Lawrence Erlbaum Associates (Taylor & Francis Group)

Autonomy and Self-Regulation

Author(s): Charles S. Carver and Michael F. Scheier
Source: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2000), pp. 284-291
Published by: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates (Taylor & Francis Group)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1449622
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 COMMENTARIES

Autonomyand Self-Regulation
Charles S. Carver
Departmentof Psychology
Universityof Miami
Michael F. Scheier
Departmentof Psychology
CarnegieMellon University

The targetarticle summarizeswell the currentstate
of the literatureof self-determinationtheory and its
predecessors. Deci and Ryan (this issue) and their
many collaboratorshave generateda largebody of evi-
dence, constituting impressive support for many of
theirassertions.Whetheror not one agrees with all as-
pects of theiranalysis, it's hardnot to be impressedby
the breadthof their efforts to develop a viewpoint on
humanbehaviorthat is humanisticas well as organis-
mic. In the target article they also extended their dis-
cussion to a wide range of theories that have focuses
different from their own. In so doing, they made a
strong claim for self-determinationas a comprehen-
sive statementon humannature.
In our commentary,we devote our attentionlargely
to issues that we think still lack clarity, assumptions
that seem arbitrary,and points on which we disagree
(for a discussion that is wider ranging, see Carver&
Scheier, 1999b).
ics added]within the self); and autonomy,as a human
characteristic,is an extension of this deeply evolved
tendency [toward integrated functioning]."It seems
clear thatautonomyhas very differentconnotationsin
self-determinationtheorythanit does in everydaylan-
guage. We think it is confusing to use the word this
way. We believe the matter of self-determinationis
logically distinctfrom the matterof integrationwithin
the self, and that the two should be kept separate.
Deci and Ryan wrote elsewhere in the targetarticle
that the development of an integratedself reflects a
deep inner design of the human organism toward
self-cohesion and the avoidanceof self-fragmentation.
We have no problem accepting this principle. This
principlefits very nicely with a hierarchicalorganiza-
tion of goals and development (Carver & Scheier,
1999b). We just object to seeing it incorporatedinto
the termautonomy.

What Is Autonomy?
An aspect of this theory we always have trouble
with is the concept of autonomy.In fact, we have sev-
eral problems with it, startingwith how it is defined
within the theory.
Defining Autonomy
What does autonomymean?The nearbydictionary
defines autonomy as "the quality or state of being
self-governing; ... self-directing freedom and esp.
moral independence."A check on the adjective form
"autonomous"adds "undertakenor carriedon without
outside control; self-contained;responding, reacting,
or developing independentlyof the whole" (Webster's
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1984) Autonomy,
then, seems to be self-direction, self-determina-
tion-plain and simple.
In contrastto this, however, the targetarticle (this
issue) includes the following statements:"autonomy
concerns the experience of integration [italics added]
and freedom;it is in people's natureto develop greater
autonomy(as representedby greaterintegration[ital-
Is Autonomy Real?
Apartfrom the issue of whetherintegrationshould
be included in it, what else is bothersome about the
concept of autonomy? Another thing that's bother-
some is the questionof whethertrueautonomyactually
exists. We raised this question earlier (Carver &
Scheier, 1999a), asking whethertrue independenceof
action ever really exists-in effect, whether there is
free will. Clearlypeople experiencea strongersense of
independence and self-determinationat some times
than at others.Just as clearly, however, the subjective
experienceof free will does not make it true in reality
(cf. Wegner& Wheatley, 1999). We arehappyto have
the sense of self-determination(at times), but we retain
some skepticismover whetherthat sense is illusory.
On the otherhand, it isn't clear whetherthe impor-
tance Deci and Ryan place on autonomy is about
whetheror not people trulyare autonomous.The issue
instead may be whether people "need to feel [italics
added] autonomous,"as Deci and Ryan (this issue)
wroteat one point in the targetarticle.Perhapsthe uni-
versalneed is actuallythe need to screen away enough
of the controllingpressurestofeel the sense of self-di-
rection,even if it happensto be illusory.RyanandDeci
(1999) placed great weight on the fact that feeling a

284
 COMMENTARIES
sense of self-determinationpromotesbetter outcomes
of varioussorts, as do Deci and Ryan in the targetarti-
cle. Yet those findings cannotshed light on whetherit
is the perception of autonomyor the existence of au-
tonomy thatmatters.
Does Everyone Want Autonomy?
People in Westernculturedo seem to like to feel au-
tonomous. However, we've also wondered how uni-
versal this desire really is (Carver& Scheier, 1999b).
Of considerableinterest,in this regard,arethe findings
(discussed in the targetarticle)reportedby Iyengarand
Lepper(1999). That researchfound thatreflections of
intrinsic interest among Asian-American children
were greater when a close and trusted other (their
mother,their classmates)made a choice for them than
when they made the choice themselves.
Deci and Ryan interpretthese results as indicating
that the means throughwhich autonomy is expressed
can differ across cultures, an interpretationwe find a
little strained.Deci and Ryan say that "in some East
Asian cultures,people may feel both highly volitional
and autonomouswhen endorsingand enacting values
of those with whom they identify"(this issue). We will
not dwell on the discrepancybetween this and the dic-
tionarydefinition of autonomy.But we are compelled
to ask what evidence sustains the conclusion that the
children whose mothers chose for them were feeling
autonomous,as opposed to the conclusion thatthe de-
sire for autonomyis a Westernphenomenon.We must
also ask why the Asian-Americanchildrenwho chose
for themselvesapparentlydid not feel autonomous.If
the essence of autonomy is self-determination,how
could their actions possibly be more self-determined
thanby making their own choices?1
The Self In Self-Determination
A final point about the use of the terms autonomy
and self-determination:Again we put aside the issue of
integrationand deal only with the dictionarydefinition
of autonomousas self-governing.Thereremainsa fur-
As an aside, we offer the speculationthat Asian-Americanchil-
drenmay hold the belief thattheirmothersand peers typically make
wiser or betterchoices thanthey would makethemselves. If so, they
would prefer to relinquishcontrol over the choice, because relin-
quishingcontrolwould promotea betteroutcome.This would render
the patternconsistent with the view that obtaininga desirableout-
come is more importantthan exertingpersonalcontrolover the out-
come, a view thatwe have and othershave promoted(see, e.g., Bur-
ger, 1989;Carveret al., 2000; Carver& Scheier, 1998;Skowronski&
Carlston, 1982). Althoughwe are mindfulof Deci and Ryan's point
thatautonomyis not quitethe same as personalcontrol,this extrapo-
lation seems not unreasonable.
therdefinitionalproblemhere. To Deci and Ryan, the
"self' in the term self-governing or self-determining
means more thanjust an "internal"perceived locus of
causality (despite their occasional emphasis on
I-PLOC).An internallocus of the originationof the act
(i.e., the impetus starts from within the person) does
not equal self-determinationin this theory.In this the-
ory an action is self-determinedonly if it reflects a
value of the "true"self.2 Deci and Ryan acknowledge
thattheirconcept of self is very differentfrom the self
in most otherviews. Fromtheirperspective,not every-
thingthat'sinside the person'smind is a partof the true
self.
This point is easy to lose trackof. In an earlydraftof
our commentary,one of us wrote that self-determina-
tion can be exercisedby steppingonto a busy highway
withoutlooking,butthat'snot right.Internalperceived
locus of causality could (we assume) be reflected in
such an act, if the impetus to act originatesinside the
person's mind. So could self-governance,in the sense
that the decision to act is made on one's own with no
outside interference(the dictionary definition of au-
tonomy).The act could be freely chosen. But upon fur-
ther review, such an act probably would not be
autonomousin the Deci andRyanview, because it fails
to advancea value of the trueself, andindeedmay con-
flict with an importantvalue of the trueself (desire for
self-preservation).
This difference in assumptionsabout what consti-
tutes the self can make debate difficult. It's not that
Deci and Ryan are not explicit abouttakinga position
that's different from those taken by others. They are
explicit that they do so. But it's hardfor at least some
of us to keep the differencein mind, and difficulties in
communicationdo arise on thataccount(for a broader
critique of the true self as a construct,see Carver&
Scheier, 1999b).
The Core Needs Are Not Structurally
Equivalent
Anotherset of issues is raised by the natureof the
basic needs thatDeci and Ryan postulate.Throughout
theirtargetarticle, they refer to the three fundamental
human needs of autonomy, relatedness, and compe-
tence. Relatednessis a relative latecomerto the Deci
and Ryan model, which formerly incorporatedonly
self-determinationand competence. Adding related-
ness broadensthe theory. However, relatedness also
differsin a fundamentalway fromthe othertwo needs.
The notionof a "true"self is on theone handappealing,andon the
otherhandmaddeninglydifficultto be preciseabout.One ofthe prob-
lems manyobservershave had with self-actualizationmodels is that
it is very hardto specify a prioriwhat anyone's true self consists of
and thus what kind of behavioris self-actualizingfor that person.
285
 COMMENTARIES
Relatedness Is Different in Form
Relatednessconcernsa "content"domainof behav-
ioralexperience(albeita broadone). The othertwo ba-
sic needs are not content needs. The need for
competence applies in principleto any domain of be-
havior,as does the need for self-determination.Indeed,
competence and self-determinationare qualities that
could readily be applied to relatedness.That is, some
people are good at maintainingrelatedness(are com-
petent at it), others are not. Some people feel thattheir
efforts to be connected to others are self-determined
and authentic,othersfeel they "ought"to be connected
to othersandare tryingto be so in orderto satisfy those
conditions of worth.
This difference between relatednessand the other
supposed core needs raises a number of questions.
Why is this particularcontent need special? Are there
no otherpsychological contentneeds thatareuniversal
besides this one? The other two needs that Deci and
Ryan postulatehave to do with the "why"of behavior
(actually, the more we think about it, the more they
seem to be partof the "how"of behavior-that is, be-
haviorbeing done well and done freely). Can it be that
the need for relatednessis the only universal"what"of
behavior?
Self-Determination Moderates
Competence
The two noncontentneeds also turnout to have an-
other importantrelationshipto each other, which ren-
ders suspect the statusof at least one of themas a basic
need in and of itself: Deci andRyan say thattheirview
is very differentfrom othersthatemphasizeconstructs
such as personal efficacy. Their position is more nar-
row and specific. In theirview, efficacy or competence
is not valuable unless it is efficacy at the right activi-
ties, being done under the right circumstances.More
specifically, competenceis desirableonly if it pertains
to an activity that authenticallyreflects some value of
the trueself, and is being engaged in freely ratherthan
being controlled.
This conditionalqualitydoes indeedmaketheirthe-
ory differentfrom others that emphasize competence.
At the same time, however, this conditionalqualityis a
double-edged sword. It also places a boundaryon the
relevancefor humanwell-being of the need for compe-
tence. It means thatthe need for competencecannotbe
fundamentalin the sense of applyingto all domainsof
behavior.
Thus, competence does not standon its own in this
theory. Competence matters only in interactionwith
self-determination.Being highly competent at break-
ing into houses is not good, because housebreaking
does not reflect the true self, even if one is choosing
286
freely to engage in it (question:does this remaintrue
even if the housebreakingstems from such motives as
the desire for fun, or curiosity,ratherthanthe desireto
steal?).Being competentat the piano is not good if the
reason for it is your mother standingover you with a
switch for 10 years forcing 2 hr of practiceevery day.
Competenceis good only if it furtherssome value of
the self, and does so freely and without coercion.
What's beneficial is behavior that simultaneouslyre-
flects competenceand self-determination.
This moderationof the positive value of compe-
tence by self-determinationraises a methodological
question. Moderationor synergistic effects should be
tested via interactionsbetween the predictors(Carver,
1989). Do researcherstesting the role of competence
and self-determinationapproachthe question in de-
signs that permit testing for interactions?If not, this
would seem to be an importantavenue for furtherex-
ploration.
Althoughwe've focused on the issue of moderation
with respect to competence, the question can also be
raisedfor autonomy.Does self-determinationstandon
its own? Is behaviorbeneficial if it is self-determined
but not competent?If it is not, the same two problems
pertainto self-determinationas applyto competence.It
cannot be fundamentalin the sense of applying to all
activities, and the propertest of its effect is its interac-
tion with competence.
Why Is Competence Necessary for an
Activity to Relate to the Authentic
Self?
A final question about these needs (also raised in
Carver& Scheier, 1999b) concerns the role that the
theory assumes for competence in the authenticself.
We've always found it odd that competence per se
should be a hallmarkof the authenticself. What if a
person wants to do something for perfectly authentic
and intrinsic reasons, but is horrible at it? We can
readilysee how this personwould have troublehaving
a "flow"experiencewhile engaged in the activity. But
why shouldthis desire(this goal) not be partof the per-
son's authenticself?
We are not arguing here that Deci and Ryan's po-
sition reduces to an efficacy model. As noted earlier,
in their view it is not beneficial to be efficacious at
an activity that's imposed on you, or is irrelevantto
your true self. Efficacy is desirable only with regard
to values that are authentic. But if the value is au-
thentic, efficacy seems very important indeed. In
fact, it seems from what Deci and Ryan have written
in various places that efficacy is one determinantof
whether the value is authentic. We find that hard to
understand.
 COMMENTARIES
Avoidance and Autonomy
In consideringthe distinctionbetween self-determi-
nation and control, we have argued that many con-
trolled actions appear to have their origins in the
attemptto avoid some undesiredstate, eithersanctions
from outside or self-sanctions (Carver & Scheier,
1999a, 1999b). In this respect,they appearto resemble
"ought" self-guides (Higgins, 1987, 1996)-values
thatpeople approach,but which seem to have a partial
basis in the attemptto avoid other self-guides such as
the "feared"self (Carver,Lawrence,& Scheier, 1999).
Ryan and Deci (1999) rejectedthis argument,holding
thatthe distinctionbetween approachand avoidanceis
unrelated to the distinction between self-determined
and controlledbehavior. They reiteratedthat position
in the targetarticle.
Some of the data suggest otherwise, however. As
noted in the target article, Ryan and Connell (1989)
found that introjected(controlled)and identified (au-
tonomous) regulation related to motivated effort in
schoolchildren. However, introjectedregulation also
related to anxiety, whereas identified regulation re-
lated to enjoyment.Why were the childrenwho were
engaged in introjectedregulationanxious?Anxiety re-
lates to avoidanceprocesses (Carver& Scheier, 1998;
Davidson, 1992; Gray, 1987; Higgins, 1987, 1996;
Roseman, 1984). This patternof findings thus seems
consistent with the idea that introjectedregulationin
these children is rooted in an avoidance im-
pulse-avoidance of a sense of guilt or shame.
Eliot and Sheldon(1998) conductedanotherproject
bearing on this issue. They had participantsreport 10
goals they were actively pursuing and characterize
each as being primarilyan approachgoal or an avoid-
ance goal. Participantsalso rated the extent to which
their pursuit of each goal was based on reasons that
were extrinsic, introjected, identified, and intrinsic.
These ratingswere used to create indices of autonomy
(from intrinsic and identified reasons) and
controlledness (from extrinsic and introjected rea-
sons). Elliot and Sheldon found thatpeople who were
pursuing a higher proportionof avoidance goals re-
portedless autonomyand more controllednessin their
goal pursuit. This patternis also consistent with the
idea thatmuch of controlledbehaviorhas avoidanceas
its core basis.
Let us be clearaboutwhatwe arenot saying here,as
well as what we are saying. We are not makingthe as-
sertion, which Deci and Ryan incorrectlyascribe to
Carverand Scheier (1999b) that approachis autono-
mous and avoidance is controlled. Our assertion is
asymmetrical.WhatCarverand Scheier(1999b) wrote
was "we can think of no case in which a value of the
trueself as [RyanandDeci] discuss it has an avoidance
tendency as its core motivationalbasis" (p. 291). Can
an action thathas approachas its core motivationalba-
sis be controlled?Yes. Can an action that has avoid-
ance as its core motivationalbasis be autonomous?Be-
cause the process leading to avoidance is always
coercive (some danger forces the avoidance), we be-
lieve the answeris no.
Internalization and Compensation
We also have some comments about how values
that are not at first intrinsicbecome part of the self.
Deci and Ryan describe the process of interalization
as moving along a continuumof incorporationinto the
self: introjectionmoves the controlinside the person's
mind but not into the self; identificationbegins an as-
similationinto the self; integrationmakes that assimi-
lation more complete. We have no doubt that this is a
useful and accuratedescriptionof how people change
over time. However, it leaves tantalizing questions
hanging. In particular,what is the process by which
this happens?
Deci and Ryan discuss evidence that certain envi-
ronmentalconditions foster the occurrenceof this in-
ternalizationand othersdo not. But the mechanismby
which it happens was less clearly specified. They
wrote that "for integrationto occur there must be an
opportunityfor the individualto freely process and en-
dorsetransmittedvalues... ," (this issue) andthatpeo-
ple must grasp the importance of the values "and
synthesize their meaning with respect to other values
and motivations"(this issue). It appearsthat they are
saying that internalizationtypically involves giving
the child (a) a rationalefor why a value is important,
(b) a chance to think about the rationalefor a while,
and (c) a chance to see thatthereare links from this to
other values that the child alreadyholds. It would ap-
pear that the key element is the discovery (through
whatever means) of links to other values that are al-
ready in place within the self.
Let us reframethis slightlyin termsof a hierarchical
modelof goals,usingthe corevaluesthatDeci andRyan
emphasize.We startwith the situationof externalcon-
trol. Externalregulationof children'sbehaviorentails
pressurefrom the parent,eitherin the form of cajoling
and rewardsor in the form of threatsand sanctions.As
an example,we use the child who doesn'twant to prac-
tice the piano.Typicaltacticsto elicit practicingareem-
phasizing how much the parent wants the child to
practice,and emphasizingthat the child will be able to
go outsideandplay (or whatever)only afterthe practic-
ing is done (Figure 1, SectionA). These two tacticsare
controlling,in thatthey interferewith autonomy.None-
theless, they rely ultimatelyon core needs. Satisfying
yourmother'sdesiresis one way of maintaininga sense
of relatednessin the family.Gettingto the goal of being
able to go outside and play is a way of pursuingan in-
trinsicmotivation.
287
 COMMENTARIES

Is"
I

Satisfy Getto do Develop A

mother funactivity pianoskill

Practice
the piano

Trueself

Maintain Maintain Do intrinsic Acquire

autonomy relatedrnss interest competence

Satisfy Get todo Develop B

mother fun activity pianoskill

Practice
the piano

Figure 1. Internalizationof a goal into the self, as changes in hierarchical links among self-goals over time
and experience. Importanceaccrues to a concrete action goal in two ways. Theaction goal maycontributein a
large way to attainmentof a higher ordergoal (indicated by a thickerline here), or it may contributeto attain-
ing several higher order goals at once (indicatedby a larger numberof upwardprojections).Interferencewith
attaining a higherorder goal (what one mightthinkof as an inhibitorylinkupward)is indicatedhere by barred
lines. (A) This child is being induced to practice the piano by the mother,who emphasizes how happy it will
make her, and that the child can go do somethingfun only after practicing. Both of these tactics rest in part on
presumedcore needs (maintainingrelatedness,and intrinsicinterestin the otheractivity), thoughboth of these
controlling tactics also interferewith the desire to maintainautonomy.(B) Later,these controlling reasons be-
come less important;this child has discovered thatdeveloping skill at thepiano is a path to an overall sense of
competence, to having connections with otherpeople, and also autonomy.Evena sense of intrinsic interesthas
emerged, with respect both to the developmentof skill and to some of the activities ofpractice itself. Thegoal of
practicing the piano has been internalized.

Now fastforwarda few years.Afterhavingthought
about why (or whether) learning the piano is valu-
able-most importantly, after having experienced
other connections among values in the hierarchyof
goals within the self, the child is now organizeda bit
differentlyregardingrelationsamonghigherorderval-
ues that supportthe practicing(Figure 1, Section B).
Now the child realizes that acquiringa musical skill
enhancespersonaloverall competence,and providesa
new pathto relatedness(i.e., playing along with others
andfor the enjoymentof others),and thatboth of those
pathspermitthe activity to be autonomous.This child
has also begun to discover an intrinsic interest in the
music makingitself, and even in some of the activities

288
 COMMENTARIES
of practicing.3The relevance of the controllingpaths
(the links to satisfying mom and getting free to go do
somethingelse) has faded. This activity is now identi-
fied, possibly even integrated.
As suggested previously, the key to interalization
seems to be the discoverythatthe activityor value con-
nects to some othervalue thatis alreadyin place within
the self (eitherbecause it is fundamental,or because it
has alreadybeen acquired).This discoverycan be quite
serendipitous(see the longer discussion on how new
goals are acquired,in Carver& Scheier, 1999b). This
line of thoughtwould also seem consonantwith Deci
and Ryan's assertionsat severalpoints thatpeople can
be filling core needs even when they are not tryingto
do so (although they may later discover that they are
doing so), and with their statementthat finding an ac-
tivity interestingor importantis influencedby priorex-
periences of need satisfaction.
It seems important,however, to be explicit about
the underlyingassumption:thatfor goals andvalues to
be internalized, their attainmentmust be enhancing
congruencewithin the self. Withoutthis principle,we
see no obvious way to accountfor the absorptionof the
goals into the self. This example thus illustrateshow a
hierarchicalconception of self can render more ex-
plicit one of the processes that is less explicit in
self-determinationtheory.
Compensatory Activity
Deci and Ryan (this issue) contrastthe process of
internalizationwith what they called compensatoryac-
tivities, or substitutefulfillments.The developmentof
compensatoryactivity is hypothesized to occur when
fulfillment of basic needs is repeatedlythwarted.The
compensatory motives do not satisfy the thwarted
need, but provide some "collateralsatisfaction."Pre-
sumably thatmeans that they satisfy needs or motives
thatare not as importantas the core ones (e.g., people
will work for money to buy food, even if they don't
like the work).
The notion of compensatoryactivities is a part of
the theorythatseems less well explicatedconceptually
thanothers.For example, it is not obvious why the fail-
ure to experiencerelatednessshouldlead to intensified
attemptsto accumulatemoney, a "wrong"goal. Nor is
it obvious why accumulatingmoney will enhance the
person's focus on the pursuitof this goal.
This example is framedin termsof a child who actuallyhas some
intrinsicinterestin the piano. If the interestisn't thereat all, thatlink
won't solidify. Further,if the child hasno inbornskill at the piano,the
sense of competencewon't be fed, not will the pianobecome a means
to connectwith otherpeople. Forsuch children,practicingmaynever
be absorbedinto the true self.
PresumablyDeci and Ryan are not saying thatsuc-
cess in pursuingmoney "reinforces"the tendency to
pursue money, as reinforcementis not a key part in
their theory. Is it that accumulatingmoney, posses-
sions, and fame producesat least a semblanceof relat-
edness thatfeels betterthanno relatednessat all? Thus
people hold tightly to the ersatzrelatedness?But peo-
ple presumablyfeel the differencebetween actualand
ersatzrelatedness.Why should people who have only
ersatz relatedness not simply experience more and
more acutely the absence of satisfactionof their core
needs? Why shouldn't involvement in pursuing the
"wrong"goals lead people to be more ready to aban-
don those goals? Why (and how) do they become en-
meshed in compensatoryactivities? How (and under
what circumstances)could they ever get out of thaten-
meshment?
We have suggested a different way of thinking
about this kind of situation (see Carver & Scheier,
1998), one that rests partly on the ideas of dy-
namic-systems theory. We suggest that people often
find themselves in less than ideal circumstancesand
become adapted to those circumstances. This idea,
which is hardlyrevolutionary,views the person's be-
havior less as compensatorythan as being "adaptive"
in the currentlife situation(thoughpossibly not at all
admirableto an outsider).As long as the behaviorre-
mains adaptive(helps the person fit into personal life
space-including fitting with the person's other val-
ues), thereis no pressureto change. Only if the person
experiencessubstantial"error"(which may come from
conflict with othervalues, fromdemandsfromoutside,
from changes in otheraspects of the situation)is there
pressureto shift, reorganize,move from one life pat-
ternto a differentone.
This view would be consonant with the ideas dis-
cussed by Deci and Ryan, if one were to accept their
core values as being alreadyembeddedin the person's
hierarchyof self (as Deci & Ryan do, of course). This
view adds some interestingpredictions,however, in-
cluding the notion that a shift (if it ever does occur)
may be expected to be fairly abrupt (cf. Hayes &
Strauss,1998).
On the otherhand,the fit with Deci andRyanwould
be less good if one were not to assume that the needs
for relatedness,competence,andautonomyarealready
there and actively pulling at the person. One of the
problems many observers have had with self-actual-
ization models is that it's hardto specify a prioriwhat
anyone's true self consists of. If an individual's true
self incorporatesan intrinsic interestin accumulating
wealth, for example,who can say thatthatinterestisn't
part of that person's true self, and that the accumula-
tion of wealth isn't self-actualizing for that person
(Carver& Baird, 1998)?
Although it is dishearteningto consider the possi-
bility, it is not clear thatthe "trueself' of every person
289
 COMMENTARIES
is really rooted in values that affirm human
connectedness and excellence (cf. Baumeister &
Campbell, 1999). Might it not be the case thatthe true
self of the sociopath is exactly what it
seems-exploitive, unconnected, and entitled; inimi-
cal to society, but supportiveand protectiveof its own
autonomouswell being?
Concluding Comment
Despite theircriticismsof cyberetic theories,Deci
and Ryan suggest that there is the potential for a suc-
cessful integrationacross conceptualboundaries.We
agree. For example, we think the notion of
hierarchicality adds considerably to discussions of
how needs are interwoven, and we think Deci and
Ryan's model benefits from explicit considerationof
this idea. As anotherexample,Powers (1973, Chap. 14
& 17) discussed in control-theoryterms some of the
same issues as Deci and Ryan discuss in the context of
autonomy needs, including the idea that giving a re-
ward to induce a behavior can impede a natural
self-correctingreorganizationprocess (p. 193).
Deci and Ryan criticized the cyberneticmodel pri-
marilybecause it doesn't specify a basis for determin-
ing what the higher ordergoals are, thatit "seem[s] to
suggest that what lies at the top of goal hierarchiesis
not organismicallydetermined"(this issue). We sus-
pect (once again) that the differencebetween views in
this respect is not nearly as sharp as Deci and Ryan
think it is (see also Powers, 1973, Chap. 17).
We offer three bases for this opinion. First, the or-
ganismic and humanisticprinciple of integration,co-
herence, or congruence within the self is entirely
commensuratewith self-regulatorycontrolprinciples.
That'swhat discrepancy-reducingloops do: createand
maintaincongruency.
Second, a numberof people have begun to invoke
the principle of self-organizationas a basis for emer-
gent properties in dynamic systems (Nowak &
Vallacher,1998; Prigogine& Stengers, 1984; for basic
introductionsee Carver & Scheier, 1998, Chap. 17).
Interestinglyenough, MacKay (1956) anticipatedthis
notion and described a system of feedback processes
that could evolve its own goals (see also Beer, 1995;
Maes & Brooks, 1990). In such an arrangementthe
goals at the top of the hierarchy would truly be
"organismicallydetermined"-that is, determinedby
the characteristicsof the entity as a whole in interac-
tion with its environment-not just postulated,as Deci
and Ryan did with respect to competence, autonomy,
and relatedness.
This is not to say that competence, autonomy,and
relatedness are not perhaps key emergent properties
withinthe frameworkof humanfunctioning.They may
well be. Our thirdreason for believing that the cyber-
netic and organismic viewpoints are not as different
290
fromeach otheras Deci andRyanthinkthey arecomes
from Powers (1973). In closing his discussion of the
controlhierarchyhe had proposed,Powers speculated
on the developmentof furtherlayers of control.Partof
his description of this possibility was not unlike
Maslow's view of transcendentself-actualizers:
Perhapswhatsome see as a universalurgetoward
Onenessrepresentstheglimmeringsof a modeof per-
ceptioninwhichallsystemconceptsareseenasexam-
ples of higher versions of reality, so that ... what we
call 'realities'will somedaybe manipulated as casu-
allyaswe nowmanipulate principlesin serviceof sys-
tems.(Powers,1973,p. 174)
We suggest that the cybernetic(which Powers has
also pointedout was an analogyfromliving to artificial
systems, ratherthanthe otherway around)and the hu-
manistic-organismicsharea greatdeal. Furtherexplo-
rations of their intersection can only enrich both of
them.
Notes
Preparationof this commentwas facilitatedby NCI
grantsCA64710, CA64711, and CA78995. We thank
Sheri Johnsonfor her commentson an earlierdraft.
CharlesS. Carver,Departmentof Psychology, Uni-
versity of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124-2070.
E-mail:ccarver@miami.edu
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avoidance of depression (Brandtstiidter& Greve,
1994). But as Deci and Ryan's theory implies, this
flexibility is limited by the persistingcharacterof the
underlyingpsychological needs.
Motivation theorists should make more effort in
testing theirmodels on olderpeople. The reluctanceto
give properacknowledgementto the study of aging is
partlydue to psychology's traditionalrelianceon labo-
ratoryexperimentand studentparticipation.Partly it
reflects gerontophobia.Yet thereare some strikingex-
ampleswhere the study of aging has led to new theory
building. Research on the importance of subjective
control for health and well-being, for example, began
in Americannursinghomes (Langer, 1983). Likewise,
growing attentionto the epidemiology of depressive
illness amongolderpeople, helped the identificationof
maintenanceof self-esteem, as well as social support,
as centralto the preventionof depression.Subsequent
researchhas establishedthat self-esteem generallyre-
mains remarkablystable until late life, but shows pro-
gressive loss from the beginning of the ninth decade
(Atchley, 1991). Social contacts show the same pat-
291