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Panganiban, Abad & Associates and Asst. City Fiscal L.L. Arguelles for appellant.
Jose M . Aruego, Arsenio Tenchavez and Luis Go for appellees.
Alfreo Concepcion for intervenor.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
FERNANDO , J : p
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for
prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due
process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and,
therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more speci cally set forth, such judgment must
be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its
validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was led on July 5, 1963 by the
petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members,
Hotel del Mar, Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the
second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his
capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the
City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement
of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is
dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members
"operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both
national and city authorities regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not
less than 2,500 persons and representing an investment of more than P3 million." 1 (par.
2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio
Astorga, who was at the time acting Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There
was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised
charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that
Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable
and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for rst
class motels and P4,500.00 for second c]ass motels; that the provision in the same
section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative
of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or
customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his lling
up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence,
wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the
occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the
room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be speci ed, with data
furnished as to his residence certi cate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled
with a certi cation that a person signing such form has personally lled it up and af xed
his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also
being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly
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authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not
only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, inde nite and
uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty
against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels
into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in rst class
motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or restaurant and laundry similarly
offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a
conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to
have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting
a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging
houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and
making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of
such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours,
runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section
4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would cause the automatic
cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the
business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due
process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a nal judgment
declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6,
1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from
enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the answer led on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal
circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are
licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of
the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional
grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the
challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a proper purpose, which is to curb
immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or
customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to
privacy and the guaranty against self- incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of
the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for its
dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of
facts dated September 28, 1964, which reads:
"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
and Hotel del Mar, Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, both with of ces in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chiu is
the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar, Inc., and the intervenor Victor
Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
"2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and
chief executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to
enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
"3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating
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hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
"4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the
respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669
of the compilation of ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein
three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent
Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in his 4th Indorsement dated February 15,
1963 (Annex B);
"5. That the explanatory noted signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was
submitted with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal
Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
"6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05
from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners)
operating in the City of Manila."
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was
laid on the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing
its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only
U .S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum
likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity.
Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was
led reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of what they
considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the
challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association,
and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party the lower court
observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with
the nod of the Court, agreed to le memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for
decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by
the parties, the decision passed upon the alleged in rmity on constitutional grounds of the
challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the untenable
objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and
came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila,
would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary
injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing
the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional
doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against
such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be
allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of
constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to
offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As
was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity
. . . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The
councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
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particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject
and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect
given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people . . . The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of
personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation." 2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face,
which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the
leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 3 where the American
Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter
thus: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the
police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the speci c method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of
law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of
this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation
being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the
stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the
ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally
defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of
protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This
particular manifestation of a police power measure being speci cally aimed to safeguard
public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and
narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, 4 extending as it does "to all the great
public needs." 5 It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its
competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare.
6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor
Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part
to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry,
presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers." The
challenged ordinance then "proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and
guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to ll up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and
by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that
characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the
license fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for
purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining
any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue
deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar, 3 0 no longer "retains its virtuality as a
living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption
by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with
public interest." 3 1 What cannot be stressed suf ciently is that if the liberty involved were
freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is
much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights
of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider. 3 2 How justify then the
allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by
invoking the principle of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the
petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the
provisions are too detailed and speci c rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age and
sex of the companion or companions as inde nite and uncertain in view of the necessity
for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving with
the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room with him at about
the same time or coming at any inde nite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its
sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is
dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which from
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their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be
charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may
be asked, do these allegations suf ce to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged
vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General
Construction Co. 3 3 to Adderley v. Florida, 3 4 the principle has been consistently upheld
that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding
or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before us? A citation
from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not
supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common
sense in constructing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 3 5
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the
arguments pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the
challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this
Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted
forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, J .B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ ., concur.
Concepcion, C .J . and Dizon, J ., are on official leave.
Footnotes
1. The eighteen members are Waldorf Hotel, Hotel Monte Carlo, Golden Gate Motel, Miami
Hotel, Palm Spring Hotel, Flamingco Motel, Holiday Motel, Rainbow Motel, Palo Alto
Hotel, Paradise Hotel, Mayfair Hotel, Siesta Court, Sun Valley Hotel, Spring eld Hotel,
New Palace Hotel, Hotel del Mar, Longbeach Hotel and Ritz Motel.
2. U.S. v. Salaveria (1918) 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an af rmation of the presumption
of validity of municipal ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria decision in
Eboa v. Daet, (1950) 85 Phil. 369.
14. Uy Ha v. The City Mayor, 108 Phil. 400; Miranda v. City of Manila L-17252, May 31, 1961.
15. U.S. v. Ten Yu (1912) 24 Phil. 1.
16. There is no occasion to consider even cursorily the alleged invasion of the right of privacy
or the prohibition against self- incrimination. Petitioners obviously are not the proper
parties to do so. Nor may such an incurable defect be remedied by an accommodating
intervenor "who has always taken advantage of, as he exclusively relies on, the facilities,
services and accommodations" offered by petitioner-motels. A general merchant, doing
business not only in Baguio City but in the City of Manila, has no legitimate cause for
complaint. At least, not according to the case as it has been developed.
17. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court (1938) pp. 32-33.
23. Citing Swarth v. People, 109 Ill. 621; Dennehy v. City of Chicago, 120 Ill. 627; 12 N.E., 227;
United States Distilling Co. v. City of Chicago, 112 Ill., 19; Drew County v. Bennet, 43 Ark.,
364; Merced County v. Fleming, 111 Cal., 46; 43 Pac., 392; Williams v. City Council of
West Point, 68 Ga., 816; Cheny v. Shellbyville, 19 Ind., 84; Wiley v. Owens, 39 Ind., 429;
Sweet v. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; Jones v. Grady, 25 La. Ann., 586; Goldsmith v. City of
New Orlean, 31 La. Ann., 646; People exrel., Cramer v. Medberry, 39 N.Y.S., 207; 17 Misc.
Rep., 8; McGuigan v. Town of Belmont, 89 Wis. 637; 62 N.W., 421; Ex parte Burnett, 30
Ala., 461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala., 728, and Muhlenbinck v. Long Branch Commissioners,
42 N.J.L., 364; 36 Am. Rep. 518. At pp. 829-830.
24. 98 Phil. 148 (1955) citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193;
U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 477; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.
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The Lutz decision was followed in Republic v. Bacolod-Murcia Milling, L-19824, July 9,
1966.
25. Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, 65 Off. Gaz. (12) 2861.
26. Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board (1957) 101 Phil. 1142.
27. Co Kian & Lee Ban v. City of Manila (1955) 96 Phil. 649, 654, citing City of New Orleans v.
Stafford, 27 L. Ann. 417.
28. Rubi v. Provincial Board (1919) 39 Phil. 660, at 706, citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones (1916), 242
U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. v. Cruz (1914), 189 Al., 66.
32. Cf. "In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish between the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the
principles of the First Amendment and those cases in which it is applied for its own
sake. The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it
also collides with the principles of the First, is much more de nite than the test when
only the fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause
disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First become its standard. The right of a
State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process
test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a
'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of
worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of
restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may
lawfully protect." (West Virginia State Bd. of Edu v. Barnette, (1942) 319 US 624, at 639).