Elites: History of the Concept

Philipp Korom, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, Germany
2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Abstract

The term elite was introduced to the vocabulary of the social sciences in the late nineteenth century by Vilfredo Pareto.
Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels developed classic elite theories in opposition to the Marxist belief that a popular
proletarian regime would yield democratization. A ruling minority, so the basic theorem goes, will always out-organize large
majorities. Contrary to the classics, the social sciences since World War II have mostly treated elites and democracy as
reconcilable. Technical terms such as strategic elites (Keller) were widely used to refer to incumbents of top positions in the
various social sectors. The functionalist or pluralist school of thought departs from the idea of heterogeneity. Critical elite
theory claims that, even in modern democracies, economically based social hierarchies are reproduced, thereby giving rise to
a single dominant class.

Long before the term elites was coined, the concept had been
used by various thinkers. Already Plato (c. 380360 B.C.E./
2002) imagined in Republic (book VII) a state ruled by
philosopher-kings (kings of a hive, better and more perfectly
educated than the rest). Platos justication of such a rule is that
philosophers only have knowledge of what really is, e.g., just or
good. That genuine philosophical knowledge is needed for
ruling, is the primary thrust of his argument.
Niccol Machiavelli (14691527), an Italian diplomat who
is commonly regarded as a predecessor of the classic elite
theories, used the terms nobles, aristocrats, or the great
interchangeable to describe societys elite. In The Prince,
Machiavelli (1531/2005) makes several recommendations for
acquiring, governing, and preserving principalities in response
to the political crisis of Italian city-states, including his own
city-state of Florence: a prince should be both loved and feared;
he needs able advisers; his best fortress is the loyalty of his
subjects; and cruelty can be legitimate to maintain order. In
a famous passage, Machiavelli advises the prince to emulate
both the fox and the lion, cleverly outmaneuvering his foes
(nd out the Snares) and courageously standing up against
enemies (fright away the Wolves). In this rst European
secular treatise on politics, elites are considered as a threat to
democracy, in the sense that they will bias the actual enacting
of laws in their own interest. Machiavelli advises princes to base
their power on the majority of citizenry rather than on the
wealthy elite. His early ideas on power-checking mechanisms
to constrain elites have been taken up in modern democratic
theory (MacCormick, 2011). Classical elite theory adopted,
among other things, not only the lion and fox metaphor, but
also the idea that different styles of leadership were related to
the rise and fall of elites as well as the conviction that self-
ishness is a natural property of the human species.
Henri de Saint-Simon (17601825), a French utopian
socialist, developed his ideas on those at the apex of social
hierarchy with the French Revolution fresh in mind. He argued
that the landed aristocracy ceased to be the dominant class and
that its place was taken by entrepreneurs, nanciers, and
scholars people whose importance derived from function
rather than status. Saint-Simon illustrated this vital point when
speculating on the loss to society if the best three thousand
scientists, artists, and artisans of France were taken away: The
nation would become a lifeless corpse . It would immediately
fall into a position of inferiority compared with the nations
which it now rivals, and would continue to be inferior until
this loss had been replaced, until it had grown another head
Saint-Simon (1819/1964: 72).
Like Saint-Simon, other leading aristocratic critics of mass
tendencies did not refer to elites, although their ideas on
large-scale processes of massication were established along
the juxtaposition of the noble man and the mass man
(Ortega y Gasset). The French social psychologist Gustave le
Bon (18411931) and the Spanish philosopher Jos Ortega y
Gasset (18831955) were both concerned with the crowd/the
mass of the mediocre entering elds of decision-making
(Le Bon, 1895/1897; Ortega y Gasset, 1929/1957). The era
of crowds (Le Bon) was suspected to result in cultural
degradation and deterioration. Human excellence, it was
ascertained, was only to be found in a few and not the many.
Society itself was seen as aristocratic in its very nature: it can
never be the many, the average, the mass, who rule. Mass,
then, referred primarily to the quality of human beings and
their numbers rather than to social class. Elites, in contrast to
the masses, share a superior moral and psychological makeup.
The term lite rst appears in an encyclopedia published
in France between 1751 and 1772 and edited by Denis
Diderot (Encyclopdie, ou dictionnaire raisonn des sciences, des
arts et des mtiers). The encyclopedia entry suggests that the
word was originally used to describe exquisite, top-of-the-line
products and that its usage was later extended to designate
membership in a superior social group (hommes dlite). The
term was, however, only introduced to the vocabulary of the
social sciences in the late nineteenth century. A rst broad
denition of elite in the social sciences is to be found in
Trattato di sociologia generale of 191519 (translated as
A Treatise of General Sociology) by the Italian economist
Vilfredo Pareto (18481923):
Let us assume that in every branch of human activity each individual
is given an index which stands as a sign of his capacity, very much the
way grades are given in the various subjects in examinations in

390 International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume 7 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.03079-8

school. The highest type of lawyer, for instance, will be given 10. The
man who does not get a client will be given 1 reserving zero for the
man who is an out-and-out idiot .. So let us make a class of the
people who have the highest indices in their branch of activity, and
to that class give the name . of lite.
Pareto (1916/1935: 142223)
Pareto himself did not make any further use of this abstract
concept. However, the idea that what counts are the skills and
activities that people bring to their work was later taken up by
functionalism, making Pareto their main precursor.
Classic Elite Theorists
The classics in elite theory were erce opponents of Marxism
(Bottomore, 1993). First, they criticized it for establishing
a theory of socioeconomic development upon a single prin-
ciple, which is the struggle between the unpropertied working
class and the property-owning class. In their view, one has to
take a multicausal approach to the study of human history
instead of pursuing any deterministic single-track doctrine
(Mosca). Second, they denied that a classless society, as
envisaged by most socialists, could ever be attained by arguing
that minority domination is an inescapable feature of human
life. Third, they challenged the view that primarily economics
and not politics were the determining force in history.
Mosca: The Ruling Class
Gaetano Mosca (18581941) posits in his work entitled Ele-
menti di scienza politica of 1896 (translated as The Ruling Class in
1939) that social change is determined not by class structure
but by the political apparatus and an organized minority in
control of this apparatus. Regardless of the type of political
organization, this minority imposes its will on the disorganized
majority. Moscas argument hinges crucially on the paired
terms organized and disorganized. He acknowledges that the
ruling class in a parliamentary system will normally be divided
into two or more competing parties and that the election
outcome may have an effect on government policy. It is simply,
however, that there will always be a discrepancy between de iure
and de facto authority, or between formal political structure and
informal political power, whatever democratic mechanisms
may be employed (Femia, 1993). For Mosca (1896/1939: 53),
the key to elite control lies in the minoritys organizational
capacity: A hundred men acting uniformly in concert, with
a common understanding, will triumph over a thousand men
who are not in accord. He adds, however, that ruling minor-
ities are endowed by a certain material, intellectual, or even
moral superiority (Mosca, 1896/1939: 53). It is not genetic
heredity that contributes to the superiority of character, but
special personal qualities, manners, habits, and wealth, which
are inherited from similarly endowed ancestors. The intergen-
erational transfer of wealth and educational privileges espe-
cially tends to transform the rulers into a hereditary caste.
Despite this hereditary basis of power, the political class
does not simply rule by force but always endeavors to justify its
power in the eyes of those being governed by a set of values, the
Elites: History of the Concept 391
political formula. In a Machiavellian fashion, Mosca thus
emphasized the need for a moral basis to maintain power. He
was convinced that political change originated from conicts
within the elite and not between elite and mass. It is, however,
only in his criticism of Marx that Mosca draws a sharp
distinction between the mass and an organized minority, while
for the most part he presents a more subtle depiction in which
he distinguishes between the top governmental leaders and
a lower stratum consisting of high-level civil servants and
others. The latter serves as a bridge between the ruling class
and the rest of society. Despite a preeminent aristocratic
tendency to recruit members from the ruling class itself, parts of
the lower stratum are granted access to positions of power and
amalgamate with the elite (democratic tendency). The most
enduring social organization is thought to be a mixed
government (partly aristocratic, partly democratic), so that the
political class does not atrophy or become unstable through
a lack of continuity. In that way, the efcacy of government
would go hand in hand with a certain measure of account-
ability to the interests of the people as a whole. A stable society
could only be maintained if all social forces, that is, all major
institutional spheres such as religion or education, are repre-
sented within the uppermost class of society.
Pareto: The Governing Lite
Instead of ruling class, Vilfredo Pareto (18481923) introduced
the term lite in his 1916 work Trattato di sociologia generale
(translated as A Treatise of General Sociology in 1935), in order
to avoid the Marxist intellectual baggage of the former term. In
an initial, broad denition, lite encompasses all individuals
with the highest ranking in their social activities based on their
skills and regardless of their moral and social qualities. Pareto,
however, does not indicate where he thinks a feasible cutoff
exists for separating the elite from the nonelite. Most likely, he
abandons this formal denition because, in reality, a certain
ascriptive status, along with wealth and birth, give the less
skilled an advantage for attaining leading positions. In a more
narrow denition, he subdivides the class of maximum
performers into governing and nongoverning sections, the rst
of which includes all individuals who play directly or indirectly
a noteworthy role at the highest levels of power (Pareto, 1916/
1935: 1423). How the governing elite, which is not necessarily
marked by superior ability, goes about its job, is not specied.
Like Mosca, Pareto is convinced that all societies are ruled by
organized minorities, also in parliamentary democracies, and
that only the elites are responsible for change, not the masses.
Pareto places particular emphasis on psychological charac-
teristics as the basis of elite rule. Notably, Pareto employs
Machiavellis lion and fox typology by applying it not only to
alternative control strategies but also to changing elite
psychologies. Famously, Pareto theorized that fundamental
distinctions can be made among the governing elites according
to the predominate residues, with residues being roughly
speaking nonlogical propensities rooted in peoples basic
aspirations and drives. Within an elite, these are classied as
either Class I residues (instincts of combinations) innova-
tive men skilled in intrigue and possessing cleverness in
negotiation, the foxes in Machiavellis language or Class II
residues (persistence of aggregates) conservative men with
392 Elites: History of the Concept
strong sentiments of order and discipline, the lions. Just as
individual atoms form molecules in nature, so, too, did Pareto
group individuals upon the basis of common residues
(Marshall, 2007: 33). Pareto specically conceived of residues
as manifestations of human sentiment. Residues are thus not
thought of as concrete realities, but as concepts created by the
observer, which implies, for example, that a mans (hidden)
taste for pork chops does not fall into the analytical category
residues. If, however, a man constructs a theory according to
which the Chinese cuisine is superior to the American, Pareto
would suggest analyzing the (irrational) residues underlying
this theory (Coser, 1977: 391).
While politics requires both sets of qualities, Class II
residues tend to weaken over time. One of Paretos key argu-
ments is that there is a constant circulation of individuals
within the governing elite. Elites decline, degenerate, and die,
sometimes at a fast rate, sometimes slowly: It ows on like
a river, never being today what it was yesterday. From time to
time sudden and violent disturbances occur. There is a ood -
the river overows its banks. Afterwards, the new governing
lite again resumes its slow transformation Pareto (1916/
1935: 1431). History, in Paretos words, is a graveyard of
aristocracies. Typically, new elites seizing power consist of
lions who are eventually replaced by more cunning foxes who,
in turn, meet their destiny in the form of new lions, and so on.
Change for Pareto is cyclical, not linear, and it is change that
maintains the equilibrium in a system.
Michels: Political Leaders and the Iron Law of Oligarchy
It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the
elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the manda-
tors, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organiza-
tion, says oligarchy. This postulate, spelled out in Robert
Michels 1911 seminal book Political Parties (1911/1999: 365),
became encapsulated in the thesis of the iron law of oligarchy.
It essentially posits that democracy contains an oligarchical
nucleus because even the most democratically committed
organizations, such as the Social Democratic Parties in Europe
studied by Michels (18761936), become divided into elite
fractions who pursue their own interests within the organiza-
tion by merely exploiting the labor and resources of the average
party members. By declaring that the exercise of political power
is an inherently oligarchic enterprise, Michels implicitly
assumes that the elite, or rather the oligarchs, are characterized
by what Meisel (1958) called the 3 Cs: group consciousness;
group coherence; and conspiracy, that is, a common will to
action. Structural forces, or more precisely, the technical
indispensability of leadership (Michels, 1911/1999: 364),
push parties, like any other large-scale organization that has
moved out of amateurishness, toward oligarchy. A political
party needs to organize its vote, canvass supporters, raise
contributions, attend to its nancial structure and legal
standing; all these activities require hard-to-acquire expertise
and scarce organizing talents that limit the capacity of the
partys rank and le to challenge elected leaders decisions or to
replace the leadership, while the leaders recognize a common
interest in steering the organization and maintaining their
position. Due to the 3 Cs, lower level protest is hobbled,
conservative loyalists promoted to the party staff, and power
inexorably concentrated in the higher echelons of bureaucratic
hierarchies. Psychological forces, such as the oligarchs desire
for power and the masses psychological need for leadership,
supplement the resulting estrangement between the leaders
and the led. Michels puts himself clearly in a Machiavellian
tradition when he writes that the the desire to dominate, for
good or evil, is universal (Michels, 1911/1999: 206), and he
suggests a modied version of Paretos circulation of elites
when speaking of the runion des elites (Michels, 1911/1999:
182): one group of elites does not replace another. Rather, there
is an ongoing process of power-sharing pacts, with established
elites absorbing and assimilating newcomers.
Despite the fact that classic elite theorists had not developed
a clear elite concept and most of their arguments were overly
general and lacking concrete substance, they succeeded in
providing bearings for empirical elite research that became
centered primarily on four major topics: elite proles, elite
recruitment, elite change, and elite cohesiveness (Aron, 1960:
272). Mosca, Pareto, and Michels, who regarded themselves as
empirical social scientists rather than social philosophers, were
either ambivalent or outright critical of democratic move-
ments: from their standpoint, an elite-dominated democracy,
in which career politicians impose themselves on the voters, is
the most that is possible (Best and Highley, 2010). The degree
to which these thinkers discredited themselves by their attitude
toward fascism differs. Mosca, a member of the Italian Senate,
took to the oor on different occasions to argue against law
bills endorsed by the fascist leader Benito Mussolini. Pareto, an
engineer who turned to economics later in life, welcomed the
advent of fascism, although fascist ideologists did not nd
much merit in his works (Cirillo, 1983). The sociologist
Michels converted from a revolutionary socialist to a fascist
ideologue and accepted a chair of politics from Mussolinis
government. Later defenders of elite theory clearly distanced
themselves from the Machiavellians and Michels by primarily
arguing that the role of elites is not irremediably opposed to
a substantial degree of democracy.
Pluralist Elite Theories
Mannheim, Dahrendorf, Dahl, Keller: Functional,
Strategic Elites
After World War II, the social sciences generally shared the basic
functionalist assumption that modern societies are character-
ized by structural differentiation and thus focused predomi-
nantly on the pluralist elite structure, in which the various
meritocratic subsystems (the economy, politics, media, etc.)
develop their own distinctive status hierarchies, with different
elite positions linked to the apex of power. Elites are thus
primarily those with power and resources at their disposal,
thanks to professional achievement (Khan, 2012). The emer-
gence of these autonomous elites was perceived as central
to the foundation of democracy (Etzioni-Halevy, 1990).
Arguably, the most important precursor of pluralist
elite theories is the German sociologist Karl Mannheim
(18931947). Although Mannheim noted that it was the
important contribution of modern democracy that the
achievement principle increasingly becomes the criterion of
social success (Mannheim, 1935/1940: 86), he interpreted,

somehow paradoxically, the general public participation as
having a deleterious effect on societal elites. Mannheim feared
that the increased size of the elite, the proletarization of the
intelligentsia, as well as inter- and intraelite conicts could
deprive society of the continuity it needs; therefore, he offered
an elitist solution to the threat of negative democratization.
Education should promote unity in the age of massication by
instilling a sense of group cohesiveness and a common Welt-
anschauung within future democratically orientated elites.
Similar to Mannheim, Ralf Dahrendorf (19292009)
contended that there are multiple elites in industrial societies.
In his theoretical approach, society consists of a plurality of
interest groups, which engender a plurality of conicts. Elites
are theorized as quasi-groups (Dahrendorf, 1962: 310) and
thus as a loose formation of individuals who occupy positions
that have the same role interests. If latent common interests
become conscious goals, then elites can turn into conict
groups. Originally, Dahrendorf (1962) distinguished between
the prestige upper class, the economic upper class, and the
ruling class, or power elite. In his later work, however, all three
quasi-groups are classied as elites without any differentiation
(Dahrendorf, 1972: 126136).
The American political scientist Robert A. Dahl (1915
2014) moved beyond classical elitism by discrediting any
ruling elite model as quasimetaphysical; instead, he supported
that of a polyarchy. For Dahl, social structure was not analo-
gous in shape to a single pyramid, but to a range of pyramids.
He argued that only a careful examination of a series of
concrete decisions could establish the dominance of a specic
group within a nation or community. Consequently, in his
work Who Governs? (Dahl, 1961), he studied three political
issues in New Haven, Connecticut, namely, party nominations
for local elective ofces, public education, and urban redevel-
opment. Dahl found no signs of a single elite operating behind
the scenes but rather many lines of cleavage and politicians
who were responsive to the desires of the citizenry.
Finally, Suzanne Keller (19272010) coined the term
strategic elites to refer to multiple, nonintegrated groups with
power in the diverse arenas of modern society. Her underlying
orientation is akin to the structural functionalism of Talcott
Parsons. Strategic elites compromise not only political,
economic, and military leaders, but also moral, cultural, and
scientic ones. Whether or not an elite is counted as strategic
does not depend on its specic activities but on the scope of its
activities, that is, on how many members of society it directly
impinges upon and in what respects (Keller, 1963/1991: 20).
Elites, in this sense, are those with sustained social impact.
These strategic elites overwhelmingly act in accordance with
the functional requirements of their status (i.e., the political
elite is primarily responsible for deciding the goals to be
pursued). Individual achievement and not class background is
the chief principle for recruitment to strategic elite positions.
Keller stresses cohesiveness regarding values as the key to the
effectiveness of strategic elites. Goals may differ, but value
consensus among elites is theorized as a prerequisite for
prosperity.
The majority of social scientists today endorse pluralist
theories of elites, with various nuances and variations.
Common to all is the argument that power is dispersed rather
than concentrated in the hands of a few.
Elites: History of the Concept 393
Critical Elite Theory
Mills, Bourdieu: Power Elite, Field of Power
Not surprisingly, pluralist elite theories have come under re.
In his provocative work The Power Elite (1956), C. Wright Mills
(191662), a radical in spirit, argued that American society is
controlled by single cohesive elite that constitutes the leader-
ship of three major areas of society: military, business, and
government. These three elites only appear to be separate. Due
to the similarity of their social origins, close personal and
family relationships, overlapping cliques between the principal
power holders in each sector, and institutional proximity, those
in different higher circles conceive of themselves to be, and are
felt by others to be, the inner circle of the upper social classes
(Mills, 1956: 11). Mills preferred the term power elite over
ruling class, because the latter term was judged to be a badly
loaded phrase as it did not give autonomy to the political order
(Mills, 1956: 277). In a Marxist interpretation, the ruling
capitalist class not only controls societys wealth but also
decides on a societys political policy. By contrast, Mills
believed that power has shifted from the owners of the means
of production to managers and functionaries of the principal
institutions of American society, such as high-ranking politi-
cians. Members of the power elite are consequently dened as
those in command of the major hierarchies and organizations
of modern society, who have the power to make decisions of
national and international consequence (Mills, 1956: 4).
Moreover, Mills subdivides the American power structure as
a whole into three levels: (1) the close-knit power elite, an
alliance between the highest military, corporate, and political
leaders; (2) the middle level of power, meaning local elites,
members of Congress, judges, pressure groups, and other
organized groups; and (3) the virtually powerless, economi-
cally dependent and unorganized masses. In essence, those on
top issue orders, which obedient administrators at the second
level transmit to the population at the third level. Nearly all of
Mills assertions on the American power elite have been criti-
cized as exaggerated or unproven (Dahl, 1958).
The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (19302002)
discards the substantialist notion of ruling class or elite in
favor of the relational concept of eld of power (Bourdieu and
Wacquant, 1993). The eld of power is the locus of struggle
between agents who already hold dominant positions in their
respective social elds, such as art, politics, or the economy. In
this general space, France is the state that particularly but not
exclusively exercises inuence over the interrelations between
specic elds because it holds a monopoly on the educational
eld and thus controls the entry points into all other elds.
Within Bourdieus theoretical framework of capital forms, the
topological notion of eld of power enables various internal
divisions resulting from struggles over which particular type of
capital should be recognized as the most important. Drawing
on extensive empirical studies, Bourdieu (1989/1996) creates
in State Nobility a topology of the French educational system,
especially the elitist grandes coles, and relates it to the internal
structure of the eld of power. By applying correspondence
analysis to 84 institutions, he discovers two striking homolo-
gies between both elds. First, the difference between major
and minor schools reects contrasts between the haute bour-
geoisie (industrialists, private sector executives) and the petty
394 Elites: History of the Concept

bourgeoisie (business owners, technicians, school teachers). Table 1 Different Meanings of the Elite Concept
Second, the animosity between the more academic schools
(such as the cole normale suprieure) and schools explicitly Criterion
of distinction Source of power Domain
established to train its students to assume power positions
(such as the cole des hautes etudes commerciales) reproduces Ortega Intellectual No power Society
a ssure within the dominant class that separates the cultural excellence
from the economic bourgeoisie. Mosca Excellence Number of Society
In general, Bourdieu identies the grandes coles not only organizations
as power institutions of the elite, but also as fortresses of Pareto Efciency Force Society
isolation, which are just as difcult to leave as to enter. He and consent
Michels Position Monopoly Complex
shows that the social and family factors dictate not only the
within the in the use of organizations
choice of more or less esteemed educational institutions, but
organization organizational
also how the criteria of university examiners reect the values means
of the dominant classes. From an analysis of a survey of Pluralists Possession of Various Society
winners of a national high school academic competition high degree resources
(Concours Gnral) and other sources, Bourdieu nds that of resources
these gate keepers in elite institutions rely on vague contrasts Mills Social status and Monopoly over Society
(brilliant versus dull, gifted versus motivated) that systemat- position within every source of
ically discriminate against lower class pupils and thus institutions power in society
contribute to the reproduction of class inequalities via the Bourdieu Social status Transformation Society
and exclusive of cultural
educational system.
educational capital into
degrees economic capital

Synopsis
The concept of elites has a long and checkered history. Initially,
it was used to describe the rule of a minority over the majority
of the population. Associated with it were usually rather vague
meanings as fewness and excellence. Precursors of classic elite
theory like Ortega (1929/1957) used dichotomies such as
noble man versus mass man to refer to the few of noble spirit
who place great demand upon themselves in the pursuit of
excellence, on the one side, and the many ordinary men who
are not concerned about individuality and consider themselves
equal to everyone else, on the other. The category of mass is
not socioeconomic and class based; it is primarily intellectual
excellence that marks the elite. Mosca gives the concept
a different twist by introducing the term ruling class, which
essentially refers to an organized minority who monopolizes
the decision-making power in society. He imagined the
members of the ruling class as leaders of excellence who could
promote the moral and material interests of a society. Pareto
dened elites as persons with the highest capacities in their
eld. These elites have to be efcient to stay at the top, that is,
they must make optimal use of scarce resources to best benet
society. Such efciency demands different styles of governing
that range from adaptive politics (elites strong in class I resi-
dues) to aggressive and authoritarian measures (elites strong in
class II residues). Finally, Michels was concerned with the
emergence of oligarchs within complex, large-scale organiza-
tions that allow people in top positions to monopolize orga-
nizational means.
Most contemporary concepts of elites depart from
a simplied juxtaposition of mass and elite. The pluralist
school of thought emphasizes that, with the increasing differ-
entiation of societies, power is dispersed among multiple
leadership groups who bargain and compromise over key
societal decisions. To identify a unique elite becomes impos-
sible. Society is conceptualized instead as a number of parallel
pyramids, each capped by an elite who hold the largest share of
Note: Partly based on Zannoni, Paolo, 1978. The concept of elite. European Journal
of Political Research 19, 130.
a given resource. These elites are accountable to public scrutiny
and open to people from all social strata. Mills concept of the
power elite differs from the prevailing pluralist vision on elites
because it implies that few upper class people are essentially
able to control very different societal sectors. Bourdieu also
stands apart because he posits that the dominant class is able to
maintain its traditional claim to key leadership positions in
society. His work on the French state nobility shows that the
acquisition of exclusive educational degrees opens the door to
top positions in companies for the few who are already in
privileged social positions and discriminates against the many
who are less privileged.
All elite concepts, although different, have some similari-
ties. Each concept deals with the criteria of distinction and the
sources of power of the elites. Table 1 offers a systematic
overview of these rather hidden commonalities.
See also: Bourdieu, Pierre (19302002); Elites: Sociological
Aspects; Field Theory; Functionalism, History of; Mannheim,
Karl (18931947); Mills, Charles Wright (191662); Pareto,
Vilfredo (18481923).
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Relevant Websites
http://hyperbourdieu.jku.at/hyperbourdieustart.html A comprehensive, contextual,
and referential bibliography and mediagraphy of all works and public statements by
Pierre Bourdieu.
http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/ Electronic edition of Diderot and dAlemberts
Enyclopdie.
http://www.cwrightmills.org/ The ofcial C. Wright Mills website, maintained by
his son.
http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/ A site by G. William Domhoff about how
power is distributed and wielded in the United States.