Valentin Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board

151 SCRA 208

The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill
Delegation of Power Delegation to Administrative Bodies

FACTS:
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board was enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate
and supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to minimize the
economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms as
it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has
significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that
such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD
imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.

In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional

on the following grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and
is not germane to the subject matter of the law.

2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative

body, because the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other
government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tios arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof is sufficiently complied with if the title
be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to
achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and
is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD,
which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its
title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject
and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.

2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being
tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion
to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law.
Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit
such assistance is for a fixed and limited period with the deputized agencies
concerned being subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].

Lidasan v Comelec
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
Sanchez, J.:

Facts:
1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato,
and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790
and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for electoral
purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in the
province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought
about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.

2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the
Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of
another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato
and not of Lanao del Sur.

3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to

Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting
legislation."

4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless

declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality
of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in
another province Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one
subject in the title

HELD: YES. RA 4790 is null and void

1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power.

First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language
sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import
of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject
of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional
requirement "breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the
fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during
its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247,
which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final
approval in the House where the bill, being of local application, originated.

2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an

enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to
inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate
action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which
technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express
terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose
of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either
in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject
or scope of the act, is bad.

4. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of
Lanao del Sur" projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is
affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new
Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without
subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is
that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it
creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the
towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also
dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del
Sur.

5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the
law. One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being
taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of
Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces
were actually affected by the bill.
Demetria vs Alba
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987
Justice Marcelo Fernan
Procedure: prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction

FACTS:
1.) Petitioners filed as concerned citizens of the country, as members of the
National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as
parties with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as
taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs
2.) Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of
Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the Budget Reform Decree of
1977 on the ff. grounds:
- It infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing the illegal transfer of public
moneys
- It is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to specify the objectives and purposes
for which the proposed transfer of funds are to be made
- It allows the President to override the safeguards, form and procedure prescribed
by the Constitution in approving appropriations
- it amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers on the transfer of funds by
the President and the implementation thereof by the Budget Minister and the
Treasurer are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction
- The threatened and continuing transfer of funds by the president and the
implementation thereof by the budget minister and the treasurer of the Philippines
are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction.
3.) Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of
petitioners. He further contended that:
-The provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5), Art.VIII
of the 1973 Constitution
-Prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch
to enjoin the performance of duties within the latters sphere of responsibility
4.) On February 27, the Court required petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment.
Petitioners stated that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a
need to hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance.
5.) The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss setting forth as
ground therefore, abrogation of Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution by
the Freedom Constitution, which has allegedly rendered the petition moot and
academic

ISSUES
1. WON the case is justiciable.
2. WON the Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is
unconstitutional.

HELD
1. The case is justiciable. The court cited Ecelio Javier v. COMELEC where it said
that: This Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic
and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic. - According to
Pascual v Secretary of Public Works, ... taxpayers have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore
question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public
moneys..As regards taxpayers suit, this Court enjoys that open discretion to
entertain the same or not (Tan v Macapagal).

- Where the legislature or the executive branch acts beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other
branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of
judicial power conferred by the Constitution in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

2. YES. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, being repugnant

to Section 16(5) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is null and void.
- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: The President shall have the authority to
transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau,
or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment.

- Section 16(5) Article VIII reads as follows: No law shall be passed authorizing
any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the
Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.

- Prohibition to transfer was explicit and categorical. For flexibility in the use of
public funds, the Constitution provided a leeway in which the purpose and condition
for which funds may be transferred were specified.

- The constitution allows the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds
for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned
- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under
Section 16(5), and empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from
one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department, which are
included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment, without regard to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are savings, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which the transfer is to be made.
- It completely disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, amounting to
an undue delegation of legislative power

Demetria vs Alba
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987
Procedure: prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction

FACTS
1.) Petitioners filed as concerned citizens of the country, as members of the
National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as
parties with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as
taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs
2.) Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of
Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the Budget Reform Decree of
1977 on the ff. grounds:
- It infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing the illegal transfer of public
moneys
- It is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to specify the objectives and purposes
for which the proposed transfer of funds are to be made
- It allows the President to override the safeguards, form and procedure prescribed
by the Constitution in approving appropriations
- it amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers on the transfer of funds by
the President and the implementation thereof by the Budget Minister and the
Treasurer are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction
- The threatened and continuing transfer of funds by the president and the
implementation thereof by the budget minister and the treasurer of the Philippines
are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction.
3.) Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of
petitioners. He further contended that:
-The provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5), Art.VIII
of the 1973 Constitution
-Prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch
to enjoin the performance of duties within the latters sphere of responsibility
4.) On February 27, the Court required petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment.
Petitioners stated that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a
need to hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance.
5.) The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss setting forth as
ground therefore, abrogation of Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution by
the Freedom Constitution, which has allegedly rendered the petition moot and
academic

ISSUES
1. WON the case is justiciable.
2. WON the Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is
unconstitutional.
HELD
1. The case is justiciable. The court cited Ecelio Javier v. COMELEC where it said
that: This Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic
and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic. - According to
Pascual v Secretary of Public Works, ... taxpayers have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore
question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public
moneys..As regards taxpayers suit, this Court enjoys that open discretion to
entertain the same or not (Tan v Macapagal).
- Where the legislature or the executive branch acts beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other
branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of
judicial power conferred by the Constitution in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
2. YES. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, being repugnant
to Section 16(5) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is null and void.
- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: The President shall have the authority to
transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau,
or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment.
- Section 16(5) Article VIII reads as follows: No law shall be passed authorizing
any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the
Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
- Prohibition to transfer was explicit and categorical. For flexibility in the use of
public funds, the Constitution provided a leeway in which the purpose and condition
for which funds may be transferred were specified.
- The constitution allows the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds
for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned
- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under
Section 16(5), and empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from
one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department, which are
included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment, without regard to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are savings, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which the transfer is to be made.
- It completely disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, amounting to
an undue delegation of legislative power

Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague

G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991

FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8
Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise
known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the
appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18,
entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand
Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177,
entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act
Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the
Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans
by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation

for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is
against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to assign the
highest budgetary priority to education.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it
being higher than the budget for education.

HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress
is mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not
thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the
power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment
of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to
provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not
only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More
especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process
Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated
to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby
assailed as unconstitutional