68 Phil.

12 Political Law Constitutional Law Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid

Classification Bar from Drinking Gin
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or
any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera,
was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to
pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he
challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his
right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them
with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet
with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians
from Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable
classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the
characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable
requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or
parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or
less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the
public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the
enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be
no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government
has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure
for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their
Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.
 65 Phil. 56 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection
Probation Law
Separation of Powers Undue Delegation of Powers Power to Pardon
Constitutionality of Laws May the State Question Its Own Laws
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The
matter was referred to the Insular Probation Office which recommended the denial of Cu
Unjiengs petition for probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition
for probation. The Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the hearing,
the Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that courts like
the Court of First Instance of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have no
jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act No.
4221 or The Probation Law), probation is only meant to be applied in provinces with probation
officers; that the City of Manila is not a province, and that Manila, even if construed as a
province, has no designated probation officer hence, a Manila court cannot grant probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act 4221 is
unconstitutional for it violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws.
HSBC averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of provinces whether or nor to apply
the probation law if a province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will appoint a
probation officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed hence, that
makes it violative of the equal protection clause.
Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of power because it
gave the option to the provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law however,
the legislature did not provide guidelines to be followed by the provincial board.
Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the executives
power to grant pardon. They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in
effect encroached upon the executives power to grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution
agreed with the issues raised by HSBC ironic because their main stance was the non-
applicability of the probation law only in Manila while recognizing its application in provinces).
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, representing the
State as well as the People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like Act
4221, which the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila
who himself had used the Probation Law in the past without question but is now questioning
the validity of the said law (estoppel).
ISSUE:
1. May the State question its own laws?
2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative, from
questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had been
using an invalid law.
2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There is violation of
the equal protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to apply the law
by simply providing for a probation officer. So if a province decides not to install a probation
officer, then the accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the
Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall only apply to
provinces where the respective provincial boards have provided for a probation officer. But
nowhere in the law did it state as to what standard (sufficient standard test) should provincial
boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the probation law in their province. This
only creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily according to its whims.
Encroachment of Executive Power
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress
to provide for probation. Probation does not encroach upon the Presidents power to grant
pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation is within the power of Congress to fix penalties
while pardon is a power of the president to commute penalties.
 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection
The Legislative Department Undue Delegation
Imelda Marcos was charged for violating Central Bank Circular No. 960 which banned
residents, firms, associations and corporations from maintaining foreign exchange accounts
abroad without permission from the Central Bank. Several informations were filed against
her. During the pendency of the cases, C.B. Circ. 1318 and C.B. Circ. 1353 (Further
Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulations) were issued which basically allowed residents,
firms, associations and corporations to maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad but the
circulars have a saving clause excepting from the circular pending criminal actions involving
violations of C.B. Circ. 960. Marcos filed a Motion to Quash the informations filed against her
based on the new circulars. The RTC denied the Motion so did the CA hence the appeal.
Marcos averred that her right to equal protection has been violated, among others, as the
new circular was purposedly designed to preserve the criminal cases lodged against her.
She also averred that C.B. Circ. 960, as well as the Central Bank Act (which allowed the
Central Bank to issue circulars) is an undue delegation of legislative power because the said
law allowed the Central Bank to legislate (define crimes) penal laws and determine penalties
therefor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Marcos are correct.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The Central Bank Act is the penal law which
defined the crimes which allegedly were committed by Imelda Marcos. The C.B. Circulars
concerned merely spelled out the details of the offense. These circulars are mere
administrative regulations and not the penal laws itself alleged to have been violated by
Marcos.
Anent the issue of equal protection, the Supreme Court said [Marcoss] lamentations that the
aforementioned provisions are discriminatory because they are aimed at her and her co-
accused do not assume the dignity of a legal argument since they are unwarranted
conjectures belied by even the text of the circulars alone. Hence, as respondent appellate
court correctly concludes, the foregoing facts clearly disprove petitioners claim that her
constitutional right to equal protection of the law was violated. Should she nonetheless desire
to pursue such objection, she may always adduce additional evidence at the trial of these
cases since that is the proper stage therefor, and not at their present posture.
Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)
Nature: Original Petition in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus.

FACTS: Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to reclusion perpetua for the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with
Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the first two petitioners was rendered on March 8, 1954
and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on
Jan. 12, 1954. Each of the petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their
convictions.

They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which negated such complex crime, a
ruling which was not handed down until after their convictions have become final. In
People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information against the accused for rebellion complexed with
murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there
being no such complex offense. This ruling was not handed down until after their convictions have
become final. Since Hernandez served more than the maximum penalty that could
have been served against him, he is entitled to freedom, and thus, his continued detention is illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a retroactive effect is applicable
in this case (WON judicial decisions favourable to the accused/convicted for the same
crime can be applied retroactively)

RULING: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be applied retroactively. Petitioners
relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favour the accused who is not a habitual criminal. The Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the Constitution forms part of our legal
system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional right to equal protection, given that Hernandez et al.,
has been convicted for the same offense as they have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas
corpus is the only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision.
 357 SCRA 757 Political Law Constitutional Law Equal Protection Clause Cases
Before the Sandiganbayan
On May 18, 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were shot to death. The
incident was later sensationalized as a rub out. This implicated case Panfilo Lacson, who, at
the time of the rub out was then the PNP Chief, among others, as the ones responsible.
They were accused of multiple murder. The case reached the Sandiganbayan. In 1996,
Lacson et al filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They
aver that the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section
2 (par a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975 also known as An Act To Strengthen The Functional
And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose
Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended.
They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where
one or more of the principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher.
The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a
Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
In 1997, Republic Act No. 8249 was passed which basically expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The law was authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed
the law as it was introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely
suit the situation in which Lacsons cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring
jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-
dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the
cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake
such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioners
vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection by Lacson et al has been violated with
the passage of RA 8249.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al to equal
protection. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a
declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the
co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is
presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of
arbitrariness. It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements,
namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class
The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials
whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the
amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases
where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction
that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet
presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs,
examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to
define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably
anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which
is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, Lacson et al
cannot claim that Secs 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly
situated as them.
Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public
officials and, under the transitory provision in Sec 7, to all cases pending in any court.
Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are
in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng
cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already
begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Sec 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
 Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila

Thirteenth Congress
Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the nineteenth day of February, two thousand seven.

Republic Act No. 9372 March 6, 2007

AN ACT TO SECURE THE STATE AND PROTECT OUR PEOPLE FROM TERRORISM

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:

SECTION 1. Short Title. - This Act shall henceforth be known as the "Human Security Act of
2007."

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is declared a policy of the State to protect life, liberty, and
property from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the national
security of the country and to the welfare of the people, and to make terrorism a crime against the
Filipino people, against humanity, and against the law of nations.

In the implementation of the policy stated above, the State shall uphold the basic rights and
fundamental liberties of the people as enshrined in the Constitution.

The State recognizes that the fight against terrorism requires a comprehensive approach,
comprising political, economic, diplomatic, military, and legal means duly taking into account the root
causes of terrorism without acknowledging these as justifications for terrorist and/or criminal
activities. Such measures shall include conflict management and post-conflict peace-building,
addressing the roots of conflict by building state capacity and promoting equitable economic
development.

Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally

recognized powers of the executive branch of the government. It is to be understood, however that
the exercise of the constitutionally recognized powers of the executive department of the
government shall not prejudice respect for human rights which shall be absolute and protected at all
times.

SEC. 3. Terrorism.- Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following
provisions of the Revised Penal Code:

a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters);

b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);

c. Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private persons;
 d. Article 248 (Murder);

e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);

f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under

1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);

2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste
Control Act of 1990);

3. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);

4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);

5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974);
and,

6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal
and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of
Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)

thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the
crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit
of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
as amended.

SEC. 4. Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism. - Persons who conspire to commit the crime of
terrorism shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
the crime of terrorism as defined in Section 3 hereof and decide to commit the same.

SEC. 5. Accomplice. - Any person who, not being a principal under Article 17 of the Revised Penal
Code or a conspirator as defined in Section 4 hereof, cooperates in the execution of either the crime
of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism by previous or simultaneous acts shall suffer the
penalty of from seventeen (17) years, four months one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.

SEC. 6. Accessory. - Any person who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, and without having participated therein, either as
principal or accomplice under Articles 17 and 18 of the Revised Penal Code, takes part subsequent
to its commission in any of the following manner: (a) by profiting himself or assisting the offender to
profit by the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects,
or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; (c) by harboring, concealing, or assisting in
the escape of the principal or conspirator of the crime, shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and
one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

Notwithstanding the above paragraph, the penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed
upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate,
natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the
single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of subparagraph (a).

SEC. 7. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of Communications. -The

provisions of Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) to the contrary notwithstanding, a
police or law enforcement official and the members of his team may, upon a written order of the
Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of
electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of
any other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation,
discussion, or spoken or written words between members of a judicially declared and outlawed
terrorist organization, association, or group of persons or of any person charged with or suspected of
the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.

Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of communications between lawyers and
clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence
shall not be authorized.

SEC. 8. Formal Application for Judicial Authorization. - The written order of the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record communications,
messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words of any person suspected of the
crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall only be granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte written application of a police or of a
law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council
created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex parte application, and upon examination under oath
or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce to establish: (a) that there is
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the said
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism has been committed, or is being committed, or
is about to be committed; (b) that there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that evidence, which is essential to the conviction of any charged or
suspected person for, or to the solution or prevention of, any such crimes, will be obtained; and, (c)
that there is no other effective means readily available for acquiring such evidence.

SEC. 9. Classification and Contents of the Order of the Court. - The written order granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order, if any, to extend or renew the same,
the original application of the applicant, including his application to extend or renew, if any, and the
written authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council shall be deemed and are hereby declared as
classified information: Provided, That the person being surveilled or whose communications, letters,
papers, messages, conversations, discussions, spoken or written words and effects have been
monitored, listened to, bugged or recorded by law enforcement authorities has the right to be
informed of the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or
she intends to do so, the legality of the interference before the Court of Appeals which issued the
written order. The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall specify the
following: (a) the identity, such as name and address, if known, of the charged or suspected person
whose communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words are to be
tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and, in the case of radio, electronic, or
telephonic (whether wireless or otherwise) communications, messages, conversations, discussions,
or spoken or written words, the electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be
tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and their locations or if the person
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully known, such person
shall be subject to continuous surveillance provided there is a reasonable ground to do so; (b) the
identity (name, address, and the police or law enforcement organization) of the police or of the law
enforcement official, including the individual identity (names, addresses, and the police or law
enforcement organization) of the members of his team, judicially authorized to track down, tap, listen
to, intercept, and record the communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words; (c) the offense or offenses committed, or being committed, or sought to be prevented;
and, (d) the length of time within which the authorization shall be used or carried out.

SEC. 10. Effective Period of Judicial Authorization. - Any authorization granted by the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(d) of this Act, shall only be effective for the
length of time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which
shall not exceed a period of thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals by the applicant police or law enforcement official.

The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the said authorization for
another non-extendible period, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days from the expiration of the
original period: Provided, That the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals is satisfied that such
extension or renewal is in the public interest: and Provided, further, That the ex parte application for
extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly authorized in
writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council.

In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled to file the application for
extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the original applicant among the members of the team
named in the original written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall file the
application for extension or renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice to the liability of the police or
law enforcement personnel under Section 20 hereof, the applicant police or law enforcement official
shall have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period granted by the Court of Appeals as
provided in the preceding paragraphs within which to file the appropriate case before the Public
Prosecutor's Office for any violation of this Act.

If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or law enforcement official
shall immediately notify the person subject of the surveillance, interception and recording of the
termination of the said surveillance, interception and recording. The penalty of ten (10) years and
one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the applicant police or law
enforcement official who fails to notify the person subject of the surveillance, monitoring, interception
and recording as specified above.

SEC. 11. Custody of Intercepted and Recorded Communications. - All tapes, discs, and
recordings made pursuant to the authorization of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals,
including all excerpts and summaries thereof as well as all written notes or memoranda made in
connection therewith, shall, within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the
written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals or within forty-eight (48) hours after
the expiration of any extension or renewal granted by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals, be deposited with the authorizing Division of the Court of Appeals in a sealed envelope or
sealed package, as the case may be, and shall be accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant
police or law enforcement official and the members of his team.

In case of death of the applicant or in case he is physically disabled to execute the required affidavit,
the one next in rank to the applicant among the members of the team named in the written order of
the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall execute with the members of the team that
required affidavit.

It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or any custodian of the tapes, discs and recording,
and their excerpts and summaries, written notes or memoranda to copy in whatever form, to remove,
delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the items enumerated above in whole or
in part under any pretext whatsoever.
Any person who removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys the items enumerated
above shall suffer a penalty of not less than six years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.

SEC. 12. Contents of Joint Affidavit. - The joint affidavit of the police or of the law enforcement
official and the individual members of his team shall state: (a) the number of tapes, discs, and
recordings that have been made, as well as the number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the
number of written notes and memoranda, if any, made in connection therewith; (b) the dates and
times covered by each of such tapes, discs, and recordings; (c) the number of tapes, discs, and
recordings, as well as the number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written
notes and memoranda made in connection therewith that have been included in the deposit; and (d)
the date of the original written authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to
file the ex parte application to conduct the tracking down, tapping, intercepting, and recording, as
well as the date of any extension or renewal of the original written authority granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.

The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part of
any of such tapes, discs, and recordings, and that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part of
any of such excerpts, summaries, written notes, and memoranda, have been made, or, if made, that
all such duplicates and copies are included in the sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case
may be, deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.

It shall be unlawful for any person, police or law enforcement official to omit or exclude from the joint
affidavit any item or portion thereof mentioned in this Section.

Any person, police or law enforcement officer who violates any of the acts prescribed in the
preceding paragraph shall suffer the penalty of not less than ten (10) years and one day to twelve
(12) years of imprisonment.

SEC. 13. Disposition of Deposited Material. -The sealed envelope or sealed package and the
contents thereof, which are deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be
deemed and are hereby declared classified information, and the sealed envelope or sealed package
shall not be opened and its contents (including the tapes, discs, and recordings and all the excerpts
and summaries thereof and the notes and memoranda made in connection therewith) shall not be
divulged, revealed, read, replayed, or used as evidence unless authorized by written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which written order shall be granted only upon a written
application of the Department of Justice filed before the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals
and only upon a showing that the Department of Justice has been duly authorized in writing by the
Anti-Terrorism Council to file the application with proper written notice the person whose
conversation, communication, message discussion or spoken or written words have been the
subject of surveillance, monitoring, recording and interception to open, reveal, divulge, and use the
contents of the sealed envelope or sealed package as evidence.

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing the
persons subject of the surveillance as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one
day to eight years of imprisonment.

SEC. 14. Application to Open Deposited Sealed Envelope or Sealed Package. - The written
application with notice to the party concerned to open the deposited sealed envelope or sealed
package shall clearly state the purpose or reason: (a) for opening the sealed envelope or sealed
package; (b) for revealing or disclosing its classified contents; (c) for replaying, divulging, and or
reading any of the listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations,
discussions, or spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and
any of the notes or memoranda made in connection therewith); [ and, (d) for using any of said
listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or
spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and any of the notes
or memoranda made in connection therewith) as evidence.

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify as defined
above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.

SEC. 15. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Materials. - Any listened to, intercepted, and recorded
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, or any part or
parts thereof, or any information or fact contained therein, including their existence, content,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning, which have been secured in violation of the pertinent
provisions of this Act, shall absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence against anybody in
any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.

SEC. 16. Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Interceptions and/or Recordings. - Any police
or law enforcement personnel who, not being authorized to do so by the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals, tracks down, taps, listens to, intercepts, and records in whatever manner or form
any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written word of a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism
shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12)
years of imprisonment.

In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment and the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office shall be imposed upon any police or
law enforcement personnel who maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals to track
down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record in whatever manner or form any communication, message,
conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words of a person charged with or suspected of the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism: Provided, That notwithstanding Section 13 of
this Act, the party aggrieved by such authorization shall be allowed access to the sealed envelope or
sealed package and the contents thereof as evidence for the prosecution of any police or law
enforcement personnel who maliciously procured said authorization.

SEC. 17. Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Association, or Group of Persons. - Any

organization, association, or group of persons organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, or
which, although not organized for that purpose, actually uses the acts to terrorize mentioned in this
Act or to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall, upon application
of the Department of Justice before a competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice and
opportunity to be heard given to the organization, association, or group of persons concerned, be
declared as a terrorist and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons by the said
Regional Trial Court.

SEC. 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. - The provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement
personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken
custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to
commit terrorism shall, without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained
persons to the proper judicial authorities, deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper
judicial authority within a period of three days counted from the moment the said charged or
suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the said
police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and
examination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this Act.

The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the person suspected of
the crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at the latter's residence or office nearest
the place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge,
among other things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the
person or persons they have arrested and presented before him or her, to inquire of them the
reasons why they have arrested the person and determine by questioning and personal observation
whether or not the suspect has been subjected to any physical, moral or psychological torture by
whom and why. The judge shall then submit a written report of what he/she had observed when the
subject was brought before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person
thus arrested. The judge shall forthwith submit his/her report within three calendar days from the
time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office.

Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the
judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest: Provided ,That where the arrest is
made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shall be served at
the residence of the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested.

The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed
upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify and judge as Provided in the
preceding paragraph.

SEC. 19. Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or Imminent Terrorist Attack. - In the
event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may not be detained for more than three
days without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human Rights
Commission or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the
Court of Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays,
holidays or after office hours, the arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring the
person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the
place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall be
secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five days after the date of the
detention of the persons concerned: Provided, however, That within three days after the detention
the suspects, whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not established, shall be released
immediately.

SEC. 20. Penalty for Failure to Deliver Suspect to the Proper Judicial Authority within Three
Days. - The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be
imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel who has apprehended or arrested, detained
and taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism and fails to deliver such charged or suspected person to the proper judicial
authority within the period of three days.

SEC. 21. Rights of a Person under Custodial Detention. - The moment a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism is apprehended or
arrested and detained, he shall forthwith be informed, by the arresting police or law enforcement
officers or by the police or law enforcement officers to whose custody the person concerned is
brought, of his or her right: (a) to be informed of the nature and cause of his arrest, to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel of his or her choice, the police or law enforcement officers concerned shall
immediately contact the free legal assistance unit of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) or the
Public Attorney's Office (PAO). It shall be the duty of the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the
PAO thus contacted to immediately visit the person(s) detained and provide him or her with legal
assistance. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of the counsel of
choice; (b) informed of the cause or causes of his detention in the presence of his legal counsel; (c)
allowed to communicate freely with his legal counsel and to confer with them at any time without
restriction; (d) allowed to communicate freely and privately without restrictions with the members of
his family or with his nearest relatives and to be visited by them; and, (e) allowed freely to avail of
the service of a physician or physicians of choice.

SEC. 22. Penalty for Violation of the Rights of a Detainee. - Any police or law enforcement
personnel, or any personnel of the police or other law enforcement custodial unit that violates any of
the aforesaid rights of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10)
years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

Unless the police or law enforcement personnel who violated the rights of a detainee or detainees as
stated above is duly identified, the same penalty shall be imposed on the police officer or hear or
leader of the law enforcement unit having custody of the detainee at the time the violation was done.

SEC. 23. Requirement for an Official Custodial Logbook and its Contents. - The police or other
law enforcement custodial unit in whose care and control the person charged with or suspected of
the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism has been placed under
custodial arrest and detention shall keep a securely and orderly maintained official logbook, which is
hereby declared as a public document and opened to and made available for .the inspection and
scrutiny of the lawyer or lawyers of the person under custody or any member of his or her family or
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree or his or her physician at any time of
the day or night without any form of restriction. The logbook shall contain a clear and concise record
of: (a) the name, description, and address of the detained person; (b) the date and exact time of his
initial admission for custodial arrest and detention; (c) the name and address of the physician or
physicians who examined him physically and medically; (d) the state of his health and physical
condition at the time of his initial admission for custodial detention; (e) the date and time of each
removal of the detained person from his cell for interrogation or for any purpose; (f) the date and
time of his return to his cell; (g) the name and address of the physician or physicians who physically
and medically examined him after each interrogation; (h) a summary of the physical and medical
findings on the detained person after each of such interrogation; (i) the names and addresses of his
family members and nearest relatives, if any and if available; (j) the names and addresses of
persons, who visit the detained person; (k) the date and time of each of such visits; (1) the date and
time of each request of the detained person to communicate and confer with his legal counsel or
counsels; (m) the date and time of each visit, and date and time of each departure of his legal
counsel or counsels; and, (n) all other important events bearing on and all relevant details regarding
the treatment of the detained person while under custodial arrest and detention.

The said police or law enforcement custodial unit shall upon demand of the aforementioned lawyer
or lawyers or members of the family or relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the person under custody or his or her physician issue a certified true copy of the entries of
the logbook relative to the concerned detained person without delay or restriction or requiring any
fees whatsoever including documentary stamp tax, notarial fees, and the like. This certified true copy
may be attested by the person who has custody of the logbook or who allowed the party concerned
to scrutinize it at the time the demand for the certified true copy is made.
The police or other law enforcement custodial unit who fails to comply with the preceding paragraph
to keep an official logbook shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years
of imprisonment.

SEC. 24. No Torture or Coercion in Investigation and Interrogation. - No threat, intimidation, or

coercion, and no act which will inflict any form of physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or
psychological pressure, on the detained person, which shall vitiate his freewill, shall be employed in
his investigation and interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism; otherwise, the evidence obtained from said detained person resulting from such threat,
intimidation, or coercion, or from such inflicted physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or
psychological pressure, shall be, in its entirety, absolutely not admissible and usable as evidence in
any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.

SEC. 25. Penalty for Threat, Intimidation, Coercion, or Torture in the Investigation and
Interrogation of a Detained Person. - Any person or persons who use threat, intimidation, or
coercion, or who inflict physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, which
shall vitiate the free-will of a charged or suspected person under investigation and interrogation for
the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and
shall suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.

When death or serious permanent disability of said detained person occurs as a consequence of the
use of such threat, intimidation, or coercion, or as a consequence of the infliction on him of such
physical pain or torment, or as a consequence of the infliction on him of such mental, moral, or
psychological pressure, the penalty shall be twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of
imprisonment.

SEC. 26. Restriction on Travel. - In cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the person
charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is entitled to bail and is granted
the same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused
to within the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of
national security and public safety, consistent with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution. Travel
outside of said municipality or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation
of the terms and conditions of his bail, which shall then be forfeited as provided under the Rules of
Court.

He/she may also be placed under house arrest by order of the court at his or her usual place of
residence.

While under house arrest, he or she may not use telephones, cellphones, e-mails, computers, the
internet or other means of communications with people outside the residence until otherwise ordered
by the court.

The restrictions abovementioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal of the accused or of the
dismissal of the case filed against him or earlier upon the discretion of the court on motion of the
prosecutor or of the accused.

SEC. 27. Judicial Authorization Required to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and
Records. - The provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 as amended, to the contrary notwithstanding,
the justices of the Court of Appeals designated as a special court to handle anti-terrorism cases after
satisfying themselves of the existence of probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose that: (1)
a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or, conspiracy to commit terrorism, (2)
of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; and (3)
of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons,
may authorize in writing any police or law enforcement officer and the members of his/her team duly
authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism council to: (a) examine, or cause the examination of, the
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records in a bank or financial institution; and (b)
gather or cause the gathering of any relevant information about such deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records from a bank or financial institution. The bank or financial institution
concerned, shall not refuse to allow such examination or to provide the desired information, when
so, ordered by and served with the written order of the Court of Appeals.

SEC. 28. Application to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The written order of
the Court of Appeals authorizing the examination of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets, and records: (1) of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of any judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization,
association, or group of persons, or (3) of any member of such organization, association, or group of
persons in a bank or financial institution, and the gathering of any relevant information about the
same from said bank or financial institution, shall only be granted by the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals upon an ex parte application to that effect of a police or of a law enforcement
official who has been duly authorized in writing to file such ex parte application by the Anti-Terrorism
Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex parte application, and upon examination
under oath or affirmation of the applicant and, the witnesses he may produce to establish the facts
that will justify the need and urgency of examining and freezing the bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records: (1) of the person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism
or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization,
association or group of persons; or (3) of any member of such organization, association, or group of
persons.

SEC. 29. Classification and Contents of the Court Order Authorizing the Examination of Bank
Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The written order granted by the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals as well as its order, if any, to extend or renew the same, the original ex parte
application of the applicant, including his ex parte application to extend or renew, if any, and the
written authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council, shall be deemed and are hereby declared as
classified information: Provided, That the person whose bank deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets, and records have been examined, frozen, sequestered and seized by law enforcement
authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the
premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the legality of the interference. The written
order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals designated to handle cases involving
terrorism shall specify: (a) the identify of the said: (1) person charged with or suspected of the crime
of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of persons; and (3) member of such judicially declared and
outlawed organization, association, or group of persons, as the case may be. whose deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are to be examined or the information to be
gathered; (b) the identity of the bank or financial Institution where such deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records are held and maintained; (c) the identity of the persons who will
conduct the said examination and the gathering of the desired information; and, (d) the length of time
the authorization shall be carried out.

SEC. 30. Effective Period of Court Authorization to Examine and Obtain Information on Bank
Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The authorization issued or granted by the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals to examine or cause the examination of and to freeze bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, and records, or to gather information about the same, shall be
effective for the length of time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals, which shall not exceed a period of thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the written
order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals by the applicant police or law enforcement
official.

The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the said authorization for
another period, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days renewable to another thirty (30) days from the
expiration of the original period: Provided, That the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals is
satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest: and, Provided, further, That the
application for extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly
authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council.

In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled to file the application for
extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the original applicant among the members of the ream
named in the original written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall file the
application for extension or renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice to the liability of the police or
law enforcement personnel under Section 19 hereof, the applicant police or law enforcement official
shall have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period granted by the Court of Appeals as
provided in the preceding paragraphs within which to file the appropriate case before the Public
Prosecutor's Office for any violation of this Act.

If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or law enforcement official
shall immediately notify in writing the person subject of the bank examination and freezing of bank
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records. The penalty of ten (10) years and one day
to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the applicant police or law enforcement
official who fails to notify in writing the person subject of the bank examination and freezing of bank
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records.

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing as
defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.

SEC. 31. Custody of Bank Data and Information Obtained after Examination of Deposits,
Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. - All information, data, excerpts, summaries,
notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and other documents obtained from the examination of
the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of: (1) a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially
declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of
any such organization, association, or group of persons shall, within forty-eight (48) hours after the
expiration of the period fixed in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals or
within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of the extension or renewal granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, be deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals in a sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, and shall be accompanied by
a joint affidavit of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the persons who actually
conducted the examination of said bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records.

SEC. 32. Contents of Joint Affidavit. - The joint affidavit shall state: (a) the identifying marks,
numbers, or symbols of the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records examined; (b)
the identity and address of the bank or financial institution where such deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records are held and maintained; (c) the number of bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, and records discovered, examined, and frozen; (d) the
outstanding balances of each of such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets; (e) all
information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, documents,
records examined and placed in the sealed envelope or sealed package deposited with the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals; (f) the date of the original written authorization granted
by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex parte Application to conduct the
examination of the said bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records, as well as
the date of any extension or renewal of the original written authorization granted by the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals; and (g) that the items Enumerated were all that were found in the
bank or financial institution examined at the time of the completion of the examination.

The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the information, data,
excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and documents acquired from the
examination of the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records have been made,
or, if made, that all such duplicates and copies are placed in the sealed envelope or sealed package
deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.

It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or custodian of the bank data and information
obtained after examination of deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records to copy, to
remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the items enumerated above in
whole or in part under any pretext whatsoever,

Any person who copies, removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys the items
enumerated above shall suffer a penalty of not less than six years and one day to twelve (12) years
of imprisonment.

SEC. 33. Disposition of Bank Materials. - The sealed envelope or sealed package and the
contents thereof, which are deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be
deemed and are hereby declared classified information and the sealed envelope or sealed package
shall not be opened and its contents shall not be divulged, revealed, read, or used as evidence
unless authorized in a written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which written
order shall be granted only upon a written application of the Department of Justice filed before the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals and only upon a showing that the Department of Justice
has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file the application, with notice in
writing to the party concerned not later than three days before the scheduled opening, to open,
reveal, divulge, and use the contents of the sealed envelope or sealed package as evidence.

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing as
defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.

SEC. 34. Application to Open Deposited Bank Materials. - The written application, with notice in
writing to the party concerned not later than three days of the scheduled opening, to open the sealed
envelope or sealed package shall clearly state the purpose and reason: (a) for opening the sealed
envelope or sealed package; (b) for revealing and disclosing its classified contents; and, (c) for using
the classified information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports,
and documents as evidence.

SEC. 35. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Bank Materials. - Any information, data, excerpts,
summaries, notes, memoranda, work sheets, reports, or documents acquired from the examination
of the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of: (1) a person charged or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially
declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of
such organization, association, or group of persons, which have been secured in violation of the
provisions of this Act, shall absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence against anybody in
any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
SEC. 36. Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Examination of a Bank or a Financial
Institution. - Any person, police or law enforcement personnel who examines the deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial institution of: (1) a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism;
(2) a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a
member of such organization, association, or group of persons, without being authorized to do so by
the Court of Appeals, shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and
one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon
any police or law enforcement personnel, who maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of
Appeals to examine the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or
financial institution of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy
to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or
group of persons; or (3) a member of such organization, association, or group of persons: Provided,
That notwithstanding Section 33 of this Act, the party aggrieved by such authorization shall upon
motion duly filed be allowed access to the sealed envelope or sealed package and the contents
thereof as evidence for the prosecution of any police or law enforcement personnel who maliciously
procured said authorization.

SEC. 37. Penalty of Bank Officials and Employees Defying a Court Authorization. - An
employee, official, or a member of the board of directors of a bank or financial institution, who
refuses to allow the examination of the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records of:
(1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons; or (3)
a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons in
said bank or financial institution, when duly served with the written order of the authorizing division of
the Court of Appeals, shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and
one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

SEC. 38. Penalty for False or Untruthful Statement or Misrepresentation of Material Fact in
Joint Affidavits. - Any false or untruthful statement or misrepresentation of material fact in the joint
affidavits required respectively in Section 12 and Section 32 of this Act shall constitute a criminal
offense and the affiants shall suffer individually the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve
(12) years of imprisonment.

SEC. 39. Seizure and Sequestration. - The deposits and their outstanding balances, placements,
trust accounts, assets, and records in any bank or financial institution, moneys, businesses,
transportation and communication equipment, supplies and other implements, and property of
whatever kind and nature belonging: (1) to any person suspected of or charged before a competent
Regional Trial Court for the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) to a
judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) to a member
of such organization, association, or group of persons shall be seized, sequestered, and frozen in
order to prevent their use, transfer, or conveyance for purposes that are inimical to the safety and
security of the people or injurious to the interest of the State.

The accused or a person suspected of may withdraw such sums as may be reasonably needed by
the monthly needs of his family including the services of his or her counsel and his or her family's
medical needs upon approval of the court. He or she may also use any of his property that is under
seizure or sequestration or frozen because of his/her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of the
court for any legitimate reason.
Any person who unjustifiably refuses to follow the order of the proper division of the Court of Appeals
to allow the person accused of the crime of terrorism or of the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism to withdraw such sums from sequestered or frozen deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets and records as may be necessary for the regular sustenance of his/her family or to use any of
his/her property that has been seized, sequestered or frozen for legitimate purposes while his/her
case is pending shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.

SEC. 40. Nature of Seized. Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust
Accounts, Assets and Records. - The seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets and records belonging to a person suspected of or charged with the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be deemed as property held in trust by the bank or
financial institution for such person and the government during the pendency of the investigation of
the person suspected of or during the pendency of the trial of the person charged with any of the
said crimes, as the case may be and their use or disposition while the case is pending shall be
subject to the approval of the court before which the case or cases are pending.

SEC. 41. Disposition of the Seized, Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements,
Trust Accounts, Assets and Record. - If the person suspected of or charged with the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is found, after his investigation, to be innocent by the
investigating body, or is acquitted, after his arraignment or his case is dismissed before his
arraignment by a competent court, the seizure, sequestration and freezing of his bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records shall forthwith be deemed lifted by the investigating
body or by the competent court, as the case may be, and his bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records shall be deemed released from such seizure, sequestration and
freezing, and shall be restored to him without any delay by the bank or financial institution concerned
without any further action on his part. The filing of any appeal on motion for reconsideration shall not
state the release of said funds from seizure, sequestration and freezing.

If the person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is convicted by a
final judgment of a competent trial court, his seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records shall be automatically forfeited in favor of the
government.

Upon his or her acquittal or the dismissal of the charges against him or her, the amount of Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500.000.00) a day for the period in which his properties, assets or funds
were seized shall be paid to him on the concept of liquidated damages. The amount shall be taken
from the appropriations of the police or law enforcement agency that caused the filing of the
enumerated charges against him/her.

SEC. 42. Penalty for Unjustified Refusal to Restore or Delay in Restoring Seized, Sequestered
and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. - Any person
who unjustifiably refuses to restore or delays the restoration of seized, sequestered and frozen bank
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of a person suspected of or charged with
the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism after such suspected person has been found
innocent by the investigating body or after the case against such charged person has been
dismissed or after he is acquitted by a competent court shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and
one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

SEC. 43. Penalty for the Loss, Misuse, Diversion or Dissipation of Seized, Sequestered and
Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. - Any person who is
responsible for the loss, misuse, diversion, or dissipation of the whole or any part of the seized,
sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of a person
suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism shall suffer the
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

SEC. 44. Infidelity in the Custody of Detained Persons. - Any public officer who has direct
custody of a detained person or under the provisions of this Act and who by his deliberate act,
misconduct, or inexcusable negligence causes or allows the escape of such detained person shall
be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of: (a) twelve (12) years and one day to twenty
(20) years of imprisonment, if the detained person has already been convicted and sentenced in a
final judgment of a competent court; and (b) six years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment, if the detained person has not been convicted and sentenced in a final judgment of a
competent court.

SEC. 45. Immunity and Protection of Government Witnesses. - The provisions of Republic Act
No. 6981 (Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act) to the contrary notwithstanding, the
immunity of government witnesses testifying under this Act shall be governed by Sections 17 and 18
of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court: Provided, however, That said witnesses shall be entitled to
benefits granted to witnesses under said Republic Act No.6981.

SEC. 46. Penalty for Unauthorized Revelation of Classified Materials. - The penalty of ten (10)
years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person, police or
law enforcement agent, judicial officer or civil servant who, not being authorized by the Court of
Appeals to do so, reveals in any manner or form any classified information under this Act.

SEC. 47. Penalty for Furnishing False Evidence, Forged Document, or Spurious Evidence. -
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment shall be imposed
upon any person who knowingly furnishes false testimony, forged document or spurious evidence in
any investigation or hearing under this Act.

SEC. 48. Continuous Trial. - In cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the judge shall
set the continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so
as to ensure speedy trial.

SEC. 49. Prosecution Under This Act Shall be a Bar to Another Prosecution under the
Revised Penal Code or any Special Penal Laws. - When a person has been prosecuted under a
provision of this Act, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense or
felony which is necessarily included in the offense charged under this Act.

SEC. 50. Damages for Unproven Charge of Terrorism. - Upon acquittal, any person who is
accused of terrorism shall be entitled to the payment of damages in the amount of Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) for every day that he or she has been detained or deprived of liberty
or arrested without a warrant as a result of such an accusation. The amount of damages shall be
automatically charged against the appropriations of the police agency or the Anti-Terrorism Council
that brought or sanctioned the filing of the charges against the accused. It shall also be released
within fifteen (15) days from the date of the acquittal of the accused. The award of damages
mentioned above shall be without prejudice to the right of the acquitted accused to file criminal or
administrative charges against those responsible for charging him with the case of terrorism.
Any officer, employee, personnel, or person who delays the release or refuses to release the
amounts awarded to the individual acquitted of the crime of terrorism as directed in the paragraph
immediately preceding shall suffer the penalty of six months of imprisonment.

If the deductions are less than the amounts due to the detained persons, the amount needed to
complete the compensation shall be taken from the current appropriations for intelligence,
emergency, social or other funds of the Office of the President.

In the event that the amount cannot be covered by the current budget of the police or law
enforcement agency concerned, the amount shall be automatically included in the appropriations of
the said agency for the coming year.

SEC. 51. Duty to Record and Report the Name and Address of the Informant. - The police or
law enforcement officers to whom the name or a suspect in the crime of terrorism was first revealed
shall record the real name and the specific address of the informant.

The police or law enforcement officials concerned shall report the informant's name and address to
their superior officer who shall transmit the information to the Congressional Oversight Committee or
to the proper court within five days after the suspect was placed under arrest or his properties were
sequestered, seized or frozen.

The name and address of the informant shall be considered confidential and shall not be
unnecessarily revealed until after the proceedings against the suspect shall have been terminated.

SEC. 52. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. - The provisions of Book I of the Revised Penal
Code shall be applicable to this Act.

SEC. 53. Anti-Terrorism Council. - An Anti-Terrorism Council, hereinafter referred to, for brevity, as
the "Council," is hereby created. The members of the Council are: (1) the Executive Secretary, who
shall be its Chairperson; (2) the Secretary of Justice, who shall be its Vice Chairperson; and (3) the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs; (4) the Secretary of National Defense; (5) the Secretary of the Interior
and Local Government; (6) the Secretary of Finance; and (7) the National Security Advisor, as its
other members.

The Council shall implement this Act and assume the responsibility for the proper and effective
implementation of the anti-terrorism policy of the country. The Council shall keep records of its
proceedings and decisions. All records of the Council shall be subject to such security classifications
as the Council may, in its judgment and discretion, decide to adopt to safeguard the safety of the
people, the security of the Republic, and the welfare of the nation.

The National Intelligence Coordinating Agency shall be the Secretariat of the Council. The Council
shall define the powers, duties, and functions of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency as
Secretariat of the Council. The National Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Immigration, the
Office of Civil Defense, the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Anti-
Money Laundering Council, the Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the Philippine
National Police intelligence and investigative elements shall serve as support agencies for the
Council.

The Council shall formulate and adopt comprehensive, adequate, efficient, and effective anti-
terrorism plans, programs, and counter-measures to suppress and eradicate terrorism in the country
and to protect the people from acts of terrorism. Nothing herein shall be interpreted to empower the
Anti-Terrorism Council to exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial power or authority.
SEC. 54. Functions of the Council. - In pursuit of its mandate in the previous Section, the Council
shall have the following functions with due regard for the rights of the people as mandated by the
Constitution and pertinent laws:

1. Formulate and adopt plans, programs and counter-measures against terrorists and acts of
terrorism in the country;

2. Coordinate all national efforts to suppress and eradicate acts of terrorism in the country
and mobilize the entire nation against terrorism prescribed in this Act;

3. Direct the speedy investigation and prosecution of all persons accused or detained for the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and other offenses punishable under
this Act, and monitor the progress of their cases;

4. Establish and maintain comprehensive data-base information system on terrorism,

terrorist activities, and counter-terrorism operations;

5. Freeze the funds property, bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records
belonging to a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9160, otherwise known as the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001, as amended;

6. Grant monetary rewards and other incentives to informers who give vital information
leading to the apprehension, arrest, detention, prosecution, and conviction of person or
persons who are liable for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism;

7. Establish and maintain coordination with and the cooperation and assistance of other
nations in the struggle against international terrorism; and

8. Request the Supreme Court to designate specific divisions of the Court of Appeals and
Regional Trial Courts in Manila, Cebu City and Cagayan de Oro City, as the case may be, to
handle all cases involving the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and all
matters incident to said crimes. The Secretary of Justice shall assign a team of prosecutors
from: (a) Luzon to handle terrorism cases filed in the Regional Trial Court in Manila; (b) from
the Visayas to handle cases filed in Cebu City; and (c) from Mindanao to handle cases filed
in Cagayan de Oro City.

SEC. 55. Role of the Commission on Human Rights. - The Commission on Human Rights shall
give the highest priority to the investigation and prosecution of violations of civil and political rights of
persons in relation to the implementation of this Act; and for this purpose, the Commission shall
have the concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute public officials, law enforcers, and other persons who
may have violated the civil and political rights of persons suspected of, or detained for the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.

SEC. 56. Creation of a Grievance Committee. - There is hereby created a Grievance Committee
composed of the Ombudsman, as chair, and the Solicitor General, and an undersecretary from the
Department of Justice (DOJ), as members, to receive and evaluate complaints against the
actuations of the police and law enforcement officials in the implementation of this Act. The
Committee shall hold office in Manila. The Committee shall have three subcommittees that will be
respectively headed by the Deputy Ombudsmen in Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao. The
subcommittees shall respectively hold office at the Offices of Deputy Ombudsman. Three Assistant
Solicitors General designated by the Solicitor General, and the regional prosecutors of the DOJ
assigned to the regions where the Deputy Ombudsmen hold office shall be members thereof. The
three subcommittees shall assist the Grievance Committee in receiving, investigating and evaluating
complaints against the police and other law enforcement officers in the implementation of this Act. If
the evidence warrants it, they may file the appropriate cases against the erring police and law
enforcement officers. Unless seasonably disowned or denounced by the complainants, decisions or
judgments in the said cases shall preclude the filing of other cases based on the same cause or
causes of action as those that were filed with the Grievance Committee or its branches.

SEC. 57. Ban on Extraordinary Rendition. - No person suspected or convicted of the crime of
terrorism shall be subjected to extraordinary rendition to any country unless his or her testimony is
needed for terrorist related police investigations or judicial trials in the said country and unless his or
her human rights, including the right against torture, and right to counsel, are officially assured by the
requesting country and transmitted accordingly and approved by the Department of Justice.

SEC. 58. Extra-Territorial Application of this Act. - Subject to the provision of an existing treaty of
which the Philippines is a signatory and to any contrary provision of any law of preferential
application, the provisions of this Act shall apply: (1) to individual persons who commit any of the
crimes defined and punished in this Act within the terrestrial domain, interior waters, maritime zone,
and airspace of the Philippines; (2) to individual persons who, although physically outside the
territorial limits of the Philippines, commit, conspire or plot to commit any of the crimes defined and
punished in this Act inside the territorial limits of the Philippines; (3) to individual persons who,
although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit any of the said crimes on
board Philippine ship or Philippine airship; (4) to individual persons who commit any of said crimes
within any embassy, consulate, or diplomatic premises belonging to or occupied by the Philippine
government in an official capacity; (5) to individual persons who, although physically outside the
territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes against Philippine citizens or persons of
Philippines descent, where their citizenship or ethnicity was a factor in the commission of the crime;
and (6) to individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines,
commit said crimes directly against the Philippine government.

SEC. 59. Joint Oversight Committee. - There is hereby created a Joint Oversight Committee to
oversee the implementation of this Act. The Oversight Committee shall be composed of five
members each from the Senate and the House in addition to the Chairs of the Committees of Public
Order of both Houses who shall also Chair the Oversight Committee in the order specified herein.
The membership of the Committee for every House shall at least have two opposition or minority
members. The Joint Oversight Committee shall have its own independent counsel. The Chair of the
Committee shall rotate every six months with the Senate chairing it for the first six months and the
House for the next six months. In every case, the ranking opposition or minority member of the
Committee shall be the Vice Chair. Upon the expiration of one year after this Act is approved by the
President, the Committee shall review the Act particularly the provision that authorize the
surveillance of suspects of or persons charged with the crime of terrorism. To that end, the
Committee shall summon the police and law enforcement officers and the members of the Anti-
Terrorism Council and require them to answer questions from the members of Congress and to
submit a written report of the acts they have done in the implementation of the law including the
manner in which the persons suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism have been dealt
with in their custody and from the date when the movements of the latter were subjected to
surveillance and his or her correspondences, messages, conversations and the like were listened to
or subjected to monitoring, recording and tapping. Without prejudice to its submitting other reports,
the Committee shall render a semiannual report to both Houses of Congress. The report may
include where necessary a recommendation to reassess the effects of globalization on terrorist
activities on the people, provide a sunset clause to or amend any portion of the Act or to repeal the
Act in its entirety. The courts dealing with anti-terrorism cases shall submit to Congress and the
President a report every six months of the status of anti-terrorism cases that have been filed with
them starting from the date this Act is implemented.

SEC. 60. Separability Clause. - If for any reason any part or provision of this Act is declared
unconstitutional or invalid, the other parts or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall
remain and continue to be in full force and effect.

SEC. 61. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules or regulations or parts
thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified
accordingly.

SEC. 62. Special Effectivity Clause. - After the bill shall have been signed into law by the
President, the Act shall be published in three newspapers of national circulation; three newspapers
of local circulation, one each in llocos Norte, Baguio City and Pampanga; three newspapers of local
circulation, one each in Cebu, lloilo and Tacloban; and three newspapers of local circulation, one
each in Cagayan de Oro, Davao and General Santos city.

The title of the Act and its provisions defining the acts of terrorism that are punished shall be aired
everyday at primetime for seven days, morning, noon and night over three national television and
radio networks; three radio and television networks, one each in Cebu, Tacloban and lloilo; and in
five radio and television networks, one each in Lanao del Sur, Cagayan de Oro, Davao City,
Cotabato City and Zamboanga City. The publication in the newspapers of local circulation and the
announcements over local radio and television networks shall be done in the dominant language of
the community. After the publication required above shall have been done, the Act shall take effect
two months after the elections are held in May 2007. Thereafter, the provisions of this Act shall be
automatically suspended one month before and two months as after the holding of any election.

Approved,

JOSE DE VENECIA JR. MANNY VILLAR

Speaker of the House of President of the Senate
Representatives

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2137 and House Bill No. 4839 was finally passed
by the Senate and the House of Representatives on February 8, 2007 and February 19, 2007,
respectively.

ROBERTO P. NAZARENO OSCAR G. YABES

Secretary General Secretary of Senate
House of Represenatives

Approved: MARCH 06, 2007

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CHAPTER IV THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human Security Act/Anti-Terrorism Law, Republic Act No.
9372, Approved on March 6, 2007 and effective on July 15, 2007 (This Law shall be automatically
suspended one (1) month before and two (2) months after the holding of any election)

Sec. 18. Period of detention without judicial warrant of arrest.- The provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel, who, having
been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism shall, WITHOUT INCURRING ANY CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF
DETAINED PERSONS TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES, DELIVER SAID CHARGED OR SUSPECTED
PERSON TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY WITHIN A PERIOD OF THREE (3) DAYS counted from
the moment said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and
taken into custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the arrest of
those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the
surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 pf this Act.

The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the person suspected
of the crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at the latters residence or office
nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night. It shall be the duty
of the judge, among other things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement
personnel and the person or persons they have arrested and presented before him or her, to
inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the person and determine by questioning and
personal observation whether or not the subject has been subjected to any physical, moral or
psychological torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit a written report of what
he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper court that has
jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested.

The judge shall forthwith submit his report within 3 calendar days from the time the suspect was
brought to his/her residence or office.

Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism
or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in writing
the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest; provided, That where the
arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shall
be served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested. The
penalty of 10 years and 1 day to 12 years imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law
enforcement personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the preceding paragraph.

Section 19. Period of Detention in the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack.- In the
vent of an actual or imminent terrorist attack,, suspects may not be detained for more than three
days without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human
Rights Commission, or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice
of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays
or holidays, or after office hours, the arresting police of law enforcement personnel shall bring
the person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest
the place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall
be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five days after the date
of the detention of the persons concerned; Provided, however, That within three days after the
detention the suspects whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not established, shall
be released immediately.
Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorismeven if they have been granted bail because evidence of guilt is not strongcan be:
Detained under house arrest;
Restricted from traveling; and/or
Prohibited from using any cellular phones, computers, or other means of communications with
people outside their residence.

Section 39. Seizure and Sequestration.- The deposits and their outstanding balances, placements,
trust accounts, assets, and records in any bank or financial institution, moneys, businesses,
transportation and communication equipment, supplies and other implements, and property of
whatever kind and nature belonging:

To any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism;
to a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons;
to a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association or group of
persons,

-shall be seized, sequestered, and frozen in order to prevent their use, transfer or conveyance for
purposes that are inimical to the safety and security of the people or injurious to the interest of
the State.

The accused or suspect may withdraw such sums as are reasonably needed by his family including
the services of his counsel and his familys medical needs upon approval of the court. He or she
may also use any of his property that is under seizure or sequestration or frozen because of
his/her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of the court for any legitimate reason.

Section 40. The seized, sequestered and frozen bank depositsshall be deemed property held in
trust by the bank or financial institution and that their use or disposition while the case is pending
shall be subject to the approval of the court before which the case or cases are pending.
Section 41. If the person suspected as terrorist is acquitted after arraignment or his case
dismissed before his arraignment by a competent court, the seizureshall be lifted by the
investigating body or the competent court and restored to him without delay. The filing of an
appeal or motion for reconsideration shall not stay the release of said funds from seizure,
sequestration and freezing.

If convicted, said seized, sequestered and frozen assets shall automatically forfeited in favor of
the government.

Requisites of a valid search warrant

Read:

a. Essentials of a valid search warrant,145 SCRA 739

b. Validity of a search warrant and the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation

thereof.

c. The place to be searched as indicated in the warrant is controlling

PEOPLE VS. CA, 291 SCRA 400

Narvasa, CJ
In applying for a search warrant, the police officers had in their mind the first four (4)
separate apartment units at the rear of ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE in Quezon City to be the
subject of their search. The same was not, however, what the Judge who issued the warrant
had in mind, AND WAS NOT WHAT WAS ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT. As
such, any evidence obtained from the place searched which is different from that indicated in
the search warrant is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose and in any proceeding.
This is so because it is neither licit nor fair to allow police officers to search a place different
from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searchedalthough not
that specified in the search warrantis exactly what they had in view when they applied for
the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. WHAT IS MATERIAL IN
DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A SEARCH IS THE PLACE STATED IN THE WARRANT ITSELF, NOT
WHAT THE APPLICANTS HAD IN THEIR THOUGHTS, OR HAD REPRESENTED IN THE PROOFS THEY
SUBMITTED TO THE COURT ISSUING THE WARRANT. As such, it was not just a case of obvious
typographical error, but a clear case of a search of a place different from that clearly and
without ambiguity identified in the search warrant.
NOTE: Very Important: Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action
base don the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, IT IS NOT THE
RULE THAT A MOTION TO QUASH THE WARRANT (or to retrieve the things seized) MAY BE
FILED ONLY IN THE ISSUING COURTSUCH A MOTION MAY BE FILED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN
EITHER THE ISSUING COURT OR THAT IN WHICH THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING IS PENDING.

d. Validity of a warrantless search and seizure as a result of an informers tip. Note the two (2)
conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court.

PEOPLE VS. ARUTA, 288 SCRA 626

On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello of the Olongapo PNP was tipped off by an informer that
Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of
marijuana. As a result of the tip, the policemen waited for a Victory Bus from Baguio City
near the PNB Olongapo, near Rizal Ave. When the accused got off, she was pointed to by the
informer. She was carrying a traveling bag at that time. She was not acting suspiciously. She
was arrested without a warrant.
The bag allegedly contained 8.5 kilos of marijuana. After trial, she was convicted and imposed
a penalty of life imprisonment.
Issue:
Whether or not the marijuana allegedly taken from the accused is admissible in evidence.
Held:
Warrantless search is allowed in the following instances:
1. customs searches;
2. searches of moving vehicle;
3. seizure of evidence in plain view;
4. consented searches;
5. search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
6. stop and frisk measures.
The above exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant, however, should not become
unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to trample upon the conditionally guaranteed
and more fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and seizures. The
essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and
seizure can be lawfully conducted. In order that the information received by the police
officers may be sufficient to be the basis of probable cause, it must be based on reasonable
ground of suspicion or belief a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
The marijuana obtained as a result of a warrantless search is inadmissible as evidence for the
following reasons:
a. the policemen had sufficient time to apply for a search warrant but they failed to
do so;
b. the accused was not acting suspiciously;
c. the accuseds identity was previously ascertained so applying for a warrant should
have been easy;
d. the accused in this case was searched while innocently crossing a street
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the police to effect a warrantless search of the
accuseds bag, there being no probable cause and the accuseds not having been legally
arrested. The arrest was made only after the accused was pointed to by the informant at a
time when she was not doing anything suspicious. The arresting officers do not have personal
knowledge that the accused was committing a crime at that time.
Since there was no valid warrantless arrest, it logically follows that the subsequent
search is similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. This is so because if a
search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on the evidence produced by the
search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.
This case is similar tot he case of PEOPLE VS. AMINNUDIN, and PEOPLE VS. ENCINADA.
PEOPLE VS. MONTILLA, 284 SCRA 703
On June 19, 1994, at about 2 p.m., SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin of the
Dasmarinas, Cavite PNP were informed by an INFORMER that a drug courier would be arriving
in Barangay Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavite, from Baguio City, with an undetermined amount of
marijuana. The informer likewise informed them that he could recognize said person.
At about 4 in the morning of June 20, 1994, the appellant was arrested by the above-
named police officers while alighting from a passenger jeepney near a waiting shed in
Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavite, upon being pointed to by the informer. The policemen recovered
28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves. The arrest was without warrant.
The trial court convicted the appellant for transporting marijuana based on the
testimonies of the Above-named police officers without presenting the alleged informer.
Issue:
Was the warrantless arrest valid?
Held:
The accused claims that the warrantless search and seizure is illegal because the
alleged information was received by the police on June 19, 1994 and therefore, they could
have applied for a search warrant. The said contention is without merit considering that the
information given by the informer is too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of
the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is indication that the informer knows
the courier, the records do not show that he knew his name. On bare information, the police
could not have secured a warrant from a judge.
Furthermore, warrantless search is allowed in the following instances:
1. customs searches;
2. searches of moving vehicle;
3. seizure of evidence in plain view;
4. consented searches;
5. search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
6. stop and frisk measures.
Since the accused was arrested for transporting marijuana, the subsequent search on his
person is justified. An arresting officer has the right to validly search and seize from the
offender (1) dangerous weapons; and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense.
In the case at bar, upon being pointed to by the informer as the drug courier, the policemen
requested the accused to open and show them the contents of his bag and the cartoon he was
carrying and he voluntarily opened the same and upon cursory inspection, it was found out
that it contains marijuana. Hence the arrest.
The accused insists that it is normal for a person traveling with a bag and cartoon which
should not elicit the slightest suspicion that he was committing a crime. In short, there was no
probable cause for these policemen to think that he was committing a crime.
The said contention was considered without merit by the Supreme Court considering the fact
that he consented to the search as well as the fact that the informer was a reliable one who
had supplied similar information to the police in the past which proved positive.
(NOTE: The SC held that the non-presentation of the informer does not affect the case for the
prosecution because he is not even the best witness. He is merely a corroborative witness to
the arresting officers. )
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
To say that reliable tips from informers constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest
or search IS A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT AND PLACES IN GREAT JEOPARDY THE DOCTRINES LAID
DOWN IN MANY DECISIONS MADE BY THIS COURT. (PEOPLE VS. BURGOS, 144 SCRA 1; PEOPLE
VS. AMINNUDIN, 163 SCRA 402; PEOPLE VS. ENCINADA, October 2, 1997; PEOPLE VS.
MENGOTE, 220 SCRA).
The case is similar to the case of People vs. Encimada where the appellant was searched
without a warrant while disembarking from a ship on the strength of a tip from an informer
received by the police the previous afternoon that the appellant would be transporting
prohibited drugs. The search yielded a plastic package containing marijuana. On Appeal, the
SC reversed the decision of conviction and held that Encinada did not manifest any suspicious
behavior that would necessarily and reasonably invite the attention of the police.

ELI LUI, ET AL. VS. MATILLANO, May 27, 2004

Right against unreasonable searches and seizures; Mission Order does not authorize an illegal
search. Waiver of the right against an unreasonable search and seizure.

In search of the allegedly missing amount of P45,000.00 owned by the employer, the residence of
a relative of the suspect was forcibly open by the authorities by kicking the kitchen door to gain
entry into the house. Thereafter, they confiscated different personal properties therein which
were allegedly part of those stolen from the employer. They were in possession of a mission order
but later on claimed that the owner of the house gave his consent to the warrantless search. Are
the things admissible in evidence? Can they be sued for damages as a result of the said warrantless
search and seizure?

Held:

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived
expressly or impliedly. BUT A WAIVER BY IMPLICATION CANNOT BE PRESUMED. There must be clear
and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. There must be proof of the
following:

a. that the right exists;

b. that the person involved had knowledge, either constructive or actual, of the existence
of said right;

c. that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Finally, the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently in order that the said is
to be valid.

The search was therefore held illegal and the members of the searching party held liable for
damages in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon and MHP Garments
vs. CA.

e. General or roving warrants

Read:

1. Stonehill vs. Diokno,June 19,1967

Concepcion, C.J.

The petitioners are questioning the validity of a total of 42 search warrants issued on different
dates against them and the corporations in which they are officers, directing the peace officer to
search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and to seize
and take possession of the following personal property, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,

typewriters and other documents or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements

since they are the subject of the offense of violating the CENTRAL BANK LAWS, TARIFF AND
CUSTOMS LAWS, INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
The petitioners claim that the search warrants are void being violative of the Constitutional
provision on search and seizure on the ground that:

a. The search warrants did not particularly describe the documents, books and things to be seized;

b. cash money not mentioned in the warrant were actually seized;

c. The warrants were issued to fish evidence in the deportation cases against them;

d. the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner;

e. the things seized were not delivered to the court to be disposed of in a manner provided for by
law.

Issue:

Were the searches and seizures made in the offices and residences of the petitioners valid?

a. As to the searches made on their offices, they could not question the same in their personal
capacities because the corporations have a personality separate and distinct with its officers. An
objection to an unlawful search and seizure IS PURELY PERSONAL AND CANNOT BE AVAILED OF BY
THIRD PARTIES. CONSEQUENTLY, THE PETITIONERS MAY NOT VALIDLY OBJECT TO THE USE IN
EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM OF THE DOCUMENTS, PAPERS AND THINGS SEIZED FROM THE OFFICES AND
PREMISES OF THE CORPORATIONS, TO WHOM THE SEIZED EFFECTS BELONG, AND MAY NOT BE
INVOKED BY THE CORPORATE OFFICERS IN PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THEM IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITY.

b. As to the documents seized in the residences of the petitioners, the same may not be used in
evidence against them because the warrants issued were in the nature of a general warrant for
failure to comply with the constitutional requirement that:

1. that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and

2. that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. They were issued
upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a
violation of Central bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal revenue Code and Revised Penal
Code. IN OTHER WORDS, NO SPECIFIC OFFENSE HAD BEEN ALLEGED IN SAID APPLICATIONS. THE
AVERMENTS THEREOF WITH RESPECT TO THE OFFENSE COMMITTED WERE ABSTRACT. AS A
CONSEQUENCE, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE JUDGE WHO ISSUED THE WARRANTS TO HAVE
FOUND THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE, FOR THE SAME PRESUPPOSES THE INTRODUCTION
OF COMPETENT PROOF THAT THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM IT IS SOUGHT HAS PERFORMED
PARTICULAR ACTS, OR COMMITTED SPECIFIC OMISSIONS, VIOLATING A GIVEN PROVISION OF
OUR CRIMINAL LAWS.

2. Bache vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823

3. Secretary vs. Marcos, 76 SCRA 301

4. Castro vs. Pabalan, April 30,l976

5. Asian Surety vs. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312 (A search warrant for estafa, falsification, tax evasion
and insurance fraud is a general warrant and therefore not valid)

6. Collector vs. Villaluz, June 18,1976

7. Viduya vs. Verdiago, 73 SCRA 553

8. Dizon vs. Castro, April 12, 1985

9. People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169

1. TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE, July 14, 1995; PEOPLE VS. CA, 216 SCRA 101. A SCATTER-SHOT
WARRANT is a search warrant issued for more than one specific offense like one for estafa,
robbery, theft and qualified theft)

f. Define probable cause. Who determines probable cause?

a. ROBERTS VS. CA, 254 SCRA 307

b. DE LOS SANTOS VS. MONTESA, 247 SCRA 85

VICENTE LIM,SR. AND MAYOR SUSANA LIM

VS.HON. N. FELIX (G.R. NO. 99054-57)
EN BANC
GUTIERREZ, JR. J.
Facts:

Petitioners are suspects of the slaying of congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and three of his
security escorts and the wounding of another. They were initially charged, with three others, with
the crime of multiple murder with frustrated murder. After conducting a preliminary
investigation, a warrant of arrest was issued on July 31, 1989. Bail was fixed at P200,000.

On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane, designated to review the case, issued a Resolution
affirming the finding of a prima facie case against the petitioners but ruled that a case of Murder
for each of the killing of the four victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound
on the survivor be filled instead against the suspects. Thereafter, four separate informations to
that effect were filed with the RTC of Masbate with no bail recommended.

On November 21, 1989, a motion for change of venue, filed by the petitioners was granted by the
SC. It ordered that the case may be transferred from the RTC of Masbate to the RTC of Makati.

Petitioners then moved that another hearing ba conducted to determine if there really exists a
prima facie case against them in the light of documents showing recantations of some witnesses in
the preliminary investigation. They likewise filed a motion to order the transmittal of initial
records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal judge of Barsaga of Masbate.
These motions were however denied by the court because the prosecution had declared the
existence of probable cause, informations were complete in form in substance , and there was no
defect on its face. Hence it found it just and proper to rely on the prosecutors certification in
each information.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists?

Held:

1. The judge committed a grave abuse of discretion.

In the case of Placer vs. Villanueva, the sc ruled that a judge may rely upon the fiscals
certification of the existence of a probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest. However, the certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of arrest.
This decision interpreted the search and seizure provision of the 1973 Constitution. Under this
provision, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a
warrant of order of arrest. If on the face of information, the judge finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscals certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witness to
aid him at arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule
since U.S vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas.

2. In the case of Soliven vs. Makasiar, decided under the 1987 Constitution, the Court noted that
the addition of the word personally after the word determined and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to other respondent officers as to may be
authorized by law does not require the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.What the
Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. Following established doctrine and procedures, he
shall:
(1) personally evaluate the reports and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest;

(2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.

3. The case of People vs. Honorable Enrique B. Inting reiterates the following doctrines:

(1) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. It is not for the Provincial
Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the judge alone makes this
detemination.

(2) The preliminary inquiry made by the prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assist him
to make the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the
prosecutors present to him. By itself, the prosecutors certification of probable cause is
ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, and all other
supporting documents behind the prosecutors certification which are material in assisting the
judge to make his determination.

(3) Preliminary inquiry should be distinguished from the preliminary investigation proper. While
the former seeks to determine probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest, the latter
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released.

4. 4. In the case of Castillo vs. Villaluz, the court ruled that judges of RTC no longer have
authority to conduct preliminary investigations: This authority was removed from them by the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985.

5. In the present case, the respondent judge relies solely on the certification of the
prosecutor. Considering that all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he has not
personally determined the existence of probable cause. The determination was made by the
provincial prosecutor. The constitutional requirement had not been satisfied.

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and
reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the
warrant of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent judge to make his
personal determination regarding the existence of probable cause from the issuance of warrant of
arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not have possibly known what has transpired in
Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Although the judge does not have to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses (for the prosecutor can perform the same functions as
commissioner for taking of evidence) there should be a report and necessary documents
supporting the Fiscals bare certification. All of these should be before the judge.
1. Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739

1-a. 20th Century Fox vs. CA, 164 SCRA 655

1-b. Quintero vs. NBI, 162 SCRA 467

1-c. The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. CA, GR No. 83578, March 16, 1989

SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR, 167 SCRA 393

The word personally after the word determined does not necessarily mean that the judge
should examine the complainant and his witnesses personally before issuing the search warrant or
warrant of arrest but the exclusive responsibility on the part of said judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. As such, there is no need to examine the complainant and his
witnesses face to face. It is sufficient if the judge is convinced of the existence of probable cause
upon reading the affidavits or deposition of the complainant and his witnesses.

1-e. Pendon vs. CA, Nov. 16, 1990

1-f. P. vs. Inting, July 25, 1990

1-g. Umil vs. Ramos, et al., July 9, 1990 with the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration in
November, 1991

1-h. Paderanga vs. Drilon, April 19, 1991

2. Department of Health vs. Sy Chi Siong, Inc., GR No. 85289, February 20, 1989

2-a. P. vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465

2-b. Placer vs. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463 (Only a judge has the power to determine probable
insofar as the issuance of a warrant of arrest is concerned)

3. Tolentino vs. Villaluz,July 27,1987

4. Cruz vs. Gatan, 74 SCRA 226

5. Olaes vs. P., 155 SCRA 486

1. Geronimo vs. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435

7.JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR, ET AL., G.R.NO. 92163, June 5, 1990
Due process; right to bail; warrant of arrest
(Note: This might be useful also in your Criminal Law)
Narvasa, J.
On February 27, 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by
NBI Director Alfredo Lim on the strength of a warrant of arrest issued by the respondent judge,
HON. JAIME SALAZAR, Regional trial Court, Branch 103, Quezon City in Criminal Case No. 90-
10941. The warrant was issued on an information signed and filed earlier in the day by Senior
State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI Headquarters on
Taft Ave., Manila, WITHOUT BAIL, NONE HAVING BEEN RECOMMENDED IN THE INFORMATION AND
NONE FIXED IN THE WARRANT OF ARREST.

On February 28, 1990, petitioner through counsel filed a petition for Habeas Corpus alleging that
he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:

a. held to answer for a criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;

b. charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or
preliminary investigation was conducted, hence, he was denied due process;

c. denied the right to bail; and

d. arrested or detained on the strength of warrant issued without the judge who issued it first
having personally determined the existence of probable cause.

HELD:

The parties oral and written arguments presented the following options:

1. Abandon the Hernandez Doctrine and adopt the dissenting opinion of Justice Montemayor that
rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes;

2. Hold Hernandez Doctrine applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as necessary

means for the commission, of rebellion, BUT NOT TO ACTS COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF A
REBELLION WHICH ALSO CONSTITUTE COMMON CRIMES OF GRAVE OR LESS GRAVE CHARACTER;

3. Maintain Hernandez Doctrine as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed
in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.

1. On the first option, 11 justices voted AGAINST abandoning Hernandez. Two members felt that
the doctrine should be re-examined. In view of the majority, THE RULING REMAINS GOOD LAW, ITS
SUBSTANTIVE AND LEGAL BASES HAVE WITHSTOOD ALL SUBSEQUENT CHALLENGES AND NO NEW
ONES ARE PRESENTED HERE PERSUASIVE ENOUGH TO WARRANT A COMPLETE REVERSAL. This is so
because of the fact that the incumbent President (exercising legislative powers under the 1986
Freedom Constitution) repealed PD No. 942 which added a new provision of the Revised Penal
Code, particularly Art. 142-A which sought to nullify if not repealed the Hernandez Doctrine. In
thus acting, the President in effect by legislative fiat reinstated the Hernandez as a binding
doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition,
absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.

2. On the second option, the Supreme Court was unanimous in voting to reject the same though
four justices believe that the arguments in support thereof is not entirely devoid of merit.

3. With the rejection of the first two options, the Hernandez Doctrine remains a binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the
occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as unintended effect of an
activity that constitutes rebellion.

On the issues raised by the petitioner:

a. By a vote of 11-3, the Court ruled that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact
charge an offense despite the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging SIMPLE REBELLION. The
petitioners contention that he was charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books,
WHILE TECHNICALLY CORRECT SO FAR AS THE COURT RULED THAT REBELLION MAY NOT BE
COMPLEXED WITH OTHER OFFENSES COMMITTED ON THE OCCASION THEREOF, MUST THEREFORE BE
DISMISSED AS A MERE FLIGHT OF RHETORIC. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information
does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code:
SIMPLE REBELLION.

b. Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary
investigation conducted? The record shows that a complaint for simple rebellion against petitioner
was filed by the NBI Director and that based on the strength of said complaint a preliminary
investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors culminating in the filing of the
questioned information. THERE IS NOTHING INHERENTLY IRREGULAR OR CONTRARY TO LAW IN
FILING AGAINST A RESPONDENT AN INDUCTMENT FOR AN OFFENSE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS
CHARGED IN THE INITIATORY COMPLAINT, IF WARRANTED BY THE EVIDENCE DEVELOPED DURING
THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.

c. The petitioner claims that the warrant issued is void because it was issued barely one hour and
twenty minutes after the case was raffled to the respondent judge which could hardly gave him
sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. Also,
the petitioner claims that the respondent judge issued the warrant for his arrest without first
personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation
the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, Section 2, of the Constitution. This
Court has already ruled that it is not unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by PERSONALLY
EVALUATING THE REPORT AND THE SUPPORTING DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE PROSECUTOR.
MEREBY BECAUSE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD WHAT SOME MIGHT CONSIDER ONLY A RELATIVELY
BRIEF PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO COMPLY WITH THAT DUTY , GIVES NO REASON TO ASSUME THAT
HE HAD NOT, OR COULD NOT HAVE, SO COMPLIED; NOR DOES THAT SINGLE CIRCUMSTANCE
SUFFICE TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT OFFICIAL DUTY HAS BEEN REGULARLY
PERFORMED.

d. Petitioner also claims that he is denied of his constitutional right to bail. In the light of the
Courts affirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioners case, and of the logical and
necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the
crime of simple rebellion which is bailable before conviction, THAT MUST NOW BE ACCEPTED AS A
CORRECT PROPOSITION.

NOTES:

This might be useful also in your Remedial Law.

Was a petition for Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a
right to bail or vindicating its denial?

The Supreme Court held that the criminal case before the respondent judge is the normal venue
for invoking the petitioners right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The
correct course was for the petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted
to bail, claiming a right to bail per se or by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him.
ONLY AFTER THAT REMEDY WAS DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD THE REVIEW JURISDICTION
OF THE SUPREME COURT BE INVOKED, AND EVEN THEN, NOT WITHOUT FIRST APPLYING TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS IF APPROPRIATE RELIEF WAS ALSO AVAILABLE THERE.

Even assuming that the petitioners premise that the information charges a non-existent crime
would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious
recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent
judge.

g. Warrantless searches and seizureswhen valid or not. Is Operation Kapkap valid?

Read:

PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, G.R. No. 87059, June, 1992, 210 scra 174
Warrantless search and seizure
Cruz, J.
Facts:
1. On August 8, 1987, the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that
there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Blvd., in
Tondo, Manila;

2. When the surveilance team arrived therein, they saw the accused looking from side to side
and holding his abdomen. They approched these persons and identified themselves as
policement that is why they tried to ran away because of the other lawmen, they were unable to
escape;

3. After their arrest, a .38 cal. Smith and Wessor revolver was confiscated from the accused and
several days later, an information for violation of PD 1866 was filed against him;

4. After trial, Mengote was convicted of having violated PD 1866 and was sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua based on the alleged gun as the principal evidence. Hence this
automatic appeal.
Issue:

Was there a valid warrantless search and seizure?

Held:

There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is

inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III,
Section 3 [2], of the Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the
justification given by Justice Learned Hand that only in case the prosecution, which
itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be
repressed.

Section 5, Article 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

x x x
 We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we we can agree
with the prosecution.

Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal
institution when he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness
of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this Section.

Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting
officer.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused-appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his
abdomen, according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that
had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted
by Mengote in thie presence.

The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long
as Mengotes acts created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and
induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that accused-appellant had
committed it. The question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested
by a person looking from side to side and holding his abdomen and in aplace not
exactly forsaken.

These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It
might have been different if Mengote had been apprehended at an unholy hour and in a place
where he had no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 oclock in the morning. But he was
arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a
passenger jeep with his companion.He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear
light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the
blaze of the noonday sun.

On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innoent, why
hiseyes were darting from side to sideand he was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion
in the minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been
shown what their suspicion was all about.

xxx

The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers
suspicion other than Mengotes darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the
imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed,
or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.
This is similar to PEOPLE vs. AMMINUIDIN, 163 SCRA 402 where the Court held that a warrantless
arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while he was coming down the
vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He
had not committed nor was actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the
presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no
probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional
requirement of a warrant.

Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been
satisfied. Theprosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengotes arrest an offense had in
fact been committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowldge of facts indicating
that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller,
and about a crime that had yet to bem committed.

xxx

Before these events, the peace officers had no knowledge even

of Mengotes identity, let alone the fact that he was involved in the robbery of Danganans
house.

In the landmark case of People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personalknowledge of that fact. The
offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (SAYO vs. CHIEF OF POLICE, 80
Phil. 859).

xxx

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must
in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an
essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The
fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies
only to the identity of the perpetrator..

This doctrine was affirmed in Alih vs. Castro, 151 SCRA 279, thus:

If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a
crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There
is no allegation in the record of such a falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed
that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal
knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People vs. Burgos.
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just
because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a
peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may
have committed a criminal act is actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be
done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse,
personal malice on the part ofthe arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.

xxx

The court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened,
they allowed their over zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of
the requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the evidence they had
invalidly seized.

This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of
the acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law, because,
ironically enough, it has not been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.

When illegal arrest is deemed waived.

Warrantless arrest; no personal knowledge of the arresting officer

PEOPLE VS. GALVEZ, 355 SCRA 246

Mendoza, J.

The policeman arrested the accused-appellant on the basis solely of what Reynaldo Castro had
told him and not because he saw the accused-appellant commit the crime charged against him.
Indeed, the prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of arrest issued against accused-
appellant when the latter was taken into custody. Considering that the accused-appellant was not
committing a crime at the time he was arrested nor did the arresting officer have any personal
knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant committed a crime, his arrest without a
warrant cannot be justified.

However, by entering a plea of not guilty during the arraignment, the accused-appellant waived
his right to raise the issue of illegality of his arrest. IT IS NOW SETTLED THAT OBJECTION TO A
WARRANT OF ARREST OR THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH A COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF AN ACCUSED MUST BE MADE BEFORE HE ENTERS HIS PLEA, OTHERWISE, THE OBJECTION
IS DEEMED WAIVED. THE FACT THAT THE ARREST WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT RENDER THE
SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS VOID AND DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS RIGHT TO CONVICT THE GUILTY
WHEN ALL THE FACTS POINT TO THE CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED.
g-1. Warrantless Search and seizure by a private person. (Valid since the constitutional
provision is not applicable to him; when it is not valid)
Read:

1. PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA, 301 SCRA 66

Warrantless searches and seizures by private individuals
2. SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. VS. ROGELIO SOLUTA, ET AL., 482 SCRA 660
Carpio-Morales, J.

The petitioner suspects that the respondents who are officers of the Silahis International Hotel
Union were using the Union Office located inside the hotel in the sale or use of marijuana, dollar
smuggling, and prostitution. They arrived at the said conclusion through surveillance.

In the morning of January 11, 1988, while the respondent union officer was opening the Union
Office, security officers of the plaintiff entered the union office despite objections thereto by
forcibly opening the same. Once inside the union office they started to make searches which
resulted in the confiscation of a plastic bag of marijuana. An information for violation of the
dangerous drugs act was filed against the respondent before the RTC of Manila which acquitted
them on the ground that the search conducted was illegal since it was warrantless and without
consent by the respondents.

After their acquittal, the respondents filed a case for Malicious Prosecution against the petitioner
for violation of Art. 32 of the Civil Code. After trial, the Regional Trial Court held that petitioners
are liable for damages as a result of an illegal search. The same was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

Issue:

Whether the warrantless search conducted by the petitioners (private individual and corporation)
on the union office of the private respondents is valid.

Held:

The search is not valid and they are civilly liable under Art. 32 of the Civil Code. The fact that the
union office is part of the hotel owned by the petitioners does not justify the warrantless search.
The alleged reports that the said union office is being used by the union officers for illegal
activities does not justify their acts of barging into the said office without the consent of the
union officers and without a search warrant. If indeed there was surveillance made, then they
should have applied for a search warrant.

The ruling in People vs. Andre Marti is not applicable here because in Marti, a criminal case, the
issue was whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of ones constitutional
rights may be invoked against the State. In other words, the issue in Marti is whether the evidence
obtained by a private person acting in his private capacity without the participation of the State,
is admissible.
 3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANDRE MARTI
G.R. NO. 81561, January 18, 1991
Warrantless Search and seizure
by a private person
Bidin, J.
FACTS:

Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export
Forwarders to send four (4) packages to Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes, owner of the place (no
relation to Shirley), received said goods and asked if she could examine and inspect it. Marti
refused. However later, following standard operating procedure, Job Reyes, co-owner and
husband of Anita opened the boxes for final inspection, before delivering it to the Bureau of
Customs and/or Bureau of Posts.

Upon opening, a peculiar odor emanated from the box that was supposed to contain gloves. Upon
further perusal, he felt and saw a dried leaves inside the box. Job Reyes then brought samples to
the NBI, he told them that the boxes to be shipped were still in his office. In the presence of the
NBI agents, Reyes opened the box and discovered that the odor came from the fact that the dried
leaves were actually those of the marijuana flowering tops.

Two other boxes,marked as containing books and tabacalera cigars; also revealed bricks or case-
like marijuana leaves and dried marijuana leaves respectively.

Marti was later invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the dried leaves.
Thereafter an information was filed against the appellant for violating RA 6425 or the Dangerous
Drugs Act. The Special Criminal Court of Manila convicted accused Marti of violating sec.21(b) of
said RA.
ISSUES:

1. Did the search conducted by a private person, violate accuseds right against unreasonable
searches seizures and invocable against the state?

2. Was the evidence procured from the search admissible?

Held:

1. No, constitutional protection on search and seizure is imposable only against the state and not
to private persons.

Since Art. III,2 of the 1987 constitution is almost verbatim from the United States constitution, the
SC may consider US Fed. SC cases as likewise doctrinal in this jurisdiction. Hence, in US cases, the
constitutional provision against unreasomable searches and seizure was intended as a restraint
upon the activities of the sovereign authority and NOT intended against private persons. If a
search was initiated by a private person the provision does not apply since it only proscribes
government action. This view is supported by the deliberations by the 1986 Constitutional
Commission.

In short, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
comitted by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.

Case at bar will show that it was Job Reyes` initiative that perpetrated the search. He opened the
packages and took the samples to NBI. All the NBI agents did was to observe and look in plain
sight. This did not convert it to a search as contemplated by the constitution.

2. Yes, since the search was valid, the evidence from therein is admissible evidence.

Art.III [2], on the admissibility of evidence in violation of the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, likewise applies only to the government and its agencies and not to private persons.

(U.S. cases cited: Burdeau v. McDowell (256 us 465 [1921], state v. Bryan (457 p 2d 661 [1968],
Walker v. state (429 s.w 2d 121 [1969]), Barnes v. us (373 F 2d 517 [1967]), Chadwick v. state
(329 sw 2d 135).

VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE:

1. Search made incidental to a valid arrest

a. Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil. 439

b. PEOPLE VS. ANG CHUN KIT, 251 SCRA 660

c. PEOPLE VS. LUA, 256 SCRA 539

d. PEOPLE VS. Figueroa, 248 SCRA 679

e. NOLASCO VS. PANO, 139 SCRA 541 (A search incidental to a valid arrest must be done at
the place where the accused is arrested. As such, if accused was arrested while inside a jeepney,
there is no valid search incidental to a valid arrest if she will be brought to her residence and
thereafter search the said place)

f. ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA 588 (If the accused was arrested in the street during a buy-
bust operation, the search of his house nearby is not a valid search incidental to a valid arrest)

PEOPLE VS. GO, 354 SCRA 338

Where the gun tucked in a persons waist is plainly visible to the police, no search warrant is
necessary and in the absence of any license for said firearm, he may be arrested at once as he is
in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. No warrant is necessary in
such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules.

As a consequence of the accuseds valid warrantless arrest inside the nightclub, he may be
lawfully searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126. This
is a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest.

In fact, the subsequent discovery in his car which was parked in a distant place from where the
illegal possession of firearm was committed [after he requested that he will bring his car to the
Police Station after his warrantless arrest) , of a drug paraphernalia and shabu, CANNOT BE SAID
TO HAVE BEEN MADE DURING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH. As such, the items do not fall under the
exclusionary rule and the unlicensed firearms, drug paraphernalia and the shabu, can be used as
evidence against the accused.

2. Search of moving vehicles

a. Carrol vs. US, 267 US 132

b. PEOPLE VS. LO HO WING, et al.

(G. R. No. 88017) January 21, 1991

c. MUSTANG LUMBER VS. CA, 257 SCRA 430

d. PEOPLE VS. CFI, 101 SCRA 86

e. PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT198 SCRA 401

f. PEOPLE VS. LO HO WING, 193 SCRA 122

FACTS:

In July 1987, the Special Operations Group of the CIS received a tip from one of its informers
about an organized group engaged in importation of illegal drugs and smuggling of contraband
items. To infiltrate the crime syndicate, they recruited confidential men and deep penetration
agents under OPLAN SHARON 887. One such agent was Reynaldo Tia (the dicharged/accused). As
an agent, he submitted regular reports of undercover activities of suspected syndicates. CAPTAIN
PALMERA, head of oplan sharon 887, in turned informed the Dan

gerous Drugs Board of Tias activities.

Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat by another agent named George. Lim
wanted a male travelling companion for his business trips abroad. Tia offered his services and was
hired by Lim. Later, Tia was introduced to Peter Lo (alias of accused/appellant Lo Ho Wing), the
later turning out to be Tias intended companion.

Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia left for Hongkong on October 4, 1987. Tia telephoned Capt. Palmera
that they would return to the Philippines on October 6. From Hongkong, the two proceeded to
Guangzhou in mainland China. There, appeallant Lo Ho Wing bought six (6) cans of tea.Tia saw
these 6 bags when they were opened for examination. That evening, they went to Lo Ho Wings
room and he saw two other men with him. One was fixing the tea bags, while the other was
burning a substance on a piece of aluminum foil using a lighter. Appellant Lo Ho Wing joined the
second man and sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning substance. When Tia asked Lo Ho Wing
what cargo they would bring to Manila, the latter replied that they would be bringing Chinese
drugs.

The next day en route to Manila, customs examiners inspected the bags containing the tin cans of
tea. Since the bags were not closely examined, appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia were cleared. In
Manila, They were met by Lim Cheng Huat. Appelant Lo Ho Wing and Tia boarded a taxi from the
airport and loaded their luggage in the taxis compartment. Lim Cheng Huat followed them in
another taxi.

Meamwhile, a team composed by Capt. Palmera positioned themselves in strategic areas around
the airport. The CIS men who first saw Lo Ho and Tia followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the CIS
car overtook the taxi ridden by Lo Ho Wing and Tia , forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle.
The CIS team asked the taxi driver to open the baggage compartment. The CIS team asked
permission to search their luggage.

A tin can of tea was taken out of the compartment. Sgt. Cayabyab of the CIS pried the lid
open and pressed it in the middle to pull out the contents. Crystalline white powder resmbling
crushed alum came out. Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the
three travelling bags opened for inspection. All the bags threshed out a total of six tin cans. Tia
and appellant were taken to the CIS headquarters for questioning. Meanwhile, the second taxi
carrying Lim Cheng Huat sped in attempt to escape. However, they were later captured.

Samples from the bag tested positive for metamphetamine. The three suspects were indicted for
violating Art. III, sec.15 of the Dangerous Drug Act. Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Lim Cheng Huat
were sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P25,000 each. Reynaldo Tia was
discharged as a state witness. The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of government
agents since the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties were in their
favor.
ISSUES:

1. Was the warrantless search valid?

2. Are the effects taken admissible as evidence?

HELD:

1. This is a case of search on a moving vehicle which is one of the well-known exceptions to the
valid warrantless search and seizure. To stilol get a search warrant from a judge would allow the
accused go scot-free.

2. Since the search and seizure are valid, the evidence obtained is admissible as evidence in any
proceeding.

3. Seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties/taxes (Valid)

a. Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857

b. Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16

c. HIZON VS. CA, 265 SCRA 517

d. PEOPLE VS. QUE, 265 SCRA 721

4. Seize of evidence in plain view

a. Harris vs. US, 390 US 234

b. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547

c. PEOPLE VS. VELOSO, 252 SCRA 135

d. PEOPLE VS. LESANGIN, 252 SCRA 213

5. When there is waiver of right or gives his consent;

a. De Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689

b. Lopez vs. Commissioner, 65 SCRA 336

c. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA (In order that there is a valid waiver to a warrantless
search, the waiver or consent should be given by the person affected, not just anybody. Example:
The landlady could not give a valid consent to the search of a room occupied by a tenant. Said
tenant himself should give the consent in order to be valid. The doctrine in Lopez vs.
Commissioner to the effect that it could be given by any occupant of a hotel room being rented by
the respondent is deemed abandoned)
d. VEROY VS. LAYAGUE, 210 SCRA 97. (If the owner of the house allowed the policemen
to enter his house because they are searching for rebel soldiers but when inside the house, they
instead seized an unlicensed firearm, there is no consent to a warrantless search)

6. STOP AND FRISK.

a. People vs. Mengote, June, 1992

b. PEOPLE VS. POSADAS, 188 SCRA 288

c. MANALILI VS. PEOPLE, October 9, 1997. (The policemen saw several suspicious looking
men at dawn who ran when they went near them. As the policemen ran after them, an unlicensed
firearm was confiscated. The search is valid)

d. MALACAT VS. CA, 283 SCRA 159. (Mere suspicions not sufficient to validate warrantless
arrest)

6. EDDIE GUAZON, ET AL. VS. MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, ET AL., GR NO. 80508, January 30,
1990
Warrantless searches;
zonings and saturation drives
Section 17, Art. VII of the Constitution
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Facts:

This is a petition for Prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit military and police officers
from conducting Areal target zonings or saturation drive in Metro Manila particularly in places
where they suspect that the subversives are hiding. The 41 petitioners claim that the saturation
drives conducted by the military is in violation of their human rights because with no specific
target house in mind, in the dead of the night or early morning hours, police and military officers
without any search warrant cordon an area of more than one residence and sometimes the whole
barangay. Most of them are in civilian clothes and w/o nameplates or identification cards; that
the raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their
homes, shouting, kicking their doors open (destroying some) and ordering the residents to come
out; the residents are herded like cows at the point of high powered guns, ordered to strip down
to their briefs and examined for tattoo marks; that while examination of the bodies of the men
are being conducted, the other military men conduct search and seizures to each and every house
without civilian witnesses from the neighbors; some victims complained that their money and
other valuables were lost as a result of these illegal operations.

The respondents claim that they have legal authority to conduct saturation drives under Art. VII,
Sec. 17 of the Constitution which provides:
The respondents would want to justify said military operation on the following constitutional
provisions:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion

xxxxxx

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Held:

There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action of the nature
described by the petitioners would be illegal and blatantly violative of the Bill of Rights. If the
military wants to flush out subversive and criminal elements, the same must be consistent with
the constitutional and statutory rights of the people. However, nowhere in the Constitution can
we see a provision which prohibits the Chief Executive from ordering the military to stop unabated
criminality, rising lawlessness and alarming communist activities. However, all police actions are
governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The government cannot adopt the same
reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and of the left. This is so
because Art. III, Section 3 of the Constitution is very clear as explained in Roan vs. Gonzales, 145
SCRA 687 and Century Fox vs. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 655. Also, it must be pointed out that
police actions should not be characterized by methods that offend ones sense of justice (Rochin
vs. California, 342 US 165).

The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. But the
remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. A show of
force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated.
However, the remedy of the petitioners is not an original action for prohibition since not one
victim complains and not one violator is properly charged. It is basically for the executive
department and the trial courts. The problem is appropriate for the Commission of Human Rights.

The petition was therefore remanded to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon and Pasay
City where the petitioners may present evidence supporting their allegations so that the erring
parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted. In the meantime, the acts violative of human rights
alleged by the petitioners as committed during the police actions are ENJOINED until such time as
permanent rules to govern such actions are promulgated.

********************

Cruz, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ. , Dissenting

The ruling of the majority that the petitioners are not proper parties is a specious pretext for
inaction. We have held that technical objections may be brushed aside where there are
constitutional questions that must be met (RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA, 92 PHIL. 603; TOLENTINO VS.
COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702; PHILCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 65 SCRA 479; EDU VS. ERICTA, 35 SCRA 481;
GONZALES VS. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835; LAGUNZAD VS. CA, 154 SCRA 199; DEMETRIA VS. ALBA,148
SCRA 208). Lozada was in fact an aberration.

Where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he may not be directly injured.
Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes him a proper party. It is not only the
owner of a burning house who has the right to call the firemen.

Section 2, Art. III of the constitution is very clear: Unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for whatever purpose is prohibited.

Saturation drives are NOT AMONG THE ACCEPTED INSTANCES WHEN A SEARCH OR AN ARREST MAY
BE MADE WITHOUT A WARRANT. THEY COME UNDER THE CONCEPT OF THE FISHING EXPEDITIONS
STIGMATIZED BY LAW AND DOCTRINE X X X I submit that this court should instead categorically and
emphatically that these saturation drives are violative of human rights and individual liberty and
should be stopped immediately. While they may be allowed in the actual theater of military
operations against the insurgents, the Court should also make it clear that Metro Manila is not
such a battleground.

7. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and
RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA UMIL and NICANOR DURAL, FELICITAS SESE VS. FIDEL RAMOS, ET
AL. and companion cases, G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990 (An NPA may be arrested without warrant
while sleeping or being treated in a hospital because his being a communist rebel is a continuing
crime)

h. If the judge finds that theres probable cause, must he issue a warrant of arrest as a matter of
course? See the distinctions.

Read:

1. SAmulde vs. Salvani, September 26, 1988 (No because a warrant is issued in order to
have jurisdiction of the court over the person of an accused and to assure the court of his
presence whenever his case is called in court. As such, if the court believes that the presence of
the accused could be had even without a warrant of arrest, then he may not issue said warrant.
Note: This case involves a minor offense)
2. GOZO VS. TAC-AN, 300 SCRA 265. If the offense committed is a serious one like that
obtaining in this case for murder, the Judge must issue a warrant of arrest after determining the
existence of probable cause)

i. Searching questions
Read:

DR. NEMESIO PRUDENTE VS. THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC 33,
Manila & People of the Philippines, GR No. 82870, December 14, 1989 (En Banc)
Search and seizure; requirements/requisites of a valid search warrant; searching questions
Padilla, J.

This is a petition to annul and set aside the Order of respondent Judge DENYING the motion of the
petitioner to quash Search Warrant No. 87-14 as well as its Order denying the petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration.

Facts:

1. On October 31, 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special Action
Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 33, presided by the respondent Judge, an application for the issuance of a Search Warrant
for violation of PD 1866 against the petitioner;

2. In his application for search warrant, P/Major Dimagmaliw alleged that:

1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that NEMESIO
PRUDENTE who may be found at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines x x x has in his
control or possession firearms, explosives, hand grenades and ammunition intended to be used as
the means of committing an offense x x x;

2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact x x x .

In support of said application, P/Lt. Florencio Angeles executed a Deposition of Witness dated
October 31, 1987 .

3. On November 1, 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was enforced by some
200 WPD operatives led by Col. Edgar Dula Torre and Major Maganto;

4. On November 2, 1987, Ricardo Abando, a member of the searching team executed an affidavit
alleging that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudentes office a
bulging brown envelope with three live fragmentation hand grenades separately with old
newspapers;

5. On November 6, 1987, the petitioner moved to quash the search warrant on the grounds that:

a. the complainants lone witness, Lt. Angeles had no personal knowledge of the facts which
formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant;

b. the examination of said witness was not in the form of searching questions and answers;
c. the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly describe
the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense; and

d. the warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the
complainant failed to allege that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent.

6. On March 9, 1986, the respondent judge denied the motion to quash and on April 20, 1988, the
same judge denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Was the Search Warrant issued by the respondent judge valid? Was there probable cause?

Held:

a. For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined by
the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the judge must,
before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted.

The probable cause for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. (Quintero vs. NBI, June 23, 1988). This probable cause must be shown to
be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not
based on mere hearsay. (P. VS. SY JUCO, 64 PHIL. 667; ALVAREZ VS. CFI, 64 PHIL. 33; US VS.
ADDISON, 28 PHIL. 566).

In his affidavit, Major Dimagmaliw declared that he has been informed that Nemesio Prudente
has in his control and possession the firearms and explosivees described therein, and that he
has verified the report and found it to be a fact. On the other hand, Lt. Angeles declared that
as a result of continuous surveillance for several days, they gathered informations from verified
sources that the holders of said firearms and explosives are not licensed t possess them. It is
clear from the foregoing that the applicant and his witness HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES which became the basis for issuing the questioned search
warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information from other sources or persons.

Despite the fact that Major Dimagmaliw stated in his affidavit that he verified the information he
had earlier received and found it to be a fact, YET THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO SHOW
OR INDICATE HOW AND WHEN SAID APPLICANT VERIFIED THE EARLIER INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY
HIM AS TO JUSTIFY HIS CONCLUSION. He might have clarified this point if there had been searching
questions and answers, but there were none. In fact, the records yield no questions and answers,
whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said applicant.

In ALVAREZ VS. CFI, 64 PHIL. 33, it was held that the following test must be complied with in an
application for search warrant or in a supporting deposition based on personal knowledge or not-

The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it was drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be held
liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the applicant of a search warrant and/or his witnesses, not of the facts
merely reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable.

Tested by the above standards, the allegation of the witness, Lt. Angeles, do not come up to the
level of facts based on his personal knowledge so much so that he cannot be held liable for
perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of the questioned search warrant.

Besides, respondent judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as required by the Rules of
Court. As held in Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 694, mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus insufficient. The examining judge has to take the depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record.

b. There was also no searching questions asked by the respondent judge because as shown by the
record, his questions were too brief and short and did not examine the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. On the contrary, the questions asked
were leading as they called for a simple yes or no answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI, June
23, 1988, the questions propounded are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause.
Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant and conducting of
examination in a general manner would not satisfy the requirements for the issuance of a valid
search warrant.

The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for determination of probable
cause in the valid issuance of a search warrant as enunciated in earlier cases. True, this
requirements are stringent but the purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the
individual against unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both meaningful and effective.

c. The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended (P VS. VELOSO, 48
PHIL. 180). In the case at bar, the warrant described the place to be searched as the premises of
the PUP, more particularly the offices of the Department of Science and Tactics as well as the
Office of the President, Nemesio Prudente.
There is also no violation of the one specific offense requirement considering that the
application for a search warrant explicitly described the offense: illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions under PD 1866.

d. CIRCULAR NO. 19 OF THE SUPREME COURT merely provides for a guideline, departure from
which would not necessarily affect the validity of the search warrant provided the constitutional
requirements are complied with.

a. HUBERT WEBB VS. DE LEON, 247 SCRA 650

Read also:

1. Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 (When the applicant is basing his knowledge from an informant, the
same is not valid)

2. Luna vs. Plaza, 26 SCRA 313

3. De Mulata vs. Irizari, 62 SCRA 210

4. Marinas vs. Siochi, 104 SCRA 423

5. Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 687

6. Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388 (Depositions of the applicants and witnesses should be attached
to the record of the case)

7. Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541

8. Nolasco vs Pano, 147 SCRA 509

9. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800

10. P. vs. Burgos, September 14,1986

11. P. vs. Aminnudin Y Ahni, July 6,1988

12. Ponsica vs. Ignalaga, July 31,1987 (When the statements in the affidavits of witnesses are
mere generalities, mere conclusions of law, and not positive statements of particular acts, the
warrant is not valid)

13. Aberca vs. Ver, April 15,1988

2. Panganiban vs. Cesar, 159 SCRA 599

3. PENDON VS. CA, November 16, 1990. (When the questions asked to the applicant for a
search warrant was pre-typed, the same is not valid since there could have been no searching
questions)

j. Warrantless searches and seizureswhen valid or not.

Read:

1. RICARDO VALMONTE VS. GEN RENATO DE VILLA, GR No. 83988, September 29, 1989
Warrantless searches and seizures;
validity of checkpoints
Padilla, J.
Facts:

1. On January 20, 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated with
the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility for the purpose of
maintaining peace and order. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners claim that because of these checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela, MM are worried
of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military authorities manning the checkpoints considering that their cars and
vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or dawn,
without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.

2. On July 9, 1988 at dawn, the apprehensions of the residents of Valenzuela increased because
Benjamin Parpon, the supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela was gunned down in cold
blood by the military men manning the checkpoints for ignoring or refusing to submit himself to
the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspite of several warning shots fired in the air.

Issue:

Whether or not the existence of said checkpoints as well as the periodic searches and seizures
made by the military authorities without search warrant valid?

Held:

Petitioners concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning
the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal.

Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on a public fair grounds (People vs. Case, 190 MW 289), or simply looks into a vehicle
(State vs. Gaina, 97 SE 62), or flashes a light therein (Rowland vs. Commonwealth, 259 SW 33),
these do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila may be considered as security measure
to effectively maintain peace and order and to thwart plots to destabilize the government. In this
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of
the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and
military men by NPAs sparrow units, not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms.

BETWEEN THE INHERENT RIGHT OF THE STATE TO PROTECT ITS EXISTENCE AND PROMOTE PUBLIC
WELFARE AND AN INDIVIDUALS RIGHT AGAINST A WARRANTLESS SEARCH WHICH IS HOWEVER
REASONABLY CONDUCTED, THE FORMER SHALL PREVAIL.

True, the manning of these checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in
uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible to abuse. BUT , AT THE
COST OF OCCASIONAL INCONVENIENCE, DISCOMFORT AND EVEN IRRITATION TO THE CITIZEN, THE
CHECKPOINTS DURING THESE ABNORMAL TIMES ARE PART OF THE PRICE WE PAY FOR AN ORDERLY
SOCIETY AND PEACEFUL COMMUNITY.

Finally, it must be emphasized that on July 17, 1988, the military checkpoints in Metro Manila
were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and
military manning the checkpoints upon order of the NCRDC Chief.

Cruz and Sarmiento, JJ., dissenting:

The bland declaration by the majority that individual rights must yield to the demands of national
security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the
State even if asserted on the ground of national security.

RESOLUTION ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, JUNE 15, 1990

Very Important:
The Supreme Court in its Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration dated 15 June,
1990, held that military and police checkpoints are not illegal as these measures to protect
the government and safeguards the lives of the people. The checkpoints are legal as where
the survival of the organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of
the people are in grave peril. However, the Supreme Court held further that the military
officers manning the checkpoints may conduct VISUAL SEARCH ONLY, NOT BODILY SEARCH.

Read also the RESOLUTION ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated JUNE 15, 1990, 185
SCRA 665
Read also:

1-a. Rizal Alih vs. Gen. Castro, June 23,1987

1-b. P s. Cendana, October 17, 1990

1-c. P. vs. Castiller, August 6, 1990

1-d. P. vs. Olaes, July 30, 1990

2. Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857

3. Roldan vs. Arca, 65 SCRA 336

4. P. vs. CFI, 101 SCRA 86

5. Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16

6. Lopez vs. Commisioner, 65 SCRA 336

7. P vs. Cruz, 165 SCRA 135

8. Nolasco vs. Pano, 147 SCRA 509 & 139 SCRA 152

9. P vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 (There is a valid warrantless search if a NARCOM officer arrests the
person who owns a bag which contains marijuana which he found out when he smelled the same.
Here , there is a probable cause since he was personal knowledge due to his expertise on drugs)

2. PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO, July 10, 1994. (After the informant was given by the police
the amount of P100.00, he went to buy marijuana from the accused then return to the police
headquarters with said article. Thereafter, the policemen went to arrest the accused without
warrant. The arrest is not valid since it does not fall under Section 5 Rule 113)

Likewise, after securing a search warrant authorizing the seizure of shabu and its paraphernalia
and instead, an unlicensed firearm was seized instead, said gun is inadmissible in evidence.

k. May a non-judicial officer issue a warrant of arrest? (NO)

Read:

1. Harvey vs. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, June 26,1988

2. Moreno vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562

3. Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299

4. HORTENCIA SALAZAR VS. HON TOMAS ACHACOSO, G.R. NO. 81510, March 14, 1990 (En
banc)

5. Presidential Anti_Dollar Salting Task Force vs. CA, March 16, 1989

l. Properties subject to seizure

Read:

1. Sec. 2, Rule 126,1985 Rules on Crimial Procedure, as amended

2. ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA 558

m. Warrantless searches and arrests

Read:

1. P. vs. Bati, August 27, 1990

1-a. Manuel et al., vs. Judge Tirso Velasco, GR No. 84666, February 9, 1989

1-b. Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile,121 SCRA 47 & 137 SCRA 647

1-c. P. vs. Maspil, Jr., August 20, 1990 (Compare with P. vs. Aminnudin, July 6, 1988, supra)

1-d. Posadas vs. CA, Aug. 2, 1990

1-e. P. vs. De la Cruz

1-f. P. vs. ortiz, Dec. 3, 1990

1-g. Rolito Go vs. CA, Feb. 11, 1992

1-h. People vs. Mati, January 18, 1991

2. Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538

2-a. P vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1

2-b. People vs. de la Cruz, 184 SCRA 416

2-c. Gatchalian vs. Board, May 31, 1991

2-d. People vs. Sucro, March 18, 1991

2-e. PEOPLE VS. SOLAYAO, 262 SCRA 255

2-f. PEOPLE VS. CUISON, 256 SCRA 325

2-g. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547

2-h. OPOSADAS VS. CA, 258 SCRA 188

2-i. PEOPLE VS. JUATAN, 260 SCRA 532 (Buy-bust operation)

3. Sec. 6, Rule 113, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended

n. Effect posting bail or entering a plea during the arraignment, if the arrest was illegal. (The
alleged illegality of the arrest is deemed waived upon posting of the bond by the accused)

PEOPLE VS. GALVEZ, 355 SCRA 246

Mendoza, J.
The policeman arrested the accused-appellant on the basis solely of what Reynaldo
Castro had told him and not because he saw the accused-appellant commit the crime charged
against him. Indeed, the prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of arrest issued
against accused-appellant when the latter was taken into custody. Considering that the
accused-appellant was not committing a crime at the time he was arrested nor did the
arresting officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant
committed a crime, his arrest without a warrant cannot be justified.

However, by entering a plea of not guilty during the arraignment, the accused-appellant waived
his right to raise the issue of illegality of his arrest. IT IS NOW SETTLED THAT OBJECTION TO A
WARRANT OF ARREST OR THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH A COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF AN ACCUSED MUST BE MADE BEFORE HE ENTERS HIS PLEA, OTHERWISE, THE OBJECTION
IS DEEMED WAIVED. THE FACT THAT THE ARREST WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT RENDER THE
SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS VOID AND DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS RIGHT TO CONVICT THE GUILTY
WHEN ALL THE FACTS POINT TO THE CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED.

Read:

1. Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA 377

2. PEOPLE VS. NAZARENO, 260 SCRA 256

3. FILOTEO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 263 SCRA 222

4. PEOPLE VS. NAZARENO, 260 SCRA 256

5. PEOPLE VS. LAPURA, 255 SCRA 85

6. PEOPLE VS. SILAN, 254 SCRA 491

o . Penalty for illegal arrest

Read:

Palon vs. NAPOLCOM, May 28, 1989

p. Judicial pronouncements on illegally seized evidence, 106 SCRA 336

q. The exclusionary rule,155 SCRA 494

n. What is the status of a document obtained through subpoena?

Read:

Dianalan vs. Pros., Office of the Tanodbayan, Nov. 27, 1990

r. Search warrant for pirated video tapes

1. Century Fox vs. CA, 164 SCRA 655 (The master copy of the allegedly pirated tape should
be presented before the judge in order to convince him of the existence of probable cause)

2. COLUMBIA PICTURES VS. CA, 261 SCRA 144

LATEST CASES ON SEARCH AND SEIZURES

UY VS. BIR, 344 SCRA 36
The following are the requisites of a valid search warrant:
1. The warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
2. The probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by applicant or
any other person;
3. In determining probable cause, the judge must examine under oath and affirmation the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
4. The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and the person
or things to be seized.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from
other places in the community. Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful
basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. In this case, most of the items listed in the
warrants fail to meet the test of particularity, especially since the witness had furnished the
judge photocopies of the documents sought to be seized. THE SEARCH WARRANT IS SEPARABLE,
AND THOSE ITEMS NOT PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED MAY BE CUT OFF WITHOUT DESTROYING THE
WHOLE WARRANT.
PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ, 341 SCRA 25
 The protection against unreasonable search and seizure covers both innocent and
guilty alike against any form of highhandedness of law enforces.
The plain view doctrine, which may justify a search without warrant, APPLIES ONLY
WHERE THE POLICE OFFICER IS NOT SEARCHING FOR EVIDENCE AGAINS THE ACCUSED, BUT
INADVERTENTLY COMES ACROSS AN INCRIMINATING OBJECT.
Just because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does nor prevent the
appellant from invoking the protection afforded by the Constitution. The right against
unreasonable search and seizure is the immunity of ones person, which includes his
residence, papers and other possessions. For a person to be immune against unreasonable
searches and seizures, he need not be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or private
place.

PEOPLE VS. BAULA, 344 SCRA 663

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against

obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute waiver, IT MUST APPEAR THAT THE RIGHT
EXISTS; THE PERSONS INVOLVED HAD KNOWLEDGE, EITHER ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE, of the
existence of such right. The third condition did not exist in the instant case. Neither was the
search incidental to a valid warrantless arrest. (PEOPLE VS. FIFUEROA, July 6, 2000) An
alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. THE PRESUMPTION BY ITSELF,
CANNOT PREVAIL AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL,
AND ZEAL IN THE PURSUIT OF CRIMINALS CANNOT ENNOBLE THE USE OF ARBITRARY METHODS
THAT THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF ABHORS.
Reference:
Constitutional Law Reviewer by Atty. Larry D. Gacayan (2008)
College of Law
University of the Cordilleras
Requisites for Valid Search Warrant and Warrant of Arrest (Sec. 2. Art. III)
1. It must be issued upon probable cause;

2. The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge himself;

3. The determination of the existence of probable cause must be made after examination by the judge of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and

4. The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
What instances when a warrantless search is valid?
Posted on March 7, 2015by Erineus

Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid.
These are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now Section
13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[14]
Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact that
the search was conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search.

Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable
cause.[15]
In People v. Bagista,[16] the Court said:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search
had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that
the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to
be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the

requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or
seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential
requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can
be lawfully conducted.[17] Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted
in evidence against the person arrested.[18]
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and
circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection
with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be
searched.[19]
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.[20]
Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized
whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is
so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to
be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement
which borders on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport
contraband from one place to another with impunity.[21]
This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the
search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is
impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an
aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.[22]
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The
vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc
had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to
procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the
essence in this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he
only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.

It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellants arrest, the
police received information that marijuana was to be transported from Barangay
Balbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects. At
dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent from the Barangay
Intelligence Network, who informed him that a baggage of marijuana was loaded on a
passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable
cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.[23]
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although,
generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the
exceptions therefor, to wit:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.[24]
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest
can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of
the search.[25]
Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest based on that search is also valid.
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA [288 SCRA 626; G.R. NO. 120515; 13 APR
1998]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a
certain Aling Rosa will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of
marijuana and assembled a team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus
terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when the informer pointed
out who Aling Rosa was, the team approached her and introduced themselves
as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked aling Rosa about the contents of her
bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana leaves
packed in a plastic bag marked cash katutak.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence

alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the
accused claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre where she watched
a movie Balweg. While about to cross the road an old woman asked her for help
in carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested by the police. She has
no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman was nowhere to
be found. Also, no search warrant was presented.

The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972

Issue: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from
the accused.

Held: The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,

Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence
must be immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's

inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in
public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminalactivity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk;

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a

warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.

The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing
the street and was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that
she was committing a crime. There was no legal basis toeffect a warrantless
arrest of the accuseds bag, there was no probable cause and the accused was
not lawfully arrested.

The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not
do so. The seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.
RULE 113, RULES OF COURT

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without
a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall
be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

RULE 126, RULES OF COURT

Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed.

Anapplication for search warrant shall be filed with the following:

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed if the place of thecommission of the crime
is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be
enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only
be made in the court where the criminal action is pending.
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and
authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any
part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or
any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.

Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and
proceedings thereon.

(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued
the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall
ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to
whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was
made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11
of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property seized
be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been
complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by thecustodian of
the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return,
the result, and other actions of the judge.

A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.

SEARCH WARRANT AND ISSUES
SURROUNDING ITS PROCUREMENT
AND IMPLEMENTATION
Posted on Saturday, December 26, 2009. Filed under: PHILIPPINE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE |
Tags: search warrant, search with warrant |

Parallel to the rule on warrant of arrest is the rule on search and seizure. These two
warrants are safeguards to the possible abuses that may be committed by public officers or
employees against the constitutional rights of every Filipino citizens or aliens who live
permanently or temporarily stay in the Philippines.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the right of the
people to be secure in their houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon a probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

The said constitutional provision simply means that search and seizure to the house and
property of a person can only be made if there is a lawful reason and if the person
conducting the search and seizure is authorized to do so, that is, if he is armed with a
search warrant.

The term search in relation to searches and seizures is an examination of a mans

dwelling or his other premises, or an examination to the man himself with the purpose of
discovering property which is considered as contraband, illegal, or stolen or which can be
used as an evidence to prove his guilt in the prosecution of a criminal offense that which he
was charged.
On the other hand, seizure is the physical taking of the property subject of a valid search
into the custody of the law.
Search warrant is defined as an order issued in the name of the People of the Philippines,
signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before the court (Section 1).

The prime law in the Philippines in relation to search and seizure and search warrant is Rule
126 of the Rules of Court.

Section 4 provides for the requisites for issuing search warrant: 1) it must be based upon a
probable cause; 2) probable cause must be determined by the issuing judge personally; 3)
the judge must have personally examined, in the form of searching questions and answers,
the applicant and his witnesses and taken down their written depositions; 4) the search
warrant must particularly describe or identify the property to be seized as far as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow; 5) the warrant issued must particularly describe the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized; 6) it shall issue only for one
specific purpose; and 7) it must not have been issued more than 10 days prior to the search
made pursuant thereto.

The law states that one search warrant shall only be issued for one specific purpose, that is
one single warrant for one single offense committed. It shall also describe with particularity
the personal properties to be seized. A search warrant which was issued for more than one
offense is called a scatter shot warrant. A general warrant is a search warrant which
vaguely describes and does not particularize the personal properties to be seized. Both
warrants are not valid since they violate the constitutional and law provisions specifically the
fifth and the sixth requisites of a valid search warrant.

In the enforcement of the search warrant, officers implementing it must remember the
Knock and Announce Principle. They must announce their presence, identify themselves to
the accused or to the person who was given the authority to allow the officers search the
premises, show the warrant to be implemented, and explain to them said warrant in a
language or dialect known and understood by them.

The officer has the right to break door or window to effect search, if after executing the
knock and announce principle, he was refused admittance thereto (Section 7).

It is also required and mandated by law that the conduct of the search should be done in
the presence of any of the following: 1) lawful occupant of the place to be searched, or 2)
any member of his family; or 3) in their absence, in the presence of two witnesses of
sufficient age or discretion residing in the same locality. Officers conducting search without
the said requisite could be held liable for violating Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code that
is (Searching Domicile without Witnesses).

A public officer or employee who procured a search warrant without just cause or who
exceeded his authority or used unnecessary severity in executing a search warrant legally
procured like maliciously destroying or breaking of objects or things that do not hinder the
implementation of the search could be held liable for violating Article 129 of the Revised
Penal Code (Search Warrants Maliciously Obtained and Abuse in the Service of Those
Legally Obtained).

A public officer or employee who entered without authority the dwelling and/or to make a
search for papers and for other effects could be held liable for violating Article 128 of the
Revised Penal Code (Violation of Domicile).

As a general rule, search warrants could only be served at day time (Section 7, Rule 113,
Rules of Court), except when it is positively asserted in the affidavit that the property is on
the person or in the place to be searched only at night (Alvares vs. CFI of Tayabas, 64 Phil.
33).

Unlike a warrant of arrest, search warrant is only valid 10 days from its date, and could only
be used once. Thereafter, it becomes void.
diokno
Lessons Applicable: Right against warrantless searches and seizures

Laws Applicable: bill of rights

FACTS:

In violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the
Revised Penal Code, 42 warrants were issued against petitioners or the corporation where they
are officers to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of their books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins
(cigarette wrappers) which are the subject of the offense.
Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued alleging the search warrants to be void since (1) they do not
describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not
mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence
against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches
and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance
with law
ISSUE: W/N the seizure is valid

HELD: YES. warrants for the search of 3 residences null and void; searches and seizures made are
illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction issued

the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question
may be split into two (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and
have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made
in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the
amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever
the offices they hold therein may be.
question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been
invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
2 points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and - not met
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. - not met
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws
the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers.