LABOR STANDARDS CASES ISSUE: Are private respondents responsible for petitioners
Labor Arbiter Augusto L. Villanueva recruitment and deployment to Singapore?
SSCR
2ndSem A.Y. 2015-2016
Chapter III Special Group of Workers/Employees
1. HORNALES v. NLRC
Prohibited business agencies and entities
FACTS: Mario Hornales (herein petitioner) filed with the
POEA a complaint[5] for non-payment of wages and recovery
of damages against JEAC International Management &
Contractor Services (JEAC) and its owner, Jose Cayanan
(herein private respondents). As private respondents surety,
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (Country Bankers) was
later on impleaded by petitioner. respondents sent petitioner,
together with other Filipinos, to Singapore. On board the vessel,
petitioner was subjected to inhumane work conditions, like
inadequate supply of food and water, maltreatment by the ship
captain, and lack of medical attendance. He was also required
to work for twenty-two hours a day without pay. Unable to bear
his situation any longer, he joined the other Filipino workers in
leaving the vessel while it was docked at Mauritius Islands on
July 15, 1992.
Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner asked private
respondents to pay his salaries. Instead of doing so, they
required him to surrender his passport promising that they
would procure another job for him. respondents filed an
answer[7] claiming that, petitioner, Victor Lim and Min Fee
Fishery Co. Ltd are all total strangers to them. To bolster the
claim, they offered in evidence the Joint Affidavit[8] of Efren B.
Balucas and Alexander C. Natura, petitioners co-workers in
Singapore, stating that while they were in Singapore, petitioner
admitted to them that he did not apply in any agency in the
Philippines; that he came to Singapore merely as a tourist; and
that, he applied directly and personally with Step-Up Agency.
Petitioner filed a Supplemental Affidavit[10] claiming that he was
not a total stranger to private respondents, and that, as a matter
of fact, he knew respondent Cayanan since 1990, when they
used to go to the San Lazaro Hippodrome to watch horse races.
He also averred that while the vessel was docked at Mauritius
Islands on June 1992, respondent Cayanan reminded him and
his co-workers of their loan obligations by sending them
photocopies of the PNB checks he (respondent Cayanan)
issued in favor of their relatives, and the agreements whereby
they authorized Victor Lim to deduct from their salaries the
amount of their loan obligations.
The POEA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
On appeal, respondent NLRC vacated the decision of the
POEA and dismissed petitioners complaint mainly on the
ground that there was no employer-employee relationship
between the parties.
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied.
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
HELD: The scale of evidence must tilt in favor of petitioner.
In a catena of labor cases, this Court has consistently held that
where the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-
examine the affiants, affidavits are generally rejected for being
hearsay, unless the affiant themselves are placed on the witness
stand to testify thereon. Private respondents Joint
Affidavit has no probative value. It suffers from two
infirmities, first, petitioner was not given the opportunity to
cross-examine the two affiants regarding the contents thereof,
and second, the two affiants merely swore as to what petitioner
told them but not as to the truth of the statements uttered.
In concluding that respondent JEAC was a mere travel agency
and petitioner, a mere tourist, respondent NLRC came up with
a new theory which find no support even from the evidence of
private respondents, the party in whose favor the decision was
rendered. First, there is nothing in the record which shows that
respondent JEAC is a mere travel agency. Even private
respondents consistently plead that respondent JEAC is a
licensed recruitment agency authorized to recruit and deploy
overseas Filipino contract workers.
Second, the evidence upon which respondent NLRC based its
findings consist of agreements authorizing Victor Lim to
deduct from the salaries of petitioner and his co-workers the
amount of their obligations to respondent Cayanan. It would be
too much of a coincidence to say that petitioner and his co-
workers are all mere tourists who allowed a certain Victor Lim
to deduct from their salaries the amount of their obligations to
respondent Cayanan. What is evident here is that there is an
internal arrangement between respondent Cayanan and Victor
Lim brought about by the fact that the former deployed these
workers to serve the latter. As correctly pointed out by the
POEA, there must be a previous arrangement between private
respondents and Victor Lim.
Significantly, from these pieces of evidence respondent NLRC
could already see the falsity in private respondents total
strangers theory. How could there be an arrangement between
two persons who do not know each other?respondents act of
deploying petitioner to Singapore without complying with the
POEA requirements only made them susceptible to cancellation
or suspension of license as provided by Section 2, Rule I, Book
VI of POEA Rules and Regulations:
SEC. 2. Grounds for suspension/cancellation of license.
m. Deploying workers whose employment and travel
documents were not processed by the Administration;
n. Deploying workers workers or seafarers to vessels or
principals not accredited by the Administration;
But of course, such violations should be threshed out in a proper
administrative proceeding for suspension or cancellation of
license.
2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROSE
DUJUA (at large) EDITHA S. SING (at large)
Page | 1
GUILLERMO WILLY SAMSON (at large) RAMON
SAMSON DUJUA, accused. RAMON SAMSON DUJUA,
appellant.
G.R. Nos. 14901416. February 05, 2004.
Criminal Law Labor Law Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale Elements.The essential elements of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale are: (1) the accused engages in
acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined under
Article 13(b) or in any prohibited activities under Art. 34 of the
Labor Code (2) the accused has not complied with the
guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an
authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or
overseas and (3) the accused commits the unlawful acts against
three or more persons, individually or as a group.
FACTS:
In August 1991, Beldon Caluten went to the accuseds
office, the World Pack Travel and Tours located in Suite 28,
Manila Midtown Arcade, Adriatico Street, Ermita, Manila.
Upon Beldons inquiry, Ramon Dujua said that he sends
applicants abroad and gave Beldon an application form. Beldon
filled up the form and submitted it to Ramon, who told him that
he must pay a processing fee and make an advance payment.
Beldon was promised work as a factory worker in Japan. On
August 15, 1991, he paid Ramon the processing fee and these
payments, Beldon was issued receipts signed by Ramons
mother Rose Dujua. On the last week of August 1991, Beldon
gave another P10,000.00 to Benita Valdes, another applicant in
the accuseds office, but no receipt was issued for the amount.
Finally, Beldon gave P41,000.00 to Rose Dujua but when
Beldon asked for a receipt for the latter payment, Rose said she
already gave him one.
When, despite such payments, the promise to send
Beldon to work in Japan remained unfulfilled, Beldon asked
Ramon to give him back his money. Beldon never recovered his
payments, however, prompting him and his fellow applicants to
file a complaint at the NBI.
Jaime Cabus went to the accuseds office. Ramon said
they were deploying workers to Taiwan and that if Jaime could
afford the placement fee of P45,000.00, plus the passport and
processing fee, he could leave for Taiwan in a few weeks. The
following day, Jaime gave Ramon P2,000.00 at the latters
office, for the processing of his passport. Jaime was not issued
a receipt for his payment but was assured that the passports
processing would take just two days. Indeed, Jaime was able to
see his passport. In the latter part of October 1991, Jaime paid
P10,000.00 as down payment for the placement fee. Jaime gave
Ramon the sum inside the accuseds office. On March 16, 1994,
when they were about to leave for the airport Jaime handed
Rose P47,000.00 representing the balance of the placement fee.
At the airport, Ramon told Jaime that the tickets were still being
processed. Feeling that his and the other thirty applicants flight
would not push through, Jaime asked for a refund. Ramon and
his mother refused to pay him back because the money was
supposedly going to be used in the processing of their tickets.
Rose assured him, though, that they would be able to leave the
following day. The flight and the job never materialized,
however, so after a week Jaime decided to file a complaint with
theNBI.
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
Another complainant, Roberto Perlas, went to the
accuseds office to apply for a job abroad. Ramon told him that
they were deploying factory workers to Taiwan. Convinced,
Roberto accomplished the biodata form given by Ramon.
Roberto also paid a total of P30,000.00 as placement fee. On
separate occasions, Roberto gave Ramon P7,000.00 and
P10,000.00, for which he was issued the corresponding receipts
by Rose Dujua. The balance of the P30,000.00 he later gave to
Rose, who did not issue a receipt therefor because at the time a
lot of people were milling about. Notwithstanding payment,
Roberto was not able to leave for Taiwan. Rose and Ramon kept
on telling him that he would leave the following day but
Roberto waited in vain.
The money he gave was never refunded. Finally, he decided to
file a complaint against the accused.
In August 1991, private complainant Romulo Partos
was introduced to Ramon Dujua at the latters by one Baby
Ramos. Baby, like Romulo, was an applicant for deployment to
Taiwan. Ramon told Romulo about the work in Taiwan and in
Japan. Ramon said that Romulo would get the job he was
applying for and leave within a week if he paid P45,000.00.
Romulo and his wife Melodea Villanueva then decided that
Romulo would withdraw his application and that Melodea
would be the one to leave for abroad. The amount of P45,000.00
that Romulo was supposed to pay was changed to P25,000.00,
payableupon application. Romulo also had to pay P50,000.00
upon the release of the visa and another P75,000.00 upon
departure. Romulo paid Ramon P18,000.00 for his wifes
application, and Rose Dujua issued the corresponding receipt.
Subsequently, Romulo gave another P7,000.00 to complete the
required P25,000.00. No receipt was issued for the latter
payment. Romulos wife raised another P50,000.00, which was
given to Rose, for her Japanese visa. As nothing came about of
the employment promised, Romulo decided to file a complaint
with the NBI.
The prosecution also presented a Certification dated
March 1998 stating that Ramon Dujua is not licensed or
authorized by the POEA to recruit workers abroad. Another
Certification, of even date shows that neither is the World Pack
Travel and Tours authorized to recruit workers abroad.
The accused Ramon Dujua admitted having met
private complainants but denied that he was a recruiter. He
claimed that he was a mere janitor, messenger and errand boy
of the World Pack Travel and Tours, where he worked from
October 28, 1991 up to June 20, 1992. The company is owned
by his aunt, Editha Singh, and managed by his mother Rose
Dujua. While admitting that he did not have a license to recruit,
Ramon acknowledged receiving the money given by
complainants but denied knowing what it was for. He said,
however, that his mother only asked him to count the money.
He further maintained that he did not sign any receipt relative
to the payments made by private complainants. The accused
claimed that he was being charged only because complainants
were angry with his mother. Zenaida Perez, who used to work
for World Pack Travel and Tours, corroborated Ramons claim
that he was a janitor/ messenger in said office.
RTC:
WHEREFORE, the Court, finding the accused
Ramon Dujua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense in
Criminal Case 92108910 which is for Illegal Recruitment for
Violation of Art. 38 (a and b) in relation to Art. 39 of PD 442,
Page | 2
as amended by PD 1412 and further amended by PD 1920 and
PD 2018, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay fine in the amount of P100,000.00. He
is further ordered to pay the private complainants a) Jaime
Cabus the amount of P47,000.00 b) Benton [sic] C. Caluten the
amount of P26,000.00 and c) Roberto Perlas the amount of
P17,000.00. In so far as Romulo Partos is concerned, his case is
dismissed. With costs.
ISSUE:
WON Dujua is criminally liable for illegal recruitment
in large scale.
HELD:
YES. The essential elements of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale are: (1) the accused engages in acts of
recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article
13(b) or in any prohibited activities under Art. 34 of the Labor
Code (2) the accused has not complied with the guidelines
issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly
with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit
and deploy workers, either locally or overseas and (3) the
accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more
persons, individually or as a group. All three elements have
been established beyond reasonable doubt.
First, the testimonies of the complaining witnesses
satisfactorily prove that appellant promised them employment
and assured them placement overseas. Complainants were firm
and categorical. All of them positively identified appellant as
the person who recruited them for employment abroad. Their
testimonies dovetail each other on material points. There is no
adequate showing that any of them was impelled by any ill
motive to testify against appellant. Their testimonies were
straightforward, credible and convincing. As against the
positive and categorical testimonies of the three complainants,
appellant's mere denials cannot prevail. It is irrelevant whether
or not complainants claims are supported by receipts. The
absence of receipts in a case for illegal recruitment does not
warrant the acquittal of the appellant and is not fatal to the
prosecutions case. As long as the prosecution is able to
establish through credible testimonial evidence that the
appellant has engaged in Illegal Recruitment, a conviction for
the offense can very well be justified.
Second, appellant did not have any license or authority
to recruit persons for overseas work, as shown by the
Certification issued by the POEA. Neither did his employer, the
World Pack Travel and Tours, possess such license or authority.
Third, it bears clarifying that although Romulo Portos
was named as among those recruited by appellant the evidence
reveals that Romulo withdrew his application in lieu of which
his wife Melodea Villanueva applied for placement with
appellant. Villanueva, however, is not
named as one of appellants victims. Nevertheless, it has been
alleged and proven that appellant undertook the recruitment of
not less than three persons, namely, Cabus, Caluten and Perlas.
The RTC, therefore, aptly meted upon appellant the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P100,000.00, in accordance with Article 39(a) of the Labor
Code.
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LARRY
LAURO DOMINGO, appellant.
G.R. No. 181475. April 7, 2009.
Labor Law Illegal Recruitment To prove illegal
recruitment in large scale, the prosecution must prove three
essential elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook a
recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited
practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code (2) he/she did not
have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment or placement of workers and (3) he/she committed
the prohibited practice against three or more persons
individually or as a group.To prove illegal recruitment in
large scale, the prosecution must prove three essential elements,
to wit: (1) the person charged undertook a recruitment activity
under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34
of the Labor Code (2) he/she did not have the license or the
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement
of workers and (3) he/she committed the prohibited practice
against three or more persons individually or as a group.
Same Same For even if at the time appellant was
promising employment no cash was given to him, he is still
considered as having been engaged in recruitment activities,
since Article 13(b) of the Labor Code states that the act of
recruitment may be for profit or notit suffices that appellant
promised or offered employment for a fee to the complaining
witnesses to warrant his conviction for illegal recruitment.
That no receipt or document in which appellant acknowledged
receipt of money for the promised jobs was adduced in evidence
does not free him of liability. For even if at the time appellant
was promising employment no cash was given to him, he is still
considered as having been engaged in recruitment activities,
since Article 13(b) of the Labor Code states that the act of
recruitment may be for profit or not. It suffices that appellant
promised or offered employment for a fee to the complaining
witnesses to warrant his conviction for illegal recruitment.
FACTS:
Of the 23 complainants, only five testified, namely:
Rogelio Cambay, Florentino Ondra, Dionisio Aguilar, Ma.
Leah Vivas, and Simeon Cabigao. The substance of their
respective testimonies follows:
Rogelio Cambay: Appellant recruited him for a
painting job in Marianas Island for which he paid him the
amount of P15,000 in two installmentsP2,500 during his
medical examination at Newton Clinic in Makati City, andthe
balance of P12,500 before the scheduled departure on January
25, 2000. On his scheduled departure, appellant did not show
up at their meeting place in Malolos, Bulacan, hence, the around
one hundred people who waited for him organized a search
party to look for him in Zambales. Appellant was arrested on
February 25, 2000 at the Balintawak tollgate. A verification
with the Department of Labor and Employment showed that
appellant was not a licensed recruiter.
Florentino Ondra: He was recruited by appellant for
employment as laborer in Saipan, for which he gave P14,700
representing expenses for passporting, NBI clearance, and
medical examination. Dionisio Aguilar: In September, 1999, he
met appellant thru a friend whereupon he was interviewed,
tested for a hotel job, and scheduled for medical examination.
Page | 3
He gave P30,000 to appellant inside the latters car on
November, 1999 after his medical examination. While he was
twice scheduled for departure, it did not materialize.
Ma. Leah Vivas: After meeting appellant thru Eddie
Simbayan on October 19, 1999, she applied for a job as a
domestic helper in Saipan, for which she paid appellant
P10,000, but like the other complainants, she was never
deployed.
Simeon Cabigao: He was recruited by appellant in
September, 1999 for employment as carpenter in Saipan with a
guaranteed salary of $375 per month. For the promised
employment, he paid appellant P3,000 for medical fee, and an
additional P9,000, supposedly to bribe the examining physician
because, per information of appellant, he (Cabigao) was found
to have an ailment. He was scheduled for departure on February
23, 2000, but the same never took place. He was among those
who looked for appellant in Zambales.
Private complainant Cabigao later recanted this
testimony, per his affidavit dated March 3, 2003. Testifying
anew, this time for the defense, he averred that the one who
actually recruited him and his co-complainants and received
their money was Danilo Gimeno (Gimeno), and that they only
agreed among themselves to file a case against appellant
because Gimeno was nowhere to be found. Thus, they filed a
criminal complaint against Domingo.
Appellant, denying all the accusations against him,
claimed as follows: He was a driver hired by the real recruiter,
Gimeno, whom he met inside the Victory Liner Bus bound for
Manila in September, 2000. It was Gimeno who undertakes
recruitment activities in Dakila, Malolos, Bulacan at the
residence of Eddie Simbayan, and that the other cases for illegal
recruitment filed against him before other courts have all been
dismissed. Appellant likewise presented as witnesses private
complainants Enrico Espiritu and Roberto Castillo who
corroborated his claim that it was Gimeno who actually
recruited them, and that the filing of the complaint against
appellant was a desperate attempt on their part to get even
because Gimeno could not be located.
RTC:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal case No. 1224M2001,
for Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale), this Court finds the
accused LARRY DOMINGO GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Article 38(b) of the Labor Code, as
amended, in relation to Article 13 (b) and 34 of the same Code
(Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale) and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and pay a fine of
P100,000.00.
CA:
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision
by the challenged Decision dated September 28, 2007, holding
that the straightforward and consistent testimonies of the
complaining witnesses sufficiently supported the trial courts
conclusion that appellant undertook recruitment activities
beginning September up to December 1999 in Dakila, Malolos,
Bulacan without the license therefor, and failed to deploy those
he recruited.
ISSUE:
WON Domingo is liable for the crime of illegal
recruitment.
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
HELD:
YES. The term recruitment and placement is
defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines as follows: (b) Recruitment and placement
refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.
Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
On the other hand, Article 38, paragraph (a) of the
Labor Code, as amended, under which the accused stands
charged, provides: Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment.(a) Any
recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by
nonlicensees or nonholders of authority shall be deemed illegal
and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of
Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may
initiate complaints under this Article. (b) Illegal recruitment
when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall
be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out
by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or
illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first
paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that any
recruitment activities to be undertaken by nonlicensee or
nonholder of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable
under Article 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the
prosecution must prove three essential elements, to wit: (1) the
person charged undertook a recruitment activity under Article
13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor
Code (2) he/she did not have the license or the authority to
lawfully engage in the recruitment andplacement of workers
and (3) he/she committed the prohibited practice against three
or more persons individually or as a group.
The Court finds that the prosecution ably discharged
its onus of proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
appellant of the crimes charged. That no receipt or document in
which appellant acknowledged receipt of money for the
promised jobs was adduced in evidence does not free him of
liability. For even if at the timeappellant was promising
employment no cash was given to him, he is still considered as
having been engaged in recruitment activities, since Article
13(b) of the Labor Code states that the act of recruitment may
be for profit or not. It suffices that appellant promised or offered
employment for a fee to the complaining witnesses to warrant
his conviction for illegal recruitment.
4.1 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RODOLFO GALLO, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 185277. March 18, 2010.
Page | 4

Same Labor Law Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale
Elements In the simplest terms, illegal recruitment is
committed by persons who, without authority from the
government, give the impression that they have the power to
send workers abroad for employment purposes. To constitute
illegal recruitment in large scale, three elements must concur:
(a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law
to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement
of workers (b) the offender undertakes any of the activities
within the meaning of recruitment and placement under
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of the same Code (now
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042) and, (c) the offender
committed the same against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group. Article 13(b) of the Labor Code
defines recruitment and placement as any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not. In the simplest terms, illegal
recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority
from the government, give the impression that they have the
power to send workers abroad for employment purposes.
FACTS:
Appellant Rodolfo Gallo (Gallo), together with Pilar
Manta (Manta) and Fides Pacardo (Pacardo), was originally
charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and thirty four
(34) counts of estafa in thirty five (35) separate informations
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34.
When arraigned, all three accused pleaded not guilty to the
charges. In the course of the trial of the cases, some of the
private complainants, one after another, moved for the
withdrawal of their respective complaints while others failed to
appear during the scheduled hearings despite due notice. Hence,
the public prosecutor moved for the provisional dismissal of
their cases until only three private complainants remained. The
remaining private complainants, Reynaldo Panlilio (Panlilio),
Ian Fernandez (Fernandez) and Zenaida Filomeno (Filomeno),
testified for the prosecution.
Fernandez narrated that at around 9:00 a.m. on 5 June
2001, he was at the MPM International Recruitment Agency
(MPM) with his friend Reynaldo Panlilio applying for a job
overseas. He recounted that he was able to talk first with
accused Gallo, then with the owner of MPM, Mardeolyn Martir
(Martir). Gallo informed him that if he pays P45,000.00, he
would be able to leave for Korea in two to three months time.
Thus, he returned the following day with P45,000.00 and gave
the amount to Martir. Gallo issued a receipt covering the
amount but this was later on replaced with a promissory note.
Panlilio narrated that on 5 June 2001, he went to the
offices of MPM in Ermita, Manila, to apply for a job as a factory
worker in Korea. He testified that he talked to Martir who told
him to come back the next day with P45,000.00 for the
processing of his application. Upon arriving the following day
(6 June 2001), he was met by accused Gallo and upon the
instruction of Martir, Panlilio gave the money to Gallo. Unable
to leave for Korea despite the lapse of several months, Panlilio
demanded the return of his money. The agency, however,
requested a month within which to refund the money and the
receipt issued for the P45,000.00 he paid was replaced with a
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
promissory note. While in the province, he learned that the
agency had closed, so he went back to Manila to verify this
information. He found out that the agency had transferred its
offices to the Prudential Bank Building in Sta. Cruz, Manila.
There, he and about 30 to 40 other victims of the agency
arrested the three accused by virtue of a citizens arrest. The
accused were first brought to the Sta. Cruz Police Station, then
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), where a formal
complaint was filed against them.
Filomeno testified that she learned from a friend that
MPM is accepting applicants for work in Korea. She went to
the agency sometime in May 2001 and was initially met by
accused Manta who instructed her to talk to Martir. Inside the
latters office, she found Gallo and Martir accepting applicants
for overseas employment. She narrated that she initially paid
P15,000.00 as processing fee to Gallo and Martir who both
counted the money in front of her. She later on paid another
P5,000.00, both of which amounts were covered by a receipt.
Gallo and Martir told her that in September 2001, she would be
able to leave for Korea where she would be working as a factory
worker with a monthly salary of US$500.00 plus overtime pay.
Because she failed to leave as promised, she called the agency
on at least four occasions to follow up her application, but she
was unable to talk to either accused Gallo or Martir. When she
went to the agency to personally inquire about the status of her
application, she found out that the accused had been arrested so
she proceeded to the NBI to file a complaint.
The prosecution likewise presented documentary
evidence consisting of the promissory notes and official
receipts issued by the agency to the private complainants. Also
presented was a certification dated 23 August 2002, issued by
the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency, stating that
according to its records, the New Filipino Manpower
Development and Services, Inc. had an expired license and that
its application for the reissuance of a new license was denied. It
appears that MPM had earlier applied for a license but its
application was not granted hence, it changed its name to New
Filipino Manpower Development and Services, Inc.
For his defense, appellant Gallo alleged that he was
not an employee of MPM but was himself an applicant for
overseas work. According to him, someone from their province
informed him that MPM was recruiting applicants to be
employed as factory workers in Korea, so he applied sometime
in November 2000. He further testified that he paid P20,000.00
for the processing of his visa but was not issued a receipt his
payment was merely recorded in the agencys logbook. When
his visa was issued, the agency asked for an additional payment
of P40,000.00 for his plane fare, but he was unable to produce
the amount, so another person was sent abroad in his stead. He
was advised by Martir to wait because the visa issued to him
earlier will be replaced by a trainee visa. As a result, he was
often seen at the office of Martir because he would often go
there to follow up his application. He denied having received
money from or having issued any receipt to private
complainants. Appellant, however, admitted having executed a
Kontra Salaysay and a Rejoinder Affidavit wherein it was
stated that he is merely a utility worker of New Filipino
Manpower Development and Services, Inc., and, as such, his
only duties therein consist of repair, janitorial and messengerial
jobs. He explained the conflict in his statements by claiming
that the aforesaid documents were prepared by a lawyer from
the NBI and he signed them without reading their contents. He,
Page | 5
nevertheless, disclosed during his testimony that the personal
circumstances stated in the documents were gathered by the
NBI from him.
The trial court rendered a decision on 10 April 2003
convicting him of the crimes charged. Accused Manta and
Pacardo were acquitted for insufficiency of the evidence
presented against them.
In view of the penalty imposed, the case was elevated
to this Court on automatic review. In accordance with our ruling
in People v. Mateo, the Court resolved to transfer the cases to
the Court of Appeals for intermediate review. CA affirmed the
decision with some modifications.
ISSUE:
WON Gallo is guilty of illegal recruitment.
HELD:
Yes. We find no valid grounds to reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals affirming the lower courts judgment
of conviction. Appellants defense that he is also an applicant is
unavailing given the complete absence of any attempt on his
part to seek a refund of the money he allegedly paid to the
agency when the job promised him failed to materialize. He did
not complain at all, at the very least, but, instead, even helped
out at the office whenever he went there to follow up his
application. As aptly put by the Court of Appeals, [s]uch a
story is highly improbable, incompatible with human behavior
and contrary to ordinary experience.Likewise, we find that the
trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant
guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale under
Republic Act No. 8042.
We are persuaded that all three elements of illegal
recruitment in large scale were proven in this case. First,
appellant had no valid license or authority to engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers. This is established by
the Karagdagang Salaysay executed by Pacardo on 8 March
2002, paragraph 6 of which states that while MPM applied for
a license, it was never issued one, for which reason, it changed
its name to New Filipino Manpower Development and
Services, Inc. Second, despite not having such authority,
appellant nevertheless engaged in recruitment activities,
offering and promising jobs to private complainants and
collecting from them various amounts as placement fees. This
is substantiated by the respective testimonies of the three
private complainants. Third, he committed the same against
three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.
4.2 HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. HON.
TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 81510. March 14, 1990.
Labor Law Constitutional Law Administrative Law Remedial
Law Only a judge may issue warrants of search and arrest.
Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written,
was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos.
1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to
Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative
powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. We
reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities
must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare
Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional
and of no force and effect.
FACTS:
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz
Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for
brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar. On November 3,
1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said
complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following
telegram: YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR
BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA
COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON
NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST
YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.
On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner
had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public
respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his
challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205.
On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and
Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order
designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara
and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to
implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the
group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito
Castillo of the Peoples Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News
Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O.
Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found
that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before
entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure
order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed
them entry into the premises. Mrs Flora Salazar informed the
team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman
Development (Phil.) However, when required to show
credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio,
the team chanced upon twelve talent performers practicing a
dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside. The
team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted
for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora
Salazar.
On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the
following letter: Gentlemen: On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar
of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we
respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her
residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the
ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will
of the owner thereof.
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for
prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are already
fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider
the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public
interest involved.
ISSUE:
May the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue
warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the
Labor Code?
Page | 6
HELD:
No. Under the new Constitution, it is only a judge who
may issue warrants of search and arrest. In one case, it was
declared that mayors may not exercise this power. Neither may
it be done by a mere prosecuting body. That makes, to our mind
and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. We reiterate
that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer
issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go
through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article
38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no
force and effect.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm
the following principles: Under Article III, Section 2, of the
1987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may
issue warrants of arrest and search: The exception is in cases of
deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the
President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order
arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose
of deportation.
5.1 FLOURISH MARITIME SHIPPING and LOLITA UY,
petitioners, vs. DONATO A. ALMANZOR, respondent.
Labor Law Appeals Judicial review by the Supreme Court
does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its
determination.
Same Overseas Filipino Workers Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (R.A. No. 8042) The choice of
which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas
contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract, or three (3) months salary
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes
into play only when the employment contract concerned has a
term of at least one (1) year or more.
FACTS:
Respondent Donato A. Almanzor entered into a two-
year employment contract with Flourish Maritime Shipping as
fisherman, with a monthly salary of NT15,840.00 with free
meals every day. It was, likewise, agreed that respondent would
be provided with suitable accommodations. On October 1,
2004, respondent was deployed to Taipei, Taiwan as part of the
crew of a fishing vessel known as FV Tsang Cheng 66.
Respondent was surprised to learn that there were only five (5)
crew members on board and he had to buy his own food,
contrary to the agreed stipulation of free food and
accommodation. While on board, the master of the vessel gave
respondent orders which he could not understand thus, he
failed to obey him. Consequently, enraged at not being obeyed,
the master struck him, hitting the right dorsal part of his body.
He then requested medical assistance, but the master refused.
Hence, he sought the help of petitioner Lolita Uy (the manning
agency owner), who then talked to the master of the vessel.
While the vessel was docked at the Taipei port, respondent was
informed that he would be repatriated. Upon his arrival in the
Philippines, he reported to petitioners and sought medical
assistance after which he was declared fit to work. Petitioners
promised that he would be redeployed, but it turned out that it
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
was no longer possible because of his age, for then he was
already 49 years old.
Thus, respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, payment for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract, earned wages, moral and exemplary damages plus
attorneys fees.
Petitioners countered that respondent voluntarily
resigned from his employment and returned to the Philippines
on the same day. They, likewise, sought the dismissal of the
complaint for failure of respondent to comply with the
grievance machinery and arbitration clause embodied in the
contract of employment. Lastly, they insisted that respondent
failed to discharge the burden to prove that he was illegally
dismissed.
On October 7, 2005, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
Decision in favor of respondent. On appeal to the NLRC, the
Commission affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiters findings.
Unsatisfied, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals on petition for certiorari. The appellate court agreed
with the Labor Arbiters conclusion (as affirmed by the NLRC)
that respondent was illegally dismissed from employment. It,
however, modified the NLRC decision by increasing the
monetary award due respondent in accordance with its
interpretation of Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) 8042.
Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC Board of
Commissioners awarded such amount equivalent to
respondents salary for six (6) months (3 months for every year
of the unexpired term) considering that respondents
employment contract covered a twoyear period and he was
dismissed from employment after only 26 days of actual work.
The CA, however, disagreed with such interpretation.
According to the CA, since respondent actually worked for 26
days and was thereafter dismissed from employment, the
unexpired portion of the contract is one (1) year, eleven (11)
months and four (4) days. For the unexpired one (second) whole
year, the court awarded three months salary. As to the 11
months and 4 days of the first year, the appellate court refused
to apply the threemonth rule. Instead, in addition to three
months (for the unexpired second year), it awarded full
compensation corresponding to the whole unexpired term of 11
months and 4 days. Thus, the CA deemed it proper to award a
total amount equivalent to the respondents salary for 14
months and 4 days.
ISSUE:
WON LA has jurisdiction over money claims under
RA 8042.
HELD:
Yes. The Labor Arbiter concluded that petitioners,
who had the burden of proof, failed to adduce any convincing
evidence to establish and substantiate its claim that respondent
voluntarily resigned from employment. Likewise, the NLRC
held that petitioners failed to show that respondent was not
physically fit to perform work due to his old age. Moreover, the
labor tribunal said that petitioners failed to prove that the
employment contract indeed provided a grievance machinery.
Clearly, both labor tribunals correctly concluded, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, that respondent was not redeployed for
work, in violation of their employment contract. Perforce, the
termination of respondents services is without just or valid
cause.
Page | 7
We reiterate the dictum that this Court is not a trier of facts, and
this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Factual
questions are for the labor tribunals to resolve. In this case, the
factual issues were resolved by the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC. Their findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a reevaluation
of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor
tribunal has based its determination. On the amount of the
award due respondent, Section 10 of R.A. 8042 provides:
SECTION 10. Money Claims.x x x x x x x In case of
termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall
be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with
interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for
the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three
(3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less. x x x x. Applying the above provision, and considering that
the employment contract covers a twoyear period, we agree
with the Labor Arbiters disposition, as affirmed by the NLRC,
that respondent is entitled to six (6) months salary. This is
obviously what the law provides.
5.2 ANTONIO M. SERRANO, petitioner, vs. Gallant
MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW
NAVIGATION CO., INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009.
Same Same Republic Act No. 8042 Prior to Republic Act
8042, all Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs), regardless of
contract periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated
alike in terms of the computation of their monetary benefits in
case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a
uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by
the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
Same Same Same With the enactment of Republic Act 8042,
specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally
dismissed Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), with an
unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment
contract have since been differently treated in that their money
claims are subject to a 3month cap, whereas no such limitation
is imposed on local workers with fixed- term employment.
FACTS:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services,
Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA)approved Contract of Employment. On March 19,
1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to
accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of
Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he would be
made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. Respondents did
not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer.
Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was
repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998. Petitioners
employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from
March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his
repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2)
months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired
portion of nine (9) months and twentythree (23) days.
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a
Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and
for payment of his money claims in the total amount of
US$26,442.73 as well as moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999,
declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him
monetary benefits. In awarding petitioner a lumpsum salary of
US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation on the salary
period of three months onlyrather than the entire unexpired
portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioners employment
contract applying the subject clause.
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) to question the finding of the LA that
petitioner was illegally dismissed. Petitioner also appealed to
the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying
the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal
dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired
portion of their contracts.
In a Decision dated June 15, 2000, the NLRC modified
the LA Decision. The NLRC corrected the LAs computation
of the lumpsum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the
applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00
because R.A. No. 8042 does not provide for the award of
overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually
performed, and for vacation leave pay.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the subject
clause. The NLRC denied the motion. Petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional
challenge against the subject clause. In a Decision dated
December 8, 2004, the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the
reduction of the applicable salary rate however, the CA skirted
the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.His Motion for
Reconsideration26 having been denied by the CA, petitioner
brings his cause to this Court.
Petitioner contends that the subject clause is
unconstitutional because it unduly impairs the freedom of
OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their overseas
employment contracts a determinate employment period and a
fixed salary package. It also impinges on the equal protection
clause, for it treats OFWs differently from local Filipino
workers (local workers) by putting a cap on the amount of
lumpsum salary to which OFWs are entitled in case of illegal
dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award for
local workers when their dismissal is declared illegal that the
disparate treatment is not reasonable as there is no substantial
distinction between the two groups and that it defeats Section
18, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees the
protection of the rights and welfare of all Filipino workers,
whether deployed locally or overseas. Petitioner further
underscores that the insertion of the subject clause into R.A. No.
8042 serves no other purpose but to benefit local placement
agencies. He further claims that the subject clause violates the
due process clause, for it deprives him of the salaries and other
emoluments he is entitled to under his fixed-period employment
contract.
Respondents contend that the constitutional issue
should not be entertained, for this was belatedly interposed by
petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the earliest
Page | 8
opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal before the
NLRC.
The Solicitor General (OSG) points out that as R.A.
No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, its provisions could not
have impaired petitioners 1998 employment contract. Rather,
R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioners contract, the
provisions thereof are deemed part of the minimum terms of
petitioners employment, especially on the matter of money
claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties. Moreover,
the OSG emphasizes that OFWs and local workers differ in
terms of the nature of their employment, such that their rights
to monetary benefits must necessarily be treated differently.
The OSG enumerates the essential elements that distinguish
OFWs from local workers: first, while local workers perform
their jobs within Philippine territory, OFWs perform their jobs
for foreign employers, over whom it is difficult for our courts
to acquire jurisdiction, or against whom it is almost impossible
to enforce judgment andsecond, as held in Coyoca v. National
Labor Relations Commission and Millares v. National Labor
Relations Commission, OFWs are contractual employees who
can never acquire regular employment status, unlike local
workers who are or can become regular employees. Hence, the
OSG posits that there are rights and privileges exclusive to local
workers, but not available to OFWs that these peculiarities
make for a reasonable and valid basis for the differentiated
treatment under the subject clause of the money claims of
OFWs who are illegally dismissed. Thus, the provision does not
violate the equal protection clause nor Section 18, Article II of
the Constitution. Lastly, the OSG defends the rationale behind
the subject clause as a police power measure adopted to mitigate
the solidary liability of placement agencies for this redounds
to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare the
government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate
placement agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant
workers are properly deployed and are employed under decent
and humane conditions.
ISSUE:
WON the subject clause or for three months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
constitutional.
HELD:
No. It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs,
regardless of contract periods or the unexpired portions
thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their
monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were
subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries
multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment
contracts.The subject clause violates Section 1, Article III of
the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3,
Article XIII on labor as a protected sectorThe subject clause
does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose
and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just
petitioners right to equal protection, but also her right to
substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution.Thesubject clause or for three months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL and the December 8,
2004 Decision and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his
employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days
computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month.
6. Almodiel vs. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 100641. June 14, 1993
Facts:
Petitioner Farle P. Almodiel is a certified public
accountant who was hired in October, 1987 as Cost Accounting
Manager of respondent Raytheon Philippines, Inc. through a
reputable placement firm, John Clements Consultants, Inc. He
started as a probationary or temporary employee. As Cost
Accounting Manager, his major duties were: (1) plan,
coordinate and carry out year and physical inventory (2)
formulate andissue out hard copies of Standard Product costing
and other cost/pricing analysis if needed and required and (3)
set up the written Cost Accounting System for the whole
company.
On January 27, 1989, petitioner was summoned by his
immediate boss and in the presence of IRD Manager, Mr.
Rolando Estrada, he was told of the abolition of his position on
the ground of redundancy. He pleaded with management to
defer its action or transfer him to another department, but he
was told that the decision of management was final and that the
same has been conveyed to the Department of Labor and
Employment. Thus, he was constrained to file the complaint for
illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of the National
Capital Region, NLRC, Department of Labor and Employment.
On September 27, 1989, Labor Arbiter Daisy
CautonBarcelona rendered a decision declaring that
complainants termination on the ground of redundancy is
highly irregular and without legal and factual basis.
Raytheon appealed therefrom on the grounds that the
Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
its right to dismiss petitioner on the ground of redundancy, in
relying on baseless surmises and selfserving assertions of the
petitioner that its act was tainted with malice and bad faith and
in awarding moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
On March 21, 1991, the NLRC reversed the decision
and directed Raytheon to pay petitioner the total sum of
P100,000.00 as separation pay/financial assistance.
Petitioner filed the instant petition averring that: The
public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to (lack of) or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring
as valid and justified the termination of petitioner on the ground
of redundancy in the face of clearly established finding that
petitioners termination was tainted with malice, bad faith and
irregularity.
There is no dispute that petitioner was duly advised,
one (1) month before, of the termination of his employment on
the ground of redundancy in a written notice by his immediate
superior, Mrs. Magdalena B.D. Lopez sometime in the
afternoon of January 27, 1989. He was issued a check for
P54,863.00 representing separation pay but in view of his
refusal to acknowledge the notice and the check, they were sent
to him thru Presiding Commissioner Bartolome S. Carale and
Commissioner Vicente S.E. Veloso registered mail on January
30, 1989. The Department of Labor and Employment was
served a copy of the notice of termination of petitioner in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and
the implementing rules. Petitioner claims that the functions of
Page | 9
his position were absorbed by the Payroll/Mis/Finance
Department under the management of Danny Ang Tan Chai, a
resident alien without any working permit from the Department
of Labor and Employment as required by law. Petitioner relies
on the testimony of Raytheons witness to the effect that
corollary functions appertaining to cost accounting were
dispersed to other units in the Finance Department. And
granting that his department has to be declared redundant, he
claims that he should have been the Manager of the
Payroll/Mis/Finance Department which handled general
accounting, payroll and encoding. As a B.S. Accounting
graduate, a CPA with M.B.A. units, 21 years of work
experience, and a natural born Filipino, he claims that he is
better qualified than Ang Tan Chai, a B.S. Industrial Engineer,
hired merely as a Systems Analyst Programmer or its equivalent
in early 1987, promoted as MIS Manager only during the
middle part of 1988 and a resident alien.
On the other hand, Raytheon insists that petitioners
functions as Cost Accounting Manager had not been absorbed
by Ang Tan Chai, a permanent resident born in this country. It
claims to have established below that Ang Tan Chai did not
displace petitioner or absorb his functions and duties as they
were occupying entirely different and distinct positions
requiring different sets of expertise or qualifications and
discharging functions altogether different and foreign from that
of petitioners abolished position. Raytheon debunks
petitioners reliance on the testimony of Mr. Estrada saying that
the same witness testified under oath that the functions of the
Cost Accounting Manager had been completely dispensed with
and the position itself had been totally abolished.
Destitute of merit is petitioners imputation of
unlawful discrimination when Raytheon caused corollary
functions appertaining to cost accounting to be absorbed by
Danny Ang Tan Chai, a resident alien without a working
permit.
Article 40 of the Labor Code which requires
employment permit refers to nonresident aliens. The
employment permit is required for entry into the country for
employment purposes and is issued after determination of the
nonavailability of a person in the Philippines who is competent,
able and willing at the time of application to perform the
services for which the alien is desired. Since Ang Tan Chai is a
resident alien, he does not fall within the ambit of the provision.
Petitioner also assails Raytheons choice of Ang Tan
Chai to head the Payroll/Mis/Finance Department, claiming
that he is better qualified for the position. It should be noted,
however, that Ang Tan Chai was promoted to the position
during the middle part of 1988 or before the abolition of
petitioners position in early 1989.
Issue: WON Farle Almodiel was illegally dismissed.
Held: No. It has been consistently held that an objection
founded on the ground that one has better credentials over the
appointee is frowned upon so long as the latter possesses the
minimum qualifications for the position. In the case at bar, since
petitioner does not allege that Ang Tan Chai does not qualify
for the position, the the Court cannot substitute its discretion
and judgment for
that which is clearly and exclusively management prerogative.
To do so would take away from the employer what rightly
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
belongs to him as aptly explained in NationalFederation of
Labor Unions v. NLRC:
It is a wellsettled rule that labor laws do not authorize
interference with the employers judgment in the conduct of his
business. The determination of the qualification and fitness of
workers for hiring and firing, promotion or reassignment are
exclusive prerogatives of management. The Labor Code and its
implementing Rules do not vest in the Labor Arbiters nor in the
different Divisions of the NLRC (nor in the courts) managerial
authority. The employer is free to determine, using his own
discretion and business judgment, all elements of employment,
from hiring to firing except in cases of unlawful
discrimination or those which may be provided by law. There is
none in the
instant case.
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National
Labor Relations Commission in reversing and annulling the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and that on the contrary, the
termination of petitioners employment was anchored on a valid
and authorized cause under Article 283 of the Labor Code, the
instant petition for certiorari must fail
7. General Milling Corporation vs. Torres
G.R. No. 93666. April 22, 1991
Facts:
On 1 May 1989, the National Capital Region of the
Department of Labor and Employment issued Alien
Employment Permit No. M06893535 in favor of petitioner Earl
Timothy Cone, a United States citizen, as sports consultant and
assistant coach for petitioner General Milling Corporation
(GMC).
On 27 December 1989, petitioners GMC and Cone
entered into a contract of employment whereby the latter
undertook to coach GMCs basketball team.
On 15 January 1990, the Board of Special Inquiry of
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation approved
petitioner Cones application for a change of admission status
from temporary visitor to prearranged employee.
On 9 February 1990, petitioner GMC requested
renewal of petitioner Cones alien employment permit. GMC
also requested that it be allowed to employ Cone as fullfledged
coach. The DOLE Regional Director, Luna Piezas, granted the
request on 15 February 1990. On 18 February 1990, Alien
Employment Permit No. M02903881, valid until 25 December
1990, was issued.
Private respondent Basketball Coaches Association of
the Philippines (BCAP) appealed the issuance of said alien
employment permit to the respondent Secretary of Labor who,
on 23 April 1990, issued a decision ordering cancellation of
petitioner Cones employment permit on the ground that there
was no showing that there is no person in the Philippines who
is competent, able and willing to perform the services required
nor that the hiring of petitioner Cone would redound to the
national interest.
Petitioners are now before the Court on a Petition for
Certiorari, dated 14 June 1990, alleging that: respondent
Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion when he
revoked petitioner Cones alien employment permit and
Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code is null and void as it is in
Page | 10
violation of the enabling law as the Labor Code does not
empower respondent Secretary to determine if the employment
of an alien would redound to national interest.
Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing
Rules, provides as follows: Section 6. Issuance of Employment
PermitThe Secretary of Labor may issue an employment
permit to the applicant based on: Compliance by the applicant
and his employer with the requirements of Section 2 hereof
Report of the Bureau Director as to the availability or non-
accordance with the imperative of economic development
Petitioners apparently suggest that the Secretary of Labor is not
authorized to take into account the question of whether or not
employment of an alien applicant would redound to the
national interest because Article 40 does not explicitly refer to
such assessment.
Petitioner GMC also claims that hiring of a foreign
coach is an employers prerogative.
Issue: WON an alien is required to obtain an employment
permit before working in the Philippines.
Held: Yes. Petitioner GMCs claim that hiring of a foreign
coach is an employers prerogative has no legal basis at all.
Under Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking
employment of an alien must first obtain an employment permit
from the Department of Labor. Petitioner GMCs right to
choose whom to employ is, of course, limited by the statutory
requirement of an alien employment permit.
Petitioners will not find solace in the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. As pointed out by the
SolicitorGeneral, no comparison can be made between
petitioner Cone and Mr. Norman Black as the latter is a long
time resident of the country, and thus, not subject to the
provisions of Article 40 of the Labor Code which apply only to
non resident aliens. In any case, the term nonresident alien
and its obverse resident alien, here must be given their
technical connotation under our law on immigration.
Neither can petitioners validly claim that
implementation of respondent Secretarys decision would
amount to an impairment of the obligations of contracts. The
provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations requiring alien employment permits were in
existence long before petitioners entered into their contract of
employment. It is firmly settled that provisions of applicable
laws, especially provisions relating to matters affected with
public policy, are deemed written into contracts. Private parties
cannot constitutionally contract away the otherwise applicable
provisions of law.
Petitioners contention that respondent Secretary of
Labor should have deferred to the findings of Commission on
Immigration and Deportation as to the necessity of employing
petitioner Cone, is, again, bereft of legal basis. The Labor Code
itself specifically empowers respondent Secretary to make a
determination as to the availability of the services of a person
in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time
of application to perform the services for which an alien is
desired. In short, the Department of Labor is the agency vested
with jurisdiction to determine the question of availability of
local workers. The constitutional validity of legal provisions
granting such jurisdiction and authority and requiring proof of
nonavailability of local nationals able to carry out the duties of
the position involved, cannot be seriously questioned.
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
Petitioners apparently suggest that the Secretary of
Labor is not authorized to take into account the question of
whether or not employment of an alien applicant would
redound to the national interest because Article 40 does not
explicitly refer to such assessment. This argument (which
seems impliedly to concede that the relationship of basketball
coaching and the national interest is tenuous and unreal) is not
persuasive. In the first place, the second paragraph of Article 40
says: [t]he employment permit may be issued to a nonresident
alien or to the applicant employer after a determination of the
nonavailability of a person in the Philippines who is competent,
able and willing at the time of application to perform the
services for which the alien is desired.
The permissive language employed in the Labor Code
indicates that the authority granted involves the exercise of
discretion on the part of the issuing authority. In the second
place, Article 12 of the Labor Code sets forth a statement of
objectives that the Secretary of Labor should, and indeed must,
take into account in exercising his authority and jurisdiction
granted by the Labor Code.
8. Nitto Enterprises v. NLRC (1995)
Topic: Allowed Employment; Requirement Program
Approval; Art. 60
FACTS: Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in
the sale of glass and aluminum products, hired Roberto Capili
sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and
core maker as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement 2 for
a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28,
1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the
applicable minimum wage.
Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass
which he was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg
of an office secretary who was treated at a nearby hospital.
Later that same day, after office hours, private
respondent entered a workshop within the office premises
which was not his work station. There, he operated one of the
power press machines without authority and in the process
injured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the amount of P1,023.04
to cover the medication of private respondent.
The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign
in a letter, in a brief, that the company will pay for the expenses
and as a consequence for him to resign for violating the terms
of their agreement when he acted with gross negligence
resulting in the injury not only to himself but also to his fellow
worker.
Capili executed a Quitclaim and Release. Then the respondent
formally filed before the NLRC a complaint for illegal
dismissal and payment of other monetary benefits.
Petitioner assails the NLRC's finding that private
respondent Roberto Capili cannot plainly be considered an
apprentice since no apprenticeship program had yet been filed
and approved at the time the agreement was executed.
Petitioner further insists that the mere signing of the
apprenticeship agreement already established an employer-
apprentice relationship
.
ISSUE: Was the employer-apprentice relationship established
between the parties
Page | 11
HELD: No. In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement
between petitioner and private respondent was executed on
May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in
the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, an
apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and
submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment.
However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June
7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the
Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship
agreement was enforced the day it was signed. Based on the
evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the
requirements of the law. It is mandated that apprenticeship
agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall
be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program
duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and
Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is,
therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship
agreement can be validly entered into.
The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code
provides:
Contents of apprenticeship agreement.
Apprenticeship agreements, including the main rates of
apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of
Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall not
exceed six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for
wage rates below the legal minimum wage, which in no case
shall start below 75% per cent of the applicable minimum wage,
may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship
program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and
Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard model
programs of apprenticeship. (emphasis supplied)
9. Bernardo v. NLRC & FEBTC
Topic: Persons with disabilities as to Rights and Privileges
FACTS: Complainants are deaf-mutes who were hired on
various periods by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as
Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded
agreement called Employment Contract for Handicapped
Workers.
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular
employees, because their task as money sorters and counters
was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank.
They further allege that their contracts served merely to
preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from
becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners
were hired only as special workers and should not in any way
be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank.
Rather, they were special workers under Article 80 of the Labor
Code. Private respondent contends that it never solicited the
services of petitioners, whose employment was merely an
accommodation in response to the requests of government
officials and civic-minded citizens. They were told from the
start, with the assistance of government representatives, that
they could not become regular employees because there were
no plantilla positions for money sorters, whose task used to be
performed by tellers. Their contracts were renewed several
times, not because of need but merely for humanitarian reasons.
Respondent submits that as of the present, the special position
that was created for the petitioners no longer exist[s] in private
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
respondent [bank], after the latter had decided not to renew
anymore their special employment contracts.
LA & NLRC: Ruled against the petitioners.
ISSUE: Should the disabled persons be entitled to regular
employment? Should Art. 280 apply?
HELD: The facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the
Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably show that the
petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular
employees. As such, they have acquired legal rights that this
Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold, not as a matter of
compassion but as a consequence of law and justice.
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated
that they shall be trained for a period of one month, after which
the employer shall determine whether or not they should be
allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore,
the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just
and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the
employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of
the term.
According to private respondent, the employment contracts
were prepared in accordance with Article 80 of the Labor Code,
which provides:
ART. 80. Employment agreement. Any employer who employs
handicapped workers shall enter into an employment agreement
with them, which agreement shall include:
(a) The names and addresses of the handicapped workers to be
employed;
(b) The rate to be paid the handicapped workers which shall be
not less than seventy five (75%) per cent of the applicable legal
minimum wage;
(c) The duration of employment period; and
(d) The work to be performed by handicapped workers.
The employment agreement shall be subject to inspection by
the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives.
The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably
conform with the aforecited provision. Succeeding events and
the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons), however, justify the application of Article 280 of the
Labor Code.
Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers
and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks
were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important,
these facts show that they were qualified to perform the
responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their
disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks
assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates
that a qualified disabled employee should be given the same
terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied
person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides:
Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment. No disabled
person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable
employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to
the same terms and conditions of employment and the same
compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives
or allowances as a qualified able bodied person.
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons
necessarily removes the employment contracts from the ambit
of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of
Page | 12
qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article
280 of the Labor Code
10. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE
EXPORTERS, INC., vs.HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON
GR # 81958 June 30, 1988
Facts:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally
in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement challenges the validity of D.O. No 1
(Guidelines governing the temporary suspension of deployment
of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers) of DOLE on the
grounds of discrimination against males or females and that
it does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills as well as violative of
the right to travel and an invalid exercise of lawmaking power,
police power being legislative and not executive in character.
PASEI also invokes Sec. 3 of Article 13 of the Constitution
providing for worker participation in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law. Petitioners further contend that D.O. No. 1
was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed,
finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment
clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that
PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.
Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE
submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving
the police power of the State and informed the court that the
respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where
there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and
existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to
ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in
the challenged Department Order No. 1.
Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been
valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working
abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk
to which their class was exposed. There is no question that
Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does
not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is
well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution
does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and
women. It admits of classification, provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions.
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law.
3. They are not confined to existing conditions.
4. They apply equally to all members of the same class.
In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on
substantial distinctions. D.O. No. 1 does not impair the right to
travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right
to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is
subjects among other things, to the requirements of public
safety as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female
domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police
power has been defined as the state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE
with rule making powers.
11. PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
COMPANY vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997
Facts:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company)
initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as
Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from
November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F.
Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited
for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on
leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July
19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to
join PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary
period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the
job application form under civil status that she was single
although she had contracted marriage a few months
earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its
branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a
memorandum requiring her to explain the
discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder
about the companys policy of not accepting married women
for employment. She was dismissed from the company
effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down
decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner
illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the
status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that
she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted
marriage in violation of company policies.
Issue: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be
grounds to terminate the services of an employee.
Held: Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws
for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason
of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that
company is free to regulate manpower and employment from
hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business
judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or
those provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from
work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the
right against discrimination provided to all women workers by
our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses
clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved
principally because of the companys policy that married
women are not qualified for employment in the company, and
not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the
nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be
unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall
not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon
getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned
or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
Page | 13
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of
marriage.
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions
stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to
be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in
connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to
good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her
freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an
individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of
policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and
purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and
ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy
must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled
forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the
land not only for order but also imperatively required.
13. PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
COMPANY,** petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE
GUZMAN, respondents.
CASE SUMMARY :
Labor Law Dismissals Petitioners policy of not
accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman
worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the
right against discrimination afforded all women workers by our
labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.In the case at
bar, petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as
disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage runs afoul of the test
of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women
workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.
Contrary to petitioners assertion that it dismissed private
respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the
record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were
dissolved principally because of the companys policy that
married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and
not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
G. R. NO. AND DATE : G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997
FACTS :
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Company, (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment
of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to
terminate the services of an employee. That employee, herein
private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that
what really motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her
having contracted marriage during heremployment, which is
prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. She thus claims
that she was discriminated against in gross violation of law,
such a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article
136 of the Labor Code.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a
reliever. Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with
petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately
terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. On September
2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join
petitioner company as a probationary employee, the
probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she
indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was
single although she had contracted marriage a few months
earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.
When petitioner supposedly learned about the same
later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Official,
sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15,
1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that
memorandum, she was reminded about the companys policy
of not accepting married women for employment. In her reply
letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she
was not aware of PT&Ts policy regarding married women at
the time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her
true civil status. Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced
by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the
company.
ISSUE :
Whether or not the company policy of not accepting
married women is valid?
RULING :
The petition has no merit. The government, to repeat,
abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by
petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms,
as follows:
"ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage.It shall be
unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a
woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly
or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to
actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise
prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of
marriage.
In the case at bar, petitioners policy of not accepting
or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker
who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right
against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our
labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to
petitioners assertion that it dismissed private respondent from
employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses
clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved
principally because of the companys policy that married
women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not
merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the
provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a
woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage
in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults
good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a
woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by
all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and
inalienable right. Hence, while it is true that the parties to a
contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions
that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that
petitioners policy against legitimate marital bonds would
encourage illicit or common law relations and subvert the
sacrament of marriage.
Page | 14
 Petitioner would have the Court believe that
althoughprivate respondent defied its policy against its
femaleemployees contracting marriage, what could be an act
ofinsubordination was inconsequential. What it submits
asunforgivable is her concealment of that marriage yet, at
thesame time, declaring that marriage is a trivial matter towhich
it supposedly has no objection. In other words, PT&Tsays it
gives its blessings to its female employeescontracting marriage,
despite the maternity leaves andother benefits it would
consequently respond for and whichobviously it would have
wanted to avoid. If that employeeconfesses such fact of
marriage, there will be no sanctionbut if such employee
conceals the same instead ofproceeding to the confessional, she
will be dismissed. Thisline of reasoning does not impress us as
reflecting its truemanagement policy or that we are being
regaled with responsible advocacy.
13. DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMANPTGWO
and PEDRO A. TECSON, petitioners, vs. GLAXO
WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
CASE SUMMARY :
Labor Law Dismissals Glaxos policy prohibiting an
employee from having a relationship with an employee of a
competitor company is a valid exercise of management
prerogative.No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court
of Appeals when it ruled that Glaxos policy prohibiting an
employee from having a relationship with an employee of a
competitor company is a valid exercise of management
prerogative. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets,
manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors,
especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly
competitive pharmaceutical industry.
Same Same Glaxo does not impose an absolute
prohibition against relationships between its employees and
those of competitor companies What the company merely seeks
to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the
company that may arise out of such relationships.From the
wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its
employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an
absolute prohibition against relationships between its
employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees
are free to cultivate
relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing.
What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest
between the employee and the company that may arise out of
such relationships.
G. R. NO. AND DATE : G.R. No. 162994. September 17,
2004
FACTS :
Confronting the Court in this petition is a novel
question, with constitutional overtones, involving the validity
of the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its
employees from marrying employees of any competitor
company.Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by
respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as
medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had
undergone training and orientation. Thereafter, Tecson signed
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that
he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules to
disclose to management any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employeesor employees of
competing drug companies and should management find that
such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign
from the company.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos
products in the Camarines Sur Camarines Norte sales
area.Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romanticrelationship
with Bettsy, an employee of AstraPharmaceuticals (Astra), a
competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy wasAstras Branch Coordinator in
Albay.Even before they got married, Tecson received several
reminders from his District Manager regarding the conflict of
interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender.
Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan
CitySurigaoCityAgusandel Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo
to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied.
Petitioners filed the instant petition. Petitioners
contend that Glaxos policy against employees marrying
employees of competitor companies violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid
distinctions among employees on account only of marriage.
They claim that the policy restricts the employees right to
marry. They also argue that Tecson was constructively
dismissed as shown by the following circumstances: (1) he was
transferred from the Camarines Sur Camarines Norte sales area
to the ButuanSurigaoAgusan sales area, (2) he suffered a
diminution in pay, (3) he was excluded from attending seminars
and training sessions for medical representatives, and (4) he
was prohibited from promoting respondents products which
were competing with Astras products.
In its Comment on the petition, Glaxo argues that the
company policy prohibiting its employees from having a
relationship with and/or marrying an employee of a competitor
company is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives and
does not violate the equal protection clause and that Tecsons
reassignment from the Camarines Norte Camarines Sur sales
area to the Butuan City Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales
area does not amount to constructive dismissal.
Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the
promotion and sale of pharmaceutical products, it has a genuine
interest in ensuring that its employees avoid any activity,
relationship or interest that may conflict with their
responsibilities to the company. Thus, it expects its employees
to avoid having personal or family interests in any competitor
company which may influence their actions and decisions and
consequently deprive Glaxo of legitimate profits. The policy is
also aimed at preventing a competitor company from gaining
access to its secrets, procedures and policies. It likewise asserts
that the policy does not prohibit marriage per se but only
proscribes existing or future relationships with employees of
competitor companies, and is therefore not violative of the
equal protection clause. It maintains that considering the nature
of its business, the prohibition is based on valid grounds.
ISSUE :
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Glaxospolicy against its employees marrying employees
fromcompetitor companies is valid, and in not holding that
saidpolicy violates the equal protection clause of
theConstitution?
Page | 15

RULING :
The Court finds no merit in the petition. No reversible
error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that
Glaxos policy prohibiting an employee from having a
relationship with an employee of a competitor company is a
valid exercise of management prerogative. Glaxo has a right to
guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies and other confidential programs and information
from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival
companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic
interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a
policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments
and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor
to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the
protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute
will be decided in favor of the workers.
The challenged company policy does not violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners
erroneously suggest. In any event, from the wordings of the
contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook,
it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition
against relationships between its employees and those of
competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate
relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing.
What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest
between the employee and the company that may arise out of
such relationships.
The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the
assailed company policy which forms part of respondents
Employee Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its
employees, such as that signed by Tescon, was made known to
him prior to his employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of
that restriction when he signed his employment contract and
when he entered into a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson
knowingly and voluntarily entered into a contract of
employment with Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force
of law between them and, thus, should be complied with in good
faith. He is therefore estopped from questioning said policy.
14. Domingo v. Rayala
G.R. No. 155831 February 18, 2008
FACTS:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo, then Stenographic Reporter
III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment
againstRayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of
DOLE. The complaint contains the following allegations :
Holding and squeezing Domingos shoulders,
running his fingers across her neck andtickling
her ear, having inappropriate conversations
with her, giving her money allegedly for
schoolexpenses with a promise of future
privileges, and making statements with
unmistakable sexualovertones all these acts of
Rayala resound with deafening clarity the
unspoken request for a sexualfavor.
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
Upon receipt of the Complaint, DOLE Secretary
referred it to the OP, Rayala being a presidential appointee. The
OP,through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered
Secretary Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the
Complaintand create a committee for such purpose.
On December 4, 1998, Secretary Laguesma issued
Admin. Order. No. 280, Series of 1998, constituting a
Committee onDecorum and Investigation (Committee) in
accordance with Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995. The Committee heard the parties and
received their respective evidence.
On March 2, 2000, the Committee submittedits report
and recommendation to Secretary Laguesma. It found Rayala
guilty of the offense charged and recommended theimposition
of the minimum penalty provided under AO 250, which it
erroneously stated as suspension for six (6) months (thecorrect
penalty is 6months and 1 day).Executive Secretary Zamora,
issued AO 119, which dismissed Rayala from service effective
upon receipt of the Order.Rayala filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a Resolution. Under
Rule 65, Filed a Petitionfor Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order. However, it
was dismissed fordisregarding the hierarchy of courts. Motion
for reconsideration was filed and the case was referred to CA
for appropriate action.
CA: Sufficient evidence on record to create moral certainty that
Rayala committed the acts he was charged with.Dismissed for
disgraceful and immoral conduct in violation of RA 6713, the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for PublicOfficials and
Employees.Rayala timely filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.CAmodified its ruling in a special division of
5, the penalty of dismissal is DELETED and instead the penalty
ofsuspension from service for the maximum period of one (1)
year is HEREBY IMPOSED upon the petitioner. The rest of
thechallenged decision stands.Domingo filed a Petition for
Review, but was denied for having a defective verification.
MR granted, petitionreinstated.Rayala likewise filed a Petition
for Review arguing that he is not guilty of any act of sexual
harassment.Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA, but was denied.
ISSUE:
W/N Rayala commits sexual harassment.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and
establish any sexual favour, demand or request from petitioner
in exchange for her continued employment or for her
promotion. According to Rayala, the acts imputed to him are
without malice or ulterior motive. It was merely Domingos
perception of malice and a product of hew own imagination.
RULING:
YES. Factual findings are conclusive on the SC. And
quite significantly, Rayala himself admits to having
committedsome of the acts imputed to him.It is noteworthy that
the five CA Justices who deliberated on the case were
unanimous in upholding thefindings of the Committee and the
OP. They found the assessment made by the Committee and the
OP to be ameticulous and dispassionate analysis of the
testimonies of the complainant (Domingo), the respondent
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(Rayala), andtheir respective witnesses. They differed only on
the appropriate imposable penalty.That Rayala committed the
acts complained of and was guilty of sexual harassment is,
therefore, the commonfactual finding of not just one, but three
independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the CA. It
should beremembered that when supported by substantial
evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and
administrativebodies are accorded great respect and even
finality by the courts. The principle, therefore, dictates that such
findingsshould bind us.
Likewise, contrary to Rayalas claim, it is not essential
that the demand, request or requirement be made as a condition
for continued employment or for promotion to a higher
position. It is enough that the respondents act result in creating
an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the
employee.
15. Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation vs.
NLRC and Cortez
G.R. No. 124617 April 28, 2000
FACTS:
Rosalinda Cortez was the company nurse at Philippine
Aeolus. As early as her first year of employment, her Plant
Manager, William Chua, already manifested a special liking for
her, that she was receiving special treatment from him who
would oftentimes invite her for a date, which she would as
often refuse. On many occasions, he would make sexual
advances touching her hands, putting his arms around her
shoulders, running his fingers on her arms and telling her she
looked beautiful. The special treatment and sexual advances
continued during her employment for four (4) years but she
never reciprocated his flirtations, until finally, she noticed that
his attitude towards her changed. He made her understand that
if she would not give in to his sexual advances he would cause
her termination from the service; and he made good his threat
when he started harassing her. She just found out one day that
her table which was equipped with telephone and intercom units
and containing her personal belongings was transferred without
her knowledge to a place with neither telephone nor intercom,
for which reason, an argument ensued when she confronted
Chua resulting in her being charged with gross disrespect. The
company then dismissed her for throwing a stapler and
throwing invectives, among others, at her Plant Manager, Chua.
Rosalinda, thereafter, filed an illegal dismissal case and
explained that the incident arose when she had been trying to
refuse the sexual advances of Chua. The Labor Arbiter and the
National Labor Relations Commission ruled in her favor,
holding that the dismissal was illegal and ordering the company
to pay her moral damages. The corporation elevated the case on
certiorari to the Supreme Court alleging grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE:
W/N NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding as illegal
the dismissal of private respondent (Cortez) and W/N she is
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
entitled to damages in the event that the illegality of her
dismissal is sustained
RULING:
The Supreme Court declared Rosalindas dismissal
illegal and affirmed the award of moral damages. It did not give
merit to the companys argument that it is unbelievable that it
took her four (4) years before she reacted violently in defense
of her womanhood. The court recognized Mr. Chuas acts as
sexual harassment and explained that there is no time period for
reporting such crime saying:
Public respondent in thus concluding appears baffled
why it took private respondent more than four (4) years to
expose William Chuas alleged sexual harassment. It reasons
out that it would have been more prepared to support her
position if her act of throwing the stapler and uttering invectives
on William Chua were her immediate reaction to his amorous
overtures. In that case, according to public respondent, she
would have been justified for such outburst because she would
have been merely protecting her womanhood, her person and
her rights.
We are not persuaded. The gravamen of the offense in
sexual harassment is not the violation of the employees
sexuality but the abuse of power by the employer. Any
employee, male or female, may rightfully cry foul provided
the claim is well substantiated. Strictly speaking, there is no
time period within which he or she is expected to complain
through the proper channels. The time to do so may vary
depending upon the needs, circumstances, and more
importantly, the emotional threshold of the employee.
Private respondent admittedly allowed four (4) years
to pass before finally coming out with her employers sexual
impositions. Not many women, especially in this country, are
made of the stuff that can endure the agony and trauma of a
public, even corporate, scandal. If petitionercorporation had not
issued the third memorandum that terminated the services of
private respondent, we could only speculate how much longer
she would keep her silence. Moreover, few persons are
privileged indeed to transfer from one employer to another. The
dearth of quality employment has become a daily monster
roaming the streets that one may not be expected to give up
ones employment easily but to hang on to it, so to speak, by all
tolerable means. Perhaps, to private respondents mind, for as
long as she could outwit her employers ploys she would
continue on her job and consider them as mere occupational
hazards. This uneasiness in her place of work thrived in an
atmosphere of tolerance for four (4) years, and one could only
imagine the prevailing anxiety and resentment, if not bitterness,
that beset her all that time. But William Chua faced reality soon
enough. Since he had no place in private respondents heart, so
must she have no place in his office. So, he provoked her,
harassed her, and finally dislodged her; and for finally venting
her pent-up anger for years, he found the perfect reason to
terminate her.
Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced
superiority which is enough to dampen an employees spirit
in her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of
Page | 17
judgment. It changes her life, if for this alone private respondent
should be adequately compensated.
16. Apex Mining Company, Inc. vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 94951. April 22, 1991
Facts:
Private respondent Sinclitica Candido was employed
by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc. on May 18, 1973 to
perform laundry services at its staff house located at Masara,
Maco, Davao del Norte.
In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis.
However, on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly basis
at P250.00 a month which was ultimately increased to P575.00
a month. On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her
assigned task and she was hanging her laundry, she accidentally
slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported the accident to
her immediate supervisor Mila de la Rosa and to the personnel
officer, Florendo D. Asirit. As a result of the accident she was
not able to continue with her work. She was permitted to go on
leave for medication. De la Rosa offered her the amount of
P2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to
persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer and
preferred to return to work. Petitioner did not allow her to return
to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.
On March 11, 1988, private respondent filed a request
for assistance with the Department of Labor and Employment.
After the parties submitted their position papers as required by
the labor arbiter assigned to the case on August 24, 1988 the
latter rendered a decision rendered ordering the respondent,
Apex Mining Company, Inc., Masara, Davao del Norte, to pay
the complainant total of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SIXTY ONE PESOS AND 42/100 (P55,161.42).
Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed to the
public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). A decision was rendered by the Fifth Division thereof
on July 20, 1989 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and
affirming the appealed decision.
Hence, the herein petition for review by certiorari.
The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent should
be treated as a mere househelper or domestic servant and not as
a regular employee of petitioner.
Issue: Is the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial
company a domestic helper or a regular employee of the
said firm?
Held: Regular employee. The petition is devoid of merit. Under
Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended,
the terms househelper or domestic servant are defined as
follows:
The term househelper as used herein is synonymous to the
term domestic servant and shall refer to any person, whether
male or female, who renders services in and about the
employers home and which services are usually necessary or
desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and
ministers exclusively tothe personal comfort and enjoyment of
the employers family. The foregoing definition clearly
contemplates such house helper or domestic servant who is
employed in the employers home to minister exclusively to the
Dan Gloria// Kat Ramirez// Jessica Bernardo// Joseph De Mesa// Arvin Figueroa// Marvin Villardo Jr.// Chriszel Queano
personal comfort and enjoyment of the employers family. Such
definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry
women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and other similar
househelps.
The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or
laundry women working in staffhouses of a company, like
petitioner who attends to the needs of the companys guest and
other persons availing of said facilities. By the same token, it
cannot be considered to extend to the driver, houseboy, or
gardener exclusively working in the company, the staffhouses
and its premises.
They may not be considered as within the meaning of
a househelper or domestic servant as abovedefined by
law.The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the
family of the employer in the home of said employer. While it
may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper,
domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company
staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their
circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually
serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a
corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or
industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is
being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the
business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees
of the company or employer in the business concerned entitled
to the privileges of a regular employee.
Petitioner contends that it is only when the
househelper or domestic servant is assigned to certain aspects
of the business of the employer that such househelper or
domestic servant may be considered as such as employee.
The Court finds no merit in making any such
distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic
servant is working within the premises of the business of the
employer and in relation to or in connection with its business,
as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and
employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or
domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular
employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper
or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section 1(b),
Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.
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