ENFORCE PLEA AGREEMENT BRIEF

Plea bargaining facilitates the effective operation of the criminal justice system as courts
accept the practice as “an integral part of the administration of justice in the United States.”
Barber v. Gladden, 220 F. Supp. 308, 314 [D. Ore. 1963]. Also, disposition of a criminal case
by a negotiated plea is “essential to expeditious and fair administration of justice.” People v.
Williams, 269 Cal. Rptr. 348, 351 (1969) Furthermore, the defense counsel has an obligation to
explore plea bargaining possibilities. Cole v. Slayton, 378 F. Supp. 364 [W.D. Va. 1974]
Failure to explore bargaining possibilities may justify charges of inadequate and incompetent
representation. See, Polstein, How to “Settle” a Criminal Case, 8 Prac.Law. 35, 44 (1962)

As set forth in People v. Smith, 99 Cal. Rptr. 17122 Cal.App. 3d 25 (1971), the judge
does not have an absolute right to reject a plea bargain and he must at least consider accepting it.

In United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. 1974), the defendant was charged
with first degree murder. Prior to trial, the United States Attorney and the defendant agreed that
the defendant would plead guilty to second degree murder and he would receive a life sentence.
The first degree murder charge would be dismissed. The trial judge refused to accept the plea
agreement and the defendant proceeded to trial and was convicted of first degree murder.

On appeal, the Court agreed with the defendant that trial judge erred in refusing to accept
the plea to second degree murder. While the court on appeal held that while the judge could
reject a plea bargain that did not protect the public the public interest, this type of rejection
should only be permitted when the prosecutor, who has the primary responsibility for protecting
the public, had abuse his discretion. In issuance of its decision, the court stated:

First, the trial judge must provide a reasoned exercise of discretion in

order to justify a departure from the course agreed on by the prosecution
and defense. This is not a matter of absolute judicial prerogative. The
authority has been granted to the judge to assure protection of the public
interest, and this in turn involves one or more of the following
components: (a) fairness to the defense, such as protection against
harassment; (b) fairness to the prosecution interest, as in avoiding a
disposition that does not serve due and legitimate prosecutorial
interests; (c) protection of the sentencing authority reserved to the judge.
The judge's statement or opinion must identify the particular interest that
leads him to require an unwilling defendant and prosecution to go to trial.

As to fairness to the prosecution interest, here we have a matter in

which the primary responsibility, obviously, is that of the prosecuting
attorney. The District Court cannot disapprove of his action on the
ground of incompatibility with prosecutive responsibility unless the judge
is in effect ruling that the prosecutor has abused his discretion. The
requirement of judicial approval entitles the judge to obtain and
evaluate the prosecutor's reasons

The judge may withhold approval if he finds that the prosecutor has
failed to give consideration to factors that must be given consideration
 in the public interest, factors such as the deterrent aspects of the
criminal law. However, trial judges are not free to withhold approval of
guilty pleas on this basis merely because their conception of the public
interest differs from that of the prosecuting attorney.

Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 622

Finally, the Ammidown Court in ruling that the judge of a trial court should give great
latitude to the prosecutor’s decision to agree to a plea offer with the defendant as to deferring to
the prosecutor’s view of the case, stated the following:

We start with the presumption that the determination of the United

States Attorney is to be followed in the overwhelming number of cases.
He alone is in a position to evaluate the government's prosecution
resources and the number of cases it is able to prosecute.

Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 621; See, also: United States v. Fleming,

215 A.2d 839 (D.C. 1966).

Where vigorous prosecution of one case threatens to undermine

successful prosecution of another, it has traditionally been the
prosecutor who determines which case will be pressed to conclusion,
and his decision has been given great deference by the courts.

Ammidown, supra; See, also: United States v. Shanahan, 168 F.Supp. 225,
230 (S.D.Ind.1959).