Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
During the British Mandate, Japan supported the Balfour Declaration, which on
2 November 1917 set the goal of establishing a Jewish national home in the Land
of Israel.1 Already on 6 January 1919 the Japanese ambassador to Britain,
Sutemi Chinda, wrote a letter on behalf of his government to Dr. Chaim
Weizmann supporting the Jewish national home.2 In 1920, Japan participated
in the San Remo Conference that allocated the mandate for the territory to
Britain. Although Japans contribution to the discussions that preceded the
decision was marginal, this marked its rst involvement in the Middle East.
The Zionist Federation of Shanghai conducted the contacts with the Japanese
embassies and consulates. The rst ocial visit to Japan by its spokesman,
Israel Cohen, took place during 8-18 December 1920.4 The contacts with Japan
through members of this Federation continued throughout the 1920s. For
example, on 8 June 1922 the Japanese consul-general in Shanghai, Funatsu
Tatsuichiro, wrote a letter to Nissim Ezra, its secretary-general, stating that if
the subject of a Jewish homeland were to be discussed by the League of Nations
in Geneva, Japan would be inclined to support the project.5 In appreci ation of
these contacts, the Jewish Federation of Shanghai decided to include the name
of Japanese Foreign Minister Oshida in the Golden Book of the Jewish
National Fund (4 March 1923).
Most of the Japanese public and government knew little about the Jews and
Zionism. At the same time, many anti-Semitic articles, translated from Russian,
were published in Japan, originating in the Japanese encounter with Russian
anti-Semitism in Siberia, to which the Jews were exiled or ed from the
pogroms.6 Many Japanese viewed the Jews and Zionism as the Jewish power,
as depicted in the anti-Semitic literature. In fact, the only foreign nancier who
was prepared to help nance the Japanese war eort against Russia (1904-1905)
was an American Jewish banker named Jacob Schi, who did so primarily as a
protest against the anti-Semitism of the Czar and the Russian establishment.
Israel was the rst Middle Eastern country to open a diplomatic mission in
Tokyo in 1952, which received the status of embassy in 1963. Japans foreign
policy in the period following World War II and since the restoration of its
sovereignty on 28 April 1952 involved reliance on the United States. The
successive Japanese governments, however, also espoused a policy of separating
economics and politics, thus acting on economic considerations in general and,
in particular, vis-a`-vis countries with which Japan had no diplomatic relations.
1
During the 1950s, structural changes in the Japanese economy aected Japans
relations with the Middle East, including Israel. In 1952, Japan adjusted its
energy policy when it changed from using coal in industry to oil. By 1957, amid
accelerated development and in the wake of the Korean War, Japan became one
of the worlds largest importers of Middle Eastern oil. The Japanese Foreign
Ministry published a Blue Book outlining its policy toward Middle Eastern
countries, emphasizing the desire to cooperate with the regions oil producers
that were members of the Afro-Asian bloc. In the 1960s, Japans dependence on
energy from foreign sources reached 80.9 per cent of consumption. About 70
percent of these were in the Middle East, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran,
and the Gulf states. The relatively cheap oil in the 1950s and 1960s was an
important compo nent of what would later be called the Japanese economic
miracle. Japanese industry became more energy intensive than in other coun
tries because of the growing dependence of its heavy industry, its steel and
shipbuilding, and its chemical and petrochemical industry on oil; by the
beginning of the 1970s Japans dependence on imported energy reached 90
percent.
Until the outbreak of the rst energy crisis in 1973, Japanese foreign policy was
generally neutral on the Arab-Israeli conict. In 1956, after the Sinai Campaign,
it advised the parties to reach a settlement by negotiations. In 1967 Japan
criticized Israels conquest of the territories, though in the Arabs view Japans
statement was low-key and unconvincing.7
The second relevant event in the 1970s was that, also in 1972, King Faisal of
Saudi Arabia visited Japan and warned that Japans continued support of U.S.
policy would lead to undesirable results for [it].9 Faisal also tried to persuade
2
the Japanese to transfer their oil purchases from Iran to Saudi Arabia, and he
stated bluntly that Japans future lies with the Arabs and not with the West.
The Japanese believed that Faisals threat was merely verbal and did not take it
very seriously. Hence, the energy crisis of 1973 came as a complete surprise to
the Japanese decision-makers.
About ten days after the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, the
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) decided to raise
the price of oil and, concomitantly, to use oil as a weapon in the Arab-Israeli
conict.10
At the end of that month, Saudi Arabia repeated its demand that Japan sever
relations with Israel. On 6 November 1973, the secretary-general of the
Japanese cabinet declared that: Israel must withdraw from the occupied
territories and expressed its support for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people. Japan hoped that the Arabs would treat it the same way they had
treated the European Community, most of whose members, except for Holland,
had not been declared unfriendly states. The Arabs, aware of the debate within
the Japanese establishment and sensing Japans weak ness, increased the
pressure. The United States, however, pressured Japan not to cave in to the
Arab demands, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger emphasized this in a visit
to Tokyo in November. In exchange, the Japanese demanded a guarantee from
Kissinger for the supply of oil from the U.S. emergency stocks if the oil ow
from the Middle East were to be cut o. When Kissinger did not give the
Japanese such an explicit commitment, they saw it as justication for changing
their policy.11
Amid contending pressures from the Arab and American sides, opinions in
Japan were divided. Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira and his adviser,
Kensaku Hogen, held that Japan should not hasten to decide. The minister of
MITI (the Ministry of International Industry and Trade), Yoshihiro Nakasone,
who later became prime minister and chairman of the Friendship League with
the Arab League, supported the Arab demands to sever relations with Israel,
claiming that energy and markets were just as important to Japan as defense.
Japanese businesspeople were also divided in their opinions, with some among
them arguing that most Japanese imports into the United States were managed
by Jews.12 The results of the debate were typical of Japan. The new line adopted
was based on a formula with two conicting components: to soothe and satisfy
the Arabs on the one hand, without causing a schism with the United States on
the other. The actual signicance of the formula included the adoption of a
3
declarative pro-Arab policy; total support by the business world, backed by the
establishment, for the rules of the Arab boycott against Israel; and,
concomitantly, ongoing low-prole relations with Israel.
The years 1973-1985 were the pro-Arab period in Japans foreign relations,
marked by discrimination against Israel. The consensus in the Japanese
bureaucracy, ruling party, and business community was to maintain very low-
prole relations with Israel while expressing, in every manner possible, support
for the Arabs and the PLO. This state of aairs continued until the mid-1980s,
and the eects were still felt at the start of the Gulf War in 1991.
4
The deep freeze in the relations continued until the visit of Foreign Minister
Yitzhak Shamir to Tokyo in September 1985. The Japanese took every
opportunity to express their pro-Arab line particularly in international
institutions. Sometimes they used arguments taken from the ideology of
Japanese militarism of the 1930s and 1940s. In those decades, there was a wide
consensus in Japan that the availability of raw materials and energy determines
a nations strength and level of development. Japanese militarists invoked the
vital need for raw materials when they conquered Manchuria and large parts of
China and Indonesia. An entire generation of Japanese was educated on the
ideology of the pivotal importance of raw materials. The Japanese government
also continued this line in the 1970s, and a generation of Japanese Arabists
regarded the Arab states as a crucial source of oil and a primary market for
Japanese products. The Japanese establishment disseminated King Faisals
statement that Japans future lay with the Arabs and not with the West. Japan
established bodies whose task was to strengthen relations with the Arab world
including the PLO. At the same time, the perception gained ground, fed by
ignorance, that relations with Israel would detract from relations with the Arabs.
The Arabs work in Japan in 1973-1985 was easy. Most of the propa ganda about
implementing the Arab boycott was put forth by the Japanese-with even greater
fervor than required, since this was seen as serving Japans interest.
Following the rst oil crisis, the Japan Oil Development Company (JODCO) was
established and became the instrument for cementing relations between Japan,
the Arab countries, and the PLO. Former Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura was
appointed chairman of the Japan-PLO Friendship League. Yoshihoru Nakasone
was appointed chairman of the Friendship League with the Arab League.
Nakasone also served in this capacity while he was prime minister, which is
inconsistent with diplomatic practice. Toshiki Kaifu, a senior member of the
ruling party and also subsequently a prime minister, was ap pointed chairman
of the Friendship League with Jordan, and there were several other
appointments of chairmen of friendship leagues with Arab countries. The
Japanese ocials employed by these leagues had all material published in
Japan on relations with Israel translated into English and brought it to the
attention of the Arab and PLO embassies and missions, thus giving direction to
their anti-Israeli activi ties. Except for what was customary in the Communist
countries during the Cold War, there is no precedent for a country and its
institutions establishing and nancing such activities against another country
5
on its own territory. But this has been done publicly in Japan from the 1970s to
this very day.
Japans approach to the Arab boycott was dierent from that of other
industrialized nations. The acquiescence of its political-econom ical
establishment went far beyond the requirements of the Arab boy cott rules. The
establishment and the companies willingly complied with the boycott even when
it came to matters that were not prohibited by its rules, such as the sale to Israel
of cars and other nished products, and did not try to circumvent it as was done
in other countries. To critics, the Japanese government responded that it did
not interfere in the economic decisions of Japanese companies.13
Foreign Ministry, MITI, the Keidanren (an umbrella organization for large
Japanese companies), or the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce regarding ties with
Israel was answered with explanations about the need for caution so as not to
infringe the boycott. In certain cases ocials warned Japanese companies
against ties with Israel, and in other cases they informed on companies that did
maintain such ties. During that entire period, Japan ocially reiterated to the
United States its adher ence to the principles of free trade.
6
The Japanese governments claim that it did not interfere in the companies
economic decisions was only partially accurate. Although there is a certain
amount of decentralization in Japan, at that time it was the government that
conducted negotiations on behalf of its companies regarding the voluntary
restriction of automobile exports. It also conducted, and still does, negotiations
for semiconductors, information technology agriculture, shing rights, and so
forth. As such, what the Japanese government could have done, but refrained
from doing, was to direct the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce not to issue
conrmations that an ocial Japanese entity did not trade with Israel, its
products did not contain spare parts from Israel, and Jews did not serve on its
board of directors.
It should be noted in this context that the rules of the Arab boycott were
determined back in 1945-1946, before Israels establishment, with the aim of
choking o the economic development of the Jewish community in Palestine by
boycotting goods and services produced by Jews. In the 1950s, the direct or
primary boycott system, which prohibits Arab companies from trading
directly with Israel, was ex tended to the secondary and tertiary boycott. The
former refers to prohibiting trade with companies (from a third country) that
trade with Israel or whose owners are Jewish; the latter requires companies
from a third country to force their secondary suppliers not to trade with Israel.
There is a fourth type which is a voluntary boycott of Israel. The Japanese
companies, in cooperation with the establishment, excelled in their voluntary
boycott of Israel. Even the Japanese media joined in this. For example, they did
not report condemnations of the boycott by American politicians visiting Japan.
When then New York Mayor Ed Koch sharply criticized the Japanese
capitulation to the boycott during his visit in 1985, claiming that it cast Japans
adherence to free trade in doubt, no Japanese-language newspaper made any
mention of these statements.
The Arab boycotts impact on Japan reached a peak during the second oil crisis
in 1979. For example, the semi-governmental agricul tural cooperative Zenno,
which for twenty-six years had imported potash from Israels Dead Sea Works
rm, decided unilaterally and arbitrarily to cease importing from Israel. Zenno
made known that it had been inundated with letters from the friendship leagues
with Arab countries, whose ocials had informed about the companys ties with
7
Israel, and claimed that the company had had to choose between potassium and
oil.
The slow and gradual change regarding the boycott began in the second half of
the 1980s. Late in that decade and during the 1990s, Japan consumed less
energy and fewer raw materials than in the 1970s. The downward trend has
continued since. Japans economic-nancial crisis during the 1990s led to a
further signicant decrease in its consumption and import of oil.
In 1985, the American Free Trade Committee began to operate in New York
with the participation of representatives of all the important American Jewish
organizations, headed by Walter (Wally) Stern who had extensive contacts in
the Japanese business and banking world. The Committee worked eectively
under his leadership, and during his twice-yearly visits to Japan beginning in
1985, he held talks with high government ocials, the economic organizations,
and large com panies about Japanese adherence to the Arab boycott. His
discreet approach inuenced the Japanese establishments attitude toward this.
The United States also raised the subject of the boycott ocially through the
under secretary of state for economic aairs, Allen Wallis, during periodic U.S.
government consultations with Japan. American public gures such as
Congressman Steven Solarz, and Jewish and non-Jewish businesspeople also
stressed to the Japanese that adherence to the boycott gave its companies unfair
advantages over American competitors that had to obey the American laws
against the boycott and discrimination.
8
The Maghreb countries, for their part, never implemented the secondary and
tertiary boycotts, while Egypt and subsequently Jordan ocially canceled the
boycott of Israel when they signed peace agree ments with it.
A dramatic decrease in Japanese exports to the Middle East due to the rise in
the value of the yen during that period and a decline in the purchasing power of
Arab oil producers.
The lack of signicant Arab counterreactions to Japan improving the form and
content of its relations with Israel, including an increase in bilateral trade.14
The realization, again via the Iran-Iraq War, that the claim that Israel was the
root of everything that ailed the Arab world was merely propaganda.
Japans reluctance to add its adherence to the Arab boycott to the disputed
issues between itself and the United States.
The great importance that the Japanese government and the large companies in
the Keidanren ascribed to the position of American Jewry in general and the
issue of the boycott in particu lar. They emphasized that there were many Jews
among those representing the large Japanese companies throughout the United
States, and that a large part of Japanese exports to the United States was
managed by Jews.15
Foreign Minister Shamirs ocial visit to Japan in September 1985. The Israeli
nance and communications ministers also visited Japan that year.
9
Two visits to Japan by delegations of the Israeli Industrialists Association in
October 1987 and in May 1988.
The rst seminar on the Israeli economy under the auspices of the Japanese
Foreign Ministry, MITI, the Keidanren, and the Kikanren-also an umbrella
organization of the Japanese econ omy-in Tokyo and Osaka in 1988 with the
participation of Israeli business representatives.
Not least, Sosoke Uno becoming the rst Japanese foreign minis ter to visit
Israel in June 1988.
What diered from the past was that these were the rst events of their kind to
be regarded by the Japanese government and business community as openings
for advancing relations with Israel, albeit cautiously.16 At that time, Mitsubishi
became the second Japanese automobile exporter to Israel, after Subaru. Direct
and indirect Israeli exports to Japan in 1988 reached $850 million, and imports
reached $650 million. During that period, part of the Israeli exports reached
Japan indirectly through Hong Kong, and part of the imports into Israel arrived
through Europe and Cyprus.17
During the rst intifada, the Japanese Foreign Ministry would regularly
summon the Israeli ambassador to protest some action taken by the Israel
Defense Forces that aected Palestinian civilians. This, however, did not
prevent the Japanese from sending numerous profes sional delegations to Israel
in various elds. For example, from January to May 1988, while the intifada was
10
in full force, fteen Japanese delegations in the elds of science, economics,
religion, communica tions, and education-a delegation of university presidents-
visited Israel.
The gradual change in relations was inuenced by signals from ocial circles in
Japan. Conicting signals adversely aected the rela tions at the beginning of
the Gulf War, but after it, with the Madrid Conference and the launching of the
Arab-Israeli political process, the signals were positive and had a favorable
eect. Throughout the period, a Japanese company, institution, or bank rarely
made its own overture to Israel without coordinating with the establishment. By
the end of the 1990s, however, this situation changed because of the
diminishing role of the bureaucracy and governmental guidance in Japan.
11
This episode in Japanese-Israeli relations occurred during a period in which
Israels behavior, even from Japans viewpoint, was irreproach able, as Israel
refrained from reacting to the Iraqi missile attacks. In contrast, Japans
behavior was negative and its adherence to the boy cott of Israel did not change
as a result of Odas visit. Ultimately what calmed the situation were the
roundabout solutions found by Israeli banks and companies over the course of
time, by nancing transactions in or with Japan through the branches of
American and European banks.
Since the end of the Gulf War and the ocial cancellation of the secondary and
tertiary boycotts by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf states, there has been a
signicant overall improvement in bilateral and multilateral relations with
Israel. In May 1992, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama paid a visit to
Israel in which he praised Israels restraint during the Gulf War and the
progress that had been made at the Madrid Conference. In September 1995,
Prime Minister Michi Murayama made the rst visit by a Japanese prime
minister to Israel. In addition, Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and, later,
Benjamin Netanyahu, as well as Foreign Ministers Shimon Peres and David
Levy, visited Japan.
12
percent of their total foreign investments are in Middle Eastern countries. The
air trac agreement was signed, but not put into practice. Since the late 1990s,
however, there have been positive developments with the Japanese beginning to
invest in Israeli venture capital funds, Japanese enterprises submitting tenders
for infrastructure projects in Israel, and investing in Israel in high tech, a
seaweed plant in Eilat, and other ventures.
In the 1990s Japan, which had become the largest single-state contributor of
international assistance in the world, began to take more responsibility in the
international arena. For example, it dispatched a Japanese army unit to
UNDORF (the UN peacekeeping force). The Japanese defense minister went to
visit the Japanese soldiers stationed since 1996 on the Golan Heights. Japan
also aspired to become a permanent member of the Security Council.
The second wave, which included the translation of Mein Kampf and other anti-
Semitic works, reached Japan during the period of its cooperation with the Axis
countries. In their lectures and publications, the Japanese anti-Semites warned
of the danger of Jewish domination of the world. One of the major anti-
Semitic propagandists in Japan during that period, former General Shiodo
Novotaka, won the largest number of votes in general elections held in 1942.22
Despite its partnership with the Axis countries Japan allowed Jewish refugees
from Europe to settle in territory it had conquered in Manchuria and Shanghai.
Many refugees were even allowed to enter Japan itself and stay there until they
found another place of refuge. At that time the desperate Jews were not allowed
to enter the United States, the territories controlled by Great Britain including
Mandatory Palestine, and other countries.
13
The Japanese consul-general in Kovno, Lithuania, Chiune Sugih ara, saved
thousands of Jews, among them a future Israeli minister of religious aairs,
Zerach Warhaftig, by giving them transit visas without obtaining approval from
the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Sugihara was punished for his humanitarian
actions by the Japanese government at the time, and only many years later was
he recognized as a Righteous Gentile by the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial in
Jerusalem.
The third wave of anti-Semitism reached Japan following the rst oil crisis and
originated in Arab anti-Semitism. Masami Ono, an author of many anti-Semitic
books, began his career as director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies in
Osaka. The inspiration for his anti-Semitism, including Holocaust denial,
probably came from his visits to Arab countries. In If You Understand the Jews,
You Will Understand the World, he warns about Jews taking over Japan. The
book sold more than 1.1 million copies in Japan and went through several
editions. Ono idealized Adolf Hitler and asserted that the Holocaust was Jewish
propaganda. He urged the Japanese to awaken to the Jewish conspiracy and to
emulate Hitler so as to protect the interests of the Japanese Volk from the
insidious Jewish menace.23
Apart from Ono, the second half of the 1980s witnessed a surge of anti-Semitic
books by Ota Ryo, Shoko Asahara, and others. These authors blamed the Jews
for Japans economic woes and other prob lems, including AIDS. This wave of
anti-Semitism continued through out the 1990s. In January 1995, on the day
marking the ftieth anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, a monthly
magazine called Marco Polo, with a circulation of 250,000, published an article
denying the Holocaust and claiming there were no gas chambers in Auschwitz.
As a result of the activities of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, advertise ments
placed by Japanese and international economic companies in Marco Polo were
canceled, which led the publisher to re the editor and close the newspaper.
14
foreign residents. Jews economic, cultural, and political inuence is minuscule,
and Japan has not given a foothold to any Jewish economic entity. The late
Israeli billionaire Shaul Eisenberg-thanks to whom there is a synagogue in
Tokyo and who helped the state of Israel purchase a lot and a building for an
embassy-married a Japanese woman and began his career in Japan, but did not
remain there and did not receive Japanese citizenship.
There are two pro-Israeli Christian sects in Japan. The larger one, the Makoya,
was founded by Ikuro Teshima, who preached the centrality of Jerusalem and
that the Japanese are the descendants of the ten lost tribes. Members of the sect,
estimated at about 120,000, visit Israel to work and study in various elds,
including Judaism and Hebrew. They have published guidebooks on Israel in
Japanese and a Japanese-Hebrew dictionary. The second, smaller sect, Beit
Shalom, comprises about ten thousand people and was founded by the late
Father Takeshi Otsuki. Based in Kyoto, it was the only group in Japan that
demonstrated on Israels behalf during the Yom Kippur War. Beit Shalom was
also active in the cause of Soviet Jewry during the 1980s.
At the beginning of the 21st century, Japan needs the United States more than
at any other time. It needs the American market and the support of the
American government to balance the rising power of China, to neutralize the
missile threat from North Korea, and to fulll its aspirations to win a permanent
seat on the Security Council. Hence the American consideration in Japanese
foreign pol icy, including its economic foreign policy as viewed by the political-
economic establishment, the economic establishment, and the com panies, is far
more important than all other considerations jointly and separately.
In addition, the Japanese fear of the use of oil as a political weapon, as occurred
in the 1970s, faded over the years, particularly from the early 1990s with the rise
in signicance of oil producers outside OPEC. Moreover, the status of Saudi
Arabia, which played an extremely negative role in Japanese-Israeli relations in
the 1970s, as well as its ability to inuence American positions, changed greatly
at the beginning of the 21st century. Even the present period of uctuating oil
prices has not changed basic political facts, which are that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
and the Gulf states need the United States more than ever as their crutch in the
region. Since 9/11 Saudi Arabia has constantly been on the defensive, and its re
presentatives in Washington must work hard to deect veried ac cusations
about the connection between its nancial support for Muslim movements
around the world and fundamentalist Muslim terror. The facts that have been
published about the bin Laden family belonging to fundamentalist movements
like the Muslim Brotherhood, about their longstanding support for the Taliban
15
in Afghanistan, and about the use of their investments in the United States-
through Citygroup, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs-to nance the activities of
organizations that were later determined to be terror ones, do not help Saudi
Arabia and its emissaries in the United States to convince the American public
of the purity of its motives.
The American public was not convinced by the Saudi propaganda blitz
explaining that its longstanding policy on behalf of fundamental ist movements
was only intended to keep terrorism out of its own territory and maintain the
stability of the royal family. On the contrary, the awareness among large parts of
the American public that Saudi Arabia supports Muslim fundamentalist
movements around the world, and the fact that fteen of the nineteen terrorists
who committed the 9/ 11 attack were Saudis, has greatly reduced Saudi Arabias
maneuvering space in Washington. At the beginning of the 21st century, Saudi
Arabias status in the United States, both among politicians and the general
public, is not what it once was despite the ties between the Saudi royal family
and the Bush family.24
What remains from the period of the illusion of Arab political and economic
power, Arab unity, Arab solidarity, Arab immense purchasing power, and
the belief in the myth of its ability to utilize the oil weapon to inuence
American positions, is the Japanese fear of an irrational response by extreme
elements in the Muslim Arab world that might damage Japans interests around
the world. The Japanese are aware that their support for the United States in
Iraq makes them more vulnerable. They are also aware that this has no
connection to Japanese-Israeli relations.
Until 2030, the world will be dependent on Saudi and Iranian oil. The
continuation and duration of this dependence are contingent on the policy
decisions of the U.S. government and the means it will allocate to reducing the
dependence on imported oil. If extensive use is made of new technologies as
alternatives to oil, even if it is done gradually, the status of Saudi Arabia and
Iran, whose role in nancing fundamentalist and subversive movements is
unquestioned, will change, and Japan and other oil consumers will then be less
inuenced by oil considerations.
In the short term, the oil minister of Venezuela, Humberto Calderon, was
condent when he declared in September 2004: The world must accustom
itself to a situation in which oil prices remain high. However, in the medium
and long term it is highly probable that the prediction of Sheikh Zaki Yamani,
the legendary oil minister of Saudi Arabia, will come true. He said and
reiterated several times during the 1970s: The age of oil [will] end long before
the oil reserves ended.25
16
Japanese-Israeli Relations at the Start of the 21st Century
In general, the political dimension of the relations was aected by the outbreak
of the Palestinian intifada, while the economic dimen sion was aected by the
economic situation prevailing both in Japan and Israel during that period and
the nancial situation around the world. Bilateral trade, which reached $2
billion during the period of the high-tech bubble, dropped to about $1.5 billion
in 2003. For political reasons, Japan halted implementation of cultural,
scientic, and air trac agreements with Israel. Japanese groups stopped visit
ing Israel because of an advisory by their Foreign Ministry. The investments by
Japanese companies in Israeli venture capital funds also declined. This was
connected in no small part to the losses in venture capital funds around the
world and in Israel after the high-tech bubble burst.
Nevertheless, the economic relations did not come to an end and new high-tech
deals were even made. Israeli tourists continued to visit Japan, and Israeli
businesspeople continued trying to get a foothold in the Japanese market.
According to records of the Israeli Embassy in Tokyo, about sixteen Israeli
companies kept active representation in Japan during 2000-2004, and four of
them even acquired Japanese companies while operating them with Japanese
managers and em ployees. In 2004, Japanese-Israeli trade began to return to its
previous level and Japanese investments in Israeli venture capital funds began
to grow once again.
17
Japan has a great interest in Israeli technologies in the elds of biotechnology,
medical instruments, electro-optics, agrotechnology, informatics,
telecommunications, Internet and information protec tion, homeland security,
antimissile defense, space science and tech nology, and so on. The Japanese are
becoming more aware that the Israeli and Japanese economies are
complementary in the sense that advances in these elds in Israel can integrate
easily with the manu facturing, marketing, and nancial capacity of the
Japanese compan ies and help them diversify their products. Whereas Japanese
high-tech companies have almost no ties with the Arab world, they have
extensive ties with concerns in the United States, where the same Israeli
companies operate that are active in Japan. This contributes to appreciation of
the benets of ties with Israel and of tripartite technological cooperation among
Japan, the United States, and Is rael. Although slow and gradual, this perceptual
change may eventu ally aect many other areas. It will not be the rst time high-
tech has inuenced the low-tech world.
Conclusion
Although the stalemate continues in the political eld, we are now on the
threshold of a new era in Japanese-Israeli economic relations.
The era of Japanese companies and banks massive adherence to the Arab
boycott eectively ended in the 1990s. What remains is a voluntary boycott that
is maintained out of a mixture of caution and ignorance. The anti-Israeli
activities of Japanese ocials and of the friendship leagues with the Arab states
and the PLO, which were established and are being funded to this day by the
Japanese establish ment, are still having a negative eect. Also problematic are
the certi cations issued by the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, which attest-at
the behest of the boycott oce in Damascus-that a particular com pany does not
trade with, invest in, or use spare parts from Israel and that its board of
directors contains no Jews. The Japanese political and economic establishment,
however, is aware that there is no longer any danger of the oil weapon being
18
used against Japan by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or the Gulf states. This time, no
one in Japan accuses Israel of being the cause for the rise in oil prices.
Nevertheless, oil-related considerations will continue to inuence Japanese
policymak ers, as evidenced by the $2 billion investment in discovering new oil
reserves in Iran.
Thus, while the political dierences between Tokyo and Jerusa lem continue,
the economic relations have shown notable resilience during the recent dicult
period. Presumably, the political relations will improve as a result of President
Bushs reelection and the ex pected adoption of new policies after the death of
Yasser Arafat. The outlook for future relations both in the political and
economic spheres is one of cautious optimism. Oil will remain a factor in
Japans policies in the short term. However, what will have an impact on
relations in the medium and long term will be the processes connected to
developing innovative technologies to lower the cost of oil replacements. Also,
Japanese rms interest in the growing importance of advanced technology will
increasingly aect Japanese-Israeli relations-
Notes
2. Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, copy Z4/2039. The same copy is kept at
the Weizmann archives in Rehovot.
3. Yasumasa Kuroda, Japan, the Arab World, and Israel, article derived from
his lecture at the Truman Institute, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 24 March
1988.
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11. Nester, Japans Oil Diplomacy, p. 78; Katakuro Kunio, Narrow Options for
a Pro-Arab Shift, Annals of Japan Association for Middle Eastern Studies, 1973,
p. 140.
20