BASCOS, Jane Lennie T.

2-D

CASE DIGEST

CALUB v CA
GR No 115634, April 27, 2000
Facts
The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two
motor vehicles. One is loaded with 1,026 board feet of illegally sourced
lumber valued at P8,544.75, with Plate No. HAK-733, being driven by one Pio
Gabon and owned by Jose Vargas. The other is loaded with 1,224.97
board feet of illegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, with plate
number FCN 143, being driven by one Constancio Abuganda and owned by
[a certain] Manuela Babalcon.
The drivers of the vehicles failed to present proper documents and/or
licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles
and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR Office. Seizure receipts were issued
but the drivers refused to accept the receipts. Felipe Calub, Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial
Prosecutors Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda
for violation of Section 68 [78), Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Exec
utive Order277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. On January
31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and
Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub this
time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and
Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor.
The vehicle driven by Constancio Abuganda was again apprehended by a
composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and Philippine Army elements
of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Barangay Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded
with forest products with an equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet,
valued at P10,054.70.Calub duly filed a criminal complaint against
Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John for violation of
Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as
amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code. Although Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of re
asonable, the trial courtordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the
Secretary of Justice, in order that the necessary criminal action may be filed
against Pagarao and all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised
Forestry Code. It appeared that it was Pagarao who chartered the subject
vehicle and ordered that cut timber be loaded on it.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is
in custodia legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of
impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against
the State.

Held:
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all
conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78.
In addition, Section 78 makes mere possession of timber or other forest
products without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable
with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310
of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were
loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no
permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest
products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally
sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the
Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons
responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public
prosecutor. The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all
conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78
of the Revised Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the
same Code. The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990,
implements Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code.

LALICAN v VERGARA
GR No. 108619, July 31, 1997

Facts
Petitioner in this case was charge for violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. Accordingly, petitioners had in their
possession and custody of 1,800 board feet of assorted species and
dimensions of lumber on board two passenger jeeps with a value of
14,000.00 pesos.

Issue
Petitioner questioned the charge of illegal possession of lumber is
excluded from the crime of illegal possession of timber as defined in Sec. 68
of P.D. 705 (Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended, to
warrant the quashing of an information charging the former offense on a
nonexistence crime.

Held
The petitioner is devoid of merit. A law should not be so construed as
to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as
afford as opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create
inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law; The phrase forest
products is broad enough to encompass lumber which is manufactured
timber.

PALLADA v PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.

GR No. 131270, March 17, 2000
Facts
Pallada, as general manager of Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation,
a rice milling company, was convicted of possessing 29,299.25 board feet of
lumber, worth P488,334.45 in total, which were confiscated during a raid by
police and DENR officers. On the scene, the company provided 2 receipts
issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard, whose permit to operate had already
been suspended.
Issue
Whether or not the term timber includes lumber and, therefore, the
Certificates of Timber Origin and their attachments should have been
considered in establishing the legality of the companys possession of the
lumber.
Held
No, the statement in the Mustang Lumber case that lumber is merely
processed timber and, therefore, the word timber embraces lumber, was
made in answer to the lower courts ruling in that case that the phrase
posses timber or other forest products in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705
means that only those who possess timber and forest products without the
documents required by law are criminally liable, while those who possess
lumber are not liable.

On the other hand, the question in this case is whether separate

certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber. Indeed,
different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and non-
timber forest products.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHIL v DATOR
GR No. 136142, October 24, 2000
Facts
Police officers confiscated pieces of lumber from an Isuzu cargo for failure of
the driver, accused Benito Genol, to show the required documents for the
proper transport of the pieces of lumber consisting of forty-one
(41) pieces of Dita lumber and ten (10) pieces of Antipolo lumber with a tota
lvolume of 1,560.16 board feet. Pastor Telen, owner of lumber, testified that the
lumber will be used in renovating his residence. Boy Leonor, who was the Officer in
Charge of CENRO Maasin, Southern Leyte allegedly allowed Telen to cut the aging Dita
trees only. According to Telen, Leonor assured him that a written permit was not
anymore necessary before he could cut the Dita trees, which are considered
soft lumber, from the private land of his mother, provided the same would be used
exclusively for the renovation of his house and that he shall plant trees as
replacement thereof, which he did by planting Gemelina seedlings.The trial
court convicted Pastor Telen of violation of Sec 68 of PD No. 705 which Telen
appealed.

Issue
Whether or not the legal documents or permit is still required for
cutting or transporting the soft lumber.

Held
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction. The fact of possession by
the appellant of the subject lumber, as well as his subsequent failure to
produce the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 705, Section 68. The appellant stands charged with the crime
of violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705, a special statutory law, and which crime is
consideredmala prohibita. In the prosecution for crimes that are considered m
ala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law has been violated.
The motive or intention underlying the act of the appellant is immaterial for
the reason that his mere possession of the confiscated pieces of lumber
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations gave rise to his criminal liability.

PICOP v CALO
GR No. 161798, October 20, 2004
Facts
PICOP, a pulp and manufacturing facility in Bislig City, Agusan del
Norte held a Pulpwood and Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and
Integrated Forest Management (IFMA) No. 35 covering 130,000 hectares of
forest land within Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. Three DENR
Memoranda dated 1997, February 2001, and April 2001 designated the
petitioner as a DENR depository and custodian for apprehended forest
products and conveyances with its concession. Thereafter, private
respondents, Casia et al, were arrested by PICOP security officers
transporting falcata logs. PICOP refused to release the confiscated forest
products.

Issue
Whether or not a depository can retain possession of conveyances.

Held
No, the petitioner has no material interest to protect in the
confiscated forest products and conveyances. It has no subsisting
proprietary interest, as borne out by its licensing agreements, which need to
be protected by annulling the writ of injunction issued by the trial court.
Also, the petitioner also cannot claim the right to retain custody of the
apprehended logs and conveyances by virtue of its being designated a
depository of the DENR pursuant to the assailed Memoranda. As such
depository, petitioner merely holds the confiscated products and
conveyances in custody for the DENR while the administrative or criminal
proceedings regarding said products are pending.

The Memorandum dated February 16, 2001, which designated

petitioner as a DENR depository, had been revoked by the Memorandum of
January 21, 2002. As of the filing of the petition for review before this Court
on March 11, 2004, petitioner no longer had any right, as a depository, to
retain possession of the conveyances.

YSMAEL v THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

GR No. 79538, October 18, 1990
Facts
In 1986, at the start of President Corazon Aquinos administration,
petitioner sent letters to the Office of the President and to the Ministry of
Natural Resources (MNR) seeking the reinstatement of its timber license
agreement (TLA No. 87), which was cancelled in August 1983 along with nine
other concessions, during the Marcos administration. It alleged that after
the its TLA was cancelled without being given the opportunity to be heard,
its logging area was re-awarded to other logging concessionaires without a
formal award or license, as these entities were controlled or owned by
relatives or cronies of deposed President Marcos. The Ministry ruled that a
timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of the
Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public
interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated
against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose
licenses were revoked in 1983.It also emphasized the fact that there was
currently a total log ban being imposed on the subject areas. After the
logging ban was lifted, petitioner appealed to the Office of the President,
but the petition was denied on the ground that the appeal was prematurely
filed, the matter not having been terminated in the MNR. Hence, petitioner
filed with the Supreme Court petition for certiorari.

Issue
Whether public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to overturn
administrative orders issued by their predecessors.

Held
The refusal of public respondents to reverse final and executory
administrative orders does not constitute grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is an established doctrine in
this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies
have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment
within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and
orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though
the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of
res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by
competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction.

BON v PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.

GR No. 152160, January 13, 2004
Facts
Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, together with Rosalio Bon under
Information, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:

That sometime in the month of January or February, 1990, at

Barangay Basud, Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, the
accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, cut, gather and manufacture into lumber four
(4) narra trees, one (1) cuyao-yao tree, and one (1) amugis tree, with an
approximate volume of 4,315 bd. ft. and valued at approximately
P25,000.00, without the knowledge and consent of the owner Teresita
Dangalan-Mendoza and without having first obtained from proper
authorities the necessary permit or license and/or legal supporting
documents, to the damage and prejudice of the Government and the owner
in the aforementioned amount of P25,000.00.

Issue
Whether or not the prosecution witnesses had credibility and
sufficiency of the evidence proving their guilt.

Held
It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of
evidence, however, is not the only matrix from which the trial court may
draw its conclusions and findings of guilt.1[33] Conviction may be based on
circumstantial evidence, as long as the circumstances proven constitute an
unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is
necessary that the following elements concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance.
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven.
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 68 of the Forestry Code, as amended,2[30] provides:

SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest

Products without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations,
or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection
or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the
part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
 The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected,
removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements
and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are
found.

Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1)
cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products
from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possessing
timber or other forest products without the legal documents.

Petitioner was charged with the first offense.3[32] It was thus

necessary for the prosecution to prove the alleged illegal cutting, gathering
or manufacture of lumber from the trees.

CHU v TAMIN
AM No. RTJ-03-1786, August 28, 2003
Facts
Judge Tamin issued a search warrant ordering the seizure of several
pieces of mangrove lumber from Chus fishpond in Bulawan, Payao,
Zamboanga del Sur. CENRO Officer dela Cruz and the police, seized 576
pieces of pagatpat lumber (mangrove specie) with an estimated value
of P183,790. These certified copies did not contain any transcript of
respondent judges examination of CENRO dela Cruz or his witnesses as
required under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Chu claims that was the fifth time that Judge Tamin issued,
under questionable procedure, search warrants against him for violation of
PD 705. Complainant recalled that on 10 November 1998, respondent judge
issued four search warrants against him. Judge Tamin replied that the failure
to give the transcript was through pure inadvertence, by the office legal
researcher to recopy such transcript, and that he conducted searching
questions on Cuaresma, the witness of CENRO.
Issue
Whether Judge Tamin acted in gross ignorance of the law.

Held
Yes, because omissions bolster complainants claim and weaken the
respondents defense. As respondent judge claims, he personally examined
a Cuaresma as the witness of CENRO dela Cruz, he should have secured the
affidavit of Cuaresma. Respondent should also have secured the affidavit of
the unnamed legal researcher who allegedly prepared the copies of the
records obtained by complainant.

Lastly, respondent judge should have shown Executive Judge Villegas,

during the latters investigation, the magnetic (hard disk) copy of the
transcript allegedly stored in his office computer. These omissions bolster
complainants claim and correspondingly weaken respondent judges
defense.

OPOSA v FACTORAN
GR No. 101083, July 30, 1993
Facts
A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al.,
representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented
by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They
prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or
appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises. They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in
its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources
property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following

grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.
 Issue
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to
prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?
Held
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as
well as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right considers the rhythm and harmony of nature which indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to

preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right
to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of
their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.

PEOPLE OF THE PHIL v CFI OF QUEZON

GR No. L-46772
Facts
The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified
theft of logs, under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705. They entered
the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, then illegally cut,
gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of the
said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease
license or permit, 60 logs of different species, consisting of about 541.48
cubic meters, with total value of P50,205.52 including government charges.
The trial court dismissed the information.
Issue

1. whether the information charged an offense

2. whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.
 Held

Yes, the failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were
owned by the state is not fatal. It should be noted that the logs subject of
the complaint were taken not from a public forest but from a private
woodland registered in the name of complainants deceased father, Macario
Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license
or lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber
products produced in the Philippines including those produced in private
woodlands.

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in

Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the
true owner of the forest products is not material; it was sufficient that it
alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the
government.

Yes, with the exception of the so-called private crimes and in

election offenses, prosecutions in Courts of First Instance may be
commenced by an information signed by a fiscal after conducting a
preliminary investigation. Section 80 of P.D. 705 did not divest the fiscals of
this general authority. Neither did the said decree grant forest officers the
right of preliminary investigations.

PEOPLE OF THE PHIL v QUE

GR No. 120365, December 17, 1996
Facts
The Provincial Task Force on illegal logging received information that a
ten-wheeler truck with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte.
Ques truck was spotted and discovered to contain cocounut slabs with sawn
lumber inserted in between. He failed to give the cargos supporting
documents: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport
agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5)
certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs.
All he could show was a certification 7 from the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he
legally acquired the coconut slabs.
Issues

1. Whether there are no existing forest laws and regulations which required
certain legal documents for possession of timber and other forest products.
2. Whether the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that
the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering,
collecting or removal of such forest products is legal.

Held
1. No, appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and regulations
to refer to those laws and regulations which were already in effect at the
time of the enactment of E.O. 277. However, the suggested interpretation is
strained and would render the law inutile. The phrase should be construed
to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber
or other forest products.
DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the
documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products.
Section 3 of the Administrative Order provides that the movement of logs,
lumber, non-timber forest products and wood-based or wood based shall be
covered with the appropriate Certificates of Origin. The transport of lumber
shall be accompanied by CLO (Certificate of Lumber Origin).

2. No, because there are 2 distinct and separate offenses punished under
Section 68 of P.D. 705. In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the
legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or
other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In
the second offense, however, mere possession of forest products without
the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber
comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O 277 considers the mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents as malum prohibitum.

ROLDAN v MADRONA
GR No. 152989, September 4, 2002
Facts
Pending the application in the DENR for a Private Land Timber Permit
on his own land, Roldan was allegedly informed by some DENR employees
that he could proceed with the cutting of trees. Later, petitioner cut trees,
bulldozed the roadway and used cut logs as materials to build chicken cages.
The CENRO group confiscated 872 pieces of sawn lumber/flitches (8,506
board feet) and three felled timber logs with a total market value of
P235,454.68 at P27.00 per board foot.
Issues

1. Whether the petitioners penalty for cutting trees in his own land should not
be equated with that for qualified theft.
2. Whether the owner of a private property is administratively liable under
Section 14 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact
that he did not transport the logs out of his property and used them for his
own agricultural purposes.

3. Whether the logs confiscated by the DENR should be returned to petitioner.

Held

1. No, Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, it is clear that the
violators of the said law are not declared as being guilty of qualified theft;
hence his ownership of the land is of no moment. The said law does not
even distinguish whether or not the person who commits the punishable
acts under the aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what is
material in determining the culpability of a person is whether or not the
person or entity involved or charged with its violation possesses the
required permit, license or authorization from DENR at the time he or it
cuts, gathers or collects timber or other forest products.

2. No, the administrative order considers the mere act of transporting any
wood product or timber without the prescribed documents as an offense
which is subject to the penalties provided for by law. As to the defense of
petitioner that he never transported the logs out of his property, suffice it to
say that such is a factual issue which this Court under Rule 45 cannot
determine.

3. No, any pronouncement thereon at this point would be premature as the

guilt of the petitioner has not been legally established. The records of the
case indicate that trial on the merits is still in progress.

DENR vs Mayor Yap Et al.

GR No 167707

FACTS
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo
Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-
claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801
declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that
Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in
Kalibo, Aklan.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)

opposed the petition countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land
of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public
forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of
PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed
agricultural land, therefore making these lands alienable.

HELD
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigators, and a legislative act or statute.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In

keeping with the presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and
again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such
as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
 All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not
been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.