Climate and Energy Program
Policy Brief
June 2010
Summary: Although China is often
blamed for the muddled outcome
of the 2009 Copenhagen talks, its
position on how to tackle climate
change may not be so far from the
West’s. Much reporting on Copen-
hagen portrayed China as being
hostile to rules—considered essen-
tial by the West—that would hold it
accountable through independent
verification of its greenhouse gas
emissions. In fact, China’s position
on this issue and its opposition to
legally binding targets should not be
confused for a lack of political will
or action to address climate change
at home. U.S. action is essential for
a legally binding climate agreement
that includes all major economies,
but it may not be sufficient: China
will join such an agreement when
the time is right for China. In the
meantime, the United States and
Europe must continue to pursue
clean energy and climate coop-
eration in forums outside the UN
and share their best practices on
shifting to a low-carbon economy.
China’s successes in this area must
be recognized, encouraged, and
replicated.
1744 R Street NW
Washington, DC 20009
T 1 202 683 2650
F 1 202 265 1662
E info@gmfus.org
Decoding China’s Climate and Energy Policy
Post-Copenhagen
by Joanna I. Lewis
Six months after the December 2009 describes how the positions of China
climate talks in Copenhagen, countries and the West are closer than their
are still trying to draw lessons from the respective negotiating stances indicate
negotiations. Few countries have been and recommends practical ways that
the focus of as much scrutiny as China the United States, Europe, and China
has; Chinese officials were widely can work more closely on shifting
accused by foreign governments away from fossil fuels and toward
and media of forcefully obstructing clean energy technologies and tackling
progress in reaching an agreement.1 climate change.
Less attention, however, has been
paid to what has been unfolding in
The Politics of Emissions Data
Beijing since the December nego-
tiations. While climate and energy Much of the coverage of the Copen-
legislation stalls in Washington, China hagen negotiations reported that
has unrolled an impressive suite of the measurement, reporting, and
potentially game-changing programs verification of emissions was a key
to regulate carbon emissions while issue of disagreement — particu-
continuing to promote energy effi- larly between China and the United
ciency and the increased use of clean States.2 According to these accounts,
energy technologies. The successful the United States insisted that China’s
implementation of such domestic mitigation measures be subject to
programs will help China reduce independent verification, but China
its carbon intensity (carbon emis- resisted anything that might be seen
sions per unit of economic output) as interfering with its national sover-
and increase its capacity to report eignty. Two-and-a-half years ago in
its emissions to the international Bali, countries called for MRV3 actions
community, as it agreed to do in the or commitments from both developed
Copenhagen Accord. Why, then, in the and developing countries, launching
face of unambiguous unilateral action, a discussion about what should be
is China still the subject of harsh measured and reported, and when and
international criticism? This paper how it should be verified. As countries
1
See, for example, Lynas, Mark, “How do I know China wrecked the Copenhagen deal? I was in the room.” The Guardian,
December 22, 2009. http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climate-change-mark-lynas;
Rapp, Tobias, Christian Schwägerl and Gerald Traufetter, “The Copenhagen Protocol: How China and India Sabotaged
the UN Climate Summit,” Der Spiegel, May 5, 2010. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,692861-2,00.html
2
Broder, John M. and James Kanter. “China and U.S. Hit Strident Impasse at Climate Talks.” The New York Times,
December 14, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/science/earth/15climate.html?_r=2&hp; Friedman, Lisa,
“U.S., China may be near ‘transparency’ compromise,” E&E News, December 17, 2009.
3
The acronym “MRV” most commonly stands for “measurable, reportable, and verifiable” as referenced in the Bali
Action Plan (UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.13, 2007). It is also used throughout this paper to refer to the general topic of emis-
sions measurement, reporting and verification.
Climate and Energy Program
Policy Brief
announced targets in Copenhagen, discussions turned to
how to quantify such targets and assess progress toward
their achievement. Having a national emissions inven-
tory system in place is a crucial step in enabling binding
emissions reduction policies’ adoption and enforcement,
whether enacted nationally or internationally. But, as most
countries either have developed or are currently devel-
oping such an emissions inventory system, are the U.S. and
Chinese positions really so far apart?
Some of China’s hesitance to commit to an international
MRV regime stems from reasonable concerns about energy
data quality and transparency. In many developing coun-
tries, where resource constraints can result in poor data
quality, inventories of national greenhouse gas emissions
are notoriously inexact;4 problems with carbon emissions
data quality in China have led to embarrassing confronta-
tions in the past.5 Another reason for China’s hesitance
stems from broader concerns about the role of interna-
tional actors. China has long resisted foreign involvement
in various sectors and activities, particularly those deemed
to have an impact on national economic security.6 Rumors
of facility-level inspections to monitor and verify emissions
(akin to the UN nuclear inspections) certainly did not help
to ease China’s concerns about international infringements
on its sovereignty.7 But while some have claimed that nego-
tiations almost collapsed because China didn’t want the
world to “look at [their] books,”8 this theory is refuted by
the fact that the United States and China had already signed
an agreement calling for cooperation on the development of
robust greenhouse gas inventories,9 and the fact that China
is already moving ahead on developing a wide-reaching
4
U.S. General Accounting Office, “Selected Nations’ Reports on Greenhouse Gas emis-
sions Varied in Their Adherence to Standards,” GAO-04-98, December 2003, http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d0498.pdf; David G. Streets et al., “Recent Reductions in China’s
Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” Science, November 30, 2001, pp. 1835–1837; Subodh
Sharma, Sumana Bhattacharya, and Amit Garg, “Greenhouse Gas Emissions From
India: A Perspective,” Current Science, February 10, 2006. http://www.ias.ac.in/currsci/
feb102006/326.pdf.
5
For example, in 2007, when the Netherlands Environment Agency announced that its re-
searchers had calculated that China was now the largest emitter of CO2, Chinese officials
immediately responded that this was not true. They later realized that it was, quite likely,
an accurate assessment.
6
Lewis, Joanna. “China’s Strategic Priorities in International Climate Change Negotia-
tions.” The Washington Quarterly 31:1 pp. 155–174, winter 2007-2008.
7
Friedman, Lisa. “Copenhagen: U.S., China may be near ‘transparency’ compromise.” E&E
News, Dec 17, 2009.
8
Lee, John. (2009). “How China Stiffed the World in Copenhagen. Why Beijing insists,
“Don’t look at our books!” Foreign Policy, December 21, 2009. http://www.foreignpolicy.
com/articles/2009/12/21/how_china_stiffed_the_world_in_copenhagen
9
Memorandum of Cooperation to Build Capacity to Address Climate Change between the
U.S. EPA and China NDRC. November 2009 Press Release: http://yosemite.epa.gov/OPA/
ADMPRESS.NSF/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/d931638c50ae881e85257673006
47cf4!OpenDocument and text of agreement: http://www.epa.gov/international/regions/Asia/
china/2009-moc.pdf.
2
national scheme for measuring carbon emissions that
builds upon its energy efficiency monitoring and verifica-
tion programs.
Despite the concerns mentioned above, the “MRV standoff ”
in Copenhagen was likely more political than rational.
When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arrived in Copen-
hagen and announced that the United States was prepared
to work with other countries to mobilize “$100 billion a
year by 2020 to address the climate change needs of devel-
oping countries,”10 she said that the United States would
contribute funds “in the context of a strong accord in which
all major economies stand behind meaningful mitigation
actions and provide full transparency as to their imple-
mentation.” This declaration directly tied the promise of
climate financing to transparency, or “MRV,” in developing
countries. China’s blocking of Secretary Clinton’s offer for
climate financing would likely have angered other devel-
oping countries.11 In addition, China was now no longer
able to use the lack of financing from developed countries
as an excuse for its own inaction, and it had already agreed
that internationally supported mitigation actions should
indeed be subject to international MRV.12 Chinese negotia-
tors felt that they were getting little in return for accepting
Secretary Clinton’s transparency conditions since the
United States had made it clear that this financing would
not flow to China.13
The MRV issue came to be about much more than just data
verification. It was also used as a possible means to break
down the Kyoto “firewall” that set up very different expecta-
tions for developed and developing countries’ mitigation
10
Clinton, Hillary Rodham, “Remarks at the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change.” Copenhagen, Denmark, December 17, 2009. http://www.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2009a/12/133734.htm
11
Wilson, Peter, “Kevin Rudd holds out deal hope as Hillary Clinton offers to help poorer
countries,” The Australian, December 18, 2009. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/
kevin-rudd-vows-to-work-through-the-night-to-seal-climate-deal/story-e6frg6xf-1225811611620
12
“Premier Wen: China’s climate action not subject to international monitoring,” www.
chinaview.cn, December 18, 2009. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/18/con-
tent_12664134.htm
13
There was a widely reported standoff between the United States and China in Copen-
hagen over the issue of finance. See, for example, Torello, Alessandro, “Envoy Says U.S.
Won’t Pay China to Cut Emissions.” Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2009. http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB126037451679983669.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLETopStories#project%3D
COPENHAGEN_TIMELINE%26articleTabs%3Darticle; Ward, Andrew & Fiona Harvey, “US rules
out climate aid for China,” Financial Times, December 9, 2009. http://www.ft.com/cms/
s/0/e1b1f2e4-e4f7-11de-9a25-00144feab49a.html; Harvey, Fiona, “China signals climate
funds shift,” Financial Times, December 13, 2009. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b261d086-
e81c-11de-8a02-00144feab49a.html; “Chinese side concedes assistance to help the poor
countries reduce emissions (Zhong fang jiu jianpai yuan zhurang bu chengwei zhao gu
qiong guo).” China News Net, December 16, 2009.
Climate and Energy Program
Policy Brief
actions.14 U.S. negotiators pressed China to agree to inter-
national verification so Congress could be reassured that
China would be held accountable if it did not deliver on
its commitment to reduce its emissions intensity. In doing
so, the United States also wanted to eliminate the differ-
entiation between verification procedures for developed
and developing countries. Developing country negotia-
tors feared that this threatened the 1992 UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change principle, commonly
invoked by Chinese negotiators, that countries should
participate in an international climate regime “in accor-
dance with their common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities and their social and economic
conditions.”15 In response, developing countries ensured
that the final text agreed upon in the Copenhagen Accord
does include a clear differentiation between the MRV
requirements for the developed and developing countries.16
The targets that the United States and China had
announced prior to their arrivals in Copenhagen were the
important backdrop for all of these discussions. The United
States pledged to meet an absolute emissions target that
was arguably more stringent than China’s target in terms
of emissions reductions, but which hinged on uncertain
congressional action. While China’s target would be volun-
tary and indexed to economic growth, it would be backed
by China’s Five-Year Plan and unprecedented levels of
government resources. Since each target would be imple-
mented domestically, international verification of nationally
reported progress toward meeting the target was a way to
link domestic actions to the international regime.
Domestic Energy and Climate Action in China
China’s unwillingness to commit to legally binding targets
and its pushback on MRV in the international climate
14
The Kyoto Protocol has explicit requirements for Annex I (developed countries) coun-
tries, while it precludes any new commitments for non-Annex I (developing) countries.
See Kyoto Protocol (1997) article 3 and article 10. http://unfccc.int/essential_background/
kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php
15
UNFCCC, preamble, 1992 http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/
items/1349.php
16
The Copenhagen Accord states that the “Delivery of reductions and financing by
developed countries will be measured, reported, and verified in accordance with existing
and any further guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties, and will ensure that
accounting of such targets and finance is rigorous, robust, and transparent.” It goes on to
say that “Mitigation actions taken by Non-Annex I Parties will be subject to their domestic
measurement, reporting and verification the result of which will be reported through their
national communications every two years,” and that “Non-Annex I Parties will communi-
cate information on the implementation of their actions through National Communica-
tions, with provisions for international consultations and analysis under clearly defined
guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected.” Decision 2/CP.15,
Copenhagen Accord. Available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.
pdf#page=4
3
negotiations should not be confused for a lack of political
will in addressing climate change domestically. China’s
energy efficiency and renewable energy achievements have
been well documented. Few of the programs at the center
of China’s greenhouse gas mitigation strategy, however,
were motivated purely by the potential for carbon emission
reductions. The ability to produce more economic output
with less energy helps make China more energy secure and
saves money, while the dissemination of locally manufac-
tured clean energy technologies helps promote industrial
development and provides vast export opportunities. Thus,
promoting energy efficiency and renewable energy have
become a fundamental part of China’s national develop-
ment strategy.
From 2002-2005, China’s energy intensity grew sharply
for the first time in decades due to a resurgence in heavy
industry, industrial energy consumption, and coal use.
Rapid energy growth during this period threw off all projec-
tions of China’s emissions trajectory and resulted in China’s
emissions surpassing those of the United States two decades
ahead of schedule.17 A suite of energy efficiency and other
programs, however, have driven China’s energy intensity
down for the last four years. One of the core elements of
China’s current Five-Year Plan period, spanning 2006-2010,
is to lower national energy intensity by 20 percent. China’s
National Development and Reform Commission reported
a 14 percent drop in energy intensity so far, and additional
measures are being implemented in a final effort to meet
the target by the end of this year.18
While industrial energy consumption in China is
increasing, it has been offset considerably by energy effi-
ciency improvements.19 China’s Top 1000 Program has
helped to cut energy use among China’s biggest energy-
consuming enterprises (representing 33 percent of China’s
17
Lewis, Joanna and Kelly Sims Gallagher, “Energy and Environment in China: Achievements
and Enduring Challenges” in The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy (Third Edi-
tion), edited by Stacy VanDeveer and Regina Alexrod, CQ Press, March 2010, p. 272.
18
Chen Chao, “Shanxi leads China in saving energy,” China.org.cn, March 10, 2010. http://
www.china.org.cn/china/NPC_CPPCC_2010/2010-03/10/content_19576768.htm; Seligsohn, Debo-
rah, “China in Major Push to Meet 20% Energy Intensity Target,” World Resources Institute,
April 30, 2010. http://www.chinafaqs.org/blog-posts/china-major-push-meet-20-energy-intensity-target
19
Mark Levine and Lynn Price, “Assessment of China’s Energy-Saving and Emission-Reduc-
tion Accomplishments and Opportunities during the 11th Five-Year Plan,” Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory Report, December 2009. http://china.lbl.gov/sites/china.lbl.gov/files/LBNL11t
h%20FYP%20Presentation%20for%20WRI%20Dec%202.2009.pdf
Climate and Energy Program
Policy Brief
overall energy consumption, 47 percent of industrial energy
consumption, and 43 percent of China’s carbon dioxide
emissions).20 The 10 Key Projects Program provides finan-
cial support for implementing energy efficient technology
and proving results. In addition, many inefficient power
and industrial plants have been targeted for closure.21 While
China built a reported 89.7 gigawatts of new power plant
capacity in 2009, it also shut down 26.2 gigawatts of small,
inefficient fossil fuel power stations.22 Thus, one-third of
China’s new power plant growth last year was offset by old
plant closures — a significant share of the nation’s annual
capacity additions.
The government has also strengthened local accountability
for meeting targets by intensifying oversight and inspec-
tion. China’s 2007 Energy Conservation Law requires
local governments to collect and report energy statistics
and requires companies to measure and record energy
use. In addition, each province and provincial-level city is
required to help meet China’s goal to cut energy intensity
by 20 percent (with targets ranging from 12 to 30 percent).
Governors and mayors are held accountable to their targets,
and experts from Beijing conduct annual site visits of facili-
ties in each province to assess their progress. The 10 Key
Projects Program requires selected enterprises to undergo
comprehensive energy audits, and offers financial rewards
based on actual energy saved. The audits follow detailed
government monitoring guidelines and must be indepen-
dently validated.
These and other programs in China offer evidence that
the country is making a good faith effort to strengthen the
accountability of local governments and enterprises and
improve the reporting accuracy in the power and industrial
sectors.
In late 2009 China announced that its 12th Five-Year Plan
(2011-2015) will include a carbon intensity target in addi-
20
Price, Lynn; Wang, Xuejun; Jiang, Yun. “China’s Top-1000 Energy-Consuming Enterprises
Program: Reducing Energy Consumption of the 1000 Largest Industrial Enterprises in
China,” Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Report (LBNL-519E), 2008. http://ies.lbl.
gov/iespubs/LBNL-519E.pdf
21
All coal plants with capacity under 50 megawatts (MW) and any 100 MW generators
that have been in operation for 20 years or more have been ordered to close by 2010. All
cement plants with annual capacity of less than 200,000 tons were ordered to be closed
by the end of 2008, with a total of 250 million tons of outdated cement capacity to be
eliminated by 2010. In the steel sector, outdated pig iron capacity is to be reduced by 100
million tons, and steel capacity by 55 million tons, by 2010.
22
“Report on the Work of the Government,” delivered at the Third Session of the Eleventh
National People’s Congress, March 5, 2010, by Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council,
People’s Republic of China. http://www.china.org.cn/china/NPC_CPPCC_2010/2010-03/15/
content_19613822.htm
4
tion to an energy intensity target. This first-ever carbon
target for China will require an important change in the
country’s data collection and transparency practices. China
has not publicly released any official carbon dioxide emis-
sions inventories that date past 1994. The national carbon
intensity target will be allocated across each province,
municipality, and economic sector and enforced with new
monitoring rules. In addition, the government will conduct
a national inventory of greenhouse gas emissions for 2005
and put in place a statistical monitoring and assessment
system to ensure greenhouse gas emissions goals are met.23
In Copenhagen, China agreed to publically report its emis-
sions every two years, and if these recently announced
programs are carried out domestically, it is very likely that
China will be able to follow through on this agreement.24
Implementation of China’s national carbon intensity
target across all sectors and regions of the country is being
supported by government-funded analysis led by China’s
leading academic and research institutions.
While there is some debate over whether a carbon inten-
sity target will do much in the way of reducing China’s
greenhouse gas emissions trajectory,25 there is no question
that improving China’s capacity to quantify its emissions
is a fundamental first step to achieving this target as well
as more ambitious targets in the future. A carbon intensity
target will not only accelerate the energy efficiency improve-
ments already taking place in response to the energy inten-
sity target, but will also further promote the development
of low-carbon energy sources like nuclear, hydropower, and
renewables.
Dim Prospects for a New Climate Treaty
It is unlikely that countries will have dramatically shifted
their negotiating positions by the November 2010 climate
conference in Cancun, Mexico. The legally binding climate
treaty that was unachievable in Copenhagen will likely
23
Buckley, Chris, “China says moving to enforce greenhouse gas goals,” Reuters, February
28, 2010. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61R12720100228.
24
Copenhagen Accord “Mitigation actions taken by Non-Annex I Parties will be subject
to their domestic measurement, reporting and verification the result of which will be re-
ported through their national communications every two years.” http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf
25
See, e.g. Finamore, Barbara, “China’s Carbon Intensity Target,” NRDC, November 27,
2009, http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/bfinamore/chinas_carbon_intensity_target.html; and
Levi, Michael, “Assessing China’s Carbon-Cutting Proposal,” Council on Foreign Relations,
November 30, 2009. http://www.cfr.org/publication/20862/assessing_chinas_carboncut-
ting_proposal.html
Climate and Energy Program
Policy Brief
remain elusive in Cancun — and potentially for many years
to come.
Yet, it is unfair to blame China alone. The Copenhagen
Accord would not have gained the support of more than
100 countries representing over 80 percent of global green-
house gas emissions had the United States not played such
an important role in its formation. While the United States
could be a leader in ongoing multilateral discussions to
ensure that the Copenhagen Accord’s goals are implemented,
following through on the Accord’s provisions will not be an
easy feat, and U.S. inaction could severely impede its future.
International goodwill toward the U.S. conditional target
is unlikely to persist if that target is not further legitimized
through domestic legislation. Moreover, without such legis-
lation, the United States is unlikely to be able to push for a
binding international climate treaty.
If the United States were to take on a credible international
climate change commitment — one backed by ambitious
domestic legislation — China would certainly face renewed
pressure to revisit its delay tactics. Yet, while U.S. climate
action is surely a necessary condition for reaching a legally
binding agreement that includes all major economies, it is
likely not a sufficient one. China will join such an agreement
when the time is right for China. This time will come when
several preconditions are met, including that China has the
ability to accurately measure, monitor, and project emis-
sions, and that it has developed a policy roadmap detailing
how it can decarbonize its economy while maintaining a
secure energy supply. Such achievements would help to
establish the confidence that China’s leadership will need to
take on international mitigation commitments.
While China must do much more to cut its rapidly
increasing emissions if the world is to avoid dangerous
climate impacts, China’s leaders know that such reductions
will not come easily nor cheaply. Since about 80 percent of
China’s electricity needs and 68 percent of its total primary
energy demand are met by coal, a real decoupling of energy
growth from greenhouse gas emissions will require a calcu-
lated move toward a low-carbon economy. The beneficial
impacts of China’s policies to deploy renewable energy
technology domestically and develop leading clean manu-
facturing sectors are finally coming to fruition — China
installed more wind turbines than any other country in
2009, and Chinese-owned companies manufactured about
5
80 percent of them. But progress is still inadequate as less
than 1 percent of China’s electricity today comes from wind
power.
Until all the major developed countries are willing to take
on binding international commitments, it is not a real-
istic yardstick for China, and is an increasingly unrealistic
expectation for the international negotiations to deliver in
the near term. This makes other forums for pushing inter-
national climate action all the more crucial.
Finding Common Ground among the United States,
Europe, and China
The longer the United States waits to act on climate change,
the more it is sacrificing its international credibility on the
issue. U.S. commentators tend to criticize the ambition
of China’s climate actions while simultaneously fearing
its superiority in clean energy development. As tensions
escalate, cooperation to accelerate the transition to a low-
carbon global economy is increasingly important.
In November 2009, the United States and China launched
a collection of bilateral clean energy agreements, providing
a strong foundation for enhanced cooperation on renew-
able energy, energy efficiency, clean coal, and low-carbon
vehicles.26 The EU and China have launched joint initiatives
in many of these areas as well — for example, the agreement
on Near-Zero Emissions Power Generation Technology
through Carbon Capture and Storage and the Sino-
Danish Renewable Energy Development Program.
If the United States in particular fails to follow through
on its clean energy agreements with China, it will not only
miss a huge opportunity to increase cooperation on key
technologies to help address climate change but will also
undermine China’s trust as it enters a challenging period in
Sino-U.S. relations. Although bilateral cooperation between
the United States and China alone cannot solve the global
climate challenge, it is essential to working out key differ-
ences, facilitating dialogue among business and policy
leaders, and implementing workable solutions to climate
change in incremental but concrete steps.
26
U.S. Department of Energy, 2009. “U.S.-China Clean Energy Announcements,” Novem-
ber 17 Press Release. http://www.energy.gov/news2009/8292.htm
Climate and Energy Program
Policy Brief
It is imperative that the United States take its clean energy
cooperation with China seriously and devote substantial
financial and human resources to its side of the effort. It is
important for EU member states to convey to China their
key models for success in transitioning to a low-carbon
economy. Moreover, it is essential that all UNFCCC coun-
tries work out the details of the MRV regimes put forth
in the Copenhagen Accord so that increased transparency
begins right away. Furthermore, it is critical that China’s
energy efficiency and renewable energy successes be recog-
nized, encouraged, and replicated wherever possible.
China has made some impressive accomplishments to date,
and is poised to pursue even more aggressive plans to curb
emissions growth and promote clean energy use. China is
taking these actions in response to worrisome growth in
energy consumption and emissions, and its efforts were
implemented rapidly and — for the most part — effectively.
The Chinese have displayed foresight in thwarting coming
crises related to wasteful energy consumption, persistence in
their drive to improve the effectiveness of implementation,
and flexibility in rising to the demands of the international
community in taking the first important steps to increase
transparency in measuring, reporting and verifying its emis-
sions. So, while the next five years will no doubt be ones of
continued rapid energy consumption driven by economic
expansion, the Chinese leadership’s high-level attention to
energy efficiency, energy conservation, and the development
of low-carbon energy technologies has already placed the
country on a different emissions trajectory than the one it
was on a decade ago.
Joanna I. Lewis, Assistant Professor, Georgetown
University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Joanna Lewis is an assistant professor of Science, Technology and Inter-
national Affairs (STIA) at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service. Her research focuses on renewable energy in-
dustry and policy development, mechanisms for low-carbon technology
transfer in the developing world, and expanding options for multilateral
engagement in a post-2012 international climate change agreement.
Most of Professor Lewis’ research is based in China. Current projects in-
clude studies of China’s wind power industry development, the security
implications of climate change impacts for China, and the future of the
bilateral relationship between the United States and China on energy
and climate change. Dr. Lewis serves as an international advisor to the
Energy Foundation China Sustainable Energy Program in Beijing. She is
a member of the National Academies Committee on U.S.-China Coop-
eration on Electricity from Renewables, the Advisory Board of the Asia
Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations, and the Strategic Advisory
Board of the American Council on Renewable Energy (ACORE)’s U.S.-
China Program. She is a Lead Author on the forthcoming Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change Fifth Assessment Report.
About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United
States (GMF) is a
nonpartisan American public policy and
grantmaking institution
dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding
between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting
individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by
convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes,
and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can
address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF supports
a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972
through a gift from Germany on the 25th anniversary of the Mar-
shall Plan as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF
maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to
its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe:
Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.
About the Transatlantic Climate Bridge
This paper would not have been possible
without funding from the Transatlantic
Climate Bridge, an initiative jointly launched
by the German Federal Foreign Office and the
German Federal Environment Ministry to connect and support those
working to address the challenges of climate change, energy security,
and economic growth at the local, the state, and the federal level in the
United States and Germany.