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In the present case there can be no such honest difference of The Court cannot close this case without making the observation
opinion. As maybe gleaned from the allegations of the complaint that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original
as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action for damages complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of
and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is
complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by considering the action alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no
to be merely one for specific performance where the amount other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees
involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing
erroneous. Although the total amount of damages sought is not fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this
stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an
of the complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended
should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee. complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being
asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in
4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial
brought to the attention of this Court together with similar other court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the
cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the Court. amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages
Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body
filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 for the of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid
inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and payment of the required docket fee is obvious.
by emanating any mention of the amount of damages in the body
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private
repetition of this unethical practice. To put a stop to this irregularity, respondent had paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as
henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar herein-above related, and considering that the total amount sought to
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for be recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is
not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private
damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same,
petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all
in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement
incidents arising therefrom should be annulled.
shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An Ruling: The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of
vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original
fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
ruling in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed. However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket
fee until] the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus,
in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of
Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the
merit. case and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted
inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.
SO ORDERED.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is
EN BANC called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent
G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989 demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the
WARBY, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on
Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as
CHUA UY PO TIONG, ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance
by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as
Issue: Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when may be ordered.
the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid
Facts: On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is
filed a complaint with the RTC for the consignation of a premium a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly
refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and,
declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private
Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the respondent to pay the same.
required answer within the reglementary period.
The basic complaint for partition alleges that plaintiff Tancredo WHEREFORE, the petition for relief dated 27 December 1999
and defendant Leocadio are both sons of one Maximo Redea: is hereby DENIED.
Tancredo, by Maximos marriage to Magdalena Fernandez,
and Leocadio, by Maximos previous marriage to Emerenciana
SO ORDERED.
Redea. The complaint further alleged that the parties
common father, Maximo, left several pieces of realty, to wit: a
residential lot at M. Calim Street, Famy, Laguna; a riceland at Explains the CA in said resolution:
Poroza, Famy, Laguna; and another parcel of land at Maate,
also in Famy, Laguna. Petition for relief is not among the remedies available in the
Court of Appeals. In fact, authorities in remedial law (noted
In a decision3 dated August 20, 1997, the trial court, based on authors Regalado, Herrera, and Feria) are one in their
the evidence presented, confined the partition to only the commentaries that these petitions are filed with the trial courts.
property actually pertaining to the estate of the parties Not one of them has advanced an opinion or comment that this
deceased father and co-owned by them, namely, the parcel of equitable relief can be obtained in the Court of Appeals. Under
land at Maate, and accordingly rendered judgment as follows: Rule 47, an annulment of judgment or final orders and
resolutions may be filed before this court based on the ground
of extrinsic fraud which seems to be the premise of the petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
Perhaps it is worth looking into by the petitioner if the factual
rendered ordering the defendant [now respondent Leocadio] to
basis of the present petition for relief may qualify as an
partition only the property located at Maate, Famy, Laguna
extrinsic fraud, under Rule 47.
after plaintiffs [Tancredos] reimbursement of the expenses
incurred by the defendant in relation to the said lot. However,
partition cannot be effected with regard to properties located at Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned
M. Calim Street, Famy, Laguna and the property located at resolution was likewise denied by the CA in its equally
Poroza, Famy, Laguna, as the same belong to the defendant. challenged Resolution11 of November 16, 2000, wherein the
No pronouncement as to costs. appellate court further wrote:
SO ORDERED. (Words in brackets supplied) Under the 1964 Rules of Court, there was only one court
where a petition for relief may be filed the Court of First
Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. Section 1 thereof
On December 11, 1997, petitioner filed with the trial court a
governs a petition to Court of First Instance for relief from
Notice of Appeal.4 The court gave due course to the notice and
judgment of inferior court while Section 2 thereof governs
directed the elevation of the records of the case to the CA
petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or
whereat petitioners appeal was docketed as CA-G.R.CV No.
other proceeding thereof. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
59641.
has altered the said precept. Now, it must be filed before the
Municipal Trial Courts or Metropolitan Trial Courts for In Hagonoy Market Vendor Association v. Municipality of
judgments or final orders or other proceedings taken in said Hagonoy, Bulacan, G.R. No. 137621, February 6, 2002, then
courts, and in the same case. And for judgment, order, or other Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proceedings in the Regional Trial Court, it must be filed in the reminded us that
same Regional Trial Court which rendered the judgment or
final order, or other proceedings taken and in the same case. Laws are of two (2) kinds: substantive and procedural.
In other words, under the present rule, such a petition may be Substantive laws, insofar as their provisions are unambiguous,
filed in the same court which rendered the judgment or final are rigorously applied to resolve legal issues on the merits. In
order, or proceedings taken and in the same case. This is in contrast, courts generally frown upon an uncompromising
accordance with uniform procedure rule for Municipal and application of procedural laws so as not to subvert substantial
Regional Trial Courts. justice. Nonetheless, it is not totally uncommon for courts to
decide cases based on a rigid application of the so-called
The above construction to limit the term "any court" to technical rules of procedure as these rules exist for the orderly
Municipal Trial Court and Regional Trial Court and not to administration of justice.
include the Court of Appeals finds support in Section 7 of the
Rules which states: From the petition, it is clear that this Court is called upon to
relax the application of procedural rules, or suspend them
Sec. 7. Procedure where the denial of an appeal is set aside. altogether, in favor of petitioners substantial rights. There is no
Where the denial of an appeal is set aside, the lower court doubt as to the power of this Court to do that. In a fairly recent
shall be required to give due course to the appeal and to case, we reiterated:
elevate the record of the appealed case as if a timely and
proper appeal had been made. The Court has often stressed that rules of procedure are
merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Significantly, there is no specific provision in both the 1964 and They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the
1997 Rules of Court making the petition under Rule 38, court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or
applicable in the Court of Appeals. The procedure in the Court robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In
of Appeals from Rule 44 to Rule 55 with the exception of Rule rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to
45 which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance,
remedies available before said court such as annulment of technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and
judgment or final orders and resolution (Rule 47); motion for not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules
reconsideration (Rule 52); and, new trial, (Rule 53). Nowhere is would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always
petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned. within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular
case from its operation.12
But even as the CA stood firm on its stand that a petition for
relief from denial of appeal is not among the remedies The Rules itself expressly states in Section 2 of Rule 1 that the
available before the CA itself, the appellate court, in the same rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
Resolution of November 16, 2000, left the final determination object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
of the question to this Court, thus: inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.
Courts, therefore, not only have the power but the duty to
Parenthetically, the main question presented herein is novel in construe and apply technical rules liberally in favor of
that there is yet no definite and definitive jurisprudence from substantive law and substantial justice. Furthermore, this
the Supreme Court. Perhaps, the case will clarify this gray area Court, unlike courts below, has the power not only to liberally
in our adjective law for guidance of the Bench and Bar. The construe the rules, but also to suspend them, in favor of
issue should be elevated to that Tribunal. substantive law or substantial rights. Such power inherently
belongs to this Court, which is expressly vested with rule-
making power by no less than the Constitution.13 1awphi1.net
Presently, petitioner is now before this Court via the instant
recourse on his submission that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion when it - It is equally settled, however, that this Courts power to liberally
construe and even to suspend the rules, presupposes the
existence of substantial rights in favor of which, the strict
I application of technical rules must concede. The facts are
borne out by the records pertaining to petitioners purported
XXX RULED THAT A PETITION FOR RELIEF IS NOT AN undivided share in the property at M. Calim Street, Famy,
AVAILABLE REMEDY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS. Laguna, and the property in Poroza clearly showed that these
two properties had been subject of an agreement (Exh. "1")
II whereby petitioner recognized respondents rights to said
properties. This fact binds this Court, there being nothing on
record with the trial court as to the herein alleged fraud against
XXX REFUSED TO GRANT THE PETITION DESPITE A the petitioner. Upon thorough deliberation of the supposed
CLEAR SHOWING THAT (A) PETITIONER, BY REASON OF substantial rights claimed by the petitioner with the court below,
FRAUD AND MISTAKE, WAS PREVENTED FROM the Court finds no cogent basis to favorably rule on the merits
PROSECUTING HIS APPEAL, AND (B) PETITIONER HAS A of the appeal even if it may be given due course which is
GOOD AND SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST indispensable to justify this Court in considering this case as
PRIVATE RESPONDENT. an exception to the rules.
G.R. No. 139596 January 24, 2006 Via a reply-letter dated August 31, 1994, the manager of UBPs
Acquired Assets Department advised petitioner that his offer to
purchase is yet to be acted upon because the bank was still
CHARLES CU-UNJIENG, Petitioner, awaiting the opinion of its legal division regarding the sale of
vs. "CARPable" agricultural assets acquired by the bank.5
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and UNI0N BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
As it turned out, UBP rejected petitioners offer as shown by
the fact that in another letter6 dated December 19, 1994, the
DECISION bank informed petitioner that his offer could not be favorably
acted upon on account of the legal divisions opinion that sales
GARCIA, J.: of lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
without prior Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approval
are considered null and void. Accordingly, UBP advised
By this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Charles Cu-
petitioner to pick up the refund of his P103,915.27 "earnest
Unjieng seeks the reversal of the following issuances of the
money" at the banks disbursing unit.
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 8177-B-
UDK, entitled Charles Cu-Unjieng, plaintiff-appellant vs. Union
Bank of the Philippines, et al., defendants-appellees, to wit: Unable to accept UBPs rejection of his offer, petitioner,
through counsel, made a formal demand7 for the bank to
comply with its obligation to transfer and deliver the title of the
1. Resolution1 dated May 10,1999, dismissing, for
subject property to him by executing the proper deed of
non-payment of docket and other lawful fees,
conveyance, under the terms and conditions set forth in his
petitioners appeal from an earlier decision of the
April 11, 1994 offer.
Regional Trial Court at Malolos, Bulacan which
dismissed his complaint for specific performance and
damages against respondent Union Bank of the Responding thereto, UBP, thru its counsel, Atty. Luzano, in a
Philippines and others; and letter8 dated July 19, 1995, reiterated the banks rejection of
petitioners offer as "the land being carpable could only be
disposed of by the bank either thru Voluntary Offer to Sell
2. Resolution2 dated July 30, 1999 which denied
(VOS) or compulsory acquisition, the procedure of which is
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and ordered
outlined in Sec. 16" of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657.
expunged the appeal brief thereto attached.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied, Petitioner would have the Court view his failure to pay the
petitioner filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal11therein appeal docket fees on time as a non-fatal lapse, or a non-
making known that he is taking an appeal from the adverse jurisdictional defect which the CA should have ignored in order
decision to the CA. Acting thereon, the trial court issued an to attain substantial justice. Further, petitioner passes the
Order12 directing the elevation of the records of the case to the blame to the RTC clerk of court who allegedly made the
CA, whereat petitioners appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV erroneous computation of docket fees.
No. 8177-B-UDK.
We are not persuaded.
Doctrinally entrenched is the pronouncement that the right to sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and
appeal is merely statutory and a party seeking to avail of that fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in
right must comply with the statute or rules.15 consideration of all attendant circumstances
Rule 41, Section 4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Then, too, in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
provides: (MCIAA) vs. Mangubat,22 we held that late payment of docket
fees may be admitted when the party showed willingness to
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within abide by the Rules by immediately paying the required
the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the fees. Mactan, however, cannot be a source of comfort for
clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order herein petitioner. For there, the appellate docket fees were
appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket paid six (6) days after the timely filing of the notice of appeal.
and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be Unlike in Mactan, payment of the appellate docket fees in this
transmitted to the appellate court together with the original case was effected by petitioner only after four (4) months
record or the record on appeal. following the expiration of the reglementary period to take an
appeal.
Well-settled is the rule that payment of the docket and other
legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and With the reality obtaining in this case that payment of the
jurisdictional,16 noncompliance with which is fatal to an appeal. appellate docket fees was belatedly made four (4) months after
For, to stress, appeal is not a matter of right, but a mere the lapse of the period for appeal, it appears clear to us that
statutory privilege.17 the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioners appeal
except to order its dismissal,23 as it rightfully did. Thus, the
September 1, 1998 decision of the RTC has passed to the
An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to realm of finality and became executory by operation of law.
the CA must be made within fifteen (15) days from
notice.18 And within this period, the full amount of the appellate
court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of We must emphasize that invocation of substantial justice is not
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed a magical incantation that will automatically compel this Court
from. to suspend procedural rules. Rules of procedure are not to be
belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance
may have resulted in prejudice to a partys substantive rights.
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that full Like all rules, they are required to be followed. So it must be
payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is here.
mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such
payment, the appeal is not perfected and the appellate court
does not acquire jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, thereby WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED and the assailed
rendering the decision sought to be appealed final and resolutions dated May 10,1999 and July 30, 1999 of the Court
executory.19 of Appeals AFFIRMED.
For sure, nonpayment of the appellate court docket and other Costs against petitioner.
lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided under
Section 4, Rule 41, supra, is a ground for the dismissal of an SO ORDERED.
appeal under Section 1(c) of Rule 50, to wit:
On September 3, 2000, Ludolfo sought an extension of his (a) Failure to attach or incorporate an Affidavit of
loan by replacing the DBP check with Rizal Commercial Service as required under Section 13, Rule 13 in
Banking Corporation (RCBC) Check No. 0000057285 relation to Section 3, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
for P500,000.00, drawn by petitioner4 and postdated December Civil Procedure, as amended; and
3, 2000. Sunwest accepted the replacement check.5
(b) Failure to furnish copy of the petition and its
On February 5, 2001 Sunwest deposited the RCBC check with annexes to the Office of the Solicitor General which is
the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Legaspi City,6 which the counsel of the People of the Philippines.19
presented it to the drawee bank RCBC, but the latter
dishonored the check for insufficiency of funds.7Thus, on
February 8, 2001, Sunwest sent by registered mail a letter With the denial by the CA of her Motion for Reconsideration,
addressed to Ludolfo, informing him of the dishonor of the petitioner is now before the Court raising the following issues:
RCBC check and demanding that he make good the check or
pay the amount thereof within five days from receipt of said Whether or not the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals
notice.8 The letter was received on the same day by Eden gravely erred in dismissing the petition for review filed by
Barnedo at the postal address "L.P. Muoz, Jr. [sic] herein petitioner purely on technical grounds.
Construction, Fernando Avenue, Doa Maria Subd., Daraga,
Albay."9 Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the
petitioner notwithstanding the fact that the criminal complaint
On March 14, 2001, Sunwest sent by registered mail another was filed by an unauthorized representative of the private
letter, this time addressed to petitioner, informing her of the complainant corporation.
dishonor of the RCBC check and demanding that she pay the
said check within five days from receipt of the letter.10 The letter Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the
was received on March 20, 2001 by Eden Barnedo at the petitioner notwithstanding the fact that the prosecution failed to
postal address, "Fernando Avenue, Doa Maria Subd., prove the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds in or
Daraga, Albay".11 credit with the drawee bank on the part of the petitioner.
In her March 20, 2001 reply to Sunwest, petitioner explained Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred when it held the
that Sunwest and Muoz Construction had mutual claims petitioner civilly liable notwithstanding the absence of authority
against each other: Muoz Construction had a claim against of Elizaldy S. Co to file the instant case for and in behalf of the
Sunwest for P10,000,000.00, including a 15% advance private complainant corporation.20
payment, for two river control projects, while Sunwest had a
claim against Muoz Construction forP500,000.00. Given that
the claim of Muoz Construction was bigger than that of The Court finds no merit in the Petition.
Sunwest, petitioner treated the first claim as having
automatically offset, covered or paid the second claim as Except in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
represented by the amount of the RCBC check. This explains is reclusion perpetua or death, an appeal is not a matter of
why petitioner did "not give emphasis" anymore to the RCBC right but of sound judicial discretion. It may be availed of only
check, the amount of which she considered as having been in the manner provided by law and the rules.21
already settled. Petitioner reminded Sunwest that it was made
aware of the offsetting of the amount of the RCBC check as
Rule 42 prescribes the following requirements for the filing with
early as February 15, 2001.12
the CA of a petition for review from a decision of the RTC:
It is true that oftentimes the Court applied the rules with Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground
flexibility in order that the merits of a case will be fully therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a
adjudicated upon, not-withstanding its technical motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
imperfections.30 But what impels the Court to do so is neither a information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
party's empty invocations of liberality nor its mechanical failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a
correction of the imperfections.31 Rather, only a clear showing waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds
of prima facie merit of the petition will persuade the Court to provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of
take the extraordinary effort of setting aside its rules to give this Rule.
The deficiency in the complaint/information arising from the DE LEON-CHAN, DANIEL T. DAYAN, SALVADOR P.
lack of authority of Elizaldy Co was not jurisdictional. It did not MALBAROSA, LEO V. PADILLA and ELPIDIO G.
detract from the unquestioned authority of the Assistant City DAMASO, all former members of the Board, ERNEST
Prosecutor to file the Information, nor impair the jurisdiction of FREDERICK O. VILLAREAL, Chairman of the Board,
the MTCC to act on the same.38 and JOEMARI D. GEROCHI, ANGELITO M.
VILLANUEVA, MARTIN S. SANCIEGO, JR., and
Second, petitioner harps on the purported lack of notice to her RODOLFO T. TUAZON, all Board members, JAIME
of the dishonor of the RCBC check. This contention flies in the R. MILLAN, Assistant General Manager, MANUEL R.
face of documentary evidence consisting of the March 20, BERIA, JR., Deputy General Manager for
2001 letter of petitioner to Sunwest where she expressly Operations & Technical Services and Chairman of the
acknowledged receiving the March 14, 2001 notice of dishonor Ad Hoc Committee responsible for the bidding and
of the RCBC check.39 award of the construction contract for the President
Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard Project, THERON
VICTOR V. LACSON, Deputy General Manager for
In fine, for deficiency in form and for lack of showing that her Finance, Legal and Administration and member of the
appeal to the CA was meritorious, the petition for review of Ad Hoc Committee, BERNARDO T. VIRAY, Manager
petitioner was correctly dismissed by the CA. for Technical Services Department and member of the
Ad Hoc Committee, RAPHAEL POCHOLO A.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. ZORILLA, Project Management Officer, ERNESTO L.
ENRIQUEZ, Senior Corporate Attorney and member
Costs against petitioner. of the Ad Hoc Committee, and CRISTINA AMPOSTA-
MORTEL, Department Manager, Legal Department,
and other responsible public officials of the
SO ORDERED. Commission on Audit (COA), namely: MANUELA E.
DELA PAZ, State Auditor V, ARTURO S. LAYUG,
THIRD DIVISION State Auditor V and Chief of the Technical Services
Audit Division A, Technical Services Office, BENILDA
E. MENDOZA, Supervising Technical Audit Specialist,
G.R. No. 173956 August 6, 2008
EPIFANIO L. PUREZA, Assistant Chief of the
Technical Services Audit Division A, JOSE G.
FRISCO F. SAN JUAN, petitioner, CAPISTRANO, Technical Audit Specialist II, and MA.
vs. CECILIA A. DELA RAMA, Technical Audit Specialist I,
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE all of whom were public officials during the times
PHILIPPINES, respondents. material to the subject offense, while said public
officials were occupying their respective positions as
DECISION just stated, acting in such capacity and committing the
subject offense in relation to office and while in the
performance of their functions and duties, with
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
manifest partiality and evident bad faith (or at the very
least, gross inexcusable negligence), conspiring and
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court confederating with accused JESUSITO D. LEGASPI,
assails the February 6, 2006 Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan a private contractor doing business under the name of
in Criminal Case No. 27808 granting the prosecutions J.D. Legaspi Construction, did then and there,
Manifestation with Motion for Additional Marking of willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted
Documentary Exhibits and the June 21, 2006 benefits, advantage and preference to accused
Resolution2 denying the motions for reconsideration separately JESUSITO D. LEGASPI, through the commission of
filed by petitioner and his co-accused. numerous illegal related acts all pertaining to the
President Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard Project,
Petitioner Frisco F. San Juan, in his capacity as Chairman of such as (but not limited to) the bidding out of the said
the Public Estates Authority (PEA), together with 26 other project and illegally awarding the same to accused
accused, composed of PEA Board of Directors, PEA Officers, JESUSITO D. LEGASPIs J.D. Legaspi Construction
Officers of the Commission on Audit and the contractor of and approving the award of the project to, as well as
Central Boulevard Project (now the President Diosdado the Construction Agreement with, J.D. Legaspi
Macapagal Boulevard), Jesusito D. Legaspi, were charged Construction despite the lack of compliance with the
before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Sec. 3 (e) of mandatory requirements and procedure for bidding,
Republic Act No. 30193 in an Information which reads: even if no funds are yet available to finance the
project, without the requisite certificate of availability
of funds and without complying with the mandatory
That in or about the period from April 1999 to August conditions imposed by the Office of the President of
2002, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the the approval thereof, per Memorandum dated 29
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused public January 2000 from the Office of the Executive
officials of the Public Estates Authority (PEA), namely: Secretary, Malacaang, and approving/allowing
CARLOS P. DOBLE, former General Manager (with several improper variation/change orders and
Salary Grade 30) and ex-oficio member of the PEA overruns to be implemented without the requisite
Board, BENJAMIN V. CARIO, PEA General presidential approval and the appropriate funds,
Manager (with Salary Grade 30) and ex-oficio recognizing, affirming and causing the implementation
member of the Board, and other responsible public of the just-mentioned void contract, allowing and
officials of PEA, namely: FRISCO FRANCISCO SAN paying or causing the allowance and payment of
JUAN, former Chairman of the Board, CARMELITA several claims of accused JESUSITO D. LEGASPI for
initial contract price, contract price adjustment, prosecutions "additional evidence" when such pieces of
variation orders, overruns and other claims even evidence ought to have been presented during the pre-trial of
when the same were clearly improper, illegal and the case; that the prosecution failed to show "good cause" in
without the requisite presidential approval, thereby order for the "additional evidence" to be accepted, since only
paving the way for accused JESUSITO D. LEGASPI those pieces of evidence which are identified and marked are
to claim and receive undue payments from the allowed by the court.
Government totaling millions of pesos in improper
overprice, thereby causing undue injury and grave On February 6, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued the herein
damage to the government in the aggregate amount assailed Resolution11 granting the motion of the OSP, the
of at least FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY TWO MILLION pertinent portion of which reads:
NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED TWENTY AND 39/100 PESOS
(P532,926,420.39), more or less, constituting the total Acting on the Prosecutions Manifestation with Motion
illegal overprice paid to accused JESUSITO D. for Additional Marking of Documentary Exhibits dated
LEGASPI for the subject Project. January 23, 2006, with the comments and/or
oppositions thereto separately filed by accused: (1)
Layug, (2) de Leon-Chan, (3) Pureza and Capistrano,
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 (4) Legaspi, (5) Padilla, (6) Beria, Millan, Viray and
Zorilla, (7) San Juan, and (8)Amposta-Mortel, the
When arraigned on January 21, 2005, petitioner and his co- Court resolves to GRANT the aforementioned motion
accused pleaded "not guilty." but only insofar as to allow additional marking of
documentary exhibits which have been sufficiently
The People, represented by the Office of the Special described in the said motion, over the objection of the
Prosecutor (OSP), filed its pre-trial brief with proposed Exhibits defense, in order to give the Prosecution the
A to HHHH dated March 16, 2005. Petitioner filed his pre-trial opportunity to fully present its case, and considering
brief on June 23, 2005. that the Pre-Trial Order has not been signed by the
parties. The defense may register their objections to
the documentary exhibits at the time that the same
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial Order,5 the are introduced in evidence. As prayed for, the
pertinent portions of which state: prosecution may present the additional documents
enumerated in its aforesaid motion for marking, and
The Prosecution reserves the right to present the same shall be included in its list of exhibits in the
additional documentary evidence, although this Amended Pre-Trial Order to be issued by the Court.12
reservation was objected to by the accused on the
ground that it violates their constitutional right.6 Petitioner and his co-accused filed separate motions for
reconsideration but were denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
xxxx June 21, 2006 Resolution,13 the pertinent portions of which
state:
Accused Frisco F. San Juan reserves the right to
present additional documentary evidence.7 While it is true that pre-trial has already been
terminated, records show that, before the Pre-Trial
xxxx Order dated November 7, 2005 was issued, the Court
made clear to all the parties, considering the
numerous documentary evidence sought to be
This Pre-Trial Order shall bind the parties, limit the marked and presented by the parties, that the said
issues and control the course of the trial, unless Order was "without prejudice to the comment [on the
modified by the Court to prevent manifest injustice. Pre-Trial Order] of the prosecution and the accused;"
that is, the Court may still accept any modification of
SO ORDERED.8 the said Order from both the prosecution and the
accused. Upon request of the parties, the Court gave
the prosecution and the accused a period of time "to
On November 10, 2005, trial commenced with the OSP
file a formal manifestation with respect to some
presenting Karen Villamil as its first witness, without prejudice
changes they would like to propose in the Pre-Trial
to the signing of the Pre-Trial Order by the parties.
Order" notwithstanding the commencement of the
trial.14
At the scheduled hearing on January 24, 2006, instead of
proceeding with the presentation of its evidence, the OSP filed
xxxx
a manifestation with motion for additional marking of
documentary exhibits.9
Apparent from the foregoing is the fact that while the
pre-trial has effectively been terminated, the Court
Petitioner filed an Opposition10 alleging that the motion fails to
gave both the prosecution and the accused the
comply with the three (3) day notice rule, thus, it is fatally
opportunity to submit comments to the Pre-Trial Order
defective which must be dismissed outright; that the
or to modify their submissions or in some instances,
prosecutions attempt to introduce additional evidence after
even to withdraw the stipulations they made during
Pre-Trial has been completed, without petitioner having been
the pre-trial. The Courts position is consistent with the
confronted by such evidence, violates petitioners fundamental
exercise of its discretion to decide how best to
rights under the Constitution; that petitioners right to due
dispense justice in accordance with the
process has been violated by the presentation of the
circumstances of the proceedings before it. The
decision to grant the prosecutions motion for In the instant case, petitioner was served with the
additional marking of documentary exhibits is another Manifestation with Motion for Additional Marking of
exercise of this judicial prerogative, which prerogative Documentary Exhibits on January 24, 2006, or two days prior
was made known to the parties in the Pre-Trial Order to the scheduled hearing date on January 26, 2006.18 Although
dated November 7, 2005, when the Court stated that the three-day notice rule was not complied with, the
such was subject to modification "in order to prevent Sandiganbayan allowed the motion based on good cause, i.e.,
manifest injustice." that the markings of the additional documentary evidence at
this period was due to the sheer volume of the supporting
The guidelines on the conduct of the pre-trial, documents to the disbursement vouchers and the fact that
including A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, were prescribed by such supporting documents were only recently completed and
the Honorable Supreme Court to "abbreviate court secured.19
proceedings, ensure prompt disposition of cases and
decongest court dockets." The Court does not mean This Court allows a liberal construction of this rule where the
to disregard or ignore these guidelines but the Court interest of substantial justice will be served and where the
is compelled to take into consideration, in the interest resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and
of substantial justice, the various submissions of both judicious discretion of the court,20 as in the instant case. Thus,
the prosecution and the accused mentioned above in the Sandiganbayan correctly held that:
connection with the agreements reached by the
parties that they be allowed to submit their comments Apparent from the foregoing is the fact that while the
on the pre-trial order, even while the trial had begun pre-trial has effectively been terminated, the Court
so as not to delay the proceedings. gave both the prosecution and the accused the
opportunity to submit comments to the Pre-Trial Order
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant or to modify their submissions or in some instances,
Motions for Reconsideration of the accused-movants even to withdraw the stipulations they made during
are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. the pre-trial. The Courts position is consistent
with the exercise of its discretion to decide how
SO ORDERED.15 best to dispense justice in accordance with the
circumstances of the proceedings before it. The
decision to grant the prosecutions motion for
Hence, this petition. additional marking of documentary exhibits is
another exercise of this judicial prerogative,
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the Sandiganbayan which prerogative was made known to the parties
gravely abused its discretion when it granted OSPs motion for in the Pre-Trial Order dated November 7, 2005,
additional marking of exhibits; and (2) whether the admission when the Court stated that such was subject to
of the "additional evidence" constitutes a violation of modification "in order to prevent manifest
petitioners constitutional right to due process. injustice.21 (Emphasis supplied)
The petition lacks merit. There is likewise no merit to petitioners contention that his
right to due process was violated when the OSPs motion was
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, reads: granted. In its Resolution of February 6, 2006, the
Sandiganbayan declared, thus:
SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions T]he Court resolves to GRANT the aforementioned motion but only insofar as to allow
which the court may act upon without prejudicing the additional marking of documentary exhibits which have been sufficiently described in the said
rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall motion, over the objection of the defense, in order to give the Prosecution the opportunity to
be set for hearing by the applicant. fully present its case, and considering that the Pre-Trial Order has not been signed by the
parties. The defense may register their objections to the documentary exhibits at the time that
Every written motion required to be heard and the the same are introduced in evidence. x x x22
SO ORDERED.