U.S.

-Mexican Relations: The 1980s and beyond

Author(s): Peter H. Smith
Source: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Feb., 1985), pp.
91-101
Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/165666
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 US. - MEXICAN RELATIONS:
THE 1980s AND BEYOND

by PETER H. SMITH

WHAT does the future hold for U.S.-Mexican relations? Optimis

assessments usually point to the high degree of interpenetration
tween the two societies, the recent history of intergovernmental
operation, and the commonality of basic interests. Developments
one country have significant impact on the other, a process that
works both ways: the 1982 economic crisis in Mexico created se
ous difficulties for retailers on the U.S. side of the border, Mexi
subsequent cutbacks in imports prompted the loss of 200,000 jo
in the U.S., and Mexico's struggles with its international debt h
crucial implications for banks in the U.S. Each country needs th
other, and this kind of "interdependence" creates mutuality of p
pose. According to this logic, the rational pursuit of national g
will build and fortify harmonious bilateral relations.
A contrasting vision conjures up predictions of catastrophe. N
too long ago General Paul F Gorman, head of the Southern C
mand, declared in congressional testimony that Mexico could w
become "the number one security problem for the United State
within the next ten years. Mexico has "the most corrupt governm
and society in Central America,' in Gorman's much-noted phras
and the country is a vulnerable target for left-wing subversion (
ing, 1985: 327). Apparently sharing the same opinion, another U
policy-maker has offered more delicate language: "By the end of
decade Mexico could become our most important foreign-po
problem, bar none" (Time, 1982: 30).
I disagree with both of these evaluations. It strikes me as nai
to assume that interdependence will necessarily lead to harmon
and as either myopic or malicious to depict Mexico on the brink o
leftist takeover. My own belief is that the United States and Me
will face difficult times in the future, that problems will be difficul
but not intractable, that creative leadership will be required to m

Peter H. Smith is Professor of History and Political Science at the Massac

setts Institute of Technology. He is the author of LABYRINTHS OF POW
POLITICAL RECRUITMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY MEXICO
among other works, and co-author of MODERN LATIN AMER
also past-president of the Latin American Studies Association.
91

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92 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

and manage the challenges, and that the stakes are high for both
countries and rapidly climbing. Rather than concentrate on isolated
issues in an ad hoc way (such as the latest round of debt renegotia-
tions), the time has come for policy-makers in both nations to pre-
pare themselves for long-run tendencies and transformations in the
bilateral relationship. The opportunity to plan is now, not when the
next crisis appears.
To develop this interpretation I focus on two related themes: en-
during characteristics of U.S.-Mexican relations and foreseeable
trends for the future. My analysis extends only to the year 2000 - not
because I imagine cataclysmic change beyond that point but be-
cause my vision becomes excessively blurred. Throughout the dis-
cussion I assume basic familiarity with major bilateral issues (for
background see Smith 1980, 1984a, 1984b; Erb and Thorup, 1984;
Vaisquez and Garcia y Griego, 1983). Caveats aside, let me now
begin.

STRUCTURES

THROUGHOUT the 1980s and 1990s some historic characteris

of the U.S.-Mexican relationship are certain to persist. Four featu
come to mind.
1. Asymmetry The United States is bigger, stronger, and richer
than Mexico and has been ever since the early nineteenth century
(though not before). The U.S. has about three times the population
of Mexico, fifteen times the GNP, five times the GNP per capita, and
an overwhelming military superiority. The U.S. accounts for two-
thirds of Mexico's foreign trade while Mexico comprises only 3-4%
of U.S. international transactions. Under these conditions bargaining
tends to be unequal, and Mexicans are constantly aware of such real-
ities. "Poor Mexico," one well-known slogan goes, "so far from God,
and so close to the United States"
Within limits, however, Mexico can still assert itself. In the first
place, there is a considerable difference between power resources
and power application. The U.S. might possess the capability to con-
quer Mexico militarily or destroy it economically, but has not done
either in the last 100 years and is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable
future. In the absence of plausible threats Mexico acquires substan-
tial room for maneuver - and expands its policy space.
Second, there is the fact of interdependence. Mexico can hurt
the U.S. and is therefore vital to the U.S. (which is one reason why the

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 SMITH: U.S. -MEXICAN RELATIONS: THE 1980s AND BEYOND 93

U.S. has refrained from displays of naked power)..This is evident in

several areas - trade, investment, energy - and most conspicuous in
the case of the $96 billion debt. A Mexican default would cripple the
U.S. banking community and jeopardize the entire international fi-
nancial system. The U.S. needs Mexico just as much as Mexico needs
the U.S. - maybe even more - and this gives ample leverage to the
weaker side: each is hostage to the other, and the possibility of recip-
rocal blackmail tends to reduce the practical impact of power dispar-
ities. Inequality looms large, but Mexico is far from helpless. Over-
all, one might describe the relationship as one of "asymmetric
interdependence."
2. Conflict. Whatever else it means, interdependence does not
indicate automatic concurrence or complementarity of interests.
Quite the contrary: what's good for Mexico is not always good for the
United States and vice versa (or, more precisely, what's good for cer-
tain interests in Mexico might not be good for certain interests in the
U.S.). As Wayne Cornelius has observed, the fundamental challenge
of the future will be "how to prevent major confrontations and puni-
tive policy responses between two cultures, economies, and politi-
cal systems which are intertwined and interpenetrated to an extraor-
dinary degree, but which mutually resent and reject such
interdependence" (1984: 5).
Disagreement can take many forms. With regard to energy, for
example, the U.S. and Mexico have conventional buyer-seller con-
flicts. The U.S. would like to purchase large amounts of Mexican oil
on a steady basis at the lowest possible price; Mexico wants to re-
serve much of its petroleum for domestic development, to avoid
long-term dependence on a single purchaser, and to fetch the high-
est possible price for exported oil. Such differences can be resolved
through negotiation, even after the contemporary market glut dis-
solves, but they will not disappear. They are part and parcel of the
commercial connection.
A more complicated and far-reaching discrepancy derives from
antagonistic models for economic strategy. To recover from its 1982-
83 crisis and to repay its debt, Mexico has embarked on a plan to ex-
pand non-traditional non-oil exports - to pursue a path of so-called
"export substitution." The hope is that this will stimulate growth,
create new jobs, improve the balance of payments, avoid over-
reliance on oil, and provide much-needed foreign exchange. The
problem is that Mexico's main market is the United States, a country
whose massive trade deficit (estimated at $130 billion for 1984) has

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94 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

fostered a wave of protectionist sentiment. U.S. businessmen have

complained about unfair "export subsidies" by the Mexican govern-
ment and demanded "countervailing duties," and U.S. labor leaders
have decried the consequent threats to employment. So Mexico
faces a Catch-22: to pay the debt it needs to trade with the U.S., but
the U.S. often discourages such trade. The problem here is not only
a conflict between Mexico and the U.S., it is also conflicting signals
from the U.S.
3. Diplomatic limitations. Government-to-government negotia-
tions do not and will not have the capability to resolve some key bi-
lateral issues in a definitive manner. This is partly due to the nature
of the issues - such as migration, which responds to socioeconomic
stimuli and stoutly resists official regulation (with or without the
Simpson-Mazzoli law). The blunt truth is that, in many areas, inter-
societal exchange will simply overwhelm the plausible reach of in-
tergovernmental accords. The powers of the state (s) are limited.
A second constraint on diplomatic negotiation derives from di-
versity and contradictions in policy-making, particularly in the U.S.
(where multitudinous government agencies, each with its own per-
spective and constituency - including almost all departments of the
Executive Branch plus both houses of Congress - take part in the
policy process). Inconsistency is more apparent in U.S. decision-
making toward Mexico than toward Cuba, for instance, or even to-
ward'Nicaragua, where the bilateral agendas are more clearly de-
fined. This situation contrasts sharply with the centralized apparatus
in Mexico, where presidential will prevails. And it is not just a matter
of bargaining style. Diversification of bureaucratic authority in the
U.S. also means that it would be extremely difficult for the United
States to achieve and implement an overarching "package deal" with
Mexico. The path of least resistance calls for piecemeal bargaining.
Related to this is the apparent and imminent "domestication" of
some major issues. The Simpson-Mazzoli bill represented a unilater-
al act by the United States, and its ultimate fate, as of late 1984, has
been determined by domestic (largely electoral) considerations.
Economic protectionism has become an internal political issue as
well. Decisions affecting Mexico are not only dispersed throughout
a massive and often incoherent Washington bureaucracy, they are
also made out on the campaign trails.
A final limitation on governmental negotiation, perhaps the
most basic of all, comes from the fact that the U.S.-Mexican relation-
ship is itself in large measure dependent upon trends and forces

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 SMITH: U.S.- MEXICAN RELATIONS: THE 1980s AND BEYOND 95

throughout the world. A mutually beneficial commercial relation-

ship will require, for example, a sustained recovery throughout the
capitalist community of nations. A major blowup in the Middle East,
and consequent shutdown of oil exports, would have serious reper-
cussions for Mexico and the U.S. (some North Americans would
probably counsel caution and generosity in dealing with the south-
ern neighbor while others would, no doubt, call for virtual annexa-
tion of the oil fields). The continuing ability of Argentina and Brazil
to meet their debt obligations will have major implications for
Mexico's connection with her U.S. creditors. The Reagan Administra-
tion's tolerance for the Contadora initiative will hinge in part on U.S.-
Soviet talks. And so on. My point is so obvious that it is often over-
looked: the bilateral relationship between Mexico and the United
States does not exist in a vacuum, and it is subject to a growing variety
of external influences. I strongly suspect that this reality will be-
come increasingly apparent and important in the future.
4. Cultural differences. Underlying all these factors are diver-
gent value systems and senses of history. North Americans look to the
future while Mexicans, like most other civilized people of the earth,
remain aware of the past. As the philosopher-poet Octavio Paz once
said: "North Americans consider the world to be something that can
be perfected, while we [Mexicans] consider it to be something that
can be redeemed" (1961: 24).
This concern with history has instilled Mexicans with deep-
seated suspicion of the United States. They recall with bitterness the
disputes over Texas and the "war of the North American invasion"
that led to the loss of half the nation's territory. They remember U.S.
intervention in the Mexican Revolution of 1910, including acquies-
cence in the assassination of Francisco Madero (since revered as the
"apostle" of the Revolution), and the naval occupation of the port of
Veracruz. Pridefully noting the international prestige of PEMEX, the
government-owned petroleum company (while often lamenting its
domestic political role), they are reminded of strident U.S. opposi-
tion to the nationalization of oil in 1938. Such recollections directly
affect the style and tone of bilateral negotiations. As former Mexican
presidentJose Lopez Portillo declared on one occasion, after the dis-
covery of large-scale energy reserves, Mexico "suddenly found itself
the center of American attention - attention that is a surprising mix-
ture of interest, disdain and fear, much like the recurring vague fears
you [the United States] inspire in certain areas of our national sub-
conscious" (Riding 1985: 321).

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96 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

Additional differences pertain to political culture. For a variety

of reasons the ideological center of the Mexican political spectrum
lies well to the left of the political center in the United States (there
is greater variation in Mexico too). These discrepancies in political
discourse not only impede understanding but also contribute to
missed opportunities and senses of betrayal. It is my judgment that,
for instance, the Reagan Administration could not possibly hope for
a more congenial and cooperative government in Mexico than that
of Miguel de la Madrid. It is important for Washington policy-makers
to recognize that De la Madrid has deliberately chosen to occupy the
right-hand side of his nation's political spectrum, that he has incurred
some costs in so doing, and that a subsequent shift to the left should
not be seen as quixotic - indeed, it might merely mean a movement
toward the center in Mexican terms.
Perhaps in keeping with the dictates of a hierarchical and au-
thoritarian society, many Mexicans tend to assume that the exercise
of power reflects rational intentions. Things do not happen by
chance or mistake; they happen because those in power bring them
about. In the bilateral context this often translates into a conviction
that U.S. actions toward Mexico are orchestrated, not coincidental;
deliberate, not accidental; organized, not spontaneous. For example
there was, in mid-1984, much gossip in Mexico City about a contro-
versial Washington Post column byJack Anderson on De la Madrid's
presumed self-enrichment, about cover stories in Time magazine
and the National Geographic on the population explosion in Mexico
City, about the rewriting of a CIA report on political stability in Mexi-
co, and about the presence of opposition party members at the Re-
publican convention: all were seen as part of a subtle campaign and
coordinated conspiracy to harass and "destabilize" Mexico. Suspi-
cions about the CIA affair were no doubt well-founded, but the oth-
ers are open to question. The presumption of intention persists,
however, and it adds another burden to negotiation: diplomats are
expected to account for an enormous range of actions and activities.
Needless to say, this difference in fundamental beliefs can impede
understanding within general publics as well.

TRENDS

PREDICTION is risky but necessary nonetheless. It seems m

plausible and constructive to anticipate trends in the general c
acter of the U.S.-Mexican relationship than to forecast spec

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 SMITH: U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONS: THE 1980s AND BEYOND 97

events (e.g. the status of the debt in 1994), and it is in that cautious
spirit that I offer the speculations that follow. For the sake of brevity
I concentrate on three selected themes: the capacity of state-state ne-
gotiation, Mexico's regional role, and the type and rate of political
transition within the two societies.
1. Intergovernmental negotiation. My guess is that the relative
capacity of bilateral government bargaining will decline over time
with regard to intersocietal exchange, particularly with regard to so-
cial questions, but that it may increase in other areas. To be specific,
I suspect that the migration of undocumented Mexican workers to
the United States will continue with or without a bilateral accord. I
believe that diplomatic negotiation can do little to alter the fact of
migration, though I believe that a mutually beneficial bilateral agree-
ment could greatly affect the form, the status, and the social conse-
quences of migration. Paradoxically, one consequence of such a uni-
lateral initiative as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill might be to reveal the
inadequacy of preemptive measures, to heighten social anxieties
within the U.S., and to discourage North American law makers from
seeking the sort of bilateral arrangement that might have a small
chance of achieving at least partial success. Currents of anti-Mexican
nativism are already swirling in American society, and they could
well crest into a wave of xenophobic public opinion - and a danger-
ous sociopolitical force.
In the economic arena, with regard to investment and trade (in-
cluding energy), however, I would anticipate heightened activity
and efficacy for state-state bargaining. Protectionist impulses and
governmental regulations on both sides of the border are likely to
place enhanced authority at the disposition of the states, and this will
increase their capacity for negotiation. And Mexico's critical role
among debtor nations has great significance for the U.S., a fact that
should heighten the incentive for reaching commercial and finan-
cial accords.
2. Mexicos international role. It seems safe to assume that
Mexico's position as a middle-range power and "newly industria
ing country" (NIC) will increase during and beyond the decade
come. The international system is becoming more highly stratif
rather than less, and such nations as Mexico, Brazil, India, Argen
and Korea will have growing opportunities to exert power and p
tige on the regional level.
Such a trend is particularly apparent in Central America and
Caribbean, where Mexico has performed conspicuous (and c

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98 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND W\ORLD AFFAIRS

structive) roles. This is a recent development: it would have been

impossible to imagine the Contadora initiative during the 1950s or
probably even the 1960s. The hemispheric arena has thus been un-
dergoing a long-run process of change in power relationships.
I see every reason to believe that this trend will persist - and that
it will create a continuing source of friction between Mexico and the
U.S. Conflict strikes me as inevitable while the U.S. searches for an
appropriate response to its relative decline in regional (and global)
hegemony. This quest is, in my judgment, one of the central chal-
lenges for U.S. foreign policy. Until or unless it is met, assertions of
newly acquired influence by Mexico (and other NICs) will be
viewed resentfully by Washington as insolent encroachments on tra-
ditional power domains of the U.S.
3. Types and Rates of Political Change. I believe that Mexico
and the U.S. will undergo very different kinds of political transition
in the years to come, and that imbalances resulting from these pro-
cesses could place serious strains on the bilateral relationship.
Within the U.S. I do not foresee any basic change in the two-
party system, but the political mobilization of the Chicano popula-
tion could have several long-run implications for the relationship
with Mexico. First, Chicano mobilization could move questions
about U.S. policy toward Mexico to a more prominent place on the
North American political agenda. Second, it could define and pres-
ent such problems as partisan issues, since Chicanos tend strongly to
support the Democratic Party (even in the face of President Reagan's
recent landslide about 65% of the Hispanic population voted Demo-
cratic, and the Chicano share was, no doubt, higher than that). Third,
as Chicanos attain governorships and other high offices in the Ameri-
can Southwest, they could add a markedly regional dimension to for-
mulation of official U.S. postures toward Mexico. Such forums as the
conference of border governors, already viewed with mild appre-
hension in both national capitals, could become increasingly impor-
tant vehicles. Fourth, a successful Chicano movement could provoke
the kind of nativist backlash that could spawn ugly signs of bigotry
and, as suggested above, impede discussion of such diplomatic is-
sues as migration. Finally, a politically organized Chicano communi-
ty could become a major resource, and occasional problem, for the
Mexican government in its negotiations with U.S. authorities. In-
deed, the relationship between Mexican officialdom and the Chica-
no movement has been markedly ambivalent, and the resolution of
this ambiguity could have lasting consequences for both sides.

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 SMITH: U. S. -MEXICAN RELATIONS: THE 1980s AND BEYOND 99

In contrast to the United States, Mexico could well undergo

basic changes in its political regime. Notwithstanding General
Gorman's counsel, I do not think there is any serious likelihood that
Mexico will fall victim to a radical revolution or leftist takeover in the
foreseeable future. There are other possibilities.
One such possibility is that the system will survive intact, that
De la Madrid will restore the now-endangered social compact be-
tween elites and masses. The political system would thus retain and
recover its traditional characteristics of moderate authoritarianism:
i.e. competition will be low, mobilization will be limited, elections
will serve as ritual plebiscites. Party opponents will express loyalty
to the system and accept the hegemony of the PRI (Partido
Revolucionario Institucional). The private sector will revive, and the
state will continue its economic partnership with local capital and
foreign transnationals. Mexico has shown flexibility before, accord-
ing to this view, and it can do so again. The more it changes, as the
adage goes, the more it stays the same.
A second scenario envisions genuine liberalization of the politi-
cal system. In this concept the institutional reforms of the late 1970s
would become so thoroughly implemented and extended that op-
position parties, of the left as well as the right, would acquire a legiti-
mate and enduring place on the national scene. The PRI would ac-
cept and espouse its position as a party of the center. Dialogue and
debate would become an integral part of political discourse, and rul-
ing groups would seek the assistance of opposition leaders in form-
ing a national agenda (if not a consensus). Competition would in-
crease. It would become feasible for opposition parties to capture
major electoral contests (in the 1980s perhaps governorships and
mayorships in prominent cities, in the 1990s maybe more) and to
hold cabinet portfolios. The presidency would continue to wield
great power but it would no longer command imperial
omnipotence.
A third possibility, both disturbing and realistic, entails a "hard-
ening" or derechizacion of the political system. This could follow
from two related developments: disintegration of the organized
labor movement (assuming that Fidel Velazquez fades from the
scene) and the expression of urban unrest (triggered by price hikes
or other bread-and-butter issues). Under such conditions the mili-
tary may take decisive steps to quell popular disturbances, as it did
in 1968; it may also demand a stronger role in making policy. This
would not necessitate the imposition of a military dictatorship a la

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100 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

Chile or Brazil. It would mean political encroachment by the mili-

tary during the 1980s and 1990s and a sharp turn to the right in social
policy.
What implications have these scenarios for U.S.-Mexican rela-
tions? Assuming that the United States retains its basic present pos-
ture towards Mexico and Central America, I would expect the first
possibility, preservation and restoration of the status quo, to be the
most congenial for U.S. policy-makers, especially if De la Madrid se-
lects a successor who will follow the course that he has set. I would
expect the second option, liberalization, to be the leastcongenial for
U.S. policy-makers, since it would presumably involve a shift toward
the left and an accommodation with (or cooptation of) leftist groups.
Democratization in Mexico would thus increase the likelihood of
friction with the U.S. rather than diminish it.
The significance of the third scenario - hardening - is less easy
to evaluate, partly because we know so little about the attitudes and
outlooks of Mexico's military officers (see Ronfeldt, 1984). They
might be eager to collaborate with the U.S., or they might adopt a
hard-line nationalistic stance. My guess is that the outcome would
depend, at least in part, on the conditions that precipitate any hard-
ening or derechizacidn. The foreign-policy correlates of this scenar-
io strike me as volatile and ultimately unpredictable.
Observers and pundits frequently imply that primary responsi-
bility for the management and improvement of the U.S.-Mexican re-
lationship belongs to Mexico. It is Mexico's task to find a way to pay
its debt, Mexico's obligation to find employment for its workers,
Mexico's duty to extirpate the forces of corruption, Mexico's chal-
lenge to reconcile political stability with democratic evolution. The
U.S. has done what it can, according to this view, and the ball is now
in Mexico's court.

I find this argument self-serving and oversimplified. What Mex-

ico does will no doubt be of crucial importance, but this is no time
for the U.S. to adopt a passive pose. U.S. analysts and policy-makers
will confront two basic issues in the years ahead:first, what is the U.S.
national interest regarding Mexico? is it more than the sum of partic-
ular interests? if so, how should it be defined? by whom? second,
should the U.S. pursue a genuinely "special relationship" with Mexi-
co and give it preferential treatment? if so, how and why?
My personal impression is that the U.S. has a profound and per-
severing interest in Mexico's political stability and in its peaceful ev-
olution. The U.S. has been extremely fortunate in having such a se-

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 SMITH: U.S. -MEXICAN RELATIONS: THE 1980s AND BEYOND 101

cure and friendly neighbor to the south (and another one to the
north); one has only to imagine alternatives (Nicaragua, El Salvador,
Guatemala) to appreciate that simple fact, and to realize that relative
tranquillity along the Mexican border has enabled the U.S. the free-
dom to project its power in other parts of the world. It is my further
opinion that, in the long run, some measure of internal democratiza-
tion in Mexico will protect and consolidate this remarkable advan-
tage for the U.S., though this scenario would necessarily entail some
short-run conflict. Only time will tell whether U.S. policy-makers
have the vision and capacity to accept such a reality.
The questions ahead are not simple. They requiie sustained and
careful thought at the highest levels of the policy-making establish-
ment. The U.S. has skirted them so far but a moment of truth is certain
to come. It would be a tragedy to be caught unawares.

REFERENCES

CORNELIUS, W (1984) "Mexico and the United States in the 198

Paper presented at Symposium on Jose Clemente Orozco and the M
can Revolution, Dartmouth College, October.
ERB, G. and C. THORUP (1984) "U.S.-Mexican Relations: The Issue
Ahead" Pamphlet based upon paper presented at Conference on
Mexican Relations. Washington, DC: Overseas Development Cou
Development Paper 35.
PAZ, 0. (1961) The Labyrinth of Solitude: Life and Thought in M
Translation by Lysander Kemp. New York, NY: Grove Press.
RIDING, A. (1985) Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans
York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
RONFELDT, D. (ed.) (1984) The Modern Mexican Military: A Reas
ment. Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, Monograph Series 15. La J
CA: University of California, San Diego.
SMITH, P. H. (1984a) "Mexico: The Continuing Quest for a Policy," pp
53 in Richard Newfarmer (ed.) From Gunboats to Diplomacy: New
Policies for Latin America. Baltimore, MD: TheJohns Hopkins Unive
Press.

(1984b) Mexico, Neighbor in Transition. NewYork, NY: Foreign Poli-

cy Association.
(1980) Mexico: The Quest for a U.S. Policy. New York, NY: Foreign
Policy Association.
Time Magazine (1982) "We Are in an Emergency." 20 December: 30-40.
VASQUEZ, C. and M. GARCIAY GRIEGO (eds.) (1983) Mexican-U.S. Re-
lations: Conflict and Convergence. Los Angeles, CA: UCLA Chicano
Studies Research Center and Latin American Center.

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