guilty of serious dereliction or neglect of duty, gross
inefficiency or incompetence, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Time and again, this Court has stressed that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with the
dispensation of justice from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. They must at all times not only observe propriety and decorum, they must also be
above suspicion. 23
WHEREFORE, for grave misconduct, gross dishonesty, serious dereliction or neglect of duty, gross
incompetence or inefficiency, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, respondent EXEQUIEL
ENRILE, Deputy Sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cabanatuan City, is ordered DISMISSED from
the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of service of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.