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Japan and the Zionist Movement

During the British Mandate, Japan supported the Balfour Declaration, which on
2 November 1917 set the goal of establishing a Jewish national home in the Land
of Israel.1 Already on 6 January 1919 the Japanese ambassador to Britain,
Sutemi Chinda, wrote a letter on behalf of his government to Dr. Chaim
Weizmann supporting the Jewish national home.2 In 1920, Japan participated
in the San Remo Conference that allocated the mandate for the territory to
Britain. Although Japans contribution to the discussions that preceded the
decision was marginal, this marked its rst involvement in the Middle East.

The Zionist Federation of Shanghai conducted the contacts with the Japanese
embassies and consulates. The rst ocial visit to Japan by its spokesman,
Israel Cohen, took place during 8-18 December 1920.4 The contacts with Japan
through members of this Federation continued throughout the 1920s. For
example, on 8 June 1922 the Japanese consul-general in Shanghai, Funatsu
Tatsuichiro, wrote a letter to Nissim Ezra, its secretary-general, stating that if
the subject of a Jewish homeland were to be discussed by the League of Nations
in Geneva, Japan would be inclined to support the project.5 In appreci ation of
these contacts, the Jewish Federation of Shanghai decided to include the name
of Japanese Foreign Minister Oshida in the Golden Book of the Jewish
National Fund (4 March 1923).

Most of the Japanese public and government knew little about the Jews and
Zionism. At the same time, many anti-Semitic articles, translated from Russian,
were published in Japan, originating in the Japanese encounter with Russian
anti-Semitism in Siberia, to which the Jews were exiled or ed from the
pogroms.6 Many Japanese viewed the Jews and Zionism as the Jewish power,
as depicted in the anti-Semitic literature. In fact, the only foreign nancier who
was prepared to help nance the Japanese war eort against Russia (1904-1905)
was an American Jewish banker named Jacob Schi, who did so primarily as a
protest against the anti-Semitism of the Czar and the Russian establishment.

Relations from the Establishment of Israel to 1973

Israel was the rst Middle Eastern country to open a diplomatic mission in
Tokyo in 1952, which received the status of embassy in 1963. Japans foreign
policy in the period following World War II and since the restoration of its
sovereignty on 28 April 1952 involved reliance on the United States. The
successive Japanese governments, however, also espoused a policy of separating
economics and politics, thus acting on economic considerations in general and,
in particular, vis-a`-vis countries with which Japan had no diplomatic relations.

1
During the 1950s, structural changes in the Japanese economy aected Japans
relations with the Middle East, including Israel. In 1952, Japan adjusted its
energy policy when it changed from using coal in industry to oil. By 1957, amid
accelerated development and in the wake of the Korean War, Japan became one
of the worlds largest importers of Middle Eastern oil. The Japanese Foreign
Ministry published a Blue Book outlining its policy toward Middle Eastern
countries, emphasizing the desire to cooperate with the regions oil producers
that were members of the Afro-Asian bloc. In the 1960s, Japans dependence on
energy from foreign sources reached 80.9 per cent of consumption. About 70
percent of these were in the Middle East, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran,
and the Gulf states. The relatively cheap oil in the 1950s and 1960s was an
important compo nent of what would later be called the Japanese economic
miracle. Japanese industry became more energy intensive than in other coun
tries because of the growing dependence of its heavy industry, its steel and
shipbuilding, and its chemical and petrochemical industry on oil; by the
beginning of the 1970s Japans dependence on imported energy reached 90
percent.

Until the outbreak of the rst energy crisis in 1973, Japanese foreign policy was
generally neutral on the Arab-Israeli conict. In 1956, after the Sinai Campaign,
it advised the parties to reach a settlement by negotiations. In 1967 Japan
criticized Israels conquest of the territories, though in the Arabs view Japans
statement was low-key and unconvincing.7

In 1972, two events aected Japanese-Israel relations. In May, Kozo Okamoto


and his Japanese Red Army terrorists carried out an attack at Ben-Gurion
Airport, killing twenty-six people and wounding seventy, among them many
foreign tourists. Amid fears of a negative reaction against Japan, the Japanese
prime minister immediately sent a delegation to apologize and oered nancial
compensation to the victims families. This event also claried the cooperation
between the Japanese Red Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP), then and now part of the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO). The Arab states, which viewed the murder of Jews and non-Jews on
Israeli soil as a legitimate act, protested to the Japanese government against the
apology. In response, the Japanese Foreign Ministry sent a delegation to the
Arab countries to explain the meaning of the apology and its motives as a
humanitarian gesture. In other words, they apologized for the apology.8
Dispatching personages and delegations to the Middle East to apologize, explain,
and soothe became an element of Japanese Middle Eastern policy.

The second relevant event in the 1970s was that, also in 1972, King Faisal of
Saudi Arabia visited Japan and warned that Japans continued support of U.S.
policy would lead to undesirable results for [it].9 Faisal also tried to persuade

2
the Japanese to transfer their oil purchases from Iran to Saudi Arabia, and he
stated bluntly that Japans future lies with the Arabs and not with the West.

The Japanese believed that Faisals threat was merely verbal and did not take it
very seriously. Hence, the energy crisis of 1973 came as a complete surprise to
the Japanese decision-makers.

The Yom Kippur War: A Turn for the Worse

About ten days after the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, the
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) decided to raise
the price of oil and, concomitantly, to use oil as a weapon in the Arab-Israeli
conict.10

At the end of that month, Saudi Arabia repeated its demand that Japan sever
relations with Israel. On 6 November 1973, the secretary-general of the
Japanese cabinet declared that: Israel must withdraw from the occupied
territories and expressed its support for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people. Japan hoped that the Arabs would treat it the same way they had
treated the European Community, most of whose members, except for Holland,
had not been declared unfriendly states. The Arabs, aware of the debate within
the Japanese establishment and sensing Japans weak ness, increased the
pressure. The United States, however, pressured Japan not to cave in to the
Arab demands, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger emphasized this in a visit
to Tokyo in November. In exchange, the Japanese demanded a guarantee from
Kissinger for the supply of oil from the U.S. emergency stocks if the oil ow
from the Middle East were to be cut o. When Kissinger did not give the
Japanese such an explicit commitment, they saw it as justication for changing
their policy.11

Amid contending pressures from the Arab and American sides, opinions in
Japan were divided. Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira and his adviser,
Kensaku Hogen, held that Japan should not hasten to decide. The minister of
MITI (the Ministry of International Industry and Trade), Yoshihiro Nakasone,
who later became prime minister and chairman of the Friendship League with
the Arab League, supported the Arab demands to sever relations with Israel,
claiming that energy and markets were just as important to Japan as defense.

Japanese businesspeople were also divided in their opinions, with some among
them arguing that most Japanese imports into the United States were managed
by Jews.12 The results of the debate were typical of Japan. The new line adopted
was based on a formula with two conicting components: to soothe and satisfy
the Arabs on the one hand, without causing a schism with the United States on
the other. The actual signicance of the formula included the adoption of a

3
declarative pro-Arab policy; total support by the business world, backed by the
establishment, for the rules of the Arab boycott against Israel; and,
concomitantly, ongoing low-prole relations with Israel.

On 22 November 1973 (two days before expiration of the Saudi ultimatum on


severing relations with Israel), the Japanese government published a statement
accepting the Arab interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242, warning
that Japan would consider changing its policy toward Israel if the latter did not
uphold the resolution. The Arabs, knowing that a decision to boycott Japan was
not practical and was liable to show the world the hollowness of the threat,
suced with this declaration. Japan, as was customary, sent Deputy Prime
Minister Takeo Miki to eight Arab countries to explain the change in Japanese
policy, in the course of which Miki oered signicant nancial assistance to
Egypt and Syria. During additional visits, Japan oered extensive credits for
implementing projects in Iraq and applied the interpretation of Israeli
withdrawal from all territories to East Jerusalem.

It should be noted that the change in Japanese policy occurred at a time of


American demands that the Japanese markets be opened to American products,
with the aim of reducing the trade decit. The Americans claimed, among other
things, that Japan, which bene ted from the American security umbrella, was
competing unfairly with American rms within the United States and taking a
foreign policy line that contravened U.S. policy. This explains the dierences of
opinion within the Japanese establishment and its lack of compli ance with all
the Arab demands: to sever diplomatic and trade relations with Israel, to sell
arms to the Arabs, and to pressure the United States to change its policy toward
Israel. We must not, how ever, underestimate the importance of the change and
its results. Japan became a more vociferous supporter of the Arabs and the PLO
than other Western countries-except for Greece and Spain- and made every
eort, even when not required, to implement the Arab boycott of Israel with the
total backing of its political-economic establishment.

The years 1973-1985 were the pro-Arab period in Japans foreign relations,
marked by discrimination against Israel. The consensus in the Japanese
bureaucracy, ruling party, and business community was to maintain very low-
prole relations with Israel while expressing, in every manner possible, support
for the Arabs and the PLO. This state of aairs continued until the mid-1980s,
and the eects were still felt at the start of the Gulf War in 1991.

The Ramications of the First (1973)and Second (1979) Oil Crises

4
The deep freeze in the relations continued until the visit of Foreign Minister
Yitzhak Shamir to Tokyo in September 1985. The Japanese took every
opportunity to express their pro-Arab line particularly in international
institutions. Sometimes they used arguments taken from the ideology of
Japanese militarism of the 1930s and 1940s. In those decades, there was a wide
consensus in Japan that the availability of raw materials and energy determines
a nations strength and level of development. Japanese militarists invoked the
vital need for raw materials when they conquered Manchuria and large parts of
China and Indonesia. An entire generation of Japanese was educated on the
ideology of the pivotal importance of raw materials. The Japanese government
also continued this line in the 1970s, and a generation of Japanese Arabists
regarded the Arab states as a crucial source of oil and a primary market for
Japanese products. The Japanese establishment disseminated King Faisals
statement that Japans future lay with the Arabs and not with the West. Japan
established bodies whose task was to strengthen relations with the Arab world
including the PLO. At the same time, the perception gained ground, fed by
ignorance, that relations with Israel would detract from relations with the Arabs.
The Arabs work in Japan in 1973-1985 was easy. Most of the propa ganda about
implementing the Arab boycott was put forth by the Japanese-with even greater
fervor than required, since this was seen as serving Japans interest.

Funding and assistance for anti-Israeli activities were provided by Japanese


institutions and companies; the following are examples.

1. Setting up a pro-Arab lobby in Japan, initiated and funded by Japanese


political and economic institutions.

Following the rst oil crisis, the Japan Oil Development Company (JODCO) was
established and became the instrument for cementing relations between Japan,
the Arab countries, and the PLO. Former Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura was
appointed chairman of the Japan-PLO Friendship League. Yoshihoru Nakasone
was appointed chairman of the Friendship League with the Arab League.
Nakasone also served in this capacity while he was prime minister, which is
inconsistent with diplomatic practice. Toshiki Kaifu, a senior member of the
ruling party and also subsequently a prime minister, was ap pointed chairman
of the Friendship League with Jordan, and there were several other
appointments of chairmen of friendship leagues with Arab countries. The
Japanese ocials employed by these leagues had all material published in
Japan on relations with Israel translated into English and brought it to the
attention of the Arab and PLO embassies and missions, thus giving direction to
their anti-Israeli activi ties. Except for what was customary in the Communist
countries during the Cold War, there is no precedent for a country and its
institutions establishing and nancing such activities against another country

5
on its own territory. But this has been done publicly in Japan from the 1970s to
this very day.

Iko Kasuga, chairman of the Japan-Israel Parliamentary Friend ship League,


was for many years until his death chairman of the Social Democratic Party
(DSP), the opposition to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Kasuga and
his replacement, Masaaki Nakayama (the brother of the former foreign minister,
Taro Nakay ama), were true friends of Israel and worked diligently to cultivate
relations under the adverse conditions. The Japan-Israel Parliamentary
Friendship League did much to strengthen the relations, but never acted against
the interests of the Arab states or the PLO on Japanese territory.

It was then hard to nd a senior Japanese who was prepared to be chairman or


even a member of the Japan-Israel Parliamentary Friendship League and
support Israeli positions. Only in the mid 1980s did several important LDP
parliamentarians agree to add their names to this League. In a meeting held on
behalf of the Friendship League with Abba Eban, who visited Japan at the head
of an Israeli parliamentary delegation in September 1986, fty members of
parlia ment from various factions participated. Conspicuously absent were
parliamentarians from the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP). In contrast, the entire
Social Democratic (DSP) faction stood behind its party chairman Kasuga, as did
several important members of the Komeito (Clean) Party. Opposition
members of parliament who were mem bers of the Friendship League, however,
did not publicly criticize Japans discriminatory policies against Israel.

2. The negative inuence of the Arab boycott in Japan.

Japans approach to the Arab boycott was dierent from that of other
industrialized nations. The acquiescence of its political-econom ical
establishment went far beyond the requirements of the Arab boy cott rules. The
establishment and the companies willingly complied with the boycott even when
it came to matters that were not prohibited by its rules, such as the sale to Israel
of cars and other nished products, and did not try to circumvent it as was done
in other countries. To critics, the Japanese government responded that it did
not interfere in the economic decisions of Japanese companies.13

Foreign Ministry, MITI, the Keidanren (an umbrella organization for large
Japanese companies), or the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce regarding ties with
Israel was answered with explanations about the need for caution so as not to
infringe the boycott. In certain cases ocials warned Japanese companies
against ties with Israel, and in other cases they informed on companies that did
maintain such ties. During that entire period, Japan ocially reiterated to the
United States its adher ence to the principles of free trade.

6
The Japanese governments claim that it did not interfere in the companies
economic decisions was only partially accurate. Although there is a certain
amount of decentralization in Japan, at that time it was the government that
conducted negotiations on behalf of its companies regarding the voluntary
restriction of automobile exports. It also conducted, and still does, negotiations
for semiconductors, information technology agriculture, shing rights, and so
forth. As such, what the Japanese government could have done, but refrained
from doing, was to direct the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce not to issue
conrmations that an ocial Japanese entity did not trade with Israel, its
products did not contain spare parts from Israel, and Jews did not serve on its
board of directors.

It should be noted in this context that the rules of the Arab boycott were
determined back in 1945-1946, before Israels establishment, with the aim of
choking o the economic development of the Jewish community in Palestine by
boycotting goods and services produced by Jews. In the 1950s, the direct or
primary boycott system, which prohibits Arab companies from trading
directly with Israel, was ex tended to the secondary and tertiary boycott. The
former refers to prohibiting trade with companies (from a third country) that
trade with Israel or whose owners are Jewish; the latter requires companies
from a third country to force their secondary suppliers not to trade with Israel.
There is a fourth type which is a voluntary boycott of Israel. The Japanese
companies, in cooperation with the establishment, excelled in their voluntary
boycott of Israel. Even the Japanese media joined in this. For example, they did
not report condemnations of the boycott by American politicians visiting Japan.
When then New York Mayor Ed Koch sharply criticized the Japanese
capitulation to the boycott during his visit in 1985, claiming that it cast Japans
adherence to free trade in doubt, no Japanese-language newspaper made any
mention of these statements.

There are countless examples of Japanese companies refusal to sell nished


products to Israel, which, as mentioned, is not prohibited by the boycott rules.
The pharmaceuticals company Matszushita re fused to supply Israel with
pharmaceutical products and equipment for hospitals. Toshiba refused to sell
mail-sorting equipment to the Israeli Communications Ministry.

The Arab boycotts impact on Japan reached a peak during the second oil crisis
in 1979. For example, the semi-governmental agricul tural cooperative Zenno,
which for twenty-six years had imported potash from Israels Dead Sea Works
rm, decided unilaterally and arbitrarily to cease importing from Israel. Zenno
made known that it had been inundated with letters from the friendship leagues
with Arab countries, whose ocials had informed about the companys ties with

7
Israel, and claimed that the company had had to choose between potassium and
oil.

The slow and gradual change regarding the boycott began in the second half of
the 1980s. Late in that decade and during the 1990s, Japan consumed less
energy and fewer raw materials than in the 1970s. The downward trend has
continued since. Japans economic-nancial crisis during the 1990s led to a
further signicant decrease in its consumption and import of oil.

In 1985, the American Free Trade Committee began to operate in New York
with the participation of representatives of all the important American Jewish
organizations, headed by Walter (Wally) Stern who had extensive contacts in
the Japanese business and banking world. The Committee worked eectively
under his leadership, and during his twice-yearly visits to Japan beginning in
1985, he held talks with high government ocials, the economic organizations,
and large com panies about Japanese adherence to the Arab boycott. His
discreet approach inuenced the Japanese establishments attitude toward this.

The United States also raised the subject of the boycott ocially through the
under secretary of state for economic aairs, Allen Wallis, during periodic U.S.
government consultations with Japan. American public gures such as
Congressman Steven Solarz, and Jewish and non-Jewish businesspeople also
stressed to the Japanese that adherence to the boycott gave its companies unfair
advantages over American competitors that had to obey the American laws
against the boycott and discrimination.

It should be emphasized that there is and was no Israeli policy to pressure


Japan via parties in the United States. Those who acted did so for American
interests. Moreover, the factors that aected the decision of Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and the Gulf states to abolish the secondary and tertiary boycotts
following the Gulf War in 1991, a decision that altered the Japanese attitude
toward the boycott, involved American interests. The Americans argued that
American soldiers, among them Jews, had fought for Kuwaits independence
and Saudi Arabias security and to ensure the ow of oil from the Middle East to
Japan, Korea, and elsewhere, whereas these countries boycotted American
companies because they traded with Israel and had Jews in their management.
The Americans stressed to Japan that it was among the principal beneciaries of
the U.S. eort to maintain the regular supply of raw materials and oil, and
Japan could not continue discriminating against U.S. companies and citizens on
a religious and political basis.

8
The Maghreb countries, for their part, never implemented the secondary and
tertiary boycotts, while Egypt and subsequently Jordan ocially canceled the
boycott of Israel when they signed peace agree ments with it.

The Mid-1980s: Gradually Improving Relations

Starting in the mid-1980s, Japan adopted a cautious and gradual policy of


improving relations with Israel. Its reasons were:

A decrease in Japans dependence on Middle Eastern oil, from 90 percent in the


1970s to about 65 percent at the beginning of the 1990s.

A dramatic decrease in Japanese exports to the Middle East due to the rise in
the value of the yen during that period and a decline in the purchasing power of
Arab oil producers.

The lack of signicant Arab counterreactions to Japan improving the form and
content of its relations with Israel, including an increase in bilateral trade.14

Inherent Middle Eastern instability as demonstrated by the Iran-Iraq War,


impairing the Japanese government and companies ability to plan investments
and development in the region. Japanese companies also encountered the
phenomena of bad loans, delayed payment or nonpayment for goods and
projects that had been supplied. This cost the Japanese government a great deal
of money through its foreign risk insurance company.

The realization, again via the Iran-Iraq War, that the claim that Israel was the
root of everything that ailed the Arab world was merely propaganda.

Japans reluctance to add its adherence to the Arab boycott to the disputed
issues between itself and the United States.

The great importance that the Japanese government and the large companies in
the Keidanren ascribed to the position of American Jewry in general and the
issue of the boycott in particu lar. They emphasized that there were many Jews
among those representing the large Japanese companies throughout the United
States, and that a large part of Japanese exports to the United States was
managed by Jews.15

Milestones on the path of improved bilateral relations, starting in the mid-1980s,


were:

Foreign Minister Shamirs ocial visit to Japan in September 1985. The Israeli
nance and communications ministers also visited Japan that year.

Exchanges of visits by parliamentary delegations in 1985 and 1986.

9
Two visits to Japan by delegations of the Israeli Industrialists Association in
October 1987 and in May 1988.

A reciprocal visit to Israel in November 1987 by a delegation from the


Keidanren-the rst such visit to Israel by the top Japanese economic echelon.

The rst seminar on the Israeli economy under the auspices of the Japanese
Foreign Ministry, MITI, the Keidanren, and the Kikanren-also an umbrella
organization of the Japanese econ omy-in Tokyo and Osaka in 1988 with the
participation of Israeli business representatives.

Not least, Sosoke Uno becoming the rst Japanese foreign minis ter to visit
Israel in June 1988.

What diered from the past was that these were the rst events of their kind to
be regarded by the Japanese government and business community as openings
for advancing relations with Israel, albeit cautiously.16 At that time, Mitsubishi
became the second Japanese automobile exporter to Israel, after Subaru. Direct
and indirect Israeli exports to Japan in 1988 reached $850 million, and imports
reached $650 million. During that period, part of the Israeli exports reached
Japan indirectly through Hong Kong, and part of the imports into Israel arrived
through Europe and Cyprus.17

The ambassadors of Arab countries, headed by representatives of the Arab


League, the PLO, and Iraq, requested an urgent meeting at the Japanese
Foreign Ministry to ocially protest the increased Japanese-Israeli trade. They
used material in Japanese that was sup plied by ocials of the Japanese
friendship leagues with Arab coun tries. During those years, the Japanese got
used to a ritual in which the Arab ambassadors in Tokyo would protest visits of
Japanese per sonalities to Israel, and be told that actually there was no change
in Japanese policy toward Israel. Concurrently, the Americans and Isra elis were
told that Japan had decided to improve its relations with the Jewish state. Thus,
upon his return from his visit to Israel, Foreign Minister Uno explained to the
Japanese press that his visit did not in any way signify a change in Japanese
Middle Eastern policy, and his oce sent these words in writing to the Arab
embassies and the pro-Arab lobby in Japan.18 However, the Japanese
ambassadors to the United States and to Israel spoke of an upward trend in
relations.

During the rst intifada, the Japanese Foreign Ministry would regularly
summon the Israeli ambassador to protest some action taken by the Israel
Defense Forces that aected Palestinian civilians. This, however, did not
prevent the Japanese from sending numerous profes sional delegations to Israel
in various elds. For example, from January to May 1988, while the intifada was

10
in full force, fteen Japanese delegations in the elds of science, economics,
religion, communica tions, and education-a delegation of university presidents-
visited Israel.

The gradual change in relations was inuenced by signals from ocial circles in
Japan. Conicting signals adversely aected the rela tions at the beginning of
the Gulf War, but after it, with the Madrid Conference and the launching of the
Arab-Israeli political process, the signals were positive and had a favorable
eect. Throughout the period, a Japanese company, institution, or bank rarely
made its own overture to Israel without coordinating with the establishment. By
the end of the 1990s, however, this situation changed because of the
diminishing role of the bureaucracy and governmental guidance in Japan.

The Disgraceful Behavior of Japanese Banks and Companiesduring


the Gulf War

In January 1991, the Japanese banking association recommended that its


members include Israel among the eleven nations for which they should not
nance trade as long as the Gulf War continued.19 Thus, the Japanese banks
refused to accept letters of credit from Israeli banks or to open letters of credit
in favor of Israeli customers. The Japanese banks also halted the transfer of
payments that were owed to Israeli companies. On 15 January 1991, the
Japanese postal service refused to accept or send mail to Israel. Japanese
newspapers joined the chorus and advised Japanese importers of diamonds
from Israel to seek alternative sources in Antwerp, Bombay, Amsterdam, and
New York. Particularly blatant was the behavior of the Foreign Risk Insurance
Company of Japan; in several cases, goods that had already been loaded were
removed from ships.

The Japanese establishments hysterical reaction to the war stemmed from


ignorance and years of anti-Israeli propaganda. If they had bothered to check
what had happened to Israeli foreign trade during previous wars, they would
have found that the Israeli companies and banks did not cease payments to their
foreign suppliers and clients in even one case. After protests swept Israels
media and business community in response to the Japanese measures, Japan
returned to proven tactics, sending Deputy Foreign Minister Hisashi Oda to
Israel on 26 February 1991 for a two-day visit to explain and reassure. In fact,
the governments signals to the economic establishment had been full of
contradictions and reected fears about Arab reactions, and more specically
about the fate of several projects in Iraq. Yet, at this time, America was putting
together a coalition against Saddam Hussein that included Arab states.

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This episode in Japanese-Israeli relations occurred during a period in which
Israels behavior, even from Japans viewpoint, was irreproach able, as Israel
refrained from reacting to the Iraqi missile attacks. In contrast, Japans
behavior was negative and its adherence to the boy cott of Israel did not change
as a result of Odas visit. Ultimately what calmed the situation were the
roundabout solutions found by Israeli banks and companies over the course of
time, by nancing transactions in or with Japan through the branches of
American and European banks.

Changes since the Gulf War

Since the end of the Gulf War and the ocial cancellation of the secondary and
tertiary boycotts by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf states, there has been a
signicant overall improvement in bilateral and multilateral relations with
Israel. In May 1992, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama paid a visit to
Israel in which he praised Israels restraint during the Gulf War and the
progress that had been made at the Madrid Conference. In September 1995,
Prime Minister Michi Murayama made the rst visit by a Japanese prime
minister to Israel. In addition, Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and, later,
Benjamin Netanyahu, as well as Foreign Ministers Shimon Peres and David
Levy, visited Japan.

An envoy of the Japanese prime minister brought a message to Prime Minister


Rabin about Japans willingness to take an active part in the peace process.
Japan assumed the chair of the environmental committee in the framework of
the multilateral process, even during periods in which it stagnated. The
Japanese government has nancially supported the Palestinian Authority more
than other countries except for the United States and the European Union. The
abolition of the indirect boycott by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf states
brought to Israel the large Japanese vehicle manufacturers: Toyota, Nissan,
Honda, Mazda, and others. Import of the cars harmed Israel in the bilateral
balance of trade-proving that it was not an Israeli talent for commerce that had
made the balance of trade favorable to Israel for so many years, but rather
Japanese companies fear of trading with Israel because of the Arab boycott.
Since the opening of a JETRO (the Japanese Institute of Foreign Trade) branch
in Tel Aviv and of representations of Japanese trading companies in Israel, the
trade gap has widened even further in Japans favor.

The signing of agreements on avoiding double taxation (1993), on scientic and


technical cooperation (1994), on cooperation regarding foreign risk insurance
(1997), on air trac (1998), and on investment protection put trade relations on
a new footing. However, one should beware of illusions. The Japanese are still
deterred by the high risk involved in investments in the Middle East; only 1

12
percent of their total foreign investments are in Middle Eastern countries. The
air trac agreement was signed, but not put into practice. Since the late 1990s,
however, there have been positive developments with the Japanese beginning to
invest in Israeli venture capital funds, Japanese enterprises submitting tenders
for infrastructure projects in Israel, and investing in Israel in high tech, a
seaweed plant in Eilat, and other ventures.

In the 1990s Japan, which had become the largest single-state contributor of
international assistance in the world, began to take more responsibility in the
international arena. For example, it dispatched a Japanese army unit to
UNDORF (the UN peacekeeping force). The Japanese defense minister went to
visit the Japanese soldiers stationed since 1996 on the Golan Heights. Japan
also aspired to become a permanent member of the Security Council.

With the boycott weakening as the dominant component in Ja panese-Israeli


relations, there was less need for roundabout commerce by Japanese
companies-that is, the import into Japan of Israeli pro ducts through a third
country (usually Hong Kong), and the export of Japanese products to Israel
through agents in European countries, or by switching papers in Cyprus.
Whereas until the Gulf War 15-20 percent of the trade was indirect, not listed in
the statistics, the data on current trade more or less reect the existing
situation.20

Japan and the Jews

Anti-Semitism came to Japan in three waves. The rst originated in Russian


anti-Semitism before and after the October Revolution of 1917. In this period
the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and various publications on the Jewish
danger and the Jewish conspiracy were translated and distributed in
Japanese.21

The second wave, which included the translation of Mein Kampf and other anti-
Semitic works, reached Japan during the period of its cooperation with the Axis
countries. In their lectures and publications, the Japanese anti-Semites warned
of the danger of Jewish domination of the world. One of the major anti-
Semitic propagandists in Japan during that period, former General Shiodo
Novotaka, won the largest number of votes in general elections held in 1942.22

Despite its partnership with the Axis countries Japan allowed Jewish refugees
from Europe to settle in territory it had conquered in Manchuria and Shanghai.
Many refugees were even allowed to enter Japan itself and stay there until they
found another place of refuge. At that time the desperate Jews were not allowed
to enter the United States, the territories controlled by Great Britain including
Mandatory Palestine, and other countries.

13
The Japanese consul-general in Kovno, Lithuania, Chiune Sugih ara, saved
thousands of Jews, among them a future Israeli minister of religious aairs,
Zerach Warhaftig, by giving them transit visas without obtaining approval from
the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Sugihara was punished for his humanitarian
actions by the Japanese government at the time, and only many years later was
he recognized as a Righteous Gentile by the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial in
Jerusalem.

The third wave of anti-Semitism reached Japan following the rst oil crisis and
originated in Arab anti-Semitism. Masami Ono, an author of many anti-Semitic
books, began his career as director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies in
Osaka. The inspiration for his anti-Semitism, including Holocaust denial,
probably came from his visits to Arab countries. In If You Understand the Jews,
You Will Understand the World, he warns about Jews taking over Japan. The
book sold more than 1.1 million copies in Japan and went through several
editions. Ono idealized Adolf Hitler and asserted that the Holocaust was Jewish
propaganda. He urged the Japanese to awaken to the Jewish conspiracy and to
emulate Hitler so as to protect the interests of the Japanese Volk from the
insidious Jewish menace.23

Apart from Ono, the second half of the 1980s witnessed a surge of anti-Semitic
books by Ota Ryo, Shoko Asahara, and others. These authors blamed the Jews
for Japans economic woes and other prob lems, including AIDS. This wave of
anti-Semitism continued through out the 1990s. In January 1995, on the day
marking the ftieth anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, a monthly
magazine called Marco Polo, with a circulation of 250,000, published an article
denying the Holocaust and claiming there were no gas chambers in Auschwitz.
As a result of the activities of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, advertise ments
placed by Japanese and international economic companies in Marco Polo were
canceled, which led the publisher to re the editor and close the newspaper.

Although Japanese anti-Semitism, compared to European, Muslim, and Arab


anti-Semitism with their religious, ideological, and socioeconomic roots, is still
marginal, it had horrendous eects in the attack by Kozo Okamoto and his
comrades. As evident, however, in the episodes of Marco Poloand the behavior
of the Japanese banks and companies during the Gulf War, Japan is very
sensitive to criticism. This underlines the importance of struggling against
Japanese anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli activities by all legitimate means.

The Jewish community in Japan is small. Composed mainly of foreign nationals,


it changes in accordance with the number of Jewish employees of foreign rms
in Japan. Even those Jews who have lived in the country since World War II
have not been given Japanese citizenship; like many others, they are considered

14
foreign residents. Jews economic, cultural, and political inuence is minuscule,
and Japan has not given a foothold to any Jewish economic entity. The late
Israeli billionaire Shaul Eisenberg-thanks to whom there is a synagogue in
Tokyo and who helped the state of Israel purchase a lot and a building for an
embassy-married a Japanese woman and began his career in Japan, but did not
remain there and did not receive Japanese citizenship.

There are two pro-Israeli Christian sects in Japan. The larger one, the Makoya,
was founded by Ikuro Teshima, who preached the centrality of Jerusalem and
that the Japanese are the descendants of the ten lost tribes. Members of the sect,
estimated at about 120,000, visit Israel to work and study in various elds,
including Judaism and Hebrew. They have published guidebooks on Israel in
Japanese and a Japanese-Hebrew dictionary. The second, smaller sect, Beit
Shalom, comprises about ten thousand people and was founded by the late
Father Takeshi Otsuki. Based in Kyoto, it was the only group in Japan that
demonstrated on Israels behalf during the Yom Kippur War. Beit Shalom was
also active in the cause of Soviet Jewry during the 1980s.

The Oil Factor in Japans Current Political Considerations

At the beginning of the 21st century, Japan needs the United States more than
at any other time. It needs the American market and the support of the
American government to balance the rising power of China, to neutralize the
missile threat from North Korea, and to fulll its aspirations to win a permanent
seat on the Security Council. Hence the American consideration in Japanese
foreign pol icy, including its economic foreign policy as viewed by the political-
economic establishment, the economic establishment, and the com panies, is far
more important than all other considerations jointly and separately.

In addition, the Japanese fear of the use of oil as a political weapon, as occurred
in the 1970s, faded over the years, particularly from the early 1990s with the rise
in signicance of oil producers outside OPEC. Moreover, the status of Saudi
Arabia, which played an extremely negative role in Japanese-Israeli relations in
the 1970s, as well as its ability to inuence American positions, changed greatly
at the beginning of the 21st century. Even the present period of uctuating oil
prices has not changed basic political facts, which are that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
and the Gulf states need the United States more than ever as their crutch in the
region. Since 9/11 Saudi Arabia has constantly been on the defensive, and its re
presentatives in Washington must work hard to deect veried ac cusations
about the connection between its nancial support for Muslim movements
around the world and fundamentalist Muslim terror. The facts that have been
published about the bin Laden family belonging to fundamentalist movements
like the Muslim Brotherhood, about their longstanding support for the Taliban

15
in Afghanistan, and about the use of their investments in the United States-
through Citygroup, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs-to nance the activities of
organizations that were later determined to be terror ones, do not help Saudi
Arabia and its emissaries in the United States to convince the American public
of the purity of its motives.

The American public was not convinced by the Saudi propaganda blitz
explaining that its longstanding policy on behalf of fundamental ist movements
was only intended to keep terrorism out of its own territory and maintain the
stability of the royal family. On the contrary, the awareness among large parts of
the American public that Saudi Arabia supports Muslim fundamentalist
movements around the world, and the fact that fteen of the nineteen terrorists
who committed the 9/ 11 attack were Saudis, has greatly reduced Saudi Arabias
maneuvering space in Washington. At the beginning of the 21st century, Saudi
Arabias status in the United States, both among politicians and the general
public, is not what it once was despite the ties between the Saudi royal family
and the Bush family.24

What remains from the period of the illusion of Arab political and economic
power, Arab unity, Arab solidarity, Arab immense purchasing power, and
the belief in the myth of its ability to utilize the oil weapon to inuence
American positions, is the Japanese fear of an irrational response by extreme
elements in the Muslim Arab world that might damage Japans interests around
the world. The Japanese are aware that their support for the United States in
Iraq makes them more vulnerable. They are also aware that this has no
connection to Japanese-Israeli relations.

Until 2030, the world will be dependent on Saudi and Iranian oil. The
continuation and duration of this dependence are contingent on the policy
decisions of the U.S. government and the means it will allocate to reducing the
dependence on imported oil. If extensive use is made of new technologies as
alternatives to oil, even if it is done gradually, the status of Saudi Arabia and
Iran, whose role in nancing fundamentalist and subversive movements is
unquestioned, will change, and Japan and other oil consumers will then be less
inuenced by oil considerations.

In the short term, the oil minister of Venezuela, Humberto Calderon, was
condent when he declared in September 2004: The world must accustom
itself to a situation in which oil prices remain high. However, in the medium
and long term it is highly probable that the prediction of Sheikh Zaki Yamani,
the legendary oil minister of Saudi Arabia, will come true. He said and
reiterated several times during the 1970s: The age of oil [will] end long before
the oil reserves ended.25

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Japanese-Israeli Relations at the Start of the 21st Century

In general, the political dimension of the relations was aected by the outbreak
of the Palestinian intifada, while the economic dimen sion was aected by the
economic situation prevailing both in Japan and Israel during that period and
the nancial situation around the world. Bilateral trade, which reached $2
billion during the period of the high-tech bubble, dropped to about $1.5 billion
in 2003. For political reasons, Japan halted implementation of cultural,
scientic, and air trac agreements with Israel. Japanese groups stopped visit
ing Israel because of an advisory by their Foreign Ministry. The investments by
Japanese companies in Israeli venture capital funds also declined. This was
connected in no small part to the losses in venture capital funds around the
world and in Israel after the high-tech bubble burst.

Nevertheless, the economic relations did not come to an end and new high-tech
deals were even made. Israeli tourists continued to visit Japan, and Israeli
businesspeople continued trying to get a foothold in the Japanese market.
According to records of the Israeli Embassy in Tokyo, about sixteen Israeli
companies kept active representation in Japan during 2000-2004, and four of
them even acquired Japanese companies while operating them with Japanese
managers and em ployees. In 2004, Japanese-Israeli trade began to return to its
previous level and Japanese investments in Israeli venture capital funds began
to grow once again.

Despite the period of coolness in relations, the political dialogue continued.


Foreign Minister Yoriku Kamaguchi visited Israel twice in 2002. She has served
two terms as foreign minister and was appointed on 27 September 2004 as
special adviser to the prime minister for international aairs and worked in her
youth as a volunteer at Kibbutz Ayelet Hashachar.

Despite the Koizumi governments pro-American policy and public reservations


about nuclear proliferation, in February 2004 Japan signed a deal to develop oil
elds in Azadegan, Iran. At about $2 billion, the deal is considered one of the
largest of its kind to be signed in this period. It reects a continuation of the
traditional policy of acting with oil considerations in mind, while ignoring U.S.
demands that its allies act to thwart the nuclear empowerment of dangerous
countries. At the same time, Japan tried to convince the Americans to include it
in the Quartet that now consists of the United States, the European Union,
Russia, and the UN, and wishes to help out with security arrangements between
Israel and the Palestinians as part of Prime Minister Sharons disengagement
plan in Gaza. As noted earlier, Japan still has fears of extremist Arab or Muslim
elements damaging its interests, while also recognizing that this is not
connected to its relations with Israel.

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Japan has a great interest in Israeli technologies in the elds of biotechnology,
medical instruments, electro-optics, agrotechnology, informatics,
telecommunications, Internet and information protec tion, homeland security,
antimissile defense, space science and tech nology, and so on. The Japanese are
becoming more aware that the Israeli and Japanese economies are
complementary in the sense that advances in these elds in Israel can integrate
easily with the manu facturing, marketing, and nancial capacity of the
Japanese compan ies and help them diversify their products. Whereas Japanese
high-tech companies have almost no ties with the Arab world, they have
extensive ties with concerns in the United States, where the same Israeli
companies operate that are active in Japan. This contributes to appreciation of
the benets of ties with Israel and of tripartite technological cooperation among
Japan, the United States, and Is rael. Although slow and gradual, this perceptual
change may eventu ally aect many other areas. It will not be the rst time high-
tech has inuenced the low-tech world.

Conclusion

Although the stalemate continues in the political eld, we are now on the
threshold of a new era in Japanese-Israeli economic relations.

Reasons include the opening up of the Japanese economy to foreign investment,


the gradual economic recovery both in Japan and Israel, Japanese technology
rms continued investment in Israeli rms and venture capital funds, and, not
least, Israeli rms recent successes in acquiring and operating Japanese
companies, a development that op ens promising possibilities. Orbotech, for
example, runs its operation in East Asia and the Pacic through Orbotech
Japan-a company that is successful in the Japanese market. Despite the
reservations of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, two Japanese economic
delegations visited Israel late in 2004, including experts in homeland security
and in communications.

The era of Japanese companies and banks massive adherence to the Arab
boycott eectively ended in the 1990s. What remains is a voluntary boycott that
is maintained out of a mixture of caution and ignorance. The anti-Israeli
activities of Japanese ocials and of the friendship leagues with the Arab states
and the PLO, which were established and are being funded to this day by the
Japanese establish ment, are still having a negative eect. Also problematic are
the certi cations issued by the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, which attest-at
the behest of the boycott oce in Damascus-that a particular com pany does not
trade with, invest in, or use spare parts from Israel and that its board of
directors contains no Jews. The Japanese political and economic establishment,
however, is aware that there is no longer any danger of the oil weapon being

18
used against Japan by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or the Gulf states. This time, no
one in Japan accuses Israel of being the cause for the rise in oil prices.
Nevertheless, oil-related considerations will continue to inuence Japanese
policymak ers, as evidenced by the $2 billion investment in discovering new oil
reserves in Iran.

Thus, while the political dierences between Tokyo and Jerusa lem continue,
the economic relations have shown notable resilience during the recent dicult
period. Presumably, the political relations will improve as a result of President
Bushs reelection and the ex pected adoption of new policies after the death of
Yasser Arafat. The outlook for future relations both in the political and
economic spheres is one of cautious optimism. Oil will remain a factor in
Japans policies in the short term. However, what will have an impact on
relations in the medium and long term will be the processes connected to
developing innovative technologies to lower the cost of oil replacements. Also,
Japanese rms interest in the growing importance of advanced technology will
increasingly aect Japanese-Israeli relations-

Notes

1. Naoki Maruyama, Japans Response to the Zionist Movement in the 1920s,


Bulletin of the Graduate School of International Relations, 1984, pp. 28, 30.

2. Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, copy Z4/2039. The same copy is kept at
the Weizmann archives in Rehovot.

3. Yasumasa Kuroda, Japan, the Arab World, and Israel, article derived from
his lecture at the Truman Institute, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 24 March
1988.

4. Israel Messenger, Monthly Bulletin of the Zionist Federation (Zionist arch


ives), March 1923, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem.

5. Maruyama, Japans Response, p. 30.

6. See the section below on Japan and the Jews.

7. Naoki Maruyama, Japans Middle East Policy in a Dilemma, Bulletin of the


Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 1986, p. 264.

8. Kobi Moshe, Japan-Israel Chamber of Commerce Bulletin, 1989, p. 2.

9. W. Nester, Japans Oil Diplomacy, JWQ, January 1989, p. 77.

10. Maruyama, Japans Middle Eastern Policy, pp. 270, 275.

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11. Nester, Japans Oil Diplomacy, p. 78; Katakuro Kunio, Narrow Options for
a Pro-Arab Shift, Annals of Japan Association for Middle Eastern Studies, 1973,
p. 140.

12.Maruyama, Japans Middle Eastern Policy, pp. 271, 274.

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