JAMES IENT v. TULLETT PREBON, GR No.

189158, 2017-01-11
Facts:
Petitioner Ient is a British national and the Chief Financial Officer of Tradition Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.
(Tradition Asia) in Singapore.[4] Petitioner Schulze is a Filipino/German who does Application
Support for Tradition Financial Services Ltd. in London (Tradition London).
Tradition Group and Tullett are competitors in the inter-dealer broking business.
Sometime in August 2008, in line with Tradition Group's motive of expansion and diversification
in Asia, petitioners Ient and Schulze were tasked with the establishment of a Philippine subsidiary
of Tradition Asia to be known as Tradition Financial Services Philippines, Inc. (Tradition
Philippines).[9] Tradition Philippines was registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on September 19, 2008
Jaime Villalon (Villalon), who was formerly President and Managing Director of Tullett
Mercedes Chuidian (Chuidian)... formerly a member of Tullett's Board of Directors
John and Jane Does
Issues:
On October 15, 2008, Tullett, through one of its directors, Gordon Buchan, filed a Complaint-
Affidavit... against the officers/employees of the Tradition Group for violation of the Corporation
Code.
Villalon and Chuidian were charged with using their former positions in Tullett to sabotage said
company by orchestrating the mass resignation of its entire brokering staff in order for them to
join Tradition Philippines.
With respect to Villalon, Tullett claimed that the former held several meetings between August
22 to 25, 2008 with members of Tullett's Spot Desk and brokering staff in order to convince them
to leave the company. Villalon likewise supposedly intentionally failed to renew the contracts of
some of the brokers. On August 25, 2008, a meeting was also allegedly held in Howzat Bar in
Makati City where petitioners and a lawyer of Tradition Philippines were present. At said
meeting, the brokers of complainant Tullett were purportedly induced, en masse, to sign
employment contracts with Tradition Philippines and were allegedly instructed by Tradition
Philippines' lawyer as to how they should file their resignation letters.
On August 26, 2008, Villalon allegedly informed Mr. Barry Dennahy, Chief Operating Officer of
Tullett Prebon in the Asia-Pacific, through electronic mail that all of Tullett's brokers had resigned.
Subsequently, on September 1, 2008, in another meeting with Ient and Tradition Philippines'
counsel, indemnity contracts in favor of the resigning employees were purportedly distributed
by Tradition Philippines.
According to Tullett, respondents Villalon and Chuidian... violated Sections 31 and 34 of the
Corporation Code which made them criminally liable under Section 144. As for petitioners Ient
and Schulze, Tullett asserted that they conspired with Villalon and Chuidian in the latter's acts of
disloyalty against the company.
Villalon and Chuidian filed their respective Counter-Affivadits.
Villalon claimed that the DOJ had previously proclaimed that Section 31 is not a penal provision
of law but only the basis of a cause of action for civil liability. Thus, he concluded that there was
no probable cause that he violated the Corporation Code nor was the charge of conspiracy
properly substantiated.
Chuidian claimed that she left Tullett simply to seek greener pastures.
She argued that Section 144 as a penal provision should be strictly construed against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused and Tullett has failed to substantiate its charge of bad faith
on her part.
In her Counter-Affidavit,[17] petitioner Schulze denied the charges leveled against her.
she concluded that a charge of conspiracy which has for its basis Article 8 of the Revised Penal
Code cannot be made applicable to the provisions of the Corporation Code.
Ient alleged in his Counter-Affidavit that the charges against him were merely filed to harass
Tradition Philippines and prevent it from penetrating the Philippine market.
t
Tullett filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice to assail the foregoing resolution
of the Acting City Prosecutor of Makati City.
Ient and Schulze moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution by the Secretary of
Justice.
Ient and Schulze brought the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65
The main bone of disagreement among the parties in this case is the applicability of Section 144
of the Corporation Code to Sections 31 and 34 of the same statute such that criminal liability
attaches to violations of Sections 31 and 34.
Ruling:
In a Resolution... dated February 17, 2009, State Prosecutor Cresencio F. Delos Trinos, Jr.
(Prosecutor Delos Trinos), Acting City Prosecutor of Makati City, dismissed the criminal
complaints.
On the issue of conspiracy, Prosecutor Delos Trinos found that since Villalon and Chuidian did not
commit any acts in violation of Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation Code, the charge of
conspiracy against Schulze and Ient had no basis.
d... ated April 23, 2009, then Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez reversed and set aside
Prosecutor Delos Trinos's resolution and directed the latter to file the information for violation
of Sections 31 and 34 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code against Villalon, Chuidian,
Harvey, Schulze, and Ient before the proper court.
Undeniably, respondents Villalon, Chuidian and Harvey occupied positions of high responsibility
and great trust as they were members of the board of directors and corporate officers of
complainant.
the consolidated petitions are GRANTED
Principles:
The provision of Section 144 of the Corporation Code is also applicable in the case at bar as the
penal provision provided therein is made applicable to all violations of the Corporation Code, not
otherwise specifically penalized.
After a meticulous consideration of the arguments presented by both sides, the Court comes to
the conclusion that there is textual ambiguity in Section 144; moreover, such ambiguity remains
even after an examination of its legislativ... e history and the use of other aids to statutory
construction, necessitating the application of the rule of lenity in the case at bar.
There is no provision in the Corporation Code using similarly emphatic language that evinces a
categorical legislative intent to treat as a criminal offense each and every violation of that law.
Consequently, there is no compelling reason for the Court to construe Section 144 as similarly
employing the term "penalized" or "penalty" solely in terms of criminal liability.
The Corporation Code was intended as a regulatory measure, not primarily as a penal statute.
Sections 31 to 34 in particular were intended to impose exacting standards of fidelity on
corporate officers and directors but without unduly impeding them in the discharge of their work
with concerns of litigation.

KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO (G.R. No. 142396
February 11, 2003)
Facts
Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, was filed against Minucher following a buy-bust
operation conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house
of Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was later
acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by
Arthur Scalzo.
Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely
an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special
agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic
immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy addressed
to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the
note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE
Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.
RULLING
YES.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as
it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.
The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.
The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two
countries
Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United
States Embassy
Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the buy-bust operation
conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo
These may be inadequate to support the diplomatic status of the latter but they give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the
activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers
and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be
expected to make the arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the
buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR no. 125865 January 28, 2000
Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang
Respondent: People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994,
for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged
before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was
arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail, the MeTC
released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received
an office of protocol from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government
regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol communication
that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed
the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA.
When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce
the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, the
petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by
immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the
criminal case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners case is covered with immunity from legal process with regard
to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Govt.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioners case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to
the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no
binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only of the
accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement
is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in official capacity.
Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such
as this case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when
specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary
investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Hence, SC denied the petition.
PEOPLE V. ROGER TULIN
MT Tabangao is a cargo vessel owned by PNOC. It was sailing near the coast of Mindoro loaded
with barrels of kerosene, gasoline, and diesel oil with a total value of 40.4M. The vessel was
suddenly boarded by 7 fully armed pirates (accused in the case Emilio Changco, Cecilio Changco,
Tulin, Loyola, Infante, etc.). they detained and took control of the vessel. The name MT Tabangao
and the PNOC logo were painted over with black. Then it was painted with the name Galilee. The
ship crew was forced to sail to Singapore. In Singapore, the ship was awaiting another vessel that
did not arrive. Instead, the ship went back to Batangas Philippines and remained at sea. Days
later, it went back to Singapore. This time, another vessel called the Navi Pride anchored beside
it. Another accused, Cheong San Hiong, supervised the Navis crew and received the cargo on
board MT Tabangao/Galilee. After the transfer of goods were completed, MT Tabangao/Galilee
went back to the Philippines and the original crew members were released by the pirates in
batches. The crew was ordered not to tell authorities of what happened. The chief engineer of
the crew, however, reported the incident to the coast guard. Afterwards, a series of arrests were
effected in different places. An information charging the accused with qualified piracy or violation
of the PD 532 Piracy in the Philippine Waters was filed against the accused. As it turns out,
Navi Pride captain, Hiong, was employed with Navi Marine Services ( a Singaporean firm, I think).
Before the seizure of the MT Tabangon, Navi Marine was dealing for the first time with Paul Gan,
a Singaporean broker who offered to sell bunker oil to the former. When the transaction pushed
through, Hiong was assigned to supervise a ship to ship transfer. He was told that the Galilee
would be making the transfer, so Navi Pride ship-sided with Galilee and the transfer was effected.
Paul Gan received the payment. Upon arrival in Singapore, Hiong was asked again to transact
another transfer of oil. The same procedure was followed. Hiong then went to the Philippines to
arrange another transfer with Changco the pirates head. This was how Hiong was arrested by
the NBI agents.
All the accused put up denials and alibis. The trial court, with ROMEO CALLEJO deciding, ruled
that the accused were all guilty. ISSUE: w/n the accused are guilty of qualified piracy YES!
RULING: [only the important part for crim] Hiong argues that he can not be convicted under PD
534 or Art 122 of the RPC as amended, since both laws punish piracy committed in Philippine
waters. Hiong also contends that the court never acquired jurisdiction over him since the crime
was committed outside Philippine waters. Art. 122 of the RPC (piracy in general and mutiny in
the high seas) provided that piracy must be committed in the high seas by any person not a
member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. It was amended by RA 7659, which
broadened the law to include offenses committed in Philippine waters. PD 532 on the other hand,
embraces any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in the
Philippine waters. Passenger or not, member of the complement or not, any person is covered
by the law. No conflict exists among the mentioned laws, they exist harmoniously as separate
laws. The attack on and the seizure of MT Tabangao and its cargo were committed in Philippine
waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore, where its cargo
was off-loaded, transferred and sold. Such transfer was done under Hiongs supervision.
Although the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo was not done in Philippine
waters, it is still deemed part of the same act. Piracy falls under Title 1 of Book 2 of the RPC. It is
an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies to the case,
even if Hiong is charged with violation of a special penal law, instead of the RPC. Regardless of
the law penalizing piracy, it remains to be a reprehensible crime against the whole world.

White Light Corp. v. City of Manila

Police Power Not Validly Exercised Infringement of Private Rights
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting
short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels
who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private
rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the
personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the
ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered
to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including
tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual
liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against
arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who
goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some
are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be
avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC
reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of
physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of
custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part
of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth
by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte.
The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment
on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner
no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an
invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure
to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for
prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on
said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust
and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect
the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows
an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised
in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the
Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means
that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and
apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification
and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the
right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention that by not
allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it
ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because
violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial,
function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other
law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

Guingguing v. CA (2005)
Facts:
Cirser Torralba, a radio broadcaster of DYLA and DYFX based in Cebu City, filed a libel
complaint against Guingguing and Lim.
Lim published a paid article at Sunday Post and published the records and pictures of estafa
cases filed against Torralba.
Lim said that Torralba makes scurillous attacks against him and his family over his programs,
he opted for paid advertisements to answer the attacks.
Lower court found the publication libelous
Issue: WON the petitioners is guilty of libel.
Ruling: NO. Cirser Torralba is a public figure as established in the case of Ayer Productions.
Estrada vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada,
the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas
City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio
Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived
with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand,
Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or
Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower
and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their
religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective
when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio,
Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since
1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which
was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three
witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and
immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives
room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its
ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court
Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling
that it should override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the
complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The
burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the
Office of the Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within
the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where
the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at
respondents claim of religious freedom but must also apply the compelling state interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor
General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine
the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present
evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and
practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days
from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.