The Infinite Contradiction

Author(s): Etienne Balibar, Jean-Marc Poisson and Jacques Lezra

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Yale French Studies, No. 88, Depositions: Althusser, Balibar, Macherey, and the Labor
of Reading (1995), pp. 142-164
Published by: Yale University Press
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 ETIENNE BALIBAR

The InfiniteContradiction'

In the shorttime allowed forthis presentation, I will provideyou

neitherwitha summaryofwhatyouhaveread,norwitha framework
forwhateverquestionsyou may eventuallywant to pose. I will try
insteadto reviewthegeneralissueswhoseinsistenceI nowrecognize,
afterthefact,in manyofthe textsthatmake up thisfile.WhatI am
suggesting is notthattheseissuesderivefromsomesimpleinitialidea,
but thata numberof theirhypothesesand formulations can now,I
believe,be inserted in an project.Forthemostpart,thisseries
on-going
ofworkshas beendrivenbyeventsandsummations(orbyeventsthatI
perceivedto be summations), whichmeansthatit is governedbydis-
parityand aboundsin palinodes.I couldtryto confera fictitiousunity
on theseworks,butthatwouldnotdeceiveanyone.Still,I wouldlike
to suggestthatthenecessityofpresenting themtogether, and thusof
linkingthem,comes at a momentwhen (maybeforthe firsttime)I
believe-and thefeelingmayturnouttobe an illusion-that I am able
to understand, in lightoftoday'squestions,whatwas andmayremain
ofinterestabout,andsomeofthepresuppositions of,theissuesformu-
lated twentyor thirtyyearsago in circlesto which I belonged,and
whichhave notall vanished,at least notas faras I am concerned.
Therefore, I wouldlikethisreviewto revolvearoundthreethemes:
philosophicalpractice,theconstruction ofthesubject,andthetheme

1. Exceptfortheinitialacknowledgments, whichhavebeen cut,thisis thesame

paperI readtopresentthebodyofmyworkduringmyResearchDirectorhabilitationon
16 January1993at theUniversit6de ParisI. MembersofthejuryincludedOlivierBloch
(ResearchDirector),PauletteCarrive(President),
GeorgesLabica,GerardLebrun,and
AlexandreMatheron.

YFS 88,Depositions,ed. Lezra,X 1995byYale University.

142

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 ETIENNE BALIBAR 143
of structuralcausalityand historicalmaterialism.I will tryto con-
clude with a fewremarksor questionsregarding the maximsof an
ethicsthatseemsindispensableto me whenone proposes,withMarx-
in politics.
ism,but also againstit,thatthereare trutheffects

I. WRITING AND CONJUNCTURE

Philosophyis indeeda practice,evenifit is notpracticeitself.To add
thatthis practiceis essentially"theoretical"is a usefulbut insuffi-
cientprecision.Itarmsus in advanceagainsttherisksofempiricism or
subjectivismthatare boundto ariseout oftheinevitableuse ofsuch
wordsas activity, operation,intervention,
experience,andwork.It also
prevents us fromgettinglostin a pointlessdiscussionon themeansof
overcoming ofpreserving)
(or,conversely, thegapthatis oftenthought
to dividetheoreticalactivities(especiallyphilosophy)frompractical
activities-even in the formthatconsistsin claimingthatthought
shouldbe actionand,therefore, nonphilosophicalor postphilosophi-
cal,as withtheHeideggeroftheLetteronHumanism.Finally,itwarns
us that,ifall practicerequiresmatterexteriorto it,thismattermust
nonethelessbe transformed in a way thatshowspreciselyits mate-
rialityas such,in thefieldoftheory. Now,withregardto theundoubt-
edlydiversewaysandmeansofsucha trulyphilosophicaltransforma-
tion (a paradoxicalone, to be sure, since in a sense it must be a
nontransformation or,to parodyWittgenstein,a transformation that
leaves thingsas theystand,which is to say,a transformation that
returnsthemto wheretheystood)and notwithstanding anyidealiza-
tion,the expression"theoreticalpractice,"in its generality,
does not
yettell us anythingspecific.
Intheessaysyouhavebeforeyou,I havetriedtopracticephilosophy
in a waythatis surelynottheonlypossibleone,butthatunquestiona-
bly assembledand addressedmatter-a greatdeal of it-much of
whichcame and stillcomesfromoutsidewhatis officially definedas
philosophy. I
Andyetas was reading,rereading, ortranslatingphiloso-
phersamongwhomI was hopingtofindmymaterialorwhosesecretsI
was hopingtowhateverdegreetopenetrate(Kant,Marx,Spinoza,Des-
cartes,Wittgenstein, and Fichte,amongothers),I formeda notionof
thewaytheythemselvespracticedphilosophy:frankly, no philosopher
has heldanyinterestforme as longas I was awareonlyofhisideas,and
notofhis practice.Fromtheconfrontation betweenwhatI was trying
to achieveand what I perceivedof our models,I drewa hypothesis

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144 Yale FrenchStudies
about the specificmodalityof theoreticalpracticein philosophy.I
wouldput it thisway:philosophyconstantlyendeavorsto untieand
retiefromtheinsidetheknotbetweenconjunctureand writing,or if
you will, it worksfromwithinthe elementof writingto untie the
elementsof conjuncture,but it also worksunderthe constraintof
conjuncture toretietheconditionsofwriting. This is thedoublemate-
riality,bothindissociableand heterogeneous, thatI will brieflytryto
characterize bygoingbacktosomeofthethemesandexamplesthatare
scatteredhereand therein thesetexts.
I hold,then,thatphilosophyis neverindependentofspecificcon-
junctures.It shouldbe clearthatI use thiswordin a qualitativerather
thana quantitativesense,stressingby it the verybriefor prolonged
eventofa crisis,a transition, a suspense,a bifurcation, whichmani-
festsitselfby irreversibility, i.e., in the impossibilityof actingand
thinkingas before.Withoutnecessarilyusingthis terminology, but
alwaystrying preciselyto tie fromwithintheregister oftheeventand
that of the theoreticalintervention (howeverindirect,and however
muchperformed primarily in thefieldoftheoryitself),I haveanalyzed
a numberof exemplary, evenprivilegedconjunctures-forinstance,
thereversaloftherelationsbetweentheStateandthelabormovement,
whichMarxand Engels"answered"bymeansofthe "rectification of
the CommunistManifesto,"2 ofthe tendentialchangefromthe con-
ceptionof"thepartyas conscience"to thatof"thepartyas organiza-
tion,"3 and of the distinctionbetweenclasses and masses;4 or the
OrangistRevolutionof1672,whichcanbe interpreted, afterthefact,as
theDutch aristocracy's abandoningtheirefforts to organizetheworld
economyintoa free-trade network, whichSpinoza"answered"bysub-
stituting a "scienceoftheState"fora "democraticmanifesto," i.e.,by
moving from an ethicoffreedom of expressionto an of
ontology abso-
lutepower.5Finally,I haveanalyzedboththeannihilationofGerman
freedomunderNapoleon,and theresistanceit occasioned,including
Fichte'sAddressestotheGermanNation,botha stabat resistanceand

2. EtienneBalibar,Cinq etudesdu materialismehistorique(Paris:FrancoisMas-

pero, 1974). [All other notes below referto works by Balibar,unless otherwise
indicated-Editor'snote.]
3. Marxet sa critiquede la politique(in collaborationwithCesareLuporiniand
AndreTosel)(Paris:FrancoisMaspero,1979).
4. See "The VacillationofIdeology"and "PoliticsandTruth,"in Masses, Classes,
Ideas: Studieson Politicsand PhilosophyBeforeandAfterMarx,trans.JamesSwenson
(New Yorkand London:Routledge,1994),87-123; 151-74.
de France,1985).
5. Spinozaet la politique(Paris:PressesUniversitaires

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 ETIENNE BALIBAR 145
a wayto escape therepetitionsofthe Wissenschaftslehre and to offer
withtheexpression"interior border"a concretesolutionto theaporia
of the selfand the "non-self."6 But individualexamplesare not the
onlyones: collectiveexamples,i.e.,examplesthatshowhowphiloso-
pherssee theirdiscoursesinternallyconnectedto one another(and
connectedto nonphilosophical, e.g.,theological,legal,scientificdis-
courses)in thesame conjuncture, are in a sensemoresignificant. For
instance-and bearingin mindthattheseare in partthe same exam-
ples as those givenabove-"the inventionof consciousness"in the
conjunctureof "1690" (the mechanisticor spiritualistCartesians,
Malebranche,Leibniz,and Locke);7the inventionof the "subjectof
history"(orof"historicity") in the conjunctureof"1807-1809" (Ad-
dressesto the GermanNation,Phenomenology of Spirit,and Schel-
ling's"Freiheitsschrift").
Such a notionposes theimmanenceofphilosophicalworkto his-
tory,but it is resolutelyopposedto all the variantsof the notionof
Zeitgeist,or ofthe "culture"or "spirit"ofa time,includingtheform
that Marx's conceptof "dominantideology"gives it and the form
Foucaultgivesit by means ofthe conceptofepisteme.On the other
hand,thisnotionseeks to linkitself,freeing up theconcept'scritical
and analyticalpotential,withFoucault'spointsdheresie-heretical
points"sharedby" a numberofphilosophies,insofaras thesepoints
designatein theirverylanguagewhatis at stakein theirconfrontation.
Marx's "contradictions,"Spinoza's "aporias,"Descartes's "ambiva-
lence," and so on, aroundwhichI have organizedthe studyof their
argumentations and concepts,shouldhelp to clarifyone anotheras
termsofa contradictory conjuncture and as reflectionofthesecollec-
tivepointsdhe'resieat theheartofeachphilosophicaldiscourse.This
is whyI proposed,in reference to Fichte,that"thephilosophicaltext
carriesto an extremecontradictions thatgo beyondit, but thatno-
whereelse findso constricting a formulation."
This leads us to thesecondpoint:notonlydo philosophers always
writewithina conjuncture, but conversely, withinthe conjuncture,
theywrite.They "think,"no doubt(how could theynot?),but only
through writingandin constantconfrontation withtheproblemswrit-

6. "La Frontiereinterieure.
Reflexion surles Discoursa la Nation allemandede
Fichte,"Cahiers de Fontenay58/59 (June1990).An Englishtranslationappearsin
Masses,Classes,Ideas, 61-84.
7. "L'invention " in Traduire
dela conscience:Descartes,Locke,Costeetles autres,
les philosophes,ed. OlivierBloch(forthcoming).

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146 Yale FrenchStudies
ingposes forthem,while also benefiting fromthe termsand conve-
niencesit offers.All philosophyis essentiallywritten,and philoso-
phershavea particular relationtowritingthatnecessarilyincludesthe
issue ofits forms,"technical"modesor genres(whichValeryrightly
emphasized),or styles(whichGrangerrightly emphasizes).More: the
philosopher'soriginalrelationto writingis determined especiallyby
thefactthata singularexperienceofthoughtis alwaysan experienceof
writing,and that"philosophicalpractice"is one that,consciouslyor
not,seeksin andbymeansofwritingtogobackto theveryconstraints
thelatterimposeson thought.
I do not wantto treatherethe crucialquestionofknowingwhat
happensto philosophersin theirtexts.Let me insteadallude onlyto
threeincreasingly constraining modalitiesunderwhichI have come
acrossit in mywork:
Firstmodality:aporia,in thatitdetermines theneedfora constant
rewriting ofthephilosophicaltext.Allowme at thispointto elaborate
on thetypeofincompleteness[inachevement] propertophilosophical
texts-an incompleteness thatmyreadingsconstantlyillustrate,and
thathas led me to use theverbtoincomplete[inachever]in theactive
form:MarxUncompleted Capital (andtoiledall his lifeto incomplete
it); HeideggerincompletedBeingand Time. At the riskof supersti-
tion,I haveevenproposedthattherewouldbe a certainlogicalbenefit
in readingtheinterruption ofSpinoza'sPoliticalTreatiseas ifit were
an activeincompletion, comparableto thatoftheRegulaeorDe intel-
lectus emendatione.8One mightgo evenfurther and assertthatthe
natureof a greatphilosophyis not onlyto incompleteitself,but to
incompleteothers,byintroducing itselforbybeingintroduced intheir
writing:thus,fromthe "Manuscriptsof 1843" up to Capital, Marx
prodigiously incompletedHegel'sPhilosophyofRight.Andifitis true
thatthe regulatingidea of "system"is fundamentally a modernver-
sionoftheold imagomundi,themeaningofall theseaporeticunder-
takingsis, ifnotto "transform,"probablytoincompletetheworld,or
therepresentation oftheworldas "a world."
Secondmodality:dispersionor dissemination,understoodas the
factthatno philosophercan write"the same book twice,"not only
becauseeverybookis undertaken in orderto tryto overcometheapo-

8. "Spinoza,1'anti-Orwell-lacraintedes masses,"Les TempsModernes470 (Sep-

tember1985):353-98. An Englishtranslation appearsin Masses,Classes,Ideas, 3-37.

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 ETIENNE BALIBAR 147
rias ofthepreviousone,whetherby reversing its pointofview or by
introducing a difference-even,perhaps,an imperceptible difference-
in itsproject,butbecauseeachwritingexperienceis an unpredictable
adventure.Derridawould say: writingis openingup a trace(forone-
self),in whichtheconceptis exposedtoafter-effects, tothebacklashof
words,and especiallyofits own names. have triedin particularto
I
demonstrate thateach ofSpinoza'sthreegreatbooks,each ofhis great
theoreticalpractices,is a singularexperienceofwritingthatleads to
otherpropositions.I am readyto attemptthesame demonstration in
regardto Descartes,Marx,Hegel,or Kant.This does notmean thata
philosopher has no doctrine,butthatthisdoctrinelies nowherebutin
theintersecting [recoupement] ofhis orherdifferent writingpaths.
Hence,finally, a thirdmodalityunderlying thefirsttwo:theinter-
sectingofthesignifying chain itself.This point,whichseems to me
particularlyimportant, was the last of these modalitiesto become
explicit,in the courseofefforts to rereadDescartes'sstatement:Ego
sum,ego existo.9I had alreadyused thesame expression, however,in
addressing thefunctionoftheword"dictatorship" inthehistoryofthe
problemofthe"dictatorship oftheproletariat" in Marxand surround-
ingMarx.10Andinmanyrespects,theportmanteau wordI fashionedin
"La Propositionde l'egaliberte"'6" is myownattemptbothto intersect
a signifying chainand simultaneously to makeitsexistencemanifest.
Again, I am not proposing here a generaltheorythatis nowhereto be
foundin myessays,butratherdrawingattentiontoa factoftheoretical
experience:in the practiceof philosophicalwriting,the wordsand
propositionsaroundwhich aporias crystallizeand inventionstake
place alwaysbelongto longsignifying chains;mostoftentheyconsti-
tuteitselementofUnruhe,ofuneasinessoruncertainty-theone that
constantlyreturnsto the "origins,"i.e., to thenecessityfornewuses
and interpretations.
The odds are good,then,thatan intrinsicrelationexistsbetween

9. "Ego sum,ego existo:Descartesau pointd'heresie,"a paperpresentedto the

Societ6frangaisedephilosophicon22 February 1992,andpublishedin theBulletinde la
Soci&t6franqaisede philosophie86/3(July-September 1992):81-123.
10. "Marx le joker-ou le tiersinclus,"in Rejouerle politique (Paris:Editions
Galilee,1981);"Dictatureduproletariat," entryin Dictionnairecritiquedu marxisme,
ed.GeorgesLabicaandGerardBensussan(Paris:PressesUniversitaires de France,1982).
11. "La Propositionde l'6galibert6,"
Les Conferences du Perroquet22 (November
1989);Les Frontieresde la democratie (Paris:La Decouverte,1992).A partialEnglish
translationofLes Frontikres appearsin Masses,Classes,Ideas, 205-25.

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148 Yale FrenchStudies
the intersecting or overtreversalofa signifying chainthatlets itself
be seen moreorless cryptically in thefabricofphilosophicalwriting,
and,on theone hand,theradicalalternatives orpointsdhere'siethat
dividephilosophers;and,on theotherhand,thelinesofdemarcation
orformsofcollusionbetweenphilosophicalandnonphilosophical dis-
courses(or betweenthe philosophicaland the nonphilosophicalas-
pects of discourses-for instance,scientific,legal, or theological
discourse).
Wemusttherefore thinkthroughtogether bothdeterminations of
philosophicalpractice:its necessaryrelationto conjunctures(which
leads philosophicaltextsto organizethemselvesinto sets that are
themselvesdependenton a conjuncture) anditsrelationtowritingas a
permanent orshort-cut
short-circuit betweentheimmediacyofthink-
ing and its longerhistory.These two determinations entailtwo dis-
tinctbutequallyconstraining materialities.
I see thisconjuncturefirstofall in thewayphilosophyformulates
historicalor experienced divergences thatrequirechoicesto be made
in thecreationofwordsandin thestatingofpropositions. Philosophy
posesthesedivergences in termsofantinomiesandintroducesuniver-
sal antinomiesintoeach particularwriting.Next,I see it in the fact
thatthegreatphilosophicalmomentsarethosein whichtheoreticians
(concurrently andagainstone another)bringbackintoplay,in theheat
ofthe conjuncture, theveryformsor categoriesofthe theoretical,as
Althussermightsay.Finally,I see itin theindirectbutuniquecapacity
ofphilosophicalwritingto showwhy,althoughnot unintelligible, a
historicalconjuncture(inthestrongsenseoftheword)is nonetheless
fundamentally unmasterable:it alwayscontainsevenmoredivergent
positionsthananystrategic representation can apprehend(thisis why
philosophers,at least seemingly,constantly"shoot at their own
camp,"be it revolutionary or conservative).
These observationslead me bothto adoptthepointofviewofthose
whobelievethata "hermeneutic ofphilosophy"is structurally
impos-
of of
sible (whichis notthecase a "pragmatics" philosophy-a point
on whichI would agreewithPierreMacherey),and to assertthat,if
therecan be no separationbetweenphilosophyand ideologies(and
indeed,the "matter"we treatin philosophyis always,in a sense,
ideological),therenonethelessremainsbetweenthema difference of
practice.Unceasinglyrecreated, thisdifferenceofpracticeforbidsany
confusionbetweenphilosophy andideologies.Letmethencometomy
secondpoint.

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 ETIENNE BALIBAR 149
II. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SUBJECT
Withyourpermission, I willnotjustifyat greatlengththefactthatthis
partof my recentwork,concernedwith the comparativehistoryof
philosophy, turnsupontheissue ofthe "subject"(moreprecisely, the
confrontation betweenthenotionsof"subject"and "citizen").Hints
ofthisorganizing questioncropup in myearlierwork,to be takenup
againsooneror later.Foremostamongthesewouldbe myattemptto
rereadSpinoza'sTheologico-Political Treatisefromthepointofview
of the "constructionof the subject,"'12 which I undertookbetween
1982 and 1985.I could evengo back as faras thenotionof "formsof
historicalindividuality, " whichin mycontribution toReading"Capi-
tal,"I arguedto be a sortoftouchstonefortherelevanceofstructural
Marxism-a notionthatwas,we cannowagree,morea wayofdenying
theneedto addressin specifictermstheproblemofthesubjectandthe
meaningofthe concept,thana firstsketchofor primingforsuch an
engagement.'3 I shouldalso mention,howeverbriefly, therelationof
complementarity betweenthis and otherinvestigations(whichyou
have in handand whichfallwithintheprovinceofpoliticalphiloso-
phy,ifyouwill)concerning pastandpresentformsofnationalismand
racism,and more generallywhat Wallersteinand I have called the
intrinsicambiguityof individual and collectiveidentities.'4The
meetingpointoftheseissuesofpoliticsandthehistoryofphilosophy
is finallythecomplementary lighttheytryto shedon themomentof
extremeuncertainty in whichtheintellectualandinstitutional figure
ofthe "citizen"findsitselfagaintoday.
But all thiswill probablycome up duringour discussion.Let me
insteadgiveyou some reference pointsaboutthe originofmywork.
Whatis the sourceofthisincompleteinvestigation ofthehistoryof
theconceptof"subject"and,as a consequence,oftheproblems, forms,
and meaningof anthropological questionsin philosophy?It started
withthreesuccessivemomentsof surprise,whichI came to under-
standmoreclearlyonce theyhad reconfigured themselvesaroundcer-
tainquestionsbearingupon conjuncture.

12. "Jus,Pactum,Lex: sur la constitutiondu sujet dans le Trait6theologico-

politique,"Studia Spinozana1 (1985):105-42.
13. "The BasicConceptsofHistoricalMaterialism,"in Reading"Capital" (incol-
laborationwithLouis Althusser, PierreMacherey, JacquesRanciere,RogerEstablet),
trans.BenBrewster (London:Verso,1979),201-308.
14. Race,Nation,Class (incollaboration
withImmanuelWallerstein),trans.Chris
Turner(London:Verso,1992).

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150 Yale FrenchStudies
Firstsurprise:thereexistsin Spinoza a causal theoryof the con-
structionofthesubject(whatonemightcall an etiologyofthesubject),
presentedessentiallyas thetheoryofthe"firstkindofknowledge"in
thatitis also a wayoflife,a structureofbehaviorsandimagesthatgive
meaningto individualand collectiveexistence.It does not character-
ize first
persondiscourseas a merewayoftaking(a)placeintheimagin-
ary,but demonstrates thatit is itselfconditionedbythe existenceof
symbolicnarratives, institutions,and representations:"Jus,Pactum,
Lex."
However,not onlyis this etiologynot merelya reductionof the
subjectivemoment(fromthepointofviewofphilosophyitself),butit
coexistswithtwo(andmaybethree)resurgences ofthe "subject"that
can be identifiedwithsimilarphilosophicalmovements(at least by
analogy),eventhoughtheirunityis farfromobvious.Here,I am think-
ingofthe Theologico-Political Treatiseand theinsistent,irreducible
referenceto the dictamenrationis,or voice of reason,which is the
basisfortheestablishment ofthe"regimeoftolerance"thatis boththe
goal of the State and the conditionof its continuedexistence.I am
thinkingof the emergenceof a transindividual subjectivityin the
Ethics,understoodas a practiceofcommunication. The scientificuse
of "commonnotions" is no morethan the base of such a practice,
which also requiresthe sharingof certainactiveaffects:the shared
knowledgeand love of bodies.'5Finally,I have in mindthe way the
PoliticalTreatisedirectstheanalysisoftheinstitutionalmediations
of the monarchicand aristocraticregimesor the double processof
democratizationof equalityand liberty, not onlytowarda theoryof
collectivepower,but towarda theoryofdecision.Thus, it is Spinoza
himself,masterofall thegreatcritiquesofphilosophicalsubjectivism
(whetheritbe theepistemology ofthe"I think"ortheontotheology of
creation),who discoversforus in eachofhisworksa horizonofsubjec-
tivization:an unremovableremnant,but also the priming,the first
momentofa movementto pass beyondsuch subjectivization. Buthe
discoversit almostat themarginsofhiswritingandaccordingto three
apparently incompatiblemodalities.Firstsurprise, firstpuzzle.
Second,and to a certainextent,contrary surprise:therecan be no
doubtthatMarxis, amongotherthings(as Althusserhelpedus under-

15. "Spinoza: FromIndividuality a lecturedeliveredin

to Transindividuality,"
Rijnsburg in MedelelingenvanwegehetSpinozahuis71.
on 15 May 1993,forthcoming

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 ETIENNE BALIBAR 151
stand),a philosopherofthe subjectin themostclassical sense.More
precisely,Marxis a philosopheroftheself-construction ofthesubject
and its libertyin and by means of revolutionary practice.Fromthis
pointofview,Marxbelongstothegreattradition ofhistoricalidealism,
wherehe followsandintervenes at thesame speculativelevelas Kant,
Fichte,Hegel,evenSchelling,clarifying finally(ifitwereindeedneces-
saryto do so) theintrinsicrelationbetweenmodern,Idealistphiloso-
phyofhistoryand the traceofthe revolutionary eventas well as the
anticipationofits accomplishment. All thisis expressedquite clearly
in the Theses on Feuerbach:and the schema thus constitutedwill
neverbe refuted[recuse].16
Now,the categoryin whichwe spontaneouslyconceivethisself-
construction ofthesubjectis obviouslythatofthe"subjectofhistory"
themeoftheimpassioneddiscussionsofouryouth.InMarx,thePro-
letariatis thesubjectofhistory-likeHumanityin Kant,thePeoplein
theFichteoftheAddressesto theGermanNation,ortheWorld-Spirit
in theHegelofLessonson thePhilosophyofHistory.Andyet,however
muchyoumaysearchforthe "subjectofhistory"in theyoungor old
Marx,I challengeyouto findit expressedin so manywords,i.e.,in its
explicittheoreticalwording.The term'sabsence "in the flesh" [en
personnel(as Althusserwould have put it) is not the only surprise
encounteredwhenMarx'stextsare readto theletter:foryou will be
equallyunableto findotherexpressionsthat,rightly orwrongly, have
beenattributed toMarx-forinstance,"proletarian ideology"or"class
consciousness."It is unquestionably in Marx'sintellectualwake that
wephilosophizeandwritethehistory ofphilosophy intermsofSubjekt
derGeschichte.This category, however,is nonethelessnotto be found
andmayin factbe impossiblein hiswriting, howeverclearlywe think
wediscernitbetweenthelinesofmanypublishedorunpublished pages.
Neitheris it to be foundin Kant,orin Fichte,orespeciallyin Hegel-
althoughagainwe cannothelpbutdiscernitbetweenthelines.Accord-
ingto mypreliminary theinventorofthe "Subjectof
investigations,
history"is noneotherthanLukaics-quitespecifically in Historyand
Class Consciousness.And the roundof debateson this issue, or of
theoreticalinnovationsrelatedto this problematic,ends with Al-
thusser's"processwithoutsubject."'17
16. La Philosophie de Marx (Paris: La Decouverte, 1993).
17. "Le Non-contemporain," in Ecritspour Althusser (Paris: La Decouverte, 1991),
91-118.

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152 Yale FrenchStudies
It is thereforea historyquiteinternaltoMarxistcircles(althoughit
is decenteredand delayedvis a vis thedevelopment ofMarxism),and
yetofan orderofnecessityanduniversality suchthatall ofthemodern
philosophyofhistorycan no longerbe perceivedwithoutat least an
implicitreference to it. Secondsurprise,secondpuzzle.
The thirdand last momentof surprisecomes when, distancing
ourselvesfromthetraditions ofspiritualism,neo-Kantianism, Hegelia-
nism,andphenomenology (whichareconvergent on thispoint),we ask
ourselveswhenand forwhatreasonswe begantoread in Descartesa
philosophyof the subject and, a fortiori, of the "sovereignty of the
subject,"when,once again,sucha termis radicallynotto be foundin
hiswriting-is,indeed,I thinkI haveshown,impossibleinhisthought.
I beganto studythe problemmyselfsome yearsago when Jean-Luc
Nancyformulated, in deliberately paradoxicalterms,a questionthat
forcedme to make old inquiriescrystallizewithnew preoccupations
andto takeup,as muchtheenlightened amateuras I couldbe,areasof
historyorphilologythatphilosophyhas alwaysin factpresupposed.18
The questionwas "Whocomesafterthesubject?" Andtheanswer-to
my mind,the inescapableanswer,inescapablenot in speculativeor
moralterms,butfromthepointofviewofhistoricalfactsthemselves-
was this:afterthesubjectcomesthecitizen.Forthe"subject,"which
has hauntedthe whole problematicof libertyand of the individual
[personnel forfifteen centuries,is notan ontologicalfigure, thatofan
objectumor hypokeimenon, but a legal, political,theological,and
moralfigure, thatofa subjectusorsubditus,i.e., a dependent, believ-
ing,and obedientindividual.
What-or ratherwho-comes afterthesubject(first around1789-
93),is theuniversal,national,andcosmopoliticalcitizenwhois indis-
sociablybotha politicaland a philosophicalfigure.Andheremysur-
prise,or,ifyou prefer, mythirdpuzzle comes intofocus:thereis no
doubt that with the revolutionary eventthe subjectus irreversibly
cedeshisplace to thecitizen;thatthehumilityoftheone who listens
to theVoiceofan externalorinternal"master"giveswayin principle
to theautonomyofa collectivelegislator:thisbreakis recordedin the
insurrectional negativityofthePropositionofEqualiberty as "de jure
fact"and "trutheffect,"fromthenon ineffaceable even as theyare
18. "CitoyenSujet-Reponse a la questionde Jean-Luc
Nancy:Qui vientapresle
sujet?," CahiersConfrontation
20(1989).AnEnglishtranslation
appearsin WhoComes
AftertheSubject?,ed. EduardoCadava,PeterConnor,Jean-Luc Nancy(New Yorkand
London:Routledge,1991),33-57.

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 ETIENNE BALIBAR 153
denounced.Still,nothingchanges(orverylittle),exceptfora slight
displacement,inscribedin a play on words-althoughthis play on
wordsfitsintoa veryold and longsignifying chainalmostindissocia-
blefromthehistoryofuniversallanguagesandlaw in theWest.I mean
bythisdisplacementthetransitionfromthesubjectusto thesubjec-
tum,or Subjekt.Nothingchangesunlesseverything does,and thisis
thepuzzlingnatureofwhatis called "modernity," fortheindividual
can be a citizeneffectively onlyifhe orshe becomesa subjectagain.It
is to thisendthatinstitutions anddiscourses,includingphilosophical
discourse,thenseek a "psychological," a "moral,"ora "legal" subject
dissociatedor unitedin the figureof the "transcendental subject,"
according to the schema thatMichel Foucaultcharacterized so aptlyas
the "empirico-transcendental doublet."Thus, fortwo centuriesthe
historysharedbyinstitutionsandanthropological discoursehas been
thatofthebecoming-subject ofthecitizenand ofthedenominations
andconflicts ofits"subjectivity"-anendlesstask,butalwaysalready
underway,engaged,in truth,fromtheverymomentofthebreak.'9
I said thatnothing(orhardlyanything) changes,for,in thisproduc-
tionofthecitizenas subjectorofthe"subjectCitizen,"thesubjectus
is stillandalwayspresent,submitting totheinnervoiceof"conscious-
ness" thatinforms himorherofhisorherresponsibility. ButI also said
thateverything (oralmosteverything) changes,forwe knowthatthe
permanenceand insistenceofthe subjectusin the subjectumin the
last two centurieshave onlybeen possiblein conjunctionwith and
maybeunderthe dominationofquite different modalitiesof subjec-
tificationand subjection.I am thinking herenotofschemataoftran-
scendence,butofimmanentones,like theinscription oftheindivid-
ual withintheframework ofnorms,normalities,capacities,and dis-
ciplines-whose otherface,as we know,is theindividualor transin-
dividualoutcomeofanomies,deviances,inferiorities, minorities, and
incapacities.20 I have in mindalso mainlycommunalschematathat
combineimmanenceand transcendence-inparticular, thetwogreat
rivalschemataof "nation" and "class," both secretlyhauntedby a
thirdschema(theschemaof"race")producing whatwe call identities
throughtheplayand investment ofanthropological differences.2'

19. "Ce qui faitqu'unpeupleestun peuple:Rousseauet Kant,"Revuede Synthese

serie4, 3/4 (July-December 1989):391-417.
20. "CrimeprivM, foliepublique,"in Le Citoyenfou,ed. NathalieRobatel(Paris:
PressesUniversitaires de France,19911,81-104.
21. "Culturae identitA" (an Italiantranslation
ofthekeynotespeechfora confer-

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154 Yale FrenchStudies
Enoughphilology, however.Whatconclusionshave I drawnfrom
thisinvestigation, some ofwhosethemesI have just evoked?Let me
offer two,and runtheriskofbeingtoo cavalierafterhavingbeen too
fragmentary.
Firstofall, I have convincedmyself,not thatthe questionofthe
subjectis or shouldbe the specificobjectofphilosophy-farfromit;
butnevertheless thaton theissue ofthesubject (inextinguishable as
such,and anything butcircumscribed in an "age ofsubjectivity,"pre-
ciselybecauseit is notunivocal)onlyphilosophicalworkcan be criti-
cal work.The historyofthefiguresofthesubject,ofsubjection,sub-
jugation,subjectivity, and subjectification (wenowknowthatall this
is not"thesame thing,"butthatit is thesameproblem)is to a certain
extentnothingbutphilosophy ruminating on thegreat"historicalplay
on words,"subjectus/subjectum, and a fewothersthat are closely
linked to it, like conscience/consciousness/self-consciousness or
Gewissen/Bewusstsein, or the double meaningof Beruf("election"
and "profession"). Philosophyhas no metatheoretical positionor ex-
ternalvantagepointin relationto thesignifying compositesthatcon-
stituteit.It is,however, quiteillusoryto relyon disciplinesotherthan
philosophyin orderto displaythe marginof freedomor capacityof
variationthattheseproblematicnotionsconceal,and thus to point
towardwhatI calledearlierthecontradictions orpointsdheresieofa
conjuncture. Perfectlyillusory,unless,underthename ofthisor that
discipline,whatis reallytakingplaceis philosophicalwork-as is the
case, to offersome notableexamples,in Max Weber,Kelsen,Mauss,
Freud,Benveniste, andLacan.Fundamentally, thiscriticismis always
alreadyphilosophical, since,beingimmanenttowriting, it can neither
resortto an analyticalmetalanguagenorbringabout a reductionto
externalprocesses.To putit concretely, thismeansthatwe will always
learnmoreon thispoint from philosophers themselves(whatever they
call themselves)thanwiththenonphilosophical usersofphilosophy
forwhomthephilosophicaltextis merelyan elementofan archiveor
thereflection ofanotherstructure.
And thismeans thatby rereadingphilosopherswith "the greater
forceofthepresent,"i.e., withtheuncertainties and questionsofour
conjuncture, in whichwe too wantto philosophizeor,in Alain Bad-

enceorganizedbytheDivisionde philosophicetdesSciencesHumainesde 1'UNESCO,

Paris,on 14-15 December1989),in Problemidel Socialismo3 (1989): 13-34.

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 ETIENNE BALIBAR 155
iou's wonderfulexpression,to "take anotherstep" [ faireun pas de
plus] in philosophy, we are boundnot onlyto rectify preconceptions
but alwaysto discoversomethingnew,perhapseven somethingun-
known.Thus,afterI thoughtI had made surethatthereadingofDes-
cartesas a "philosopherof the subject"and a "philosopherof con-
sciousness"could onlybe a Kantianand Cousinianphilosopheme,I
had to ask myselfwhat,in Descartes,occupiedthespacethathadthus
been as it wereclearedout. I came to understandthatit was the far
moreradicalthesisofa nonsubjectivefreedom.Thisledme tosurmise
(contraryto what I-along with many others-had believed for
twenty-five yearson thestrength ofan almostunanimousFrenchand
Germanacademictradition) thatDescartesand Spinozawerenotthat
incompatible(as prototypes ofthe"philosopher ofthesubject"andthe
"philosopher ofsubstance"),or,moreprecisely, thattheywereirrecon-
cilable,to be sure,but also indissociable,so thatit is mostunlikely
thatwe will everbe able to choose betweenthem-for instance,on
such issues as thepersonality and impersonality ofthought.
My secondconclusionis thatthemajortaskofthephilosophicalor
philosophico-philologico-historicalworkin whichwe are involvedis
to establisha programofinvestigation ofmodes ofsubjection.
I use this term(perhapsprovisionally) forseveralreasons.First,
because the two aspectsofthe issue beforeus need to be subsumed
undera singletwo-sidedword:subjugationin its different forms(ser-
vitus,as Spinoza used to say) and subjectification-orbecominga
subjecton one's own-in itsdifferent forms(esse sui juris,as Spinoza
also used to say).The terminology thatwe need shouldincludeboth
activityandpassivity, andconsequently raise,in itself,theproblemof
theirdifference and themovementofthisdifference. All philosophies
ofliberationhavebeenreflections, each in its ownway,on thecondi-
tionsandformsofthisconatus,ortransition, thatdifferentiatesactiv-
ityfrompassivityas such.
ButI also use theexpression modesofsubjectionbecausethereare,
orused to be,modes ofproduction.At thispoint,however, we should
backup: in mostofthetextsI have submittedto youunderthecom-
monlabel "essaysin philosophicalanthropology," we aredealingwith
a determinedmode of subjection,whose transformations have at
timesbeen announcedand at timesreflected afterthefactbymodern
philosophy.Because of the closenessof its conflictedrelationwith
theology(evenwhenthepointhas beento denounceit),classicalphi-

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156 Yale FrenchStudies
losophyhas naturally privilegedtheschemathatAlthussercalled"the
interpellation oftheindividualas a subject," andthatI call theschema
ofthe"innervoice,"i.e.,theschemaoftranscendence, oftheLaw that
alwaysremainswithheldbehindthemouththatuttersit.This is only
one mode ofsubjection,or rather,it is the traitsharedby a seriesof
modesofsubjection.Byisolatingand privileging it,modernphiloso-
phershave builtthe fictionthatthe evolutionofthoughtfolloweda
singlepath-which easilygrantsittheallureofa goalora destination.
No doubtI riskcontributing to thisfictionbyfocusingmyresearchon
therevolutionary relievingandreplacingofthesubjectbythecitizen,
andon thebecoming-citizen ofthesubject.Andyet,evenin therough
sketchof a phenomenology of this becoming-subject, thereappear
already,as we have just seen,irreducibleformsof subjection,whose
historyshouldalso be recounted.Clearly,therearemodes ofsubjec-
tion otherthanthe "innervoice" that,similarly, may combinerela-
tionsofpower,an economyoflanguage,and imaginationofthebody
and soul.
This wouldhavebecomeapparent, I think,ifinsteadofcomparing
Descartes,Locke, Kant,and Fichtewith one another,we had con-
fronted themwith,say,Aristotle-thefirstofthegreatstructuralists
in whom the egalitarianfigureof thepolites is studiedand defined
againsta quite different relationofsubjection(characterized bywhat
I call unilateraldiscourse),distributed accordingto thetripleinequal-
ity of man to woman, masterto slave, and fatherto son, i.e., to
disciple.
Itwouldhavebecomeapparent, too,if,rereading Marx'stexts(espe-
ciallyhis analysisof "fetishism")fromthisangle,we had lookednot
onlyfora critiqueofalienation,butfora similarlystructural theoryof
the articulationof commercialand legal formsof exchange,which
establishesindividualsas carriersorholdersofvalue and thuscreates
withintheveryfabricoftheiractivitiesan empireofobjectified signs,
workingindeedlike a "spiritualautomaton,"like an a priorimaterial
formofgeneralizedequivalenceor a languageofthings,a "language-
object."
But since I have just evokedMarxand time is runningout,I will
nowtakea newshort-cut orshort-circuit anddiscussbriefly thewayI
studiedhimandhowI use himtoday,deferring anyfurther elaboration
to my answersto whateverquestionsyou maywish to pose on this
point.

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 ETIENNE BALIBAR 157
III. MARXISM AND STRUCTURAL CAUSALITY
I workedcontinuouslyand almostexclusivelywithMarx'stexts,and
oftenwithhis verywords,fornearlytwentyyears.Needless to say,I
would not writeany ofthe studiesI devotedto him in preciselythe
samewaytoday,eitherbecausetheyseemabstruseanddubiousto me,
or because thepositionstheyupholdnow seem quiteuntenable.And
yet,thereis notone ofmypreviousstudies(atleastthoseI keptas part
ofthethesisI submitted fiveyearsagoandwhich,underothercircum-
stances,youhavebeforeyouagain)fromwhichI wouldnotretainsome
element.So I wouldnotwritethathistoricalmaterialismis a science
(as I did in the late 1960s),22or thatclass struggleis in itselfthe in-
stanceof the irreconcilable in the materialityofhistoryand,conse-
quently,the"engine"ofitsirreversible transformations (as I didin the
1970s),23 althoughI am certainthatanyexplanationofhistoricalpro-
cess,sequences,orconjunctures shouldbe principally causal and that
theeffectivity ofclass divisionsandstruggles (evenoverdetermined by
otherstructures) is harderthaneverto overlookor ignoretoday.
Similarly, I wouldnotwrite(as in my 1976book,Surla Dictature
du proletariat)24 that the general formof developmentfordemocracy
beyonditsclassfrontiers lies in thedismantlingoftheStateapparatus
andgenerally in thedeclineoftheState.Forthepoliticalexperienceof
the 1970sand 1980shas taughtme (orso I believe)thattheexistenceof
a social movement"outsidethe State" is a contradiction in terms.
Indeed,it is on this veryissue that I began to partcompanywith
Althusserin 1978.25AndthecourseofthoughtI havetriedtofollowfor
thepasttenyearsorso,eitheraloneorin collaboration withImmanuel
Wallersteinand others,whichfocuseson presentand past formsof
racismandnationalism,andtheirambiguouscombinationswithclass
struggle,has suggestedto me thatclass struggle experienced, thought,
andorganizedunderits ownname is theexception,nottherule.Today
I believethatwhat can be called thetheoreticalanarchismsharedby
Marxismandtheentirelibertarian tradition(whethersocialistornot)

22. "La Sciencedu Capital,"in Le Centenairedu Capital,D6cades de Cerisy-la-

Salle: Exposeset Entretienssurle marxisme(ParisandThe Hague:Mouton,1967).
23. "A Nouveausurla contradiction," in Surla Dialectique,ed. GuyBesse(Paris:
C.E.R.M.-Editions Sociales,1977).
24. Surla Dictaturedu proletariat (Paris:FrangoisMaspero,1976).
sul partitofuoridelloStato," in LouisAlthusser
25. "Interrogativi et al.,Discutere
lo Stato:posizionia confrontosu una tesidi LouisAlthusser(Bari:De Donato,1978).

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158 Yale FrenchStudies
is mainlyresponsible,at least fromthe standpointofits theoretical
component,forits inabilityto size up the crisisit has facedsince at
leasttheyearsofitsconfrontation withNazism,andfromwhichithas
neveremerged.26 AndI believe,a fortiori,thatitis noton thesegrounds
thatwe are likelyto contribute intellectually to solvingthe crisisof
democraticpoliticsthattodaythreatensin different waysto open a
new doorto variousneo-Fascisms.
However,thisin no senseleads me to abandontheidea thata new
practiceofpoliticsis a mass practice.On the contrary, knowingthat
sucha notionis necessarilyambivalent, I believethatit is all themore
indispensableto include the "insurrectional"dimension(or,if you
will,thataspectofmovementsofcollectiveliberationthatexceedsthe
functioning ofinstitutionsandapparatuses)in anyreflection on dem-
ocraticcitizenship.Neither does thislead me to consider as meaning-
less one or anotheroftheissues thatMarxisttraditionhas subsumed
underthenotionof"communism"and to whichfromthestartI had
attachedparticularimportance:forinstance,whatclassical theoreti-
cianscalledthe"endofthedivisionofmanualandintellectuallabor,"
andwhichdidnotfallwithinthedomainofa description oftheforms
ofnineteenth-century industrializationso muchas itreferred to one of
the underlying anthropological forcesof the transhistorical division
betweengovernors and governed.27
IfI wantedto givea brief,schematicrecapitulationofthe succes-
sivestagesofmyworkon Marx,I wouldsaythatthefirsttask,under-
takenwithAlthusser,was to reconstruct or remodelMarxism:in a
sense,to completeit or to findat last the shape ofits coherenceand
systematicity. This programwas widespreadat the time, although
orientedin directionscontrary to one another.
I thenundertooka longand,in a sense,opposedprocessofdecon-
structionoftheMarxisttext.The mostsignificant thresholdsofthis
secondtaskwerecrossedwhenI toocametorealizethatthecontradic-
tionsofMarxism-as a politicaltheoryandas a historical movement-
cannotbe accountedforoutsideofMarx'sowncontradictions, forthey
arenothingotherthanthesecontradictions renderedeffective. It then

in Masses, Classes,Ideas, 177-

Freudo-Marxism,"
26. "Fascism,Psychoanalysis,
89.
in L'intellec-
27. "Surle conceptde la divisiondu travailmanuelet intellectuel,"
et les manuels,ed. JeanBelkhin(Paris:Anthropos,
tuel,l'intelligentsia 1983).See also
my article"Division du travailmanuelet intellectual,"in Dictionnairecritiquedu
marxisme,secondedition,1985.

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 ETIENNE BALIBAR 159
becameclearthat,in its strongest realizations,thehistoryofMarxist
is
theoryitself nothing buta displacement orevasionofcertainfunda-
mental aporias whose traceand termsmust be soughtin the very
textureofMarx'swriting-themostfundamental ofall theseaporias,
theone whichin factgovernsthewholefateofMarxism(as Althusser
hadperfectly understood andshown),beingtheaporiaoftheconceptof
ideology.
Aporiadoes not mean error, ofcourse,but the double bind28ofa
discovery orsimplyofa revolutionary theoretical question,posedinthe
verytermsofitsdenialorin theimpossibility ofits solution.I believe
thatin commenting uponandanalyzingMarx'stests,andbeginning as
earlyas my 1974 essays includedin Cinq etudes du materialisme
historique,but especiallyin thosepublishedin 1979 (Marxet sa cri-
tique de la politique)and mostclearlyin thoseoftheearly1980s(my
articlesfromthe Dictionnairecritique du marxismedirectedby
GeorgesLabica and mystudyon La Vacillationde lideologie dans le
marxisme),29 I establishedtheclose correspondence in Marxbetween
the aporiaofideology(thatis, the completeimpossibility ofconcep-
tualizingtheideologyofthe "proletarian masses" that,Marxtellsus,
makehistory)andthesuccessive,conjunctural versionsofhis critique
ofpoliticaleconomyandtheoryoftheStateapparatus,dictatorship of
theproletariat, andrevolutionary Frommypointofview,thisfirst
party.
negativeresultis attained,andithelpsus understand howthehistorical
cycleofdogmaticand criticalMarxismscircledbackupon itself.
This workofdeconstruction, however, whichis neverbydefinition
finishedandwhichhas muchtogaininnotlimitingitselfto a confron-
tationwithMarxalone,was neveran endin itself.It onlymakessense
to the extentthatit allows us to thinkotherwise,i.e., to tease out
positively,affirmatively,anotherproblematic,or,to relyuponourold
terminology, anothertopicor anotherschemaofhistoricalcausality.
FortheconceptofideologyinMarxhas morethana merelydescriptive
or evencriticalfunction:as the veryconceptof the discrepancybe-
tweentendencies[tendances]and events,it representsthe key mo-
ment of the interworking-Wechselwirkung or Riickwirkung-of
28. In Englishin theoriginaltext-Translator'snote.
29. See thefollowingentriesintheDictionnairecritiquedumarxisme:"Appareil,"
"Bakouninisme," "Classes," "Critiquede l'6conomiepolitique,""Contre-revolution,"
"Dictaturedu proletariat,""Droit de tendances,""Luttede classes," "Pouvoir."See
also "L'ideed'unepolitiquede classe chez Marx,"in Marxenperspective, ed. Bernard
Chavance(Paris:E.H.E.S.S.,1985),497-526. An Englishtranslation appearsin Masses,
Classes,Ideas, 125-49.

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160 Yale FrenchStudies
causes and effectsupon each other;it is therefore the touchstoneof
everything thathas takenthename of"historicalmaterialism."
Can we then"takeanotherstep"?I believeso; indeed,I eventhink
thatwe can describewhatsuch a schemawouldideallyconsistof.It
wouldnotbe thesumofa "base" anda "superstructure," workinglike
a complementor supplementofhistoricity, but ratherthe combina-
tionoftwo"bases" ofexplanationortwodeterminations bothincom-
patible and indissociable:the mode of subjectionand the mode of
production(or,moregenerally, the ideologicalmode and the gener-
alizedeconomicmode).Botharematerial,althoughin oppositesenses.
To name these different senses of the materialityof subjectionand
production, thetraditionaltermsimaginaryandrealitysuggestthem-
selves.One can adoptthem,providedthatone keepin mindthatin any
historicalconjuncture, the effectsof the imaginarycan only appear
through andbymeansofthereal,andtheeffects oftherealthrough and
bymeansoftheimaginary: in otherwords,thestructural law ofcausal-
ityin historyis thedetourthroughand bymeans oftheotherscene.
Letus say,parodying Marx,thateconomyhas no morea "historyofits
own" than does ideology,since each has a historyonlythroughthe
otherthatis the efficient cause ofits own effects. Not so much the
"absentcause" as the cause that absentsitself,or the cause whose
effectivityworksthroughits contrary.
This,then,is thetheoreticalpointofview,ifnotproperly the ob-
ject,ofRace, Nation,Class and Les Frontieresde la democratie:not
the object,forthese two collectionsof essays do not seek only to
illustratemethodologicalpostulates,but to questioneventsand de-
scribetendencies[tendances]so thata democraticpracticecan arisein
them.It is a theoreticalpointofview,then,whosevaliditycan onlybe
testedin itspractice.Indeed,in thesetextsI illustrateagainand again
the idea thatonlyimaginarycommunities(includingpoliticalcom-
munities)are "real." I suggestalso, however,thatcollectiveforma-
tionsoftheimaginary andtheirsymbolicframe(therefore all tracesof
theideologicalpastfraught withthemostambivalenteffects: nation-
alism,patriotism,institutionalor culturalracism,but also religion
and socialism)do not prescribeany futureoutsidepresent-day con-
straintsofaccumulation,the State,and class struggle.
The problematicthatis thusundoubtedly outlinedis notconceiv-
able withoutthetotalityofintellectualexperiencesand issues raised
byMarxism,butit deliberately playsMarxismagainstitselfas much
as againstits adversaries.In thissense it is irreversibly
post-Marxist,

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 ETIENNE BALIBAR 161
thoughthe morepedantic"meta-Marxist"mightmake clearerthat
theissue is notto declare"out ofdate" or surpassed-in a historicist
way-the conceptsand issuesofMarxism,butto confront themwith
theirantithesis.30Preciselybecauseit is radicallycausal, sucha prob-
lematichas no partin anydeterministic representationofthecourse
ofhistory.No onewhohas triedtoschoolhimselforherselfinthework
ofSpinozacan confusethetwonotions.Besides,we knowthatdeter-
minismis indeeda teleology. In contrast,totheextentthatitopensthe
wayto a philosophyofhistory, or better,a philosophyin history, the
conceptionofcausalityI am advancingcan onlyallow a conjectural
philosophy:notan attemptto computeprobabilities ofevents,butan
attemptto diagnosethe configurations of forcesthatwill face the
politicaland thesymbolicissues thatwill divideit withinitself.
Mustsucha problematic begivena name?Insteadoftheterms"sur-
rationalism"(usedbyGastonBachelard)or "sur-materialism" (coined
onthesamemodelbyDominiqueLecourt), andespecially"surrealism"
(thefirstandbesttermoftheseries,butwhichmighthaveus confused
withpoetsorlunatics),itmaybeworthreviving thewordstructuralism
(andI mustsayI amincreasingly temptedtodoso).The termis certainly
notthatold,thoughnobody(oralmostnobody)todayseemstowantto
haveanything todowithit-so muchso,indeed,thatsomeonerecently
thought itpossibletochronicleitshistory inafewhundredpagesas,and
I quote,the storyofa "collectiveshipwreck."Structuralism, then-
provided, however, thatwe understand it notas a combinativeorhier-
archicalschemaforconstructing setsortotalities,but,on thecontrary,
as a problematicof differential identities;an analysisof the double
inscriptionofcauses andtheirexcessofproductivity withintherepre-
sentationoffunctionalities;finally,as an infinitetopicofthenoncon-
temporaneity ofeventsto themselves.

Ifyougrantme a fewmoreminutesto conclude,I will proposenotan

argument, but a numberoftheseson the ethicalattitudethatis im-
plied,it seemstome,bythiswayofphilosophizing withinwhatI have
called theinfinitecontradiction
ofhistory.
One cannotproposethathistoryis causallyoverdetermined with-
30. In the same spirit,see my "Foucaultet Marx: l'enjeu du nominalisme,"in
Michel Foucaultphilosophe:rencontre internationale,Paris,9, 10, 11 janvier1988
is availablein MichelFoucault,
(Paris:Editionsdu Seuil, 1989).An Englishtranslation
Philosopher,trans.TimothyJ.Armstrong (LondonandNew York:Routledge,19911.

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162 Yale FrenchStudies
out positingthatthereare trutheffects in history.3'All materialism
(and I intendto proposeways of remainingwithinmaterialism)is
incompatiblewithanyrelativism.Itdoesnot,though,seektheantith-
esis ofrelativismin someeternaltruthorin whatis no morethana lay
versionof such a truth,a law ofevolution,i.e., some guaranteeor a
priorithatanticipatesa consensus.It seeksthetrutheffect onlyin the
irreversibility ofcertainbreaks,in theincoerciblecharacterofcertain
issues.Letme hazardin passingthatI believeit to be a sortofintellec-
tualpointofhonor,forsomeonewhosubscribedforyearsto a doctrine
orideologywhoseflagboretheinscription "Marx'stheoryis all power-
fulbecauseitis true,"nottoabandonthispositionthrough anyrelativ-
ism,historicism, orpluralism,butinsteadbymeansofa renewedeffort
tounderstand themodeofexistenceoftruthin history. Thathistoryis
not the processof effectuation of truthdoes not mean thatit is the
processofits constantdestitution.
Still,one can onlypositthatthestructure ofthishistoriccausality
is thatofa doublescene (real/imaginary) orthatit is "surreal,"ifone
presupposesthattrutheffectsin historyare firstnegative-in other
words,that such effectsmake institutionalconstructionspossible
onlyby theircapacityto interrupt or suspendthe courseofevents.I
believe I identifiedthis formalcharacteristic in the propositionof
equaliberty, as wellas in itsanticipationsandreiterations. This means
precisely, not thatequalibertyis "empty,"but thatit is an issue or a
question,andthatthisissueis there,whetherone likesitornot.Itfits,
irrepressibly, into the historyof subjection.It representsa point at
which the historyof economico-political systemsof productionre-
versescourse.It transforms thewhole ofphilosophicalwriting.
Finally,one cannotposit that because historyis structuralit is
therefore conjectural,without-like Spinozaand,to a certainextent,
like Hegel and Marx-reversingthe termsof the classical issue of
libertyand necessity(whoserelationto theologicalnarratives ofsub-
jection is well known):therewill not be a leavingof the "reignof
necessity"forthe "reignofliberty,"thatland of milk and honeyor
wine and roses in which therewill be neithersocial relationsnor
ideology,but,on the contrary, the realizationofliberty,a Verwirk-
lichung of the maximum of libertywithinthe field of necessity.
31. See Theses,defendedon 11 December1987beforethejuryoftheUniversit6 de
Nimegue(Netherlands),forthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy. Publishedin Frenchin
Raisonprdsente89(1989): 15-17.

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 ETIENNE BALIBAR 163
Betteryet:therealizationoftheconditionsformaximalliberty within
the fieldof necessity.In otherwords,the propositionthat because
historyis structural itis thereforeconjecturalsupposesthebecoming-
necessaryofliberty[devenirnecessairede la liberte].This means,and
I admitit unreservedly, thatpoliticsis also ethics.Not in thesenseof
an amorfati,norbecause the politicalwould be subjectedto moral
meansand ends,butin thatpoliticsactsso as to renderlibertyneces-
sary,withinthe broadestpossiblelimitsand forthe longestpossible
time.
Sucha positionis consistent-orI believeittobe-with thethesisI
havemaintainedin thefieldofhistoricalmaterialism:thatformations
of the imaginaryor subjectiveformationsare not the reflectionor
superstructure of economy and politics, but rathertheir psychic
material-a materialthat cannotbe manipulatedat will. To act is
therefore notto "master,"it is notto shape,it is notevento organize
historyor humanity even by means of the law, science, and
institution-asHobbesandso manyafterhimbelieved.Nor,however,
is it to limitoneselfto resistingheroicallytheimmemorialattraction
ofthehumanspeciesto "evil." Instead,to act is to playa gamewith
manyplayers,sometimestrickingor finessing, withand againstthe
risksofideology and economy.
Such a positionis thusnot incompatiblewithGramsci'sfamous
maxim(who claimedto have takenit fromRomainRolland):"pessi-
mismoftheintellect,optimismofthewill"-an injunctionthatone
shouldbe carefulnot to interpret as a merecombinationofactivism
and fatalism.Nor does it contradict Max Weber'sseeminglyopposite
and no less famousmaximurgingthejoiningof"theethicofconvic-
tion" with "the ethic of responsibility," i.e., (ifI understandit cor-
rectly) the presumption of truthwith the attention or
paid to effects,
consequences.Suchmaxims,however, opposedbothto therationalist
ideologyofinevitableprogressand to themysticismofimminentca-
tastrophe, shouldnotbe repeatedtoooften.Youhaveprobablyguessed
thatI wouldreadilyapplyto themthelaststatementoftheTractatus,
which,by definition,is also a rule concerningjudgmentin ethics:
"Those thingsabout whichwe cannotspeak,we must pass overin
silence." A contradictory injunction,ofcourse,andtherefore an ironic
one, whichcould be glossedas: one shouldnot make speeches[faire
des discours],nor,evenless,shouldone theorizeaboutsuchan injunc-
tion; still,it shouldbe set forthat least once (forit is neithera secret

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164 Yale FrenchStudies
noran initiatory
rule),andevenbe madea thesis:silenceshouldthere-
forebe broken.Hence the compromisesolutionthatI practice:we
shouldtalkaboutit as littleas possible,or,ifI mayputit thisway,we
must speak about "those things"as littleas possible,and make as
much "silence" as possible.

TranslatedbyJean-Marc
PoissonwithJacquesLezra

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