Supplementary Material for Representation and New Party Survival in Multi-Level

Systems

This appendix provides additional information that readers might find useful when evaluating
the analysis as it is discussed in the manuscript. More specifically, we present the following
information:

A full list of parties that are considered in the analysis (A Database)

Survey questions used for several of the variables (B Operationalization of Contextual
Attitude-Based Variables)
Summary statistics for the variables included in the regression models (C Summary
statistics)
Regression models with alternative measures and data structures (D Robustness
Analysis)

If you have any questions concerning the material that is presented here, please contact the
authors Peter Obert (Peter.Obert@hhu.de) or Jochen Mller (jochen.mueller@uni-
greifswald.de).

Dsseldorf and Greifswald, July 2017

A Database

Table A.1: Czech new parties included in the analysis

Year Party Origin Participation and survival across regions1

Central Bohemia

Ust nad Labem

Moravia-Silesia
Hradec Krlov

South Bohemia

South Moravia
Karlovy Vary

Pardubice

Vysocina
Olomouc
Liberec

Prague
Plzen

Zln
2004 esk hnut za nrodn jednotu New Party X X X X
Dlncka strana - akce za snen poslaneckch Alliance X
plat2
Dlnick strana New Party X X X X X X
Demokratick Unie esk republiky New Party X X
ED, VPM, SOS - Volba pro kraj Alliance X
Evropt demokrat a Nezvisl starostov pro Alliance X
kraj
Evropsk strana dstojnho st3 Alliance
Evropt demokrat New Party X X X X X X X X
Helax-Ostrava se bav New Party X
Kesansk a demokratick unie Split X X X X
eskoslovensk strana lidov
Koalice Dlnick a Nrodn strany Alliance (new only) X
Koalice Strany zelench a SNK-ED Alliance X
Koalice jin Morava Alliance X
4
Koalice pro Karlovarsk kraj Alliance X
Koalice pro Pardubick kraj Alliance X
Koalice pro Stedoesk kraj Alliance X
Konzervativn strana New Party X X X
Koruna esk (monarchistick strana ech, New Party X X X X X X
Moravy a Slezska)
Masarykova demokratick strana New Party X
Morava New Party X
Moravsk demokratick strana Alliance X X X
NK+SJ+SV+SZR= Spojen Obansk Sly Alliance X
Nadje New Party X
 Nrodn sjednocen Alliance X X X X X X
Obansk demokratick aliance Split X
SVOBODN New Party X X X
Sdruen pro zdrav, sport a prosperitu New Party
Sdruen nezvislch kandidt Alliance X
Sprvn smr New Party X
Strana za ivotn jistoty + Strana Oban esk Alliance X
republiky
Strana zelench a Strana pro otevenou Alliance X X
spolenost
Strana prce New Party X
Zmna pro Krlovhradeck kraj New Party X X X X
Strana zelench a US-DEU Alliance X
Unie pro sport a zdrav - Demokratick Alliance X
regionln strana
Unie svobody - Demokratick unie Alliance X X X X X X X X X
Volba pro msto Merger X
V hlas ... pro zdravotnictv Alliance (new only) X
ZELEN pro MORAVU Alliance X
ZHN a SNK spolen Alliance X
Za prosperitu a jistoty vchodn Moravy New Party X
Zelen a oteven spolenost Alliance X
2006 esk pravice New Party X
esk strana nrodn socialistick New Party X
Koalice KDU-SL, Nestranci Alliance X
NEZVISL New Party
Nezvisl demokrat New Party X
Nezvisl pro Prahu New Party X
Nrodn strana New Party X
POLITIKA 21 New Party X
Prvo a Spravedlnost New Party X
STRANA ROVNOST ANC New Party X
Strana obansk sebeobrany New Party X
Strana zelench New Party
Vci veejn New Party X
Volba pro msto Split X
 Volte Prav Blok www.cibulka.net5 Split
Zelen se SONOB za ochranu bydlen a proti Alliance X
zdraovn njemnho
2008 ALTERNATIVA PRO KRAJ New Party X
DOHODA PRO JIN MORAVU Alliance X
Nezvisl starostov pro kraj Split X X X
esk strana nrodn socialistick New Party X X
Alternativa 2008 Alliance X
Balbnova poetick strana New Party X
6
Dlnick strana sociln spravedlnosti Alliance X X X X X X X X X X X X X
DOHODA pro Vysoinu Alliance X
DOHODA pro steck kraj Alliance X
Demokracie New Party X X
Dohoda pro zmnu Alliance X
Doktoi (za uzdraven spolenosti) New Party X X
Folklor i Spolenost New Party
7
Koalice pro Karlovarsk kraj Alliance
Nrodn socialist a Rozumn Alliance X
Koalice nestrank Alliance (new only) X
8
Koalice pro Krlovhradeck kraj Alliance X
9
Koalice pro Libereck kraj Alliance X X X
10
Koalice pro Pardubick kraj Alliance X
Konzervativn koalice Alliance X X X X X
Moravan Alliance
NESPOKOJEN OBAN! New Party X
Nejen hasii a ivnostnci pro kraj Alliance (new only) X X
Osobnosti kraje Alliance X
S.O.S. pro kraj Alliance X
SD-Strana dustojnho ivota New Party X X X X X X X X X X X X
STEDOEI New Party X
STAROSTOV A NEZVISL PRO ZLNSK Alliance X
KRAJ
Sdruen pro republiku Republiknsk strana Merger X X X X X X X X X X X X
eskoslovenska
Severoei.cz New Party
Spojen demokrat - Sdruen nezvislch Alliance (new only) X
 Starostov pro Libereck kraj New Party
Strana drobnch ivnostnk a podnikatel New Party X
Unie pro sport a zdrav Split X
Volba pro kraj Alliance X
Zelen New Party X
ance pro n kraj Alliance X
2010 ESK POLITICK STED New Party X
esk pirtsk strana New Party X
Dlnick strana sociln spravedlnosti New Party X
Hnut pro Prahu 11 New Party X
Nezvisl oban Prahy New Party X
Praan za sv prva New Party X
11
Strana Prv Oban ZEMANOVCI New Party X
Strana podnikatel a ivnostnk New Party X
Strana soukromnk esk Republiky New Party X
Strana svobodnch oban New Party X
Suverenita - Strana zdravho rozumu Alliance
TOP 0912 New Party X

1
The symbols indicate in which region(s) the respective new party participated. An X means that the party did not participate in the subsequent regional election, while means that
the party participated (i.e. it survived).
2
In the region of Plzen Dlncka strana cooperated with the party Prav alternativa.
3
The party did also participate in elections as ZDRAV KRAJ.
4
The movement did also participate in elections as Koalice pro Olomouck kraj se starosty.
5
The complete name of the party is much longer (187 words) and contains political views as well as attacks on various aspects of the Czech political system.
6
In the region of Plzen, the party used the name affix NE americkmu radaru.
7
The Koalice pro -alliances include the KDU-SL but differ across regions, here: KDU-SL a HNHRM.
8
The Koalice pro -alliances include the KDU-SL but differ across regions, here: KDU-SL a Nestranci.
9
The Koalice pro -alliances include the KDU-SL but differ across regions, here: KDU-SL a SNK ED.
10
The Koalice pro -alliances include the KDU-SL but differ across regions, here: KDU-SL, SNK ED a Nestranci.
11
The name affix ZEMANOVCI was dropped in 2014.
12
New party because it competed on its own in Prague while it formed alliances with mayors in the regions.
B Operationalization of Contextual Attitude-Based Variables

To allow for a better approximation to the theoretical concept that deals with societal
processes that we expect to be related to the success of new parties, we also make use of
survey data provided by the Czech Data Archive of Social Sciences. In particular, we draw on
monthly data collected by the Centre for Research on Public Opinion (CVVM) of the
Sociological Institute of the Czech Academy of Science made available by the NESSTAR
data catalogue.1 These surveys include questions that allow us to examine the impact of the
corresponding explanatory factors on the level of individual regions.

The specific questions used in order to measure characteristics of the political context of the
regions read in their original wording used in the survey of the CVVM as follows:

Voter dissatisfaction
Zamyslte-li se nad celkovou souasnou politickou situac v esk republice, ekl byste, e
jste s n [velmi spokojen velmi neskopojen]?

If you think about the overall current political situation of the Czech Republic: How satisfied
are you?

Control of corruption
Jak jste spokojen nebo nespokojen se souasnm stavem nsledujcch oblast v R:
korupce?

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the current state of affairs in the following areas in
the Czech Republic: corruption?

Political Trust
eknte prosm, dvujete [Vaemu krajskmu zastupitelstvu]?

Would you say you trust [your regional council]?

1
The data can be obtained via the data catalogue specified above, which can be accessed via the website of the
Czech Data Archive of Social Sciences (esk socilnvdn datov archiv) following user registration:
http://archiv.soc.cas.cz/pristup-k-mikrodatum-setreni-ceskeho-statistickeho-uradu-pro-ucely-vedeckeho-
vyzkumu.
C Summary statistics

Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Included in the Analysis

Variable Mean Median Min. Max. SD

Party Survival (Dependent variable) 0.112 0 0 1 0.315

Representation (Region) 0.130 0 0 1 0.336

Representation (Local) 0.090 0 0 1 0.286

Representation (Any other Region) 0.126 0 0 1 0.332

Representation (Any other County) 0.143 0 0 1 0.350

Vote sharet-1 (Region) 2.138 0.632 0.000 30.634 4.169

Vote sharet-1 (Local) 0.271 0.000 0.000 30.259 1.398

Genuinely New 0.439 0 0 1 0.496

Split 0.078 0 0 1 0.268

Voter Dissatisfaction 2.166 1.470 0.916 3.272 0.947

Control of Corruption 4.576 4.591 4.350 4.765 0.106

Political Trust 2.564 2.589 2.162 2.909 0.179

Unemployment 8.014 7.117 4.07 13.384 2.530

Note: Values are based on the 1,146 observations that are included in the regression models.
D Robustness Analysis

In the following we report the results of additional analyses that were conducted with the goal
of further validating the findings shown in the paper and check their robustness. There are two
aspects that might be of particular interest: (a) the measurement of some of the core concepts
used in the analyses and (b) the actual method used to analyze the data considering its
particular structure in which the success of regional parties is observed at the local level.

Starting with the first point mentioned above, in analyzing the impact of citizen attitudes on
the chances of survival of new parties, in our paper we use three different measures to capture
as much of the empirical dynamics of a conceptual differentiation between specific and
diffuse sources of political support. These are (see Table 2 in the paper): voter dissatisfaction,
control of corruption and political trust. As far as this approach goes, a legitimate concern can
be raised that these variables actually refer to the same underlying concept or dimension and
therefore can be summarized by creating an index of all three variables. Table D.1 below
empirically tests the impact of estimating our models with an index of political attitudes
instead of three separate variables and reports the results for Models 4 and 5. In order to be
able to properly estimate the impact of the index, the values of the original variables have
been recoded such that higher values indicate more favorable attitudes toward the overall
political situation as well as the regional councils in any given region. Generally speaking, the
coefficient of the index variable is now uniformly negative in both models. A substantial
conclusion would be that in regions with politically dissatisfied and distrusting citizens, the
chances of survival of new parties increase, which corresponds to our hypotheses. More
importantly, the substantial impact of regional and local representation remains the same. This
is also true for the observed higher chance of survival of new parties as compared to parties
connected to previously existing party organizations.

A second possible objection that relates to (a) is that macroeconomic variables other than
unemployment should be included as well. In the paper, we focus on regional levels of
unemployment based on the existing conceptual and theoretical work that relates
unemployment to favorable conditions for the survival of new parties. In particular, it not only
captures differences amongst regions in terms of their economic performance but the socio-
economic dimension of voter participation as well. Furthermore, we also agree with Tavits
(2008: 131) who documented in her study of electoral support of new parties in East
European countries that there is no immediate reason why these two indicators [GDP
growth and inflation] should become the source of disappointment with all existing parties.
However, we also estimated models that include a GDP-indicator at the level of the Czech
regional context. The indicator is based on data provided by the Czech Statistical Office and
reports the relative GDP of the regions as percentage share of the national average (equal to
100). The results of the analysis are reported in table D.2. As can be seen from the reported
results, in all of the models, the GDP-variable has a marginal impact and is statistically not
significant.

As far as the second point (b) is concerned, the data is structured in a way such that an
observation is constituted by the electoral performance of a political party at the county-level
at a given point in time. This is true for both, the electoral results of local elections as well as
elections for the regional assemblies. With regard to the latter, we consider the electoral
performance of parties during regional elections at the local level (i.e. the results of regional
elections are disaggregated to show exactly in which local contexts a party participating in the
regional elections was successful). The context variables that are incorporated in our models
are measured exclusively at the regional level. The main reason behind the disaggregation is
that we strongly believe that there is value added in looking more closely into the specific
local support of parties. A different approach towards modelling the data is equally viable;
namely an analysis that aggregates the results of local elections instead of disaggregating
regional elections to the local level. We therefore re-estimated the models that are reported in
the paper using the aggregation-based approach. The results are reported in Tables D.3 and
D.4. Although the relevance of local and regional representation appears to be lower
compared to the models that are currently reported in the paper, the result regarding
representation in any other region or county emerge even more strongly than before.
Table D.1: Analysis of Party-Specific and Contextual Explanations (Regional Level Only)

Model
[4] [5]
Fixed effect
Representation (Region) 1.445* 1.515*
(0.596) (0.710)
Representation (Local) 1.596** 1.683**
(0.526) (0.549)
Representation (Any Other -4.023*** -4.190***
Region) (1.226) (1.292)
Representation (Any Other 3.654*** 3.820***
County) (0.414) (0.454)
Vote share t-1 (Region) 0.042 0.441
(0.050) (0.050)
Vote share t-1 (Local) 0.070 0.051
(0.126) (0.116)
Genuinely New 1.163*** 1.183***
(0.314) (0.315)
Split 2.535** 2.638**
(0.978) (1.012)
Fixed effect (Regional Context)
Political Attitudes (Index) -3.422*** -5.783*
(0.600) (2.428)
Unemployment -0.385
(0.381)
Constant 6.665*** 17.446
(1.890) (10.888)
Variance component
2u0 3.332 6.443
Deviance 478.5 477.4
N (Observations) 1146 1146
N (Regions) 14 14
Test vs. Standard Logit (p) 0.000 0.000
Note: Table shows parameters of multilevel logit models with 15
integration points. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of statistical
significance are: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
The results shown here relate to the estimates reported in Table 2 in
the manuscript.
Table D.2: Random Intercept Models for Party-Related and Contextual Predictors including GDP

Model
[4] [5] [6] [7]
Fixed effect
Representation (Region) 1.422* 1.396* 1.381* 1.897*
(0.690) (0.683) (0.599) (0.760)
Representation (Local) 1.567** 1.535** 1.243** 2.213***
(0.524) (0.526) (0.476) (0.611)
Representation (Any Other -3.805** -3.685** -3.703*** -5.646***
Region) (1.187) (1.178) (0.996) (1.568)
Representation (Any Other 3.642*** 3.604*** 2.853*** 4.236***
County) (0.411) (0.416) (0.342) (0.493)
Vote share t-1 (Region) 0.046 0.046 0.035 0.059
(0.050) (0.050) (0.046) (0.049)
Vote share t-1 (Local) 0.056 0.065 0.076 0.114
(0.129) (0.139) (0.116) (0.133)
Genuinely New 1.139*** 1.125*** 0.866*** 1.307***
(0.313) (0.315) (0.297) (0.337)
Split 2.354* 2.271* 1.986* 3.444**
(0.948) (0.948) (0.781) (1.183)
Fixed effect (Regional Context)
Voter Dissatisfaction 1.071*** 0.807 3.567***
(0.189) (0.585) (0.928)
Unemployment 0.144 -0.792
(0.307) (0.422)
Political Trust 2.200 -9.828***
(1.398) (2.654)
Control of Corruption 1.327 13.47*
(3.026) (6.425)
GDP 0.019 0.020 0.005 0.037
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.036)
Constant -8.710*** -9.331*** -15.250 -46.520
(1.669) (2.058) (15.110) (29.570)
Variance component
2u0 2.611 1.866 1.755 20.918
Deviance 478.7 478.5 517.8 456.7
N (Observations) 1146 1146 1146 1146
N (Regions) 14 14 14 14
Test vs. Standard Logit (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Table shows parameters of multilevel logit models with 15 integration points.
Standard errors in parantheses. Levels of statistical significance are: *p<0.05; **p<0.01;
***
p<0.001.
The results shown here relate to the estimates reported in Table 2 in the manuscript
.
 Table D.3: Analysis of Party-Specific Explanations (Regional Level Only)

Model
[1a] [1b] [2] [3]
Representation (Region) 0.724 0.860 1.233 1.096
(0.360) (0.562) (0.924) (1.004)
Representation (Local) 1.284*** 1.334 2.518 2.024
(0.743) (1.509) (2.457) (2.373)
Representation (Any Other -4.392** -5.194** -7.232***
Region) (1.536) (1.956) (2.068)
Representation (Any Other 5.789** 4.270 4.911*
County) (1.768) (0.313) (2.504)
Vote share t-1 (Region) -0.093 -0.101
(0108) (0.117)
Vote share t-1 (Local) 0.194 0.238
(0.163) (0.171)
Genuinely New 0.038
(0.171)
Split 1.918*
(0.942)
Constant -2.561*** -2.797*** -2.688*** -2.798***
(0.278) (0.296) (0.306) (0.434)
N 215 215 215 215
Pseudo R2 0.175 0.253 0.263 0.282
AIC 136.8 128.4 130.8 131.9
BIC 146.9 145.3 154.4 162.2
Note: Table shows parameters of multilevel logit models with 15 integration points.
Standard errors in parantheses. Levels of statistical significance are: *p<0.05; **p<0.01;
***
p<0.001.
The results shown here relate to the estimates reported in Table 1 in the manuscript.
Table D.4: Analysis of Party-Specific and Contextual Explanations (Regional Level Only)

Model
[4] [5] [6] [7]
Representation (Region) 1.050 1.656 0.974 1.784
(1.256) (1.231) (1.065) (1.254)
Representation (Local) 2.112 2.359 2.127 2.668
(2.075) (2.254) (2.126) (1.934)
Representation (Any Other -8.490*** -9.369*** -7.183*** -9.915***
Region) (2.489) (2.591) (1.961) (2.406)
Representation (Any Other 6.706* 6.676* 5.137* 6.847*
County) (3.123) (3.230) (2.550) (3.233)
Vote share t-1 (Region) -0.119 -0.176 -0.078 -0.178
(0.135) (0136) (0.103) (0.128)
Vote share t-1 (Local) 0.270 0.344 0.194 0.320
(0.181) (0.185) (0.157) (0.169)
Genuinely New 0.466 0.533 0.121 0.720
(0.702) (0.724) (0.622) (0.765)
Split 2.381* 2.742* 1.969* 3.229**
(1.207) (1.209) (0.932) (1.116)
Voter Dissatisfaction 0.702 0.255 -0.303
(0.399) (0.517) (0.643)
Unemployment 0.254 0.460*
(0.160) (0.195)
Political Trust 1.394 2.705
(2.114) (1.769)
Control of Corruption -1.364 -2.893
(2.436) (2.431)
Constant -4.691*** -5.899*** -0.295 -0.396
(1.332) (1.481) (13.44) (12.96)
N 215 215 215 215
Pseudo R2 0.313 0.334 0.291 0.359
AIC 129.0 127.8 134.4 127.7
BIC 162.7 164.9 171.5 171.5
Note: Table shows parameters of multilevel logit models with 15 integration points.
Standard errors in parantheses. Levels of statistical significance are: *p<0.05; **p<0.01;
***
p<0.001.
The results shown here relate to the estimates reported in Table 2 in the manuscript.