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1. ROLITO GO v. CA that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.

That same day,
the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992 petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor")
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner, informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail
vs. himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and
before an information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan,
FELICIANO, J.: died of his gunshot wound(s).

According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an
Report, 1 on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder 3
Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the
Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary
travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute
and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Code.
Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the
scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner
petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and
scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round proper preliminary investigation,4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of
of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been
Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa conducted before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that
Ang Go. he be released on recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro
Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of the
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted
find out where the suspect had come from; they were informed that provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.
petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting.
The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special
petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the raffle 5 in order to expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail
bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge,
him as the same person who had shot Maguan. Having established that who, on the same date, approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner
the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a and ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was in fact released that same
manhunt for petitioner. day.

On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a
Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation8 and prayed that
he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated
him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of

Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court
investigation, which motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor entered for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court then set the criminal
Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail of case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11
P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991. 11
of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in
Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave the Court of Appeals. He alleged that in view of public respondent's
to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelling the arraignment set failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him, after
for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its the lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his detention, he was
preliminary investigation. entitled to be released on habeas corpus.

On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas
Order, 10 embodying the following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which corpus. 13 The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the
granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were
the Order to surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals.
granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation
was recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution
immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 denying petitioner's motion to restrain his arraignment on the ground
was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991. that that motion had become moot and academic.

On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the
mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, prosecution presented its first witness.
contending that the information was null and void because no
preliminary investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated
his right to due process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all decision 14 dismissing the two (2) petitions, on the following grounds:
proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of
his petition; this motion was, however, denied by respondent Judge. a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for
which he was arrested and charged had been "freshly committed." His
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police. identity had been established through investigation. At the time he
showed up at the police station, there had been an existing manhunt
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for him. During the confrontation at the San Juan Police Station, one
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the Court of Appeals. witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit.

On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any
setting the arraignment of petitioner on 23 August 1991. irregularity attending his arrest. He waived his right to preliminary
investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the
On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion Rules.
to restrain his arraignment.
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order July 1991 Order because the trial court had the inherent power to
directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to
custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was law and justice.

" Those offenses were subversion. petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant. the offense for which petitioner addressed: first.. whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been was arrested was murder. the Court issued a Resolution directing warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case after the actual commission of the offenses. In the instant case. and he has Accordingly. two (2) principal issues need to be People's Army.. 5 Arrest without warrant. The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. none of the police officers who arrested him had and a valid commitment order (issued by the trial judge after petitioner been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner was given to the had the "personal knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a custody of the Provincial Warden). not be granted. the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was d. petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested being transferred from one confinement to another. or has escaped while On the other hand. the prosecution presented three (3) more respect of petitioner. from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. committed. In Umil v. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. Sec. in the circumstances of this case. the person to be arrested has with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil. witnesses at the trial. and completed at one definite location in time and space. could not apply in On 3 October 1991. Counsel for petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court. in his presence. On 14 October 1991. Thus. misplaced. without warrant. the petition for habeas corpus could warrantees arrest. arrest a person: Station. 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows: Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently established by police work. in the view of the Solicitor General. petitioner . the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was Ramos. Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because has committed it. etc. et al. upon the ground that such below until further orders from this Court." investigation. 16 one of the seven (7) cases consolidated (a) When. Secondly. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. by an eight-to-six vote. the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped information for murder even without preliminary investigation. etc. is actually committing. Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation. We consider these issues seriatim. Moreover.. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a offense. an offense which was obviously commenced effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go. when lawful. Ramos is. the Solicitor General argues that under the petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule facts of the case. Ramos. without warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. the Court sustained the legality of the filed. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest. offenses constituted "continuing crimes. the provisions of personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested Section 7. we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of In respect of the first issue. v. Section 7. No one had whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime. membership in an outlawed organization like the New In this Petition for Review. — A peace officer or a petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police private person may. Station Commander. On 4 October 1991. and second. or is attempting to commit an etc. et al. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner arrested. and petitioner had declined to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. argues. with petitioner's conformity. warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in connection with which Nazareno had been arrested.

ask for a preliminary arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the police station or jail. is also not applicable. petitioner was not arrested at all. a preliminary investigation. as amended. the derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of — one stated that petitioner was the gunman. with or without a warrant. the must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception. the Moreover. since petitioner It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest had not been arrested. The preliminary investigation was responsible person of his choice. and he shall be proceed against in accordance with manner prescribed in this Rule. constitute "personal knowledge. as noted earlier. police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor. The Solicitor General contends that that However. — When a Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable right to preliminary investigation. (Emphasis supplied) Rule 112. Notwithstanding such waiver. a be predicated on such a slim basis. accompanied by two (2) Maguan. Section 7. It is apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation true that at the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion. When the in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). That information did not. which provides: investigation. Indeed. not by the Regional Trial Court. When Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of he walked into San Juan Police Station. the person the time he learns of the filing of the information. 19 this Court held: . on the same day that the information investigation having been first conducted. he may to be conducted by the Prosecutor. Mogul. As earlier pointed out. in all Maguan. for petitioner however. We do not believe of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The "arresting" officers obviously were not present. within the lawyers. he was also entitled of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. In Crespo v.In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof. we note that petitioner had from the by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be the offended party. and that the petitioner should accordingly be held to accordance with this Rule. with the that waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer. It is clear too to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary that Section 7 of Rule 112. peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary conducted. on the basis of the affidavit for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court. at the time petitioner had allegedly shot authorities. the accused may within five (5) days from Prosecutor. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. but he must sign a waiver of the provisions have waived his right to preliminary investigation. another was able to take Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out registered in petitioner's wife's name. before the filing of such complaint or information. This was substantive error. the person omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in the Prosecutor. information for murder had already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the having been first conducted. none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in shot Maguan. he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police meaning of Section 5(a). He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself. Moreover. The information upon which the police acted had been court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. petitioner filed with of the offended party or arresting office or person the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation." 18 was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Sec. Instead.

The investigation before his arraignment. He had preliminary investigation. the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. The rule is that the right to dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it discretion of the Court. not to speak of consideration of the Court. To deny right of the People to due process of law. In fact. After constitutional in its fundament. Finally. 20 (Citations omitted. (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable. and that the trial court was five (5) days later thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his investigation. the permission of the Court must be secured." 24 In was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary the instant case. is not a mere formal or technical already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel right. aggravation. Mogul Again. as above stated. Accordingly. Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure of his right to due process. when . we cannot reasonably imply prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. At the time of his arraignment. at such stage. 21 The should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. in the circumstances of this case. to hardened criminals. once the case had incarceration or some other penalty. While it is true right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of not a criminal case should be filed in court or not. . Selfaison. In turn. the 5-day determining whether a prima facie case exists to warranting the reglementary period in Section 7. . even on the waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. and since the Prosecutor himself did file posting bail petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. on the 5th day after filing the information for murder. we do not believe that by involved a re-investigation). In People v. . it is a substantive right. they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial court. 22 In the instant control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is case. petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. or the one save. While that right is statutory rather than case. is a valuable right. it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the exposed to prolonged anxiety. 23 we did hold that appellants there had waived a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation (attaching to his their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion). information in the proper court. since it has in fact been established by such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal statute. Rule 112 must be held to have been prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the substantially complied with. emphasis supplied) prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial. petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari. with the trial court. xxx xxx xxx The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or preliminary investigation in the instant case considering that he was information is filed in Court any disposition of the case [such] as its already arraigned on 23 August 1991. we conclude that arrest. perhaps. Although the fiscal retains the direction and before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the preliminary investigation. since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for a re-investigation (Crespo v. the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's release on 12 July 1991. What that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.. Thus. The only qualification is that the action of expense. petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. Nonetheless. humiliation.

In any event. failure to accord preliminary investigation. The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that. could petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. that is. Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be. however. in view of to legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the the evidence that he may at this time have on hand. upon the other hand. before the prosecution called its petitioner was entitled to bail. We would clarify. And. to hold that petitioner's on the merits has already began. did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect investigation. while constituting a denial of counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary justice. strong." 29 Petitioner had July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order granting promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and prohibition to bail and requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48) challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to hours from notice. impact upon. petitioner through counsel once again reiterated his acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation: petitioner's then in his hands was not strong. the In respect of the matter of bail. we similarly believe and so hold that Prosecutor having already presented four (4) witnesses. petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and. trial on the merits has already commenced. Accordingly. conclude that Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and probable cause exists. rather. trial. petitioner did so "kicking and screaming. it would not be idle arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary ceremony. and if he cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses. to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail. 25 counsel's protests and objections that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout. in any case. petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor. he clearly if impliedly recognized that audience that filled the courtroom. waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process. to the applause from the preliminary investigation. 28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's the jurisdiction of the trial court. that contrary to petitioner's contention the the date set for arraignment of petitioner. we consider that the 17 counsel made of record his "continuing objection. It would then against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be released on bail? be up to the trial court. with extraordinary haste. we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial To reach any other conclusions here. promising to replace him It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that with counsel de oficio. the Prosecutor conceivably effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant vanishing point." in a manner of speaking . But the Court is procedural due process. It may be that to require the State to accord petitioner a finding of probable cause. the constitutional point is that his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point. and just before arraignment. and to run the risk of being held to have entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. the Prosecutor may to have a preliminary investigation conducted in respect of the charge move in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. secondly. firstly. If he submitted to arraignment at petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one. it would be a celebration by the State of the rights . it was submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de oficio order issued just five (5) days before. after a careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record. During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991. During the trial. This was equivalent to an first witness.the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct investigation. 27 Petitioner was forced to undergo not compelled to speculate. was plainly arbitrary considering that no evidence at undergo and the lawfulness of his detention. Trial on the merits should be rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be accorded to petitioner. It follows that petitioner was selected by the trial judge. in the instant case. 26 It is true that the Prosecutor might. petitioner remains entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation.30 If he did not walk out on all — and certainly no new or additional evidence — had been the trial.

MIRANDA v. mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE. son of private respondent Virgilio DECISION Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program. 2 JOSE C. and it is hereby ordered: The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against 1.] and REINSTATING the Order dated June (P100. SPO2 Alexander This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Micu. Dalmacio. SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan. AFFIRMING[. Regional Trial Court of Santiago City. CHICO-NAZARIO. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. This Decision is immediately executory. 3.and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. Nibulan. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private 2. Criminal Cases Nos. and to complete such preliminary investigation within a September 21. DALMACIO. vs. Anghad on Certiorari. Agustin. SPO2 Rodel Maderal. 2001 issued by the then acting order that the trial court may issue. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the No pronouncement as to costs. TULIAO respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda. The trial on the Order dated November 14. This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful 25. The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. MIRANDA. and the Decision of the Court of Appeals excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17. Petitioners. of the assailed decision reads as follows: ACCORDINGLY. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion Meantime. Order dated petitioner Go. Isabela. and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Court. On 8 March 1996. J. assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City. 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6.: Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño. SP No. the instant petition dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED. should the Office of the Provincial Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan. 2006 Nos. the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review WHEREFORE. Anghad in SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. and SO ORDERED. ALBERTO P. two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok VIRGILIO M. all issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D. TULIAO. for certiorari.000. No. Respondent. petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. SPO3 Alberto P. SPO1 Ruben B. 2.R. 2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be Murder. 2001 and Joint period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. Joint Order dated October 16. Ocon and accused Rodel T. PO3 Romeo B. Maderal in said Criminal Cases G.00). 158763 March 31. 2001. The dispositive portion determination to respect those rights and liberties.R. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution . Isabela. Ramon. The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows: OCON. and ROMEO B. 2001. and another entered posting of a cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos UPHOLDING. Appeals in CA-G. 36-3523 and 36-3524.

for murder. as well as the issuance of Prosecutor Leo T. 2001. of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two mandamus and prohibition with this Court. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. On 19 November 2001. with prayer for a Temporary counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be Restraining Order. accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt. petitioners. Reyes to the Department of Justice.The venue was later transferred to Manila. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001. as the persons responsible the aforesaid resolution. he ordered the cancellation of the Hence. we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondent’s In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001. noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that. petitioners appealed the resolution of State criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City. Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt. and submitted the sworn and issued the temporary restraining order while referring the petition confession of SPO2 Maderal. alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and On 29 June 2001. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 The facts of the case being undisputed. and 22 October 2001. Miranda. and SPO3 Alberto P. Judge Tumaliuan petition for certiorari. On 27 On 12 November 2001. Shortly after a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe. November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. Ocon. the RTC On 25 October 2001. PO3 Romeo B. 2001. Acting Presiding Judge to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits. this Court issued a Resolution resolving to April 2001. SPO2 Maderal was arrested. Dalmacio. Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. September 21." On 21 November 2001. Anghad in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003. acquitted the Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001. but the motion for reconsideration FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Consequently. prohibition and mandamus. the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. October 16. Sometime in September 1999. On 25 June 2001. being at large. the motion cannot be properly heard by decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the the court. Anghad dated August 17. 2001 . to reinvestigate. seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further arraigned at that time. and to recall and/or quash 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations the warrants of arrest. 16 October 2001. Reyes and respondent Court the following assignments of error: Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad. the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed jurisdiction over their persons. the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. and Amado Doe. petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November preliminary investigation. With all due respect. Boyet dela Cruz. respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari. The case was appealed to this proceeding with the case. this Court took note of respondent’s Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against cash bond evidenced by O. On 22 April 1999. and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Court on automatic review where we. took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. petitioners bring forth to this September 2001. but the same was denied On 17 August 2001. No. on 9 October 2001. 21 September 2001. this petition. he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Jose C. In the meantime. since the court did not acquire On 18 December 2002.R.

Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera: 3523 and No. the Court ordered the case [A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause. the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest the Court of Appeals’ ruling that: in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. and. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with 307). and in ordering the public on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest. that jurisdiction over their person was he surrenders to the police or to the court. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the Wit all due respect. or through his voluntary appearance. court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a). jurisdiction over the person of the accused. is accomplished either by his pleading to . the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a adjudication of applications for bail. whereby the court acquires on his petition for judicial reliefs. in invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. nor custody of law over the In Allado vs. affirming and reinstating the Proceeding from this premise. such jurisdiction respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.6 accused may be acquired either through compulsory process. it is not necessary for the court to first ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case herein petitioners. 12a). the case was dismissed on body of the accused. 36-3523 and 36-3524 applications for bail. petitioners already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke our pronouncement. 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge petitioners Miranda. the order of dismissal issued therein having become or grant other relief. No. Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. In Paul Roberts vs. and in Except in applications for bail. A. through Justice Florenz D. 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524. Alfonso V. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City.M."4 SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that With all due respect. such as warrant of arrest. investigation. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025). Regalado. Vasquez7: Jr. Diokno (232 SCRA 192). such as when In arguing. the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. the Court of Appeals ruled that Order dated July 6.. Philippines. November 6. Furthermore. The outright dismissal of the case even before the final and executory. It is only when the court has already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion. 1992). petitioners quote Retired Court of reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36. RTJ-91-764. on the other hand.3 jurisdiction over his person.and November 14. assuming that in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act Trial Court of Santiago City. Santiago v. And in Lacson vs. Philippines. to reinvestigate. Combing. Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief Wilfredo Tumaliuan. petitioners argue. Pico vs. motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been arrested. Thus. over their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion. on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary the court. erred in upholding. an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act The voluntary appearance of the accused. to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest.

in criminal cases. seeking an a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has affirmative relief in court. 13 involving special appearances. since affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused. surrender. but is not release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.8 Custody of the bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender. where there is the special Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. 17 as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago. in narrow cases application for bail. who is thereby deprived of his own will and jurisdiction of the court. however.’" The rationale behind this special rule on of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Pasicolan. Respondent Judge should have diligently accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief. On the matter of bail. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the reads: court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest. A person who has not submitted To recapitulate what we have discussed so far. required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant Thus. motions to dismiss on the of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. and the consequent the custody of the law. or not other grounds for dismissal are included. an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. such as when an accused escapes custody after submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court. A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. 10 One can be under the custody of the law personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Therefore. In Feliciano of the law and jurisdiction over the person.the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover. detention. Pico deals with an application for bail. been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary constitutes voluntary appearance. motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over The statement in Pico v. one who seeks an arraignment. and yet not be in affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance. whether in civil or criminal proceedings. binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases. and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. which only leads to a special appearance. This is in the his trial has commenced. 13 cited by the Court of the person of the accused. such therefor. whether but is not limited to. an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor . custody of the law. himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the processes of that court. one can be There is. we clarify that. It includes.. ‘bail is the security required and given for the release of a person where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense who is in the custody of law. without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his or voluntary appearance. On the other hand. entering trial) or by filing bail. as court. appearing for concerns bail.9 while practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest post his bail. as a general rule. except ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the impugning such jurisdiction over his person. 11 Being in the custody of the law signifies case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the restraint on the person. ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. 18 (2) in criminal cases. Custody of the law is v. Judge Combong. 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure one’s required before the court can act upon the application for bail. liberty. Jr. Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case.

of arrest. nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest: In fine. v. after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the of the Sandiganbayan. Diokno. the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. it would be very rare that a person not genuinely . Court of Appeals.21 on the prayer of the accused in his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part climate in the city. According to Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the criminal cases against the petitioners. but were deemed to have placed their persons under the be taken against him in the determination of probable cause. pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions. since flight jurisdiction of the court. Jr."24 custody of the law. Moreover. commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. a deferment of the proceedings is but proper. rule applies. On the other hand. where therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time of the day we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of and night. Note that none of these cases involve the is indicative of guilt. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause. two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the case. he must first submit himself to the custody judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not of the law. if a person invoking the special jurisdiction entitled to liberty would remain scot-free.. he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused. it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail before the Secretary of Justice. it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before 1. we issued a rights than property rights. However. The following cases best illustrate this point. nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person. we directed respondent judge therein to cease of Judge Anghad. of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and. Second. and because of 3. In Lacson v. Notwithstanding this.custody of the law. shortly after assuming will remain at large. he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause. he quashed the the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused. as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners. instead. First.20 upon the accused’s Motion to by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion.22 Furthermore. In Roberts. Executive Secretary. to elevate the records to us. Judge Anghad. doing so the warrants of arrest. i. "x x x prudence dictates (that) and if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the because of comity. the continued absence of the accused can the law. we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the prosecutor’s resolution. standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice. application for bail. the general cause after personally examining the records of the case. In Allado v. Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions Department of Justice. This is because it is the same of the court applies for bail. and could elude being held to answer for the office. 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for asserting it. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutor’s resolution of the law. there is no requirement for him to be in the the warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and custody of the law.e.23 demanding that due process in the temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after. Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered 2. and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable In cases not involving the so-called special appearance. quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal.

the Court proceeded to determine the existence of a probable cause by In these double murder cases. after a deep accompanied by supporting documents. for the arrest arrest. Similarly. 6(a). which is Sec. Jose "Pempe" Miranda. Ocon. Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question: Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor. the issuance of showed that it was based only on the fiscal’s certification. did this Court comply or adhere to the personally evaluating the records x x x. de Leon. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B.[29] above-quoted constitutional proscription. which clearly stated that the determination of probable cause was based on In Webb v. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Inting. of the petitioners is apparent from the face of the order itself. 2. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Miranda warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to and Reynaldo de la Cruz. under oath. Rule 112. Article III Bill of Rights. 2. appeal the assistant abused his discretion. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. following the requirement perusal of the arguments raised. But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of According to petitioners: arrest.Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. houses. Felix30 and People v. Petitioners’ claim is untrue. It is inconceivable However. and 5. through [its] regular under Lim.27 6. Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan: 2. Rules of Criminal Procedure and to The records of the case show that the prosecutor’s certification was the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue. . including to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to the supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just determination of probable cause. of the fiscal and not on a separate as premature the filing of the information in court against them on the determination personally made by the Judge. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. Sec. prosecutor’s resolution to the Secretary of Justice. Judge Tumaliuan’s Joint Order contains no such indication that he relied solely on the prosecutor’s certification. Hence. we find that Judge Anghad gravely because the petitioners might. after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case. documents are the following: movant.28 warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same ground. No presumption of ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of regularity could be drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. in the future. Reyes. be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. this Court. 97-160355.26 1. to Sec. 3. Branch 41 in Criminal Case No.25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail the certification. The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the The Joint Order even indicated the contrary: warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. and no search 4. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio. the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor’s resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of In this case. Sr.31 The supporting Presiding Judge. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan. finds merit in the contention of herein accused. v.

we can conclude that there was no violation on other things. probable value. Indeed. Information dated 22 June 2001. Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground. RTC. and lies" and that because of the decision acquitting said officers "who were allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other. However. 9.7. two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao. however. We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without reason to disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan. No. It is not a evidence presented by the prosecution in that case. (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward he pinpointed to Mr. Judge section. and (4) it was given during the other police officers as the direct perpetrators.e. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these cause. Branch 41. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente discretion. Preliminary investigation is not a 8. it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal. (2) it was Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. 2001 statements. 13886..R."32 likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27." A finding of probable acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. part of trial x x x. given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a et al. of the Constitution. Buazon. Accordingly. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt. procedurally. Miranda – the mastermind and with him and the of discharge from the information. the existence of probable cause. witness is not within the province of the determination of probable 97-160355. In failing to find probable Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the cause. fugitive for five years. the probative value of his statements is practically nil. Navarro. 2001 election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder. United States. prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Wilfredo Leaño. City voters were pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda certainly makes his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S." This Court agrees with the defense’s views. neither on evidence establishing guilt This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda beyond reasonable doubt and definitely.. than evidence which would justify x x x conviction. of what use is Maderal’s statements when the Supreme Court rejected the It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a prosecution’s evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case No.. Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is petitioners on the basis of the following explanation: incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation. As we held in Webb33: two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to. after Judge Anghad. Section 2. G. not on evidence establishing dated October 18. the pronouncement of guilt. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was xxxx committed by the suspects." it requires "less in People of the Philippines vs. and Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused constitutes grave abuse of 10. x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. As well put in Brinegar v. i.34 . Wilfredo Leano. 2001. focused on the substantive part of said the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution. Manila. while (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion. that there was a petition for review of the assistant the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III. and based from his sworn statements. among Hence. praying for the summary dismissal of the two absolute certainty of guilt. the October 9. et al.

36-3524. case was presented. bond. Diokno and Roberts v. since the prosecution in where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other that case relied on circumstantial evidence. issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad. petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of In their second assignment of error. an acquittal on the ground of reasonable would have been legally permissible for them to do so. it was to twist our decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal. however. bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable proceeding with the case. While the dismissal of the case was able in the same vein. orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of is without probable value. and are also available to this Court. we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing to beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order. the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao’s son. allowing both the Court of probable cause. The blunder new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of Appeals. upon the filing of a determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria."35 On the contrary. There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceeding. the declaration of nullity of whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. In their third assignment of error. an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so. without a personal who was still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leaño determination of probable cause. As we have We cannot let unnoticed. petitioners claim that the Court of Criminal Cases No. even of this Court. especially in this case doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein. alleging that the order Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by . acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of We disagree. we just found that there was reasonable allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits. Firstly. too. 36-3523 and No. The records of doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecution’s version of the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of the facts therein. A decision. Judge Anghad’s order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified. "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful. Judge Anghad had no right apparently new warrants of arrest. the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be the crime did not happen. Certainly. fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same Even if.36 According to the petitioners. which interestingly is not direction. Judge Tumaliuan. such a finding of probable cause. conducted by Judge Anghad void. The bond was filed the day after the cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.37 which issued the warrants of arrest. therefore those It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed. if we are to permit the new warrants of arrest based on a determination of probable cause. the informations two days after we resolved to issue. informations were dismissed. doubt in Leaño. The accused in Secondly. it use of our decision in Leaño. Judge Anghad’s dismissal of the ruled in Allado v. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of criminal case against different accused for the same crime. the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Court of Appeals. We never ruled in Leaño that scrupulous semantics. also on the ground of grave abuse of abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Court’s resolve to discretion. Appeals and this Court to personally examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor.

Anghad dated November 14. respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave abuse of discretion. is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari. 2001. Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE. The Decision dated 18 prohibition and mandamus.38 arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order were questioned by private respondent. around three Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case. antedating it so as to avoid the Court of Appeals.000. According issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals.) Joint Order dated October 22. respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. 36-3523 and No. In this connection.41 by alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 2.) Joint Order dated October 16." On Constitution. 2001 of Judge Anghad. the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before of the Joint Order of November 14. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao’s Petition for was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.40 Certiorari. Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the 2001 Order on 15 November 2001. 3. only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad Resolution. the petition is DENIED. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005. however. with the modification that Criminal Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Cases No. While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt. we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals. 21 November 2001.) Joint Order dated August 17.39 the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable Obviously. P20. in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliao’s petition for certiorari. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. . to wit: enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliao’s filing of a bond in the amount of 1. 2001. SPO1 Leaño.00. In said 12 November 2001 assailed Decision. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001. We with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt. under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Hence. 2001. the Joint Order dated November 14.) Order dated September 21. 36-3523 and No.of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. and seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which require the granting of 4. The Court of Appeals decided the case As to respondent Tuliao’s prayer (in both the original petition for because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001 certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Resolution. of the dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder. 2001. the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity In any case. but with this Court. December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. 2001. 36-3524 contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order to the City of Manila. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order. further resolve to follow the case of People v. Upon receipt of the 14 number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to November 2001 Order. In claiming that to petitioners: Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order. pursuant to Article VIII. Section 4. opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent. we hold that the weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order.

death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Information in Criminal Case No. No. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary December 2002. Romeo B. No. CARPIO. and EVANGELINE from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. Isabela. Miranda. SAN PEDRO The MeTC refused quashal. 2803). Ponce and damage to conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. petitioner moved to quash the SO ORDERED. Isabela.R. Maderal. Judge of the a petition for certiorari (S. incident grounding the second prosecution. for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. No. Criminal Case No. PONCE. Petitioner. finding no identity of offenses in the two G. Invoking this conviction. invoking S.3 JASON IVLER y AGUILAR. and Following a vehicular collision in August 2004. 4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to The Facts report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August On 7 September 2004. Respondents. Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial 2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago. cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Meanwhile. Ponce 6) Finally. who is directed to effect the The Case transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof. Without acting on petitioner’s motion. in HON. Branch 71 (MeTC). Costs against Petitioners. 82366. petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig 5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to City. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. 2010 cases. release in both cases. petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in 2003 is hereby LIFTED. IVLER v. Pasig City. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Branch 157 (RTC). 3. is Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding likewise directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution (10) days from transfer of these cases. .C. Branch 71. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO. Judge Anastacio D. Dalmacio. 172716 November 17. because of petitioner’s absence. petitioner sought Metropolitan Trial Court. DECISION the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and. and accused Rodel T.C.: 1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith (respondent Ponce). Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. This. including the arraignment on 17 May 2005.4 Seven days later. 2803 as a prejudicial question.A. J. After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration. matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless 3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer. with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.A. Ocon. 82366) for the Alberto P. and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. petitioner elevated the vs.

125.5 grave or less grave felonies (e.A. 2803 when the MeTC No. not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further conviction.A. Rule 124. 2803. No. 2803. Rule are material only to determine his penalty. 82366. of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also.C.A.A. Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in in S. and (2) if in the negative. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line Criminal Case No. homicide). 82366.C.6 constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. slight physical injuries) Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions. dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in S. petitioner argues that his Criminal Case No. slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82366. this petition. No. Thus. 82366. custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the 82366.C. Relying on the arrest order against petitioner.8 in relation to Section 1. the prosecution Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case forfeited his standing to seek relief in S. 82367 for the Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No.C. The Ruling of the Court Petitioner denies absconding. 2803 the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. Hence. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime second paragraph of Section 8. whether petitioner’s but this proved unavailing.A.C. the was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No.C. Petitioner sought reconsideration Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding the petition in S. General’s motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is The Ruling of the Trial Court represented by counsel. and (2) the protection afforded by the appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in seeking a pre-trial relief. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. . No.7 proceedings in Criminal Case No.A. No.C. Petitioner contested the motion. Hence. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for to Maintain the Petition in S.A.A. In an Order dated 2 February 2006.C. The Issues 2803. the RTC dismissed S. upon motion of the appellee or motu Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s proprio.the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.g. 2803.g. Invoking jurisprudence." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.A. we granted the Office of the Solicitor standing to maintain the suit. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of In the Resolution of 6 June 2007. respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C. having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the motion remained unresolved. without reaching the merits of S. 82366. jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the 2803. He explains that his petition in S. On the merits. narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain S. 82366.C. No. the ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. confinement. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.A. respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to pendency of the appeal.

His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition. shall suffer the Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime. by simple imprudence or negligence. the defendant’s absence merely renders Property are Material Only to Determine his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation the Penalty should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days). Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. if it would have MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released constituted a light felony. would why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is constitute a grave felony. Any person who. the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation imprudence.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in reliance on People v. 82366 as proof of his loss of We find for petitioner. should he fail to surrender. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless 124. shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its belied by the records. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences The MeTC ruled otherwise. . namely. arraignment hearings. if it would the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. post-conviction prosecution for the same offense."15 The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No.10 Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Days before the arraignment. had it been intentional. were tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the among others. the case turns on the question There. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling Criminal Case No. jurisdiction upon a valid charge. with Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code. as day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused amended. the 30. will be The two charges against petitioner. Indeed. petitioner sought period shall be imposed. 82367 involve sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she the "same offense. underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto The text of the provision reads: convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing. by reckless Further.A. shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony. standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post. Rule 11411 of the Revised its Consequences on Persons and Rules of Criminal Procedure. the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was whether Criminal Case No. Thus. Under Section 21. 82367 penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods. submitting jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. Imprudence and negligence.C." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view. if it would Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting under Republic Act No. petitioner sought maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. — Any person who. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82366 have constituted a less grave felony. shall commit any act which. 2803. the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed. The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"13 protects him from. The RTC’s valid information. 82366 have constituted a less serious felony. arising from the same facts. the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest). No. Following the minimum and medium periods shall be imposed. the defendant retains his standing and. reconsideration. the penalty of arresto mayor in its in light of his petition with the RTC in S.

their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder. lack some wrong which. classification or terminology. in which case legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and maximum periods. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply. malicious mischief. (2) a modified penalty damages to three times such value. lack of care or foresight. by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes). in negligence or imprudence. In intentional crimes. robbery. degree of intelligence. then it would be absorbed . the notion that quasi-offenses. as amended. would have constituted a light of care or foresight. In truth. is nothing new. taking into consideration his employment or committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability occupation. Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies. criminal negligence Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense."16 unlike willful offenses felony. doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of The proposition (inferred from Art. a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5). these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub- resulted in damage to the property of another. It is not a mere question of nor the danger clearly manifest. what is principally penalized is The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article the mental attitude or condition behind the act. the act itself is punished. separately defined and penalized under the 1. but without malice. the offender shall be groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2). to death of a person shall be caused. quasi-offenses penalize "the mental upon any person who. whether reckless or simple. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of failing to perform such act. etc. operating only to reduce the penalty therefor. the imprudencia punible. and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed (paragraphs 7-8). (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes: Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary. When. x x x x injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give. in which case the last century. physical condition and other is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of In the imposition of these penalties. There are crimes that by circumstances regarding persons. by simple imprudence or negligence. treason. but which shall in no case be less scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4. 6 and 9). the dangerous recklessness. Penal Code.When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only Structurally. and dealt cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate with separately from willful offenses. if done maliciously. (2) the Automobile Law. the dangerous shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the recklessness. which punish the intentional criminal act. Conceptually. that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of 2. are distinct species of crime. As early as the middle of those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article. we already sought to bring clarity to this field by the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which rejecting in Quizon v. and. time and place. the imprudencia punible. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable: Indeed. the court shall exercise their sound intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised discretion. without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four. (3) than twenty-five pesos. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than framework of our penal laws. shall cause attitude or condition behind the act.

there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. per Reyes. speaking through Mr. per x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x. willfully. specially the lack of intent to prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. acting Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of C.). People v. we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without same accused for "reckless driving. unreported. in barring . regardless of its various resulting acts. It can be seen that The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes individual willful crime. Quasi-Offense notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death.). J. 13. whenever the same legal question was brought before the Mischief. if the willful act would constitute a grave felony. the Court Quizon. property. Quizon rejected Faller’s by the Court en banc. City Court of Manila33 jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division. day penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated. rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied) prosecution for the same quasi-offense. Buerano v. J.in the mitigating circumstances of Art.). per Relova. People v. J. For each penalty for the willful offense. J. These cases an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.21 stands on solid Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc. per Makalintal. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959. Justice J.). People v. conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed second prosecution was based. an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the Court. had been dismissed earlier. such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent of crimes.). J. that is. Furthermore. where. and People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x People v. barring second best articulated by Mr. rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Faller found expression in post-Quizon Court en banc. But instead. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc. the Quizonian conception of quasi."23 has long been abandoned Bengzon J. Imprudence. J. undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v.. Buan31 conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless Reckless Imprudence Bars imprudence at arresto mayor maximum. per Concepcion. There. People v. per Reyes. J. per Relova.). J. whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes." arising from the same act upon jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property through Reckless which the first prosecution was based.L.25 decided in 1954. as will be shown shortly. either to person or Diaz. The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses. to state that their commission results in damage.B. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939.). imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense. a full Court. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two banc. according to the case. conceptual foundation. Penal Code which. to prision correccional Subsequent Prosecution for the Same [medium]. our Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Revised Penal Code (Art.L.B.19 Justice Montemayor. ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the Accordingly.)." its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Since then. but is set in relation to a whole class. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in Yap v. Reyes in Buan. regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges. Indeed. or series. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the committing crimes. per Paredes.

At any rate. It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano. Buerano had effectively overruled the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second Estipona. not the result thereof. then . 22 SCRA 1383 where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. if offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal intentionally done. the accused may not be offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal prosecuted again for that same act. the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same. Bulacan. not the result thereof.37 There. and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. We reversed admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea on the strength of Buan:38 of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28. without costs. Estipona decided on November set aside. Buan. if thus the negligent or careless act. However." with both charges grounded on the same act. 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) was based. the exoneration of this appellant. prosecution was based. in the case of People vs. The gravity of intentionally done. L. of the charge of extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade." arising from the same act upon which the second charge MANIFESTATION dated December 12. And. a fact which we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for did not escape the Court’s attention: "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless Then Solicitor General. in his imprudence. The law penalizes the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty. joined causes with the accused.36 decided by the pre-war colonial accident. would be punishable as a felony. allowed the subsequent prosecution of an second jeopardy for the same offense. this Court. . For the essence of the quasi of a specific act of reckless imprudence. prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this the Court of First Instance of the province. The law penalizes Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that. 1969. in Criminal Case No. whether the injurious result should affect one person or does not qualify the substance of the offense. it is single. slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. as the careless act several persons. the Court explained:34 Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence. Estipona. would be punishable as a felony.a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to (March 29. by the Justice of the Evidently. held property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior that – acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. where both charges are unbroken line of authority. the accused may not be Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted prosecuted again for that same act. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. El derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular Pueblo de Filipinas v. it thus the negligent or careless act. now Justice Felix V. 05123-CR finding petitioner Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence should be Court in the pre-war case of People vs. B.35 x xxxx x x (Emphasis supplied) . 1968). For the essence of the quasi Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists 14. Jose Buan. 1940. the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto. his earlier stance in Silva. for all intents and purposes. Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it.39 (Emphasis supplied) accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from Thus. whether the injurious result should affect one person or same. Makasiar. as the careless act the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty. And. speaking thru Justice J. the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the is single. because the second accusation places the appellant in Court in November 1940. and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. in a reversal of all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano. . The gravity of does not qualify the substance of the offense. several persons. Reyes.

R. Belga:42 through reckless imprudence. One of the acquittal. Both of these two complaints were of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City filed against Jose Belga only. two other amount of the damage was alleged to be ₱249. Case No. x x x In the case cited. we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts investigation."40 (Emphasis supplied) in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary Hence. 1959 and dismissed the case. 1959. The trial court initially denied relief. and on appeal by the Government connection with the same collision one for damage to property through we affirmed the ruling. the case for damage to property through cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved vehicle arising from the same mishap. the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2. Belga. Without the aforesaid accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. 88. whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Verily. both defendants were acquitted Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless of the charge against them in Crim. we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property following Diaz and its progeny People v. but. accused sought the quashal of the latter. who was also involved in a vehicular collision." Following his acquittal of the former. Diaz.50. contending that the case was just a duplication of in the former complaint or information (Rule 113. on reconsideration. In the meantime. Albay. 96) signed by the The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense passengers injured in the accident. Another test the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. A more fitting jurisprudence could not injuries through reckless imprudence. one for physical by the Double Jeopardy Clause. the accused was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. holding: — 1954. 88). double jeopardy enunciated in People v.. prom. F. the accused. invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. the accused filed a motion. [T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner . Fiscal. charging the same automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. in jeopardy. Case No. G. On June 26. the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. L-6518. the in the following language: . Following his imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance.’ After the accused had pleaded not guilty Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of the Government to Court of Malilipot. 95) signed by the owner of one Justice Montemayor — of the vehicles involved in the collision. Sec.the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law. March 30. 41 a Diaz progeny. The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. and another for damage to be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Both cases were dismissed by There. reckless imprudence (Crim. No. and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Silva. On appeal by the Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries Prov. with the crime of physical injuries through prosecute’. thereby causing an accident. After such remand. Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged injured passengers. was the Court of First Instance. 9). convicted.. the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision Albay. upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. Pleading double criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court. is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is . Case No. the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court thru Reckless Imprudence. In the case of Peo[ple] v. After trial. property through reckless imprudence. Among other things we there said through Mr. The complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of. In the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent affirming the trial court.

lack of care or foresight x x x. We find. this Court has proceed under a single charge. in attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious lieu of serving multiple penalties. upon the basis of the to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries. On one hand. the dangerous recklessness. Lutero. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 works the case. the prosecuting legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who. Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi- Revised Penal Code. urges a re. However. etc. to which injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the MeTC succumbed. would have reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case.43 defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act. 48 of the in criminal law. In the same breath said State. that grave or grave offenses. Reckless Imprudence. Having first prosecuted the felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46). Thus. The prosecution’s contention might offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes. The Solicitor General. will framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple yield no practical advantage to the government. Book II of the Revised Penal Code. stems from persistent but awkward attempts to the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules imprudence in this case. The Meycauayan. when proper. Hon. 1959. less of delimiting or clarifying its application. upon which the order of dismissal of the produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models – that of lower court was anchored. will only serve the maximum of the charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless penalty for the most serious crime. x x x supplied) xxxx Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave injuries through reckless imprudence. collectively alleging all the . admits that the facts of the case at bar. April 30. imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior In contrast. as amended. which acquitted the defendant. and (2) defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. upon certain considerations for the purpose persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light. the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more application. thus: consequences. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case.45 (Emphasis one crime is an ingredient of the other. a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to examination of said ruling. Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act court. nevertheless. however..to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven. both under the be true. or whether of Yap v. on the ground of double jeopardy. in the identical case been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa."47 a single Significantly. in view of the provisions of Art. Bulacan. these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article Belga (and hence. there is (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution applicability of the Belga case. The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing Ordinarily."44 We declined the invitation. thru the Solicitor Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their General. L-12669. On the other. thru under Titles 1-13. the complexities of human interaction can ruling of the Belga case x x x. It was clear. the how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case. fall squarely on the consequences. namely.

framing under Article 365. less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and.49 Expectedly. the offender shall be reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code: punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value." as follows: committing another. x x x reads as follows: second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through resulted in damage to the property of another. in which case maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light 365.consequences of the single quasi-crime. are irreconcilable. abandon its present under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period. logically.50 the MeTC has breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty felonies). discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by invokes). Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi- consequence separately. require single single prosecution of all the resulting acts. resulting acts amounting to light felonies and Evidently. resulting acts amounting to grave or under Article 365. x x x. one line of rulings (none The information cannot be split into two." the Court meant. Thus. This is why. to be penalized separately The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage following the scheme of penalties under Article 365? to property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed.1avvphi1 less grave offenses. in Angeles v. while parallel. or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for injuries. on the one hand. articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or in the Diaz line of cases. but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless . the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13.52 we interpreted crimes under Article 365. way back in 1968 in Buan. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi- paragraph three of Article 365.51 penalizing each under our penal code. regardless of their number or severity. in which case charges were By "additional penalty. but which shall in no case be less The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight than 25 pesos. Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. filing the charge with the first level courts. Thus. and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi- Under this approach. this is the Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce other. we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does not bar a [T]he third paragraph of said article. of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by and another for the damage to property. even though under Republic Act No. Jose. the penalty scheme split by grouping. on the other hand. thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime. and thus other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses. these approaches. in relation to a charge alleging "reckless offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical less grave felonies. or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes. Book "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting II under the penal code. 7691.53 (Emphasis supplied) "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony. The issue of double jeopardy prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the severity. separately penalize each as provided in Article 365. A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies one charge. one for the physical injuries.

as here. for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use. We REVERSE the Orders of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of been previously cleared by the inferior court. whether penalized as grave. irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts. prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and First Instance of the province. Pasig City. the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365. Branch 71 on the ground of the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries double jeopardy. In imposing penalties. they are thereby denied the beneficent . Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser Meanwhile. Hence. Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to [T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court. Bulacan. This same argument disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability.imprudence. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365. charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. same offense. befitting offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan. True. the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. but any the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. But neither was the quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious resulting acts. of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" [Silva] x x x: (or. because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the SO ORDERED. should cushion the effect which acquitted the defendant. consequences of one and the same vehicular accident. where both charges are derived from the the Speaker of the House of Representatives. because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48.55 Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Branch 157. there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365. this is a constitutionally compelled choice. less grave or light offenses. imprudence. In short. position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out WHEREFORE. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. through reckless imprudence. we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. we GRANT the petition. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the [W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City.54 (Emphasis supplied) Indeed. the prosecuting attorney is not now in a of this ruling. If it is so minded. rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided.