G.R. No.

172357 March 19, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
MARCELO BUSTAMANTE y ZAPANTA, NEIL BALUYOT y TABISORA,
RICHARD DELOS TRINO y SARCILLA, HERMINIO JOSE y MONSON,
EDWIN SORIANO y DELA CRUZ and ELMER SALVADOR y
JAVALE, Appellants.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The police authorities are the ones tasked to promote and maintain peace and order in
our country. Thus, it becomes doubly deplorable when they themselves commit the
criminal act. In this case, appellants insist on their innocence; they deny that they
killed the victim Romeleo Quintos on June 1, 1997 inside the detention cell of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). But we are not persuaded. We took a
second hard look at the evidence presented and we hold that both the trial court and
the appellate court correctly found that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the appellants are guilty of murder.

This is an appeal from the July 19, 2005 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00665 which affirmed in toto the March 17, 2000 Decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109, finding the appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. Also assailed is the March 6,
2006 Resolution3 of the CA denying the separate motions for reconsideration filed by
the appellants.

Factual Antecedents

On May 22, 1998, two Informations were filed against the herein appellants, together
with Carlito Lingat and Mutalib Abdulajid, charging them with the crimes of Murder
and Arbitrary Detention. The Informations read:

Crim. Case No. 98-0547 (for Murder):

The undersigned Ombudsman Investigator, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military, hereby accuses NEIL BALUYOT, RICHARD DELOS TRINO, HERMINIO
JOSE, EDWIN SORIANO, MARCELO BUSTAMANTE, CARLITO LINGAT,
MUTALIB ABDULAJID, AND ELMER SALVADOR of the crime of MURDER
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:
That in the early morning of June 01, 1997, between 2:00 to 3:00 oclock [in the
morning], or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused NEIL BALUYOT,
RICHARD DELOS TRINO, HERMINIO JOSE, EDWIN SORIANO, MARCELO
BUSTAMANTE, and CARLITO LINGAT, all public officers, being then members of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Force, assigned [at] the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA), and accused ELMER SALVADOR and MUTALIB
ABDULAJID, security guards, also assigned at the NAIA, conspiring and
confederating with one another, with intent to kill and taking advantage of their
superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously tie a plastic
nylon cord around the neck of one Romeleo A. Quintos, and hang him at the end
portion of the detention cell, which caused the instantaneous death of said Romeleo A.
Quintos to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Criminal Case No. 98-0548 (for Arbitrary Detention)

The undersigned Ombudsman Investigator, Office of the Ombudsman for the Military,
hereby accuses EDWIN D. SORIANO, MARCELO Z. BUSTAMANTE, HERMINIO
M. JOSE, CARLITO D. LINGAT and NEIL T. BALUYOT of the crime of
ARBITRARY DETENTION, defined and penalized under Article 124 of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about June 01, 1997, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, all public officers,
being then members of the Philippine National Police Force assigned at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport, conspiring and confederating with each other,
committing the offense in relation to their office, and without any legal ground, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously detain and restrain Romeleo A.
Quintos of his personal liberty, without his consent and against his will since midnight
of May 31, 1997 until around 3:15 a.m. of June 01, 1997 when said Romeleo A.
Quintos was found dead inside the detention cell.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Neil Baluyot (Baluyot), Richard Delos Trino (Delos Trino), Herminio Jose (Jose),
Edwin Soriano (Soriano), Marcelo Bustamante (Bustamante), Carlito Lingat (Lingat)
and Elmer Salvador (Salvador), were arraigned on July 14, 1998 where they all
entered a plea of not guilty.6 Mutalib Abdulajid (Abdulajid) remains at large.

The records show that at around midnight of May 31, 1997, Romeleo Quintos
(Romeleo) and his friend, Ancirell Sales (Ancirell), went to the NAIA to fetch
Rolando Quintos (Rolando), brother of Romeleo, who was arriving from the United
States. At the arrival extension area of the NAIA, Ancirell alighted from the car driven
by Romeleo to check whether Rolando had already arrived. Upon his return, he was
surprised to see Romeleo arguing with a man in uniform later identified as Soriano
who arrested Romeleo for expired license.

Romeleo vehemently denied the charge causing a heated altercation. Outraged,

Romeleo challenged Soriano to a gun duel. Thinking that Romeleo was a military
man, Soriano called for reinforcement. In a few minutes, Lingat and Bustamante
arrived followed by Jose. They asked Romeleo to hand over his license but the request
went unheeded. Thus, Jose seized the ignition key of the vehicle and ordered Romeleo
to alight from the vehicle but the latter refused. Thereupon, Soriano, Lingat,
Bustamante and Jose pulled Romeleo out of the vehicle and brought him to the
Intelligence and Investigation Division of the NAIA (IID-NAIA) supposedly for
questioning. At the IID-NAIA, it was decided that Romeleo be brought to the Pasay
General Hospital for examination where he was found positive for alcoholic breath.
Thereafter, Romeleo was brought back to the IID-NAIA for further investigation.

Romeleo was shoved into a cell already occupied by prosecution witness Noel
Gabornes (Gabornes), who had earlier been arrested for being an unauthorized porter.
Professing his innocence, Romeleo cursed and shouted at Baluyot, Delos Trino, Jose,
Soriano, Bustamante, Lingat, Salvador and Abdulajid to release him as he was only at
the airport to fetch his brother. Jose ordered him to stop but Romeleo persisted.
Infuriated, Jose entered the cell and kicked the victim hard on the stomach. Salvador
also entered the cell followed by Baluyot while Delos Trino stayed near the door.
Romeleo was still reeling from the blow delivered by Jose when Baluyot boxed him
in the abdomen. Salvador also punched him at the solar plexus causing the victim to
writhe in pain at a corner of the cubicle. To avoid being hit, Gabornes went outside
the cell.

Gasping for breath, Romeleo sought succor from Gabornes but the latter declined,
afraid to get involved. After a while, Gabornes asked Jose if he could go home but the
latter did not answer. Instead, Jose directed Salvador to transfer Gabornes to an
adjacent cell. Thereafter, Gabornes overheard Jose saying "tapusin na natin ito".
Intrigued, Gabornes peered through the iron grill to see what was happening. From his
vantage point, he saw Baluyot handing a piece of grayish plastic cord to Salvador.
Thereafter, he heard Romeleo coughing and gasping for breath as if he was being
strangled. Peering closely, the witness saw Salvador and Abdulajid twisting the cord
with a piece of wood, "garrote" style. Romeleos hand could be seen trying to reach
for the piece of wood in a backward angle in a vain effort to stop the twisting. After a
couple of minutes, Gabornes saw a body being carried out of the cell. Delos Trino
then approached Gabornes and said: "Kung anong nakita mo, nakita mo lang. Kung
anong narinig mo, narinig mo lang. Sana huwag mo ng ikalat ito." Fearing for his
life, Gabornes promised not to tell anybody about the incident. Thereafter, he was
released.
At about that time, the victims brother, Rolando, had already arrived from the United
States. Informed by Ancirell of the detention of his brother Romeleo, Rolando set out
for home to deposit his luggage but immediately went back to the airport with
Ancirell and a cousin, Rabadon Gavino (Gavino), to check on Romeleo. At around
3:00 a.m. of the same day, they arrived at the IID-NAIA office and were met in the
hallway by Bustamante who told them that Romeleo was in the detention cell. Asking
for directions, the group was ushered towards a dark cell. When the lights were turned
on, they were horrified to see the lifeless body of Romeleo hanging with a cord
around his neck with the other end tied around the iron grills of the cell window.

Rolando, Ancirell and Gavino, along with Soriano and Lingat, immediately brought
the victim to the San Juan De Dios Hospital aboard a police car. Rolando and his
companions carried the victim to the emergency room. Soriano and Lingat remained
in the vehicle but returned to the NAIA after a while. Romeleo was declared dead on
arrival by the attending physician. Gabornes later learned of the victims identity
through the newspapers.

Baluyot, Delos Trino, Jose, Soriano, Bustamante, and Lingat, were all members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned with the IID-NAIA, while Salvador and
Abdulajid were security guards of the Lanting Security Agency assigned at NAIA.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After due proceedings, the trial court promulgated its Decision dated March 17, 2000,
the decretal portion reads:

In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Neil Baluyot y Tabisora,
Richard delos Trino y Sarcilla, Herminio Jose y Mozon, Edwin Soriano y dela Cruz,
Marcelo Bustamante y Zapanta, Carlito Lingat y Salvador, Elmer Salvador y Javale,
and Mutalib Abdulajid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER in Criminal Case
No. 98-0457. It appearing on evidence that the accused voluntarily surrendered at the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group as evidenced by Exh. 21, the Court
credits them with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and hereby
sentences each of them to RECLUSION PERPETUA and for each accused to pay the
heirs of the victim indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.

In Criminal Case No. 98-0548 for Arbitrary Detention, it appearing from the evidence
that the victim Romeleo Quintos was detained at the IID for three (3) hours and
fifteen (15) minutes, the same is punished or penalized under Art. 124, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code which is herein below reproduced:

ART. 124. Arbitrary Detention. Any public officer or employee who, without legal
grounds, detains a person, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correctional in its
minimum period if the detention has not exceeded three days;

xxxx

hence the case is not within the jurisdiction of this Court.

The OIC of this Court is hereby ordered to transmit the records of Criminal Case No.
98-0548 for Arbitrary detention to the Metropolitan Trial Court.

The Petition for Bail filed by all the accused is hereby considered moot and academic.

Let an Alias Warrant of arrest be issued in so far as accused Mutalib Abdulajid is

concerned who remains at large.

SO ORDERED.7

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC in a Decision dated July 19, 2005, thus:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED

in toto. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.8

Aggrieved, appellants filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration. In the

meantime, Lingat died. On March 6, 2006, the CA denied the motions for
reconsideration.9

All the appellants, except Bustamante, filed notices of appeal. Bustamante filed an
Urgent Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration 10 but it was
denied by the CA in its Resolution11 dated April 28, 2006. Thereafter, Bustamante
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari but the same was treated as an appeal in the
Resolution12 dated January 15, 2007.

Issues

The issues raised are: (1) whether the uncorroborated testimony of the lone
eyewitness, Gabornes, is sufficient to produce a judgment of conviction; (2) whether
conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) whether appellants should
be held liable only for homicide, and not for murder.

Our Ruling
Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the
defense, we are unable to consider the appellants appeal with favor.

The uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, if credible, is enough to warrant

conviction.

We find that the CA did not err in affirming the Decision of the trial court convicting
the appellants of murder based on the testimony of Gabornes, the lone eyewitness. It
is settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a single witness, if credible, is enough to
warrant conviction. Both the trial court and the CA found Gabornes to be credible and
whose testimony is entitled to full faith. We find no cogent reason to depart from said
findings.

As borne out by the records, Gabornes positively identified and categorically pointed
to appellants as the ones who conspired with one another to kill Romeleo on June 1,
1997. He narrated the incident in a clear and convincing manner. He testified on the
degree of participation of each of the accused with regard to the killing of Romeleo
inside the IID-NAIA detention cell in such a manner that only an unbiased eyewitness
could narrate. Gabornes was not shown to have had any ill motives to testify falsely
against the appellants. As correctly observed by both the trial court and the CA, the
fact that Gabornes was previously arrested for being an unauthorized porter is not
enough reason for him to falsely accuse appellants of a very grave offense.

We also hold that the CA correctly disregarded the affidavit of recantation of

Gabornes dated February 21, 2005. In the said affidavit, Gabornes denied that he was
inside the detention cell of the NAIA on June 1, 1997. Instead, he claimed that he was
under the fly-over near the NAIA playing a card game. Consequently, he averred that
there is no truth to his testimony given before the trial court pointing to the appellants
as the perpetrators of the crime. We are not persuaded.

Our ruling in People v. Ballabare13 is instructive:

It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny by the court
and the parties simply because an affidavit withdrawing the testimony is subsequently
presented by the defense. In the first place, any recantation must be tested in a public
trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected by it to cross-
examine the recanting witness. x x x

In the second place, to accept the new evidence uncritically would be to make a
solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses. For even assuming that Tessie Asenita had made a retraction, this
circumstance alone does not require the court to disregard her original testimony. A
retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. For this reason, courts
look with disfavor upon retractions because they can easily be obtained from
witnesses usually through intimidation or for monetary considerations. Hence, when
confronted with a situation where a witness recants his testimony, courts must not
automatically exclude the original testimony solely on the basis of the recantation.
They should determine which testimony should be given credence through a
comparison of the original testimony and the new testimony, applying the general
rules of evidence. x x x 14

As we have already discussed, Gabornes testimony given before the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) and the trial court was replete with details that only a person
who witnessed such gruesome crime could narrate. Even during cross-examination, he
remained steadfast in his account that the appellants were the ones who killed
Romeleo. Also, both the trial court and the appellate court had several opportunities of
taking a hard look at the records of the case considering the motions for
reconsideration filed by the appellants. Both the CA and the RTC found beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellants were indeed the authors of the crime.

The prosecution satisfactorily established that appellants conspired with each other
in killing Romeleo.

We are not persuaded by the contention of the appellants that there was no conspiracy
considering that they were in different areas of the NAIA premises when the crime
took place. As correctly held by the CA:

At bar, appellants claimed that they were either at the NAIA parking lot or were at the
adjacent IID-NAIA office when the crime took place. These places, however, are but a
short distance away from the scene of the crime and one could travel to and from
these points in a little over a few seconds or minutes of leisure walking, as readily
admitted by appellants in their own version of the event. Verily, the possibility of
appellants to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, is thus not
farfetched.15

Besides, it is not required for conspiracy to exist that there be an agreement for an
appreciable period prior to the occurrence. It is sufficient that at the time of the
commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its
execution. Direct proof of such agreement is not necessary. It may be deduced from
the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts
of the accused which point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.16

This community of design is present among the appellants as deduced from their
individual acts. The RTC observed thus:

The act of the accused Elmer Salvador, Neil Baluyot y Tabisora, and Richard Delos
Trino y Sarcilla of boxing the victim on the stomach and the act of accused Herminio
Jose who said tapusin na natin ito together with the act of accused Neil Baluyot of
handing a tale or cord to Elmer Salvador who thereafter twisted the cord which was
around the neck of the victim with a piece of wood with the help of accused Mutalib
Abdulajid who up to the present remained at large, all acts of which were done in the
presence of all the accused namely: Neil Baluyot y Tabisora, Richard Delos Trino y
Sarcilla, Herminio Jose y Mozon, Edwin Soriano y dela Cruz, Marcelo Bustamante y
Zapanta, Carlito Lingat y Damaso and Elmer Salvador (including the accused who is
at large) clearly show that all accused conspired, confederated and helped one another
in murdering the victim with abuse of superior strength by strangling and hanging the
victim Romeleo Quintos causing him to die of asphyxia. In conspiracy, the act of one
is the act of all.

xxxx

Likewise, the act of accused Carlito Lingat y Damaso and Edwin Soriano y Dela Cruz
of not coming to the hospital to give the medical clerk the name and circumstances of
the victim including the facts surrounding the victims death is very suspicious indeed
and is contrary to the SOP of officers who bring victims to the hospital. Also the
failure of all the accused to immediately report to the police investigator of Pasay City
is quite unusual. In the same manner the acts of accused Neil Baluyot y Tabisora,
Herminio Jose y Mozon and Richard Delos Trino y Sarcilla of leaving the IID office
and cell which is the scene of the crime and then going to Bian and to Atty. Augusto
Jimenez is quite unusual for persons who professed innocence.17

Moreover, the doctrine is well settled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence but may be proven through the series of acts done by each of the accused in
pursuance of their common unlawful purpose. For collective responsibility among the
accused to be established, it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all of them
acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfill their common design to kill the victim.18

The CA correctly observed that:

A fortiori, appellants should be held liable for the death of Romeleo Quintos. Their
sequential attack, one after another, revealed their unlawful intent to kill the victim.
Herminio Joses utterances of "tapusin na natin ito" only strengthens the link that
binds the acts of the appellants in their coordinated effort to kill Romeleo. x x x19

The circumstance of abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to murder.

There is likewise no merit to appellants contention that they should only be held
liable for homicide, and not for murder, because the qualifying circumstance of abuse
of superior strength was not specifically alleged in the Information.
Contrary to the assertion of the appellants, the Information specifically alleged that
the appellants were

x x x conspiring and confederating with one another, with intent to kill and taking
advantage of their superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously tie a plastic nylon cord around the neck of one Romeleo A. Quintos, and
hang him at the end portion of the detention cell, which caused the instantaneous
death of said Romeleo A. Quintos to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
victim.

It has been satisfactorily established that Baluyot, Delos Trino, Jose, Soriano,
Bustamante, and Lingat, were all members of the PNP assigned with the IID-NAIA,
while Salvador and Mutalib were security guards of the Lanting Security Agency
assigned at NAIA. The eight of them acted in concert and definitely took advantage of
their superior strength in subduing and killing their lone victim who was unarmed.
Thus, all the appellants must be held liable for the crime of murder.

All told, appellants miserably failed to show convincing reasons to overturn the
Decision of both the trial court and the CA. In this case, the CA ascertained the factual
findings of the trial court to be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt which led
to the conclusion that appellants acted in unison in killing Romeleo. It is worthy to
stress that findings of fact of the CA, especially if they affirm factual findings of the
trial court, will not be disturbed by this Court, unless these findings are not supported
by evidence.20

The liabilities of Carlito Lingat and Mutalib Abdulajid

It has not escaped our notice that Abdulajid was not arraigned and remains at large up
to this time. However, in the Decision of the trial court which was affirmed by the
CA, Abdulajid was likewise found guilty as charged. This is erroneous considering
that without his having been arraigned, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
his person.

As regards Lingat, his death pending appeal and prior to the finality of conviction
extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities.21 Moreover, the death of Lingat would
result in the dismissal of the criminal case against him.22

Damages

We note that both the trial court and the CA awarded the heirs of the victim only the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. In line with prevailing jurisprudence, 23 we
also award the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. Further, we also award the
amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Angeles24 where we held that "under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary
damages may be awarded in criminal cases when the crime was committed with one
or more aggravating circumstances, (in this case, abuse of superior strength). This is
intended to serve as deterrent to serious wrongdoings and as vindication of undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured, or as a punishment for
those guilty of outrageous conduct. The imposition of exemplary damages is also
justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code in order to set an example for the public
good." In addition, and in lieu of actual damages, we also award temperate damages
in the amount of P25,000.00.25

Likewise, we note that both the trial court and the CA overlooked the fact that during
the testimony of Clementina Quintos, the mother of the victim, sufficient evidence
was presented to show that the victim before his untimely death, was gainfully
employed in a private company with a monthly salary of P15,000.00.

Fiscal Barrera:

Q Would you describe Romeleo Quintos prior to his death?

A He was gainfully employed. He is an executive at IPC (International product

Corporation), Makati as operation officer.

xxxx

Q How much was your son Romeleo Quintos receiving as operation officer at IPC?

A P15,000.00, sir, monthly.

Q Do you have any evidence to show that he earn Five Thousand pesos [sic]
(P15,000.00) a month as project engineer?

A Yes, sir.

Fiscal Barrera:

May I request that the Certification dated January 22, 1999 issued by IPC be marked
as Exh. "EEE"; the name appearing thereat that Romeleo Quintos has been an
employee of IPC from January 8, 1997 up to June 1, 1997 with the position of
operation officer with monthly salary of P15,000.00 x x x be marked as Exh. "EEE-1"
and the signature of a person who issued the certification be marked as Exh. "EEE-
2".26

The formula27 for unearned income is as follows:

Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income (GAI) less Living Expenses (50% GAI)]
Where Life Expectancy= 2/3 x (80 age of the deceased)

Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2206. That amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall
be at least Three Thousand Pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:

(1) the defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased,
and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter, such indemnity shall in every
case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the accused, had no earning capacity at
the time of his death;

xxxx

Hence, the testimony of the victims mother that Romeleo was earning P15,000.00 per
month is sufficient basis for an award of damages for loss of earning
capacity.1avvphi1

It is well settled that the factors that should be taken into account in determining the
compensable amount of lost earnings are: (1) the number of years for which the
victim would otherwise have lived; (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the
deceased.

The unearned income of Romeleo is computed as follows:

Unearned
= 2/3 (80 3028) [(P15,000.00 x 12) (P15,000.00 x 12)]
Income

= 2/3 (50) (P180,000.00 P90,000.00)

= 2/3 (50) (P90,000.00)

= 9,000,000.00/3

= P 3,000,000.00

WHEREFORE, the July 19, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00665 is MODIFIED. Appellants Neil Baluyot, Richard Delos Trino,
Herminio Jose, Edwin Soriano, Marcelo Bustamante, and Elmer Salvador, are hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Romeleo Quintos the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00
as temperate damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P3,000,000.00 as lost
income. In view of the death of Carlito Lingat pending appeal and prior to the finality
of his conviction, Criminal Case No. 98-0547 is DISMISSED and the appealed
Decision is SET ASIDE insofar as Carlito Lingat is concerned. Insofar as Mutalib
Abdulajid is concerned, the March 17, 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 109 in Criminal Case No. 98-0547 is NULLIFIED for failure of
the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over his person. Consequently, the appealed July
19, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00665 is likewise
SET ASIDE insofar as Mutalib Abdulajid is concerned.

2. Soria vs Desierto
GR No. 153524-25, January 31, 2005

Facts:
Soria and Bista were arrested on may 13, 2001 (a Sunday and the day before the May 14, an
election day) without a warrant of arrest by the public respondents for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition. Later, it was found out that Bista has a standing warrant of arrest for
violation of BP Blg. 6. Soria was detained for 22 hours while 26 days had elapsed before Bista was
released.
Petitioners alleged that he could only be detained for 18 hours while Bista could only be detained
for 36 hours following the rule set forth in Art. 126 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that:
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. -
The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public
officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen
(18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their
equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and
shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel.
The public respondents for their part contended that the petitioners were timely delivered to the
proper judicial authorities and that in computing for the periods provided in Art. 125, it should
be construed as excluding Sundays, holidays and election days.

Issue:
Whether or not public respondents gravely erred in construing Article 125 as excluding Sundays,
holidays and election days in the computation of the periods prescribed within which public
officers should deliver arrested persons to the proper judicial authorities as the law never makes
such exception.
Ruling:
No. Based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not
be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for the filing of
complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a "no-office day."
(Medina vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.)
In the instant case, while it appears that the complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court
and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 2001 at 4:30 p.m., he had
already been released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents,
as directed by the Provincial Prosecutor. Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or violation
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to speak of.
With respect with petitioner Bista, the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by
law for the filing of the complaint against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day
(election day).Further, he has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was
only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an Order of
Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released if he has no other pending criminal case
requiring his continuous detention. The complaints against him were seasonably filed in the court
of justice within the 36-hour period prescribed by law as discussed above. The duty of the
detaining officers is deemed complied with upon the filing of the complaints. Further action, like
issuance of a Release Order, then rests upon the judicial authority

3. FELICIANO GALVANTE, petitioner, vs. HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Deputy Ombudsman for
the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices et. al., respondents. G.R. No. 162808, April 22,
2008

FACTS:
Private respondents confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super .38 automatic with serial
no. 67973, one short magazine, and nine super .38 live ammunitions. Consequently, the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor filed against petitioner an Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions in Relation to Comelec Resolution No. 3258, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5047,
before the RTC of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. Pending resolution of Criminal Case No. 5047,
petitioner filed against private respondents an administrative case for Grave Misconduct, before
the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII, Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG); and a criminal case for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and Grave Threats, before the
Ombudsman. The petitioner filed his Affidavit-Complaint in both cases, he narrated how the
private respondents aimed their long firearms at him, arbitrarily searched his vehicle and put him
in detention, however, private respondent Conde filed a Counter-Affidavit where he argued that
he had nothing to do with the detention of the petitioner as it was Chief of Police/Officer-in-
Charge Police Inspector Dioscoro Mehos Rocacorba who ordered the detention, he also denies
searching petitioner's vehicle, but admits that even though he was not armed with a warrant, he
searched the person of petitioner as the latter, in plain view. Petitioner then filed an Affidavit of
Desistance with both the IAS and Ombudsman, absolving private respondents Avenido, Degran,
Rufano and Balolot, but maintaining that private respondent Conde alone be prosecuted in both
administrative and criminal cases. Ombudsman Investigation & Prosecution Officer Dennis L.
Garcia issued a Resolution ruling that there is no probable cause in the offense charged against
the respondents, the same is approved by the Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and called the attention of the Ombudsman to the earlier decision
which declared the warrantless search conducted by private respondents illegal, which are
contradicted by the Ombudsman Resolution declaring the warrantless search legal. Ombudsman
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the latter offered "no new
evidence or errors of law which would warrant the reversal or modification.
Petitioner filed the present petition, attributing to Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro saying that the
Ombudsman has acted with grave abuse of discretion by saying that the searches made were
legal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman correct in dismissing the complaints.

HELD:
YES. The Constitution vests in the Ombudsman the power to determine whether there exists
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.

The Court respects the relative autonomy of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute, and
refrains from interfering when the latter exercises such powers either directly or through the
Deputy Ombudsman, except when the same is shown to be tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of
law as when judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and
despotism. This does not obtain in the present case. It is noted that the criminal complaint which
petitioner filed with the Ombudsman charges private respondents with warrantless search,
arbitrary detention, and grave threats. The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal
offense. The conduct of a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the
Revised Penal Code or any other special law. Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal
complaint for illegal search which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman against private
respondents was therefore proper, although the reasons public respondents cited for dismissing
the complaint are rather off the mark because they relied solely on the finding that the
warrantless search conducted by private respondents was valid and that the Affidavit of
Desistance which petitioner executed cast doubt on the veracity of his complaint.

Public respondents completely overlooked the fact that the criminal complaint was not
cognizable by the Ombudsman as illegal search is not a criminal offense. Nevertheless, the result
achieved is the same: the dismissal of a groundless criminal complaint for illegal search which is
not an offense under the RPC.
 4. [G.R. No. 158211. August 31, 2004]

ERNESTO J. SAN AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Ernesto J. San Agustin of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71925 dismissing his petition
for certiorari.

The Antecedents

Luz Tan executed a notarized criminal complaint and filed the same with the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) charging the petitioner, the Barangay
Chairman of Barangay La Huerta, Paraaque City, with serious illegal detention
alleging that the petitioner detained her husband Vicente Tan, on June 19, 2002,
without lawful ground therefor.[2]
On June 25, 2002, the petitioner received a subpoena from Ferdinand M. Lavin,
the Chief of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI, requiring him to appear
before said office the next day, on June 26, 2002, in order to give his evidence in
connection with said complaint and to bring with him the barangay logbook for June
19, 2002. The petitioner complied with the subpoena and presented himself at the
NBI with the barangay logbook. However, the petitioner was placed under arrest and
prevented from going back home.
On June 27, 2002, the NBI Director transmitted to the Department of Justice the
findings of the NBI on its investigation of the case:

On June 19, 2002 at around 9:00 oclock in the morning while Victim RICARDO
TAN and Witness ANTONIO GERONIMO were selling their wares of kitchen
utensils along the highway of La Huerta, Paraaque City, Victim TAN was mistaken
as a snatcher by two tricycle drivers, namely, ROMEO C. ALCANTARA and
JOSEFINO FERRER, JR. Victim was turned-over to Subject SAN AGUSTIN and
other Subjects at the Barangay Hall of La Huerta, Paraaque City; witness
GERONIMO followed them. GERONIMO witnessed that Victim was beaten by
Subjects and locked-up at the Barangay jail so he decided to inform the wife of the
Victim (Complainant) who was residing in San Pedro, Laguna. When Complainant
went to the Barangay Hall on the same day and inquired on the whereabouts of his
husband, two female clerks thereat denied having seen the Victim. Complainant was
able to talk to Subject SAN AGUSTIN the following day but he also denied having
seen Victim, worst Subject SAN AGUSTIN was furious and even shouted at them and
brought out his knife. Up to date, Victim, never resurfaced nor his whereabouts
located. Record at the NBI central file of Subject SAN AGUSTIN revealed that he
has several cases of homicide, murder and multiple murder.[3]

The NBI Director stated that the basis for the arrest of the petitioner was:

BASIS OF ARREST:

Subject SAN AGUSTIN was subpoenaed to appear before the NBI-AOCD to

controvert allegations filed against him for kidnapping by Ms. Luz Tan. He was
enjoined to come with his Counsel and bring the logbook of the Barangay. When
Subject appeared at the NBI, he presented at once the logbook of the Barangay. It
was noted at the said logbook that there was no entry on June 19, 2002 that Victim
RICARDO TAN was arrested or transmitted to any law enforcement agency or proper
authority.[4]

State Prosecutor Elizabeth L. Berdal conducted an inquest investigation on June

27, 2002 and came out with a Resolution, on the same day, affirmed by the Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor, finding probable cause against the petitioner for serious illegal
detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.[5]
On June 28, 2002, an Information was filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, charging the petitioner with
kidnapping/serious illegal detention with no bail recommended. The case was raffled
to Branch 258 of the court and docketed as Criminal Case No. 02-0759.
On July 1, 2002, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
ground that he was illegally arrested and subjected to an inquest investigation; hence,
he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation. He also prayed that he be
released from detention and that, in the meantime, the NBI be ordered to refile the
complaint against him with
the Office of the Paraaque City Prosecutor and for the latter to conduct a preliminary
investigation. On July 4, 2002, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information, this time, on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute
the felony of kidnapping/serious illegal detention. He claimed that he was
a barangay chairman when the private complainant was allegedly detained; hence, he
should be charged only with arbitrary detention, the most severe penalty for which
is reclusion temporal.
 The prosecution opposed the petitioners motion to quash the Information on the
ground that when he detained the private complainant, he acted in his private capacity
and not as a barangay chairman.[6]
On July 24, 2002, the RTC issued an Order directing the City Prosecutor to
conduct a reinvestigation within a non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days.
[7]
Assistant City Prosecutor Antonietta Pablo Medina was assigned to conduct the
reinvestigation. The petitioner opposed the reinvestigation contending that the
prosecutor should conduct a regular preliminary investigation since the inquest
investigation was void. He refused to submit a counter-affidavit.
On July 31, 2002, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals assailing the July 24, 2002 Order of the RTC. He raised in his petition the
following issues:

1. Whether or not respondent Judge De Leon acted arbitrarily and in grave abuse of
discretion in not granting petitioners Urgent Motion to Quash Information dated 01
July 2002.

2. Whether or not respondent Judge De Leon acted arbitrarily and in grave abuse of
discretion in not granting petitioners Urgent Motion to Quash On The Ground That
The Facts Charged Do Not Constitute An Offense dated 04 July 2002.

3. Whether or not respondent Judge De Leon acted arbitrarily and in grave abuse of
discretion in not granting bail as a matter of right in favor of the petitioner.

4. Whether or not respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. of the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Paraaque, Branch 77, can validly and legally proceed with the hearing of
Criminal Case No. 02-2486.[8]

In the meantime, on August 27, 2002, the Assistant City Prosecutor came out
with a Resolution finding probable cause of arbitrary detention against the petitioner
and recommending that the Information for arbitrary detention and the Motion to
Withdraw Information appended thereto be approved.[9] The City Prosecutor opposed
the said Resolution.
On August 28, 2002, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed with the trial court a
Motion to Withdraw Information.[10] On August 30, 2002, the RTC issued an Order
granting the motion and considered the Information withdrawn.
On the same day, an Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) docketed as Criminal Case No. 02-2486, charging the petitioner with
arbitrary detention, viz:

That on or about the 19th day of June 2002 and subsequent thereto, in the City of
Paraaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being a Barangay Chairman of Brgy. La Huerta, Paraaque
City, a public officer, committing the offense in relation to office, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain one RICARDO TAN, an act done as he
well knew, arbitrary and without legal ground (sic).

CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]

The case was raffled to Branch 77 of the court. The petitioner posted a cash bond
of P3,000.00 for his provisional release without prejudice to the outcome of his
petition in the Court of Appeals.[12]
On April 15, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision denying due course
and dismissing the petition for certiorari of the petitioner.
The petitioner filed the petition at bar contending that:
4.1 THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED
BY JUDGE RAUL E. DE LEON WHEN HE DENIED PETITIONERS
URGENT MOTION TO QUASH INFORMATION DATED JULY
01, 2002.
4.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED
BY JUDGE RAUL E. DE LEON WHEN HE DENIED PETITIONERS
URGENT MOTION TO QUASH ON THE GROUND THAT THE
FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE DATED
04 JULY 2002.
4.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITED BY
JUDGE RAUL E. DE LEON WHEN HE DENIED PETITIONER OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY-GUARANTEED RIGHT TO BAIL.
4.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT OF PARAAQUE, BRANCH, (sic) CAN VALIDLY AND
LEGALLY PROCEED WITH THE HEARINGS IN CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 02-2486.[13]
The petitioner asserts that he was illegally arrested by the NBI; hence, he was
entitled to a regular preliminary investigation, not merely to an inquest
investigation. He contends that since the Information charging him with
kidnapping/serious illegal detention was filed before the Regional Trial Court without
affording him a preliminary investigation, the Information is void. The RTC, the
petitioner avers, should have granted his motion to quash the Information and ordered
the NBI to refile its complaint against him with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Paraaque for the appropriate preliminary investigation and that, in the meantime, the
RTC should have ordered his release from detention. The petitioner posits that the
RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in denying his motion to quash the Information and directing the City
Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation. On the other hand, since the Assistant City
Prosecutor did not conduct a regular preliminary investigation before filing the
Information for arbitrary detention against him with the MeTC, the Information is
void. Hence, the MeTC should be ordered to quash the Information filed therein.
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contends that the petition for certiorari of the petitioner in the Court of Appeals and in
this Court had become moot and academic by the withdrawal of the Information from
the Regional Trial Court and filing of the Information for arbitrary detention against
the petitioner in the MTC. The inquest investigation conducted by the State
Prosecutor was valid because the petitioner refused to execute a waiver under Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code. The OSG asserts that the investigation conducted by
the Assistant City Prosecutor, as directed by the RTC, was valid. The petitioner is
estopped from assailing the Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor finding
probable cause for arbitrary detention because of his failure to submit his counter-
affidavit.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the petitioner was unlawfully arrested; hence, he
was entitled to preliminary investigation and release from detention subject to his
appearance during the preliminary investigation. However, the Court of Appeals
declared that the lack of preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the
Information filed with the RTC. Moreover, the Court of Appeals declared that the
petitioner had already been granted a reinvestigation after which the Information filed
with the RTC was withdrawn. Consequently, the appellate court further declared that
the petition had been mooted by the withdrawal of the Information from the RTC and
the filing of another Information in the MeTC for arbitrary detention. The appellate
court also held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Order. It ruled that even if the
reinvestigation conducted by the City Prosecutor is defective, the Information filed
with the MeTC is valid because under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, there
is no need for a preliminary investigation for crimes cognizable by the Metropolitan
Trial Court.
The petition is partially granted.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the petitioner was unlawfully arrested
without a warrant of arrest against him for kidnapping/serious illegal detention. As
correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals:

Furthermore, warrantless arrest or the detention of petitioner in the instant case does
not fall within the provision of Section 5, Rule 113, Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has been committed and he has probable cause to believe, based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.

considering that petitioner only went to the Office of the NBI to answer
the subpoena it issued which was seven (7) days after the supposed turning over of
the custody of Ricardo Tan to petitioner who was then the Barangay Chairman of La
Huerta, Paraaque City, and his locking up in the barangay jail and, thereafter, he was
already arrested and detained. Certainly, the arresting officers were not present
within the meaning of Section 5(a) at the time when the supposed victim, Ricardo
Tan, was turned over to petitioner. Neither could the arrest which was effected
seven (7) days after the incident be seasonably regarded as when the turning over
and locking up in the Barangay jail had in fact just been committed within the
meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any personal
knowledge of facts indicating that petitioner was the person to whom the custody of
the victim Ricardo Tan was turned over and who locked up the latter in the Barangay
jail. The information upon which the arresting officers acted upon had been derived
from the statements made by the alleged eyewitnesses to the incident which
information did not, however, constitute personal knowledge.[14]

Consequently, the petitioner is entitled to a preliminary investigation before an

Information may be filed against him for said crime. The inquest investigation
conducted by the State Prosecutor is void because under Rule 112, Section 7 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, an inquest investigation is proper only when
the suspect is lawfully arrested without a warrant:

SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need
of such investigation provided an inquest investigation has been conducted in
accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest
prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer
directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or
arresting officer or person.[15]

We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the absence of a preliminary
investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court but merely the regularity
of the proceedings. It does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise
render it defective.[16] Neither is it a ground to quash the Information or nullify the
order of arrest issued against him or justify the release of the accused from detention.
[17]
However, the trial court should suspend proceedings and order a preliminary
investigation[18] considering that the inquest investigation conducted by the State
Prosecutor is null and void.[19] In sum, then, the RTC committed grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the City Prosecutor
to conduct a reinvestigation which is merely a review by the Prosecutor of his records
and evidence instead of a preliminary investigation as provided for in Section 3, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
However, we do not agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that there was
no need for the City Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation since the crime
charged under the Information filed with the MeTC was arbitrary detention under
Article 124, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code punishable by arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccionalin its minimum period, which has a range of
four months and one day to two years and four months. Whether or not there is a
need for a preliminary investigation under Section 1 in relation to Section 9 of Rule
112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure depends upon the imposable penalty
for the crime charged in the complaint filed with the City or Provincial Prosecutors
Office and not upon the imposable penalty for the crime found to have been
committed by the respondent after a preliminary investigation. In this case, the crime
charged in the complaint of the NBI filed in the Department of Justice was
kidnapping/serious illegal detention, the imposable penalty for which is reclusion
perpetua to death.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, dated July 24,
2004, ordering the City Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation is SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court is directed to ORDER the City Prosecutor of Paraaque City to
conduct a preliminary investigation as provided for in Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In the meantime, the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Paraaque City, Branch 77, is ordered to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 02-2486 pending the outcome of said preliminary investigation.

5. G.R. No. 137841 October 1, 2001 EN BANCThe People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
Alberto Chua alias BERT, accused-appellant.Nature: Automatic Review of a decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Br 78.Counsel: The Solicitor General for plaintiff-
appellee; Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellant.Ponente: Puno, J.:Facts:This is an
automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan,imposing death
penalty on accused-appellant Alberto Bert Chua.On April 20, 1998, appellant was arraigned
and he pleaded not guilty. At the pretrialconference however, appellant, through counsel,
manifested his intent to withdraw the plea. On May13, 1998, the trial court propounded into the
voluntariness of his change of plea and his comprehensionof its consequences. Satisfied with
appellants response, the trial court ordered his re-arraignment andchanged his plea of not
guilty into the plea of guilty.On May 22, 1998, the trial court found appellant guilty of the
offense and sentenced him todeath obliged him to pay moral and exemplary damages to private
complainant Chenny Chua.Issue/s:1.

WON the elements or rape were present through evidence in the instant case;2.

WON the trial court erred in accepting with alacrity accused plea of guilty to the
offensecharged.Held and Ratid:1.

No. Rape, under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is committed by
havingcarnal knowledge of a woman:1.

By using intimation or force;2.

When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or3.

When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.The victim was not under twelve
years old or demented; nor was she deprived of reasonor rendered unconscious; nor any force
was used on her as she testified.2.

Yes. When the accused enters into a plea of guilty the court must do the following:a.

Conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accuseds
fullcomprehension of the consequences thereof;b.

Require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and theprecise
degree of his culpability; andc.

Ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.The RTC failed to follow the procedure laid down in the Rules of Court thus
deprivingappellant of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of theaccusation
against him, and also therefore, denied due process.

6. Jasper Agbay vs. Deputy Ombudsman for Military (G.R. No. 134503)
Facts:

On September 7, 1997 Jasper Agbay together with a Sherwin Jugalbot were arrested and
detained at the Liloan Police Station by herein private respondent policemen. They were arrested
for an alleged violation of R.A. 7160. The following day a complaint for violation of said law was
filed against the two accused before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu by
one Gicarya for and behalf of her daughter Gayle.

On September 10, 1997 the petitioner argued to the Chief of Police that they be released,
considering that the latter had failed to deliver the detained petitioner to the proper judicial
authority within 36 hours from Sept. 7, 1997.

The Main argument of herein petitioners that they were not delivered to the proper judicial
authority, hence herein private respondent policemen were in violation of Art. 125 of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioner contends that the act of Gicarya in filing the complaint before the MCTC
was for the purposes of P.I. as the MCTC has no jurisdiction to try the case, thus not falling within
the requirements of Art. 25.

Isuue:

Wheter or not there was a violation of Art. 125 of the RPC?

Decision:

NO. The SC Held that upon filing of the Complaint to the MCTC, the intent behind Art. 125 of the
RPC is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime
imputed against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be released on bail.
Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order release when he applied for
and was granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Art. 125 of the
RPC has been duly served with the MCTC. That the filing of the complaint with the MCTC
interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.

7. [G.R. No. 141176. May 27, 2004]

ELI LUI and LEO ROJAS, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES EULOGIO and PAULINA MATILLANO,
respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 44768 which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bansalan,
Davao del Sur, Branch 21.[2]

The Antecedents

Sometime in September 1987, then seventeen-year-old Elenito Lariosa visited his aunt, his
fathers older sister, Paulina Lariosa Matillano, at Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan, Davao del Sur.
On May 2, 1988, Lariosa was employed as a laborer at the Davao United Products Enterprise
store, with a monthly salary of P800.00. The store was owned by Leong Shiu Ben and King Kiao
and was located at the corner of Monteverde and Gempesaw Streets, Davao City. Lariosa was
tasked to close the store during lunchtime and after store hours in the afternoon. Ben himself
opened the store in the mornings and after lunchtime. Adjacent to the said store was another
store owned by Kiaos son, Eli Lui, who also happened to be Bens nephew. Aside from Lariosa,
Ben and Kiao employed Maximo Pagsa and Rene Malang.

Lariosa chose to live in the house of Kiao. Lariosa fed the dogs of his employer every morning
before going to work and in the afternoon, in exchange for free meals and lodging. There were
occasions when Lariosa stayed in the house of Pagsa and Malang and left some of his things with
them. Lariosa deposited his savings with the Mindanao Savings Bank in Bansalan.

On October 17, 1988, Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the day off. He went to the
house of his aunt, Paulina Matillano, and her husband Eulogio Matillano in Bansalan City, where
he rested until the next day, October 18, 1988. Lariosa reported for work the day after, or on
October 19, 1988, but Kiao told him that his employment was terminated. Lariosa was not paid
his salary for the month of October. Kiao warned Lariosa not to report the matter to the
Department of Labor. Lariosa decided to return to Bansalan without retrieving his things from
Kiaos house.

On October 27, 1988, Lariosa returned to Davao City and was able to collect his backwages from
Ben in the amount of P500.00. Lariosa withdrew his savings from the Mindanao Savings Bank in
Bansalan City and on November 1, 1988, applied for a job at his cousins place, at Quimpo
Boulevard, Davao City. He bought a radio cassette for P2,500.00 and a pair of Rayban sunglasses
for P900.00.

On November 3, 1988, Lariosa went to the house of his fiancee, Nancy, at New Matina, Davao
City, but returned to Bansalan on the same day. On November 4, 1988, he returned to Nancys
house and stayed there until the next day, November 5, 1988.

That day, Ben informed his nephew, Eli Lui, that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash at the store. Ben
reported the matter to NBI Senior Agent Ruperto Galvez, and forthwith executed an affidavit
wherein he alleged that after Lariosas employment was terminated on October 19, 1988, he
discovered that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash. He suspected that Lariosa was the culprit because
the latter, as a former employee, had a duplicate key to the side door of the United Products
Enterprise Store.
At 9:00 a.m. on November 6, 1988, a Sunday, Lariosa went to the house of Pagsa and Malang to
retrieve his things. The two invited Lariosa to go with them to the beach, and when Lariosa
agreed, they borrowed Luis Ford Fierra for their transportation. The vehicle stopped at the
Almendras Hall where Pagsa alighted on the pretext that he was going to buy fish. Lariosa, Rene,
and his wife remained in the Fierra. Pagsa contacted Lui and informed the latter that Lariosa was
with him.

After about an hour, Lui arrived on board a vehicle. With him were Pagsa and two others, Alan
Mendoza and Henry Tan. Lui told Lariosa that he wanted to talk, and asked the latter to go with
him. Pagsa urged Lariosa to go along with Lui. Lariosa agreed and boarded Luis vehicle. The car
stopped in front of Luis house, where the latter alighted and went inside, while his companions
and Lariosa remained in the car. When Lui returned, he was armed with a 9 mm. caliber gun and
poked Lariosa with the weapon. He warned Lariosa not to run, otherwise, he would be killed. The
group went to Bens house to get the keys to the store. Ben joined them as they drove towards
the store.

Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to admit that he had stolen Bens money. Lariosa
refused to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the comfort room of the store and pushed his face
into the toilet bowl, in an attempt to force him into confessing to the crime. Lariosa still refused
to admit to anything. Lui then made a telephone call to the Metrodiscom (PNP) based in Davao
City.

Sgt. Alberto Genise of the Metrodiscom (PNP) issued Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-88 dated
November 6, 1988, directing Pat. Leo Rojas to follow up a theft case committed in Davao City
from 12:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Rojas was directed to coordinate with the nearest PNP
headquarters and/or stations. He was authorized to carry his firearm for the mission. He then left
the police station on board a police car and proceeded to the corner of Magsaysay and
Gempesaw Streets.

In the meantime, a police car arrived at the store with two policemen on board. One of them
handcuffed Lariosa at gunpoint and ordered him to open the store with the use of the keys. As
Lariosa opened the lock as ordered, one of Luis companions took his picture. Another picture was
taken as Lariosa held the door knob to open the door. Lariosa was then boarded in the police car
and brought to the corner of Magsaysay and Gemphesaw Streets where he was transferred to
the police car driven by Rojas. He was brought to the Metrodiscom headquarters. Lui once more
mauled Lariosa, still trying to force the latter to confess that he stole P45,000.00 from his uncle
and to reveal what he did with the money. When a policeman asked him where he slept the night
before, Lariosa replied that he spent the night in the house of his girlfriends parents at New
Matina, Davao City. The policemen brought Lariosa there, where they asked Nancy if Lariosa had
left anything while he slept thereat. Nancy replied that Lariosa had left a radio cassette and a pair
of sunglasses. The policemen took these and brought Lariosa back to the Metrodiscom
headquarters where Lui and his two companions were waiting.

Lui asked Lariosa where he stayed when he went to Bansalan, and Lariosa replied that he used to
stay in the house of his aunt and uncle, the Spouses Matillano, in Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan.
Rojas and Lui then brought Lariosa, with his hands still handcuffed, to a car. Luis companions,
Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan boarded another car and proceeded to the Matillano residence.

Without prior coordination with the Bansalan PNP, Rojas, who was in civilian clothes, Lui, Tan and
Mendoza arrived at the house of the Spouses Matillano at about 3:00 p.m, with the handcuffed
Lariosa in tow. With handguns drawn, they kicked the door to the kitchen and gained entry into
the house. They then proceeded to the sala where they found Lariosas aunt, Paulina Matillano. In
the adjacent room were Julieta, Lariosas sister, Paulinas daughter-in-law, Virginia, the latters
sister, Erlinda, and a seven-month-old baby. Paulina was shocked. Rojas told Paulina, Mrs., we are
authorities. We are here to get something. Paulina remonstrated, Why are you meddling
(manghilabot)?

Lui poked his gun at Paulina and warned her not to talk anymore because something might
happen. He then said, All right, where is your aparador because we are getting something.
Paulina told Lui to wait for her husband Eulogio. Lui ignored her protest and told her that they
were in a hurry. Paulina was then impelled to bring Lui and his two companions, Mendoza and
Tan, to the second floor where her aparador was located. Rojas and the handcuffed Lariosa
remained in the sala. Lui and his two companions then took two mats and two pairs of ladies
shoes belonging to Paulina and Eulogio, two pairs of pants, leather shoes, two t-shirts and two
polo shirts which belonged to the latters children. They also ordered Paulina to open a chest and
when she did, Lui and his companions took her old Bulova wristwatch, necklace, ring and old
coins. Lui and his two companions then went down to the ground floor. When Julieta went out of
the room, one of Luis companions recognized her as Lariosas sister. Lui and his companions
brought her along with them as they left the house.

Paulina was so unnerved by the incident. Her vision blurred, her stomach ached and she was on
the verge of losing consciousness. Concerned, Erlinda massaged Paulinas stomach. However,
Erlinda had to leave because she was worried about her mother. Paulina then went to the
kitchen, prepared hot water and put a soothing ointment on her stomach to relieve the pain.

In the meantime, Lui and his companions proceeded to the Bansalan Police Station and caused
an entry in the police blotter at 3:20 p.m. that he had recovered the following items from the
Matillano residence -- one pair of colored blue pants valued at P89.00; one floor mat costing
P290.00; a pair of black ladies shoes worth P126.00; and another pair of ladies shoes worth
P69.00.

At 4:30 p.m., Paulina reported to the barangay captain that persons identifying themselves as
policemen had gained entry into their house and took the following: two polo shirts; two t-shirts;
two pairs of pants; two floor mats; two pairs of ladies shoes; one Bulova wristwatch; one
necklace; one ring; and old coins.[3]

At 7:35 p.m., Eulogio Matillano made an entry in the Bansalan police blotter that earlier that day,
at 4:00 p.m., Rojas took the following from his house: two polo shirts; two t-shirts; 2 pairs of
pants; two floor mats; two pairs of ladies shoes; 1 Bulova wristwatch; 1 necklace; one ring; and,
old coins, without his and his wifes consent and without a search warrant.[4] In the meantime,
Doroteo Barawan, officer-in-charge of the Office of the Barangay Captain, filed a complaint
against Kim Kiao, et al., based on the complaint of Paulina, docketed as Barangay Case No. 168.[5]

On November 8, 1988, Lariosa executed an uncounselled confession where he stated that he

stole P40,000.00 on October 15, 1988 from the Davao United Products, and that he used part of
the money to buy appliances, a Sony cassette tape-recorder, two pairs of ladies shoes, a Seiko
wristwatch, two pairs of maong pants, Rayban sunglasses and floor mats.[6]

On November 16, 1988, an Information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
charging Lariosa with robbery with force upon things. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 17,136,88.[7] The trial court rendered judgment on June 14, 1989, acquitting Lariosa of the
crime charged on reasonable doubt. The trial court held that Lui procured Lariosas confession
through force and intimidation, in connivance with police authorities.[8] The trial court, likewise,
found that Lui had an ulterior motive for charging Lariosa of robbery:

What would have been the possible motive of complainant in putting the burden of this charged
against the accused despite want of any appreciable evidence, can be gathered in the record, as
indicating the fear of complainant, that the accused will file a complaint against him in the
Department of Labor for illegally dismissing him in his employment, without any sufficient legal
grounds and basis. This unfounded complaint was intended to support complainants ground
against any possible complaint, the accused might file against him with the Department of Labor
by way of anticipation.[9]

On motion of Lariosa, the trial court ordered the return of the following exhibits:

Accordingly and conformably with the judgment of this court dated June 14, 1989, one Eulogio
Matillano, accuseds uncle, is hereby allowed to get or to retrieve exhibits H, I, J, K, L, and M,
consisting of Sony Cassette with serial no. W3658; Rayban sunglasses; two (2) bundles of floor
mat; two (2) pairs of pants; two (2) pairs of ladies shoes; and Seiko Actus wristwatch.[10]

Meanwhile, Paulina Matillano filed a criminal complaint for robbery against Lui, Peter Doe, John
Doe and Alan Mendoza. An Information was, thereafter, filed against them in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, and the case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
880-B. On December 13, 1988, the court issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused therein.
Upon reinvestigation, however, the Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated March 31,
1989, recommending that the case be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, but that the
charges be forwarded to the Judge Advocate Generals Office for possible administrative sanctions
against Rojas.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against
the respondents Eli Lui be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Considering that Pat. Leo Rojas
is a member of the Integrated National Police, this office is without jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint against him pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850. Therefore, let the complaint
against Pat. Leo Rojas, together with its annexes, including a copy of the resolution of the
undersigned, be forwarded to the Judge Advocate Generals Office at Camp Catitipan, Davao City,
for whatever action it may take.[11]

The complaint was docketed as Administrative Case No. 92-0020. The National Police
Commission, thereafter, rendered a decision exonerating Rojas of administrative liability for the
complainants failure to substantiate the charges.[12] The Commission held that Rojas was merely
complying with the mission order issued to him when he accompanied Lui and the latters two
companions to the Matillano residence.

In a Resolution dated August 25, 1989, then Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III dismissed the
petition for review of the Provincial Prosecutors resolution filed by Paulina Matillano. The
Secretary of Justice, likewise, denied a motion for reconsideration thereon.

In a parallel development, Lariosas parents, as well as Paulina Matillano, filed a complaint for
robbery, violation of domicile, unlawful arrest and/or arbitrary detention against Leo Rojas, Eli
Lui, et al., with the Commission of Human Rights docketed as CHR Case No. RFO No. 88-0207-DS.
In a Resolution dated December 4, 1989, the Regional Office of the Commission recommended,
thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we are recommending that there is sufficient prima facie
evidence:

1. to indict Eli Lui for unlawful arrest as defined under Art. 369 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended; and

2. to indict both Eli Lui and Pat. Leo Rojas liable for Violation of Domicile, as defined under Art.
128 of the same code.[13]

The Proceedings in the Trial Court

On January 11, 1990, the spouses Eulogio and Paulina Matillano filed a civil complaint for
damages in the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur against Eli Lui, Leo Rojas, Alan Mendoza and
Henry Tan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. G-XXI-47(90). The plaintiffs therein alleged
the following:

3. That plaintiffs are merchants by occupation and have been residing in Bansalan, Davao del Sur,
for several years now. They are law-abiding and peaceful citizens in the community;

4. That at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 6, 1988, while plaintiff husband was
away from his residential house at Lily St., Bansalan, Davao del Sur, and plaintiff wife was there
tending the house, defendants, without any lawful search warrant, arrived and thru intimidation
succeeded in searching the house owned by the plaintiff after which they brought with them two
floor mats, two pairs of ladies shoes, two pairs of pants, two polo shirts, two T-shirts, one Relova
wrist watch, one necklace (sinubong), one ring (sinubong) and several old coins, without the
consent of the plaintiffs and without even giving any receipt for the items taken;

5. That the defendants allegedly wanted to recover the items taken by one Elinito Lariosa but
defendants thru the use of naked power and brute force, illegally searched the house of the
herein plaintiffs in gross violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights;

6. That what defendants did in conspiring and confederating to illegally search the house of
plaintiffs and then taking with them the items mentioned above without even the benefit of any
receipt is not only violative of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code but also of
Article 32 of the Civil Code;

7. That because of what defendants did, plaintiffs suffered mental anguishes, wounded feelings,
deprivation of the properties taken, besmirched reputation, and fright for which reason
defendants should be made to jointly and severally pay moral damages in the amount of
P500,000.00;

8. That in order to deter others similarly bent and minded and by way of example or correction
for the public good, defendants should be made to pay jointly and severally exemplary damages
in the amount of P300,000.00;

9. That in the protection of their rights, plaintiffs engaged the services of counsel for an agreed
attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the total award plus per diem of P1,000.00 per court
appearance;

10. That plaintiffs are bound to incur litigation expenses in an amount not less than P10,000.00;
[14]

They prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, viz:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing judgment issue ordering the
defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs:

1. P500,000.00 as moral damages;

2. P300,000.00 as exemplary damages;

3. Litigation expenses of P10,000.00;

4. Attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the total award;

5. Per diems to be proved during the trial of this case.

Plaintiffs pray for other reliefs consistent with equity.[15]

In their Answer to the complaint, the defendants therein alleged, inter alia, that they did not
conduct a search in the house of the plaintiffs and that plaintiff Paulina Matillano allowed them
to enter the house and even brought out pairs of pants. They added that the other items were
brought out by Lariosas sister and that they took only one (1) floor mat, two (2) pairs of ladies
shoes, and one (1) pair of blue pants.[16]

The defendants adduced evidence that plaintiff Paulina Matillano allowed them to enter their
house, and with Lariosas sister, voluntarily turned over the items declared in the complaint. They
testified that no violence, threats or intimidation were even committed by them against Paulina
Matillano. Defendant Rojas further testified that he was merely complying with the Mission
Order issued to him when he entered the house of the plaintiffs in the company of the other
defendants, and that he remained in the ground floor while the other defendants retrieved the
goods from plaintiff Matillano in the second floor of the house.

On August 18, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment, ordering the dismissal of the complaint for
plaintiffs failure to prove their claims. The trial court also dismissed the defendants
counterclaims. The trial court gave credence to the collective testimonies of the defendants, that
plaintiff Paulina Matillano voluntarily allowed them to enter her house, and that the latter
voluntarily turned over the subject items to them. The trial court took into account the findings
of the Provincial Prosecutor, the Secretary of Justice, the National Police Commission, as well as
the order of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bansalan, dismissing Criminal Case No. 880-B.

The Case on Appeal

The decision of the trial court was elevated to the Court of Appeals where the appellants
contended, thus:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT PAULINA MATILLANO VOLUNTARILY
ALLOWED APPELLEES TO ENTER THE HOUSE BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF HER NEPHEW
ELINITO LARIOSA WHO WAS HANDCUFFED;

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MRS. PAULINA MATILLANO WAS THE ONE WHO
REPORTED THE MATTER TO THE BANSALAN POLICE STATION.

3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT DESPITE CLEAR PREPONDERANCE
OF EVIDENCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS APPELLEES.[17]

On April 22, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment reversing the decision of the RTC. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one entered ordering defendants-appellees jointly and severally:
1. To pay plaintiffs-appellants the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages
and Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as exemplary damages; and

2. Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), as attorneys fees; and

3. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[18]

The appellate court denied the appellees motion for reconsideration of the said decision. The
appellees Mendoza and Tan no longer appealed the decision.

Petitioners Eli Lui and Leo Rojas now assail the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE TIME-HONORED DOCTRINE LAID

DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT THAT FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING AND
CONCLUSIVE AND DESERVE A HIGH DEGREE OF RESPECT, WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE FINDINGS OF
FACTS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT TRIED THE CASE;

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT AN ILLEGAL SEARCH
WAS CONDUCTED IN MRS. MATILLANOS RESIDENCE, IN DISREGARD OF THE EXCULPATORY
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT MRS. MATILLANO HAD VOLUNTARILY ALLOWED
PETITIONERS ENTRY INTO HER HOUSE.[19]

The Issues

The issues in this case may be synthesized, thus: (a) whether or not respondent Paulina Matillano
consented to the petitioners entry into her house, as well as to the taking of the clothes, shoes
and pieces of jewelry owned by her and her family; (b) whether or not the petitioners are liable
for damages to the respondents; and, (c) if so, the extent of the petitioners liability to the
respondents.

Considering that the assignments of errors are interrelated, this Court shall delve into and resolve
them simultaneously.

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Admittedly, the issues in the case at bar are factual. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised in this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. However, the
rule admits of some exceptions, such as a case where the findings of facts of the trial court are
substantially different from those of the appellate court, and the resolution of such issues are
determinative of the outcome of the petition.[20]

The petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in discarding the
factual findings of the trial court. Contrary to the disquisitions of the appellate court, the
petitioners assert that the inconsistencies between the testimonies of Rojas and Lui are
peripheral. Lui did not conduct any search in the second floor of the respondents house and even
if he did so, respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search when
she allowed the petitioners to enter. According to the petitioners, the respondents failed to prove
that they forced their way into the house of the respondents, and that the facts and
circumstances which the appellate court found the trial court to have overlooked are not, in fact,
substantial enough to warrant a reversal of the factual findings of the court a quo. According to
the petitioners, the appellate court failed to discern that the action filed by the respondents with
the trial court was merely a leverage to the charge of robbery against Lariosa, the respondents
nephew.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals gave credence and full probative weight to the evidence
of the respondents. It stated in its decision that the trial court erred in giving credence and
probative weight to the testimonies of the petitioners (the appellants therein). Moreover, the
appellate court found that the trial court had overlooked facts and circumstances of substance,
which, if considered, would have altered the courts decision. The appellate court gave weight to
the findings of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 17,136,88.[21]

We agree with the Court of Appeals.

The evidence of the respondents show that the petitioners, Tan and Mendoza, guns drawn and
with the handcuffed Lariosa in tow, kicked the kitchen door and barged into the house of the
respondents. They proceeded to the sala where respondent Paulina Matillano was. Over her
vehement protests, and because of petitioner Luis warning that she might be harmed,
respondent Paulina Matillano was forced to accompany the petitioner and his cohorts to the
second floor of their house. The foregoing was testified to by respondent Paulina Matillano, thus:

ATTY. SUARIO:

Q Mrs. Matillano, do you know the person of Eli Lui?

A I know him.

Q Why do you know Eli Lui?

A Because he is from Bansalan.

Q On November 6, 1988, where were you, Mrs. Matillano?

A I was in our house.

Q At about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 6, 1988, did you notice any unusual
incident that took place in your house?

A There was.

Q What incident was that, Mrs. Matillano?

A There were five (5) persons who suddenly went inside our house.

Q Where did they enter?

A They entered through the kitchen.

Q Now, where were you when they entered suddenly in your house?

A I was in our sala.

Q Now, what did you do when you saw these five (5) persons entered (sic) your house?

A I was afraid.

Q Aside from fear, what did you do?

A One of them suddenly said, Mrs., we are authorities.

ATTY. TAN:

Not responsive to the question, Your Honor.

ATTY. SUARIO:

She is responding the question because my question is, Aside from fear, what did you do? and
according to this witness, she was not able to do anything because one of those who entered(not
continued)

COURT:

I think the answer is not responsive. Just reform the question.

ATTY. SUARIO:

Q What did these persons do when they entered your house?

A One of them said, Mrs., we are authorities. We are here to get something from your house."

Q Do you know who this person was, this person who was talking that they were persons in
authority?

A That person when he first went to our house, I do not know him yet, but I know (sic) him later
to be Leo Rojas.

Q Why do you know him later to be Leo Rojas?

A When the case was already being tried, he introduced himself as Leo Rojas.

Q What was Leo Rojas wearing at that time?

A He was in civilian clothes.

Q Aside from Leo Rojas, who were the other persons who entered your house?

A Aside from the two (2) persons whom I do not know, my nephew was also with them in the
name of Elinito Lariosa.

Q Who else, Mrs. Matillano?

A Eli Lui.

ATTY. SUARIO:

At least, may we ask, Your Honor, that the word manghilabot be incorporated.

COURT:

So, the word is interfering or meddling. You record the word manghilabot.

ATTY. SUARIO:

Q When you said manghilabot, what do you mean, Mrs. Matillano?

A Yes, because they said that they are taking some of our things and I said why are they doing
that (manghilabot)?

Q When you said those remarks, what else happened?

A It was Eli Lui who answered, Mrs., do not answer anymore because something might happen.
(Basig madisgrasya).
ATTY. SUARIO:

Madisgrasya, Your Honor, is more than something.

ATTY. SUARIO:

Q When you heard those words from Eli Lui, what else transpired?

A He said, All right, where is your aparador because we are getting something. And I even told
him that we should wait for my husband but they did not agree because they said they are in a
hurry.

Q And after that, what else happened?

A I accompanied him upstairs.

Q You accompanied him upstairs, who are you referring to that you accompanied upstairs.

A Eli Lui and his other two (2) companions.

Q These two (2) companions whom you said you do not know their names?

A Yes, sir.[22]

ATTY. TAN:

Q Now, you said on November 6, 1988, five (5) men suddenly entered your house. When you said
suddenly, will you please describe how did they enter the house?

A They passed through the kitchen and suddenly appeared inside the house.

Q You mean to say that they did not knock at the door?

A They did not.

Q Who first entered the house among the five (5)?

A What I first saw was that they immediately converged in the sala and whom I recognized was Eli
Lui and my nephew who was in handcuffs.

Q Was your door opened at that time?

A It was closed but it was not locked. It can be kicked open.

Q But you can open it without kicking the door?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, you said that you were afraid, why were you afraid?

A Why would you not be afraid when they were armed?

Q Who were armed among the five (5)?

A All of them except the one who was in handcuffs.

Q You are very sure of that?

A I am very sure.[23]

Respondent Paulina Matillano, likewise, testified that petitioner Lui and his cohorts took her
personal things, and those of her familys, from the second floor of the house:

Q Now, while you and Eli Lui with two (2) other companions were upstairs, what happened
upstairs?

A Upon reaching upstairs, they immediately rolled the two (2) floor mats, the pair of leather
shoes, 2 pairs of pants, two (2) polo-shirts. They also let me open the chest and when it was
already open they rummaged through it and they got my old Bulova watch, my necklace, my ring
and a coinsita, old gold coins.

Q When you said coinsita, what is coinsita?

A Old coins.

Q After taking all of these things, what else happened?

A They went downstairs.[24]

Q Now, you mentioned in this affidavit that several properties were taken from your house, do
you confirm that there were two (2) polo-shirts that were taken?

A Yes.

Q And there were also two (2) floor mats?

A Yes, that is true.

Q One (1) Bulova wristwatch?

A Yes.

Q One (1) necklace?

A Yes.

Q Two (2) pairs of lady (sic) shoes?

A Yes.

Q Two (2) pairs of pants?

A Yes.

Q One (1) ring?

A Yes.

Q Who owns these two (2) pairs of ladys (sic) shoes?

A That was mine.

Q What were the color of the shoes?

A Black and dirty white (referring to the color of the rostrum).

Q Where did you buy that shoes?

A In Davao City.

Q What store in Davao City?

A NCCC.

Q What particular date when you bought that shoes?

A I think it was in the month of November.

Q 1988?

A 1988.
Q And who owns these two (2) polo-shirts?

A My children.

Q What are the names of your children?

A Allan and Danilo.

Q Where is Allan residing?

A During the incident, Allan was still schooling in Tacloban.

Q So, you mean to say, on November 6, 1988, he was no longer residing in Bansalan?

A No more.

Q How about Danilo, where was he residing in November 6, 1988?

A He was living in Sta. Cruz.

Q He has a family of his own at Sta. Cruz?

A He was still single then.

Q But he was residing in Sta. Cruz?

A Yes.

Q How about these two (2) pairs of pants, who owns these pants?

A My children also.

Q You are referring to Allan and Danilo?

A No, because I still have so many children.

Q So, who owns these two (2) pants?

A Also my children, Eulogio, Jr. and Allan.

Q Now, Eulogio, Jr. where is (sic) he residing on November 6, 1988?

A In our house.
Q How about these two (2) t-shirts?

A Also owned by my children.

Q Are you referring to Allan and Danilo?

A They used to wear that.

Q How come that Allan has a polo-shirt in your house when you said he was then residing in
Tacloban?

ATTY. SUARIO:

May we manifest, Your Honor, that he was schooling in Tacloban.

COURT:

All right.

A They used to have a vacation during December and March and usually they left some of their
clothes inside our aparador.

Q These polo shirts were still new?

A Already used.

Q How about the pants?

A The other one is already used and the other one is new.

Q How about the floor mats?

A That is mine.

Q Now, you claimed that these clothes were taken from the cabinet or aparador, is that correct?

A Yes, that is true.

Q Inside your aparador, how many pieces of clothes were stored therein?

A Many.

Q Could you say one (1) dozen?

A It cannot be counted.

Q Could you say three (3) dozens?

A It is really full of dress.

Q Would you say it is more than three (3) dozens?

A More.

Q And these more than three (3) dozens consists of polo shirts, t-shirts and pants?

A Yes.

Q And inspite (sic) the fact that there were more than three (3) dozens of clothes, pants, polo
shirts and t-shirts only these two (2) pants, two (2) polo shirts and two (2) t-shirts w ere taken?

A Only those things because they only selected the ones which were still usable the good ones.

Q Now, you mentioned also in your affidavit that the group also searched your trunk?

A I was ordered to open the trunk.

Q Who particularly ordered you to open the trunk?

A Eli Lui.[25]

The respondents immediately reported the matter to the Office of the Barangay Captain[26] and
filed a complaint against petitioner Lui and his cohorts.[27]

The petitioners claim that respondent Paulina Matillano allowed them and their cohorts inside
the house and voluntarily gave their personal belongings is belied by the unshaken testimony of
respondent Paulina Matillano, corroborated by Erlinda Clarin.

The petitioners attempt to project themselves to have acted with civility and courtesy to
respondent Paulina Matillano is implausible, taking into account petitioner Luis state of mind
before he and petitioner Rojas and their cohorts left the Metrodiscom Headquarters in Davao
City, and proceeded to the house of the respondents in Bansalan. Before they left Davao City, Lui
sadistically mauled Lariosa with the acquiescence of the police authorities, and forced him to give
an uncounselled extrajudicial confession. This was the finding of the RTC in Criminal Case No.
17,136,88:

Despite being mauled by Eli Lui and drowned in a toilet bowl, accused denied having anything to
do with the lost money of the complainant. Later, he was turned over to the police for
investigation and there without affording accused with his right to counsel, he was interrogated
orally and was forced to admit that out of the money he stole, he bought items which the police
later recovered at Bansalan. They also returned the accused to the complainants establishment
and forced to do re-enactment of the act of robbery, without accused again afforded the right to
counsel. Pictures were taken during the re-enactment while accused was handcuffed, as shown in
the pictures taken by the police.

Finally, the accused was forced to admit and sign his extrajudicial statement (Exhibit A), no longer
able to bear the pain of the mauling to him by Eli Lui, who has the temerity of maltreating the
accused even in the presence of the guards in the jail and seriously threatening accused to admit
ownership of the recovered items at Bansalan and at New Matina, SIR, Davao City, otherwise he
will be salvaged, along with the serious threatening words of accuseds companion in the jail, that
if he will refuse to sign his alleged confession, he will be salvaged as directed by Eli Lui with the
police.

Indeed, in the records, it can be deduced with sufficient basis, that Eli Lui seems to have an open
hand in the prosecution of the accused. He was the one who called the police to arrest him, even
without a warrant of arrest. Before his statement was obtained, policeman relied on him in the
investigation and the filing of proper charges against accused. They rode in a car of Eli Lui, in
taking accused from the Metrodiscom to the establishment of complainant during the re-
enactment in going to Bansalan, to recover the items allegedly bought by accused out of the
money allegedly stolen; all of these incidents shows the police despite justification, that they do
not have enough facilities, gone astray in conducting an impartial investigation, by submitting to
any possible indiscretion of Eli Lui of making the scale of justice bend in his favor, by manifesting
control over the police power of investigation highly and seriously pre-judicial to the rights, and
interests of the accused.[28]

If petitioner Lui was so brazen as to have mauled Lariosa in the presence of police authorities, he
would not have cared a whit in barging into the respondents house with petitioner Rojas, a
policeman of Davao City, and his cohorts, and divesting the respondents of their belongings. The
petitioners and their cohorts wanted to insure that their caper would succeed. Hence, they did
not coordinate with the Bansalan Police Station when they went to the respondents house with
their intention to divest them of their belongings.

Petitioner Rojas reliance on Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-98 issued to him by Sergeant Alberto
Genise is misplaced. It bears stressing that the petitioner was merely tasked in the said order to
follow up a theft case within the area of responsibility of the Metrodiscom, Davao City. The
petitioner was not authorized, under the said order, to commit or tolerate the commission of a
crime, such as violation of domicile as defined in Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:

ART. 128. Violation of domicile The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any public officer or employee who, not being authorized by judicial order, shall
enter any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof, search papers or other effects found
therein without the previous consent of such owner, or, having surreptitiously entered said
dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse to do so.

If the offense be committed in the nighttime, or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence
of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender, the penalty shall
be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Although petitioner Rojas did not follow petitioner Lui and his cohorts to the second floor of the
respondents house and himself conduct a search therein, he allowed them to search the
premises without a warrant. The petitioners and their cohorts were not authorized to conduct a
search in the house of the respondents, much less divest the latter of their personal belongings.
As a police officer, it was petitioner Rojas duty to prevent the commission of crimes in his
presence, and to arrest the persons committing such crimes.

The trial court rejected the testimony of respondent Paulina Matillano on the following grounds:
(a) she had known petitioner Lui for ten years as a businessman doing business in Bansalan; (b)
the occupants of the respondents house when the petitioners and their cohorts arrived were all
women; (c) the respondents failed to report the incident to the Bansalan police authorities; and,
(d) the provincial prosecutors resolution recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 880-B
for robbery against the petitioners, which was sustained by the Secretary of Justice, and the
ruling of the National Police Commission exonerating petitioner Rojas from any liability.

We find that the Court of Appeals was correct in overruling the trial court.

First. Respondent Paulina Matillano testified that petitioner Lui did not stay permanently in
Bansalan. He went there only to collect money from a certain Matura and other businessmen.
[29] She also testified that there were many cases against the petitioner, one of which was for
arson. The case was dismissed, but one of her neighbors was rendered missing.[30] If the
petitioner, a businessman for ten years or so, had no qualms in torturing Lariosa under the very
noses of police officers, he would, likewise, have no qualms about intimidating respondent
Paulina Matillano and divesting her of her personal belongings. It must be stressed that
petitioner Lui was in the company of petitioner Rojas, a police officer from Davao City.

Second. The petitioners and their cohorts had no foreknowledge that the occupants of the
respondents house were all women. They must have believed that there were male occupants;
hence, barged into the house with drawn guns.

Third. As shown clearly in respondent Paulina Matillanos sworn statement before the Bansalan
Police Station, she declared that the petitioners were armed with guns. They threatened her life
and, without any search warrant therefor, divested her and her family of their personal
belongings against their will.[31]

Fourth. In her complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain, respondent Paulina Matillano
declared that the petitioners entered their house, that petitioner Lui pointed a gun at her, and
that the petitioners and their cohorts searched the house and carted away their personal
belongings.[32] That the report made before the Barangay Captain and petitioner Paulina
Matillanos sworn statement are not as complete as her testimony before the trial court is
understandable. Affidavits are usually taken ex parte and are almost always incomplete and
inaccurate, but they do not detract from the credibility of the witness.[33] An entry in the police
blotter is usually incomplete and inaccurate for want of suggestions or inquiries, without the aid
of which the victim may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for
the correction of the first suggestion of his memory, and for his accurate recollection of all that
pertain to the subject.[34] The same principle applies to entries in the barangay blotter.

Fifth. As correctly held by the trial court, the findings of administrative and quasi-administrative
agencies are not binding on the courts. In the present case, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, as affirmed by the Secretary of Justice,[35] found no probable cause for robbery
against the petitioners because they had no intent to rob, but merely to recover the properties
from the house of the respondents which petitioner Lui perceived to have been acquired by
Lariosa with money stolen from his uncle, Ben.[36] The decision of the National Police
Commission absolving petitioner Rojas of grave misconduct was anchored on its finding that the
petitioner was merely performing his duty as ordered by his superior officer.[37] It was inevitable
for the City Prosecutor to dismiss the complaint for violation of domicile filed against petitioner
Rojas in I.S. No. 91-1488 because the crime of violation of domicile was committed in Bansalan
and not in Davao City.[38] In contrast, the Commission on Human Rights recommended the
indictment of petitioner Lui for unlawful arrest and of petitioner Rojas for violation of domicile.
[39]

Sixth. Under Articles 19 and 32, in relation to Article 21 of the New Civil Code, the dismissal of
the complaint against the petitioners by the Provincial and City Prosecutors, the Municipal Trial
Court and the National Police Commission are of no relevance to the civil complaint for damages
filed by the respondents against the petitioners. The action of the respondents against the
petitioners may still proceed despite the dismissal of the criminal and administrative actions
against them.

The petitioners contention that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against
unreasonable search and seizure deserves scant consideration. Under Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution, the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable. This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who
appear to be guilty, who must nevertheless be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
[40] The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried through or with judicial
warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure becomes unconstitutional within the context of the
constitutional provision[41] because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional
right. Peace officers who effect a warrantless search cannot invoke regularity in the performance
of official functions.[42]

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived
expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed.[43] There must be clear
and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right to constitute a waiver of a
constitutional right. There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the
person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and,
(c) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.[44] The waiver must be
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The Court indulges every reasonable presumption
against any waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.[45] The fact that the aggrieved person
did not object to the entry into her house by the police officers does not amount to a permission
to make a search therein.[46] A peaceful submission to search and seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.[47]

In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that respondent
Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search and seizure by consenting
thereto, either expressly or impliedly. Admittedly, respondent Paulina Matillano did not object to
the opening of her wooden closet and the taking of their personal properties. However, such
failure to object or resist did not amount to an implied waiver of her right against unreasonable
search and seizure. The petitioners were armed with handguns; petitioner Lui threatened and
intimidated her. Respondent Eulogio Matillano, her husband, was out of the house when the
petitioner and his cohorts conducted the search and seizure. He could, thus, not have waived his
constitutional right.

Furthermore, the petitioners claim that respondent Paulina Matillano voluntarily handed over
the articles to petitioner Lui is incredible. There is no evidence that there was foreknowledge on
the part of the petitioners of the articles they wanted to retrieve from the respondents house.
Even if respondent Paulina Matillano did hand over the articles to the petitioner, it was only
because the petitioner and his cohorts had earlier threatened and intimidated her into doing so.

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners are liable to the
respondents for moral and exemplary damages in the amounts respectively awarded by it.
Petitioner Rojas, a policeman of Davao City, conspired with petitioner Lui and, with drawn guns,
gained entry into the respondents house, and threatened and intimidated respondent Paulina
Matillano. Although petitioner Rojas did not himself conduct the search, he assented thereto by
allowing petitioner Lui and his cohorts to go up to the second floor and divest the respondents of
their belongings. The petitioners even left together after the incident.

In MHP Garments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[48] we had the occasion to state:

In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of
constitutional rights and liberties from public officer or private individual, thus:

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
xxx

(9) the rights to be secure in ones persons, house, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

xxx

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudged.

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

xxx

(6) Illegal search;

(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or
impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible
therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded.

xxx

The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary
therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the
main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in
the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse
by plea of the good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort. (emphasis
supplied)

In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, the Court En Banc explained the liability of persons
indirectly responsible, viz:

[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an
officer or employee or person directly or indirectly responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly
responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible
has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

xxx

While it would certainly be too nave to expect that violators of human rights would easily be
deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no
uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as
indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.

xxx

[N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated directly should be held liable.
Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well
as indirectly, responsible for its violations. (emphasis supplied)

Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly granted
damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of
private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid
pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in
court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. As correctly observed by respondent court:

Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing appellees (respondents)
merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for unfair competition against appellees
(respondents) were for the protection and benefit of appellant (petitioner) corporation. Such
being the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair to infer from those acts that it was upon appellant
(petitioner) corporations instance that the PC soldiers conducted the raid and effected the illegal
seizure. These circumstances should answer the trial courts query posed in its decision now
under consideration as to why the PC soldiers immediately turned over the seized merchandise
to appellant (petitioner) corporation.

The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not
lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scout items. By standing by and apparently
assenting thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. So with the
petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonable seized by the
PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the
dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.[49]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioners.

8. ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No 170180

November 23, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 of
RA 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs) after dried marijuana leaves were found in his
possession by three barangay tanods who made a search on him

Petitioner denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted from the bus when one of
the barangay tanods approached him and requested to see the contents of his bags. The
petitioner was then brought by the three tanods to the house of Brgy. Captain Mercado, who
again ordered to have the bag opened. During which, the dried marijuana leaves were found.

Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on appeal, that his
warrantless arrest was effected unlawfully and the warrantless search that followed was likewise
contrary to law.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted for the lack of a warrant supporting the arrest
and the search.

Held:

The Court ruled for the reversal of the decision by the lower courts. The accused was acquitted
by reasonable doubt.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions
permitting a warrantless arrest: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The Court held that none of the circumstances was attendant at the time of the arrest.

The Court also posed 2 exceptions to the said rule, to wit: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer.

None of the petitioners actuations (i.e. his looking around and alleged fleeing upon approach of
the tanods) is adequate to incite suspicion of criminal activity to validate the warrantless arrest.

However, the Courts decision was not only hinged on this premise but also on the fact that the
lower courts failed to establish the veracity of the seized items by virtue of the chain of custody
rule and in view of the contrasting testimonies by the prosecution witnesses.

Failure of the lower courts to satisfy the test of moral certainty, the accused was thus acquitted.

The Court added that the petitioners lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless
search and seizure.

9. Abraham Miclat vs. People, GR 176077 (2011)

FACTS:

Petitioner Abraham C. Miclat, Jr. was charged for Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165,
illegal possession (shabu).

P/Insp. Jose Valencia received an INFOREP Memo from Camp Crame relative tothe illicit and
down-right drug-trading activities being undertaken along Caloocan.

Immediately, P/Insp. Valencia formed a surveillance team headed by SPO4 ErnestoPalting and is
composed of five (5) more operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit.

When the group arrived at the area they were [at] once led by their informant to the
house of one Alias Abe.

PO3 Antonio then positioned himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the
members of the group deployed themselves nearby.
o
Thru a small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped
inside and there at a distance of 1 meters, he saw Abe arranging several
pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to be containing shabu.
o
Upon gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio forthwith introduced himself as a police
officer while Abe, on the other hand, after being informed of such authority,
voluntarily handed over to the former the (4) pieces of small plastic sachetsthe latter was earlier
sorting out.
o
PO3 Antonio immediately placed the suspect under arrest and brought himand the four (4)
pieces of plastic sachets containing white crystallinesubstance to their headquarters and turned
them over to PO3 FernandoMoran for proper disposition.

DEFENSE: They were at their house watching television when they heard thecommotion
downstairs. Men in civilian clothes introduced themselves as raiding
police officers who were set out to arrest Abe, petitioner for drug pushing.

o
That he was immediately arrested;
o
That on their way to the Bagong Silang Police Station, PO3 Pagsolinganshowed to [petitioner] a
small piece of plastic sachet containing whitecrystalline substances allegedly recovered by the
raiding police team fromtheir house.
o

At around 9:00 oclock in the evening, [petitioner] was transferred to the

Sangandaan Headquarters where he was finally detained.

RTC: convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. CAaffirmed.

ARGUMENTS: Petitioner also posits that being seen in the act of arranging severalplastic sachets
inside their house by one of the arresting officers who was peepingthrough a window is not
sufficient reason for the police authorities to enter his housewithout a valid search warrant
and/or warrant of arrest.
o
Arguing that the act of arranging several plastic sachets by and in itself is nota crime
per se
,

petitioner maintains that the entry of the police surveillanceteam into his house was illegal, and
no amount of incriminating evidence willtake the place of a validly issued search warrant.
o
Moreover, peeping through a curtain-covered window cannot becontemplated as within the
meaning of the plain view doctrine, rendering thewarrantless arrest unlawful.ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners arrest
and the subsequent seizure of the arrestingofficer of the suspected sachets of dangerous drugs
valid? YES.RATIO:
o
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of hisarrest
before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in thetrial of the case,
jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submittedto the jurisdiction of the trial
court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
o
Warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:Sec. 5.
 Arrest without warrant; when lawful
. a peaceoffice of a private person may,
without a warrant
, arrest a person:(a) When,
in his presence
, the person to bearrested has committed,
is actually committing
, or isattempting to commit an offense;
o
For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two(2) elements
must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overtact indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting tocommit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
o
In this case, he was caught
in flagrante delicto
and the police authorities effectivelymade a valid warrantless arrest.
o

During the operation, PO3 Antonio, through petitioners window, saw

petitioner arranging several plastic sachets containing what appears to be
shabu
in the living room of their home. The plastic sachets and its suspicious

contents were plainly exposed to the view of PO3 Antonio, who was onlyabout one and one-half
meters from where petitioner was seated.
o
When PO3 entered the house and introduced himself, petitioner voluntarilyhanded the sachets.
Thereafter he was arrested and the sachet were markedas evidence.
o
Considering the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding thearrest of the petitioner,
petitioner was clearly arrested
in flagrante delicto
ashe was then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, withinthe view of the
arresting officer.

o
It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealedplastic sachets
in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily surrendered them tohim upon learning that he is
a police officer. The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner
was not only incidental to a lawful arrest,
but it also falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.
o

Since petitioners arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant
before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the petitioner was the resultof a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plainview of the
arresting officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure wereadmi
ssible in evidence to prove petitioners guilt of the offense charged.

10. People vs. Marcelino

G.R. No. 189278. July 26, 2010

A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.

FACTS:

Elizabeth Marcelino was found guilty of violating Sec 5 and Sec 11 of RA 9165. In the version
of the prosecution; SPO1 Dela Cruz conducted a test-buy on 30 October 2002 to verify a report of
the accused having been engaged in illegal drug activities. Upon confirmation, SPO3 Felix Dela
Cruz approached them. The accused was apprised of her constitutional rights. In the version of
the defense, Elizabeth Marcelino was at her home with her grandson and sister when suddenly 3
people entered the house and announced that they were police officers. Elizabeth revealed that
the police officers who arrested her at her house were not the same as that the prosecution
presented as members of the bu-bust operation. This statement was corroborated by Rodrigo
Lavia, a tricycle driver and neighbor of Elizabeth. The accused also contented that there was no
warrant of arrest or search warrant served to her when she was arrested.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a warrant of arrest was necessary in the case at bar

HELD:

No. The OSG (Office of the Solicitor General argues that no search warrant and warrant of
arrest was needed, a buy-bust operation being recognized as a valid form of entrapment. Citing
jurisprudence, the OSG claims that it is ridiculous for the buy bust team to first obtain a search
warrant when a crime was committed before their eyes. The prosecution failure to submit the
evidence required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated will not result
in accused acquittal of the crime charged. Non-compliance with the provisions of RA 9165 on the
custody and disposition of dangerous drugs is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution case.
Neither will it render the arrest of an accused illegal nor the items seized from inadmissible. The
accused is found guilty in violation of Sec 5 and Sec 11 of Art.11 of RA 9165.

11.
People v.
Martinez et al.G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010
FACTS
: On September 2, 2006 at around 1245 PM, PO1 Bernard Azarden was on duty at the
PoliceCommunity Precinct along Arellano St., Dagupan City when a concerned citizen reported
that apot session was underway in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in Trinidad
Subdivision,Dagupan City. PO1 Azardan, PO1 Alejandro dela Cruz and members of Special
Weapons andTactics (SWAT) proceeded to aforesaid house. Upon inquiry from people in the area,
the houseof Gonzales was located. As the team entered the house, accused Orlando Doria was
arrestedwhile coming out. Inside the house were Gonzales, Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, and
RezinMartinez. Seized from the accused were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue),
piecesof rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil. The accused were arrested
andbrought to police station, seized items were sent to the Pangasinan Provincial Police
CrimeLaboratory. All accused, except for Doria, were found positive for methylamphetamine
HCL.On February 13, 2008, RTC found Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, Rezin Martinez and
RafaelGonzales guilty beyond reasonable doubt under Sec. 13 in relation to Sec. 11, Art. II of RA
9165and sentenced each to life imprisonment and fined PHP 500,000 plus cost of suit.The CA
supported the findings of the lower court.
ISSUE
: Were the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING
: No, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused
beyondreasonable doubt because (1) evidence against the accused are inadmissible and (2) even
if theevidence were admissible, the chain of custody was not duly established .
The evidence is inadmissible because of the illegal arrest, search and seizure. Searches and
seizures without a warrant are valid in (1) incidence of lawful arrest, (2) plain view search of
evidence, (3) moving vehicle search, (4) consented search, (5) customs search, (6) stop and frisk,
(7)exigent and emergency cases. Under Rule 113, Sec. 5 of RRCP warrantless arrest can only
bedone in
in flagrante cases
, hot pursuit cases, and fugitive cases. The arrest of the accused-appellants were based solely on
the report of a concerned citizen, no surveillance of the placewas conducted. Under Rule 113,
fugitive case does not apply. In flagrante and hot pursuit casemay apply only upon probable
cause, which means actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion. It is reasonable ground of
suspicion when suspicion of a person to be arrested isprobably guilty of the offense based on
actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances. In caseat bar, this is not the case since the entire
arrest was based on uncorroborated statement of aconcerned citizen.The chain of custody as
outlined in Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165 was not observed as no properinventory, photographing,
was done in the presence of the accused nor were thererepresentatives from the media, the DOJ
and any popularly elected official present, although inwarrantless seizures, marking and
photographing of evidence may be done at the nearest policestation.Court sets aside and
reverses the decision of the CA dated August 7, 2009, acquits the accusedand orders their
immediate release.

12. People vs Mariacos

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BELEN MARIACOS

GR NO. 188611 June 16 2010

FACTS:
October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with secret agent of the Barangay
Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded in a
passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned 3 bags and 1
plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc boarded
the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. He found bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspapers. He them asked the other passengers about the owner of the bag, but no one know.

When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with other passengers.
Unfortunately, he did not noticed who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only
realized a few moments later that the said bag and 3 other bags were already being carried away
by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told
them that they were under arrest, but on the women got away.

DOCTRINES:

ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES: The right of the People to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
Judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

Purpose: MOVING VEHICLE (WARRANTLESS SEARCH)

A. This has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible
for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought.
B. This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless
searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause when a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extension search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long
as officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search
that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched.

MALUM PROHIBITUM
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the
ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana
is not necessary.

Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defence. Lack of criminal intent
and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charge is malum prohibitum.

PEOPLE vs. MARIACOS (G.R. No. 188611, 16-JUN-2010)51

FACTS: The O.K. bag that was described to have in it the marijuana as reported by a condential
informant was found by the policeman. He then asked the other passengers in the jeepney who
owns the bag, but nobody knew. Meanwhile, as the jeepney reached its destination, the bag was
carried by accused-appellant, hence, the police caught them up and introduced himself as a
policeman.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was probable cause to warrant the warrantless arrest. YES.

HELD: YES. Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to
the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant
issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause.

13. SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 169156 : February 15, 2007]

SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT, INC., Petitioner, v. RIGHT FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On application of Inspector Rommel G. Macatlang of the Philippine National Police, after a

complaint was received from petitioner, Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. (SCEI), eight search
warrants1 for copyright and trademark infringement, of which Search Warrant Nos. 05-6336 and
05-6337 are relevant to the present case, were issued by the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Executive Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. following which a raid was conducted on the premises of
respondent, Bright Future Technologies, Inc. (BFTI), on April 1, 2005. Seized during the raid were
the following items:

eight replicating machines

five bonding machines

four printing machines

seven polycarbonate dryers

one table for silk screen

ten moulds

two shredder machines

one color blue centroller

one dryer machine

92 boxes of assorted colors of paint

600 pieces of counterfeit Sony Playstation DVDs

285 boxes of blank CDs

eight boxes of white blank CDs

nine boxes of AL targets

two boxes of sputtering targets

18 gallons of UV bonding adhesive

four gallons of DVD bondage

21 gallons of phothum chemicals

four gallons of CPS mesh prep, and

nine gallons of CD lacquer.2

BFTI subsequently filed on April 5, 2005 before Branch 24 of the RTC Manila presided by Judge
Eugenio an Urgent Motion to Quash and/or to Exclude or Suppress Evidence and Return Seized
Articles,3 alleging as follows, quoted verbatim:

1. The searching team entered the premises and conducted the search without any witness in
violation of the Rules of Court;

2. The raiding team planted evidence of 600 compact discs at the scene while no witnesses were
present;

3. Certification against forum shopping prescribed by law was not executed;

4. For search warrant to be valid, the master tapes must be presented;

5. The statement made by the affiants in their joint-affidavit in support of the application for the
search warrant were false and perjurious;

6. No probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant;

7. The search conducted was illegal;

8. The place to be searched was not described with particularity;

9. No bond was posted by the applicant.4 rbl rl l lbrr

SCEI filed an Opposition5 to the motion, to which BFTI filed a Reply,6 the latter arguing that SCEI
had no personality to represent the People of the Philippines in the case and to file the
opposition to the motion because SCEI's agents were mere witnesses of the applicant for the
issuance of the search warrants.7

On April 11, 2005, acting on a Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit8 filed by SCEI to which BFTI
interposed its objection, Judge Eugenio "voluntarily inhibited" himself from the case.9 The case
was thereafter raffled to Branch 21 of the Manila RTC, presided by Judge Amor A. Reyes.10

In the meantime or on April 14, 2005, SCEI, through counsel, filed with the Department of Justice
Task Force on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy a complaint-affidavit against the directors and
officers of BFTI.11

By Order12 dated April 18, 2005, the RTC denied BFTI's motion to quash the warrants, it finding
that they were regularly issued and implemented, and that a bond is not required in the
application for their issuance.

BFTI filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 of the denial of its motion to quash. It also filed joint
motions "for the inhibition of the Honorable Judge Amor Reyes," "for reconsideration of the
order of voluntary inhibition dated April 11, 2005," and "for the return of the case to the
executive judge."14

In an Order dated May 20, 2005, Judge Reyes transmitted the records of the case to the Executive
Judge pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02.15 The case was then re-raffled to Branch 8 of the Manila
RTC, presided by Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.16

In addressing the issue of SCEI's personality to appear in the proceedings, the RTC held that it
would treat SCEI's counsel as "an officer of [the] Court to argue the other side, so to speak, for
the clarification of issues related to search and seizure cases and to arrive at a better conclusion
and resolution of issues in this case."17

The RTC, however, found that the two-witness rule under Section 8 of Rule 126 which provides:

SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. No search
of a house, room or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. (Underscoring supplied),

was violated and that the searching team's use of a bolt cutter to open the searched premises
was unnecessary, hence, it granted BFTI's Motion for Reconsideration of its April 18, 2005 Order
by Order of August 8, 2005.18

BFTI subsequently filed on August 9, 2005 an Ex Parte Motion to Return Seized Articles19 which
the RTC granted, by Order of August 10, 2005, subject to the filing of a bond.20 BFTI filed the
required bond alright,21 and the seized items were turned over to its custody.22

Hence, arose SCEI's present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 4523 which assails the
August 8 and August 10, 2005 Orders of the court a quo, contending that the RTC erred

(1) . . . when it disregarded [its] clear right . . . to appear and participate as a private complainant
in the search warrant proceedings;

(2) . . . when it granted respondent's Motion to Quash based on questions of alleged irregularities
by the peace officers in enforcing the search warrants.

(a) . . . when it ruled that the use of the bolt cutter violated Section 7 of Rule 126.

(b) . . . when it ruled that the enforcement of the search warrant violated the two-witness rule
provided in Section 8 of Rule 126;

[3] . . . when it ordered the immediate release of the seized property prior to the finality of the
order quashing the search warrants.
(a) . . . when it released the seized properties by virtue of the filing of a bond by the
respondent.24

The issue of whether a private complainant, like SCEI, has the right to participate in search
warrant proceedings was addressed in the affirmative in United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip:25
rbl rl l lbrr

. . . [A] private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a government

agency charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the BFAD, may appear,
participate and file pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the
validity of the search warrant issued by the court and the admissibility of the properties seized in
anticipation of a criminal case to be filed; such private party may do so in collaboration with the
NBI or such government agency. The party may file an opposition to a motion to quash the search
warrant issued by the court, or a motion for the reconsideration of the court order granting such
motion to quash.26 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

When SCEI then opposed BFTI's Urgent Motion to Quash and/or to Suppress or Exclude Evidence
and Return Seized Articles (emphasis supplied), the RTC correctly recognized the participation of
SCEI in the proceedings.

As for the use of a bolt cutter to gain access to the premises of BFTI, it was, under the
circumstances, reasonable, contrary to the RTC's finding that it was unnecessary. For, as the RTC
itself found, after the members of the searching team introduced themselves to the security
guards of BFTI and showed them the search warrants, the guards refused to receive the warrants
and to open the premises, they claiming that "they are not in control of the case."27 The
conditions required under Section 7 of Rule 126 were thus complied with:

The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose
and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a
house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding
him when unlawfully detained therein. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

The RTC's finding that the two-witness rule governing the execution of search warrant was not
complied with, which rule is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search
warrant,28 is in order, however.

Observed the RTC:

At this point, it is worthy of note [sic] the two statements issued by Barangay Police Subrino P. de
Castro and Gaudencio A. Masambique who affirmed in their testimonies in Court that, to wit:

x x x

3. Noong ako ay makarating sa nasabing lugar nadatnan ko ang mga pulis at mga miyembro ng
Raiding Team na nasa loob na ng gusali ng Bright Future at nagsisiyasat sa mga gamit at
makinaryang naroroon. Pagkatapos ay nilapitan ako ng isang pulis at ipinatanggap sa akin ang
nasabing search warrant.

The police were already searching ("nagsisiyasat") the area of respondent BFTI in clear violation
of the two-witness rule provided for by Section 8 of Rule 126. These statements of the two
Barangay Police ostensibly arriving late while a search was going on was corroborated by Insp.
Macatlang's testimony that the Barangay officials arrived at about 11:30 PM to 12 AM.29
(Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

The RTC did not thus err in ordering the quashal of the search warrants.

SCEI insists, however, that the searching team waited for the arrival of the barangay officials who
were summoned to witness the search,30 and that "[e]ven when the enforcing officers were
moving towards the actual BFTI premises . . . they were accompanied at all times by one of the
security guards on duty until the barangay officials arrived."31 SCEI's position raises an issue of
fact which is not proper for consideration in a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court
under Rule 45, which is supposed to cover only issues of law.32 In any event, a security guard
may not be considered a "lawful occupant" or "a member of [the lawful occupant's] family"
under the earlier quoted Section 8 of Rule 126.

As the two-witness rule was not complied with, the objects seized during the April 1, 2005 search
are inadmissible in evidence. Their return, on motion of BFTI, was thus in order.33

A final word. The RTC order requiring BFTI to file a bond to ensure the return of the seized items
should the Department of Justice find probable cause against it in I.S. No. 2005-315, SCEI v.
Anthony Bryan B. Sy, et al., has no basis in law. Besides, the seized items being inadmissible in
evidence, it would serve no purpose to ensure their return.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

The August 8, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8 granting the Urgent
Motion to Quash filed by respondent, Bright Future Technologies, Inc., is AFFIRMED.

The August 10, 2005 Order granting the Ex Parte Motion to Return Seized Articles filed by
respondent is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the portion requiring respondent to file a
bond is SET ASIDE. Let the bond then filed by respondent be CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED.