Sanchez Mira, Cagayan against his will with the use of a Maroon Tamaraw
FX motor vehicle.
[G.R. No. 133289. December 23, 1999]
LICERIO A. ANTIPORDA, JR., ELITERIO RUBIACO, VICTOR
GASCON and CAESAR TALIA petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCIS E.
GARCHITORENA, HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON.
CATALINO CASTAEDA, JR. in their capacity as Presiding Justice and
Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to restrain the respondent
Justices of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding
with Crim. Case No. 24339 and from enforcing the warrants for the arrest of
the accused named therein (herein petitioners) or to maintain
the status quo until further orders from this Court.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Accused Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., Eliterio Rubiaco, Victor Gascon, and
Caesar Talla were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer Ramos in
an Information dated September 18, 1997. It was filed with the First Division
of the Sandiganbayan comprised of the Honorable Francis E. Garchitorena,
Edilberto E. Sandoval, and Catalino Castaeda, Jr. The Information reads as
follows:
That on or about September 1, 1995, in the Municipality of Sanchez Mira,
Province of Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused Eliterio Rubiaco, Caesar Talla, Vicente Gascon and Licerio
Antiporda, Jr., armed with guns, conspiring together and helping one another,
by means of force, violence and intimidation and without legal grounds or
any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap and carry away one Elmer Ramos from his residence in Marzan,
CONTRARY TO LAW[1]
On November 10, 1997, the Court issued an order giving the
prosecution represented by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero Agcaoili thirty (30)
days within which to submit the amendment to the Information.The said
order is quoted in full as follows:
ORDER
This morning, the prosecution represented by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero
Agcaoili appeared in response to this Courts Order of clarification on the
propriety of proceeding with the Information as it stands.
On her own, Prosecutor Agcaoili informed the Court that there were
inadequacies in the allegations in the Information for which reason she would
beg leave to amend the same. The Court for its part expressed anxiety as to
the Courts jurisdiction over the case considering that it was not clear whether
or not the subject matter of the accusation was office related.
For this purpose, Prosecutor Agcaoili is given thirty (30) days within which
to submit the amendment embodying whatever changes she believes are
appropriate or necessary in order for the Information to effectively describe
the offense herein charged. Within the same period, Prosecutor Agcaoili shall
submit an expansion of the recommendation to file the instant Information
against the accused before this Court indicating thereon the office related
character of the accusation herein so that the Court might effectively exercise
its jurisdiction over the same.
SO ORDERED.[2]
The prosecution on even date complied with the said order and filed an
Amended Information, which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan in a
resolution dated November 24, 1997.[3] The Amended Information thus
reads:
That on or about September 10, 1997, at Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Licerio Antiporda,
1
Jr., being the Municipal Mayor of Buguey, Cagayan in the exercise of his
official duties as such and taking advantage of his position, ordered,
confederated and conspired with Juan Gallardo, Barangay Captain of San
Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan (now deceased) and accused Eliterio
Rubiaco, barangay councilman of San Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan, Vicente
Gascon and Caesar Talla with the use of firearms, force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap
and abduct the victim Elmer Ramos without any authority of law from his
residence at Marzan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan against his will, with the use of
a Maroon Tamaraw FX motor vehicle and subsequently bring and detain him
illegally at the residence of accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda, Jr. for more
than five (5) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Accused then filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion dated November 16,
1997 praying that a reinvestigation of the case be conducted and the issuance
of warrants of arrest be deferred.[5]
An order dated November 26, 1997 was penned by Prosecutor Evelyn T.
Lucero-Agcaoili recommending the denial of the accuseds Urgent Omnibus
Motion[6] was approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto on January 9,
1998.[7]
The accused thereafter filed on March 5, 1998 a Motion for New
Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance and/or Recall Warrant of
Arrest Issued.[8] The same was denied in an order given in open court dated
March 12, 1998 "on the ground that there was nothing in the Amended
Information that was added to the original Information so that the accused
could not claim a right to be heard separately in an investigation in the
Amended Information. Additionally, the Court ruled that 'since none of the
accused have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court, the
accused are not in a position to be heard on this matter at this time' (p. 245,
Record)."[9]
Subsequently, the accused filed on March 24, 1998 a Motion to Quash
the Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.[10]
On March 27, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order, to wit:
"The Motion to Quash filed in behalf of the accused by Atty. Orlando B.
Consigna is ignored, it appearing that the accused have continually refused or
otherwise failed to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court. At all
events there is an Amended Information here which makes an adequate
description of the position of the accused thus vesting this Court with the
office related character of the offense of the accused.
"SO ORDERED."[11]
A motion for reconsideration was filed on April 3, 1998 by the accused
wherein it was alleged that the filing of the Motion to Quash and the
appearance of their counsel during the scheduled hearing thereof amounted to
their voluntary appearance and invested the court with jurisdiction over their
persons.[12]
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the
accused in its resolution dated April 24, 1998.[13]
Hence, this petition filed by Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., Eliterio Rubiaco,
Victor Gascon, and Caesar Talla.
The petitioners pose the following questions for the resolution of this
Court.
a) CAN THE SANDIGANBAYAN, WHICH HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE
ORIGINAL INFORMATION, SUBSEQUENTLY ACQUIRE
SUCH JURISDICTION BY THE SIMPLE EXPEDIENT OF
AMENDING THE INFORMATION TO SUPPLY, FOR THE
FIRST TIME, JURISDICTIONAL FACTS NOT
PREVIOUSLY AVERRED IN THE ORIGINAL
INFORMATION? and
b) COROLLARILY, CAN THE AMENDED INFORMATION BE
ALLOWED WITHOUT CONDUCTING ANEW A
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION FOR THE GRAVER
OFFENSE CHARGED THEREIN?
The petition is devoid of merit.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for
administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the
court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.[14]
2
 Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861
provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxx
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes,
where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00. Provided, however,
That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for
six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court.
The Sandiganbayan exercises not only civil but also criminal
jurisdiction. Criminal jurisdiction, as defined in the case of People vs.
Mariano[15], is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular offense
and impose the punishment for it.
The case of Arula vs. Espino[16]enumerates the requirements wherein a
court acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case, to wit:
To paraphrase: beyond the pale of disagreement is the legal tenet that a court
acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case only when the following requisites
concur: (1) the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take
cognizance of, (2) the offense must have been committed within its territorial
jurisdiction, and (3) the person charged with the offense must have been
brought in to its forum for trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his
voluntary submission to the court.
The petitioners argue that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case because the original information did not allege that
one of the petitioners, Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., took advantage of his
position as mayor of Buguey, Cagayan to order the kidnapping of Elmer
Ramos. They likewise assert that lacking jurisdiction a court can not order
the amendment of the information. In the same breath, they contend however
that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the persons of the accused.
They question the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over
their case yet they insist that said court acquired jurisdiction over their
motion to quash. The petitioner can not have their cake and eat it too.
In the aforementioned case of Arula vs. Espino[17]it was quite clear that
all three requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the offense, territory and person,
must concur before a court can acquire jurisdiction to try a case.
It is undisputed that the Sandiganbayan had territorial jurisdiction over
the case.
And we are in accord with the petitioners when they contended that
when they filed a motion to quash it was tantamount to a voluntary
submission to the Courts authority. They cite the case of Layosa vs.
Rodriguez[18] in support of their contention. For therein, it was ruled that the
voluntary appearance of the accused at the pre-suspension hearing amounted
to his submission to the courts jurisdiction even if no warrant of arrest has yet
been issued.
To counter this contention of the petitioners the prosecution adverted to
case of de los Santos-Reyes vs. Montesa, Jr.[19] which was decided some 28
years after the Layosa case. In this more recent case, it was held that:
xxx the accused xxx have no right to invoke the processes of the court since
they have not been placed in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of
their liberty by reason or as a consequence of the filling of the
information. For the same reason, the court had no authority to act on the
petition.
We find that the case of Layosa and de los Santos-Reyes are not
inconsistent with each other since both these cases discussed the rules on
when a court acquires jurisdiction over the persons of the accused, i.e., either
through the enforcement of warrants of arrest or their voluntary submission
to the court.
The only difference, we find, is that the de los Santos-Reyes case harped
mainly on the warrant of arrest angle while the Layosa case dealt more on the
issue of voluntary submission ruling, that the appearance at the hearing
through a lawyer was a submission to the courts jurisdiction.
3
 Having discussed the third requirement we now come to the question of
whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged.
We answer in the negative. The original Information filed with the
Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is
office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the prosecution
belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.
However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to
motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation dated June 10, 1997[20] filed
with the same court, it was they who challenged the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for
Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected, which is hereunder
quoted, as follows:
Respondents (petitioners herein) have thoroughly scanned the entire records
of the instant case and no where is there any evidence to show that the
Honorable Prosecution Office of the Province of Cagayan have been
authorized by the Office of the Honorable Ombudsman to conduct the
Preliminary Investigation much less had the former office been authorized to
file the corresponding Information as the said case, if evidence warrants, fall
exclusively with the jurisdiction of the Honorable Sandiganbayan
notwithstanding the presence of other public officers whose salary range is
below 27 and notwithstanding the presence of persons who are not public
officers.
It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.[21]
We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case
because of estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to order the
amendment of the Information.
Rule 110, Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides thus:
Section 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in
substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave
and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner prayed that a reinvestigation be made in view of the Amended
Information.
We hold that the reinvestigation is not necessary anymore. A
reinvestigation is proper only if the accuseds substantial rights would be
impaired. In the case at bar, we do not find that their rights would be unduly
prejudiced if the Amended Information is filed without a reinvestigation
taking place. The amendments made to the Information merely describe the
public positions held by the accused/petitioners and stated where the victim
was brought when he was kidnapped.
It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially
inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who
may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare
his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has
no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof, and it does not place the persons accused in jeopardy. It is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for
the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded
belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof.[22]
The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already
and we see no cogent nor compelling reason why a reinvestigation should
still be conducted.
As an aside, an offense is considered committed in relation to office
when it is intimately connected with their respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of their official functions.[23]
In the case of Cunanan vs. Arceo, it was held that:
... the absence in the information filed on 5 April 1991 before Branch 46 of
the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, of an allegation that petitioner had
committed the offense charged in relation to his office is immaterial and
easily remedied. Respondent RTC judges had forwarded petitioners case to
the Sandiganbayan, and the complete records transmitted thereto in
accordance with the directions of this Court set out in the Asuncion case: x x
x As if it was originally filed with [the Sandiganbayan]. That Information
may be amended at any time before arraignment before the Sandiganbayan,
4
and indeed, by leave of court at any time before judgment is rendered by
the Sandiganbayan, considering that such an amendment would not affect the
juridical nature of the offense charged (i.e., murder), the qualifying
circumstances alleged in the information, or the defenses that petitioner may
assert before the Sandiganbayan. In other words, the amendment may be
made before the Sandiganbayan without surprising the petitioner or
prejudicing his substantive rights.[24] (Underscoring Supplied)
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER
FRANCISCO (ECOT) GARCIA, RICARDO (CADOY) GARCIA,
JOSE BETHOVEN (ATSONG) CABRAL, CAPTAIN FLORENDO
BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER, OSCAR, OMAR, JACK, RICHARD,
JAMES, DONALD, WILLIAM, ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY,
PAUL, all surnamed DOES respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, 1 to order a change of
venue to avoid any miscarriage of justice as well as the procedure ordained in
the implementation of the right to bail 2 are involved in this petition which,
even if not so denominated, partakes of the nature of a certiorari. It must have
been the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio
Espiritu, 3 no doubt under the conviction that there was no time to lose, that
must have led them to devote less than that full measure of attention to
certain fundamentals. They ignored the principle that the responsibility for
the conduct of the prosecution is with the public officials concerned.
Nonetheless, the importance of the questions raised, the need for a change of
venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds, necessitated that further action
be taken. Accordingly, in a resolution dated February 12, 1981, one day after
the filing of the petition, the Court required the comment of the Solicitor
General as well as of the private respondents, 4 the accused in six pending
criminal cases before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Estelito
P. Mendoza. 5 It opened with this preliminary statement: "The present
petition was filed by the private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-
1706, People v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this Honorable
Court on behalf of the People of the Philippines can, under the law, be
instituted only by the Solicitor General. The assertion of the petitioner private
prosecutors that they are instituting the action 'subject to the control and
supervision of the Fiscal' will not, therefore, improve their legal
standing." 6 Nonetheless, it did not press the legal point but instead adopted
"the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of
the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge
Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned
above, and 2. the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same
criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 7
The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15, 1980, acting on the
evidence presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental, the Court of First Instance of that province issued a
search warrant for the search and seizure of tile deceased bodies of seven
persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda
at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. * * * On September 16, 1980
armed with the above warrant, elements of the of the 332nd PC/INP
Company proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield
yielded two common graves containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez,
5
Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie
Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. On September 23 and October 1, 1980, the
PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate
complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia,
Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14)
other persons of unknown names. The cases were docketed as Criminal
Cases No. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140 of the Municipal
Court of Kabankalan. After due preliminary examination of the complainant's
witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause
against the accused. It thus issued an order for their a. rest. However, without
giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of
the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their
temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose
Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and have since been
released from detention. In a parallel development. the witnesses in the
murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at
the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers
from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the
accused are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have
been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large.
Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on
the families of the witnesses." 8 The facts alleged argue strongly for the
remedies sought, namely a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail
bonds.
On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the following
resolution: "The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor
General on the urgent petition for change of venue and cancellation of bail
bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by
certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over
by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in Criminal Cases
Nos. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140, all entitled "People of
the Philippines v. Mayor Pablo Sola. et al."; (2) the petition for a change of
venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of
Justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V
of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided
by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge
Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch
VI at Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence covering the period
from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral
thrombosis and that the said Branch V is the nearest court station to
Himamaylan: and (c) [Await] the comment of respondents on the petition to
cancel bail, without prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the
necessary measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of the
prosecution." 9 Thus, the issue of a change of venue has become moot and
academic. The comments respectively submitted by respondent Florendo
Baliscao on March 5, 1981, respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981
and respondent Pablo Sola on March 16, 1981, dealt solely with the question
of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Such comments were considered as
answers, with the case thereafter deemed submitted for decision.
The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds of respondents,
there being a failure to abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be
heard in a case where the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to
bail being granted, must be decided in favor of petitioner. The bail bonds
must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge
Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. So we rule.
1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of transferring the
place of trial, in this case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod City. The
Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a change of
venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." 10 The Constitutional
Convention of 1971 wisely incorporated the ruling in the landmark decision
of People v. Gutierrez, 11 where Justice J. B. L. Reyes as ponente vigorously
and categorically affirmed: "In the particular case before Us, to compel the
prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at
liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process,
and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been
established." 12 Why a change of venue is imperative was made clear in the
Comment of the Solicitor General. Thus: "The exercise by this Honorable
Court of its above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The
witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be
killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial.
Because of qqqts fear, they may either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to
save their lives. 13 Respondent Florendo Baliscao was not averse to such
transfer, but his preference is for a court anywhere in Metro
Manila. 14 Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the
question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Respondent Pablo Sola made
clear that he had "no objection to the transfer. 15 It may be added that there
may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals,
be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on the
witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution
6
must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of the resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is directed forthwith to hear the
a change of venue. As a matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this petitions for bail of private respondents, with the prosecution being duly
character filed before this Court. Such a plea could have been done heard on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
administratively. In this particular case, however, there is justification for the respondents is strong. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
procedure followed in view of the fact that along with the change of venue,
the cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought. Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De
Castro and Melencio-Herrera JJ., concur.
2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justified. Bail
was granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipal Court without Barredo and Abad Santos, JJ., are on leave.
hearing the prosecution That is to disregard the authoritative doctrine
enunciated in People v. San Diego. 16 As pointed out by Justice Capistrano,
speaking for the Court: "The question presented before us is, whether the
prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The answer is in the
affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for
bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a
summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must
be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence
that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for
bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the
prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation
of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be
considered void on that ground." 17 These words of Justice Cardozo come to
mind: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant
charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an G.R. No. 90625 May 23, 1991
opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every
concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the vs.
pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due BENEDICTO DAPITAN y MARTIN, @ "Benny" and FRED DE
to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is GUZMAN, accused. BENEDICTO DAPITAN y MARTIN @
narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." 18 This norm which "Benny", accused-appellant.
is of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires
that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized
as searching. That fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional DAVIDE, JR., J.:
character. 19
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to (Branch 75, San Mateo) 4th Judicial Region, finding the accused-appellant
private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to:
and effect. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been transferred by virtue of
7
 . . . suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay the
heirs of the victim Rolando Amil in the amount of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. 1
Only the accused-appellant was tried. His co-accused, Fred de Guzman,
remained at large and the court ordered the archival of the case as against
him, to be revived upon his arrest.
The information filed with the court a quo on 7 August 1986 against
accused-appellant and his co-accused reads in part as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of May, 1986, in Barangay San Rafael,
Municipality of Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Province of Rizal,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain, armed
with deadly weapon and by means of force and violence, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously took, robbed/stole and
carried (sic) away two (2) pieces of men's watches worth One
Thousand One Hundred Eighty Eight Pesos (P1,188.00), one (1) pair
of long pants worth Two Hundred Fifty Pesos (P250.00) and cash
money in the amount of Seventy Five Pesos (P75.00) belonging to
Orencia E. Amil, without the knowledge and consent of said owner
and to her damage and prejudice in the total amount of One
Thousand Five Hundred Thirteen Pesos (P1,513.00), Philippine
Currency; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the
purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away the above-
mentioned articles, the herein accused in pursuance of their
conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior
strength and with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of Rolando Amil (an eight
year old child) by stabbing him on the neck and hitting him several
times on the head with a piece of wood, to prevent him from making
an outcry, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which
directly caused his death. 2
When arraigned on 25 November 1986 with the assistance of counsel de
oficio, Atty. Magsanoc, accused entered a plea of not guilty. 3
At the scheduled hearing on 10 February 1987, new counsel de oficio for the
accused, Atty. Gabriel Alberto of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office
(CLAO) of San Mateo, Rizal, manifested that the accused had expressed to
him the desire to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The court forthwith
issued an order reading as follows:
Atty. Alberto of CLAO and de oficio counsel for the accused
manifested that the accused has manifested his desire to make a plea
of guilty to a lesser offense but the circumstances are yet to be made
in details. It appears that there are two mitigating circumstances that
maybe applied. The Prosecuting Fiscal made no objection but also
manifested that he has to look into the penalty applicable. The
counsel for the accused and the Prosecuting Fiscal jointly moved that
the hearing of this case be reset to another date.
WHEREFORE, reset the hearing of this case for March 9, 1987 at
9:30 A.M. . . . . 4
The scheduled hearing of 9 March 1987 was cancelled and reset to April 13,
1987 in view of the required vacation leave of absence of the judge.
On 13 April 1987, upon motion of the prosecution and the defense in view of
the projected settlement of the civil liability of this case, the hearing was
reset to 19 May 1987. 5 On that date, however, counsel de oficio for the
accused did not appear, hence "a report on the projected settlement of the
civil aspect of the case cannot be made" and the hearing was reset again to 15
June 1987 6 which schedule was later on cancelled due to the compulsory
retirement of the presiding judge (Judge Conrado Beltran) which took effect
on 7 June 1987. 7
In the meantime, Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez, Jr. presided over the trial
court 8
The initial reception of evidence took place on 24 August 1987 with the
accused-appellant represented by Atty. Benjamin Pozon, also of the CLAO.
On various dates thereafter, hearings were had until the parties completed the
presentation of their evidence. Witnesses Orencia Amil and Cpl. Rodolfo
Rivera for the prosecution testified during the incumbency of Judge
8
Rodriguez. The rest testified before Judge Edilberto H. Noblejas who
succeeded Judge Rodriguez.
On 5 May 1989, the trial court promulgated its Decision 9 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, after appraising the evidence
presented by the prosecution and the evidence of the defense, the
Court finds the accused BENEDICTO DAPITAN y MARTIN
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, punishable under Article 294, par. 1
of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay the heirs of the victim
Rolando Amil in the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
With respect to the case against FRED DE GUZMAN, the records of
the case insofar as he is concerned is hereby ordered ARCHIVED to
be revived upon his arrest when he may be heard to answer for the
offense charged.
On 11 May 1 989, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal, manifesting
therein that he was appealing the decision to this Court. 10 However, in the
Order of 11 May 1989, Judge Cipriano de Roma erroneously directed the
transmittal of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. 11 The Court of
Appeals transmitted to this Court on 4 March 1989 the records which were
erroneously transmitted to it. 12
In this appeal accused-appellant assigns only one error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW THAT FAVORS THE
ACCUSED APPELLANT. 12
He is thus deemed to be in complete agreement with the findings and
conclusion of facts by the trial court which We quote:
The evidence adduced by the prosecution more than prove with
moral certainty the guilt of the accused Benedicto Dapitan for the
crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. While there may be no
direct evidence linking the accused to said crime, the witnesses who
testified more than fully satisfy the requirements for conviction on
the basis of circumstancial evidence, because it affords enough basis
for a reasonable inference of the existence of the fact thereby sought
to be proved, that the accused performed the criminal act.
Orencia Amil, principal witness for the prosecution testified that at
around 8:30 in the morning of May 16, 1986, she left for her farm
which was about 50 meters away, leaving behind in her house his
adopted son Rolando (the victim) very much alive.(TSN, page 5,
hearing of August 24, 1987) who refused to go with her because he
chose to play in the house instead; and that because she heard the
barking of her dog which aroused her suspicion, she immediately
returned and saw the accused Benedicto Dapitan and his co-accused
Fred de Guzman passing through her fence (TSN, pp. 5-6, hearing of
August 24, 1987); and that when she entered her house calling her
child's name, and seeing the backdoor open, she entered and saw
Rolando's body sprawled on the floor and his brain "scattered". Near
his body was a piece of wood, also bloodied. Thinking her son to be
still alive she took her in her arms, placed him on the table and that
was the time she realized he was dead. (TSN pages 6-7, hearing of
Aug. 24, 1987).
She likewise testified that she lost two watches worth P1,180; pants
at P250.00 and cash amounting to P75.00; and after her son's burial
she further found that her child's toy worth P500.00, a flashlight and
a bolo worth P45.00 and P120.00, respectively, were missing. (TSN,
pages 8-9, hearing of August 24, 1987).
Orencia Amil's testimony is likewise corroborated on its material
points by the testimony of Celo Nilo, another prosecution witness.
He testified that between the hours of 8:00 to 9:00 in the morning of
May 16, 1986, he saw two persons entering the house of Mrs.
Orencia Amil, one of whom he identified as Benedicto Dapitan,
(TSN, pages 4-5, hearing of October 26, 1987). He positively
identified Benedicto Dapitan who was in Court (TSN, pages 5-6,
hearing of October 26, 1987). He likewise testified that when the two
suspects entered the house of Mrs. Amil, he heard the voice of a
child. In the statement he gave the police investigators (Exhibit B)
which he confirmed when he testified, pertinent portions of which
are herein quoted, he said:
9
xxx xxx xxx
T Noong May 16, 1986, sa pagitan ng ika 8:00 ng umaga,
natatandaan mo ba noon kung saan ka naroroon?
S Ako po ay galing sa aming bahay at ako po ay patungo sa
bundok para magtanim po ng punong saging.
xxx xxx xxx
T Noong ikaw ay papadaan sa malapit sa bahay ni Orencia
Amil, wala ka bang napansin na tao na nagtungo doon sa
kanilang bahay.?
S Mayroon po.
T Nakilala mo ba naman kung sinong tao ang iyong nakita
na dumaan doon sa bahay nina Mrs. Orencia Amil?
S Iyon lang pong isang tao ang aking kilala na dumaan doon
sa bahay nina Mrs. Orencia Amil na si Benny Dapitan na ang
tirahan po ay doon po rin sa Sitio Tabak, Brgy. San Rafael,
R/R, pero iyon pong isa na kasama ni Benny Dapitan ay
hindi ko po kilala sa kanyang tunay na pangalan.
T Ilan bang tao ang iyong nakita na nagpunta doon sa bahay
ni Mrs. Orencia Amil?
S Dalawang tao po.
T Mayroon ka ba gaano kalayo doon sa dalawang tao na ang
isa ay si Benny Dapitan ng sila ay makita mo na pumunta
doon sa bahay ni Mrs. Orencia Amil?
S Mayroon po lamang na mga 10 metro ang aking layo sa
kanila.
T Matapos na makita mo si na si Benny Dapitan at iyong isa
niyang kasama ay pumasok doon sa bahay, ano pa ang sunod
na pangyayari?
S Akin pong nakita na matapos na sila ay makapasok sa loob
ng bahay ni Mrs. Amil ay kanila pong isinara iyong pintuan
noong bahay, at hindi ko po naman sila pinansin at ako po ay
nagpatuloy na sa aking pupuntahan.
xxx xxx xxx
T Matapos na makapasok iyong sina Benny Dapitan doon sa
bahay, wala ka ba namang narinig na sigaw ng isang bata?
S Mayroon po pero hindi ko po pinansin. (Emphasis
supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
The testimonies of these two witnesses, evaluated together, on what
transpired in the morning of May 16, 1986, between the hours of
8:00-9:00 a.m. attest to the existence of the following facts:
1. That the victim, Rolando Amil, was alive when her mother left her
as testified to by Orencia Amil and witness Celo Nilo, who cry out
when the two suspects entered the house. (Testimony of Orencia
Amil)
2. That the accused Benedicto Dapitan and an unidentified
companion entered the house at a time when Mrs. Amil had already
left, and that the victim, at the time, was still alive. (Testimonies of
Celo Nilo & Orencia Amil)
3. That when Mrs. Amil returned at quarter to nine she saw
Benedicto Dapitan and Fred de Guzman leaving the
premises.(Testimony of Orencia Amil)
4. And that when Mrs. Amil entered her house, the victim, Rolando
Amil, was already dead. (Testimony of Orencia Amil)
As gleaned from the records, witness Orencia Amil was
straightforward in her testimony. She remained steadfast even on
cross-examination, and there is nothing on record concerning her
testimony which would leave the court in doubt as to the truth of
10
what she testified to. Her testimony therefore, relative to the
circumstances transpiring at the time she left the house at 8:30 a.m.
up to the time she returned at quarter to nine engenders belief.
Celo Nilo's testimony was likewise made in the same vein as that of
Orencia Amil. This witness was not shown to have cause to perjure
himself on a serious crime against the accused. As the Court
observed during the trial, his testimony, based on his demeanor when
he testified, is impressed with a ring of veracity.
The Court did not give credit to the testimony of Patrolman Rodolfo
Rivera except on the fact that he conducted an investigation. No
value whatsoever was given to the sworn statement of Benedicto
Dapitan, even as to the portion in said testimony, where Benedicto
Dapitan admitted being present when Fred de Guzman allegedly hit
the victim on the head and that the stolen articles were in the
possession of Fred de Guzman, because as wisely put by defense
counsel, the sworn statement was taken in violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused.
In sum, therefore, there can be no other inference from the evidence
presented by the prosecution considering the short span of time the
victim Rolando Amil was left alive by his mother, and her return
fifteen (15) minutes later to find him dead and the testimony that the
accused was seen entering and leaving the premises during this
intervening period, except the inevitable conclusion that the accused
is responsible for the death of Rolando Amil.
For his part, the accused Benedicto Dapitan interposes the defense of
"alibi". This, he sought to establish through the testimony of witness
Ismael Anacio. Pertinent portion of the witness' testimony, is herein
quoted, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, do you remember, Mr. Witness, if this Benedicto
Dapitan was present in the said house on the period from
May 16 to May 19, 1986?
A He was there, sir.
Q Was there any occasion when this Benedicto Dapitan left
your house during that period?
A None, sir.
(TSN, pages 3-5, hearing of September 12, 1988).
The testimony of witness Ismael Anacio, a salesman by occupation,
that defendant Benedicto Dapitan, from May 16 to May 19, 1986,
was in his house all the time, and that there was no occasion that he
left the place during this period does not spark belief. In the first
place, the witness wants the Court to believe that he was in his house
during all the time so that he could during all the days alluded to, be
in a position to be positive as to the whereabouts of the accused. This
circumstance alone generates doubt on his testimony, because it was
not explained why the witness, a salesman by occupation, would be
in his house from the period beginning May 16-19, 1986 (TSN,
pages 2-3, hearing of September 12, 1988).
Assuming though, for the sake of argument, that the witness actually
monitored the whereabouts of the accused during all the time, his
testimony sustaining Benedicto Dapitan's defense of "alibi" cannot
defeat the positive identification made of Benedicto Dapitan and of
his presence in Montalban on May 16, 1986, by witness Orencia
Amil and Celo Nilo. Even on this score alone, without taking into
consideration that Sampaloc District where he allegedly was, is
geographically not so far from Montalban, from where he could have
commuted through the ordinary means of transportation present in
the area, his defense of "alibi" naturally falls, so that his conviction is
reasonably called for. 14
In support of the assigned error accused-appellant argues that the imposition
over him of the penalty of reclusion temporal by the trial court is
"tantamount to deprivation of life or liberty without due process of law or is
tantamount to a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment prohibited by the
Constitution" and he submits that "the righteous and humane punishment that
should have been meted out should be indeterminate sentence" with "all
mitigating circumstances as well as the legal provisions favorable to the
accused-appellant . . . appreciated or . . . taken advantage for constructive and
humanitarian reasons." He stresses that since mitigating circumstances are
based on, among others, the lesser perversity of the offender, such should be
11
appreciated in his favor since he had "a companion then when he entered
Mrs. Orencia Amil's house and perpetrated the offense. 15 And it was his
companion or mate by the name of Fred de Guzman who took the personal
belongings of Mrs. Amil as the men's watch worth P1,188.00. It was Fred de
Guzman who is still at large who stabbed and hit the head of Rolando
Amil. 16 These facts or circumstances reveal that accused-appellant had a
"lesser perversity than his companion Fred de Guzman." As evidence of such
lesser perversity, "he did not flee or hide himself from the authorities. . . .
within two (2) days' time he surrendered voluntarily to the police authorities .
. . ." Thus, the "mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender must be
considered" in his favor. 17
He prays that he be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum,
to reclusion perpetua as maximum. 18
Meeting squarely the points raised by the accused-appellant, the People, in
the Brief for Plantiff-Appellee submitted by the Solicitor General on 9 June
1990, asserts that the same are without merit for the accused was not
deprived of due process as he was, as admitted by him, afforded full
opportunity to be heard; for a penalty to be cruel, degrading or inhuman, "it
must take more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or
severe. . . . ; it must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive, disproportionate to
the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community 19 or
when they involve torture or lingering death" 20 and since the penalty
of reclusion perpetuaimposed on him is sanctioned by law, Act No. 3815 as
amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code, said penalty is not
cruel, degrading or inhuman. It further argues that the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide defined under Article 294, par. 1, of the Revised
Penal Code is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death; with the abolition
of the death penalty by the 1987 Constitution, the only penalty imposable
upon a person found to have committed such complex crime is the single
penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is an indivisible penalty. Under Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code it should be applied regardless of the presence
of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
As regards the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the People submits that the
accused-appellant cannot avail of it since Section 2 of the law (Act No. 4103)
specifically provides that it shall not apply to, among others, persons
convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment.
We find the instant appeal to be totally bereft of merit.
There was no denial of due process.
Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present: (1) there must
be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired by it over the
person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the
proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
(4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. 21
In People vs. Castillo, et al., 22 We ruled that if an accused has been heard in
a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly
processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon
notice to him, with opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within
the authority of the constitutional law, then he has had due process .23
We reiterated the above doctrine in People vs. Muit. 24
All the requisites or conditions of due process are present in this case. The
records further disclose that accused-appellant was given the fullest and
unhampered opportunity not only to reflect dispassionately on his expressed
desire to plead guilty to a lesser offense which prompted the court to cancel
the hearing of 10 February 1987, but also to confront the witnesses presented
against him and to present his own evidence.
If indeed accused-appellant had been deprived of due process, he would have
faulted the trial court not just for failure to apply the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, but definitely for more. Yet, he found it futile to go any farther.
Neither is the penalty of reclusion perpetua cruel, degrading, and
inhuman.1wphi1 To make that claim is to assail the constitutionality of
Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, or of any other provisions
therein and of special laws imposing the said penalty for specific crimes or
offenses. The proposition cannot find any support. Article 294, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code has survived four Constitutions of the Philippines,
namely: the 1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution, the Freedom
Constitution of 1986 and the 1987 Constitution. All of these documents
mention life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua as a penalty which may be
imposed in appropriate cases.25 As a matter of fact, the same paragraph of the
12
section of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
the imposition of cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment expressly
recognizes reclusion perpetua. Thus:
Sec. 19(l). Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the Congress hereafter provides it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
As to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances, We also agree with the
Solicitor General that since robbery with homicide under paragraph 1 of
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is now punishable by the single and
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the death
penalty, it follows that the rule prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code shall apply. 26 Consequently, reclusion
perpetua must be imposed in this case regardless of the presence of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
The trial court correctly imposed on the accused the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The civil indemnity awarded by the trial court should, in line with Our
decision in People vs. Sison, G.R. No. 86455, 14 September 1990,
and People vs. Sazon, G.R. No. 89684, 18 September 1970, be increased
from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, except as modified above in respect to the civil indemnity,
the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 131652. March 9, 1998]
BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO
JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 131728. March 9, 1998]
BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MAXIMO
SAVELLANO, JR., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
JUVIELYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Pending before this Court are two separate petitions, one filed by
petitioner Bayani M. Alonte, docketed G.R. No. 131652, and the other by
petitioner Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed G.R. No. 131728, that assail
the decision of respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., of the Regional
Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 53, of Manila finding both petitioners guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The two petitions were
consolidated.
On 05 December 1996, an information for rape was filed against
petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna, and
Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan. The information contained the following averments; thus:
That on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas, Bian, Laguna, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above named accused,
who is the incumbent mayor of Bian, Laguna after giving complainant-child
drinking water which made her dizzy and weak, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with said JUVIELYN
PUNONGBAYAN against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
That accused Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion without having participated
as principal or accessory assisted in the commission of the offense by
bringing said complainant child to the rest house of accused Bayani `Arthur
13
Alonte at Sto. Tomas, Bian, Laguna and after receiving the amount
of P1,000.00 left her alone with Bayani Alonte who subsequently raped her.
Contrary to Law.[1]
The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B and assigned by
raffle to Branch 25 of the RTC of Bian, Laguna, presided over by Judge
Pablo B. Francisco.
On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel
Attorney Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor (ACSP)
Leonardo Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a
Petition for a Change of Venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-
12-RTC) to have the case transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial
Courts in Metro Manila.
During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or on 25 June
1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed
an affidavit of desistance, quoted herein in full, as follows:
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
I, JUVIE-LYN YAMBAO PUNONGBAYAN, 17 years of age, a resident of
No. 5 Uranus Street, Congressional Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City, duly
assisted by private legal counsel and my parents, after having duly sworn in
accordance with law, depose and say:
1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case filed against Mayor Bayani
`Arthur Alonte of Bian, Laguna, with the RTC-Branch 25 of Bian, Laguna;
2. That the case has been pending for some time, on preliminary issues,
specifically, (a) change of venue, filed with the Supreme Court; (b) propriety
of the appeal to the Court of Appeals, and after its denial by said court,
brought to the Office of the President, on the veracity of the findings of the
Five-Man Investigating Panel of the State Prosecutors Office, and the
Secretary of Justice, and (c) a hold-departure order filed with the Bian Court;
3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly, and meanwhile, I have
already lost two (2) semesters of my college residence. And when the actual
trial is held after all the preliminary issues are finally resolved, I anticipate a
still indefinite suspension of my schooling to attend the hearings;
4. That during the entire period since I filed the case, my family has lived a
most abnormal life: my father and mother had to give up their jobs; my
younger brother, who is in fourth grade, had to stop his schooling, like
myself;
5. That I do not blame anyone for the long, judicial process, I simply wish to
stop and live elsewhere with my family, where we can start life anew, and
live normally once again;
6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my complaint for rape and the
other charge for child abuse wherein the Five-Man Investigating Panel of the
Office of the State Prosecutor found a prima facie case although the
information has not been filed, and that I will not at any time revive this, and
related cases or file new cases, whether, criminal, civil, and/or
administrative, here or anywhere in the Philippines;
7. That I likewise realize that the execution of this Affidavit will put to doubt
my credibility as a witness-complainant;
8. That this is my final decision reached without fear or favor, premised on a
corresponding commitment that there will be no reprisals in whatever form,
against members of the police force or any other official of officer, my
relatives and friends who extended assistance to me in whatever way, in my
search for justice.
"WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.
"(Sgd) JUVIE-LYN
Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Compl
ainant
"Assisted by:
(Sgd) ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Private Prosecutor
"In the presence of:
(Sgd) PABLO PUNONGBAYAN
14
 Father
(Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Mother
"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 day of June, 1997, in
Quezon City.
"(Sgd) Illegible
Administering
Officer"[2]
On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf of petitioners,
moved to have the petition for change of venue dismissed on the ground that
it had become moot in view of complainant's affidavit of desistance. On 22
August 1997, ACSP Guiyab filed his comment on the motion to
dismiss. Guiyab asserted that he was not aware of the desistance of private
complainant and opined that the desistance, in any case, would not produce
any legal effect since it was the public prosecutor who had direction and
control of the prosecution of the criminal action. He prayed for the denial of
the motion to dismiss.
On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a Resolution (Administrative
Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC), granting the petition for change of venue. The
Court said:
"These affidavits give specific names, dates, and methods being used to
abort, by coercion or corruption, the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9619-
B. It is thus incorrect for oppositors Alonte and Concepcion to contend that
the fear of the petitioner, her private counsel and her witnesses are too
generalized if not fabricated. Indeed, the probability that in desisting from
pursuing her complaint for rape, petitioner, a minor, may have succumbed to
some illicit influence and undue pressure. To prevent possible miscarriage of
justice is a good excuse to grant the petition to transfer the venue of Criminal
Case No. 9619-B from Bian, Laguna to the City of Manila.
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of Venue from Bian, Laguna
to the City of Manila is granted. The Executive Judge of RTC Manila is
ordered to raffle Crim. Case No. 9619-B to any of its branches. The judge to
whom Crim. Case No. 9619-B shall be raffled shall resolve the petitioner's
Motion to Resume Proceedings filed in Br. XXV of the RTC of Bian, Laguna
and determine the voluntariness and validity of petitioner's desistance in light
of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor
Leonardo Guiyab. The branch clerk of court of Br. XXV of the RTC of Bian,
Laguna is ordered to personally deliver to the Executive Judge of Manila the
complete records of Crim. Case No. 9619-B upon receipt of this
Resolution."[3]
On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal Case No.
97-159955 by the Clerk of Court of Manila, was assigned by raffle to Branch
53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding.
On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Attorney Balbin,
submitted to the Manila court a "compliance" where she reiterated "her
decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance."
In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge Savellano found probable
cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte and
Concepcion without prejudice to, and independent of, this Courts separate
determination as the trier of facts, of the voluntariness and validity of the
[private complainant's] desistance in the light of the opposition of the public
prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab.
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered himself to
Director Santiago Toledo of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
while Concepcion, in his case, posted the recommended bail of P150,000.00.
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded not
guilty to the charge. The parties manifested that they were waiving pre-
trial. The proceedings forthwith went on.Per Judge Savellano, both parties
agreed to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits.[4] According to
Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed the prosecution to present
evidence relative only to the question of the voluntariness and validity of the
affidavit of desistance.[5]
It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, the
prosecution presented private complainant Juvie-lyn Punongbayan followed
by her parents. During this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the validity and
voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance. She stated that she had no
intention of giving positive testimony in support of the charges against
Alonte and had no interest in further prosecuting the action. Punongbayan
confirmed: (i) That she was compelled to desist because of the harassment
she was experiencing from the media, (ii) that no pressures nor influence
were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of desistance, and (iii) that neither
15
she nor her parents received a single centavo from anybody to secure the
affidavit of desistance.
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then presented, in
sequence: (i) Punongbayans parents, who affirmed their signatures on the
affidavit of desistance and their consent to their daughters decision to desist
from the case, and (ii) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente, who
attested that the affidavit of desistance was signed by Punongbayan and her
parents in his presence and that he was satisfied that the same was executed
freely and voluntarily. Finally, Campomanes manifested that in light of the
decision of private complainant and her parents not to pursue the case, the
State had no further evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the
accused. She, then, moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both Alonte
and Concepcion.
Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for
decision."[6]
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to
Admit to Bail." Assistant State Prosecutor Campomanes, in a Comment filed
on the same date, stated that the State interposed no objection to the granting
of bail and in fact Justice and Equity dictates that it joins the accused in his
prayer for the granting of bail.
Respondent judge did not act on the application for bail.
On 17 November 1997, Alonte filed anew an Urgent Plea to Resolve the
Motion for Bail. On even date, ASP Campomanes filed a Manifestation
deeming "it proper and in accord with justice and fair play to join the
aforestated motion.
Again, the respondent judge did not act on the urgent motion.
The records would indicate that on the 25th November 1997, 1st
December 1997, 8th December 1997 and 10th December 1997, petitioner
Alonte filed a Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Motion for Early Resolution,
respectively, in respect of his application for bail. None of these motions
were acted upon by Judge Savellano.
On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the lead
counsel for petitioner Alonte received a notice from the RTC Manila, Branch
53, notifying him of the schedule of promulgation, on 18 December 1997, of
the decision on the case. The counsel for accused Concepcion denied having
received any notice of the scheduled promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and
Atty. Jose Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could not attend the
promulgation of the decision because he was suffering from mild
hypertension and was confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other
hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel would appear not to have been
notified of the proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of the decision
proceeded in absentia; the reading concluded:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two (2) accused
Mayor Bayani Alonte and Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of RAPE, as defined and penalized
under Article 335(2) in relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for which each one of the them is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA or imprisonment for twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty
(40) years.
In view thereof, the bail bond put up by the accused Buenaventura `Wella
Concepcion for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and rendered
without any further force and effect.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On the same day of 18th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a
motion for reconsideration. Without waiting for its resolution, Alonte filed
the instant "Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam" for"Certiorari, Prohibition, Habeas
Corpus, Bail, Recusation of respondent Judge, and for Disciplinary Action
against an RTC Judge." Petitioner Concepcion later filed his own petition
for certiorari and mandamus with the Court.
Alonte submits the following grounds in support of his petition seeking
to have the decision nullified and the case remanded for new trial; thus:
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a
quo (Annex A) without affording the petitioner his Constitutional right to due
process of law (Article III, 1, Constitution).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo in
violation of the mandatory provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
16
specifically, in the conduct and order of trial (Rule 119) prior to the
promulgation of a judgment (Rule 120; Annex A).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when, in total disregard of the Revised Rules on
Evidence and existing doctrinal jurisprudence, he rendered a Decision in the
case a quo (Annex A) on the basis of two (2) affidavits (Punongbayans and
Balbins) which were neither marked nor offered into evidence by the
prosecution, nor without giving the petitioner an opportunity to cross-
examine the affiants thereof, again in violation of petitioners right to due
process (Article III, 1, Constitution).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a
quo without conducting a trial on the facts which would establish that
complainant was raped by petitioner (Rule 119, Article III, 1, Constitution),
thereby setting a dangerous precedent where heinous offenses can result in
conviction without trial (then with more reason that simpler offenses could
end up with the same result).[8]
On the other hand, Concepcion relies on the following grounds in
support of his own petition; thus:
1. The decision of the respondent Judge rendered in the course of resolving
the prosecutions motion to dismiss the case is a patent nullity for having been
rendered without jurisdiction, without the benefit of a trial and in total
violation of the petitioners right to due process of law.
2. There had been no valid promulgation of judgment at least as far as
petitioner is concerned.
3. The decision had been rendered in gross violation of the right of the
accused to a fair trial by an impartial and neutral judge whose actuations and
outlook of the case had been motivated by a sinister desire to ride on the crest
of media hype that surrounded this case and use this case as a tool for his
ambition for promotion to a higher court.
4. The decision is patently contrary to law and the jurisprudence in so far as it
convicts the petitioner as a principal even though he has been charged only as
an accomplice in the information.[9]
The petitions deserve some merit; the Court will disregard, in view of
the case milieu, the prematurity of petitioners' invocation, i.e., even before
the trial court could resolve Alonte's motion for reconsideration.
The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the somewhat strange way
the case has proceeded below. Per Judge Savellano, after the waiver by the
parties of the pre-trial stage, the trial of the case did proceed on the merits but
that -
"The two (2) accused did not present any countervailing evidence during the
trial. They did not take the witness stand to refute or deny under oath the
truth of the contents of the private complainant's aforementioned affidavit
which she expressly affirmed and confirmed in Court, but, instead, thru their
respective lawyers, they rested and submitted the case for decision merely on
the basis of the private complainant's so called 'desistance' which, to them,
was sufficient enough for their purposes. They left everything to the so-called
'desistance' of the private complainant."[10]
According to petitioners, however, there was no such trial for what was
conducted on 07 November 1997, aside from the arraignment of the accused,
was merely a proceeding in conformity with the resolution of this Court in
Administrative Case No. 97-1-12-RTC to determine the validity and
voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance executed by Punongbayan.
It does seem to the Court that there has been undue precipitancy in the
conduct of the proceedings. Perhaps the problem could have well been
avoided had not the basic procedures been, to the Court's perception, taken
lightly. And in this shortcoming, looking at the records of the case, the trial
court certainly is not alone to blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution
provides the fundamentals.
"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
17
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."
Jurisprudence[11] acknowledges that due process in criminal
proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case
is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the
accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that
judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.[12]
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now
elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are
mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and
are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process
cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."[13]
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled out in Section 3,
Rule 119, of the Rules of Court; viz:
"Sec. 3. Order of trial. - The trial shall proceed in the following order:
"(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the
proper case, the civil liability.
"(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if
any, arising from the issuance of any provisional remedy in the case.
"(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless
the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional
evidence bearing upon the main issue.
"(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision unless the court directs the parties to argue orally or to submit
memoranda.
"(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the
complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial
may be modified accordingly."
In Tabao vs. Espina,[14] the Court has underscored the need to adhere
strictly to the above rules. It reminds that -
"x x x each step in the trial process serves a specific purpose. In the trial of
criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of an
accused requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to present
his defense. So, with the prosecution as to its evidence.
"Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into
consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether in the
prosecution or defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges are sworn
not only to uphold the law but also to do what is fair and just. The judicial
gavel should not be wielded by one who has an unsound and distorted sense
of justice and fairness.[15]
While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that -
"Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on 07
November 1997 with their respective counsel of choice. None of their
counsel interposed an intention to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn
Punongbayan, even after she attested, in answer to respondent judge's
clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits - one
detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy her desistance;
the opportunity was missed/not used, hence waived. The rule of case law is
that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness 'is a personal one and
may be waived.'" (emphasis supplied) -
it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be
positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires that it "not only
must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."[16] Mere
silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of
right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver.[17] The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations
from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial:
(1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their
defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose; [18] (2) the
parties have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor
have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose;[19] and (3)
petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to
justify any modification in the order of trial.[20] There can be no short-cut to
18
the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his
full day in court.Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place
of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that
cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. And, since
the case would have to be sent back to the court a quo, this ponencia has
carefully avoided making any statement or reference that might be
misconstrued as prejudgment or as pre-empting the trial court in the proper
disposition of the case. The Court likewise deems it appropriate that all
related proceedings therein, including the petition for bail, should be subject
to the proper disposition of the trial court.
Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few observations on the affidavit of
desistance executed by the complainant.
Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan,
hereinbefore quoted, does not contain any statement that disavows the
veracity of her complaint against petitioners but merely seeks to "be allowed
to withdraw" her complaint and to discontinue with the case for varied other
reasons. On this subject, the case of People vs. Junio,[21] should be
instructive. The Court has there explained:
The appellants submission that the execution of an Affidavit of Desistance by
complainant who was assisted by her mother supported the `inherent
incredibility of prosecutions evidence is specious. We have said in so many
cases that retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with
considerable disfavor by the courts. The unreliable character of this
document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after going
through the process of having accused-appellant arrested by the police,
positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the
humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts, and then repeating
her accusations in open court by recounting her anguish, Maryjane would
suddenly turn around and declare that `[a]fter a careful deliberation over the
case, (she) find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant criminal
prosecution.
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which
should not be given probative value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject
the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness
who has given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a
rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can easily
be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary
consideration, the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as
exceedingly unreliable. [Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA 622, citing De
Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128; People vs.
Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.][22]
The Junio rule is no different from ordinary criminal cases. For instance,
in People vs. Ballabare,[23] a murder case, the Court has ruled:
The contention has no merit. To begin with, the Affidavit executed by
eyewitness Tessie Asenita is not a recantation. To recant a prior statement is
to renounce and withdraw it formally and publicly. [36 WORDS AND
PHRASES 683, citing Pradlik vs. State, 41-A 2nd, 906, 907.] In her affidavit,
Tessie Asenita did not really recant what she had said during the trial. She
only said she wanted to withdraw her testimony because her father, Leonardo
Tacadao, Sr., was no longer interested in prosecuting the case against
accused-appellant. Thus, her affidavit stated:
3. That inasmuch as my father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., the complainant
therein, was no longer interested to prosecute the case as manifested in the
Sworn Affidavit of Desistance before the Provincial Prosecutor, I do hereby
WITHDRAW and/or REVOKE my testimony of record to confirm (sic) with
my fathers desire;
It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny by
the court and the parties simply because an affidavit withdrawing the
testimony is subsequently presented by the defense. In the first place, any
recantation must be tested in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given
to the party adversely affected by it to cross-examine the recanting
witness. In this case, Tessie Asenita was not recalled to the witness stand to
testify on her affidavit. Her affidavit is thus hearsay. It was her husband,
Roque Asenita, who was presented and the matters he testified to did not
even bear on the substance of Tessies affidavit. He testified that accused-
appellant was not involved in the perpetration of the crime.
In the second place, to accept the new evidence uncritically would be to
make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses. [De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184
SCRA 128, 134, citing People vs. Morales, 113 SCRA 683.] For even
assuming that Tessie Asenita had made a retraction, this circumstance alone
19
does not require the court to disregard her original testimony. A retraction
does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. [People vs. Davatos, 229
SCRA 647.] For this reason, courts look with disfavor upon retractions
because they can easily be obtained from witnesses usually through
intimidation or for monetary considerations. [People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA
642.] Hence, when confronted with a situation where a witness recants his
testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the original testimony
solely on the basis of the recantation. They should determine which
testimony should be given credence through a comparison of the original
testimony and the new testimony, applying the general rules of
evidence. [Reano vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 525.] In this case we
think the trial court correctly ruled.[24]
It may not be amiss to state that courts have the inherent power to
compel the attendance of any person to testify in a case pending before it,
and a party is not precluded from invoking that authority.[25]
Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a
pardon in the so-called "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of
the criminal case once the action has been instituted. The affidavit,
nevertheless, may, as so earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose
weight or probative value, like any other piece of evidence, would be up to
the court for proper evaluation. The decision in Junio went on to hold -
While `[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness,
shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party
or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has
been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may
be, [Third par. of Art. 344, The Revised Penal Code.] the pardon to justify
the dismissal of the complaint should have been made prior to the institution
of the criminal action. [People vs. Entes, 103 SCRA 162, cited by People vs.
Soliao, 194 SCRA 250, which in turn is cited in People vs. Villorente, 210
SCRA 647.] Here, the motion to dismiss to which the affidavit of desistance
is attached was filed after the institution of the criminal case. And, affiant did
not appear to be serious in `signifying (her) intention to refrain from
testifying since she still completed her testimony notwithstanding her earlier
affidavit of desistance. More, the affidavit is suspect considering that while it
was dated `April 1992, it was only submitted sometime in August 1992, four
(4) months after the Information was filed before the court a quo on 6 April
1992, perhaps dated as such to coincide with the actual filing of the case.[26]
In People vs. Miranda,[27] applying the pertinent provisions of Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code which, in full, states -
"Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended spouse.
"The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including
both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.
"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall
not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been
expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.
"In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the
marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this
paragraph shall also be applicable to the coprincipals, accomplices and
accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes." -
the Court said:
"Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted prohibits a prosecution for
seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, except upon a complaint
made by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in
any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named
persons, as the case may be. It does not prohibit the continuance of a
prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender after the cause has
been instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of said cause. The only act that
according to article 344 extinguishes the penal action and the penalty that
may have been imposed is the marriage between the offended and the
offended party."[28]
In People vs. Infante,[29] decided just a little over a month
before Miranda, the Court similarly held:
20
"In this court, after the case had been submitted, a motion to dismiss was
filed on behalf of the appellant predicated on an affidavit executed by
Manuel Artigas, Jr., in which he pardoned his guilty spouse for her
infidelity. But this attempted pardon cannot prosper for two reasons. The
second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which is in
question reads: 'The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution
without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any
case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.' This provision
means that the pardon afforded the offenders must come before the
institution of the criminal prosecution, and means, further, that both the
offenders must be pardoned by the offended party. To elucidate further,
article 435 of the old Penal Code provided: 'The husband may at any time
remit the penalty imposed upon his wife. In such case the penalty imposed
upon the wife's paramour shall also be deemed to be remitted.' These
provisions of the old Penal Code became inoperative after the passage of Act
No. 1773, section 2, which had the effect of repealing the same. The Revised
Penal Code thereafter expressly repealed the old Penal Code, and in so doing
did not have the effect of reviving any of its provisions which were not in
force.But with the incorporation of the second paragraph of article 344, the
pardon given by the offended party again constitutes a bar to the prosecution
for adultery. Once more, however, it must be emphasized that this pardon
must come before the institution of the criminal prosecution and must be for
both offenders to be effective - circumstances which do not concur in this
case."[30]
The decisions speak well for themselves, and the Court need not say
more than what it has heretofore already held.
Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of Judge Savellano from
further hearing the case, the Court is convinced that Judge Savellano should,
given the circumstances, be best excused from the case. Possible animosity
between the personalities here involved may not all be that unlikely. The
pronouncement of this Court in the old case of Luque vs. Kayanan[31]could
again be said: All suitors are entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality of
an independent, wholly-free, disinterested and unbiased tribunal. Second
only to the duty of rendering a just decision is the duty of doing it in a
manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to the fairness and integrity
of the Judge.[32] It is not enough that a court is impartial, it must also be
perceived as impartial.
The Court cannot end this ponencia without a simple reminder on the
use of proper language before the courts. While the lawyer in promoting the
cause of his client or defending his rights might do so with fervor, simple
courtesy demands that it be done within the bounds of propriety and
decency. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions hardly can
be justified nor can have a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility
among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that must at
no time be lost to it.
Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again, that prosecutors are
expected not merely to discharge their duties with the highest degree of
excellence, professionalism and skill but also to act each time with utmost
devotion and dedication to duty.[33] The Court is hopeful that the zeal which
has been exhibited many times in the past, although regrettably a
disappointment on few occasions, will not be wanting in the proceedings yet
to follow.
WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing, the Court hereby
RULES that -
(a) The submission of the "Affidavit of Desistance," executed by Juvie-Lyn
Y. Punongbayan on 25 June 1997, having been filed AFTER the institution
of Criminal Case No. 97-159935, DOES NOT WARRANT THE
DISMISSAL of said criminal case;
(b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed judgment, dated 12
December 1997, convicting petitioners is declared NULL AND VOID and
thereby SET ASIDE; accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings; and
(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding Judge of Branch 53 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, is ENJOINED from further hearing Criminal
Case No. 97-159935; instead, the case shall immediately be scheduled for
raffle among the other branches of that court for proper disposition.
No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Kapunan, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., no part. Related to one of counsel.
Puno, J., see separate opinion.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Mendoza and Panganiban, JJ., joins
Justice Puno in his separate opinion.
21
 This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31,
1995[1] and its Resolution dated December 1, 1995.[2] The Court of Appeals
dismissed for being insufficient in substance the Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus, which sought to nullify two orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 53, dated April 18, 1994 and May 6, 1994.

The Antecedent Facts

The City Prosecutor of Manila charged petitioner with the crime of

Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document before the Manila Regional
Trial Court.[3] Petitioner executed before a Notary Public in the City of
Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a parcel of land stating that she
was the sole surviving heir of the registered owner when in fact she knew
there were other surviving heirs. Since the offended party did not reserve the
right to file a separate civil action arising from the criminal offense, the civil
action was deemed instituted in the criminal case.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision dated
January 17, 1994 acquitting petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. In
the same decision, the trial court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the
case, ordering the return to the surviving heirs of the parcel of land located in
Bulacan.[4]
[G.R. No. 123340. August 29, 2002] On January 28, 1994, petitioner received a copy of the decision.
On February 10, 1994, petitioner filed by registered mail a motion for
reconsideration dated February 7, 1994, assailing the trial courts ruling on the
LUTGARDA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner furnished the City Prosecutor a
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the HEIRS OF copy of the motion by registered mail.
ESTANISLAWA C. REYES, represented by MIGUEL C.
On April 18, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners motion for
REYES, respondents.
reconsideration stating:
DECISION
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 7, 1994, filed by
CARPIO, J.: the accused through counsel and considering that there is nothing to show
that the Office of the City Prosecutor was actually furnished or served with a
copy of the said Motion for Reconsideration within the reglementary period
The Case of fifteen (15) days from receipt by the accused on January 28, 1994 of a
copy of the Courts decision dated January 17, 1994, so that the same is

22
already final and executory, let the Motion for Reconsideration be Denied for
lack of merit.[5]
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the trial courts order of April
18, 1994. The trial court denied the same in an order dated May 6, 1994, to
wit:
Under the Interim Rules, no party shall be allowed a second motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment (Sec. 4). The motion of accused
dated 22 April 1994 is a violation of this rule.
WHEREFORE, said motion is DENIED.[6]
Left with no recourse, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the Court of Appeals to nullify the two assailed orders of the
trial court. Petitioner also asked the Court of Appeals to compel the trial
court to resolve her motion for reconsideration of the decision dated February
7, 1994.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On March 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied due course to the
petition and dismissed the case for being insufficient in substance.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts order of April 18, 1994
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
declared in part:
Section 10, Rule 13, Rules of Court, provides as follows:
SEC. 10. Proof of Service. Proof of personal service shall consist of a
written admission of the party served, or the affidavit of the party serving,
containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the
service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the
person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 5 of this rule. If
service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and
the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall
be filed immediately upon receipt thereof by the sender, or in lieu thereof the
letter unclaimed together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given
by the postmaster to the addressee.
Patent from the language of the said section is that in case service is made by
registered mail, proof of service shall be made by (a) affidavit of the person
mailing and (b) the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. Both must
concur. In the case at bench, there was no such affidavit or registry receipt
when the motion was considered. Thus, respondent Judge cannot be said to
have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
in ruling in the manner he did.[7]
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial courts order of May 6, 1994
denying the subsequent motion for reconsideration, as follows:
xxx, while there is merit in petitioners submission that the motion for
reconsideration dated April 22, 1994 was not a second motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment, as contemplated in the Interim
Rules because the motion sought to impugn the order dated 18 April 1994
not on the basis of the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration dated
07 February 1994 but on the erroneous legal conclusion of the order dated
May 6, 1994,[8] this is already academic. The decision dated January 7, 1994
had long become final when the second motion for reconsideration was filed
on 03 May 1994. Hence, the pairing Judge who issued the order on 06 May
1994 had no more legal competence to promulgate the same.[9]
Finally, the Court of Appeals upheld the assailed decision of the trial
court on the civil aspect of the case, to wit:
x x x, the institution of a criminal action carries with it the civil action for the
recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. There was
neither reservation nor waiver of the right to file the civil action separately
nor has one been instituted to the criminal action. Hence, the civil action for
the civil liability has been impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal
case before respondent Judge. This is the law on the matter. The proposition
submitted by petitioner that the court presided by respondent Judge had no
jurisdiction over the property because it is located in Bulacan - outside the
territorial jurisdiction of said court -does not hold water. Being a civil
liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, not the civil procedure rules which pertain to civil action
arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.[10]
23
 In the dispositive portion of its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals
declared:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition not being sufficient in substance is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and the case DISMISSED.[11]
In a resolution dated December 1, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.[12]
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS DULY
FURNISHED WITH COPY OF THE PETITIONERS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH RESPECT TO
THE DECISION ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 87-54773 (SIC) OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 53.
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA HAD
JURISDICTION TO RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE CIVIL
ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-57743 FOR
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT, INVOLVING A
PROPERTY LOCATED IN BULACAN.
3. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE
PROCESS WHEN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, BRANCH 53, RENDERED DECISION ON THE
CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-57743.[13]
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
When the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but is adjudged
civilly liable, his motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect must be
served not only on the prosecution, also on the offended party if the latter is
not represented by a private counsel. Moreover, if the trial court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the accused, and the crime was
committed within its territorial jurisdiction, it necessarily exercises
jurisdiction over all matters that the law requires the court to resolve. This
includes the power to order the restitution to the offended party of real
property located in another province.
Absence of Proof of Service
The first issue is whether petitioners motion for reconsideration dated
February 7, 1994 complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 6,
Rule 15 on proof of service. Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals
erred in sustaining the trial courts finding that the City Prosecutor was not
duly and timely furnished with petitioners motion for reconsideration of
February 7, 1994.
Petitioner asserts that both copies of the motion for reconsideration were
sent to the trial court and the City Prosecutor by registered mail on February
10, 1994. Petitioner relies on jurisprudence that the date of mailing is the date
of filing, arguing that the date of mailing of both motions was on February
10, 1994. Petitioner maintains that the motion was properly filed within the
15-day period, citing the registry return card which shows actual receipt on
February 22, 1994 by the City Prosecutor of a copy of the motion.
The Court of Appeals, noting that petitioner received a copy of the
decision on January 28, 1994, stated that petitioner had until February 12,
1994 to appeal the decision or file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals ruled that petitioner, by filing a motion for reconsideration without
any proof of service, merely filed a scrap of paper and not a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the reglementary period of petitioner to appeal
continued to run and lapsed after the 15-day period, making the trial courts
decision final and executory.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner patently failed to
comply with the mandatory requirements on proof of service insofar as the
public prosecutor is concerned. The Court has stressed time and again that
non-compliance with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 is a fatal defect. The
24
well-settled rule is that a motion which fails to comply with Sections 4, 5,
and 6 of Rule 15 is a useless piece of paper. If filed, such motion is not
entitled to judicial cognizance and does not stop the running of the
reglementary period for filing the requisite pleading.[14]
Section 6 of Rule 15 reads:
SEC. 6. - Proof of service to be filed with motions. No motion shall be acted
upon by the court, without proof of service of the notice
thereof.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
From the language of the rule, proof of service is mandatory. Without
such proof of service to the adverse party, a motion is nothing but an empty
formality deserving no judicial cognizance.
Section 13 of Rule 13 further requires that:
SEC. 13. Proof of Service. x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof
shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing
office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by
the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified
or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the
addressee.[16] (Emphasis supplied)
If service is by registered mail, proof of service consists of the affidavit of
the person mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended
to the motion. Absent one or the other, or worse both, there is no proof of
service.
In the instant case, an examination of the record shows that petitioner
received a copy of the trial courts decision of January 17, 1994 on January
28, 1994. Within the reglementary period to appeal, petitioner filed on
February 10, 1994, by registered mail, a motion for reconsideration.
However, petitioner failed to attach both the affidavit and the registry receipt
to the motion for reconsideration as required by the Rules.
The defect of the motion is apparent on its face. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper as it did not contain the required
proof of service.
However, petitioner is contesting that part of the decision of the trial
court finding him civilly liable even as he is acquitted from the criminal
charge on reasonable doubt. This raises the issue of whether the public
prosecutor is the only proper party to be served with petitioners motion for
reconsideration. The present Rules do not require the accused to serve a copy
of his motion for reconsideration on the offended party who may not be
represented by a private counsel. The Rules require service only on the
public prosecutor if the offended party is not represented by a private
counsel.
A judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the
prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy. However, either the offended party or
the accused may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal
of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing
the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused.
The acquittal ends the work of the public prosecutor and the case is
terminated as far as he is concerned.
The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the
offended party and the accused. Thus, any appeal or motion for
reconsideration of the civil aspect of a decision in a criminal case must be
served on the other real party in interest. If the offended party appeals or
moves for reconsideration, the accused is necessarily served a copy of the
pleading through his counsel.
If the accused appeals or moves for reconsideration, a lacuna arises if
the offended party is not represented by a private counsel. In such a situation,
under the present Rules only the public prosecutor is served the notice of
appeal or a copy of the motion for reconsideration. To fill in this lacuna in
the present Rules, we require that henceforth if the accused appeals or moves
for reconsideration, he should serve a copy of his pleading on the offended
party himself if the latter is not represented by a private counsel. This is in
addition to service on the public prosecutor who is the counsel of record of
the State.
In the instant case, the Court notes that petitioner did not serve a copy of
her motion for reconsideration on the offended party who was not
represented by a private counsel in the trial court. In the interest of justice,
and considering that the present Rules are silent on the matter, it is only fair
to give petitioner a period of five days from receipt of this decision within
which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended
party.
25
Trial courts jurisdiction over the civil aspect. The action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the
criminal action unless reserved by the offended party.[19] In the instant case,
the offended party did not reserve the civil action and the civil action was
Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the deemed instituted in the criminal action. Although the trial court acquitted
trial court had jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the petitioner of the crime charged, the acquittal, grounded on reasonable doubt,
criminal case. Petitioner asserts that the Manila trial court had no jurisdiction did not extinguish the civil liability.[20] Thus, the Manila trial court had
over the parcel of land in Bulacan which is outside the trial courts territorial jurisdiction to decide the civil aspect of the instant case - ordering restitution
jurisdiction. even if the parcel of land is located in Bulacan.
In upholding the trial courts jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals held: Consequently, while we find no reversible error in the decision of the
Court of Appeals as to proof of service and the trial courts jurisdiction on the
Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is civil aspect, we remand this case for further proceedings in the interest of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the civil procedure rules which pertain justice.
to civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.[17]
WHEREFORE, petitioner is given five (5) days from receipt of this
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals. decision within which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on
the offended party. Let this case be remanded to the trial court for further
Petitioner asserts that the location of the subject property outside the proceedings.
courts territorial jurisdiction deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over the
civil aspect of the criminal case. This argument is contrary to the law and the SO ORDERED.
rules. Puno, (Chairman), and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
There are three important requisites which must be present before a Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.
court can acquire criminal jurisdiction. First, the court must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the
territory where the offense was committed. Third, the court must have
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.[18] In the instant case, the trial
court had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has conferred on the
court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa through
falsification of a public document. The trial court also had jurisdiction over
the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial
jurisdiction. The trial court also acquired jurisdiction over the person of
accused-petitioner because she voluntarily submitted to the courts authority.
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial
jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
the law requires the court to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case is
the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime. Article 100 of the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
Revised Penal Code provides that [E]very person criminally liable for a vs.
felony is also civilly liable. Article 104 of the same Code states that civil HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
liability x x x includes restitution.

26
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Resolution1 of the Third Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2,
2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein respondent for
alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019),
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's
Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
which nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, through
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to
Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation
and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a
certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019.
Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman
and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC
Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
found probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation
of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable
cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died
prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged
before the SB as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in
relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with
accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine
International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after
the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to
Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially
amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the
NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718
(BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as
the assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event
of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to
Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial
to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government
of the Republic of the Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to
show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private
person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is
already deceased, and not an accused in this case.5
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has
already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his
voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he
posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive
jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he
was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed
against him on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not
constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the
show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the
deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to
have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated
by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
27
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of
which read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22,
2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a
private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already
deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the
Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.9
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN
GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN
RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF
RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE
HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN,
IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND
DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the
public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when
acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found
guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt
practices act or which may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as
enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving
herein private respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether
herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in
violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he
was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is
no public officer who was charged in the Information and, as such,
prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
28
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any
public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A.
3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between
them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already
expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his
criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the
basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated
differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no
public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict
Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A.
3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be
alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however,
does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together
with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may
no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer
has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment
for conspiracy.15 If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done
by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act
of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor.16 This means that
everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or
furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or
written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is
alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial.17 The death of one of two or
more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or
survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot
conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more
persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of
conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not
remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found
guilty of the offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the
Information filed against respondent, which is deemed hypothetically
admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired with
Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability
incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the
State and the legislative intent to repress "acts of public officers and private
persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be
frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a
private person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-
Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v.
Peralta21 as to the nature of and the principles governing conspiracy, as
construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally,
conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty
therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of conspiracy known
to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An
agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of
morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in
furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not
outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is
committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy
assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the
perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this
Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of
conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a
penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a
crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together
with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the
consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators.
29
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are
liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their
respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes
perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law
the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound
principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal
object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding
severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes
to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though
performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable
for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to
commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in
furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective
liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this
Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each
(conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and inseparable
relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which
they all acted by common agreement x x x. The crime must therefore in view
of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the x x x
accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they
are all equally responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and
confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of
the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court
shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of
course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he
could be drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved
that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the latter
were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and
execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of
any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a
separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once
conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the
common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of collective criminal
liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted
action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent
display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal
enterprise they must be held solidarily liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of
conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of
conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the
allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left ventilated before the
trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or
disprove its presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his Urgent
Motion to Resolve25 that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before
the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement
(Side Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject
of the present case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091.
Here, the SB, through a Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the
Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person of
respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court
denied the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB. This
Resolution became final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent
now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied
in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this
Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional
liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation26 in Criminal Case
No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private
respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests
the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act
of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is
tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
30
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by
virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of
his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the
courts jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he
gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the
merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel.
John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either
expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed
to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not
to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to
have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting
to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and
separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any
other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over
the person."
Verily, petitioners participation in the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent
courts exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny
said courts jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to
question the jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail
and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an
Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case
involves a contract entered into by public officers representing the
government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019
committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended
by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the
instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both
respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried
jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter,
this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it
does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the
person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would
mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on
the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one
of the alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are
mere incidents in the main case and the main case has already been pending
for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional Trial
Court would further delay the resolution of the main case and it would, by no
means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition
of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith
DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of
Criminal Case No. 28090.
SO ORDERED.
31
 further proceeding with the case. Petitioner invokes his constitutional right to
due process, a speedy trial, and a speedy determination of his cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. Further, he prays for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction enjoining respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) from further
enforcing and/or implementing its order dated February 20, 1995 which bans
petitioner from leaving the country except upon prior approval by said
court.[1]
Criminal Case No. 22018 is an offshoot of a complaint filed on January
12, 1990, by the Office of the Solicitor General before the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), docketed as I.S. No. 74, against
the former Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) and the
former members of the PCA Governing Board, petitioner among them, for
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as amended. In said complaint, the respondents were charged for having
conspired and confederated together and taking undue advantage of their
public positions and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections
or relationship with the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former
First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos without authority granted a donation
in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED), a private entity, using PCA
special fund, thereby giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits, advantage and
preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross
inexcusable negligence to the grave (sic) and prejudice of the Filipino people
and to the Republic of the Philippines.[2]
[G.R. No. 134307. December 21, 1998] Subsequently, however, this Court ruled that all proceedings in the
preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG were null and void and the
PCGG was directed to transmit the complaints and records of the case to the
Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.[3]
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., petitioner vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
(FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators
PHILIPPINES, respondents. recommended the filing of an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against herein petitioner and five other
DECISION respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.: As set out in the Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
subsequently, the following relevant incidents took place:
This petition for prohibition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeks to dismiss Criminal Case No. 22018 entitled People of the The above Resolution dated June 2, 1992 was referred by Assistant
Philippines vs. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al., now pending before Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. to the Office of the Special
respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division), and to prohibit said court from
32
Prosecutor for review and if warranted, for the preparation of the criminal
information.
In a Memorandum dated July 15, 1992 the Office of the Special Prosecutor
affirmed the recommendation as contained in the Resolution dated June 2,
1992.
However, on August 19, 1992 then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez
ordered the panel of investigators to discuss the merits of the prejudicial
question posed by respondent Lobregat.
In a Memorandum dated November 18, 1992, the panel of investigators
found that Civil Case No. 0033 does not pose a prejudicial question which
will warrant the suspension of the filing of the criminal case.
The aforesaid Memorandum was received by Assistant Ombudsman
Abelardo L. Aportadera on December 1, 1992 who submitted his comment
thereto on December 16, 1992 to then Ombudsman Vasquez.
On December 23, 1992, then Ombudsman Vasquez ordered the panel of
investigators to go to the specifics and not the general averments on issue of
prejudicial question.
In a Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 the panel of investigators
recommended that the motion to suspend proceedings be granted.
On December 3, 1993 then Ombudsman Vasquez referred for comment to
the Office of the Special Prosecutor the Memorandum dated December 1,
1993 of the panel of investigators on the issue of the existence of prejudicial
question.
In a Memorandum dated January 16, 1995, Special Prosecution Officer
Daniel B. Jovacon, Jr. resolved that no prejudicial question exists to warrant
the suspension of the criminal proceedings which recommendation was
approved by then Ombudsman Vasquez on January 26, 1995. The
Information, together with the case record of OMB-0-90-2806, was
forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman on February 10, 1995.
On February 16, 1995 Criminal Case No. 22018 was filed with the
Sandiganbayan and thereafter raffled to the First Division.
On February 17, 1995, an order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by the
respondent Sandiganbayan.
On February 19, 1995 petitioner filed with respondent court an Opposition to
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with Motion For Leave To File Motion For
Reconsideration of Ombudsman Resolutions. In his Opposition, petitioner
alleged that since the only documents attached to the Information and
submitted to respondent Sandiganbayan were the Resolution dated June 2,
1992 of the panel of investigators and the Memorandum dated January 16,
1995 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, the same were not adequate for
the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest by
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, petitioner claims the respondent
Sandiganbayan should recall the warrant of arrest already issued or desist
from issuing a warrant of arrest. Petitioner, avers, furthermore that the filing
of the Information was premature considering that he was not furnished a
copy of the Ombudsmans Resolution in violation of Section 27 of R.A. No.
6770 and prays that he be given leave to file a motion for reconsideration of
the Ombudsmans Resolution dated June 2, 1992 and the Office of the Special
Prosecutors Memorandum dated January 16, 1995.
On February 22, 1995, petitioner posted bail. On the same day he likewise
filed, through counsel, a Manifestation stating that he was posting bail
without prejudice to the Opposition To Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with
Motion For Leave To File a Motion For Reconsideration of the Ombudsmans
Resolution which he filed.
In a Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan
barred petitioner from leaving the country except upon approval of the court.
In an Order dated February 22, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan gave
petitioner and the other accused twenty (20) days to file their respective
motions for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans Resolution with the Office
of the Ombudsman. PCGG was likewise given a similar period within which
to file its comment to the motions for reconsideration. Furthermore, the
respondent Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to supplement or amplify his
existing motion on the issue of the propriety of the issuance of an Order of
Arrest based merely on the resolution of the Ombudsman in support of the
filing of the Information, among others.
On March 9, 1995, petitioner filed a Memorandum in Amplification of
Opposition To Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.
33
In a Resolution dated March 14, 1995, petitioner was granted additional
fifteen (15) days or until March 29, 1995 within which to file his motion for
reconsideration with the Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration on March 28, 1995.
In a Resolution dated April 3, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan denied
petitioners motion seeking the recall of the issuance of the warrant for his
arrest.
On April 7, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution dated April 3, 1995 of the respondent Sandiganbayan.
On May 25, 1995, petitioner was conditionally arraigned pleading not guilty
to the Information. The arraignment was undertaken solely to accommodate
the petitioner in his request to travel pending the determination of probable
cause against him at the reinvestigation stage. The conditional arraignment is
subject to the condition that if petitioner is exonerated at the preliminary
investigation, the arraignment is set aside. On the other hand, should there be
cause against the petitioner either as already charged or a separate charge
which might be related to the case pending, the arraignment will not serve as
basis for the invocation of the right against double jeopardy.
In the meantime, in a Memorandum dated October 22, 1995, Special
Prosecution Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil found no probable cause to
warrant the filing against petitioner and the other accused in Criminal Case
No. 22018 and recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation
for dismissal was approved by the Honorable Ombudsman on November 15,
1996.
On December 6, 1996, Special Prosecutor Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil
filed a Manifestation attaching a copy of the Memorandum dated October 22,
1995 with the respondent Sandiganbayan for its consideration.
On December 13, 1996 petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To Dismiss
alleging that with the reversal of the earlier findings of the Ombudsman of
probable cause, there was therefore nothing on record before the respondent
Sandiganbayan which would warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest and
the assumption of jurisdiction over the instant case.
On December 23, 1996 the Office of the Solicitor General, in representation
of the PCGG, filed with the Office of the Special Prosecutor a motion for
reconsideration of the Memorandum dated October 22, 1996 recommending
the dismissal of the case against petitioner and the other accused in Criminal
Case No. 22018.
In an Order dated January 6, 1997, Special Prosecution Officer Victorio U.
Tabanguil merely noted the motion for reconsideration dated December 23,
1996 of the Office of the Solicitor General.
On January 13, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion To Strike Out Alternatively,
Opposition To Complainants Motion For Reconsideration dated December
23, 1996 alleging that the motion was filed out of time.
In an Order dated January 9, 1997, the respondent Sandiganbayan ordered
the prosecution to justify the relationship that may be established with
respect to the COCOFED on one hand and the Philippine Coconut Authority
on the other, as a basis for justifying the position of the prosecution in this
case. Furthermore, upon information provided by Prosecutor Tabanguil that
the Office of the Solicitor General has sought a reconsideration on the desire
of the prosecution to withdraw the information, the Office of the Solicitor
General was given fifteen (15) days to submit its comment to the Motion to
Withdraw Information. The petitioner and the other accused were given the
same period to reply to the comment if they so desire. After which the matter
will be deemed submitted for resolution.
On January 17, 1997, the prosecution filed its compliance to the Order dated
January 9, 1997. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General filed
its comment on January 24, 1997.
In an Order dated February 4, 1997, the respondent Sandiganbayan ordered
the PCGG lawyers to present themselves before the respondent court and
respond to the claim of the OSG that the exhibits necessary are with the
PCGG so that the Republic might effectively substantiate its position that
probable cause exists. Furthermore, it is as much the function of the court to
determine the existence of probable cause and the propriety of the
withdrawal of the Information to be assured that the evidence for the
complainant has been properly presented or the accused is properly protected
at preliminary investigation.
34
In an Order dated February 17, 1997, the respondent Sandiganbayan, with the
agreement of the parties, gave the Office of the Solicitor General ten (10)
days within which to submit some form of cataloging and explanation of the
documents on record to the prosecution. On the other hand, the prosecution
was given fifteen (15) days from receipt of the submission within which to
review the matter once more and to respond thereat.
On June 13, 1997, the PCGG filed its Entry of Appearance dated June 3,
1997.
On June 19, 1997, petitioner filed a Second Motion To Resolve the Urgent
Motion To Dismiss dated December 12, 1996.
On July 3, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Out (Re: PCGGs Entry of
Appearance) dated June 30, 1997.
On July 16, 1997, the PCGG filed an Opposition to the Motion To Strike Out
(Re: PCGGs Entry of Appearance).
On July 18, 1997, petitioner filed a Reply to the Opposition to Strike Out.
On July 31, 1997, the PCGG filed a Rejoinder to the Reply of petitioner.
On January 23, 1998, petitioner filed a Third Motion To Resolve the Urgent
Motion To Dismiss dated December 12, 1996.
In an Order dated January 26, 1998, respondent Sandiganbayan duly noted
petitioners Motion to Dismiss. [4]
Hence, the present petition.
On July 22, 1998, the Court issued a resolution requiring respondents to
file their respective comments to the petition.[5]
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed a motion reiterating his application
for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with
urgent motion for hearing thereon[6] citing the urgency of lifting the travel
restriction on him in view of the various problems involving the investments
of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) abroad which must be immediately
attended to by petitioner as duly elected Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of SMC. Petitioner asserts that quite often, it becomes necessary for
him to attend meetings and conferences abroad where attendance must be
confirmed promptly.Considering that he must first secure the permission of
respondent Sandiganbayan before he can travel abroad and abide by the
conditions imposed by said court upon the grant of such permission,
petitioner contends that it becomes impossible for him to immediately attend
to the aforecited tasks.
On September 2, 1998, the Court noted the respective comments to the
petition filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Solicitor
General and required petitioner to file a consolidated reply within ten (10)
days from notice.[7]
On September 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Second Motion Reiterating
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with Urgent Motion for Hearing,[8] arguing among others that
the continued maintenance of the hold-departure order against him has
deleterious consequence not only on him personally but also on San Miguel
Corporation, a publicly listed stock company, of which he is now Chairman
and Executive Officer.[9]
On September 7, 1998, the Court resolved to defer action on the
aforementioned second motion reiterating the application for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction until the
filing of petitioners Consolidated Reply and required the Sandiganbayan to
file its own Comment on the petition in view of the Comment filed by the
Office of the Special Prosecutor divergent from the position taken by
respondent Sandiganbayan.[10]
On September 10, 1998, petitioner filed a Consolidated Reply[11] and
prayed that his Second Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Urgent Motion for hearing dated
September 2, 1998 be now acted upon.
On September 17, 1998, respondent Sandiganbayan filed a motion for
extension of time to file its comment to the petition. Subsequently, petitioner
filed his Third Motion Reiterating Application for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Urgent Motion for
Hearing[12] in view of the urgency of lifting the ban on foreign travel imposed
on him by respondent Sandiganbayan.
After respondent Sandiganbayan filed its comment on October 5, 1998,
the Court in its Resolution dated October 7, 1998, noted the aforesaid
comment and resolved to set the case for oral argument on October 21,
1998.[13]
35
 During the oral argument, the Court suggested that the parties take up in
their arguments the following issues:
(1) whether the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is
null and void, or should now be lifted if initially valid;
(2) whether petitioners basic rights to due process, speedy trial and
speedy disposition of the case have been violated as to
warrant dismissal of Criminal Case No. 22018; and
(3) whether the ban on foreign travel imposed on petitioner per Order of
February 20, 1995 should be vacated to enable petitioner to
go abroad without prior permission of, and other restrictions
imposed by, the respondent Sandiganbayan.[14]
After hearing the arguments of the parties, the Court resolved to require
them to submit their respective memoranda on the related issues taken up on
the hearing including the merits of the case within twenty (20) days. The
motion of counsel for petitioner that the issue of lifting the ban on foreign
travel imposed on petitioner be resolved first, was held under advisement.[15]
On November 6, 1998, petitioner filed another Motion to Resolve
Petitioners Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction Enjoining Enforcement of Respondent
Sandiganbayans Order dated February 20, 1995 (Hold Departure Order) with
an alternative prayer to travel abroad within a period of six (6) months.[16]
In its Resolution dated November 9, 1998, the Court noted the aforesaid
motion and directed petitioner that in the meanwhile, he may address his
request for permission to travel abroad to the Sandiganbayan.[17]
On November 12, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Courts resolution dated November 9, 1998 and argued that:
xxxxxxxxx
(6) While the petitioner may indeed obtain some relief by addressing his
prayer for permission to travel abroad to the Sandiganbayan, to a large
extent, this defeats the purpose of the petition because petitioner has
precisely come to the Supreme Court to obtain relief from an oppressive
regime of authorization to travel abroad that the Order of the
Sandiganbayan of February 20, 1995 (Annex E, Petition) has
imposed. Significantly, not any of the respondents have opposed
petitioners application for the issuance of temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction or for permission to travel
abroad.[18]
On November 20, 1998, petitioner filed a Manifestation[19] in support of
his motion for reconsideration, setting forth the urgency of lifting the ban on
foreign travel imposed on him in view of the need to oversee the critical
stages in the international operations of SMC as its Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer.
On November 20, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation indicating that it is not interposing any objection to petitioners
prayer that he be allowed to travel abroad.
With the submission of the parties respective memoranda, the Court
now proceeds to resolve the petition.
As postulated during the oral argument, three main issues confront us in
this petition, to wit:
(1) whether the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is
null and void, or should now be lifted if initially valid;
(2) whether petitioners basic rights to due process, speedy trial and
speedy disposition of the case have been violated as to
warrant dismissal of Criminal Case No. 22018; and
(3) whether the ban on foreign travel imposed on petitioner per Order of
February 20, 1995 should be vacated to enable petitioner to
go abroad without prior permission of, and other restrictions
imposed by, the respondent Sandiganbayan.[20]
On the first issue, petitioner and the Office of the Special Prosecutor
both argue that the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is
null and void for lack of sufficient basis upon which it could have personally
determined the existence of probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest
against him. They contend that there was a violation of Section 2, Article III
of the Constitution because the Information in Criminal Case No. 22018 was
accompanied only by the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the Panel of Graft
Investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman recommending the filing of
the information and the Memorandum dated January 16, 1995 of the Office
36
of the Special Prosecutor denying the existence of a prejudicial question
which will warrant the suspension of the filing of the criminal case. Their
argument is principally anchored on the pronouncements made in the case
of Ho vs. People[21] that reliance on the prosecutors report alone is not
sufficient in determining whether there is probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Consequent to the nullity of the warrant of arrest, petitioner
further argues that the Sandiganbayan has not acquired jurisdiction over him
and is without power to exercise the same.
However, the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Office of the
Solicitor General maintain that any infirmity that may have attended the
issuance of the warrant of arrest was cured by petitioners voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the respondent Sandiganbayan when
petitioner posted bail and subsequently invoked the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by filing numerous motions wherein he sought affirmative
reliefs.
Now, pertinent to the issue at hand is the second clause of Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that:
Sec. 2. x x x no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon a
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
In Ho vs. People,[22] the Court had the opportunity to elucidate on the
matter of determining of probable cause to merit the issuance of a warrant of
arrest:
First, x x x the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a
purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there
is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The
judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus,
even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or
evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on
the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the
prosecutors report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to
charge the accused of an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge
must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other
than the prosecutors bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own
findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of a probable cause to issue an
arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently
the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less
than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease
the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to
the latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable
cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable
His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to
issue a warrant of arrest.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during
the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We
do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the
complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of
ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge
must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits,
counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of
stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or,
at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the
existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely
on the prosecutors recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this
case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in
the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his
report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands
the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants
of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden
duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating
officer.[23]
As alleged by petitioner, in the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan had two
pieces of documents to consider when it resolved to issue the warrant of
arrest against the accused: (1) the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the Panel
of Investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman recommending the filing of
the Information and (2) the Memorandum dated June 16, 1995 of the Office
of the Special Prosecutor denying the existence of a prejudicial question
37
which will warrant the suspension of the criminal case. The Sandiganbayan
had nothing more to support its resolution.
In Roberts vs. Court of Appeals, [24] we struck down as invalid an order
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest which were based only on the
information, amended information and Joint Resolution, without the benefit
of the records or evidence supporting the prosecutors finding of probable
cause. And in Ho vs. People,[25] we declared that respondent palpably
committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso factoissuing the challenged
warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutors findings and
recommendation, and without determining on its own the issue of probable
cause based on evidence other than such bare findings and
recommendation.[26]
Similarly, we are now constrained to rule that herein respondent court
failed to abide by the constitutional mandate of personally determining the
existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. For the two
cited documents were the product of somebody elses determination,
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by the
Sandiganbayan. Hence, the warrant of arrest issued by respondent court on
February 17, 1995 against herein petitioner is palpably invalid.
Consequent to the nullity of the warrant of arrest, the crucial issue now
posed is whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan could still exercise
jurisdiction over the petitioner and proceed with the trial of the case.
As already adverted to, the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the
Office of the Solicitor General are in agreement, that whatever infirmity
might have attended the issuance of the warrant of arrest against petitioner, it
was cured by petitioners subsequent act of voluntarily submitting to
respondent courts jurisdiction by posting his bail and filing the following
pleadings which sought affirmative relief, to wit: (1) Opposition to Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest with Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration; (2) Motion for extension of time to file Motion for
Reconsideration; (3) seven Motions to Travel Abroad and two Motions for
Extension of time to stay abroad.[27] Hence, they contend that respondent
courts jurisdiction over petitioner has remained in effect.
Petitioner objects to this contention, and asserts that since the warrant of
arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void, it never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner; as a consequence, it never
acquired jurisdiction to take of the offense charged and to issue any order
adverse to the rights of petitioner, including an Order restricting his right to
travel.[28] According to petitioner, the submission of both the Office of the
Special Prosecutor and the Office of the Solicitor General is not only absurd
but also oppressive and offensive to the Bill of Rights since it would mean
that to preserve his right against the issuance of a warrant of arrest without
probable cause determined in accordance with Sec. 2, Article III of the
Constitution, petitioner should have allowed himself to be incarcerated or
imprisoned from the time the warrant of arrest was issued on February 20,
1995 up to the present, or for more than three (3) years now, and continue to
be imprisoned until the Supreme Court decides to declare the arrest void.[29]
On this score, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by
the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of
the court.[30] Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by
virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of
his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the
courts jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives
bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the
merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel.
John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxxxxxxx
Conceding again that the warrant issued in this case was void for the reason
that no probable cause was found by the court before issuing it, the defendant
waived all his rights to object to the same by appearing and giving bond.[31]
By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption from the
effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court. While
petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has been
negated when he himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through
the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs.
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA[32]:
[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either
expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed
to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.If he so wishes not
to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of
38
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to
have submitted himself to that jurisdiction.
Moreover, [w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the
sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance
is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court
jurisdiction over the person.[33]
Verily, petitioners participation in the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent
courts exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny
said courts jurisdiction over him. Nor can we ignore the long line of
precedents declaring that where the accused had posted bail, as required, to
obtain his provisional liberty, it becomes futile to assail the validity of the
issuance of the warrants of arrest.[34]
As to petitioners contention that he should have just allowed himself to
stay in jail pending the resolution of his opposition to the issuance of the
warrant of arrest against him, if only to avoid waiving his right to question
the jurisdiction of respondent court, the Office of the Special Prosecutor has
pointed out that petitioner is not without a remedy. Petitioner could have
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, rather than actively participate in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. And as exemplified by the case of
Allado vs. Diokno,[35]this remedy has already proved to be effective.
Against the continued exercise of jurisdiction by respondent
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 22018, petitioner also invokes the
Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor dated October 22, 1995
recommending the dismissal of the case against him due to the absence of
probable cause, which was later on approved by the Ombudsman on
November 15, 1996. Citing the case of Torralba vs.
Sandiganbayan,[36] petitioner argues that this Memorandum is an integral part
of the preliminary investigation and should take precedence notwithstanding
the fact that the same was made after the filing of the Information before the
Sandiganbayan, for to deny any efficacy to the finding of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor would negate the right of the petitioner to a preliminary
investigation.
The well-entrenched rule however, as laid down by the case of Crespo
vs. Mogul[37] is that:
x x x once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the
case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and
control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in
Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best
and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the records of the investigation.
Nevertheless, petitioner claims exception to this rule by making this
distinction:
b. The preliminary investigation in Crespo vs. Mogul, supra, was conducted
by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and, following established procedure
with respect to such preliminary investigations, the preliminary investigation
conducted by the fiscal, in the language of Crespo, is terminated upon the
filing of the information in the proper court (at p. 470). On the other hand,
the instant case involves a preliminary investigation conducted by the Office
of the Special Prosecutor pursuant to Sec. 11[4](a), and under Sec. 27 of R.A.
No. 6770. In preliminary investigations conducted by the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, the respondent has the right to file a motion for
reconsideration of any resolution within five (5) days from receipt of written
notice, and pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7 (Rules
of Procedure of the Ombudsman), the respondent has the right to file a
motion for reconsideration within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
Resolution of the Ombudsman. Until the motion for reconsideration is
resolved, preliminary investigation is not terminated notwithstanding filing
of information in court. In the instant case, no copy of the Resolution of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor which brought about the filing of the
Information, was served on the petitioner; consequently, when the
Information was filed, the preliminary investigation had not yet been
terminated. It follows that the Resolution of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (approved by the Ombudsman) resolving in petitioners favor the
Motion for Reconsideration he had filed, now finding no probable cause, was
39
an integral part of the preliminary investigation, not subject to review by the
Sandiganbayan (see Torralba vs. Sandiganbayan, 230 SCRA 33 [1994]).[38]
Petitioners reliance on Torralba vs. Sandiganbayan is not, in our view,
persuasive. In that case the petitioners were not given any chance at all to
seek reconsideration from the Ombudsmans final resolution because they
were not furnished with a copy of the final resolution of the Ombudsman that
could have enabled them to file a motion for reconsideration. As a result, the
Court declared that petitioners were not only effectively denied the
opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans final
resolution but also deprived of their right to a full preliminary investigation
preparatory to the filing of the information against them.[39]
In the case at bar, however, notwithstanding the filing of the Information
before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was able to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans Resolution with leave of court, and in
fact his two motions for extensions to file the same were granted by the
respondent court.[40] This eventually paved the way for the filing of
subsequent Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, which was
later on approved by the Ombudsman, recommending the dismissal of the
case against him. However, since the Information has already been filed
before the Sandiganbayan, the resolution of the aforesaid recommendation
now lies within the jurisdiction and discretion of respondent
court. Parenthetically, in the Torralba case, we did not altogether deprive the
Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction to proceed with the case, despite the defect
in the conduct of the preliminary investigation, since we declared that:
The incomplete preliminary investigation in this case, however, does not
warrant the quashal of the information, nor should it obliterate the
proceedings already had. Neither is the courts jurisdiction nor validity of an
information adversely affected by deficiencies in the preliminary
investigation. Instead, the Sandiganbayan is to hold in abeyance any further
proceedings therein and to remand the case to the Office of the Ombudsman
for the completion of the preliminary investigation, the outcome of which
shall then be indorsed to Sandiganbayan for its appropriate
action.[41] (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, consistent with the rule in Crespo vs. Mogul, after the filing of
the information in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the
Court.[42]
Proceeding now to the second issue, petitioner maintains that the long
delay that characterized the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 22018 before
respondent Sandiganbayan has resulted in the violation of his Constitutional
right to a speedy trial and a speedy determination of his case. Thus, petitioner
submits that:
4.09. It has been more than three (3) years since the Information in Criminal
Case No. 22018 was filed with respondent Sandiganbayan. More than one
and a half (1/2) years have elapsed since the Office of the Special Prosecutor
filed its Manifestation seeking the dismissal of the case. Based on the Office
of the Special Prosecutors finding of the absence of probable cause,
petitioner filed on December 13, 1996, an Urgent Motion To Dismiss. Three
times, on March 24, 1997, June 18, 1997 and January 23, 1998, petitioner has
sought resolution of his Urgent Motion To Dismiss. These notwithstanding,
the dismissal of the information as to petitioner remains pending and
petitioner continues to be under criminal indictment -- constrained to suffer
without justification in law and the Constitution, the humiliation, the
restraints to liberty and the tormenting anxieties of an accused.[43]
Respondents concede that there has indeed been some delay but deny
that it amounted to a violation of petitioners right of speedy disposition of his
case. They cite as justification the reorganization of the Sandiganbayan on
September 23, 1997 wherein it was reconstituted into five (5)
Divisions;[44] (2) the filing of motions by petitioner seeking affirmative reliefs
from the Sandiganbayan; (3) the failure of petitioner himself to invoke his
right to speedy resolution of his pending motions prior to the filing of this
petition;[45] (4) the heavy caseload of respondent court.[46]
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial,
is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays.[47] It should be emphasized that the factors
that must be taken into account in determining whether this constitutional
rights has been violated are as follows: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reason
for such delay and (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.[48]
As in previous occasions, the Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact
that structural reorganizations[49] and the ever increasing case load of courts
have adversely affected the speedy disposition of the cases pending before
them.
40
 In the instant case, however, the Court finds that delay concerns the
resolution of petitioners Urgent Motion to Dismiss, which is an offshoot of
the Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommending the
dismissal of the case. Such delay is now far from excusable. Petitioners
Motion to Dismiss has been filed as early as December 13, 1996 and, on
three occasions, petitioner has moved for the urgent resolution of this
motion.[50] What further militates against further delay in resolving this case
is the fact that the government prosecutors themselves concede that this case
is of paramount importance, involving as it does the recovery of the ill-gotten
wealth or government funds, unlawfully used or misused by persons close or
perceived to be close to the Marcoses.[51] Respondent court declared in its
Order dated February 17, 1997 that the matter would be deemed submitted
for resolution upon compliance with the Office of the Special Prosecutor as
to whether there is indeed no probable cause against petitioner,[52] which
compliance was submitted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor on March
17, 1997.[53] Under these circumstances, the Court does find the period of
more than one year that elapsed for resolving petitioners motion to dismiss
quite long, considering that all pertinent pleadings required by the
Sandiganbayan were already submitted.
Even if petitioner himself might have contributed to said delay, as
contended by respondents, in our view it is best that the case be resolved on
the merits by the Sandiganbayan with due regard to petitioners right to due
process, speedy trial and speedy disposition of the case against him and his
co-accused.
Finally, with respect to the issue of whether or not the ban on foreign
travel should be continued, as imposed on petitioner by respondent
Sandiganbayan per its Order dated February 20, 1995 with accompanying
restrictions in effect, we resolve to rule in the negative. The travel ban should
be lifted, considering all the circumstances now prevailing.
The rule laid down by this Court is that a person facing a criminal
indictment and provisionally released on bail does not have an unrestricted
right to travel, the reason being that a persons right to travel is subject to the
usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of
justice.[54] But, significantly, the Office of the Solicitor General in its
Manifestation dated November 20, 1998 indicated that it is not interposing
any objection to petitioners prayer that he be allowed to travel abroad based
on the following considerations:
x x x (1) that it is well within the power of this Court to suspend its own
rules, including the second paragraph, Section 23, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court; (2) that it has been shown in the past that the petitioner has
always returned to the Philippines after the expiration of the period of
his allowed travel; and (3) that petitioner, now Chairman of the Board
of San Miguel Corporation, may be constrained to leave the country for
business purposes, more often than he had done in the past, x x x.[55]
It however recommended that the period of travel should be reduced to
three (3) months instead of six (6) months as requested by petitioner and that
the latter should be required to post an additional cash bond equivalent to the
present cash bond posted by him.[56]
Moreover, prescinding from our initial declaration that the issuance of
warrant of arrest against petitioner by respondent court is invalid, it now
becomes necessary that there be strong and compelling reasons to justify the
continued restriction on petitioners right to travel abroad. Admittedly, all of
petitioners previous requests to travel abroad has been granted and that, as
confirmed by the Office of the Solicitor General, that petitioner has always
returned to the Philippines and complied with the restrictions imposed on
him. The necessity of further denying petitioners right to travel abroad, with
attendant restrictions, appears less than clear. The risk of flight is further
diminished in view of petitioners recent reinstatement as Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of San Miguel Corporation, though he has now more
justification to travel so as to oversee the entire operations of that
company. In this regard, it has to be conceded that his assumption of such
vital post has come at a time when the current economic crisis has adversely
affected the international operations of many companies, including San
Miguel. The need to travel abroad frequently on the part of petitioner, to
formulate and implement the necessary corporate strategies and decisions,
could not be forestalled. These considerations affecting the petitioners duties
to a publicly held company, militate against imposing further restrictions on
petitioners right to travel abroad.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS the petition
insofar as the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 22018 against the petitioner is
concerned. Respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) is hereby ordered to
proceed with the resolution of the pending motions and incidents in Criminal
Case No. 22018 with utmost dispatch. Meanwhile, the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division), dated February 20, 1995, imposing a ban on
petitioners travel abroad without its prior approval pending the resolution of
Criminal Case No. 22018 is, for the reasons heretofore advanced, hereby
41
LIFTED for a period of three (3) months counted from the finality of this
decision. Any similar request during the pendency of said case before the
Sandiganbayan shall be addressed to that court. WHEREFORE, finding public respondent
Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave abuse
No pronouncement as to costs. of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari,
SO ORDERED.
mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and
GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:
JOSE C. MIRANDA, G.R. No. 158763
ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, 1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17,
and ROMEO B. OCON, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint
Petitioners, Present: Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order
dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two
PANGANIBAN, C.J. (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public
Chairperson, respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having
CALLEJO, SR., and been issued with grave abuse of discretion
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,]
Promulgated: and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25,
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued
Respondent. March 31, 2006 by the then acting Presiding
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;

2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are

DECISION hereby ordered REINSTATED in the docket of
active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the
Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela;
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: and

3. Public respondent
Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the
of Court, assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals apprehension of private respondents
Jose Pempe Miranda, SPO3 Alberto
in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and
accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524.[2]
assailed decision reads as follows:

42
 The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows: Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against
petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding
in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and
bodies of Vicente Bauzon and ElizerTuliao, son of private SPO2 Maderal.
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete
Two informations for murder were filed against preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the
SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, warrants of arrest.
SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City. In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001,
Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire
RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the
counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State
arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein
on the ground of reasonable doubt. On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding
Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the
April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He
Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order
certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and
deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and
prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration
43
was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for
inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders
of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October
2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to
grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid
resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November
2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners.On 19
November 2001, this Court took note of respondents cash bond evidenced by
O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary
restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for
adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public
Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad deliberately and
willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001
the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for
murder. On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of
Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondents petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal
cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of
arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this
Court the following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals
gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of
Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001,
September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14,
2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-
3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the
Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding
Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an
accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit
his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
44
 With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals
gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of Criminal
Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active
Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of
Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public
respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein
petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket
of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial
court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the
public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein
petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having
become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion
to quash a warrant of
arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the
person of the
accused, nor custody of
law over the body of the
accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the
Court of Appeals ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not
submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction
over the person of the accused may be acquired either
through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or
through his voluntary appearance, such as when he
surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the
court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that
an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M.
Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-
764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be
placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly
act on his petition for judicial reliefs.[3]
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners
Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were
not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed
their Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate;
to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest.[4]
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in applications for
bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over
their person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the
warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already
acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the
adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of
Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the
court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright
dismissal of the case even before the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized
under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary
45
 Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA
192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for
lack of probable cause without the accused having been
arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA
307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant
of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of
Justice. And in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA
102[5]), the Court ordered the case transferred from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the
dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.[6]
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already
acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our
pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v.
Vasquez[7]:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby
the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits
(such as by filing a motion to quash or other
pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts
jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail,
since the same is intended to obtain the provisional
liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be
posted before custody of the accused has been
acquired by the judicial authorities either by his
arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody
of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required
before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for
the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused.[8] Custody of the law is accomplished either
by arrest or voluntary surrender,[9] while jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.[10] One can be
under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant
files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand,
one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not
be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after
his trial has commenced.[11] Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint
on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding
him to become obedient to the will of the law.[12] Custody of the law is
literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited
to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr.,[13] cited by the Court of
Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is
the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the
law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the
custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A
person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court has no right to invoke the processes of that
court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained
the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had
jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering
the application for bail.[14]
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns
bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.[15] As we held in
46
the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court,
whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special
requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano
v. Pasicolan,[16] we held that [t]he purpose of bail is to secure ones release
and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, bail is the
security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody
of law. The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and
prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could
just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the
jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance
[17]
with the requirements therefor.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings
seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the
consequent submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is
in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the
jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance.These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds
for dismissal are included;[18] (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest.The first two are
consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence
of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the
submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to
quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he
files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he
invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction
over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an
accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither
jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person
invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first
submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule
applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding
this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The
following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted variousreliefs to
accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have
placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of
these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to
quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion
to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno,[19] on the prayer of the accused in a petition
for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued
a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing
the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from
further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the
records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[20] upon the accuseds Motion
to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of
Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for
Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent
47
 judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with
the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests
against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,[21] on the prayer of the
accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the
Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional
Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is
likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting
it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than
property rights,[23] demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty
must come before its taking and not after.

Quashing a warrant of
arrest based on a
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the subsequently filed petition
law in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of for review with the
Secretary of Justice and
arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the based on doubts
law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at engendered by the
political climate
large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense
constitutes grave abuse of
if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of discretion.
warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very
rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot- We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of
free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the
who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant
determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to
if he really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of
the case. probable cause due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the
Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, he dismissed the
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with
warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a
[22]
be enforced on any day and at any time of the day and night. Furthermore, temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the case.
the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the
determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt. After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner
Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of
Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of
48
arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad,
x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the
proceedings is but proper.[24]
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable
to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity
when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the
petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolution to
the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before
the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a
petition for the review of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash
the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,[25] we held that the petitioners therein cannot
assail as premature the filing of the information in court against them on the
ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the
DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of
arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature
on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the
warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence,
Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply
or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional proscription,
which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule
112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited
decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal
of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular
Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein
accused-movant, Jose Pempe Miranda.[26]
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the
Constitution as having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.[27]
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including
the supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his
determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused
his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for
the arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the face of the
order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of
probable cause was based on the certification, under oath, of
the fiscal and not on a separate determination personally
made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be
drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly showed
that it was based only on the fiscals certification.[28]
Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no such
indication that he relied solely on the prosecutors certification. The Joint
Order even indicated the contrary:
49
 the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was
prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine the existence
of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records given in exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information;
x x x.[29] and (4) it was given during the election period amidst a politically charged
scenario where Santiago City voters were pitted against each other along the
The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S.
accompanied by supporting documents, following the requirement Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the
under Lim, Sr. v. Felix[30] and People v. Inting.[31] The supporting documents other.[32]
are the following:
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo to disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon; It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor a witness is not within the province of the determination of probable
Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio; cause. As we held in Webb[33]:
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97- A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
160355; showing that more likely than not a crime has been
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable
2001 of Rodel Maderal; cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
8. Information dated 22 June 2001; guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegarv. United
of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon. States, while probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion, it requires less than evidence which would justify
x x x conviction. A finding of probable cause merely binds
over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on guilt.
the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and
Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part of said
should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary
section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, investigation is not a part of trial x x x.
Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the
following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the custody of
50
Dismissing a criminal case
on the basis of a decision
of this Court in another
case with different accused
constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other
things, that there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutors
resolution before the Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of
Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, Judge Anghad summarily
dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the
following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People
vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and
based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr.
Miranda the mastermind and with him and the other police
officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001
Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of
murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a narration of
falsehood and lies and that because of the decision acquitting
said officers who were likewise falsely linked by
said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is
now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful,
fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is
without probable value. This Court agrees with the defenses
views. Indeed, of what use is Maderals statements when the
Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions evidence presented
and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-
160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in
these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision
adverted to, the probative value of his statements is
practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the
accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying for the
summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of
the latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of the
Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886,
acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all
the evidence presented by the prosecution in that case.
Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed
against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.[34]
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist
our decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still
at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leao case was
presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a
crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different
accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more
pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leao was based on reasonable
doubt. We never ruled in Leao that the crime did not happen; we just found
that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since
the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which
interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners
in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused
in Leao furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliaos son, whereas
petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of
respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of
reasonable doubt in Leao, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made
untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is
without probable value.[35] On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our
decision in Leao, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually
51
points to the probability of the prosecutions version of the facts therein. Such the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the dispositions
probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause. on the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court
of Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissal of reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,[37] which issued the
warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the
the informations two days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a
proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of
bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further proceeding
nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of
with the case. The bond was filed the day after the informations were
the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghads order
dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of
date of the temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
the informations (days after this Courts resolve to issue a TRO against
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new
Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.
warrants of arrest based on a determination of probable cause, it would have
Nullification of a been legally permissible for them to do so. The records of the preliminary
proceeding necessarily investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals, and are also
carries with it the
available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to
reinstatement of the
orders set aside by the personally examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the
nullified proceeding. certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled
in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in
Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on
Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also
warrants of arrest.[36] According to the petitioners, it was an error for the overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on
Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
probable cause.
There is no double
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new jeopardy in the
reinstatement of a
warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of criminal case dismissed
arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuanis merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, before arraignment

52

In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases
No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued
therein had become final and executory. According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint
Order of Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT
ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private
respondent TuliaosPetition for Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court
of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the
assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by
Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14,
2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissed Criminal
Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the
list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of
Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity
of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.[38]
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of
Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case because
we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such
petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks beforethe 14
November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order,
however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion to
Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad deliberately
and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November
2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for
murder. On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of
Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliaos petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite
Public Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within
the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that
Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November
2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much
more serious than grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November
2001 Order on 15 November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of
our 12 November 2001Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we
resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliaos filing
of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond
on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing
as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are
cases of indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be
heard on the part of respondent,[39] the prayer to cite public respondent in
contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should
be construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November
2001 Order.
53
 4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before to report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within
arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be ten (10) days from said compliance; and
invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his 5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is
[40]
express motion that the case was dismissed. directed to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.
As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as 6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue
well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners
further proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of instances of Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and
abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the
on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
[41]
v. SPO1 Leao, by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523
and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003
the Constitution. is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18
December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of SO ORDERED.

Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases
No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional
Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,
G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner, v. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE
the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt
DECISION
hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to report to this Court
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the
compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these
Order1 dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
cases; Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition for certiorari filed
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to by Renato M. David (petitioner). Petitioner assailed the Order2 dated March
22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Socorro, Oriental Mindoro
raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer; denying his motion for redetermination of probable cause.
54
The factual antecedents:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen
by naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to
the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot
along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they
constructed a residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to
know that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of
the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease
Application3 (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application,
petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground
that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed
a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,4(R.A. 9225) as evidenced by
Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate General of
the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he
had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been
assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He
further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who
misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled land and they have
the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the
institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private respondents
family.
On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its
Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article
172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding
information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for
review he filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioners MLA. It
ruled that petitioners subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did
not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab
initio.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner
was denied by the DOJ which held that the presence of the elements of the
crime of falsification of public document suffices to warrant indictment of
the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or
intended to injure a third person in committing the act of
falsification.9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of Public
Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant
of arrest was issued against the petitioner.
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his
arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of Probable
Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the law relied upon by
petitioner, the said court denied the motion, holding that R.A. 9225 makes a
distinction between those who became foreign citizens during its effectivity,
and those who lost their Philippine citizenship before its enactment when the
governing law was Commonwealth Act No. 6311 (CA 63). Since the crime
for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been
committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a
Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and
for lack of merit, the motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing order
denying him relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and insisted that the
issue raised is purely legal. He argued that since his application had yet to
receive final evaluation and action by the DENR Region IV-B office in
Manila, it is academic to ask the citizenship of the applicant (petitioner) who
had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six months after he applied for lease of
public land. The MTC denied the motion for
reconsideration.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for
certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
55
MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an accused cannot
be a pre-condition for the re-determination of probable cause by the court
that issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011 Order
disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had
been naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A.
9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on account
of said naturalization.
In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the act of
falsification was already consummated as petitioner has not yet re-acquired
his Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent oath to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship will only affect his citizenship status and not his criminal act
which was long consummated prior to said oath of allegiance.
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition
for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the
lower court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is
not left without any remedy or recourse because he can proceed to trial where
he can make use of his claim to be a Filipino citizen as his defense to be
adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in case of conviction, to appeal such
conviction.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that
A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for
falsification, the lower court has disregarded the undisputed
fact that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that
by re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was
by legal fiction deemed not to have lost it at the time of his
naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was
said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.
B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal
residence in Canada and to surrender or allow himself to be
arrested under a warrant for his alleged false claim to
Philippine citizenship, the lower court has pre-empted the
right of petitioner through his wife and counsel to question
the validity of the said warrant of arrest against him before
the same is implemented, which is tantamount to a denial of
due process.18
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioners argument
regarding the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without merit. It is contended that
this Courts rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections19 and Altarejos v.
Commission on Elections20 on the retroactivity of ones re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship to the date of filing his application therefor cannot be
applied to the case of herein petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that such doctrine applies in the present situation, it will still not
work for petitioners cause for the simple reason that he had not alleged,
much less proved, that he had already applied for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship before he made the declaration in the Public Land Application
that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in falsification of public
document, it is not necessary that the idea of gain or intent to injure a third
person be present. As to petitioners defense of good faith, such remains to
be a defense which may be properly raised and proved in a full-blown trial.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the
Solicitor General opines that in seeking an affirmative relief from the MTC
when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause,
petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person to the said courts
jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC correctly
ruled that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
the petitioners motion after a judicious, thorough and personal evaluation of
the parties arguments contained in their respective pleadings, and the
evidence submitted before the court.
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted
for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land
Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship
under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC properly denied
petitioners motion for re-determination of probable cause on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused (petitioner).
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared the policy of the State
that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
56
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions
of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of
a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the
laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this
Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship, such is qualified by the phrase under the conditions of this
Act. Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-born
Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first
paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of
allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens
who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is
different, re-acquired for the first group, and retain for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Although the heading of Section 3 is Retention of Philippine Citizenship,
the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms re-acquire and
retain to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law
using both re-acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be
deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost
pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of
the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares,
R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law
which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual
citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and
retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship
despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of
allegiance under the new law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and
retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that interpretation of
the law which favors the accused is preferred because it is consistent with the
constitutional presumption of innocence, and in this case it becomes more
relevant when a seemingly difficult question of law is expected to have been
understood by the accused, who is a non-lawyer, at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense. He further cites the letter-reply dated
January 31, 201122 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to his query, stating
that his status as a natural-born Filipino will be governed by Section 2 of
R.A. 9225.
These contentions have no merit.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine
citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference
Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate
Bill No. 2130 held on August 18, 2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon was
responding to the query of Representative Exequiel
Javier:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section 3 of
the Senate version, Any provision of law on the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
shall and so forth, ano, shall retain their Philippine citizenship.
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their
citizenship by reason of their naturalization after the effectivity of this Act
are deemed to have reacquired
57
 Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity. effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural-born
Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here. citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual
Natural-born citizens who acquired foreign citizenship after the effectivity of citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the
this act are considered to have retained their citizenship. But natural-born required oath of allegiance.
citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before the effectivity of this act are
considered to have reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you mean to For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of
say that natural-born citizens who became, lets say, American citizens after filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings
the effectivity of this act are considered natural-born? in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition because
R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became
citizenship before the effectivity of this act are no longer natural born citizens foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2
because they have just reacquired their citizenship. I just want to know this declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as
distinction, Mr. Chairman. not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with
Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is all cases after the new laws effectivity.
precisely retention and reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to those
who lost their Philippine citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without
63. Upon the effectivity -- assuming that we can agree on this, upon the any reference to Section 3 on the particular application of reacquisition and
effectivity of this new measure amending Commonwealth Act 63, the retention to Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the
Filipinos who lost their citizenship is deemed to have reacquired their effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of the act.
Petitioners plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the accused is
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation more favorable to the
future instances. So thats the distinction. accused following the time-honored principle that penal statutes are
construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
REP. JAVIER. Well, Im just asking this question because we are here accused.23 R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.
making distinctions between natural-born citizens. Because this is very
important for certain government positions, no, because natural-born Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation to
citizens are only qualified for a specific Article 17125 of the RPC refers to falsification by a private individual, or a
public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct. position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements of
falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC
REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law. are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. Its who did not take advantage of his official position;
one of the provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the explanation, (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article
Congressman Javier, that is our conceptualization. Reacquired for those 171 of the RPC; and
who previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth (3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial
Act 63, and retention for those in the future. (Emphasis supplied) document.26
58
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that
he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in
fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at
the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign
country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his
Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act,
the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status
is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for
falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
accused as ground for denying petitioners motion for re-determination of
probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest. However, custody
of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an
application for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to
quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction between custody
of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking
an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction
of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already
acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our
pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v.
Vasquez:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the
merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the
exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is
intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same
cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.cralawred
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the
law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before
the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by
arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be
under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant
files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand,
one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not
be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after
his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on
the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him
to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally
custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to,
detention.
x x x x
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns
bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief
is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held
in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court,
whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance.
x x x x
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases,
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except
in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases
involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the
court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of
the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court
applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the
law.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for
re-determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it
lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such erroneous ground
stated in the MTCs order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of
merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011
59
of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case AUSTRIA-MART INEZ,
No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is hereby AFFIRMED and CALLEJO, SR., and
UPHELD. CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

With costs against the petitioner.

Promul gated:
SO ORDERED. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS April 12, 2006
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe,*JJ., R e s p o n d e n t.
concur.cralawlawlibrary x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- x

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on cert iorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, assailing the twi n
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated 18 October
2002 [ 1 ] and 19 February 2003, [ 2 ] respecti vel y, in CA -G.R. CR
No. 24077, entitled People of the Philippines v. Arnold Alva.

ARNOLD ALVA, G.R. No. 157331

P e t i t i o n e r, The CA, in the assailed resolutions, dismissed
petitioners appeal of t he trial courts j udgment of conviction for
failing to post a new bail bond to secure his provisional libert y

Present: on appeal.

- versus - PANGANIBAN, CJ,

Chair man, The Facts
YNARES -SANT IAGO
60
 The present petition stemmed from an CONTRARY TO LAW.
[3]
Infor mation char ging petitioner with having committed the
crime of estafa defined under Article 315, Paragraph 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, alleging as follows: The resultant criminal case was filed and docketed as Cri minal
Case No. 95 -143803 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court
The undersigned accuses ARNOLD ALV A (RTC) of Manila, Br anch 54, presided by Judge Manuel T.
of the cri me of ESTAFA, committed as follows:
Muro.
That in or about and during the period
covered bet ween October 18, 1993 up to
December 18, 1993, inclusive, in the City of On 5 September 1995, the RTC issued a Recall
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there willfully (sic), unlawfull y and Order [ 4 ] of the War rant of Arrest issued on 18 July
feloniously defraud YUMI VERANGA y
HERVERA in the fol lowing manner , to wi t: the 1995 against petitioner in view of the approval of his bail bond
said accused, by means of false manifestation and by Hon. William Bayhon, then Executive Judge of the RTC of
fraudulent representation which he made to said
YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to the effect that Manila.
he could process the latters application for U.S.
Visa provided she would gi ve the amount
of P120,000.00, and by means of other similar Upon arrai gnment on 7 December 1995, petitioner, dul y
deceit, induced and succeeded in inducing said
YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to gi ve and assisted by counsel, [ 5 ] pleaded not guilt y to t he cri me char ged.
deliver, as in fact she gave and deli vered t o said
accused the amount of P120,000.00 on the
strength of said manifestation and represent ation After the trial on the merits, in an Order [ 6 ] dated 6 April
said accused well knowing that the same were
false and untrue for the reason that the U.S. Visa 1998, the RTC considered the case submitted for decision.
is not genuine and were made solel y to obtain, as
in fact he did obtain the amount of P120,000.00
On 4 May 1999, petitioners counsel filed an Urgent
which amount once in his possession with i ntent
to defraud, he wilfully (sic), unlawfull y and Motion to Cancel Promulgation [ 7 ] praying for the resetting of
feloniously misappr opriated, misapplied and the 5 May 1999 schedule of promul gation of the RTCs decision
converted the said amount to his own personal
use and benefit, to the damage and prej udice of to 17 June 1999 in vi ew of the fact that said counsel alr eady
the said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA in the had a prior commit ment on subj ect date. The RTCgranted the
aforesaid amount of P120,000.00, Phili ppine
Currency.
61
motion. The promul gation, however, was def erred onl y until 19
May 1999.
A day before the rescheduled date of promulgation, or
on 18 May 1999, petitioners counsel again moved for the
defer ment of the promul gation, due to prior undertakings of
similar i mportance. [ 8 ]
hi m to an indeter minate ter m of i mprisonment of
nine (9) years and one (1) day as mi nimum
of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as
maxi mum of reclusion temporal in accor dance
with the provisions of Article 315, first, and the
Indeter mi nate Sentence Law, and further for the
accused to return the P120,000.00 t o the
complainant with an interest at the rate of t wel ve
percent (12%) compounded annuall y from January
1, 1994 (the amount has been gi ven to the
accused in October and December 1993).

On 19 May 1999, peti tioner and counsel both failed to

appear in court de spite due notice. In his st ead, clai ming to be
Meanwhile, as appearing in the records of the RTC,
petitioners representative, a certain Joey Perez personall y
immediatel y following an original dupli cate copy of the
delivered to the RTC a hand written medical
aforequoted decision, a document entit led Personal Bail
certificate [ 9 ] expressing petitioners inability to attend the days [12]
Bond dated 21 May 1999 issued by Mega Pacific Insurance
hearing due to hypertension.
Corporation, seemed t o have been filed before and approved by
the RTC as evidenced by the si gnature of Judge Muro on the
In response to the aforestated acts of petitioner and
face of said bail bond. [ 1 3 ] For such reason, petitioner appeared
counsel, the RTC issued an Order [ 1 0 ] directing the
to have been admitted to bail anew after his conviction.
promul gation of its decision in absentiaand the issuance of a
bench warrant of arr est against petitioner f or his failure to
Incongr uous to the above inference, however, in a n
appear before it despit e due notice.
Order [ 1 4 ] dated 25 May 1999, j udgment was rendered against
Eastern Insurance and Suret y Corporation, the bonding
In its decision dated 25 March 1999, [ 1 1 ] the RTC found
company that issued petitioners o riginal bail bond, in the
petitioner guilt y of t he cri me of e stafa under Article 315,
amount of P17,000.00 , for failure to produce the person of
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, t he decretal part of
petitioner within the 10 day period earlier provided and to
which reads:
explain why the amount of its undertaking should not be

WHEREFORE, j udgment is hereby forfeited.

rendered: finding the accused guilt y beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under
Article 315, No. 2(a) of the RPC and sentences
62
 In the interregnum, Police Superintendent Ramon In an Order [ 1 8 ] dated 30 August 1999, the RTC
Flores De Jesus, Chief of Warrant and Subpoena declined to gi ve due course to said motion f or failure to set
Section, [ 1 5 ] manifested to the RTC the return of the it for hearing; thus, tr eating it as a mere scrap of paper.
unexecuted Warrant of Arrest issued on 19 May 1999 for the
reason that the address of the accused (petitioner) is not On 2 September 1999, petitioner received the above
Order. The next day, or on 3 September 1999, petitioner filed
within our area of responsibility. x x x Nevertheless, De
a Notice of Appeal [ 1 9 ] before the RTC.
Jesus reassured the RTC that the name of the accused will
be included in our list of wanted persons for our future
In an Order [ 2 0 ] dated 20 September 1999, the RTC again
reference. Exami nation of the recor ds of t he case revealed declined to gi ve due course to the Notice of Appeal ,
that petitioner already moved out of his address on record ratiocinating thus:
without infor ming the RTC.
The Notice of Appeal filed by accused
cannot be gi ven due course as it was filed out of
time. Although accused filed a Motion for
On 15 July 1999, hand deli vered by a certain Reconsideration dated 23 July 1999, the C ourt
Remedios Caneda, petitioner wrote [ 1 6 ] the RTC requesting considered it as a mere scrap of paper and was
not acted upon as t he same was not set for
for a certified photocopy of his exhibits submitted to it hearing, hence, it did not stop the reglementary
period to file appeal.
during trial.

On 25 November 1999, petitioner filed anew a motion

On 21 July 1999, a Termination of Legal Services was
praying for the RTCs categorical re solution of his 23 July
filed by petitioner before the RTC infor mi ng it of his
1999 Motion for Reconsideration .
decision to terminate t he services of his counsel and that he
was currentl y in the process of hiring a new one. In an Order dated 7 December 1999, the RTC granted
the abovestated motion, the full text of which states:
On 26 July 1999, [ 1 7 ] petitioner filed a Motion for
The Motion to Resolve the Motion for
Reconsideration befor e the RTC. Reconsideration of the accused, dated November
20, 1999 is granted in the interest of j ustice,

63
 considering that the one who prepared the Motion
for Reconsideration appears to be the accused
hi mself, who may not appear t o be a lawyer and
may not be conversant with the rules, amon g
others, governing moti ons.
Acting on the said Motion for
Reconsideration itself, same is denied for lack of
merit. The Decision has examined and discussed
the evidence presented and the merit s of the
case.
Because of the pendency of the Motion for
Reconsideration, the appeal is deemed filed on
time, and the appeal is gi ven due course.
Let the records of the case, together with
three (3) copies of the transcripts of stenogr aphic
notes be t ransmitted to the Hon. Court of
Appeals.
On 29 October 2001, petitioner, through new counsel,
filed a Compliance [ 2 2 ] essentially stating ther ein that:
x x x x
3. Upon learning of the course of action taken by
the presiding j udge, and for purposes of
appealing the decision subj ect of the instant case,
on May 21, 1999, accused i mmediatel y posted a
new bond for his provisional libert y. The
presiding j udge of the lower cou rt, which i ssued
the questioned decisi on, dul y approved the new
bond. Certified true copy of the bond is hereto
attached as Annex 3 and made an integral part
hereof;
x x x x.

On appeal before the Court of Appeals, in a In a Resolution [ 2 3 ] dat ed 18 October 2002, t he Court of
Resolution [ 2 1 ] dated 16 October 2001, the appellate court Appeals, nonetheless dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner
required petitioner to show cause why his appeal should not be for appellants failure to post a new bond for h is provisional
dismissed it appeari ng that no new bail bond for his liberty on appeal despite our directive as contained in our
provisional libert y on appeal had been posted, to wit: Resolution dated October 16, 2001, and in view of the fact that
his personal bail bond posted in the lower court had alread y
Considering the arrest warrant issued by
expired, x x x.
the trial court against the accused who faile d to
appear at the promul gation of the j udgment , and
it appearing from the record that no new bond for Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for
his provisional liberty on appeal has been posted,
appellant is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE within Reconsideration [ 2 4 ] thereto seeking its reversal. According to
ten (10) days from notice why his appeal should petitioners counsel, he was of the understanding that the Show
not be dismi ssed outri ght.
Cause Resolution of 16 October 2001 merely sought an
explanation vis--vis the absence of a bail bond guaranteeing
petitioners provisional liberty while his conviction was on
64
appeal. All the same, petitioners counsel manifested that Mega
Pacific Insurance Cor poration, had alr eady extended the period
Hence, this petition.
covered by its 21 May 1999 bail bond. Attached to said motion
was a Bond Endorsement [ 2 5 ] extending the coverage of the bail
bond from 21 May 1999 to 21 May 2003. The Issues

Asked to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration , Petitioner now comes to this Court via a petition for
respondent People of the Philippines (People), through the review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) , interposed alleging the f ollowing errors: [ 2 8 ]
obj ections. In its Comment , [ 2 6 ] respondent People raised two
arguments: 1) that an application for bail can only be availed I.
of by a person who i s in the custody of the law or ot her wise
deprived of his liberty; and 2) that bail on appeal is a matter of THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
DECIDED QUEST IONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A
discretion when the penalty i mposed by the trial court is WAY NOT IN ACCORD WIT H LAW OR WITH
imprisonment exceedi ng six (6) years. APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT;

On 19 Februar y 2003, the Court of Appeal s issued the II.

[27]
second assailed Resol ution, disposing of petitioners motion
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
as follows: ACTED WIT H GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNT ING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
Finding no merit in appellants motion for JURISDICT ION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE
reconsideration (citation omitted) filed PET IT ION DOCKETED AS CA G.R. CR NO.
on November 12, 2002, the same is hereby 24077 ON THE GROUND OF ALLEGED
DENIED. We agree with the appellee that FAILURE TO POST A NEW BOND FOR
appellant has failed to subm it him self under the PET IT IONERS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY AND
jurisdiction of t he court or under the cust ody of THAT THE PERSONAL BAIL BOND POSTED
the law since his conviction in 1999 and that IN THE LOWER COURT HAD ALLEGEDLY
there was no valid bail bond in place when ALREADY EXPIRED;
appellant took his appeal .

WHEREFORE, appellants motion for III.

reconsideration is DENIED. [Emphasis supplied.]
65
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WIT H GRAVE
ABUSE OF D ISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT
CONSIDER AS SUBSTANT IAL, THE The bombardment of errors notwithstanding, onl y two
COMPLAINCE FILED BY THE PET IT IONER
WHICH SHOWED THE FACT THAT IN DEED issues are raised in this petition: 1) with the exception of the
THERE WAS A BAIL BOND FILED FOR THE fifth assignment of error, all six can be encapsulated in one
PROV ISIONAL LIBERTY OF THE ACCUSED
solitary question, that is, whether or not the Court of Appeals
DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL;
committed reversible error in dismissing t he appeal in view
of petitioners alleged failure to post a valid bail bond to secur e
IV .
his provisional liberty on appeal; and 2) whether or not
THE HONORABLE COUR T OF APPEALS petitioner failed to submit hi mself to the j urisdiction of the
GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WIT H GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRET ION WHEN IT IGNORED court or to the custody of the law despite the posting of the
THE RECENT BAIL BOND EXTENSION subj ect bail bond.
ATTACHED TO THE MOT ION FOR
RECONSIDERAT ION FILED BY THE
PET IT IONER; The Courts Ruling

V.
Petitioner faults the appellate court for expressing x x x
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS in its questioned resolutions that herein petitioner did not
GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WIT H GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED submit to the j urisdiction of the court or custody of the law, or
THAT THE PET IT IONER FAILED TO SUBMIT
that there was no valid bail bond when the appeal was taken
TO THE JURISDICT ION OF THE COURT OR
TO THE CUSTODY OF LAW DESPIT E THE when the records of the case would readily prove the
BAIL BOND POSTED ON MAY 21, 1999; and
contrary. [ 2 9 ] In issuing said resolution, petitioner concludes

VI. that the Court of Appeals made x x x no careful examination of

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WIT H GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED
THAT THERE WAS NO V ALID BAIL BOND IN
PLACE WHEN THE PET IT IONER TOOK HIS
APPEAL.
the records x x x. Petitioner rational izes his deduction in the
following manner:
x x x [T]he records of the case readily reveals
(sic) that several pl eadings were filed by the
petitioner before the lower court even after the
66
 promul gation of j udgment was made. Ri ght after
the promul gation of the decision in the l ower there is nothing on re cord which shows that petitioner
court, herein petitioner went to the court and had surrendered, was arrested or otherwise depri ved of his
posted a bail bond. If the posting of the bond
which was approved by the same Regional Trial liberty after the pr omul gation of the j udgment of his
Court who rendered the decision subj ect of appeal
is not yet a submission to the j urisdic tion of the conviction in his absence. x x x. To illustrate its point ,
court, then the respondent Hon. Court of Appeals respondent People cites the following fact s: 1) the return of
must have been thinki ng of another matter beyond
the comprehension of the petitioner and obvi ously the Warrant of Arrest issued on May 19, 1999 si gned b y
outside the matters being contemplated by law
and the Rules of Court. P/Superintendent Ramon Flores De Jesus, Chief of Warrant and
Subpoena Section, whi ch states in full:

Equally, petitioner fu r ther posits that: Respectfully returned this unexecuted

x x x Although it is respectfully submitted t hat an
accused shall be denied bail or his bail shall be
cancelled if sentenced to an i mprisonment
exceeding six (6) year s as provided in Secti on 5,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, j ust the
same, there must be a show ing by the
prosecution w ith notice to the accused of the
fact that, the accused is a recidivist, has
previousl y escaped from confinement, evaded
sentence, has commit ted an offense while under
probation, there are circumstances ind icating the
probability of flight if released on bail, etc. But
there was none of the said instances that may be
attributable to herein petitioner. [ 3 0 ]
Respondent People, in contrast, counters
x x x [a]lthough a per sonal bail bond dated May 21, 1999 was
executed in favor of petitioner by Mega Pacific Insurance
Corporation two days after the promulgation of the Decision,
Warrant of Arrest for the reason that the address
of the accused is not within our area of
responsibility. Further request that the warrant of
Arrest be forwarded t o the Police Station which
has Jurisdiction over t he address of the accused.
However , the name of the accused will be
included in our list of wanted persons for our
future reference.
2) the fact that six days after the decision of the RTC was
promul gated, or on 25 May 1999, said court rendered j udgment
against the bail bond issued by Eastern Assurance and Suret y
Corporation executed to secure petitioners provisional liberty
that during the trial, for the bondsmans failure to produce
petitioner before the court, to wit:
In view of the failure of Eastern Insurance
& Surety Cor poration, bondsman of herein
67
 accused, to produce the herein accused w ithi n the
period granted it by this Court, j udgment is
hereby rendered against said bond in the amount
of Seventeen Thousand (P17,000.00) Pesos. [ 3 1 ]
Respondent People explains that the first two facts make
it impr obable to concl ude that there existed a valid bail bond
securing petitioners provisional libert y even after conviction.
Stated in another way, petitioners admission to bail presumes
that the latter surrendered, was arrested or he had otherwise
submitted hi mself under the custody of the l aw.
And, 3) that petitioner belatedly attached a bond endorsement
to his motion for reconsideration dated November 7, 2002
submitted before the Court of Appeals, pur portedly to extend
the expired personal bond dated May 21, 1999 x x x, did not
automatically confer on petitioner the benefits of an effecti ve
bail bond, [ 3 2 ] as petitioner made no extensi on of the previous
personal bond before t he same expired.
We disagree in petitioners assertions; hence, the petition
must fail.
A definitive disposit ion of the issue relating to the
existence and validity of petitioners bail bond on appeal
presupposes that the latter was allowed by law to post bail
notwithstanding the RTCs j udgment of conviction and the
imposition of the penalty of i mprisonment for an indeter minate
period of nine (9) year s and one (1) day as minimum of prision
mayor to seventeen (17) years as maxi mum of reclusion
temporal.
Section 5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court, as amended,
intrinsically addresses the foregoing prefator y matter viz:
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, recl usion
perpetua or life i mprisonment, the cour t, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discr etion, may allow the
accused to continue on prov isional libert y under
the same bail bond during the period to appeal
subj ect to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceedi ng six (6) years, but not
more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be
denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall
be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused, of the followi ng or
other similar circumst ances :
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi -
recidivist, or habit ual delinquent, or has
committed the cri me aggravated by the
circumstances of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have
previousl y escaped from legal confinement ,
evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of
his bail without valid j ustification;
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 (c) That the accused committed the offense
while on probation, parole, or under conditional In the case at bar , pet itioner was convicted by the RTC
pardon; to suffer the penalt y of i mprisonment for an indeterminate ter m
(d) That the circumst ances of the accused of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision
or his case indicate the probability of flight i f
released on bail; or mayor to seventeen (17) years as maxi mum of reclusion
temporal. Quite clearly, the approval of
(e) That there is undue risk that during the
pendency of th e appeal, the accused may commit petitioners applicationfor bail was discretionary upon the
another cri me.
RTC.
The appellate court may review the
resolution of the Regi onal Trial Court, on motion
and with notice to the adverse part y. [Emphasis It is incongruous, to say the least, that the posting of a bail
supplied.]
presupposes that the accused and/ or accused -appellant is

From the preceding quoted provision, the RTC is gi ven detained or in the custody of the law. [ 3 3 ] In t he case at bar, the

the discretion to admi t to bail an accused even after the latter bench warrant issued by the RTC on 19 May 1999 still

has been convicted to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a remains unser ved . Not hing in the records of the case, neither

term of more than six (6) years but less than twent y (20) years. in the RTC nor the Court of Appeals, demonstrates that

However , the same al so provides for the cancellation of bai l petitioner was ever arr ested, as there has been no related Order

bonds already granted or the denial of a bail bond application of Release issued by any court, or that he voluntarily

upon the concurrence of two points: 1) if the j udgment of the surrendered or at the ver y least placed hi mself under the

Regional Trial Court exceeds six (6) years but not more than custody of the law.

twent y (20) years; and 2) upon a showing by the prosecution,

with notice to the accused, of the presence of any of the five Basic is the principle that that the right to bail can only be

circumstances therein enumerated or other si milar availed of by a per son who is in custody of the law or

circumstances. otherwise depri ved of his liberty and it would be premature, x

x x, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has
yet to be curtailed. [ 3 4 ]

69
 All told, no bail shoul d have bee n granted petitioner. It be exercised in accordance with applicable l egal principles. As
is beyond dispute that the subj ect bail bond issued by Mega when there is a concurrence of the enumerated circumstances
Pacific Insurance Cor poration was irregularly approved. Worth and the range of penal ty i mposed, the prosecution must first be
noting is the fact that nowhere in the records of the case is it accorded an opportunity to obj ect and pr esent evidence, if
shown that petitioner applied for bail throu gh a motion dul y necessary, wi th notice to the accused. It is on this basis that
filed for such purpose nor is there showing that the RTC issued j udicial discretion is balanced in deter mining whether or not an
an Order of Approval or any other court process accused -appellant should be admitted to bai l pending appeal of
acknowledging such document. Be that as it may, even his conviction vis--vis the increased possibi lity or li kelihood
granting for the sake of argument that it was indeed approved of flight.
by Judge Mur o, such approval did not render the subj ect bail
bond valid and binding for it has been established that Approval of an application for bail on appeal, absent the
petitioner was not enti tled to bail on appeal. knowledge of the prosecution of such appl ication or, at the
ver y least, failing to allow it to obj ect, is not the product of
That the prosecution appears not to have been gi ven the sound j udicial discretion but of i mpulse and arbitrariness, not
chance to obj ect, as evidentl y required under the quoted rule, to mention violati ve of respondent Peoples r ight of procedural
to the application or approval of the subj ect bail bond (with due process.
notice to the accused), fortifies the declaration as to its
invalidit y. Nowhere i n the ori ginal records of the RTC does it This is especially true in this case as a close scrutiny of
even show that the prosecution was infor med of petitio ners the ori ginal records of the case at bar reveals that petitioner
application for bail, much less the approval of such violated the conditions of his bail without valid j ustifi cation
application. his failure to appear before the RTC, despite due notice, on the
day of the promul gat ion of the latters j udgment, absent any
Noting that the raison d'tre for such requirement is the j ustifiable reason. His absence was a clear contravention of the
discretionary nature of the admission to bail of an accused conditions of his bail bond to say the least . As evidenced by
after conviction, though discretionar y, such assessment must the undertaking print ed on the face of the bond issued by
70
Eastern Insurance and Suret y Corporation and li kewise Further, it should be recalled as well, that as early as 4
required under Section 6 [ 3 5 ] of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, May 1999, petitioner and counsel had already been notified of
petitioner must present himself before the court for the reading the 19 May 1999 schedule of promul gation. The first having
of the j udgment of the RTC in order to render hi mself to the been postponed in view of the Urgent Motion to Cancel
execution thereof. Promulgation (on 5 May 1999) filed by petitioners counsel.

While, indeed, a medi cal certificate was hand delivered Another telling evidence of the violation of petitioners
and filed by a certain Joey Perez, allegedl y a representative of original bail bond is revealed by t he Process Servers
petitioner, stating therein the reason for t he latters absence, Return, [ 3 8 ] indicated at the dorsal portion of the RTCs Produce
the RTC found insubstantial the explanation proffered. Order, indicating peti tioners change of address without prior
Appropriatel y, it ordered the promul gation of its j udgment in notice to the RTC, it states:
absentia. It also issued a bench warrant of arrest against
PROCESS SERVERS RETURN
petitioner.
This certifies that on the 17 t h day of
May, (sic) 1999, undersigned return (sic) again
Upon examination, the subj ect medical to Fersal Apartelle located at
130 Kalayaan Ave. (si c) Dili man, QuezonCit y for
certificate [ 3 6 ] merely states that petitioner was diagnosed t o be confir mation and indeed the addressee, Arnold
suffering from hypert ension. It failed to el ucidate further any Al va, had no (sic) l onger been residing nor
holding office at the aforementioned address.
concomitant conditions necessitating pet itioners physical
incapability to present hi mself before the court even for an
hour or two; thus, it considered the absence of petitioner By failing to infor m the RTC of his change of address,
unj ustifi ed. What's more, though notari zed, the subj ect petitioner failed to hold hi mself amenable to the orders and
document failed to indicate evidence of affiants [ 3 7 ] identit y processes of the RTC. It was an unmistakable arrant breach of
making its due executi on doubtful. the conditions of his bail bond.

71
 Prescinding from the above discussion, the conviction of
petitioner to a period beyond six (6) years but less than twent y
(20) years in tandem with attendant circumstances effectivel y
violating his bail without valid j ustification should have
effectivel y precluded hi m from being admitted to bail on
appeal.
The issue of the vali dity of petitioners bail bond on
appeal having been laid to rest by Section 5 of Rule 114 of the
1994 Rules of Court, as amended, petitioners alleged failure to
post a bail bond on appeal is, therefore, i nconsequential as,
under the circ umstances, he is disallowed by law to be
admitted to bail on appeal. Thus, for all legal intents and
purposes, there can be no other conclusion t han that at the time
petitioner filed his not ice of appeal and duri ng the pendency of
his appeal even until now he remains at large, placing hi msel f
beyond the pale, and protection of the law.
Inexorabl y, having j umped bail and eluded arrest until the
present, the issue of whether or not petitioner has lost his ri ght
to appeal his conviction now ensues.
The manner of revi ew of petitioners conviction is
governed by the Rules of Court. Appropriately, Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court presents the procedural requirements regarding
appeals taken to the Court of Appeals. Section 8 of said Rule
finds application t o the case at bar, viz:
SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for
abandonment or f ailure to prosecute . The
appellate court may, upon motion of the appellee
or its own motion and notice to the appellant,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his
brief within the ti me prescribed by this Rule,
except in case the appellant is represented by
a counsel de oficio.
The court may also, upon motion of the
appellee or on its own motion, dism iss the appeal
if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinem ent or ju m ps bail or flees to a foreign
country during t he pendency of the appeal .
[Emphasis supplied.]
By virtue of the second paragraph of the abovequoted
provision, the act of j umping bail, among otherthings, will
result in the outright dismissal of petition ers appeal. As
pointed out by the Court in the case of People v.
Mapalao, [ 3 9 ] the reason for said rule is that:
[O]nce an accused escapes from prison or
confinement or j umps bail or flees to a foreign
country, he losses his standing in court and
unless he surrenders or submits to the j urisdiction
of the court he is deemed to have wai ved any
right to seek relief from the court.
72
 Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error in dismissing petitioners appeal. Within the meaning of
the principles gover ning the prevailing cr iminal procedure,
petitioner i mpliedl y withdrew his appeal by j umping bail and
thereby made the j udgment of the RTC final and executor y. [ 4 0 ]
By putting hi mself beyond the reach and application of
the legal processes of the land, petit ioner revealed
contempt of the law and placed hi mself in a position to
speculate at his pleasure his chances for a reversal. This, we
cannot condone. Once more, by j umping bail, petitioner has
wai ved his ri ght to appeal. In the case of People v. Ang
Gioc, [ 4 1 ] we enunciated that:
There are certain fundamental ri ghts which
cannot be wai ved even by the accused himself,
but the right of appeal is not one of them. This
right is granted solely for the benefit of the
accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases.
He may wai ve it either expressly or by
implication. When the accused flees after the case
has been submitted to the court for decision, he
will be deemed to have waiv ed his right to appeal
from the j udgment rendered against hi m x x x.
Coming now to the second issue of whether or not
petitioner failed to submit hi mself to the j urisdiction of the
court or to the custody of the law, despite the posting of the
subj ect bail bond, petitioner argues that his act of filing
several pleadings after the promul gation of the RTCs j udgment
plus his filing of the application f or his admission to bail
should be considered a submission to the courts j urisdiction.
He rationalizes that:
[T]he records of the case readily reveals that
several pleadings were filed by the petitioner
his before the lower court even after the
promul gation of j udgment was made. Ri ght after
the promul gation of the decision in the l ower
court, herein petitioner went to the court and
posted a bail bond. If the posting of the bond
which was approved by the same Regional Trial
Court who rendered the decision subj ect of appeal
is not yet a submission to the j urisdiction of the
court, then the respondent Hon. Court of Appeals
must have been thinki ng of another matter beyond
the comprehension of the petitioner and obvi ously
outside the matters being contemplated by law
and the Rules of Court.
For the resolution of the second issue, it should have
been sufficient to st ate that for reasons stat ed in the foregoing
discussion, the quest ion posed has now become academic.
However , to di mi nish the confusion brought about by
ostensibly equating the ter m jurisdiction of the court (over the
person of the accused) with that of custody of the law, it is
fundamental to differentiate the two. The ter m:
73
 Custody of the law is accomplished either by
arrest or voluntar y surrender (citation omitted);
while (the ter m) j urisdiction over the person of
the accused is acquired upon his arre st or
voluntar y appearance (citation omitted). One can
be under the custody of the law but not yet
subj ect to the j urisdiction of the court over his
person, such as when a person arrested by virtue
of a warrant files a motion before arrai gnment to
quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be
subj ect to the j urisdiction of the court over his
person, and yet not be in the custody of the law,
such as when an accused escapes custody aft er his
trial has commenced ( citation omitted). [ 4 2 ]
Moreover, j urisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the
instance of parties, as when an accused escapes from the
custody of the law, but continues until the
is terminated. [ 4 3 ] Evidently, petitioner is cor rect in that there is
no doubt that the RTC already acquired j urisdiction over the
person of the accused petitioner when he appeared at the
arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the cri me char ged
notwithstanding the fact that he j umped bail and is no w
considered a fugiti ve.
As to whether or not petitioner has placed hi mself under the
custody of the CA, al as, we cannot say the same for [b] eing in
the custody of the law si gnifies restraint on the person, who is
thereby depri ved of his own will and liberty, binding hi m to
become obedient to the will of the law (citation omitted) .
Custody of the law i s literally custody over the body of the
accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention. [ 4 4 ] In the
case at bar, petitioner, bein g a fugiti ve, until and unless he
submits hi mself to the custody of the law, in the manner of
being under the j urisdiction of the courts, he cannot be granted
any relief by the CA.
Parenthetically, we cannot end this ponencia without
calling attention to a ver y disturbing fact that petitioner admits
of being the author of a falsified public document was treated
nonchalantl y by authorities.
case
In fine, the petitioner has remained at large even as he
hopes that his appeal, and consequentl y, this petition, w ill
succeed and he can then appear before the Court to clai m his
victor y. He hopes in vain.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, in
CA-G.R. CR No. 24077, which dismissed petitioners appeal,
are hereby AFFIRMED. In this connection, Judge
Manuel Muro is DIRECTED to issue forthwith a warrant of
arrest for the apprehension of Petitioner Arnold Alva and
for proper disposition of the case in line with the foregoing
discussion.
Costs against the petit ioner. SO ORDERED.
74