ADMIN LAW 2ND BATCH CASE DIGESTS
2. CEFERINO PADUA
vs.
HON. SANTIAGO RANADA
FACTS: The focal point upon which these two consolidated cases
converge is whether the Resolution issued by the Toll Regulatory
Board (TRB), authorizing provisional toll rate adjustments at the
Metro Manila Skyway is valid. The resolution was issued by TRB as
answer on the petition of Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation,
as an investor and/or the operator because of significant currency
devaluation, which in turn, according to CITRA, necessitates the need
for the increase of the toll rates to meet the loan obligations of the
Project and the substantial increase in debt-service burden.
Petitioners Padua and Zialcita, as toll payer and taxpayer, assail the
validity and legality of TRB Resolution before the court. Private
respondent CITRA, with the OSG, counter that the TRB has primary
administrative jurisdiction over all matters relating to toll rates.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners are correct when it sought recourse to
the court in assailing the TRB resolution.
HELD: Yes (Emphasis supplied by MC). The instant petition violates
the twin doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies. P.D. No. 1112 explicitly
provides that "the decisions of the TRB on petitions for the increase
of toll rate shall be appealable to the Office of the President within
ten (10) days from the promulgation thereof."
The initial proper recourse is to file a petition for review of the
adjusted toll rates with the TRB. The TRB, as the agency assigned to
supervise the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities,
has the necessary expertise, training and skills to judiciously decide
matters of this kind. As may be gleaned from the petition, the main
thrust of petitioner Zialcitas argument is that the provisional toll rate
adjustments are exorbitant, oppressive, onerous and
unconscionable. This is obviously a question of fact requiring
knowledge of the formula used and the factors considered in
determining the assailed rates. Definitely, this task is within the
province of the TRB.
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized
administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes
on technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial
review in case of grave abuse of discretion, is indispensable. Between
the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the
unmistakable trend is to refer it to the former.
3. G.R. No. 166910 October 19, 2010
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. and JOSE MA. O. HIZON vs. TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD
FACTS: On March 31, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. ("P.D.") 1112, which created the Toll
Regulatory Board ("TRB") and invested it under Section 3 (a) (d) and
(e) with the power to enter, for the Republic, into contracts for the
construction, maintenance and operation of tollways, grant authority
to operate a toll facility, issue therefor the necessary Toll Operation
Certificate ("TOC") and fix initial toll rates, and, from time to time,
adjust the same after due notice and hearing.
Petitioners Francisco and Hizon, as taxpayers and expressway users,
seek to nullify the various STOAs adverted to TRB resolutions fixing
initial rates and/or approving periodic toll rate adjustments therefor.
To the petitioners, the STOAs and the toll rate-fixing resolutions
violate the Constitution in that they veritably impose on the public
the burden of financing tollways by way of exorbitant fees and thus
depriving the public of property without due process.
Additionally, petitioners also seek to nullify certain provisions of P.D.
1113 and P.D. 1894, which uniformly grant the President the power
to approve the transfer or assignment of usufruct or the rights and
privileges thereunder by the tollway operator to third parties,
particularly the transfer effected by PNCC to MNTC. As argued, the
authority to approve partakes of an exercise of legislative power
under Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution.15
*In short, Toll Regulatory Board granted franchises for the operation
of toll facilities which have the authority to increase the toll fees to
be paid accordingly by motorists. Petitioners cried a foul for alleged
violation of their rights to due process. They further alleged that TRB
has no authority to increase the fees without any legislative act.
ISSUE: WON the certain provisions of STOAs and related agreements
entered into by TRB are valid.
RULING: Petitioners presupposition that only Congress has the
power to directly grant franchises is misplaced. Time and again, We
have held that administrative agencies may be empowered by the
Legislature by means of a law to grant franchises or similar
authorizations.87 And this, We have sufficiently addressed in the
present case.88 To reiterate, We discussed in Albano that our statute
books are replete with laws granting administrative agencies the
power to issue authorizations.89 This delegation of legislative power
to administrative agencies is allowed "in order to adapt to the
increasing complexity of modern life."90 Consequently, We have held
that the "privileges conferred by grant by local authorities as agents
for the state constitute as much a legislative franchise as though
the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature."91
In this case, the TRBs charter itself, or Section 3 (e) of P.D. 1112,
specifically empowers it to "grant authority to operate a toll facility
and to issue therefore the necessary Toll Operation Certificate
subject to such conditions as shall be imposed by the [TRB]x x
x."92 Section 3 (a) of the same law permits the TRB to enter into
contracts for the construction, operation and maintenance of toll
facilities. Clearly, there is no question that the TRB is vested by the
Legislature, through P.D. 1112, with the power not only to grant an
authority to operate a toll facility, but also to enter into contracts
for the construction, operation and maintenance thereof.
4. G.R. No. 77663 April 12, 1988
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EMMANUEL G. PEA, as Presiding Judge, RTC, NCJR, Br. CLII,
Pasig, Metropolitan Manila, and YEUNG CHUN KAM, YEUNG CHUM
HO and ARCHIE CHAN represented by YIM KAM
SHING, respondents.
Facts: On March 25, 1986, the commission issued an order freezing
the assets, effects, documents and records of two export garment
manufacturing firms: American Inter-fashion Corporation and De
Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation.
The Commission appointed Saludo as Officer-in-Charge (OIC)
of the said corporations, along with Mr.Yeung Chun Ho private
respondent herein, as authorized signatories to effect deposits and
withdrawals of the funds of the two corporations. On September 4,
1986, the Commission designated Mr. Yim Kam Shing as co-signatory,
in the absence of Mr. Yeung Chun, however said authorization was
revoked by Saludo; on the ground that Shing was a Hongkong
Chinese national staying in the country on a mere tourist visa.
The respondents filed and action for damages against the
Commission, then Commissioner Bautista and the OIC, Saludo.
The Commission filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the Commission or over
the subject of the case. Said motion was, however, dismissed by
respondent judge.
Issue: WON the RTC have jurisdiction over the Commission and
properties sequestered and placed in custodia legis in the exercise of
its powers under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, as amended.
Ruling: The Court holds that regional trial courts and the Court of
Appeals for that matter have no jurisdiction over the Presidential
Commission on Good Government in the exercise of its powers under
the applicable Executive Orders therefore may not interfere with and
restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the Commission.
The Commission exercises quasi-judicial functions.
In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the Commission is a co-
equal body with regional trial courts and "co-equal bodies have no
power to control the other."
Executive Order No. 14, which defines the jurisdiction over
cases involving the ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates, close and/or business
associates, dummies, agents and nominees, specifically provides in
section 2 that "The Presidential Commission on Good Government
shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the
Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original
jurisdiction thereof."
Thus, those who wish to question or challenge the
Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the
Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original
jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders are in
turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.
5. Saado vs Court of Appeals ; 356 SCRA 546
FACTS:
1. Saado was issued by the now defunct Philippine Fisheries
Commission an Ordinary Fishpond Permit covering an area
of 50 hectares. Saado executed a contract with
Nepomuceno wherein the latter agreed to develop 30
hectares of the 50 hectares covered by Saado's fishpond
permit.
2. the Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
recommended to the then Ministry of Natural Resources the
conversion of Sanados fishpond permit into a 25-year
fishpond loan agreement which covered a reduced area of
26.745 hectares. Accordingly, a Fishpond Lease Agreement
was issued.
3. Saado filed a complaint against Nepomuceno with the RTC
for recovery of possession and damages, alleging that
Nepomuceno failed to deliver Saados share of the net
harvest among other things. While this case was pending,
the then Minister of Agriculture and Food canceled the
Fishpond Lease Agreement, forfeiting the improvements
thereon in favor of government. Later, said order was
reconsidered to the extent that Nepomuceno was given
priority to apply for the area and that his improvements
thereon were not considered forfeited in favor of the
government.
4. Saado elevated the matter to the Office of the President
but appeal was dimissed. Meanwhile, the trial court
rendered a decision over Saado's complaint for recovery of
possession in his favor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President in
cancelling petitioner's lease agreement should be given weight
RULING: Yes. The action of an administrative agency in granting or
denying, or in suspending or revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or
certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative or
quasi-judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasi-judicial
or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts
by the administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made
and rights and liabilities determined. As such, the July 31, 1989
decision of the Office of the President is explicitly an official act of
and an exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Executive Department
headed by the highest officer of the land. It thus squarely falls under
matters relative to the executive department which courts are
mandatorily tasked to take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule
129 of the Rules of Court. Judicial notice must be taken of the
organization of the Executive Department, its principal officers,
elected or appointed, such as the President, his powers and duties.
The policy of the courts as regards such factual findings is not to
interfere with actions of the executive branch on administrative
matters addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies.
This policy is specially applicable in the grant of licenses, permits, and
leases, or the approval, rejection, or revocation of applications
therefor. Such respect is based on the time-honored doctrine of
separation of powers and on the fact that these bodies are
considered co-equal and coordinate rank as courts. The only
exception is when there is a clear showing of capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, which
we find absent in the case at bar.
6. EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC. and
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION
CORPORATION, respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner Telecommunications Technologies Philippines, Inc.
(TTPI), as an affiliate of petitioner Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), was granted by the NTC a PA on September
25, 1996, to install, operate and maintain a local exchange service in
the Provinces of Batanes, Cagayan Valley, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao,
Nueva Vizcaya, Ifugao, Quirino, the cities of Manila and Caloocan,
and the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila.
It appears, however, that before TTPI was able to fully accomplish its
rollout obligation, ICC applied for and was given a PA by the NTC on
November 10, 1997, to install, operate and maintain a local exchange
service in Manila and Navotas,6 two areas which were already
covered by TTPI under its PA dated September 25, 1996.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals with application for a temporary restraining order and a writ
of preliminary injunction arguing that the NTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in granting a provisional authority to respondent
ICC to operate in areas already assigned to TTPI. On April 30, 1998,
the Court of Appeals dismissed7 the petition for review on the
ground that the NTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
granting the PA to TTPI.
ISSUE: WON the NTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
provisional authority to ICC in areas already assigned to TTPI.
Ruling: No the NTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion because
as the regulatory agency of the national government with jurisdiction
over all telecommunications entities, it is clothed with authority and
given ample discretion to grant a provisional permit or authority and
the authority to issue Certificates of Public Convenience and
Necessity (CPCN) for the installation, operation, and maintenance of
communications facilities and services, radio communications
systems, telephone and telegraph systems, including the authority to
determine the areas of operations of applicants for
telecommunications services.
The DOTC issued on September 30, 1991, Department Circular No.
91-260, with the purpose of minimizing or eliminating situations
wherein multiple operators provide local exchange service in a given
area. Pursuant thereto, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) was tasked to define the boundaries of local
exchange areas and authorize only one franchised local exchange
carrier to provide local exchange service within such areas.
Thereafter, on July 12, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Executive Order No. 109 entitled Local Exchange Carrier Service.
Section 2 thereof provides that all existing International Gateway
Facility (IGF) operators2 are required to provide local exchange
carrier services in unserved and underserved areas, including Metro
Manila, thereby promoting universal access to basic
telecommunications service. Thus, NTC promulgated Memorandum
Circular No. 11-9-93 on September 17, 1993 implementing the
objectives of E.O. No. 109.3
The Court will not interfere with these findings of the NTC, as these
are matters that are addressed to its sound discretion, being the
government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under its special and technical forte. 15 Moreover, the exercise
of administrative discretion is a policy decision and a matter that can
best be discharged by the government agency concerned, and not by
the courts.16
Petitioner insists compliance with the service area scheme (SAS)
mandated by DOTC Dept. Circular No. 91-260, to wit:
1. The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
shall define the boundaries of local exchange areas, and
shall henceforth authorize only one franchised Local
Exchange Carrier (LEC) to provide LEC service within such
areas.
The Court is not persuaded. Said department circular was issued by
the DOTC in 1991, before the advent of E.O. No. 109 and R.A. No.
7925. When E.O. No. 109 was promulgated in 1993, and R.A. No.
7925 enacted in 1995, the service area scheme was noticeably
omitted therefrom. Instead, E.O. No. 109 and R.A. No. 7925 adopted
a policy of healthy competition among the local exchange carrier
service providers.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7925 specifically limits the DOTC from exercising
any power that will tend to influence or effect a review or a
modification of the NTC's quasi-judicial functions, to wit:
Section 6. Responsibilities of and Limitations to Department
Powers. -- The Department of Transportation and
Communications (Department) shall not exercise any power
which will tend to influence or effect a review or a
modification of the Commission's quasi-judicial function.
The power of the NTC in granting or denying a provisional authority
to operate a local exchange carrier service is a quasi-judicial
function,20 a sphere in which the DOTC cannot intrude upon.
The service area scheme provided in DOTC Dept. Circular No. 91-260
is only one of the factors, but should not in any way, tie down the
NTC in its determination of the propriety of a grant of a provisional
authority to a qualified applicant for local exchange service.
Corrolarily, the grant of a PA to ICC to operate in areas covered by
TTPI is not tainted with any grave abuse of discretion as it was issued
by the NTC after taking into account ICC's technical and financial
capabilities an issue within NTCs competence which must be
accorded great respect and in keeping with the policy of healthy
competition fostered by E.O. No. 109 and R.A. No. 7925.
7. SPS. BALANGAUAN VS. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Katherene was a Premier Customer Services
Representative (PCSR) of respondent bank, HSBC. As a PCSR, she
managed the accounts of HSBC depositors with Premier Status. One
such client and/or depositor handled by her was Roger Dwayne York
(York).
York maintained several accounts with respondent HSBC. Sometime
in April 2002, he went to respondent HSBCs Cebu Branch to transact
with petitioner Katherene respecting his Dollar and Peso Accounts.
Petitioner Katherene being on vacation at the time, York was
attended to by another PCSR. While at the bank, York inquired about
the status of his time deposit. The PCSR representative who attended
to him, however, could not find any record of said placement in the
banks data base.
York adamantly insisted, though, that through petitioner Katherene,
he made a placement in a higher-earning time deposit. York further
elaborated that petitioner Katherene explained to him that the
alleged higher-earning time deposit scheme was supposedly being
offered to Premier clients only. Upon further scrutiny and
examination, respondent HSBCs bank personnel discovered that: (1)
York pre-terminated a time deposit; (2) there were cash movement
tickets and withdrawal slips all signed by York; and (3) there were
regular movements in Yorks accounts.
It was likewise discovered that the above-mentioned deposits were
transacted using petitioner Katherenes computer and work station
using the code or personal password "CEO8." The significance of
code "CEO8," according to the bank personnel of respondent HSBC, is
that, "[i]t is only Ms. Balangauan who can transact from [the]
computer in the work station CEO-8, as she is provided with a swipe
card which she keeps sole custody of and only she can use, and
which she utilizes for purposes of performing bank transactions from
that computer."
So as not to ruin its name and goodwill among its clients, respondent
HSBC reimbursed York the P2,500,000.00.
Based on the foregoing factual circumstances, respondent HSBC,
through its personnel, filed a criminal complaint for Estafa and/or
Qualified Estafa before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Cebu City.
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene submitted their joint counter-
affidavit basically denying the allegations. They argued that the
allegations in the Complaint-Affidavits were pure fabrications.
Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Victor C. Laborte in a Resolution,
found no probable cause to hold petitioners Bernyl and Katherene
liable to stand trial for the criminal complaint of estafa and/or
qualified estafa, particularly Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Respondent HSBC appealed the above-quoted resolution and
foregoing comment to the Secretary of the DOJ by means of a
Petition for Review. DOJ explains that, the appellant failed to present
any iota of evidence directly showing that respondent Katherene
Balangauan took the money and invested it somewhere else. All it
tried to establish was that Katherene unlawfully took the money and
fraudulently invested it somewhere else x x x, because after the
withdrawals were made, the money never reached Roger York as
appellant adopted hook, line and sinker the latters declaration,
despite Yorks signatures on the withdrawal slips covering the total
amount of P2,500,000.00.
CA reversed the decision of the DOJ. The Court of Appeals found fault
in the DOJs failure to identify and discuss the issues raised by the
respondent HSBC in its Petition for Review filed therewith. And, in
support thereof, respondent HSBC maintains that it is incorrect to
argue that "it was not necessary for the Secretary of Justice to have
his resolution recite the facts and the law on which it was based,"
because courts and quasi-judicial bodies should faithfully comply
with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution requiring that
decisions rendered by them should state clearly and distinctly the
facts of the case and the law on which the decision is based.
Petitioners joined by the Office of the Solicitor General, on the other
hand, defends the DOJ and assert that the questioned resolution was
complete in that it stated the legal basis for denying respondent
HSBCs petition for review "that (after) an examination (of) the
petition and its attachment [it] found no reversible error that would
justify a reversal of the assailed resolution which is in accord with the
law and evidence on the matter."
ISSUE: WON the Secretary of Justice must necessisarily have his
resolution recite the facts and the law on which it was based,"
because courts and quasi-judicial bodies should faithfully comply
with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution requiring that
decisions rendered by them should state clearly and distinctly the
facts of the case and the law on which the decision is based?
RULING: NO. It must be remembered that a preliminary investigation
is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is not a quasi-
judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews
the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of
probable cause. In Bautista v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a
preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, thus:
[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does
not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often
the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused
is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination,
he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the
courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not
the fiscal.
Though some cases describe the public prosecutors power to
conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is
true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor
is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to
those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. A quasi-judicial
body is an organ of government other than a court and other than a
legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-judicial agency performs
adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of
parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a
court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a
preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an
Information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or
when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the formers order or
resolutions. In this case, since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body,
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution finds no application. Be
that as it may, the DOJ rectified the shortness of its first resolution by
issuing a lengthier one when it resolved respondent HSBCs motion
for reconsideration.
8. G.R. No. 134625 August 31, 1999
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS, CHANCELLOR
ROGER POSADAS, DR. EMERLINDA ROMAN, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ,
DR. ISAGANI MEDINA, DR. MARIA SERENA DIOKNO, DR. OLIVIA
CAOILI, DR. FRANCISCO NEMENZO II, DEAN PACIFICO AGABIN,
CARMELITA GUNO, and MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM
MARGARET CELINE, respondents.
FACTS: Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a
citizen of India and enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology
of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and
Philosophy. Subsequently, she graduated and was issued with a
Doctorate Degree in philosophy.
However, it was found out that she plagiarized her thesis and hence,
the UP Board of Regents revoked and withdrew her degree.
Thus, she filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and damages alleing that
petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without
justification and without affording her procedural due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of respondent's rights
when the UP Board of Regents withdrew her doctorate degree?
Whether or not she was deprived of due process?
HELD: NO to both issues.
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing
body of the University of the Philippines. It has the power confer
degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council. If
follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or
fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the
observance of due process, to withdraw what it has granted without
violating a student's rights.
In the case at bar, the Board of Regents determined, after due
investigation conducted by a committee composed of faculty
members from different U.P. units, that private respondent
committed no less than ninety (90) instances of intellectual
dishonesty in her dissertation. The Board of Regents' decision to
withdraw private respondent's doctorate was based on documents
on record including her admission that she committed the offense. 41
On the other hand, private respondent was afforded the opportunity
to be heard and explain her side but failed to refute the charges of
plagiarism against her. Her only claim is that her responses to the
charges against her were not considered by the Board of Regents
before it rendered its decision. However, this claim was not proven.
Accordingly, we must presume regularity in the performance of
official duties in the absence of proof to the contrary.
9. CARIO vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Facts: Public school teachers, members of the Manila Public School
Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers
(ACT) undertook a "mass concerted actions" to negotiate the granting
of demands but had elicited no response from the Secretary of
Education. The "mass actions" hence consisted in staying away from
their classes. The teachers participating in the mass actions were
served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work
or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials
concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not
comply and to hire their replacements. For failure to heed the return-
to-work order, some of private respondents were dismissed and
some were also preventively suspended.
The respondent submitted sworn statements to the CHR to complain
that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they
suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without
notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.
The Commission thereafter issued an Order enjoining to appear
Secretary Cario, of the DECS, the school superintendent of Manila
and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila.
Secretary Cario alleged that the complaint states no cause of action
and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case.
The Commission intends to itself adjudicate, determine with
character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have
been passed upon and decided by the Secretary, subject to appeal to
the CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that
the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matters, if
still timely.
Issue: Whether or not the CHR has the power under the Constitution
to do so like a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency.
Held: No. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to
have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental
law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence
and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights (investigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights) which is stated in
the Constitution. But fact finding and receiving of evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not adjudication,
and not a judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-
judicial agency or official. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function,
to repeat, the Commission does not have.
It cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is
not to adjudicate or adjudge.
Hence it is that the CHR, having merely the power "to investigate,"
cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate)
the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case, as it has
announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a
claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their
human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
The matters involved here are undoubtedly and clearly within the
original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the
scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil
Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has already taken cognizance of
the issues and resolved them, and it appears that appeals have been
seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service
Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon
said issues.
10. BIRAOGO VS PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
FACTS: PTC was promulgated under EO no. 1 by President Aquino.
The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed
under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to
submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. Furthermore, EO no.1 also provides that to
accomplish PTCs task, it shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code
of 1987.
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the
petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to
enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued, among
others, that E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and
pertinent statutes when it vested the "Truth Commission" with quasi-
judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of
the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the
Department of Justice created under the Administrative Code of
1987.
ISSUE: Whether or not PTC is vested with Quasi-Judicial powers?
RULING: No quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body
as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it.
It has been said that "Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is
to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by
law itself in enforcing and administering the same law." In simpler
terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-
judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and
must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of
administrative agencies.
Therefore, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to
state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or
sanctions.
11. HLC CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND
HENRY LOPEZ CHUA vs. EMILY HOMES SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION
FACTS: EHSHA filed a civil action for breach of contract, damages and
attorneys fees with the RTC of Davao del Sur, against HLC. The latter
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, claiming that it was the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and not the trial
court which had jurisdiction over the case. They also cited the
defective certification on non-forum shopping which was signed only
by the president of EHSHA and not by all its members; such defect
allegedly warranted the dismissal of the complaint. The trial court
denied petitioners motion to dismiss on the ground that the case fell
within its jurisdiction, not with the HLURB, and that respondents
certificate of non-forum shopping substantially complied with Rule 7,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It also denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, HLC filed the
instant petition alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in holding
that EHSHA had substantially complied with the rules on forum
shopping despite the fact that only one of the 150 respondents had
signed the certificate therefor.
ISSUE: WON EHSHA had substantially complied with the rules against
forum shopping?
HELD: Yes (Emphasis supplied by MC). Petitioners are correct that
the case between them and respondents fell within the jurisdiction
of the HLURB, not the trial court. However, we cannot sustain
petitioners contention that respondents certificate of non-forum
shopping was defective, thus allegedly warranting the outright
dismissal thereof by the trial court.
The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must
be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one
of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed that the
rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted
with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective. The strict compliance with the provisions
regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping merely underscores
its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether
dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does
not thereby prohibit substantial compliance with its provisions under
justifiable circumstances.
Respondents (who were plaintiffs in the trial court) filed the
complaint against petitioners as a group, represented by their
homeowners association president who was likewise one of the
plaintiffs, Buat. Respondents raised one cause of action which was
the breach of contractual obligations and payment of damages. They
shared a common interest in the subject matter of the case, being
the aggrieved residents of the poorly constructed and developed
Emily Homes Subdivision. Due to the collective nature of the case,
there was no doubt that Mr. Samaon M. Buat could validly sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of all his co-plaintiffs.
In cases therefore where it is highly impractical to require all the
plaintiffs to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping, it is sufficient,
in order not to defeat the ends of justice, for one of plaintiffs, acting
as representative, to sign the certificate provided that the plaintiffs
share common interest in the subject matter of the case or filed the
case as a collective, raising only one common cause of action or
defense.
12. G.R. No. 164250 September 30, 2005
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO, in his
capacity as Special Prosecutor, Office of the
Ombudsman, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. GIL A. VALERA and COURT OF APPEALS* (Special First
Division), Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent Valera was appointed Deputy Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. He is
in charge of the Revenue Collection Monitoring Group. Office of the
Ombudsman received the Sworn Complaint charging respondent
Valera with criminal offenses as well as administrative offenses of
Grave Misconduct and Serious Irregularity in the Performance of
Duty.
Petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, in the administrative case,
issued the Order placing respondent Valera under preventive
suspension for six months without pay.
Respondent Valera sought reconsideration of the said Order claiming
denial of due process. Respondent Valera already filed with the Court
of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition as he
sought to nullify the Order of preventive suspension issued by
petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio. Petitioner Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio denied respondent Valeras motion for
reconsideration. In so ruling, the CA held mainly that petitioner
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio is not authorized by law to sign and
issue preventive suspension orders.
The petitioners fault the appellate court for not dismissing outright
respondent Valeras petition for certiorari. They charge him with
violation of the rule on non-forum shopping as he filed his petition
for certiorari with the CA even when his motion for reconsideration
had yet to be acted upon by petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-
Ignacio.
*In Short, Valera filed a petition at the CA before Special Prosecutor
promulgated a decision for the motion for reconsideration vis--vis
his preventive suspension. This is where Ombudsman based its
allegations contending that it is a violation of the rule against forum
shopping.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation of the rule against forum
shopping.
RULING: The SC ruled that there was no violation. Because contested
in the court was the authority of the Special Prosecutors to issue the
preventive suspension and there was really basis because under the
law the Special Prosecutor does not have the power to issue
preventive suspension, only the Ombudsman or Deputy
Ombudsman.
Here, deputy commissioner Valera was the subject of an
administrative investigation by the Ombudsman and in fact during
the pendency of the investigation he was preventively suspended.
The one who preventively suspended Valera was the Special
Prosecutor. So Valera filed a motion for reconsideration of his
preventive suspension order, only for him to file a petition before the
appellate court, certiorari.
Even if the Special Prosecutor is of the same rank as the Deputy
Ombudsman, he does not have the same rights/powers. The law
does not confer this power to the Special Prosecutor. So there is no
violation of this rule against forum shopping.
13. G.R. No. 149335 July 1, 2003
EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR, petitioner,
vs.
LUIS BUNDALIAN, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, Executive Secretary,
Office of the President, AND GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, Secretary,
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), respondents.
Facts: Private Respondent, Bundalian, through a letter-complaint
accused petitioner, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the
DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8
of Republic Act No. 3019. According to Bundalian, Montemayor and
his wife purchased a house and lot in California.
Petitioner Montemayor, on the other hand, alleged that the
real owner of the subject property was his sister-in-law, Fajardo.
According to petitioner, Fajardo offered to buy the Burbank property
and put the title in their names to support their emigration plans.
Petitioner likewise pointed out that the charge against him
was the subject of similar cases filed before the Ombudsman, which
was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PCAGC) conducted its own investigation concluded that as
petitioners acquisition of the subject property was manifestly out of
proportion to his salary, it has been unlawfully acquired. Thus, it
recommended petitioners dismissal from service pursuant to Section
8 of R.A. No. 3019. The Office of the President concurred with the
findings and recommendation of PCAGC and ordered petitioners
dismissal.
Issue: WON the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the
Ombudsman render the administrative case before the PCAGC moot
and academic
Ruling: No. The dismissal of similar charges against Petitioner before
the Ombudsman does not render the administrative case against him
before the PCAGC moot and academic. The decision of the
Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case
subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative powers.
Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his
possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property
in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the
Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as
a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of
the administrative power and control of the President over him. As
the PCAGCs investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature,
the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar.
14. JESUS CABARRUS, JR. vs. JOSE ANTONIO S. BERNAS A.C. No.
4634 September 24, 1997
FACTS:
1. Cabarrus filed an administrative complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas. Cabarrus alleged that
Bernas and his client caused the preparation and filing of a
criminal complaint for falsification of a public document
(three days before the filing of a Civil Case) in the National
Bureau of Investigation, in violation of the non-forum
shopping rule by the Supreme Court.
2. The gravaman of the affidavit complaint of the respondent
is forgery, the same legal issue in a Civil Case. Cabarrus
contended that Atty. Bernas should be disbarred for having
instigated, abetted and facilitated the perversion and
subversion of truth in the said verification and certification
of non-forum shopping.
3. In his Comment, Bernas averred that he has not committed
forum shopping because the criminal action is not an action
that involves the same issue as those in a civil action and
both suits can exist without constituting forum shopping so
long as the civil aspect has not been prosecuted in the
criminal case.
4. He emphasized that forum shopping only exists when
identical reliefs are issued by the same parties in multiple
fora.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing a complaint before the National
Bureau of Investigations when another action has already been filed
in another court constitutes forum shopping.
HELD: No. The courts, tribunals and agencies referred to under
Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 are those vested with judicial powers or quasi-
judicial powers and those who not only hear and determine
controversies between adverse parties, but to make binding orders
or judgments.
As succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is not performing judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. The NBI cannot therefore be among those
forums contemplated by the Circular that can entertain an action or
proceeding, or even grant any relief, declaratory or otherwise. The
functions of the National Bureau of Investigations are merely
investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-
judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to a party. It
cannot even determine probable cause.
It is an investigative agency whose findings are merely
recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own
initiative and as public welfare may require. It renders assistance
when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes which
precisely what Atty. Bernas sought in order to prosecute those
persons responsible for defrauding his client.
15. TOMAS G. VELASQUEZ, Officer-In-Charge, Office of the School
Superintendent, DECS Division of Abra; MARIETTA BERSALONA,
Chairperson, DECS Fact Finding Committee; EDUARDO RUPERTO,
JOAQUIN PILIEN and LUZ CURBI, Members, DECS Fact Finding
Committee, petitioners
vs.
HELEN B. HERNANDEZ, respondent.
FACTS: On 26 September 1996, Velasquez convened a fact-finding
committee composed of members assigned at DECS-Division of Abra,
for the purpose of determining the veracity of the alleged violations
of Hernandez based on the complaints of 23 teachers. On account of
the sworn statements made by said teachers in the meeting
conducted by the fact finding committee, it appears that Hernandez
demanded and/or received money in various amounts from the
teachers in consideration of their appointment, promotion, and
transfer from one school to another. On November 15, 1996the
Committee issued an Investigation Report recommending the filing of
administrative and criminal complaints against respondent. On 14
March 1997, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct, Conduct Grossly
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Abuse of Authority, and
Violation of Section 22 (k) Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
E.O. 292 and other related laws was filed by petitioner against
respondent in the Civil Service Commission where the latter has
ruled finding Hernandez guilty of the charges against her and
ordering her dismissal from the service. Meanwhile a sworn
complaint was filed by the complaining teachers before the
Provincial Prosecutors Office which the latter decided finding
probable cause to indict respondent for direct bribery but was
however reversed by the Office of the Ombudsman on February
1998, the latter ordered the withdrawal of the information.
On appeal the CA reversed the CSC decision ruling that the petitioner
in its formal charge filed before the CSC should have attached a
certification of non-forum shopping as it was incumbent upon them
to inform the Civil Service Commission that another case was filed
before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon considering
that the facts and circumstances from which both complaints stem
are the same.
ISSUE: WON the certification of non-forum shopping should be
attached in the formal complaint filed before the CSC.
RULING: No. There is no need for the certification of non-forum
shopping in the complaint filed before the CSC.
Forum shopping consists of filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. 5 It
may also consist in a party against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum, seeking another and possibly favorable
opinion in another forum other than by appeal or special civil action
of certiorari.6
The following are the yardstick to determine whether a party
violated the rule against forum shopping where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other, to wit: there must be between
the two cases (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) that the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that
any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.9
In the present case, the action filed before the CSC is administrative
in nature, dealing as it does with the proper administrative liability, if
any, which may have been incurred by respondent for the
commission of the acts complained of. In stark contrast, the case
filed before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, which
incidentally was not initiated by herein petitioners but by the
complainant teachers, deals with the criminal accountability of the
respondent for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Unmistakably, the rule on forum shopping would find no proper
application since the two cases although based on the same essential
facts and circumstances do not raise identical causes of action and
issues. It would therefore be absurd to require the certification of
forum shopping to be attached to the formal charge filed before the
CSC, for the evil sought to be curbed by the proscription against
forum shopping namely the vexation caused the courts and parties-
litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or
related causes or grant the same or substantially the same relief is
not present in the instant case.
16. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN VS. RODRIGUEZ
FACTS: On 26 August 2003, the Ombudsman in Visayas received a
complaint for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct
in office, and neglect of duty against Rolson Rodriguez, punong
barangay in Brgy. Sto. Rosario, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. On 1
September 2003, the sangguniang bayan of Binalbagan, Negros
Occidental, through vice-mayor Jose G. Yulo, received a similar
complaint against Rodriguez for abuse of authority, dishonesty,
oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty.
Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss the case filed in the sangguniang
bayan on the ground that the allegations in the complaint were
without factual basis and did not constitute any violation of law.
Meanwhile, the Ombudsman required Rodriguez to file his answer.
Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss the case filed in the Ombudsman
on the grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping. He alleged
that the sangguniang bayan had already acquired jurisdiction over
his person as early as 8 September 2003.
When the case was called for hearing, complainants counsel
manifested that complainants would like to withdraw the
administrative complaint filed in the sangguniang bayan. On 29
October 2003, complainants filed a motion to withdraw the
complaint lodged in the sangguniang bayan on theground that they
wanted to prioritize the complaint filed in the Ombudsman.
Rodriguez filed a comment praying that the complaint be dismissed
on the ground of forum shopping, not on the ground complainants
stated. In their opposition, complainants admitted they violated the
rule against forum shopping and claimed they filed the complaint in
the sangguniang bayan without the assistance of counsel. In his 4
November 2003 Resolution, the municipal vice-mayor dismissed the
case filed in the sangguniang bayan.
ISSUE: (1) whether complainants violated the rule against forum
shopping when they filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang
bayan identical complaints against Rodriguez; and (2) whether it was
the sangguniang bayan or the Ombudsman that first acquired
jurisdiction.
RULING: The facts in the present case are analogous to those
in Laxina, Sr. v. Ombudsman, which likewise involved identical
administrative complaints filed in both the Ombudsman and the
sangguniang panlungsod against a punong barangay for grave
misconduct. The Court held therein that the rule against forum
shopping applied only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to
administrative cases. Thus, even if complainants filed in the
Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayan identical complaints
against private respondent, they did not violate the rule against
forum shopping because their complaint was in the nature of an
administrative case.
In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or
more disciplining authorities, the body in which the complaint is filed
first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent
jurisdiction. In this case, since the complaint was filed first in the
Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over
the complaint, the Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction is to the
exclusion of the sangguniang bayan exercising concurrent
jurisdiction.
It is a hornbook rule that jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction,
once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated. When herein complainants
first filed the complaint in the Ombudsman, jurisdiction was already
vested on the latter. Jurisdiction could no longer be transferred to
the sangguniang bayan by virtue of a subsequent complaint filed by
the same complainants.
As a final note, under Section 60 of the Local Government Code,
the sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an
elective barangay official. Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper
court may do so. Unlike the sangguniang bayan, the powers of the
Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. The Ombudsman is
clothed with authority to directly remove an erring public official
other than members of Congress and the Judiciary who may be
removed only by impeachment.
17. G.R. No. 112024 January 28, 1999
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, COURT OF TAX APPEALS
and COURT OF APPEALS,respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner herein PBCom claimed for refund/tax credits of
overpaid income tax. However, it was denied on the ground that it
was filed beyond the prescriptive period of 2 years as provided under
Sec. 230 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1977 (now
Sec. 229, NIRC of 1997).
PBCom now hinges its claims upon the REVENUE MEMORANDUM
CIRCULAR NO. 7-85 issued by the BIR which states that overpaid
income taxes are not covered by the 2 year prescriptive period under
the tax Code and that taxpayers may claim refund or tax credits for
the excess quarterly income tax with the BIR within 10 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in denying the plea for tax
refund or tax credits on the ground of prescription, despite
petitioner's reliance on RMC No. 7-85, changing the prescriptive
period of two years to ten years?
HELD: No, the denial of the claim is correct.
Basic is the principle that "taxes are the lifeblood of the nation. From
the same perspective, claims for refund or tax credit should be
exercised within the time fixed by law because the BIR being an
administrative body enforced to collect taxes, its functions should
not be unduly delayed or hampered by incidental matters.
In this case, the relaxation of revenue regulations by RMC 7-85 is not
warranted as it disregards the two-year prescriptive period set by
law.
When the BIR issued RMC 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of
two years to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax
payments, such circular created a clear inconsistency with the
provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply
interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the
statute passed by Congress. Thus there can be no vested rights
arising from such.
18. OPLE vs. TORRES
Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that the SC invalidate A.O. No. 308
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System" on the constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Ramos on December 12, 1996
which: Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification
Reference System. A decentralized Identification Reference System
among the key basic services and social security providers.
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then
Executive Secretary Torres and the heads of the government
agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308.
Then the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its
implementation.
Respondents counter-argue that A.O. No. 308 [1996] was issued
within the executive and administrative powers of the president
without encroaching on the legislative powers of congress;
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power.
Held: Yes. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere
administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the
President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system
of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and
liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more
particularly, violates their right to privacy.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not
indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution,
to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution has
vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. On the
otherhand, the President is vested with executive powers or to
executes the laws. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance. He is also granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control. He
can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations which is
concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a
subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative
order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President
which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for
the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the
legislative policy. We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308
implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987.
The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified document
the major structural, functional and procedural principles of
governance." and "embodies changes in administrative structure and
procedures designed to serve the people." It cannot be simplistically
argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code
of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of
national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-
gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. As said
administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of
our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and the
legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with
a subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not
a law because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no
protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen
cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic
services to the people without the contemplated identification card.
No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can
avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear that without the ID, a
citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his
privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives
no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the
authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent
source of power to make laws."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order
No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.
19. DADOLE VS COA
FACTS: The RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving
monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation
ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In
1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge.
Later, the DBM issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC
55) which provides that the additional monthly allowances to be
given by a local government unit should not exceed P1,000 in
provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities. The said circular
likewise provided for its immediate effectivity without need of
publication.
Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued
notices of disallowance to herein petitioners in excess of the amount
authorized by LBC.
Beginning October, 1994, the additional monthly allowances of the
petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They were also asked
to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000.
ISSUE: Whether or not LBC 55 went beyond the law it seeks to
implement?
RULING: Yes. Section 458 of the Local Government Code, the law
that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant
of additional allowances to judges "when the finances of the city
government allow." The said provision does not authorize setting a
definite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to
judges.
Thus, we need not belabor the point that the finances of a city
government may allow the grant of additional allowances higher
than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city government exceed its
annual expenditures.
Thus, to illustrate, a city government with locally generated annual
revenues of P40 million and expenditures of P35 million can afford to
grant additional allowances of more than P1,000 each to, say, ten
judges inasmuch as the finances of the city can afford it.
Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an
inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458 of
the Local Government Code. The rules and regulations must always
be in conformity with the law. It cannot go beyond what it provided
in the law, otherwise, it will already be usurping a power belonging
to legislature.
In the case at bar, the DBM over-stepped its power of supervision
over local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not
correspond with the law it sought to implement.
In other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal
basis.
20. LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A.
MESINA, ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL, JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO
V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTOC. BLAS, JR., ELPEDIO
M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION
FACTS: PRC issued a resolution as parts of its "Additional Instructions
to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the
licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution prohibits the
examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout
materials, tips, or the like three (3) days before the date of the
examination. Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the
licensure examinations in accountancy filed with the RTC of Manila, a
complaint praying for the issuance of a writ of a preliminary
injunction against PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the
above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same as
unconstitutional. PRC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the
enforcement of its resolution. It further contended that under
Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is the Court of Appeals
which has jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: WON the CA or the RTC has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: The proper jurisdicition is with the RTC. In order to invoke the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided
for in Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final
order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the
administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. In
Black's Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to
the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official
action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound
thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of
rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which
applies to a specific situation. This does not cover rules and
regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body
to implement its purely administrative policies and functions like
Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a
measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.
21. G.R. No. L-30918 July 18, 1974
ANNIE SAND, LYDIA VALDES, LUZ SABAS, JOSEFINA A. MENDOZA
and ROSARIO A. ORDIZ, in their capacity as Chairman and Members
of the Board of Examiners for Nurses, petitioners,
vs.
ABAD SANTOS EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION, SCHOOL OF NURSING
and HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, Quezon City, respondents.
FACTS: Respondent schools filed a petition to declare void the
regulation of petitioner board providing for periodic inspection of
nursing schools and barring from admission to the nurses'
examination the graduates of schools that are duly found to be sub-
standard during the period of the deficiency, and in lieu thereof
renders judgment declaring the said regulation valid and applicable
to all existing schools of nursing. The lower court granted the
petition.
Petitioners seek to reverse the ruling of the lower court contending
that they have the authority to issue such regulations for the
inspection of nursing schools and barring from admission to the
nurses' examination the graduates of schools that are duly found to
be sub-standard during the period of the deficiency.
ISSUE: WON the Board of Examiners are authorized to issue such
regulations.
RULING: Yes. Respondent school's challenge against the authority of
petitioner board to promulgate the disputed regulation for periodic
inspection by the board and for non-admission to the nurses'
examination conducted by the board of graduates of sub-
standard nursing Schools is manifestly untenable.
It is well settled that it is beyond the domain of the courts to inquire
into the wisdom of the Act vesting the petitioner board with similar
powers to that likewise entrusted to the Bureau of Private Education.
This is a reasonable regulation, a valid exercise of police power.
22. G.R. No. 163583 August 20, 2008
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO, petitioner, vs. JOSE ISIDRO N.
CAMACHO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Finance and GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, respondents.
Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing, Inc., fortune tobacco,
corp., MIGHTY CORPORATION, and JT InTERNATIONAL,
S.A., respondents-in-intervention.
Facts: R.A. 8240 was passed recodifying the NIRC where Sec 142 was
renumbered Sec 145. British American Tobacco assailed the validity
of Sec. 145 of the NIRC (amended by RA 8240), arguing that the said
provisions are violative of the equal protection and uniformity
clauses of the Constitution.
Section 145 provides for a four-tier tax rate based on net
retail price per pack of cigarettes: (1) low-priced, (2) medium-priced,
(3) high-priced, and (4) premium-priced. Said section further provides
that new brands (registered after January 1, 1997) of cigarettes shall
be taxed at their current retail price. On the other hand, old or
existing brands (registered before January 1, 1997) shall be taxed at
their net retail price as of October 1, 1996. Those brands classified as
of October 1, 1996 were embodied in Annex D of RA 8240 and shall
remain in force until revised by Congress. Hence, there exist a
legislative classification freeze.
To implement RA 8240, BIR issued a Revenue Regulation (RR
No. 1-97) classifying existing brands of cigarettes as those existing or
active (old) brands prior to January 1, 1997, while new brands of
cigarettes are those registered after January 1, 1997. Another
Revenue Regulation was issued amending the first (RR No. 9-2003) by
providing BIR with the power to periodically review every two years /
earlier the current net retail price of new brands to establish and
update their tax classification.
(Not entirely related to the issue. Pero basig mangutana si
sir about ani) British American Tobacco is the distributor of Lucky
Strike Cigarette in the Philippines. In June 2001, it introduced the
Lucky Strike Filter, Lucky Strike Lights and Lucky Strike Menthol
Lights. Lucky Strike was taxed based on its suggested gross retail
price from the time of its introduction in the market in 2001 until the
BIR market survey in 2003. According to BAT, there arises a
discrimination between brands under Annex D and BATs newly
introduced brands because the former were classified based on their
"current" net retail price as of October 1, 1996 and petitioners newly
introduced brands were classified based on their "current" net retail
price as of 2003. BATs brand was classified under the premium-
priced tax, while old brands such as Marlboro and Philip Morris,
though their net retail price have increased, are still classified under
high-priced tax bracket.
Petitioner asserts that aforementioned revenue regulations
are invalid insofar as they empower the BIR to reclassify or update
the classification of new brands of cigarettes based on their current
net retail prices every two years or earlier. It claims that RA 8240,
even prior to its amendment by RA 9334, did not authorize the BIR to
conduct said periodic resurvey and reclassification.
Issue: W/N the Revenue Regulations are invalid in so far as they
empower BIR to reclassify and update the classification of new
brands every two years or earlier.
Ruling: Yes. Nowhere in Section 145 grants the Bureau such
authority. Unless expressly granted to the BIR, the power to
reclassify cigarette brands remains a prerogative of the legislature
which cannot be usurped by the former.
The clear legislative intent was for new brands to benefit
from the same freezing mechanism accorded to Annex "D" brands.
To reiterate, in enacting RA 8240, Congress categorically rejected the
proposal which would have empowered the DOF and BIR to
periodically adjust the excise tax rate and tax brackets, and to
periodically resurvey and reclassify cigarette brands. It would thus,
be absurd for the Court to conclude that Congress intended to allow
the periodic reclassification of new brands by the BIR after their
classification is determined based on their current net retail price
while limiting the freezing of the classification to Annex "D" brands.
These revenue regulations are, however, deemed modified upon the
effectivity of RA 9344.
23. G.R. No. 131082 June 19, 2000
ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS
ANGELES, petitioner,
vs.
HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, respondent.
FACTS:
1. PETITIONER, a law firm, was exempted from the Pag-IBIG
Fund coverage by respondent Home Development Mutual
Fund because of a superior retirement plan.
2. the HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board Resolution No. 1011,
Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended,
Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be
entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage, 3 it
must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement
and housing benefits superior to those provided under the
Pag-IBIG Fund.
3. PETITIONER filed with the respondent an application for
Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage because of its
superior retirement plan. 4 In support of said application,
PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that
the 1995 Amendments to the Rules are invalid.
4. the President and Chief Executive Officer of HDMF
disapproved PETITIONER's application on the ground
that the requirement that there should be both a
provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear
in the use of the phrase "and/or," and that the Rules
Implementing R.A. No. 7742 did not amend nor repeal
Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely implement the
law.
Issue: W/N HDMF BOTs amendment and resolution of the RRI
valid.
Ruling: NO. It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-
making power as provided in Section 51 17 of R.A. No. 7742 and
Section 13 18 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well-settled that rules
and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to
create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of
law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by
the legislature to the administrative agency. 19 It is required that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and
be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law. 20
In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF
required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules
and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should
have both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its
employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund, it
effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the
Board subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996
Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such
amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as
they are not within the delegated power of the Board. The HDMF
cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation
not consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative
issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must
remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. 21 Only
Congress can repeal or amend the law.
24. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THRU: THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), AFP ANTI-GRAFT
BOARD, COL. ERNESTO A. PUNSALANG and PETER T.
TABANG, Petitioners, v. HON. EUTROPIO MIGRINO, as Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Branch 151, Pasig, Metro Manila
and TROADIO TECSON, Respondents.
FACTS: PCGG Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, ordered on May 13, 1986,
the creation of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft
Board. The Board shall be primarily charged with the task of
investigating cases of alleged violations of RA 3019 the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and 3079 in so far as they involve to the
recovery of the ill gotten wealth of Pres. Marcos, his family,
associates cronies or subordinates and shall make the necessary
recommendations to appropriate government agencies and
instrumentalities with respect to the action to be taken thereon
based on its findings. Acting on information received by the Board,
which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income,
private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) was required by the
Board to submit his explanation/comment together with his
supporting evidence by October 31, 1987, which however Tecson
failed to do so. The Board proceeded with its investigation and
submitted its resolution, dated June 30, 1988, recommending that
private respondent be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act
No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended. The case
was set for preliminary investigation by the PCGG in which private
respondent moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the PCGG
has no jurisdiction over his person because the alleged illegal acts
being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his
legal means while Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary, are
acts of his own alone, not connected with his being a crony, business
associate, etc. or subordinate of the late President Marcos and that
the order creating the AFP Anti-Graft Board (Annex "A", Petition) is
null and void because nowhere in Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A
is there any authority given to the commission, its chairman and
members, to create Boards or bodies to be invested with powers
similar to the powers invested with the commission.
In a resolution the PCGG denied the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit. Hence, private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro
Manila. The RTC granted the motion but was ordered by this Court to
vacate its orders.
ISSUE: WON private respondent Tecson may be investigated and
caused to be prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for
violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379.
RULING: No. While it is true that it has been alleged that the
unlawful accumulation of wealth was done during the administration
of Pres. Marcos it was not alleged therein that it was made by means
of his being a "subordinate" of Pres. Marcos within the
contemplation of E.O. No. 1, the law creating the PCGG. It does not
suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government
official or employee during the administration of former Pres.
Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent
unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or
relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife otherwise the
respondents case will fall under existing general laws and
procedures on the matter.
Moreover, the record shows that private respondent was being
investigated for unlawfully acquired wealth under Rep. Acts Nos.
3019 and 1379, and not under the fact of his being a close associate
or subordinate of Marcos as contemplated under EO No. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A the law creating the PCGG.
However this should not be taken to mean that the PCGGs creation
of the AFP Anti-Graft Board is a nullity and that the PCGG has no
authority to investigate and cause the prosecution of members and
former members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for violations
of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 as the PCGG may investigate and
cause the prosecution of active and retired members of the AFP for
violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 only in relation to E.O.
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A that is insofar as they involve the recovery of
the ill-gotten wealth of former Pres. Marcos his family and his
cronies. The PCGG was created for a specific and limited purpose and
would not have jurisdiction over an ordinary case falling under Rep.
Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379. It cannot do more than what it was
empowered to do. Its powers and tasks are limited to the recovery of
the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. The
PCGG cannot, through an order of its chairman, grant itself additional
powers powers not contemplated in its enabling law.
25. CONTE VS. COA
FACTS: Petitioners Avelina B. Conte and Leticia Boiser-Palma were
former employees of the Social Security System (SSS) who retired
from government service. They availed of compulsory retirement
benefits under Republic Act No. 660.
In addition to retirement benefits provided under R.A. 660,
petitioners also claimed SSS "financial assistance" benefits granted
under SSS Resolution No. 56, series of 1971.
SSS Resolution No. 56 provides financial incentive and inducement to
SSS employees qualified to retire to avail of retirement benefits
under RA 660 as amended, rather than the retirement benefits under
RA 1616 as amended, by giving them "financial assistance"
equivalent in amount to the difference between what a retiree
would have received under RA 1616, less what he was entitled to
under RA 660.
Long after the promulgation of SSS Resolution No. 56, respondent
Commission on Audit (COA) issued a ruling, captioned as "3rd
Indorsement", disallowing in audit "all such claims for financial
assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56", for the reason that:
. . . the scheme of financial assistance authorized by the SSS
is similar to those separate retirement plan or
incentive/separation pay plans adopted by other
government corporate agencies which results in the increase
of benefits beyond what is allowed under existing retirement
laws.
Accordingly, all such claims for financial assistance under
SSS Resolution No. 56 dated January 21, 1971 should be
disallowed in audit.
Despite the aforequoted ruling of respondent COA, then SSS
Administrator nevertheless wrote then Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., seeking "presidential authority for SSS to continue
implementing its Resolution No. 56 granting financial assistance to its
qualified retiring employees".
Herein petitioners filed with respondent COA their "letter-
appeal/protest" seeking reconsideration of COA's ruling disallowing
claims for financial assistance under Res. 56.
Petitioner Conte sought payment from SSS of the benefits under Res.
56. But SSS Administrator Renato C. Valencia denied the request in
consonance with the previous disallowance by respondent COA, but
assured petitioner that should the COA change its position, the SSS
will resume the grant of benefits under said Res. 56.
Respondent COA rendered its COA Decision No. 94-126 denying
petitioners' request for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the SSS under Resolution no. 56 has the power to grant
financial incentive/assistant to the petitioner?
RULING: NO. Although such financial assistance package may have
been instituted for noble, altruistic purposes as well as from self-
interest and it is intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining
years of his life, lessening the burden of worrying about his financial
support or upkeep. But it is simply beyond dispute that the SSS had
no authority to maintain and implement such retirement plan,
particularly in the face of the statutory prohibition. The SSS cannot,
in the guise of rule-making, legislate or amend laws or worse, render
them nugatory.
Clearly, the SSS, in promulgating this resolution provides
supplementary retirement or pension plan for the retiring SSS
employee is a violation of the TEVES RETIREMENT LAW. So the
resolution is null and void.
*RA 4968 (The Teves Retirement Law), which took effect June 17,
1967 and amended CA 186 (otherwise known as the Government
Service Insurance Act, or the GSIS Charter), making Sec. 28 (b) of the
latter act read as follows:
(b) Hereafter, no insurance or retirement plan for officers or
employees shall be created by employer. All supplementary
retirement or pension plans heretofore in force in any government
office. agency or instrumentality or corporation owned or controlled
by the government, are hereby declared in operative or abolished;
Provided, That the rights of those who are already eligible to retire
there under shall not be affected."
26. G.R. No. 162372 October 19, 2011
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), AMORSONIA B. ESCARDA, MA.
CRISTINA D. DIMAGIBA, and REYNALDO P. VENTURA, Respondents.
FACTS: On the yer 2000, the GSIS Board of Trustees, pursuant to the
powers granted to it by RA 8291, approved Board Resolution No. 326
wherein they adopted the GSIS Retirement Financial Plan (RFP).
However on the following year, the retirement plan was questioned
for being contrary to the Teves Retirement Law which contemplates
and prohibits separate retirement or insurance plans.
Now petitioner argues that that Republic Act No. 8291 had modified
or repealed all provisions of the Teves Retirement Law that were
inconsistent with it as stated in section 3 thereof which says "all laws
or any law or parts of law specifically inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly, all provisions of the Teves
Retirement Law that are inconsistent with Republic Act No. 8291 are
deemed repealed or modified."
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8291 repealed the Teves Law and hence
the retirement plan can be considered valid?
HELD: No, it did not repeal said law and the retirement plan is null
and void.
While it is true that under Section 41(n) of Republic Act No. 8291,
GSIS is expressly granted the power to adopt a retirement plan
and/or financial assistance for its employees, but a closer look at the
provision readily shows that this power is not absolute. It is qualified
by the words "early," "incentive," and "for the purpose of
retirement." The retirement plan must be an early retirement
incentive plan and such early retirement incentive plan or financial
assistance must be for the purpose of retirement.
Such is not the case with the GSIS RFP. Its very objective, "to
motivate and reward employees for meritorious, faithful, and
satisfactory service," contradicts the nature of an early retirement
incentive plan, which involves a substantial amount that is given to
motivate employees to retire early. Instead, it falls exactly within the
purpose of a retirement benefit.
Furthermore, to be able to apply for the GSIS RFP, one must be
qualified to retire or must have previously retired under our existing
retirement laws. This only means that the employees covered by the
GSIS RFP were those who were already eligible to retire or had
already retired. Certainly, this is not included in the scope of "an
early retirement incentive plan or financial assistance for the purpose
of retirement."
Clearly, the GSIS RFP is a supplementary retirement plan, which is
prohibited by the Teves Retirement Law.
27. SEC vs. INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION
Facts: The BOD of IRC approved a MOA with Ganda Holdings Berhad
(GHB). Under the MOA, IRC acquired 100% or the entire capital stock
of Ganda Energy Holdings, Inc. (GEHI), which would own and operate
a 102 megawatt (MW) gas turbine power-generating barge. The
agreement also stipulates that GEHI would assume a five-year power
purchase contract with National Power Corporation. In exchange, IRC
will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC. On the
side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital stock of Philippine
Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI). Under the Agreement, GHB, a member of the
Westmont Group of Companies in Malaysia, shall extend or arrange a
loan required to pay for the proposed acquisition by IRC of PRCI.
IRC alleged that a press release announcing the approval of the
agreement was sent through facsimile transmission to the Philippine
Stock Exchange and the SEC.
The SEC averred that it received reports that IRC failed to make timely
public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its
directors, respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this
material insider information. The SEC Chairman issued a directive
requiring IRC to submit to the SEC a copy of its aforesaid MOA with
GHB. He further directed all principal officers of IRC to appear at a
hearing before the Brokers and Exchanges Department (BED) of the
SEC to explain IRC's failure to immediately disclose the information.
Then IRC complied with the directives of the SEC.
The SEC Chairman, however, issued an Order finding that IRC violated
the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, in connection with the Old
Securities Act of 1936, when it failed to make timely disclosure of its
negotiations with GHB and that some of the officers and directors of
IRC entered into transactions involving IRC shares in violation of
Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the Revised Securities Act.
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion alleging that the SEC had no
authority to investigate the subject matter, since under Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1758, jurisdiction was conferred upon the Prosecution and
Enforcement Department (PED) of the SEC.
The SEC, however, issued an Omnibus Order which: To create a
special investigating panel to hear and decide the instant case in
accordance with the Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the
Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED), Securities and
Exchange Commission.
(It should be noted that while this case was pending in this Court,
Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation
Code, took effect on 8 August 2000. Section 8 of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A, as amended, which created the PED, was already repealed
as provided for in Section 76 of the Securities Regulation Code. Thus,
under the new law, the PED has been abolished, and the Securities
Regulation Code has taken the place of the Revised Securities Act.)
Issue: Whether or not the SEC had no authority to investigate the
said subject matter.
Held: No. The petition is impressed with merit.
The SEC retained the jurisdiction to investigate violations of the
Revised Securities Act, reenacted in the Securities Regulations Code,
despite the abolition of the PED.
Section 53 of the Securities Regulations Code clearly provides that
criminal complaints for violations of rules and regulations enforced or
administered by the SEC shall be referred to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) for preliminary investigation, while the SEC nevertheless
retains limited investigatory powers. Additionally, the SEC may still
impose the appropriate administrative sanctions under Section 54 of
the aforementioned law.
In Morato v. Court of Appeals, the cases therein were still pending
before the PED for investigation and the SEC for resolution when the
Securities Regulations Code was enacted. The case before the SEC
involved an intra-corporate dispute, while the subject matter of the
other case investigated by the PED involved the schemes, devices,
and violations of pertinent rules and laws of the company's board of
directors. The enactment of the Securities Regulations Code did not
result in the dismissal of the cases; rather, this Court ordered the
transfer of one case to the proper regional trial court and the SEC to
continue with the investigation of the other case.
The case at bar is comparable to the aforecited case. In this case, the
SEC already commenced the investigative proceedings against
respondents as early as 1994. Respondents were called to appear
before the SEC and explain their failure to disclose pertinent
information on 14 August 1994. Thereafter, the SEC Chairman, having
already made initial findings that respondents failed to make timely
disclosures of their negotiations with GHB, ordered a special
investigating panel to hear the case. The investigative proceedings
were interrupted only by the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the CA, which became permanent by virtue of the Decision, dated 20
August 1998. During the pendency of this case, the Securities
Regulations Code repealed the Revised Securities Act. As in Morato v.
Court of Appeals, the repeal cannot deprive SEC of its jurisdiction to
continue investigating the case; or the regional trial court, to hear any
case which may later be filed against the respondents.
Provided in the Transcription: The SC ruled that even in the absence
of the rules to implement the Revised Securities Act, the Act was
approved way back in 1982 but it was only after 14 years, in 1996,
that the full disclosure rules were promulgated by the SEC, even in
the absence of such IRR, it does not invalidate nor make ineffective
the Revised Securities Act. So long as there are reasonable and
sufficient standards embodied in the law itself, and reasonable
interpretation may be given.
28. KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS. DIRECTOR-GENERAL
FACTS: The then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 420
that directs all government agencies and government-owned and
controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and
format for their existing identification (ID) systems.
Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded
under the uniform ID system to only 14 specific items, namely: (1)
Name; (2) Home Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date
of Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8) Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents;
(10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two index fingers and two
thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing features like moles
or others; and (14) Tax Identification Number.
Petitioners in allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it
constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive
branch of the government.
Clarify/Amend the RIRR, praying to exclude independent review
center from the coverage of the CHED, arguing among others, that
giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education
Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations
will effectively abolish independent review centers. CHED
Chairman Neri responded to the peti tioner that: to
exclude the operation of independent review centers from the
coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said
Executive Order No.566.
ISSUE: WON EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive
of legislative power as it expands the CHEDs jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-
making power?
HELD:

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 420 constitutes usurpation of legislative
functions by the Executive Branch of the Government.
RULING: No. EO 420 is valid. The purposes of the uniform ID data
collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and
reliability, insure compatibility, and provide convenience to the
people served by government entities.
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved
in either of two ways. First, the heads of these existing government
entities can enter into a MOA making their systems uniform. If the
government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID
pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they can also
adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the
uniform format will result in substantial savings, greater efficiency,
and optimum compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter,
and does not involve the exercise of legislative power.
Second, the President may by executive or administrative order
direct the government entities under the Executive department to
adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution provides that the "President shall have
control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices." The same
Section also mandates the President to "ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed."
1. Yes, it expands CHEDs jurisdiction, hence unconsititutional. The
scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHEDs coverage
under RA 7722. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to
public and private institutions of higher education and degree-
granting programs in all public and private post-secondary
educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a
framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities. A
review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated
by RA 7722. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would
put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
2. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is
also an invalid exercise of the CHEDs quasi-legislative power.
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-
making power through the promulgation of rules and regulations.
The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the
confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review
centers and similar entities which are neither institutions of higher
education nor institutions offering degree-granting programs.

Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President

can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions
under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID
format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and
convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of
control is self-executing and does not need any implementing
legislation.

Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the

President to promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative
power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power
the Presidents constitutional power of control over the Executive
department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of the
constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

29. REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON
HIGHER EDUCATION represented by its Chairman ROMULO L. NERI,
Respondents.

FACTS: This case is in connection with the controversy involving the

2006 Nursing Board Exam. The PRC admitted the leakage and traced
it to two Board of Nursing members. President GMA ordered for a re-
examination and issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to
supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and
similar entities in the Philippines. CHED likewise approved the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of E.O. 566. Review Center
Association of the Philippines, filed before the CHED a Petition to