Adelman - Socialism and Democracy in Argentina PDF

Socialism and Democracy in Argentina in the Age of the Second International
Author(s): Jeremy Adelman

Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 72, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 211-238
Published by: Duke University Press
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Socialismand Democracyin Argentina

in the Age ofthe Second International
JEREMY ADELMAN
H E "failure"ofArgentine
socialismpriorto WorldWar
II has stirredthe interestof historiansand social scien-
tists. Whereas the European working classes became
strong supporters of democratic socialism, the Argentine working class,
even in free elections, spurned and continues to spurn a Socialist option.
What's more, the working class of Argentina, and of Latin America as
a whole (with the arguable exception of Chile), traditionallyhas thrown
its support behind populist parties. The failure of socialism and the suc-
cess of populism are connected: the weakness of socialism in Argentina,
and in Latin America in general, opened the way for populist politicians
to galvanize the unintegrated masses into a forcefulpolitical movement.
In Argentina, this correlation is especially pronounced: the failure of
democratic socialism before 1930 leftvacant a political space that Colonel
Juan Domingo Peron successfullyexploited in the wake of the 1943 coup
d'etat.'
The authoris gratefulto Paula Alonso,Emilio Kouri,Hilda Sabato,and RichardWalterfor

theircommentson an earlierdraftofthisarticle.
i. The list of writersin thistraditionis long. To name some classics:Gino Germani,
Estructurasocial de la Argentina:analisisestadistico(BuenosAires:EditorialRaigal, 1955);
Samuel L. Baily,Labor, Nationalism,and Politicsin Argentina(New Brunswick:Rutgers
Univ. Press, 1967); RichardJ. Walter,The SocialistPartyofArgentina,i8go-i930 (Austin:
Instituteof Latin AmericanStudies, Univ. of Texas, I977). While each of these offersa
differentfocuson the politicsoflabor,all threecoincidein describingthe failureof main-
streamdemocraticSocialiststo earn the enduringsupportof Argentina'smasses, leaving
themopen to capturebyothermovements.For morerecentworkswiththe same angle, see
CharlesBergquist,Labor in LatinAmerica:ComparativeEssays on Chile,Argentina,Vene-
zuela, and Colombia(Stanford:StanfordUniv.Press, 1986),chap. 3, esp. 137-39; Ronaldo
Munck,Argentina:FromAnarchismto Peronism(London:Zed Books, 1987);JulioGodio,
El movimiento obreroargentino,4 vols. (BuenosAires:EditorialLegasa, 1987-go); Isidoro
Cheresky,"Sindicatosy fuerzaspoliticasen la Argentinapre-peronista," in Historia del

212 | HAHR I MAY I JEREMY ADELMAN
But the correlationdoes not necessarilyimplycausality.Democratic

socialism'sfailureto generatesignificantenduringsupportis not an ex-
planationforpopulism.Moreover,the concernto explainthe success of
populismby pointingto the failureof socialismpresumesthatsocialism
would have made inroadsamong the workingclasses if theyhad pro-
moted a prototypeof what laterwould emergeas a populistdiscourse.
The assumptionimpliesthatthe masses,whoevertheywere,were ready
formobilizationand providedthe naturalpoliticalspace fora progressive
movement.The mostpopularaccountof the failureof Argentinesocial-
ism,forinstance,blamesitsleadershipforemulatingEuropean Socialists
and failingto appreciatethereal interestsofArgentine workers.2
This articlehopes to contributeto a reassessmentof the Argentine
Socialistexperience.It looksat one aspectofthe Socialistmovement:the
thinkingand strategybehindelectoralparticipation priorto the coup of
1930, and especiallysurrounding the complexand intenseyears of the
transitionto democracy,from1g9o to theelectionofHipolitoYrigoyenin
1916.3Democraticpoliticswas important to ArgentineSocialistsbecause
theychampioneda parliamentary road to socialismover others,such as
movimiento obreroen AmericaLatina, ed. Pablo Gonzalez Casanova,vol. 4 (Mexico City:

Siglo Veintiuno,1984), 147-99.
historiography.
2. This is especiallytrueoftheleft-nationalist A classicrenditioncan be
foundin JorgeAbelardoRamos,Revoluci6nycontra-revoluci6n en Argentina:el sextodomi-
nio, 1922-1943, 5thed. (BuenosAires:Plus Ultra,1973), and one morerecentlylaundered
in Godio's multivolume Movimientoobreroargentino.For recentattemptsto reassessthe
politicalbehavioroftheArgentine workingclass,see Jeremy Adelman,"The PoliticalEcon-
omyofLabour in Argentina,1870-1930,"and OfeliaPianetto,"The Labour Movementand
the HistoricalConjuncture:C6rdoba, 1917-1921," in Essays in ArgentineLabour History,
1870-1939, ed. Jeremy Adelman(London: Macmillan,1992); RicardoFalc6n, "Izquierdas,
regimenpolitico,cuesti6netnicay cuesti6nsocial en Argentina(1890-1912)," 12 Anuario.
Segunda Epoca, Escuela de Historia,UniversidadNacionalde Rosario(Rosario,1986-87),
367-88. Torcuato S. Di Tella has tried to reconcilethe nationalistrevisionistliterature
and more recentstudiesofthe workingclass by emphasizingthe internalheterogeneity of
the labor movementand the failureofworking-class leadersto emulatethe naturalaffinity
for caudillismoamong Argentineworkers,especiallyof the interior.See his "Working-
Class Organizationand Politicsin Argentina,"LatinAmnerican ResearchReview16:2 (1981),
33-56.
3. This articlebuilds on RichardWalter'sseminalworkon pre-1930spartypolitics.
See his "MunicipalPoliticsand Government in BuenosAires,1918-1930," JournalofInter-
AmericanStudiesand WorldAffairs16:2 (May 1974), and "Electionsin the CityofBuenos
Aires duringthe First YrigoyenAdministration: Social Class and PoliticalPreferences,"
HAHR 58:4 (Nov. 1978),595-624. A less informative piece is E. SpencerWellhofer, "Politi-
cal PartyDevelopmentin Argentina:The Emergenceof SocialistPartyParliamentarism,"
Journalof Inter-American Studiesand WorldAffairs17:2 (May 1975), 153-74. Fine work
on the earlyhistoryof the partysystemcan be foundin Anne L. Potter,"The Failure of
Democracyin Argentina,1916-1930: An Institutional Perspective," JournalofLatinAmeri-
can Studies 13:1 (May 1981), 83-109; Karen L. Remmer,PartyCompetitionin Argentina
and Chile: PoliticalRecruitment and PublicPolicy,i8go-i930 (Lincoln:Univ. of Nebraska
Press, 1984),93-104. While Potterand Remmerexaminepartycompetition, theypay scant
attentionto the Socialistparty.

SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA 213
revolutionary or syndicalroutes.Theirchoice hingedon a numberofas-

sumptionsabout democracy.These assumptions-discussedin the first
section-and the strategythatflowedfromthe theory-discussedin the
second section-set the contextforthe Socialistparty'sinvolvementin
Argentina'sbriefexperiencewithdemocracybeforeWorldWar II.
This essayarguesthatArgentine Socialistsboundthemselvesin a theo-
reticaltrap.They called fortwotransitions: a transitionto "real" democ-
racyand a transitionto socialism.By demanding"real" democracy,they
depreciatedthe systemalreadyin operation.At the same time,theyar-
gued thatworkerswouldbe fullyenlightened votersonlywhenthe march
towardsocialismhad begun. The transition to socialismwas a precondi-
tionfor"real" democracy,but onlyin a "real"democracywould workers
be enlightenedor "conscious"enoughto vote forSocialists.How could
Socialistspursuea parliamentary road to socialismifthe end resultwas a
precondition forrationalvotingbehavior?Argentine Socialistswere never
able to resolvethis teleologicalproblem,and it plagued theirelectoral
strategy,whichturneditsbackon the"unconscious"voter.
The Questionof Democracy

ArgentineSocialistswere profoundly affectedby the reigningpolitical
theoriesof the Second International.In Marx'stime,the prospectsfora
democraticrouteto socialismwere bleak,and Marxhimselfbelievedthat
socialismwould come about onlywitha violentand cataclysmicrevolu-
tion.By the 188os, however,afterMarx'sdeath,mattersbegan to change.
In the wake of Bismark'spoliticalopening,GermanSocialistpoliticians
were able to organizeeffectively.In no time,the GermanSocial Demo-
craticpartybecame the largestpoliticalpartyin Europe. Accordingly,
the ErfurtProgramofthe Second International (1891)anchoredSocialist
politicsto democracy:onlythroughelectedrepresentative politicswould
socialismbe achieved.4
At the same time,Socialistgroups(oftenled by European and espe-
cially German exiles) began to formin Latin Americancities, mainly
Buenos Aires.These disparategroupswere soon takenoverby a genera-
tionofArgentine-born Socialists.A nucleusofSocialistcenterswitha new
nativeleadershipformedthecoreoftheArgentine Socialistpartyin 1896.5
Theirdoctrine,however,was importedfromEurope.
4. For a summary,see Carl E. Schorske,GermanSocial Democracy,1905-1917: The

DevelopmentoftheGreat Schism(Cambridge:HarvardUniv.Press,1955), 4-6; JamesJoll,
The Second International, 1889-1914 (London:Weidenfeld
and Nicolson,1955), 7-36; Adam
Przeworskiand JohnSprague,PaperStones:A HistoryofElectoralSocialism(Chicago:Univ.
ofChicago Press, 1986),esp. 29-60.
5. The PartidoSocialistaObreroInternacionalformedin April1895;held itsfirstexecu-

Socialists,European and Argentine,soon abandonedMarx'sprefer-

ence forrevolutionary politics,but theystillsubscribedto Marx'stheo-
reticalsubordination ofpoliticsto socialand economicdevelopment.The
laws ofmotiongoverningsocialformations were drivenby the needs and
level ofsophisticationofthe economic"base." Politicscould meddlewith
the needs of technology, but oftenat the cost ofmisuseor misallocation
of the means of production.In time,progresswas markedby less inter-
ferenceby politicsin the economicrealm.Capitalism'sgreatsuperiority
was itsabilityto shed noneconomicobstaclesto self-sustainedtechnologi-
cal development.Historywas supposedto see politicsincreasingly mirror
economics.6
TheoreticiansoftheSecondInternational stretchedtherelativenature
ofpoliticsto a logicalconclusion:a Socialistpoliticalpartycould notpush
a societybeyondwhat the economicbase would allow. The founderof
the ArgentinePartidoSocialista(PS), JuanB. Justo,tookthiscredo seri-
ously. Fromhis readingof Marxand nineteenth-century positivistssuch
as HerbertSpencerand AugusteComte,he understood
the forceof the phenomenonof productionwithinthe framework of
history,the subordinationofpoliticalandjuridicalinstitutions
to tech-
nologyand the economy,and the incessantsocial evolutionwhich
is historyitself,and the weaknessof all writtenlaws which impede
technical-economic forces.7
For Justo,Marxand Engels "werethe firstto understandthoroughly
the historicalrole ofthe mode ofproduction,to whichare subordinated
all otherphases ofsociallife."8The primacyofeconomicsoverpoliticsin
determining the courseofhistorywas a powerfultheoreticaltool against
forcesaspiringto takepoliticsbeyondtheparliamentary realm.
A physicianby training,Justojoined the youthwing of the Union
tive meetingin October,whenit changeditsnameto PartidoSocialistaObreroArgentino;

and held its firstcongressin June1896. Walter,SocialistParty,17-37; Michael F. Mul-
laney,"The ArgentineSocialistParty,1890-1930: EarlyDevelopmentand InternalSchisms"
(Ph.D. diss., Universityof Essex, 1982), 13-48. For a selectionof writingsby the most
importantMarxistto come fromEurope, see Leonardo Paso, ed., La clase obrera y el
nacimientodel marxismoen la Argentina,selecci6nde articulosde GermanAve Lallemant
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Anteo, 1974).
6. Noberto Bobbio, Which Socialism?:Marxism,Socialismand Democracy, trans.
RogerGriffin, ed. RichardBellamy(Minneapolis:Univ.ofMinnesotaPress, 1987), 37-39.
7. Juan B. Justo,Economia, valor, interes(Buenos Aires: EditorialLa Vanguardia,
1928), 4; Teoria y practicade la historia(BuenosAires:Lotitoy Barberis,1969), 6-1o. The
formerwas written in 1913, the latter in 1909.
8. Justo,Teoriay practica,6o-6i; and "El CongresoSocialistaInternacionalde Copen-
hagen"(1910), in Internacionalismo y patria: obras completas,vol. 5 (BuenosAires:Libre-
ria "La Vanguardia,"1925), 14. Hereafterall referencesto Justo'scompleteworksare cited
as OC.

Civica, then an oppositionmovementamongthe politicalforcesof the

late i88os. In 1890, when a groupfromthe Union Civica joined other
forcesin an abortiverebellionagainstPresidentJu'arezCelman,Justolent
his medicalservicesto the cause. The faileduprisinglefta lastingmark:
Justodefectedfromthe Union Civica, charginghis formercohortswith
adventurism, withtryingto pushpoliticsbeyondtheboundsofwhatcon-
ditionswould allow. His Socialistinclinations grewalongwithhis disgust
at thevoluntarism ofthenewbornUnionCivicaRadical(UCR), whichled
a revoltin 1893and forwhichJustoheld a lifetimeabhorrence.9
In 1895,touringEurope and theUnitedStatesafterfinishing his trans-
lation of the firstvolume of Das Kapital, Justowitnessedanotherver-
sion of politicaladventurism: WilliamJenningsBryan'spopulism.Justo
saw the "freesilver"campaignin the UnitedStatesas the last gasp of a
dyingmiddleclass caughtbetweena swellingproletariat and a voracious
bourgeoisie.It was retrograde,mystical,and out of step witheconomic
and technicaldevelopments.'0 The experiencecontributed to Justo'ssus-
picion of and hostilitytowardanythingresemblingpopulism,and when
he foundedthe PartidoSocialistain June1896 he made the basic prin-
ciples clear: all politicalprojectswereto be keptwithinthe realmofwhat
could be modestlyrealized. No politicalproposalcould violatewhatthe
economycould sustain.When dissentdid emergewithinthe party,Justo
preferredwholesaledefectionsto preserveideologicalpurityratherthan
acceptance of internaldifferences. Justo'sfirmhand overthe partyuntil
his deathin January1928 ensuredthatdemocraticsocialismin Argentina
conformedto thiselementary reductionofpoliticsto economics."
9. The mostdetailedJustobiographiesare bothbyDardo Cuneo:JuanB. Justo(Buenos

Aires:EditorialAmericalee,1945), andJuan B. Justoy las luchas sociales en la Argentina
(BuenosAires:ALPE, 1956), but theyread morelikehagiography. Biographicalinformation
is also scatteredthroughout JoseArico,"La hip6tesisde Justo:una propuestalatinoameri-
cana de recreaci6ndel socialismo"(unpublishedms., Centrode EstudiosContemporaneos,
UniversidadAut6nomade Puebla, 1981). For Justo'schargeagainsttheUCR see Cuneo, 73;
and Justo,"El momentoactual del socialismo:II" (I920), RevistaSocialista6 (June1935),
403-4.
10. Justo,En los Estados Unidos.Apuntesescritosen 1895 para un peri6dicoobrero
(BuenosAires:EditorialLa Vanguardia,1928),65-78.
11. Justo'sinfluenceoverthe partywouldbe hardto uinderestimate. As a professor
on
the medical facultyof the University of Buenos Aires,he was seen as the modernizerof
Argentinemedicine;as Marx'sfirstArgentinetranslator, he was seen as the authorityon
Socialisttheory.His voraciousreadingofEnglish,French,and GermanSocialisttractsen-
sured his unchallengedintellectualleadership.Long afterhis death,Justo'swritingswere
printedin La Vanguardia,thepartynewspaper,and well intothe 1940She was stillcitedto
back up partypolicies.Perhapstheonlysystematic challelngeto Justo'ssocialismcame from
the little-known Manuel Ugarte,who was ejected fromthe partyin 1913. Justo'sview of
internaldissentis the runningthemein Mullaney's"Argentine SocialistParty."On Ugarte,
see BenitoMarianetti,Manuel Ugarte:un precursoren la lucha emancipadorade Ameirica
Latina (BuenosAires:EdicionesSilalba, 1976),29-92.

216 I HAHR I MAY I JEREMY ADELMAN
But how did the Socialistsjustifyparticipating in a systembetter

knownforitswidespreadfraudand corruption, bothbeforeand afterthe
electoralreformof 1912? International Socialists,Justoincluded,also had
inheriteda kind of positivist-naturalism thatwas increasinglyin vogue
afterMarx'sdeath,whenEngels' influenceon Socialistthoughtprevailed.
This thinkingheld thatthe breakdownof capitalismwas a precondition
forsocialism,and thatsuch a breakdownwas inevitableaccordingto the
overarching laws ofmotionofhistory. 12 The beliefin thisinevitability,
re-
inforcedby an elaboratearrayof technicalexplanationsforcapitalism's
economiccontradictions, enthusedSocialistswiththe further beliefthat
participationin electoralpoliticsmightcoax the transition.Socialism-
"the enlightenedexpressionof historicalinevitability," to borrowPrze-
worski'sdescription-couldplaythedemocraticgamewithoutlosingand
could acceleratethetransitionto a classlessor"real"democracy.ForJusto,
the naturallaws ofprogresswere as sharplydefinedas the solarsystem:
The worldofhistoryis a massofmenand thingsmovedand shapedby
forcesas regularas thosewhichmovethe solarsystemand mold the
earth. Historicalphenomenaare also logicaland necessary,the fatal
consequencesofcombinations determinedby circumstance.13
The naturaland immutablelaws ofhistorymade socialismthe logical
and fataldestinyofsociety.Butwhatdeterminedthatsocialismwould be
the naturaloutcome?Justoand his mostdevoutfollowerswere doctors,
and as such were versedin Darwin'sevolutionary biology.For manyof
them, Spencer's Social Darwinismwas moreformative than Marx'sdia-
lectics.14 Socialismwould win by naturalselection:in economicterms,
the collectivepracticesof socialismwere superiorto the individualized
practicesofcompetitive capitalism.Andsincethefittest survive,socialism
would simplyelbowcapitalismintothepast. Understanding thebiological
basis of social development,in Justo'sview,dispelledidealistnotionsof
the past and futureand, at the same time,offereda simpleexplanation
forthe adventof socialism:socialismadaptsbetterthancapitalismto the
exigenciesoftechnology. 15
12. PeterGay,The DilemmaofDemocraticSocialism:Eduard Bernstein's Challengeto

Marx (New York:Collier Books, 1962), 87-88, 298-99; and Adam Przeworski,Capitalism
and Social Democracy (Cambridge:CambridgeUniv.Press, 1985), 49-50.
13. Justo,Teoria y practica, 9-0o.
14. See, forinstance,Nicolas Repetto'sconfessionthatSpencer was moreinfluential
and thatMarxwas unintelligible, in Mi paso por la politica,de Roca a Yrigoyen(Buenos
Aires:S. Reuda, 1956),35. See also EnriqueDickmann,Recuerdosde un inilitante socialista
(Buenos Aires: Editorial La Vanguardia, 1949), 418.
15. Justo'sconfidencein naturalselectionled him to argue thatthe laws of evolution
toolsthanwere dialectics.Justo,Teoriay practica,19-27; and "El
were betterexplanatory

Hence politicswas subordinateto economics,and economics was

bound by the laws ofnaturalselection,whichwould make the transition
to socialisminevitable.But ifpoliticswas onlyrelativeand socialismin-
evitable,whydid Socialistsengagein democraticpoliticsat all? Socialist
partiesworldwidethrewthemselvesinto the melee of late nineteenth-
centurydemocraticpoliticsbelievingthattheycould guide the progress
oftransition.As theenlightenedbearersofthetruth,theycould "legislate
thesocietyintosocialism"(toborrowanotherofPrzeworski's phrases)and
mitigatetheviolenceand costofthetransition.'6 Capitalism,by enlarging
theranksoftheproletariat, wouldcreatemoreSocialistvoters,and liberal
governments would graduallygiveway to Socialistones. "When thisin-
fluencebecomespreponderant," wroteJustoin 1902, "the Statewillhave
lostitspolice function,
and the government willbe electedto develop,to
the maximumofits ability,and forthe good ofsociety,its administrative
function."
17
The intellectualarsenal to justifySocialistparticipationin electoral

politicsrestedon one criticallink:it assumedthatworkerswould auto-
maticallyand necessarilytranslatetheirobjectiveinterests as workersinto
subjectivepracticesas Socialistvoters.Workerswere expected to vote
Socialistbecause theywere workers.Justas economicsdeterminedpoli-
tics, the voter'slocationin the productionprocessdeterminedelectoral
preference.For Justo,"experienceis the sourceofall knowledgeand the
inexorablecritiqueof illusion,"and since workwas the mostimportant
and constantexperience,it was onlynaturalthatthe experienceofbeing
proletarianinstructed theworkeras to his lamentablecondition.'8 Experi-
ence, in Justo'sview, "obviously"determinedconsciousness,and "once
exploitation is feltand understood,nothingcan impede the workerfrom
defendinghimselfand maintaining his rightto strugglefora betterlife."'9
In case the automaticconnectionbetweenexperienceand conscious-
ness,betweenobjectivelocationin theproduction processand thesubjec-
tiveinterestin an alternative societywas interrupted, Socialistsassumed
an educationalrole. Facing a societywitha strongCatholicchurchand
caudillistatraditions,Justobecame an avid exponentofliteracycampaigns
and public and seculareducationto erode archaicCatholicand person-
realismoingenuo"(1903),in La realizaci6ndel socialismo,OC vol. 6 (BuenosAires:Editorial

La Vaiiguardia, 1947), 255-63.
i6. Palabra Socialista,Feb. 15, 1914;AdamPrzeworski, "Social Democracyas a His-
torical Phenomenon," New Left Review 122 (1980), 31; Przeworski, Capitalism and Social
Democracy, 47-50; Przeworski and Sprague, Paper Stones, 29-31.
17. Justo, "El socialismo" (1902), in Realizaci6n del socialismo, 201.
i8. Justo,Teoriay practica,516.
19. Justo,"La acci6nobrera"(1896), in Realizaci6ndel socialismo,33.

218 I HAHR I MAY I JEREMY ADELMAN
alist vestiges. In his writingshe claimed to followin the footstepsof

Argentina'smid-nineteenth-century liberalarchitectofpubliceducation,
Domingo Sarmiento.And like Sarmiento,Justowas unkindto backward
criollo elementsfromthe interior,whose hostilityto European mores
blockedArgentines' pathto self-awareness.20
The Argentinecase was twisted,however,by an additionalproblem:
the systemto whichthe Socialistscommitted themselveswas nota freely
operatingdemocracyuntil 1912, at least formale voters. Unlike most
oftheirEuropean and NorthAmericancolleagues,Argentinedemocratic
Socialistsdecidedtoparticipate in electionsriddledwithfraudand corrup-
tionand in whichonlya smallproportion ofeligiblevotersparticipated.
Whereas the UCR refusedto legitimatesuch a regimeand sustaineda
ferventand intransigent positionin favorof electoralreform,the Social-
ists,thoughunhappy,playedbytherules.Why?Accordingto Justo,"new
politicalrelationscorrespondto newmodesofproduction," and thespread
ofcapitalismeventually wouldcreateliberalpoliticalpractices.2' The bour-
geois revolutionof the nineteenthcenturyallowed capitalistrelationsto
productionand marketforcesto breakdownall vestigesoftheold regime.
Capitalismflourishedin the wake of a seriesof reforms:independence
fromSpain brokethe yokeof mercantilism; the abolitionof slaveryand
the mitaforcedemployersto relyincreasingly on purelyeconomicmea-
suresto recruitlabor;and the railwaysallowednew coloniststo establish
specializedproductionunits-farmsand chacras-for theworldmarket.
Indeed, accordingto Mario Bravo,one ofJusto'sfollowers,"the railway
has democratizedour countrymorethanthe representative and federal
systemenshrinedin theconstitution."22
But thisrevolutionwas incomplete.A truecapitalistbourgeoisiedid
notsurface.Instead,as thevalue ofland rosewiththeconstruction ofthe
railways,the introduction ofnew breedsoflivestock,and a liberalaccess
to creditthatfomentedspeculation,theArgentine dominantclass intensi-
fiedits investment patterns:it investeditsfortunes notin intensiverural
20. See Justo,Educaci6n puiblica, OC vol. 3 (Buenos Aires: La Vanguardia,1930),

which is entirelydevoted to the themeof education.See also "Maestrosy no maestros"
(n.d.), in RevistaSocialista7 (Apr.1937),241; "El trabajoy el estudio,"in RevistaSocialista
8 (May 1937), 323; Luis Caminos Ceballos to Alfredo Torcelli, Oct. 27, 1913, Archivo Gen-
eral de la Naci6n,Buenos Aires,ArchivoAlfredoTorcelli,Sala 8-7-8-16(hereafter cited as
AGN, AAT).
21. Justo,Realizaci6n del socialismo, 200.
22. Mario Bravo,"El unitarismo en el programadel partidosocialista,"RevistaArgen-
tina del Ciencias Politicas5 (1912),287. Socialistshad theirown readingofArgentinehis-
tory,whichmistakenly saw the thinkers ofthe Generationof 1837as followersofBernardo
Rivadaviaand beacons ofan enlightenedcentralism againstthe backwardfederalismof the
interior.

productionbut in extensiveestancias.The estancieroclass aimed its pro-

duce to the worldmarketbut used resourcesinefficiently. Moreover,by
monopolizingthe land, the estancierosblockedthe creationofa dynamic
class of pettybourgeoisruralproducersalong the lines of NorthAmeri-
can farmers.If powerfullandownerswere the creationof international
capitalism,the estancieroclass nippedArgentinecapitalismin the bud.23
This stultified
bourgeoisrevolutiontherebyheld back liberaldemocratic
progress.Justoand his followersexcoriatedthe "South Americanpluto-
crats"and the "luxurycivilization"theycreated,forit preventedpolitics
fromtakingitsnaturalcourse.
Due to the barbarismand corruptionof the oligarchy,the electoral
strugglepresentssome exceptionaldifficulties
amongthe organized
workers,only the select few,who by intelligenceor character,can
understandpoliticsseriously.24
The irreversiblepressureoftheforcesofproduction,however,would
sweep awayall precapitalist
obstacles.The autonomousflourishing ofthe
forcesof productionwould therebycreate the simultaneousconditions
forboth a liberalrevolution-byentrenching liberaldemocracy-and a
Socialisttransformation-by openingthe eyes of workersto theirclass
position.Liberalreforms wouldsimultaneously lead to socialism:
Thus whenthereis freedomto struggle-freetradersand protection-
ists,landownersand tenants-whentheworkingpeople cease to look
with indifferenceat the taskof fencingin theirland or introducing
sheep-shearing devices,theywilldemandall sortsofimprovements in
productionto correspondwithan improvement in theirlifestyle,
and in
thismannercollaborateto createan alternativepathofdevelopment.25
In thisfashion,Justoand his followersclaimedto be the trueheirsof
Argentina'sgreatnineteenth-century liberals,MarianoMoreno,Bernar-
23. The mostforceful rendition ofthisexplanationofArgentina's failedbourgeoisrevo-

lutioncan be foundin Justo'sbooksEl socialismoargentino(BuenosAires:La Vanguardia,
1910), 10-24, and La teoria cientifica de la historia y la politica argentina (BuenosAires:La
Vanguardia,1898), 18-49. This thesishas become the dominantexplanationofwhyArgen-
tina failed to go the route of Australiaand Canada. For some recentexplorationsof the
historiography, see JuanCarlos Koroland Hilda Sabato, "IncompleteIndustrialization: An
ArgentineObsession,"Latin American Research Review 25:1 (1990), 7-30; Waldo Ansaldi,
"Reflexioneshist6ricassobrela debilidadde la democraciaargentina(1880-1930)," 12 Anua-
rio. SegundaEpoca, Escuela de Historia,UniversidadNacionalde Rosario,391-421; Jeremy
Adelman,FrontierDevelopment:Land, Labour and Capital on the WheatlandsofArgen-
tinaand Canada, 1890-1914 (New York:OxfordUniversity Press,forthcoming), esp. chaps.
i and 8.
24. Justo,Realizaci6n del socialismo, 247; also in Teoria y practica, 225.
25. Justo,Teoria cient4fica,46; also in Realizaci6ndel socialismo,200.

dinoRivadavia,DomingoSarmiento, and especiallyJuanBautistaAlberdi

liberalswho, iftheyhad been allowedto realize theirprojects,would
have forgeda societyakin to those of the BritishDominions.26In the
meantime,itwas up to theArgentine Socialiststoperseverein thecause of
politicalliberalismagainstla politicacriolla-which galvanizedrelations
betweenestancierosand unenlightened subalternclasses.Butbecause the
realm of politicswas only relativeand "real" democracyimplieda cer-
tainilevel ofconsciousness,reforms could notbe pushedtoo quickly.For
thesereasons,Socialistsdislikedtheadventurism ofthe UCR (and eventu-
ally the voluntarismofanarchistsand Communists, who espoused armed
struggle).27
If ArgentineSocialistssaw the nineteenth-century liberalsas heralds
ofprogress,theyalso sharedtheirdistrustofthe masses.Justowas wary
ofthe prematureintroduction ofuniversalsuffrage: by forcingunenlight-
ened citizensto vote, criollobarbarianscould retainthe reinsof power
and enjoytheillusionofbeingliberals.In Spainand LatinAmerica,Justo
cautioned,oligarchicalgovernments "have given the rightto vote to a
people who forthe mostpart neverasked forit and do not know how
to exercisethatright."28 On thispointJustowas unbending:the working
class had to be "conscious"first,and thenit could earn and exerciseits
rights.For thisreasonJustoneveragreedto a coalitionwiththe UCR in
supportof electoralreform,and he denouncedgeneralstrikesaimed at
forcingthe government ofthedayto implement changes.29
Herein lay one of the centralpoliticalproblemsfacingthe Argentine
Socialists.Consciousnesswas a prerequisiteforproperelectoralpolitics.
But withouta fullbourgeoisrevolutionor pervasivecapitalism,proletar-
ian consciousnesswas truncated.Thus the Socialistssimultaneously had
to push forgradualdemocratization in accordancewitheconomicdevel-
opmentand to infuseworkerswitha sozialistischer Geistthroughschools,
26. La Vanguardia, Feb. 3, 1914; Justo,Teoria cientffica,37-40; Dickmann,Recuer-

dos, 8o-8i; Repetto,Mi paso por la politica,113-14;MarioBravo,"Organizaci6n,programa
y desarrollodel PartidoSocialistaen la Argentina,"RevistaArgentinade Ciencias Politicas
10:56 (May 1915), 1i9. It is interesting to note that when Jean Jaures visited Buenos Aires
in 1911, he gave a seriesofspeeches,the mostmemorableofwhichvindicatedthe political
thoughtof JuanBautistaAlberdi.See JeanJaures,Conferenciaspronunciadasen Buenos
Aires(BuenosAires:La Vanguardia,1922). ForJusto'sfullagreement withtheFrenchSocial-
ist, see his prologuein the same booklet.On the nineteenth-century liberals,see Tulio
Halperin-Donghi,Una nacionpara el desiertoargentino(BuenosAires:CentroEditorde
AmericaLatina, 1982), 19-55; and Leon Pomer,"El estadonacionalargentino," Revista de
Historiade America no. 105 (Jan.-June1988),53-88.
27. Justo,"El congresosocialistainternacional
de Copenhagen,"38.
28. Justo,Teoria y practica, 449-50.
29. On thisissue the legacyofEduard Bernsteinand Rosa Luxembourg,who favored
the use ofstrikesforthevote,had no influenceon Justo.See, forinstance,Justo,"La admi-
si6nde gruposgremialesen el PartidoSocialista"(ig9o), in Realizaci6ndel socialismo,277.

libraries,cooperatives,and unions,so thattheywould recognizetheir

class interests.The goal ofthistwo-track
strategywas thatwhenuniversal
suffrage was trulyin place, theworkerswouldbe readyto exercisetheir
rightsconsciously,by supportingsocialism.30In thisfashionJustoand his
followers whitewashedanyapparentconflicts in playingby theruleswhile
chargingthatthe rulesperpetuatedtheold regime.
The PartidoSocialistaat the Polls

Even beforethe PS was founded,Socialistsranforpublicoffice.In 1896,
nine Socialistcentersformeda local federation to fieldcandidatesin the
Federal Capital for the March electionsfornationaldeputies. Out of
12,973 votes cast, the groupreceived 138. For Enrique Dickmann,the
Russian-bornfollowerofJusto,the resultswere not surprising: fromthe
startthe campaignhad been symbolic,designedto inject"reason"into
the occasion.31In Juneof thatyearthe partywas founded,thoughwith
principlesreflecting theprimacyplaced on economicsoverpolitics.To be
sure,as earlyas the 1895elections,candidatesdid championthe cause of
electoralreform.The party'sexecutivecommittee,drafting the electoral
platform in October 1895,dividedit intoeconomicand politicalparts.At
the top ofthe politicallistwas a call foruniversalsuffrage.
Yet when the
firstsix pointsin the party'sprogramwere adopted in June1896, they
dealtwithworkconditions, followedbythestruggleformonetary stability
and the eventualabolitionof paper money.At least in a formalsense,
electoralreformwas at thebottomofthelist.32
The party'srangewas limitedto the FederalCapitaldistrict,and only
later did it spread to otherurbancenters.The 1898 partycongressin-
cludedno representatives frombeyondthecapital.The nationalexecutive
committee'sreporturged militantsto turntheireyes to new districts-
thoughthe same reportassuredmembersthatsocialism'sslow penetra-
tionofotherregionswas due to the economicand politicalbackwardness
outsidethe country'smaincity.33
Part of the problemlay in the party'sstructure.It was not a decen-
tralizedcommitteestructurealong the lines of the UCR and the main
Americanpoliticalparties,but a tightcentralization in the hands of the
30. Justo,"El socialismo,"in Realizaci6ndel socialismo,200.

31. Dickmann, Recuerdos, 101-4.
32. Mullaney,"ArgentineSocialistParty,"47-48; JacintoOddone, Historiadel socia-
lismoargentino,1896-1g91, vol. i (BuenosAires:CentroEditorde AmericaLatina, 1983),
includedwomen,and the PS shouldgo on recordas the most
46, 66. The call forsuffrage
consistentchampionofwomen'ssuffrage in Argentina. however,economicissues
Ultimately,
prevailed.
33. La Vanguardia, Feb. 19 and Apr.23, 1898.

TABLE i: SocialistPartyVotein the FederalCapital,1896-ig9o
Year Vote
1896 134
1898 105
1goo 135
1902 165
1904 1,257
1906 3,495
1908 5,178
1g9o 7,oo6
Source: La Vanguardia, selected years.
executivecommittee.Delegates dispatchedfromthe capital set up re-

gional brancheswhose credentialshad to be approvedby the executive
committee.This leftlittleroomforspontaneousorganization frombelow
or regionalprogramsthatmightdiffer accordingto local issues.
In 1898 the partyfieldedcandidatesagain,winninga mere 105 votes
amid conditionsoffraudand corruption.34 It repeatedtheabysmalperfor-
mance in the nextfewelections(Table i), thoughthe poor showingdid
not drivethe partyeitherto abstainor to call on tradeunionsupportto
reinforceitscampaign.
It was not until 1904 thatthe partytastedsuccess. AlfredoPalacios
became the firstSocialistdeputy,elected with 804 votes to represent
the neighborhoodof La Boca.35Underthe reformist wingofJoaquinV.
Gonzailez,PresidentRoca's interior minister, a briefand verymodestelec-
toralreformwas initiated.Butthe 1905UCR revoltand theretrenchment
of the new president,Quintana,reversedthe reformsin 1906. Palacios
losthis seat in the nextelection.
While the Socialistsparticipatedsymbolically in electoralpoliticsand
the UCR stagedoccasionaluprisings,thecountry's workerswere engaged
in an increasinglybitterconfrontation in thestreetsofitslargecities.After
1902, the wave of strikesand unionorganizationintensified, peakingin
theyears1909 and 1g_0.36 In spiteoftheviolenceon theshopfloorand on
34. Some of the campaignersrememberedthe atmospherewell. See Dickmann,Re-

cuerdos, 117; Repetto,Mi paso por la politica,84-85.
35. La Vanguardia,Mar. 19, 1904; Dickmann,Recuerdos,119-21.
36. DepartamentoNacionalde Trabajo,Estadisticade las Huelgas(BuenosAires,1940),
20. For a generalsurveyof strikeaction,see Adelman,"PoliticalEconomyof Labour in
Argentina";and RonaldoMunck,"CyclesofClass Struggleand the Makingofthe Working
Class in Argentina,189o-192o,"JournalofLatinAmericanStudies19:i (May 1987), 19-39.
The best summaryof statepoliciesin responseto workeragitationis JuanSuriano,Traba-
jadores, anarquismoy estado represor:de la Ley de Residenciaa la Ley de Defensa Social
(1902-1910) (BuenosAires:CentroEditorde Am6ricaLatina, 1988).

the streets,the PS stayedalooffromconflicts.The party'srelationswith

tradeunionswere stormy.By rigidlydistinguishing betweenpoliticaland
economicpraxis,the partysegregatedelectoralfromtradeunionorgani-
zation.Thus, Socialistswere averseto massiveorganization ofworkerson
the shop floor,leavingsuch mobilizationto professional tradeunionists.
Only among the railwayworkers(the rankand fileof La Fraternidad)
and the typographical workersdid the Socialisttrade union leadership
emerge.
Accordingto the party'sstatutes,trade unionistshad to affiliate
throughlocal partyoffices.Only in LgLo, at the party'sninthcongress,
was the firstarticleof the statutesamendedto allow the representation
ofagrupacionesde oficio(tradeunionaffiliates) to bridgeunionand party
militancy. By then,however,unionculturehad takena different, syndical-
isttack.Onlythe typographical workersestablishedaffiliates
to theparty,
thoughwoodworkers,metalworkers, and smithsset up short-lived agru-
paciones. In early 1912, at the party'stenthcongress,the typographical
workerssponsoreda resolutioncallingfora commissionon unionpropa-
ganda and a special committeeto enlistthe supportof union affiliates.
Althoughthe clauses were approved,the executivecommitteeinsisted
thatnew unionaffiliates shouldnotbe allowedto swaytheciviland politi-
cal operationoftheparty.38
This splitbetweenthepoliticalandtheeconomicsometimesled Social-
ists to adopt hostilestancesagainststrikesthatcalled foranythingmore
thanmerelyeconomicconcessions.Strikeactionwas theindependentter-
rain of unions,and aside fromcallingforsolidarity withpicketers,the
partydid next to nothingto supportthem.The rankand filewho did
bridgethe gulfbetweentheunionsand thepartychafedunderthe strain.
Roque Masi, a meatpackerfromSan Nicolas,struggledforyearsto enroll
his companeros in the party.Afterenlistingtwo, he wrotebitterlyto a
friend:
I thinkI have been successful,and I am proud,and hope to get many
more. It is a real shamethatwe countonlyon the "conscious"votes,
37. RuthThompson,"The Limitations ofIdeologyin theEarlyArgentine Labour Move-

ment:Anarchismin TradeUnions,18go-1920," JournalofLatinAmericanStudiesi6:i (May
1984), 81-89, and "TradeUnionStructures:Some NeglectedIssues,"in Essays in Argentine
Labour History,ed. Adelman.
38. On the agrupacionesde oficio,see PartidoSocialista,"Orden del dia del IX Con-
greso Nacionaldel PartidoSocialista,"May 23-24, 1910, pp. 15-16. On the typographical
workers'resolution,see AdolfoDickmann,Los congresossocialistas:40 anos de democracia
(BuenosAires:La Vanguardia,1936), 19-20. The same splitbefellthe leadersofthe incipi-
ent agrarianmovementafterthe Gritode Alcortauprisingin 1912. Early efforts to make
the Federaci6nAgrariaArgentinaaddressruraltenantdisgruntlement withthe partyfloun-
dered. See JeremyAdelman,"Una cosecha por levantar:el PartidoSocialistay el campo
antesde la PrimeraGuerraMundial,"Anuariodel IEHS 4 (1989).

and thatour ranksare filledwithSocialistswho thinktheyare Social-

istsonlybecause theyread La Vanguardia.9
Protestingagainststaterepressionalso raisedthe trickyissue of citi-
zenship.Repressionwas directedespeciallyat non-Argentines, who com-
posed the bulk of the urbanworkforce.The state'sopen repressionof
foreign-born anarchist"insurgents" dissuadedthose workersfromopen
expressionsofdissent.Nordid thestateurgeforeign-born workersto take
up citizenship;indeed,itpractically discouragedthem.Moreover,conser-
vativeregimesdid theirutmosttofosterimmigration oftemporary workers
fromItaly and Spain to workon the pampean harvest,only to return
home at the end of the season. The famedgolondrina(swallow)seasonal
migration did nothingto rootimmigrant workersin Argentine society.Im-
migrantschose notto botherapplyingforcitizenshipto a countrythat,at
least officially,
did notwantthem.40
The positionof the PS duringthisperiod may help to explainwhy
workersdid not supporteven minimalpoliticalreforms.While the state
unleashedthe police againststrikers and stuffedballotboxes in the coun-
try'selection,the partyand its leaderscalled on non-Argentines to take
up citizenshipand togethercreatea newArgentina.4' Thiswas reasonable
enough,forwithoutbecomingcitizenstheycould notvote. But withlow
ratesofnaturalization in generaland persistent
ethnicsolidaritiesthatiso-
lated immigrant workersfromthe formalpoliticalrealm,the Socialists'
citizenshipdrivesfloundered.
Justohad unkindwordsforthosewho refusedto changetheirnation-
ality."Foreignershave not made use of theirrights,whichcost so little
to acquire,"he wrote,"forlack ofvalue placed on the battleagainstthe
vices ofla politicacriolla,or outofignoranceand lackofpubliceducation,
or due to greed, or due to negativeand sterilepatrioticpreoccupations
withtheirhomeland.... 42 Socialistsexpoundedon thechargeofgreed:
workerscame to Argentinaonlyto make moneyand not to participate
in civil life-an ironicaccusation,giventhe Socialists'own primacyon
economicmatters.43
39. Roque Masi to AlfredoTorcelli,July24, 1914, AGN, AAT.

40. Suriano,Trabajadores,3; Adelman,"PoliticalEconomyof Labour in Argentina";
Falc6n, "lzquierdas,"367-88. This does not mean thatimmigrants were bereftof political
channels.Atlocal and informallevels,activitywas robust.See Hilda SabatoanidEma Cibotti,
"Hacer politica en Buenos Aires: los italianosen la escena puiblicaportefia,i86o-i88o,"
Boletindel Institutode HistoriaArgentinay Americana2 (1990).
41. See La Vanguardia,Mar. 22, 1906; Justo, Internacionalismo y patria,7, 93, 199.
42. Justo,"Nuevas practicasy no nuevasleyes,"El Diario del Pueblo (Buenos Aires),
Oct. 22, 1899. Throughout1899 Justocarriedon a visceralcampaignin thispaper against
immigrants who refusedto takeup citizenship.
43. See VirgilioAuresin La Vanguardia,Feb. 10, 1912.

The Socialists'frustration sometimesled themto attackethnicinsu-

larity.Justo'sopen disdain fornationalismled him to condemnethnic
diversity;he dreamedofa "razanacional."By rejectingethnicdifferences,
however,theSocialistsalienatedthoseworkerswhowantedto retaintheir
heritage.The anarchists,by contrast,were noticeablymore sensitiveto
ethnicparticularity-inpart because it reinforcedtheirgenerallyanti-
politicalviews.44
The labor unrestpeaked in 0gog-1owitha seriesof generalstrikes,
followedby anotherroundofantilaborlegislation.DuringPresidentJose
Figueroa Alcorta'sterm(L9o6-191o), fivestatesof siege were declared,
leading to the Law of Social Defenseof 1g1o, whichimposeddraconian
penaltiesagainstsubversion.But if 1g1o was the culminationof nearlya
decade of capital-laborviolence,it was also the beginningof a new era.
The old regimewas exhausted,and manymembersofthe establishment
recognizedthe necessityofstavingoffcivilwar.When Roque SaienzPefia
was elected in late 1910, he promisedwidespreadchanges.A projectfor
free,compulsory, and secretballotingwas sentto Congressin 1911 and
passed in early1912.
While the PS hithertohad emphasizedcitizenshipand economicmat-
ters,it had said littleabout democracy.Its mainorgan,La Vanguardia,
had scarcelymentionedthe congressionaldebate on democraticreform.
SaienzPefia,withhis interiorminister, IndalecioGomez, had draftedthe
broad outlinesof democraticaperturein Europe even beforereturning
to ArgentinafromRome in mid-1g9o. Since the PS alreadyabided by
the old rules, appearingunconcernedabout immediatedemocratization
and avoidingthe role ofintransigent opposition,the SaienzPe-nagovern-
mentfeltno pressureto strikea deal. Instead,thenewlyelectedpresident
turnedto the UCR and HipolitoYrigoyenforan agreementon the con-
tentofthebill.45It was betweentheestablishment and itsmostvociferous
opponents(aside fromtheanarchists) thatthenew rulesofthe gamewere
drawnup.
When the new law tookeffect,so did a new constellationof forces.
44. See, forinstance,Justo,"Por qu6 no me gustaescribirpara una hoja que se dice

israelita,"Vida Nuestra(Nov. 1923). See also Enrique Dickmann'sown deniialofhis Juda-
ismand Russianbackgroundin Recuerdos,43, 88. The ethnicquestionand Socialistpolitics
have been exploredby Falc6n in "lzquierdas,"367-8o, and Pianetto,"Labour Movement
and HistoricalConjuncture."
45. For a detaileddiscussionofthelegislation,see Dario Cant6n,Eleccionesy partidos
y balance: 1910-1 966 (BuenosAires:Siglo
politicosen la Argentina:historia,interpretation
VeintiunoArgentinaEditores,1973),21-22; MiguelAngelCarcano,Sienz Peiia, la revolu-
ci6n por los comicios(BuenosAires:EditorialUniversitariade BuenosAires,1986), 146-64;
RobertoGarcia Pinto,"IndalecioG6mez y la politicade su tiempo,"Boletindel Institutode
San Felipe y Santiagode EstudiosHist6ricosde Salta 6:26 (1952), 124.

Overnight,politicsshiftedfromexclusionary to inclusionary.Those who

until1912 had playedby the rules,therebylegitimating them,bore the
politicalcostofthenewarrangement, whilethosewho refusedto playand
had criticizedfromthe outsidecould now claim to be the rightful heirs
ofreform.The olderestablishment, despiteitshopes offorming a vibrant
conservativeparty,benefitedleast; the Radicalsbenefitedmost.The net
gains forthe Socialistswere mixed,but theyno longerenjoyedalmost
unchallengeddominionoverthecountry's working-classvoters.Suddenly
the PartidoSocialistawas forcedto competewiththe UCR forthe same
votingconstituencies.
Having takenno positionin the negotiations and havingignoredthe
congressionaldebates,the Socialistswere forcedto accept whatthe new
law offered.They were pleased withsome of the clauses, includingthe
same reforms thathad helped Palacioswin in 1904 (the secretballotand
single-memberconstituencies).But in a long editorial,La Vanguardia
attackedthelegislation,especiallytheclause makingvotingobligatory.
The obligatoryvote,above all, whichmaynotconstitute theprincipal
ofthe new law, is a leap intothe unknown,whichmay
characteristic
leave us worseoffWill it cause, amongthe downtrodden and uncon-
scious, more venality?Or will thosenow submergedin indifference
become sane forcesin civillife?46
While itacceptedsomepoints,theeditorialdenouncedthelegislation
as anothertwist"byouraristocratic president" who"has madean electoral
reformforthe bourgeoisie,and not forthe people." Yet the PS agreed
to abide by the rules,just as it had before,symbolically.
On the surface,
the Socialistssneeredat the possibleeffectsof the new law and at their
principalrivals.Deeper down,theyrecognizedthatthiswas the party's
opportunity to make sweepinggains in the wake of the consciousness-
raisingeventsof 9gogand g91o. Aboundingwithoptimism,theythrew
themselvesintothe electoralmelee.
The law tookeffect immediately: congressional
midterm electionswere
posted forApril7, 1912. Fromtheoutset,the PS decided to concentrate
itseffortsin thecitiesofBuenosAiresand Rosario,wherethevastmajority
ofpartyaffiliates lived. Outsidethe cities,it wouldtaketimeto generate
support.The problemwithelections,La Vanguardianoted,was the long
traditionofignoranceand indifference amongthemasses:theydid notap-
46. La Vanguardia,Feb. 9, 1912. See also the executivecommitteereporton electoral

reform,PartidoSocialista,"Ordendel Dia del X CongresoNacionaldel PartidoSocialista,"
Jan.13-14, 1912, pp. 9-10. Whilethe recordclearlyshowsthatthe PS did nottakethe new
law seriously,thisdid notpreventJusto,Dickmann,or Repetto,in theirsubsequentwriting
and memoirs,fromdescribingthe Saenz Pefialaw as a milestone.

preciatethemeaningofthevote,and itwas up to thepartyto demonstrate

thattheirvote mattered.ThroughoutFebruaryand March,partyactiv-
ists blasted the UCR and other"oligarchic"partiesfortheiremptiness,
averringthatonly seriousparties(like the PS) had a "real," "practical,"
and "concrete"essence thatdid notfallintothe melange"ofabstraction
and imprecision."47 Socialistsattackedthe "unconscious"votersand the
partiesthatattractedthem.On theeve oftheelection,Justodeclaredthat
workerswho failedto vote Socialistbetrayedtheirinterests.
Withgood reasonit is said thatcollectivemiserycan be explainedby
theincapacityofthepeople to sustaina collectivestruggleforlife....
We representthe electoralorganizationof the workingpeople, and
aspire, throughpoliticalpower,to raise theirstandardof livingand
preparethemfortheircompleteemancipation.48
A self-righteous tonelaced a messagethatdrummedhome the mean-
inglessnessofelectionsunderthetutelageofpoliticacriollawhileinsisting
thatcitizensparticipate.The dual messagecalled on electorsto legitimate
a regimethatcould notmeettheirdemands.Hope, as faras thevoterwas
concerned,residednotin thesubjectivewillofthecitizenry butin theob-
jective forceofeconomicdevelopment.The long-term forceofeconomic
change would eventuallymold politics,but in the meantime,Socialists
had to prepare the citizenryby a modicumof legislationand symbolic
participation in elections.
The electionresults,however,pleased the Socialists:votersfromthe
capital sent JuanB. Justoand AlfredoPalacios to Congress.The vote
was close. The UCR and the PS joustedforleadershipwithinthe capital
(Table 2). Beyondthe capital,the PS returnswerethreadbare(Table 3).
The resultspromptedsome rethinking by PS leaders. Where it mat-
tered(thatis, among"conscious"voters),the PS clearlydid notmonopo-
lize votes;itcompetedcloselywiththeRadicals.Nevertheless, theresults
did exceed expectations, and thecompleteeclipseoftheconservative can-
didatesin thecapitalled someto concludethattheold oligarchy had been
dethroned.The UCR's triumph acrossthecountryand challengeto Social-
ists in the capitalwas due, notedLa Vanguardia,to its "use of different
methodsfromthe old shenanigansof the oligarchs. . . whichforus im-
plies thatwe mustwatchthemcloselyin Parliament and in government."
The PS recognizedthatitwas no longersufficient "to marchin itsnormal
pace withthe pleasure of knowingthatgood citizenswill recognizeits
value." But such a germof reappraisalwas buriedin the convictionthat
47. La Vanguardia,Mar. 5, 1912.

48. Ibid., Mar. 9, 12, and 24, 1912; also El Ariete(Quilmes),Feb. 20, 1912. Emnpha-
sis added.

TABLE 2: Votesforthe Socialistand RadicalPartiesin NationalElections

in the Federal Capital,1912-1930
Uni6nCivica Radical PartidoSocialista

Year Number Percentage Number Percentage
1912 35,896 24.25 32,451 21.29
1914 37,517 32.00 43,267 36.92
1916 61,604 48.o8 52,895 41.29
1918 74,200 43.16 49,366 28.72
1920 60,364 37.29 55,000 33.98
1922 68,195 37.59 54,813 30.21
1924 71,074 38.53 77,373 41.95
1926 117,022 59.80 63,589 32.50
1928 212,365 76.29 34,780 12.49
1930 83,251 27.99 83,076 27.93
Note: 1916 and 1922 were presidentialelections.The restwere congressional.The UCR

resultsfor1926 and 1928 includebreakawayfactions.The 1918 resultsdo not include the
35,281 votes(20.54 percent)castforAlfredoPalacios'PartidoSocialistaArgentino,whilethe
1930 resultsdo not includethe 109,323 votes(36.74 percent)cast forthe PartidoSocialista
Independiente.
Source: Dario Cant6n,Materialespara el estudiode la sociologiapoliticaen la Argentina
(Buenos Aires:InstitutoTorcuatodi Tella, 1968),81-103.
TABLE T: Votesforthe PartidoSocialistaby Province,1912-1930
Year Federal Capital BuenosAires SantaFe C6rdoba All others
1912 32,451 4,354 140

1914 43,267 6,719 2,222 261 1,467
1916 52,895 7,127 1,978 693 3,704
1918 49,366 7,691 i,815 120 5,422
1920 55,000 13,751 3,679 1,575 ii,688
1922 54,813 12,379 3,004 577 7,877
1924 77,373 10,562 2,298 1,809 9,682
1926 63,589 17,820 5,651 778 10,042
1928 34,780 19,849 1,136 9,886
1930 83,076 26,408 2,386 1,260 10,604
Source: See Table 2.
historywas on the side of the Socialists;thatthe naturallaws of motion

unveiledthe superiormessageofsocialismand theintrinsic interestofthe
workersinjoiningtheforcesofprogress.49 Strategically,
the PS shiftedits
focusawayfromthe olderconservative forcesand addresseditscampaign
to radicalism.But in substanceitsmessagehad notchanged.
49. La Vanguardia,May 1i, Aug.31, Oct. 8, and Nov. 23, 1912, respectively.

The 1913and 1914congressional electionsappeared to vindicatethat

strategy.In 1913, Nicolas Repettoand Mario Bravo went to the lower
house and Enrique del Valle Iberlucea went to the Senate-all three
representing the capital. Likewisein 1914 the capitalfavoredthe Social-
ists, sendingseven new PS deputies,includingDickmann,to Congress
comparedto the UCR's three,in spiteof the net drop in Socialistvotes
from46,377 in 1913 to 43,267 in 1914. Nevertheless,it seemed thatthe
PS was on itswayto becomingthemajority forcein thecapital.
While the partycelebratedthe beginningof"the passiverevolution"
based on "a real democracy,"its reactionalso reflectedthe concernto
maintainitspurityand appeal onlyto the consciousvoter.In the wake of
the 1913results,La Vanguardianoted:
Our partynowrunstheriskofbeinginvadedbya delugeofmenwhose
meritsdo not lie, in anyway,eitherin the depthof theirideas or in
the firmness
oftheirconvictions.The partymustdefenditselfagainst
sucha danger. 50
Socialismwas supposed to be "a culminatingrole in the process of

Argentinecivilization,"whilesocialdemocracywas to be "cementedon a
broad and deep processofillumination; theremustbe no assimilationof
citizenswithouthavingilluminatedthespark of truth. "5' One Socialist,
lookingat the preferencesofvotersoutsidethe capital,complainedthat
"the people are notready"and thatonlyin BuenosAires,and to a lesser
extentRosario,were workers"awareofthe significance ofcitizenship."52
Thus it was decided not to extendthe appeal beyondthe major urban
centersbut to "deepen" the processof consciousnessraisingamong the
advanced proletariat.53Thoughsymbolic,electionswere "gloriousocca-
sions to illuminatethe mindsof the people and warmtheirhearts";the
PS shouldnotbe too concernedwithvotechasing.54
The nationalelection resultsin the rest of the countrywere poor
(Table 3). In the countyofLobos in BuenosAiresprovince,whereSocial-
ists had had an activeofficeforyears,the March 1914 electionsyielded
928 votesforthe UCR, 675 forthe Conservatives, and a mere48 forthe
PS.55One ofthe foundersoftheparty,Esteban Gimenez,notedthatbe-
50. Ibid., Apr. 6, 1913; also Apr. 13, 1913.

51. AlejandroCalzado, "La acci6nsocialistay la concienciaciudadana,"RevistaArgen-
tina de Ciencias Politicas8 (1914), 26o-6i. Emphasisadded.
52. Ibid.
53. La Vanguardia, July1 and Oct. 23, 1913; Espirtaco (Pigue), Sept. 1, 1915; Vida
Nueva (Cordoba),Jan. i6, 1915; El Ariete (Quilmes),Apr.30, 1914.
54. La Vanguardia, Feb. 1, 1914.
55. The party'sbimonthly newspaperin Lobos waxedoptimisticthatthesewere at least
48 "conscious"voters.Vida Nueva (Lobos), Apr. 1, 1914. That peak of supportremained

yondthe capitalin theprovinceofBuenosAirestheoligarchy(embodied

in strongman MarcelinoUgarte)stillheldthereinsofpower.For Gimenez
thiswas "enemycountry," where socialismwas "denied fireand water,
bereftof support,and surroundedby politicaltribesincapableofassimi-
latinganythingnew or sane, wherewe Socialistswill have to sufferthe
fateofall invaders."56 In Cordoba,some solace was foundin the Federal
Capitalresults:"BuenosAiresis a reflection ofwhatCordobawill be like
in a fewyears." 57
For all intentsand purposesthepartydismissedtherestofthecountry
as backwardand unenlightened. Votersoutsidethe capitalrespondedin
kind:exceptforCordoba,whichsentthreeSocialistdeputiesto Congress
from1924 to 1928 (due to theabstinenceofone wingofthe Radicals),the
PS neverearneda seat in Congressto representthe interior.In a speech
to Congress,Justoassuredthe deputiesthatthiswas a sourceofthe PS's
strength:
It would alarmus to findthe popularityof our candidatesas high in
Jujuyor Catamarcaas it is in the capital:we wouldhave to conclude
that our essence was lost. We are the partyof consciousuniversal
suffrage.58
In the wake of the 1913 and 1914 resultsin the capital,the PS also
reassessed its principalopponent,the UCR. While in 1912 the PS had
treatedthe UCR as a potentially forcerepresenting
progressive a dynamic
factionof the elite allied withthe middleclass, the Radicals' success in
the interior,along withtheirvague campaignpromises,now prompted
the Socialiststo dismissthemas just a new visage of the old oligarchy.
One militantobservedthatthe UCR "is a simplefactionofcriollopoliti-
cians,who ignoreor are ignorantofgenuineradicalism."59 This view fed
the illusionthatthe UCR was doomedto be squeezed betweentheforces
ofreaction,representedbytheconservative parties,and genuineforcesof
unsurpassedforyears.In 1916, witha veryhighturnout,thepartyearnedonly46 votes. In

the provinceofBuenosAires,Quilmesand Avellanedawerethe PS strongholds. Yet even in
Quilmes,by now an emergingindustrialzone, the votewas poor. See El Ariete(Quilmes),
Apr. 10, 1914;La Vanguardia,Apr.22, 1915.
56. Esteban Gim6nez, "La lucha en la provinciade Buenos Aires,"La Vanguardia,
Nov. 20, 1913. See also Vida Nueva (Lobos), Aug. 15 and Dec. 15, 1913.
57. Adelante(Cordoba),Sept. 1 and Oct. 1, 1913.Whenhe recountedhis own involve-
mentin Socialistpolitics,Repettoclaimedthatthe PS victories'beinglimitedto the capital
reflectedthe existenceof"real democracy"whenelsewhereitwas a sham. See Repetto,Mi
paso por la politica,149.
58. Justo,La obra parlamentaria,mayo1912-abril1913(BuenosAires:La Vanguardia,
1913), 145.
59. Guido AnatolioCartey,"La necesidadde un partidoradical,"HumanidadNueva
5:58 (Sept. 1913).

progress,embodiedin the PS: "theRadicalpartywillbe groundbetween

two stones-the conservatives who knowwhattheywant,and socialism,
which is the synthesisof the aspirationsand revolutionary forceof the
workingclass."60The onlyhope forthe UCR was to become the genuine
representative of the forcesof reaction.Regardless,if the PS once had
seen the Radicals as a modernizing force,it now dismissedthe UCR as
eitherdoomedorjust anotherversionofpol'ticacriolla.
In the contextof the party'sofficialneglectof the unconvertedout-
side the FederalCapital,partylocalsbeganto itchformorefreedom.The
mostseriousconflicteruptedfollowing the 1914electionsin La Plata and
led to the splintering of the partyin the provinceof Buenos Aires. The
La Plata local had startedmakingwavesas earlyas 1904, when members
called fora moredecentralizedpartystructure to give locals moreflexi-
bility.In 1913,AlfredoPalacioswas threatenedwithsuspensionfromthe
partyfordueling,alongwithotherminorinfractions ofpartystatutes;his
behavior,althoughpopularin the eyes of many,smackedof the loath-
some politicacriolla. In February1914,in responseto the groundswell
of support,the La Plata sectionsenta notedefendingPalaciosto the PS
provincialexecutive.(Palacioswas finally expelledin 1915.)
La Plata activistswere upset by the strictline partyleaders tookin
generaland theirneglectoftheprovincialelectorate-the ruralsectorin
particular.Provincialand nationalexecutivesupbraidedthe local forin-
subordinationand, afteran investigation, suspendedthe entireLa Plata
sectionin April 1914. The local's leader,the recentlyelected provincial
deputyAlfredoTorcelli,was popularamongrank-and-file activists;the
suspensionsparkedwholesaledefections fromtheparty.The refugees,led
by Palacios,formedthe PartidoSocialistaArgentino in 1915. One activist
fromthe countyofTresArroyosdecriedthe "insulting conductofthe au-
thoritariansof the party[who]will bringgraverconsequencesthanthey
realize.
"61
Electionsbeganto favornon-Socialistparties.In 1915, the UCR swept
the provincialcontests,takingthe governorships of Santa Fe and Entre
Rios and registering impressivegainsin otherprovinces.The onlycon-
servativeholdoutwas the provinceof BuenosAires,wherethe Socialists
actuallylost votescomparedto the previousnationalcongressionalelec-
tions.The Socialistreactionto thisupswingin Radicalsupportwas bitter.
Only a year earlier,the partyhad predictedthe Radicals' eclipse. Now,
"the secretto the successofRadicalismis thattheaveragevoteroffersno
6o. La Vanguardia,Oct. 28, 1914; also Nov. 25 and Dec. 2, 1914.

6i. Letters,JuanPita to AlfredoTorcelli,July13, 1915;RobertoBordemayto Torcelli,
Aug. 28, 1914, AGN, AAT.

resistance,even in themostbackwardprovinces.Theircustomsand their

educationare thoseofthegroupfromtheold regime."62 The oligarchy,ac-
cordingto the PS, let the UCR do itspoliticaldirtywork,thereby"saving
the era ofcaudillismo."When the UCR sweptCordobain November,La
Vanguardiaconcluded,"we can saythatwe are barelyon theroadtoward
a real freevote."To justifythe lackof"real"democracy,the partyorgan
maintainedthat "the few votes whichour ticketobtainedare the best
proofofour suspicion."63 Since the Socialistvotewas a gaugeofclass con-
sciousness,partyleadershipturnedits back on an electoratesupposedly
notyetreadyforthe light.
In the presidentialelectionof 1916, some conservative forcesaligned
themselvesbehind the Partido Democrata Progresistawhile others
(mainlythe provincialconservativesof Buenos Aires, behind Ugarte)
made an independentbid. The UCR and the PS avoided alliances. The
Socialistspresenteda longlistofcampaignissues,rangingfromthe dero-
gationof repressivelabor legislationto a new land tax to cuts in arms
expenditures.It was a coherentproposalnextto the vague liberalismof
the Radicals and the vague conservatism of the Right.But it was aimed
mainlyat votersin thecapital,"thesuperiorcenterofthesocialand politi-
cal organismofthe Republic."The presidential ticketofJuanB. Justoand
Nicolas Repettoattracteda crowdofnearlyone hundredthousandon the
eve ofthe election.64
The resultswere close. Yrigoyendid not win a majorityof votes in
the electoralcollege,and negotiations withtheRightallowedhimto take
office.The Socialistsdid poorly.Beyondthe capital,theirsupportwas
almostinsignificant,where"ourpartyhas yetto penetratethedenseweed
ofpopularignorance!"(Table 3). In the provinceof BuenosAires,where
the partyhad hoped to makesome advances,especiallyin the industrial
belt surrounding thecapital,thePS voterosemarginally.65 In thecountry
as a whole, the percentageof votes forthe PS actuallyfellfrom9.3 to
8.9, while the Radicals harvested45.6 percentof the votes cast. If the
atmospheresmelledof defeat,the partyfoundsolace in its stronghold,
62. La Vanguardia, Apr.27, 1915.

63. Ibid., Nov. 25, 1915; Espartaco (Pigue), Dec. 1, 1915; Vida Nueva (C6rdoba),
July 17, 1915.
64. For a recollectionof the 1916 electionsee Dickmann,Recuerdos,278. It is inter-
estingto note thatNicolas Repettodoes not even mentionthe eventin his own memoir,
whichmightindicateeithera desireto forgetthe experienceor a view thatelectionswere
unimportant in his own politicalcareer.
65. ThoughTable 3, takenfromCant6n'sestimates,suggestsan increasein votes,the
local Socialistpresspublishedresultsthatshoweda fallin votesin theprovince,from8,6oo
votesin 1914 to 7,600 in 1916. See El Ariete (Quilmes),Apr.20, 1916; Vida Nueva (Lobos),
Apr. 15, 1916.

Buenos Aires: "the metropolisof Latin America. . . will neverbe the

victimof reaction;it will alwaysbe, above all, the citylightforthe new
continent, emancipatedby democracy,impelledbylibertyand guidedby
socialismto fulfill
itsgreatand manifest destiny."66Butas theresultscame
in, it became clear thatthepartyhad forfeited itsleadershipto the UCR,
whichearnedalmosthalfthevotescast. In thecongressional vote,thetop
Socialistcandidate,Justo,ended in ninthplace behinda listof Radicals
(Table 2).
Forced to relinquishits claim to majoritystatusin the capital, the
PS reassessedits optimism.In a long editorialon the significance of the
election,La Vanguardianotedthatthe struggleforsocialismwould take
muchlongerthan expected. For the firsttime,it openlyacknowledged
thatformaldemocracywouldnotlead to an automaticSocialistvictory,in
spiteofthe party'sadvocacyofboththe modernization (in liberalterms)
and transformation (in Socialistterms)of the country.Before any ad-
vancescould be made on theparliamentary roadto socialism,othersteps
were necessary:the incorporation ofnon-Argentines intothe bodypolitic
and the raisingofworkers'consciousness.Workers'refusalto throwtheir
weightbehind the Socialistcause spoiled the necessaryrelationship be-
tweenexperienceand consciousness.
Ifthetheorylayin shamblesaroundthem,Socialistsstilldirectedtheir
critiqueat Argentinesociety.Theirdefeattheyattributed to Argentina's
"inorganic"democracy,forwhilethevotewas formally free,the elections
were not. The resilienceofpoliticacriollameantthatvotersdid not, in
substance,vote freely,because theywere notconscious.The partycon-
cluded thatonlyits 8 percentofthe votewas "good"; the rest,in effect,
was notan exercisein democracy.67
The WaningIdeal
In thewakeofthe 1916 results,theSocialistssankintodepression.Iftheir
expectationsremainedunfulfilled, itdid nothelp thattheworldwas tear-
ing itselfapart in a nationalistic
war. The consentofferedby European
Socialistpartiesto the war effortin theirrespectivecountriesdestroyed
theillusionofsocialism'sinternationalist
credentials.Meanwhile,theRus-
sian Revolutionposed an alternative routeto socialism.At firstJustosup-
portedthe Bolshevikeffort, but as it drovea wedge between members
66. La Vanguardia,Apr.9, 1916.

67. Ibid., Apr. 15, 1916; El Ariete (Quilmes), Apr. io, 1916; Vida Nueva (Lobos),
Apr. 15, 1916. For Dickmann,Yrigoyen's
election"wasa symbolicexpressionofan inorganic
democracy,chaotic,anarchic,thoughdemocratic."Dickmann,Recuerdos,279.

of the partydisillusionedwithJusto'sstrictdeterminismand parliamen-

tarism,Justoand his closestfollowers
grewincreasinglycriticalofLenin's
project.The new externalinfluencesfromEurope, whichhad originally
providedinspiration, now emaciatedtheirideals.68
It was internalforces,however,thatdid the mostdamage. Fernando
Ghio, an Italian-bornworkerfromMataderos,expresseda widelyheld
sentiment.Faced withan uncomfortable partyline thatblamedthe elec-
torateforthe poor showingin 1916, Ghio bemoanedthe
leaders of the Socialistpartywho tryto justifyto those inside and
outside [the party]the defeatsuffered at the handsof democracyon
2 April . . . [I]t is some consolation
forthoseof us who sufferedthe
insultsand diatribesof our compaiierosto have . . . put our finger
on the woundand exposedto theconsciousand Socialistpeople those
who are reallyresponsibleforthedefeatoftoday.
To Ghio,therewas littledoubtwhowas toblame:"Justo,Repetto,and the
others,thereis thefruitofourmachinations: the secondofApril,L9L6!"69
The Socialistpartyneverbrokeout ofthe capital.There, it occasion-
ally increasedits votes but neverconsolidatedits gains.70Firm support
oscillatedaround30 percent(Table 2). Outside the capital,the PS re-
mained in the wilderness(Table 3). In 1917, Ghio and otherdissidents
fromthe capital'surbanbelt met in Mataderosto establishthe Partido
SocialistaRevolucionario. The followingyear,theInternational Socialists,
led by the typographers' unionleaderJoseFernandoPenelon,splitfrom
the PS to formthe Communistparty.That same year,amid the greatest
laborunrestin the nation'shistory, the Socialistsfoughta bittermidterm
electionin the capital. In spiteof workeragitationand calls forrevolu-
tion, the Socialistvote dropped markedly-notjust in the countrybut
in the capital. What was worse, as RichardWalter'scalculationsshow,
Socialistswere losingvotes fromtheirtraditional blue-collarbulwark.7'
Only District4, La Boca, wentforthe PS. Yrigoyen's inroadsintoSocial-
ist terrainwere checked,thoughmoreeffectively by the deepeningclass
struggleand the repressionofthe Semana Tragica ofearly19L9. In local
68. For the Socialistattitudetowardcommunism, see Justo,"El momentoactual del

socialismo,I," Revista Socialista 5 (May 1935), 326. For the splitwithinthe party,see
Emilio J. Corbiere, Origenesdel comunismoargentino(Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de
AmericaLatina, 1984), 13-43; and Mullaney,"Argentine SocialistParty,"176-81.
69. Letter,FernandoGhio to AlfredoTorcelli,Apr.i8, 1916, AGN, AAT.
70. For a surveyofelectionsbetween1916 and 1920 in the FederalCapital,see Walter,
"Electionsin the CityofBuenosAires,"610-22.
71. Ibid., 614-18. At the municipallevel the PS vote increased,but as Walterpoints
out, Yrigoyenlearnedto takelocal electionsseriouslythereafter,and the Socialistsslid back
to secondplace. See Walter,"MunicipalPoliticsand Government in BuenosAires,"178.

electionsthatyear,the PS recoveredsomeofitsconstituency.The young

congressmanFedericoPinedofoundbittersweet solace in theoutcome:
Because we representthattendencymostconsistentwithcosmopoli-
tan civilization,and above all withthe European civilizationin this
country,we are the factorbest selectedto impedethe predominance
ofthoseindigenouselementswhichtodayreturntoweighin Argentine
politics,unburiedby the unconsciouspracticeofuniversalsuffrage.72
The Radicals' abilityto swingeven the mostdiehardworking-class
districtsshowedonce morewhenYrigoyenregainedcontrolof his party
in 1926 and began to reassemblea working-class constituency,drawing
supportaway fromthe Socialists.If the PS could claim to be the offi-
cial oppositionat all, it was onlybecause conservative
forcescould never
forma lastingalliance.73The Socialistsnevermanagedto win morethan
15 percentofthe nationalvote,and thatpeak (14.6 percentin 1924) was
exceptionalin lightof the UCR's rightward driftunder Marcelo T. De
Alvear.It made littledifference whetheruniversalmale suffrageactually
functioned;Socialistsupportdid not rise significantlyafterthe electoral
reformof 1912.
The stumblingof the Socialistpartyreflectedthe crumblingof Sec-
ond Internationalism aroundthe world,as its European cousins splin-
tered under the weightof staterepressionor internecinedisputes.Yet
ArgentineSocialistsclungto an electoralstrategy thatmade itsappeal to
"conscious"voters.As it became clear thatthesevotersconstitutedonly
a fractionofthe electorateand as Yrigoyen'sgripon the UCR tightened,
some SocialistsfearedthatArgentine democracywas deteriorating toward
demagoguery.The brightyounglightsof the party,AntonioDe Tomaso
and Federico Pinedo, began clandestinetalkswiththe uprootedAlvear
leadershipas wellas conservativesoutsidetheUCR to sabotageYrigoyen's
electoralbid. Afterhis victoryin 1928, a new alliance of forcesbegan
secretlyconspiringto overthrow thegovernment.
Meanwhile,Justo'shealthdeteriorated and his rolein thepartyslowly
diminishedto occasionalspeechesin theSenate.Withouta strongleader,
the schismatictendencieswithinthe PS intensified. The largestdissent-
ing group,led by De Tomasoand Pinedo,stageda dramaticsplitin July
1927. Takingthe majorityof the party'sparliamentary wing withthem,
72. Cited in Dario Cant6n,JoseLuis Moreno,and AlbertoCiria,Argentina:la demo-

cracia constitucional
y su crisis(BuenosAires:EditorialPaidos, 1972), 99.
73. On the conservatives'weakness,see Ansaldi,"Reflexioneshist6ricas,"400-401;
Ezequiel Gallo and RobertoC6rtesConde, Argentina:la repusblica conservadora(Buenos
Aires: EditorialPaidos, 1972), 229-33; Cant6net al., Argentina:la democraciaconstitu-
cional,87.

theyformedthe IndependentSocialistparty(PSI) in 1928. The PSI's pro-

gramwas identicalto thatofthe PS, but thisnew generationof Socialist
leaderswere causticcriticsofYrigoyen's "sham"democraticsystem.They
openlydamned a democracyin whichvoterswere unconsciousof their
true interests.De Tomaso, Pinedo, and otherSocialistscollaboratedin
thecoup thattoppledYrigoyenin September1930, and theylaterbecame
important membersoftheillegitimate governments ofthe 1930S.74
Many,ifnotmost,Sociali-sts stuckto theirdemocraticbeliefsand did
notparticipatein the coup. The mainstream partydid notabet the coup
or collaboratein the 1930S governments. It rejectedthevoluntarism ofthe
praetorianregime,and its leaderswere sufficiently devoutdemocratsto
recognizethe difference betweenGeneralJoseUriburu,theleaderofthe
1930 coup, and the traditional leadersofthe ancien regimebefore1916.
But theydid notdefendYrigoyen'srightto rule on the basis ofuniversal
suffrage. Instead,theyapplaudedtheend ofa regimethathad "criminally
betrayedthehopes ofthepeople."75
It mightbe arguedthatgrowingauthoritarianism reinforcedtheSocial-
ists' democraticcredentials.Indeed, the beliefthatYrigoyen'spopulism
was the malefactorof democraticfailure,combinedwiththe succession
of illegitimategovernments duringthe 1930s, made the Socialistpartya
championofdemocraticrestoration. Ironically,whenthetransition finally
came in 1945, the Socialistsfoundthemselvescut offfromthe rank-and-
fileworking-class vote.The issueofdemocracydividedthewaters:Peron's
populismand militarybackgroundreekedoffascism,even ifit attracted
workers'support.76
Conclusion
From the 189os to WorldWar I, the heydayof Second Internationalism,
ArgentineSocialistsconceivedof social classes as the bearers of objec-
interests.Working-class
tivelyconstituted voterswereexpectedto voteas
workersand the bourgeoisieas bourgeois.This meantthatonce workers
became consciousoftheirclassposition,theywouldnaturally vote Social-
74. For a catalogueof the PSI involvement in the 1930 coup, see PartidoSocialista
Independiente,La revoluci6ndel 6 de setiembrey los socialistasindependientes (Buenos
Aires:n.p., 1961).
75. For the PS positionand role in the 1930 coup, see PartidoSocialista,El Partido
Socialistay el movimiento
militardel 6 de setiembre:documentos civiles(BuenosAires,n.p.,
1931). See also JulioGodio, El movimiento obreroargentino,(1g9o-1930), vol. 2 (Buenos
Aires:EditorialLegasa, 1987),394-408.
76. For a recent chronicleof the eventsof 1945, see JuanCarlos Torre, La vieja
guardia sindical y Per6n: sobre los ortgenesdel peronismo(Buenos Aires: EditorialSud-
americana,1990).

ist. Politicalchoices followedautomatically fromeconomicstatus:class

formation was independentofpolitics.
This neattheoryposed realproblemsin practice.Socialistswere irked
by the Radicals,who blurredclass linesin vagueappeals to liberalpoliti-
cal rights.Preferring policiesfullofconstructive
hardhitting suggestions
foreconomicreform,the Socialistswere baffledby the Radicals'success.
It was up to politicalparties,in the Socialists'view, to unveilthe class
interestto citizensin thoseclassesbornofeconomictransformation. The
Radicals,on theotherhand,cloudedclassinterests.
In disclosingobjectiveclass interest,the Socialistsencounteredtwo
problems.The firstwas the trap of reductionism.By treatingclass for-
mationas a processoccurringbeyondpoliticsin the realmofeconomics,
Socialistsdiscountedthe possibilitythatworking-class votersmightvote
accordingto criterianot reducibleexclusivelyto theirproletarianstatus.
So by accusingthe Radicals of engagingin politicacriolla while at the
sametimerelegatingformaldemocratization to secondpriority, theSocial-
istsweakenedanyclaimto beingthedefendersofpoliticalrights.
The secondproblemwas logical.Since thecause ofpoliticalrightswas
secondaryto economictransformation, the call to vote Socialistwas in
itselfmeaningless.Votingwas meaningful onlywhenthe rightwas exer-
cised by consciousagents.Since the stultified bourgeoisrevolutionpre-
ventedconsciousnessfrompercolatingamongthe masses,theirvote was
bound to be "irrational." Argentinevoters'preferencewas a self-fulfilling
prophecyas long as underdevelopment, which impeded full capitalist
social relationsfromprevailing,obscured"real"consciousness.This logi-
cal cul-de-sacpromptedmanySocialiststo questionthe meritof formal
democracyin Argentina.Thus itwas notinconsistent fora smallgroupof
Socialiststo colludewithconservativesin the 120os, help lead thecoup of
1930, andform
partofthegovernments
ofthedecadainfame
ofthe1930s.
ArgentineSocialists'difficulty in coping with democracybedeviled
theirparty'sfortunes.Democracyonly matteredif citizensknew what
to do with theirpoliticalrights.If any of the necessarylinksbetween
work,consciousness,and propervotingbehaviorwas severed,the effi-
cacy ofdemocracyhad to be questioned.ArgentineSocialistsadheredto
this "necessitarian"logic.77In so doing theycould not understandwhy
the working-class electorateoftenfavoredbourgeoisparties.Their only
explanationwas "falseconsciousness," based on the survivalof an older,
precapitalist,or criollotraditionthatpreventedcitizensfromseeing the
77. For an explorationof aspects of "necessitarianlogic," see Roberto Mangabeira

Unger,False-Necessity:
Anti-Necessitarian Social Theoryin the Serviceof Radical Democ-
racy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniv.Press, 1987).

light.The forceoftradition,
manySocialistsbelieved,ultimately defeated
the purposeof elections.The PartidoSocialistaclungto the rules in the
convictionthateventuallyitsmessagewouldbe heard.But ratherthanre-
assess theirattitudetowardthe voters,the Socialistsinvokedthe circular
logicoffalseconsciousness.Disappointingperformances at the polls thus
became a self-fulfilling
prophecy.


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Socialism and Democracy in Argentina in the Age of the Second International

Author(s): Jeremy Adelman

This content downloaded from 200.89.140.130 on Fri, 23 May 2014 13:26:13 PM

Socialismand Democracyin Argentina

The authoris gratefulto Paula Alonso,Emilio Kouri,Hilda Sabato,and RichardWalterfor

This content downloaded from 200.89.140.130 on Fri, 23 May 2014 13:26:13 PM

But the correlationdoes not necessarilyimplycausality.Democratic

movimiento obreroen AmericaLatina, ed. Pablo Gonzalez Casanova,vol. 4 (Mexico City:

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revolutionary or syndicalroutes.Theirchoice hingedon a numberofas-

The Questionof Democracy

4. For a summary,see Carl E. Schorske,GermanSocial Democracy,1905-1917: The

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Socialists,European and Argentine,soon abandonedMarx'sprefer-

tive meetingin October,whenit changeditsnameto PartidoSocialistaObreroArgentino;

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Civica, then an oppositionmovementamongthe politicalforcesof the

9. The mostdetailedJustobiographiesare bothbyDardo Cuneo:JuanB. Justo(Buenos

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But how did the Socialistsjustifyparticipating in a systembetter

12. PeterGay,The DilemmaofDemocraticSocialism:Eduard Bernstein's Challengeto

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Hence politicswas subordinateto economics,and economics was

The intellectualarsenal to justifySocialistparticipationin electoral

realismoingenuo"(1903),in La realizaci6ndel socialismo,OC vol. 6 (BuenosAires:Editorial

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alist vestiges. In his writingshe claimed to followin the footstepsof

20. See Justo,Educaci6n puiblica, OC vol. 3 (Buenos Aires: La Vanguardia,1930),

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productionbut in extensiveestancias.The estancieroclass aimed its pro-

23. The mostforceful rendition ofthisexplanationofArgentina's failedbourgeoisrevo-

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dinoRivadavia,DomingoSarmiento, and especiallyJuanBautistaAlberdi

26. La Vanguardia, Feb. 3, 1914; Justo,Teoria cientffica,37-40; Dickmann,Recuer-

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libraries,cooperatives,and unions,so thattheywould recognizetheir

The PartidoSocialistaat the Polls

30. Justo,"El socialismo,"in Realizaci6ndel socialismo,200.

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TABLE i: SocialistPartyVotein the FederalCapital,1896-ig9o

Source: La Vanguardia, selected years.

executivecommittee.Delegates dispatchedfromthe capital set up re-

34. Some of the campaignersrememberedthe atmospherewell. See Dickmann,Re-

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the streets,the PS stayedalooffromconflicts.The party'srelationswith

37. RuthThompson,"The Limitations ofIdeologyin theEarlyArgentine Labour Move-

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and thatour ranksare filledwithSocialistswho thinktheyare Social-

39. Roque Masi to AlfredoTorcelli,July24, 1914, AGN, AAT.

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The Socialists'frustration sometimesled themto attackethnicinsu-

44. See, forinstance,Justo,"Por qu6 no me gustaescribirpara una hoja que se dice

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Overnight,politicsshiftedfromexclusionary to inclusionary.Those who

46. La Vanguardia,Feb. 9, 1912. See also the executivecommitteereporton electoral

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preciatethemeaningofthevote,and itwas up to thepartyto demonstrate

47. La Vanguardia,Mar. 5, 1912.

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TABLE 2: Votesforthe Socialistand RadicalPartiesin NationalElections

Uni6nCivica Radical PartidoSocialista

Note: 1916 and 1922 were presidentialelections.The restwere congressional.The UCR

TABLE T: Votesforthe PartidoSocialistaby Province,1912-1930