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\aspnum \adjustright \lin0 \rin0 \itap0 \fs21 \kerning2 \dbch \af2 \hich \af0 \loch
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 A.M. No. 03-
04-04-SC April 22, 2003}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0
\dbch \af2 \hich \af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 RE: PROPOSED RULE ON CUSTODY OF MINORS AND WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard
\plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0 \widctlpar \aspalpha \aspnum \adjustright
\lin0 \rin0 \itap0 \fs21 \kerning2 \dbch \af2 \hich \af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 IN RELATION TO CUSTODY OF
MINORS}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard \plain \ql
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\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 RESOLUTION}{\fs18 \kerning2
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\lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0 \widctlpar \aspalpha \aspnum \adjustright \lin0 \rin0
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\lisa0 \widctlpar \aspalpha \aspnum \adjustright \lin0 \rin0 \itap0 \fs21 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on
Revision of the Rules of Court submitting for this Court\uc1 \u8217 ?s
consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the
same.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0 \widctlpar \aspalpha
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The Rule
shall take effect on May 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation not later than April 30, 2003.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 April 22, 2003}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0 \widctlpar
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\langnp9 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0 \widctlpar \aspalpha
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Davide, Jr.,
C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Quisumbing,
J., on official leave.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 RULE ON
CUSTODY OF MINORS AND WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 IN RELATION TO CUSTODY OF MINORS}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 SECTION 1. Applicability. - This rule shall
apply to petitions for custody of minors and writs of habeas corpus in relation
thereto.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The Rules of
Court shall apply suppletorily.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 2.
Petition for custody of minors; who may file.- A verified petition for the rightful
custody of a minor may be filed by any person claiming such right. The party
against whom it may be filed shall be designated as the respondent.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 3. Where to file petition. - The
petition for custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court of the province
or city where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 4. Contents of petition. - The
verified petition shall allege the following:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and of the
respondent;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (b) The name,
age and present whereabouts of the minor and his or her relationship to the
petitioner and the respondent;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (c) The
material operative facts constituting deprivation of custody; and}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (d) Such other matters which are relevant to
the custody of the minor.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The verified
petition shall be accompanied by a certificate against forum shopping, which the
petitioner must sign personally.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 5. Summons; personal service on respondent. - If the
court is satisfied that the petition is sufficient in form and substance, it shall
direct the clerk of court to issue summons, which shall be served together with a
copy of the petition personally on the respondent.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 6. Motion to Dismiss. - A motion to dismiss the
petition is not allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter or over the parties. Any other ground that might warrant the
dismissal of the petition may be raised as an affirmative defense in the answer.}
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard \plain
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\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 7. Verified Answer. - The
respondent shall file an answer to the petition, personally verified by him, within
five days after service of summons and a copy of the petition.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 8. Case study; duty of social worker. - Upon the filing
of the verified answer or the expiration of the period to file it, the court may
order a social worker to make a case study of the minor and the parties and to
submit a report and recommendation to the court at least three days before the
scheduled pre-trial.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 9.
Notice of mandatory pre-trial. - Within fifteen days after the filing of the answer
or the expiration of the period to file answer, the
court shall issue an order: (1) fixing a date for the pre-trial conference; (2)
directing the parties to file and serve their respective pre-trial briefs in such
manner as shall ensure receipt thereof by the adverse party at least three days
before the date of pre-trial; and (3) requiring the respondent to present the minor
before the court.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The notice of
its order shall be served separately on both the parties and their respective
counsels. The pre-trial is mandatory.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 10. Contents of pre-trial brief. - The pre-trial brief
shall contain the following:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (a) A
statement of the willingness of the parties to enter into agreements that may be
allowed by law, indicating its terms;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (b) A concise statement of their respective claims together
with the applicable laws and authorities;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (c) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts;}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (d) The disputed factual and legal
issues;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (e) All the
evidence to be presented, briefly stating or describing its nature and purpose;}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (f) The number and names of the
witnesses and their respective affidavits which shall serve as the affiant's
testimony on direct examination; and}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (g) Such other matters as the court may require to be included
in the pre-trial brief.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Failure to
file the pre-trial brief or to comply with its required contents shall have the
same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 11. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial.-(a)
If the petitioner fails to appear personally at the pre-trial, the case shall be
dismissed, unless his counsel or a duly authorized representative appears in court
and proves a valid excuse for the non-appearance of the petitioner.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (b) If the respondent has filed his answer but
fails to appear at the pre-trial, the petitioner shall be allowed to present his
evidence ex parte. The court shall then render judgment on the basis of the
pleadings and the evidence thus presented.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 12. What may be done at pre-trial. - At the pre-trial,
the parties may agree on the custody of the minor. If the parties fail to agree,
the court may refer the matter to a mediator who shall have five days to effect an
agreement between the parties. If the issue is not settled through mediation, the
court shall proceed with the pre-trial conference, on which occasion it shall
consider such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 13. Provisional order
awarding custody. - After an answer has been filed or after expiration of the
period to file it, the court may issue a provisional order awarding custody of the
minor. As far as practicable,
the following order of preference shall be observed in the award of custody:}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (a) Both parents jointly;}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (b) Either parent, taking into account all
relevant considerations, especially the choice of the minor over seven years of age
and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen is unfit;}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (c) The grandparent, or if there are several
grandparents, the grandparent chosen by the minor over seven years of age and of
sufficient discernment, unless the grandparent chosen is unfit or disqualified;}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (d) The eldest brother or sister
over twenty-one years of age, unless he or she is unfit or disqualified;}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (e) The actual custodian of the minor over
twenty-one years of age, unless the former is unfit or disqualified; or}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (f) Any other person or institution the court
may deem suitable to provide proper care and guidance for the minor.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 14. Factors to consider in determining
custody. - In awarding custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the
minor and shall give paramount consideration to his material and moral welfare. The
best interests of the minor refer to the totality of the circumstances and
conditions as are most congenial to the survival, protection, and feelings of
security of the minor encouraging to his physical, psychological and emotional
development. It also means the least detrimental available alternative for
safeguarding the growth and development of the minor.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The court shall also consider the following:}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (a) Any extrajudicial agreement which the
parties may have bound themselves to comply with respecting the rights of the minor
to maintain direct contact with the non custodial parent on a regular basis, except
when there is an existing threat or danger of physical, mental, sexual or emotional
violence which endangers the safety and best interests of the minor;}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (b) The desire and ability of one parent to
foster an open and loving relationship between the minor and the other parent;}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (c) The health, safety and welfare
of the minor;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par
}\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0 \widctlpar \aspalpha \aspnum
\adjustright \lin0 \rin0 \itap0 \fs21 \kerning2 \dbch \af2 \hich \af0 \loch \af0
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (d) Any history of child
or spousal abuse by the person seeking custody or who has had any filial
relationship with the minor, including anyone courting the parent;}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (e) The nature and frequency of contact with both parents;}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (f) Habitual use of alcohol,
dangerous drugs or regulated substances;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0 \widctlpar \aspalpha \aspnum
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (g) Marital
misconduct;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (h) The most
suitable physical, emotional, spiritual, psychological and educational environment
for the holistic development and growth of the minor; and}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (i) The preference of the minor over seven years of age and of
sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen is unfit.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 15. Temporary visitation rights. - The court shall
provide in its order awarding provisional custody appropriate visitation rights to
the non-custodial parent or parents, unless the court finds said parent or parents
unfit or disqualified.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The temporary
custodian shall give the court and non custodial parent or parents at least five
days' notice of any plan to change the residence of the minor or take him out of
his residence for more than three days provided it does not prejudice the
visitation rights of the non-custodial parent or parents.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 16. Hold Departure Order. - The minor child subject of
the petition shall not be brought out of the country without prior order from the
court while the petition is pending.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The court, motu proprio or upon application under oath, may
issue ex parte a hold departure order, addressed to the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, directing it not to allow the departure of the minor from the
Philippines without the permission of the court.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The Family Court issuing the hold departure order shall furnish
the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation of
the Department of Justice a copy of the hold departure order within twenty-four
hours from its issuance and through the fastest available means of transmittal.}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The hold departure order shall
contain the following information:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (a) The
complete name (including the middle name), the date and place of birth, the
nationality and the place of last residence of the person against whom a hold
departure order has been issued or whose departure from the country has been
enjoined;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (b) The
complete title and docket number of the case in which the hold departure order was
issued;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (c) The
specific nature of the case;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (d) The date
of the hold departure order; and}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (e) A recent photograph, if available, of the party against
whom a hold departure order has been issued or whose departure from the country has
been enjoined.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The court may
recall the hold departure order motu proprio, or upon verified motion
of any of the parties after summary hearing, subject to such terms and conditions
as may be necessary for the best interests of the minor.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 17. Protection Order. - The court may issue a
Protection Order requiring any person:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (a) To stay away from the home, school, business, or place of
employment of the minor, other parent or any other party, or from any other
specific place designated by the court;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (b) To cease and desist from harassing, intimidating, or
threatening such minor or the other parent or any person to whom custody of the
minor is awarded;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (c) To
refrain from acts of commission or omission that create an unreasonable risk to the
health, safety, or welfare of the minor;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (d) To permit a parent, or a party entitled to visitation by a
court order or a separation agreement, to visit the minor at stated periods;}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (e) To permit a designated party to enter the
residence during a specified period of time in order to take personal belongings
not contested in a proceeding pending with the Family Court; and}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (f) To comply with such other orders as are
necessary for the protection of the minor.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 18. Judgment. - After trial, the court shall render
judgment awarding the custody of the minor to the proper party considering the best
interests of the minor.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 If it appears
that both parties are unfit to have the care and custody of the minor, the court
may designate either the paternal or maternal grandparent of the minor, or his
oldest brother or sister, or any reputable person to take charge of such minor, or
commit him to any suitable home for children.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In its judgment, the court may order either or both parents to
give an amount necessary for the support, maintenance and education of the minor,
irrespective of who may be its custodian. In determining the amount of support, the
court may consider the following factors: (1) the financial resources of the
custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the minor; (2) the physical and
emotional health, special needs, and aptitude of the minor; (3) the standard of
living the minor has been accustomed to; and (4) the non-monetary contributions
that the parents would make toward the care and well-being of the minor.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The court may also issue any order that is
just and reasonable permitting the parent who is deprived of the care and custody
of the minor to visit or have temporary custody.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 19. Appeal. - No appeal from the decision shall be
allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial
within fifteen days from notice of judgment.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 An aggrieved party may appeal from the decision by filing a
Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial and serving a copy thereof on the adverse parties.}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 20. Petition for writ of
habeas corpus. - A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody
of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable
within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in
the absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court, provided, however, that the
regular court shall refer the case to the Family Court as soon as its presiding
judge returns to duty.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The petition
may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where there are no
Family Courts.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The writ
issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the
judicial region where they belong.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The petition
may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular
court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be
found for hearing and decision on the merits.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on
custody of minors. The appellate court, or the member thereof, issuing the writ
shall be furnished a copy of the decision.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 21. Confidentiality of proceedings. - The hearings on
custody of minors may, at the discretion of the court, be closed to the public and
the records of the case shall not be released to non-parties without its approval.}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Section 22. Effectivity. - This
Rule shall take effect on May 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation not later than April 30, 2003.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 [G.R. No. 122954. February 15, 2000]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA (IN
PLACE OF THE JAIL WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH
II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, and THE CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA,
respondents.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 D E C I S I O
N}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 QUISUMBING, J.:}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case
subsequent to conviction of the accused will not render the judgment of conviction
void, nor will it warrant the release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas
corpus. The proper remedy is the reconstitution of judicial records which is as
much a duty of the prosecution as of the defense.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Subject of this petition for review on certiorari are (1) the
Decision dated April 28, 1995, of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner,
and (2) the Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1995, which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration. As hereafter elucidated, we sustain the judgment of respondent
appellate court.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Based on the
available records and the admissions of the parties, the antecedents of the present
petition are as follows:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Petitioner
Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21, 1981, up to
present[1] by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in
Criminal Case No. 60677, by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, for the
jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene
Carmona.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Some twelve
(12) years later, or on June 9, 1993, petitioner sought to be transferred from the
Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City,[2] but the Jail
Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila,
Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be effected without the submission of the
requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information.
[3] It was then discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy
of the judgment, were missing. In response to the inquiries made by counsel of
petitioner, both the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court
of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2 attested to the fact that the records
of Criminal Case No. 60677 could not be found in their respective offices. Upon
further inquiries, the entire records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the
fire which occurred at the second and third floor of the Manila City Hall on
November 3, 1986.[4]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 On October 3,
1994, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus[5]
with the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City
Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that
his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his
constitutional right to due process.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In its Resolution dated October 10, 1994,[6] the Second
Division of this Court resolved -}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 " x x x (a) to ISSUE the Writ of Habeas Corpus; (b) to ORDER
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to conduct an immediate
RAFFLE of this case among the incumbent judges thereof; and (c) to REQUIRE [1] the
Judge to whom this case is raffled to SET the case for HEARING on Thursday, October
13, 1994 at 8:30 A.M., try and decide the same on the merits and thereafter FURNISH
this Court with a copy of his decision thereon; [2] the respondents to make a
RETURN of the Writ on or before the close of office hours on Wednesday, October 12,
1994 and APPEAR PERSONALLY and PRODUCE the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing on
the aforesaid date and time of hearing to the Judge to whom this case is raffled,
and [3] the Director General, Philippine National Police, through his duly
authorized representative(s) to SERVE the Writ and Petition, and make a RETURN
thereof as provided by law and, specifically, his duly authorized representative(s)
to APPEAR PERSONALLY and ESCORT the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing at the
aforesaid date and time of hearing."}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The case was then raffled to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, which on November 15, 1994, after hearing, issued an Order[7]
dismissing the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case
does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the
petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of
the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision.}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Petitioner duly appealed said Order
to the Court of Appeals, which on April 28, 1995, rendered the assailed Decision[8]
affirming the decision of the trial court with the modification that "in the
interest of orderly administration of justice" and "under the peculiar facts of the
case" petitioner may be transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City
without submission of the requirements (Mittimus, Decision and Information) but
without prejudice to the reconstitution of the original records.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforesaid Order having been denied for lack of merit,[9] petitioner is now before
us on certiorari, assigning the following errors of law:[10]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 I. WHETHER OR NOT, UNDER THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE, WHERE THE RECORDS OF CONVICTION WERE LOST, THE PETITIONERS CONTINUED
INCARCERATION IS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE LAW.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard \plain \ql
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 COROLLARY TO THIS, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS RESOLUTION, AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF HEREIN APPELLANTS PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS IS, IN CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, A JUDGMENT OR A SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT, WHICH CAN
BE UTILIZED AS A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR HIS INCARCERATION.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RECONSTITUTION OF OFFICIAL RECORDS
LOST/DESTROYED SHOULD BE INITIATED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS ORGANS, WHO ARE IN
CUSTODY OF SUCH, OR BY THE PRISONER, WHOSE LIBERTY IS RESTRAINED.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Petitioner argues that his detention is
illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as required by Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,[11] and that the evidence considered by
the trial court and Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not
establish the contents of such judgment. Petitioner further contends that our
ruling in Gunabe v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993, 995 (1947), that
"reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense" has been
modified or abandoned in the subsequent case of Ordonez v. Director of Prisons, 235
SCRA 152, 155 (1994), wherein we held that "[i]t is not the fault of the prisoners
that the records cannot now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it surely cannot
be the prisoners, who were not the custodians of those records."}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In its Comment,[12] the Office of the
Solicitor General contends that the sole inquiry in this habeas corpus proceeding
is whether or not there is legal basis to detain petitioner. The OSG maintains that
public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the existence of a legal
ground for petitioners continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final
judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized. Petitioners
remedy, therefore, is not a petition for habeas corpus but a proceeding for the
reconstitution of judicial records.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is
traced to antiquity, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom.[13] It secures to a prisoner the right to have the
cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have
the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority.[14]
Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in
the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as
to such excess.[15] Petitioners claim is anchored on the first ground considering,
as he claims, that his continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a
valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due
process.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Based on the
records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence
on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the
legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made judicial admissions, both verbal and
written, that he was charged with and convicted of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay".}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In its Order dated October 17, 1994, the RTC-Manila, Branch 9,
made the finding that -[16]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "During the
trial and on manifestation and arguments made by the accused, his learned counsel
and Solicitor Alexander G. Gesmundo who appeared for the respondents, it appears
clear and indubitable that:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (A)
Petitioner had been charged with Robbery with Homicide in Criminal Case No. 60677,
Illegal Possession of Firearm in Criminal Case No. 60678 and Robbery in Band in
Criminal Case No. 60867. ... In Criminal Case No. 60677 (Robbery with Homicide) the
accused admitted in open Court that a decision was read to him in open Court by a
personnel of the respondent Court (RTC Branch II) sentencing him to Life
Imprisonment (Habang buhay)..." (emphasis supplied)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Further, in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Commitment
Order of the Above Entitled Criminal Case dated June 8, 1993,[17] petitioner
himself stated that -}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "COMES NOW, the undersigned
accused in the above entitled criminal case and unto this Honorable Court most
respectfully move:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 1. That in
1981 the accused was charge of (sic) Robbery with Homicide;}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 2. That after four years of trial, the court found the accused
guilty and given a Life Sentence in a promulgation handed down in 1985; (emphasis
supplied)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 3. That after
the sentence was promulgated, the Presiding Judge told the councel (sic) that
accused has the right to appeal the decision;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 4. That whether the de oficio counsel appealed the decision is
beyond the accused comprehension (sic) because the last time he saw the counsel was
when the decision was promulgated.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 5. That
everytime there is change of Warden at the Manila City Jail attempts were made to
get the Commitment Order so that transfer of the accused to the Bureau of
Corrections can be affected, but all in vain;"}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Petitioners declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him under Section 23 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule
is based upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself,
unless such declaration were true,[18] particularly with respect to such grave
matter as his conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further, under
Section 4 of Rule 129, "[a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made." Petitioner does not claim any mistake nor does he
deny making such admissions.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The records
also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985[19] of
then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was convicted
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985. Such Monthly Report
constitutes an entry in official records under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, which is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated.}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Public respondents likewise
presented a certified true copy of Peoples Journal dated January 18, 1985, page 2,
[20] issued by the National Library, containing a short news article that
petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to
"life imprisonment." However, newspaper articles amount to "hearsay evidence, twice
removed"[21] and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative
value at all whether objected to or not,[22] unless offered for a purpose other
than proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news article is
admissible only as evidence that such publication does exist with the tenor of the
news therein stated.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 As a general
rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the
petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not
subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows
good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to
allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such
process.[23] If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public
authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the
restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is
illegal. Thus, Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "SEC. 13. When the return evidence, and when
only a plea.If it appears that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of
commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie evidence
of the cause of restraint, but if he is restrained of his liberty by any alleged
private authority, the return shall be considered only as a plea of the facts
therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must prove such facts."}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Public respondents having
sufficiently shown good ground for the detention, petitioners release from
confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
which provides
that -}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "Sec. 4. When
writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment."}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In the case of Gomez v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 458
(1946), accused was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape, and was
committed to the New Bilibid Prison. Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, the
records of the case were, for reasons undisclosed, completely destroyed or lost.
Accused then filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus with
the Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition, ruling thus:}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "The petition does not make out a case. The Director of Prisons
is holding the prisoner under process issued by a competent court in pursuance of a
lawful, subsisting judgment. The prisoner himself admits the legality of his
detention. The mere loss or destruction of the record of the case does not
invalidate the judgment or the commitment, or authorize the prisoners release."}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Note further that, in the present
case, there is also no showing that petitioner duly appealed his conviction of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for all intents and purposes, such judgment
has already become final and executory. When a court has jurisdiction of the
offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree
is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.[24] Put another way, in order
that a judgment may be subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be
void for lack of jurisdiction.[25] Thus, petitioners invocation of our ruling in
Reyes v. Director of Prisons, supra, is misplaced. In the Reyes case, we granted
the writ and ordered the release of the prisoner on the ground that "[i]t does not
appear that the prisoner has been sentenced by any tribunal duly established by a
competent authority during the enemy occupation" and not because there were no
copies of the decision and information. Here, a copy of the mittimus is available.
And, indeed, petitioner does not raise any jurisdictional issue.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The proper remedy in this case is for either
petitioner or public respondents to initiate the reconstitution of the judgment of
the case under either Act No. 3110,[26] the general law governing reconstitution of
judicial records, or under the inherent power of courts to reconstitute at any time
the records of their finished cases in accordance with Section 5 (h) of Rule 135 of
the Rules of Court.[27] Judicial records are subject to reconstitution without
exception, whether they refer to pending cases or finished cases.[28] There is no
sense in limiting reconstitution to pending cases; finished cases are just as
important as pending ones, as evidence of rights and obligations finally
adjudicated.[29]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Petitioner
belabors the fact that no initiative was taken by the Government to reconstitute
the missing records of the trial court. We reiterate, however, that "reconstitution
is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense."[30] Petitioners
invocation of Ordoez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152 (1994), is misplaced
since the grant of the petition for habeas corpus therein was premised on the loss
of records prior to the filing of Informations against the prisoners, and therefore
"[t]he government has failed to show that their continued detention is supported by
a valid conviction or by the pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate
cause whatsoever." In this case, the records were lost after petitioner, by his own
admission, was already convicted by the trial court of the offense charged.
Further, the same incident which gave rise to the filing of the Information for
Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to another case for Illegal Possession of
Firearm,[31] the records of which could be of assistance in the reconstitution of
the present case.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 SO ORDERED.}
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001}
\li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200
\lisa0 \widctlpar \aspalpha \aspnum \adjustright \lin0 \rin0 \itap0 \fs21
\kerning2 \dbch \af2 \hich \af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 vs.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES
and JANE DOES, respondents. }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\langnp9 x---------------------------------------------------------x}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K.
ILUSORIO, petitioners, }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 vs.}{\fs18
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA
K. ILUSORIO, respondents.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 R E S O L U T
I O N}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 PARDO, J.:}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Once again we see the sad tale of a
prominent family shattered by conflicts on expectancy in fabled fortune.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the
matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband some years ago, filed a
petition with the Court of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to have custody of her
husband in consortium.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 On April 5,
1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for
lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio
filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have
custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio.2 This case was consolidated with
another case3 filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and
Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife,
asserting that he never refused to see her.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus4
for lack of merit, and granted the petition5 to nullify the Court of Appeals'
ruling6 giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider
the decision.8}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 On September
20, 2000, we set the case for preliminary conference on October 11, 2000, at 10:00
a. m., without requiring the mandatory presence of the parties.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In that conference, the Court laid down the issues to be
resolved, to wit:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\langnp9 \par }\pard
\plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0 \widctlpar \aspalpha \aspnum
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (a)}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \tab }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 To determine the propriety of a physical
and medical examination of petitioner Potenciano Ilusorio;}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (b)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\langnp9 \tab }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
Whether the same is relevant; and}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (c)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\langnp9 \tab }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 If
relevant, how the Court will conduct the same.9}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The parties extensively discussed the issues. The Court, in its
resolution, enjoined the parties and their lawyers to initiate steps towards an
amicable settlement of the case through mediation and other means.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 On November 29, 2000, the Court noted the manifestation and
compliance of the parties with the resolution of October 11, 2000.10}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 On January 31, 2001, the Court denied Erlinda
Ilusorio's manifestation and motion praying that Potenciano Ilusorio be produced
before the Court and be medically examined by a team of medical experts appointed
by the Court.11}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 On March 27,
2001, we denied with finality Erlinda's motion to reconsider the Court's order of
January 31 , 2001.12}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The issues
raised by Erlinda K. Ilusorio in her motion for reconsideration are mere
reiterations of her arguments that have been resolved in the decision.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss
the issues thus:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 First.
Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her
in consortium and that Potenciano's mental state was not an issue. However, the
very root cause of the entire petition is her desire to have her husband's
custody.13 Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano Ilusorio to
live with her.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Second. One
reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that respondents
Lin and Sylvia were illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently
deprive her of property rights out of pure greed.14 She claimed that her two
children were using their sick and frail father to sign away Potenciano and
Erlinda's property to companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that
since Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and
Philippine Oversees Telecommunications, she would logically assume his position and
control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the ones controlling the corporations.15}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The fact of illegal restraint has
not been proved during the hearing at the Court of Appeals on March 23, 1999.16
Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his children from seeing
anybody and that he had no objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he
loved.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Erlinda highlighted that her
husband suffered from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the
mental capacity to decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be
brought before the Supreme Court so that we could determine his mental state.}
\ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0 \widctlpar \aspalpha
\aspnum \adjustright \lin0 \rin0 \itap0 \fs21 \kerning2 \dbch \af2 \hich \af0
\loch \af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 We were not
convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to
see his wife or not. Again, this is a question of fact that has been decided in the
Court of Appeals.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 As to whether
the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are matters that
may be threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Third. Petitioner failed to
sufficiently convince the Court why we should not rely on the facts found by the
Court of Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the facts mentioned in the decision were
erroneous and incomplete. We see no reason why the High Court of the land need go
to such length. The hornbook doctrine states that findings of fact of the lower
courts are conclusive on the Supreme Court.17 We emphasize, it is not for the Court
to weigh evidence all over again.18 Although there are exceptions to the rule,19
Erlinda failed to show that this is an exceptional instance.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987
Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position that as
spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for
each other. We agree.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The law
provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity.20 The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to
enforce consortium.21}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Obviously,
there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having
separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling
between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy
but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Marriage is definitely for two loving adults
who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social
institution.22}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 On June 28,
2001, Potenciano Ilusorio gave his soul to the Almighty, his Creator and Supreme
Judge. Let his soul rest in peace and his survivors continue the much prolonged
fracas ex aequo et bono.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 IN VIEW
WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At any rate, the case has
been rendered moot by the death of subject.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 SO ORDERED.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 [G.R. No.
158802. November 17, 2004]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 IN RE: THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa City) REYNALDO DE VILLA, petitioner, JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator,
vs. THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 D E C I S I O N}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\widctlpar \aspalpha \aspnum \adjustright
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 This is a petition for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a
two-fold relief: First, that respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis for
the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and second, that petitioner be
granted a new trial.[1] These reliefs are sought on the basis of purportedly
exculpatory evidence, gathered after performing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing
on samples allegedly collected from the petitioner and a child born to the victim
of the rape.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 By final
judgment dated February 1, 2001, in People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo de Villa,
[2] we found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by
affinity; sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusin perpetua; and ordered him
to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit, and
support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of the rape.
Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa
City.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 As summarized
in our Decision dated February 1, 2001, Aileen Mendoza charged petitioner Reynaldo
de Villa with rape in an information dated January 9, 1995, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City. When arraigned on January 26, 1995, petitioner entered a
plea of not guilty.[3]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 During the
trial, the prosecution established that sometime in the third week of April 1994,
at about 10:00 in the morning, Aileen Mendoza woke up in her familys rented room in
Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila, to find petitioner on top of her. Aileen was then aged
12 years and ten months. She was unable to shout for help because petitioner
covered her mouth with a pillow and threatened to kill her. Aileen could not do
anything but cry. Petitioner succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina.
After making thrusting motions with his body, petitioner ejaculated. This encounter
allegedly resulted in Aileens pregnancy, which was noticed by her mother, Leonila
Mendoza, sometime in November 1994. When confronted by her mother, Aileen revealed
that petitioner raped her. Aileens parents then brought her to the Pasig Police
Station, where they lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner.[4]}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, who examined Aileen,
confirmed that she was eight months pregnant and found in her hymen healed
lacerations at the 5:00 and 8:00 positions. On December 19, 1994, Aileen gave birth
to a baby girl whom she named Leahlyn Mendoza.[5]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In his defense, petitioner alleged that, at the time of the
alleged rape, he was already 67 years old. Old age and sickness had rendered him
incapable of having an erection. He further averred that Aileens family had been
holding a grudge against him, which accounted for the criminal charges. Finally, he
interposed the defense of alibi, claiming that at the time of the incident, he was
in his hometown of San Luis, Batangas.[6]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of qualified rape, and sentenced him to death, to indemnify the victim
in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of the suit and to support the child,
Leahlyn Mendoza.[7]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 On automatic
review,[8] we found that the date of birth of Aileens child was medically
consistent with the time of the rape. Since it was never alleged that Aileen gave
birth to a full-term nine-month old baby, we gave credence to the prosecutions
contention that she prematurely gave birth to an eight-month old baby by normal
delivery.[9] Thus, we affirmed petitioners conviction for rape, in a Decision the
dispositive portion of which reads:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATIONS that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusin
perpetua and ordered to pay the offended party P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P50,000.00 as moral damages; costs of the suit and to provide support for the child
Leahlyn Corales Mendoza.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 SO ORDERED.
[10]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\aspnum \adjustright \lin0 \rin0 \itap0 \fs21 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once
more faced with the question of Reynaldo de Villas guilt or innocence.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Petitioner-relator in this case, June de
Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges that during the trial of the case, he was
unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine once and for all if
Reynaldo was the father of the victims child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only
informed during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioners case that DNA
testing could resolve the issue of paternity.[11] This information was apparently
furnished by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death Penalty Task Force,
which took over as counsel for petitioner.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Thus, petitioners brief in People v. de Villa sought the
conduct of a blood type test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of
the child allegedly conceived as a result of the rape.[12] This relief was
implicitly denied in our Decision of February 21, 2001.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 On March 16, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein he once more prayed that DNA tests be
conducted.[13] The Motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated November
20, 2001.[14] Hence, the Decision became final and executory on January 16, 2002.
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Petitioner-
relator was undaunted by these challenges. Having been informed that DNA tests
required a sample that could be extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator asked
Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn
Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup.[16] Leahlyn readily agreed
and did so. Billy Joe took the sample home and gave it to the petitioner-relator,
who immediately labeled the cup as Container A.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four
grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa. These samples were placed in separate
containers with distinguishing labels and temporarily stored in a refrigerator
prior to transport to the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research
Institute (NSRI).[17] During transport, the containers containing the saliva
samples were kept on ice.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Petitioner-
relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn
Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by
Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the donors of the samples, save for
the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA Analysis
Laboratory.[18]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 After
testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21, 2003, which
showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children whose
samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic
markers in petitioners sample and those of any of the other samples, including
Leahlyns.[19]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Hence, in the instant
petition for habeas corpus, petitioner argues as follows:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 DNA ANALYSIS ON PATERNITY SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT PETITIONER DE
VILLA IS NOT THE FATHER OF LEAHLYN MENDOZA; HIS CONVICTION FOR RAPE, BASED ON THE
FACT THAT LEAHLYN WAS SIRED AS A RESULT OF THE ALLEGED RAPE, CANNOT STAND AND MUST
BE SET ASIDE.[20]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 x x x x x x x
x x}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 A NEW TRIAL TO CONSIDER NEWLY
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE IS PROPER AND MAY BE ORDERED BY THIS COURT IN VIEW OF THE
RESULTS OF THE DNA TESTS CONDUCTED.[21]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Considering that the issues are inter-twined, they shall be
discussed together.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\langnp9 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0
\widctlpar \aspalpha \aspnum \adjustright \lin0 \rin0 \itap0 \fs21 \kerning2 \dbch
\af2 \hich \af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\langnp9 In brief, petitioner relies upon the DNA evidence gathered subsequent to
the trial in order to re-litigate the factual issue of the paternity of the child
Leahlyn Mendoza. Petitioner alleges that this issue is crucial, considering that
his conviction in 2001 was based on the factual finding that he sired the said
child. Since this paternity is now conclusively disproved, he argues that the 2001
conviction must be overturned.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In essence,
petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus to collaterally attack
the 2001 Decision. The ancillary remedy of a motion for new trial is resorted to
solely to allow the presentation of what is alleged to be newly-discovered
evidence. This Court is thus tasked to determine, first, the propriety of the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to release an individual already convicted and
serving sentence by virtue of a final and executory judgment; and second, the
propriety of granting a new trial under the same factual scenario.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a haven
of relief for those seeking liberty from any unwarranted denial of freedom of
movement. Very broadly, the writ applies to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which a person has been deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person has been withheld from the person entitled thereto.
[22] Issuance of the writ necessitates that a person be illegally deprived of his
liberty. In the celebrated case of Villavicencio v. Lukban,[23] we stated that
[a]ny restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.[24]}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The most basic criterion for the issuance of
the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally
deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint.
If an individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas
corpus is unavailing. Concomitant to this principle, the writ of habeas corpus
cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or
tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of
this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the proceedings.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as
the great writ of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus has very limited availability
as a post-conviction remedy. In the recent case of Feria v. Court of Appeals,[25]
we ruled that review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in very specific instances, such as
when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation
of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had
no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been
imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.[26]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus
to assail a final judgment of conviction, without, however, providing a legal
ground on which to anchor his petition. In fine, petitioner alleges neither the
deprivation of a constitutional right, the absence of jurisdiction of the court
imposing the sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been imposed upon him.}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In fine, petitioner invokes the
remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the review of findings of fact long passed
upon with finality. This relief is far outside the scope of habeas corpus
proceedings. In the early case of Abriol v. Homeres,[27] for example, this Court
stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and
should not be thus used. The writ of habeas corpus, whereas permitting a collateral
challenge of the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal issuing the process or
judgment by which an individual is deprived of his liberty, cannot be distorted by
extending the inquiry to mere errors of trial courts acting squarely within their
jurisdiction.[28] The reason for this is explained very simply in the case of
Velasco v. Court of Appeals:[29] a habeas corpus petition reaches the body, but not
the record of the case. [30] A record must be allowed to remain extant, and cannot
be revised, modified, altered or amended by the simple expedient of resort to
habeas corpus proceedings.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Clearly, mere
errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court
of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the defendant, are not
correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus; if at all,
these errors must be corrected on certiorari or on appeal, in the form and manner
prescribed by law.[31] In the past, this Court has disallowed the review of a
courts appreciation of the evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, as this is not the function of said writ.[32] A survey of our
decisions in habeas corpus cases demonstrates that, in general, the writ of habeas
corpus is a high prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary remedy; it may
thus be invoked only under extraordinary circumstances.[33] We have been
categorical in our pronouncements that the writ of habeas corpus is not to be used
as a substitute for another, more proper remedy. Resort to the writ of habeas
corpus is available only in the limited instances when a judgment is rendered by a
court or tribunal devoid of jurisdiction. If, for instance, it can be demonstrated
that there was a deprivation of a constitutional right, the writ can be granted
even after an individual has been meted a sentence by final judgment.}{\fs18
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Thus, in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals,[34] the writ
of habeas corpus was held to be available where an accused was deprived of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination. A defect so pronounced as the
denial of an accuseds constitutional rights results in the absence or loss of
jurisdiction, and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of
the accused. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral
attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus.[35] Later, in Gumabon v.
Director of the Bureau of Prisons,[36] this Court ruled that, once a deprivation of
a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is
deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail
the legality of the detention.[37] Although in Feria v. Court of Appeals[38] this
Court was inclined to allow the presentation of new evidence in a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, this was an exceptional situation. In that
case, we laid down the general rule, which states that the burden of proving
illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such
restraint. Where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets
forth a process which, on its face, shows good ground for the detention of the
prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends
to invalidate the apparent effect of such process.[39]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In the recent case of Calvan v. Court of Appeals,[40] we
summarized the scope of review allowable in a petition for the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus. We ruled that the writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to
interrupt the orderly administration of justice, can be invoked by the attendance
of a special circumstance that requires immediate action. In such situations, the
inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus would be addressed, not to errors committed by a
court within its jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the proceeding or
judgment under which a person has been restrained is a complete nullity. The probe
may thus proceed to check on the power and authority, itself an equivalent test of
jurisdiction, of the court or the judge to render the order that so serves as the
basis of imprisonment or detention.[41] It is the nullity of an assailed judgment
of conviction which makes it susceptible to collateral attack through the filing of
a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Upon a perusal of the records not merely of this case but of
People v. de Villa, we find that the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 First, the
denial of a constitutional right has not been alleged by petitioner. As such, this
Court is hard-pressed to find legal basis on which to anchor the grant of a writ of
habeas corpus. Much as this Court sympathizes with petitioners plea, a careful
scrutiny of the records does not reveal any constitutional right of which the
petitioner was unduly deprived.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 We are aware
that other jurisdictions have seen fit to grant the writ of habeas corpus in order
to test claims that a defendant was denied effective aid of counsel.[42] In this
instance, we note that the record is replete with errors committed by counsel, and
it can be alleged that the petitioner was, at trial, denied the effective aid of
counsel. The United States Supreme Court requires a defendant alleging incompetent
counsel to show that the attorneys performance was deficient under a reasonable
standard, and additionally to show that the outcome of the trial would have been
different with competent counsel.[43] The purpose of the right to effective
assistance of counsel is to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.[44]}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The U.S. Supreme Court asserts that
in judging any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, one must examine whether
counsels conduct undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process to
such an extent that the trial did not produce a fair and just result.[45] The
proper measure of attorney performance is reasonable under the prevailing
professional norms, and the defendant must show that the representation received
fell below the objective standard of reasonableness.[46] For the petition to
succeed, the strong presumption that the counsels conduct falls within the wide
range or reasonable professional assistance must be overcome.[47]}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In the case at bar, it appears that in the
middle of the appeal, the petitioners counsel of record, a certain Atty. Alfonso G.
Salvador, suddenly and inexplicably withdrew his appearance as counsel, giving the
sole explanation that he was leaving for the United States for an indefinite period
of time by virtue of a petition filed in his favor.[48] In the face of this
abandonment, petitioner made an impassioned plea that his lawyer be prevented from
this withdrawal in a handwritten Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition
of Counsels Withdrawal of Appearance with Leave of Court received by this Court on
September 14, 1999.[49] Petitioner alleged that his counsels withdrawal is an
untimely and heartbreaking event, considering that he had placed all [his] trust
and confidence on [his counsels] unquestionable integrity and dignity.[50]}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 While we are sympathetic to
petitioners plight, we do not, however, find that there was such negligence
committed by his earlier counsel so as to amount to a denial of a constitutional
right. There is likewise no showing that the proceedings were tainted with any
other jurisdictional defect.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\aspnum \adjustright \lin0 \rin0 \itap0 \fs21
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In fine, we find that petitioner invokes the remedy
of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek a re-examination of the records
of People v. de Villa, without asserting any legal grounds therefor. For all
intents and purposes, petitioner seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for
his conviction. We are being asked to reexamine the weight and sufficiency of the
evidence in this case, not on its own, but in light of the new DNA evidence that
the petitioner seeks to present to this Court. This relief is outside the scope of
a habeas corpus petition. The petition for habeas corpus must, therefore, fail.}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Coupled with the prayer for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner seeks a new trial to re-litigate
the issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendozas
paternity is not central to the issue of petitioners guilt or innocence. The rape
of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different question, separate and
distinct from the question of the father of her child. Recently, in the case of
People v. Alberio,[51] we ruled that the fact or not of the victims pregnancy and
resultant childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped.
Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which
the victim bore was fathered by the purported rapist, or by some unknown
individual, is of no moment in determining an individuals guilt.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In the instant case, however, we note that the
grant of child support to Leahlyn Mendoza indicates that our Decision was based, at
least in small measure, on the victims claim that the petitioner fathered her
child. This claim was given credence by the trial court, and, as a finding of fact,
was affirmed by this Court on automatic review.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The fact of the childs paternity is now in issue, centrally
relevant to the civil award of child support. It is only tangentially related to
the issue of petitioners guilt. However, if it can be conclusively determined that
the petitioner did not sire Leahlyn Mendoza, this may cast the shadow of reasonable
doubt, and allow the acquittal of the petitioner on this basis.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Be that as it may, it appears that the petitioner once more
relies upon erroneous legal grounds in resorting to the remedy of a motion for new
trial. A motion for new trial, under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is
available only for a limited period of time, and for very limited grounds. Under
Section 1, Rule 121, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for new
trial may be filed at any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, that
is, within fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or notice. Upon finality of the
judgment, therefore, a motion for new trial is no longer an available remedy.
Section 2 of Rule 121 enumerates the grounds for a new trial:}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.The court shall grant a new
trial on any of the following grounds:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused have been committed during the trial;}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (b) That new and material evidence has been
discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered
and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably
change the judgment.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In the case
at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly newly-discovered
evidence, i.e., the DNA test subsequently conducted, allegedly excluding petitioner
from the child purportedly fathered as a result of the rape.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has long attained finality, and entry of
judgment was made as far back as January 16, 2002. Moreover, upon an examination of
the evidence presented by the petitioner, we do not find that the DNA evidence
falls within the statutory or jurisprudential definition of newly- discovered
evidence.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 A motion for
new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if
the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after
trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of
such weight that that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment.[52] It
is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to
locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it.
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In this
instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, we
nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for newly-discovered evidence
that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could have been
discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence.}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Petitioner-relators claim that he
was unaware of the existence of DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries
no weight with this Court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks
of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioners
counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner.
It is a settled rule that a party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he
himself was guilty of neglect.[54] A client is bound by the acts of his counsel,
including the latters mistakes and negligence.[55] It is likewise settled that
relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of
the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or
to a mistaken mode of procedure.[56]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific
evidence presented by petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that
Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by
the Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is
not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand,
with Aileen Mendozas testimony and positive identification as its bases.[57] The
Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the pregnancy of the victim
has never been an element of the crime of rape.[58] Therefore, the DNA evidence has
failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be
discharged. Although petitioner claims that conviction was based solely on a
finding of paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our conviction was
based on the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given
credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for
habeas corpus and new trial is DISMISSED for lack of merit.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 No costs.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 SO ORDERED.}
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 G.R. No. L-117376}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \tab }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang9 \langnp9 December 8, 1994}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF OSCAR DE
GUZMAN, CHAIRMAN SEDFREY A. ORDO\uc1 \u209 ?EZ, DIRECTOR EMMANUEL C. NERI AND THE
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, petitioners, }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 vs.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 DIRECTOR
VICENTE VINARAO, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, respondent.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 ROMERO, J.:}
\ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0
\langnp9 This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed directly before this
Court in behalf of Oscar de Guzman y Enriquez, who was tried and convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of San Jose City \uc1 \u8212 ? Branch 39 in G.R. No. 76742,
"People of the Philippines v. Oscar de Guzman y Enriquez," 188 SCRA 407, for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, alleging in particular the fact that
de Guzman wilfully and unlawfully sold two (2) sticks of marijuana.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Upon review by this Court, the trial court's
decision sentencing de Guzman to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment plus
payment of P20,000 fine and costs was affirmed in toto and the appeal was dismissed
with costs against accused-appellant.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Under the provisions of Section 20, Republic Act No. 6425 as
last amended by R.A. 7659, which became effective on December 31, 1993, and as
interpreted by this Court in the case of People v. Simon, 1 if the quantity of the
marijuana involved is less than 250 grams, the imposable penalty, in the event that
the conviction should be affirmed, shall be within the range of prision
correccional (from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years). Clearly, de
Guzman is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new
law.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Petitioners
allege that since de Guzman has been serving sentence since July 1984 or for more
than ten (10) years now, his continued detention in the National Penitentiary is a
violation of his basic human rights and that, therefore, he should be released from
prison without further delay. In aid of judicial administration, petitioners
further recommend that all prisoners similarly situated be likewise released from
prison.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The writ of
habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty upon a verified petition setting forth:}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 1.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\lang9 \langnp9 that the person in whose behalf the application is made is
imprisoned or restrained of his liberty;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 2.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\langnp9 \tab }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 the
officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained;}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 3.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\lang9 \langnp9 the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 4.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \tab }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of
such person (Section 3, Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court).}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 It appearing that all the above requirements have been met and
finding merit in the petition, the same is hereby GRANTED. Let a writ of habeas
corpus issue immediately.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The Director,
New Bilibid Prisons, is commanded to forthwith execute the writ for de Guzman's
discharge from confinement unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause,
to make due return of the writ, and to submit a complete inventory of all other
prisoners therein similarly situated within thirty days, to relieve them from
further confinement. With costs de oficio.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 [G.R. No. 125901. March 8, 2001]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R. TIJING, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents.}{\fs18
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 D E C I S I O N}{\fs18 \kerning2
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 QUISUMBING, J.:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March
6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39056, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court in a petition for habeas corpus of Edgardo Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child
of petitioners.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr.,
who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse
Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the
laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo,
Manila.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 According to
Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent
laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked
Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo,
Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child
while Bienvenida was doing laundry.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo,
Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelitas house in Tondo, Manila,
but did not find them there. Angelitas maid told Bienvenida that her employer went
out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelitas
house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place.
Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police who
seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not
imagine how her spouse would react to the disappearance of their youngest child and
this made her problem even more serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her
husband reconciled and together, this time, they looked for their missing son in
other places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his
whereabouts.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Four years
later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas
Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying
in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan,
where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years.
She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of
the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez.[1] She avers that
Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition
for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son. To
substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely, Lourdes
Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted
in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta.
Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with her clinical records.[2] The second
witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not
have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile. He recalled
that Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part against the edge of a banca
causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity.
Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was
only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with children.[3]}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 For her part, Angelita claimed that
she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave birth
to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban
in Singalong, Manila. She added, though, that she has two other children with her
real husband, Angel Sanchez.[4] She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by
her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on
August 4, 1989.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0
\ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0 \widctlpar \aspalpha \aspnum \adjustright \lin0 \rin0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since
Angelita and her common-law husband could not have children, the alleged birth of
John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility.[5] The trial court also held that the minor
and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural
child of petitioners. The trial court decreed:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered
GRANTING the petition for Habeas Corpus, as such, respondent Angelita Diamante is
ordered to immediately release from her personal custody minor John Thomas D.
Lopez, and turn him over and/or surrender his person to petitioners, Spouses
Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing, immediately upon receipt hereof.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is
hereby commanded to implement the decision of this Court by assisting herein
petitioners in the recovery of the person of their minor son, Edgardo Tijing Jr.,
the same person as John Thomas D. Lopez.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 SO ORDERED.[6]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Angelita
seasonably filed her notice of appeal.[7] Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the
sheriff implemented the order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In
his report, the sheriff stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered the minor and
he turned over the custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo Tijing.[8]}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court expressed
its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its view, the evidence adduced
by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor.
It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John
Thomas Lopez are one and the same person,[9] and disposed of the case, thus:}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the
lower court dated March 10, 1995 is hereby REVERSED, and a new one entered
dismissing the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 94-71606, and directing the custody of
the minor John Thomas Lopez to be returned to respondent Angelita Diamante, said
minor having been under the care of said respondent at the time of the filing of
the petition herein.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 SO ORDERED.
sought reconsideration of the abovequoted decision which was denied. Hence, the
instant petition alleging:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 I}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONERS ACTION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS
MERELY SECONDARY TO THE QUESTION OF FILIATION THAT THE PETITIONERS HAD LIKEWISE
PROVEN.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 II}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECTING THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR JOHN THOMAS LOPEZ WHO WAS
PROVEN TO THE SAME MINOR AS EDGARDO R. TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.[11]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In our view,
the crucial issues for resolution are the following:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 (2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing,
Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the son of
petitioners?}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 We shall
discuss the two issues together since they are closely related.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.[12] Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of
his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the
question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying
rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted
for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.[13] It must be
stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is
relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including those as to
identity of the person.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In this case,
the minors identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ sought.
Thus, it must be resolved first whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by
Bienvenida to be her son, is the same minor named John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita
insists to be her offspring. We must first determine who between Bienvenida and
Angelita is the minors biological mother. Evidence must necessarily be adduced to
prove that two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate from each
other, are indeed one and the same.[14] Petitioners must convincingly establish
that the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made is the person
upon whom they have rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the
minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made, petitioners cannot
invoke with certainty their right of custody over the said minor.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 True, it is not the function of this Court to
examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to the concerned
tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order.[15]
But since the conclusions of the Court of Appeals contradict those of the trial
court, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on the record to determine which
findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 A close scrutiny of the records of
this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to
establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 First, there is evidence that
Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she admitted that after
the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in
1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974.
Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no
evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten
years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No
clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Second, there is strong evidence
which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son.
Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of
the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an
adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no
children after almost fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with
private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth
certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife
and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the child. Under the
law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the
registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the
parent register the birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the
local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth.[16] Significantly, the
birth certificate
of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married on
October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even private
respondent had admitted she is a common-law wife.[17] This false entry puts to
doubt the other data in said birth certificate.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the
child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their
faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged
parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage.[18] Needless to
stress, the trial courts conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the
opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner
concerned.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Fifth,
Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenidas giving birth to Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical
records consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures of
petitioners.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 All these
considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of
petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 A final note. Parentage will still
be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific
ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA
test[19] for identification and parentage testing. The University of the
Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory
has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two
(2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from
the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage.[20]
Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is
still open to challenge.[21] Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said,
that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.[22] Though
it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be
useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and decision of
the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondent.}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 SO ORDERED.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 [G.R. No. 140823. October 3, 2000]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 JUDGE MELVYN U. CALVAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Municipal Trial Court, Branch 127, THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN of the Provincial Jail of
Ilocos Norte, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MAYOR REYNOLAN T.
SALES, respondents.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 R E S O L U T
I O N}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 VITUG, J.:}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 For resolution is the motion for
reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (for petitioners Judge
Calvan, the Provincial Warden of Ilocos Norte and the People of the Philippines)
seeking the nullification of the Court's resolution, dated 05 July 2000, that has
denied the petition for review of the decision, dated 18 November 1999, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54416, on a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioners-movants claim that the petition which respondent Sales filed is a
petition for habeas corpus which should then be confined to an inquiry on the
validity of a person's detention at the time of the filing of the petition, and
that the Court of Appeals has thus erred in ruling on the legality of the order and
warrant of arrest which can only be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari,
not a petition for habeas corpus.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The factual antecedents -}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 On 02 August 1999, at about 11:30 a.m., in a shootout at a
sitio in Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte, Reynolan T. Sales, incumbent town mayor of
Pagudpud, fatally shot former Mayor Rafael Benemerito. After the incident, Sales
surrendered his handgun, placed himself under the custody of the Municipal Police
and thereupon asked to be brought to the Provincial PNP headquarters in Laoag
City.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The next day,
03 August, Police Chief Inspector Crispin Aguno and Thelma Benemerito, wife of the
victim, lodged a criminal complaint for murder against Mayor Reynolan Sales at the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Adams-Baagui-Dumalueg-Pagudpud, Branch 127,
there docketed Criminal Case No. 9448-P, entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Mayor Reynolan T. Sales." Judge Melvyn U. Calvan, the Presiding Judge forthwith
conducted a "preliminary examination" of the witnesses and issued the assailed
order and warrant of arrest against the accused "with NO BAIL." Mayor Sales was
transferred, on 04 August 1999, from the Provincial PNP headquarters to the
Provincial Jail where he had since been detained under the custody of the
Provincial Warden of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Jail. On 05 August 1999, Judge
Melvyn Calvan, after conducting a "preliminary examination in accordance with
Section 6(b) of Rule 112 of the 1989 Rules in Criminal Procedure," issued a two-
page resolution forwarding the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor "for appropriate action." On 10 August 1999, Sales was notified by the
Provincial Prosecutor to submit his counter-affidavit and defense evidence.}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Contending that his right to due
process was violated by the cavalier and perfunctory manner by which Judge Calvan
suddenly terminated and concluded the preliminary investigation, without even
allowing him to submit counter affidavit and present his witnesses, Mayor Sales
filed a Petition For Habeas Corpus and Certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 54416) before the
Court of Appeals. He questioned his detention on the thesis that the Order and
Warrant of Arrest were improvidently and illegally issued by Judge Calvan, the
latter being a relative of complainant Thelma Benemerito within the third civil
degree of affinity and, therefore, disqualified from conducting the preliminary
investigation.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 On 30 August
1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. On 19 September 1999 and while
his motion for reconsideration was still pending, respondent Mayor Sales withdrew
the petition for certiorari, leaving the petition for habeas corpus to be the only
remaining petition. The Office of the Solicitor General was required to comment,
and a hearing was conducted by the Court of Appeals on the habeas corpus on 05
October 1999. Oral argument preceded the filing of the respective memoranda of the
parties.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 On 18
November 1999, the appellate court granted the petition for habeas corpus and
ordered the release of private respondent Mayor Sales, viz:}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby orders
the release from detention of petitioner Reynolan T. Sales, subject to the outcome
of the proper preliminary investigation."[1]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 A petition for review was filed with this Court by the Office
of the Solicitor General seeking a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court denied the petition in its resolution of 05 July 2000. In its instant
motion for reconsideration the Office of the Solicitor General would insist that
the appellate court resolved the issues beyond the basic precepts of procedure on
the theory that the determination on the legality of the order and warrant of
arrest could not be resolved in a petition for habeas corpus, the issue being
appropriate only for consideration in a petition for certiorari.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The Court of Appeals, in granting the petition
for habeas corpus and in ordering the release of Mayor Sales, ratiocinated that -}
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court disqualifies a judge from sitting in a case in which he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity. This
disqualification is mandatory, unlike an inhibition which is discretionary. It
extends to all proceedings, not just to trial as erroneously contended by
respondent Judge. Even Canon 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a
judge shall take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, as when he is `related by consanguinity or affinity to a
party litigant within the sixth degree.' Due process likewise requires a hearing
before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, so that no judge shall preside in a
case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent.
(Gutierrez vs. Santos, 2 SCRA 249, 254 [1961].)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\dbch \af2 \hich \af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard \plain
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "In Geotina vs. Gonzales,
(41 SCRA 66 [1971]) the judge who was admittedly related within the sixth civil
degree of affinity to the private complainant ordered the arrest of the petitioner.
The Supreme Court held:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "`We
therefore hold that the respondent judge is without authority to preside over the
criminal case in question. Section 1, in commanding him to withdraw from the case
herein involved, necessarily divests him of all authority to act in any judicial
capacity in connection therewith. We further hold that where the disqualifying fact
is indubitable and the parties to the case make no waiver of such disqualification
as in the case at bar, sec. 1 forthwith completely strips the judge of authority to
proceed. All his acts in the premises are without authority of law.' (Emphasis
supplied.)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "The High
Court also stated that where the judge decides in favor of his own competency,
proceeds to try a case and renders a verdict from which there is no appeal nor
plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, resort to the
extraordinary remedies, of which habeas corpus can be cited as one, constitutes the
only means available for review by a superior court.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "In the case at bench, the order and warrant of arrest issued
by respondent Judge by virtue of which the petitioner is detained offers no speedy,
adequate remedy or appeal in the ordinary course of law. Habeas corpus is the only
remedy to release him from the effects of the illegal order or one issued without
any legal authority, to use the language of Geotina vs. Gonzales."[2]}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The Solicitor General now contends, however,
that the writ of habeas corpus is simply a writ of inquiry, tasking the person who
keeps a detainee in custody to explain or justify the detention, conformably with
Sections 1, 3 and 6, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. - Except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "x x x x x x
x x x}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "SEC. 3.
Requisites of application therefor. - Application for the writ shall be by petition
signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by some
person on his behalf, and shall set forth:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "(a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is
imprisoned or restrained of his liberty;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "(b) The officer or name of the person by whom he is so
imprisoned or restrained; or, if both are unknown or uncertain, such officer or
person may be described by an assumed appellation, and the person who is served
with the writ shall be deemed the person intended;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "(c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if
known;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }\pard
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "(d) A copy of the commitment or
cause of detention of such person, if it can be procured without impairing the
efficiency of the remedy; or, if the imprisonment or restraint is without any legal
authority, such fact shall appear.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "x x x x x x
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "SEC. 6. To whom writ directed, and what to require. - In case
of imprisonment or restraint by an officer, the writ shall be directed to him, and
shall command him to have the body of the person restrained of his liberty before
the court or judge designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified.
In case of imprisonment or restraint by a person not an officer, the writ shall be
directed to an officer, and shall command him to take and have the body of the
person restrained of his liberty before the court or judge designated in the writ
at the time and place therein specified, and to summon the person by whom he is
restrained then and there to appear before said court or judge to show the cause of
the imprisonment or restraint."}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The writ, the
Solicitor General submits, should then be addressed, not to the judge or person who
issued the warrant of arrest, but to the officer or anyone who actually detains the
person in whose behalf the application is made. Since the petition for habeas
corpus concedes that Mayor Sales is in the custody of the Provincial Warden of
Laoag City, the latter, not petitioner Judge, should be the proper party
respondent.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The
proceedings before the Court of Appeals being confined to the habeas corpus case,
the petition should ordinarily be addressed to the person under whom Mayor Sales is
in detention or in alleged illegal custody[3] who would thereby be in a position to
produce at the hearing the body of the person in whose behalf the petition is made,
[4] consistently with the import of Section 6, Rule 102, of the Rules. Judge
Calvan, it might here be pointed out, however, has constructive custody over
respondent for having issued the order and warrant for his arrest.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The petition filed before the Court of Appeals was originally
one for habeas corpus and certiorari. The writ of certiorari was intended to assail
the Order and Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Melvyn Calvan while the writ of
habeas corpus was sought to relieve Mayor Sales from detention predicating the
application on the alleged illegal Order and Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge
Calvan by reason of his disqualification. Indeed, a writ of habeas corpus could be
so employed as a remedy ancillary to a proceeding in certiorari for purposes of
review.[5] Later, however, respondent Mayor withdrew the petition for certiorari
but not the petition for habeas corpus leaving the latter to sail alone. The
withdrawal must not be deemed to affect adversely the jurisdiction of the appellate
court, already acquired, to resolve all the issues theretofore brought before it.
Procedural precepts, it must again be stressed, are aids, not obstacles, in the
achievement of substantial justice.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Judge Calvan concededly is related to the complainant, Thelma
Benemerito, within the third civil degree of affinity (his wife Susan Benemerito-
Calvan being the niece of the deceased).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Rule 137, Section 1 provides:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial
officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel
within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in
which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed
by them and entered upon the record.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above."}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9
proscription against the judge from proceeding with the case is predicated on the
principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he may not be wholly
free, disinterested, impartial and independent.[6] In Geotina vs. Gonzales,[7] this
Court has said that where the disqualifying fact is indubitable and the parties to
the case make no waiver of such disqualification, the Rules forthwith strips the
judge of any authority to proceed.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 The inquiry
on a writ of habeas corpus is addressed, not to errors committed by a court within
its jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the proceeding or judgment under
which the person has been restrained is a complete nullity. The probe may thus
proceed to check on the power and authority, itself an equivalent test of
jurisdiction, of the court or the judge to render the order that so serves as the
basis of imprisonment or detention. Keeping in mind the limitation that in habeas
corpus the concern is not merely whether an error has been committed in ordering or
holding the petitioner in custody, but whether such error is sufficient to render
void the judgment, order, or process, an inquiry into the validity of
the proceedings or process[8]can be crucial in safeguarding the constitutional
right of a potential accused against an obvious and clear misjudgment. The
intrinsic right of the State to prosecute and detain perceived transgressors of the
law must be balanced with its duty to protect the innate value of individual
liberty.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Quite
evidently, the circumspection and objectivity required of the judge could not be
assured in the case at bar. Stringent standard should be applied in order to avoid
hasty and improvident issuance of a warrant for the arrest of an accused. The
deprivation of liberty, regardless of its duration, is too invaluable a price even
just to stake for any wrongful prosecution and unwarranted detention.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In Allado vs. Diokno,[9] the Court has
cautioned:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "Clearly,
probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial judge
subjectively believes that he has good grounds for his action. Good faith is not
enough. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the constitutional protection
would be demeaned and the people would be `secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects' only in the fallible discretion of the judge. (Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed. 2d.142 [1964].) On the contrary, the probable cause test
is an objective one, for in order that there be probable cause the facts and
circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and
prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been committed.
(Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d. 889 [1968].)[10]}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 In this regard, the Court of Appeals has
observed that -}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "The
preliminary examination conducted by respondent Judge does not accord with the
prevailing rules. He did it under the old rules, where the preliminary
investigation by a municipal judge had two stages: (1) the preliminary examination
stage during which the investigating judge determines whether there is reasonable
ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for
trial; and (2) the preliminary investigation proper where the complaint or
information is read to the accused after his arrest and he is informed of the
substance of the evidence adduced against him, after which he is allowed to present
evidence in his favor if he so desires. Presidential Decree 911 (further amending
Sec. 1, RA 5180, as amended by P.D. 77) upon which the present rule is based,
removed the preliminary examination stage and integrated it into the preliminary
investigation proper. Now, the proceedings consist of only one stage. (Sangguniang
Bayan vs. Albano, 260 SCRA 566 [1996].)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "Respondent Judge did not conduct the requisite investigation
prior to issuance of the arrest warrant. The Rules require an examination in
writing under oath in the form of searching questions and answers. (Roberts, Jr.
vs. CA, supra; Sec. 6 (b), Rule 112.) The statements of witnesses were not sworn
before him but before the Provincial Prosecutor. The purported transcript of the
stenographic notes do not bear the signature of the stenographer.}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "Moreover, he did not complete the preliminary
investigation. He claimed to have examined only the witnesses for the complainant.
He issued a Resolution and forwarded the records to the Provincial Prosecutor
without giving the accused (petitioner) an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits
and supporting documents. (Sec. 3 (b), Rule 112.)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang9 \langnp9 "While it is true that the usual remedy to an irregular
preliminary investigation is to ask for a new preliminary investigation or a
reinvestigation, such normal remedy would not be adequate to free petitioner from
the warrant of arrest which stemmed from that irregular investigation. The
Provincial Prosecutor has no power to recall the warrant of arrest."[11]}{\fs18
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 Habeas corpus, is a high prerogative writ,[12]
which furnishes an extraordinary remedy and may not thus be invoked under normal
circumstances but, as the Court of Appeals has so aptly explained, the illegal
order and warrant of arrest issued by petitioner Judge subsists and private
respondent is offered no speedy, adequate remedy or appeal in the ordinary course
of law. The writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to interrupt the orderly
administration of justice, can be invoked, in fine, by the attendance of a special
circumstance that requires immediate action. Such a special circumstance is here
present considering that respondent cannot resort to the remedy of a motion to
quash, the case no longer being with petitioner judge, and neither could he ask for
a reinvestigation because the preliminary investigation for purposes of filing the
information has already been taken over by the Provincial Prosecutor. The latter,
upon the other hand, does not have the authority to lift the warrant of arrest
issued by the disqualified judge. Meantime, respondent is being held and detained
under an illegal order and warrant of arrest which has no legal standing.}{\fs18
\li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0 \widctlpar \aspalpha
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 WHEREFORE,
the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. This denial is final.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1499}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 \tab }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 October 22, 1999}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 GIL RAMON O. MARTIN, complainant,}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par }\pard \plain \ql
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 vs.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 JUDGE ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO, Assisting
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City (Branch 18), respondent.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par }\pard
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 }{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 PANGANIBAN, J.:}
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
Ordinarily, judges may nor be administratively sanctioned for mere errors of
judgment, absent any bad faith or malice. Nonetheless, they have an obligation to
keep abreast of all basic laws and principles. There is no excuse for ignorance
elementary notions of law and jurisprudence.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Case and the Facts}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In a verified Complaint dated September
12, 1998, Gil Ramon O. Martin charged Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City (Branch 18) with "ignorance of the law" and
"violation of the Philippine Constitution." Respondent allegedly issued a Writ of
Habeas Corpus against herein complainant who was a resident of Para\uc1 \u241 ?aque
City, although the RTC was in Tagaytay City. Worse, the former incurred
considerable delay in resolving the latter's Omnibus Motion. The Complaint reads:
1}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Par.
I \uc1 \u8212 ? On December 27, 1995, a Petition for Habeas Corpus dated December
26, 1995 was filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 as Civil Case No. TC-
1552 by Petitioner Maria Victoria S. Ordiales against your undersigned complainant
for the custody of their begotten minor child born out of wedlock during their
union[;] a xerox copy of the said petition is attached as Annex "A".}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 xxx}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \tab }{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Par. IV \uc1 \u8212
? On December 28, 1995, Deputy Sheriff, Victor R. Hernandez
submitted his Sheriff's return certifying therein that on that same day he served
upon your undersigned complainant a copy of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, ANNEX "C"
and a copy of the petition, ANNEX "A", without mention that he also served the
Summons, ANNEX "B" upon your undersigned complainant. Most notably, the Sheriff did
not mention in his return that he effected service of the court's processes at the
business address indicated in this complaint because both the Summons, ANNEX "B"
and the Writ of Habeas Corpus, ANNEX "C" directed him to effect such service at
your undersigned residence at 24 Madrid St., BF Homes, Para\uc1 \u241 ?aque, Metro
Manila . . . . .}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0 \widctlpar
\langnp1033 Par. V \uc1 \u8212 ? For your undersigned's failure to appear in the
scheduled hearing of December 29, 1995, the respondent Judge issued an order in
open court on the said date directing the undersigned to appear before the said
court at 8:30 o'clock in the morning of Jan. 05, 1996 to show cause why no punitive
action will be taken for his refusal to acknowledge receipt of the Writ and for
failure to appear; which order of respondent Judge totally disregarded the
Sheriff's Certificate in ANNEX "D" that the undersigned instructed his secretary,
Mr. Benjamin Bermejo to receive the said processes. A xerox copy of the Order dated
Dec. 29, 1995 is attached as ANNEX "E".}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Par. VI \uc1 \u8212 ? On Jan. 04, 1995, Deputy Sheriff,
Victor R. Hernandez certified on his sheriff's return that on the same day he
served a copy of the order, ANNEX "E" and alias writ upon the undersigned at his
residence thru his maid, Susan Nadal. A xerox copy of said Sheriffs return is
attached as ANNEX "F". And a xerox copy of the alias Writ of Habeas Corpus issued
by respondent Judge on Jan. 04, 1996 is attached as ANNEX "G".}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Par. VII \uc1 \u8212 ? Both
the Order of Dec. 29, 1995, ANNEX "E", and alias Writ of Habeas Corpus dated Jan.
04, 1996, ANNEX "G" re-scheduled the case for hearing on Jan. 05, 1996 at which
hearing the undersigned did not appear. Consequently, on the same day respondent
Judge issued a Warrant for the arrest of the undersigned. And NBI agents bes[ie]ged
his residence at BF Homes from about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day up
to about a little past 8:00 o'clock in the evening of that same day. And although
they failed to arrest the undersigned, the whole exercise for a duration of time
that lasted even thereafter, or up to Jan. 12, 1996, the date that Warrant of
Arrest was lifted and Writ of Habeas Corpus dissolved per ANNEX "J" hereof, your
undersigned, his subject child and all the members of the household including his
employees, went thru an untold length of immeasurable fear, emotional and mental
anguish, sleepless nights, physical and mental stress and fatigue aggravated by a
sense of humiliation and physical insecurity and safety. A xerox copy of the
Warrant of Arrest issued respondent Judge is attached as ANNEX "H".1\uc1 \u226 ?
wphi1.n\uc1 \u234 ?t}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Par. VIII \uc1 \u8212 ? On Jan. 08, 1996, the undersigned complainant
filed an Omnibus Motion before the subject court of the respondent Judge praying
for the dismissal of the case on the basis of the legal grounds enumerated therein;
as well as seeking for the disqualification of respondent Judge from the case
\uc1 \u8212 ? briefly reciting therein the incidents that chronologically took
place from the beginning ANNEX "A" the petition was filed up to the date the
Warrant of Arrest, ANNEX "H" was issued inclusive of all the incidents that
occurred in the ANNEXES in between them. A xerox copy of the Omnibus Motion dated
Jan. 08, 1996 is attached as ANNEX "I". Let it be stated that your undersigned
complainant in attaching a copy of ANNEX "I" hereto relies principally on the
allegation of facts therein narrated as well as the provisions of laws therein
cited in order to prove this case against the respondent Judge. All accompanying
ANNEXES attached hereto are intended to support this complaint in so f[a]r as
factual allegation are concerned. For this purpose, and in order to avoid
repetition, your undersigned elects not to reproduce the contents of ANNEX "I"
inasmuch as the same is already attached.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Par. IX \uc1 \u8212 ? Obviously realizing his ignorance
of the law as pointed out in the Omnibus Motion, ANNEX "I" the respondent Judge
dissolved the Writ of Habeas Corpus and recalled the Warrant of Arrest, he both
issued against your undersigned in his order dated Jan. 12, 1996, a xerox copy of
which is attached as ANNEX "J" hereof.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Par. X \uc1 \u8212 ? In brief, the substance of the
charges against the respondent are as follows:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 1.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 \tab }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 The court of respondent Judge did not have jurisdiction over
the case nor over the person of your undersigned complainant.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 2.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \tab }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The jurisdiction of respondent
Judge was confined only to the territorial jurisdiction of Tagaytay City and did
not extend up to the territorial jurisdiction of Para\uc1 \u241 ?aque, Metro Manila
where your undersigned complainant resides with the subject child, as alleged in
the petition.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\hich \af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 3.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \tab }{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Jurisdiction is conferred by
law particularly Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 and the exercise of this jurisdiction is
affirmed in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court which are all cited in paragraph
I (Motion to dismiss, ANNEX "I" hereof).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 In addition, after the court issued the order ANNEX "J"
dissolving the Writ and recalling the Warrant, petitioner was given 10 days from
Jan. 12, 1996 to file her comment to the Omnibus Motion.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 4.a.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \tab }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 That 10-day period expired on Jan. 22,
1996 without the required comment having been filed, yet up to this date per
verification with that court personally made by the undersigned on August 14, 1996
with the Clerk of Court of that court who advised me to file a motion for early
resolution.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 4.b.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 As already above pointed out, respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action nor over the person of your undersigned
complainant and notwithstanding the failure to file comment by the Petitioner as
required by the court up to Jan. 22, 1996, such failure amounted to an abandonment
of Petitioner's right to do so, which in any manner did not operate to exculpate
respondent Judge from issuing a ruling on the motion to dismiss in culpable and
palpable violation of the three months period within which to decide as mandated by
paragraph I, Sec. 15, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution, considering that
the last matter to be resolved was the Omnibus Motion, ANNEX "I" which was filed on
Jan. 08, 1996. Hence, to date more than seven (7) months ha[s] already lapsed.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In his
Comment dated March 10, 1998, respondent insisted that the RTC had jurisdiction to
issue the Writ of Habeas Corpus, but added that he subsequently sustained
complainant's argument that the Writ could not be enforced in Para\uc1 \u241 ?aque.
He contends: 2}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 I wish to state that the complaint of Gil Ramon O. Martin, more
particularly his assertion therein that: "The court of respondent judge did not
have jurisdiction over the case nor over the person of your undersigned
complainant." \uc1 \u8212 ? is totally untrue and bereft of factual and legal
moorings. The falsity of such complaint and assertion is shown by the fact that the
Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, in which I was designated to hear and decide
cases as an Assisting Judge, like any other regional trial court in the country, is
vested with concurrent original jurisdiction not only with the Court of Appeals but
also with the Supreme Court of the Philippines pursuant to the explicit provisions
of Section 21 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act (JRA) or EO 33 and the ruling
enunciated in the case of Almine vs. CA, 177 SCRA 796.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Likewise, may I also state that when the
petition in Special Proc. Case No. TG-1552 was filed and docketed with [the]
regional trial court, I issued the writ of habeas corpus applied for therein based
upon the allegations of facts of the petitioner not only pursuant to what is
mandated by the rules, but more importantly, to allow Gil Ramon O. Martin the
chance to answer the petition. Therefore, my issuance of the writ, contrary to the
complaint of Gil Ramon O. Martin, does not constitute ignorance of the law
resulting in grave incompetence and serious misconduct in office on my part, as the
writ itself was not intended to deprive Gil Ramon O. Martin of his "day in court"
but to accord to him his right to due process of law in connection with the
petition filed in Spec. Proc. Case No. TG-1552.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Let me emphasize that Gil Ramon O.
Martin was allowed several opportunities to dispute the petition filed in Spec.
Proc. Case No. TG-1552 as sh[ow]n by the writ itself and my order dated Dec. 29,
1995 (Annexes "C" & "E", respectively, of Complaint). And, what totally negates, if
not dispute[s] the assertions and complaint of Gil Ramon O. Martin for ignorance of
the law is the undisputed fact that when he filed his Omnibus Motion raising the
enforceability of the writ that I issued, I immediately considered his arguments
and granted his prayer for relief through an Order dated Jan. 12, 1996.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Anent the remaining
charge of Gil Ramon O. Martin, let me stress that my failure to act or resolve his
motion to dismiss, as the same is incorporated in his Omnibus Motion, is
attributable to the fact that he, in the Omnibus Motion itself, asked for my
disqualification, if not inhibition, from taking part Spec. Proc. Case No. TG-1552.
Thus, upon due and careful deliberation of the motion to disqualify and, if only to
remove some clouds of doubt on the part of Gil Ramon O. Martin regarding my
impartiality and integrity to resolve his motion to dismiss, I deemed it best and
proper to inhibit, if not disqualify myself from
further handling Spec. Proc. Case No. TG-1552.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In its July 6, 1998 Resolution, 3 the
Court required the complainant and the respondent judge to manifest if they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already
filed. This the parties did. 4}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Office of the Court Administrator's Report}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In its Memorandum
to this Court, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through Deputy Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepa\uc1 \u241 ?o, recommended that Judge Guerrero be
fined in the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000) and admonished to be more
circumspect in the performance of his judicial functions. The OCA justified its
recommendations in this wise: 5}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The allegations of complainant . . . find basis in law
and jurisprudence . . . .}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Similarly, the Court, in Rafael Sr. vs. Puno (76 SCRA
115) agreed with the view of the Solicitor General in the case that: "It is obvious
from the aforequoted provisions of the law and rules that a writ of habeas corpus
that may be issued by a Court of First Instance or a judge thereof is enforceable
only within his judicial district and not outside it."}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Clearly, Tagaytay City (Fourth Judicial
Region), the site of the court where Judge Guerrero presides, and Para\uc1 \u241 ?
aque (National Capital Judicial Region) where the complainant resides do not belong
to the same region. Therefore respondent Judge may be considered to have exceeded
his authority in issuing the contested writ.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On the matter of delay in resolving the motion filed by
complainant, we find that Judge Guerrero's alleged voluntary inhibition from the
case does not relieve him from responsibility because an unjustified delay has
nevertheless been incurred in the meantime. Stated otherwise, he could have
resolved the matter of disqualification at the earlier stage of the proceedings.
His inhibition at this time seems more like an afterthought, a device to evade or
camouflage the real issue of failure to seasonably rule on the pending motion. It
must however be noted that our records do not show that Judge Guerrero filed with
this Office his Order of Inhibition, which should be the most telling proof of his
voluntary disqualification, if at all.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 This Court's Ruling}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We agree with the OCA's findings and recommendations.}
Ignorance of the Law}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Sec. 21 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 provides that "Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction (1) in the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which
may be enforced in any part of their respective regions . . . ." (Emphasis
supplied.) On the other hand, Section 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court reads:}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Sec.
2.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \tab }
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Who may
grant the writ. \uc1 \u8212 ? The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by . . . a
Regional Trial Court, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and
returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis
supplied.)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 \par }\pard
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Under the
foregoing clear provisions of BP 129 and the Rules of Court, regional trial courts
have jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus only when such writs can be
enforced within their respective judicial districts, as extraordinary writs issued
by them are limited to and operative only within such areas. 6 Clearly then,
respondent judge had no authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus against herein
complainant, who was a resident of Para\uc1 \u241 ?aque, an area outside his
judicial jurisdiction. 7}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Although respondent erred in issuing the Writ, his error did not
constitute gross ignorance of law. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or corruption, erroneous acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action, 8 for no magistrate is infallible. 9 In the
present case, complainant failed to show bad faith or malice on the part of the
respondent. Indeed, any allegation of bad faith is negated by the fact that
respondent, upon the motion of complainant, dissolved the Writ of Habeas Corpus and
recalled the Warrant of Arrest. 10}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Nonetheless, as the OCA emphasized, judges have a duty to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules.
It is imperative, therefore, that they remain conversant with basic legal
principles. 11 For committing an error on a basic legal point, respondent should be
sanctioned.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Delay}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Respondent judge should also be held liable for his failure to rule
promptly on complainant's Omnibus Motion. His explanation that he opted to inhibit
himself from further proceeding with the case did not justify the delay. It was his
duty to resolve matters pending before him expeditiously.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We reiterate that "delay in resolving
motions and incidents pending before a judge within the 90-day period fixed by the
Constitution amounts not only to gross inefficiency but also constitutes a
violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates
that a magistrate shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods. 12}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 WHEREFORE, Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero is hereby FINED in
the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) and ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the
performance of his judicial functions. A repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future will be dealt with more severely.1\uc1 \u226 ?wphi1.n\uc1 \u234 ?t}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SO
ORDERED.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 IN THE
MATTER OF APPLICATION G.R. No. 154598}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 HABEAS CORPUS Present:}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 RICHARD BRIAN
THORNTON for PANGANIBAN,J., Chairman,}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 and in behalf of the minor SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,*}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 child SEQUEIRA
JENNIFER CORONA and}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON CARPIO MORALES, JJ.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Petitioner,}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 - versus -}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON,}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Respondent. Promulgated:}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 August 16, 2004}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 }
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 x- - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 D E C I
S I O N}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 }{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 CORONA, J.:}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 This is
a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002
resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501
dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction
and lack of substance. The dispositive portion[2] read:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas
corpus on the grounds that: a) this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient in substance.}
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28,
1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year
later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle
Francisco Thornton.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a
plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a guest relations officer
in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever
petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her friends,
leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Petitioner admonished respondent about her
irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001,
respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her
husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit,
Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family
Court in Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation
that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the
whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them there
and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification[3]
that respondent was no longer residing there.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of
respondents cellular phone bills showing calls from different places such as
Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed
another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could
issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 However, the
petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of
1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas
corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980):}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Under
Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals)
has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA
7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction
finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In
1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Sec. 5.
Jurisdiction of Family Court. The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 xxx xxx xxx}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas
corpus in relation to the latter.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP
129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas
corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it did,
because there is no other meaning of the word exclusive than to constitute the
Family Court as the sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other than the
Family Court also possesses the same competence, then the jurisdiction of the
former is not exclusive but concurrent and such an interpretation is contrary to
the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes
jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a
respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by
just moving out of the region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ
has territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by
law. In the absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot
exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law
is not within the authority of this Court or any court for that matter to
determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of
the legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to
be sought form the courts but only from the legislature.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors
in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over such petitions.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that
Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation
to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has rendered
the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus
may be filed in the Supreme Court,[4] Court of Appeals, or with any of its members
and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.[5]}
petition is granted.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is
nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus
involving the custody of minors.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly
repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction
over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can
issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word exclusive apparently
cannot be construed any other way.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result
in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal
recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the
whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek
redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to
another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case
will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the
intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As
observed by the Solicitor General:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of
the State is to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children. The
creation of the Family Court is geared towards addressing three major issues
regarding childrens welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during the
deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts
exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further clogging
of regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of
the nature of the case and the parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of
the children party to the case remains protected.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The primordial consideration is the welfare and best
interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases
involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 To allow the Court
of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving a
minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of
the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child
is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not
result in disruption of the childs privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to
deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be
avoided by the legislature: the childs welfare and well being will be prejudiced.}
not the first time that this Court construed the word exclusive as not foreclosing
resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in
Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,[6] the heirs of miners killed in a work-
related accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under the
Workmens Compensation Act, the Workmens Compensation Commissioner had exclusive
jurisdiction over such cases.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General
that:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 While
Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it supports
petitioners submission that the word exclusive in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may
not connote automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over habeas
corpus cases involving minors. In the same manner that the remedies in the Floresca
case were selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in
the case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus
enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases
where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be
determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable
throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of
Court, thus:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof,
on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the
instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in
the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof,
or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision
on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge
thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable
only within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In ruling that the Commissioners exclusive jurisdiction
did not foreclose resort to the regular courts for damages, this Court, in the same
Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and giving effect to the
constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and
implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the well-established rule that what
is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter, of the law:}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Idolatrous
reverence for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures
mans survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, the letter of the law
killeth; its spirit giveth life.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social
justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New
Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering
obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation
aforementioned.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being
used in more than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind
is not accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal
interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or
contradiction.[7] In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word
exclusive will result in grave injustice and negate the policy to protect the
rights and promote the welfare of children[8] under the Constitution and the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal
technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the provisions of
RA 8369.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are
not favored:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The two
laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface,
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the
maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every
statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be
presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted
conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied
repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to
all laws on the subject.[9]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to
revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of
habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that
the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA
8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing
writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the
provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 \uc1 \u8213 ?
that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at
issue.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0
\sa200 \lisa0 \widctlpar \aspalpha \aspnum \adjustright \lin0 \rin0 \itap0
\fs21 \kerning2 \dbch \af2 \hich \af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In any case, whatever uncertainty there
was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody
of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of
the rule provides that:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A
verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be
filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial
region to which the Family Court belongs.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ
shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable
to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner
resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
(Emphasis Ours)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus
cases where the custody of minors is involved.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search
for the child all over the country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy
which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As
explained by the Solicitor General:[10]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 That the serving officer will have to search for the
child all over the country does not represent an insurmountable or unreasonable
obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or difficult than the duty of
the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise
enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition
for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the
Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SO ORDERED.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 G.R. No. 118644}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \tab }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 July 7, 1995}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 DIRECTOR EPIMACO A. VELASCO, as Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION SPECIAL OPERATIONS
GROUP (SOG), SPECIAL INVESTIGATORS III FLOR L. RESURRECCION and ANTONIO M. ERUM,
JR., and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 vs.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 COURT OF APPEALS, FELICITAS S. CUYAG, for and in behalf
of LAWRENCE A. LARKINS, respondents.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\dbch \af2
\hich \af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 DAVIDE, JR., J.:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin
is lost in antiquity, 1 was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as the best and only sufficient defense
of personal freedom. 2 More specifically, its vital purposes are to obtain
immediate relief from illegal confinement, to liberate those who may be imprisoned
without sufficient cause, and to deliver them from unlawful custody. It is then
essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which a person
is detained. 3}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Under our Constitution, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
cannot be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety
requires it. 4 Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, it extends,
except as otherwise provided by law, to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. It is not
available, however, under the instances enumerated in Section 4 of the said Rule
which reads:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Sec.
4.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \tab }
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 When writ
not allowed or discharge authorized. \uc1 \u8212 ? If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In this petition for review, the petitioners want us to
set aside and reverse the decision of 1 February 1995 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 36273, 5 a petition for habeas corpus and certiorari with a prayer
for a temporary restraining order, ordering the herein petitioners to immediately
release Lawrence A. Larkins from their custody and declaring moot the alternative
relief of certiorari.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The antecedent facts of the case as culled from the challenged decision
and the pleadings of the parties are neither complicated nor disputed.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On 16 September
1993, a warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Manuel Padolina of Branch 162 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, against accused Lawrence Larkins
in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92 for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On 20 November
1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) a complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of the crime of rape
allegedly committed against her on 19 November 1994 at 2:00 a.m. in Victoria Valley
Subdivision, Valley Golf, Antipolo, Rizal. 6}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea,
petitioners Special Investigators Flor L. Resurreccion and Antonio M. Erum, Jr.
proceeded to the office of Larkins in Makati, Metro Manila, on 21 November 1994 and
arrested the latter, who was thereupon positively identified by Alinea as her
rapist. 7 Larkins was then detained at the Detention Cell of the NBI, Taft Avenue,
Manila.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par
November 1994, Larkins posted his bail of P4,000.00 in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-
92. Judge Padolina forthwith issued an order recalling and setting aside the
warrant of arrest issued on 16 September 1993 and directing the Jail Warden of the
NBI Detention Cell to release Larkins from confinement "unless otherwise detained
for some other cause."}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\dbch \af2 \hich \af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0
\sa200 \lisa0 \widctlpar \aspalpha \aspnum \adjustright \lin0 \rin0 \itap0 \fs21
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum
refused to release Larkins because he was still detained for another cause,
specifically for the crime of rape for which he would be held for inquest.}
November 1994, a complaint against Larkins for rape was executed by Alinea. 8 It
contains a certification by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ma. Paz Reyes Yson that
it is "filed pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, the accused not having opted to avail of his right to
preliminary investigation and not having executed a waiver pursuant to Article 125
of the RPC. . . ." The complaint was filed with the RTC of Antipolo on 2 December
1994, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 94-11794, and assigned to Branch 71 of
the court, presided by Judge Felix S. Caballes.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On 2 December 1994, Larkins, through his
counsel Mauricio C. Ulep, filed an Urgent Motion for Bail 9 wherein he alleged,
inter alia, that the evidence of guilt against him for rape is not strong, as he
had no carnal knowledge of the complainant and the medical report indicates that
her hymen was neither lacerated nor ruptured; that he is entitled as a matter of
right to bail; and that he has no intention of going out of the country or hiding
away from the law.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 On 6 December 1994, Larkins, through his new counsel, Atty. Theodore O.
Te, filed in Criminal Case No. 94-11794 an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal
of the Complaint and for Immediate Release, 10 principally based on the alleged
illegality of his warrantless arrest. This motion met vigorous opposition from the
private complainant. 11}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the order of 5 January 1995, 12 the trial court denied
the aforesaid motions, thus:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 After a careful appreciation of the arguments of the
prosecution and the defense, the Court finds no legal or valid grounds to dismiss
the complaint or release the accused, or to grant him bail. The filing of this case
against the accused, which is [a] very serious offense, justifies the grant of the
motion of the prosecution for the issuance of a hold departure order.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 WHEREFORE, the
motions of the accused are hereby denied for lack of merit, and as prayed for by
the prosecution the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to
include the name of the accused, Lawrence A. Larkins, in its hold order departure
list until further order from this Court.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Unable to accept the ruling, Larkins' common-law wife,
Felicitas S. Cuyag, filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus
with certiorari. Impleaded as respondents were the herein petitioners and Judge
Felix S. Caballes.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Subsequently, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution 13 ordering the
respondents therein to appear and produce Lawrence A. Larkins before the court on
31 January 1995 at 10:30 a.m. and to show cause why Larkins' liberty is being
restrained.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 On the said date, Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum appeared
and produced Larkins at the hearing. Atty. Orlando Dizon of the NBI acted as their
counsel. 14 The Office of the Solicitor General representing the People of the
Philippines made no appearance. 15 Neither did Judge Caballes, for he had not
received a copy of the resolution. On the other hand, the petitioner therein,
Felicitas S. Cuyag, appeared with her counsel, who manifested that should the court
order the release of Larkins the alternative prayer for certiorari would be deemed
abandoned. 16}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 After hearing the arguments of the parties, the Court of Appeals
rendered the challenged decision, holding that:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 From the arguments presented by the
parties, we resolve to order the immediate release of Larkins from his present
confinement on
the ground that the complaint presented to the NBI by complainant Desiree Alinea
on the basis of which Larkins was detained without a warrant of arrest for rape did
not meet the legal requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.}
Furthermore, on the day the detention of Larkins commenced, i.e., immediately after
the NBI was served with the Order of the Pasig RTC for his release on bail in
connection with the BP 22 cases, no other criminal complaint or information had
been filed or pending in any court. It was only sometime between November 25, 1994
(when filing of the complaint was approved by the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor) and
November 29, 1994 (the date appearing on the Urgent Motion for Bail filed by
Larkins's former counsel, said Atty. Ulep) that the complaint for rape was filed
with the Antipolo RTC.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The petitioners insist that the respondent court erred in
granting the petition for habeas corpus because Larkins had already been charged
with the crime of rape and the trial court had denied his application for bail.
They further claim that the warrantless arrest in this case is valid for it was
made under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On the other hand, the private
respondent contends that habeas corpus is rendered unavailing not by the mere
filing of an information, but by the issuance of a warrant of arrest or warrant of
commitment, which are the only two processes recognized by law to justify
deprivation of liberty, and the order of Judge Caballes of 5 January 1995 denying
the petition for bail does not qualify as such. She asserts that the petitioners
have miscomprehended Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan 17 because that case did not rule
that the writ is no longer available after an information (or criminal complaint
for rape as in this case) is filed against the person detained; what it stated is
that the writ of habeas corpus will not issue when the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by
the court which has jurisdiction to do so. She submits that the controlling
doctrine is that enunciated in Ilagan vs. Ponce Enrile, 18 adverted to in Sanchez
vs. Demetriou, 19 that "[t]he filing of charges, and the issuance of the
corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the
defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of
such defect."}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 We find for the petitioners.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 But, before we take up the substantive merits of this
petition, we shall first delve into the propriety of the petition for habeas corpus
and certiorari filed by private respondent Cuyag with the Court of Appeals.}
Concededly, the private respondent has the personality to institute on behalf of
her common-law spouse, Lawrence Larkins, the habeas corpus aspect of the petition,
as she falls within the purview of the term "some person" under Section 3, Rule 102
of the Rules of Court, which means any person who has a legally justified interest
in the freedom of the person whose liberty is restrained or who shows some
authorization to make the application. 20 She is not, however, the real party in
interest in the certiorari aspect of the petition. Only Larkins could institute a
petition for certiorari to set aside the order denying his motions for bail and for
the dismissal of the complaint against him.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It does not, however, follow that if certiorari is
available to Larkins, an application for a writ of habeas corpus will absolutely be
barred. While ordinarily, the writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when there
is an adequate remedy by writ of error or appeal or by writ of certiorari, it may,
nevertheless, be available in exceptional cases, for the writ should not be
considered subservient to procedural limitations which glorify form over substance.
21 It must be kept in mind that although the question most often considered in both
habeas corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an inferior court has exceeded
its jurisdiction, the former involves a collateral attack on the judgment and
"reaches the body but not the record," while the latter assails directly the
judgment and "reaches the record but not the body." 22}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 And now on the merits of the petition.}
Court of Appeals granted the writ of habeas corpus because it found that the
warrantless arrest of Larkins for the crime of rape "did not meet the legal
requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court." It could have in mind
Section 5 thereof on lawful warrantless arrest.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\itap0 \fs21 \kerning2 \dbch \af2 \hich \af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Even if the arrest of a person is
illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is
to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the
filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is
at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of
the filing of the application. Among such supervening events is the issuance of a
judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person. Thus, in Sayo vs.
Chief of Police of Manila, 23 this Court held:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 [W]e hold that petitioners are being illegally restrained
of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained
by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice. (emphasis supplied)}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Another
is the filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the accused
is detained, as in the instant case. By then, the restraint of liberty is already
by virtue of the complaint or information and, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus
is no longer available. Section 4 of Rule 102 reads in part as follows: "Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with .
. . an offense in the Philippines."}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Thus, in Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, 24 where
petitioners Macario Herce and Celso Almadovar claimed to have been illegally
detained for more than one year without any complaint or information filed against
them, this Court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, for at the time
they filed the petition they had already been charged with the crime of treason and
confined by reason thereof. Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago 25 reiterates Matsura.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In Cruz
vs. Montoya, 26 this Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for having
become academic because the information for estafa against the party whose liberty
was allegedly illegally restrained had already been filed and a warrant for his
arrest had been issued, and whatever illegality might have originally infected his
detention had been cured.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In Umil vs. Ramos 27 this Court, applying the last
sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102, held that the writ of habeas corpus should not
be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court.
Thus:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It is
to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been
filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court,
the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court,
as amended is quite explicit in providing that:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Sec. 4.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 . . . Nor shall anything in this rule be
held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense
in the Philippines or of a person suffering from imprisonment under lawful
judgment. 28 (emphasis supplied)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It may also be said that by filing his motion for bail,
Larkins admitted that he was under the custody of the court and voluntarily
submitted his person to its jurisdiction. In De Asis vs. Romero, 29 this Court
stated:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 De Asis
could have, right after his arrest, objected to the regularity of the issuance of
the warrant of arrest in question. Instead he not only filed a petition for bail
with the lower court, thereby accepting the court's jurisdiction over his person,
but he also pleaded, on arraignment, to the information filed against him.
(emphasis supplied)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail is
recommended has the same legal import and effect as the posting of bail in cases
where bail is recommended. It is settled that the giving or posting of bail by the
accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
In the case of Carrington vs. Peterson, 30 this Court declared:}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 When a defendant in a
criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest
or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of
the court he must raise the question of the court's jurisdiction over his person at
the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files
any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction
over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In United States
vs. Grant, 31 this Court held:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Conceding again that the warrant issued in this case was
void for the reason that no probable cause was found by the court before issuing
it, the defendant waived all his rights to object to the same by appearing and
giving bond.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 While
it may be true that on 6 December 1994, or four days after the filing of the Urgent
Motion for Bail, Larkins, thru a new counsel, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for
Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release based on the alleged
illegality of his warrantless arrest, the said motion was a mere afterthought which
came too late in the day. By then, the trial court had firmly acquired jurisdiction
over his person.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Moreover, the trial court's order of 5 January 1995 denying the urgent
motion for bail was an unequivocal assertion of its authority to keep in custody
the person of Larkins. This order comes under the purview of the word order under
the first sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102 reading: "If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer . . . }
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 by
virtue of [an] order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to . . . make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. . . ."}
foregoing renders untenable the private respondent's claim that it is the rule in
Ilagan vs. Enrile 32 which must govern, that the writ may not be allowed only where
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by the court or judge, and that there are only two recognized
processes which justify deprivation of liberty, viz., (1) commitment order and (2)
warrant of arrest. The contention is not only a deliberate misreading of Section 4
of Rule 102 limiting its application to the first part of the first sentence and
disregarding the rest, but is also an undue and unwarranted restriction of the term
process. A commitment order and a warrant of arrest are but species of judicial
process.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 this Court stated:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Invariably a judicial process is defined
as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law;
also, the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, or all
writs, warrants, summonses and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers. It
is likewise held to include a writ, summons or order issued in a judicial
proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the
cause or enforce the judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate or other process issuing
from a court of justice.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 In Macondray & Co., Inc. vs. Bernabe, 34 this Court quoted Corpus
Juris' definition of the term "process," to wit:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 As a legal term, process is a generic
word of very comprehensive signification and many meanings. In its broadest sense,
it is equivalent to, or synonymous with "proceedings" or procedure and embraces all
the steps and proceedings in a cause from its commencement to its conclusion.
Sometimes the term is also broadly defined as the means whereby a court compels a
compliance with its demands. (50 C.J. 441)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We thus rule that the order of 5 January 1995 of the
trial court also qualifies as a process within the meaning of Section 4 of Rule
102.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested,
still the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will not prosper because his
detention has become legal by virtue of the filing before the trial court of the
complaint against him and by the issuance of the 5 January 1995 order.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Even as we thus
decide in favor of the petitioners, we are, nevertheless, disturbed by certain
incidents relative to the warrantless arrest of Larkins. Firstly, assuming that it
was lawful, the facts before us disclose that the arresting officers failed to
strictly comply with (1) the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court requiring that the person lawfully arrested without a warrant shall forthwith
be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against
in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112; and (2) Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, providing that he be delivered to the proper judicial authorities
within thirty-six hours, the crime with which Larkins was charged being punishable
by an afflictive penalty. Although the arrest was made in Makati where there is a
police station and a municipal (now city) jail, Larkins was brought to the NBI
Detention Cell at Taft Avenue, Manila, and though the complaint of the offended
party was executed on 23 November 1994, it was not until 2 December 1994 that the
said complaint was actually filed in court.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Unless satisfactorily explained, the non-compliance by
the arresting officers with the said provisions merits nothing but disapproval from
the Court. In the performance of their duty and in their commendable pursuit to
stamp out crimes and bring criminals to the bar of justice, law enforcement
authorities should make no shortcuts, but must comply with all procedures to
safeguard the constitutional and statutory rights of accused persons. The rule of
law must always be upheld. What this Court said in Beltran vs. Garcia 35 needs to
be repeated:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It
certainly does not speak well of officialdom, whether civilian or military, if a
person deprived of his liberty had to go to court before his rights are respected.
The good name of the administration is jeopardized, without any fault on its part,
by such inefficiency or inattention to duty. Every precaution should be taken
against its repetition. Otherwise, the parties responsible for this state of
affairs would justly lay themselves open to the accusation that the greatest danger
to constitutional rights comes from public officials, men of zeal, concededly well-
meaning, but without sufficient understanding of the implication of the rule of
law.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We also
note that the trial court did not conduct a hearing of the urgent motion for bail,
as required under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The grant or denial of
bail must be based upon the court's determination as to whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong. This discretion may only be exercised after evidence is
submitted at the hearing conducted for that}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 purpose. 36 The court's order granting or refusing bail
must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its
conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong; otherwise, the order
would be defective and voidable. 37 In fact, even if the prosecutor refuses to
adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court
may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the
State's evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. 38 It was thus
incumbent upon the trial court to receive the evidence for the prosecution on the
urgent motion for bail. For this procedural shortcoming, Larkins should also be
partly blamed. He did not press for a hearing after the scheduled hearing on 5
December 1994 was cancelled because, as he claimed, the presiding Judge was out of
the country. 39}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the
Court of Appeals of 1 February 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36273 is hereby SET ASIDE and
ANNULLED.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 No
pronouncement as to costs.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 [G.R. No. 139255. November 24, 2003]}{\fs18 \kerning2
\rin0 \itap0
\fs21 \kerning2 \dbch \af2 \hich \af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON, petitioner, vs. HON. FLORITO S.
MACALINO, RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE,
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 D E C I
S I O N}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 CALLEJO,
SR., J.:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the
reversal of the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch
267, in Special Proceedings No. 10948 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus
filed by the petitioner.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The Antecedents}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SPO3 Rodolfo M. Villaceran of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) filed an application with the RTC of Angeles City, Pampanga, for the
issuance of a search warrant against petitioner Raymond M. Jackson, an American
citizen, a.k.a. Allen Miller, and Jaime C. Bueta for the search of the articles
listed therein at No. 17-21 Apple Street, Hensonville Homes, Balibago, Angeles
City, and the seizure thereof for violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal
Code.[2] Judge Bernardita G. Erum granted the application and issued Search Warrant
No. 97-29 on November 29, 1997.[3] The search was conducted on the said date;
articles were seized and the petitioner and Bueta were apprehended and detained.
Among the articles found in the possession of the petitioner was U.S. Passport No.
Z4613110 issued on June 2, 1983 by the U.S. Embassy in Manila to and in the name of
Raymond Michael Jackson, born on October 17, 1951 in South Dakota; and U.S.
Passport No. 085238399 issued on August 15, 1996 by the New Orleans Passport
Agency, Louisiana to and under the name of Steven Bernard Bator, born on August 20,
1949 in Detroit, Michigan.[4]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Another application for a search warrant was filed by
SPO3 Pedro B. Barsana, Jr. with the RTC of Makati City for violation of Article 176
of the Revised Penal Code for the search of the premises at No. 5518 Second Floor,
Macodyn Building, South Superhighway (corner Pasay Road), Makati City under the
contract of Raymond Jackson a.k.a. Allen Miller and Bernard Bator and for the
seizure of the articles described therein. Acting on the application on November
28, 1997, Judge Pedro N. Laggui of Branch 60 of the RTC issued Search Warrant No.
97-029.[5]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 On December 2, 1997, an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 97-
2078 was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City against the
petitioner and Bueta for violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code.[6]}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 When
apprised of the seizure of the aforementioned passports from the petitioner, U.S.
Vice Consul Raymond Greene of the United States Embassy in the Philippines advised
the Department of Justice on December 10, 1997 that the said passports had been
cancelled.[7] Summary deportation proceedings were initiated at the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against the petitioner docketed as SDO No. BOC
97-46. On December 11, 1997, the Board of Commissioners (BOC) issued an Order
ordering the summary deportation of the petitioner to his country of origin and
directing the Chief of Civil Security Unit to implement the order within three days
from notice thereof, subject to compliance with the 1997 Deportation Rules of
Procedures - Office Memorandum No. ELM-97-013.[8] In the meantime, the name of the
petitioner was included in the blacklist of the CID.[9]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Aside from the aforementioned criminal
cases, other criminal cases were filed against Jackson with the RTC as follows:}
Criminal Case No. The Accused In What Court Cases}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 are Pending}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 1. 98-1155 Raymond Michael Jackson Makati RTC}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 alias Allen Miller Branch 133}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 2. 98-903 Raymond Jackson Makati RTC}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Branch
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 3. 97-
202 Raymond M. Jackson QC RTC}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 a.k.a. Allen Miller and Branch 83}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Jaime Bueta}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 4. 98-1152 Raymond
Jackson Makati RTC}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Branch 135[10]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On December 7, 1997, the Quezon City RTC ordered the
release of the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 97-202 after posting a P6,000 bail.
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On
September 18, 1998, the Makati RTC issued an order in Criminal Case No. 98-1155
directing the CID to hold the departure of the petitioner from the Philippines in
view of the pending criminal cases against him.[12] On September 28, 1998, the
Makati RTC ordered the release of the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 98-1152 after
he posted bail in the amount of P40,000.[13]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On October 1, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration with the CID for the reconsideration of the BOC Order dated
December 11, 1997 directing his deportation.[14] He alleged inter alia that: (a) he
was married to Lily Morales by whom he had two children: Cristina Jackson and
Judaline Jackson; (b) his status was converted into that of a permanent resident on
September 30, 1987 under Section 13-A of the Immigration Act, as amended with
Official Passport No. 3121487; (c) his deportation from the Philippines would
deprive him of the opportunity to defend himself in the criminal cases pending
against him. He appended to his motion a copy of his marriage contract with Lily
Morales and their childrens birth certificates. On October 14, 1998, the CID issued
an order denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.[15]}
petitioner could not be deported because he filed a petition to lift the summary
order of deportation with the CID which as of December 15, 1998 had not yet been
resolved,[16] pending the issuance of clearances from the NBI and PNP, travel
documents and an airplane ticket.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On May 18, 1999, Tedd Archabal, Vice Consul of the Anti-
Fraud Unit in the U.S. Embassy in Manila, issued a certification that U.S. Passport
No. Z4613110 issued to and under the name of Raymond Michael Jackson and No.
085238399 issued to Steven Bernard Bator had been cancelled because the persons
appearing in the photographs affixed in the said passports did not match those
appearing in the photographs affixed in the original applications for the issuance
of the same.[17] The CID issued Mission Order No. RBR-99-164 on May 21, 1999 for
the petitioners arrest for being an undesirable alien under Section 37(a),
paragraph 9 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended,[18] based on the
hold departure order in Criminal Case No. 98-1155 and the certification of Vice
Consul Tedd Archabal. The petitioner was arrested by P/C Inspector James B. Mejia
of the Foreign Intelligence and Liaison Office, PNP Intelligence Group, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, who turned him over to the CID on the said date.[19]}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The petitioner
filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court on June 28, 1999 against the
Commissioner of the CID and John Doe and Jane Doe; and on the same date, the Court
issued a resolution (a) directing the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the
respondents to make a return of the writ on or before July 2, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.;
(b) ordering the Pasig RTC Judge to whom the case would be raffled to conduct a
hearing of the petition, to render judgment and to serve a copy of its decision
within two days from its promulgation.[20]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In their return filed with the RTC on July 8, 1999, the
respondents alleged inter alia that the petitioner was arrested and detained at the
CID on the basis of the summary deportation order issued by the BOC on December 11,
1997 and of the hold departure order of the Makati RTC in Criminal Case
No. 98-1155; the petitioners petition for habeas corpus was premature as there was
a pending petition to lift the summary deportation order before the BOC filed by
him.[21] On July 15, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petition of
Jackson and denied his plea for a writ of habeas corpus.[22]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The petitioner assails the decision of
the RTC and prays for the reversal thereof, contending that:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 A. RODRIGUEZ CANNOT ISSUE WARRANTS OF
ARREST SINCE ONLY JUDGES CAN ISSUE THE SAME.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 B. ASSUMING, WITHOUT CONCEDING, THAT RODRIGUEZ CAN ISSUE
WARRANTS OF ARREST, SUCH CAN ONLY BE ISSUED TO ENFORCE A FINAL ORDER OF
DEPORTATION; HOWEVER, IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE IS NO FINAL ORDER OF DEPORTATION.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 C.
PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS HAS BEEN VIOLATED.[23]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The petitioner avers that under Article
III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution, only judges are vested with
authority to issue warrants for the arrest of persons, including aliens. Even if it
is assumed that the Commissioner of the CID is authorized to issue a warrant of
arrest, this is limited only to those cases where a final order of deportation had
already been issued by the BOC, and only for the purpose of implementing the said
order. According to the petitioner, the order of deportation issued by the BOC on
December 11, 1999 is illegal; hence, null and void. The petitioner was not apprised
of any specific charges filed against him with the CID and was not heard on the
said charges as required by law before the order was issued. The petitioner asserts
that there was no probable cause for his arrest by the CID and that the respondents
even violated the Memorandum Circular of the Secretary of Justice dated June 7,
1999.[24] The petitioner cited the ruling of the Court in Lao Gi v. CA[25] to
fortify his petition.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 In their comment on the petition, the respondents averred that the CID
is authorized under Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, to issue warrants for the arrest of aliens on the CIDs finding of the
existence of a ground for deportation. The petitioner cannot feign lack of due
process because he filed a motion for the reconsideration of the December 11, 1997
Order of the BOC ordering his summary deportation which the BOC denied on October
14, 1998. When Mission Order RBR-99-164 was issued on May 21, 1999 to effect the
arrest of the petitioner, it was on the basis of a final and executory order of
deportation. The RTC, for its part, held that (a) the petition was premature
because the petitioners petition with the CID to lift the summary order of
deportation had not yet been resolved by the BOC of the CID; (b) the petition for
habeas corpus was inappropriate because the petitioner was validly detained under a
mission order issued by the Commissioner based on the order of deportation issued
by the BOC on December 11, 1997; (c) the petitioner is estopped from assailing his
arrest and detention by the CID.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The petition is dismissed.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, provides that except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The ultimate purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is
essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is
detained.[26] Section 4, Rule 102 of the said Rules provides when the writ of
habeas corpus is not allowed or discharged authorized:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or
discharged authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court
or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment; or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ
is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or
defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held
to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in
the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.}
term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau
of Immigration.[27]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar
his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality
of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ
of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by
reason of same supervening events such as the instances mentioned in Section 4,
Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Any
such supervening events are the issuance of a judicial process preventing the
discharge of the detained person.[28]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal
restraint by the respondents rests on the petitioner who attaches such restraints.
Whether the return sets forth process where on its face shows good ground for the
detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege and prove new matter
that tends to invalidate the apparent effects of such process.[29]}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Section 13 of Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, provides that if it appears that the detained person is
in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be
considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint:}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Sec. 13. When the return
evidence, and when only a plea. If it appears that the prisoner is in custody under
a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima
facie evidence of the cause of restraint; but if he is restrained of his liberty by
any alleged private authority, the return shall be considered only as a plea of the
facts therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must prove such facts.}
case, based on the return of the writ by the respondents, the petitioner was
arrested and detained at the CID detention center at Bicutan, Paraaque City, under
Mission Order No. RBR-99-164 dated May 21, 1999 based on the Order of the BOC dated
December 11, 1997 which had become final and executory. The BOC found, after due
proceedings, that:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Records show that on 10 December 1997, Vice Consul Raymond Greene of
the U.S. Embassy in Manila advised the Department of Justice that the U.S.
passports which were confiscated from the abovenamed respondent when he was
arrested by PNP operatives in Angeles City on 30 November 1997 and purportedly
issued to Raymond Michael Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator have been determined to
have been tampered. As a consequence, said passports were cancelled by the U.S.
Embassy.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 86461, 30 May 1989), the
Supreme Court ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the passport of an alien, or
does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain
in the country.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of Commissioners hereby
orders the summary deportation of NORMAN LLOYD @ RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON @ STEVEN
BERNARD BATOR to his country of origin subject to compliance with the 1997
Deportation Rules of Procedures-Office Memorandum Order No. ELM-97-013.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Chief of the
Civil Security Unit is hereby ordered to implement this Order within three (03)
days from receipt hereof.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Include respondents name on the Blacklist.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Give respondent a
copy hereof.[30]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The information relayed by U.S. Vice Consul Raymond Greene to the DOJ
on December 10, 1997 was reiterated by U.S. Vice Consul Tedd Archabal in
his certification forwarded to the DOJ on May 18, 1999, thus:}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 CERTIFICATION}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 I, Tedd Archabal,
Vice Consul of the United States hereby certify that United States Passport Number
Z4613110 issued June 2, 1983 at the U.S. Embassy, Manila in the name of RAYMOND
MICHAEL JACKSON, born October 17, 1951 at South Dakota is a genuine United States
Government document that has been altered and photosubstituted.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 I also certify that United
States Passport Number 085238399 issued August 15, 1996 at the New Orleans Passport
Agency, Louisiana, in the name of STEVEN BERNARD BATOR, born August 20, 1949 at
Detroit, Michigan, is a genuine United States Government document that has been
altered and photosubstituted, as well.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 I further certify that a comparison of photographs
affixed to U.S. Passports Number Z4613110 and 085238399 which were seized by
Philippine National Police officers on or about November 29, 1997 from a man
claiming to be Raymond Michael Jackson and photographs affixed to the original
applications for passports number Z4613110 and 085238399 in the names of Raymond
Michael Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator on file with the U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, revealed that these are not/not the same people.[31]}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The petitioners
arrest and detention are in accord with Section 45(d) in relation to Section 37(a)
(9) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 which respectively reads:}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SEC. 45. (d) being
an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by the
immigration officials, or obtains entry into the Philippines by willful, false, or
misleading representation or willful concealment of a material fact;}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SEC. 37. (a) The
following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the
Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 (9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections Forty-
five and Forty-six of this Act, independent of criminal action which may be brought
against him:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In Tung
Chin Hui v. Rodriguez,[32] this Court held that such documents from a foreign
embassy attesting to the cancellation of the passports held by their national on
the ground that the said passports were tampered with; hence, cancelled were
sufficient grounds for the arrest and deportation of aliens from the Philippines:}
above-quoted official letters demonstrate the speciousness of the petitioners
contention that his passport could not have been cancelled in 1995, inasmuch as he
was allowed to enter the country as late as 1998. The letters show that the
Philippine government was informed about the cancellation only in 1998.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Furthermore, the
foregoing letters of the official representative of the Taiwanese government belie
the petitioners submission that there was no evidence to prove the findings of the
CA and the Board of Commissioners. Verily, these documents constitute sufficient
justification for his deportation. As the Court held in the landmark case Forbes v.
Chuoco Tiaco, [t]he mere fact that a citizen or subject is out of the territory of
his country does not relieve him from that allegiance which he owes to his
government, and his government may, under certain conditions, properly and legally
request his return.[33]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the charges against him in
the CID and insist on being deprived by the BOC of his right to due process as
prescribed for in Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, thus:}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (c) No
alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for
deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be
prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 This is so because on October 1, 1998, the petitioner
filed a motion with the CID for the reconsideration of the December 11, 1997 Order
of the BOC. The petitioner did not allege therein that he was not informed of the
charges against him. In fact, the petitioner did not even rebut the claim of the
U.S. Vice Consul that the passport he was carrying was tampered and had been
already cancelled. Neither did he allege that he requested for the reinstatement of
his passport with the United States Embassy. Despite the finality of the
deportation order of the BOC, it still entertained the petitioners motion for
reconsideration but denied the same on its findings that there were inconsistencies
in his sworn statement and the documents he presented in support of his motion,
thus:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
going over the motion, we find no valid reason to disturb the order of 12 (sic)
December 1997. Likewise, the same had long become final and executory.}{\fs18
grounds alleged in the motion have no merit and are irrelevant. The alleged
marriage of respondent to a Filipina, a certain Lily Morales, with whom respondent
allegedly begot two (2) children named Cristina and Judaline both surnamed Jackson,
and the supposed conversion of respondents status to permanent resident on 30
September 1987 under Section 13(a) of the Immigration Act (CA No. 613, as amended),
does not change the fact that the two (2) US passports purportedly issued to
Raymond Michael Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator which were used by respondent,
were tampered and subsequently cancelled by the U.S. Embassy. Respondent already
lost the privilege to remain in the country (Schonemann v. Comm. Santiago, G.R. No.
86461, 30 May 1989).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 It is also significant to note the evident inconsistencies in the sworn
statement of respondent conducted by Special Prosecutor Henry B. Tubban on 5
December 1997 with the documents attached in the motion. Hereunder are the said
inconsistencies:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 1. Annex A of the Motion is an alleged Marriage Contract between the
respondent and one Lily H. Morales showing Manila City Hall as the place of
marriage and which was held on 6 September 1984.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the Sworn Statement, the respondent
claimed to have entered the country for the first time only in 1988 (p. 1 of sworn
statement), that he married a certain Lily Morales sometime in 1989 in Angeles City
(p. 2 of sworn statement).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 2. The motion stated that out of the union of the
respondent with Ms. Morales, two (2) children named Cristina and Judaline both
surnamed Jackson, were born. In the sworn statement of the respondent, he stated
that they have five (5) children.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In addition, in the marriage contract (Annex A of
motion), it was stated that Ms. Morales is 17 years of age, a minor. However, below
the personal circumstances of the respondent and Mrs. Morales is a statement in
bold letters that BOTH PARTIES ARE OF LEGAL AGES.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The foregoing creates a serious doubt on the allegations
in the motion and on the authenticity of the documents attached thereto. With more
reason that the motion should be denied.[34]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Moreover, the petitioner, in his motion for
reconsideration with the CID, offered to post a bail bond for his provisional
release to enable him to secure the necessary documents to establish the
appropriate grounds for his permanent stay in the Philippines. By offering to post
a bail bond, the petitioner thereby admitted that he was under the custody of the
CID and voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of the CID.[35]}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The present as clearly as the
petitioners petition to lift the order of deportation was as yet unresolved by the
BOC when he filed the petition for habeas corpus.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED.
The Decision of the RTC in Special Proceedings No. 10948 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
the petitioner.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 SO ORDERED.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 [G.R. No. 141443. August 30, 2000]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR THE
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS :}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 AZUCENA L. GARCIA, petitioner.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 D E C I S I O N}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 DE LEON, JR., J.:}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Azucena L. Garcia
petitions this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus in order to free, relieve and
exonerate her from the penalty of imprisonment adjudged and imposed upon her, in
gross violation of her constitutional rights to due process of law and other
fundamental rights[1] pursuant to an allegedly void judgment rendered on April 20,
1995 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 86, in Criminal Case
No. Q-94-53589.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The antecedent facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:}
October 27, 1989, herein accused, Azucena Locsin Garcia, filed an application for
land registration with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 80) docketed
as LRC Case No. 89-007 covering two parcels of land identified as Lots Nos. 822-C-1
and 822-C-2 with an area of 32,350 and 28,750 sq. m., respectively. Appended to
said application were the following documents, to wit: (1) Tax Declaration No. 2273
with PIN-21-11773-1 for Lot 822-C-1; (2) Tax Declaration No. 22732 with PIN-21-
11773-2 for Lot 822-C-2; Subdivision Plan Psd-19954; (4) Technical Description of
Lot 822-C-1; and Technical Description of Lot 822-C-2.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 There is no evidence as to the
proceedings taken, if any, in the said application for land registration. It would
appear, though, as borne out by subsequent events, that said application was
abandoned because on May 8, 1991 accused, who is the applicant in the land
registration case, filed an application this time for administrative reconstitution
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 308462 with the Land Registration Authority
(Exh. F). Attached to the application for reconstitution, aside from the documents
appended to the previous application for land registration which were reproduced in
the former, were the owners copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 308462 (Exh.
N for the prosecution which is similar to Exh. 2 for the defense) in the name of
the accused and Real Property Tax Bill-Receipts (Exhs. 12, 12-A to 12-G).}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On June 7, 1991, at
the request of the accused, Edgardo Castro, Deputy Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, issued a certification (Exh. B; Exh. 1) stating that the original of TCT No.
308462 was among those burned during the fire that razed the Quezon City Hall on
June 11, 1988.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 On June 20, 1991 (not 1992 as appearing in the Information in
Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589), TCT No. 308462 was ordered reconstituted, along with
other TCTs in the names of other applicants, pursuant to Administrative Order No.
Q-283(91) signed by Benjamin M. Bustos, Reconstituting Officer of the Land
Registration Authority (Exh. 6).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On September 10, 1991, complainant [Antonio de]
Zuzuarregui wrote the Quezon City Assessors Office (Exh. L) requesting for
certification as to the authenticity of Declaration of Real Property No. 2273,
Property Index No. 21-11773-1 Piedad Estate (Exh. L-1) and Declaration of Real
Property No. 22732, Property Index No. 21-11773-2, Piedad Estate (Exh. L-2), both
issued in the name of Domingo R. Locsin and purportedly signed by Jose C. Gonzales,
then acting City Assessor of Quezon City, because the lot embraced by the said
declarations are allegedly within the boundary of said complainants property per
his TCT No. 181095.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 In reply to the above letter, Q.C. City Assessor Constantino P. Rosas
wrote Zuzuarregui on September 11, 1991 stating that no such records (Declarations
of Real Property Nos. 2273 and 22732) exist in their office and the same appear to
be spurious (Exhs. J and J-1).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Meanwhile, on September 23, 1991, accused, thru counsel,
filed a Motion to Withdraw her application for land registration with the RTC Q.C.
(Br. 80) which was granted by the court in its Order dated September 25, 1991
(Exhs. I & 11).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 On October 4, 1991, Zuzuarregui wrote another letter this time to Mrs.
Brigida Llave, Technical Records Section of the Bureau of Lands, NCR, Q.C. (Exh. C)
requesting for certification as to the authenticity of the documents attached to
the letter, namely Annex 1 xerox copy of Plan Psd-19954 of Lot 822-C in the name of
Domingo R. Locsin; Annex 2 xerox copy of the technical description of Lot 822-C-1,
Psd-19954, also in the name of Domingo R. Locsin (Exh. C-2); and Annex 3 xerox copy
of the technical description of Lot 822-C-2, Psd-19954, likewise in the name of
Domingo R. Locsin (Exh. C-3, all of which were appended to and used in support of
the above-mentioned application for administrative reconstitution. Said xerox
copies of the plan and technical descriptions were respectively referred to Brigida
Llave of the Technical Records Section and Engr. Elpidio de Lara of the Technical
Services Section of the Bureau of Lands, for their Comments (Exh. C-1).}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In Llaves reply of
October 7, 1991 (Exh. E), she stated that the alleged plan, Psd-19954, is non-
existing in their files and called attention to the fact that she has no signature
over her stamped name Brigida R. Llave on said plan. De Lara, for his part, in an
interoffice memorandum dated October 14, 1991 (Exh. D), disputed the authenticity
of the technical descriptions (Annexes 2 and 3 to the letter of Zuzuarregui) by
stating that the signatures thereon are not his (T.S.N., April 1, 1994, p. 10.)}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Based
on the above developments tending to discredit the authenticity and credibility of
the documents presented by the accused in support of her application for
reconstitution with the LRA, on complaint of Zuzuarregui, Benjamin Bustos caused a
review of his previous order giving due course to the reconstitution of TCT No.
308462 and on the basis of his findings, recalled and set aside, said previous
order as far as TCT No. 308462 is concerned in a Supplemental Order dated October
8, 1991. From said Supplemental Order, herein accused interposed an appeal to the
LRA Administrator.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 On or about November 11, 1991, Zuzuarregui instituted a criminal
complaint with the Fiscals Office of Quezon City charging the herein accused of
falsifying the technical descriptions and tax declarations all issued in the name
of Domingo R. Locsin, father of the accused. Said complaint was dismissed in an
order dated May 15, 1992. On July 16, 1992, Zuzuarregui filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dismissal (Exh. 14).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 x x x}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Meanwhile, on August 14, 1992, Samuel C. Cleofe, Register
of Deeds of Quezon City, in his reply to a letter from herein complainant
Zuzuarregui, stated that per verification from their Control Log Book, TCT No.
308462 is not shown as among those filed in their office (Exh. A).}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On September 18, 1992,
Zuzuarreguis Motion for Reconsideration of the order
dismissing his criminal complaint against the accused was granted in a resolution
issued by Asst. City Prosecutor Dimaranan Vidal (Exh. 15). Accordingly, herein
accused was formally charged with three counts of falsification of public documents
in three separate criminal informations filed with the RTC of Quezon City and
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 36490-92, the first being for falsification of
technical description of land and the other two being for falsification of
Declarations of Real Property (Exhs. 13; 13-B and 13-C).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the meantime, upon request of certain
Miguel V. Sison, Jr., Officer in Charge, Director IV, Office of the Executive
Secretary, Presidential Action Center, Malacaang, the National Bureau of
Investigation conducted an examination of both the specimen and questioned
signatures of Vicente Coloyan, former Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the
questioned signatures being those appearing on TCT No. 308462. On March 9, 1993,
Director Epimaco Velasco of the NBI wrote Miguel V. Sison, Jr. (Exh. 3)
transmitting copy of their findings contained in a Questioned Document Report No.
151-393, dated March 9, 1993 (Exh. 4) signed by Rogelio G. Azores, Document
Examiner IV of the NBI (Exh. 4-B), as approved by Arcadio A. Ramos, Chief of the
Questioned Document Division (Exh. 4-C) and noted by Manuel C. Roura, Deputy
Director, Technical Services (Exh. 4-D). The conclusion arrived at as per the
Report is that the questioned and standard signatures of Vicenter [sic] Coloyan
were written by one and the same person.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On October 13, 1993, in response to a request of Rogelio
Azores who rendered the above Questioned Document Report, Quezon City Assosor [sic]
Constantino P. Rosas issued a Certification (Exh. K) to the effect that Tax
Declarations Nos. 22731 for Lot 822-C-1 Piedad Estate and 22732 for Lot 822-C-2
Piedad Estate, both in the name of Domingo R. Locsin, do not appear in their Office
Tax Map, Property Index System as well as in the Assessment Roll.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On April 15, 1994,
Assistant Quezon City Assessor Benjamin Kasala issued still another Certification
to the effect that per assessment records of their office, there is no property
whether land or improvement registered for taxation purposes in the name of accused
Garcia (Exh. M).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Meanwhile, Criminal Cases Nos. 36490-92 for falsification of public
documents filed by the herein complainant against the herein accused were raffled
to Branch 85 of this Court then presided by the Honorable Benjamin P. Abesamis and
subsequently by the Honorable Judge Mariano M. Umali. In a decision penned by the
latter, dated May 17, 1994, the herein accused was acquitted of all the above
charges on reasonable doubt (Exh. 16-C).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On June 9, 1994, in the course of the trial of the
present case, counsel for the accused, Atty. Ciriaco O. Atienza, wrote the Land
Registration Authority (Exh. 9) requesting, among others, clarification on the
finality of an order of reconstitution, apparently referring to the order of August
20, 1991 by Reconstituting Officer Bustos (Exh. 6, supra.) which was later set
aside in a Supplemental Order of the same officer dated October 8, 1991. x x x}
August 5, 1994, herein complainant wrote another letter-request this time addressed
to Mr. Ernesto Erive, Land Management Services Chief of Surveys Division, Bureau of
Lands (Exh. V), for the latter to certify as to the authenticity of the technical
description of Lot 822-C-2, Psd-19954, in the name of Domingo Locsin attached to
the letter-request which was one of the documents submitted by the accused in
support of her application for administrative reconstitution. In reply thereto,
Erive wrote Zuzuarregui on August 18, 1994 (Exh. U) informing the latter that their
office (Department of Environment and Natural resources, National Capital Region)
has no record of Lot 822-C-2, Psd-19954 and, hence, said technical description was
not prepared by their office.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On September 30, 1994, the LRA Administrator Reynaldo
Maulit came out with a Resolution (Exh. 20) on the appeal interposed by the accused
affirming the finality of LRA Administrative Reconstitution Order No. Q-283(91)
dated August 20, 1991 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
reconstitute, among others, the original of TCT No. 308462 in the name of
petitioner-appellant Azucena L. Garcia, accused herein and, therefore, the
Supplemental Order dated October 8, 1991 could not have validly amended the
aforestated order of August 20, 1991. It added, however, that the reconstitution
does not confirm nor adjudicate ownership over the property subject thereof citing
the case of Serra, Serra vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 482 (Exh. S).[2]}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Thus, petitioner
was charged in Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589 with falsifying the entries in Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 308462, forging the signature therein of Vicente N.
Coloyan, and introducing or using said TCT in support of her application for
reconstitution of title. Similarly, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-53590 and Q-94-
53591, petitioner was charged with falsifying the entries in Declaration of Real
Property Nos. 22731 and 22732, respectively, forging the signatures therein of Jose
C. Gonzales, and introducing or using the same in support of her application before
the Land Registration Administration (LRA).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\dbch \af2 \hich \af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In its Decision dated April 20, 1995,
the trial court found petitioner guilty of three (3) counts of falsification of
public documents. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court,
and subsequently this Court, affirmed petitioners conviction. Entry of judgment was
made on April 8, 1999.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the instant petition, petitioner only questions the
validity of the judgment rendered in Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589. She contends
that where proceedings were attended by violations of the constitutional rights of
the accused, the judgment of conviction is void thereby warranting relief by the
extraordinary legal remedy of habeas corpus. Hence, in her case, the fundamental
unfairness of the judgment, when viewed in light of the record, renders the same
subject to attack for being violative of her right to due process of law.
Petitioner explains that this fundamental unfairness stems from the omission and
failure of the trial court, the prosecution and the defense counsel to formally
project into the evidentiary stream the evidence decisive on the merits of the
case, consisting of official determinations and findings[3] on the genuineness and
authenticity of Vicente Coloyans signature on the owners copy of TCT No. 308462,
which underlay the different official acts of office holders participating in the
proceeding on administrative reconstitution of the original of said [TCT] No.
308462 of the Q.C. Register of Deeds.[4]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Petitioner explains that the disquisition of the trial
judge was totally silent on the official findings and determinations that Coloyans
signature on the owners copy of the TCT No. 308462 was genuine. Instead, the trial
judge merely relied on the testimony of Coloyan that the signature appearing on the
photocopy of TCT No. 308462 is not his. Petitioner points out that the unfairness
of such reliance becomes apparent when official determinations and findings as to
the genuineness of Coloyans signature on TCT No. 308462 are considered.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Petitioner then
alleges that the prosecution failed to call the attention of the trial court to
these official determinations and findings which constituted exculpatory evidence
in her favor. Petitioner further faults the prosecution in willfully presenting
Coloyan as a witness to disclaim his signature notwithstanding indications in the
record that he was hired and was possibly a corrupt witness. She maintains that the
prosecution should have exerted their best efforts to safeguard the trial process
against this type of witness, who from all reasonable indicators is a paid and
perjured witness.[5]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Petitioner likewise claims that she was denied due process of law by
reason of her being represented by ineffective counsel. Petitioner illustrates that
her counsel failed to formally offer in evidence exhibits, consisting of the
official acts of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and officials of the LRA,[6]
for the specific purpose of proving the genuineness of Coloyans signature.
Petitioners counsel also took no steps to bar Coloyan from being presented as a
witness for the prosecution and was not especially alert to the danger or risk of a
perjured witness. In this regard, petitioner maintains that her counsel could have
asked for a deferment of the trial to give him time to make a full investigation of
the circumstances attending the presentation of Coloyan as a witness.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Petitioner
concludes that the foregoing arguments and precedents warrant the grant of
preliminary injunctive relief in the form of a status quo order, and, after
consideration of the merits of the case, a writ of habeas corpus annulling the
judgment of conviction rendered against her.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on the other
hand, states that the writ of habeas corpus is a remedy available to a person who
is illegally imprisoned or restrained of his liberty. Consequently, a person
discharged or out on bail, like petitioner, is not entitled to the writ.}{\fs18
ground invoked by petitioner pertains to the appreciation of evidence, a matter
which falls within the exclusive discretion and prerogative of the trial court. The
OSG stresses that a writ of habeas corpus can issue only for want of jurisdiction
of the sentencing court, and cannot function as a writ of error. As such, the writ
will not lie to correct alleged mistakes of fact or of law committed by a court in
the exercise of its functions. The OSG also points out that the ground invoked by
petitioner is one which has been considered, passed upon and found to be without
merit not only by the Court of Appeals but by this Court as well. The OSG is of the
view that the instant petition is merely intended to delay the administration of
justice.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We deny
the petition.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The
high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.[7] Its object is to
inquire into the legality of ones detention, and if found illegal, to order the
release of the detainee.[8] However, it is equally well-settled that the writ will
not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail,[9] or
is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order.[10] In
the case at bar, therefore, petitioner can no longer seek relief via a petition for
habeas corpus having been convicted by final judgment of the crime of falsification
of public document and use thereof. Said judgment is already final and executory.
Petitioner even discloses that entry of judgment was made on April 8, 1999, or
eight (8) months prior to the filing of this petition. The OSG has also pointed out
that petitioner is still out on bail. To this petitioner merely replied that:}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 For
purposes of habeas corpus, RESTRAINT is not confined to imprisonment or actual
physical custody. Recent federal jurisprudence has extended this to accused under
final conviction, who are out on bail, and to convicts on parole. Such
jurisprudence is part of Anglo-American jueisprudence (sic), which is highly
persuasive in this jurisdiction because our law on Habeas Corpus is of Anglo-
American origin.[11]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Even if we disregard the fact that petitioner is out on bail, the writ
prayed for should not be granted. Indeed, we have held that once a deprivation of a
constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is
deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail
the legality of his detention.[12] Petitioner, however, has failed to persuade this
Court that the proceedings before the trial court were attended by violations of
her right to due process, or for that matter, other constitutional rights.}
apparent from the arguments advanced by petitioner that the purpose of this
petition is to cause this Court to once again re-examine and pass judgment upon the
trial courts appreciation of the evidence presented, especially the credibility of
Coloyan as a witness. The Decision dated April 20, 1995 of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the disquisition of the Court of Appeals, and the Resolution dated
October 27, 1998 of the Third Division of this Court, finding that no reversible
error was committed by the trial court, should have impressed upon petitioner that
issues relating to the trial courts appreciation of the evidence have already been
settled and thus, can no longer be reviewed anew by this Court. As early as the
1913 case of Trono Felipe v. Director of Prisons,[13] we have laid down the rule
that an application for habeas corpus cannot function as a writ of error. We
explained therein that:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 But the writ of habeas corpus is not a remedy for the
correction of such errors.[14] Court cannot, in habeas corpus proceedings, review
the record in a criminal case after judgment of conviction has been rendered, and
the defendants have entered on the execution of the sentence imposed, to ascertain
whether the facts found by the trial court were in accordance with the evidence
disclosed by the record, or to pass upon the correctness of conclusions of law by
the trial court based on the facts thus found. Under the statute, a commitment in
due form based on a final judgment convicting and sentencing a defendant in a
criminal case is conclusive evidence of the legality of his detention under such
commitment, unless it appears that the court which pronounced the judgment was
without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in imposing the penalty. Mere
errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court
of its jurisdiction over the cause and the person of the defendant, if corrected at
all, must be corrected on appeal in the form and manner prescribed by law.[15]}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 As to
the charge that the prosecution committed manifest prosecutorial misconduct, we
find the same bereft of merit. First, the existence of exculpatory evidence is a
matter of defense. As such, it is principally the duty of the accused, not the
prosecution, to bring its existence to the attention of the court. Second, whether
the Orders of Reconstitution issued by the reconstitution officer and the LRA
administrator on August 20, 1991 and September 30, 1994, respectively, as well as
the reconstituted TCT No. 308462 constitute sufficient evidence to exonerate
petitioner from criminal liability, involves appreciation and weighing of evidence,
and for reasons already stated, this Court is proscribed from again considering.
Even petitioners accusation that Coloyan was a paid and perjured witness was not
supported by evidence.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Similarly, apart from her bare allegations, petitioner
offered no convincing evidence to substantiate her claim that the ineffectiveness
of her counsel deprived her of her right to counsel. We specifically note that
petitioners own documentary evidence in support of the instant petition actually
belies her allegation that her counsel failed to adduce exculpatory evidence.
Petitioners Formal Offer of Exhibits before the trial court shows that among the
evidence offered by her counsel were the following:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Exhibit(s) Description(s) Purpose(s)}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 x x x x
x x xxx}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 3, 4 and 4-A 4-B, (a) NBI Directors (1) To prove that
the NBI examined}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 4-C and 4-D Letter dated March 9, TCT No. 308462 and the}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 1993, (Exh. 3)
signature of Vicente N. Coloyan}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 transmitting to Hon. (2) To prove that the NBI}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Miguel V. Sison, Jr
findings is that the signature}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 the NBI Questioned of Vicente N. Coloyan appearing}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Documents Report on
(sic) TCT No. 308462 is written}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 No. 151-393 by one and the same Vicente N.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Coloyan, Acting
Register of}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 (b) Questioned NBI Deeds, whose standard signatures}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Documents Report No. appear
on various titles on}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 151-391 dated March file with the Registry of}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 9, 1993 Deeds, Quezon City}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (3) to prove that
this Questioned}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Documents Report No. 151-393}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 submitted by Document Examiner}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Rogelio G. Azores was approved}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 by NBI}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (4) To prove that
TCT No.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 308462 is
genuine, not falsified}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 6 Adm. Reconstitution
(1) To prove that the LRA}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Order No. Q-283 (91) approved the Administrative}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 issued
on August 20, 1991 Reconstitution of the}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 by Land Registration Accuseds TCT No. 308462}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Authority (LRA)
through for Lot 822-C-1 and Lot}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 the Reconstitution Officer, Atty. 822-C-2, Piedad Estate}
Benjamin Busto}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\aspalpha \aspnum \adjustright \lin0 \rin0 \itap0 \fs21 \kerning2 \dbch \af2 \hich
\af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 (2) To prove that this Adm.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Reconstitution Order had}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 already acquired finality}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 when the
reconstitution}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 of TCT No.308462}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 was recalled by Atty. Busto}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (3) To prove that TCT}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 No. 308462 is genuine,}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 not falsified16
(Underscoring ours)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 It appears, however, that these documents were among the official acts
repeatedly cited by petitioner as presupposing official determination and findings
that Coloyans signature on TCT No. 308462 was genuine and, therefore, allegedly
constituted evidence exempting petitioner from criminal liability. Petitioner
faulted her counsel in Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589 for being ineffective in that
her counsel allegedly failed to formally offer in evidence the said documents but
the record shows that her counsel did not fail to do so.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Significantly, it is not disputed that
petitioner appealed the adverse Decision or judgment of conviction dated April 20,
1995 of the RTC of Quezon City to the Court of Appeals; that the Court of Appeals
and later this Court affirmed the conviction of the petitioner; and that Entry of
Judgment was made on August 8, 1999. The petitioner, therefore, may not validly
resort to this present petition for habeas corpus in lieu of her lost or dismissed
appeal in the said criminal case. The petition of herein petitioner who is out on
bail, appears to be patently intended for delay.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 WHEREFORE, petitioner Azucena L. Garcia,
having failed to establish sufficient cause to warrant issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 G.R. No. L-63345}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \tab }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 January 30, 1986}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 EFREN C. MONCUPA, petitioner, }{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 vs.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
FABIAN C. VER, GALILEO KINTANAR, FERNANDO GOROSPE, AND JOSE CASTRO, respondents.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Lorenzo
M. Tanada, Jose W. Diokno and Joker Arroyo for petitioner,}{\fs18 \kerning2
\rin0 \itap0 \fs21 \kerning2
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 As early as 1919, in the leading case of Villavicencio v.
Lukban (39 Phil. 778, 790), this Court ruled:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 A prime specification of al application for a writ of
habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint
is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. ...}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 This
latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas-corpus has, in law, remained
undiminished up to the present. The respondents' contention that the petition has
become moot and academic must necessarily be denied. Efren C. Moncupa may have been
released from his detention cell. The restraints attached to his temporary release,
however, preclude freedom of action and under the Villavicencio v. Lukban rule
warrant this Court's inquiry into the nature of his involuntary restraint and our
relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together
with others, was arrested on April 22, 1982 at about 10:50 P.M., at the corner of
D. Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa D. Tuazon was brought to MIG-15
Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he was detained. On April 23, 1982, on the
allegation that he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a
Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and eight (8) other
persons.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
two separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo
Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa Investigation Group and second, by
Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of Quezon City, it was ascertained that the
petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators
recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of
firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree
No. 33.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par
Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the petitioner, one, for
illegal possession of firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the
other for violation of P.D. 33 before the City Court of Quezon City. Against the
other accused, however, the cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885 as amended.
Significantly, the petitioner was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-
Subversion Law. During the pendency of this petition, it is significant that his
arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued. And yet, the
petitioner's motions for bail were denied by the lower court.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Hence, the petitioner filed
the instant petition.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity of
petitioner's detention on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been
suspended as to the petitioner. However, on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed
a motion to dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily
released from detention on orders of the Minister temporary of National Defense
with the approval of the President. The respondents stated. "Since the petitioner
is free and no longer under the custody of the respondents, the present petition
for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic as in similar cases.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The issue to be
resolved is whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in
view of the petitioner's temporary release.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's
temporary release are restrictions imposed on him. These are:}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par }\pard
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 1)}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 His freedom of
movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the approval of
respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 2)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 His liberty of abode is restricted because
prior approval of respondents is also required in case petitioner wants to change
his place of residence.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 3)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he
should not "participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass
media representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to
the interest of national security."}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 4)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 He is required to report regularly to respondents or their
representatives.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The petitioner argues that although admittedly his temporary release is
an improvement upon his actual detention, the restrictions imposed by the
respondents constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.}
petitioner stresses that his temporary release did not render the instant
petitioner moot and academic but that "it merely shifted the inquiry from the
legality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions imposed by the
respondents."}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 We agree with the petitioner.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The reservation of the military in the form of
restrictions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitute
restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of
movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired
into by the writ of habeas corpus.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the women who had been
illegally seized and transported against their will to Davao were no longer under
any official restraint. Unlike petitioner Moncupa, they were free to change their
domicile without asking for official permission. Indeed, some of them managed to
return to Manila. Yet, the Court condemned the involuntary restraints caused by the
official action, fined the Mayor of Manila and expressed the hope that its
"decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws
and to protect individual liberty from Megal encroachment."}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the light of the above
ruling, the present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic.
Other precedents for such a conclusion are not wanting.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The decision in Caunca v. Salazar (82
Phil. 851) states:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a
prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of
movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house
of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom
of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, from to choose one's
residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or
groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of the will. If the actual
effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another,
the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the
individual who is illigally deprived of liberty by deprived or physical coercion.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In Tibo
v. The Provincial Commander (85 SCRA 564), this Court ruled:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Although the release in the custody of
the Deputy Minister did not signify that petitioners could once again enjoy their
full freedom, the application could have been dismissed, as it could be withdrawn
by the parties themselves. That is a purely voluntary act. When the hearing was
held on September 7, 1978, it turned out that counsel for petitioner Bonifacio V.
Tupaz could have academic in a hasty manner when he set forth the above allegations
in his manifestation of August 30, 1978, for Attorney Jose C. Espinas, who appeared
for petitioners, while conceding that there was such a release from confinement,
also alleged that it was conditioned on their restricting their activities as labor
union leaders to the premises of the Trade Unions of the Philippines and ABSOLUTE
Services, presumably in Macaraig as well as the Ministry of labor. As the voting
was to take place in the business firm in Bataan, the acts set would nullify
whatever efforts they could have exerted. To that extent, and with the prohibition
against their going to Bataan, the restraint on liberty was undeniable. If so, the
moot and academic character of the petition was far from clear.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 More recently, we had
occasion to rule squarely on whether or not a temporary release from detention
renders the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. As in this case
of Moncupa, the petitioners in Toyoto, et al v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al, G.R. No.
69270, October 15, 1985, were temporarily released from detention. The respondents
filed a motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus on the ground that the
petitioners had been temporarily released and their case had, therefore, become
moot and academic. The petitioners insisted, however, that their case may be
considered moot and academic only "if their release would be permanent." In ruling
for the petitioners, we said:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and
academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either
temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a number of cases. But the instant
case presents a different situation. The question to be resolved is whether the
State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of
competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmative answer is
the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the petitioners being
merely 'temporary' it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their
acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such a reservation is
repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle. Under this principle
the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained
or re-arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basic and elementary that
it needs no elaboration.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from
involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or
more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due
process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light
of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those
applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.}
respondents have failed to show why the writ may not issue and why the restraints
on the petitioner's freedom of movement should not be lifted.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 WHEREFORE, the PETITION is
GRANTED. The conditions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner are
declared null and void. The temporary release of the petitioner is declared
ABSOLUTE. No costs,}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 [G.R. No. L-27331 : July 30, 1981.]}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 ELISEO ALIMPOOS, CIRIACA
ALIMPOOS, SGT. MILLARDO M. PATES, PEDRO BACLAY, CATALINO YAMILO, RAFAEL
CAPANGPANGAN, DALMACIO YGOT and EUFROCINA ESTORES, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE JUDGE MONTANO A. ORTIZ, REYNALDO MOSQUITO and MATILDE
ABASTILLAS MOSQUITO, Respondents.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 D E C I S I O N}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Petitioner-spouses, Eliseo Alimpoos and Ciriaca Alimpoos,
shall hereinafter be called the Offended Parties. Petitioners Pedro Baclay,
Catalino Yamilo, Rafael Capangpangan, Dalmacio Ygot, Eufrocina Estores and Sgt.
Millardo M. Pates may hereinafter be referred to as the Witnesses.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Respondent Reynaldo Mosquito
will hereinafter be called the Accused. Respondent Matilde A. Mosquito is the
Accused\uc1 \u8217 ?s wife. Respondent Court of Appeals will be termed the
Appellate Tribunal; respondent Judge Montano A. Ortiz, as respondent Trial Judge,
and the Municipal Judge, as such.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In this Petition for Certiorari, the Offended Parties and
the Witnesses seek the reversal of the Decision of the Appellate Tribunal,
upholding the disallowance of the Offended Parties\uc1 \u8217 ? appeal by the Court
of First Instance of Agusan cranad(the Trial Court, for short) in Civil Case No.
1088, entitled \uc1 \u8220 ?Reynaldo Mosquito, et al. vs. Eliseo Alimpoos, et
al,\uc1 \u8221 ? wherein respondent Trial Judge granted the Accused\uc1 \u8217 ?s
petition for Habeas Corpus and declared his detention illegal. He also enjoined the
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 458 of the Municipal Court of Bayugan, Agusan
cranad(hereinafter called Criminal Case) where the Accused had been arrested.}
Accused was detained by the Chief of Police of Bayugan, Agusan, by virtue of a
Warrant of Arrest issued by the Municipal Judge in the Criminal Case, which was a
prosecution for Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries. The place allegedly
robbed belonged to the Offended Parties. Contending that the Warrant was issued
without the observance of the legal requirements for the issuance thereof, the
Accused, then detained, and his wife instituted the Habeas Corpus case before the
Trial Court. Named as defendants in the original complaint were the Offended
parties and the Witnesses cranad(as witnesses for the prosecution) all of whom are
residents of Agusan. In an amended complaint, the two arresting policemen, the
Chief of Police, and the Municipal Judge were added as co-defendants.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Complaint of
the Accused was premised on the alleged violation of Article 32 cranad(4),
cranad(8), cranad(15), cranad(16), cranad(17) and cranad(19) of the Civil Code, and
Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code, by defendants therein who were said to have
been instrumental in causing the detention and arrest of the Accused. It prayed for
the Accused\uc1 \u8217 ?s release from detention, as well as for the issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the Offended Parties and the Witnesses,
and the Municipal Judge and/or their representatives, from proceeding with the
Criminal Case. Actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney\uc1 \u8217 ?s fees,
and costs were also prayed for.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Offended Parties and the Witnesses, except Sgt.
Pates, were represented by the law firm of Seno, Mendoza and Associates, with
offices located in Cebu City. They contended that they had nothing to do with the
Accused\uc1 \u8217 ?s detention and arrest. The Municipal Judge, the Chief of
Police, and Patrolmen Libres and Galimba, who were represented by the Acting
Provincial Fiscal of Butuan City, alleged that the Warrant of Arrest was validly
issued. Sgt. Pates was represented by Capt. Igualdad Cunanan, and reiterated
substantially the same defense.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 After due hearing in the Habeas Corpus case, respondent
Trial Judge issued the appealed Order cranad(the ORDER, for short), dated March
26, 1966, declaring the detention of the Accused illegal and granting the Writ of
Habeas Corpus as well as the Preliminary Injunction prayed for upon the filing of
the required bond. The dispositive portion of the ORDER reads:}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \uc1 \u8220 ?WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered declaring illegal the detention of plaintiff Reynaldo
Mosquito by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued without the observance of the
fundamental legal requirements prior to the issuance of said Writ. The petition for
habeas corpus is therefore granted and it is hereby ordered that said detention
prisoner be forthwith released from custody, and set at liberty and that upon the
filing of the bond in the amount of P1,000.00 a writ of preliminary injunction
issue restraining the Municipal Judge of Bayugan, Agusan, defendant Vicente Galicia
and the rest of the defendants, their attorneys, agents or representatives from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 458 entitled \uc1 \u8216 ?The People of the
Philippines versus Reynaldo Mosquito et als.\uc1 \u8217 ?, for the crime of Robbery
with Less Serious Physical Injuries, with costs against the defendants in these
habeas corpus and preliminary injunction proceedings.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SO ORDERED.\uc1 \u8221 ? 1}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Acting
Provincial Fiscal of Agusan received copy of said ORDER on March 31, 1966, and on
April 1, 1966, moved for extension of time within which to appeal, but eventually
desisted from doing so.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On April 4, 1966, counsel for the Offended Parties and
the Witnesses mailed from Cebu City a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals
stating that:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 \uc1 \u8220 ?Undersigned counsel received a copy of the order only
today cranad(April 4, 1966) which copy was handed to him by defendant
cranad(petitioner) Eliseo Alimpoos.\uc1 \u8221 ?}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The appeal was opposed by the Accused on
the ground that it was filed beyond the 48-hour reglementary period within which to
perfect an appeal in Habeas Corpus proceedings.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On April 23, 1966, over the Offended
Parties\uc1 \u8217 ? objections, respondent Trial Judge dismissed their appeal
thus:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \uc1
\u8220 ?The notice of appeal of the Provincial Fiscal or of Atty. Seno for the
defendants, having been filed out of time the Order of March 26, 1966 granting the
habeas corpus is now final and executory. The urgent ex-parte motion to grant
extension to file notice of appeal does not interrupt the running of the period
fixed by law for filing an appeal which is forty-eight hours from receipt of the
order.\uc1 \u8221 ? 2}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 No reconsideration was prayed for by the Provincial Fiscal.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Offended
Parties, however, resorted to a Mandamus proceeding before the Court of Appeals
seeking to compel respondent Trial Judge to give due course to said appeal.}
January 11, 1967, the Appellate Tribunal, 3 in CA-G.R. No. 37781-R, denied Mandamus
stating in part:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 \uc1 \u8220 ?As the records show that copy of the questioned Order was
received by counsel on March 30, 1966, the notice of appeal was not filed within
the 48-hour limit. Petitioners\uc1 \u8217 ? appeal was therefore filed out of time
and the judgment has become final.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par }\pard \plain
\ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0 \widctlpar \aspalpha \aspnum \adjustright \lin0
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \uc1 \u8220 ?In view of the
foregoing, this petition is hereby denied. Costs against petitioners.\uc1 \u8221 ?}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Hence,
this Petition for Certiorari, filed on March 13, 1967, praying that the Decision of
the Appellate Tribunal be set aside and the appeal interposed by the Offended
Parties in the Habeas Corpus case be allowed.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We gave due course to the Petition on March 31, 1967, and
after the filing of the respective Briefs, the case was considered submitted for
decision on April 19, 1968.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Offended Parties and the Witnesses pose the following
Assignments of Error:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 \uc1 \u8220 ?I}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that \uc1
\u8216 ?counsel,\uc1 \u8217 ? however, has not presented a shred of proof to
bolster his claim of actual receipt of the order, Annex \uc1 \u8216 ?B\uc1 \u8217 ?
on April 4, 1966, save of his own self-serving assertions, which cannot prevail
over the court record, cranad(Annex 1 of Answer) certified to by the Clerk of
Court, bearing the true actual date when the parties and counsel herein received
their corresponding copies. The same certified true copy of the order shows that
the law office of herein counsel received its copy on March 30, 1966 not on April
4, 1966;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 II}
Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that \uc1 \u8216 ?respondent Judge was
fully justified in relying on its own record to determine the date on which
petitioners\uc1 \u8217 ? counsel received copy of the order, without any proof
thereof, because courts will take judicial notice of its records and of the facts
which the same records establish and which are known to judges by reason of their
judicial functions.\uc1 \u8217 ?}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 III}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that \uc1
\u8216 ?as the records show that copy of the questioned order was received by
counsel on March 30, 1966, the notice of appeal was not filed within the 48-hour
limit.\uc1 \u8217 ?}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 IV}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that \uc1 \u8216 ?
petitioners\uc1 \u8217 ? appeal was, therefore, filed out of time and the judgment
has become final.\uc1 \u8217 ?}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 V}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in denying the
Motion for Reconsideration without requiring the adverse party to answer the said
Motion for Reconsideration.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\widctlpar \aspalpha \aspnum \adjustright \lin0
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 VI}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
failing to pass upon the issues raised in the lower court and in the Court of
Appeals.\uc1 \u8221 ?}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The technical issue of timeliness of the appeal will first be
considered. Counsel for the Offended Parties alleges that he received a copy of the
ORDER only on April 4, 1966 from the Offended Party, Eliseo Alimpoos, who handed
him the copy in Cebu City. The latter had received it on March 31, 1966. Counsel
contends that the reglementary period to appeal can not be reckoned from the latter
date because, under the Rules, when a party is represented by counsel, notice
should be sent, not to the party, but to his counsel of record. Counsel for the
Offended Parties and the Witnesses further maintains that the period from which to
reckon the period of appeal should actually be April 14, 1966 when he actually
received, through the mails, his copy of the ORDER, as shown by the rubber stamp of
his office appearing on the upper right hand corner of a duplicate copy of the
ORDER. 4}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
Respondent Trial Judge and the Appellate Tribunal alike found the foregoing
assertion self-serving and relied instead on the last page of the ORDER, 5
purportedly showing that the law office of counsel for the Offended Parties and the
Witnesses received its copy on March 30, 1966 and not on April 4, 1966, hence the
disallowance of the appeal by respondent Trial Judge, and its affirmance by the
Appellate Court.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The crucial last page is reproduced hereunder exactly as it appears:}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \uc1
\u8220 ?CIVIL CASE NO. 1088}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 ORDER}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \uc1 \u8212 ? 5 \uc1 \u8212 ?}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 and preliminary injunction proceedings.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SO ORDERED.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 [G.R.
No. 111876. January 31, 1996]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 JOHANNA SOMBONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MARIETTA NERI ALVIAR, LILIBETH NERI and all persons holding the subject child
ARABELA SOMBONG in their custody, respondents.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SYLLABUS}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; HABEAS CORPUS;
PURPOSE. - In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine
whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and
not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is
restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus
is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPER
LEGAL REMEDY. - Although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the
restraint is voluntary, we have held time and again that the said writ is the
proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even
if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will. It may even
be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and
involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the
availability of the writ as a remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 3. ID.; ID.; ID.;
CHILD CUSTODY CASES; WELFARE OF THE CHILD IS THE SUPREME CONSIDERATION. - The
controversy does not involve the question of personal freedom, because an infant is
presumed to be in the custody of someone until he attains majority age. In passing
on the writ in a child custody case, the court deals with a matter of an equitable
nature. Not bound by any mere legal right of parent or guardian, the court gives
his or her claim to the custody of the child due weight as a claim founded on human
nature and considered generally equitable and just. Therefore, these cases are
decided, not on the legal right of the petitioner to be relived from unlawful
imprisonment or detention, as in the .case of adults, but on the courts view of the
best interests of those whose welfare requires that they be in custody of one
person or another. Hence, the court is not bound to deliver a child into the
custody of any claimant or of any persons, but should, in the consideration of the
facts, leave it in such custody as its welfare at the time appears to require. In
short, the childs welfare is the supreme consideration.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Nimfa N. Ward for
petitioner.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Josefin de Alban Law Office for private respondent.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 D E C I S I O N}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 HERMOSISIMA, JR.,
J.:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Every
so often two women claim to be the legitimate parent of the same child. One or the
other, whether for financial gain or for sheer cupidity, should be an impostor. The
court is consequently called upon to decide as to which of them should have the
childs lawful custody. This is the very nature of this case. The child herein had
considerably grown through the years that this controversy had unbearably lagged.
The wisdom of the ages should be of some help, delicate as the case considerably
is. The earliest recorded decision on the matter is extant in the Bible, I Kings 3.
As it appears, King Solomon in all his glory resolved the controversy posed by two
women claiming the same child:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 And the King said, Bring me a sword. And they brought a
sword before the King.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 And the King said, Divide the living child in two, and
give half to the one, and half to the other.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Then spoke the woman whose the living child was unto the
King, for her bowels yearned upon her son, and she said, O my Lord, give her the
living child, and in no wise slay it. But the other said, Let it be neither mine
nor thine, but divide it.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Then the King answered and said, Give her the living
child, and in no wise slay it: she is the mother thereof. (1 Kings, Chapter 3,
Verses 25-27)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 King Solomons wisdom, was inspired by God:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 And all Israel heard of the judgment
which the King had judged; and they feared the King: for they saw that the wisdom
of God was in him, to do judgment. (Ibid., Verse 28)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We do resolve the herein controversy
inspired by Gods own beloved King.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Petition for Review on Certiorari before us seeks the
reversal of the decision1 of respondent Court of Appeals2 which had reversed the
decision3 of the Regional Trial Court4 which granted the Petition for Habeas Corpus
filed by petitioner.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The following facts were developed by the evidence presented by the
opposing parties:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Petitioner is the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April
23, 1987 in Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila.5 Some time in November, 1987,
Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic, located at
121 First Avenue, Kalookan City, for relief of coughing fits and for treatment of
colds. Petitioner did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the amount
of P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged, then, because of the petitioners
failure to pay the bill.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Petitioner surprisingly gave testimony to the effect that she allegedly
paid the private respondents by installments in the total amount of P1,700.00,
knowing for a fact that the sum payable was only P300.00. Despite such alleged
payments, the owners of the clinic, Dra. Carmen Ty and her husband, Mr. Vicente Ty,
allegedly refused to turn over Arabella to her. Petitioner claims that the reason
for such a refusal was that she refused to go out on a date with Mr. Ty, who had
been courting her. This allegedly gave Dra. Ty a reason to be jealous of her,
making it difficult for everyone all around.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On the other hand and in contrast to her foregoing
allegations, petitioner testified that she visited Arabella at the clinic only
after two years, i.e., in 1989. This time, she did not go beyond berating the
spouses Ty for their refusal to give Arabella to her. Three years thereafter, i.e.,
in 1992, petitioner again resurfaced to lay claim to her child. Her pleas allegedly
fell on deaf ears.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Consequently, on May 21, 1992, petitioner filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus
against the spouses Ty. She alleged therein that Arabella was being unlawfully
detained and imprisoned at No. 121, First Avenue, Grace Park, Kalookan City. The
petition was denied due course and summarily dismissed,6 without prejudice, on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, the alleged detention having been perpetrated in
Kalookan City.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Petitioner, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint7 with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City against the spouses Ty. Dr. Ty, in her
counter-affidavit, admitted that petitioners child, Arabella, had for some time
been in her custody. Arabella was discharged from the clinic in April, 1989, and
was, in the presence of her clinic staff, turned over to someone
who was properly identified to be the childs guardian.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the face of the refusal of the
spouses Ty to turn over Arabella to her, she had sought the help of Barangay
Captains Alfonso and Bautista of Kalookan City, Mayor Asistio of the same city, and
even Congresswoman Hortensia L. Starke of Negros Occidental. Their efforts to help
availed her nothing.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 On September 4, 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan
City, on the basis of petitioners complaint, filed an information8 against the
spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a Minor before the Regional
Trial Court of Kalookan City.9 On September 16, 1992, an order for the arrest of
the spouses Ty was issued in the criminal case. Facing arrest, Dra. Ty disclosed
the possibility that the child, Arabella, may be found at No. 23 Jesus Street, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation went to said address and there found a female child who answered to
the name of Cristina Grace Neri. Quite significantly, the evidence disclosed that
the child, Cristina, had been living with respondent Marietta Neri Alviar since
1988. When she was just a baby, Cristina was abandoned by her parents at the Sir
John Clinic. On April 18, 1988, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at the Sir John Clinic
and niece of both Dra. Ty and respondent Alviar, called the latter up to discuss
the possibility of turning over to her care one of the several abandoned babies at
the said clinic. Respondent Alviar was told that this baby whose name was unknown
had long been abandoned by her parents and appeared to be very small, very thin,
and full of scabies. Taking pity on the baby, respondent Alviar and her mother,
Maura Salacup Neri, decided to take care of her.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 This baby was baptized at the Good
Samaritan Church on April 30, 1988. Her Certificate of Baptism10 indicates her name
to be Cristina Grace S. Neri; her birthday to be April 30, 1987; her birthplace to
be Quezon City; and her foster father and foster mother to be Cicero Neri and Maura
Salacup, respectively. Respondent Alviar was invited by the National Bureau of
Investigation for questioning on September 22, 1992 in the presence of Dra. Ty and
petitioner. Cristina was also brought along by said respondent. At that
confrontation, Dra. Ty could not be sure that Cristina was indeed petitioners
child, Arabella. Neither could petitioner with all certainty say that Cristina was
her long lost daughter.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court11 of Quezon City.
The trial court conducted a total of eight (8) hearings, for the period, from
October 28, 1992 to December 11, 1992. On January 15, 1993, it rendered a decision
granting the Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordering respondent Alviar to
immediately deliver the person of Cristina Grace Neri to the petitioner, the court
having found Cristina to be the petitioners long lost child, Arabella.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The trial court, in
justification of its conclusions, discussed that:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On the issue of whether or not the minor child, in
question, is the daughter of the petitioner, there seems to be no question, to the
mind of this Court, that the petitioner, is, indeed, the mother of the child,
registered by the name of Arabella O. Sombong, per her Certificate of Birth x x x
and later caused to be baptized as Cristina Grace S. Nery (sic) x x x For, this
child is the same child which was delivered by the Sir John Clinic at Kalookan
City, owned by Dra. Carmen Ty, to Dra. Fe Mallonga and later given to the custody
of the respondents. In fact, Dra. Carmen Ty, in her testimony admitted that the
petitioner is the mother of Arabella xxx}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On the question of whether or not the petitioner has the
rightful custody of the minor child, in question, which is being withheld by the
respondents from her, as will authorize the granting of the petition for habeas
corpus x x x there is no question that the minor x x x is only about five (5) years
old x x x it follows that the child must not be separated from the mother, who is
the petitioner, unless, of course, this Court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Heretofore, under the New Civil Code of the Philippines, the compelling
reasons which may deprive the parents of their authority or suspend exercise
thereof are stated. It was then provided in Article 332, supra, that:}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The courts may
deprive the parents of their authority x x x if they should treat their children
with excessive harshness x x x or abandon them. x x x (Italics supplied by the
RTC)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Unfortunately, the foregoing article, which was under
Title XI, parental authority, was expressly repealed by Article 254 of the Family
Code of the Philippines xxx}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It can be seen, therefore, that the words or abandoned
them mentioned in Article 332 of the New Civil Code x x x is (sic) no longer
mentioned in the amending (of) Art. 231 of the Family Code of the Philippines.}
clear x x x that under the law presently controlling, abandonment is no longer
considered a compelling reason upon the basis of which the Court may separate the
child below seven (7) years old from the mother.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Conceivably, however, in paragraph 6 of
Article 231, supra, the effects of culpable negligence on the part of the parent
may be considered by this Court in suspending petitioners parental authority over
her daughter, in question x x x}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The question, therefore, is whether there is culpable
negligence on the part of the petitioner so that her parental authority over her
child, in question, may at least be suspended by this Court.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 This Court is not persuaded that the
petitioner is guilty of culpable negligence vis-a-vis her daughter, in question,
upon the bases of the facts adduced. For, there is no question that from April,
1988 she kept on demanding from Dra. Carmen Ty x x x the return of her child to her
but the latter refused even to see her or to talk to her. Neither did Vicente Ty,
the husband of Dra. Carmen Ty, respond to her entreaties to return her daughter.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 xxx xxx
xxx}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
Besides, in the interim, while petitioner was looking for her daughter, she made
representations for her recovery with Barangay Captains Alfonso and Bautista, and
Mayor Asistio, all of Kalookan City, as well as with Congresswoman Hortensia L.
Starke to intervene in her behalf.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It cannot be said, therefore, no matter how remotely,
that the petitioner was negligent, nay culpably, in her efforts for the recovery of
her daughter.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 xxx xxx xxx}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Certainly, the respondents have no right to the parental
authority of the child, superior to that of the petitioner as they are not her
parents. They have, therefore, no right to the custody of petitioners daughter. The
Sir John Clinic, or Dra. Carmen Ty, have (sic) no right to deliver the child, in
question, to Dra. Fe Mallonga. Neither had the latter the right and the authority
to gave (sic) the child to the respondents, whose custody of petitioners daughter
is, consequently, illegal.12}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Herein private respondents filed an appeal from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals. The Appellate Court
took cognizance of the following issues: (1) The propriety of the habeas corpus
proceeding vis-a-vis the problem respecting the identity of the child subject of
said proceeding; (2) If indeed petitioner be the mother of the child in question,
what the effect would proof of abandonment be under the circumstances of the case;
and (3) Will the question of the childs welfare be the paramount consideration in
this case which involves child custody.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court, ruling as it did
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 x x x
the lower court erred in sweepingly concluding that petitioners child Arabella
Sombong and respondents foster child Cristina Neri are one and the same person to
warrant the issuance of the writ. x x x}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 As clearly stated in the facts of this case, not even
petitioner herself could recognize her own child when respondents foster child
Cristina Neri was presented to her before the NBI and respondent court. Dr. Carmen
Ty at the NB! investigation could not also ascertain whether or not Cristina Neri
and petitioners missing child are one and the same person.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Before the lower court,
petitioner-appellee presented two physicians from the Sir John Clinic, namely, Dr.
Carmen Ty and Dr. Angelina Trono to identify the child in question. But both
witnesses could not positively declare that Cristina Neri is the same missing child
Arabella Sombong of petitioner. Dr. Trono even declared in court that there were
other babies left in the clinic and that she could not be certain which baby was
given to respondents (pp. 48-49, tsn, Nov. 10, 1992). x x x Petitioner, herself,
could not identify her own child, prompting the respondent court to call for child
Cristina Neri to come forward near the bench for comparison of her physical
features with that of her alleged mother, the petitioner (p. 32, tsn, Nov. 5,
1992). After a comparison of petitioner and Cristina Neris physical features, the
lower court found no similarity and to which petitioner agreed claiming that said
child looked like her sister-in-law (p. 33, id.) When the lower court instructed
petitioner to bring said sister-in-law in the next hearing, petitioner stated they
were not on good terms (p. 34, id.) No one, therefore, up to this time has come
forward to testify as a witness in order to positively identify respondents child
Cristina Neri to be one and the same as petitioners missing child, Arabella
Sombong.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus does not lie in this case considering that
petitioner is not entitled to the custody of Cristina Neri because she is not the
mother of the said child, and does not have the right to have custody over said
child.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We do
not agree with the lower court that the ground of abandonment of a child has been
repealed by Art. 231 of the Family Code for abandonment can also be included under
the phrase cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent (par.
2, Art. 231 of the Family Code). What can be the worst culpable negligence of a
parent than abandoning her own child. This court does not believe petitioner-
appellees explanation that she had been negotiating for the discharge of her child
for the past five years. That was too long a time for negotiation when she could
have filed immediately a complaint with the authorities or the courts x x x}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 As to
the issue of the welfare of the child, petitioner-appellees capability to give her
child the basic needs and guidance in life appear (sic) to be bleak. Before the
lower court petitioner-appellee filed a motion to litigate as pauper as she had no
fixed income. She also admitted that she had no stable job, and she had been
separated from a man previously married to another woman. She also confessed that
she planned to go abroad and leave her other child Johannes to the care of the
nuns. The child Arabella Sombong wherever she is certainly does not face a bright
prospect with petitioner-appellee.13}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 This prompted the petitioner to file this petition.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We do
not find the petition to be meritorious.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 While we sympathize with the plight of petitioner who has
been separated from her daughter for
more than eight years, we cannot grant her the relief she is seeking, because the
evidence in this case does not support a finding that the child, Cristina, is in
truth and in fact her child, Arabella; neither is there sufficient evidence to
support the finding that private respondents custody of Cristina is so illegal as
to warrant the grant of a Writ of Habeas Corpus. In general, the purpose of the
writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally
held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact,
is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of
liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for
a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose
of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint
as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient.14}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas
corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under the
first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides
that except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be
resorted to in cases where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto. Thus, although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be
issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have held time and again that the said
writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor
child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free
will.15}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It may
even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and
involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the
availability of the writ as a remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The controversy
does not involve the question of personal freedom, because an infant is presumed to
be in the custody of someone until he attains majority age. In passing on the writ
in a child custody case, the court deals with a matter of an equitable nature. Not
bound by any mere legal right of parent or guardian, the court gives his or her
claim to the custody of the child due weight as a claim founded on human nature and
considered generally equitable and just. Therefore, these cases are decided, not on
the legal right of the petitioner to be relieved from unlawful imprisonment or
detention, as in the case of adults, but on the courts view of the best interests
of those whose welfare requires that they be in custody of one person or another.
Hence, the court is not bound to deliver a child into the custody of any claimant
or of any person, but should, in the consideration of the facts, leave it in such
custody as its welfare at the time appears to require. In short, the childs welfare
is the supreme consideration.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Considering that the childs welfare is an all-important
factor in custody cases, the Child and Youth Welfare Code16 unequivocally provides
that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child,
his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.17 In the same vein, the Family
Code authorizes the courts to, if the welfare of the child so demands, deprive the
parents concerned of parental authority over the child or adopt such measures as
may be proper under the circumstances.18}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the
writ in the instant case will all depend on the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor; (2)
that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the
respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in
the custody of petitioner and not that of the respondent.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Not all of these requisites exist in
this case. The dismissal of this petition is thus warranted.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 I}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 As to the question}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 of identity.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par }\pard \plain \ql
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Petitioner does not have the
right of custody over the minor Cristina because, by the evidence disclosed before
the court a quo, Cristina has not been shown to be petitioners daughter, Arabella.
The evidence adduced before the trial court does not warrant the conclusion that
Arabella is the same person as Cristina. It will be remembered that, in habeas
corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to
the usual presumptions including those as to identity of person.19 These
presumptions may yield, however, to the evidence proffered by the parties.}
Identity may be thought of as a quality of a person or thing, - the quality of
sameness with another person or thing. The essential assumption is that two persons
or things are first thought of as existing, and that then the one is alleged,
because of common features, to be the same as the other.20}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Evidence must necessarily be
adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate
from each other, are indeed one and the same. The process is both logical and
analytical.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 x x x it operates by comparing common marks found to exist in the two
supposed separate objects of thought, with reference to the possibility of their
being the same. It follows that its force depends on the necessariness of the
association between the mark and a single object. Where a certain circumstance,
feature, or mark, may commonly be found associated with a large number of objects,
the presence of that feature or mark in two supposed objects is little indication
of their identity, because x x x the other conceivable hypotheses are so numerous,
i.e., the objects that possess that mark are numerous and therefore any two of them
possessing it may well be different. But where the objects possessing the mark are
only one or a few, and the mark is found in two supposed instances, the chances of
two being different are nil or are comparatively small.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Hence, in the process of identification
of two supposed objects, by a common mark, the force of the inference depends on
the degree of necessariness of association of that mark with a single object.}
simplicitys sake, the evidential circumstance may thus be spoken of as a mark. But
in practice it rarely occurs that the evidential mark is a single circumstance. The
evidencing feature is usually a group of circumstances, which as a whole constitute
a feature capable of being associated with a single object. Rarely can one
circumstance alone be so inherently peculiar to a single object. It is by adding
circumstance to circumstance that we obtain a composite feature or mark which as a
whole cannot be supposed to be associated with more than a single object.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The process of
constructing an inference of identity thus consists usually in adding together a
number of circumstances, each of which by itself might be a feature of many
objects, but all of which together make it more probable that they co-exist in a
single object only. Each additional circumstance reduces the chances of there being
more than one object so associated.21}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial
proof establishes the individual and separate existence of petitioners child,
Arabella, from that of private respondents foster child, Cristina.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We note, among others, that
Dr. Trono, who is petitioners own witness, testified in court that, together with
Arabella, there were several babies left in the clinic and so she could not be
certain whether it was Arabella or some other baby that was given to private
respondents. Petitioners own evidence shows that, after the confinement of Arabella
in the clinic in 1987, she saw her daughter again only in 1989 when she visited the
clinic. This corroborates the testimony of petitioners own witness, Dra. Ty, that
Arabella was physically confined in the clinic from November, 1987 to April, 1989.
This testimony tallies with her assertion in her counter-affidavit to the effect
that Arabella was in the custody of the hospital until April, 1989. All this, when
juxtaposed with the unwavering declaration of private respondents that they
obtained custody of Cristina in April, 1988 and had her baptized at the Good
Samaritan Church on April 30, 1988, leads to the conclusion that Cristina is not
Arabella.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
Significantly, Justice. Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, herself a mother and the ponente
of the herein assailed decision, set the case for hearing on August 30, 1993
primarily for the purpose of observing petitioners demeanor towards the minor
Cristina. She made the following personal but relevant manifestation:}{\fs18
\lin0 \rin0 \itap0 \fs21 \kerning2 \dbch \af2
\hich \af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The undersigned ponente as a mother herself of four
children, wanted to see how petitioner as an alleged mother of a missing child
supposedly in the person of Cristina Neri would react on seeing again her long lost
child. The petitioner appeared in the scheduled hearing of this case late, and she
walked inside the courtroom looking for a seat without even stopping at her alleged
daughters seat; without even casting a glance on said child, and without even that
tearful embrace which characterizes the reunion of a loving mother with her missing
dear child. Throughout the proceedings, the undersigned ponente noticed no signs of
endearment and affection expected of a mother who had been deprived of the embrace
of her little child for many years. The conclusion or finding of undersigned
ponente as a mother, herself, that petitioner-appellee is not the mother of
Cristina Neri has been given support by aforestated observation x x x.22}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The process of
constructing an inference of identity having earlier been explained to consist of
adding one circumstance to another in order to obtain a composite feature or mark
which as a whole cannot be supposed to be associated with more than a single
object, the reverse is also true, i.e., when one circumstance is added to another,
and the result is a fortification of the corporeality of. each of the two objects
the identity of which is being sought to be established, the nexus of circumstances
correspondingly multiply the chances of there being more than one object so
associated. This is the situation that confronts us in this case, and so the
inevitable but sad conclusion that we must make is that petitioner has no right of
custody over the minor Cristina, because Cristina is not identical with her missing
daughter, Arabella.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 II}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Private respondents}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 not unlawfully}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 withholding custody.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Since we hold that petitioner has not been established by
evidence to be entitled to the custody of the minor Cristina on account of mistaken
identity, it cannot be said that private respondents are unlawfully withholding
from petitioner the rightful custody over Cristina. At this juncture, we need not
inquire into the validity of the mode by which private respondents acquired
custodial rights over the minor, Cristina. This matter is not ripe for adjudication
in this instant petition for habeas corpus.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Private respondents}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 have the interest of}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 the child Cristina at heart.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We find that private respondents are
financially, physically and spiritually in a better position to take care of the
child, Cristina. They have the best interest of Cristina at heart. On the other
hand, it is not to the best interest of the minor, Cristina, to be placed in the
custody of petitioner, had the petitioners custody rights over Cristina been
established. The Court of Appeals gave the reason:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 As to the issue of the welfare of the
child, petitioner-appellees capability to give her child the basic needs and
guidance in life appear (sic) to be bleak. Before the lower court petitioner-
appellee filed a motion to litigate as pauper as she had no fixed income. She also
admitted that she had no stable job, and she had been separated from a man
previously married to another woman. She also confessed that she planned to go
abroad and leave her other child Johannes to the care of the nuns. The child
Arabella Sombong wherever she is certainly does not face a bright prospect with
petitioner-appellee 23}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the light of the aforegoing premises, we are
constrained to rule that Habeas Corpus does not lie to afford petitioner the relief
she seeks.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\aspalpha \aspnum \adjustright \lin0 \rin0 \itap0 \fs21 \kerning2 \dbch \af2 \hich
\af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 30574 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against petitioner.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SO ORDERED.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 G.R. No. 83251 January 23,
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 RENATO
B. SUAREZ, petitioner, }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 vs.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ZENAIDA BALTAZAR as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig, Metro Manila, and ROSEMARIE
MANESE, respondents.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Emiliano S. Samson, R. Balderrama-Samson and Mary Anne B. Samson for
petitioner.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Marcelino P. Arias for private respondent.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 MEDIALDEA, J.:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 This is a petition for review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition filed by petitioner to annul and set aside the orders of the trial
court and to enjoin the latter from proceeding with the petition for custody of and
support of minor Rafael Carlos Suarez docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 840-J filed by
respondent Manese.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The antecedent facts are as follows:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On December 11, 1986, respondent Manese
filed with the trial court a petition for writ of habeas corpus against petitioner
Renato Suarez, his mother Paz Suarez and his sister Milagros Suarez docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. 734-J.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 On February 23, 1987, before she could finish the presentation of her
evidence, respondent Manese filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice to her
right to file another action for custody of minor under Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court, contending that the issue as to who between the parties has the rightful and
legal custody of the minor child could be fully adjudicated in another action and
not in the present action for writ of habeas corpus.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On February 24, 1987, the trial court
issued a resolution granting the motion with prejudice.1\uc1 \u226 ?wphi1}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Thereafter,
respondent Manese filed another action for custody of minor and support on May 27,
1987 before the trial court, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 840-J against petitioner.
The latter moved to dismiss
the action on the ground of bar by prior judgment rendered in Sp. Proc. No. 734-J
dismissing the same with prejudice. On October 1, 1987, the motion to dismiss by
petitioner was denied by the trial court. Petitioner, however, moved for the
reconsideration of the denial which was also denied.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Respondent Manese filed on December 1,
1987 a motion for visitorial rights and on December 14, 1987, a motion for custody
of the minor during the Christmas season.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On December 15, 1987, the trial court issued an order
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and granting respondent Manese's
two motions.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
January 22, 1988, the trial court issued another order setting aside its order
dated December 15, 1987, which granted the petitioner's motion for visitorial
rights over the minor, and setting the pre-trial of the case on a scheduled date.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Not
satisfied with the orders of the trial court, petitioner filed with respondent
appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for
restraining order/preliminary injunction, seeking to set aside the orders of the
trial court of October 1, 1987 and December 15, 1987.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On February 12, 1988, the Court of
Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the special civil action.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Hence, this petition was
filed with the petitioner assigning the following errors of the respondent
appellate court:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 I}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 THE ORDER OF THE HONORABLE JUDGE EUTROPIO MIGRINO IN SP. PROC. NO. 734-
J DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS A VALID JUDGMENT.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 II}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 17 OF
THE RULES OF COURT, THE HON. JUDGE MIGRINO HAS THE RIGHT TO DISMISS THE HABEAS
CORPUS CASE FILED BY MANESE WITH PREJUDICE.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 THE PROPRIETY OR VALIDITY OF JUDGE MIGRINO'S ORDER OF
DISMISSAL (ANNEX 'D') OF THE HABEAS CORPUS CASE CANNOT BE PASSED UPON BY THE COURT
OF APPEALS, BECAUSE IT WAS NOT APPEALED.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 IV}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, MANESE'S CAUSE OF ACTION
(PETITION FOR CUSTODY OF MINOR) IS BARRED BY A PRIOR RESOLUTION (SEC. 1, PAR. (F),
RULE 16 OF THE RULES OF COURT).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 V}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 GRANTING IN GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT THE
ORDER OF DISMISSAL BY JUDGE MIGRINO IS NULL AND VOID UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH
SUAREZ VEHEMENTLY DENIES, NEVERTHELESS, THE PETITION FOR CUSTODY OF MINOR SHOULD
STILL BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF LITIS PENDENTIA.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 VI}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 GRANTING, FURTHER, THAT THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS NOT A
VALID JUDGMENT, WHICH SUAREZ VEHEMENTLY DENIES, NEVERTHELESS, RESPONDENT JUDGE
BALTAZAR COMMITTED NOT ONLY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BUT EXCEEDED HER JURISDICTION
WHEN SHE GRANTED MANESE'S MOTION FOR CUSTODY OF THE MINOR (ANNEX "M") IN HER ORDER
OF 15 DECEMBER 1987 (ANNEX "N").}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The assigned errors boil down to the following issues: 1)
Whether or not the order of dismissal with prejudice in the action for the writ of
habeas corpus, docketed as Sp. No. 734-J is res judicata to the present action for
custody of minor and support docketed as Sp. No. 840-J; 2) whether or not the
respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting custody
to the private respondent during the Christmas season as stated in the questioned
order of December 15, 1987.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We find the petition devoid of merit.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Anent the first issue,
petitioner contends that the petition for custody of minor cannot prosper due to
the prior judgment dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus and the
principle of res judicata applies even if the party changed the form of its cause
of action in filing the present action for custody of minor.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 There are four well known requisites to
the principle of res judicata: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the
court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
parties; (3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is
between the first and the second action identity of parties, of subject matter, and
of causes of action (Filipinas Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
66059-60, December 4, 1989). However, the foregoing requisites should be
subservient to the most significant requirement that the former judgment must be a
valid one. We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the former
order issued by the trial court in Sp. Proc. No. 734-J, dismissing the habeas
corpus case is null and void for having been rendered in violation of the
constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based (Article VIII, Section 14, 1987 Constitution). Further, the circumstances
surrounding the dismissal of the case show that the order of the trial court was
issued whimsically and capriciously and with grave abuse of discretion tantamount
to nullity of the order.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Records show that the motion to dismiss of respondent Manese, who was
the plaintiff in the trial court was filed during the trial and hearing stage of
the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The general rule governing dismissal of
actions by the plaintiff after the answer has been served is laid down in Rule 17
of the Revised Rules of Court, which rule is summarized as follows \uc1 \u8212 ? an
action shall not be dismissed at the request of the plaintiff after the service of
the answer except by order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the
court deems proper. Hence, the trial court has the judicial discretion in ruling on
a motion to dismiss at the instance of the plaintiff, but this discretion should be
exercised within reasonable limits. In such case, the trial court has to decide
whether the dismissal of the case should be allowed, and if so on what terms and
conditions.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 In the case at bar, the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff states
that it was without prejudice to the filing of an action for the custody of minor
on the ground that the issue as to the custody of the child would be properly
determined in a second action to be filed under Rule 99 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Clearly, the purpose of the plaintiff in dismissing the first action for a
writ of habeas corpus was not to end litigation concerning the right of the former
to the custody of her child but on the contrary, to pursue it in a second action,
this time for custody of minor. It is worthy to note that the ground upon which
respondent Manese filed her motion for dismissal is erroneous since the question as
to who shall have the custody of the child can be sufficiently resolved in the
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court
without the necessity of filing a separate action under Rule 99 of the said rules
for that purpose. Nevertheless, it is error for the trial court to dismiss the
first case with prejudice to the filing of the second action without stating the
reasons or basis thereof This should not prevent the filing of the second action
for custody of minor, since no opportunity was granted by the trial court to the
plaintiff to raise this issue for the determination of the court in the habeas
corpus case. Hence, We believe that the order of dismissal of the petition for the
writ of habeas corpus cannot be considered as a valid adjudication on the merits
which would serve as a bar to the second action for custody of minor.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Assuming in gratia
argumenti that the prior judgment of dismissal with prejudice was validly rendered
within the lawful discretion of the court and could be considered as an
adjudication on the merits, nonetheless, the principle of res judicata should be
disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to
technicality (Republic v. De los Angeles, No. L-30240, March 25, 1988, 159 SCRA
264). The application of the said principle, under the particular facts obtaining,
would amount to denial of justice and/or bar to a vindication of a legitimate
grievance (Ronquillo v. Marasigan, No. L-11621, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 304). It is
worth stating here that the controversy in the instant case is not just an ordinary
suit between parties over a trivial matter but a litigation initiated by the
natural mother over the welfare and custody of her child, in which the State has a
paramount interest. The fundamental policy of the State as embodied in the
Constitution in promoting and protecting the welfare of children shall not be
disregarded by the courts by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve
the family and the youth.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The other issue raised by petitioner concerning grave
abuse of discretion of the trial court in granting the custody of the child to
respondent Manese during the Christmas season from December 18, 1987 to January 2,
1988 is already moot and academic.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated February 12, 1988 is AFFIRMED.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 G.R.
No. 85140}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\tab }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 May
17, 1990}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 TOMAS
EUGENIO, SR., petitioner, }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy
Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private
Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus", namely:
CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 G.R. No. 86470}
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \tab }{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 May 17, 1990.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 TOMAS
EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant, }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS,
ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE
LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents-appellees.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Maximo G. Rodriguez for
petitioner.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for
PADILLA, J.:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as
G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas
Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the
respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing the writ and orders of the
respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September 1988, and to declare said writ and
orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11 October 1988, this Court
required comment from the respondents on the petition but denied the application
for a temporary restraining order.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The records disclose the following:}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Unaware of the death on 28
August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood brothers
and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27
September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental
(Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from
her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial
residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was
allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the
petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and
living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988
issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner
refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the
respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus
proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial
permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the burial
at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc.
(PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme
President and Founder.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart
failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28 August 1988. As her
common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. These reasons
were incorporated in an explanation filed before the respondent court. Two (2)
orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were then issued by respondent court,
directing delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro
City and its autopsy.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an
urgent motion to dismiss the petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the
court over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec.
2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. 1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus,
petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention of a live person.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Before resolving the motion to dismiss,
private respondents (as petitioners below) were granted leave to amend their
petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28
September 1988 (or after the filing of the habeas corpus petition), private
respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way
related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury
her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3 the Vargases contended that,
as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead
body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to
dismiss was finally submitted for resolution on 21 October 1988.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the absence of a
restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before the respondent
court; the body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills
Memorial Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge of respondent
court, and examined by a duly authorized government pathologist. 4}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Denying the motion to dismiss
filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an order, 5 dated 17 November 1988,
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It
should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition, up to
the second amended petition that the ultimate facts show that if the person of
Vitaliana Vargas turns out to be dead then this Court is being prayed to declare
the petitioners as the persons entitled to the custody, interment and/or burial of
the body of said deceased. The Court, considering the circumstance that Vitaliana
Vargas was already dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court on
September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the
nature and subject matter of this case because it may entertain this case thru the
allegations in the body of the petition on the determination as to who is entitled
to the custody of the dead body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial
or interment thereof, for the reason that under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Sec. 19.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 Jurisdiction in civil cases. \uc1 \u8212 ? Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (1)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In all civil actions in which the subject of
the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 xxx}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 xxx}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 xxx}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (5)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 (6)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions:}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 it so provides that
the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try this case. The
authority to try the issue of custody and burial of a dead person is within the
lawful jurisdiction of this Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and because of
the allegations of the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated in Sec. 19,
pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil
cases and, in due course, rendered a decision on 17 January 1989, 6 resolving the
main issue of whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction over the case by
treating it as an action for custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having
to file a separate civil action for such relief, and without the Court first
dismissing the original petition for habeas corpus.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of
Rule 135 of the Rules of Court 8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation to Article 294 of
the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative Code,
9 the decision stated:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 . . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court
observed that the allegations in the original petition as well as in the two
amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has been restrained of her liberty and
if she were dead then relief was prayed for the custody and burial of said dead
person. The amendments to the petition were but elaborations but the ultimate facts
remained the same, hence, this court strongly finds that this court has ample
jurisdiction to entertain and sit on this case as an action for custody and burial
of the dead body because the body of the petition controls and is binding and since
this case was raffled to this court to the exclusion of all other courts, it is the
primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of this case. . . . . 10}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Satisfied with its
jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of rightful custody
over the dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to
give support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since there was no
surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were
preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being
himself legally married to another woman. 11}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with
application for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was
filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were pure questions of law,
basically Identical to those raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140);
hence, the consolidation of both cases. 12 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an
urgent motion for the issuance of an injunction to maintain status quo pending
appeal, which this Court denied in a resolution dated 23 February 1989 stating that
"Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently establish a clear legal right to
the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana Vargas, which now needs a decent burial."
The petitions were then submitted for decision without further pleadings.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Between the two (2)
consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 1.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to recover custody of the dead body of a 25 year old
female, single, whose nearest surviving claimants are full blood brothers and
sisters and a common law husband.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\lang1033 \langnp1033 jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its
authority to treat the action as one for custody/possession/authority to bury the
deceased/recovery of the dead.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art.
199 of the new Family Code) which states:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Art. 294.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \tab }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons
are obliged to give it, shall be made in the following order:}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (1)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 From the spouse;}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Section 19, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial
Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of
habeas corpus may be granted by a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court). It is an elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not the caption
of the complaint or petition; but the allegations therein determine the nature of
the action, and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may
nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the
evidence introduced so warrant. 13}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the
court a quo, it was not certain whether Vitaliana was dead or alive. While habeas
corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfimetory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is
exercised in its issuance, and such facts must be made to appear to the judge to
whom the petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the
petitioner to the writ. 14 While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the
petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ should issue if the
petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments make a prima facie
case for relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus
need not be very critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds for
the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into the
cause of commitment or detention will enable him to correct any errors or defects
in the petition. 15}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal
of a habeas corpus petition filed by a brother to obtain custody of a minor sister,
stating:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 All
these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should not have been
dismissed. The court below should not have overlooked that by dismissing the
petition, it was virtually sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous and
scandalous relation between the minor and her married employer, respondent Benildo
Nunez against all principles of law and morality. It is no excuse that the minor
has expressed preference for remaining with said respondent, because the minor may
not chose to continue an illicit relation that morals and law repudiate.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The minor's welfare
being the paramount consideration, the court below should not allow the
technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in the
way of its giving the child full protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the
court had power to award temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other
suitable person, after summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What matters is
that the immoral situation disclosed by the records be not allowed to continue. 17}
the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was
proper to avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally
favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that
every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order to
expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary expense,
unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the
adverse party by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to
amend. 18 As correctly alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a
remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the person allegedly restrained
of liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the court a quo had to
resolve.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code,
the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the
absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body.
Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not
recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for
many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband
and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they
live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines. 19}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that
such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of
properties and interests which is governed by law, 20 authority exists in case law
to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case,
herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment
which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of
Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil
Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried
Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must
be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of
exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is
said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a
sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. 23 But this
view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions
of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144,
when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-
a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not
legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly
awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Sec. 1103.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Persons charged with duty of burial. \uc1 \u8212 ?
The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the
ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons
hereinbelow specified:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 xxx}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 xxx}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (b)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child,
and left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the
deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines and in possession of
sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SO ORDERED.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 G.R. No. 114046}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 October 24, 1994}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 HONORATO GALVEZ and
GODOFREDO DIEGO, petitioners, }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 COURT OF APPEALS (17TH DIVISION), First Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor. DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO of Pasig, Rizal; THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
and PNP P/SR. SUPT. RICARDO F. DE LEON, Camp Commander and Head of the PNP
Custodial Group, Camp Crame, Cubao, Quezon City, respondents.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Emerito M. Salva &
Associates; Juanito L. Andrade; and Lazaro Law Firm for petitioners.}{\fs18
\plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200 \lisa0 \widctlpar \aspalpha
\loch \af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 REGALADO, J.:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Submitted for resolution in the present special civil
action are: (1) the basic petition for certiorari and mandamus with a petition for
habeas corpus, to review the resolution issued by respondent Court of Appeals,
dated}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
February 18, 1994, in CA-G.R. SP No. 33261; 1 (2) the Urgent Motion 2 and
Supplemental Urgent Motion 3 for Immediate Action on Petition for Habeas corpus;
and (3) the Urgent Petition to Declare Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. and First
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio for Contempt and to Annul
Proceedings (with Immediate Prayer for another Cease and Desist Order). 4}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On November 12,
1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan,
and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide
and two counts of frustrated homicide fot has been the rule that under the first
paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, the amendment of the information may also be
made even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14, and docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93. 5 Both accused posted their respective cash bail bonds
and were subsequently released from detention.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On November 15, 1993, Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor
Liberato L. Reyes filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment and Subsequent Proceedings to
enable him "to review the evidence on record and determine once more the proper
crimes chargeable against the accused," 6 which was granted by Judge Villajuan in
an order dated November 16, 1993. 7 Thereafter, pursuant to Department Order No.
369 of the Department of Justice, respondent Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio was
designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan and was instructed to conduct a
re-investigation of the aforesaid criminal cases filed against herein petitioners.
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 By
virtue of a Manifestation with Ex-parte Motion dated November 23, 1993 9 filed by
respondent prosecutor, the proceedings were again ordered suspended by Judge
Villajuan until after the prosecution's request for change of venue shall have been
resolved by the Supreme Court, and the preliminary investigation being conducted by
the former shall have been terminated. 10 It appears that on December 2, 1993,
private complainants, through their counsel, Atty. Silvestre R. Bello III, had
filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Change of Venue of Criminal Cases Nos.
3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, purportedly to safeguard the lives of the victims and their
witnesses, and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 11}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On December 15, 1993, before petitioners
could be arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, respondent
prosecutor filed an Ex}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 parte Motion to Withdraw Informations in said cases. 12
This motion was granted by Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases
were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. 13 On the same day,
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners for
murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 for illegal possession of firearms 14 which were subsequently raffled to the
sala of Judge Victoria Pornillos of Branch 10, Regional}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and were
docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93. No bail having been
recommended for the crime of murder, Judge Pornillos ordered the arrest of herein
petitioners. 15 On December 23, 1993, said presiding judge issued an order setting
the arraignment of the accused for December 27, 1993. 16}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On December 27, 1993, the scheduled
arraignment before Judge Pornillos were reset due to the absence of respondent
prosecutor. On even date, petitioners filed before Judge Villajuan a Motion for
Reconsideration of his order of December 15, 1993 which granted the motion to
withdraw the original informations. 17}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for
lack}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 of
jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. 18
At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners on January 24, 1994,
Judge Pornillos issued an order denying
the motion to quash and, at the same time, directed that a plea of not guilty be
entered for petitioners when the latter refused to enter their plea. 19}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the meantime,
and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, an order
was issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners, ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases
Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, and setting the arraignment of the accused therein for
February 8, 1994. 20 On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in
the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24,
1994 issued by Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners' motion to quash filed in
Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 and 4007-M-93. As earlier stated, respondent court
dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence
this petition.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 I. On the Main Petition}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The main issue in this case involves a determination of
the set}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 of
informations under which herein petitioners should be tried, that is, (a) the first
set of informations for homicide and frustrated homicide in Criminal}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Cases Nos. 3642-M-
93 to 3644-M-93, or (b) the subsequent informations for murder, frustrated murder,
and illegal possession of firearms in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93.
Several corollary but equally important issues have likewise been addressed to us
for resolution, to wit:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original
informations is null and void on the ground that (a) there was no notice and
hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; and (b)
the appropriate remedy which should have been adopted by the prosecution was to
amend the informations by charging the proper offenses pursuant to Section 14 of
Rule 110;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 2.}
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Whether the order
granting the withdrawal of the original informations was immediately final and
executory;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 3.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Whether Judge Pornillos was correct in denying the motion to quash and
thereby acquired jurisdiction over the new informations considering that (a) the
designated public prosecutor allegedly had no authority to file the second set of
informations; and (b) the filing thereof constituted forum shopping; and}{\fs18
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Whether the arraignment
proceeding held on January 24, 1994 in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93
was valid.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 We shall discuss these issues seriatim.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It is petitioners' submission that the
prosecution's failure to serve them a copy of the motion to withdraw the original
informations and to set said motion for hearing constitutes a violation of their
right to be informed of the proceedings against them, as well as a violation of
Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Hence, so they contend, the ex
parte motion should be considered as a worthless scrap of paper and Judge Villajuan
had no authority to act on it. Ergo, the order granting the same is null and void.}
Petitioners advance the theory that respondent prosecutor should have amended the
original informations instead
of withdrawing the same and filing new ones. They postulate that the principle of
nolle prosequi does not apply in this case since the withdrawal or dismissal of an
information is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court
which has the option to grant or deny it and the prosecution cannot impose its
opinion on the court. It is further stressed that in case there is a need to change
the nature of the offense charged, that is, from homicide to murder, by adding the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the only legal and proper remedy is through
the filing of the corresponding amended information; and that the withdrawal of an
information is allowed only where the new information involves a different offense
which does not include or is not included in the offense originally charged.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Normally, an
accused would not object to the dismissal of an information against him because it
is to his best interest not to oppose the same. Contrarily, if the accused should
deem such conditional or provisional dismissal to be unjust and prejudicial to him,
he could object to such dismissal and insist that the case be heard and decided on
the merits. 21 However, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of
the trial court petitioners had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte
motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they could be arraigned, there
would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof. In actuality, the real
grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three informations
but the filing of four new informations, three of which charge graver offenses and
the fourth, an additional offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there
would obviously have been no cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their
complaint about the supposed procedural lapses involved in the motion to dismiss
filed and granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us
as a candid presentation of their real position.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Petitioners' contention that the
dismissal of the original informations and the consequent filing of the new ones
substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous an argument.
They would want to ignore the fact that had the original informations been amended
so as to charge the capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be
deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that the evidence of guilt is
strong. Petitioners could not be better off with amended informations than with the
subsequent ones. It really made no difference considering that where a capital
offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of
discretion under either an amended or a new information.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Contrary to petitioners' submission, the
absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial court of authority to pass on
the merits of the motion. It has been held that \uc1 \u8212 ?}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The order of the court
granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of
service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a
competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its
authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in
such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise
cured by the court which dismissed the complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal
and not certiorari. 22}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Besides, when petitioners were given by Judge Villajuan
the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration, even assuming the alleged
procedural infirmity in his issuance of the order of dismissal, the same was
thereby deemed cured. This is especially so in this case since, on his order, the
original informations were reinstated in Branch 14 of the trial court.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The rule is now
well settled that once a complaint or information is filed in court any disposition
of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the
accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. Although the prosecutor
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even when
the case is already in court, he cannot impose}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 his opinion upon the tribunal. For while it is true that
the prosecutor has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in court, once the case had already been brought
therein any disposition the prosecutor may deem proper thereafter should be
addressed to the court for its consideration and approval. 23 The only
qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial
rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We reiterate once
again the doctrine we enunciated and explained in Crespo vs. Mogul, etc., et al.:
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Whether
the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation
by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss
was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant
the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the
proper determination of the case.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 xxx}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a
complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as to its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of
the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge on what
to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions
of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In such
an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the public
prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be secured. And, if after
such re-investigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw the
information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course of
action may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. 25}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
not denied that in the present case, the court granted the motion of respondent
prosecutor for the suspension of the proceedings until the}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 re-investigation thereof
shall have been terminated. Thereafter, the prosecutor arrived at a finding that
petitioners should have been charged with murder, frustrated murder, and illegal
possession of firearms. This prompted him to file an ex parte motion to withdraw
the original informations for homicide and frustrated homicide. Although the motion
did not state the reasons for the withdrawal of the informations, nevertheless, the
court in the exercise of its discretion granted the same, as a consequence of which
a new set of informations was thereafter filed and raffled to another branch of the
court. Petitioners now question the propriety of the procedure adopted by the
prosecution, insisting that an amendment, not a new information, was required under
the circumstances.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 It must here be emphasized that respondent prosecutor sought, and was
subsequently granted, permission by the court to dismiss the original informations.
It cannot therefore be validly claimed that the prosecutor exceeded his authority
in withdrawing those informations because the same bore the imprimatur of the
court. The issue is thus focused on whether or not under the given situation the
court acted correctly in dismissing the original informations rather than ordering
the amendment thereof.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It has been observed that while the Rules of Court gives
the accused the right to move for the quashal of the information, it is silent with
respect to the right of the prosecutor to ask for a dismissal or withdrawal
thereof. 26 A perusal of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure will show that there
are only two provisions concerning the dismissal of an information other than on
motion of the accused, namely, Section 14 of Rule 110 and Section 11 of Rule 119.
But then, it may be contended that these rules speak of a dismissal by the court
when there is a mistake in charging the proper offense, but make no mention of a
dismissal made upon application of the prosecution. That is not necessarily so.}
true that Section 11, Rule 119 is virtually a restatement of Section 14, Rule 110,
providing as it does that:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense.
\uc1 \u8212 ? When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment, that a mistake
has been made in charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be convicted
of the offense charged, or of any other offense necessarily included therein, the
accused shall not be discharged, if there appears to be good cause to detain him.
In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense
and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information. (Emphasis
supplied.)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Rule 119 is the rule specifically governing the trial stage where
evidence is necessarily being presented, hence the trial
court is now in a better position to conclude that manifestly the accused cannot
be convicted of the offense charged or of one that it necessarily includes. It
would primarily be the function of the court to motu proprio order the dismissal of
the case and direct the filing of the appropriate information. We do not discount
the possibility of either the prosecution or the defense initiating such dismissal
and substitution at that stage, although, from a realistic point of view, that
would be a rare situation. This provision, therefore, is more directly and
principally directed to the trial court to invest it with the requisite authority
to direct by itself the dismissal and refiling of the informations therein
contemplated.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Rule 110, on the other hand, provides the procedural governance for the
prosecution of offenses. Section 14 thereof, quoted infra, provides in its second
paragraph the procedure and requisites for the substitution of a defective
information by the correct one. Although, just like Section 11 of Rule 119 the
permissible stage for effecting that substitution is "at any time before judgment,"
unlike the latter situation it is sufficient that "it appears . . . that a mistake
has been made in charging the proper offense, . . . ." The situation under said
Section 14 contemplates a longer time span, inclusive of the period from the filing
of the information up to and before trial. Since no evidence has been presented at
that stage, the error would appear or be discoverable from a review of the records
of the preliminary investigation. Of course, that fact may be perceived by the
trial judge himself but, again, realistically it will be the prosecutor who can
initially determine the same. That is why such error need not be manifest or
evident, nor is it required that such nuances as offenses includible in the offense
charged be taken into account. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the
prosecutor can and should institute remedial measures for the dismissal of the
original information and the refiling of the correct one, otherwise he would be
recreant to his duties.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It is interesting to note that in the American
jurisdiction, such right is specifically recognized under Rule 48 (a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the entry of a nolle
prosequi by the Government is a permissible right, although requiring in all cases
the approval of the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion. 27 As a
matter of fact, the prosecuting attorney is given the broad power, sole authority
and discretion to enter a nolle prosequi provided he does not act arbitrarily 28
and subject to the discretion of the court.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In several cases, we have also impliedly recognized the
propriety of such a procedure particularly in those instances where the prosecution
is allowed to dismiss or withdraw an information on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. We have even gone further by imposing upon the fiscal, as he was then
called, the duty to move for the dismissal of the information if he is convinced
that the evidence is insufficient to establish, at least prima facie, the guilt of
the accused. 29}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 In this case now before us, what is involved is a dismissal effected at
the instance of the prosecutor by reason of a mistake in charging the proper
offense, in order that new informations can be filed. The problem that may be
posited, and should now be resolved, is when the fiscal may be allowed to move to
dismiss an information and when he should merely move to amend it.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Section 14 of Rule 110, which
is invoked by petitioners, reads as follows:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 Amendment. \uc1 \u8212 ? The information or complaint may be
amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by
leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake
has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original
complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense
in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed
thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The first paragraph provides the rule for amendment of
the information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution
of the information or complaint. Under the second paragraph, the court can order
the filing of another information to charge the proper offense, provided the
accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and that could only be true
if the offense proved does not necessarily include or is not necessarily included
in the offense charged in the original information.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 It has been the rule that under the first paragraph of Section 14,
Rule 110, the amendment of the information may also be made even if it may result
in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without prejudice to
the rights of the accused. Hence, in the case of Dimalibot vs. Salcedo, 30 the
accused therein were originally charged with homicide and were released on bail.
However, the then provincial fiscal, after a review of the affidavits of the
witnesses for the prosecution, discovered that the killing complained of was
perpetrated with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, taking advantage of
superior strength, and employing means to weaken the defense of the victim.
Consequently, an amended information for murder was filed against the accused who
were ordered re-arrested without the amount of bail being fixed, the new charge
being a capital offense.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The Court ruled therein that the amendment was proper, pursuant to
Section 13, Rule 106 of the 1940 Rules of Court (now Section 14, Rule 110 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), thus:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Here these rules properly apply, since it is undisputed
that the herein accused were not yet arraigned before the competent court when the
complaint for homicide was amended so as to charge the crime of murder. Upon the
authority of said rules, the amendment could therefore be made even as to substance
in order that the proper charge may be made. The claim that such amendment can only
refer to matters of specification affecting the elements constituting the crime is
not correct, for there is nothing in the rule to show that the nature of the
amendment should only be limited to matters of specification. The change may also
be made even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it
can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Be that as it may, it is
quite plausible under Section 14 of Rule 110 that, instead of an amendment, an
information for homicide may also be dismissed before the accused pleads, to give
way to the filing of a new information for murder. This may be deduced from the
pronouncement of the Court in the aforecited case of Dimalibot, to wit:}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 This clearly
appears from the second part of Section 13 of Rule 106 which says that, if it
appears before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court may dismiss the original information and order the filing of a
new one provided the defendant may not be placed in double jeopardy. If a new
information may be ordered at any time before judgment no reason is seen why the
court may not order the amendment of the information if its purpose is to make it
conformable to the true nature of the crime committed. . . .}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the subsequent case of Teehankee, Jr.
vs. Madayag, et al., 31 however, Section 14 of Rule 110 was clarified to mean as
follows:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It may
accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may
be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following
respects:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 1.}
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Amendment may
involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily
involves a substantial change from the original charge;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Amendment before plea has been entered can be
effected without leave of court, but substitution of information must be with leave
of court as the original information has to be dismissed;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Where the amendment is only as to form, there
is no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of
the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is
entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and}{\fs18
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 An amended information refers
to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence
substantial amendments
to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection
of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused
could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or
presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not
include or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused
cannot claim double jeopardy.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In determining, therefore, whether there should be an
amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of
information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second
information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information
is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is
distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In any
event, we are inclined to uphold the propriety of the withdrawal of the original
informations, there having been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
court in granting the motion and, more importantly, in consideration of the fact
that the motion to withdraw was filed and granted before herein petitioners were
arraigned, hence before they were placed in jeopardy. Thus, even if a substitution
was made at such stage, petitioners cannot validly claim double jeopardy, which is
precisely the evil sought to be prevented under the rule on substitution, for the
simple reason that no first jeopardy had as yet attached. Consequently, we hold
that although the offenses charged under the three new informations necessarily
include those charged under the original informations, the substitution of
informations was not a fatal error. A contrary ruling, to paraphrase from our
former pronouncements, would sacrifice substantial justice for formal nuances on
the altar of procedural technicalities. Furthermore, petitioner's right to speedy
trial was never violated since the new informations were filed immediately after
the motion to withdraw the original informations was granted.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 2.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The controversy over the
jurisdiction of Judge Pornillos to entertain and act upon the new informations for
murder, frustrated murder and illegal possession of firearms, is grounded on three
points of disagreement.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Firstly, it is argued that the new informations were
prematurely filed considering that the order granting the withdrawal of the
original informations had not yet become final and executory and that, as a matter
of fact, the same was subsequently reconsidered and the case reinstated by Judge
Villajuan. Therefore, so petitioners postulate, Judge Pornillos could not acquire
jurisdiction over the same offense involving the same incident and the same
accused.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
Secondly, petitioners contend that the dismissal of the original informations and
the filing of new ones which were raffled to another branch of the court
constituted forum shopping, and was tainted with malice considering the indecent
haste with which the motion to withdraw the informations was filed, the order
granting the same was issued, and the new informations were filed, all of which
took place on the same day. Pursuant to the doctrinal ruling that the court first
acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts, it is theorized that the
cognizance of the case taken by Judge Villajuan barred Judge Pornillos from
assuming jurisdiction thereover.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Finally, the designation of respondent Prosecutor Dennis
Villa-Ignacio (who was then First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig, Rizal)
as Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan was arbitrary and without any
justifiable reason. It follows, therefore, so petitioners vigorously argue, that in
the absence of such authority, the informations should be considered null and void
by reason of which Judge Pornillos did not acquire jurisdiction over the same.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On the
other hand, respondents question the propriety of petitioners' filing of a petition
for certiorari prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals against the order
of the lower court denying petitioners' motion to quash, claiming that the proper
remedy was to proceed to trial on the merits and thereafter raise on appeal, as
special defenses, the grounds invoked in the motion to quash.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It is a general rule that a
nolle prosequi or dismissal entered before the accused is placed on trial and
before he is called on to plead is not equivalent}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 to an acquittal, 32 and does not bar a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense. 33 It is not a final disposition of the case. 34
Rather, it partakes of the nature of a nonsuit or discontinuance in a civil suit
and leaves the matter in the same condition in which it was before the commencement
of the prosecution. 35}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 A dismissal is different from an acquittal. An order of
dismissal which is actually an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be
reconsidered. 36 Furthermore, an acquittal is always based on the merits, that is,
the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant's
guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but a dismissal does not decide the case on the
merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissals terminate the proceedings,
either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence
does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and
substance. 37 For dismissal to be a bar under double jeopardy, it must have the
effect of acquittal.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 All these go to show, therefore, that the dismissal of Criminal Cases}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Nos.
3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 did not amount to an acquittal of herein petitioners.
Consequently, the same did not immediately become final, hence petitioners could
still file a motion for the reconsideration thereof. Moreover, such dismissal does
not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. 38 Since jeopardy had
not yet attached, herein petitioners were not prejudiced by the filing of the new
informations even though the order of dismissal in the prior case had not yet
become final. Neither did it affect the jurisdiction of the court in the subsequent
case.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
American legal practice, where a motion for an order of nolle prosequi is made, the
only power to deny the motion would be based on failure of the district attorney to
judiciously exercise his discretion. 39 In most cases, the motion will be readily
granted and should not be refused unless the court has some knowledge that it is
based on an improper reason or a corrupt motive. But such a motion to dismiss will
not also be approved unless the court is satisfied that the administration of
justice requires that the prosecution be ended, or if there appears to be a clear
violation of the law. 40 Whatever may be the reason therefor, a denial of the
motion to withdraw should not be construed as a denigration of the authority of the
special prosecutor to control and direct the prosecution of the case, 41 since the
disposition of the case already rests in the sound discretion of the court.}
brings us to the question as to whether or not an order of dismissal may be
subsequently set aside and the information reinstated. Again, in American
jurisprudence, the authorities differ somewhat as to whether a nolle prosequi may
be set aside and the cause reinstated. 42 Some cases hold that the nolle prosequi
may be recalled and that the accused may be tried on the same information, 43 but
before it can be retraced, set aside, cancelled, or struck off, the permission or
assent of the court must be had and obtained, and such cancellation or retraction
must be duly entered. According to other authorities, however, the entry of an
unconditional nolle prosequi, not on the ground that the information is
insufficient on its face, is an end to the prosecution of that information, and
such nolle prosequi cannot afterward be vacated and further proceedings had in that
case. 44}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Still
in some cases, it has been held that a nolle prosequi may be set aside by leave of
court, so as to reinstate proceedings on the information, or unless it was entered
by mistake. 45 In our jurisdiction, we follow the rule which allows an order of
dismissal to be set aside by leave of court. In one case, it was held that in the
absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, the court may, in the interest
of justice, dismiss a criminal case provisionally, that is, without prejudice to
reinstating it before the order becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new
information for the offense. 46}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The rule that in cases of concurrent jurisdiction the
court first acquiring jurisdiction will retain it to the end to the exclusion of
other tribunals, is not to be given unyielding effect in all cases and it does not
apply where the jurisdiction of the first court has come to an end in any legal
way, such as by nolle prosequi. 47 The rule on exclusions is intended to prevent
confusion and conflicts in jurisdiction and to prevent a person from being twice
tried for the same offense, but no accused has a vested right to be tried in any
particular court of concurrent jurisdiction; and when one court of concurrent
jurisdiction voluntarily relinquishes it by a nolle prosequi or dismissal of the
case, there can be no legal or logical reason for preventing the other court from
proceeding. 48 With much more reason will this rule apply where only branches of
the same court, and not different courts, are involved in the jurisdictional
conflict.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 There
was no forum shopping in the lower court with respect to the case involved. While
the procedure adopted by the prosecution was somewhat cumbersome, it was not in bad
faith and, accordingly, it did not affect the legality of the proceedings. There is
no showing, and petitioners failed to prove otherwise, that the assignment by
raffle of the new informations to another branch of the same court was intended to
prejudice herein petitioners, or to place them under less favorable circumstances,
or to find a court which would act favorably on the prosecution's case.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The authority of
the special prosecutor appointed by the Secretary of Justice to sign and file
informations has long been recognized in this jurisdiction and it has been
held that such information cannot be quashed on that account. There is nothing so
sacrosanct in the signing of complaints, holding of investigations, and conducting
prosecutions that only an officer appointed by the President or one expressly
empowered by law be permitted to assume these functions. 49 And any irregularity in
the appointment does not necessarily invalidate the same if he may be considered a
de facto officer. 50}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Of course, where the person who signed the information was disqualified
from appointment to such position, the information is invalid and the court does
not acquire jurisdiction to try the accused thereon. 51 Such is not, however, the
situation obtaining in the case at bar. It will be noted that respondent prosecutor
was designated by the Secretary of Justice to handle the re-investigation}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 and prosecution of
the case against petitioners pursuant to Department Order No. 369. Petitioners
failed to show any irregularity in the issuance of said directive.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 At any rate, the power of
supervision and control vested in the Secretary of Justice under Presidential
Decree No. 1275 had been broadened beyond the confines of the old law, that is,
Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code, wherein the power of the Secretary
was then limited only to certain instances. Pertinently, in Aguinaldo, et al. vs.
Domagas, et al., 52 we said:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Court notes, however; that Department of Justice
Order No. 85 was issued pursuant to, among others, P.D. No. 1275 issued on 11 April
1978 which provides:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Sec. 1.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control
of the Secretary of Justice. \uc1 \u8212 ? There is hereby created and established
a National Prosecution Service under the supervision and control of the Secretary
of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary
of Justice and such number of Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial
and City Fiscal's Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations
of penal laws.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The power of supervision and control vested in the Secretary of Justice
includes the authority to act directly on any matter within the jurisdiction of the
Prosecution Staff, the Regional State Prosecution Office or the Office of the
Provincial or City Fiscal and to review, modify or revoke any decision or action of
the Chief of said staff or office.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The power of supervision and control vested in the
Secretary of Justice under P.D. No. 1275 had thus been broadened beyond the
confines of the old law, i.e., Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917, where the power of the Secretary of Justice to designate acting fiscals or
prosecutors to handle a particular case was limited to instances "when a provincial
fiscal shall be disqualified by personal interest to act in a particular case or
when for any reason he shall be unable, or shall fail to discharge any of the
duties of his position." Indeed, the limitation upon which petitioners rely no
longer subsisted under P.D. No. 1275.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Having been duly designated in accordance with law, the
panel of prosecutors had complete control of the investigation and prosecution of
the case. . . .}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 3.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Petitioners similarly dispute the legality of their arraignment on
January 24, 1994, when Judge Pornillos entered a plea of not guilty for them after
they refused to plead, without furnishing them copies of the information with the
list of witnesses, after merely reading the informations against them and asking
whether they understood the same, which were allegedly in palpable violation of
Section 1, Rule 116. Petitioners aver that they were requesting for the suspension
of the arraignment as they wanted to have a final copy of the order of January 24,
1994 which was merely read in open court, and to take the necessary steps to
question the same by way of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In criminal cases,
it is the duty of the accused, in addition to the other pleas authorized by law, to
plead whether he is guilty or not of the crime charged. In that way and in that way
only can an issue be created upon which the trial shall proceed. 53 Section 1 (c)
of Rule 116 is quite explicit that where the accused refuses to plead, a plea of
not guilty shall be entered for him. Hence, under such mandatory language, if the
accused refuses to
plead, the court must enter a plea of not guilty. The words are so plain and
unambiguous that no construction is necessary. It actually calls for a literal
application thereof. Any explanation or defense which petitioners would want to
invoke can be properly raised during the trial, but they cannot refuse to enter
their plea. Nonetheless, the alleged defect in their arraignment on January 24,
1994 is deemed to have been cured when they were again arraigned on February 18,
1994 with the assistance of counsel de oficio, and the information was read to them
in the vernacular.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 In conclusion, considering that Branch 10 of the same trial court
handling Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93 legally acquired jurisdiction
over the new informations which we have likewise declared valid, petitioners may be
prosecuted thereunder.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 II.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 On the Petition for Habeas corpus}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 This petition is predicated mainly on
petitioners' asseveration that the court which issued the warrant for their arrest
had no jurisdiction over the case, hence their detention should be deemed illegal.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We have
earlier declared that Branch 10 of the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
new set of informations. Consequently, the warrant of arrest issued on the bases of
said informations filed therein and the subsequent detention of herein petitioners
pursuant thereto are valid. What instead has to be resolved is the corollary issue
of whether the petition for habeas corpus was properly filed together with their
present petition for certiorari and mandamus.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The writs of habeas corpus and certiorari may be
ancillary to each other where necessary to give effect to the supervisory powers of
the higher courts. A writ of habeas corpus reaches the body and the jurisdictional
matters, but not the record. A writ of certiorari reaches the record but not the
body. Hence, a writ of habeas corpus may be used with the writ of certiorari for
the purpose of review. 54 However, habeas corpus does not lie where the petitioner
has the remedy of appeal or certiorari because it will not be permitted to perform
the functions of a writ of error or appeal for the purpose of reviewing mere errors
or irregularities in the proceedings of a court having jurisdiction over the person
and the subject matter. 55}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Neither can we grant the writ at this stage since a writ
of habeas corpus is not intended as a substitute for the functions of the trial
court. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the orderly course of trial
should be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ may be invoked.
Habeas corpus is not ordinarily available in advance of trial to determine
jurisdictional questions that may arise. 56 It has to be an exceptional case for
the writ of habeas corpus to be available to an accused before trial. 57 In the
absence of special circumstances requiring immediate action, a court will not grant
the writ and discharge the prisoner in advance of a determination of his case in
court. 58 In the case under consideration, petitioners have dismally failed to
adduce any justification or exceptional circumstance which would warrant the grant
of the writ, hence their petition therefor has to be denied.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In addition, a petition for habeas
corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating
its denial. In the case of Enrile vs. Salazar, etc., et al., 59 we held that:}
criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the
petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The
original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The
correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition
to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness
of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court
should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 III.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 On the Motion to Cite for Contempt}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The records show that on February 24, 1994, this Court
issued a temporary restraining
order, pursuant to its resolution in Administrative Matter No. 94-1-13-RTC which
is a petition for change of venue filed by the Vinculados, requiring Judges Felipe
N. Villajuan and Victoria Villalon-Pornillos to cease and desist from hearing the
criminal cases involving herein petitioners which were pending before them. 60}
Subsequently, another resolution was issued in said cases, dated}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 March 1, 1994, with
the following directive:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 ACCORDINGLY, without prejudice to the final determination as to which
of the two (2) sets of information will be upheld or prevail, the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan is hereby directed to transfer all
the aforementioned criminal cases filed against Mayor Honorato Galvez, et al. now
in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, to the Executive Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle as one (1) single case among its branches and
for the branch concerned, after raffle, to proceed with all deliberate dispatch
after the issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 33261 have been resolved with finality.
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 As a
consequence, the seven informations which were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
94-55481 to Q-94-55487 were assigned to and are now pending trial on the merits
before Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by
Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. Petitioners now assert that Judge Salazar and
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio proceeded with the trial of the cases despite the
aforestated directives in the above cited resolutions. We find no merit in the
motion to cite them for contempt.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The records reveal that there was a manifestation dated
May 31, 1994 62 filed by the Solicitor General wherein the latter manifested his
conformity to the agreement made between the prosecution and the defense before
Judge Salazar, the pertinent part of which agreement is as follows:}{\fs18
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 During the hearing on May 26,
1994, the prosecution, through Senior State Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio, the
defense through Justice Alfredo Lazaro, and this Honorable Court agreed that the
trial in these cases shall proceed on condition that: (a) the defense shall not be
deemed to have waived any issue or objection it has raised before the Supreme Court
in G.R. No. 114046; and (b) that the trial shall also be without prejudice to
whatever decision and resolution the Supreme Court may render in the case before
it.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Counsel
for petitioners, retired Justice Alfredo Lazaro, takes issue with said agreement on
the pretension that the same is not the true agreement of the parties, but he
failed to state what they actually agreed upon. Withal, the resolutions of this
Court in the petition for change of venue, as well as the cease and desist order
issued therein, are clearly directed against the two aforenamed regional trial
judges in Malolos, Bulacan. By no stretch of the imagination can we interpret the
same to include Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. of Quezon City.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 For that matter, the issues
involved in this petition for certiorari do not necessarily require a suspension of
the proceedings before the present trial court considering that the main petition
hinges only on a determination of which set of informations shall constitute the
indictments against petitioners and for which charges they shall stand trial.
Whichever set of informations prevails, the evidence of the prosecution and defense
will more or less be the same and can be utilized for the charges therein. Hence,
no cogent reason exists for the suspension of the proceedings before the court
below.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 As a
final word, while it may well be that both sets of information validly exist for
the nonce, to allow both of them to subsist will only serve to confuse and
complicate the proceedings in the cases therein. Brushing aside procedural
technicalities, therefore, it becomes exigent to now consider and declare the four
informations for murder, frustrated murder and illegal possession of firearms as
having amended and superseded the original three informations for homicide and
frustrated homicide, there being no substantial rights of herein petitioners which
may be affected thereby. Correspondingly, the three informations for homicide and
frustrated homicide should be ordered withdrawn from the Quezon City trial court's
docket.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition for certiorari and
mandamus together with the petition for habeas corpus; DENYING, for lack of merit,
the motion to cite respondent judge and prosecutor for contempt and to annul
proceedings; and ORDERING the withdrawal and
invalidation of the three informations for homicide and frustrated homicide
against petitioners from the docket of Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 G.R.
No. 80591}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\tab }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 August
5, 1991}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par
MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IN BEHALF OF DANIEL NGAYA-AN, CARMENCITA
NGAYA-AN, CLEMENTE WINGNGA and FELISA NGAYA-AN TACALIG, petitioners, }{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 CONRADO BALWEG,
alias KA AMBO, SAGMAYAO APPAG, alias KA SULONG, and THE CORDILLERA PEOPLE'S
LIBERATION ARMY (CPLA), respondents.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 PARAS, J.:p}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed
directly before this Court in behalf of Daniel Ngaya-an. Petitioners Carmencita
Ngaya-an, Clemente Wingnga and Felisa Ngaya-an Tacalig (Petitioners for brevity)
are the wife, brother and sister, respectively, of Daniel Ngaya-an. Named as
respondents are Conrado Balweg alias "Ka Ambo," the Head of Cordillera People's
Liberation Army (CPLA for short), Sagmayao Appag alias "Ka Sulong" the Head of the
CPLA Moro Company and the CPLA.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In their petition dated November 17, 1987, petitioners
alleged, among others, that Daniel Ngaya-an is the Chairman of the Cordillera
Bodong Association; that sometime on October 5, 1987, at a checkpoint manned by
elements of the CPLA situated at Cagaluan Gate, past Kalinga-Apayao on direct order
of Sagmayao Appag alias "Ka Sulong", Daniel was forcibly taken and brought to their
headquarters at Cagaluan Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao; that Daniel has been detained and
deprived of his liberty by respondents; that respondents have no legal basis nor
authority to detain him; that Daniel has not committed a crime nor charged with an
offense for which he can be legally detained; that petitioners together with their
relatives and friends went several times to the CPLA detachment at Cagaluan but
respondents refused to release Daniel and reveal the place where he is detained;
that respondent Balweg in a radio interview admitted that the CPLA is responsible
for the disappearance of Daniel and even hinted that he will be or had been killed
by the CPLA. As a relief petitioners prayed that a writ of habeas corpus be issued
directing respondents to produce the body of Daniel and show cause for his
detention. They also prayed that after hearing Daniel be restored of his liberty
and discharged from confinement.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On November 23, 1987, the Second Division of this Court
resolved to issue a writ returnable to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City. It also directed the Executive Judge to hear the case and
submit its report to this Court which retains full control over the petition.
Likewise, the respondents were required to respect Daniel's constitutional rights.
(Rollo, p. 9).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Through registered speed air mail respondents Conrado Balweg and the
CPLA were furnished a copy of the resolution dated November 23,1987, at the
Cordillera House, Presidential Mansion House, Wright Park, Baguio City, the address
of the respondents stated in the petition. In addition respondents were advised of
said resolution by telegrams sent by Second Division Clerk of Court Salvador de
Guzman. The copy of the resolution sent to respondent Appag was returned unserved
with the notation from the post office that the addressee is unknown in Cagaluan,
Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao the address indicated in the petition.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\itap0 \fs21 \kerning2 \dbch \af2 \hich \af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On December 9, 1989, pursuant
to this Court's resolution dated November 23, 1987, RTC Executive Judge Stella
Dadivas Farrales of Baguio City twice called the case for hearing, but there was no
appearance by the respondents.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On December 16, 1987, the petitioners filed a motion to
cite respondents for contempt. They pointed out that respondents should be punished
for their refusal to obey the November 23, 1987 resolution of this Court. They also
prayed that the RUC Commander of Region I be deputized to serve the writ of habeas
corpus on the respondents.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In this Court's resolution dated January 6, 1988 the
respondents were required to comment on the motion for contempt. Copy of the
resolution was sent by registered mail to the respondents at their respective
addresses as stated in the petition. Again the copy of the resolution sent to
respondent Appag was returned unserved with the notation that the addressee is
unknown.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
April 11, 1988, this Court issued another resolution directing the PC Provincial
Commander of Region I at Dangwa to serve on the respondents the resolution of
January 6, 1988. Copy of the resolution was again sent by registered mail to
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On May
19,1988, Col. Honorio Capulong of the AFP Northern Luzon Command, informed this
Court that the Office of Conrado Balweg at the Presidential Mansion House Complex
refused to receive the resolution of January 6, 1988 alleging that said refusal is
in compliance with the CBA-CPLA Collective Agreement,}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On June 22, 1988, the Second Division
referred the case to the Court En Banc en consulta. In its resolution dated August
30, 1988, the Court En Banc accepted the case.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On petitioners' motion, the Court En Banc issued a
resolution directing the Northern Luzon Command to submit a report on whether the
resolution of January 6, 1988 was served on respondents. Copy of said resolution
for Conrado Balweg and the CPLA was received by Celso Martinez on October 4, 1988.}
August 24, 1989, the Court En Banc resolved to order the arrest of respondent
Balweg. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was directed to
arrest respondent Balweg and incarcerate him until he complies with the
aforementioned resolution of this Court (Rollo, pp. 152-154).}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On September 6, 1989,
respondent Balweg, thru his counsel Atty. Romeo Bringas filed an urgent motion to
lift the order of arrest alleging among others that he has not defied any lawful
order of this Court. He pointed out that he is not residing nor holding office at
the Cordillera House. He also denied having authorized Celso Martinez or anybody to
receive any mail matter or resolution in his behalf at the Cordillera House or
elsewhere. In his motion he also requested a period of thirty (30) days to file his
comment on the petition.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 In their comment and opposition to the urgent motion filed on September
15, 1989, petitioners argued that the urgent motion dated September 6, 1989 is a
mere scrap of paper as it was not verified by respondent Balweg but by a certain
Ama Mariano Agosto who claims to be the Deputy Chief Executive of the Cordillera
Bodong Administration.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On September 27,1989, respondent Balweg, thru his
counsel, filed a reply to petitioners' comment and opposition. The reply was
verified by respondent Balweg and subscribed before the Assistant Clerk of Court
Luzviminda Puno of this Court. On even date respondent Balweg also filed his
compliance/comment of the resolutions of this Court dated November 23, 1987,
January 6, 1988 and August 30, 1988.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On October 27,1989, the Court En Banc resolved to lift,
effective immediately, the order of arrest it had issued on August 24, 1989.
It also exonerated respondent Balweg from the charge of contempt. This Court noted
that respondent Balweg has not defied the order of this Court as he never resided
at the place where said order was served. Respondent Balweg was required to appear
before Executive Judge Stella Dadivas-Farrales and make a return of the writ of
habeas corpus (Rollo, pp. 190-191).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In his return of the writ of habeas corpus dated November
3, 1989, respondent Balweg alleged inter alia that Daniel Ngaya-an is not in his
custody; that he has not ordered the apprehension of Daniel; that he has nothing to
do with the disappearance of Daniel; that he learned of Daniel's disappearance in
the radio and newspaper reports; that the petition does not specifically state his
participation in the disappearance of Daniel so that the petition states no cause
of action against him.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Despite notice served on December 26, 1989, petitioners
failed to produce their witnesses in the hearing scheduled on February 5, 1990. To
avoid delay, Executive Judge Stella Dadivas-Farrales allowed respondent Balweg to
present his evidence. In his testimony respondent Balweg confirmed the statements
contained in his return of the writ of habeas corpus dated November 3, 1989 which
was marked as Exhibit "I ". His compliance/comment filed on September 27, 1989
before this Court, marked as Exhibit "2" was also offered together with Exhibit "1"
as part of the testimony of respondent Balweg, Atty. Noe Villanueva, who appeared
as counsel for petitioners, cross-examined respondent Balweg.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On April 30,1990, pursuant to
the resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 1, 1990, allowing Atty. Noe
Villanueva to present evidence for the petitioner, Judge Stella Dadivas-Farrales
heard the testimony of Carmencita Ngaya-an, the wife of Daniel Ngaya-an. In her
testimony she declared that her husband left Kalinga-Apayao to attend a seminar of
the Cordillera People's Alliance on September 7, 1987; that on October 5, 1987 on
his way home her husband was abducted; that on October 6, 1987 she was informed by
her uncle Gavino Laoen that her husband was captured by the CPLA at Cagaluan Gate;
that together with her brothers, sisters, and relatives numbering about 50, on the
same day, they proceeded to the Cagaluan Gate to talk with the CPLA; that at the
Cagaluan Gate she talked with Saginayao Appag alias "Ka Sulong", the Commander of
the CPLA; that Saginayao Appag informed her that they talked to her husband but
"they let him leave" and "sent him away"; that she retorted that if it is true that
her husband left them he should be in their home; that they left the barracks and
searched the surroundings at the Cagaluan Gate and in the river; that the search
lasted for 10 days but they were not able to find Daniel Ngaya-an; that she knows
Conrado Balweg alias "Ka Ambo", because she saw him before; that "Ka Ambo" wrote a
letter dated October 20, 1987 to Barangay Captain Balway requesting for a
conference; that they did not go to Captain Balway for a conference because they
were afraid that if they do not consent to the wishes of "Ka Ambo" they will be
imprisoned.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Ramon Edduba, another witness for the petitioners, testified that on
October 5, 1987, at around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, while he was standing in
front of the restaurant at the Cagaluan Gate, a jeep arrived with Daniel Ngaya-an
as one of the passengers seating in the front portion of the jeep; that as Daniel
was about to step down from the jeep, Saginayao Appag together with four (4) other
men carrying long firearms, one of whom he identified was "Ka Ambo", the
"Assistant" of Saginayao Appag, approached the former and got some papers from him;
that after Daniel refused to drink liquor "Ka Sulong" and his men tied his hand and
feet with a rope; that Daniel shouted for help when he was carried to the
detachment but nobody helped him; that after that he boarded a jeepney and left the
place. On direct examination he identified the affidavit he executed on November
19, 1987. When cross-examined he admitted to Atty. Romeo Bringas the counsel for
respondent Balweg that he did not know the full name of "Ka Ambo" and the other
companions of Saginayao Appag.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Petitioners formally offered Exhibit "A", the letter
dated October 20,1987 of "Ka Ambo" in the Ilocano dialect with a translation in the
English language by Court Interpreter Teodora Paquito and Exhibit "B", the
affidavit dated November 17,1987 of witness Ramon Edduba, after which they rested
their case.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The primary issue to be resolved is whether or not Daniel Ngaya-an is
unlawfully detained or restrained of his liberty by respondent Balweg and the
CPLA.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Habeas
corpus generally applies to "all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." (Section 1, Rule 102, Revised
Rules of Court).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a
person from unlawful restraint.(Castriciones v. Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 65731, September 28, 1989, En Banc, Minute Resolution;
Mizuaki Takenouchi v. Cristi et al., G.R. 82232, July 25,1988, Third Division,
Minute Resolution). It is devised as a speedy relief from unlawful restraint
(Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778). It is a remedy intended to determine
whether the person under detention is held under lawful authority (Quintos v.
Director of Prisons, 55 Phil, 304).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must determine whether: (1)
the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of
his liberty; (2) the name of the person detaining another; (3) the place where he
is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (4) the cause of his detention (Section
3, Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court). Only if the Court is satisfied that a person
is unlawfully restrained of his liberty that the petition for habeas corpus will be
granted and the person detained will be released from confinement (Gonzales v.
Viola, 61 Phil. 824). If the respondents are not detaining nor restraining the
applicants or the person in whose behalf the petition for habeas corpus is filed
the petition should be dismissed (In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus
of Ferdinand E. Marcos, etc. v. Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, May 18,
1989, G.R. No. 88079, En Banc, Minute Resolution).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the case at bar, petitioners
miserably failed to substantiate by clear and convincing evidence that Daniel
Ngaya-an in whose behalf the petition has been filed is under the custody or is
unlawfully detained and restrained of his liberty by the respondent Balweg. The
only evidence linking respondent Balweg to the disappearance of Daniel Ngaya-an is
the declaration of Ramon Edduba, the lone eyewitness for the petitioners that on
October 5, 1987, at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Saginayao Appag together
with "Ka Ambo" and three other men carrying long firearms accosted Daniel Ngaya-an
at the Cagaluan Gate and thereafter with a rope tied on Daniel's hands and feet he
was carried to the detachment. Witness Edduba apparently committed an error in
naming "Ka Ambo" as one of the companions of Saginayao Appag as he declared that
"Ka Ambo" is the assistant of Saginayao Appag (TSN, June 19, 1990, p. 6, Rollo, p.
231). On cross-examination he even admitted that he does not know the full name of
"Ka Ambo". In the affidavit he executed on November 19,1987, which petitioners
offered as Exhibit "B", Ramon Edduba declared that before Daniel Ngaya-an could
step down from the jeep he was approached by Saginayao Appag accompanied by men
armed with long firearms one of whom he identified as "Ka Elias". He has not
declared nor even insinuated that respondent Conrado Balweg popularly known as "Ka
Ambo" the Head of the CPLA was with the group of Saginayao Appag when Daniel Ngaya-
an was accosted at the Cagaluan Gate on October 5, 1987.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Ostensibly, the disappearance of Daniel
Ngaya-an was established by Ramon Edduba's testimony corroborated by Carmencita
Ngaya-an, the wife of Daniel Ngaya-an. However, the granting of the relief is not
predicated on the disappearance of a person. The petitioners must establish by
competent and convincing evidence that the missing person in whose behalf the
petition is filed is under the custody of the respondents.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Here there is no evidence
that respondent Balweg, the Head of the CPLA, is responsible for the disappearance
of Daniel. Neither is there any evidence that the missing person is presently
detained by respondent Balweg. On his part respondent Balweg has not only
categorically denied that Daniel Ngaya-an is under his custody but also that he is
not responsible for his disappearance.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It is possible that based on the testimony of Ramon
Edduba the person responsible for the disappearance of Daniel is respondent
Saginayao Appag. However, we could not grant the relief and order respondent
Saginayao Appag to release Daniel because up to now this Court has not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent Appag. As borne by the records of this
case, the writ issued on November 23, 1987, as well as the subsequent resolutions
of this Court, were returned unserved because respondent Appag is unknown at
Cagaluan, Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao, the address indicated in the petition.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 All law enforcement
agencies of the government must join hands in locating the whereabouts of Daniel
Ngaya-an who has been missing since October 5, 1987. The National Bureau of
Investigation can conduct its own investigation so that if warranted by the result
of its investigation, Saginayao Appag alias "Ka Sulong" and all persons responsible
for the abduction or disappearance of Daniel Ngaya-an can be prosecuted for the
crime they have committed.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED without
prejudice to reinstatement and further proceedings, if necessary, the moment the
petitioners can furnish the Court the exact address where Saginayao Appag can be
served with the legal processes of this Court. Let the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces
of the Philippines, National Bureau of Investigation and the Commissioner of Human
Rights be furnished a copy of this recommendation for their appropriate action.}
\par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0 \sa200
\lisa0 \widctlpar \aspalpha \aspnum \adjustright \lin0 \rin0 \itap0 \fs21
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 G.R. No. 70748}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 October 21, 1985}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF LAURENTE C. ILAGAN, ANTONIO B. ARELLANO, and MARCOS D.
RISONAR, JR., Integrated Bar of the Philippines [IBP]; Free Legal Assistance Group
[FLAG] and Movement of Attorneys For Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc.,
[MABINI], petitioners, }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Minister of National Defense; LT.
GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, Acting Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines; BRIG.
GEN. DIONISIO TAN-GATUE, PC-INP Regional Commander for Region XI, Camp Catitipan,
Davao City, respondents.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Roberto Concepcion, Jose B.L. Reyes, Raul S. Goco, Joker Arroyo, Haydee
Yorac, Fulgencio S. Factoran, Francisco I. Chavez , Lorenzo M. Ta\uc1 \u241 ?ada,
Wigberto Ta\uc1 \u241 ?ada and Martiniano Vivo for petitioners.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Solicitor General for
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 This is a petition for Habeas Corpus filed by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG); and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism (MABINI) on behalf of
Attorneys Laurente C. Ilagan, Antonio B. Arellano, and Marcos Risonar, Jr.}
facts follow:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 On May 10, 1985, Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City
by elements of the PC-INP and detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a Mission
Order allegedly issued by the Ministry of National Defense. On that same day,
fifteen lawyers from the IBP Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan. One of the
visiting lawyers, Atty. Antonio Arellano, was also arrested and detained on the
basis of an unsigned Mission Order. On May 13, 1985, the military sent word to the
IBP Davao Chapter that Attorney Marcos Risonar would likewise be arrested. The
latter went to Camp Catitipan to verify his arrest papers and was detained on the
basis of a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.}
petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the three arrested
lawyers hereinafter referred to as the detained attorneys on the ground that their
arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution, since arrests cannot be
made on the basis of Mission Orders. and that there appears to be a military
campaign to harass lawyers involved in national security cases.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On May 16, 1985, the Court
issued the Writ, required a Return, and set the petition for hearing on May 23,
1985.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
their Return, respondents contended that the detained attorneys were arrested on
the basis of a PDA issued by the President on January 25, 1985; that the Writ of
habeas corpus is suspended as to them by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A; and
that pursuant to the ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Ponce Enrile, et al, 1 Courts
lack the authority to inquire into the cause and validity of detention of persons
held pursuant to the suspension. Respondents further expounded on the state of
rebellion in Davao City on the basis of seized subversive documents, implying that
the detained attorneys played active
roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front. Respondents then prayed for the denial of the petition.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 During
the hearing on May 23, 1985, the detained attorneys narrated to the Court the
circumstances of their arrest and detention. Counsel for the respondents, on the
other hand, presented evidence of subversive activities in Davao, but due to lack
of evidence linking the detained attorneys with the alleged subversive activities,
the Court, on the same day resolved to order the temporary release of the detained
attorneys on the recognizance of the principal counsel of petitioner's, namely,
retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate Justice J.B.L.
Reyes. The Court further resolved to give petitioners ten days within which to file
a traverse to the Return of the Writ and the respondents ten days to file a Reply
thereto.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
next day, or on May 24, 1985, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion stating
that the detained attorneys had not yet been released and praying that they be
released to the custody of the principal counsel of petioners at the Supreme
Court.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
27, 1985, respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's
Order of Release reiterating that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus has
the effect of ousting the Court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, and attached
thereto classified documents consisting of the Report of respondent Brig. Gen. Tan-
Gatue stating that the detained attorneys "were arrested not on the basis of their
'lawyering' but for specific acts of rebellion and economic sabotage as well as for
their leadership in the CPP" ... "even to the extent of attending CPP and NPA rites
and using their profession as lawyers as cover-up for their activities in
furtherance of CPP goals and objectives;" and that the detained attorneys were
involved in the Welgang Bayan in Davao City, a mass action "with demands for the
armed overthrow of the government." Sworn statements of several persons also
implicated the detained attorneys in alleged subversive activities. Respondents
added that, while there is a Court Order directing release, they, too, are under
orders, pursuant to the PDA, to hold in custody the detained attorneys until
ordered released by the President or by his duly authorized representative, and
that the PDA, when issued, constitutes authority to preventively detain them for a
period not exceeding one year.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On May 28, 1985, respondents filed an Urgent
Manifestation/Motion stating that an Information for Rebellion was filed on May 27,
1985 against the detained attorneys before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch X, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12,349; that a Warrant of Arrest had been
issued against them; and praying that this Petition be dismissed for having been
rendered moot and academic.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On May 30, 1985, petitioners filed an Opposition to
respondents' Urgent Motion/Manifestation contending that since the detained
attorneys were not given the benefit of preliminary investigation, they were denied
their constitutional right to due process; consequently, the Information for
Rebellion filed against them is void. Respondents, on the other hand, filed on the
same day a Comment to petitioners' Manifestation and Motion reiterating their
prayer for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of mootness by virtue of the
proceedings before the Regional Trial Court of Davao.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On June 3, 1985, petitioners filed a
consolidated Comment and Traverse contending that the "Welgang Bayans" were in
legitimate exercise of the constitutional right of expression and assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievances; that the detained attorneys'
participation was limited to serving in the legal panel and the negotiating panels;
that Proclamation No. 2045 is unconstitutional because there exists no factual or
legal basis for the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus as provided for in the
Constitution; that the evidence presented by respondents against the detained
attorneys are of a doubtful and flimsy nature; and that the PDA is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On July 1, 1985, petitioners filed a Manifestation and
Motion praying that the Court immediately resolve the issues raised as the case
affects not only the detained attorneys but the entire legal profession and the
administration of justice as well.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Finally, after two extensions granted by the Court, on
July 8, 1985, respondents filed a Consolidated Reply, reiterating first, the
validity of Proclamation No. 2045, as amended by Proclamation No. 2045-A and of the
PDA issued against petitioners as an incident to the suspension of the privilege of
the Writ of habeas corpus: secondly, the ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Ponce Enrile,
et al.; 2 and thirdly, its prayer for the dismissal of the petition on the ground
of mootness by virtue of the filing of an Information for Rebellion against the
detained attorneys before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City .}{\fs18 \kerning2
\rin0 \itap0 \fs21 \kerning2
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been
rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them
for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and
the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. 3 The function of the special
proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. Now
that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in
relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional
Trial Couravao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had
served its purpose. 4}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.-If it appears
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment, or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize to discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment. (Rule 102)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 If the detained attorneys question their detention
because of improper arrest, or that no preliminary investigati\'7fn has been
conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion
before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and /or the Information on
grounds provided by the Rules or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of
the case. 5 Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued
by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused. 6 So is it
explicitly provided for by Section. 14, Rule of 102 of the Rules of Court,
reading:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SEC.
14. When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted and when let to bail.- If it
appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly and specifically
charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by death, he shall
not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or restrained
on a charge of having committed an offense not so punishable, he may be recommitted
to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the court or judge. . . .}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 But
petitioners submit that because of the absence of a preliminary investigation, the
Information for Rebellion filed against the detained attorneys is void and the
Court below could not have acquired jurisdiction over them, and consequently, they
are entitled to release.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 On the other hand, respondents contend that a preliminary investigation
was unnecessary since the detained attorneys were lawfully arrested without a
warrant.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
Pursuant to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, no Information for an offense
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, except as provided for in Section 7 of
Rule 112. 7 The Information filed by the City Fiscal before the Regional Trial
Court of the City of Davao fell within the exception. Thus, the Verification
reads:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
VERIFICATION}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 I
HEREBY CERTIFY that I am filing this Information in pursuance with Rule 112,
Section 7 of the 1985 Rules on criminal Procedure, wherein after examining the
affidavits of the government witnesses and other documents attached to the records,
I found sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (SGD.) EMMANUEL E. GALICIA}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 City Fiscal}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Section
7, Rule 112, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure above referred to provides:}
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.-
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended
party, peace officer or fiscal without preliminary investigation having been first
conducted on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arrested officer
or person.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person
arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance
with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-
availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such
waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 If the
case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the
filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right
to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Section 5, Rule 113
of the same Rules enumerates the instances when an arrest without warrant is
lawful.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SEC. 5.
Arrest without warrant; when lawful.\uc1 \u8212 ?A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (a)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (b)}
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 When an offense has
in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (c)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In cases falling under paragraphs [al
and [b] hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (Rule 113)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to cases
when a suspect is caught in flagrante delicto or immediately thereafter, while
paragraph (c) refers to escaping prisoners. As to whether the detained attorneys
fall under either of the first two instances enumerated is a question of fact,
which will need the presentation of evidence and is more properly within the
province of the trial Court.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The question of absence of a proper preliminary
investigation is also better inquired into by the Court below. When so raised, this
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, has held that the trial
Court is called upon "not to dismiss the information but hold the case in abeyance
and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation.
8 As stressed in People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 [1961], this is the proper
procedure since the "absence of such investigation did not impair the validity of
the Information or otherwise render it defective. Much less did it affect the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance". 9 The right to a preliminary
investigation, being waivable, does not argue against the validity of the
proceedings, the most that could have been done being to remand the case in order
that such
investigation could be conducted. 10}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 ... The proper forum before which absence of preliminary
investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court.
Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence of preliminary investigation does not
go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the
proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are
matters to be inquired into by the trial court, not an appellate Court. 11}
Nolasco case, which petitioners invoke, 12 wherein this Court ordered the release
of two of the accused, is not on all fours with the case at bar as, in that case,
the accused were charged only with Illegal Possession of Subversive documents under
Presidential Decree No. 33, which is punishable by prision correccional in its
minimum period, and the trial Court had granted bail; whereas in this case,
petitioners are charged with the capital offense of Rebellion, and the trial Court
has not allowed bail.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 WHEREFORE, this petition for Habeas Corpus is hereby dismissed for
having become moot and academic. Petitioners are now detained by virtue of a
Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in relation to
the criminal case for Rebellion filed against them before said Court.}{\fs18
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 [A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1510. November 6, 2000]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 COMMISSIONER RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE
RODOLFO R. BONIFACIO, RTC, Branch 151, Pasig City, respondent.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 R E S O L U T I O N}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
allegedly granting improvidently a petition for Habeas Corpus in Special Proceeding
No. 10931[1] entitled In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Ma Jing,
respondent was charged in a verified complaint[2] with Violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Incompetence,
Gross Inefficiency and Knowingly Rendering An Unjust Judgment relative to the
above-mentioned case.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the verified
complaint to respondent judge for his comment thereon within ten (10) days from
notice.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On July
30, 1999, respondent judge filed his comment[3] denying the charges against him and
prayed for the dismissal of the case against him for utter lack of merit.[4]}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The case was
subsequently referred to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. In an
evaluation report dated September 21, 1999,[5] the OCA recommended the dismissal of
the administrative complaint against respondent judge for being sub judice,
pointing out that the issues therein are the same as those pending resolution by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53425 entitled Rufus B. Rodriguez v. Hon.
Rodolfo R. Bonifacio, et al.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\dbch \af2 \hich \af0 \loch
Court of Appeals subsequently promulgated a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 53425 dated
May 4, 2000[6] setting aside for lack of legal basis the assailed Order of
respondent Judge dated June 24, 1999 which found herein complainant guilty of
indirect contempt.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 In the meantime, in a Resolution dated November 24, 1999,[7] the Court
resolved to: 1.] docket the case as a regular administrative proceeding; and 2.]
refer the case to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales for
investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from notice.}
compliance with the foregoing directive, Justice Morales submitted a Report
summarizing the factual antecedents of the case thus:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On May 7, 1999 at about 11 p.m., the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in coordination with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) and the Bureau of Immigration (BI) conducted simultaneous
raids at the Royal Flame Club, Space World and Narcissus Club which are all located
in Ermita, Manila as a result of which 20 female Chinese nationals were caught in
the act of entertaining customers and guests.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 No Alien Employment Permits or Alien Employment
Registration Certificates having been presented by these nationals, they were
turned over to the BI for custody and verification of their alien status. They were
thereupon confined at the BI Detention Center at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro
Manila on May 8, 1999.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On May 17, 1999, Chinese National Ma Jing, one of the 20
apprehended Chinese, filed a petition for habeas corpus at the Pasig Regional Trial
Court (RTC) which was raffled to Branch 151 thereof.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The caption of the petition did not name
any respondent but it alleged as follows:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 x x x x x x x x x}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 2. On or about 07 May 1999 at about 10:00 oclock in the
evening, petitioner, a temporary visitor in the Philippines from the Peoples
Republic of China, was taken from a nightclub (Royal Flame) in Metro Manila by
individuals who represented themselves as Agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) and/or Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and since then confined, restrained and deprived her
of her liberty and [is] now confined at the BID Detention Center, Camp Bagong Diwa,
Taguig, Metro Manila.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 3. In spite of the fact that petitioner has been confined from then on,
to date, no formal complaint or accusation for any specific offenses has been filed
against her nor any judicial writ or order for her commitment has at any time been
issued so far.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 4. According to reliable information, the petitioner is now being
unlawfully detained and deprived of her liberty by the Warden and/or Chief of the
BID Detention Center, at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Tagig, Metro Manila at the
behest of the Chief of a special operation unit of the NBI combined with BID and
DOLE agents and whose office is at NBI, NBI Bldg., Taft Ave., Manila. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Acting Presiding Judge Rodolfo Bonifacio of Branch 151 of
the Pasig RTC issued a writ.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On May 21, 1999, Atty. Rommel J. de Leon, Technical
Assistant, Commissioners Office, BI, submitted a RETURN OF THE WRIT alleging, inter
alia:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
x x x x x}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
an investigation was conducted by Special Prosecutor Ramoncito L. Tolentino by
(sic) the Bureau of Immigration;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 5. That during the said investigation the subject foreign
nationals including the petitioner failed to produce any travel documents while the
National Bureau of Investigation showed their Affidavit of Arrest, pictures taken
at Royal Flame Club and other evidences in support of their claim, copy of said
Affidavit of Arrest and pictures are attached hereto as Annexes B and C
respectively;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 6. That on May 13, 1999, Special Prosecutor Ramon L. Tolentino issued a
Charge Sheet charging said alien for violation of Section 37 (a) [7] of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, a copy of the charge sheet is
attached hereto as Annex D;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 7. That during the hearing at the Bureau of Immigration
on May 20, 1999, the Counsel for petitioner and a certain Willy Ang manifested that
the petitioner together with her companion are going to submit [an] application for
Voluntary Deportation;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 8. That based on the foregoing premises it is crystal
clear that the petitioner is lawfully detained by the Bureau of Immigration; and}
moreso (sic), if ever the petitioner would submit an application for Voluntary
Deportation as manifested by his Counsel Atty. San Pedro and their representative
Mr. Willy Ang this petition would already be moot and academic.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 After conducting a hearing on
the petition for habeas corpus, Judge Bonifacio, by Order of May 27, 1999, held:}
x x x x x}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Upon
due inquiry, the Court finds that the petitioner is not really an undocumented
alien as she has a valid PROC passport No. 1437777 and Visa No. 1201 issued by the
Philippine Embassy on March 18, 1999. Her stay in the Philippines has been duly
extended up to June 30, 1999 under O.R. No. M 7922945. The Charge Sheet, however,
remains as a mere accusation, i.e. that petitioner is a mere suspect, working as a
Guest Relation Officer at the Royal Flame Club without securing the necessary
working permit/visa from the Bureau of Immigration. She was not notified though of
the charges against her nor was she afforded due process. No commitment order was
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration or any competent authority to justify her
continued detention.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 x x x x x x x x x}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In Dramayo, the Supreme Court has ruled categorically
that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). The illegal arrest
of petitioner without warrant of arrest or seizure on 07 May 1999 and arbitrary
detention, to date, is not remedied by the supposed filing in a Charge Sheet dated
13 May 1999 but assumably filed only on 14 May 1999. Petitioner had been detained
without any valid charge from 07 May 1999 to 14 May 1999. The filing of the Charge
Sheet did not (sic) the illegal detention of the petitioner. xxx}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Accordingly the
said Order of May 27, 1999 disposed:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds no cogent reason to hold
petitioner under continued detention so that Ma Jings immediate release is hereby
ordered, unless otherwise held on a different case and/or valid judicial process.}
following day, May 28, 1999 respondent Bureau of Immigration by counsel Atty.
Rommel J. de Leon, Technical Assistant, Commissioners Office filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the May 27, 1999 [Order].}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On May 31, 1999, Ma Jing not having been released from
detention, filed a Motion to Declare Parties Guilty of Contempt naming BI
Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez, Atty. de Leon, BI Detention Center Warden Enrico
R. Paner and BI employees Mar Novales and Richie Galvadores as contemnors.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 By
Order of June 15, 1999, Judge Bonifacio denied the BIs Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order of May 27, 1999 and directed BI Commissioner Rodriguez and his co-
respondents in the Motion to hold them in contempt of court for failure to obey the
Order of May 27, 1999.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the same Order of June 15, 1999, Judge Bonifacio
ordered Commissioner Rodriguez and co-respondents to immediately release Ma Jing in
accordance with his May 27, 1999 Order.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Also on June 15, 1999, the BI issued a summary
deportation order to Ma Jing who refused to receive it.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The following day or on June 16, 1999,
the BI filed at Branch 151 of the RTC Pasig a Notice of Appeal (to the Court of
Appeals) of the May 27, 1999 Order and the June 15, 1999 Order.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On June 18, 1999,
Commissioner Rodriguez and his co-respondents, in compliance with the show cause
order, filed an Explanation dated June 17, 1999 stating, inter alia, that they were
never ordered in the May 17, 1999 Order to release Ma Jing; that except for
Commissioner Rodriguez, the other respondents had no authority to release Ma Jing
from the Detention Center; that the contempt proceedings in the case at bar was not
initiated by the Court motu propio, hence, the indirect contempt should be
commenced by a verified petition and not by merely filing a Motion as was done in
the instant case, following Sec. 4 of Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which they therein quoted; and that the Motion for Reconsideration of the May 17,
1999 Order stayed the execution thereof as did the Notice of Appeal (filed on June
17, 1999) of the same order.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the meantime, the other Chinese nationals petitions
for voluntary deportation were, by separate orders, granted by the BI.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 By June 24, 1999,
Judge Bonifacio found Commissioner Rodriguez and co-respondents guilty of indirect
contempt and ordered their arrest and detention at the Pasig City jail until they
have complied with the Order dated May 27, 1999 in the light of the following
disquisition:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 xxx proceedings in habeas corpus are separate and distinct from any
deportation proceedings taking place at the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.
They (habeas corpus proceedings) rarely, if ever, touch the merits of the
deportation case and require no pronouncement with respect thereto.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In its May 27, 1999
Order, this Court ordered the immediate release of petitioner Ma Jing, principally
upon the following reasons: (i) the petitioner was unlawfully arrested without any
warrant of arrest and, thereafter, arbitrarily detained, in disregard of her
rights, even as an alien, to due process of law; and (ii) a warrant of arrest
issued by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration, to be valid, must be for
the sole purpose of executing
a final order of deportation.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 1. It is not correct to say that the May 27, 1999 Order
should not be obeyed because it did not specifically direct Hon. Rufus D (sic)
Rodriguez, P/Supt. Angelito O. Tan, Mar Navales and Richie Galvadores as the
persons who should obey the said Order.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Writ of Habeas Corpus dated May 17, 1999 as directed,
among others, to The Chief of the Special Operation UnitNBI and/or the Warden or
Chief of the BID Detention Center, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro, Manila. As
such, all the respondents fall under the classification BID Agents and are thus
included in the persons to whom the writ of habeas corpus is directed.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 x x x x x x x x x}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 2.
Neither is the Court impressed with the argument that P/Supt. Angelito O. Tan,
Atty. Rommel J. de Leon, Enrico R. Paner, Mar Navales and Richie Galvadores do not
have the authority to release the petitioner from the BID Detention Center, such
authority pertaining only to the Commissioner, BID.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The authority for the release of
petitioner Ma Jing is precisely the May 27, 1999 Order of this Court which directs
her immediate release. There can be no doubt on the jurisdiction of this Court on
habeas corpus cases, as the case at bar, and the validity of its lawful orders
issued pursuant to the exercise of such jurisdiction.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It is significant that Hon. Rufus
Rodriguez has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the refusal of
his subordinates to obey the subject court order, as he would certainly have done
if his authority had been improperly invoked.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 3. Neither is this Court persuaded by the argument that
the May 27, 1999 Order was not yet executory because BIDs Motion for
Reconsideration stayed its execution.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 By its very nature, habeas corpus proceedings are always
characterized by promptness or speed. It is always timely to recall this
categorical affirmation in the ponencia of Justice Malcolm in the landmark case of
Villavicencio v. Lukban, supra:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The writ of habeas corpus was devised as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Therefore, only an injunction from a Higher Court could
restrain enforceability of the May 27, 1999 Order which, by its unmistakable
language, directed the immediate release of petitioner Ma Jing.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 4. There is also a puerile
claim that the contempt proceeding was improper because it was commenced by mere
motion and not by a verified petition.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\lang1033 \langnp1033 The Revised Rules of Court (should be 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure) cannot be any clearer. The appropriate section is quite explicit.: After
a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished
for indirect contempt (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order or judgment of a court}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It is very clear that, as to form, the only requirement
is that the charge be in writing. x x x}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 5. On the claim that the Notice of Appeal filed by BID on
June 17 stayed execution of the May 27, 1999 Order, suffice it to say that, as
already discussed above, being a writ of liberty, habeas corpus proceedings are
always characterized by promptness or speed. Therefore, the May 27, 1999 Order of
release was inherently immediately executory, and only an injunction from a Higher
Court could restrain its immediate enforceability.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 6. Finally, the respondents submit the
argument that it is no longer legally possible for the BID to order the release of
the petitioner because of the issuance of a Summary Deportation Order against her.}
first time the respondents first disobeyed the May 27, 1999 Order was on May 28,
1999. There was no deportation order yet at that time. The Court cannot accede to
the proposition that the subsequent issuance of the deportation order should have
the effect of erasing or pardoning the contempt already committed by the
respondents as early as May 28, 1999.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Moreover, the release of petitioner Ma Jing is not really
a primordial consideration insofar as the pending incident is concerned. The
ultimate purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the respondents are guilty
of indirect contempt, i.e., disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, or judgment of a court.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Court finds that such disobedience has been
indubitably established by the various Sheriffs Reports extant in the records of
this case, and that the reasons advanced by the respondents in their Explanation
dated June 17, 1999 are not the real reasons which impelled said disobedience, as
the same conclusively stems from the perception of the Hon. Rufus Rodriguez and his
subalterns that the Court has no authority to order the release of petitioner Ma
Jing. Even assuming that the respondents were of the opinion that the subject Order
was grossly erroneous, they could have availed of the remedy of certiorari
immediately after its promulgation. But they, certainly, cannot adamantly and
belligerently defy the Order of the Courts simply because they have a contrary
opinion.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
Confronted with the mandatory directive of May 27, 1999 to release petitioner Ma
Jing, the obstinate refusal of the respondents to obey the same constitutes
indirect contempt. (Underscoring supplied).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On June 25, 1999, a Friday, at about 2 oclock in the
afternoon, Commissioner Rodriguez, et al. were, pursuant to the June 24, 1999
Order, arrested by the NBI whose Director was specifically ordered by Judge
Bonifacio to serve the warrant.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Commissioner Rodriguez et al. lost no time in filing at
the Court of Appeals on June 25, 1999 an Urgent Petition for Certiorari against
Judge Bonifacio, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 53425, followed by an Amended Petition,
assailing the Judges Order of June 24, 1999.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 By Order of June 25, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the immediate release of
Commissioner Rodriguez et al. after posting a bond and directing Judge Bonifacio to
file his comment on the petition.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 At 10:00 p.m. of June 25,
1999, Commissioner Rodriguez, et al. were released after posting a bond.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On the basis of the
foregoing facts, the Investigating Justice recommends respondent judge be fined
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for gross ignorance of the law and warned that a
repetition or the commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely, reasoning thus:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Under Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
contempt proceedings may be commenced as follows:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. - Proceedings for
indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the
contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the
respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In all other cases,
charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of the documents or papers
involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing
initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt
charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the
petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed,
heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and
decision.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
petition for habeas corpus alleged that Ma Jing was [a]ccording to reliable
information being unlawfully deprived of her liberty by the Warden and/or Chief of
the BID Detention Center at the behest of the Chief of a special operations unit of
the NBI combined with BID and DLE agents whose office is at NBI. It did not name
herein complainant as respondent.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Neither did the May 27, 1999 Order direct herein
complainant to release Ma Jing. It was when Ma Jing filed on May 31, 1999 a Motion
to Cite in Contempt that herein complainants name was for the first time drawn in
the case.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Under
the circumstances, compliance with the second mode of initiating a petition for
contempt under Sec. 4 of Rule 71 of the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure, - filing a
verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for initiating pleadings for civil action in the court concerned was
in order. It is in this light that the undersigned investigator finds that
respondent ERRED in giving due course to the mere motion to cite in contempt and
finding herein complainant guilty thereof by Order of June 24, 1999, especially
given the fact that in the ExplanationAnswer to the show cause Order of respondent
herein, complainant et al. quoted Sec. 4 of Rule 71 and alleged that as [t]he
contempt proceedings w[ere] not initiated by the Court motu proprio, the indirect
contempt should be commenced by a verified petition and not by mere filing [of a]
motion as was done in the instant case.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 For administrative liability to attach for errors of
judgment, the error must be gross, patent or deliberate (Re: Judge Silverio S.
Tayao, A.M. No. 93-8-1204, 229 SCRA 723 [1994].}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 For administrative liability to attach
for gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust order or
judgment, it must be established that the order or judgment is not only erroneous
but [that] he was actuated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, revenge, corrupt
purpose or some other like motive (Guerrero v. Villamor, A.M. No. RTJ-90-617, 296
SCRA 88 [1998]).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\hich \af0
For a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order
or decision he renders (Rodrigo v. Quijano, 79 10 [1997]) [sic] otherwise it would
render judicial office untenable for no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible (vide
Lopez v. Corpus, 78 SCRA 374 [1997] (sic); Pilipinas Bank v. Tirona-Liwag, 190 SCRA
834 [1994]).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
undersigned finds that respondents error in giving due course to the Motion to
Declare Parties Guilty of Contempt was patent, given that circumstances mentioned
above. Respondents invoking of Sec. 3 of the same Rule 71 (of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, not revised Rules of Court as he stated) which to him clearly
shows that the only requirement is that the charge be in writing, citing Tomas C.
Aguador v. Malcolm S. Enerio, et al., G.R. No. L-20383, January 30, 1971, betrays
his ignorance that this Aguador case was decided in 1971, long before Sec. 4, Rule
71, which is a new provision, was incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 And, as from the following portion of respondents Order of June 24,
1999, to wit:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Incidentally, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is not a
sovereign entity where the commissioner reigns supreme. It is a mere Bureau and a
becoming modesty of inferior offices demands a conscious realization of the
position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the huge
governmental bureaucracy. Most decidedly, this Court does not believe that the
Honorable Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation however exalted he may
personally feel his position to be is beyond the processes of Courts of the land.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 it is
gathered that he was actuated by anger or hatred in so acting on the motion for
contempt, administrative liability attaches for his gross ignorance of the law.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 As for
the rest of the assailed Orders bases of the other charges at bar, complainants
charge that they violate the law and the jurisprudence he cited not being
indubitable in the light of respondents own citations of the law and jurisprudence,
the undersigned does not find respondent to have acted arrantly. The issue thus
becomes judicial in character and would not warrant faulting him administratively
(Godinez v. Alano, 303 SCRA 259 [1999]).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Court agrees with the investigating Justice that
respondent judge should indeed be sanctioned, but finds the recommended penalty not
commensurate to the gravity of respondents malfeasance for the following reasons:}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 First,
the degree of restraint respondent should have observed in the exercise of his
contempt powers leaves much to be desired, given the prevailing facts of this case
much more so, considering that the same bears with it the taint of personal
hostility and passion against the party to whom it is directed. Time and again
magistrates have been reminded that}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 the salutary rule is that the power to punish for
contempt must be exercised in the preservative not vindictive principle,[8] and on
the corrective not retaliatory idea of punishment.[9] The courts and other
tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise the power for contempt
for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not
for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[10]}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Besides the basic
equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must
exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety[11] and self-
restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge.[12] A judge anywhere
should be the last person to be perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway
over his domain. Such an image is, however, evoked by the actuations of respondent
judge in this case.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 It has time and again been stressed that the role of a judge in
relation to those who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience
and courtesy.[13] A judge who is commanded at all times to be mindful of his high
calling and his mission as a dispassionate and impartial arbiter of justice[14] is
expected to be a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of
purely personal preferences which he shares with his fellow mortals.[15]}{\fs18
\lin0 \rin0
\itap0 \fs21 \kerning2 \dbch \af2 \hich \af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Judges have been admonished to observe
judicial decorum which requires that a magistrate must at all times be temperate in
his language[16] refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric[17] or from
resorting to the language of vilification.[18] In this regard, Rule 3.04 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct states that}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive and
courteous to all lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses,
and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling
into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the
courts for the litigants.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Respondent judge needs to be reminded that government
service is people-oriented.[19] Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice
and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding.[20] Belligerent behavior has
no place in government service where personnel are enjoined to act with self-
restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and
insolence.[21]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Second, it is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal
principles. The Code of Judicial Conduct, in fact, enjoins judges to be faithful to
the law and maintain professional competence.[22] Respondent judge owes it to the
public and to the legal profession to know the law he is supposed to apply in a
given controversy.[23] Indeed}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he
be conversant with basic legal principles and aware of well-settled authoritative
doctrines. He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth,
to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law.[24]}
case, respondent judge displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic
principles governing contempt. As defined, indirect contempt is one committed out
of or not in the presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or
embarrass the court and justice.[25] On the other hand, direct contempt consists of
or is characterized by misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court
or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same within the meaning of
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[26]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 There is no question that disobedience
or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court or
injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt.[27] Section
4, Rule 71 of the Rules, provides for two (2) modes of commencing proceedings for
indirect contempt, to wit:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 1.] It may be initiated motu proprio by the court against
which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring
the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 2.] In all other
cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved
therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. (all initiatory pleadings
should be accompanied with a certificate of non-forum shopping, Sec. 5 Rule 7).
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 As can
be gleaned from the records of the case, the contempt proceedings commenced by Ma
Jing was made through a motion and not a verified petition as required by the
above-cited Section. Respondent Judge relied on Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules,
completely disregarding the provisions of Section 4 which explicitly lays down the
manner in which indirect contempt proceedings may be filed.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Contempt of court has been
distinctly described as an offense against the State and not against the judge
personally. To reiterate, a judge must always remember that the power of the court
to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are not personal,
because that power is intended as a safeguard, not for judges as persons, but for
the functions they exercise.[29]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Viewed vis--vis the foregoing
circumscription of a courts power to punish for contempt, it bears stressing that
the court must exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly with utmost
self-restraint[30] with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and
preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.[31]
In this case, respondent judge failed to observe the procedure expressly spelled
out in Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 As stated earlier, a judge is called upon to exhibit more
than a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative
that he be conversant with basic legal principles.[32] Canon 4 of the Canon of
Judicial Ethics requires that a judge should be studious of the principles of law
and Canon 18 mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the
integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depositary
of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.[33]}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Observance of the law which
he is bound to know and sworn to uphold is required of every judge.[34] When the
law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it;[35]
anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.[36] In
short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.[37]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Third, assuming ex gratia argumenti that there was indeed
a valid contempt charge filed against herein complainant, the validity of the
charge will not extricate respondent judge from his predicament. The records
disclose that the Return of the Writ[38] stated that a Charge Sheet[39] was filed
on May 13, 1999 against Ma Jing for violation of Section 37 [a] (7) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Despite this, respondent judge issued an Order
dated May 27, 1999[40] directing Ma Jings immediate release. It was grievous error
for respondent judge, in the face of these factual circumstances disclosed by the
records, to give due course to the petition for habeas corpus despite the pendency
of a deportation case against Ma Jing. Where the BID had not yet completed its
hearing and investigation proceedings with respect to an alien and there is no
showing that it is unduly delaying its decision, habeas corpus proceedings are
premature and should be dismissed.[41] Along the same vein, when an alien is
detained by the BID pursuant to an order of deportation, as in this case where a
Summary Deportation Order[42] had already been issued by the BID, Courts of First
Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, have no power to release the said alien on
bail even in habeas corpus proceedings, because there is no law authorizing it.
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It,
furthermore, must be pointed out that on May 28, 1999, complainant-respondent filed
a Motion for Reconsideration[44] of the said order but respondent judge denied the
same in an Order dated June 15, 1999,[45] and required complainant and his co-
respondents to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt. On the same
date, a Summary Deportation Order was issued in the BID Case against Ma Jing. The
filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively tolled the period within which
to appeal respondent judges decision dated May 27, 1999. It was not a pro forma
motion, as respondent judge himself did not say so in the June 15, 1999 order
denying the motion. The two-day period to appeal provided in Section 39, B.P. Blg.
129 certainly did not proscribe the filing of the motion for reconsideration of the
judgment in the habeas corpus case. The motion for reconsideration was filed on May
28, 1999, a day after the decision dated May 27, 1999 was received by complainant.
The Notice of Appeal,[46] on the other hand was filed on June 17, 1999. Complainant
and co-respondents received the order dated June 15, 1999 of respondent judge on
June 16, 1999. Since under Section 15, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the prisoner
shall be released if the officer or person detaining him does not desire to appeal,
complainant did not commit indirect contempt because of the timely filing of the
motion for reconsideration and later the notice of appeal.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Be that as it may, there was
a valid judicial process justifying Ma Jings detention even before respondent judge
rendered his decision as shown by the Return of the Writ which averred, among
others, that a Charge Sheet was filed against Ma Jing. Even granting that the
arrest of Ma Jing was initially illegal, the filing of the Charge Sheet cured
whatever incipient infirmity there was in her arrest. Respondent judge therefore
had no authority to release the party who was thus committed.[47] Section 4, Rule
102 of the Rules of Court provides:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If
it appears that the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or
if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may
no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information
and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued.[48] The writ of habeas corpus should not
be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court.
[49] The term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of
the Bureau of Immigration.[50]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It is significant to note vis--vis the foregoing
disquisitions that in it Decision dated May 4, 2000[51]in CA-G.R. SP No. 53425, the
Court of Appeals faulted respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion and gross
ignorance of the law in issuing the June 24, 1999 Order on similar grounds. In
castigating respondent judge, the appellate court minced no words:}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 When the inefficiency springs
from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in
the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of
the position and title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission
was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority[52] xxx
Thus, when the law transgressed is elementary the failure to know to observe it,
constitute gross ignorance of the law.[53] To be able to render substantial justice
and to maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges are expected to keep
abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence, consistent with the standard that
magistrates must be the embodiments of competence, integrity and independence.[54]}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Lastly,
it appears from the record that respondent judges malfeasance is not merely
confined to the abuse of his judicial prerogatives and ignorance of basic legal
precepts but also to the predilection of making false representations to suit his
ends. Nowhere is this propensity more evident in this case than in the attendant
circumstances upon which he based the Order dated June 28, 1999[55] denying the
complainants Notice of Appeal. A circumspect scrutiny of the said order reveals in
its first paragraph that it refers to respondents Notice of Appeal dated June 16,
1999 to which petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition to Notice of Appeal on June 29,
1999. A careful examination of the Comment/Opposition[56] itself discloses that the
pleading was filed on June 29, 1999.[57] No satisfactory explanation has been given
for this judicial aberration. Needless to state, the allusion contained in an order
to a pleading filed after its issuance can lead to no other conclusion than that
the said order was antedated and, thus, falsified in the absence of any explanation
to shed light on the discrepancy.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The foregoing act not only seriously undermines and
adversely reflects on the honesty and integrity of respondent judge as an officer
of the court; it also betrays a character flaw which speaks ill of his person.
Suffice it to state in this regard that [M]aking false representations is a vice
which no judge should imbibe. As the judge is the visible representation of the
law, and more importantly justice, he must therefore, be the first to abide by the
law and weave an example for the others to follow.[58]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 A verification with the OCA discloses
that aside from the instant complaint, respondent judge has other pending
administrative complaints filed against him for the same or similar offenses. In
A.M. No. RTJ-99-845, respondent judge stands charged with Serious Misconduct Re:
JDRC Case No. 2913, while in A.M. No. RTJ-00-972 he stands indicted for Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Bias, Abuse of Authority and Malicious Intent to Hinder and
Frustrate the Administration of Justice by Interfering with Orders and Processes of
a Co-equal Court. Needless to state, these circumstances only further erode the
peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary for it is the duty of all members of
the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity
of the judiciary which in recent times has been the object of criticism and
controversy.[59]}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Taking into account the prevailing circumstances of this case, the
Court believes that in lieu of the fine recommended by the investigating Justice, a
three (3) month suspension without pay would be a more appropriate penalty.}
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Rodolfo R. Bonifacio is SUSPENDED from the service for
three (3) months, without pay, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt
with more severely.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\dbch \af2 \hich \af0 \loch \af0
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 G.R. No.
92163}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \tab }
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 June 5,
MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner }{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR
(Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE
PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT
CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR
ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police
District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON
OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E.
PANLILIO, petitioners, }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE,
FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in
his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103,
NARVASA, J.:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Thirty-
four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs.
Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law
that would re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its
applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number of similar cases 2
that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it
would Beem, where season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract
wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none,
certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now
brought to bear on the same question.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of
February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by
law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The
warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel
of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State
Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil,
Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and
Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from
November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at
the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been
recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following
morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City
where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police
District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. 3}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile,
through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by
a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of
his constitutional rights in being, or having been:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 held to answer for criminal offense which does
not exist in the statute books;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 charged with a criminal offense in an information for which
no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence
was denied due process;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (c)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 denied his right to bail; and}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (d)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 arrested and detained on the strength of a
warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined
the existence of probable cause. 4}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5,
1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the
Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this case
and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by
two of Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and
raised similar questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does not
fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it very simply-the
information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a
necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against
Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion,
but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would
distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense
being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second
clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez
ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act
constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first
clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which,
therefore, it should not apply.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on
March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the same date 8
granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned
upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00
(for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The
Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more extended
resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed
that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of
the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against
granting bail to the Panlilios.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are
raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The parties' oral and written
pleas presented the Court with the following options:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view
expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion
cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code rebellion may properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this
option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not
offered in his written pleadings;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\lang1033 \langnp1033 hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in
furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to
acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes
of grave or less grave character;}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (c)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all
other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission
or in furtherance thereof.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court
voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should
be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its
substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new
ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view
is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President,
exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among
others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to
nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the
Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any
of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes
rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed
by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum
period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in
effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect
of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any
sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to
reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to
offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that
the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion
with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance,
thereof. While four Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were
not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient to
overcome what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing
of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under either of the
aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from
the majority opinion in that case:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-
why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder
were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately
(assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon
the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000
and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for
the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending
upon the modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of
aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in
the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if
construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to
the movant.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of
favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that
which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished
separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de
delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado
francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de
Espana, p. 2168.)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71
(later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as
amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables
en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de
ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 En estos casos solo se impondra la pena
correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que
represents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los
delitos.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Cuando
la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por
separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p.
2163)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 and
that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment,
restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum
period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable
if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in
our Penal Code does not, to
our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act
constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment
graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In
directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its
maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a
penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed
separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily
discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender
is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct
acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he
must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption
that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each
offense. 12}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling
of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the
occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended
effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 This, however, does not write finis to the case.
Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That
is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely provides
a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the
petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the
recourse he has taken.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the
information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense.
Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple
rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the
amended information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders,
arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of
rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the
perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the
aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum
penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision
mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy of this court
in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant
may be allowed bail. 13}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged
with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so
far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses
committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of
rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the
petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple
rebellion.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially
filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that
a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of
the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a
preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating
in the filing of the questioned information. 14 There is nothing inherently
irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an
offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by
the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It is also contended that the respondent
Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without first personally
determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation
the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the
Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the
unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it being
sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. 16 Petitioner
claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after
the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter
sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary
investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only
a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to
assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single
circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the
light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case,
and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should
be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable
before conviction, that must now be accepted
as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which
this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate
vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The criminal case
before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's
right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course
was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted
to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence
against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first
applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Even
acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the
information charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same
basis that it charges more than one offense, would not excuse or justify his
improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would
have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent
Judge. 18}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 There
thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded
the present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in
the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel
or of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were originally
justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought up
there instead of directly to this Court.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution
of any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent
Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial
courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental
importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them;
none, in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes
designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts.
Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court
against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not
thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail,
and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It
makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest
fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's
recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for
the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. 19
It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been
recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof
the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It is apropos to point out that the
present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a similar
situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of
the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The
proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner
may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Not only because popular interest seems
focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also because to wash the
Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it
has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so
doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition
interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that should have
started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for
was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Let it
be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will
give short shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the
judicial process and burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the
original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally
applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164)
which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is
therefore determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses have
uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused
of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before
NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into
custody and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-
they claim-of their constitutional rights.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the
act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies the
relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day
rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become
no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human
life, is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores
this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings
and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against
innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to, or
even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It is enough to
give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets
of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of
the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is
an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty
therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as
absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for
every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to
effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given
time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will
perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is
properly within its province.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the
doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed
against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio
must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled
to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant
of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in
both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail
to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of
the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become
functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 G.R. No. 141938 April 2, 2001}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 TUNG CHIN HUI, petitioner, }
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 vs.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 RUFUS
B. RODRIGUEZ, Commissioner of Immigration and the BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, respondents.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 PANGANIBAN, J.:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued in cases in
which the Bureau of Immigration has duly ordered the deportation of undocumented
aliens, specifically those found guilty of illegally entering the Philippines with
the use of tampered and previously cancelled passports.1\uc1 \u226 ?wphi1.n\uc1
\u234 ?t}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
Case}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Before
us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July
30, 1999 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 51723. The
dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appeal is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 "SO ORDERED."2}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The CA reversed the January 7, 1999
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, which disposed as follows:}
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition,
and as such, public respondent, Hon. Rufus Rodriguez, Commissioner Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, is hereby ordered to immediately release the person of
petitioner, Tung Chin Hui, from his official custody, upon receipt of this
Decision."4}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Also challenged by petitioner is the February 4, 2000 CA Resolution5
denying his Motion for Reconsideration.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Facts}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Petitioner, a "Taiwanese national,"6 arrived in this
country on November 5, 1998, as a temporary visitor. A few days later, he was
arrested by several policemen, who turned him over to the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Petitioner was duly charged. In due course, the Bill Board of
Commissioners issued a Summary Deportation Order dated November 25, 1998, finding
him guilty of possessing a tampered passport earlier cancelled by Taiwanese
authorities.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
December 11, 1998, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the ground that his detention was illegal. In their
Return of Writ, respondents denied petitioner's claim. In a Decision dated January
7, 1999, the trial court granted his Petition and ordered his release. In its
January 29, 1999 0rder, it denied respondents' Motion for Reconsideration.}
Respondents, who received the trial court's January 29, 1999 Order on February 11,
1999, then filed a Notice of Appeal on February 16, 1999. In an Order dated
February 18, 1999, the RTC rejected petitioner's Opposition and granted due course
to the Notice of Appeal.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Subsequently, the appellate court rendered its July 30, 1999 Decision,
which as earlier mentioned reversed the trial court.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Meanwhile, during the pendency of the
proceedings before the CA, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari7 before this
Court, docketed as GR No.137571, contending that the RTC should have rejected the
appeal for allegedly being filed late-beyond the 48-hour period provided under the
pre-1997 Rules of Court. In its September 21, 2000 Decision which became final on
October 31, 2000,8 this Court denied the Petition.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Ruling of the Court of Appeals}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The appellate court
held that petitioner was not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus, because the BID
Board of Commissioners had found him guilty of violating Section 37 (a) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. Citing documents from the Taiwan
Economic and Cultural Offices (TECO), the CA found that petitioner's passport had
been cancelled by the Republic of China on the ground that its holder was not the
real Tung Chin Hui, but a fugitive from justice who had tampered the passport. The
CA also held that the TECO documents, being public in nature, need not be testified
to by the persons who had issued them.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Hence, this Petition.9}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Issues}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In his Memorandum, petitioner submits
the following issues for the consideration of this Court:10}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 "A. PRINCIPAL ISSUES:}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (1) Is
the reglementary period within which to appeal in habeas corpus cases forty-eight
hours from notice of the Decision appealed from? (as petitioner contends); or is it
15 days similar to other cases from notice of the Decision? (as contended by the
respondents);}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 (2) Was the appeal taken by the respondents from the Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, denying respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration, proper? (as postulated by the respondents) or improper and not
allowable being violative of Sec. 1 (a), Rule 41, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure? (as comprehended by the petitioner)}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 A. SECONDARY ISSUES:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (1) Should the Court of Appeals give weight to findings
of fact arrived at by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, based on the
evidence presented or adduced during the trial of the case, in keeping with
established precedents?}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (2) May the Honorable Court of Appeals consider
extraneous facts brought out by the respondents in their memorandum but are not
supported by the evidence presented, identified and admitted by the trial court
during the hearing of the case?}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 (3) Did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction over
the case when the appeal was filed out of time and the Order appealed from is not
appealable?"}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the
main, this Court will resolve the propriety of issuing a writ of habeas corpus. As
a preliminary matter, the Court will also consider the propriety of the appeal
before the CA.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Court' s Ruling}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Petition is not meritorious.}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Preliminary Matter:}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Propriety of the
Appeal}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
Petitioner contends that the appeal from the trial court to the CA was improper for
two reasons: (1) it was filed beyond the reglementary 48-hour period provided under
the pre-1997 Rules of Court; and (2) it assailed not a judgment but a resolution
denying a motion for reconsideration, contrary to Section 111 of Rule 41.12}
Court already rejected the same arguments in its earlier Decision in GR No.
137571,13 which debunked petitioner's challenge to the propriety of the appeal.
Pertinent portions of that Decision are reproduced below:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 "Clearly then, the reglementary period
for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus case is now similar to that in ordinary
civil actions and is governed by Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules, which
provides:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 'SEC.
3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal
is required the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The period of
appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration
shall be allowed.'}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 In this light, the appeal was seasonably filed within the 15-day
reglementary period.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 xxx xxx xxx}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We agree with respondents. In referring to the trial
court's 'judgment,' respondents were dearly appealing the January 7, 1999 Decision.
Had they thought otherwise, they would have referred to the 'Order.' Indeed,
'judgment' is normally synonymous with 'decision.'}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Furthermore, the wrong date of the
appealed judgment may be attributed merely to inadvertence. Such error should not,
by itself, deprive respondents of their right to appeal. x x x."}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Main Issue:}
Propriety of the Writ of Habeas Corpus}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Habeas corpus is a writ directed to a person detaining
another, commanding the former to produce the body of the latter at a designated
time and place.14 Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ
of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The objective of the writ
is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful.13 If it
is, the writ cannot be issued.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the present case, petitioner's confinement is in
accord with Section 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended,
which reads as follows:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 "Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration
or of another officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the
alien:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 x x x
x x x x x x}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 (7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any
limitation or condition under which he was admitted as a non-immigrant;}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 x x x x x x
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 One
such condition for the admission of aliens is found in Section 10 of the same law,
which requires them to "present for admission into the Philippines unexpired
passports or official documents in the nature of passports issued by the
governments of the countries to which they owe allegiance or other travel documents
showing their origins and identity as prescribed by regulations, x x x."}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Herein petitioner
was properly charged before the Bureau of Immigration for illegally entering the
Philippines with the use of a passport issued to another person and cancelled by
the Taiwanese government in 1995. The Charge Sheet reads as follows:}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 "CHARGE SHEET}
undersigned Special Prosecutor charges for deportation CHEN KUAN-YUAN @ TUNG, CHIN-
HUI @ DONG TUNG, Taiwanese national for violation of Section 37 (a) (7) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, committed as follows:}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 'that on November
21, 1998. respondent was turned over by the Western Police District to immigration
authorities and upon investigation, it was found out that respondent [was] an
undocumented alien it appearing that respondent [was] in possession of a tampered
Taiwanese passport which was cancelled by Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on
July 19, 1995, in violation of Sec. 37 (a) (7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940, as amended.'"}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Subsequently, on November 25, 1998, the BID Board of Commissioners
issued the Summary Deportation Order, which is reproduced in full as follows:}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SUMMARY
DEPORTATION ORDER}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Records show that on November 21, 1998 respondent was turned over by
the WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT to immigration authorities and upon investigation, it
was found out that respondent [was] an undocumented alien, it appearing that he
[was] in possession of a tampered Taiwanese Passport which was cancelled by the
Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 10, 1995.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Accordingly, on November 25, 1998,
deportation charges were filed against respondent with the Board of Commissioners
for violation of Sec. 37 (a) (7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as
amended.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 After a
careful examination of the records, we determine that respondent has violated the
above-cited provision.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\dbch \af2 \hich \af0 \loch
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board of Commissioners hereby orders that
summary deportation of respondent, CHEN KUAN-YUAN @ TUNG CHIN-HUI @ DONG TUNG to
his country of origin subject to the submission of the usual clearances.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Include his name in
the Blacklist upon implementation of this Order.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Chief of the Civil Security Unit is
hereby directed to implement this Order within three (3) days from receipt hereof.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Give
respondent a copy of this Order.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 SO ORDERED."}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Echoing the holding of the RTC, herein petitioner argues
that no evidence was presented to prove that he was an "undocumented alien"; that
is, that he tampered with a passport that had already been cancelled by the
Taiwanese government. He further contends that he was in fact allowed to enter the
Philippines seventeen times from 1995 to 1998, notwithstanding the alleged
cancellation of his passport in 1995.16}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 These contentions are not meritorious. The Return of the
Writ submitted by respondents before the trial court clearly shows that petitioner
had lawfully been charged and ordered deported for being an undocumented alien.
Section 13, Rule 102 of the Ru1es of Court specifically provides that "the return
[of the writ] shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of the
restraint; x x x."}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Moreover, attached to the Return of the Writ were copies of official
letters of the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Offices. These documents show that
petitioner, whose real name is Chen Kuan-Yuan, was using a passport that had
already been cancelled by the Taiwanese government in 1995 and previously issued to
a man named Tung Chin Hui. The two letters are reproduced in full hereunder:}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 "November 24, 1998}
Honorable Rufus B. Rodriguez}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Commissioner }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Bureau of Immigration }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Magallanes Drive, Intramuros}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Manila}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Attention: Chief,
Intelligence Division}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Sir:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 \par }\pard \plain \ql \li0 \ri0 \lisb0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In behalf of the Bureau of Immigration
of the Republic of China, I would like to inform your good office that Taiwanese
fugitive MR. CHEN, KUAN-YUAN (D.O.B. 0ctober 12, 1956) tampered Republic of China
passport number M 9534820, issued to MR. TUNG, CHIN-HUI (D.O.B. November 28, 1956).
The said passport was cancelled by the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on July 19t 1995.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Very truly yours,}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 KUO, KUANG-KWO}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Senior Assistant}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Encl. Fingerprint of Mr. Tung, Chin-Hui"}{\fs18 \kerning2
\dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 November 19, 1998}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Honorable Rufus B.
Rodriguez}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
Commissioner }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Bureau of Immigration }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Magellanes Drive, Intramuros}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Manila}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Attention: Chief. Intelligence Division}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Sir:}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In behalf of the
Bureau of Immigration of the Republic of China, I have the honor to seek your kind
assistance to deport MR. CHEN, KUAN-YUAN (D.O.B. 12 October 1956). Mr. Chen was
sentenced to 8 years and 2 months imprisonment for drug trafficking and violation
of controlling guns, ammunition and knives law. Mr. Chen was arrested by the
Western Police District Command last November 16, 1998 through the request of the
Republic of China international Police. According to the travel record of the said
fugitive he has no record of leaving Taiwan.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Your immediate action and assistance in this matter will
be highly appreciated.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Very truly yours,}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 KUO, KUANG-KWO}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Senior Assistant"}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The above-quoted official letters demonstrate the
speciousness of petitioner's contention that his passport could not have been
cancelled in 1995, inasmuch as he was allowed to enter the country as late as 1998.
The letters show that the Philippine government was informed about the cancellation
only in 1998.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Furthermore, the foregoing letters of the official representative of
the Taiwanese government belie petitioner's submission that there was no evidence
to prove the findings of the CA and the Board of Commissioners.17 Verily, these
documents constitute sufficient justification for his deportation. As the Court
held in the landmark case Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco,18 "[t]he mere fact that a citizen
or subject is out of the territory of his country does not relieve him from that
allegiance which he owes to his government, and his government may under certain
conditions, properly and legally request his return."19}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Alleged Lack of Notice}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 We likewise reject
petitioner's reliance on the ruling of the trial court that "[w]hile it may be true
that there is a Summary Deportation Order against the petitioner allegedly for
being [an] undocumented alien, having used a passport which had already been
cancelled, there is no showing that he was informed about it."20}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Other than
petitioner's bare allegations, however, we find no sufficient basis to overturn the
presumption that the Bureau of Immigration conducted its proceedings in accordance
with law.21}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 In any event, when petitioner filed the Petition for Habeas Corpus
before the RTC, he was afforded ample opportunity to air his side and to assail the
legal and factual bases of the Board of Commissioners' Summary Deportation Order.
Moreover, he could have raised the same points in the proceedings before the CA and
even before this Court. Indeed, an alien has the burden of proof to show that he
entered the Philippines lawfully.22 Petitioner has not discharged this burden. He
has not controverted - either before the RTC, the CA or this Court - the Board of
Commissioners' ruling that he was in fact Chen Kuan-Yuan, who was "sentenced to 8
years and 2 months imprisonment for drug trafficking and violation of controlling
guns, ammunition and knives law and was holding a passport cancelled by the
Republic of China in 1995.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Just as unmeritorious is petitioner's contention that "at
the time of his detention, there was no deportation charge filed against him."23
Assuming arguendo that his arrest was illegal, supervening events bar his
subsequent release.24 In this case, when the Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed,
petitioner had already been charged and ordered deported by the Board of
Commissioners.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 In sum, we hold that petitioner's confinement was not illegal; hence,
there is no justification for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, he
has not shown any cogent reason to warrant the nullification of the Board of
Commissioners' Summary Deportation Order.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1\uc1 \u226 ?wphi1.n\uc1 \u234 ?t}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 \line }
{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 G.R. No.
93559 April 26, 1991}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\widctlpar \aspalpha \aspnum \adjustright
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 MAJOR ROMEO G.
ELEPANTE, petitioner, }{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, 1st Vice Executive Judge,
Branch 145, Makati, Metro Manila REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, and MAJ. GEN. RODOLFO
BIAZON, Commanding General, National Capital Region Defense Command, respondents.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Michael
P. Moralde for petitioner.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 PARAS, J.:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 This is a petition for certiorari questioning the
decision* dated May 24, 1990, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 145, National
Capital Judicial Region, Makati, Metro Manila dismissing Major Romeo Elepante's
petition for habeas corpus.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 It appears on record that on May 11, 1990, Major Romeo
Elepante filed a petition for habeas corpus with this Court docketed as G.R. No.
93172.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033
15, 1990, the Court resolved to issue a writ returnable to the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro Manila. Also this Court directed the latter
to hear and decide the case.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In an order dated May 17, 1990, Executive Judge Santiago
Ranada, Jr., assigned the case to Judge Job Madayag. The latter heard the case with
the conformity of the parties' lawyers.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the hearing on May 24, 1990, Romeo Elepante testified
that he is a Major in the Philippine Navy (Marines) and the Executive Officer of
the Metropolitan Citizens Military Training Command; that on April 15, 1990, at
about 3:00 o'clock in the morning, he was awakened in his house by a platoon of
armed soldiers led by Captain Doctor who informed him that he was invited by the
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; that the soldiers
brought him to the National Capital Region Defense Command where he was detained;
that there was no warrant for his arrest; that he was investigated for five (5)
days and confined as prisoner at Fort Bonifacio; that no formal charges have been
filed against him.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 Except for a xerox copy of an order of arrest and confinement dated
April 14, 1990, issued by Colonel Jorge Agcaoili, the Adjutant General of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, which was marked as Exhibit "1", Assistant Solicitor
General Zoilo A. Andin respondent's counsel, did not offer other documentary nor
testimonial evidence.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 On even date May 24, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision
dismissing for lack of merit the petition for habeas corpus. The trial court opined
that Major Elepante was arrested because of his involvement in several coup
attempts. Citing Article 70 of the Articles of War, the trial court stated that it
is the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines who can order his
release. It also pointed out that military procedure does not require that a formal
charge must be filed before a military officer may be arrested and confined on
orders of his commanding officer.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 On June 11, 1990, Major Elepante filed this petition for
review on certiorari, alleging inter alia, that there is no criminal complaint
filed against him so that his continued detention is a violation of the
Constitution. He also argues that confinement or detention is allowed under Article
70 of the Articles of War if a case is filed against a military officer.}{\fs18
\lin0 \rin0 \itap0 \fs21 \kerning2 \dbch
\lang1033 \langnp1033 In compliance with this Court's resolution En Banc dated June
21, 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its comment. In his comment the
Solicitor General pointed out that counsel for petitioner received on May 29, 1990,
a copy of the trial court's decision dated May 24, 1990, so that when he filed this
petition on June 11, 1990, the assailed decision had attained finality. Citing Rule
41, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Court, appeal in habeas corpus should be
filed within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment. The Solicitor
General also argued that petitioner may be confined or restricted on the mere
suspicion of having committed a crime or offense he being a military officer
subject to the provisions of Article 2 of the Articles of War and Section 8 of the
Manual of Court Martial.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033
\langnp1033 The first issue to be resolved is timeliness of the instant petition
for review on certiorari.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 Section 18 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court,
explicitly provides, viz:}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0
\lang1033 \langnp1033 Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. \uc1 \u8212 ? An
appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of the
court or the judge who rendered the judgment, within forty-eight (48) hours from
notice of such judgment, a statement that the person making it appeals therefrom.}
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 As
interpreted in the case of Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz (109 Phil. 379 [1960]), which
also involved a habeas corpus case, this Court ruled that the requirement under
Section 18 of Rule 41 of the Old Rules of Court which provides that an appeal in
habeas corpus should be perfected within twenty-four (24) hours (now forty-eight
hours under Rule 41, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Court), is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional. Hence, this Court has no other alternative but to
dismiss the appeal filed out of time.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 The Saulo case was cited in Medina v. Yan (60 SCRA 73
[19741) where the Court ruled that appeal in habeas corpus from the decision of the
CFI shall be taken to the Court of Appeals where it involves factual questions or
directly to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. Amplifying the Saulo
ruling, this Court ruled that the decision of the Judge to whom the writ is made
returnable, either for the release of the detainee or for sustaining his detention,
if not appealed on time, can become final just like an ordinary case.}{\fs18
\kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In computing the
forty-eight (48) hour period of appeal, this Court in Kabigting v. Director of
Prisons (6 SCRA 281 [1962]), ruled that the date on which the decision was
promulgated and/or served is not counted and the period starts to run the following
day unless the same by a Sunday or legal holiday in which case the period of appeal
is to be considered from the succeeding day. To perfect an appeal, a notice of
appeal is required to be filed with the Clerk of Court or Judge who rendered the
judgment (Rule 41, Section 18, Revised Rules of Court).}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 In the case at bar, counsel for
petitioner received on May 29, 1990 a copy of the trial court's decision dated May
24, 1990 (Rollo, p. 8).1\uc1 \u226 ?wphi1 Clearly when he filed the instant
petition on June 11, 1990, thirteen (13) days had lapsed, so it was filed outside
the forty-eight (48) hour reglementary period. This being so, the decision sought
to be reviewed is already final so that this Court following the Saulo ruling, has
no alternative but to dismiss the instant petition.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0
\hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang1033 \langnp1033 However, this Court as protector of the
rights of the people, must stress the point that if the participation of petitioner
in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of Adjutant General
Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be filed against him or the
existence of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military commission is
wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to
release petitioner. Respondents must also be reminded that even if a military
officer is arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite
confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof, mandates that immediate steps
must be taken to try the person accused or to dismiss the charge and release him.
Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying
the case to a final conclusion may even be punished as a court martial may direct.}
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the petition is hereby DISMISSED for the decision sought
to be reviewed is already final and (b) General Rodolfo Biazon or his successor is
directed to take appropriate action.}{\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0
\dbch \af2 \hich \af0 \loch \af0 {\fs18
\af0 {\fs18 \kerning2 \dbch \af0 \hich \af0 \loch \f0 \lang9 \langnp9 \par }}

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