[G.R. No. 166337.

March 7, 2005]

BAYANIHAN MUSIC vs. BMG

THIRD DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR 7 2005.

G.R. No. 166337 (Bayanihan Music Philippines, Inc. vs. BMG Records (Pilipinas) and Jose Mari Chan, et
al.)

Subject of this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision dated December 14, 2004[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69626, upholding the Order dated August 24, 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court at Quezon City, Branch 90, which found no merit in petitioner's application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction, along with the Order dated January 10, 2002, which denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

On July 16, 1973, private respondent Jose Mari Chan (Chan) entered into a contract with petitioner
Bayanihan Music Philippines, Inc. (Bayanihan), whereunder the former assigned to the latter all his
rights, interests and participation over his musical composition "Can We Just Stop and Talk A While". On
March 11, 1976, the parties entered into a similar contract over Chan's other musical composition
entitled "Afraid For Love To Fade".

On the strength of the abovementioned contracts, Bayanihan applied for and was granted by the
National Library a Certificate of Copyright Registration for each of the two musical compositions, thus:
November 19, 1973, for the song "Can We Just Stop and Talk A While" and on May 21, 1980, for the
song "Afraid for Love To Fade."

Apparently, without the knowledge and consent of petitioner Bayanihan, Chan authorized his co-
respondent BMG Records (Pilipinas) [BMG] to record and distribute the aforementioned musical
compositions in a then recently released album of singer Lea Salonga.

In separate letters both dated December 7, 1999, petitioner Bayanihan informed respondents Chan and
BMG of its existing copyrights over the subject musical compositions and the alleged violation of such
right by the two. Demands were made on both to settle the matter with Bayanihan. However no
settlement was reached by the parties.

Hence, on August 8, 2000, Bayanihan filed with the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City a complaint
against Chan and BMG for violation of Section 216 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as
the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, with a prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent BMG from further recording and
distributing the subject musical compositions in whatever form of musical products, and Chan from
further granting any authority to record and distribute the same musical compositions.

In its answer, BMG contended, among others, that: (1) the acts of recording and publication sought to
be enjoined had already been consummated, thereby rendering moot Bayanihan's prayer for TRO and/or
preliminary injunction; and (2) there is no clear showing that petitioner Bayanihan would be greatly
damaged by the refusal of the prayed for TRO and/or preliminary injunction. BMG also pleaded a cross-
claim against its co-respondent Chan for violation of his warranty that his musical compositions are free
from claims of third persons, and a counterclaim for damages against petitioner Bayanihan.

Chan, for his part, filed his own answer to the complaint, thereunder alleging that: (1) it was never his
intention to divest himself of all his rights and interest over the musical compositions in question; (2)
the contracts he entered into with Bayanihan are mere music publication agreements giving Bayanihan,
as assignee, the power to administer his copyright over his two songs and to act as the exclusive
publisher thereof; (3) he was not cognizant of the application made by and the subsequent grant of
copyrights to Bayanihan; and (4) Bayanihan was remissed in its obligations under the contracts because
it failed to effectively advertise his musical compositions for almost twenty (20) years, hence, he caused
the rescission of said contracts in 1997. Chan also included in his answer a counterclaim for damages
against Bayanihan.
After hearing the parties, the lower court came out with an order denying Bayanihan's prayer for TRO,
saying, thus:

After carefully considering the arguments and evaluating the evidence presented by counsels, this Court
finds that the plaintiff has not been able to show its entitlement to the relief of TRO as prayed for in its
verified complaint (see Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended), hence, this
Court is of the considered and humble view that the ends of justice shall be served better if the
aforecited application is denied.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the aforecited application or prayer for the issuance of a TRO is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Thereafter, the same court, in its subsequent Order dated August 24, 2001,[2] likewise denied
cralaw

Bayanihan's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to wit:

After carefully going over the pleadings and the pertinent portions of the records insofar as they are
pertinent to the issue under consideration, this Court finds that the plaintiff has not been able to show
its entitlement to the relief of preliminary injunction as prayed for in its verified complaint (see Section
4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended), hence, this Court is of the considered and
humble view that the ends of justice shall be served better if the aforecited application is denied, (see
also Order dated July 16, 2001).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the application or prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Its motion for a reconsideration of the same order having been likewise denied by the trial court in its
next Order of January 10, 2002,[3] petitioner Bayanihan then went to the Court of Appeals on a
cralaw

petition for certiorari, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69626, imputing grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court in issuing the Orders of August 24, 2001 and January 10, 2001, denying its
prayers for a writ of preliminary injunction and motion for reconsideration, respectively.

In the herein assailed Decision dated December 14, 2004, the Court of Appeals upheld the
challenged orders of the trial court and accordingly dismissed Bayanihan petition, thus:

WHEREFORE, finding neither flaw of jurisdiction nor taint of grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of
the assailed Orders of the respondent court dated August 24, 2001 and January 10, 2002, the instant
petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[4] cralaw

Hence, Bayanihan's present recourse.

It is petitioner's submission that the appellate court committed reversible error when it dismissed its
petition for certiorari and upheld the trial court's denial of its application for a writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioner insists that as assignee of the copyrights over the musical compositions in
question, it has a clear legal right to a writ of preliminary injunction; that respondents BMG and Chan
violated its copyrights over the same musical compositions; that despite knowledge by respondent BMG
of petitioner's copyrights over the said musical compositions, BMG continues to record and distribute the
same, to petitioner's great and irreparable injury.

We DENY.

We have constantly reminded courts that there is no power, the exercise of which is more delicate and
requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or which is more dangerous in a doubtful
case, than the issuance of an injunction. A court should, as much as possible, avoid issuing the writ
which would effectively dispose of the main case without trial.
Here, nothing is more evident than the trial court's abiding awareness of the extremely difficult
balancing act it had to perform in dealing with petitioner's prayer for injunctive reliefs. Conscious, as
evidently it is, of the fact that there is manifest abuse of discretion in the issuance of an injunctive writ if
the following requisites provided for by law are not present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the
existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a
violation of such right,[5] the trial court threaded the correct path in denying petitioner's prayer
cralaw

therefor. For, such a writ should only be granted if a party is clearly entitled thereto.[6] cralaw

Of course, while a clear showing of the right to an injunctive writ is necessary albeit its existence need
not be conclusively established,[7] as the evidence required therefor need not be conclusive or
cralaw

complete, still, for an applicant, like petitioner Bayanihan, to be entitled to the writ, he is required to
show that he has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its complaint.[8] Here, the trial court
cralaw

did not find ample justifications for the issuance of the writ prayed for by petitioner.

Unquestionably, respondent Chan, being undeniably the composer and author of the lyrics of the two (2)
songs, is protected by the mere fact alone that he is the creator thereof, conformably with Republic Act
No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code, Section 172.2 of which reads:

172.2. Works are protected by the sole fact of their creation, irrespective of their mode or form of
expression, as well as of their content, quality and purpose.

An examination of petitioner's verified complaint in light of the two (2) contracts sued upon and the
evidence it adduced during the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, yields not the
existence of the requisite right protectable by the provisional relief but rather a lingering doubt on
whether there is or there is no such right. The two contracts between petitioner and Chan relative to the
musical compositions subject of the suit contain the following identical stipulations:

7. It is also hereby agreed to by the parties herein that in the event the PUBLISHER [petitioner
herein] fails to use in any manner whatsoever within two (2) years any of the compositions covered by
this contract, then such composition may be released in favor of the WRITER and excluded from this
contract and the PUBLISHER shall execute the necessary release in writing in favor of the WRITER upon
request of the WRITER;

xxx xxx xxx

9. This contract may be renewed for a period of two-and-one-half (2 1/2) years at the option of the
PUBLISHER. Renewal may be made by the PUBLISHER by advising the WRITER of such renewal in
writing at least five (5) days before the expiration of this contract.[9]cralaw

It would thus appear that the two (2) contracts expired on October 1, 1975 and March 11, 1978,
respectively, there being neither an allegation, much less proof, that petitioner Bayanihan ever made
use of the compositions within the two-year period agreed upon by the parties.

Anent the copyrights obtained by petitioner on the basis of the selfsame two (2) contracts, suffice it to
say 'that such purported copyrights are not presumed to subsist in accordance with Section 218[a] and
[b], of the Intellectual Property Code,[10] because respondent Chan had put in issue the existence
cralaw

thereof.

It is noted that Chan revoked and terminated said contracts, along with others, on July 30, 1997, or
almost two years before petitioner Bayanihan wrote its sort of complaint/demand letter dated December
7, 1999 regarding the recent "use/recording of the songs 'Can We Just Stop and Talk A While' and
'Afraid for Love to Fade,'" or almost three (3) years before petitioner filed its complaint on August 8,
2000, therein praying, inter alia, for injunctive relief. By then, it would appear that petitioner had no
more right that is protectable by injunction.

Lastly, petitioner's insinuation that the trial court indulged in generalizations and was rather skimpy in
dishing out its reasons for denying its prayer for provisional injunctive relief, the same deserves scant
consideration. For sure, the manner by which the trial court crafted its challenged orders is quite
understandable, lest it be subjected to a plausible suspicion of having prejudged the merits of the main
case.

WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO

Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

[1]Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Juan Q.
cralaw

Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas; Rollo, pp. 49-62.

[2] cralaw Rollo, p. 148.

[3] cralaw Rollo, p. 162.

[4] cralaw Rollo, pp. 49-63.

[5]Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106043,
cralaw

March 4, 1996 citing Sales v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 169 SCRA 109 [1989].

[6] cralaw Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 686, [2000].

[7]
cralaw Developers Group of Companies, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 715, March 8, 1993.

[8]
cralaw Ibid.

[9] cralaw Rollo, pp. 58-59.

[10] cralaw Section 218. 2. In an action under this Chapter:

(a) Copyright shall be presumed to subsist in the work or other subject matter to which the action
relates if the defendant does not put in issue the question whether copyright subsist in the work or
subject matter; and

(b) Where the subsistence of the copyright is established, the plaintiff shall be presumed to be the
owner of the copyright if he claims to be the owner of the copyright and the defendant does not put in
issue the question of his ownership;
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 108946. January 28, 1999]

FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and BJ PRODUCTIONS,

INC., petitioners, vs. FRANKLIN DRILON GABRIEL ZOSA,
WILLIAM ESPOSO, FELIPE MEDINA, JR., and CASEY
FRANCISCO, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari. Petitioners seek to annul the resolution of the Department
of Justice, dated August 12, 1992, in Criminal Case No. Q-92-27854, entitled Gabriel Zosa,
et al. v. City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Francisco Joaquin, Jr., and its resolution, dated
December 3, 1992, denying petitioner Joaquins motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner BJ Productions, Inc. (BJPI) is the holder/grantee of Certificate of Copyright
No. M922, dated January 28, 1971, of Rhoda and Me, a dating game show aired from 1970 to
1977.
On June 28, 1973, petitioner BJPI submitted to the National Library an addendum to its
certificate of copyright specifying the shows format and style of presentation.
On July 14, 1991, while watching television, petitioner Francisco Joaquin, Jr., president
of BJPI, saw on RPN Channel 9 an episode of Its a Date, which was produced by IXL
Productions, Inc. (IXL). On July 18, 1991, he wrote a letter to private respondent Gabriel M.
Zosa, president and general manager of IXL, informing Zosa that BJPI had a copyright
to Rhoda and Me and demanding that IXL discontinue airing Its a Date.
In a letter, dated July 19, 1991, private respondent Zosa apologized to petitioner Joaquin
and requested a meeting to discuss a possible settlement. IXL, however, continued airing Its a
Date, prompting petitioner Joaquin to send a second letter on July 25, 1991 in which he
reiterated his demand and warned that, if IXL did not comply, he would endorse the matter to
his attorneys for proper legal action.
Meanwhile, private respondent Zosa sought to register IXLs copyright to the first
episode of Its a Date for which it was issued by the National Library a certificate of copyright
on August 14, 1991.
Upon complaint of petitioners, an information for violation of P.D. No. 49 was filed
against private respondent Zosa together with certain officers of RPN Channel 9,
namely, William Esposo, Felipe Medina, and Casey Francisco, in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-27854 and assigned to Branch
104 thereof. However, private respondent Zosa sought a review of the resolution of the
Assistant City Prosecutor before the Department of Justice.
 On August 12, 1992, respondent Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon reversed the
Assistant City Prosecutors findings and directed him to move for the dismissal of the case
against private respondents. [1]
Petitioner Joaquin filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by
respondent Secretary of Justice on December 3, 1992. Hence, this petition. Petitioners
contend that:
1. The public respondent gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when he invoked non-presentation of the master tape as being fatal to the existence of
probable cause to prove infringement, despite the fact that private respondents never
raised the same as a controverted issue.
2. The public respondent gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when he arrogated unto himself the determination of what is copyrightable - an issue
which is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court to assess in a
proper proceeding.
Both public and private respondents maintain that petitioners failed to establish the
existence of probable cause due to their failure to present the copyrighted master videotape
of Rhoda and Me. They contend that petitioner BJPIs copyright covers only a specific
episode of Rhoda and Me and that the formats or concepts of dating game shows are not
covered by copyright protection under P. D. No. 49.

Non-Assignment of Error

Petitioners claim that their failure to submit the copyrighted master videotape of the
television show Rhoda and Me was not raised in issue by private respondents during the
preliminary investigation and, therefore, it was error for the Secretary of Justice to reverse the
investigating prosecutors finding of probable cause on this ground.
A preliminary investigation falls under the authority of the state prosecutor who is given
by law the power to direct and control criminal actions.[2] He is, however, subject to the
control of the Secretary of Justice. Thus, Rule 112, 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, provides:

SEC. 4. Duty of investigating fiscal. - If the investigating fiscal finds

cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and
corresponding information. He shall certify under oath that he, or as shown
by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the
complainant and his witnesses, that there is reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof, that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him and that he was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend dismissal of the
complaint.

In either case, he shall forward the records of the case to the provincial or
city fiscal or chief state prosecutor within five (5) days from his
 resolution. The latter shall take appropriate action thereon within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof, immediately informing the parties of said action.

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an

investigating fiscal without the prior written authority or approval of the
provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor.

Where the investigating assistant fiscal recommends the dismissal of the

case but his findings are reversed by the provincial or city fiscal or chief
state prosecutor on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may,
by himself, file the corresponding information against the respondent or
direct any other assistant fiscal or state prosecutor to do so, without
conducting another preliminary investigation.

If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the

resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall
direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information without
conducting another preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for
dismissal of the complaint or information.

In reviewing resolutions of prosecutors, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from

considering errors, although unassigned, for the purpose of determining whether there is
probable cause for filing cases in court. He must make his own finding of probable cause and
is not confined to the issues raised by the parties during preliminary investigation. Moreover,
his findings are not subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.

Opinion of the Secretary of Justice

Petitioners contend, however, that the determination of the question whether the format
or mechanics of a show is entitled to copyright protection is for the court, and not the
Secretary of Justice, to make. They assail the following portion of the resolution of the
respondent Secretary of Justice:

[T]he essence of copyright infringement is the copying, in whole or in part, of

copyrightable materials as defined and enumerated in Section 2 of PD. No.
49. Apart from the manner in which it is actually expressed, however, the idea
of a dating game show is, in the opinion of this Office, a non-copyrightable
material. Ideas, concepts, formats, or schemes in their abstract form clearly do
not fall within the class of works or materials susceptible of copyright
registration as provided in PD. No. 49.[3] (Emphasis added.)

It is indeed true that the question whether the format or mechanics of petitioners
television show is entitled to copyright protection is a legal question for the court to make.
This does not, however, preclude respondent Secretary of Justice from making a preliminary
determination of this question in resolving whether there is probable cause for filing the case
in court. In doing so in this case, he did not commit any grave error.

Presentation of Master Tape

Petitioners claim that respondent Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in
ruling that the master videotape should have been presented in order to determine whether
there was probable cause for copyright infringement. They contend
th
that 20 Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals, on which respondent Secretary
[4]

of Justice relied in reversing the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, is inapplicable to

the case at bar because in the present case, the parties presented sufficient evidence which
clearly establish linkages between the copyrighted show Rhoda and Me and the infringing
TV show Its a Date.[5]
The case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation involved raids conducted on various
videotape outlets allegedly selling or renting out pirated videotapes. The trial court found that
the affidavits of NBI agents, given in support of the application for the search warrant,
were insufficient without the master tape. Accordingly, the trial court lifted the search
warrants it had previously issued against the defendants. On petition for review, this Court
sustained the action of the trial court and ruled:[6]

The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the
pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search
warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The
petitioners argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the
time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in
nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the
issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that
duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it
owns.

The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which
allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted
films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.

The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial

similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the
applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the
purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the
latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the
copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the
copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.

This ruling was qualified in the later case of Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[7] in
which it was held:
In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for the
presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity of search
warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in
determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement cases where
there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the pirated
copies. An objective and careful reading of the decision in said case could lead to
no other conclusion than that said directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping
and inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases. . . .[8]

In the case at bar, during the preliminary investigation, petitioners and private
respondents presented written descriptions of the formats of their respective televisions
shows, on the basis of which the investigating prosecutor ruled:

As may [be] gleaned from the evidence on record, the substance of the television
productions complainants RHODA AND ME and Zosas ITS A DATE is that two
matches are made between a male and a female, both single, and the two couples
are treated to a night or two of dining and/or dancing at the expense of the
show. The major concepts of both shows is the same. Any difference appear mere
variations of the major concepts.

That there is an infringement on the copyright of the show RHODA AND ME both
in content and in the execution of the video presentation are established because
respondents ITS A DATE is practically an exact copy of complainants RHODA
AND ME because of substantial similarities as follows, to wit:

RHODA AND ME ITS A DATE

Set I Set I

a. Unmarried participant a. same

of one gender (searcher) appears on one side of a divider, while three (3)
unmarried participants of the other gender are on the other side of the
divider. This arrangement is done to ensure that the searcher does not see
the searchees.

b. Searcher asks a question b. same

to be answered by each of the
searchees. The purpose is
to determine who
among the searchees is the
most compatible with the
searcher.

c. Searcher speculates on the c. same

match to the searchee.

d. Selection is made by the d. Selection is

use of compute (sic) methods, based on the

or by the way questions are answer of the
answered, or similar methods. Searchees.

Set 2 Set 2

Same as above with the genders same

of the searcher and

searchees
interchanged.[9]
Petitioners assert that the format of Rhoda and Me is a product of ingenuity and skill and
is thus entitled to copyright protection. It is their position that the presentation of a point-by-
point comparison of the formats of the two shows clearly demonstrates the nexus between the
shows and hence establishes the existence of probable cause for copyright infringement. Such
being the case, they did not have to produce the master tape.
To begin with, the format of a show is not copyrightable. Section 2 of P.D. No.
49, otherwise known as the DECREE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, enumerates the
[10]

classes of work entitled to copyright protection, to wit:

Section 2. The rights granted by this Decree shall, from the moment of creation,
subsist with respect to any of the following classes of works:

(A) Books, including composite and cyclopedic works, manuscripts, directories,

and gazetteers;

(B) Periodicals, including pamphlets and newspapers;

(C) Lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery;

(D) Letters;

(E) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions; choreographic works and

entertainments in dumb shows, the acting form of which is fixed in writing or
otherwise;

(F) Musical compositions, with or without words;

(G) Works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving, lithography,

and other works of art; models or designs for works of art;

(H) Reproductions of a work of art;

(I) Original ornamental designs or models for articles of manufacture, whether or
not patentable, and other works of applied art;

(J) Maps, plans, sketches, and charts;

(K) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;

(L) Photographic works and works produced by a process analogous to

photography; lantern slides;

(M) Cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to

cinematography or any process for making audio-visual recordings;

(N) Computer programs;

(O) Prints, pictorial illustrations advertising copies, labels, tags, and box wraps;

(P) Dramatizations, translations, adaptations, abridgements, arrangements and

other alterations of literary, musical or artistic works or of works of the Philippine
government as herein defined, which shall be protected as provided in Section 8 of
this Decree.

(Q) Collections of literary, scholarly, or artistic works or of works referred to in

Section 9 of this Decree which by reason of the selection and arrangement of their
contents constitute intellectual creations, the same to be protected as such in
accordance with Section 8 of this Decree.

(R) Other literary, scholarly, scientific and artistic works.

This provision is substantially the same as 172 of the INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (R.A. No. 8293).[11] The format or mechanics of a television
show is not included in the list of protected works in 2 of P.D. No. 49. For this reason, the
protection afforded by the law cannot be extended to cover them.

Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new or
independent right granted by the statute, and not simply a pre-existing right
regulated by the statute. Being a statutory grant, the rights are only such as the
statute confers, and may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the subjects
and by the persons, and on terms and conditions specified in the statute.[12]

Since . . . copyright in published works is purely a statutory creation, a copyright

may be obtained only for a work falling within the statutory enumeration or
description.[13]
Regardless of the historical viewpoint, it is authoritatively settled in the United
States that there is no copyright except that which is both created and secured by
act of Congress . . . .[14]

P.D. No. 49, 2, in enumerating what are subject to copyright, refers to finished works and
not to concepts. The copyright does not extend to an idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.[15] Thus, the new INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES provides:

Sec. 175. Unprotected Subject Matter. - Notwithstanding the provisions of

Sections 172 and 173, no protection shall extend, under this law, to any idea,
procedure, system, method or operation, concept, principle, discovery or mere data
as such, even if they are expressed, explained, illustrated or embodied in a work;
news of the day and other miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items
of press information; or any official text of a legislative, administrative or legal
nature, as well as any official translation thereof.

What then is the subject matter of petitioners copyright? This Court is of the opinion that
petitioner BJPIs copyright covers audio-visual recordings of each episode of Rhoda and Me,
as falling within the class of works mentioned in P.D. 49, 2(M), to wit:

Cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to

cinematography or any process for making audio-visual recordings;

The copyright does not extend to the general concept or format of its dating game show.
Accordingly, by the very nature of the subject of petitioner BJPIs copyright, the investigating
prosecutor should have the opportunity to compare the videotapes of the two shows.
Mere description by words of the general format of the two dating game shows is
insufficient; the presentation of the master videotape in evidence was indispensable to the
determination of the existence of probable cause. As aptly observed by respondent Secretary
of Justice:

A television show includes more than mere words can describe because it
involves a whole spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no
similarity or dissimilarity may be found by merely describing the general
copyright/format of both dating game shows.[16]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman), no part due to relation to one of the parties.

[1]
Petition, Annex A, p. 4; Rollo, p. 27.
[2]
Sangguniang Bayan of Batac, Ilocos Norte v. Albano, 260 SCRA 561 (1996).
[3]
Petition, Annex B, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 28-29.
[4]
164 SCRA 655 (1988).
[5]
Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18.
[6]
Id., at 663-664.
[7]
261 SCRA 144 (1996).
[8]
Id., 173.
[9]
Petition Annex G; Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[10]
Promulgated on November 14, 1972.
[11]
Effective on January 1, 1998.
SEC. 172. Literary and Artistic Works. - 172.1. Literary and artistic works, hereinafter referred to as works, are
original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation and
shall include in particular:
(a) Books, pamphlets, articles and other writings;
(b) Periodicals and newspapers;
(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery whether or not reduced in writing or
other material form;
(d) Letters;
(e) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions; choreographic works or entertainment in dumb shows;
(f) Musical compositions, with or without words;
(g) Works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving, lithography or other works of art; models or
designs for works of art;
(h) Original ornamental designs or models for articles of manufacture, whether or not registrable as an industrial
design and other works of applied art;
(i) Illustrations, maps, plans, sketches, charts and three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography,
architecture or science;
(j) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;
(k) Photographic works including works produced by a process analogous to photography; lantern slides;
(l) Audiovisual works and cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to
cinematography or any process for making audio-visual recordings;
(m) Pictorial illustrations and advertisements;
(n) Computer programs; and
(o) Other literary, scholarly, scientific and artistic works.
[12]
18 C.J.S. 161.
[13]
Id., at 165.
[14]
HORACE G. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY. 45 (1944).
[15]
NEIL BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW 25 (1981).
[16]
Comment of Public Respondent, p. 9; Rollo, p. 152.