The logic of tenancy cultivation:

central and south-east Punjab,

1870-1935*

Neeladri Bhattacharya
Centre for Historical Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University

Tenancy and share-cropping are often seen as expressions of either semi-

feudalism formal
or subsumption of labour by capital. Both these concepts
are based on the notion that share-croppers and tenants are a homogeneous
class, invariably impoverished and perpetually indebted. While according to
the first view, this implied forcible involuntary exchange is characteristic of
semi-feudalism, according to the latter, this bondage was an aspect of
capitalist subordination of labour and the extraction of absolute surplus
value in the form of rent. However, tenancy cultivation and share-cropping
can reflect different forms of social relations depending on the specific units of

production within which they are integrated. Only by differentiating these

forms can one understand the nature and function of tenancy and rent. What
we need to examine is: Who leased out and who leased in the land? Why was
land leased out? What did rent represent?
The different forms of tenancy should not be defined merely in juridical
terms-e.g., the difference between occupancy tenants and tenants-at-will. A
predominant emphasis on the juridical distinction can be seen in
Rothermunds argument.2 According to Rothermund, the protected

*
t with to thank Prof. S. Bhattacharya for discussing earlier drafts of this paper and helping me
clarify my ideas, and Sudipto Mundle, Sumit Guha, Shahid Amin, Chitra Joshi, Sanjeev Raut,
S. Sadgopan and the referee of the journal for their comments and editorial help.
For the former view see A. Bhaduri, An Analysis of Semi-Feudalism in East Indian
1
Agriculture, Frontier, 29 September 1973. For the latter view see Jairus Banaji, Capitalist
Domination and the Small Peasantry, Deccan Districts in the late Nineteenth Century, EPW,
Special No., 1978. See also D. Gupta, Formal and Real Subsumption of Labour Under Capital:
The Instance of Share Cropping, EPW, 27 Sept. 1980. Bhaduris argument is in the context of
Bengal; Banajis study refers to the Deccan.
2 D. Rothermund, Government, Landlord, and Peasant in India, Agrarian Relations under
British Rule 1865-1935, Wiesbaden, 1978. I have discussed the juridical aspect in N.
Bhattacharya, Tenancy, Rent and Differentiation, (mimeo) 1976.
122
occupancy tenants under British rule formed the privileged upper strata of
rural society, while the tenants-at-will constituted the lowest strata. In such an
analysis, tenants-at-will are, again, mistakenly identified as an undifferentiated
class representing the same social relation. While the differing nature of rights of
occupancy tenants and tenants-at-will is undoubtedly significant, and needs
emphasis, an analysis of this aspect alone does not enable us to understand the
logic and significance of tenancy cultivation and the calculations of those who
leased out land and those who leased it in. I shall focus here only on the latter
aspect. My analysis covers only tenants-at-will and not occupancy tenants.

The Ideology of Khudkasht

In Bengal, share-cropping and tenancy existed within.the context of the

zamindari system in which the ideology of t herentier became predominant.3i
In rural Punjab, on the other hand, the values that were upheld and
appreciated were not those of the aristocratic, pleasure-loving zamindar, but
those of the self-cultivating proprietors who toiled in the fields-the ideology
of khudkasht (self-cultivation).
Toil and labour was praised and admired. Kar kam, pa aram(Do work
and earn rest) was the rural maxim.4 Kar kar, na awe har(W ork, and you will
not want) ran another proverb.5 Sloth and inactivity were scorned and
ridiculed. There was no sympathy for those who were lazy: Laziness and sleep
destroy a farmer, as coughing betrays a thief.&dquo; Labour was not socially
degrading-From industry comes respect, as well as comfort and
influence. 7
Cultivation was regarded as the best occupation-chokha dhanda . It
expressed sovereignty-wahi badshahi. But it depended on the work of the
owner, on personal care and effort-Kheti khasman seti, Kheti sanyan
seti: 10 If the owner did not go to the field, he would be ruined. Direct
3See Tapan Raychaudhuri, Permanent Settlement in Operation: Bakarganj District, East
Bengal, in R.E. Frykenberg, ed., Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History, New
Delhi, 1979, p. 168.
4R. Maconachie, Selected Agricultural Proverbs of the Punjab, Delhi, 1890, p. 188. See also
SR: Jullunder: 1880-86, App. XIII. The folk-sayings whichwe refer to here, were all recorded in

the late nineteenth century.

5R. Maconachie, op. cit., p. 187.
Alkas nind kisan ko khoe, chor ko khoe khansi.
6 Variations of this proverb were popular in
Jullunder, Rohtak and Delhi. Ibid., pp.186-87.
Tehlan mahl
7 was the saying in Rawalpindi. Ibid., p. 190. Sukhe dalidar, karashie bhag,
ibid., p. 189.
Ibid., p. 192.
8
Ibid., p. 180.
9
Ibid., pp. 179-80.
10
Jis kheti par khasam na jawe, Wuh kheti khasam nun khawe. (The field to which the
11
husbandman does not go, will eat up [ruin] the latter.)
This was a common saying recorded in a number of districts. See SR: Jullunder: 1880-86, App.
XIII. Nos. 102 and 103; SR: Hoshiarpur: 1879-84, App. IV, No. 63.
 123

cultivation was only preferred but strongly advocated-Cultivation,

not
correspondence, prayers and tightening the girth of your horse should all be
done with ones own hands; and that is the way to live. ~2 Only through
khudkasht could one get the most from the land-He who has himself driven
the plough gets the whole crop, he who has merely remained with the tenants
or labourers gets half; he who only asks &dquo;where is
my plough?&dquo; will allow all to
be lost after he has sown the seeds.13
The stereotypes-the industrious Jat and the indolent Rajput-projected
by the British officials were not merely a creation of their imagination.~4 In
rural Punjab, these images formed a part of the mental world of many who
associated Rajputs with sloth and inactivity and saw the Jats as born
cultivators. 1 If the Rajputs were in debt, they earned no sympathy. For, only
those who worked had a right to live well (Angre dukh pet na sukh, Angre
sukh pet na dukh). 16 Clearly stereotypes do not always correspond to real
situations. There were Rajputs who worked in the fields and Jats who did not.
We cannot always consider proverbs as evidence of existing reality, though
they do reflect popular notions and, in this context, the mental attitudes to
work and leisure and the moral sanction for khudkasht. 7
The object of emulation, thus, was not the work ethic and values of the
Rajput, but those of the J at, or the Arain which was essentially the ideology of
self-cultivation. This mentality of the small proprietor was transformed into
the dominant work ideology in rural Punjab which, in many ways, expressed
and regulated the work pattern of the peasants. Despite this, tenancy
cultivation not only existed in the Punjab, but the area under tenancy
cultivation increased over time. However, as we shall see, the specific form of

Kheti, pati, benti, aur ghore ka tang, Apne hathian kijiye jiwan ka dhang. SR: Jullunder:
12
1880-86, App. XIII, No. 115; SR: Hoshiarpur: 1879-84, App. IV, No. 63.
Sari khetijo hal gahya, Adhi khetijo sang raha, Bij pot gawawan wahan, Jisne puchha mira
13
This, again, is a saying recorded in many districts. See Maconachie, op. cit., p. 18.
hal kahan.
14 Malcolm
Darling went into raptures describing the qualities of Jat Sikhs: for industry and
thrift, the Ludhiana Sikh is hard to beat, and the Sikh from Amritsar... is unsurpassed as a
cultivator. Grit, skill in farming, and a fine physique are characteristics common to all. The
Arain was described as thrifty and prolific,capable of extracting the last ounce of produce from
the soil. Consider now his comments on the Rajputs: Proud of his birth and traditions, more
accustomed to fight than to till, loving the bravura of life and scorning drudgery, he is by
common consent the worst cultivator of Punjab (p. 33). The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and

Debt, Fourth ed., reprint, New Delhi, Manohar, 1977.

Note the proverb: Jat da putra patile jeda pakra hal di chauri.
15 (The son of a Jat holds the
plough while in his cradle.) R. Maconachie, op. cit., p. 243.
Ibid.,
16 Gujar, Mali, aur Ahir kheti ap karen, aur bir yih mahnat ka phal hi
p. 188. Further—
pawen, Thakar kare asami ke karan, Baniye, Baman bipat bicharan (Gujars, Malis, and Ahirs
cultivate their land themselves; so they enjoy the fruits of their labour. The Thakurs [Rajput
zamindars] are obliged to cultivate in bad times, Baniyas and Brahmins do so to avert their bad
days.) Ibid., p. 241.
Even on this aspect, one can hazard no conclusive generalisation entirely on the basis of
17
folklore. It is necessary to consider the significance of such proverbs in relation to the weight of
other evidence which we discuss subsequently.
124

tenancy predominant in the region of my study is not incompatible with the

ideology of khudkasht.

Measuring Tenancy

Estimating the area under tenancy poses some problems. A casual calculation
of the average provincial figures would suggest a sharp increase in tenancy in
the Punjab between 1874-75 to 1932. The proportion of total cultivated area
under tenancy, according to official statistics, went up from 29 per cent to 47
per cent during this period.. X Considering the quality of data and the varying
rcgional patterns, such general comparisons obscure more than they reveal.
I he extent of decline in self-cultivation in the area is exaggerated in the
official figures. Scepticjsm about the reliability of the agricultural statistics of
British India is now generally shared.19 However, the quality of data
improved over the years: a fact which affects comparisons over time.
Investigations of the area under khudkasht or tenancy was possible only after
the definition and recording of rights. In the Punjab, this preliminary
process continued till the late 1880s. The initial summary settlements were not
based on any girdawari and.jamabandi records. Only after Prinsep took over
as Settlement Commissioner in 1863 were proposals made for a more
accurate record of rights.20 But there was no effective agency to undertake this
mammoth task. In the absence of supervision, records were fabricated.
According to Douie the patwari often found it quite safe to register the crops
without seeing them, and to make the jamabandi a copy of the previous
year.21 Efforts were made in the 1880s to improve the revenue administration
machinery at a lower level. In 1;,85 the patwari and kannungo staff was
organised and strengthened, a Director of Land Records appointed, and new
patwari and kannungo rules formulated.-&dquo; In 1887 the Land Revenue Act was
passed, codifying some of the new proposals. Increasing importance was
attached to the maintenance of a proper record of rights and the regular
revision of .jamabandi records. Numerous weaknesses remained in the
records; but over the years the statistical returns were, in general, collected
18 1874-75 and 1932-33.
LRARP:
19For the Punjab see Clive Dewey, Patwari and Choukidar: Subordinate Officials and the
Reliability of Indias Agricultural Statistics, Clive Dewey and A.G. Hopkins, ed., The Imperial
Impact, London, 1978.
20 The Administration
Report of the Punjab issued every year since 1849 contains evidence on
this aspect. Local records also abound. See, for instance, Hissar Div. Rec., Reference File 19 and
24; Ambala Div. Rec., Series XIV, Bundle No. 75.
For a brief account of the changes in land administration see James Douie, Punjab Settlement
Manual, 1930. The duties and activities of the patwaris and kanungoes are detailed in James
Douie, Punjab Land Administration Manual, 1908, Second ed. 1931, reprint 1972, Chs. 7 and 9;
Miles Irving, Punjab Land Records Manual, 1935, revised ed. 1973, Chs. 2 and 3.
21 James Douie, Punjab Settlement Manual, p. 36.
22 See
Punjab Patwari and Kanungo Rules, 1885.
 125

more systematically.23 The increase in the recorded area under tenancy was to
a large extent due to a more complete registration of tenancy.24
The distinction between the area under self-cultivation and that under
tenancy was not clearly made when the records were initially drawn up. This
again affects the measurement of change. J.M. Dunnet, a settlement officer
investigating the reasons for the sharp fall in the recorded khudkasht area in
Ludhiana, reported in 1911 that during the earlier settlement operation
(1878-83) all land in a village cultivated by a village owner was shown as
khudkasht whether it belonged to him, or to another.25 Such a definition of
khudkasht inevitably meant an underestimation of the area under tenancy,
especially regions where leasing in by owner cultivators was significant.
in
When the area leased in by owner cultivators was excluded in the estimation
of khudkasht land later, the area under tenancy showed an obvious increase.
There are further problems with the data. The distinction between a share-
cropper and an agricultural labourer receiving a share of the crop as wage is
always difficult to make. In the Punjab, both were referred to by the same
terms: sanjhi (in central Punjab) or sajji (in south-east Punjab). It was also
common for officials to interpret the term sanjhi as a partner. or a joint
cultivator, 26 and the area cultivated on the basis of such a part nershipwas
likely to be classified as khudkasht. Thus, many share-croppers were not
categorised as tenants in the early records. A subsequent reclassification of
such joint-cultivators as tenants would again tend to show an increase in the
area under tenancy cultivation.
in the official records, therefore, the extent of increase in the area under
tenancy is definitely overstated. Yet, the increase was partly real-there is
enough qualitative evidence to suggest this. What was the nature of this
increase? Table I shows a few important features: (z) The difference between
south-east Punjab and central Punjab is obvious. In Jullunder, Ludhiana,
Lahore and Ferozepur, the rate of increase in the proportion of area
under tenancy is more marked than in the districts of south-east Punjab:
Hissar, Rohtak, Gurgaon and Karnal. (The rates of change are detailed in
Table 2.) (ii) The change over time was not continuous. The major change in
No one who knows what land records were like before 1885, will dream of undervaluing the
23
reforms introduced in the period, wrote Douie ( Punjab Settlement Manual, p. 37). Douie, an
official, may be overstating the point. but there is some truth in the statement.
This was emphasised in the report of a special enquiry into the causes for the rise of tenancy in
24
the Punjab. See LRARP: 1898-99, p. 33.
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Sept. 1911, A, No. 36, para 28.
25
26 I have discussed this in Agricultural Labour and Production: A Study with reference to
Central and South-East Punjab, 1870-1940, paper presented at the Seminar on
Commercialisation in Indian Agriculture, held at the Centre for Development Studies,
Trivandrum, 1981. In the Census of 1881, there was an attempt to separate joint-cultivators
from landowners, tenants, and labourers. But D. Ibbetson, the Census Superintendent,
admitted that the attempt was not successful. See D. Ibbetsons report Census: Punjab: 1881,
Part I, p. 382.
126

Table 1
Proportion of cultivated Area Under Owners and Tenants 1873174-1922123 (Percentages)

Source: Calculated from LRARP of the relevant years. After 1922-23, no detailed district-wise
figures were given in LRARP.
the form of tenure occurred between 1890 and 1902 (see Tables I and 2). After
that there was little variation. The rate of change between 1902 and 1922 was
often negligible. Though disaggregated figures for each district are not
available after 1922, the provincial average suggests no significant increase in
the area under tenancy.27
These features are suggestive. The decline in khudkasht was most
pronounced in regions where long distance emigration was marked. While
from the central districts there was a massive outflow, from the south-east
such long distance migration was insignificant. 28 In some places in central
Punjab this emigration checked the rate of growth of population; in others, it
led to negative rates of growth.
27The proportion of cultivated area under tenancy in Punjab was as follows: 1900-1 = 43 per
cent,1911-12=43 per cent,1922-23 = 45 per cent,1927-28 = 46 percent, 1932= 47 per cent,1947
=
37 per cent. LRARP, relevant years.
28The colonisation project was started after 1886, and the Lower Chenab Canal opened in
1892. There could be no substantial flow of emigrants to the colonies before the 1890s. By 1901,
the net emigration to the Chenab colonies from other districts of the Punjab was as follows—
 127

Table 2
Annual Rates of Change in the Proportion of Area Cultivated by Owners and Tenants-at-Will
1890/91-1922/23

Source: See Table 1.

Moreover, the timing of the first phase of large-scale migration to the Canal
colonies and overseas in the 1890s, coincides with the period when tenancy
cultivation increased sharply. Towards the end of the period there was a violent
Hissar: 1,834 (13.5 per cent), Rohtak: nil, Gurgaon: nil, Hoshiarpur: 35,099 (35 per cent),
Jullunder: 56,983 (86 per cent), Ludhiana: 17,807 (99 per cent), Ferozepur: 15,048 (28 per cent),
Lahore: 28,620 ( 146 per cent), Amritsar: 67,963 (121 per cent). (The figures within brackets show
the net emigration to the Chenab colonies as a proportion of the total net emigration to all
regions from the particular district. For Lahore and Amritsar the proportion is over100 per cent
since there was an overall net immigration into these districts from other regions of Punjab,
whereas from these two districts there was a net emigration to the Chenab colonies.) Calculations
based on Census: Punjab: 1901, Part I, Subsidiary Table IV-B.
We are referring here to the late nineteenth and the early decades of the twentieth century. In a
recent article, Ajit Dasgupta has noted that large-scale movement of population to the Canal
colonies did not actually effect the long-term trends in the density of population in the central
districts of the Punjab. Agricultural Growth Rates in the Punjab, 1906-42, IESHR, 1981,
Vol. 18, Nos. 3 and 4, p. 345. Dasgupta, however, has compared the census figures of 1941 with those
of 1901. This comparison will not tell us about the phases of decline and increase which is
important for our argument here. If we study decennial changes of population from 1881, it is
clear that the rate of growth of population in central Punjab declined sharply between 1891 and
1901, showed a dramatic negative trend between 1901 and 1911, increased moderately between
1911 and 1921, and rapidly thereafter. The decennial percentage change of total population in
Jullunder Division was as follows—1881—91 = + 11.3 per cent, 1891-1901 = + 2.1 per cent,
1901-11= -7.8 per cent, 1911-21 = + 5.3 per cent, 1921-31 =+ 10 per cent. The relative stagnation
between 1891 and 1901, and the decline between 1901 and 1911 was largely due to emigration and
plague. In south-east Punjab, too, the population declined between 1891 and 1911. but this was
primarily due to famine mortality and not emigration.
128
outbreak of plague, which again led to an increase in tenancy. (I will discuss
the links between emigration, plague and tenancy cultivation subsequently.)
There was, thus, no steady long-term shift away from khudkasht, towards a
consolidation of landlordism. A comparison of average provincial figures at
two points of time conceals the nature of the shift in the form of tenure and the
regional differences. Further, the average figures are crucially affected by the
trend of development in the Canal colonies of north-west Punjab. In these
newly colonised areas conditions were very different from the rest of the
Punjab. The state policy of granting huge estates of 100 to 500 acres inevitably
encouraged tenancy cultivation. Direct cultivation on such a large scale was
problematic within the technological constraints of the time. In any case,
many of the grants of large estates were made to selected members of the
traditional gentry in the hope that this would restore the weakening position
of the class. Most of these grantees become absentee landowners. 29 This was
not the general trend in all regions of the Punjab. In the districts of central and
south-east Punjab, the proportion of cultivated area under tenants-at-will
fluctuated between 30 per cent and 45 per cent (see Table 1), while in the Canal
colonies it varied between 45 per cent and 80 per cent.

The Lessor and the Lessee

Measurement of the area under different forms of tenure by itself does not tell
us much about the nature of tenancy cultivation. Why was land leased out? To
understand the calculations which determined lease transactions, one has to
analyse who the lessor was and who the lessee.
The agrarian structure in the region of my study, was not charcterised by
the dominance of rentier landlords over a mass of undifferentiated tenants-at-
will. There was, of course, a class of landowners who in many ways resembled
the classical rentier. Their income from production was not recycled into
agriculture in any form; it was spent on extravagant consumption, and
represented a diversion of capital from production rather than a form of
money accumulation within agriculture.

The nature of my evidence makes it difficult to clearly identify this class

Here, the proportion of total cultivated area under khudkasht was considerably lower than in
29
central Punjab. By 1922, the proportion of area cultivated by tenants had increased to 48 per cent
in Lyallpur, 45 per cent in Jhelum, 61 per cent in Shahpur, 65 per cent in Jhang, 74 per cent in
Multan, and 79 per cent in Montgomery. Calculated from LRARP: 1922, Statement II. (This
explains why the proportion of cultivated area under tenants-at-will in the Punjab showed a
sudden fall after Partition: it was 47 per cent in 1932 and 37 per cent in 1947.)
The grant of large estates—yeomen and landlord grants—did not lead to large-scale farming
as the British officials expected. While the officials were disappointed with the colonists drawn
from within the traditional gentry, they were all praise for the peasant colonists from central
Punjab (who received smaller plots of about one square: i.e., 25 to 27 acres). The Jat Sikhs and
Arains of Ludhiana, Jullunder and Amritsar were considered the most desirable colonists who
in less than a generation made the wilderness blossom like a rose. See M. Darling, op. cit.,
pp. 117-22.
 129

and ascertain their strength. It seems, however, that-many big Rajput

landowners were of this class. In Rajput villages khudkasht was reported to
have been conspicuously low. We are repeatedly told that Rajputs are proud
of their birth and take little interest in cultivation so much so that some of
them do not touch the plough or any other implements.30 They were also
considered extremely extravagant and inclined to live luxurious lives,31
concerned more about their izzat than about production. These descriptions
can be infinitely multiplied, but no conclusive argument can be made on the
basis of such impressionistic accounts. These characteristics are not being
suggested as typical of all Rajputs; they were not. But those with such a
rationality (whether Rajputs or not) can perhaps be identified as the classic
rentiers with a feudal rationality.32
Within the tenantry, tne landless were significant in some regions. Many of
them were from the menial or artisan castes. In some tahsils, like Tarn Taran
and Amritsar, as much as 33 per cent of the land under tenants-at-will in the
late nineteenth century was held by the kamins (village menials).33 In the
census data we find a large proportion of the working male population of
these castes categorised as cultivators (in 1911, 20 per cent of the Chamars,.
10 per cent of the Chuhras, and about 23 per cent of the artisanal castes like
Tarkhanas, Loharas, etc.).34 While some of them owned land, most were
tenants. These census figures, however, tend to overstate the number of
menial cultivators. Even a menial with a small plot, earning a fraction of his
total subsistence from land, called himself a cultivator.3s
30Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Oct. 1913, No. 38, para 12.
31 Land Rev. and
Ag. (Rev.), Oct. 1913, No. 45, para 22. As I have already noted, the British
officials labelled the Rajputs the worst cultivators, and they were popularly associated with
indolence, inactivity and extravagance. The official view can be found easily in the numerous
Settlement Reports. For some lucid and interesting comments see M. Darling, op. cit., p. 34;
D. Ibbetson, Punjab Castes (Official: 1916); E.D. Maclagan, Census: Punjab: 1891, Part I.
32This feudal rationality was not characterised by the fact that direct cultivation was avoided,
or that the land was leased out, but by the fact that production was oriented towards meeting the
exorbitant levels of consumption expenditure for the maintenance of their life-style and izzat. The
British officials were fond of referring to the extravagant expenditures of the peasants as a cause
of their indebtedness. This remark, though fallacious in general, was perhaps true of many big
zamindari households. In their effort to sustain their noble life-styles on the basis of an
inefficient utilisation of their resources, many such families became increasingly indebted and
lost their land.
Ass. Rep: Tarn Taran: 1891, para 26; Ass. Rep: Amritsar: 1892, para 26. In Jagadhri it was
33
reported that landless tenants, mostly Chamars, were primarily in baniya and Rajput villages.
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Aug. 1920, A, No. 1. Menials continued to constitute a section of the
tenants-at-will, but the proportion of land under them declined in regions of expanding
production.
34 Census:
Punjab: 1911, Part II, calculated from Table XVI. In 1931, the proportions were as
follows: Chamar 20 per cent, Chuhra 9 per cent, Lohar 16 per cent, Julaha 11 per cent, Jhiwar 11
per cent. Census: Punjab: 1931, Part II, calculated from Table XI.
35The census officials noted this tendency as early as 1881: It is exceedingly probable that in
such cases, at any rate where the second occupation is of a menial nature, it has been dropped and
Census: Punjab: 1881, Part I, p. 381.
only agricultural occupation returned.
130
There were, in fact, two distinct groups of such lower caste tenants. There
were the sepidars of the village attached to different landowning households.
Grants of small plots of land to these village servants at low rents helped to
keep down their wages (mostly a share of the harvest). When kamins from
central Punjab began migrating in large numbers, specially to the Canal
colonies, the landowners were more keen to make such grants, to restrict the
mobility of the village kamins and retain their services.
However, not all Chamars or Chuhras were sepidars, and not all of them
could acquire land in exchange for customary services. So they tried to lease
in small plots. Land hunger was general: land provided not only a small
supplementary income but was also the basis for claiming some social
respectability. In order to lease in land these landless kamins had to compete
with the landowning classes. They were most successful in regions where the
demand for tenants was greater than the land hunger amongst the
landowning classes. This was the situation in the arid south-east. In Bhadas,~a
village in Gurgaon, it was reported that there is a steady demand for tenants
in the village ... this demand has brought into the field people of the menial
classes, though they are unable to secure land on favourable terms.36 Here, 34
per cent of the tenants were landless; of these, 20 per cent were Chamars and
Dhanaks, and 57 per cent were from the various artisanal and service castes
In the early years of colonisation of the north-west, the kamin immigrants
acquired tenancies with relative ease. In the Canal colonies there was a scarcity
of tenants. 38 In 1903 it was reported from Gujaranwala that the tenants which
(sic) landlords can secure are by no means always of a good class, and the
number of menial tenants in the Chenab is quite remarkable.39
However, those who leased out land for cultivation were not necessarily
rentier zamindars with huge estates, nor were the tenants-at-will all
impoverished landless peasants. A large proportion of the tenants-at-will,
specially in the central districts, were themselves landowners or occupancy
In 1901, 33, 189 tenants in the Punjab stated that they had menial occupations; but only 29 per
cent referred to it as their principal occupation, 71 per cent entered it as their subsidiary
occupation. Similarly, of the 56,240 tenants who were shown to have artisanal occupations, 72
per cent claimed that cultivation was their principal occupation. Many, of course, referred to
cultivation as their only occupation. Census: Punjab: 1901, Part I, p. 364.
36 VS: Bhadas
(1936). About Rohtak district it was reported that the tenants in the tahsil are
village servants ... and their holdings are usually small. Report of the Indian Famine
Commission: 1880, p. 241.
VS: Bhadas (1936).
37
38Cf. A. Anderson, Commissioner of Lahore Division:No doubt in most parts of Montgomery
the demand is for tenants and not for land. This is likely to go on much longer, in fact until
LRARP: 1902-3, Extract from Reports of
colonisation and extension of canals come to an end.
Commissioner, p. 2. In order to obtain tenants, often the landlord had to give advances. See
Report of the Deputy Commissioner, Lahore Division, ibid.
LRARP: 1903-4, p. 10. In later years, with the increase of production and the demand for
39
land, the situation changed. In 1932, a village survey in Lyallpur showed that only one out of 28
landless tenants belonged to the non-agricultural caste. Many of the tenants were relations of
owners, and stayed with them. VS: Kala Gaddi Thaman, Chak 73 G.B. (1932), pp. 61-62.
 131

tenants. A detailed investigation by Gordon Walker revealed that as early as

the 1870s over 60 per cent of the area cultivated by tenants-at-will in Ludhiana
was actually leased in either by proprietors or occupancy tenants.4~ In 19111
this was noted again in Ludhiana: the tenants are usually themselves owners
in the village.4i We get similar reports from other places: nearly all tenants-
at-will are connected with the proprietory body, a fact tending against
mobility (Zira tahsil, Ferozepur);42 in some circles tenants-at-will are really
proprietors and occupancy tenants who year after year take on cash rents
pieces of land adjoining their holdings (Una tahsil, Hoshiarpur);43 tenants-at-
will are nearly always themselves owners who have insufficient land of their
own (Moga tahsil, Ferozepur);44 they are proprietors... cultivating spare
land belonging to other owners (Jagadhri tahsil, Ambala).45 According to the
Khasra Girdawari records of village Tehong in Jullunder, only 17 per cent of
the tenants-at-will were landless.46 In village Gaggar Bhana, around 1922-23,
landless tenants cultivated only 6 per cent of the total cultivated area, whereas
42 per cent was held by tenants-at-will who owned land.4~ In Bairampur,a
village in Hoshiarpur, only 0.7 per cent of the total cultivated area was held by
nineteen tenants-at-will who did not own land. 48 In this village, 48 per cent of
the owners, in addition to the land they owned, leased in land for cultivation.
If one examines Table 3 one is confronted with a seeming paradox:
khudkasht was least prevalent among small owners. The proportion of
cultivating owners increased with the size of the holding. This, however, only

confirms our argument that the large landowners were not always non-
cultivating rentiers, and small landowners often had to lease out their
holdings.
Table 3
Percentage of Different Categories of Owners who Cultivated their Land

Note: The figures include those who had part of their holding under khudkasht.
Source: VS: Suner ( 1936), pp. 49-51; VS: Tehong ( 1931 ), pp. 51-55; VS: Gaggar Bhana ( 1928),
pp. 50-57.
SR: Ludhiana: 1878-83, p. 40.
40
41Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Sept. 1911, A, No. 36.
42Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Jan. 1914, A, No. 20.
43Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Jan. 1914, A, No. 37.
44Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), April 1913, A, No. 42.
45Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Aug. 1920, A, No. 1.
VS: Tehong (1931), pp. 56-57.
46
47
VS: Gaggar Bhana (1928), p. 69.
48
VS: Bairampur (1922), pp. 28-29.
132,
In general, the rich and middle peasants were the dominant lessees (see
Table 4). In all the villages, the proportion of operated holdings in the size-
categories between 7.5 to 50 acres was in general considerably larger
compared ownership holdings of the same size. The pattern was reversed
to
for size holdings below 5 acres, and those above 50 acres. Some of the small
holders leased in a little and cultivated a larger area than they owned (they will
thus be categorised in the higher group); but many were forced to lease out
their land. The nature of redistribution of land through such a process would
be more clearly reflected in the proportional distribution of owned and
operated area m different size holdings (see 1 able 5). Statistical data on this
aspect are difficult to get. Only rough estimates are possible.49 According to
calculations, of the total area under operated holdings, the proportion held by
cultivators with 7.5 to 50 acres was 61 per cent in village Tehong, 86 per cent in
Gaggar Bhana, 78 per cent in Suner, 65 per cent in Bhadas and 79 per cent in
Jamalpur Sheikhan. ~1 he area under ownership holdings of this size was
lower. The corresponding proportions in the above villages were 27 per cent,
62 per cent, 50 per cent, 60 per cent and 32 per cent. Conversely, the operated
area under holdings of less than 7.5 acres, particularly in the central Punjab

villages, was lower than the area under ownership holdings of this size.
Some studies on tenancy in post-colonial India show that in the dry tracts
of the country (north-western and western India) a typical tenant is a big
peasant, whereas in the wet regions (eastern and southern India) a typical
tenant is a small peasant.50 The argument is as follows. lf the supply of labour
within each cultivating household is considered as given, labour intensive
cultivation in the wet regions would imply a sharp decline of marginal
productivity of land beyond a point when the operated area is extended in
relation to the given amount of labour; on the other hand, in the unirrigated
dry tracts, the intensity of labour required for production being lower (due to
soil and crop mix), the marginal productivity of land declines more slowly
when the operational holding is extended.
In the former, the operational holdings are smaller, extension of
production being difficult without employment of wage labour and its
associated problems of management; in the latter region, there is greater
incentive for larger farmers to lease in land since a larger area can be
cultivated on the basis of family labour supply. Differences in the rate of
49To estimate the area, the arithmetic mean of the class intervals were multiplied with the
number of holdings in the category.1.2 was taken as the mean for the category below 2.5 acres,
and 75 as that of the category over 50 acres. There are obvious problems in this method of
calculation, with an arithmetic mean for non-homogeneous data. Though the exact figures may
be questionable, the broad pattern appears plausible.
50See Pranab Bardhan, Variations in Extent and Forms of Agricultural Tenancy, EPW, 11
and 18 Sept. 1976. One of the most interesting explorations into this question is by K.N. Raj,
Ownership and Distribution of Land, The Indian Economic Review (New Series), Vol. 5, No. 170.
For a critique of the neo-classical assumptions in much of the writings on crop-sharing tenancy
see A.K. Bagchi, Crop Sharing Tenancy and Neo-classical Economics, EPW, Vol. 11: 17,
Jan. 1976.
 133

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decline of the marginal utility of land thus get reflected not only in the scale
but in the direction of land transfers through leasing.51 Landowners prefer
large tenants in drier tracts where the probability of default of rent is higher,
and small tenants where security of production reduces the risk of default and
allows a higher level of rent extraction. Moreover, where production is more
secure and alternative wage employment uncertain, poor peasants are more

willing to cultivate small plots of land.52

As we have seen, leasing in by rich peasants and middle peasants was net a
post-colonial phenomenon in the Punjab.53 However, the Punjab was not a
zone with homogeneous characteristics. While the south-east was a dry,
insecure tract with wide tluctuations in annual rainfall and frequent bad
harvests, central Punjab had a more even distribution of rainfall and a larger
area under irrigation. Production in this central zone was more secure and the

intensity of labour input higher. Yet, leasing in by rich peasants was equally, if
not more, common in this region: so was leasing out of land by small holders.
Apart from the evidence already cited (Tables 4 and 5) one may refer to other
similar indications (see Table 6). The proportion of rented area to the total
area under small operated holdings (below 2.5 acres) was insignificant in the

central Punjab villages of Tehong and Gaggar Bhana. The situation in

Hissar--the most arid tract of the south-east-appears to be different. In
Jamalpur village in this district, of the 404 acres held by cultivators with less
than 2.5 acres, 287 acres (i.e., 71 per cent) was rented land. For the larger
holdings we do not have figures relating to all the villages. But the general
dependence of the large holders on leased in land is apparent (see Table 6). 1 n
Tehong 73 per cent of the area under operated holdings of 15-20 acres, and 46
per cent of the area under 20-50 acres, was rented. About 70 per cent of the
total leased in area in this village was held by those cultivating over 7.5 acres.54
The pattern of lease transfers in the two regions was not merely related to
the differential rate of decline of marginal productivity of land conditioned by
the intensity of labour input required for production. Whether or not small
holders leased out or leased in land depended on the alternative sources of
income available within the village and outside. The rich peasants or middle
51Cf. K.N. Raj, op. cit.
52There is a high positive correlation between the area under small tenancy and the percentage
of area under labour intensive crops, and the percentage of cultivated area under irrigation. Cf. P.
Bardhan, op. cit.
53
In much of the literature on the subject this type of lease exchange is considered a recent
phenomenon in India.
54In Tehong, the proportion of total leased in area under different sizes of operational holdings
was as follows: below 5 acres = 15 per cent. 5 to 10 acres = 39 per cent, 10- 15 acres = 28 per cent,

15 50 acres= 18 per cent.

Compared to the central Punjab villages, the difference between the percentage of area under
small operated holdings and ownership holdings (categories a and b ) in the south-east Punjab
villages was not so marked (Table 5). In village Gijhi of Rohtak, the percentage of small operated
holdings in category a was much lower than the ownership holdings in this category (Table 4),
but in categories a and c, the pattern was reversed.
136

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peasants would attempt to control the leased in land only when the broader
processes had led to the evolution of these classes and created conditions for
expanded commercial production. In central Punjab (a region of expanding
commercial agriculture) a class of rich peasantry was slowly crystallising, and
a substantial section of the middle peasantry was consolidating itself by the
end of the nineteenth century. The existing cultivated land was coming under
their control through purchase and lease. The growing population also
pressed against the limits of cultivated area. The small holders and the
landless found it difficult to lease in land. Irrigated land, nahri (canal
irrigated) or chahi (land irrigated from wells) was usually retained by the
owners.55 Barani land was more easily available, but such insecure tracts
could not provide any stable source of income. Many small holders preferred
to lease out their land and migrate along with the landless. This was possible
since the colonisation of north-western Punjab opened up better
opportunities of earning: there was a demand for agricultural labourers as
well as tenants. Large-scale emigration and expansion of production was
accompanied by an increased demand for labour and a rise in wages within
central Punjab. Small holders, who did not migrate, had the option of
supplementing their income from cultivation with wages earned during peak
seasons instead of leasing in land at a high rent.56 Since employment in the
seasonal factories was increasing, some could also work in the cities off-
season.
In many villages of the south-east the context was different. Uncertainty
of harvests and repeated droughts acted as a barrier to any rapid expansion of
cultivation of valuable commercial crops. The population pressure was less
severe and the limits of cultivation were yet to be exhausted. Rents and wages
were lower than in central Punjab. Seasonal migration, rather than long-
term migration, was the norm. While leasing out by small holders was more
common in regions where out-migration was significant, leasing in by small
owners and the landless was more necessary where alternative sources of
income (either through migration or wage employment in the region) were
limited. In particular villages, this pattern could be modified by various othe
conditions which I shall discuss later.
In his analysis of peasant farming in the Punjab, Tom Kessinger considers .

farm size to be a function of family size. Lease transactions are seen as one of
the mechanisms by which farm size was adjusted to family labour resources
and needs. Kessinger does show a positive correlation between family size and
the size of ownership and operated holdings. But a correlation does not
In tahsil Tarn Taran it was reported: Tenants are not admitted so much to the chahi and
55 ...

nahri soils which the owners keep in their own hands or let to each other. Ass. Rep: Tarn Taran:
1891, para 51. In Nawashahr: Cultivating proprietors reserve the best land for their own
cultivation and let out their outlying holdings to tenants-at-will. Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Sept.
1916, A, No. 15, para 41.
56 I have discussed the question of agricultural employment and wages in Agricultural Labour
and Production (mimeo: 1981).
138
indicate the actual nature of a causal connection. Rich peasants can afford
large families and hence have a larger family labour force. Smaller families
and a larger number of emigrants are characteristic of poor peasant
households. 57 Leasing out and leasing in by the rich peasants and poor
peasants were determined by different considerations. For the rich peasants,
leasing out of surplus land was necessary because of diseconomies of scale,
problems of management and supervision, and calculations of wage
expenditure. The poor peasant leased out when he was too heavily weighed
down with debts to carry on cultivation, and the holding was too small to
sustain his needs or absorb the labour resources of the family. Even when
there was surplus family labour in relation to the area of land owned, poor
peasants often could not expand cultivation. Large households of rich
peasants and the more affluent middle peasants, who had other resources
(capital and bullocks) could expand cultivation with greater ease.58
Demographic pressure within the poor peasant or lower middle peasant
households could imply intensification of labour on the same land area,
search for alternative employment, indebtedness and pauperisation.
Within particular units of production, the ratio of owned land to leased in
land varied over time. Short-term fluctuations were determined by the
movement of prices and weather conditions. The rich and middle peasant
households would lease in more land when weather conditions were
favourable. The ratio of leased in land would thus increase within the unit of
production. The prospect of a timely shower was particularly crucial in
regulating the demand for barani land. Cash rents for barani land declined
when a dry season was expected, and rose when rain was plentiful.59
A rise in prices is also accompanied by an attempt to expand cultivation,
and consequently a higher proportion of land is leased in by the rich peasants
and middle peasants.60 The demand for irrigated tracts seems to have been
relatively steady; a variety of cash crops could be grown there and all sections
57 While
talking of farm size adjusting to family size, Kessinger also talks of family size adjusting
to farm size. Unless one specifies at what levels the opposing determinations operate, the
argument is inconsistent and contradictory. Tom Kessinger, Vilyatpur, New Delhi, 1979; The
Explorations in Economic History, Vol. 12, 1975.
Peasant Farm in North India, 1848-1968,
58
Assuming a relatively adequate control over capital resources, the extent of khudkasht within
the peasant farm may be related to the number of working members within the family. Compared
to cultivation through family labour, extended production on the basis of hired labour tended to
bring lower income per acre&mdash;particularly in regions like the Punjab where wages were rising
rapidly. Further, given the technological constraints of the time, machines could not substitute for
physical labour. Rich peasants, whose ownership holdings were much larger in relation to family
size, leased out part of the holding, retaining the best land for self-cultivation. Those with smaller
plots and surplus family labour leased in.
59See the section in this article on Levels of Rent.
60 M. Darling noted that a large proportion of the tenants who are increasing their holding are
themselves owners, who saw in high prices an opportunity to improve their position. To this type
of man and to the tenants generally, high prices, as M r Calvert says, acted "as a stimulus to greater
exertion and greater interest". Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt, Delhi, 1925, p. 119.
 139

of the peasants competed for such land. Fluctuations in demand were marked
on unirrigated land where only a limited variety of crops could be grown-
bejhar (mixed wheat and gram) and fodder being most important. It was
perhaps the rising prices of gram and fodder, apart from the prospects of good
rainfall, which determined the increased demand for such land. However, the
rising prices of cotton, wheat or maize and expansion of their cultivation
would also be reflected in an increased leasing in of baram land. Fodder or
gram displaced from the irrigated land (by cotton, wheat or maize) would
now be grown on barani land. A fall in prices did lead to a decline in the
demand for such land and a fall in cash rents, 61 but the decline in leased in area
was not proportional to the fall in prices. Many cultivating owners were
forced to cultivate their leased in land, and at times increase the area leased in,
to meet their cash demands. During the Depression many such cultivators
increased the area of land leased in to check the rapid decline in their
income.62
In holdings where a part of the surplus land was leased out, the ratio of
khudkasht to leased out land would not necessarily fluctuate so much with
price and weather conditions. In such units where members of the household
were already absorbed in khudkasht, extension of direct cultivation and

resumption of leased out land could be through the employment of hired

labour. This would become lucrative only if there was a sharp long-term price
rise without a corresponding rate of wage inflation. Alternately, such a trend
towards the resumption of leased out land for direct cultivation could be
determined by extension of mechanical agriculture which would increase
labour productivity; or, it could be prompted by government legislation
restricting tenancy cultivation; or, it could be a response to a stron~1tenant
movement. All these might influence the long-term shifts of tenancy
cultivation, as they did in the post-independence era, but not the short-term
fluctuations in the relationship between khudkasht and leased out land in the
larger units of production.63 .

Till now I have discussed the question of leasing in and leasing out land in
relation to the extent of land held by individual owners (the size of their
holding). This, however, is a simplified picture. The working of the lease
market, the transactions between landowners and tenants, were more
complex. There were other types of lessors and lessees, other conditions
61
See note 1 15 below.
62
This trend is reflected even in the Farm Accounts in the Punjab (Lahore) which relate to large
holdings.
J. Martinez Alier has analysed how, in Spain, the landowners shifted from one form of
63
labour use to another in response to the peasant movement. See Labourers and Landowners in
Southern Spain, London, 1971. In India, in the post-independence period, there has been a large-
scale resumption of leased out land and a distinct general decline of tenancy cultivation. This was
) peasant movements against share-cropping; (
related to (
a ) a shift in the terms of trade in favour
b
of agriculture (after 1956); and () government policies: (
c ) leasing out was generally considered
i
ii the various government subsidies cheapened production costs
unsafe after the land reforms, )
(
and allowed higher profits through direct employment of wage labour.
140
which affected the calculations and decisions of owners-determinants which
had no necessary connection with the size of the holding.
Exchanging plots through lease transactions was necessary to consolidate
the operational holding of a cultivating owner. The proprietory holdings of
most owners were split up into numerous fragments. In the villages of
Amritsar, Jullunder, Rohtak, Gurgaon, Ferozepur and Ambala, 52 per cent
of the holdings were composed of 6 to 40 fragments; only 20 per cent were not
fragmented.64 With every generation the fragmentation increased. For an
owner; direct cultivation of his scattered plots was not only inconvenient but
often impossible. Plots were sometimes miles apart. Extensive cultivation of
any particular crop or irrigation from a common source was difficult, and
guarding the fields was a problem. Conflicts and friction with the neighbours
were a recurring phenomena. If the cultivator had to cart his manure to the

field, or carry the wheat sheaves to the threshing floor he had to pass through
his neighbours fields, who could always deny him the right of way. So the
tendency was to lease out distant plots and lease in nearby land-facility in
cultivating adjacent and contiguous land is kept in view in the mutual
transactions.65 We are told that exchanges have all been in the direction of
concentration if not consolidation. 66 Exchange need not combine two
fragments into one, but it does bring together the area cultivated by a
proprietor. The number of fragments may be the same, but instead of being a
mile apart, they may be only a few yards apart.
I have mentioned earlier that leasing out was common when the family
could not cultivate the entire holding, a problem more specific to large
owners. However, in many households, even those with small holdings, there
were often no men to cultivate the land. In some, there were childless widows
who had acquired land. which belonged to their husbands; in others,
unmarried women had inherited shares of their fathers property. Sometimes,
cultivators died when their children were too young to work; often, a childless
peasant survived till he was too old and feeble to hold the plough. In most of
these cases the land was leased out to another cultivator, who was often a
relative.
The literature on the subject is too vast to be cited. For a specific discussion of tenancy see
Dharm Narain and P.C. Josh:, Magnitude of Tenancy in India, EPW, 27 Sept. 1969; Shiela
Bhalla, Changes in Acreage and Tenure Structure of Land Holdings in Haryana 1962-72, EPW,
March 1977; N. Bandyopadhyaya, Causes of Sharp Increase in Agricultural Labourers,
1961-71, EPW, Review of Agriculture, 31 Dec. 1977; Utsa Patnaik, Class Differentiation
Within the Peasantry: An Approach to Analysis of Indian Agriculture, EPW, 25 Sept. 1976;
Krishna Bharadwaj and P. K. Das, Tenurial Conditions and Modes of Exploitation: A Study of
Some Villages in Orissa, EPW, 21 and 28 June 1975.
Calculated from the figures given in the various village surveys of these districts.
64
65Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Oct., 1913, A, No. 45, para 31; cf. H.W. Steel, Deputy
Commissioner of Rohtak. One of the commonest reasons which induces owners to become
tenants of the lands of one another is the convenience of being able to cultivate in one place only,
Letter No. 664, Nov. 1884. Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), May 1885, No. 20.
66
VS: Gaggar Bhana (1928), p. 65
 141

Such peasant families were not few. In

village Suner, for instance, 22 per
cent of the households which did not cultivate belonged to this category; in
village Tehong, 20 per cent. /17 An epidemic plague, cholera or influenza
of
would leave many families without any healthy working person. Khudkasht
declined sharply in the regions most affected by the plague of 1900-1. After
the influenza epidemic in Gurgaon, the demand for tenants increased greatly
and land had to be let out at low rentS.68
Many artisans of the village (the Tarkhan, the Lohar, the Kumhar) managed
to acquire plots of land, but often could not cultivate. They had to go out of
the village in search of work, leasing their land to others. In Tehong, there
were seven Tarkhans with plots of land. Only one lived in the village,

practising his craft and cultivating his land. Two worked in Lahore in the
railway workshops; one was at the Beas station; one had left the village and
nothing was known of him; another was in the Canal colonies; the last one
died, and his widow lived in another village.69
The baniyas of the village, who were involved in trade, moneylending and
shopkeeping, did not cultivate the land themselves. Tenancy cultivation was
extensive in villages held by baniyas. Mortgages and the sale of land to non-
agriculturist moneylenders usually implied an increase in tenancy: the baniya
mortgagee leased the land back to the peasant. However, by the twentieth
century, the rich peasants had acquired greater control over the mortgaged
area, and the mortgagees cultivated the land directly. In such a context, an
increase in mortgages did not necessarily lead to an increase in tenancy. A
mortgage could be a form of secure long-term lease; the loan ensured a
prolonged possession by the mortgagee. There could be no continuous threat
of eviction and enhancement of rent. ,

Forms of Rent: Cash or Kind?

The transformation in the form of rent payment is often considered a function

of the expansion of the market and commodity production. In tracing the
genesis of capitalist ground rent, Marx observed a linear progression from
labour rent to rent in kind, and finally to money rent. 70 Historically, however,
forms of rent reflect more complex patterns of mutation. In the Punjab, the
forms of rent paid by the tenants-at-will differed from region to region, and
Calculated from figures in VS: Suner (1936), Ch. 4; VS: Tehong (1931), Ch. 4.
67
VS: Bhadas (1936), p. 58; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Sept. 1916, No. 15.
68
VS: Tehong (1931), Ch. 4.
69
Karl Marx, Genesis of Capitalist Ground Rent, Capital, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1971. Marxs
70
analysis has influenced much of the subsequent discussions on the subject. See, for instance, the
articles of M. Dobb, P. Sweezy and H.K. Takahashi in R. Hilton, ed., The Transition from
Feudalism to Capitalism, London, 1976. Kosminskys analysis of the complex pattern of
evolution of feudal rent in England provides a historical critique of such conceptions. See
Studies in the Agrarian History of England in the Thirteenth Century, Oxford, 1956; The
Evolution of Feudal Rent in England, Past and Present, No. 7, April 1955.
 142
over time. In analysing this, one does not find any positive correlation
between the development of commodity production, the dissolution of share-
cropping and the spread of money rent.71
Cash rent was characteristic of regions with uncertain harvests and low
yield. In the arid south-east Punjab in the late nineteenth century, we are told,
cash rents were at once, most common and most stable.72 In Hissar, the
settlement officer observed that cash rents are of great importance. They are
practically always taken on the Karipuri system, by which the tenant pays rent
on all land in his possession, whether cultivated or not, and whether the
cultivated land produced a crop or not.3Where sharp fluctuations in yield
were normal, the landowner could secure a regular income only through fixed
cash rent. If the harvest failed, the tenant was forced to borrow, but the
income of the landowner was ensured. In the late nineteenth century, cash

rent was charged from about 80 per cent of the area held by tenants-at-will in
Rohtak, Hissar and Gurgaon (see Table 7). Since long-term leases were rare,
rents could be increased in correspondence with the rise in prices.
Regions of expanding and stable cycles of production were regions where
share-cropping was most dominant. This was observed by all revenue
officials: in tahsil Ludhiana cash rents are not general, are not paid in the best
villages and are everywhere confined to the poorest soils.74 In Fazilka tahsil
The area under which genuine cash rents are taken is
comparatively ... trifling;~5 in Tehong village of Jullunder, cane is a
commercial crop, and tenants would like to grow it on the Bet on cash rents,
Marx, of course, was not analysing the actual historical evolution of the forms of rent, and the
71
numerous historically determinate forms of its existence in different societies:We cannot enter
into the endless variety of combinations wherein the various forms of rent may be united,
adulterated and amalgamated. Capital, Vol. 3, p. 796. His concern was with pure formsand the
logical presuppositions of their existence. Money rent, emphasised Marx, presupposes a
considerable development of commerce, of urban industry, of commodity production in general,
and thereby of money circulation. Ibid., p. 797. Rent in kind, on the other hand, presupposes the
existence of a natural economy, and the combination of rural home industry with agriculture.
Ibid., p. 795. There is thus an implicit suggestion that rent in kind is incompatible with
commercial agriculture. And this conception inevitably leads to the notion that rent in kind
persists after the break down of natural economy only as an antiquated survival from an
obsolete mode of production. Ibid., Ch. 67, passim. It is true that historically rent in kind pre-
dated money rent, and the growth of commerce and money circulation was a necessary condition
for the evolution of money rent, but it was not a sufficient condition for the dissolution of rent
in kind. Whether there is a tendency towards its dissolution depends on numerous other historical
conditions.
72 1896-97, p. 25, para 8.
LRARP:
SR: Hissar: 1906-10, p. 12. In Sirsa, cash rents are the rule, and grain rents the exception.
73
Report of Major E.G. Wace, Settlement Commissioner Punjab, LRARP: 1880-81, App. A. In
district Gurgaon, kind rents were reported to be unknown in tahsil Palwal and rare in Nuh and
Ferozepur tahsils. SR: Gurgaon: 1872-83, p. 71. See also SR: Rohtak: 1905-10, p. 20; SR:
Sirsa:1879-83, pp. 348-49.
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Sept. 1911, A, No. 36.
74
75
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Nov. 1914, A, No. 10. This is a common remark in numerous
reports. See section on Tenancies and Rent in Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), March 1916, A, No. 1;
 143

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144
but land is lacking except on batai.76 In contrast to the arid and backward

south-east, in the fertile central Punjab, rents were paid in kind on 60

more

per cent of the area cultivated by tenants-at-will (see Table 7). Here share-
cropping was becoming more widespread over the years.
This regional variation shows the contrast in the dominant forms of rent
which existed in districts with secure harvests on the one hand, and those with
uncertain harvests on the other. Within the south-eastern districts, cash rents
tended to decline with the extension of irrigation. In Gijhi village of Rohtak,
cash rents disappeared in irrigated circles; the yield is assured in irrigated
areas and high price of produce makes batai the preferred form of rent from
the standpoint of the owners. The case of barani tracts is different.77
In Hissar, most tenants-at-will paid cash rent; but it was noted that No land
inundated by the Gaggar, the Joiya or the Rangoi ever pays a cash rent. It is
all subject to batai. 78 In Karnal, where rainfall was less precarious and
irrigation more extensive, the proportion of area under cash rent was lower; it
declined from about 55 per cent in 1890-91 to about 41 per cent in 1922 (see
Table 7).~9 Within central Punjab, where rent in kind was predominant, most
insecure tracts with a low productive capacity were subject to cash rent. Cash
rents are commoner on barani than on irrigated soils; the rule being to take a
share of the produce where there is little risk of failure and cash where the risk is
great.80 In Tam Taran tahsil of Amritsar, 75 per cent of the area under cash
rent was barani. H owever, the tahsil settlement officer noted, even on barani
land the better the produce and more certain the yield, the more likely is the
land to be let on kind rent,8I Similar observations were made on most
districts of central Punjab.82
in general-with the extension of irrigation, increased production of more
valuable crops, and a long-term price rise-there was a shift from cash rents to
share-cropping. Even in the south-east, where cash rents continued to
predominate, the system of batai slowly gained ground in the early twentieth
century. Between 1890 and 1922, the proportion of leased in area under cash
rent decreased by 30 per cent in Hissar, 33 per cent in Rohtak, 5 per cent in
Gurgaon, 26 per cent in Karnal (see Table 7). However, there was no
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Nov. 1915, A, Nos. 21-22; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Jan. 1914, A, No.
20; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Oct. 1913, A, No. 45.
76
VS: Tehong (1931), p. 188.
77
VS: Gijhi (1932), p. 181. This feature was observed in Rohtak much earlier: in irrigated land
they (i.e., kind rents) are everywhere of importance and specially so in the best irrigated tracts,
that is, in tahsil Gohana and in the northern parts of Sampla and Rohtak. SR: Rohtak: 1905-10,
p. 20.
SR: Hissar: 1906-10, p. 12.
78
79 For details on rents in kind in Karnal see SR: Karnal: 1901, pp. 17-18, para 22.
Ass. Rep: Tarn Taran: 1891, App. D, para 18.
80
81
Ibid., para 51.
82 In Ludhiana, it was the same pattern: On barani they (i.e., cash rents) are never paid on
double cropped lands. Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Sept. 1911, A, No. 36, para 30. For Lahore see
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), May 1914, A, Nos. 13-14, para 45.
 145

unilinear progression in the form of rent payment. During the long-term price
rise, there were phases of depression and inflation which conditioned the
calculations of landowners and tenants. When money rents were fixed during
the initial summary settlements in some regions of the Punjab the system
appealed to the landowners. In the price depression of the 1830s and 1840s,
rent in kind would have meant a declining income for the landowners who
had to pay their revenue to the colonial state in cash. By the 1850s the
depression was lifting, and landownersin central Punjab were anxious to go
back to rent in kind which could ensure an automatic increase in their
incomes when prices rose. In many instances where money rates were fixed,
wrote Brandreth in June 1854, I find them again returning to payments in
kind.g3 British officials who had initially hoped to enforce a uniform regular
mode of cash rent payment, had to soon give up their attempt and allow local
conditions to determine the system. Official objection to the division of crops
grew weaker, efforts at commutation were considered hopeless,84 and batai
was increasingly recognised as the normal system of levying dues from
land.85 The real situation forced a change in the official attitude, and the
theory of non intervention allowed a rationale for the change.86
In the south-east, the direction of shift was reversed. In the early nineteenth
century, ryots were allowed to pay batai, which was more acceptable to the
tenant in insecure tracts.87 In this region favourable terms of tenancy had to
be offered since tenants were scarce. By the late nineteenth century, the
context had changed, and landowners could enforce the form of rent which
they found profitable. There was a rapid shift from rent in kind to cash rent
(Table 7).88 The extension of irrigation in the twentieth century led to a
gradual shift back to batai from cash rent. But rent in kind now emerged in a
context different from that of the early nineteenth century. At that time the
system was preferred by the tenants.
E.L. Brandreth, Deputy Commissioner Ferozepur, to G.C. Barnes, Commissioner and
83
Superintendent Cis-Sutlej States, Ambala Div. Rec. 13, Bundle 14, Case 175, 8 June 1854.
After a money payment was fixed, when improvement began to show itself, and opportunity of
profit offered, the cash system might always revert to ... Batai or Kunkoot, wrote H. Davidson
from Jullunder. SR: Jullunder: 1862, p. 11. For a discussion of changes in the form of rent in
Bengal and Bihar see Ranajit Guha, Evidence on Some Correlations of Rents and Prices in Bihar
Under Early British Rule, Indian Historical Commission: Proceedings, 1958, Vol. 34, Part 2;
Binay Bhushan Chaudhuri, Movement of Rent in Eastern India: 1793-1930, The Indian
Historical Review, Jan. 1977, Vol. 3, No. 2.
84E.L. Brandreth, Deputy Commissioner Ferozepur, to G.C. Barnes, Commissioner and
Superintendent Cis-Sutlej States, Ambala Div. Rec. 13, Bundle 14, Case 175, 8 June 1854.
SR: Jullunder: 1862, p. 11.
85
J.E. Cracroft expressed the prevailing view of the time that of late years it appears to be
86
acknowledged on all sides that rent in kind is not so bad a thing after all. The proprietors cling to
grain payments with a tenacity impossible to overcome.... We have at last adopted a policy of
non-intervention in this matter.
SR: Rawalpindi: 1864, p. 101.
87See comments of John Lawrence in Settlement of Pergunnah Taroo, 1837, Statistical
Report on the District of Gurgaon, Agra, 1849, App. C, para 20.
Ibid.,
88 p. 91.
 146

With the onset of the Great Depression and the collapse of prices in the
1930s, the order of preferences was again reversed. Landowners attempted,
often unsuccessfully, to shift back to cash rent. These formal shifts in the
mode of payment of rent did not necessarily reflect any corresponding change
in the actual content of social relations. They were the most convenient means
of expanding or stabilising the income of the landowner at a given
conjuncture.
.
Levels of Rent .

Whether the payment was in cash or in kind, there was a secular long-term rise
in the levels of rent paid by the tenants-at-will. Statistical data on rent are
abundant, but largely unreliable. Some of the figures can still be used if one
exercises some caution. Often the cash rent figures, especially of the earlier
period, show peculiarities which are difficult to explain. According to the
entries in 1870-71, for instance, rent per acre of tobacco land was Rs 40 in
Sialkot, Rs 2.75 in Amritsar, and Rs 20 in Gurdaspur; but the per acre yield of
tobacco in these districts was not so varied.89 Entries referring to rent for
wheat land are even more peculiar-it varied inversely with output. In
AmriEsar wheat output was much higher than in Gurdaspur or in Sialkot; yet
the rent was lower in Amritsar (Rs 3 in Amritsar as compared to Rs 8.25 in
Gurdaspur and Rs 10.50 in Sialkot).~ However, cash rents in the Punjab were
not crop specific. The rent rates for different crops, entered in the annual
statements till the 1880s, were assumed rates not real ones and are of little
value.9~ Only after the 1880s was the system of recording altered. Thereafter,
rent rates for each class of soil were collected.
Often the variation between districts merely reflected the different ways in
which patwaris entered cash rent figures. The patwari was expected to show
one prevailing rate for each class of soil; a task which was difficult where
wide variations in rent rates were characteristic. From these dubious figures,
when one rate was arbitrarily selected as the prevailing rate of the tahsil or
district, errors were multiplied.92 Mention of the maximum and minimum
rate in the annual statements did not resolve the problem: the wide difference
between the two extremes makes meaningful averaging impossible.
See Report of the Amritsar Division by Divisional Commissioner W.G. Davies, para 41,
89
LRARP: 1870-71.
90 Ibid.

91
Revenue officials were aware of this: The statistics on rent per acre of land suited for various

crops specified are not of much value, as rents are not usually fixed upon this basis in Punjab.
LRARP: 1877-78, General Report, para 53; see also LRARP: 1875-76, General Report, para
129. Land leased for sugarcane cultivation was an exception.
When we come to larger subdivisions such as tahsils and districts, it was observed in
92
1888-89, it is hardly too much to say that it is impossible to name one rate only as the prevailing
rate for each class of soil. The report added that the entries on cash rent were far from giving an
accurate idea on any class of soil. LRARP: 1888-89. See also LRARP: 1889-90, para 27, for a
similar report.
 147

Moreover, the concept of cash rent acquired different connotations. In somf

districts, it was reported, the entries are made from the actual money rent
paid, and in some by valuation, as ascertained by experiment, of the share of
the produce taken by the landlords.93 The figures derived from the valuation
of shares were normally higher, since kind rent was more common on
irrigated double-cropped land which produced more valuable crops. So the
stated cash rents of different regions were not always comparable. In some
cases, the impression of a gradual rise of rent could turn out to be false. In
1871- 72 it was found that the apparent increase in cash rent reflected in the
figurcs was chiefly due to the fact that rates in kind and rates paid by tenants-
at-will were taken as the basis of calculations to a greater extent than before.94
The revenue officials were themselves aware that the cash rent figures were
questionable. The statements throughout are so full of startling anomalies
that they cannot be correct, wrote W.G. Davies, the Divisional Commissioner
of Amritsar.95 Two years later, in 1872-73, we are again cautioned: It is not
safe to form any general conclusions as to the rise and fall of rents upon such a
return as this.96 Subsequently, from time to time, there were hopeful reports
of considerable improvement in the nature of entries,97 followed soon by
further warnings about their unreliability. The quality of data did improve
after the 1880s, but I prefer to use the statements prepared during the
Settlement enquiries. These were more carefully collected so that the
productive capacity of the soil and the rental value of the land could be
assessed.98 The changes between the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century can be analysed from these. My efforts to study the nature of the
annual fluctuations have proved rather futile. The yearly statements
reproduced in the annual Report on the Land Revenue Administration of the
Punjab of the 1890s were based on a system of quadrennial attestation, by
which one-fourth of the villages in each district came under attestation each
year. The figures used for computing average rates, therefore, referred to
different sets of villages for different periods of time. This, however, did not
preclude a gradual rise in rents being recorded; but the effect of sudden and
violent fluctuations were eliminated.99
Statistics on rent collected during the settlement have their own problems.
Since increased rental value of the land meant increased revenue demand,
landowners usually gave false figures. In many villages the rent was
LRARP: 1874-75, para 122.
93
LRARP: 1871-72, para 156.
94
95 1870-71, para 93.
LRARP:
LRARP: 1872-73, para 237.
96
Report of W.G. Davies, Commissioner Delhi Division, para 36, LRARP: 1876-77; LRARP:
97
1888-89.
fard lagan, but often the existing entries were cross-
There were attempts to obtain special
98
jamabandis attested after village inspections. See LRARP
checked and (annual); Report on the
Operations of the Department of Land Records, Punjab (annual: from 1905-6); Report on the
Settlement Operations in the Punjab (from 1901-2 to 1909-10).
LRARP: 1901-2, p. 13
99
148

systematically understated. 100 As early as 1891, John Grant had observed

that the people are quite alive to the possible advantage they may gain by
wilfully understating the rents, and are often found to combine in stating
rents which are really much below those actually taken.101 It was not
uncommon for tenants to conceal the actual rent as well. There were reasons
for their silence; revenue and rent demand being interrelated, the higher the
revenue assessment, the greater the magnitude of rent enhancement would be.

Moreover, in many regions of the Punjab, tenants and landowners did not
form two distinct classes with opposing interests: a rich tenant could also be a
landowner leasing out some land. 102
If the landowners attempted to understate the rent, the settlement officials
in search of a rational basis for revenue enhancement tended to overstate the
rent. They were quick to note all possible reasons for low rents. During
village inspections and jamabandi attestations, abnormal rents were
identified and eliminated from the original rent list before the statements on
rent for the purposes of revenue reassessment were prepared. 103 What were
these abnormal rents? The definition as such was simple-all rates that give
an erroneous view of the renting value of the land. 104 In effect, whenever the
rates were not purely competitive,they were considered abnormal. We are
told that rent affected by relationship, service, lenient absentee rents, and
obtrusively false rents were excluded.105 What officials identified as
extraneous factors were, as we shall see, important determinants of the level
of rent: caste and kinship ties and relationships of social and economic power.
The stated normal rents were much higher than those excluded; often the
latter were 30 per cent to 50 per cent lower. ~06 This did not always push up the
overall rate greatly since the area affected by the abnormal rents was not
extensive It is reasonable to suppose, however, that this official attitude
counteracted the possible understatement of rent figures. At any rate, this will
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Sept. 1916, A, No. 15, para 42.
100
Ass. Rep: Tarn Taran: 1891, App. D, para 183. The Settlement Collector from tahsil
101
Gohana reported: As a rule, lower ones (rents) are being generally entered in settlement papers to
conceal the real productive value of the estate in question.
Ass. Rep: para Gohana, 1873-79, 56.
102 For this reason it was most difficult to discover the actual rates on
irrigated land which was
largely in the hands of landowning tenants. Lower caste landless tenants were less keen on stating
false rates. This meant that the extent of understatement of rent on irrigated land was perhaps
greater compared to unirrigated land where lower caste tenants were more numerous. Ass. Rep.:
Tarn Taran: 1891, App. D, para 18.
Ass. Rep: Taran Taran: 1891, App. D, para 18; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Sept. 1916, A,
103
No. 15, para 42; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Jan. 1914, A, No. 21, para 36.
104
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Aug. 1920, A, No. 1, para 35.
105 Land Rev. and
Ag. (Rev.), Sept. 1916, A, No. 15, para 42. Even when relationships between
people are established through the market, the social context defines and modifies the nature of
market mediation. To eliminate social determinants is to derive an ahistorical notion of the
penetration of market relations.
106 Calculation based on
figures given in Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Oct. 1913, A, No. 38.
It was around 10 per cent in some districts like Amritsar. Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Jan.
107
1914, No. 21, para 35.
 149

not affect a rough estimation of rent increase between the 1870s and 1920s. The
bias would have been similar in both periods.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, over large areas, especially in
the south-east, no rent was charged by landowners-that is, the tenant had
to pay only the revenue which was due to the government. Often the amount
of revenue paid by the biswadar was more than the rent he collected from the
tenants. John Lawrence, who surveyed pargana Taoru around 1837, declared:
There are few, if any, estates with which I am acquainted where the zamindars
pay their revenue from their rent realizations.... In fact land does not afford
a rent. &dquo; 8 In tahsil Fei&dquo;ozepur, there was a popular belief in the 1830s that
the owner should always pay a higher rate than the non-proprietor. 109 Land
was abundant and tenants scarce. The landowners and biswadars (who had to

pay a fixed revenue assessment) were keen on retaining their tenants even if
the rents paid were low. In such a situation the tenants had bargaining power.
Subsequently, the pressure of population and expanding commercial
agriculture, accompanied by the redefinition and codification of property
rights and increased revenue demand, provided the basis for an increased
rental demand.
The rate of increase varied. In the south-east it was lower than in central
Punjab. Even in the 1880s, over large areas in Rohtak and Karnal revenue
rate was the nor.110 A continuous rise in rents was reported from Gurgaon;
but the actual increase was not spectacular (between 1838 and 1881--82, cash
rents increased by 14 per cent in tahsil Palwal, 13 per cent in Ferozepur, 23 per
cent in Nuh, and 8 per cent in Reward).&dquo; Only after the 1880s was there a
significant rise in rents in this region.l 12 In central Punjab, on the other hand,
the increase was not only sharper but it began earlier. Here, the limits of the
extension of cultivation were exhausted early, the pressure of population on
land was higher, double-cropping more common, and a substantial section of
peasantry sought to expand the cultivation of valuable commercial crops.
Cash rents doubled between 1850 and 1885,113 and by the second decade of the
twentieth century they had doubled again in most tahsils (Table 8). The
figures on which these calculations are based may not be very reliable, but
Settlement of Pergunnah Taroo, No. 361, from J. Lawrence, officiating Collector,
108
Goorgaon, to Commissioner, Delhi, 30 Nov. 1837, Statistical Report on the District of Gurgaon,
Agra, 1849, App. C.
Settlement of Pergunnahs Ferozepore and Poonahanah, No. 51, from J. Lawrence,
109
officiating Collector, Goorgaon. to Commissioner, Delhi, ibid., App. G.
According to the popular notion, explained Lawrence, the government land revenue wasa tax
on the landowner and any one who, without an equal interest in the soil, relieves him of a portion

of this tax, is entitled to indulgence in his rates of contribution.

See SR: Karnal: 1872-80, para 258; SR: Rohtak: 1873-79.
110
111 Calculations based on
figures in SR: Gurgaon: 1883. App. VIII.
SR: Karnal: 1907-9, para. 22; SR: Rohtak: 1905-10, para. 28. In Hissar, between 1880 and
112
1898, rents doubled. Report of P.D. Agnew, Deputy Commissioner, Hissar District, LRARP:
1897-98, p. 39.
SR: Jullunder: 1880-86, p. 156.
113
150
 151
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152

they do suggest likely trends. The figures on kind rent are somewhat better:

they give us an idea of the changes in area under different rates of batai. The
marked increase in the area under half-batai (between the 1880s and 1920s) is
evident in Table 9. Where the rate was unchanged, the increase in the value of
shares kept pace with the rise in prices. This was another reason why
landowners preferred batai. Cash rents moved with prices, but there was a lag;
and the rate of change was not always proportional. The sharp long-term
increase in cash rents between the late nineteenth and the early twentieth
century, already noted, did not exactly keep pace with the rise in prices. When
cash rents are deflated by prices of grain, the general increase appears to be
more moderate; in many cases the figures in fact show a fall (see Table 8,

Column 6). During the Great Depression, there was a general fall in the level
of cash rent. But again it lagged behind prices. So, for the tenants, the initial
impact of the Depression was the most severe. The amount of grain used to
pay the cash rent increased sharply between 1927-28 and 1931--32, after
which it declined. 114 When prices picked up gradually, cash rents remained at
a low level for some time.

Within the long-term rise of rent, there were short-term yearly fluctuations.
The range of fluctuation was less in the case of kind rent. In a share-cropping
system, a good harvest can imply higher rent (amount per acre as well as total
volume); while a bad harvest can imply a fall. Since share-cropping was most
prevalent on irrigated tracts, such fluctuations were minimised. -The money
value of rent in kind can, however, fluctuate every year with prices. But for
the landowner the significance of such fluctuations would be related to his
capacity to hold his stocks. Richer landowners did not sell when prices were
low.
In any case, under share-cropping the rate of rent as a proportion of gross
produce is not subject to wide fluctuations either due to harvest or price
changes (i.e., the proportion taken obviously remains constant). The rate of
cash rent as a proportion of gross produce fluctuates every year, even if the
rent is fixed I 15 If there is a sudden collapse in prices, the fixed cash rent will
actually constitute a larger proportion of the gross produce of the tenant;
In Amritsar, the index figure of cash rent per acre (with 1928-29 as base) declined as follows:
114
1928-29 = 100, 1929-30 =78, 1930-31 = 69, 1931-32 = 30, 1932-33 = 27, 1933-34= 24. 1936 37 = 24.
Expressed in seers of wheat per rupee, the movement of cash rent per acre in Amritsar was as
follows: 1928-29 = 5.8, 1929-30 = 6.4, 1930-31 =11, 1931-32 = 3.4, 1932-33 = 2.6, 1933-34 =3,
1936-37 = 2.2. Calculations are based on Farm Accounts in the Punjab (Annual). Trends in other
regions were similar.
The prevailing cash rent actually fluctuated every year with the price of produce and the
115
demand for land. In 1893- 94, for instance, when grain prices collapsed, a contraction of
cultivation followed. M uch of the land, usually leased out on a yearly basis, was allowed to remain
uncultivated during the year and it was necessary in numbers of cases to reduce the rent
According to H.A. Rose, the Settlement Officer of Jullunder District, cash rents fell as much as
). In 1897-98, when south-east Punjab was affected by drought and
LRARP: 1893-94
one-third (
famine, grain prices soared. In the secure tracts of central Punjab wherever cash rents were
common, there was a shift to rent in kind, or an enhancement of rent. LRARP: 1897-98.
 153

Table 9
Proportion of Area Under Kind Rent Paying at Different Rates (Percentage)

Source: Compiled from Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), November 1915, No. 21; Land Rev. and Ag.
(Rev.), January 1913, A. No. 28; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), October 1913, A, No. 45;
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), March 1916, A, No. 1; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), September
1911, A, No. 36.

when prices rise, it will obviously constitute a lower proportion. However,

high prices do not necessarily imply greater possibilities of accumulation by
the tenants paying cash rents on insecure unirrigated tracts. For, in such
regions, high prices are often the result of a bad harvest-a situation when
peasants have little to sell. Although rent appears as a decreasing mass of
dearer grain, it may absorb a large proportion of the decreased output. The
actual income of the peasant would be dependent on the extent to which the
rise in prices compensated for the decline in production. The prevalence of
cash rents, therefore, cannot always be considered a potential basis for
accumulation by the tenants. One has to analyse the context within which
cash rents prevailed. On tracts with low productivity and no irrigation, cash
rents were not preferred by tenants even when the rates were low. For them,
fixed cash rents were profitable in a period of price rise only on irrigated
lands where valuable crops could be produced. Even in such a context, not all
classes of the tenantry would benefit to the same extent-a point I will discuss
later.
The movement of rent in different regions, within a given year, had no fixed
pattern. The recurring harvest failures in Rohtak, Gurgaon and H issar led to
a fodder famine and a decline in cultivated area. While land remained
uncultivated in this region, the increase in grain prices and the demand for
fodder led to an extension of cultivation and a rent increase in the secure
tracts. The famine of 1897-98 illustrates this point. It was reported that in
154

regions affected by the drought rents on barani land have been very much
reduced owing to the difficulty of finding tenants.I 16 Elsewhere, in the same
year, the situation was different. The Commissioner and Superintendent of
Jullunder Division found that on account of the rise in prices landlords tried
to rent in kind and on refusal instituted suits of enhancement. 117
get
Neither the income of the tenant nor that of the landowner was
determined merely by the level of rent. What was important in the
determination of their income was their mutual share in the expenses of
cultivation. Who was to pay the dues of the kamins or the abiana? Who
would supply the seed, the manure and the bullocks? For both the tenant and
the landowner these were significant questions.
After the threshing and winnowing of the crops, the dues of the Tarkhans,
the Lohars and other menials had to be paid. In the late nineteenth century it
was generally reported that the dues of the kamins were almost invariably

paid from the common heap before the division of the produce between the
landlord and the tenant. 118 In a way, the landowner shared the payment. In
many regions, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the custom changed.
In Jagadhri, we are told, the tenant had to pay the badhi and the Lohar from
his own share after the division of the produce on the threshing floor. &dquo;9
Evidence from Nawashahr showed the same: Circumstances have entirely
changed, in the Dhak and Retli at any rate, and the people confess to
ignorance of ever having divided from a common heap.... Kamins dues fall
entirely on the tenants. 120 Even without necessarily increasing the batai rates,
the landowner could thus increase his income by reducing the deductions
from his share of the crop.
There was a persistent attempt by landowners to reduce such deductions
from their income. For instance, there is definite evidence that in the 1870s
and 1880s, the landowners provided a share of the necessary seeds for
production-the share being equal to the share of batai (i.e., if it was half
batai, he had to give half the seed). 121 By,1910, the practice was different: An
owner never supplies a share of the seeds We are informed that the custom
used to be much more general than it is, but is graduallv dving out.z3 Other
LRARP: 1897-98, p. 51.
116
117
Ibid.
Ass. Rep: Tarn Taran: 1891, para 9; Ass. Rep: Amritsar: 1892, para 69; SR: Jullunder:
118
1880-86, para 43; SR: Karnal: 1872-80, para 260.
119
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Aug. 1920, A, No. 1, para 39.
120
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Sept. 1916, A, No. 15, para 51. In Hissar the Kamins are
paid
entirely by the tenant, save those employed in cotton picking. SR: Hissar: 1910-12, p. 12. The
practice did not change uniformly in all districts. In many districts, payments to the menials were
still made before the division of the produce. In many places like Ludhiana, both
practices co-
existed around 1910. See Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Sept. 1911, A; No. 36, p. 2081.
121 Land Rev. and
Ag. (Rev.), Sept. 1911, A, No. 36, p. 2081.
121 Land Rev. and
Ag. (Rev.), Oct. 1913, A, No. 45, para 32.
Ibid.
122
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Sept. 1911, A, No. 36, para 38. See also para 30.
123
 155

expenses of cultivation, whether on manure or ploughs and bullocks. were

also to be met by the tenant.
The tenant had to pay rent to the landowner, and the latter was to pay the
land revenue and other government dues. This was the normal understanding
in the second half of the nineteenth century in the Punjab. But, during the
settlement operations in the beginning of the twentieth century, it was found
that frequently a share of the revenue or something per ghumao in addition to
half batai is extracted from the tenant. 124 When the water advantage rate
was introduced in the new canal irrigated lands, the government expected the

landowners to pay this charge. The water rate, which was separately charged
by the irrigation department, was to be paid by the tenants. ~25 Here, again, the
landowner tried to shift the burden of these charges over to the tenant. Where
cash rents were prevalent, it became the invariable rulethat the tenants had
to pay all the canal dues, water advantage rate as well as the water rates, In the
case of batai the tenant was to pay a share of irrigation and land revenue

charges.26
There were other possible ways by which the landowner could increase his
income from tenancy cultivation without raising the rate of batai. In
Hissar, Karnal, Hoshiarpur and many other regions, the tenant had to pay,
apart from the share of batai, an additional allowance (kharcha), generally I
seer to 2.5 seers per maund.127 In the pre-British period, however, this

customary payment was made to the village headmen. Now the proprietors
were keen to retain the custom for the convenience it offers in raising and

lowering the rent. Instead of raising the batai, the proprietors could increase
the kharcha to be paid, thus making a gradual and almost imperceptible rise
in the rate of rent. 128
Till the late nineteenth century the tenants normally collected all the straw
after the crops were reaped. Straw was not shared out. Occasionally, the
proprietors took a few sheaves.29 With the diminishing grazing land,
especially in the plains, straw became a valuable commodity. Cattle had to be
regularly stall-fed on wheat and gram stalks. Even bajra and maize stalks were
used as fodder in times of scarcity. Straw was no longer left to the tenant. The
proprietors claimed a share equal to the rate of batai. Nowadays, wrote a
settlement officer around 1912, even landlords who are absentees or who
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), April 1913, A, No. 42, para 37.
124
Ass. Rep: Tarn Taran: 1891, App. B, para 10.
125
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), April 1913, A, No. 42, para 39.
126
SR: Hissar: 1905-10, para 230; SR: Karnal: 1872-80, para 260; SR: Hoshiarpur: 1879-84,
127
para 71; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Aug. 1920, A, No. 1, para 34.
SR: Hissar: 1905-10, para 230.
128
In 1882, A. Kensington, Assistant Settlement Officer of Garshankar tahsil Hoshiarpur,
129
tenants ( Rep: Garshankar: 1882, para 33).
reported that straw was invariably taken by the Ass.
Reports from other regions were similar. However, in regions like Jullunder, where grazing land
was swallowed up by expanding cultivation by the late nineteenth century, the practice of
dividing the straw was reported as early as 1880s. See SR: Jullunder: 1880-86, para 43.
156
themselves own no cattle insist on receiving their share of straw which they
can usually sell the
on threshing floor.130
Thus the rate of batai did not fully reflect the actual rental demand. The
rate itself was determined by the share of other expenses to be borne by the
landowner and the tenant. Often a variety of batai shares coexisted within a
region on the same type of land-the range of batai was from half to one-
fourth. The actual proportion of the produce retained by the tenant might not
differ as much. On nahri land, when the batai was one-fourth, the tenant had
to pay the revenue, the abiana, and provide his own seed; where the batai
was one-third, the landowner paid part (one-third or half) of the revenue and

provided half the seed. Where the batai was half, the tenant paid half the
revenue and half the abiana or no revenue and the entire abiana, and the
landowner provided some of the seed. 131 Variations of such combinations
were found all over the Punjab. 1his must be kept in mind when comparing
the batai rates in different regions (Table 9). In Lahore, for instance, the
proportion of area under half batai was lower than other regions of central
Punjab, and the area under one-third batai higher. But in Lahore a much
larger proportion of the cultivated area was canal irrigated and the tenants
had to pay the canal dues. ~3z
There were other factors that account for the differences in the rates of rent.
There were regions where the batai was one-third on chahi and half on
barani. 133 It may be argued that one-third batai was accepted on chahi since
the gross value of the rental for the landowner was higher, and the re.turn was
secure, as against the barani where the yields were low, and a higher rate was
necessary to ensure a minimum return. In fact, this was stressed by J.M.
Dunnet, the settlement officer of Ludhiana tahsil. Generally t he poorest soils
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Jan. 1913, A, No. 28, para 46. See also Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.),
130
Nov. 1917, A, No. 5, para 43; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Sept. 1916, A, No. 15, para 50; Land Rev.
and Ag. (Rev.), March 1917, A, No. 5, para 63.
131
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), May 1914, A, No. 13, para 43; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Nov.
1914, A, No. 10, para 37; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), March 1913, A, No. 39, para 37; Land Rev.
and Ag. (Rev.), May 1914, A, No. 1, para 37; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Sept. 1911, A, No. 36,
para 30; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Sept. 1914, A, No. 26, para 30; Ass. Rep: Iorn Taran: 1891,
paras 10 and 21; Ass. Rep: Amritsar: 1892, para 66; SR: Hissar: 1910-11, p. 12. The amount of
kharch also varied with rates of batai&mdash;usually it was one seer to a maund in the case of two-fifth
batai, and one and a half seer for one-third batai. Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Aug.1920, A, No. 1,
para 34.
132
In most regions of central Punjab, except Amritsar and Lahore, well-irrigation was more
important than canal irrigation. In 1898, 70 per cent of the cultivated land in Lahore was irrigated
and 50 per cent of this area was under canal irrigation; in Amritsar 64 per cent was irrigated, 50 per
cent of it from canals. On the other hand, in Jullunder 50 percent of the cultivated area was irrigated,
and in Ludhiana 30 per cent. In Jullunder about 99 per cent of the irrigated area was well-
irrigated, and in Ludhiana 70 per cent. ARP: 1898-1899, Statement No. 41.
This peculiar feature puzzled many officials. Some found the evidence highly suspicious,
133
others considered it definite proof of the unreliability of the figures on rent. As I have already
mentioned, when dealing with these figures there is need for caution; but all peculiarities cannot
be dismissed as suspicious.
 157

pay the highest rates of batai, on the ground that only a high batai rate brings
anything considerable into the owners pockets. On the other hand, on the best
soils the prevailing rates leave a large profit for the tenant.134 This argument
may be valid, but only partially. It does not explain why there was no
maximisation of rental demand on chahi. Moreover, it was not only rent in
kind, but cash rents which often failed to reflect the differential rents of
different soils. ~35 This peculiarity was the result of a fragmented lease market.
Since chahi and nahri lands were limited, the owners attempted to retain them
for direct cultivation, or leased them to someone within the proprietory body,
preferably a close relative. 136 So the rent charged was low. 137 The controlled
and restricted availability of irrigated land forced tenants, especially menials
and artisans, to compete for the outlying barani land. As a result, the rent was
pushed up there. Even landowners sometimes competed for barani land. On
the basis of a given amount of labour, extension of cultivation on irrigated
land beyond a point meant a sharper decline of marginal returns. 138 Those
with irrigated holdings extended cultivation by leasing in some unirrigated
land.139

The Struggle Over Rent

The landowner could not always impose the most lucrative form of rent-
shift from cash to kind, or increase the demand. The tenants were not passive
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Sept. 1911, A, No. 36, para 33.
134
barani was only marginally lower compared to chahi: in Tarn Taran
Sometimes cash rent on
135
itwas I 1 per cent lower (1891), in Gaggar Bhana 14 per cent (1918-19). This, however, was not a

general feature. In many regions barani rents were considerably lower&mdash;in tahsil Phillour it was
38 per cent lower (1916), in tahsil Jullunder 32 per cent ( 1916), in tahsil Hoshiarpur 38 per cent
(1913), in tahsil Garshankar 24 per cent (1913).
Barani rents fluctuated significantly with rainfall. Evidence from the village notebooks of
Suner in Ferozepur shows that cash rent on barani was higher than that on chahi in 1912-13 and
1916-17 (about 16 to 22 per cent) which were years of good rainfall. Subsequently in 1920-21 or
1924-25 it was much lower. VS: Suner (1936), p. 137.
The intention was to retain a firm control, and eliminate the risk of losing occupancy rights
136
over this irrigated land around the village. There was also concern over the fertility of chahi land.
A landowner in Ferozepur was loath to let his best
chahi land on short term cash rent as it mightnot
be properly manured. Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Jan. 1914, A, No. 20, para 40.
John Grant, the Settlement Collector of Lahore, wrote in 1891 that classes who are willingto
137
pay high competitive rents have not access to the irrigated soils, and ... rents ... paid on chahi and
nahri lands should not properly have been taken as true rents seeing that they are paid by
cultivators to whom, as belonging to the brotherhood, some consideration has been shown in
fixing the rate of rent. Ass. Rep: Tam Taran: 1891, para 20. It was the general opinion of all
observers that tenants in chahi did not pay a full rent.
138
K.N. Raj, op. cit.
There is a decided preference for unirrigated land, because the labour of cultivation is so
139
much lighter. A proprietor who has already some land can add an acre or two of unirrigated
cultivation to his holding without having to increase the number of his cattle and without much
additional labour to himself, while for irrigated lands new cattle and much heavier labour is
required. SR: Ludhiana: 1878-83, p. 193.
158

beings who were willing to accept the dictates of the landowner. They resisted
the demands of the proprietors, though often unsuccessfully.
In a share-cropping system, the stated proportion of shares was only
notional. The real shares which the tenant and the landowner would
ultimately get was determined by their mutual power to enforce a fair
division (i.e., the actual shares agreed upon). The time of batai was the time of
struggle-of trying to appropriate a larger share. The threshing floor was the
arena of conflict. When the grain ripened, it was a time of celebration. 140 But
the division of the produce was a dreaded task. Bar chawan, Te qayamat
awan was a saying in rural Punjab.141
Stealing which was not too difficult was a normal and regular mode of
increasing ones share of the produce. After the crop was cut, it had to be
threshed and winnowed before it could be measured and divided. The heaps
which lay on the open field and on the threshing floor had to be guarded. In
spite of this, the crop was likely to disappear. Unless someone was caught
stealing, nobody could be held responsible. The loss of the crop remained an
apparent mystery-only the bhut could be blamed.
Specific rituals developed to prevent the crop from vanishing and to protect
it from evil spirits. To keep the bhuts away, a magic circle was drawn around
the heap and a sickle placed on top of it. ~42 In eastern Punjab, the preparation
of the grain heap for measurement was accompanied by elaborate rituals and
prayers to Shaod Mata-the mother of fertility. The heap was sprinkled with
gangajal and covered with a cloth. No one but the measurer was supposed to
cross the line which was drawn around it. ~43 In some regions in south-west

Punjab, the village maulana wrote a charm which was stuck in a cleft stick in
the heap. 144 The fear of the charm, it was hoped, would prevent pilferage-the
mysterious act of the invisible hand.
The measurement of grain, crucial for the division of shares, was an
operation in which manipulation was possible. Both the tenant and the
landowner had to be on guard so that they would not be outwitted by each
other. Again, associated with the operations were certain customary practices
meant to limit confusion and quarrel. Only four men were allowed to cross the
enclosure line with wooden measuring vessels, and no one was to come near
them till they finished. Speech was taboo, and total silence had to be
maintained. Counting aloud was not allowed. Accounts were kept by putting
Jiun pakke, Tan dhol thakke. (As the crops mature, drums are played.) This was a saying in
140
Jullunder. R. Maconachie, op. cit., p. 140.
The time of division, was like doomsday.
141 Ibid.
North Indian Notes and Queries, Vol. 4, p. 593. H.A. Rose, A Glossary of the Tribes and
142
Castes of the Punjab and North-Western Frontier Provinces. First ed. 1883, reprinted, Delhi,
1970, p. 299.
143 D.J.
Ibbetson, SR: Karnal: 1872-80, p. 173; William Crooke, The Popular Religion and
Folklore of Northern India, Second ed. 1896, reprinted, Delhi, 1968.
H.A. Rose, op. cit., p. 219. In the central districts, such practices became less common by the
144
end of the nineteenth century. SR: Ludhiana: 1878-83, p. 128.
 159

aside small heaps of grain for each measure.145

Thus, batai could possibly be lucrative, only when the landowner could
watch the crop and ensure a proper division. When they were unable to do so
or uncertain of their power, they had to be content with cash rent, even on

irrigated tracts where batai was normally preferred by landowners during

periods of rising prices. It was held that in some regions of the Punjab,
chakota (lump cash rent) ended all quarrels, while batai caused a loss of
honour (due to petty quarrels). 146
So, in the area near. the wells, around the khudkasht area of the
landowners, batai was the norm; while in the outlying regions cash rents were
more common. Resident owners could hope to gain from batai; those who
were away could not: Non-resident owners living at a distance, or emigrants,
often take cash rents owing to the difficulty of making sure of their rightful
share of the crop. ~4~ The absentee could be a small holder who had left the
village to look for work in the Canal colonies or elsewhere; it could be a
peasant who had land in another village, or a baniya busy in other trades.
Widows and minors, who were unable to cultivate the land due to the lack
of family labour, could rarely realise the maximum potential rent from the
land. They leased out either on fixed cash rent or on fixed grain rent, to ensure
a secure, though lower, return. 148 To avoid persistent quarrels with the

tenants, land owned by widows, minors or migrant peasants was often given
145 D.J. Ibbetson, SR: Karnal: 1872-80, p. 174; W. Crooke, op. cit., p. 311; SR: Sirsa: 1879-83,
p. 350.
Batai, Te pat qawai; Hoiya patta, Te mukka ratta.
146 R. Maconachie, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
Continuous conflict around batai was reported from all regions. Where batai is paid, observed
a Settlement Officer, the owners accuse the tenants of defrauding them, while the tenants allege
that the owners delay dividing the crop with a view to harassing the tenants... Land Rev. and Ag.
(Rev.), April 1913, A, No. 42, para 32.
147 Land Rev. and
Ag. (Rev.), April 1913, A, No. 42, para 33. See also VS: Tehong (1931), p.
186; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Nov. 1914, A, No. 10, para 39; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Sept.
1911, A, No. 36, para 28.
Cash rents are taken by mortgagees who are not agriculturists, by widows and minors, and
148
in general by absentee landlords such as moneylenders who are not in a position to supervise
matters on the spot and so cannot secure the full value from
rent. Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.),
batai
Aug. 1920, A, No. 1, para 33.
For the same reason, a stated weight of grain could be fixed as rent through an appraisement
of produce before the harvest. The owner thus obtains the advantage of grain rent without the
risk of being cheated in the division.
Ass. Rep: Tam Taran: 1891, App. B. These fixed rents,
wrote R.C. Bolster, are preferred to half kind rents where the landlord doubts his ability to realize
a kind rent in full. Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), May 1914, A, No. 13, para 42. The amount fixed

batai share. Around 1915, it varied from 4 to 6 maunds (5

was roughly equivalent to the prevailing

being the commonest rate) per acre. This form of rent was not widely prevalent. Only on the best
canal irrigated land did the tenant agree to pay fixed grain rent. This trend was most marked in the
canal irrigated tracts of Amritsar and Lahore. While the area under fixed kind rent accounted for
less than1 per cent of the total area under kind rent in most parts of central Punjab, in tahsil
Ajnala the proportion was 20 per cent, in tahsil Amritsar 18 percent, in tahsil Lahore 10 per cent,
and in tahsil Kasur 7 per cent. Source: same as Table 7.
160
out to near relatives at low rents. 149 It was reported that tenants who paid
revenue rates, i.e., nothing more than the revenue, are as a rule, relatives of
owners absent on service or in the canal colonies.&dquo;50
Some crops were difficult to protect. Keeping a watch over the kharif crop
was a problem as it ripened by degrees, unlike the rabi which ripened field by
field. It was customary for peasants to take away ears of grain for the familys
daily meal. 151 To ensure his rightful share the proprietor had to prevent such
losses while the crop was ripening. This was not easy, specially in the case of
kharif. In regions where the kharif harvest was more important, the
proprietors, aware of their incapacity to enforce batai, often had to reconcile
themselves to a fixed cash rent. ~5
Thus, the form of rent, as much as its rate, depended on the relative strength
of the tenant and the landowner; on their respective capacity to assert their
interests within a specific situation. In Ferozepur, where the landowners were
powerful, the shift from cash to rent in kind was very sharp. For instance, in
Fazilka tahsil, during the first settlement, 44 per cent of the area under
tenancy was held by non-occupancy tenants at cash rents, and 31 per cent in
kind. By the time of the second settlement ( 1901 ) the distribution was reversed
(7.5 per cent in cash and 50.5 per cent in kind). 153 InJullunderand Ludhiana,
where a large number of the tenants-at-will were themselves owners or
occupancy holders, the shift was not so marked. Almost 35-40 per cent of the
area held by the tenants-at-will continued to be under cash rent at the time of

the second settlement (1910-15).154 The area paying batai increased

considerably, but so did the area under cash rent. As I have pointed out; the
landowners preferred batai on irrigated land. Yet, a large proportion of the
area leased out on cash rent in different tahsils was actually irrigated-48 per
cent in Nakodar, 42 per cent in Jullunder, 54 per cent in Amritsar, 84 per cent
in Lahore, 28 per cent in Ludhiana tahsil. If one considers the total irrigated
area leased out, the proportion under cash rent does not appear to be

insignificant. (The proportion was 43 per cent in Nakodar, 56 per cent in

Jullunder, 52 per cent in Amritsar. 42 per cent in Ludhiana and 27 per cent in
Lahore.) On the other hand, a large proportion of the unirrigated land leased
out in central Punjab was on kind rent. Clearly the preferences of the
Non-resident owners, particularly those who have gone to the Canal Colonies, it was
149
observed, are ready to accept rents which are not competitive, often leaving their land with
relatives on nominal terms. Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), May 1914, A, Nos. 13-14, para 45.
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Jan. 1914, A, No. 21, para 33. See also Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.),
150
Oct. 1913, A, No. 38, para 28.
SR: Sirsa: 1879-83, pp. 348-49.
151
After his survey of Karnal, lbbetson found that cash rent was charged for those crops which
152
were not collected at one time and spot, so that division would be difficult and dishonesty easy.
SR: Karnal: 1872-80, para 260. In Ludhiana, according to Gordon Walker, rents in kind were
taken for the Rabi crops, rarely for cotton, and almost never for other kharif crops. SR:
Ludhiana:1879-83, para 126.
Ass. Rep: Fazilka: 1901.
153
See Table 7.
154
 161

landowners always fulfilled. 155

were not
Similarly, in regions where cash rents were preferred by landowners,
tenants often agreed to pay only in kind. In Ambala, at the time of the second
revised settlement, 65-80 per cent of the leased out land to tenants-at-will was
under kind rents. 156 Yet, this was a district where the
Rajput and baniya
landowners were making persistent efforts to extract cash rents. But the
tenants, who were scarce in the region, had a stronger bargaining position
Mere refusal to cultivate was an effective form of resistance. After 1929, the
severe price depression was accompanied
by a series of crop failures. For the
landowner, at such a conjuncture, batai would imply a declining rent in
money terms, and a fluctuating share every year due to bad harvest. Fixed
cash rent, which the landowners now preferred, was not acceptable to the
tenants, With repeated bad harvests and the steady price collapse, they could
not possibly pay fixed cash rents. They refused to take land
except on batai,
though cash rents too had fallen sharply.
In one instance, a frustrated landowner complained: We can secure no one
tn take land on cash rent. Kartar Singh, another landowner, agreed: nobody
seems to be prepared to take land on cash rent. A third, Fateh Singh, stressed
the fact that cash rent is better because it saves the owner a great amount of
worry and trouble... but the trouble is no one will pay cash these days.1&dquo;8
The tenants were categorical about their preference for batai: We used to
take land on cash rents and preferred it, explained Sucha Singh, a tenant of
Ferozepur, but for the past few years we have gone back to our old preference
for batai. Mohinder Singh, another tenant of the area added that we are
much better off now with share rent. 159
The landowners struggled to assert their control and domination over the
tenants. The British tenancy laws could be used as an instrument of such
struggle. Legally the tenants-at-will were relatively easy to evict. And the
threat of eviction could be effective against recalcitrant tenants-sometimes,

155
J.M. Dunnet wrote from Ludhiana that The owner tries to let his best land on batai, and to
take cash for the poorest land, the tenant tries the very opposite. On the whole I think the tenant
has the best of it. Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Sept. 1911, No. 36, para 28. Here, Dunnet is
overstating the point. Only the richer tenants had such a bargaining position.
156
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Aug. 1920, A, No. 1, Statement No X.
In Jagadhri The moneylender would undoubtedly prefer to draw his rents in cash, but the
157
zamindar would rather pay in batai because in the absence of proper supervision he can
manipulate the crop division to his own advantage. In Jagadhri tahsil tenants are not so abundant
as land and have to be humoured. They often refuse to pay cash rents and the landlord has to take

what he can get. Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Aug. 1920, A, No. 1, para 35. In tahsil Garshankar of
Hoshiarpur the situation was similar&mdash;The tenants are in a stronger position than in other circles
and have been able to impose their preference for kind rent on the landlords. Land Rev. and Ag.
(Rev.), Sept. 1914, A, No. 26, para 31.
VS: Suner (1936), p.136. The village survey provides only the initials: the full names have
158
been assumed.
Ibid.
159
 162
.

for the purpose of coercing the tenant into paying higher rates;160 at other
times for effecting a change in the form of rent payment. During years of
scarcity, when tenants delayed the payment of rent, the landowners issued
notices for ejectment... to compel payment. 16 During settlement operations
suits of ejectment increased sharply. Their (i.e., the landowners) principal
object, wrote P.J. Fagan from Gurgaon, is to break the continuity of
possession. ~6z There was the fear of accrual of occupancy rights which would
restrict the control of the landowner over the tenant. The tenants could, and
did, of course, resist dispossession by contesting the suits of ejectment; but
only those who were powerful could hope for a favourable settlement.163
However, ejection did not always imply physical dispossession. After formal
ejectment, the tenants were often reinstated in their tenancies if they agreed to
the revised terms;164 at times they had to accept a change in the plot leased.
Generally, in a conjuncture of steady price rise, when production
expanded and the demand for land increased, landowners could dictate their
terms of tenancy with greater ease. On the other hand, this was not always
possible at the time of a price depression when production fell. Attempts to
forcibly impose the terms of landowners could lead to a flight of tenants and a
decline in cultivation. If production was to be sustained in such a situation,
concessions had to be given to the tenants.
Favourable terms of tenancy and rent could be secured by tenants also in
regions with a low productive capacity and a low population pressure
(Gurgaon, Rohtak, Ambala, Hoshiarpur, and the districts of south-west
Punjab). In regions of expanding production and greater concentration of
population, the competition for land was obviously more acute. In such
regions (like Ludhiana or Jullunder) the landowners had greater potential
power over the tenants. Even here, conditions were different in the early years
of British rule. Some of the proverbs recorded around the 1880s clearly refer
160
Note of the Lt. Governor on the Punjab Tenancy Act, Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Aug. 1882,
A, Nos. 33-34; see also LRARP: 1901-2, p. 14.
161 LRARP:
1897-98, p. 51; see also LRARP: 1903-4, p. 10.
LRARP: 1889-90. I have discussed elsewhere the process of redefinitionand crystallisation
162
of property rights in nineteenth century Punjab. On the struggle over tenant rights see Land Rev.
and Ag. (Rev.), June 1882, A, Nos. 4-6; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), Jan. 1883, A, No. 10; Land Rev.
and Ag. (Rev.), Feb. 1881, A, No. 88-92; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), May 1885, A, No. 20. See also
H. Banerjee, Zamindar Cultivator Relations and the Struggle over Rent in the Punjab
(1849-1901), The Punjab: Past and Present, April 1979, Vol. 13:1.
163
This resistance is reported as early as the 1850s. Ambala Div. Rec., 13, Bundle 14, Case 181,
20 May 1854. The number of successful contestants was not insignificant. Between1890 and 1900,
when the actual ejectments made every year were about 5,540, the annual average number of
successful suits to contest liability of ejectment was around 1,000. Figures calculated on the basis
ARP and Civil Justice Report of the Punjab (Annual).
of
164
Often landowners did not act after notices of ejectment were issued and necessary
settlements made. The actual ejectments were less than 30 per cent of the total number of notices.
Between 1890 and 1900, the average number of notices every year in Punjab was 19,195, while the
actual ejectments were about 5,540. Calculated on the basis of figures in ARPand Civil Justice
Reports.
 163

to norms and customs which existed in the past. A good landowner (one for
whom tenants would be willing to work well) ought to be kind, just,
compassionate and considerate. ~65 Such norms, emphasised in the rural
sayings, were perhaps characteristic of a period when the competition for land
was not so acute, when tenants had to be humoured and persuaded to

cultivate; conditions which no longer existed in the central districts of the

Punjab by the beginning of the twentieth century. Such norms, expressing
relations of the past, survived in the changed social circumstances, but no
longer mediated the real relations to the same extent. They perhaps survived
as memories of the past, and expressed the expectations and desires of the
tenants-their demand for a certain mode of behaviour towards them. But in
the given situation, the choices open to the tenants were limited. They could
not always choose their landowner, nor could they refuse the demands made
on them easily.

Though these general conditions influenced the varying trends in the

different regions and different conjunctures, they did not affect all sections of
tenants and landowners in the same way. The power of individual tenants and
landowners depended on a variety of circumstances-the number of adult
male members within the family, the ties of kinship between the family and
the village community, the physical location of the landowner (i.e., absentee
or resident) were all significant factors defining their relative strength. More

important, richer peasants, who themselves owned a part of their operational

holdings, were less dependent on the leased in area for survival, and could
more effectively secure favourable terms of lease. The poorer tenants, mostly

indebted, had lesser tactical control over the resources of their livelihood, and
succumbed more easily to the dictates of the landowners. They leased in land
on more unfavourable terms. The landless, particularly the menials, often
had no access to the best irrigated land which was mostly retained within the
proprietory body. As we have seen, the landless had to pay hunger rents on
barani land. At times, they were charged lump rent (chakota), which was a
fixed sum paid for a certain number of fields without special regard to the
area. Chakota was usually much higher than any other rent: in Rohtak,

according to an estimate by H.C. Fanshawe in 1885, it was 80 per cent

higher. 166 Poor peasants who mortgaged their land and stayed on as tenants-
at-will, also paid a higher level of rent. ~6 Yet they clung to their ancestral
Note the following rural proverbs of Jullunder: Malik je kare riayat pahi/Tan oh karda
165
(If the landowner shows kindness to his tenants, then the latter will cultivate well);
changi wahi
Pahi nun satawe/Ghar aonda rizak ganwawe (He who inflicts suffering on the tenant throws
away his future livelihood). SR: Jullunder: 1880-86, App. XIII, Nos. 124 and 126. In the south-
east there were similar sayings. Pahi bolidar sun man men rakhe preet/ Unki asa puri de kheti
puri jit. tenant keeps kindness in his mind. If you fulfil his wish your husbandry will be
(A
throughly successful.) R. Maconachie, op. cit., p. 227.
166
Memorandum by H. C. Fanshawe on the position of tenants-at-will in Rohtak, Land Rev.
and Ag. (Rev.), May 1885, A, No. 20.
167
We have some detailed enquiries on this aspect. In the second decade of the twentieth
century, the difference between the rent paid by the mortgagors to mortgagees and that paid by
164

property hoping to redeem it some day. An indebted poor tenant was liable to
default, especially when he was cultivating unirrigated marginal land. And
from him, recovery of rent was a matter of difficulty. So the landless and the
menials often had to pay rent in advance, while landowning tenants usually
paid half-yearly in arrears, after the harvests. 168 Advance payment led to
further indebtedness and increased subordination of the small cultivators. We
are also told that small holders were forced to pay a greater number of
additional dues: as a rule, the smaller the holdings in a village the higher the
rate of these extras. 169
A poor tenant might pay the same rate of rent as a rich landowning tenant,
but his return per unit of land might still be much lower. He had no cart to
carry his produce to the mart, and hiring it reduced his income. 170 He had no
shed to store his grain, to protect it from hail and storm, and pilferage at
night. Often he used cattle belonging to the landowner, for which he had to
give an extra share of grain. Wells were controlled by the village proprietory
body, whether through individual or joint ownership; and they had a greater
possibility of irrigating the land they leased in. Without irrigation manuring
was difficult. Moreover, the supply of manure was linked to the number of
cattle owned. The poor and landless tenants did own cattle, but fewer in
number and poorer in quality. There was also the question of rights over the
shamilat (the village common land) which the British declared to be the
property of the landowners.17I Over time, as cultivation expanded, grazing
land contracted, and the value of land increased, a struggle developed:
landowners tended to partition existing common land while landless tenants
demanded its reservation as the common grazing ground of the village. 172

other tenants to landowners was as tollows: Jullunder + 60 per cent, Nakodar + 31 per cent,
Phillour + 6.7 per cent, Hoshiarpur + 14 per cent, Dasuya + 23 per cent, Garshankar+ 7.2 per cent,
Una + 55 per cent. (Figures collected from different revenue files. For details see sources cited in
Table 8.) One has to be cautious in drawing conclusions from these figures. Not all mortgagor
tenants were poor peasants. So in some cases the higher rent included only the interest on loan,
while for others (i.e., the poor peasants) it also reflected the mortgagors utter dependence and
weak bargaining position. In these figures we cannot separate the two.
Ass. Rep: Tarn Taran: 1891, App. X, para 18; Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.).
168
Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.), April 1913, A, No. 42, para 34.
169
For information on various aspects mentioned below, see VS: Tehong (1931), Ch. 5; VS:
170
(1936), Ch. 5; VS: Gaggar Bhana
Suner (1928), Ch. 5; (1936), VS: Bhadas
(1932),
VS: Gighi Ch. 5;
Ch. 5; VS: Jamalpur Sheikhan (1937), Ch. 5.
171 Cf. C.L.
Tupper, Punjab Customary Law, Calcutta,1881, Vol. 1, pp. 89-97; SR: Karnal:
1872-80, pp. 239-41; SR: Sirsa: 1879-83, Ch. 5; Foreign Dept. (Rev.), May 1867, A, Nos. 6-15.
172
Before a revenue settlement, the conflict sharpened. Around 1908, the Deputy
Commissioner of Hoshiarpur reported that the relation between the landlords and tenants was
unsatisfactory for Each body is trying to place itself in what it considers the best position for the
forthcoming settlement. While the landlords issued ejectment notices and applied for partition
of every acre of shamilat the tenants on their part attempted to intervene in every partition case
and demand the reservation of large grazing areas. According to the Deputy Commissioner, the
tenants went to the civil court for declarations, but they were not above taking the law into their
own hands. LRARP: 1908-9, p. 9.
 165

Common land which was not partitioned was controlled by the proprietory
body. They could cultivate any part of the shamilat adjoining their plot with
the consent of other proprietors, and graze their cattle on any uncultivated
wasteland within the village. 173 Poorer cultivators found free access to these
lands restricted, if not totally blocked. 174 Even the dungheaps on the shamilat
were no longer open to all cultivators. 175 Moreover, the quality of cultivation
was conditioned by the security of the holding. Legally, leases might be

annual; but the capacity to eject, to enforce a legal right, depended on the
power of the landowner and the tenant. Tenants who wielded authority and
power within the village could not be ejected easily. 176 Poorer tenants, more
liable to be ejected, would be naturally more reluctant to devote their labourr
and expense on long-term improvement of the land through levelling,
construction of embankments, or manuring.
I have been referring to conflicts between landowners and tenants; but such
conflicts usually remained fragmented and atomised. The struggle was
between each tenant and the landowner for increasing their respective share
of the gross produce. Given the character of the tenantry in many areas of
Punjab, such individualised struggle was not necessarily transformed into any
general tenant movement. The tenantry was not only internally
differentiated, but the landowners and the tenants were not always exclusive
social groups with opposing interests. Generalised tenant struggles developed
primarily in regions where the tenantry as a whole was subjected to the
oppressive domination of biswadars, jagirdars or big zamindars, or in
regions where the menial castes constituted the bulk of the tenantry.
Elsewhere, a tenant movement could develop only with difficulty.

Conclusion

Thus, tenancy and rent represented a combination of different forms of

relations:

1. At one level, rent increase was the result of the land hunger of small
See C.L. Tupper, op. cit., pp. 92-93.
173
In the late nineteenth century, pasture land was still extensive in the south-east. Grazing dues
174
charged by the proprietory body were minimal: in all villages, the cattle of cultivators, whether
owners or tenants, either graze entirely free, or pay half the rate paid by
non-cultivators.
Revenue Rate Report of Purganah Karnal 1878, p. 125, Delhi Division Records, Series I, Bundle
118. By the twentieth century open grazing lands were disappearing.
C.L. Tupper, op. cit., pp. 95-96.
175
In Suner village of Ferozepur, 27 per cent of the leases were held for more than a year; in
176
about 30
Gaggar Bhana village of Amritsar 33 per cent were held for more than three years, and
the total leased out to tenants-at-will were held for such long periods. VS: Gaggar
per cent of area

Bhana ( 1928), p. 60; VS: Suner ( 1936), p. 53. It is reasonable to presume that only the middle
in land over long periods.
peasant and the rich peasants could sustain their hold over the leased
over the
Many of the relatively powerful owner-tenants managed to acquire ownership rights
leased in land during the post-independence tenancy reforms.
 166

peasants who sustained their capacity to pay high rents through

increased self-exploitation, prolonged hard labour, and depressed
levels of consumption. One can distinguish two such classes of tenants.
One section, though impoverished, continued to retain a command over
its own resources-over the conditions of its reproduction. Another
section was increasingly proletarianised and dominated by agrarian
capital which was crystallising slowly within the countryside. In the
former case, rent absorbed only the surplus product, while in the latter it
often absorbed even a part of the necessary product.
If one argues that rent absorbed a part of the necessary product then
it would appear more rational for such a proletarianised peasant to
become a free wage labourer. Since an average wage should
theoretically constitute the value of the necessary product, it should be
higher than what the tenant earned. Why, then, did the peasant
continue to pay such a large part of the produce as rent? In the first
place, the possibilities of such choices, often limited even under
developed capitalism, were more restricted within the structure of
backward agriculture under colonialism. in the absence of secure,
stable alternative sources of employment, there can be no conception of
an average wage and calculations of opportunity costs. When

employment opportunities emerged, many from within this class did
become full wage workers.177
Secondly, a large section of this proletarianised class of tenants was

-,

actually integrated within a wider system of subordination. For many,

the income from their plots supplemented their earning as casual
labourers at harvest time or sowing time. The menials who constituted
a large section of the tenants-at-will were, in any case, farm labourers.
The choice open to the peasants was not between working as tenants-at-
will and agricultural labourers. Both forms of employment were
necessary for the reproduction of the conditions of their labour. Both
forms not only coexisted, but were interrelated and mutually
dependent.
2. Rent increase was also the expression of the expansion of cultivation by
a large section of the better-off middle peasants and the rich peasants.
Such cultivators were not forced to lease in land merely to survive, to
acquire the necessary product for the reproduction of the family. For
them, leasing in was essential for the expansion of cultivation and for
accumulation. Clearly this section of the peasantry would not lease in
land unless it could retain a part of the surplus product as profit. Here,
rent appeared as a limit to the potential profit of the tenant, but it did
not absorb the entire surplus product.
177
There was also the question of the social values of the peasantry for whom identification as
an per se was socially degrading. There was an attempt to retain a small plot
agricultural labourer
for cultivation, even when they took to wage labour. I have discussed this question elsewhere. See
Agricultural Labour and Production, note 26 above.
 167

Yet, the calculations involved in such leasing in of land cannot be explained

through a purely capitalist system of accounting. If one separately calculates
the cost of production on the leased in land then it might show a net loss for
the tenant after he pays his rent. If this were actually so, then the rich peasant
would not continue to lease in land. However, as we have noted, the rich
peasant often leased in land when it did not imply any sharp increase of
production expenses-that is, when he already had surplus family labour
and plough bullocks apart from money capital. In any case, the rich tenant
could not apply any pure capitalist method of making calculations about his
investments in a situation where it was difficult to estimate alternative
possibilities of earning an average rate of profit. Such calculations are
possible only when the average rate of profit emerges as a regulator of
production, when free mobility of capital between sectors exists: conditions
which were absent within the colonial structure. While the richer tenants
accumulated and retained a larger proportion of the surplus, this could not be
measured against any given average rate of profit.
We have noted earlier that cash rents increased sharply over the years.
From this evidence alone one cannot draw conclusions about the increasing
profitability of tenancy cultivation and the consequent tendency to invest in
land purchase. As we have seen, product prices often increased faster than
cash rents: translated into seers of grain, cash rents do not show any marked
rise. In many regions there was, in fact, a decline. This wars one reason why
landowners preferred share-cropping under which there was a lesser
possibility of a decline in the proportion of produce appropriated by them.
But to analyse the returns from leasing out, one has to measure rent increase
in relation to land prices. Even when the level of rent was exorbitant, the
landowner did not necessarily derive a very high rate of return on the money
spent on land purchase. In the second decade of the twentieth century, cash
rents brought in an average return of 2 to 3 per cent, often lower (see Table 10,
Column 2). Returns from batai are more difficult to calculate, but the available
evidence suggests that generally it was not more than 4 per cent in the 1920s. 178
A detailed
178 investigation of the rate of return from batai was carried out on four farms in
Tehong in1924-25. On all the farms the rate of return was extremely low: 1.4 per cent, 0.8 per
cent, 1.6 per cent, 2.4 per cent. VS: Tehong (1931), pp. 179-80. My calculations, based on the
evidence of three other farms given in the same village survey ( ibid., pp. 197-98), suggests a
slightly higher rate of return. If we take into account the gross value of the landlords share, then
the rates of return per acre in the three farms were 4 per cent, 3.3 per cent and 3.5 per cent; if we
deduct 38 per cent of this gross income as the landowners expenditure on land revenue and
manure, as is suggested in the survey ( ibid., pp. 179-80), then the rates of return would be 2.5 per
cent,2 per cent and 2.1 per cent. (For figures of land prices in the village, see ibid., p. 177.) During
the Depression the rates of return from batai dropped to a lower level since the decline in land
prices was not as much as the slump in agricultural prices. We have detailed evidence on five farms
in Durrana Langana, a village in the Multan district of Punjab. In 1931, the rate of return from
batai in these five farms was 1.7 per cent, 0.6 per cent, 0.9 per cent, 1.2 per cent and 0.5 per cent.
VS: Durrana Langana (1938), pp. 176, 219, 329-33. Evidence from the Farm Accounts in
the Punjab indicates a similar conclusion. Note, for instance, the account of Farm A in Amritsar
168
In comparison, moneylending brought in higher returns: according to estimates
of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee it was 15 per cent on unsecured
loans and about 12 per cent on mortgages with possession. 179 Moreover, the
rate of return from leasing out of land was declining over the years (see Table
10), since land prices increased much faster than rent. Yet, purchase of land
and leasing out continued. This was not because leasing out yielded an
increasing rate of return. Clearly income from rent was not estimated against
a given average rate of profit within the economy. Secure alternative

possibilities of investment did not exist. Different spheres of investments

were not seen as absolute alternatives. There was an attempt to combine
different forms of investment to ensure a more stable income or a broader
basis of accumulation. 180
In conclusion, one may restate a point which has been emphasised in this
article. In historical literature there is frequent identification of tenants-at-
will and share-croppers as a homogeneous class, usually impoverished and
indebted. As we have seen, tenancy and share-cropping actually reflected
different forms of relations. Only through a differentiation of these forms and
an analysis of the composition of the lessors and lessees is it possible to
understand the nature and function of tenancy and rent. The form and the
level of rent also vary in relation to the social and economic power of
different classes of landowners and tenants. This is a point which is often lost
in general discussions on the subject.

which was cultivated under batai. In 1928-29, when the Depression had just set in, the
landowners net income per acre was Rs 22.20, and the rate of return 3.4 per cent (with land price
at Rs 650 per acre); in 1932-33 the net income per acre declined to Rs 11.50 and the rate of return
to 1.8 per cent (land price Rs 625 per acre); in 1936-37 the net income was Rs 10 and the rate of
return 1.6 per cent (land price Rs 600 per acre). Farm Accounts in the Punjab, 1928-29; 1932-33
and 1936-37. The net income per acre from khudkhasht on the basis of family labour was much
higher than the income from batai. (See Farm Accounts in the Punjab, 1936-37, statements
VIIIA and X.) But there was a limit to the extension of such khudkasht cultivation; beyond this
the total income could be increased through batai (though the income per acre would decline).
The Punjab Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee Report: 1929-30, Vol. 1, Lahore, 1930,
179
Ch. 16. According to this report the rate of return from land under tenancy cultivation was 3 per
cent.
180 discuss in detail the relative rates of return and the numerous other
Here it is not possible to
complex considerations which determined the various forms of investments. I discuss the nature
of land market and rural credit in my more detailed study of the agrarian economy of Punjab
during the colonial period.
 169

Note: For calculating Col. 2, 33 per cent of the cash rental was assumed as the revenue rate.
Actually in the twentieth century, revenue demand as a proportion of the rental declined.
But this would affect our calculations only marginally.
Source: Compiled and calculated on the basis of cash rent figures (Table 8) and land price figures
given in the Land Rev. and Ag. (Rev.) files, Settlement Reports, and the village surveys.
For details see sources cited for Tables 8 and 9.
170

Abbreviations