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Tijam vs Sibonghanoy on the ground that when the plaintiffs filed the case, Judiciary Act of
1948 was already in effect. It provides that all civil actions where the
Facts: value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not
The Spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced a civil exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs shall be filed with
action against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio the inferior courts. The Court of First Instance, where the case was
to recover from them the sum of P 1908.00 with legal interest. As originally filed, had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The CA
prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to the SC.
court against defendants properties, but the same was soon Issue:
dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. (Main Issue) WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal.
The court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a
writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been Ruling:
returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution against the Surety's bond against which the Surety filed a No, though it is clear that the case is outside the jurisdiction of the
written opposition upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to Court of First Instance, defendants were estopped from questioning
prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the the court's jurisdiction. The Court explained "a party may be
payment of the amount due under the judgment. Thereafter the estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to pay, different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by
the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counter- deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
bond. The court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel, granted the
latter a period of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
its failure to file such answer, the court granted the motion for and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
execution and the corresponding writ was issued. diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
the same was issued without the required summary hearing. As the it or declined to assert it.
court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Surety alleged that the court erred when the case was submitted The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a
for resolution without a summary hearing and compliance with the quasi-party, it could have raised the question of the lack of
other mandatory requirements of the Rules of Court. jurisdiction, but it was only raised after 15 years. It invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its
CA decided the case affirming the orders appealed from. case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an
When the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally
asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. The inequity and
reconsideration. The CA granted the motion in its resolution. Two unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
days later, the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS,
Moreover, adds the Court, "we frown upon the 'undesirable practice'
of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the the surety's counsel did was to ask that he be allowed and given time
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, to file an answer. Moreover, it was stated in the order given in open
when adverse," court upon request of the surety's counsel that after the four-day
period within which to file an answer, "the incident shall be deemed
Merits of the appeal: submitted for resolution"; and counsel agreed, as the order was
The writ of execution against defendants having been returned totally issued upon his instance and he interposed no objection thereto.
unsatisfied, plaintiffs moved, for issuance of writ of execution against The orders appealed from are hereby affirmed.
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce the obligation of the
bond. But the motion was, upon the surety's opposition, denied.
Plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the surety for
satisfaction of the judgment, and upon the latter's failure to pay the 2. Monzon vs. Relova
amount due, plaintiffs again filed a motion, for issuance of writ of FACTS: Spouses Relova and Spouses Perez, respondents herein,
execution against the surety, with notice of hearing. The surety filed an initiatory pleading against Atty. Luna (Clerk of Court) and
received copy of said motion and notice of hearing. Monzon (Petitioner). Respondents alleged that Monzon executed
Since the surety's counsel failed to file any answer or objection within two promissory notes, one in favor of Spouses Relova and the other
the period given him, the court, issued an order granting plaintiffs' in favor of Spouses Perez, both were secured by two different lots
motion for execution against the surety; and the corresponding writ respectively. However, Coastal Lending Corp extrajudicially
of execution was issued. foreclosed and sold the property of petitioner including the portions
mortgaged to respondents because petitioner was likewise indebted
The surety filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the to Coastal Lending Corp. Respondents then asked petitioner for the
ground that it was issued without the required "summary hearing". enforcement of the two promissory notes. The hearing date for the
This motion was denied. The surety filed a motion for reconsideration parties was set but petitioner and her counsel failed to appear on
of the above-stated order of denial, which was also denied. that date. Citing the absence of petitioner and her counsel on said
hearing date despite due notice, RTC granted an oral Motion by the
In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' respondents by issuing an Order allowing the ex parte presentation
motion for execution and of the date when the same would be of evidence by respondents.
submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present
in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that RTC: The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents and
the court gave him a period of four days within which to file an mentioned that the Order allowing the ex parte presentation of
answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer evidence by respondents was due to the continuous and incessant
or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was absences of petitioner and counsel. It can be seen that despite the
deprived of its day in court. fact that Monzon was not declared in default by the RTC, the RTC
nevertheless applied the effects of a default order upon petitioner
It is argued that the surety's counsel did not file an answer to the under Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court:
motion "for the simple reason that all its defenses can be set up
during the hearing of the motion even if the same are not reduced to SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.If the defending party fails to
writing". There is obviously no merit in this pretense because what answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion
of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of default shall be imposed upon her. "Mere non-appearance of
such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the defendants at an ordinary hearing and to adduce evidence does not
court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such constitute default, when they have already filed their answer to the
relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion complaint within the reglementary period. It is error to default a
requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence defendant after the answer had already been filed. It should be borne
may be delegated to the clerk of court. in mind that the policy of the law is to have every litigants case tried
on the merits as much as possible; it is for this reason that
(a) Effect of order of default.A party in default shall be entitled to judgments by default are frowned upon. Failure to attend, when
notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial. committed during hearing dates for the presentation of the
CA: Monzon filed a Notice of Appeal claiming that the RTC gravely complainants evidence, would amount to the waiver of such
erred in rendering its Decision immediately after respondents defendants right to object to the evidence presented during such
presented their evidence ex parte without giving her a chance to hearing, and to cross-examine the witnesses presented therein. It
present her evidence, thereby violating her right to due process of would not amount to a waiver of the defendants right to present
law. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing evidence during the trial dates scheduled for the reception of
the appeal. According to the Court of Appeals, Monzon showed tepid evidence for the defense.
interest in having the case resolved with dispatch. 3. Sablas v Sablas
Monzon filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. Monzon FACTS:
stresses that she was never declared in default by the trial court.
Petitioner Sps were served with summons and a copy of the
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Monzon is in default when she and complaint. They filed a motion for extension of time requesting an
her counsel failed to appear during the hearing date? additional period of 15 days to file for their answer. However, they
HELD: No, the petitioner is not in default. In his book on remedial were able to file it only 3 days after the expiration of the extended
law, former Justice Florenz D. Regalado writes that failure to appear period. The trial court observed that the answer was filed out if time,
in hearings is not a ground for the declaration of a defendant in it admitted the pleading because no motion to declare the petitioner
default. Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary sps in default was filed.
period, and not failure to appear at the hearing, is the sole ground for Thereafter, respondents filed a motion to declare petitioner sps in
an order of default, except the failure to appear at a pre-trial default, but was denied by the trial court. Respondents moved for
conference wherein the effects of a default on the part of the reconsideration but was denied. They challenged the trial courts
defendant are followed. The rigid requirements of a default order are order h the CA in a petition for certiorari alleging that the admission
the following: (1) the court must have validly acquired jurisdiction of the answer by the trial court was contrary to the Rules of
over the person of the defendant either by service of summons or Procedure and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to
voluntary appearance; (2) the defendant failed to file his answer lack of jurisdiction.
within the time allowed therefor; and (3) there must be a motion to
declare the defendant in default with notice to the latter. In the case CA ruled that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
at bar, petitioner had not failed to file her answer. Neither was notice pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 9 of Rules of Court, that the trial court had
sent to petitioner that she would be defaulted, or that the effects of no recourse but to declare petitioner sps in default. CA granted the
petition, vacated the trial courts order and remanded the case to the The rule on default requires the filing of a motion and notice of such
trial court for reception of plaintiffs evidence. Petitioner Sps assail motion to the defending party. It is not enough that the defendant
the decision of the CA in this petition for review on certiorari. fails to answer the complaint within the reglementary period. The trial
court cannot motu proprio declare a defendant in default] as the rules
ISSUE: WON petitioner sps is in default? leave it up to the claiming party to protect his or its interests. The trial
HELD: NO. court should not under any circumstances act as counsel of the
claiming party.
The elements of a valid declaration of default are:
It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit the
1. the court has validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant to file his answer and to be heard on the merits even after
defending party either by service of summons or voluntary the reglementary period for filing the answer expires. The Rules of
appearance; Court provides for discretion on the part of the trial court not only to
extend the time for filing an answer but also to allow an answer to be
2. the defending party failed to file the answer within the time allowed
filed after the reglementary period.
therefor and
Since the trial court already admitted the answer, it was correct in
3. a motion to declare the defending party in default has been filed
denying the subsequent motion of respondents to declare petitioner
by the claiming party with notice to the defending party.
spouses in default.
An order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Accordingly, the petition is hereby
party. It can be properly issued against the defending party who
GRANTED. The July 17, 2000 decision of the Court of Appeals in
failed to file the answer within the prescribed period only if the
CA-G.R. SP No. 57397 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
claiming party files a motion to that effect with notice to the defending
December 6, 1999 order of the Regional Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte,
party.
Branch 14 is REINSTATED. The case is REMANDED to the trial
In this connection, Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides: court for further proceedings.
5. MONARCH INSURANCE VS COURT OF APPEALS It should be noted that Aboitiz was declared as in default not for its
failure to file an answer but from its absence during pre-trial and the
FACTS: This is a petition for review assailing the decision of trial proper. A judgment of default does not imply a waiver of rights
the Court of Appeals which set aside the writ of execution issued by except that of being heard and presenting evidence in defendants
the lower court for the full indemnification of the claims of the favor. It does not imply admission by the defendant of the facts and
petitioners Monarch and Tabacalera Insurance against private causes of action of the plaintiff, because the codal section requires
respondent Aboitiz Shipping Corp. the latter to adduce evidence in support of his allegations as an
Monarch and Tabacalera are insurance carriers of los cargoes when indispensable condition before final judgment could be given in his
the ship of Aboitiz sank. They indemnified the shippers and were favor, nor could be interpreted as an admission by the defendant that
consequently subrogated to their rights, interests and actions against the plaintiffs causes of action find support in the law or that the latter
Aboitiz, the cargo carrier. Aboitiz refused to compensate Monarch so is entitled to the relief for. This is especially true with respect to a
the latter filed a complaints against the former. defendant who had filed his answer but had been subsequently
declared in default for failing to appear at the trial since he has had
Aboitiz was subsequently declared as in default for its failure to an opportunity to traverse, via his answer, the material averments
appear during the pre-trial, the counsel filed a motion to set aside the contained in the complaint. Such defendant has a better standing
motion of default. Without resolving the pending motion to set aside than a defendant who has neither answered nor appeared at trial.
the order of default, the trial court set the cases for hearing. Hoever, The former should be allowed to reiterate all affirmative defenses
since Aboitiz had repeatedly failed to appear in court, the trial court pleaded in his answer before the Court of Appeals. Likewise, the
denied the said motion and allowed Monarch and Tabacalera to Court of appeals may review the correctness of the evaluation of the
present evident ex-parte. plaintiffs evidence by the lower court.
In due course, the trial court rendered judgment agaisnt Aboitiz but
the compalint against all the other defendants was dimissed. The
petitioners moved for exe cution of judgment, the respondent filed a 6. ANTONIO GARCIA, petitioner,
motion to restrain the execution in the Court of Appeals the the latter vs.
granted the motion, hence, this appeal.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTH DIVISION) and SPS. WILLIAM
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred from taking UY and MA. JAJORIE UY, respondents.
cognizance the Aboitizs defenses on appeal for having been
declared in default.
RULING: PETITION IS DENIED. FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Garcia filed an action for damages
against private respondents, spouses William and Ma. Jajorie Uy.
For failure of the private respondents to file their answer within the requisites for executing a judgment pending appeal under Section 2
reglementary period, petitioner moved to declare the former in of Rule 39.
default. RTC granted the motion. Private respondents then filed an
appearance with motion for extension of time to file answer but the
trial court denied the motion for having been filed out of time. A party in default loses the right to present his defense and examine
or cross-examine witnesses. It does not mean that being declared in
default, and thereby losing ones standing, constitutes a waiver of all
RTC issued a judgment of default against private respondent. rights; what is only waived is the right to be heard and to present
Petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal which the trial evidence during trial while default prevails. Such party is still entitled
court granted. Private respondents appealed to CA challenging the to notice of final judgments, land orders and proceedings taken
validity of the writ of execution because it was granted without proper subsequent thereto.
notice to them and without hearing.
Petition denied.
CA granted the petition and set aside the RTC order. A motion to
reconsider the decision was denied. Hence, this petition.
7. OTERO vs. TAN
ISSUE: W/N a party who has been declared in default is entitled to G.R. No. 200134 August 15, 2012
notice of a motion for execution pending appeal of a judgment by
default
Case History:
On November 18, 2005, Tan filed a motion with the MTCC to declare Yes, Otero can appeal.
Otero in default for his failure to file his answer. Otero opposed Tans
Indeed, a defending party declared in default retains the right to
motion, claiming that he did not receive a copy of the summons and
appeal from the judgment by default. However, the grounds that may
a copy of Tans complaint. Hearing on the said motion was set on
be raised in such an appeal are restricted to any of the following: first,
January 25, 2006, but was later reset to March 8, 2006, Otero
the failure of the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of the
manifesting that he only received the notice therefor on January 23,
complaint; second, the decision is contrary to law; and third, the
2006. The hearing on March 8, 2006 was further reset to April 26,
amount of judgment is excessive or different in kind from that prayed
2006 since the presiding judge was attending a convention. Otero
for. In these cases, the appellate tribunal should only consider the
failed to appear at the next scheduled hearing, and the MTCC
pieces of evidence that were presented by the plaintiff during the ex
issued an order declaring him in default. A copy of the said order
parte presentation of his evidence.
was sent to Otero on May 9, 2006.
Petitioner then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on Facts:
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was denied for being Ruling that the judgment sought to be reviewed has become final
the wrong remedy under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. and executory, the Court of Appeals ordered the Regional Trial Court
Thus, Petitioner filed the present motion for reconsideration, alleging that to take appropriate action on the urgent ex parte motion for issuance
the filing of said petition is the proper recourse, citing Matute vs. Court of of a writ of execution filed by private respondent. Pursuant thereto,
the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued a writ of possession thus
placing private respondent in possession of petitioner's barge Lawin. Facts:
Hence, this petition.
>November 1916 private respondents (Julian Cavito) rice, hemp
The case filed by private respondent with the trial court involved and coconut land was levied because of a writ of execution issued by
multiple defendants. Several defendants entered into a compromise Justice of the Peace of Barcelona, Province of Sorsogon in the case
agreement with private respondent. A compromise agreement is filed by Eugenio Fortuno against the private respondent.
immediately final and executory. As to these defendants therefore,
the trial court Decision had become final. Nevertheless, said decision -November 4, 1916 private respondents land was sold at a public
cannot be said to have attained finality as to petitioner, which was auction and the highest bidder was the petitioner (Donato Banares)
not a party to the compromise. Moreover, petitioner filed a Motion for and since the one-year redemption period expired, a deed of sale
Reconsideration two days before the lapse of the reglementary was executed in favor of the petitioner.
period to appeal. Execution shall issue as matter of right upon the >October 18, 1927 private respondent filed a complaint in the
expiration of the period to appeal if no appeal has been duly Court of First Instance of Sorsogon against the petitioner and praying
perfected. before the Court to allow the private respondent to redeem the land,
Issue: to restore ownership and possession of the land and order the
petitioner to pay damages.
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner
in this case. >November 15, 1927 the petitioner filed an answer to the
complaint but a copy was not served to the private respondent so the
Held: latter filed a motion for default against the former on December 12,
1927, which was granted by the public respondent (Judge Tomas
NO. The sheriff's return showed that the president of petitioner Flordeliza) on December 17, 1927.
corporation was served summons through his secretary. A summons
addressed to a corporation and served on the secretary of the >February 9, 1928 and before the assignment of the date of the
President binds that corporation. The secretary however, should be hearing the petitioner filed a sworn motion to set aside the order of
an employee of the corporation sought to be summoned. In the case default together with its pertinent documents but the public
at bar, the secretary was not an employee of petitioner but of respondent refused to set aside the order of default.
Vlasons Shipping, Inc.
Issue Was it correct for the public respondent to refuse to set aside
Acting under the impression that petitioner had been placed under its order of default?
jurisdiction, the trial court dispensed with the service on petitioner of
new summons for the subsequent amendments of the petition. But Ruling:
the first service of summons on petitioner was invalid. Thus, the trial >No, it was not correct for the public respondent to refuse to set
court never acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner. Not having been aside the order of default.
validly served summons, it would be legally impossible to declare
petitioner to be in default. A default judgment cannot affect the rights >The Court ruled that while it is correct for a court to declare a
of a party who was never declared in default. defendant in default due to the failure of the latter to serve a copy his
answer to the plaintiff and it is sufficient for a court to refuse to set it
10. Banares v. Flordeliza (GR No. L-29355; July 20, 1928)
aside when a motion to that effect is presented without a sworn court processes and asked for an extension of 15 days within which
statement of merit and evidence to establish them. to file an Answer. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
66, issued an Order admitting the answer and setting the case for
-But when the motion to set aside order of default was made pre-trial.
without any loss of time and before a date was set for hearing of
the case on the merits and is accompanied by a sworn Thus, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
statement of merit and copies of documents which constitutes prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
prima facie a just and valid defense, such failure to serve the before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City which granted it. The
answer to the plaintiff is insufficient to refuse to set aside the order respondent corporation appealed to the Court of Appeals which
of default which will deprive a defendant of his rights. reversed the decision.
In the present case, the public respondent should have set aside Issue:
the order of default since the petitioner filed a motion to set aside
order of default before a date was set for hearing on the case on the Was there a valid service of summons?
merits and is accompanied by a sworn statement of merit and copies Held:
of documents which constitutes a prima facie a just and valid
defense of petitioners failure to serve a copy of the answer to private Petition is denied. There was no valid service of summons.
respondent.
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that when the
11. PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORP vs A.C. ORDOEZ defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized
CORPORATION under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service
may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
Facts: corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the Section 11, Rule 14 sets out an exclusive enumeration of the officers
decision of the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the who can receive summons on behalf of a corporation. Service of
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 58 and summons to someone other than the corporations president,
reinstated the Orders of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer,
Branch 66 which admitted respondents Answer. and in-house counsel, is not valid.
Petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, a The new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive, following the rule in
complaint for damages against respondents. Based on the Sheriffs statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
Return of Service, summons remained unserved on respondent
Suspine while it was served on the respondent corporation and Thus, the service of summons to respondent corporations Receiving
received by Samuel D. Marcoleta. Section through Samuel D. Marcoleta is defective and not binding to
said corporation.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default; however,
on June 28, 2000, the respondent corporation filed an Omnibus 12. SPOUSES RUDY S. AMPELOQUIO, SR. AND LAGRIMAS
Motion alleging that summons was improperly served upon it OBNAMIA vs.
because it was made to a secretarial staff who was unfamiliar with COURT OF APPEALS &, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
FACTS: Whether or not private respondent be granted a liberal construction
of the Rules and be declared in default for its failure to file an answer
Petitioners failed to pay their loan to private respondent PNB despite within the reglementary period?
the demand made by the latter. PNB then instituted an extrajudicial
foreclosure which consequently awarded in their favor the mortgaged
property after winning the highest bid in auction sale. A transfer of
ownership was issued in favor of PNB. Petitioners filed before RTC a HELD:
complaint for annulment of mortgage contract and also asked for the Respondent appellate court emphasized that a liberal construction of
cancellation of transfer of ownership to PNB. PNB then filed a motion the Rules is allowed by this Court to promote speedy, just, and
for extension of time to file an answer. Thereafter, instead of filing an inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. Under
answer, PNB filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause Section 11 of Rule 11 of the New Rules of Civil Procedure, it is within
of action. RTC, however, denied said motion and an order was sent the discretion of the trial court to permit the filing of defendant's
and addressed to a certain Atty. Manzala at PNB Escolta office. PNB answer even beyond the reglementary period, provided there is
claimed it did not receive the trial courts order because Atty. justification for the belated action, and there was no showing that the
Manzala who temporarily handled the case no longer held office in defendant intended to delay the case. Where the failure of defendant
Escolta. The case was eventually transferred to Atty. Torres of PNB to seasonably file his answer is excusable and will not in any way
Cavite. This prompts now petitioners to file a motion to declare prejudice the plaintiff's substantial rights, courts apply the Rules
private respondent in default for its failure to file an answer within the liberally and set aside the default order, or deny the motion by the
reglementary period. RTC denied petitioners motion and CA upheld plaintiff. In this case, respondent trial judge found that private
the decision of RTC. respondent had a meritorious defense and the case needed a full-
blown trial.
ISSUE:
13. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN
(Second Division) and FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. (as
executor of the estate of FERDINAND E. MARCOS).
G.R. No. 148154 December 17, 2007 ISSUE:
FACTS: Did the court commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in granting respondent's motion for a bill of
The administration of then President Corazon C. Aquino particulars as executor of former President Marcos' estates
successively sued former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former considering that the deceased defendant was then a defaulting
First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos (Mrs. Marcos), and their defendant when the motion was filed?
alleged cronies or dummies before the anti-graft court to recover the
alleged ill-gotten wealth that they amassed during the former RULING:
president's 20-year rule.
The court rule in the negative, and dismiss the instant petition
On April 18, 1988, the court ordered that alias summonses be served for utter lack of merit.
on the Marcoses who were then in exile in Hawaii. The alias
summonses on the Marcoses were served at 2338 Makiki Heights,
Honolulu, Hawaii. The Marcoses, however, failed to file an answer Under the Rules of Court, a defending party may be declared in
and were accordingly declared in default by the anti-graft court on default, upon motion and notice, for failure to file an answer within
April 6, 1989. the allowable period. As a result, the defaulting party cannot take
Respondent asked for three extensions totaling 35 days to file an part in the trial albeit he is entitled to notice of subsequent
answer. The court granted the motions and gave him until July 17, proceedings.
1999 to file an answer. But instead of filing an answer, respondent In this case, former President Marcos was declared in default for
filed on July 16, 1999, a Motion For Bill of Particulars, praying for failure to file an answer. He died in Hawaii as an exile while this case
clearer statements of the allegations which he called "mere was pending, since he and his family fled to Hawaii in February 1986
conclusions of law, too vague and general to enable defendants to during a people-power revolt in Metro Manila. His representatives
intelligently answer." failed to file a motion to lift the order of default. Nevertheless,
Invoking Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, respondent, as executor of his father's estate, filed a motion for leave
petitioner argues that since the default order against former to file a responsive pleading, three motions for extensions to file an
President Marcos has not been lifted by any court order, respondent answer, and a motion for bill of particulars all of which were granted
cannot file a motion for a bill of particulars. Petitioner stresses that by the anti-graft court.
respondent did not file a motion to lift the default order as executor of While it is true that there was no positive act on the part of the
his father's estate; thus, he and the estate cannot take part in the trial. court to lift the default order because there was no motion nor
Petitioner also contends that respondent was granted leave to file an order to that effect, the anti-graft court's act of granting
answer to the expanded complaint, not a motion for a bill of respondent the opportunity to file a responsive pleading meant
particulars. The anti-graft court should not have accepted the motion the lifting of the default order on terms the court deemed proper
for a bill of particulars after he had filed a motion for leave to file in the interest of justice. It was the operative act lifting the
responsive pleading and three successive motions for extension as default order and thereby reinstating the position of the original
the motion for a bill of particulars is dilatory. defendant whom respondent is representing, founded on the
court's discretionary power to set aside orders of default.
Indeed, failure to file a motion to lift a default order is not Private Respondent Christian filed with the RTC a complaint for a
procedurally fatal as a defaulted party can even avail of other sum of money and damages against the petitioner corporation.
remedies mentioned above. Petitioner corporation filed an Answer raising as defenses lack of
cause of action. According to them, Christian had no cause of action
As default judgments are frowned upon, we have been advising the because the three promissory notes were not yet due and
courts below to be liberal in setting aside default orders to give both demandable.
parties every chance to present their case fairly without resort to
technicality. The trial court ruled that under Section 5 of Rule 10 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint which states no cause of action
But as defaulted defendants are not actually thrown out of court may be cured by evidence presented without objection. Thus, even if
because the Rules see to it that judgments against them must be in the plaintiff had no cause of action at the time he filed the instant
accordance with the law and competent evidence, this Court prefers complaint, as defendants obligation are not yet due and demandable
that the lifting of default orders be effected before trial courts could then, he may nevertheless recover on the first two promissory notes
receive plaintiffs' evidence and render judgments. This is so since in view of the introduction of evidence showing that the obligations
judgments by default may result in considerable injustice to covered by the two promissory notes are now due and demandable.
defendants, necessitating careful and liberal examination of the When the instant case was filed, none of the promissory notes was
grounds in motions seeking to set them aside. The inconvenience due and demandable, but the first and the second promissory notes
and complications associated with rectifying resultant errors, if have already matured during the course of the proceeding. Hence,
defendant justifies his omission to seasonably answer, far outweigh payment is already due.
the gain in time and dispatch of immediately trying the case. The fact
that former President Marcos was in exile when he was declared in This finding was affirmed by the CA.
default, and that he later died still in exile, makes the belated filing of
his answer in this case understandably excusable.
14. Swagman Hotel and Travel Inc vs. CA | GR 161135 | Apr 8, ISSUE:
2005 May a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed
FACTS: be cured by the accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of
the case?
Petitioner Swagman through its president and vice-president,
respectively, obtained from Private Respondent Christian loans
evidenced by three promissory notes. Each of the promissory notes HELD:
is in the amount of US$50,000 payable after three years from its date
with an interest of 15% per annum payable every three months. In a No. Jurisprudence states that unless the plaintiff has a valid and
letter, Christian informed the petitioner corporation that he was subsisting cause of action at the time his action is commenced, the
terminating the loans and demanded from the latter payment of said defect cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of
loans. one while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or an
amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not
permissible.
Such interpretation by the trial court and CA of Section 5, Rule 10 of filed a Motion to Expunge respondents motion to admit amended
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is erroneous. The curing effect complaint on the ground that the latter motion was not accompanied
under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at by a notice of hearing. In her Comment on Alpines motion to
the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for expunge, respondent averred that her contested motion need not be
failure to allege the essential facts. Amendments of pleadings are accompanied by a notice of hearing as it is a non-litigated motion.
allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order On January 24, 2003, the RTC denied Alpines motion to expunge
that the actual merits of a case may be determined in the most for lack of merit. Alpine moved for a reconsideration, but this was
expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities, denied in an Order dated January 28, 2003. Hence, this petition.
and that all other matters included in the case may be determined in
a single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits. Issue:
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration with motion for leave March 9, 2011
to file an amended complaint for quieting of title. Petitioners filed their Facts:
opposition, contending that the amended complaint does not also
state a cause of action and if admitted, respondents theory of the On 19 March 1993, a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) was entered
case is substantially modified. into between respondents National Housing Authority (NHA) and R-II
Builders, Inc. (R-II Builders) for the implementation of the Smokey
ISSUE: Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP).
Whether respondent may amend his pleading. On 26 September 1994, NHA and R-II Builders, alongside petitioner
Whether a motion to dismiss is a responsive pleading. Housing Guaranty Corporation (HGC) as guarantor and the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) as trustee, entered into an Asset
RULING: Pool Formation Trust Agreement which provided the mechanics for
the implementation of the project. To back the project, an Asset Pool
Section 2, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, was created.
provides:
On the same date, the parties likewise executed a Contract of
"SEC. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. A party may amend his Guaranty whereby HGC, upon the call made by PNB and conditions
pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a therein specified, undertook to redeem the regular Smokey Mountain
responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any Project Participation Certificate (SMPPCs) upon maturity and to pay
time within ten (10) days after it is served." the simple interest thereon to the extent of 8.5% per annum.
The above provision clearly shows that before the filing of any Subsequent to R-II Builders' infusion of P300 Million into the project,
responsive pleading, a party has the absolute right to amend his the issuance of the SMPPCs and the termination of PNBs services
pleading, regardless of whether a new cause of action or change in on 29 January 2001, NHA, R-II Builders and HGC agreed on the
theory is introduced. institution of Planters Development Bank (PDB) as trustee on 29
It is settled that a motion to dismiss is not the responsive January 2001. By 24 October 2002, however, all the Regular
pleading contemplated by the Rule. Records show that petitioners SMPPCs issued had reached maturity and, unredeemed, already
had not yet filed a responsive pleading to the original complaint in amounted to an aggregate face value of P2.513 Billion. The lack of
the civil case. What they filed was a motion to dismiss. It follows that liquid assets with which to effect redemption of the regular SMPPCs
respondent, as a plaintiff, may file an amended complaint even after prompted PDB to make a call on HGCs guaranty and to execute in
the original complaint was ordered dismissed, provided that the order the latters favor a Deed of Assignment and Conveyance (DAC) of
of dismissal is not yet final. the entire Asset Pool,.
On 1 September 2005, R-II Builders filed the complaint against HGC DAC, deleted its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of
and NHA before Branch 24 of the Manila Regional Trial Court, a title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, reduced the claim
Special Commercial Court (SCC). Contending that HGCs failure to for attorneys fees to P500,000.00 sought its appointment as
redeem the outstanding regular SMPPCs despite obtaining Receiver pursuant to Rule 59 of the Rules of Court and, after an
possession of the Asset Pool ballooned the stipulated interests and inventory in said capacity, prayed for approval of the liquidation and
materially prejudiced its stake on the residual values of the Asset distribution of the Asset Pool in accordance with the parties
Pool, R-II Builders alleged, among other matters, that the DAC agreements.
should be rescinded since PDB exceeded its authority in executing
the same prior to HGCs redemption and payment of the guaranteed On 2 September 2008, HGC filed its opposition to the admission of
SMPPCs; R-II Builders Second Amended Complaint on the ground that
respondent RTC had no jurisdiction to act on the case until payment
Having filed its answer to the complaint, in the meantime, HGC went of the correct docket fees.
on to move for the conduct of a preliminary hearing on its affirmative
defenses which included such grounds as lack of jurisdiction. On 2 Issues:
August 2007, R-II Builders, in turn, filed a motion to admit its 1. Whether Branch 24 of Manila RTC, a Special Commercial Court
Amended and Supplemental Complaint which deleted the prayer for has a jurisdiction over the case.
resolution of the DAC initially prayed for in its original complaint. In
lieu thereof, said pleading introduced causes of action for 2. Whether a branch of the Regional Trial Court which has no
conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, for jurisdiction to try and decide a case has authority to remand the
NHA to pay the Asset Pool the sum of P1,803,729,757.88 same to another co-equal Court in order to cure the defects on
representing the cost of the changes and additional works on the venue and jurisdiction.
project and for an increased indemnity for attorneys fees in the sum
Rulings:
of P2,000,000.00.
1. No. the said court significantly took cognizance of its lack of
Consistent with its joint order dated 2 January 2008 which held that
jurisdiction over the case in the following wise:
R-II Builders complaint was an ordinary civil action and not an intra-
corporate controversy, Branch 24 of the Manila RTC issued a At the outset, it must be stated that this Court is a designated Special
clarificatory order dated 1 February 2008 to the effect, among other Commercial Court tasked to try and hear, among others, Intra-
matters, that it did not have the authority to hear the case. As a corporate controversies to the exclusion of ordinary civil cases.
consequence, the case was re-raffled to respondent Branch 22 of
the Manila RTC . the case was re-raffled to respondent Branch 22 of When the case was initially assigned to this Court, it was classified
the Manila RTC . as an intra-corporate case. However, in the ensuing proceedings
relative to the affirmative defences raised by defendants, even the
R-II Builders filed a motion to admit it Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff conceded that the case is not an intra-corporate controversy
on the ground that its previous Amended and Supplemental or even if it is, this Court is without authority to hear the same as the
Complaint had not yet been admitted in view of the non-payment of parties are all housed in Quezon City.
the correct docket fees therefor. Said Second Amended Complaint
notably resurrected R-II Builders cause of action for resolution of the
Thus, the more prudent course to take was for this Court to declare petitioners that based on the computation of her accountant as of
that it does not have the authority to hear the complaint it being an July 6, 1997, her unpaid obligation which includes interests and
ordinary civil action. As to whether it is personal or civil, this Court penalties was only 200,000. Petitioners agreed with respondent.
would rather leave the resolution of the same to Branch 22 of this Despite repeated demands, petitioners failed to collect the amounts
Court. Being outside the jurisdiction of Special Commercial Courts, they claimed. Hence, the complaint for sum of money with damages
the rule is settled that cases which are civil in nature, like the one filed with the RTC of Antipolo Rizal. In her answer with Compulsory
counterclaim and during the presentation of evidence, respondent
commenced by R-II Builders, should be threshed out in a regular
presented a receipt purportedly indicating payment of the remaining
court. balance of 200,000 to Losloso who allegedly received the same on
2. No. Calleja ruled on the issue, thus: Such being the case, RTC Br. behalf of petitioners.
58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer
On March 8, 2014, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only
respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision with
action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the
modification by deleting the award of moral damages and attorney's
petition for lack of jurisdiction. A re-raffle which causes a transfer of fees in favor of respondent. Aggrieved, petitioners come before the
the case involves courts with the same subject matter jurisdiction; it Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
cannot involve courts which have different jurisdictions exclusive of
the other. More apt in this case, a re-raffle of a case cannot cure a ISSUE:
jurisdictional defect. Whether it was proper to dismiss the complaint based on the ground
that the defendant fully paid the claims of plaintiff
HELD:
18. SPS DELA CRUZ VS CONCEPCION
Yes.
GR No. 172825, October 11, 2012
When the issue is tried without the objection of the parties, it should
be treated with all respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings.
FACTS: On the other hand, when there is an objection, the evidence may be
admitted where its admission will not prejudice him.
On March 25, 1996, petitioners entered into a Contract to Sell with
respondent involving a house and lot in Antipolo City for a 2 million Thus, while respondent judicially admitted in her answer that she
consideration. only paid 2 million and that she still owed petitioners 200,000,
respondent claimed later and in fact, submitted an evidence to show
Respondent made the following payments, to wit: that she already paid the whole amount of her unpaid obligation. It is
(1) 500,000 by way of downpayment; noteworthy what when respondent presented evidence of payment,
(2) 500,000 on May 30, 1996; petitioners did not object thereto.
(3) 500,000 paid on January 22, 1997; and
(4) 500,000 bounced check dated June 30, 1997 which was replaced. To be sure, petitioners were given ample opportunity to refute the
Thus, Respondent was able to pay the 2 million total obligation. fact of and present evidence to prove payment.
By virtue of the enactment and approval of the law transferring Section 6, Rule 10 and Section 7, Rule 11, of the Rules of
jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies from the SEC to the Court are relevant, thus:
regular courts designated as special (commercial) courts, the case
was then transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Sec. 6. Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party, the court
Branch 46, and was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-99677. may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just,
permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth
the RTC issued an Order denying the petitioners and transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the
respondents motions. date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party
may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order
Unsatisfied, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of admitting the supplemental pleading.
Appeals in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. The
appellate court dismissed the petition, ratiocinating that there Sec. 7. Answer to supplemental complaint. A supplemental
was no clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. complaint may be answered within ten (10) days from notice of the
order admitting the same, unless a different period is fixed by the
court. The answer to the complaint shall serve as the answer to the
Issue: supplemental complaint if no new or supplemental answer is filed.
Whether or not the trial courts denial of the motion to declare the
respondents in default for failing to answer to the petitioners As can be gleaned from the above provisions, the filing of an
supplemental petition was proper? answer to the supplemental pleading is not mandatory because
of the use of the word may. This is bolstered by the express
provision of the Rules that the answer to the original pleading
shall serve as the answer to the supplemental pleading if no
new or supplemental answer is filed. Thus, the Court cannot
Ruling: declare the respondents in default simply because the latter
Yes. opted not to file their answer to the supplemental petition.
The aforecited motions of the petitioner and of the corporation were Section 1 of Rule 11 of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the
set for hearing on February 7, 1975. On said date, after the trial court to permit the submission of an answer even after the time
respondent corporation showed to the petitioner its Articles of fixed in the rules for its presentation. The granting of extension to
Incorporation, the latter agreed to withdraw his Motion for Bill of 5
plead is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In
Particulars, leaving the private respondent's motion for resolution by some cases the court allowed the defendant to file his answer "even
the Court. after the time fixed for their presentation."
6
Thus We have set aside orders of default where defendant's failure speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases.
7
to answer on time was excusable.
WHEREFORE, the default order of February 14, 1975, as well as the
In the case at bar, respondent private corporation was not deprived Order of March 14, 1975, denying petitioner's motion for
of any substantial right by reason of the alleged defect of notice in reconsideration, is hereby set aside, and this case is ordered
petitioner's motion praying for an extension of the time to plead. remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. Costs against
There are motions that may be heard and granted ex parte, and a private respondent.
8
motion for extension of time to file an answer belongs to such class.
It was, therefore, error for the court a quo to set aside its Order 21. FILIPINAS FABRICATORS & SALES INC., FELIPE V.
granting extension to petitioner within which to file his pleading. PESTANO, and BENITO UNCHUAN,petitioners,
The petitioners' motion for bill of particulars filed on may 12, 1977,
did not contain the notice of hearing and proof of service required by
the Rules. This kind of motion, as we have already held in several
cases, is nothing but " mere scrap of paper." It presents no question
which merits the attention and consideration of the court. In fact, it is
not even considered a motion. A defective motion of this kind does
not interrupt the running of the period within which to file answer. As
the motion filed by the petitioners was nothing but a useless scrap of
paper which did not affect at all the running of the reglementary