CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 CASES pp1-23
AUDREY KRISTINA MAYPA (from diff sources)
A. POLITICAL LAW DEFINED -
DEFINITION/EFFECTIVITY
People v. Perfecto
G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922
o "The important question is here squarely presented of
whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code,
punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall
defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or
other person in authority . . .," is still in force."
o public law: It is a general principle of the public law
that on acquisition of territory the previous political
relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated --
"political" being used to denominate the laws
regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to
the sovereign.
FACTS:
This is a case relating to the loss of some documents
which constituted the records of testimony given by
witnesses in the Senate investigation of oil companies.
The newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio
Perfecto, published an article about it to the effect
that "the author or authors of the robbery of the
records from the iron safe of the Senate have,
perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators
who secured their election through fraud and
robbery."
Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a
resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate, filed an
information alleging that the editorial constituted a
violation of article 256 of the Penal Code.
The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in
the municipal court and again in the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
ISSUEs:
o Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code
was abrogated with the change from Spanish to
American sovereignty
o Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel
HELD:
It is a general principle of the public law that on
acquisition of territory the previous political relations
of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political"
being used to denominate the laws regulating the
relations sustained by the inhabitants to the
sovereign.
On American occupation of the Philippines, by
instructions of the President to the Military
Commander, and by proclamation of the latter, the
municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting
private rights of person and property and providing for
the punishment of crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code)
were nominally continued in force in so far as they
were compatible with the new order of things.
Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain
to protect Spanish officials who were the
representatives of the King. But with the change of
sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of
government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is
there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority
of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of
him only with bated breath. Said article is contrary to
the genius and fundamental principles of the American
character and system of
government. It was crowded out by implication as
soon as the United States established its authority in
the Philippine Islands.
"From an entirely different point of view, it must be
noted that this article punishes contempts against
executive officials, although its terms are broad
enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment
for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a
government based upon American principles. Our
official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some
authority greater than the people but it is an agent
and servant of the people themselves. These officials
are only entitled to respect and obedience when they
are acting within the scope of their authority and
jurisdiction. The American system of government is
calculated to enforce respect and obedience where
such respect and obedience is due, but never does it
place around the individual who happens to occupy an
official position by mandate of the people any official
halo, which calls for drastic punishment for
contemptuous remarks."
DECISION:
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of
the court are of the opinion, although for different
reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the
defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de
officio. So ordered.
B. DIVISIONS OF POLITICAL LAW
Macariola vs. Asuncion
A.M. No. 133-J, May 31 1982, 114 SCRA 77
Bernardita Macariola vs. Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI
Leyte
FACTS:
In 1963, Macariola and her step sister (Reyes) had a
dispute over their inheritance involving parcels of land
located in Leyte. A trial ensued and Judge Macariola,
after determining the legibility of the parties to inherit
rendered a decision in the civil case. Thereafter, the
counsels of the parties submitted a project partition
reflecting the preference of the parties. The project
partition was, however, unsigned by Macariola. But
her lawyer assured Asuncion that he is duly authorized
by Macariola as counsel. The judge then approved the
project partition. The decision became final in 1963 as
well.
Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Arcadio partition was unsigned by her and that what was given
Galapon, who later sold the property to judge to her in the partition were insignificant portions of
Asuncion in 1965. the parcels of land.
On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against ISSUE:
Judge Asuncion with acts unbecoming a judge on the
ground that he bought a property (formerly owned by Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said
Macariola) which was involved in a civil case decided provision.
by him; this act by Asuncion is averred by Macariola to
be against Art. 1491, par 5 of the Civil Code which
Whether or not Article 14 of the Code of Commerce
provides:
has legal and binding effect thus holding respondent
liable for a violation thereof.
"Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in
HELD:
person or through the mediation of another:
No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is
xxx xxx xxx
under pendency. The judge bought the property in
1965 2 years after his decision became final. Further,
"(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
Asuncion did not buy the property directly from any of
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
the parties since the property was directly bought by
employees connected with the administration of
Galapon, who then sold the property to Asuncion.
justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
There was no showing that Galapon acted as a
upon an execution before the court within whose
dummy of Asuncion.
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring
by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect
Also, Macariola did not show proof that there was a
to the property and rights which may be the object of
gross inequality in the partition; or that what she got
any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of
were insignificant portions of the land.
their profession".
Also, Macariola said that Asuncions act tainted his
The Supreme Court however admonished Judge
earlier judgment. Macariola said that the project
Asuncion to be more discreet in his personal
transactions.
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and
binding effect and, therefore, cannot apply to the
respondent, then Judge of the CFI of Leyte, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
Although incorporated in the Code of Commerce
which is part of the commercial laws of the
Philippines, said provision partakes of the nature of a
political law as it regulates the relationship between
the government and certain public officers and
employees, like justices and judges.
The Supreme Court stated that upon the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to the United States (US) and
later on from the US to the Republic of the Philippines,
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed
to have been abrogated because there is a change of
sovereignty. The political laws of the former sovereign,
whether compatible or not with those of the new
sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they
are expressly re-enacted by the affirmative act of the
new sovereign.
Issue: Won the recommitment order valid during the
Held: The petition is denied without costs.
ALFONSO MONTEBON vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
Ruling: Enforcement of the criminal law by the forces
Facts: This is a petition for habeas corpus by Alfonso
Montebon on behalf of Elpidio S. Cruz, a
prisoner at the Iwahig Penal Colony. A similar
petition was filed with this Court by Felicisima
Santiago in the name of the same prisoner
(Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil., 927),
a petition which was denied by us in a decision
promulgated on January 30, 1947. The ground
of the first petition was the alleged illegality of
one of the prisoner's three convictions
for estafa. The present application contests the
validity of the prisoner's recommitment
decreed by the Commissioner of Justice of the
Philippine Executive Commission under date of
June 3, 1943, for the unexpired portion of his
(prisoner's) maximum aggregate sentences in
three cases in which he had been paroled by
the Board of Indeterminate Sentence on June
26, 1941, when he still had over five years to
serve. The commissioner of Justice's
recommitment order was made by virtue of
Administrative Order No. 21, dated June 21,
1942, and approved by the Chairman of the
Executive Commission, which read: "The Board
of Indeterminate Sentence and the Board of
Pardons having been abolished, the powers,
duties and functions thereof shall henceforth
be assumed and exercised by the
Commissioner of Justice.
Japanese Occupation?
of occupation is not only valid and binding; it is
imposed on them as a high obligation by the
Hague Convention and the theory of jus
postlimitinii on the international Law. That the
legal truism in political and international law
that all acts and proceedings of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of a de
facto government are good and valid." The
reason underlying requirement is thus stated in
William vs. Bruffy (96 U.S., 176, 192), cited
in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon,
supra:
"The existence of a state of insurrection and
war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away
with civil government or the regular administration of
the laws. Order was to be preserved, police
regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property
protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated,
estates settled, and the transfer and descent of
property regulated, precisely as in the time of peace.
No one, that we are aware of, seriously questions the
validity of judicial or legislative Acts in the
ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA,
petitioners, vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased
and substituted by
JIMMY LOCQUIAO, TOMASA MARA and the
REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF
PANGASINAN, respondents.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioner, vs. BENITO A.
LOCQUIAO, now
deceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO,
respondent.
Facts: Locquiao spouses executed a deed of donation
propter nuptias written in Ilocano in favor of their
son, Benito and his soon-to-be bride, Tomasa Mara. By
the terms of the agreement, the donation consist of 4
parcels of land, one male cow and 1/3 of the conjugal
house of the spouses Locquiao. The marriage took
place on 1944. The spouses died on 1962 and 1968,
respectively leaving their 6 children as heirs. With the
permission of Benito, Romana, one of the heirs took
over the possession of the donated lands and
cultivated it. When her husband got sick, her
daughter, Constancia took over the position in
cultivating the land.
Meanwhie Benito and Tomasa registered the
Inventario Ti Sagut leaving the old title cancelled.
Later, the heirs of the Locquiao spouses, including
respondent Benito and petitioner Romana, executed a
Deed of Partition with Recognition of Rights, wherein
they distributed among 3 out of the 12 parcels of land
left by their common progenitors, excluding the land
in question and other lots disposed of by the Locquiao
spouses earlier. Contained in the deed is a statement
that respondent Benito and Marciano Locquiao,
along with the heirs of Lucio Locquiao, have
already received our shares in the estates of our
parents, by virtue of previous donations and
conveyances, and that for that reason the heirs of
Lucio Locquaio were not made parties to the deed.
All the living children of the Locquaio spouses at the
time, including petitioner Romana, confirmed the
previous dispositions and waived their rights to
whomsoever the properties covered by the deed of
partition were adjudicated.
Subsequently, disagreements among the heirs
surfaced leading to execution of deed of compromise
agreement. Benito, although not directly involved,
signed the agreement. Sometime in 1983, Constancia
filed for the annulment of the agreement. The
lower court dismissed the petition. This lead
an ejectment case raised by Benito in favor of
Constancia. Petitioners Romana and Constancia
countered with a Complaint for the annulment of the
donated and registered land against respondents
Benito and Tomasa. Petitioners alleged that the
issuance of the transfer certificate of title was
fraudulent; that the Inventario Ti Sagut is spurious;
that the notary public who notarized the document
had no authority to do so, and; that the donation did
not observe the form required by law as there was no
written acceptance on the document itself or in a
separate public instrument.
Issue: (1) whether the donation propter nuptias
is authentic; (2) whether acceptance of the
donation by the donees is required; (3) if so, in what
form should the acceptance appear, and; (4)
whether the action is barred by prescription and
laches.
Held:
- 1st Issue: To buttress their claim that the
document was falsified, the petitioners rely mainly
on the Certification that there was no notarial record
for the year 1944 of Cipriano V. Abenojar who
notarized the document on May 22, 1944 and
that therefore a copy of the document was not
available. The certification is not sufficient to prove
the alleged inexistence or spuriousness of the
challenged document. The mere absence of the
notarial record does not prove that the notary public
does not have a valid notarial commission and neither
does the absence of a file copy of the document
with the archives effect evidence of the
falsification of the document. The failure of the notary
public to furnish a copy of the deed to the appropriate
office is a ground for disciplining him, but certainly not
for invalidating the document or for setting aside the
transaction therein involved.
Moreover, the heirs of the Locquaio spouses, including
petitioner Romana, made reference in the deed
of partition and the compromise agreement to
the previous donations made by the spouses in
favor of some of the heirs. Benito was not allotted any
share in the deed of partition precisely because he
received his share by virtue of previous donations. His
name was mentioned in the deed of partition only
with respect to one parcel of land which is the
eleventh (11th) parcel in the deed but that is the same
one-third (1/3) portion of conjugal lot of their
progenitors included in the donation propter
nuptias. Similarly, Marciano Locquiao and the heirs
of Lucio Locquiao were not allocated any more share
in the deed of partition since they received
theirs by virtue of prior donations or conveyances.
- 2nd Issue: No. Unlike ordinary donations, donations
propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage
are those made before its celebration, in
consideration of the same and in favor of one or both
of the future spouses. The distinction is crucial
because the two classes of donations are not
governed by exactly the same rules, especially as
regards the formal essential requisites. Under the Old
Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in
a public instrument in which the property donated
must be specifically described. However, Article 1330
of the same Code provides that acceptance is not
necessary to the validity of such gifts. In other
words, the celebration of the marriage between the
beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with
the prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the
donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code.
Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different.
Article 127 thereof provides that the form of
donations propter nuptias are regulated by the
Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which
contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the
contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing
only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article
129, express acceptance is not necessary for the
validity of these donations. Thus, implied acceptance
is sufficient.
It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the
execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not
later statutes, unless the latter are specifically
intended to have retroactive effect.
Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in
this case since the donation propter nuptias was
executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect
only on August 30, 1950. The fact that in 1944 the
Philippines was still under Japanese occupation is of
no consequence. It is a well-known rule of the Law of
Nations that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished
from laws of political nature, are not abrogated by a
change of sovereignty. Thus, the Old Civil Code was in
force. As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the
Old Civil Code in the determination of the validity of
the questioned donation, it does not matter whether
or not the donees had accepted the donation. The
validity of the donation is unaffected in either case.
Even if the provisions of the New Civil Code were to
be applied, the case of the petitioners would collapse
just the same. As earlier shown, even implied
acceptance of a donation propter nuptias suffices
under the New Civil Code.
- 3rd Issue: It is barred by prescription. Under the Old
Code of Civil Procedure, an action for recovery of the
title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest
therein, can only be brought within ten years after the
cause of such action accrues. Thus, petitioners action,
which was filed on December 23, 1985, or more than
forty (40) years from the execution of the deed of
donation on May 22, 1944, was clearly time-barred.
Even following petitioners theory that the prescriptive
period should commence from the time of discovery
of the alleged fraud, the conclusion would still be the
same. As early as May 15, 1970, when the deed of
donation was registered and the transfer certificate of
title was issued, petitioners were considered to have
constructive knowledge of the alleged fraud,
following the jurisprudential rule that registration of
a deed in the public real estate registry is constructive
notice to the whole world of its contents, as well as all
interests, legal and equitable, included therein. As it is
now settled that the prescriptive period for the
reconveyance of property allegedly registered
through fraud is ten (10) years, reckoned from
the date of the issuance of the certificate of title, the
action filed on December 23, 1985 has clearly
prescribed.
The elements of laches are present in this case, viz:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation that led to
the complaint and for which the complainant seeks a
remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainants rights,
having had knowledge or notice of defendants
conduct and having been afforded an opportunity
to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right
on which he bases his suit, and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not
held barred Of the facts which support the finding of
laches, stress should be made of the following: (a) the
petitioners Romana unquestionably gained actual
knowledge of the donation propter nuptias when the
deed of partition was executed in 1973 and the
information must have surfaced again when the
compromise agreement was forged in 1976, and; (b)
as petitioner Romana was a party-signatory to the two
documents, she definitely had the opportunity to
question the donation propter nuptias on both
occasions, and she should have done so if she were of
the mindset, given the fact that she was still in
possession of the land in dispute at the time. But she
did not make any move. She tarried for 11 more years
from the execution of the deed of partition until she,
together with petitioner Constancia, filed the
annulment case in 1985.
in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the
authority of the National Government, and did
not impair the rights of citizens under the
Constitution." The same doctrine has been
asserted in numerous other cases.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
C. DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R.
No. 157870 (and other consolidated petitions),
November 3, 2008
DECISION
(En Banc)
VELASCO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
These consolidated petitions challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165,
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
(1) candidates for public office; (2) students of
secondary and tertiary schools; (3) officers and
employees of public and private offices; and
(4) persons charged before the prosecutors office of a
crime with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of
not less than 6 years and 1 day.
The challenged section reads:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized
drug testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard
the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing
shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods,
the screening test which will determine the positive
result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive
screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected
to undergo drug testing:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.
Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as
contained in the school's student handbook and with
notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x
x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and
private offices. Officers and employees of public and
private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be
subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained
in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any
officer or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively
which shall be a ground for suspension or termination,
subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor
Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's
office with a criminal offense having an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years
and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether
appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification
for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress
enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates
for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution?
2. Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36,
RA 9165 unconstitutional?
III. THE RULING qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is
elected as member of the Senate. The Congress to be hurdled before or after election is really of no
[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No.
cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these moment, as getting elected would be of little value if
161658 and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or drug-testing requirement.
6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It alsoPARTIALLY
alter or enlarge the Constitution.
GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633
by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA
9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec.
Pimentels contention is well-taken. 9165 are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs
36(f)UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus permanently
Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is (f) thereof is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
enjoined all the concerned agencies from
hereby declared as, unconstitutional.
implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.]

As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be and tertiary schools
1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,
Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
qualification for candidates for senator; NO, Congress District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution.
CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a
candidates for senator in addition to those laid down County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and
candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean,
by the Constitution. applied the following principles: (1) schools and their
obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to
certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect,
their students; (2) minor students have contextually
a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the
proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally custody and supervision of their parents, guardians,
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that
impose an additional qualification on candidates for and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a
[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter
senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs students and may adopt such measures as may
mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper
only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and
context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing
VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on
COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to
registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-
what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires
Beyond these stated qualification requirements, discriminatory.
for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the
candidates for senator need not possess any other
 Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of
Education, supra, the Court is of the view and so holds
that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules
and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to
enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable,
and equitable requirements.
As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees
of public and private offices
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the
Constitution is couched and as has been
held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the
validity of a government search or intrusion. And
whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness
standard is judged by the balancing of the
government-mandated intrusion on the individual's
privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest. In the criminal context,
reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to
be personally determined by a judge. Given that the
drug-testing policy for employeesand students for
that matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of
administrative search needing what was referred to
in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary
procedures, the probable-cause standard is not
required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the
review should focus on the reasonableness of the
challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of
reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest
upon which the drug testing, which effects a search
within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or
workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of
the privacy expectation of the employees and the
reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large
extent circumscribed by the company's work policies,
the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered
into by management and the bargaining unit, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline
and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy
expectation in a regulated office environment is, in
fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such
privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is
the character of the intrusion authorized by the
challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the
scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as
formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law
authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly
focused"?
The poser should be answered in the
affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as
couched, contain provisions specifically directed
towards preventing a situation that would unduly
embarrass the employees or place them under a
humiliating experience. While every officer and
employee in a private establishment is under the law
deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible
subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage
drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and
who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec.
36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a
narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to random drug test as
contained in the companys work rules and regulations
x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work
place.
For another, the random drug testing shall be
undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as
much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity.
As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that
the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e.,
the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless
to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of
the results. But the more important consideration lies
in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access-controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to
safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an
accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued
by the DOH provides that access to the drug results
shall be on the need to know basis; that the drug
test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential
subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the
confidentiality of the test results. Notably, RA 9165
does not oblige the employer concerned to report to
the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence
relating to the violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a
result of the operation of the drug testing. All told,
therefore, the intrusion into the employees privacy,
under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards,
particularly against embarrassing leakages of test
results, and is relatively minimal.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e.,
the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be
met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth
in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct
of the random testing, we hold that the challenged
drug test requirement is, under the limited context of
the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector,
government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by
the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers,
all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the
public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more
reason that it should pass the test for civil servants,
who, by constitutional command, are required to be
accountable at all times to the people and to serve
them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before
the prosecutors office with a crime with an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6
years and 1 day
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and
(d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes.
In the case of students, the constitutional viability of
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
for students emanates primarily from the waiver by
the students of their right to privacy when they seek
entry to the school, and from their voluntarily
submitting their persons to the parental authority of
school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug
test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the
case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's
office with criminal offenses punishable with 6 years
and 1 day imprisonment. The operative concepts in
the mandatory drug testing are randomness and
suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a
crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or suspicionless. The
ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons
suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled
before the prosecutors office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the
case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let
alone waive their right to privacy. To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal
prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a
persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art.
III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons
are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
SABIO V. GORDON
504 SCRA 704 Political Law Inquiry in aid of
legislation public officers
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 directing an
inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT),
and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to
the alleged improprieties in their operations by their
respective Board of Directors. Pursuant to this, on
May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman
Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting jointly
conducted by the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on
Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation
because of prior commitment. At the same time, he
invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 No member or
staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within
its official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to
ensure PCGGs unhampered performance of its task.
Gordons Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly
ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be
cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is
constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress power of
inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Courts high regard to such power is
rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it
categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad
enough to cover officials of the executive branch.
Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine
in Arnault that the operation of government, being a
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject
for investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate. Subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to
promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the
people sufficient information to enable them to
exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed
with the right information, citizens can participate in
public discussions leading to the formulation of
government policies and their effective
implementation.
MACALINTAL V. COMELEC
Political Law Election Laws Absentee Voters Act
Proclamation of Winners in a National Elections
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer,
questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of
the said act on the following grounds, among others:
immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in
absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void
because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter
must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place where he intends to vote for at
least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates
insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and
proclamation of winning candidates for president and
vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates
the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered
to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are
correct.
HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee
voters are required to physically reside in the
Philippines within the period required for non-
absentee voters. Further, as understood in election
laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used.
Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as
election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place
where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an
immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent
to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of
the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a
voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant
does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified
as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not
be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to
include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-
presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that
way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to
usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of
the presidential and vice presidential elections is still
lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to
the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS GR 122156, 3 February
1997
WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS ARE SELF-EXECUTING
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the
declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched
the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995.
Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the
GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to
accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive
that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching
bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on
prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the
Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are
self-executing.
RULING:
A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature
and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that
they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions,
the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate
the exercise of powers directly granted by the
constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement,
provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the
rights secured or the determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the
right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement
and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a
self-executing constitutional provision does not render
such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-
executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject,
but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional
right and make it more available. Subsequent
legislation however does not necessarily mean that
the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself,
fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past,
modern constitutions have been generally drafted
upon a different principle and have often become in
effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more
like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is
expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated
as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation.
CIR (Commissioner of Internal Revenue) vs. SAN
ROQUE
*Doctrine of Operative Fact
G.R. No. 187485 is a petition for review assailing the decision
and resolution promulgated by the CTA EB affirming the
decision and resolution of CTA 2nd Division. The CTA 2nd
Division ordered the CIR to refund or issue a tax credit to San
Roque Power Corporation (San Roque) for unutilized input
value-added tax (VAT) on purchases of capital goods and
services for the taxable year 2001.
Facts:
The CTA EBs narration of the pertinent facts is
as follows: [CIR] is the duly appointed Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, empowered, among others, to act
upon and approve claims for refund or tax credit, with
office at the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
National Office Building, Diliman, Quezon City. [San
Roque] is a domestic corporation duly organized and
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines with principal office at Barangay San
Roque, San Manuel, Pangasinan. It was incorporated
in October 1997 to design, construct, erect, assemble,
own, commission and operate power-generating
plants and related facilities pursuant to and under
contract with the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, or any subdivision, instrumentality or
agency thereof, or any government owned or
controlled corporation, or other entity engaged in the
development, supply, or distribution of energy. As a
seller of services, [San Roque] is duly registered with
the BIR with TIN/VAT No. 005-017-501. It is likewise
registered with the Board of Investments (BOI) on a
preferred pioneer status, to engage in the design,
construction, erection, assembly, as well as to own,
commission, and operate electric power-generating
plants and related activities, for which it was issued
Certificate of Registration No. 97-356 on February 11,
1998. On October 11, 1997, [San Roque] entered into
a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with the
National Power Corporation (NPC) to develop hydro-
potential of the Lower Agno River and generate
additional power and energy for the Luzon Power Grid,
by building the San Roque Multi-Purpose Project
located in San Manuel, Pangasinan. The PPA provides,
among others, that [San Roque] shall be responsible
for the design, construction, installation, completion,
testing and commissioning of the Power Station and
shall operate and maintain the same, subject to NPC
instructions. During the cooperation period of twenty-
five (25) years commencing from the completion date
of the Power Station, NPC will take and pay for all
electricity available from the Power Station. On the
construction and development of the San Roque
Multipurpose Project which comprises of the dam,
spillway and power plant, [San Roque] allegedly
incurred, excess input VAT in the amount of
559,709,337.54 for taxable year 2001 which it
declared in its Quarterly VAT Returns filed for the
same year. [San Roque] duly filed with the BIR
separate claims for refund, in the total amount of
559,709,337.54, representing unutilized input taxes
as declared in its VAT returns for taxable year 2001.
However, on March 28, 2003, [San Roque] filed
amended Quarterly VAT Returns for the year 2001
since it increased its unutilized input VAT to the
amount of 560,200,283.14. Consequently, [San
Roque] filed with the BIR on even date, separate
amended claims for refund in the aggregate amount of
560,200,283.14. [CIRs] inaction on the subject claims
led to the filing by [San Roque] of the Petition for
Review with the Court [of Tax Appeals] in Division on
April 10, 2003.
Trial of the case ensued and on July 20, 2005, the case
was submitted for decision.
The Court of Tax Appeals Ruling: Division
The CTA Second Division initially denied San
Roques claim. In its Decision16 dated 8 March 2006, it
cited the following as bases for the denial of San
Roques claim: lack of recorded zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated sales; failure to submit
documents specifically identifying the purchased
goods/services related to the claimed input VAT which
were included in its Property, Plant and Equipment
account; and failure to prove that the related
construction costs were capitalized in its books of
account and subjected to depreciation.
The CTA Second Division required San Roque to
show that it complied with the following requirements
of Section 112(B) of Republic Act No. 8424 (RA 8424)
to be entitled to a tax refund or credit of input VAT
attributable to capital goods imported or locally
purchased: (1) it is a VAT-registered entity; (2) its input
taxes claimed were paid on capital goods duly
supported by VAT invoices and/or official receipts; (3)
it did not offset or apply the claimed input VAT
payments on capital goods against any output VAT
liability; and (4) its claim for refund was filed within
the two year prescriptive period both in the
administrative and judicial levels. The CTA Second
Division found that San Roque complied with the first,
third, and fourth requirements, thus: The fact that
[San Roque] is a VAT registered entity is admitted (par.
4, Facts Admitted, Joint Stipulation of Facts, Records,
p. 157). It was also established that the instant claim
of 560,200,823.14 is already net of the 11,509.09
output tax declared by [San Roque] in its amended
VAT return for the first quarter of 2001. Moreover, the
entire amount of 560,200,823.14 was deducted by
[San Roque] from the total available input tax
reflected in its amended VAT returns for the last two
quarters of 2001 and first two quarters of 2002
(Exhibits M-6, O-6, OO-1 & QQ-1). This means that the
claimed input taxes of 560,200,823.14 did not form
part of the excess input taxes of 83,692,257.83, as of
the second quarter of 2002 that was to be carried-over
to the succeeding quarters. Further, [San Roques]
claim for refund/tax credit certificate of excess input
VAT was filed within the two-year prescriptive period
reckoned from the dates of filing of the corresponding
quarterly VAT returns.
For the first, second, third, and fourth quarters
of 2001, [San Roque] filed its VAT returns on April 25,
2001, July 25, 2001, October 23, 2001 and January 24,
2002, respectively (Exhibits H, J, L, and N). These
returns were all subsequently amended on March 28,
2003 (Exhibits I, K, M, and O). On the other hand,
[San Roque] originally filed its separate claims for
refund on July 10, 2001, October 10, 2001, February
21, 2002, and May 9, 2002 for the first, second, third,
and fourth quarters of 2001, respectively, (Exhibits
EE, FF, GG, and HH) and subsequently filed amended
claims for all quarters on March 28, 2003 (Exhibits II,
JJ, KK, and LL). Moreover, the Petition for Review was
filed on April 10, 2003. Counting from the respective
dates when [San Roque] originally filed its VAT returns
for the first, second, third and fourth quarters of 2001,
the administrative claims for refund (original and
amended) and the Petition for Review fall within the
two-year prescriptive period.
San Roque filed a Motion for New Trial and/or
Reconsideration on 7 April 2006. In its 29 November
2007 Amended Decision, the CTA Second Division
found legal basis to partially grant San Roques claim.
The CTA Second Division ordered the Commissioner to
refund or issue a tax credit in favor of San Roque in the
amount of 483,797,599.65, which represents San
Roques unutilized input VAT on its purchases of
capital goods and services for the taxable year 2001.
The CTA based the adjustment in the amount on the
findings of the independent certified public
accountant. The following reasons were cited for the
disallowed claims: erroneous computation; failure to
ascertain whether the related purchases are in the
nature of capital goods; and the purchases pertain to
capital goods. Moreover, the reduction of claims was
based on the following: the difference between San
Roques claim and that appearing on its books; the
official receipts covering the claimed input VAT on
purchases of local services are not within the period of
the claim; and the amount of VAT cannot be
determined from the submitted official receipts and
invoices. The CTA Second Division denied San Roques
claim for refund or tax credit of its unutilized input
VAT attributable to its zero-rated or effectively zero-
rated sales because San Roque had no record of such
sales for the four quarters of 2001. The dispositive
portion of the CTA Second Divisions 29 November
2007 Amended Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, [San Roques] Motion for New
Trial and/or Reconsideration is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED and this Courts Decision promulgated on
March 8, 2006 in the instant case is hereby MODIFIED.
Accordingly, [the CIR] is hereby ORDERED to
REFUND or in the alternative, to ISSUE A TAX CREDIT
CERTIFICATE in favor of [San Roque] in the reduced
amount of Four Hundred Eighty Three Million Seven
Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand Five Hundred Ninety
Nine Pesos and Sixty Five Centavos (483,797,599.65)
representing unutilized input VAT on purchases of
capital goods and services for the taxable year 2001.
SO ORDERED.
The Commissioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration on 20 December 2007. The CTA
Second Division issued a Resolution dated 11 July 2008
which denied the CIRs motion for lack of merit.
The Court of Tax Appeals Ruling: En Banc
The Commissioner filed a Petition for Review
before the CTA EB praying for the denial of San
Roques claim for refund or tax credit in its entirety as
well as for the setting aside of the 29 November 2007
Amended Decision and the 11 July 2008 Resolution in
CTA Case No. 6647. The CTA EB dismissed the CIRs
petition for review and affirmed the challenged
decision and resolution. The CTA EB cited
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Toledo Power,
Inc. and Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 49-03, as
its bases for ruling that San Roques judicial claim was
not prematurely filed. The pertinent portions of the
Decision state: More importantly, the Court En Banc
has squarely and exhaustively ruled on this issue in ruling which may or may not be forthcoming and
this wise: It is true that Section 112(D) of the which he has no legal right to expect. It is
abovementioned provision applies to the present case. disheartening enough to a taxpayer to keep him
However, what the petitioner failed to consider is waiting for an indefinite period of time for a ruling or
Section 112(A) of the same provision. The respondent decision of the Collector (now Commissioner) of
is also covered by the two (2) year prescriptive period. Internal Revenue on his claim for refund. It would
We have repeatedly held that the claim for refund make matters more exasperating for the taxpayer if
with the BIR and the subsequent appeal to the Court we were to close the doors of the courts of justice for
of Tax Appeals must be filed within the two-year such a relief until after the Collector (now
period. Commissioner) of Internal Revenue, would have, at his
personal convenience, given his go signal. This Court
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held in the
ruled in several cases that once the petition is filed,
case of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
the Court has already acquired jurisdiction over the
Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
claims and the Court is not bound to wait indefinitely
that the two-year prescriptive period for filing a claim
for no reason for whatever action respondent (herein
for input tax is reckoned from the date of the filing of
petitioner) may take. At stake are claims for refund
the quarterly VAT return and payment of the tax due.
and unlike disputed assessments, no decision of
If the said period is about to expire but the BIR has not
respondent (herein petitioner) is required before one
yet acted on the application for refund, the taxpayer
can go to this Court. (Emphasis supplied and citations
may interpose a petition for review with this Court
omitted) Lastly, it is apparent from the following
within the two year period. In the case of Gibbs vs.
provisions of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 49-
Collector, the Supreme Court held that if, however,
03 dated August 18, 2003, that [the CIR] knows that
the Collector (now Commissioner) takes time in
claims for VAT refund or tax credit filed with the Court
deciding the claim, and the period of two years is
[of Tax Appeals] can proceed simultaneously with the
about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in
ones filed with the BIR and that taxpayers need not
the Court of Tax Appeals before the end of the two-
wait for the lapse of the subject 120-day period, to
year period without awaiting the decision of the
wit: In response to [the] request of selected taxpayers
Collector. Furthermore, in the case of Commissioner of
for adoption of procedures in handling refund cases
Customs and Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs.
that are aligned to the statutory requirements that
The Honorable Court of Tax Appeals and Planters
refund cases should be elevated to the Court of Tax
Products, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the
Appeals before the lapse of the period prescribed by
taxpayer need not wait indefinitely for a decision or
law, certain provisions of RMC No. 42-2003 are hereby
amended and new provisions are added thereto. In
consonance therewith, the following amendments are
being introduced to RMC No. 42-2003, to wit: I.) A-17
of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 42-2003 is
hereby revised to read as follows: In cases where the
taxpayer has filed a Petition for Review with the
Court of Tax Appeals involving a claim for refund/TCC
that is pending at the administrative agency (Bureau of
Internal Revenue or OSS-DOF), the administrative
agency and the tax court may act on the case
separately. While the case is pending in the tax court
and at the same time is still under process by the
administrative agency, the litigation lawyer of the BIR,
upon receipt of the summons from the tax court, shall
request from the head of the investigating/processing
office for the docket containing certified true copies of
all the documents pertinent to the claim. The docket
shall be presented to the court as evidence for the BIR
in its defense on the tax credit/refund case filed by the
taxpayer. In the meantime, the
investigating/processing office of the administrative
agency shall continue processing the refund/TCC case
until such time that a final decision has been reached
by either the CTA or the administrative agency. If the
CTA is able to release its decision ahead of the
evaluation of the administrative agency, the latter
shall cease from processing the claim. On the other
hand, if the administrative agency is able to process
the claim of the taxpayer ahead of the CTA and the
taxpayer is amenable to the findings thereof, the
concerned taxpayer must file a motion to withdraw
the claim with the CTA. (Emphasis supplied)
****
This Resolution resolves the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration filed by San Roque Power Corporation
(San Roque) in G.R. No. 187485, the Comment to the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (CIR) in G.R. No. 187485, the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the CIR in G.R.No.
196113, and the Comment to the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Taganito Mining Corporation
(Taganito) in G.R. No. 196113.
San Roque prays that the rule established in our 12
February 2013 Decision be given only a prospective
effect, arguing that "the manner by which the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Court of Tax
Appeals(CTA) actually treated the 120 + 30 day periods
constitutes an operative fact the effects and
consequences of which cannot be erased or undone."1
The CIR, on the other hand, asserts that Taganito
Mining Corporation's (Taganito) judicial claim for tax
credit or refund was prematurely filed before the CTA
and should be disallowed because BIR Ruling No. DA-
489-03 was issued by a Deputy Commissioner, not by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
We deny both motions.
The Doctrine of Operative Fact
The general rule is that a void law or administrative act
cannot be the source of legal rights or duties. Article 7
of the Civil Code enunciates this general rule, as well
as its exception: "Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom
or practice to the contrary. When the courts declared
a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution."
The doctrine of operative fact is an exception to the
general rule, such that a judicial declaration of
invalidity may not necessarily obliterate all the effects
and consequences of a void act prior to such
declaration.2 In Serrano de Agbayani v. Philippine
National Bank,3 the application of the doctrine of
operative fact was discussed as follows:
The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view
that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an
executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise
suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of
any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official
act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental
law once judicially declared results in its being to all
intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the
new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law
to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws of the Constitution." It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution
being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or
executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the
merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently
realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the
declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or
executive act must have been in force and had to be
complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in
an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled
to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted
under it and may have changed their positions. What
could be more fitting than that in a subsequent
litigation regard be had to what has been done while
such legislative or executive act was in operation and
presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted
as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is
merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the
judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final
say on whether or not a legislative or executive
measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed
before it can exercise the power of judicial review that
may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice
then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired
prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court
decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, with respect to
particular relations, individual and corporate, and
particular conduct, private and official." This language
has been quoted with approval in a resolution in
Araneta v. Hill and the decision in Manila Motor Co.,
Inc. v. Flores. An even more recent instance is the
opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in
Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (Boldfacing and
italicization supplied)
Clearly, for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there
must be a "legislative or executive measure," meaning
a law or executive issuance, that is invalidated by the
court. From the passage of such law or promulgation
of such executive issuance until its invalidation by the
court, the effects of the law or executive issuance,
when relied upon by the public in good faith, may have
to be recognized as valid. In the present case,
however, there is no such law or executive issuance
that has been invalidated by the Court except BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03.
To justify the application of the doctrine of operative
fact as an exemption, San Roque asserts that "the BIR
and the CTA in actual practice did not observe and did
not require refund seekers to comply with the120+30
day periods."4 This is glaring error because an
administrative practice is neither a law nor an
executive issuance. Moreover, in the present case,
there is even no such administrative practice by the
BIR as claimed by San Roque.
In BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated 10 December 2003,
the Department of Finances One-Stop Shop Inter-
Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center (DOF-
OSS) asked the BIR to rule on the propriety of the
actions taken by Lazi Bay Resources Development, Inc.
(LBRDI). LBRDI filed an administrative claim for refund
for alleged input VAT for the four quarters of 1998.
Before the lapse of 120 days from the filing of its
administrative claim, LBRDI also filed a judicial claim
with the CTA on 28March 2000 as well as a
supplemental judicial claim on 29 September 2000.In
its Memorandum dated 13 August 2002 before the
BIR, the DOF-OSS pointed out that LBRDI is "not yet on
the right forum in violation of the provision of Section
112(D) of the NIRC" when it sought judicial relief
before the CTA. Section 112(D) provides for the
120+30 day periods for claiming tax refunds.
The DOF-OSS itself alerted the BIR that LBRDI did not
follow the120+30 day periods. In BIR Ruling No. DA-
489-03, Deputy Commissioner Jose Mario C. Buag
ruled that "a taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the
lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek
judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for
Review." Deputy Commissioner Buag, citing the
7February 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hitachi
Computer Products (Asia) Corporation5 (Hitachi),
stated that the claim for refund with the
Commissioner could be pending simultaneously with a
suit for refund filed before the CTA.
Before the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10
December 2003, there was no administrative practice
by the BIR that supported simultaneous filing of
claims. Prior to BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, the BIR
considered the 120+30 day periods mandatory and
jurisdictional.
Thus, prior to BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, the BIRs
actual administrative practice was to contest
simultaneous filing of claims at the administrative and
judicial levels, until the CA declared in Hitachi that the
BIRs position was wrong. The CAs Hitachi decision is
the basis of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated 10
December 2003 allowing simultaneous filing. From
then on taxpayers could rely in good faith on BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 even though it was erroneous as
this Court subsequently decided in Aichi that the
120+30 day periods were mandatory and
jurisdictional.
We reiterate our pronouncements in our Decision as
follows:
At the time San Roque filed its petition for review with
the CTA, the 120+30 day mandatory periods were
already in the law. Section112(C) expressly grants the
Commissioner 120 days within which to decide the
taxpayers claim. The law is clear, plain, and
unequivocal: "x x x the Commissioner shall grant a
refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable
input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of submission of complete documents."
Following the verbalegis doctrine, this law must be
applied exactly as worded since it is clear, plain, and
unequivocal. The taxpayer cannot simply file a petition
with the CTA without waiting for the Commissioners
decision within the 120-daymandatory and
jurisdictional period. The CTA will have no jurisdiction
because there will be no "decision" or "deemed a
denial" decision of the Commissioner for the CTA to
review. In San Roques case, it filed its petition with
the CTA a mere 13 days after it filed its administrative
claim with the Commissioner. Indisputably, San Roque
knowingly violated the mandatory 120-day period, and
it cannot blame anyone but itself.
Section 112(C) also expressly grants the taxpayer a 30-
day period to appeal to the CTA the decision or
inaction of the Commissioner x x x.
xxxx
To repeat, a claim for tax refund or credit, like a claim
for tax exemption, is construed strictly against the
taxpayer.1wphi1 One of the conditions for a judicial
claim of refund or credit under the VAT System is
compliance with the 120+30 day mandatory and
jurisdictional periods. Thus, strict compliance with the
120+30 day periods is necessary for such a claim to
prosper, whether before, during, or after the
effectivity of the Atlas doctrine, except for the period
from the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10
December 2003 to 6 October 2010 when the Aichi
doctrine was adopted, which again reinstated the
120+30 day periods as mandatory and jurisdictional.6
San Roques argument must, therefore, fail. The
doctrine of operative fact is an argument for the
application of equity and fair play. In the present case,
we applied the doctrine of operative fact when we
recognized simultaneous filing during the period
between 10 December 2003, when BIR Ruling No. DA-
489-03 was issued, and 6 October 2010, when this
Court promulgated Aichi declaring the 120+30 day
periods mandatory and jurisdictional, thus reversing
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03.
The doctrine of operative fact is in fact incorporated in
Section 246 of the Tax Code, which provides:
SEC. 246. Non-Retroactivity of Rulings. - Any
revocation, modification or reversal of any of the rules
and regulations promulgated in accordance with the
preceding Sections or any of the rulings or circulars
promulgated by the Commissioner shall not be given
retroactive application if the revocation, modification
or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers, except
in the following cases:
(a) Where the taxpayer deliberately misstates
or omits material facts from his return or any
document required of him by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue;
(b) Where the facts subsequently gathered by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially
different from the facts on which the ruling is
based; or
(c) Where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or
ruling issued by the Commissioner from the time the
rule or ruling is issued up to its reversal by the
Commissioner or this Court. The reversal is not given
retroactive effect. This, in essence, is the doctrine of
operative fact. There must, however, be a rule or
ruling issued by the Commissioner that is relied upon
by the taxpayer in good faith. A mere administrative
practice, not formalized into a rule or ruling, will not
suffice because such a mere administrative practice
may not be uniformly and consistently applied. An
administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule or
ruling, will not be known to the general public and can
be availed of only by those within formal contacts with
the government agency.
Since the law has already prescribed in Section 246 of
the Tax Code how the doctrine of operative fact
should be applied, there can be no invocation of the
doctrine of operative fact other than what the law has
specifically provided in Section 246. In the present
case, the rule or ruling subject of the operative fact
doctrine is BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated 10
December 2003. Prior to this date, there is no such
rule or ruling calling for the application of the
operative fact doctrine in Section 246. Section246,
being an exemption to statutory taxation, must be
applied strictly against the taxpayer claiming such
exemption.
San Roque insists that this Court should not decide the
present case in violation of the rulings of the CTA;
otherwise, there will be adverse effects on the
national economy. In effect, San Roques doomsday
scenario is a protest against this Courts power of
appellate review. San Roque cites cases decided by the
CTA to underscore that the CTA did not treat the
120+30 day periods as mandatory and jurisdictional.
However, CTA or CA rulings are not the executive
issuances covered by Section 246 of the Tax Code,
which adopts the operative fact doctrine. CTA or CA
decisions are specific rulings applicable only to the
parties to the case and not to the general public. CTA
or CA decisions, unlike those of this Court, do not form
part of the law of the land. Decisions of lower courts
do not have any value as precedents. Obviously,
decisions of lower courts are not binding on this Court.
To hold that CTA or CA decisions, even if reversed by
this Court, should still prevail is to turn upside down
our legal system and hierarchy of courts, with adverse
effects far worse than the dubious doomsday scenario
San Roque has conjured.
San Roque cited cases7 in its Supplemental Motion for regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of
Reconsideration to support its position that Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner."
retroactive application of the doctrine in the present
case will violate San Roques right to equal protection WHEREFORE, we DENY with FINALITY the Motions for
of the law. However, San Roque itself admits that the Reconsideration filed by San Roque Power Corporation
cited cases never mentioned the issue of premature or in G.R. No. 187485
simultaneous filing, nor of compliance with the 120+30
day period requirement. We reiterate that "any issue, F. FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
whether raised or not by the parties, but not passed LAW
upon by the Court, does not have any value as
precedent."8 Therefore, the cases cited by San Roque FRANCISCO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
to bolster its claim against the application of the
120+30 day period requirement do not have any value IMPEACHMENT; POLITICAL QUESTION; JUDICIAL
as precedents in the present case. BRANCH
Authority of the Commissioner to Delegate Power
In asking this Court to disallow Taganitos claim for tax FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
refund or credit, the CIR repudiates the validity of the
G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003
issuance of its own BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03.
"Taganito cannot rely on the pronouncements in BIR ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
Ruling No. DA-489-03, being a mere issuance of a
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG
Deputy Commissioner."9
MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS
Although Section 4 of the 1997 Tax Code provides that AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
the "power to interpret the provisions of this Code and WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by vs.
the Secretary of Finance," Section 7 of the same Code
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY
does not prohibit the delegation of such power. Thus,
"the Commissioner may delegate the powers vested in SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
him under the pertinent provisions of this Code to any REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
or such subordinate officials with the rank equivalent DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR.
to a division chief or higher, subject to such limitations AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
and restrictions as may be imposed under rules and FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
Facts:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the
House of Representatives adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings,
superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules
approved by the 11th Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives
adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee
on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada
filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for
culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes. The complaint was
endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred
to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003
in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled
on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to
dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being
insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by House Representatives
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by
at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against
the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that [n]o impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
Issues:
Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second
impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the
Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Rulings:
This issue is a non-justiciable political question which
is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the
Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the
sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is
clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality
unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of
Congress is unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that The Congress
shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section. Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to
effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI
clearly provides for other specific limitations on its
power to make rules.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the
Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power,
then it would by necessary implication have the power
to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution
without need of referendum.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the
act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral
to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action
taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article
XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another
may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was
filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate
justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to
the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003,
the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer
within a one-year period.
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial
power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty
which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this
creature called the political question doctrine. Chief
Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that
Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away
with "truly political questions." From this clarification
it is gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those
which "are not truly political questions." Truly political
questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason
for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to
be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on
November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives on
October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section
3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
ANTONIO M. SERRANO (Petitioner)
vs
GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND MARLOW
NAVIGATION CO., INC., (Respondents)
G.R. No. 167614
March 24, 2009
FACTS:
Antonio Serrano (Petitioner), a Filipino
seafarer, was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (Respondents) under
a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the
following terms and conditions:
Duration of contract 12 months
Position Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary US $1,400.00
Hours of work 48 hours/week
Overtime US $700.00/month
Vacation leave with pay 7 days/month
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure,
petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second
Officer with a salary of US $1,000.00/month upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he
would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
However, the respondents did not deliver on their
promise to make the petitioner Chief Officer. The
petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and he
returned to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.
Since the petitioners employment contract
was for a period of 12 months (March 19, 1998 to
March 19, 1999), he had served for only 2 months and
7 days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of
9 months and 23 days. Petitioner filed with the Labor
Arbiter (LA) a complaint against respondents for
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money
claims. LA rendered the dismissal of petitioner illegal
and awarding him monetary benefits. Respondents
appealed to the NLRC to question the finding of the
LA. On the other hand, the petitioner also appealed to
the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not
applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated
Services, Inc. vs NLRC that in case of illegal dismissal,
OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired
portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. He questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause. CA affirmed the
NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary
rate however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue
raised by petitioner. The last clause in the 5th par. Of
Section 10, R.A. No. 8042 states that:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. In case of termination
of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the
workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of
his placement fee with interest of 12% per annum,
plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for 3 months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less.
The NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum
salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US
$1,400.00 covering the period of 3 months out of the 9
months and 23 days unexpired portion of his contract
or a total of US $4,200.00. Impugning the
constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner
contends that, in addition to the US $4,200, he is
entitled to US $21,182.33 more or a total US
$25,382.23 for his salaries for the entire 9 months and
23 days left of his said contract.
ISSUES:
1. Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim
which is the lump-sum salary for the entire
unexpired portion of his employment contract
(12 months) and not just for a period of 3
months?
2. Should petitioners overtime and leave pay
form part of the salary basis in the
computation of his monetary award, because
these are fixed benefit that have been
stipulated into his contract?
HELD:
1. Yes, the petitioner is awarded his salaries for
the entire unexpired portion of his contract (9
months and 23 days) at the rate of US
$1,400.00/month. The subject clause or for
three months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less in the 5th paragraph of
Sec. 10 R.A. 8042 is declared unconstitutional.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers
with fixed-term employment who were illegally
discharged were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their money claims since they
were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the
entire unexpired portions of their contracts.
But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042,
specifically the adoption of the subject clause,
illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired
portion of 1 year or more in their employment
contract have since been differently treated in
that their money claims are subject to a 3-
month cap, whereas no such limitation is
imposed on local workers with fixed-term
employment. The subject clause singles out
one classification of OFWs and burdens it with
a peculiar disadvantage.
The Court further holds that the subject clause
violates petitioner's right to substantive due
process, for it deprives him of property,
consisting of monetary benefits, without any
existing valid governmental purpose. The
subject clause being unconstitutional,
petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the
entire unexpired period of nine months and 23
days of his employment contract, pursuant to
law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment
of R.A. No. 8042.
2. No, the word salaries in Section 10 (5) does
not include overtime and leave pay. For
seafarers like the petitioner, DOLE Department
Order No. 33 series 1996 provides a Standard
Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which
salary is understood as the basic wage,
 exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other
bonuses; whereas overtime pay is
compensation for all work performed in excess
of the regular 8 hours and holiday pay is
compensation for any work performed on
designated rest days and holidays. With this
definition, there is no basis for the automatic
inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the
computation of petitioners monetary rewards
unless there is evidence that he performed
during those periods.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. QUALITIES OF A GOOD CONSTITUTION
ABAS KIDA VS SENATE
FACTS:
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress.
RA No. 6734 is the organic act that established the
ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the
ARMM regional officials.
RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset
the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to
the second Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM
regional elections for the 2nd Monday of August 2005
and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional
elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for
various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30,
2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next
ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with
the regular national and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the
Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
ISSUE:
-WON the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-
readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
-WON RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional
RULING:
No, the passage of RA No. 10153 does not violate the
three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
general rule that before bills passed by either the
House or the Senate can become laws, they pass
through three readings on separate days, is subject to
the exception when the President certifies to the
necessity of the bills immediate enactment. In the
present case, the records show that the President
wrote to the speaker of the House of Representatives
to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of
a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the
national and local elections. The Presidents
certification exempted both the House and the Senate
from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is
unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established
rule that every statute is presumed valid. Congress,
thus, has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality of its acts, and the party challenging
the validity of a statute has the onerous task of
rebutting this presumption. Any reasonable doubt
about the validity of the law should be resolved in
favor of its constitutionality. As this Court declared in
Garcia v. Executive Secretary:94
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the acts
of the political departments are valid in the absence of
a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To
doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the
doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon
each department a becoming respect for the acts of
the other departments. The theory is that as the joint
act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a
law has been carefully studied and determined to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it was
finally enacted.95 [Emphasis ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the
presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No.
10153, we must support and confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the
consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No.
10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the
constitutionality of this law.
Tanada, et al. versus Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295.
May 2, 1997
272 SCRA 18
EN BANC
THE FACTS
On April 15, 1994, the Secretary of the
Department of Trade and Industry (Rizalino Navarro),
representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiations. By signing the Final Act, the Philippines,
among other countries, was put into WTO Agreement
requiring the Philippines to place nationals and
products of member-countries on the same footing as
Filipinos and local products. As a consequence, the
President sought for a Senate concurrence pursuant to
Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution. However,
the petitioners assailed the WTO Agreement for
violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to
develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give
preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
and locally produced goods.
THE ISSUES
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY?
OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE
PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL
QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS
COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO
AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE
ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19,
ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12,
ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID
AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES
LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE
EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR
OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE
OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT
IN PROMULGATING RULES ON
EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE
SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT
AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT
AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT
IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT,
MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND
DECISIONS, AND THE
UNDERSTANDING ON
COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL
SERVICES?
First Issue: JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY
The Court responded that in deciding to take
jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not
review the wisdom of the decision of the President
and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO,
or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a
policy espoused by said international body. Neither
will it rule on the propriety of the governments
economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes,
subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other
import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its
constitutional duty to determine whether or not there
had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate
in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three
annexes.
Second Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSTITUTION
CONTRAVENES
There was no contravention of the Constitution
specifically on the provisions in Section 19, Article II,
and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII. These provisions
read as follows:
Article II, Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.
Article XII, Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact
measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly
owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
Article 12, Sec. 12. The State shall promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that
help make them competitive.
Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of
principles and state policies. The principles in Article II
are not intended to be self-executing principles ready
for enforcement through the courts. They do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation.

Third Issue: THE WTO AGREEMENT AND LEGISLATIVE
POWER
The Court stressed that, as shown by the
foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be
waived without violating the Constitution, based on
the rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . .
cooperation and amity with all nations.
Fourth Issue: The WTO AGREEMENT AND JUDICIAL
POWER
The Court says that:
The requirement of Article 34 to provide a
disputable presumption applies only if (1) the product
obtained by the patented process is NEW or (2) there
is a substantial likelihood that the identical product
was made by the process and the process owner has
not been able through reasonable effort to determine
the process used. Where either of these two provisos
does not obtain, members shall be free to determine
the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems
and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in
connection with our disposition of the third issue --
derogation of legislative power - will apply to this
fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity
clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any
actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due
process and the concept of adversarial dispute
settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most
international conventions on patents, trademarks and
copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of
procedure will not be substantial.
Fifth Issue: CONCURRENCE ONLY IN THE WTO
AGREEMENT AND NOT IN OTHER DOCUMENTS
CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in
the WTO Agreement and its annexes -- but not in the
other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely
the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services -
- is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes
abuse of discretion. They submit that such
concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed
because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which
in turn was the document signed by Secretary
Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon
authority of the President. They contend that the
second letter of the President to the Senate which
enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should
have been the subject of concurrence of the Senate.
THE RULING
The Court DISMISSED the petition for LACK OF MERIT.
The concurrence of the Philippine Senate to the
Presidents ratification of the Agreement establishing
the WTO is sustained.
J. PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed
from the presidency via the non-violent people
power revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos,
in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his
return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy
is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood
firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and
his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible
threats & following supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos
leaders
2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries
aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms
dealer. This is to prove that they can stir
trouble from afar
4. Honasans failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of
1. accumulated foreign debt
2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and
prohibition to order the respondents to issue them
their travel documents and prevent the
implementation of President Aquinos decision to bar
Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner
questions Aquinos power to bar his return in the
country. He also questioned the claim of the President
that the decision was made in the interest of national
security, public safety and health. Petitioner also
claimed that the President acted outside her
jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of
their right to life, liberty, property without due process
and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it
deprives them of their right to travel which according
to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be
impaired by a court order.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers
granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
determined that the return of the Marcoses to
the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to
bar their return.
Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department
has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article
VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the executive
power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines. However, it does not define what is
meant by executive power although in the same
article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the
President, i.e., the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the power to
execute the laws, the appointing power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons (art VII secfs.
14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the
president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has
residual & discretionary powers not stated in the
Constitution which include the power to protect the
general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect
the people, promote their welfare & advance national
interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual
powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that
the President can do anything which is not forbidden
in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable
to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman,
American President) and that the president has to
maintain peace during times of emergency but also on
the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute.
Theyre flexible depending on the circumstances. The
request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of
the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of
abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the
present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that
office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or
denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to
determine is whether or not there exist factual basis
for the President to conclude that it was in the
national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in
the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual
bases in her decision. The supervening events that
happened before her decision are factual. The
President must take preemptive measures for the self-
preservation of the country & protection of the
people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
Fernan, Concurring
1. The presidents power is not fixed. Limits
would depend on the imperatives of events
and not on abstract theories of law. We are
undergoing a critical time and the current
problem can only be answerable by the
President.
2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would
pose a clear & present danger. Thus, its the
executives responsibility & obligation to
prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety
from arising.
3. We cant sacrifice public peace, order, safety &
our political & economic gains to give in to
Marcos wish to die in the country. Compassion
must give way to the other state interests.
Cruz, Dissenting
1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos right to
return, live & die in his own country. It is a right
guaranteed by the Consti to all individuals,
 whether patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant,
etc.
2. Military representatives failed to show that
Marcos return would pose a threat to national
security. Fears were mere conjectures.
3. Residual powers but the executives powers
were outlined to limit her powers & not
expand.
Paras, Dissenting
1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would
allow State to impair Marcos right to return to
the Philippines. .
2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the
event that one dies, he/she should be buried
w/in 10 days.
3. Untenable that without a legislation, right to
travel is absolute & state is powerless to
restrict it. Its w/in police power of the state to
restrict this right if national security, public
safety/health demands that such be restricted.
It cant be absolute & unlimited all the time. It
cant be arbitrary & irrational.
4. No proof that Marcos return would endanger
national security or public safety. Fears are
speculative & military admits that its under
control. Filipinos would know how to handle
Marcos return.
Padilla, Dissenting
Sarmiento, Dissenting
1. Presidents determination that Marcos return
would threaten national security should be
agreed upon by the court. Such threat must be
clear & present.
PROCLAMATION NO. 1102
B. The 1986 Revolution and Proclamation of the
Provisional Constitution
1a. Proclamation No. 1 0 February 25, 1986
Provisional Government announced the assumption
of power of Aquino and Laurel
LAWYERS LEAGUE vs AQUINO
Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she
and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was
issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the "new
government was installed through a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of
the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The petitioners claim that her government is
illegal because it was not established pursuant to the
1973 Constitution. Thus, the legitimacy of the
government of President Cory Aquino is being
questioned.
Issue:
W/N the government of Aquino is legitimate
Held:
Petitioners had no personality to sue and
petition states no cause of action.
Ruling:
a.)Legitimacy of Aquino govt belongs to realm
of politics where only the people of the Philippines are
the judge (not a justiciable matter)
b.) The people have made the judgment,
accepting the Aquino govt w/c is in effective control
of the entire country.
c.) Aquino govt is not merely a de facto govt
but in fact and law a de jure govt..
d.) Community of nations has recognized its
legitimacy.
e.) All 11 members of SC have sworn to uphold
the fundamental law of the Republic under Aquino
govt.
The legitimacy of the Aquino admimistration is
not a justiciable matter but a political one. It is political
because it belongs to the realm of politics where only
the people of the Philippines are the judge.
The Aquino government is a de jure and a de
facto government for the people have made the
judgment and have accepted the government of
President Aquino which is in effective control of the
entire country.
The community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government and all the 11
members of the Supreme Court have sworn to uphold
the fundamental law of the Republic under her
government.
IN RE: SATURNINO V. DOMINGUEZ
145 SCRA 160 Political Law De Jure vs De Facto
Government
Saturnino Bermudez, as a lawyer, questioned the
validity of the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article
XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which
provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent
President and Vice-President elected in the February 7,
1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of
elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-
President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992.
Bermudez claims that the said provision is not clear
as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court to
declare and answer the question of the construction
and definiteness as to who, among the present
incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice
President Salvador Laurel and the elected President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M.
Tolentino being referred to as the incumbent
president.
ISSUE: Whether or not said provision is ambiguous.
HELD: No. Bermudezs allegation of ambiguity or
vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly
gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and
common public knowledge that the Constitutional
Commission refers therein to incumbent President
Aquino and Vice-President Laurel, and to no other
persons, and provides for the extension of their term
to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of
synchronization of elections. Hence, the second
paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding
on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first
regular elections for the President and Vice-President
under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the
legitimacy of the government of President Aquino was
likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it
was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
The said cases were dismissed outright by the
Supreme Court which held that: Petitioners have no
personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of
action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is
not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people of the Philippines are
the judge. And the people have made the judgment;
they have accepted the government of President
Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the
entire country so that it is not merely a de facto
government but in fact and in law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has
recognized the legitimacy of the present government.
C. ADOPTION AND EFFECTIVITY OF THE PRESENT
CONSTITUTION
1. ADOPTION OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION
DE LEON vs ESGUERRA Case Digest
ALFREDO M. DE LEON VS. HON. GOVERNOR
BENJAMIN ESGUERRA
G.R. NO. 78059
AUGUST 31, 1987
FACTS: An original action of prohibition was instituted
by Alfredo M. De Leon, as Barangay Captain of Dolores
Rizal with other baranggay councilmen for the
memorandum ordered by Governer Benjamin
Esguerra in replacing the petitioners.
On February 9. 1987, Alfredo M. De Leon received a
memorandum antedated December 1, 1986
designating new officers barangay captain and
barangay councilmen by authority of the Minister of
Local Government granted by the 1986 provisional
constitution.
The Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of
the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their
terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall
commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until
their successors shall have elected and shall have
qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their
position that with the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has
the authority to replace them and to designate their
successors.
However, the respondents contend that the terms of
office of elective and appointive officials were
abolished and that petitioners continued in office by
virtue of the following provision:
All elective and appointive officials and employees
under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office
until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive
order or upon the designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such appointment is
made within a period of one year from February 25,
1986.
... and not because their term of six years had not yet
expired; and that the provision in the Barangay
Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay
officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been
repealed for being inconsistent with
the aforementioned provision of the Provisional
Constitution.
ISSUES: Whether or not the 1986 provisional
constitution may be validly recognized? Whether or
not the 1987 constitution was already in effect on
February 2, 1987 the day of the actual plebiscite or
February 8, 1987, its announcement?
HELD: The court held that since the promulgation of
the Provisional Constitution, there has been no
proclamation or executive order terminating the term
of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for
resolution is whether or not the designation of
respondents to replace petitioners was validly made
during the one-year period which ended on February
25, 1987. Considering the candid Affidavit of
respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8,
1977, should be considered as the effective date of
replacement and not December 1, 1986 to which it
was antedated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within
the one year deadline, the aforementioned provision
in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to
have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution reading:
"Sec. 27. This Constitution shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall
supersede all previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on
February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been
superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent
OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article
III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective
positions occupied by petitioners.
Further, the record of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission further shows the clear,
unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional
Commission that "the act of ratification is the act of
voting by the people. So that is the date of the
ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the
votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of
what was done during the date of the plebiscite and
the proclamation of the President is merely the of
facial confirmatory declaration of an act which was
actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the
Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of
the plebiscite."
Therefore, the 1987 Constitution is deemed ratified on
February 2, 1987, the actual date of the voting and not
February 8, 1987, the announcement of the
resolution.
When did the 1987 Constitution take effect?
The Supreme Court, with only one dissent,
ruled in De leon vs. Esguerra that the 1987
Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987 which is
the date of its ratification in the plebiscite, by virtue of
its provision under Article XVIII, Section 27 that it
shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the
purpose. (This provision was unanimously approved
by thirty-five votes in favor and none against in the
Con Com of 1986)
The effectivity of the Constitution should
commence on the date of the ratification that is the
date the people have cast their votes in favor of the
Constitution. The act of voting by the people is the act
of ratification. It should not be on the date of the
proclamation of the President since it is the act of the
people. In fact, there should be no need to wait for
any proclamation on the part of the President, if there
is, it is merely the official confirmatory declaration of
an act done by the people. The COMELEC, on the other
hand, should make the official announcement that the
votes show that the Constitution was ratified, but the
canvass is merely a mathematical confirmation of
what was done during the plebiscite.
PROCLAMATION NO. 9 creating the Constitutional
Commission of 50 members
(As compared to effectivity of statutes)
Taada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146
SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents,
moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the
instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is
required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give
the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the
height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads:
there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The
word shall therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matter of public concern is to be given
substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public
nature or of general applicability is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no
force and effect.
TAADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision
promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was
not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws
of general applicability and laws which are not as to
their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in
publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to
the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate
to the people in general albeit there are some that do
not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing
on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of
privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of
the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest eve if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all,
since its purpose is to inform the public of the content
of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of
laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The
Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as
soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of
the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn.
LAW: E.O 200 June 18, 1987 Amending Article 2 of the
Civil Code
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987
PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER
IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A
REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides
that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . .;"
WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be
effective only a publication thereof in the Official
Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a
point recognized by the Supreme Court in Taada. et
al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29,
1986) when it observed that "[t]here is much to be
said of the view that the publication need not be made
in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release
and limited readership";
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that
"[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation
could better perform the function of communicating
the laws to the people as such periodicals are more
easily available, have a wider readership, and come
out regularly"; and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2
of the Civil Code should accordingly be amended so
the laws to be effective must be published either in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in
me by the Constitution, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication either in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided.
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise
known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all
other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect
immediately after its publication in the Official
Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the
year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
III. JUDICIAL ELABORATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
A. Construction
*****SEE MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS*****
Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Margarito
Teves, et al., G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011
DECISION
 CARPIO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of
stock of Philippine Telecommunications Investment
Corporation (PTIC) by the government of the Republic
of the Philippines, acting through the Inter-Agency
Privatization Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific Assets
Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific
Company Limited (First Pacific), a Hong Kong-based
investment management and holding company and a
shareholder of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT).
The petitioner questioned the sale on the
ground that it also involved an indirect sale of 12
million shares (or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding
common shares) of PLDT owned by PTIC to First
Pacific. With the this sale, First Pacifics common
shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to
37 percent, thereby increasing the total common
shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about
81.47%. This, according to the petitioner, violates
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the
capital of a public utility to not more than 40%, thus:
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of a
public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer
period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise
or right be granted except under the condition that it
shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal
by the Congress when the common good so requires.
The State shall encourage equity participation in public
utilities by the general public. The participation of
foreign investors in the governing body of any public
utility enterprise shall be limited to their
proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive
and managing officers of such corporation or
association must be citizens of the Philippines.
(Emphasis supplied)
II. THE ISSUE
Does the term capital in Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution refer to the total common
shares only, or to the total outstanding capital stock
(combined total of common and non-voting preferred
shares) of PLDT, a public utility?
III. THE RULING
Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to
vote in the election of directors of a public utility, i.e.,
to the total common shares in PLDT.]
Considering that common shares have voting
rights which translate to control, as opposed to
preferred shares which usually have no voting
rights, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution refers only to common shares.
However, if the preferred shares also have the right to
vote in the election of directors, then the term
capital shall include such preferred shares because
the right to participate in the control or management
of the corporation is exercised through the right to
vote in the election of directors. In short, the term
capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the
election of directors.
To construe broadly the term capital as the
total outstanding capital stock, including both
common and non-voting preferred shares, grossly
contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution
that the State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos. A broad definition unjustifiably
disregards who owns the all-important voting stock,
which necessarily equates to control of the public
utility.

[The Court partly granted the petition and held

that the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
 Holders of PLDT preferred shares are explicitly
denied of the right to vote in the election of directors.
PLDTs Articles of Incorporation expressly state that
the holders of Serial Preferred Stock shall not be
entitled to vote at any meeting of the stockholders
for the election of directors or for any other
purpose or otherwise participate in any action taken
by the corporation or its stockholders, or to receive
notice of any meeting of stockholders. On the other
hand, holders of common shares are granted the
exclusive right to vote in the election of directors.
PLDTs Articles of Incorporation state that each
holder of Common Capital Stock shall have one vote in
respect of each share of such stock held by him on all
matters voted upon by the stockholders, and the
holders of Common Capital Stock shall have the
exclusive right to vote for the election of directors
and for all other purposes.
It must be stressed, and respondents do not
dispute, that foreigners hold a majority of the
common shares of PLDT. In fact, based on PLDTs 2010
General Information Sheet (GIS), which is a document
required to be submitted annually to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, foreigners hold
120,046,690 common shares of PLDT whereas Filipinos
hold only 66,750,622 common shares. In other words,
foreigners hold 64.27% of the total number of PLDTs
common shares, while Filipinos hold only 35.73%.
Since holding a majority of the common shares
equates to control, it is clear that foreigners exercise
control over PLDT. Such amount of control
unmistakably exceeds the allowable 40 percent limit
on foreign ownership of public utilities expressly
mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
As shown in PLDTs 2010 GIS, as submitted to
the SEC, the par value of PLDT common shares is P5.00
per share, whereas the par value of preferred shares
is P10.00 per share. In other words, preferred shares
have twice the par value of common shares but cannot
elect directors and have only 1/70 of the dividends of
common shares. Moreover, 99.44% of the preferred
shares are owned by Filipinos while foreigners own
only a minuscule 0.56% of the preferred
shares. Worse, preferred shares constitute 77.85% of
the authorized capital stock of PLDT while common
shares constitute only 22.15%. This undeniably shows
that beneficial interest in PLDT is not with the non-
voting preferred shares but with the common shares,
blatantly violating the constitutional requirement of
60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial
ownership in a public utility.
In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of
the voting stock, and earn less than 60 percent of the
dividends, of PLDT. This directly contravenes the
express command in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution that [n]o franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of a
public utility shall be granted except to x x x
corporations x x x organized under the laws of the
Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens x x x.
To repeat, (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the
common shares of PLDT, which class of shares
exercises the sole right to vote in the election of
directors, and thus exercise control over PLDT; (2)
Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDTs common shares,
constituting a minority of the voting stock, and thus do
not exercise control over PLDT; (3) preferred shares,
99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4)
preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that
common shares earn; (5) preferred shares have twice
the par value of common shares; and (6) preferred
shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital
stock of PLDT and common shares only 22.15%. This
kind of ownership and control of a public utility is a
mockery of the Constitution.
[Thus, the Respondent Chairperson of the
Securities and Exchange Commission was DIRECTED by
the Court to apply the foregoing definition of the term
capital in determining the extent of allowable
foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, and if there is a
violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution,
to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law.]
 (2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other
AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its
Tanada, et al. versus Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295.
ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, constitutional duty to determine whether or not there
May 2, 1997
ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
272 SCRA 18
ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate
CONSTITUTION? in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three
EN BANC
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID annexes.
AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES
THE FACTS
LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE Second Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSTITUTION
EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER CONTRAVENES
On April 15, 1994, the Secretary of the
BY CONGRESS? There was no contravention of the Constitution
Department of Trade and Industry (Rizalino Navarro),
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR specifically on the provisions in Section 19, Article II,
representing the Government of the Republic of the
OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII. These provisions
Philippines, signed in the Final Act Embodying the
OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT read as follows:
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
IN PROMULGATING RULES ON Article II, Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant
Negotiations. By signing the Final Act, the Philippines,
EVIDENCE? and independent national economy effectively
among other countries, was put into WTO Agreement
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE controlled by Filipinos.
requiring the Philippines to place nationals and
SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT
products of member-countries on the same footing as
AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT Article XII, Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact
Filipinos and local products. As a consequence, the
AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT measures that will encourage the formation and
President sought for a Senate concurrence pursuant to
IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT, operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly
Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution. However,
the petitioners assailed the WTO Agreement for MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND owned by Filipinos.
DECISIONS, AND THE
violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to
UNDERSTANDING ON In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
develop a self-reliant and independent national
COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL covering the national economy and patrimony, the
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give
SERVICES? State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
First Issue: JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY Article 12, Sec. 12. The State shall promote the
and locally produced goods.
The Court responded that in deciding to take preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that
THE ISSUES
review the wisdom of the decision of the President help make them competitive.
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A
and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY?
or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a principles and state policies. The principles in Article II
OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE
policy espoused by said international body. Neither are not intended to be self-executing principles ready
PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL
will it rule on the propriety of the governments for enforcement through the courts. They do not
QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS
economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
guidelines for legislation.
Third Issue: THE WTO AGREEMENT AND LEGISLATIVE
POWER
The Court stressed that, as shown by the
foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be
waived without violating the Constitution, based on
the rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . .
cooperation and amity with all nations.
Fourth Issue: The WTO AGREEMENT AND JUDICIAL
POWER
The Court says that:
The requirement of Article 34 to provide a
disputable presumption applies only if (1) the product
obtained by the patented process is NEW or (2) there
is a substantial likelihood that the identical product
was made by the process and the process owner has
not been able through reasonable effort to determine
the process used. Where either of these two provisos
does not obtain, members shall be free to determine
the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems
and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in
connection with our disposition of the third issue --
derogation of legislative power - will apply to this
fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity
clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any
actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due
process and the concept of adversarial dispute
settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most
international conventions on patents, trademarks and
copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of
procedure will not be substantial.
Fifth Issue: CONCURRENCE ONLY IN THE WTO
AGREEMENT AND NOT IN OTHER DOCUMENTS
CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in
the WTO Agreement and its annexes -- but not in the
other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely
the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services -
- is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes
abuse of discretion. They submit that such
concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed
because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which
in turn was the document signed by Secretary
Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon
authority of the President. They contend that the
second letter of the President to the Senate which
enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should
have been the subject of concurrence of the Senate.
THE RULING
The Court DISMISSED the petition for LACK OF MERIT.
The concurrence of the Philippine Senate to the
Presidents ratification of the Agreement establishing
the WTO is sustained.
Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
Prefatory Statement:
Last December 1 was the deadline for the filing of
Certificate of Candidacies (COCs) for the 2010
Elections. In the end, a total of 99 filed their COCs for
President. Among the lesser known presidentiables
include someone called "Manok" (because apparently
he can mimic a cock's crow), a six-star general, and a
future "emperor of the world." Considering that we
would be having automated elections next year and
the list of all candidates are to be written in the ballots
while voters are supposed to shade the circles
corresponding to their choices, would all 99
candidates be included? No. Aside from
disqualification petitions filed against the aspirants,
the Comelec can also motu propio deny due course to
the COCs. Aside from the qualifications set forth under
the Constitution, a candidate should also have the
capacity and resources to launch a national campaign.
Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), "the
State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service xxx." Would the Comelec's act of
disqualifying the so-called "nuisance" candidates
violate this constitutional provision?
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared
petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who
could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by
a registered political party with a national
constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with
the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for
public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by
political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among
all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all
the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office
of the president, he is capable of waging a national
campaign since he has numerous national
organizations under his leadership, he also has the
capacity to wage an international campaign since he
has practiced law in other countries, and he has a
platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public
office?
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable
right. There is nothing in the plain language of the
provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of
Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the
Article are generally considered not self-executing,
and there is no plausible reason for according a
different treatment to the "equal access" provision.
Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II,
the provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a
guideline for legislative or executive action. The
disregard of the provision does not give rise to any
cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the
State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public
office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much
to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of
positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as
operative in the absence of legislation since its
effective means and reach are not properly defined.
Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be
subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely
open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal
access," "opportunities," and "public service" are
susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their
inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the
intention of the framers to inflict on the people an
operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public
office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective
office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as
the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the
burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to
be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate
of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing
that any person is exempt from the limitations or the
burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance
candidates and the disqualification of candidates who
have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office
is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to
ensure that its electoral exercises are rational,
objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State
takes into account the practical considerations in
conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the
number of candidates, the greater the opportunities
for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased
allocation of time and resources in preparation for the
election. The organization of an election with bona
fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add
into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or
capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually
impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the
candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to
constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be
bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of
the electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a
senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance
candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of
the factual determination is not before this Court.
Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of
further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the
COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to
determine the question on whether petitioner Elly
Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was
that he was an international lawyer and is thus more
qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only
a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article
VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the
following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
(2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at
least forty years of age on the day of the election; and
(5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a
nuisance candidate and was disqualified.
GUTIERREZ VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE 415 SCRA 44
BY MAROON 5 PARTNERS AND ASSOCIATES JUNE 1,
2012 ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS FILING
AND REFERRAL IMPEACHMENT MERCEDITAS
GUTIERREZOMBUDSMAN ONE-YEAR BAR
Certiorari and prohibition
Date of Promulgation: February 15, 2011
Ponente: Carpio-Morales,
QuickGuide: Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges House
Resolutions of Sept. 1 and 7, 2010 finding two
impeachment complaints against the petitioner,
simultaneously referred to the House Committee on
Justice, sufficient in form and substance on grounds
that she was denied due process and that the said
resolutions violated the one-year bar rule on initiating
impeachment proceedings for impeachable officers.
Court dismissed the petition.
Facts:
22July2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress
opened its first session, private respondents Risa
Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim and spouses Pestao
(Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint
against Gutierrez upon endorsement of Party-List
Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao
27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the
complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on
August 2, directed the Committee on Rules to include
it in the Order of Business
3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes
Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre
Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes
group) filed an impeachment complaint againsta
herein petitioner endorsed by Representatives
Colmenares, Casio, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De
Jesus
J.
HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of
Procedure on Impeachment Proceedings of the
14th Congress and HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the
complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on
August 9, directed the Committee on Rules to include
it in the Order of Business
11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the
two complaints to the House Committee on Justice
(HCOJ for brevity)
After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September
1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form
2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of
Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was
published
After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September
7, 2010 found the two complaints, which both allege
culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust, sufficient in substance
 Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and
prohibition challenging Resolutions of September 1
and 7 alleging that she was denied due process and
that these violated the one-year bar rule on initiating
impeachment proceedings
Issue/s:
Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy
Whether the belated publication of the Rules of
Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the
15th Congress denied due process to the Petitioner
Whether the simultaneous referral of the two
complaints violated the Constitution
Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.
Ratio:
1. NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION
Francisco Jr. vs HOR: Judicial review is not only a
power but a duty of the judiciary
the 1987 Constitution, though vesting in the House
of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to
the exercise of such power as embodied in Section
3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These
limitations include the manner of filing, required vote
to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment
of one and the same official.
-the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or
in the language of Baker v. Carr, judicially
discoverable standards for determining the validity of
the exercise of such discretion, through the power of
judicial review
2. DUE PROCESS: Is there a need to publish as a
mode of promulgation the Rules of Procedure of
Impeachment Proceedings?
(P) alleges that the finding of sufficiency in form
and substance of the impeachment complaints is
tainted with bias as the Chairman of the HCOJs, Rep.
Tupas, father has a pending case with her at the
Sandiganbayan
Presumption of regularity
The determination of sufficiency of form and
exponent of the express grant of rule-making power in
the HOR
the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the
constitutional requirements and providing that there
must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that
the substance requirement is met if there is a recital
of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee
The Constitution itself did not provide for a
specific method of promulgating the Rules.
impeachment is primarily for the protection of
the people as a body politic, and not for the
punishment of the offender
3. THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE
(P): start of the one-year bar from the filing of
the first impeachment complaint against her on July
22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26,
2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one
year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment
complaint may be accepted and referred to public
respondent.
INITIATIVE: Filing of impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress taking initial action of said
complaint (referral of the complaint to the Committee
on Justice)
IMPEACH: to file the case before the Senate
Rationale of the one-year bar: that the
purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: 1)to prevent
undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the
legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation,
that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is
kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts
burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer
rekindle the candle. (Gutierrez vs. HOR, 2011)
THE CONSTITUTION HAS TO BE INTERPRETED AS A
WHOLE
****SEE TANADA v. ANGARA****
CHIONGBIAN VS. DE LEON ET AL, digested
82 Phil. 771 (1949) (Constitutional Law Citizenship)
FACTS: Herein petitioner is a son of a Chinese citizen
who has been elected into office before the adoption
of the Constitution, wherein said petitioner was still a
minor. Respondents seeks to cancel petitioners
registration certificates of vessels and rescind the sale
of vessels from the same on the ground that the latter
is allegedly not a Filipino citizen and therefore not
qualified to operate and own vessels of Philippine
registry.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD: Yes, because the petitioner, aside from the fact
that he was a minor at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, follows the citizenship of his father who
having been elected to public office before the
adoption of the said Constitution became a Filipino
citizen as provided by the same (Art. IV, 1987
Constitution).
Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary
FACTS:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio,
Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in
83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both
petitions were consolidated and are being resolved
jointly as both seek a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued
by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners
allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries to hold other than
government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is
are as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may in addition to his primary
position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive
the corresponding compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what
is required in section 1, they must relinquish the
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who
is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold
more than two positions other than his primary
position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards
of such corporation should either be a secretary, or
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284s
constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section
13 of Article VII other than those provided in the
constitution. According to the petitioners, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in government are those provided in the
Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3
par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.
Issue:
constitutional.
Decision:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive
Order No. 284 was declared null and void.
Ratio:
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of
Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional.
By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries
may hold in addition their primary position to not
more that two positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them
to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them
from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
The phrase unless otherwise provided in this
constitution must be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those particular instances cited in the
constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.
PLAIN MEANING RULE
****SEE ABAS KIDA****
VERBA LEGIS
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words
used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our
search for its meaning. We do not of course stop
there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed
that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed in which case
the significance thus attached to them prevails. As
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document,
it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it
should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should
be understood in the sense they have in common
use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on Tehankee, J., concurs and dissents in a separate
the postulate that the framers and the people mean opinion.
what they say. Thus these are the cases where the
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L. Dizon and Castro, JJ.,
need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37
concur in the opinion of Justice Tehankee
J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. (petitioner) v. Land Tenure
Administration (respondent)
Doctrine: Constitutional Construction
Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
Date: February 18, 1970
Ponente: Justice Fernando
Short version: RA 2616--the expropriation of the
Tatalon Estate authorized by Congress (the first
statute to be specifically tailored to expropriate land),
was decided unconstitutional by the lower court, in
favor of the petitioner JM Tuason & Co. The Supreme
Court then reversed this decision, reviewing the scope
of power given to Congress under the Constitution to
authorize expropriation of lands.
With the ff opinions:
Zaldivar, Sanchez and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.
Barredo, J. concurs in a separate opinion.

Facts:
Congress: RA 2616 August 3,
1959
RA 2616 took effect without executive approval
expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City
owned by petitioner JM Tuason & Co. (to be subdivided
into small lots and sold to their occupants) was
authorized by Congress in view of social and economic
problems.
November 15, 1960
Respondent Land Tenure Administration instituted the
proceeding for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate
RA 2616, as directed by the Executive Secretary.
II. Lower Court: RA 2616 is unconstitutional
November 17, 1960
Petitioner JM Tuason & Co. filed special action
for prohibition of RA 2616 with preliminary
injunction against the respondents to restrain
expropriation proceedings.
January 10, 1963
RA 2616 was decided unconstitutional, granting the
writ of prohibition.
III. SC: Reversing the decision and further Held: No.
proceedings
Petitioners Contention
February 18, 1970 The statute is unconstitutional because:
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts decision
that RA 2616 is unconstitutionaldenying the writ of (1) It violates the due process for landowners.
prohibition, and setting aside the preliminary
injunction filed by petitioner JM Tuason & Co. (2) It applies only to the petitioner and singles
out the Tatalon Estate among the land estates
in Quezon City.
March 30, 1970
Implications:
Motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner
invoking his rights to due process & equal protection Disregard of constitutional
of laws.
principles Misuse of power by
May 27, 1970
SG Felix Antonio filed detailed opposition to Congress
the reconsideration.
June 15, 1970
Supreme Court
Petitioner filed for a rejoinder. The expropriation of
Tatalon Estate in Quezon City is unconstitutional The statute is valid and therefore, constitutional
pursuant to RA 2616 sec 4. (as amended by RA 3453)--
because:
prohibiting the enforceability of ejectment proceedings
or the continuance of a proceeding that has already
been commenced.
(1) It gives protection and opportunity to bona
Issue: Is RA 2616 (rightfully amended) unconstitutional fide land owners (notwithstanding
because it violates the petitioners rights to due procedural mistakes made) in recognizing
process and equal protection of law? their right to expropriation proceedings and
just compensationa barrier to arbitrariness.
(2) The statute jives with the vision of dynamism
and public welfare, as intended by the
framers of the Constitution.

(3) There is nothing to prevent Congress to

follow a system of priorities. It could
determine which lands would be the first
subject of expropriation for valid reasons.

III. JUDICIAL ELABORATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
PLAIN MEANING RULE. WHENEVER POSSIBLE THE
WORDS USED IN THE CONSTITUTION MUST BE
GIVEN THEIR ORDINARY MEANING EXCEPT WHEN
TECHNICAL TERMS ARE EMPLOYED
VERBA LEGIS NON EST RECEDENDUM from the
words of a stature there should be no departure
Cynthia S. Bolos vs Danilo T. Bolos
G.R. 186400 October 20. 2010
Facts:
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos
(Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo
Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Later, the RTC granted the petition for
annulment.
Later, a copy of said decision was received by
Danilo and he timely appealed an appeal. RTC
subsequently denied due course to the appeal for
Danilos failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section
20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. His motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied and the RTC issued the order
declaring the decision which granted the
annulment as final and executory.
This lead to Danilo filing with the CA a petition for
certiorari to annul the orders of the RTC. The CA
granted the petition and reversed the assailed
orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that
the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as
a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
did not apply in this case as the marriage between
Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14,
1980 before the Family Code took effect.
Issue: W/N the phrase Under the Family Code in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC pertains to the word
petitions rather than to the word marriages.
Petitioners Contention:
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also
applicable to marriages solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code.
Respondents Contention:
Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage
with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980,
years before its effectivity.
Held:
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs
this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated
on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of
the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern
petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only
to those marriages entered into during the effectivity
of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code.
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to
petitioners interpretation that the phrase "under the
Family Code" in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather
than to the word "marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when
the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. There is only room for application. As
the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is what is
known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis.
It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or
"speech is the index of intention." Furthermore,
there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum,
or "from the words of a statute there should be no
departure."
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec
Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785, which approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties,
including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-
list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification
of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-
list system was intended to benefit the marginalized
and underrepresented; not the mainstream political
parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which
Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated
the issue to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court
was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in
the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse
of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No.
3785.
RULING:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue
notwithstanding the availability of other remedies
"where the issue raised is one purely of law, where
public interest is involved, and in case of urgency."
Tha facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.
2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may
participate in the party-list elections subject to the
requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA
7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the
Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections,
merely on the ground that they are political parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
members of the House of Representative may be
elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. It is however, incumbent upon the
Comelec to determine proportional representation of
the marginalized and underrepresented, the criteria
for participation in relation to the cause of the party
lsit applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble
purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the
propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual
allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale
of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.
However, seeing that the Comelec failed to
appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the
Consitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines
culled from the law and the Consitution, to assist the
Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the
petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine
compliance by the party lists.
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished
colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V.
Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed
intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled
from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional
construction, however, is that the primary source
from which to ascertain constitutional intent or
purpose is the language of the provision itself. The
presumption is that the words in which the
constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words,
verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of
the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort
be made to extraneous aids of construction and
interpretation, such as the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to
shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose
of the provision being construed.
***ABAS KIDA v SENATE*** TUASON v. LAND
TENURE ADMINISTRATION ***
DOMINO VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 134015
FACTS:
The case is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for
preliminary injunction are the Resolution of 6 May
1998[1] of the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections (hereafter COMELEC), declaring petitioner
Juan Domino (hereafter DOMINO) disqualified as
candidate for representative of the Lone Legislative
District of the Province of Sarangani in the 11 May
1998 elections, and the Decision of 29 May 1998[2] of
the COMELEC en banc denying DOMINOs motion for
reconsideration.
On 25 March 1998, petitioner Domino filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the
Province of Sarangani indicating in that he had
resided in the constituency where he seeks to be
elected for one (1) year and two (2) months
immediately preceding the election.
On March 30, 1998, private respondents filed with
the COMELEC a Petition to Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy against Domino.
According to respondents, Domino is not a resident
nor a registered voter of the province of Sarangani.
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had
complied with the one-year residence requirement
and that he has been residing in Sarangani since
January 1997.
On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division
promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO
disqualified as candidate for the position of
representative of the lone district of Sarangani for
lack of the one-year residence requirement and
likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy.
On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the
COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution
No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be
counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning,
considering that the Resolution disqualifying him as
candidate had not yet become final and executory.
The result of the election, per Statement of Votes
certified by the Chairman of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers, shows that DOMINO garnered the
highest number of votes over his opponents for the
position of Congressman of the Province of Sarangani.
On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May 1998,
which was denied by the COMELEC en banc in its
decision dated 29 May 1998.
Domino prayed: for Petition for Certiorari with prayer
for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the
main, that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year
residence requirement.
The candidate who gathered the second highest
number of votes intervened in the case and said that
she should be declared as a winner since Domino was
disqualified from running for the position.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction
to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy
of the petitioner.
2. Whether or not petitioner is a resident of
Sarangani Province for at least 1 year
immediately preceding the May 1998 election
HELD:
1. Yes, the COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided
in Section 78 Article IX of the Omnibus
Election Code over a petition to deny due
course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. It
is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to
determine whether false representations as to
the material facts were made in the certificate
of candidacy including the residence
requirement.

2. No, the term residence as used in the law
prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and
for elective office, means the same thing as
domicile which gives the intention to reside in
a fixed place and personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. The petitioners domicile of origin
was Candon, Ilucos Sur but acquired his
domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala
Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City.
The petitioner contended that he already
established his new domicile in Sarangani by
leasing a house and lot located therein.
However, the Court is unsatisfied with it. The
lease contract may be indicative of Dominos
intention to reside in Sarangani, however, it
does not produce the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of his original
domicile.
RATIO LEGIS ET ANIMA The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers
Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006,
petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro and other
former political leaders of Surigao del Norte,
filed before the SC a petition
for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No.
175158) challenging the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that the creation
of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected,
would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress,
and would unjustly deprive the people of
Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the
provincial territory, Internal Revenue
Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the
area. Is R.A. No. 9355 constitutional?
Suggested Answer:
February 10, 2010 Ruling
No. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is
below the Local Government Code (LGC) minimum
population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.
Neither did Dinagat Islands, with an approximate land
area of 802.12 square kilometers meet the LGC
minimum land area requirement of 2,000 square
kilometers. The Court reiterated its ruling that
paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, which
exempts proposed provinces composed of one or
more islands from the land area requirement, was
null and void as the said exemption is not found in
Sec. 461 of the LGC. There is no dispute that in case
of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules
and regulations implementing the said law, the basic
law prevails, because the rules and regulations
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the
basic law, held the Court. (GR No. 180050, Navarro
v. Ermita, May 12, 2010)
The Republic, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective
motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its
Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Supreme Court
denied the said motions.
*** (start here) Yes. In Navarro vs. Executive
Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011), the
Honorable Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act No.
9355 is as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the
proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and
the election of the officials thereof are declared
VALID.
The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands, is
declared VALID.
According to the SC, with respect to the creation
of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of
viability. However, with respect to the creation of
municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the
three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity
to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land
area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local
government unit to be created consists of one (1) or
more islands, it is exempt from the land area
requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and
Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to
be created is a municipality or a component city,
respectively. This exemption is absent in the
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a
province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is
expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
xxx There appears neither rhyme nor reason why
this exemption should apply to cities and
municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact,
considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood
that islands or group of islands would form part of the
land area of a newly-created province than in most
cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer
that the genuine legislative policy decision was
expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and
Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but
fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently omitted in
Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the
exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of
the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the
congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC
and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would,
then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity
of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
xxxConsistent with the declared policy to provide
local government units genuine and meaningful local
autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area
requirements for prospective local government units
should be liberally construed in order to achieve the
desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by
the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be
counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward,
and impractical.Picture an intended province that
consists of several municipalities and component
cities which, in themselves, also consist of
islands. The component cities and municipalities
which consist of islands are exempt from the
minimum land area requirement, pursuant to
Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet,
the province would be made to comply with the
minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square
kilometers, even if it consists of several
islands. fellester.blogspot.com This would mean that
Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference
to create a province with contiguous land area over
one composed of islands and negate the greater
imperative of development of self-reliant
communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic
services to the constituency. This preferential option
would prove more difficult and burdensome if the
2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is
scattered because the islands are separated by bodies
of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land
mass.
xxx What is more, the land area, while considered as
an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is
not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot
become a province, taking into account its average
annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time
fellester.blogspot.com of its creation, as certified by
the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is
four times more than the minimum requirement
of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The
delivery of basic services to its constituents has been
proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking
at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010
elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which
cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a
province, they must be seen from the perspective
that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a
province. (Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no.
180050, April 12, 2011)
G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G.
Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995
elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee,
another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec
praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or
holding any public office or position by reason of not
yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his
Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1,
1995, the Second Division of the Comelec
promulgated a Resolution granting the petition.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo
remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995
elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was
voted for during the elections held on said date. On
May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc affirmed the
aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the
canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of
Votes was issued showing the following votes
obtained by the candidates for the position of
Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
RaulR.Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental) petition
praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected
Governor of Sorsogon.
In an orderdated June 21, 1995, but promulgated
according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the
Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose
of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning
gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon
on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the
evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed
governor of Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying
for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation
of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that
on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his
oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after
"his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he
filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in
September 1994 had been granted." As such, when
"the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the
Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo
on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there
was no more legal impediment to the proclamation
(of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative, he
averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs.
Comelec, the Vice-Governor not Lee should
occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division
promulgated the herein assailed Resolution holding
that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of
votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as
duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having
garnered the highest number of votes, and having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on
June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 725 is qualified to hold the office of
governor of Sorsogon".
Issues: 1. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared"
disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a
continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected
to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon NO!
2. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the
election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence? -NO!
Held:
1.)
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No.
87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in
connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R.
No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992
elections. That he was disqualified for such elections
is final and can no longer be changed.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial
of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status
with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his
citizenship under any of the modes recognized by
law for the purpose.
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to
be threshed out again and again, as the occasion
demands."
2.) Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee
proclamation. We uphold him for the following
reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,
"the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of
the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC, Lee
is "a second placer, just that, a second placer."
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a
candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle
the eligible candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. A minority
or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to
the office."
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have
seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch
as he obtained the highest number of votes in the
1995 elections, henot Lee should be proclaimed.
Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous
and should now be corrected.
============================================
==============
CONCLUSION OF THE COURT
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in
the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an
elective official at the latest as of the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to
which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No.
725 to be in full force and effect up to the present,
not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor
impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by
virtue thereof to have been properly granted and
thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the
remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a
new right to resume his political status and the
legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique
situation of having been forced to give up his
citizenship and political aspiration as his means of
escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to
be given retroactive effect as of the date of his
application therefor, during the pendency of which he
was stateless, he having given ' up his U. S.
nationality.
Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital
requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of
the term of office of governor, and should have been
proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his
reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17,
1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is
deemed to have been validated as of said date as
well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely
consistent with our holding that lack of the
citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability
or disqualification to run for and hold public office.
And once again, we emphasize herein our previous
rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and
jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for
annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably
construed the electoral laws of our country to give
fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, for
in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted
to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely
expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated,
legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the
way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections (citations
omitted)."
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every
possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference
to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly
stressed the importance of giving effect to the
sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our
democracy. In any action involving the possibility of
a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court
must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a
manner that would give effect to the will of the
majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause
elective offices to be filled by those who are the
choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a
winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner
must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so
patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal
principles that overriding such ineligibility and
thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the
people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to
the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions
that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect
and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably
failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy
to find fault with his cause. The Court could have
refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his
repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his
failure to show his citizenship at the time he
registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it
could have disputed the factual findings of the
Comelec that he was stateless at the time of
repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual
citizenship as a disqualification "from running for
any elective local position." But the real essence of
justice does not emanate from quibblings over
patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the
spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law
as a brick in the ultimate development of the social
edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and
eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and
sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to
evoke substantial justice in the larger social context
consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation
approximating venerability in Philippine political life.
Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to
escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage,
we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his
loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first
opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to
serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon
overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took
an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he
filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed
naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his
demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to
re-assume his nationality of birth despite several
legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact
and in truth than any legal technicality, of his
consuming intention and burning desire to re-
embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe
old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of
country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost
on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser
 mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was
assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the
most powerful country in the world. But he opted,
nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and
serving once more his struggling but beloved land of
birth. He therefore deserves every liberal
interpretation of the law which can be applied in his
favor. And in the final analysis, over and above
Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of
Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a
leader of their overwhelming choice.
HOWEVER
MACALINTAL vs PET
Political Law Election Laws Absentee Voters Act
Proclamation of Winners in a National Elections
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer,
questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the
validity of the said act on the following grounds,
among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered
an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in
absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void
because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter
must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place where he intends to vote for at
least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates
insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and
proclamation of winning candidates for president and
vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates
the Constitution for it is Congress which is
empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are
correct.
HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee
voters are required to physically reside in the
Philippines within the period required for non-
absentee voters. Further, as understood in election
laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used.
Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as
election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place
where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an
immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent
to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of
the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a
voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant
does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified
as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not
be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to
include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-
presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that
way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to
usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of
the presidential and vice presidential elections is still
lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to
the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
OTHER CASES
Thus, presumption of constitutionality of a law must
TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
be overcome convincingly:
v THE COURT OF APPEALS
. . . To declare a law unconstitutional, the
repugnancy of that law to the Constitution
must be clear and unequivocal, for even if a
law is aimed at the attainment of some public
good, no infringement of constitutional rights
is allowed. To strike down a law there must be
a clear showing that what the fundamental
law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows
it to be done.25
3. As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to
enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos, it
behooves the Court to take a holistic view of
the pertinent provisions of both the
Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. It is a basic
rule in constitutional construction that the
Constitution should be construed as a whole.
In Chiongbian vs. De Leon,26 the Court held
that a constitutional provision should function
to the full extent of its substance and its
terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction
with all other provisions of that great
document. Constitutional provisions are
mandatory in character unless, either by
express statement or by necessary
implication, a different intention is
manifest.27 The intent of the Constitution
may be drawn primarily from the language of
the document itself. Should it be ambiguous,
the Court may consider the intent of its
framers through their debates in the
constitutional convention.28
527 SCRA 746 G.R. No. 167324
Facts:
In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform
Agenda (HSRA). It provided for five general areas of
reform:
To provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals;
Secure funding for priority public health programs;
Promote the development of local health systems
and ensure its effective performance;
Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory
agencies;
Expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance
Program (NHIP)
On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled
Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the
Department of Health, which provided for the
changes in the roles, functions, and organizational
processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive
order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the
sole provider of health services to being a provider of
specific health services and technical assistance, as a
result of the devolution of basic services to local
government units.
A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector
Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the
Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order
No. 102, Redirecting the Functions and Operations
of the Department of Health,
The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be
declared void for violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13,
15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11
and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of
Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly
or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to
protect and promote the peoples right to health and
well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned
provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing;
they are not judicially enforceable constitutional
rights and can only provide guidelines for legislation.
5. The Court of Appeals held that Executive Order
No. 102 is detrimental to the health of the people
cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question of
whether the HSRA will bring about the development
or disintegration of the health sector is within the
realm of the political department.
Issue:
Whether or not the HSRA and EO NO. 102 violates
the constitution?
Held:
The Court finds the present petition to be without
merit.
As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution
are considered self-executing, and do not require
future legislation for their enforcement. For if they
are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the
fundamental law can be easily nullified by the
inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have
already been categorically declared by this Court as
non self-executing. Some of the constitutional
provisions invoked in the present case were taken
from Article II of the Constitution specifically,
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 the provisions
of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-
executing in the aforecited case of Taada v. Angara,
wherein the Court specifically set apart the sections
as non self-executing and ruled that such broad
principles need legislative enactments before they
can be implemented. Moreover, the records are
devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA
supposedly violated the equal protection and due
process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of
Article III of the Constitution. There were no
allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due
process in connection with the HSRA. Since they
failed to substantiate how these constitutional
guarantees were breached, petitioners are
unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this
provision to the petition, and consequently, in
annulling the HSRA.
Even granting that these alleged errors were
adequately proven by the petitioners, they would still
not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious
legal errors in laying down the compensation of the
DOH employees concerned can only invalidate the
pertinent provisions of Department Circular No. 312,
Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable
appointments or transfers are properly addressed by
an appeal process provided under Administrative
Order No. 94, series of 2000; and if the appeal is
meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be
invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No. 102
would, nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the
rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes
invalid, although they may be abused or disabused,
and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the
manner of application. The validity of a statute or
ordinance is to be determined from its general
purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end
desired, not from its effects in a particular case.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly
states: [T]he president shall have control of all
executive departments, bureaus and offices. Section
31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292,
also known as the Administrative Code of 1987. It is
an exercise of the Presidents constitutional power of
control over the executive department, supported by
the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized
by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this
Court.
8. THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
ARTICLE VIII THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
***Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law, which
shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc,
including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and
other regulations, shall be decided with the
concurrence of a majority of the members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon.
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
BELGICA v. OCHOA et.al
710 SCRA 1 Political Law Constitutional Law
Local Government Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of
Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493
and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in
the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary
funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from Congressional Pork
Barrel to the latest Priority Development Assistance
Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations
Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done
in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house;
broken down to P40 million for hard projects
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools,
etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship
grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to
P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down
to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for
soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide
for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds
into their department provided that the request for
realignment is approved or concurred by the
legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit
not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential
pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas
Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the
Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the
earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since
about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged
by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle
blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the
last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system
had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles
had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork
barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-
government organizations) which would make it
appear that government funds are being used in legit
existing projects but are in fact going to ghost
projects. An audit was then conducted by the
Commission on Audit and the results thereof
concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and
several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of
the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel
system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is
constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is
unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it
violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It
regulates the release of funds (power of the purse).
The executive, on the other hand, implements the
laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a
part of. Only the executive may implement the law
but under the pork barrel system, whats happening
was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted,
the legislators themselves dictate as to which
projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a
clear act of implementing the law they enacted a
violation of the principle of separation of powers.
(Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it
was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the
Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional
insofar as the legislators only recommend where their
pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning
the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in
Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the
processes of referendum and initiative are
concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be
delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further
that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government
units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national
emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the
individual legislator to identify the projects to which
his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule
on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the
two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged
in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the
exceptions does it state that the Congress can
delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is
the power of the president to veto items in the GAA
which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this
power is already being undermined because of the
fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can
now identify the project to which he will appropriate
his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president
veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA
again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given
power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to
manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop
their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part
of the members of the house of representatives,
whats happening is that a congressman can either
bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own. This is an instance where the
national government (note, a congressman is a
national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local
government and this is contrary to the State policy
embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its
good if thats all that is happening under the pork
barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of
a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the
presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork
comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a
particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910,
which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD
1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the
appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees,
among others, collected from certain energy-related
ventures shall form part of a special fund (the
Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further
finance energy resource development and for other
purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides
that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to
a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which
shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement
of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to
be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
ARAULLO v AQUINO
Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of
Powers Fund Realignment Constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment
FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his
administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio
Butch Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the
funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects
to priority projects instead of waiting for next years
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was
that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the
funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared
as savings by the Executive and said funds will then
be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP
program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of
such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed
funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations
made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy
Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an
incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of
then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad
claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but
was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out
that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive
projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B
for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army),
Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M
for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation
Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of
the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other
concerned citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP.
Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional rule which provides that no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on
certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI
of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292
(power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec.
29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be
considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers
are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed
funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is
applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation.
It is a program for prioritizing government spending.
As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision
cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In
DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law
would have been required. Funds, which were
already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely
being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP.
Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents
power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain
or deduct appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA
unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen).
Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at
bar because whats involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were
unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and
even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make
realignment of funds, however, such transfer or
realignment should only be made within their
respective offices. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under
the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were
being transferred to the Legislative and other non-
Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices
also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing
project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though
some projects were within the Executive, these
projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is
concerned because no funds were appropriated to
them in the GAA. Although some of these projects
may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under
the GAA because they were not provided for by the
GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to
what was being declared by the Executive. Under the
definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur,
among other instances, when there is an excess in the
funding of a certain project once it is completed,
finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA
does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a
slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory
definition of savings was not complied with under the
DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further,
savings should only be declared at the end of the
fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already
being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle
of the year and then being declared as savings by
the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot
be used as money source for the DAP because under
the law, such funds may only be used if there is a
certification from the National Treasurer to the effect
that the revenue collections have exceeded the
revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was
secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which
recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is
applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate
the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the
Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the
DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The
DAP effects can no longer be undone. The
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return
what they received especially so that they relied on
the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of
Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors,
implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so
found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
Constitutional law; The DAP is not an appropriation
measure and does not contravene Section 29(1),
Article VI. The President, in keeping with his duty to
faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion
during the execution of the budget to adapt the
budget to changes in the countrys economic
situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the
purpose. He could pool the savings and identify the
PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of
savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of
the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve
appropriation in the strict sense because the
money had been already set apart from the public
treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such
actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested
in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the
Constitution [that no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law].
Operative fact doctrine. The doctrine of operative
fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive
act prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that
produced consequences that cannot always be
erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies
the void law or executive act but sustains its effects.
It provides an exception to the general rule that a
void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. But
its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and
circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate
an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is
resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It
applies only to cases where
extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the
extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent
conditions that will permit its application.
The operative fact doctrine applies to the
implementation of the DAP. To declare the
implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without
recognizing that its prior implementation constituted
an operative fact that produced consequences in the
real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and
the Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the
doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the
disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as
the recipients could be required to undo everything
that they had implemented in good faith under the
DAP. That scenario would be enormously
burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates
such burden.
ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
[G.R. L-45081; JULY 15, 1936 ]
TOPIC: Judicial Review; Theory and Justification of
Judicial Review
PONENTE: Laurel, J.
FACTS:
In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A.
Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel
Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted
for the position of members of the National Assembly
for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the
provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as
member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov.
15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed
Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date
to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed
before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of
Protest" against Angara and praying, among other
things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected
Member of the National Assembly or that the
election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935,
the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No.
6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec.
9.
Angara contended that the Constitution confers
exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission
solely as regards the merits of contested elections to
the National Assembly and the Supreme Court
therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commision and the
subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing
related facts, and in the affirmative,
(2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly
RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle
of a system of government. It obtains not through a
single provision but by actual division in our
Constitution that each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from that fact that the
three powers are to be kept separate and that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely
restrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the
government.
In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments and among the integral and
constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of
course lacking perfection and perfectability, but as
much as it was within the power of our people, acting
through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their
sovereignty however limited, has established a
republican government intended to operate and
function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances and subject to the specific
limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument.
The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
When the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after
full opportunity of argument by the parties and
limited further to the constitutional question raised
or the very lis mota presented. Courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must respect the wisdom and
justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of government.
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual
controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National Assembly
on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on
the other. Although the Electoral Commission may
not be interfered with, when and while acting wihtin
the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission
is not a separate department of the government, and
even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under
the fundamental law between departmental powers
and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justiciable and
appropriate cases.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope, and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral
Commission
The creation of the Electoral Commission was
designed to remedy certain errors of which the
framers of our Constitution were cognizant. The
purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members, to
an independent and impartial tribunal.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation,
invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and exercise of the limited and specific
function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although
it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of
government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when
acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And
thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative
power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with
it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character
to limit the time within which protests instructed to
its cognizance should be filed. Therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary
for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
must be deemed by necessary implication to have
been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission met for the first time and approved a
resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing
of election protests. When, therefore, the National
Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935,
confirming the election of the petitioner to the
National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not
yet met; neither does it appear that said body had
actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the
legislative practice of confirmation of the election of
members of the legislature at the time the power to
decide election contests was still lodged in the
legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature
cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral
Commission of the authority incidental to its
constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all
contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said
election protests.
HELD:
The Electoral Commission is acting within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by
the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against he election of
the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the
resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935,
cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest
against the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the
filing of protests within such time as the rules of the
Electoral Commission might prescribe.
 - The SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM:
separation of powers granted by Consti
(through separate articles for each branch)
but check and balances maintain coordination
among the branches. When there are conflicts
between the boundaries of powers and
functions of each branch, the Judiciary has the
power to review and resolve these conflicts
through Judicial Review (referred to as Judicial
Supremacy). This however is limited to actual
cases and controversies.
- that judicial supremacy is but the power of
judicial review in actual and appropriate cases
and controversies, and is the power and duty
to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution,
which is the source of all authority.
ELECOM acted within its jurisdiction since ELECOM is
recognized as an independent quasi-judicial body
which is not an inferior tribunal, or corporation,
board, or person, and is granted the powers to be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the NA. The
present constitution granted the ELECOM with all the
powers exercised by the legislature relating to the
said function of ELECOM, and this includes the
regulation of the rules and procedures of election
protests. The confirmation of NA of its members is
not required and does not limit the ELECOM of its
power to fix dates for election protest, or else this
would undermine the power and functions of the
ELECOM.
GR No.
177857-58
September
17, 2009
Philippine
Coconut
Producers
Federationa,
Inc.
(COCOFED),
vs Republic
of the
Philippines
Facts:
The motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of
the Court dated September 17, 2009, As may be
recalled, the Court, in its resolution adverted to,
approved, upon motion of petitioner Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), the
conversion of the sequestered 753,848,312 Class "A"
and "B" common shares of San Miguel Corporation
(SMC), registered in the name of Coconut Industry
Investment Fund (CIIF) Holding Companies
(hereunder referred to as SMC Common Shares), into
753,848,312 SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares.
Oppositors-intervenors Salonga, et al. anchor their
plea for reconsideration on the submission or issue
that:
The honorable court overlooks the value of the fact
that the government, as opposed to the current
administration, is the winning party in the case below
and thus has no incentive to convert.
In this recourse, it would appear that oppositors-
intervenors seem unable to accept, in particular, the
soundness angle of the conversion. But as we have
explained, the conversion of the shares along with
the safeguards attached thereto will ensure that the
value of the shares will be preserved. In effect, due to
the nature of stocks in general and the prevailing
business conditions, the government, through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), chose not to speculate with the CIIF SMC
shares, as prima facie public property, in the hope
that there would be a brighter economy in the future,
and that the value of the shares would increase. We
must respect the decision of the executive
department, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion.
Issue:
(1) WON the PCGG have the power to convert the
sequestered shares of stock.
Held:
The PCGG thoroughly studied and considered the
effects of conversion and, based upon such study,
concluded that it would best serve the purpose of
maintaining and preserving the value of the shares of
stock to convert the same.
It was proved that the PCGG had exercised proper
diligence in reviewing the pros and cons of the
conversion. The efforts PCGG have taken with respect
to the desired stock conversion argue against the
notion of grave abuse of discretion.
Under the government established under the
Constitution, it is the executive branch, either
pursuant to the residual power of the President or
by force of her enumerated powers under the laws,
that has control over all matters pertaining to the
disposition of government property or, in this case,
sequestered assets under the administration of the
PCGG. Surely, such control is neither legislative nor
judicial.
Apropos the separation of powers doctrine and its
relevance to this case, it may well be appropriate to
again quote the following excerpts from the decision
in JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,6 to
wit:
The role of the Courts is to ascertain whether a
branch or instrumentality of the Government has
transgressed its constitutional boundaries. But the
Courts will not interfere with executive or legislative
discretion exercised within those boundaries.
Otherwise, it strays into the realm of policy decision-
making.
P.D No. 755 which permitted the use of the Fund by PCA for
the acquisition of commercial bank for the benefit of the
coconut farmers and the distribution of the shares of the stock
of the bank it acquired free to the coconut farmers,
involves invalid delegation of legislative power. It is
fundamental that Congress may not delegate its legislative
power, what cannot be delegated is the authority to make laws
and to alter and repeal them.
The test is the completeness of the statute in all term and
provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To
determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of the
legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and
definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not
abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done,
who is to do it, and what the scope of his authority is. There
must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. A standard thus defines the
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out
its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which the
legislative purpose maybe carried out. To determine the validity
of the delegated power, two test must be complied,
(1)
completeness test
A law is complete when it set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate.
And
(2) the sufficient standard test
when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient,
the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority,
announce the legislative policy to identify the conditions under
which it is to be implemented
TAWANG Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad
Water District, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(TMPC) was organized to provide domestic water
services in Brgy. Twang, La Trinidad, Benguet.
Respondent La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a
government owned and controlled corporation, a
local water utility created under PD No. 198,
authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial
and commercial purpose within municipality of La
Trinidad, Benguet.
October 9, 2000, TMPC filed with National Water
Resources Board an application for Certificate of
Public Convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a
waterworks system in Brgy. Tawang LTWD claimed
that under Sec. 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its
franchise is exclusive.
August 15, 2002, the NWRB held that LTWDs
franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive
franchises are unconstitutional under Sec. 2, Art. XII.
October 1, 2004, upon appeal of LTWD to the RTC,
the latter cancelled TMPCs CPC and held that Sec. 47
of PD No. 198 is valid; that the ultimate purpose of
the Constitution is for the State, through its
authorized agencies or instrumentalities, to be able to
keep and maintain ultimate control and supervision
over the operation of public utilities. What is
repugnant to the Constitution is a grant of franchise
exclusive in character so as to preclude the State
itself from granting a franchise to any other person or
entity than the present grantee when public interest
so requires.
November 6, 2004, RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by TMPC.
ISSUE:
Whether RTC erred in holding that Sec. 47 of PD No.
198 is valid
Whether or not a public utility franchise may be
exclusive in character
HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
petitioner. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo,
prohibetur et per obliquum Those that cannot be
done directly cannot be done indirectly. Under Sec. 2
and 11, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, The
President, Congress, and Court cannot create
indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by
allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water
district and Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA) to create franchises that are exclusive in
character. Sec. 47 of PD no. 198 is in conflict with the
above-mentioned provision of the Constitution. And
the rule is that in case of conflict between the
Constitution and a statute, the former prevails,
because the constitution is the basic law to which all
other laws must conform to.
No. The 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitution expressly
and clearly prohibit the creation of franchise that are
exclusive in character. The President, Congress and
the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are
exclusive in character by allowing the Board of
Directors of a water district and the Local Water
Utilities Administration to create franchises that are
exclusive in character. Section 47 of PD No. 198, as
amended, allows the Board of Directors of La Trinidad
Water District and Local Water Utilities
Administration to create franchises that are xclusive
in character. Clearly, Section 47 is patently
unconstitutional.
MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD v. PHILIP RONALD P.
ESTEBAN and TEODORA ESTEBAN
G.R. No. 191567 | March 30, 2013 | J. Bersamin
FACTS:
The petitioner is the mother of the late
Cheasare Armani Chase Callo Claridad,
whose lifeless but bloodied body was
discovered in the evening of February 27,
2007 between vehicles parked at the carport
of a residential house located at No.10 Cedar
Place, Ferndale Homes, Quezon City.
Allegedly, Chase had been last seen alive with
respondent Philip Ronald P. Esteban (Philip)
less than an hour before the discovery of his
lifeless body.
Resolution of the Office of City Prosecutor
dismissed the complaint for murder due to
lack of evidence, motive, and circumstantial
evidence to charge Philip with homicide, much
less murder
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice (petition
for review) affirmed the dismissal holding
that the only circumstantial evidence
connecting Philip to the crime was the
allegation that at between 7:00 to 7:30 oclock
of the evening in question, Chase had boarded
the white Honda Civic car driven by Philip;
that the witnesses positive identification of
Philip as the driver of the car was doubtful,
however, considering that Philip did not alight
from the car, the windows of which were
tinted; and that the rest of the circumstances
were pure suspicions, and did not indicate
that Philip had been with Chase at the time of
the commission of the crime
CA (petition for review under Rule 43)
dismissed
Hence, the petitioner appealed by petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE/s & RATIO:
1. WON the CA erred in upholding the decision of
the Secretary of Justice that there was no probable
cause to charge Philip and Teodoro with murder for
the killing of Chase? NO.
 A preliminary investigation, according to
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, is an
inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial. The investigation is advisedly called
preliminary, because it is yet to be followed by the
trial proper in a court of law. The occasion is not for
the full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence but for the presentation only of such
evidence as may engender a well-founded belief that
an offense has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty of the offense. The determination
of the existence of probable cause lies within the
discretion of the public prosecutor after conducting
a preliminary investigation upon the complaint of an
offended party. Probable cause for purposes of filing
a criminal information is defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed, and that
it was committed by the accused. Probable cause,
although it requires less than evidence justifying a
conviction, demands more than bare suspicion.
Under the circumstances presented, we
conclude to be correct the CAs determination that no
prima facie evidence existed that sufficiently
indicated the respondents involvement in the been proven, and (c) the combination of all the
commission of the crime. It is clear that there was: circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
No eyewitness of the actual killing of
Chase
There was no evidence showing how
Chase had been killed, how many The only circumstantial evidence linking Philip
persons had killed him, and who had to the killing of Chase are derived from the bare
been the perpetrator or perpetrators recollections of Ariane (sister of Chase), and of Guray
of his killing and Corpus (respectively, the househelp and nanny in
Nothing that directly incriminated the
the household of a resident of the subdivision) about
respondents in the commission of
either homicide or murder. seeing Chase board the white Honda Civic at around
7:00 p.m. of February 27, 2007, and about Philip
being the driver of the Honda Civic.
2. WON the circumstantial evidence presented was
sufficient to warrant the indictment of the
respondents for murder? NO.
3. WON the affidavits of the witnesses must be
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to subscribed and sworn? YES.
support a conviction, all the circumstances must be
Preliminary investigation is ordinarily
consistent with one another and must constitute an
conducted through submission of affidavits and
unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable
supporting documents, through submission of
conclusion that a crime has been committed and that
affidavits and supporting documents, through the
the respondents are probably guilty thereof. The
exchange of pleadings. Thus, it can be inferred that
pieces of evidence must be consistent with the
the rationale for requiring the affidavits of witnesses
hypothesis that the respondents were probably guilty
to be sworn to before a competent officer so as to
of the crime and at the same time inconsistent with
ensure that the affidavits supporting the factual
the hypothesis that they were innocent, and with
allegations in the Complaint have been sworn before
every rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
a competent officer and that the affiant has signed
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient, therefore, if:
the same in the formers presence declaring on oath
(a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the
the truth of the statement made considering that this
facts from which the inferences are derived have
becomes part of the bases in finding probable guilt
against the respondent. Well- settled is the rule that
persons, such as an employee, whose unsworn
declarations in behalf of a party, or the employees
employer in this case, are not admissible in favor of
the latter. Further, it has been held that unsworn
statements or declarations are self-serving and self-
serving declarations are not admissible in evidence
as proof of the facts asserted, whether they arose by
implication from acts and conduct or were made
orally or reduced in writing. The vital objection to the
admission to this kind of evidence is its hearsay
character.
Thus, it is imperative that the circumstantial
evidence that the victim was last seen in the company
of respondent Philip must be established by
competent evidence required by the rules in
preliminary investigation. Here, it was allegedly
Chases sister, Ariane, and their two household
helpers, Marivic Guray and Michelle Corpus, who saw
respondent Philip pick up Chase at around 7:00
oclock in the evening of February 27, 2007. Yet, such
fact from which the inference is derived was not duly
proven. The statements of Marivic and Michelle both
executed on February 28, 2007 were not sworn to
before the proper officer. Neither was the affidavit
dated July 3, 2009 of Ariane Claridad duly notarized
nor is there any explanation why the same was
belatedly executed.
4. WON filing in the CA a petition for review under
Rule 43 is the correct mode of appeal? NO.
The filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 to
review the Secretary of Justices resolution on the
determination of probable cause was an improper
remedy. Indeed, the CA had no appellate jurisdiction
vis--vis the Secretary of Justice. A petition for review
under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to
review the decisions, resolutions or awards by the
quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly
those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. In the matter
before us, however, the Secretary of Justice was not
an officer performing a quasi-judicial function. In
reviewing the findings of the OCP of Quezon City on
the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice
performed an essentially executive function to
determine whether the crime alleged against the
respondents was committed, and whether there was
probable cause to believe that the respondents were
guilty thereof. On the other hand, the courts could
intervene in the Secretary of Justices determination
of probable cause only through a special civil action
for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of
Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial
officer of the executive department exercising powers
akin to those of a court of law. But the requirement
for such intervention was still for the petitioner to
demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear
demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed
in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for
review on certiorari, and AFFIRMS the decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on November 20,
2009.
METROPOLITAN BANK V. TOBIAS 664 S 165 (2012)
BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon
charged Tobias with estafa through falsification of
public documents in relation to his loan with
petitioner Metrobank. He filed a motion for re-
investigation but the City Prosecutor of Malabon still
found probable cause against him, and recommended
his being charged. Tobias appealed to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) which issued a resolution
directing the withdrawal of the information filed
against Tobias. METROBANK moved to reconsider but
the same was denied. METROBANK challenged the
adverse resolutions through certiorari with the CA
which dismissed the same. The CA stressed that the
determination of probable cause was an executive
function within the discretion of the public
prosecutor and, ultimately, of the Secretary of
Justice, and the courts of law could not interfere with
such determination; that the private complainant in a
criminal action was only concerned with its civil
aspect; that should the State choose not to file the
criminal action, the private complainant might initiate
a civil action based on Article 35 of the Civil Code. In
the eventuality that the Secretary of Justice refuses to
file the criminal complaint, the complainant, whose
only interest is the civil aspect of the case and not the
criminal aspect thereof, is not left without a remedy.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA has decided a question of
substance not in accord with law.
RULING: NO.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the
courts have no right to directly decide matters over
which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Executive Branch of the
Government, or to substitute their own judgments
for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this
case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy
is that the courts will not interfere with the
executive determination of probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information, in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law, such as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility. For instance, in
Balanganan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth
Division, Cebu City, the Court ruled that the Secretary
of Justice exceeded his jurisdiction when he required
"hard facts and solid evidence" in order to hold the
defendant liable for criminal prosecution when such
requirement should have been left to the court after
the conduct of a trial.
CRIMPRO: In this regard, we stress that a preliminary
investigation for the purpose of determining the
existence of probable cause is not part of a trial. At a
preliminary investigation, the investigating
prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice only
determines whether the act or omission complained
of constitutes the offense charged. Probable cause
refers to facts and circumstances that engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof.
There is no definitive standard by which probable
cause is determined except to consider the attendant
conditions; the existence of probable cause depends
upon the finding of the public prosecutor conducting
the examination, who is called upon not to disregard
the facts presented, and to ensure that his finding
should not run counter to the clear dictates of reason.
A preliminary investigation is designed to secure the
respondent involved against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution. A preliminary investigation is
an inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has been
committed, and (b) whether there is probable cause
to believe that the accused is guilty thereof (De
Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 480 SCRA 71 [2006]).
It is a means of discovering the person or persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime
(Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
478 SCRA 387, 410 [2005]). Prescindingly, under
Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the respondent must be informed of the
accusation against him and shall have the right to
examine the evidence against him and submit his
counter-affidavit to disprove criminal liability. By far,
respondent in a criminal preliminary investigation is
legally entitled to explain his side of the accusation.
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PRESUMPTION OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY
PEOPLE V. SITON G.R. NO. 169364, SEPTEMBER 18
2009
FACTS: Siton et al. were charged with vagrancy
pursuant to Art. 202(2) of the RPC.
1 They filed separate motions to quash on the ground
that Art. 202(2) is unconstitutional for being vague
and overbroad. The MTC denied the motions and
declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted
pursuant to the States police power and justified by
the maxim salus populi est suprema lex.
2 The MTC also noted that in the affidavit of the
arresting officer it was stated that there was a prior
surveillance conducted on Siton et al. in an area
reported to be frequented by vagrants and
prostitutes who solicited sexual favors. Siton et al.
thus filed an original petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the RTC, directly challenging the
constitutionality of Art. 202(2).
Siton et al.s position: (1) The definition is vague
(2) The definition results in an arbitrary identification
of violators (the definition includes persons who are
otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts)
 (3) Art. 202(2) violated the equal protection clause
because it discriminates against the poor and
unemployed The OSG argued that the overbreadth
and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech
cases. It also asserted that Art. 202(2) must be
presumed valid and constitutional.
Siton et al. failed to overcome this presumption. The
trial court declared Art. 202(2) as unconstitutional
for being vague and for violating the equal
protection clause.
Citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, it held that
the void for vagueness doctrine is equally
applicable in testing the validity of penal statutes.3
The court also held that the application of
Art. 1 Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty.
The following are vagrants:
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-
public buildings or places or tramping or wandering
about the country or the streets without visible
means of support;
2 The good of the people is the Supreme Law 3 In
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that loitering has become a national
pastime particularly in these times of 202(2), crafted
in the 1930s, to our situation at present runs afoul of
the equal protection clause as it offers no reasonable
classification. Since the definition of vagrancy under
the provision offers no reasonable indicators to
differentiate those who have no visible means of
support by force of circumstance and those who
choose to loiter about and bum around, who are the
proper subjects of vagrancy legislation, it cannot pass
a judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 202(2) is unconstitutional. OSGs
position: (1) Every law is presumed valid and all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality
(2) The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have
special application to freespeech cases only and are
not appropriate for testing the validity of penal
statutes
(3) Siton et al. failed to overcome the presumed
validity of the statute (4) The State may regulate
individual conduct for the promotion of public
welfare in the exercise of its police power
Siton et al.s position:
(1) Art. 202(2) on its face violates the due process and
the equal protection clauses
(2) The due process vagueness standard, as
distinguished from the free speech vagueness
doctrine, is adequate to declare Art. 202(2)
unconstitutional and void on its face
(3) The presumption of constitutionality was
adequately overthrown
HELD: CONSTITUTIONAL. The power to define crimes
and prescribe their corresponding penalties is
legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign
power of the state as an aspect of police power.
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty.
The power is plenary and its scope is vast and
pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for
public health, public safety, public morals, and the
general welfare. As a police power measure, Art.
202(2) must be viewed in a constitutional light.
In exercising its power to declare what acts
constitute a crime, Congress must inform the citizen
with reasonable precision what recession when
there are many who are without visible means of
support not by reason of choice but by force of
circumstance as borne out by the high
unemployment rate in the entire country. To
authorize law enforcement authorities to arrest
someone for nearly no other reason than the fact
that he cannot find gainful employment would
indeed be adding insult to injury.
acts it intends to prohibit so that he may know what
acts it is his duty to avoid. This requirement has come
to be known as the voidfor-vagueness doctrine which
states that a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
first essential of due process of law.
The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: (1)
the assailed Jacksonville ordinance fails to give a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute;
and (2) it encourages or promotes opportunities for
the application of discriminatory law enforcement.
The Papachristou doctrine is not applicable in the
Philippines since ignorance of the law excuses no
one from compliance therewith. Moreover, the
Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional
on account of specific provisions.4
The U.S. Supreme Court declared the ordinance
unconstitutional, because such activities or habits as
nightwalking, wandering or strolling around without
any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafing,
habitual spending of time at places where alcoholic
beverages are sold or served, and living upon the
earnings of wives or minor children, which are
otherwise common and normal, were declared illegal.
These are specific acts or activities not found in Art.
202(2). The closest to Art. 202(2) from the
Jacksonville ordinance, would be persons wandering
or strolling around from place to place without any
lawful purpose or object. But these two acts are still
not the same: Art. 202(2) is qualified by without
visible means of support while the Jacksonville
ordinance prohibits wandering or strolling without 4
The requirement of probable cause provides an
acceptable limit on police authority that may
otherwise be abused in relation to the search or
arrest of persons found to be violating Art. 202(2).
The fear exhibited by Siton et al. that unfettered
discretion is placed in the hands of the police to
make an arrest or search, is therefore tempered by
the constitutional requirement of probable cause,
which is one less than certainty or proof, but more
than suspicion or possibility. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts (i.e.
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of
the person to be arrested). As applied to the instant
case, it appears that the police authorities have
been conducting previous surveillance operations on
Siton et al. prior to their arrest. On the surface, this
satisfies the probable cause requirement. There is
no basis for saying that Art. 202(2) could have been
a source of police abuse in their case. Art. 202(2)
does not violate the equal protection clause; nor
does it discriminate against the poor and the
unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are
punished not for their status (poor or unemployed)
but for conducting themselves under such
circumstances as to endanger the public peace or
cause alarm and apprehension in the community.
Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a
justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral
conduct. Vagrancy is a public order crime repugnant
and outrageous to the common standards and norms
of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society, as would engender a justifiable
concern for the safety and well-being of members of
the community. Instead of taking an active position
declaring public order laws unconstitutional, the State
should train its eye on their effective implementation,
because it is in this area that the Court perceives
difficulties. The dangerous streets must surrender to
orderly society. Art. 202(2) should be presumed valid
and constitutional. When confronted with a
constitutional question, it is elementary that every
court must approach it with considerable caution
bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid
and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in
favor of its constitutionality. The policy of the courts
is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to
presume that the acts of the political departments
are valid in the absence of a clear showing to the
contrary. This presumption is based on the doctrine
of separation of powers. The theory is that as the
joint act of Congress and the President, a law has
been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be
in accordance with the Constitution before it was
finally enacted.
IT HAS BEEN PRESUMED THAT OFFICIAL DUTY HAS
BEEN REGULARLY PERFORMED SECTION 3 RULE 131
(RULES OF COURT)
Perez vs People G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008
ZENON R. PEREZ VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R.
No. 164763, February 12, 2008
Malversation of Public Funds
Facts: Issue: Bohol. By reason of his public office, he was
An audit team conducted a cash examination on the accountable for the public funds under his custody or
Is petitioner guilty of malversation?
account of petitioner, who was then the acting control. In malversation, all that is necessary to prove
municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. In the course is that the defendant received in his possession public
Ruling:
of the audit, the amount of P21,331.79 was found in funds; that he could not account for them and did not
the safe of petitioner. The audit team embodied their have them in his possession; and that he could not
YES. Malversation is defined and penalized
findings in the Report of Cash Examination, which give a reasonable excuse for its disappearance. An
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The acts
also contained an inventory of cash items. Based on accountable public officer may be convicted of
punished as malversation are:
the said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on malversation even if there is no direct evidence of
(1) appropriating public funds or property,
hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of the misappropriation and the only evidence is shortage in
(2) taking or misappropriating the same,
P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57. When his accounts which he has not been able to explain
(3) consenting, or through
asked by the auditing team as to the location of the satisfactorily.
abandonment or negligence, permitting any other
missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that part
person to take such public funds or property, and (4)
of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late Verily, an accountable public officer may be
being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or
brother, another portion was spent for the food of his found guilty of malversation even if there is no direct
malversation of such funds or property.
family, and the rest for his medicine. evidence of malversation because the law establishes
a presumption that mere failure of an accountable
There are four elements that must concur in order
As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin officer to produce public funds which have come into
that one may be found guilty of the crime. They are:
prepared a memorandum dated January 13, 1989 his hands on demand by an officer duly authorized to
(a) That the offender be a public officer; (b) That he
addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol examine his accounts is prima facie case of
had the custody or control of funds or property by
recommending the filing of the appropriate criminal conversion. Because of the prima
reason of the duties of his office;(c) That those funds
case against petitioner. facie presumption in Article 217, the burden of
or property involved were public funds or
evidence is shifted to the accused to adequately
property for which he is accountable; and (d) That he
Petitioner was charged before the explain the location of the funds or property under
has appropriated, took or misappropriated or
Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds, his custody or control in order to rebut the
consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised presumption that he has appropriated or
permitted another person to take them.
Penal Code misappropriated for himself the missing funds.
Failing to do so, the accused may be convicted under
Evidently, the first three elements are present in the
the said provision.
case at bar. At the time of the commission of the
crime charged, petitioner was a public officer, being
However, the presumption is merely prima
then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon,
facie and a rebuttable one. The accountable officer
may overcome the presumption by proof to the
contrary. If he adduces evidence showing that, in
fact, he has not put said funds or property to personal
use, then that presumption is at end and the prima
facie case is destroyed.In the case at bar, petitioner
was not able to present any credible evidence to
rebut the presumption that he malversed the missing
funds in his custody or control.
RULE 131
Burden of Proof and Presumptions
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
(m) That official duty has been regularly
performed
INTERPRETATION OF LAWS (NEW CIVIL CODE) ART.
10
SMART COMMUNICATION, INC VS. MUNICIPALITY
OF MALVAR, BATANGAS
G.R NO. 204429, FEBRUARY 18, 2014
FACTS:
Smart constructed a telecommunications
tower within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Malvar. The construction of
the tower was for the purpose of receiving
and transmitting cellular communications
within the covered area.
On 24 August 2004, Smart received from the
Permit and Licensing Division of the Office of
the Mayor of the Municipality an assessment
letter with a schedule of payment for the total
amount of P389,950.00 for Smarts
telecommunications tower.
On 9 September 2004, Smart filed a protest,
claiming lack of due process in the issuance of
the assessment and closure notice. In the
same protest, Smart challenged the validity of
Ordinance No. 18 on which the assessment
was based. The protest was denied.
Smart filed with the RTC an Appeal/Petition
assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 18
On 2 December 2008, the trial court rendered
a Decision partly granting Smarts
Appeal/Petition. The trial court confined its
resolution of the case to the validity of the
assessment, and did not rule on the legality of
Ordinance No. 18. The trial court held that the
assessment covering the period from 2001 to
July 2003 was void since Ordinance No. 18 was
approved only on 30 July 2003. However, the
trial court declared valid the assessment
starting 1 October 2003,
Smart filed a petition for review before the
CTA. CTA First Division denied the petition for
lack of merit. Smart filed a motion for recon
before the CTA En banc.
CTA En Banc dismissed the petition on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. CTA En Banc
held that the CTA has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review on appeal, decisions,
orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial
Courts in local tax cases originally resolved by
them in the exercise of their original or
appellate jurisdiction. However, the same
provision does not confer on the CTA
jurisdiction to resolve cases where the
constitutionality of a law or rule is challenged.
Note: Smart raises 3 issues in this case including the
jurisdiction of the CTA, but matubag rani sa ultimate
issue which is:
ISSUE:
1. Are the fees imposed under ordinance
No. 18 are in fact taxes?
HELD:
1. No, the fees imposed under Ordinace No. 18
are not taxes.
Smart argues that the "fees" in
Ordinance No. 18 are actually taxes
 since they are not regulatory, but
revenue-raising.
In this case, the Municipality issued
Ordinance No. 18, which is entitled "An
Ordinance Regulating the
Establishment of Special Projects," to
regulate the "placing, stringing,
attaching, installing, repair and
construction of all gas mains, electric,
telegraph and telephone wires,
conduits, meters and other apparatus,
and provide for the correction,
condemnation or removal of the same
when found to be dangerous, defective
or otherwise hazardous to the welfare
of the inhabitant[s]. It was also
envisioned to address the foreseen
"environmental depredation" to be
brought about by these "special
projects" to the
21
Municipality. Pursuant to these
objectives, the Municipality imposed
fees on various structures, which
included telecommunications towers
As clearly stated in its whereas clauses,
the primary purpose of Ordinance No.
18 is to regulate the "placing, stringing,
attaching, installing, repair and
construction of all gas mains, electric,
telegraph and telephone wires,
conduits, meters and other apparatus"
listed therein, which included Smarts
telecommunications tower. Clearly,
the purpose of the assailed Ordinance
is to regulate the enumerated activities
particularly related to the construction
and maintenance of various structures.
The fees in Ordinance No. 18 are not
impositions on the building or
structure itself; rather, they are
impositions on the activity subject of
government regulation, such as the
installation and construction of the
structures.22
Since the main purpose of Ordinance
No. 18 is to regulate certain
construction activities of the identified
special projects, which included "cell
sites" or telecommunications towers,
the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18
are primarily regulatory in nature, and
not primarily revenue-raising. While
the fees may contribute to the
revenues of the Municipality, this
effect is merely incidental. Thus, the
fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are
not taxes.
Considering that the fees in Ordinance
No. 18 are not in the nature of local
taxes, and Smart is questioning the
constitutionality of the ordinance, the
CTA correctly dismissed the petition
for lack of jurisdiction.
Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation
or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail. (n)
PASSAGE OF LAWS. A BILL BEFORE BECOMING A
LAW PASSES THE NECESSARY READINGS AS WELL AS
THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESIDENT. HENCE, THE
PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
Respondent-intervenor FARM would argue
that it raised the constitutionality issue in its position
paper at the level of the PARC.[163] However, this is a
late attempt on its part to remedy the situation and
comply with the foregoing requisite on timeliness in
the exercise of judicial review. Nothing in the
initiatory petitions of private respondents Supervisory
Group and AMBALA assailed the inherent invalidity of
stock distribution options as provided in Section 31 of
the CARL.
Respondent-intervenor FARM posits that it fully
complied with the requirement of timeliness under
the doctrine of judicial review since the earliest
 constitutionality; to justify its Muskrat v. United States (SAMPLE CASE)
possible opportunity to raise the issue must be with
nullification, there must be a clear
a court with the competence to resolve the and unequivocal breach of the United States Supreme Court
constitutional question, citing as basis Serrano v. Constitution, and not one that is 219 U.S. 346 (1911)
doubtful, speculative, or
Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.[164] This case is argumentative.
significantly different from Serrano as to render the
latters legal conclusions inapplicable to the present SOVEREIGNTY BELONGS TO Facts
situation. THE PEOPLE AND THE CONSTITUTION
IS THE WRITTEN INSTRUMENT Congress passed an act in 1902 allocating land to
THROUGH WHICH THE PEOPLE Native Americans. Subsequently, Congress passed
The Court will not touch the issue of ENTRUST TO GOVERNMENT A
MEASURE OF ITS OWN SOVEREIGNTY additional acts restricting the rights of Native
constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is
AND NO MORE **BERNAS** Americans who were previously allocated land. Then
the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.[168] In
in 1907, Congress passed another act allowing Native
the seminal case of Garcia v. Executive Secretary,
****THERE SHOULD BE NO Americans to bring suits against the United States to
the Court explained the concept of lis mota as a TRANSGRESSION, THE COURT SHALL
determine the constitutionality of those acts passed
requirement of judicial review in this wise: NOT DECLARE A LAW TO BE
CONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENJOYS THAT after the 1902 act, and allowing counsel for both
Lis mota - the fourth PRESUMPTION, IT SHALL ONLY sides to be paid from the United States Treasury.
requirement to satisfy before this DECLARE THE SAME TO BE
Muskrat (plaintiff) and others brought suit against the
Court will undertake judicial review - CONSTITUTIONAL****
means that the Court will not pass United States (defendant), contesting the
upon a question of constitutionality of the less favorable acts passed
unconstitutionality, although properly
presented, if the case can be disposed after 1902. This case comes on appeal to determine
of on some other ground, such as the the Supreme Courts scope of jurisdiction, and if
CONDITIONS FOR THE EXERCISE OF
application of the statute or the JUDICIAL REVIEW (ARTICLE 8 OF THE Congress can expand this scope allowing for advisory
general law. The petitioner must be 1987 CONSTITUTION)
able to show that the case cannot be opinions
legally resolved unless the
constitutional question raised is Rule: See notes
determined. This requirement is
based on the rule that every law has
in its favor the presumption of
1. JUDICIAL
POWER