Erkenn (2011) 75:1935

DOI 10.1007/s10670-011-9274-2

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function

of Epistemic Evaluations

Steven L. Reynolds

Received: 6 July 2009 / Accepted: 20 February 2011 / Published online: 27 March 2011
 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract Control of our own beliefs is allegedly required for the truth of epi-
stemic evaluations, such as S ought to believe that p, or S ought to suspend
judgment (and so refrain from any belief) whether p. However, we cannot usually
believe or refrain from believing at will. I agree with a number of recent authors in
thinking that this apparent conflict is to be resolved by distinguishing reasons for
believing that give evidence that p from reasons that make it desirable to believe
that p whether or not p is true. I argue however that there is a different problem, one
that becomes clearer in light of this solution to the first problem. Someones
approval of our beliefs is at least often a non-evidential reason to believe, and as
such cannot change our beliefs. Ought judgments aim to change the world. But
ought to believe judgments cant do that by changing the belief, if they dont give
evidence. So I argue that we should instead regard epistemic ought judgments as
aimed mainly at influencing assertions that express the belief and other actions
based on the belief, in accord with recent philosophical claims that we have epi-
stemic norms for assertion and action.

There has been much discussion recently of a philosophical problem about our
control of our own beliefs.1 Such control is alleged to be required for the truth of
normative judgments, such as S ought to believe that p, S ought not to believe
that q, or S ought to suspend judgment (and so refrain from any belief) whether
r. Some of those ought judgments seem to be true. But if ought implies can,
then in cases where one ought to believe that p, one can believe that p, and where
one ought to refrain from believing that q, one can refrain from believing that q.

1
Early influential papers include Williams (1973) and Alston (1985, 1989).

S. L. Reynolds (&)
Department of Philosophy, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-4302, USA
e-mail: steven.reynolds@asu.edu

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20 S. L. Reynolds

But it seems we cannot believe or refrain from believing at will or voluntarily. We

cant refrain from believing it is snowing when we see it snowing, nor can we
choose to believe (fully) that it is snowing, or to believe (fully) that it is not
snowing, if we have obviously inadequate evidence about the weather. (We might of
course have partial belief or some kind of acceptance that doesnt amount to belief
in that case). So there is said to be a conflict between the alleged implications of the
normative judgments we make about our beliefs and our apparent inability to
control those beliefs.
Various ways to address this problem have been proposed. I think that the correct
view holds that we do exercise effective control over our beliefs. This is not
however to be confused with the view that we can believe, or refrain from believing,
at will, a view known as doxastic voluntarism. The apparent conflict between our
normative judgments about belief and our inability to believe or refrain from
believing at will can be resolved by making a distinction among the kinds of reason
for believing, as Pamela Hieronymi and others have argued. We can believe or we
can refrain from believing if we have the right kinds of reasons.
I shall argue that there is a different but related problem, one that this solution to
the first problem only makes clearer. The problem just mentioned concerns the truth
of ought judgments, alleging that their truth is incompatible with our apparent lack
of control over the beliefs so judged. The problem I shall try to solve concerns
instead the purpose of these ought judgments. As with ought judgments
generally, our judgments about what people ought to believe aim at changing the
world.2 But its hard to see how these ought judgments can accomplish their
ostensible purpose of changing the world, if the believers the judgments are about
dont have the ability to change their beliefs in response to those judgments.
Accomplishing the world-changing purpose of epistemic ought judgments seems
to require the truth of doxastic voluntarism. I shall argue that this problem about
epistemic ought judgments persists even after we make the distinction among

2
This is of course intended only as a broad general characterization of the function of ought judgments
and so we should expect many exceptions, real and apparent. Ought judgments about past occurrences
are obviously not intended to change those past events, but as endorsements of implied standards they
may influence similar future actions and occurrences. Conditional oughts may have the ostensible aim of
affecting how something is done, if it is done, while not urging anyone to do it, and even have the aim of
discouraging the indicated conduct. If you choose to major in philosophy, you ought to take business
courses too. Sometimes ought judgments are predictions, as in She ought to arrive by three oclock
spoken in circumstances where there can be no question of influencing the arrival time. There is
commonly still a normative component howevernotice that if the speaker later came to believe the
prediction was unreasonable the claim might be withdrawn. I was mistaken in thinking that she ought to
have arrived then, as the buses dont run that frequently. If the subject of the claim was at fault on the
other hand, because she stopped to browse in a bookstore, upsetting the implied schedule, the ought
claim may not be withdrawn: She ought to have arrived at three, but she stopped at a book store. It
failed as prediction, but it may still be correct as a normative judgment. Even if the prediction is The
weather ought to be fair one may refuse to retract it when it rains. It ought to have been fair, given the
forecast and all of past experience in June. One might hope for a taxonomy of ought judgments that
would clearly distinguish those that really aimed to change the world from those that (only) had some
other purpose, but such a project even if successful seems unlikely to be more useful than just using our
existing abilities to discern intentions of speakers given sufficient information about particular cases.
(Thanks to Matthew Chrisman for comments that inspired this note.).

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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations 21

kinds of reasons for belief change that Hieronymi and others have recommended. I
will then recommend a solution to this further problem.
But to motivate this problem about the function of epistemic ought judgments,
let us first briefly review some other ways to try to resolve the apparent problem for
the truth of those judgments. The review will also motivate the idea that ought
implies can should be understood, not on the model of logical implication, but
rather as a somewhat misleadingly formulated counsel regarding when it is sensible
to attempt normative persuasion by expressing an ought judgment.
One way to avoid the apparent conflict between the truth of epistemic ought
judgments and our inability to control our beliefs is simply to give up ought
judgments about believing, holding that all such judgments are false. Talk of what
we ought to believe is at best a sort of loose talk, a way of intimating something
else. But this way out seems implausible, because judgments about what we ought
to believe often seem to be true, even on thoughtful reconsideration. You really
ought not to believe it is snowing if you have no relevant evidence about the
weather.
Another way out, which accommodates our intuitions that ought judgments
regarding beliefs are often true, is to hold that we misunderstand them when we
analogize them to our moral or rational ought judgments about acts (Plantinga
1993). S ought to believe p doesnt attribute anything like a duty to S, and
therefore doesnt imply that S has the kind of control over her believing that p that
the judgment S ought (morally or rationally) to do A implies she has over doing
A. The epistemic ought judgment perhaps merely means something like It would
be good [proper functioning? healthy?] if S believed that p. Such evaluative
judgments can be true even if we dont control our believing.
The difficulty with this way out is that when we say of someone that they believe
as they ought not, or that they ought to believe but do not, it seems we are criticizing
them. We are not merely saying that they happen to lack something it would be nice
to have. Rather we seem to be pointing out something wrong that should be
changed. That might of course be compatible with not having a duty to believe, in
some strict sense of duty. It sounds a bit odd to say that someone has a duty to
believe that it is snowing when she is seeing it snowing.3 If a determined skeptic
about the external world, by thinking intently on the familiar skeptical arguments,
succeeds in not believing that it is snowing, even as she watches the snow fall, has
she really failed to perform an epistemic duty? If not, then we seem to need some
other account of why it nevertheless seems to be a criticism of her to say that she
ought to believe it is snowing.
A third way out is to suggest that the next step in the argument, the ought
implies can principle, is false in general, or at least that it does not apply to
epistemic ought judgments (Ryan 2003). That it is false in general is suggested by
the fact that one may have duties that one cannot fulfill. For example, if I have
promised to repay a debt on a certain date, but have no money, it is still true that I
ought to pay it. So ought does not imply can in that case.

3
See Plantinga (1993) for extensive argument that it is a mistake to treat epistemic norms on the model
of moral duty.

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But there are restricted areas of normative judgment where it seems reasonable to
hold that ought implies can. Probably the most plausible area in which to hold an
exceptionless ought implies can principle would be where one is deliberating
what to do. That one (really) cannot now do A seems to be a sufficient reason to
eliminate A from consideration about what to do now, even if A continues to be
something one ought to do from a moral point of view. (That one still ought morally
to do it should of course influence ones subsequent choices, e.g., whether to
apologize, or to plan to make reparations.) All things considered, I ought to pay
that debt now cant be a reasonable conclusion about what I ought to do now if I
really have no money and no way to get any. Perhaps ought implies can should
be regarded as a principle that applies only to deliberation about what to do, all
things considered.4
However, there still seems to be a need for something like an ought implies
can principle for other uses of ought. Thus it seems to be an objection to a
proposed moral principle that it mandates conduct of which ordinary human beings
are incapablee.g., a utilitarian principle according to which one always ought to
act consciously and deliberately for what one takes to be the good of all, never
preferring ones own interests above others interests. We may admire such counsels
of saintliness, but it wouldnt be reasonable to demand that everyone follow them, at
least partly because most people cant comply. Another example: It might be said
that a teacher ought to have a complete understanding of any subject she undertakes
to teach. But actual human teachers who are charged with teaching anything more
than the simplest elements of a subject usually cant achieve such understanding in
the time they have available. This normative claim seems to be mere hyperbole, not
something that could guide our conduct. We do, as we say, the best we can. In
philosophy something like the ought implies can principle is invoked by those
who criticize certain doctrines as literally unbelievable, in spite of arguments that
apparently should be convincing. If we really cant believe it, then it is not the case
that we ought to believe it, however unanswered the arguments.
I am not of course claiming that all (or any) of these invocations of something
like an ought implies can principle are correct. But such invocations seem to be
appropriate in a wide variety of cases, and that indicates something important about
proper constraints on normative claims. It seems that we do, and apparently should,
respect something like an ought implies can principle more widely than merely
for cases of deciding what to do. I think however that it is probably a mistake to
think of this on the model of logical or conceptual implication, as in ought implies
can. It is better regarded as a pragmatic counsel that governs sensible attempts at
normative suasion. There is no point in urging people to do something that they
really cant do. You ought to do A is sufficiently answered by saying I really
cant. But to say that someone ought not to believe that p often seems reasonable,
not like the unreasonable demands exemplified in the previous paragraph. It seems
4
I think Sharon Ryans examples (Ryan 2003, pp. 5056) do not indicate that this very narrow version of
the principle is false. Wedgewood (2006) develops a semantics for this sort of ought, where (roughly) S
ought to A iff A-ing is part of every correct plan for S. Different sorts of deliberation or deliberation
analogs are supposed to allow the semantics to encompass other sorts of ought judgments. Ought
implies can is included in the semantics by requiring that the correct plans be realizable.

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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations 23

that we still need to endorse something like ought implies can, with appropriate,
but not easy to formulate, exceptions and qualifications. So we must still consider
whether it applies to the case of belief.
A fourth way to avoid the apparent conflict is to argue that we do in fact have the
kind of control over our beliefs implied (or at least suggested) by these ought
judgments (Ryan 2003, pp. 6274; Hieronymi 2006, 2008; Steup 2000, 2008). On
these views, there is some confusion in our consideration of the cases that seem to
indicate that we lack such control. The confusion concerns the reasons offeredwe
can believe as we ought, but not for the reasons suggested in the cases. As Ive said,
I think this view is roughly correct. We do control our beliefs, although we cant
believe at will.
To begin our review of this resolution of the puzzle, and to prepare the ground for
my related problem, let us take a closer look at an example that is said to illustrate
the problem:
I am now sitting at my desk with my back to the window. I have not looked
outside for several hours to check the weather. About half the time it snows
here in Rochester during the winter, and today is a typical winter day. I am
unsure whether it is snowing at the moment. I cannot, just by thinking about it,
get myself to believe that it is snowing now. Nor can I get myself to believe
that it is not snowing. Suppose that a colleague comes into my office and, for
some odd reason, offers me a little money if, without first looking out the
window, I form the belief that it is snowing right now. I would like the money
and I think that it would be beneficial (and without any significant drawbacks)
if I formed the belief. Unfortunately, I would not be able to do it. In fact, I do
not know exactly what to do in order to get myself to have the belief.
(Feldman 2008, pp. 340341)
Obviously, this is not a case in which one ought to believe, but cannot. It is not
the case in Feldmans story that he ought to believe that it is snowing. Rather he
ought to refrain from believing that it is snowing, and also from believing that it is
not snowing, and he is suspending judgment, as he ought, about whether it is
snowing. It follows that, in this case, he can do what he ought to do. It is not a
counterexample to the principle that if one ought to believe, or ought to refrain from
believing, then one can believe or refrain.
Feldman does not claim that his example is a counterexample to the principle that
epistemic ought implies can, as such. Rather it is a counterexample to the related
claim that we have voluntary control over our believing, a control that, when
exercised in a particular case, includes the ability to believe and also the ability to
refrain from believing. Apparently this is taken to be what is usually intended by
saying that ought implies can. Perhaps, to make the principle invoked fully
explicit, it really should be said that S ought to X implies both S can X and also
S can refrain from X-ing.
Such a principle seems somewhat plausible for S ought to A where A is an act
and the ought is moral or rational in character. It is a principle of alternate
possibilities, like the principle that alleges that one freely As, and so is responsible
for A-ing, only if one could A and also could refrain from A-ing. Such principles

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have been much discussed in connection with Frankfurts counterexamples

(Frankfurt 1969). In one such example the subject knowingly sets off a bomb in
a public place, but if he had been inclined instead to decide not to set it off, some
science fictional apparatus would have prevented him from making that decision. So
he could not have refrained from setting it off. In these cases it seems we are still
inclined to hold that he ought not to have triggered the bomb and that he is
responsible for his act. But such cases seem to be very rare, if they occur at all, so it
may still be hoped that clever amendments may preserve something like a principle
of alternate possibilities for action.
An example for belief in the spirit of Frankfurts examples is Plantingas brain
lesion case (Plantinga 1993, p. 44). He imagines he has a brain lesion that produces
a belief that he will be the next president of the United States. This belief is contrary
to all his evidence: he has never held elective office, has no natural base of political
support, no position in the line of succession, etc. No matter what he does in the way
of considering the evidence, he will continue to believe that he will be the next
president, and therefore to believe as he ought not. Normative persuasion in such a
case seems irrelevant or pointless. Some sort of medical intervention would be
required to allow him to believe as he ought.
But it seems unlikely that a principle of alternate possibilities is even
approximately true for our normal beliefs. We dont usually have the ability to
believe and also the ability instead to refrain from believing, as the very ordinary
example from Feldman illustrates. Thats not to say that we never have such control
of course. There are some rather common sorts of cases where we do exercise
voluntary control over our beliefs. Thus, in another example due to Feldman (2004,
p. 171), I can either believe that the light in the office is on, or that it is off,
producing either belief just by flipping a light switch. I can come to believe that I
will be home at a certain time by deciding to be there, or that I will not be home by
deciding otherwise, and so on. Ginet (2001, p. 64) notices another rather frequently
occurring kind of case: suppose that I am in the first hour of a long car trip, and
suddenly feel unsure whether I locked the door to my home. I could worry about it
for several days, or I could turn back to check the door. But I could also decide to
believe that I did lock the door, by firmly telling myself so, and then putting it out
of my mind. That doesnt always work, of course, but sometimes it does, so that it
comes as a surprise when I find the door unlocked on returning home at the end of
the trip.5 Still, cases where we are unable to change our beliefs seem to be even
more common. In those cases we cant believe or refrain from believing at will.
Some philosophers argue that, although we cant usually believe at will, we do
have appropriate control over our believing. The most promising version of this idea
holds that the impression that we lack such control arises through a confusion about
the kinds of reasons for which one can believe or refrain from believing (Hieronymi
2005, 2006, 2008; Ryan 2003; Steup 2008, p. 380). An offer of money, however
much one may want money, is not a reason to believe or to refrain from believing.

5
The cases where there is no surprise on finding the door unlocked, in spite of ones persistent
affirmations to oneself in the interim, are presumably cases of acceptance that dont amount to genuine
belief.

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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations 25

This is not merely a normative claim, to the effect that one should not allow ones
beliefs to be affected by considerations of monetary gain. It is also a claim that such
reasons are normally causally ineffective in producing the doxastic states for which
one is to be paid.6 In Feldmans case his colleagues offer of money doesnt engage
with his psychology in such a way as to produce a state of believing that it is
snowing (at least when combined with the requirement that he not look out the
window). But his colleagues saying Its snowing again, while looking out the
window, would lead Feldman, if the situation were otherwise normal, to believe that
it is snowing. One is an appropriate and effective reason to believe that it is
snowing, and the other isnt.
So how are the two kinds of reason for belief to be distinguished? Roughly, the
right sort of reasons for belief seem to have something to do with evidence for the
proposed belief, and the wrong sort of reasons seem to be non-evidential. Pamela
Hieronymi suggests that we should distinguish them as constitutive and extrinsic
reasons. Constitutive reasons for belief that p pertain to the question whether p, and
will tend to resolve that question for the subject, thereby producing either a belief
that p or a belief that not p. Extrinsic reasons for the belief that p pertain rather to the
question whether it would be a good or desirable thing to believe that p, and if they
resolve that question, will normally produce a desire to believe that p or a desire to
not believe that p. They are constitutive reasons to desire to believe that p, but only
extrinsic reasons to believe that p. Feldmans seeing snow out the window would
answer for him the question whether it is snowing, thus being a constitutive reason
for believing that it is snowing. His having that reason would normally result in his
believing that it is snowing. His hearing a co-worker offer him money to believe that
it is snowing would answer for him the question whether it is then desirable to
believe that it is snowing, thus leading him to desire to believe that it is snowing.
But it wouldnt lead him to believe that it is snowing, because it wouldnt answer
the question whether it is snowing. Constitutive and extrinsic reasons answer
different questions and thereby tend to produce different attitudes.7
Extrinsic reasons for believing or refraining from believing do sometimes
influence our believing. Suppose I have just heard on the news that a plane I believe
my mother to have been on has been lost. But I cannot bear to think she is dead, so I
find myself repeating obsessively that she may have changed flights. That I find it

6
And on some accounts, causally ineffective for conceptual reasonsthat is, if it were effective, the
state produced couldnt count as a belief (Williams 1973; Hieronymi 2006).
7
Hieronymi is also attempting to give a schematic answer to a larger question, how to give an account of
the nature of the wrong kind of reasons for a variety of different sorts of attitudes, including fearing
that, wishing that, intending to, and so on. Each attitude will have a different associated question, and
answering the appropriate question will tend to produce that attitude by giving a constitutive reason for it.
Answers to the wrong question will not be constitutive reasons to hold that attitude. An example
involving a non-belief attitude: If I hear that fearing the results of X winning the election will obtain me a
cordial meeting with very attractive person S, that might be a reason to desire to fear the victory of X. But
it is not a constitutive reason to fear it, because it indicates no danger in that victory. Perhaps there are
parallel problems for other propositional attitudes toobeing told that we ought not to fear X is normally
ineffective in removing our fears, unless supplemented by a reason for thinking X is not dangerous. But
here I will focus on the case of belief, as quite enough for one paper. Thanks to an anonymous referee for
Erkenntnis for pointing out the similarity of considerations here.

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26 S. L. Reynolds

too painful to accept is not an answer to the question whether she was on the plane,
but an answer to the question whether it is desirable to believe it. Still it seems to be
leading me to refrain from believing in this case.
As Shah and Velleman notice however, this sort of interference in the process of
inquiry works best, or perhaps only, if one doesnt consciously notice it. One mostly
cant deliberately skew the process to arrive at the belief state one finds desirable.8
Even where there is something we can deliberately do to try to arrive at a given
belief state, and succeed, it seems that that still wont be believing for the reason
that it would be good, for reasons irrelevant to the truth, to so believe. That it will be
good to believe that p, in some respect other than the truth of p, is only our reason
for doing whatever it was that brought it about that we believe.
There is another difference from our abilities to act, which may be related to our
sense that we can act, but not believe or refrain from believing, at will. When I am
deciding whether to do A, at least where A is something that is not very important to
me, it seems that I could choose to act in the absence of a deciding reason, or
perhaps even against the preponderance of the reasons. I wont, usually, but it seems
that I could. Being able to act without adequate constitutive reasons enables us to
continue to function in cases where the considerations pro and con two incompatible
courses of action are effectively tied. Some of us often find ourselves in that sort of
situation (e.g., deciding where to go for lunch). It is beneficial to be able to make a
choice for which we are aware of no decisive reason. Its not so clear that it would
be similarly beneficial to be able to represent the world arbitrarily in our beliefs.
It has been suggested that this too is to be explained by the fact that believing is
essentially concerned with truth, so that the concept of belief wont apply unless the
process of acquisition of the psychological state is so regulated. If I am controlling
my deliberations whether p so that the outcome will be true only if I am lucky, and I
am aware of this, then the outcome cant be (regarded by me as) a belief (Shah and
Velleman, p. 498). Thats presumably why, in Ginets case, one has to put the
question whether the door was locked out of ones mind. If one is successful in
avoiding thinking of it one becomes functionally unaware of the choice to believe,
so that it can gradually become effective.
Still the result of these reflections is that we can control our beliefs, and usually
do, so that we believe or refrain from believing according to the relevant reasons. If
I ought to believe that p, because the evidence I have supports that p, then I can
believe that p. But I can also refrain from believing that p, if reason recommends, as
Feldman did in the case of the snow. Our lack of control over our believing, or the
involuntary quality of belief, appears only in that in most cases we cant believe that
p because we think it would be good to so believe, for some reason other than that p
is likely to be true. So it seems that there is not a problem about ought implies
can for belief or suspension of judgment. We can do either if we have the right

8
Processes where the subject invokes the concept of belief, and so cases of self-consciously considering
what to believe, cannot be effectively so influenced, they maintain (Shah and Velleman 2005, p. 501). An
apparent counterexample might be the creationist who deliberately tries to maintain his religious beliefs
by avoiding scientific natural history. Even there the creationist probably doesnt consciously think of
himself as avoiding evidence against his religious beliefs, so much as refusing to risk being corrupted by
what he is frequently told are only lies.

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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations 27

kind of reason. The fact that we cant do it without the right kind of reason marks a
difference between deciding to believe and some cases of deciding to act, but it
doesnt show that we lack control over our believing.9
However, it seems that there is still a problem that only becomes clearer when we
distinguish the right and wrong sorts of reason for belief. That problem is how to
account for the world altering function of ought judgments in the epistemic case.
What is the point of telling someone that she ought to believe that p, or ought to
refrain from believing that p? Apparently the aim is (normally, other things equal)
to persuade her to change her belief state. But the fact that someone is urging us to
believe or refrain from believing would be only an extrinsic reason for so believing.
I might like to believe in the approved way, so as to obtain the approval and avoid
the disapproval, but it is not, just qua approval, any evidence that the belief would
be true.
Usually the point of telling someone that they ought to A is to encourage them to
do A. Mother says to her son, You ought to buy some new shoes, and even if he
doesnt agree with her he may do it because she urged him to do it. That she
approves of that course of action is a reason (typically not very weighty) to do it.
Everyone ought to take notes says the teacher, and students do it who know they
will never look at their notes again. The experienced sales person tells the new hire,
You ought to smile when you greet a customer and she does. But when her
mother says You ought to believe that your new manager means well, where she
knows that her mother has no evidence about the manager, it is not so clear that she
can do it, even if she very much wants her mothers approval.
An important and characteristic function of ought judgments is to indicate that
the speaker (and often the rest of the community) approves (or disapproves) of some
act or attitude (etc.). Such approval is, typically, and other things equal, a reason for
someone to act or attitudinize (etc.) accordingly. To say that an ought judgment
has that function is not to say that it has no other function, nor is it to say that it is
always or even most often used with the intention of accomplishing that function.
Just as a carpenters hammer functions to pound nails into wood, but may often fail
to do so, and may also be used more often to hammer things other than nails or even
to hold down papers or prop open a door, so an ought judgment may function to
encourage or influence others by indicating what the speaker approves, even if it is
also commonly used to do other things, such as to indicate the speakers superiority
or just to make conversation.
It is not claimed that expressions of ought judgments reliably cause the
indicated actions or attitudes. Nor is it always treated as a reason to act or to have
that attitude. Thus when the audience for an assertion involving ought suspects
that it isnt sincerethat is, doesnt indicate what the speaker actually approves or
disapprovesthey will naturally not treat it as a reason to act accordingly. Its the
approval of others that motivates, or serves as a reason, when we are made aware of
it, not the words they say. It is also common to make or anticipate ought
judgments that (we think) would express societys approval, or the approval of some

9
Chrisman claims it does (Chrisman 2008, p. 354) but his reasons for so holding are not clear to me.

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28 S. L. Reynolds

subset of society that is important to us (a group we would like to join or remain part
of, perhaps).
It isnt always the prospect of a speakers approval that motivates or is expected
to motivate. The extent to which even a sincere expression of approval using ought
is motivating or serves as a reason will of course depend in myriad ways on context:
the other things equal qualifier is very important. That someone I have just met
on the street tells me I ought to visit Boston may have no influence at all on me
because Im put off by the social inappropriateness of his saying so, perhaps, or
because I suspect that he is just making nervous conversation and doesnt really
mean it. Even if I am favorably impressed by the stranger and so feel somewhat
inclined to value his approval, that may seem practically no reason at all for me to
take an expensive and time consuming trip. On the other hand if I were already
seriously considering such a trip, for other reasons, the friendly encouragement of
my new acquaintance might be enough to put me over the line, so that I decide to do
it. The strangers saying that I ought to visit Boston wouldnt be the reason why I
did it, but it might be a small part of my motivational story, a reason why I decided
to go. But the puzzle about the approval expressed using the epistemic ought is not
that it typically wouldnt be sufficiently motivating: its that the approval such
judgments ostensibly express doesnt seem to be any sort of appropriate reason to
believe.10 It shouldnt even be a constitutive reason for believing.
One way to try to resolve this puzzle about the ostensible function of epistemic
ought judgments would be to deny that epistemic evaluations have a persuasive
function at all, that they offer a reason to believe, or refrain from believing, as
indicated. Perhaps epistemic ought judgments dont function to persuade someone
to change. Rather they only describe the world as it currently is with respect to
epistemic value. On this suggestion, we only express truths, and do not urge any
changes, when we express epistemic ought judgments.
It is true that my son ought to clean his room because it is dirty and thats a fact.
But You ought to clean your room when I address my son is not intended as a
mere statement of factit aims to affect his behavior, encouraging him to clean his
room. Typically, ought judgments are intended to have some influence on how we
or others act or the states we come to be in. You look exhausted. You ought to take
a day off. The background on that slide ought to be a lighter shade of blue. No
one ought to have to do without basic medical care. (A political ought,
presumably intended to help bring about the indicated political change.)11 You

10
Thanks to an anonymous referee for Erkenntnis for suggesting that I ought to clarify these points.
Another point to notice that naturally arises in talk of motivation and comparison to act-motivation is that
what the reason motivates need not be a direct consequence of recognizing the reasonvisiting Boston
may be something I do partly for the reason that my new acquaintance thinks I ought to, even though the
visit itself takes a good deal of planning and preparation after the encouragement is expressed, and itself
comprises numerous component actions such as walking to the train station, boarding the train, etc.
Similarly the remarks about reasons for believing are in no way intended to suggest that something is a
reason to believe only if one can just believe on recognizing it as a reason. For example, it may take
much consideration to come to weigh a reason appropriately even after we recognize that it is a reason to
believe.
11
In the political use there is no indicated agent who ought to bring it about (Wedgewood 2006, p. 9;
Sidgwick 1907).

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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations 29

ought to prune those rose bushes. Even where the ought concerns a past action,
such as You ought not to have said that it is plausible that the purpose is to
change how the person addressed acts in relevantly similar situations in the future.
The doctors comment, That ought to have cleared up by now, indicates that he is
dissatisfied in some way. It might lead to a new diagnosis or a new treatment that
would be more effective. It wouldnt be offered as a mere factual observation,
although it is factual. Doesnt You ought not to believe that sound as if it is
intended to encourage some change?
So if the ought epistemic judgments function to encourage a change in
something, how could they do it if not by providing a constitutive reason to change
the indicated belief? There are several possible changes to consider, all of which I
think we sometimes use epistemic ought judgments to encourage. I shall argue
however that the first four suggestions I am about to discuss are unlikely to be
adequate descriptions of the typical world-changing aims of epistemic ought
judgments, as being too tangentially related to the apparent meaning of the
epistemic ought judgments. I then propose and defend one that I think is adequate.
(A) The statement that one ought to believe that p in some cases seems to
function in effect as testimony that p. Thus suppose that someone who knows Sam
better than I do remarks that I ought not to believe that an apparent compliment
recently given me by Sam was intended sarcastically. If I realize that he is likely to
be a better judge of Sams intentions than I am, then it seems that through hearing
that remark I have acquired new and relevant evidence about whether Sam spoke
sarcastically, which may legitimately, constitutively, affect what I believe on this
topic. But effectively the same reason to believe might have been given to me by his
testifying Sam wasnt speaking sarcastically. In either case I will believe that
Sam wasnt speaking sarcastically because I trust my informant as a testifier about
Sam, rather than because I want his approval of my belief. The ought seems to be
incidental to the function of the assertion in this case. Many ought to believe
judgments dont seem to convey testimony eitherthe person speaking may say
that I ought not to believe because she knows that my evidence whether p is scant,
without having any better evidence to offer or intending to imply that she does. In
that case, she may be quite right that I ought not to believe that p, even though she is
in no position to testify whether p.
(B) Being told that I ought, or ought not, to believe something may provoke a
reconsideration of the evidence that I have, which then leads to changing my mind.
This is especially likely where I think the person making the evaluation has more or
less the same evidence I have and may have considered it more carefully or more
skillfully. But there it seems more accurate to say that I believe it for the reasons
that I have reconsidered, not to obtain his approval, even though seeking that
approval is part of the reason why I reconsidered. Reconsidering is a cognitive act,
and is not itself believing or refraining from belief, so seeking others approval may
be an intelligible, right sort of reason for doing it. But saying that one ought not to
believe that p is not, on the face of it, to recommend a reconsideration of the
evidencethat would be more naturally recommended with something like You
ought to reconsider whether p.

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30 S. L. Reynolds

(C) Another way an epistemic evaluation might be thought to enable a change of

belief is by provoking an inquiry that might obtain new evidence, not merely a
reconsideration of evidence already possessed. In many cases, an utterance of You
ought not to believe that is intended to provoke the question, Why not? It is
uttered as a prelude to offering a constitutive reason not to believe.12 I agree that, on
many occasions, provoking or recommending such an inquiry may well be the
speakers main reason for expressing an epistemic evaluation. But it seems
inadequate as an account of the purpose of such evaluations in general. What it lacks
is any sense that something is being required, as opposed to suggested. You ought
not to believe that Sam was being sarcastic doesnt have the same flavor as You
might want to reconsider whether Sam was being sarcastic. It also doesnt require
an open inquiry, as would, You ought to find out whether Sam was really being
sarcastic. Instead, it claims that you should have already reached one outcome of
such an inquiry.
The genteel air of the canonical expression you ought not to believe, and
perhaps also the customs of philosophers, may lead the reader to doubt that
epistemic evaluations are often expressed where the speaker has no constitutive
reasons to offer for belief or refraining from belief. But we shouldnt overlook the
less polite utterances that clearly convey an epistemic evaluation without an
accompanying reason: Yeah, right (sarcastic), Oh come on, I used to think
that, or even, Thats just stupid. On the positive side, consider: Seems right to
me or I couldnt agree more. In most circumstances, where such things are said,
so saying makes it very clear whether the speaker thinks the person addressed ought
to believe. If we are to understand the phenomena of epistemic evaluations, we must
consider the full range of examples, not merely those that philosophers approve.
Such rough (and sometimes rude) expressions of epistemic approval and
disapproval are I think often made without offering or being prepared to offer
any constitutive reasons for or against the belief.
The reader will notice that I have argued against proposals A)-C) on the ground
that epistemic ought judgments are not the most natural way to accomplish or
encourage the relevant project, whether testifying that p, as in A), or encouraging
reconsideration of the evidence or a search for new evidence as in B) and C).
The next proposal is closer to the view that I hold, in suggesting that the aim of the
epistemic ought judgment is at least partly to influence someone other than the
subject of that judgment.
(D) Chrisman suggests that epistemic ought evaluations might imply rules of
action for others: For example, if you have a doxastic attitude that you ought not to
have, I think it is plausible to suppose that members of your epistemic community
ought (ceteris paribus) to do what is in their power to disabuse you of this doxastic
attitude by, for example, providing you with counter-evidence, counter-arguments,
and, at the extreme, institutional care. (Chrisman 2008, p. 369) Chrismans
suggestion exploits the fact that it is often left indeterminate who is to make a
change recommended with an ought judgment, as in, You ought to have received

12
Thanks to my colleague Bernard Kobes for bringing this option for an account of the function of you
ought to believe to my attention.

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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations 31

this form. The person addressed may not be at fault in failing to receive the form.
Similarly You ought not to believe that may indicate that someone should do
something about it, or should have done something about it, although not
necessarily the person addressed.13 The approval of the speaker may be an
intelligible, constitutive, reason for someone else to undertake the project of
correcting the indicated belief, at least if that other person has some relevant
responsibility. Qua philosophy professor I feel some obligation to correct my
students mistakes or misunderstandings of philosophical matters when I become
aware of them. As a parent, I feel an obligation to correct errors my children make,
especially if I think those errors might have important practical consequences or are
likely to embarrass them in the future. When it is brought to my attention that they
believe as they ought not, I am motivated to correct them.
It seems unlikely however that saying S ought to believe (or refrain from
believing) that p implies that others ought to correct S. If the ought judgments
were intended mainly to influence members of the community other than the
believer, as Chrismans proposal I think suggests, then it seems it would not be
employed so often in the second person. By saying You ought not to believe that
we would be directing our recommendation to someone poorly placed to act on it, as
if we addressed a complaint about how a small child is being cared for to the child
herself.14 You ought not to believe that seems at least as natural as He ought not
to believe that, and this shouldnt be so if the people mainly to be persuaded are
not the subjects of the criticized belief states.
(E) I suggest that ought to believe judgments, especially when addressed to the
subject of the judgment, typically function to encourage a change in behavior
related to those beliefs, particularly the subjects assertions expressing the belief and
whether she acts on it.
Consider a high school basketball coach talking to a young woman who has been
trying out for the team. She says, gently, You really ought to be a few inches
taller. It seems clear that she is not recommending that the young woman grow a
few inches. By expressing this ought judgment, however, she is trying to affect
what the young woman does, influencing her to give up her efforts to join the
basketball team.
Another example: A teacher ought to explain her subject clearly, but some
persons who hold the position of teacher just cant do it.15 Some teachers may be
encouraged to study the material more thoroughly or to plan and practice until they
can explain it clearly. But for those who really cant explain clearly, the ought
judgment may still be appropriately influential, as discouraging them from
preparing for or applying for a teaching position. It may also discourage
administrators from hiring or retaining would-be teachers who cant explain
clearly. Now of course it does not say You ought not to apply for a position as a

13
Thanks to Chrisman (personal communication) for correcting an earlier misunderstanding of his
proposal.
14
Someone ought to wipe your nose!authors aunt, not addressing the author.
15
The example is Feldmans (2004, p. 175). He compares such obligations to epistemic obligations,
holding that both involve role oughts, which indicate the right way to play a certain role.

123
32 S. L. Reynolds

teacher of X if you cant explain X clearly, or You ought not to hire teachers who
cant explain their subject clearly. Still, we easily recognize that that is what is
implied when it is said that a teacher ought to be able to explain her subject clearly.
So what sort of conduct might ought to believe evaluations encourage, for
which they could provide the right sort of reason? Epistemic evaluations are
apparently closely linked to requirements for assertion. A number of philosophers,
including Unger (1975), Williamson (1996, 2000), De Rose (2002), and Hawthorne
(2004, pp. 21 ff.) have argued that assertions made without knowledge are
appropriately subject to criticism. Others doubt that knowledge is required for
assertions, but claim that justification for the corresponding belief is required for
assertion (Douven 2006; Lackey 2007).16 Apparently if one ought not to believe that
p, one does not know that p and also one is not justified in believing that p. So, on
either of these views about the norm of assertion, one who ought not to believe that
p also ought not to assert that p.
If knowledge or justified belief is required for appropriate assertions, then in
making assertions we must be constantly responsive to our own judgments as to
whether we know, are justified, or ought to believe. That doesnt mean we have to
be consciously thinking of the norm of assertion, any more than we have to be
thinking of grammatical norms in producing well-formed sentences. But we will
usually be aware at some level of the connection between what we ought to believe
and what we are permitted to assert. So when we say that someone ought not to
believe that p, we are conversationally implying that they ought not to assert that p.
Furthermore, it is through hearing others assert that p that we are most likely to
discover that they hold a belief that they ought not to hold. So the epistemic
judgment, whether voiced or not, is often a disapproving response to what we take
to be an inappropriate assertion.
Assertion is an act, so we can do or refrain from doing it in response to others
approval or disapproval. Although the approval of others is only an extrinsic reason
for belief, and so is likely to be ineffective in producing or preventing belief, it
could be effective in controlling our assertions expressing those beliefs.
It seems to me that this sort of indirect normative communication is actually
fairly common, as the above examples suggest. It occurs wherever there are
generally understood requirements R for doing A and it is understood that people
will sometimes want to do A whether or not they satisfy R, or even can satisfy R.
More examples: You ought to have better grades and a much higher score on the
entrance exam (in order to be admitted at college Y). You ought to have better
family connections (in order to be accepted by country club Z). She ought to have
better cheekbones and be three inches taller (in order to be a fashion model). The
purpose of such ought judgments is evidently not to encourage attempts to do
things that cant be done, but rather to discourage people from attempting to do
things for which they do not (and often cannot) satisfy the requirements.

16
Lackey argues that one need not actually believe it, but that it must be reasonable to believe it for it
to be the content of an acceptable assertion. Presumably if one epistemically ought not to believe it, then
it is not reasonable to believe it, and so one should not assert it on Lackeys view.

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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations 33

So I suggest that our epistemic judgments have a similar indirect normative

function. Instead of discouraging inappropriate beliefs, our epistemic judgments
regarding those beliefs discourage the corresponding assertions, as being thought
not to satisfy the epistemic standard for assertion. We discourage the expression of
beliefs when we judge that people ought not to hold those beliefs.
It is also said that there is a knowledge requirement for actions other than making
assertions. One ought not to treat p as a reason for action, unless one knows that p
(Hawthorne 2004, pp. 2930; Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, p. 577). If that is so,
then telling someone that they ought not to believe that p will be one way of
discouraging them from acting as if p. Presumably refraining from so acting is
possible for someone who has been warned that they ought not to believe that p,
even if they cannot refrain from believing that p through becoming aware of the
disapproval. Extrinsic reasons for belief, such as the approval or disapproval of
others, even where they cannot alter the belief itself, may function as constitutive
reasons for acting or refraining from acting as if one so believed.
So my suggestion is that epistemic ought judgments, insofar as they have
changing the world as one of their functions, do so mainly through changing what is
asserted, and perhaps also by changing how people act in other ways, not by
encouraging changes in the beliefs nominally being evaluated.
Whether this suggestion is plausible will presumably depend on whether it seems
likely that such evaluations tend to be expressed in contexts where it is one aim of
the speaker is to discourage others from saying that p or acting as if p. I think it is,
because we will not normally be aware that others do so believe unless that is
indicated by their assertions or their other actions. There are of course exceptions.
One might anticipate someones (inappropriate) belief by knowing fairly well how
they tend to process the evidence available to them, and so be motivated to suggest
that a certain belief would be one they ought not to hold, even in advance of
observing by their words or other actions that they hold it. One might hope to
prevent a harmful belief (instead of inappropriate assertions or other acts) that way.
But whether one could so prevent it would of course depend upon whether one has
some constitutive reasons for refraining from belief to offer, since epistemic
disapproval could be only an extrinsic reason not to believe.
I objected above to Chrismans account of the world-changing function of these
judgments that it did not explain why we would often express such judgments in the
second person, as in You ought not to believe that p. How could that encourage
other parties to correct that belief, by implying that they ought to provide evidence
and arguments, as he suggests? It seems in such cases rather to demand something
of the person addressed. It might be thought that my account similarly fails to
explain third person and quantified expressions of epistemic judgments, such as He
ought not to believe that and Everyone ought to refrain from believing on that
sort of evidence. How could that affect their assertions or other actions, especially
if, as seems likely, they do not even overhear the comments about their beliefs?
Part of the answer to this objection is that we are concerned with standards that
everyone is expected to comply with, standards which are taught and reinforced by
judgments about people who are not in a position to be directly influenced by the
expression of those judgments. Those who hear third person expressions of such

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34 S. L. Reynolds

judgments may thereby be instructed as to what the standards are, or reinforced in

their understanding of and commitment to those standards.
A related and more important point to make in answer to this objection however
is that we are not mainly motivated by fear or hope that others disapproval or
approval will be expressed to us, so much as by fear or hope that it will be expressed
when we are not present, or merely felt by people who do not express it at all. What
will people say or think about me, if they hear me asserting something they think I
ought not to believe? It is the approval or disapproval that we mainly seek, or seek
to avoid, not its public expression to us. That explains why third person and
quantified generalizations about what we ought to believe may effectively change
the world even if they dont directly influence someone with respect to a particular
belief. But it would not explain why second person criticisms of belief seem to be
appropriate, on Chrismans view that ought to believe judgments imply that others
ought to correct the criticized beliefs.
Another likely objection to this view of the function of epistemic ought
judgments is that it merely changes the subject, without solving the problem.
Epistemic ought judgments evidently exist to change our beliefs, their manifest
target, the hard nosed philosopher will insist, so we must have a philosophical
account of how they could do that, not merely a suggestion that they function to
change something else. But would the objector also insist that the coach, who gently
suggests to the hopeful candidate for the basketball team that she ought to be a few
inches taller, must be trying to change the height of the candidate? Is the candidate
misunderstanding the plain meaning of the coachs ought judgment, if she regards
it as intended to discourage her from trying out for the team? If she is a
conscientious philosopher, must she say something like, Its puzzling how that
could be so, Coach, since ought implies can, and its obvious that I cant be any
taller?
To sum up then, I agree with the view that the paradox that epistemic ought
judgments logically entail that we control our beliefs, and so cannot be true because
we dont control our beliefs, is to be resolved by arguing that we do in fact control
our beliefs in response to appropriate or constitutive reasons. I have argued that
there is another puzzle about how epistemic ought judgments could function to
change something (as well as express truths about how things are normatively). For,
as expressions of approval or disapproval, they offer only extrinsic reasons to
believe or refrain from believing, and so should be ineffective in changing the
beliefs they evaluate. Although they might provoke inquiry leading to obtaining
reasons that do change the beliefs, that does not explain how they can seem sensible
in apparently requiring a change. I suggest that epistemic ought judgments function
instead mainly to influence the subjects assertions, and perhaps other actions,
through the associated belief-related norms for assertion and action. The approval or
disapproval they express may be a constitutive reason for asserting or otherwise
acting as if one believed as recommended, even though it is only an extrinsic, and
therefore ineffective, reason to so believe.

Acknowledgments Thanks to Bernard Kobes, Angel Pinillos, and Michael White for comments on
earlier drafts and to the students in a seminar on doxastic voluntarism that I taught at Arizona State

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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations 35

University for helpful discussion of these issues. This paper has also benefited from unusually thorough,
perceptive, and informative comments from anonymous referees for Erkenntnis.

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