Logic of phantasy 12

JACQUES LACAN

雅克 拉岡

SEMINAR 14: THE LOGIC OF FANTASY

The Logic of Fantasy 4

幻见的逻辑

That does not at all mean that that is all that can happen! Let us suppose the same protasis false and

the

apododis true. Well then, the Stoics will tell you that this is true, because very precisely ex falso sequitur

quodlibet. From the false there can be implied the true just as much as the false and, consequently, if it

is true, there (10) is no logical objection here. Implication does not mean the cause, implication means

this liaison in which there are united, in a certain fashion, as regards the truth table, the protasis and the

apodosis.

那丝毫並不意味着，这一切都会发生。让我们假设相同的先决条件是虚假，而结果条件是真实。好，斯多葛

学派会告诉你，这是真实，因为确实这是逻辑的爆炸原理。从虚假当中，同样可以涵盖着真实与虚假。结果

是，假如这句陈述为真实，在此就没有逻辑上的異议。涵盖並不意味着原因，涵盖意味着这种联系，关於

真理的表格，先决条件跟结果条件，以某种方式的联合。

The only thing that cannot happen, at least this is the doctrine of someone called Philon who played

here an eminent role, is that the protasis is true and the apodosis false. The true cannot imply the false.

This is the most radical foundation of any possibility of handling, in a certain relation to the truth, the

signifying chain as such. We have here then the possibility of a table which, I repeat, is constructed in

this fashion:

p => q | p q

T|TT

F|FT

唯一不会发生的事情，至少这是某一位名叫菲荣的人的信条，他在这里扮演一个重要的角色。这个信条是：

先决条件为真实，而结果条件为虚假。真实不能涵盖虚假。这就是人作为一个意符的锁链，处理跟真理的某

种关系的的可能性中，最激进的基础。我们在此有可能将它列成一个表格，我重复一遍，这个表格被以这

种方式建构：

p => q | p q

T|TT

F|FT

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Namely, when the proposition p being true, the proposition q is false, then the liaison of implication is

connoted as false. What does that mean? Naturally, the most radical conditions for the existence of a

logic, as I told you. The problem is quite obvious. This is what we for our part have to do, when we

subsequently shall have to speak about what is written there. In other words, when the stating subject

(sujet de l'enonciation) comes into play. In order to highlight it, we have only to observe what happens

when we say: "it is true that it is false". Its does not budge, namely, quite simply the false. All the same,

this is not nothing. To say: "it is false that it is true", has the same result, I mean that we ground the

false, but, is it quite the same thing? Were it only to indicate the following that we have to note, that we

will say rather: "it is false that it might be true". The use of the subjunctive indicates to us here that

something is happening.

换句话说，当命题p 为真实，命题q 为虚假，那麽涵盖的联系被标明为虚假。那是什麽意思？当然，如我

曾经告诉过你们，这是一个逻辑存在的最激进的条件。这个问题是相当显而易见的。就我们而言，这是我们

必须要做的事，当随后我们将必须要谈到在那里被书写的是什麽？换句话说，陈述的生命主体运作其间。

为了强调它，我们所必需做的事，就是观察发生什麽事，当我们说：「这是虚假，这句话是真实的。」它並

没有让步，换句话说，虚假仅就是虚假。儘管这样，这並非没有发挥空间。假如我们说：「这是真实，这句

话是虚假。」结果还是一样。我的意思是，我们以虚假为基础，但是，这是完全相同的事情吗？万一它指明

我们必须注意的下列事实，我们宁可说：「这可能是真实，这句话是虚假。」在此，假设法的使用对我们指

明，某件事情正在发生。

To say: "it is true that it is true", can also be said and leaves us an assured truth, even though it is

tautological, but to say: "it is false that it is false", no doubt does not assure the same order of truth.

To say: "it is not false", does not mean to say for all that: "it is true".

「这是真实的，这句话为真实」的陈述也能够被说出，並且留给我们一个千真万确的真理，即使内容是同义

反复，但是，「这是虚假的，这句话是虚假」的陈述，无可置疑地，並没有给我们确认有相同的真理的层次。

「这並不是虚假」的陈述，並不是意味着对大家说：「这是真实的」。

We see again then, with the dimension of stating, there being put in suspense something that was only

asking to function, in a quite automatic fashion at the level of writing. (11) This is why it is altogether

striking to note what is the slippery aspect of this point where the drama, as I might say, arises very

exactly from this duplicity of the subject, and it is the one that, I must say, I will not hesitate to

illustrate with a little story, to which I already alluded on many occasions because it did not fail to have

an impact (let us say: the career of my little story).

於是我们再一次看出，从陈述的向度，有某件仅是要求运作的东西，在书写的层次，自动运转地，被悬置

在那里。这就是为什麽，这是那麽耐人寻味，当我们注意到，当生命的主体口是心非地欺骗时，这个溜滑

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的一面是什麽。就是这个欺骗，我必须说，我将毫不犹豫地用一个小故事作为说明。我曾经在许多场合提过

这个故事，因我它一定会产生效果（让我们说：我平凡一生的故事。）

This kind of complaint, indeed exigency, which one day emerged precisely from the throat of someone

who was very seduced by what I was contributing in terms of the first articulations of my teaching, a

touching ejaculation launched towards the heavens: "Why" said this personage, "why does he not say

the true about the true?" This sort of urgency, indeed unease, would already find its answer sufficiently, I

think, on this single condition of going again to the written signifier.

这种抱怨确实是有迫切需要，有朝一日，确实就会从某一个人的喉咙里发出，当他被我教学的循循善诱所

诱导，感慨万千地仰天长叹：「为什麽？」这个人问，「为什麽关於真实的事，他不说真实的话？」这种迫切

性，确实令人遄遄不安，可是我认为，人作为这个被书写的意符的基本条件下，它的回答不明而喻。

The true about the true! The T about the T. The signifier cannot signify itself, except precisely when it is

not itself that it signifies, namely, when it uses metaphor. And there is nothing to prevent the metaphor

which substitutes a different signifier for this T of the truth, from making the truth re-emerge at this

moment, with the ordinary effect of metaphor, namely: the creation of a false signified.

关於真实的事，真实地说出！问题是，意符无法使自己被意符化，除非它使之意符化的不是它自身。换句

话说，它使用比喻。比喻用一种不同的意符，来代替真理的真实性。但是，没有一样东西能够阻挡比喻，不

会使真理在这个时刻，重新出现。比喻能够产生一般的效果，换句话说，比喻能够創造一个虚假的被意符

化的生命的主体。

This even happens all the time. And in connection with discourse, however rigorous I am attempting to

make it today, this may still, in many corners of what one calls more or less appropriately your brain,

generate these worst of confusions, linked precisely to the production of the signified in metaphor.

这种情况甚至始终在发生。关於真理的论述，无论我今天多麽费心，企图要表达它，在我们适当地所谓的

你们的大脑的角落，这依旧会产生最恶化的混乱，跟用比喻产生的被意符化的生命主体，密切相连。

Certainly, it is not astonishing that it comes to my ears that from the same source, then, from which

there was produced this nostalgic invocation, a recent statement should have taken as aim, concerning

what Freud taught, what this mouth articulated so elegantly as a "conceptual watering down". There is

here, in effect, a certain sort of admission in which precisely there is designated the following: the close

relation that the partial object has with the structure of the subject.

的确，这並不令人惊奇。我听到一个最近的陈述，从相同的来源，从这个来源，怀旧的召唤被产生。关於佛

洛伊德的学说，这个嘴巴如此优雅地表达，作为「概念的稀释」，这个最近的陈述本来应该拿它当一个目标。

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事实上，这里有某种的承认，有底下的事实被指明：部分的小客体，跟人作为生命主体的结构，有密切的

关系。

The ideal or even, simply, the fact of admitting that it is possible in any way to comment on a text of

Freud by watering down his concepts invincibly evokes what can in no way satisfy the function of the

partial object: the partial object ought to be able to be settled. In no way can the mustard pot, the

mustard pot that I defined at one time as being necessarily empty (empty of mustard naturally) be filled

in a satisfying fashion with what this watering down sufficiently evokes, namely, soft shit.

这个理想，或是简单地说，承认我们可能使用稀释概念的方式，来评论佛洛伊德的的文本。这个事实必然

会让人联想到，部分小客体的功用根本就无法达成的目标：这个小客体应该能够稳定下来。芥末酱缸，我

有一次描述为必然要是虚空的芥末酱缸（当然是芥末的虚空），根本就为无法填满到令人满足，用这种稀

释的方式所召唤，换句话说，用鬆软的芥末。

It is extremely essential to see the consistency, precisely, between these primordial objects and any

correct handling of a dialectic that is described as subjective.

这是极端重要的，要準确地看出它们的一致性，处在这些原始的客体，与任何正确的方式处理一种辩证法

之间，因为这种辩证法被描述为饿主观性的。

To take up again, then, the first steps that we have taken as regards implication, it is necessary to see

there arising here - in this joint between the truth and this (12) handling of writing - to see what is

involved, namely: what can be written and what cannot be.

为了再一次演算涵盖，我们曾经採取的前面几个步骤，就是需要看出那里出现的东西，处於真理与书写的

处理之间的这个连接，要看出里面牵涉到什麽。换句话说，什麽能够被书写与什麽不能够。

What is meant by this "cannot be" whose definition, at the limit, remains entirely arbitrary? The only limit

posed, in modern logic to the functioning of an alphabet, in a certain system, the only limit being that of

the initial, axiomatic, given word. What is meant by this "cannot be?" It has its sense in the initial

interdictory word that is given, but what can be written about it? The problem of negation is to be posed

at the level of writing, in so far as it regulates it as logical functioning.

这个「不能够被书写」是什麽意思？它的定义，发挥到极限，始终是言人人殊。在某个语言体系里，有关字

母的功用的现代逻辑，被形成唯一的限制。这个唯一的限制就是，初始的、自明的某个特定的字。
「不能够被

书写」是什麽意思？在书写的层次上，有关否定的问题应该被提出，因为否定规范书写，作为逻辑的功用。

Here, immediately, of course, there appears to us the necessity which gave rise at first to this use of

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negation in these intuitive images marked by the first outline of what people did not even know then was

an edge: the images in a way of a limit, the one in which the first logic, the one introduced by Aristotle,

predicative logic, marks the field in which a class is characterised by a given predicate and the outside

this field as designated by not joined to the predicate.

当然，在此，我们立刻会面临这个首先产生否定的使用的需要，在这些直觉的意象中。人们自己甚至不知

道，生命的边缘所形成的最初的轮廓，会造成这些直觉的意象，生命终归有盡的意象。第一个逻辑，亚里

斯多德介绍的第一个逻辑，述词表述的逻辑，标示了这个领域。在这个领域里，界定一个物种的特性，是

某一个特定的述词及「这个领域之外」的东西。这个东西的指标则是「没有跟述词连接」。

雄伯译

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